Friedman Urges End to Doctor Licensure to Stop Socialized Medicine

Milton Friedman Speaks: The Economics of Medical Care (B1234) - Full Video — Free To Choose Network

Free To Choose Network

Abolishing state physician licensing and public subsidies is the only way to halt the shift toward socialized medicine because organized medicine's entry restrictions artificially suppress supply and inflate costs.

AI-assisted summary of Milton Friedman Speaks: The Economics of Medical Care (B1234) - Full Video — original source. Check the original for full context.

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Key ideas

  • Government subsidization of healthcare inevitably triggers a regulatory chain reaction, progressing from price controls to clinical oversight, and ultimately terminating in fully socialized medicine. (0:36)
  • Analysis of the British NHS reveals 'bureaucratic displacement' in action: between 1965 and 1973, administrative staff grew by 41% while daily occupied hospital beds fell by 11%. (11:54)
  • Milton Friedman calls for the complete abolition of medical licensure, identifying it as the state-enforced mechanism that secures the AMA's monopoly over the supply of doctors. (26:07)
  • To protect the uninsured, Friedman rejects targeted medical welfare in favor of a negative income tax, arguing that direct cash grants preserve consumer autonomy to buy private insurance. (43:56)

Detailed notes

## Background Published on YouTube by the Free To Choose Network in 2016, this video presents a 1978 lecture by economist Milton Friedman at the Mayo Foundation. The page description outlines how expanding government involvement in healthcare drives up costs and leads toward fully socialized medicine, arguing that the state should instead limit its role to enforcing fraud laws and offering extreme disaster relief.

## TL;DR In this address, Milton Friedman argues that expanding government intervention in healthcare inevitably leads to the inefficiencies, administrative bloat, and resource starvation seen in socialized systems like the British NHS. He contends that the rising costs of American healthcare are driven by consumer demand for advanced care, but are severely distorted by the monopolistic practices of the American Medical Association, which uses state licensure to restrict the supply of doctors. To restore efficiency and freedom, Friedman proposes radical free-market reforms, including the abolition of medical licensure and the replacement of bureaucratic welfare programs with a negative income tax that empowers the poor to purchase private health insurance.

## Atmosphere & style The lecture carries an intellectually stimulating and politely provocative atmosphere, as Friedman directly challenges the professional assumptions of his audience of medical specialists. Delivering his arguments with dry humor, sharp economic logic, and historical anecdotes, he maintains an engaging and conversational tone that transforms complex policy analysis into an accessible debate. The session feels like a rigorous but friendly academic exchange, marked by respectful pushback during the Q&A and concluding with warm, appreciative agreement from the crowd.

## Bulletin - [00:36](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rWlk9HreE7U&t=36s) Government subsidization of healthcare inevitably triggers a regulatory chain reaction, progressing from price controls to clinical oversight, and ultimately terminating in fully socialized medicine. - [11:54](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rWlk9HreE7U&t=714s) Analysis of the British NHS reveals 'bureaucratic displacement' in action: between 1965 and 1973, administrative staff grew by 41% while daily occupied hospital beds fell by 11%. - [26:07](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rWlk9HreE7U&t=1567s) Milton Friedman calls for the complete abolition of medical licensure, identifying it as the state-enforced mechanism that secures the AMA's monopoly over the supply of doctors. - [43:56](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rWlk9HreE7U&t=2636s) To protect the uninsured, Friedman rejects targeted medical welfare in favor of a negative income tax, arguing that direct cash grants preserve consumer autonomy to buy private insurance.

## Key takeaways - [00:36](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rWlk9HreE7U&t=36s) Government spending on programs like Medicare and Medicaid inevitably forces the state to dictate provider fees and regulate clinical decisions to control public expenditures. - [02:45](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rWlk9HreE7U&t=165s) Producers and professional associations, including the AMA, frequently lobby for the very state regulations and licensing restrictions that ultimately lead to government takeover. - [05:39](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rWlk9HreE7U&t=339s) The AMA historically weaponized licensing and accreditation standards to suppress competitive, cost-effective group practices and prepaid healthcare models like the Mayo Clinic. - [08:58](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rWlk9HreE7U&t=538s) While public funding initially acts as a windfall for healthcare providers, nationalized industries are eventually starved of resources as politicians redirect capital to capture new sectors. - [11:54](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rWlk9HreE7U&t=714s) Dr. Max Gammon's study of the British NHS demonstrates that state-run medical monopolies suffer from declining output, severe waiting lists, and high rates of physician emigration. - [17:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rWlk9HreE7U&t=1020s) In Sweden, socialized medicine has expanded administrative bureaucracy and eroded the traditional doctor-patient relationship by asserting state ownership over clinical practice. - [19:36](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rWlk9HreE7U&t=1176s) Rising American hospital costs are primarily driven by consumer demand for higher-quality, technologically advanced care, rather than sudden shifts in provider greed or inefficiency. - [22:46](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rWlk9HreE7U&t=1366s) The legitimate role of government in medicine should be strictly limited to public health measures, enforcing laws against fraud, and providing catastrophic emergency relief. - [26:07](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rWlk9HreE7U&t=1567s) Healthcare is highly affordable for the average American family, with national medical spending dwarfed by voluntary consumer expenditures on housing, cars, alcohol, and tobacco. - [26:07](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rWlk9HreE7U&t=1567s) Abolishing medical licensure is necessary to eliminate the AMA's cartel control, lower healthcare costs, and allow the market to determine the optimal division of medical labor. - [33:22](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rWlk9HreE7U&t=2002s) The FDA acts as an unmitigated disaster by imposing suffocating regulatory hurdles that delay life-saving drugs, cost thousands of lives annually, and drive clinical research overseas. - [34:17](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rWlk9HreE7U&t=2057s) National health insurance is a political misnomer; it is not national, does not promote health, is not insurance, and is driven by special interests rather than genuine public demand. - [38:01](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rWlk9HreE7U&t=2281s) State licensing does not guarantee ongoing clinical competence; private institutional reputation and voluntary certification serve as far superior mechanisms for quality control. - [41:15](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rWlk9HreE7U&t=2475s) The AMA controls the supply of doctors by using state licensing laws to mandate graduation from medical schools accredited exclusively by its own Council on Medical Education. - [43:56](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rWlk9HreE7U&t=2636s) Poverty is a shortage of cash, not a shortage of medical care; a negative income tax is a superior, non-paternalistic alternative to fragmented, earmarked medical welfare programs.

## Detailed walkthrough ### [00:36](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rWlk9HreE7U&t=36s) The Inevitable Progression toward Socialized Medicine

Introduced by his friend Bill Keating at the Mayo Foundation, Milton Friedman opens his address on the economics of medical care by outlining a pervasive and compounding trend: the continuous expansion of state control over the healthcare system. He observes that public expenditure—fueled by programs such as Medicare and Medicaid, alongside burgeoning budgets within the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW)—has mushroomed from a negligible sliver of national healthcare spending into a commanding share. Friedman argues that financial subsidization does not occur in a vacuum; once the state disburses public revenue, fiscal responsibility inevitably compels it to dictate the fees charged by providers. From price controls, the state must logically proceed to regulating medical procedures and policing the clinical decisions of physicians and medical personnel. Unchecked, this cumulative process terminates in a single destination: full state control of the health sector.

Friedman warns the audience that this trajectory directly undermines the welfare of consumers and medical practitioners alike. Rather than protecting the public or fostering medical excellence, the compounding intervention produces distortions that harm patients, physicians, and auxiliary health personnel. He resolves to dissect the structural causes of this interventionist momentum, identify why it runs counter to the interests of the medical community, and evaluate what corrective measures might still be taken to reverse course.

```mermaid flowchart LR accTitle: Escalation of Government Control in Medical Care accDescr: Flowchart illustrating the chain reaction from initial government spending to full socialized medicine. subgraph Funding ["Fiscal Expansion"] A["Public Spending<br/>(Medicare, Medicaid, HEW)"] end subgraph Regulation ["Regulatory Intrusion"] B["Fee & Price Controls"] C["Clinical & Personnel Oversight"] end subgraph Outcome ["Final State"] D["Completely Socialized Medicine"] end A --> B B --> C C --> D ```

As Milton Friedman warned regarding the expanding role of the state: “And if this trend continues, it inevitably leads to completely socialized medicine.” He further emphasized: “I believe that this trend, including many of the steps that have already been taken, is very much against the interests of patients, of physicians, and of other health care personnel.”

[02:45](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rWlk9HreE7U&t=165s) The General Trend of Regulation and Producer Complicity

Friedman situates the encroachment of government into medicine within a much wider socio-political current: the systematic displacement of voluntary, free-market mechanisms by state coercion and administrative rulemaking across the American economy. Health care is not an anomaly in this regard, nor is it unique in the paradoxical behavior of its practitioners. Across numerous industries, the very business leaders and producers who vocally profess their fidelity to free enterprise frequently lobby for the state interventions, protective regulations, and regulatory agencies that ultimately ensnare them. He points to history to illustrate this recurring irony: in the nineteenth century, railroad executives actively helped bring about the creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), and more recently, the domestic steel industry clamored loudly for tariffs and import quotas despite paying lip service to the free market.

This dynamic has operated with particular force within the medical establishment. Friedman contends that the primary momentum pushing the United States toward socialized medicine does not stem solely from outside agitators, but from decades of monopolistic policies pursued by the American Medical Association (AMA). While acknowledging that AMA leaders acted under the banner of raising medical standards and improving patient care, Friedman argues that the practical consequence of their efforts was the systematic curtailment of entry into the medical profession. By artificially limiting the number of doctors, the AMA suppressed the total supply and distribution of care, stifled organizational efficiency, and paradoxically created the very shortages and cost pressures that collectivist policymakers now exploit.

As Milton Friedman observed regarding producer behavior across industries: “In industry after industry, producers who protest most strongly their belief in free markets have fostered and helped produce government takeover, government regulation, government control.” Reflecting on the real origins of modern medical achievements, he added: “There has been great progress in the provision of medical care in the United States; it has been a great achievement, but it's been an achievement despite many of the best efforts of the American Medical Association, not because of it.”

[05:39](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rWlk9HreE7U&t=339s) Organized Medicine’s Suppression of Group Practice and the Mayo Model

Speaking directly to his audience in Rochester, Minnesota, Friedman presents the Mayo Clinic as a living testament to what American medicine could have looked like across the entire nation had organized medicine not blocked institutional innovation. The Mayo Clinic was established late in the nineteenth or early in the twentieth century, critically before the publication of the 1910 Flexner Report authored by Abraham Flexner. That landmark report consolidated the AMA's regulatory stranglehold over medical school accreditation, training standards, and licensing requirements. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, organized medicine weaponized this expanded authority to obstruct and penalize integrated group practices, multidisciplinary hospital-physician collaborations, and prepaid healthcare delivery models that departed from traditional fee-for-service, sole-proprietor norms.

Friedman argues that had the Mayo brothers attempted to launch their collaborative, clinic-based model in the 1920s or 1930s rather than before 1910, organized medicine would have crushed the attempt in its infancy. Very few independent institutions survived the hostile regulatory climate. Among the rare exceptions was the Ross-Loos Medical Group, alongside the Group Health Association in Washington, D.C., which only preserved its right to operate by dragging the AMA into federal court in a landmark antitrust suit that the association lost. Friedman explains that organized medicine fought prepaid and clinic-based care because group arrangements undermined the traditional sliding-scale fee structure, an artifact of individual practice that has since vanished with modern medical insurance. Had competitive institutional experimentation been permitted to flourish unhindered, Friedman maintains that team-based physician-hospital clinics like Mayo would have become the standard nationwide, yielding substantially higher clinical quality at far lower cost to the public.

Evaluating the historical impact of medical professional monopolies, Milton Friedman concluded: “I venture to predict that if the brothers Mayo had tried to organize the clinic and its practice as they did in the 1920s or 30s, I doubt very much that anything comparable to the Mayo Clinic could ever have developed or been achieved.” Looking at alternative organizational paths, he asserted: “And I believe that that would have provided more adequate, more inexpensive, and higher quality medical care to the American people.”

- Key milestones and historical legal battles highlighted include: - The 1910 Flexner Report, which institutionalized AMA control over medical school accreditation and the licensing of practitioners. - The pioneering multidisciplinary group model established by the Mayo brothers prior to the 1910 regulatory shift. - The rare prepaid clinic models that survived organized resistance, notably the Ross-Loos Medical Group and the Group Health Association of Washington, D.C. - The landmark antitrust victory against the AMA, which prohibited the medical association from systematically boycotting physicians engaged in prepaid group practices.

[08:58](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rWlk9HreE7U&t=538s) The Illusion of Government Funding and Eventual Starvation

Friedman turns to the psychological and economic trap that ensnares providers: the allure of state subsidization. To healthcare purveyors, government involvement initially masquerades as a bottomless reservoir of new funding, providing a windfall that tempts practitioners into accepting state partnerships. This dynamic accounts for what Friedman characterizes as the AMA's deep schizophrenia. On one hand, organized medicine vocally decries socialized medicine; on the other, it convenes unbalanced bodies such as its recent commission on medical care costs, actively facilitating the mechanisms of state involvement.

However, Friedman warns that the flood of public money is merely a transitory political phase. While politicians initially shower targeted sectors with funds to secure political support, once an industry is fully subordinated to state control, the political calculus shifts entirely. With no additional votes left to capture from an industry that is already nationalized, politicians inevitably redirect public capital toward conquering fresh sectors of the economy. The previously captured sector is subsequently starved of budgetary allocations, leaving providers with fewer resources and tighter operational constraints than they had under a market regime. As empirical proof, Friedman points to Great Britain, which instituted the National Health Service roughly thirty years prior, immediately following World War II. Comprehensive economic studies analyzing the relationship between British national income and medical spending demonstrated that post-war socialized medicine resulted in substantially lower aggregate expenditures on health than would have occurred had Great Britain retained a private, voluntary market structure.

Critiquing the policy judgment of commercial and professional leadership, Milton Friedman stated: “I have been impressed again and again with how often businessmen, leaders in various areas—who are very farsighted when it comes to their own activities and concerns within their enterprises, are very shortsighted when it comes to the area of public policy and allow themselves to be led by small advantages to foster and favor policies which ultimately redound very much to their disadvantage.” Describing the political lifecycle of nationalized industries, he explained: “And the result of that is that those areas already taken over get starved.”

[11:54](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rWlk9HreE7U&t=714s) Dr. Max Gammon and the British National Health Service

Milton Friedman examines international spending comparisons, noting that when evaluating the fraction of income citizens spend on medical care in other countries, the data demonstrates that Britain would devote a substantially larger total sum of resources to healthcare today if it had never instituted a state-run medical monopoly. Instead, state control produces fewer resources, declining quantity, and deteriorating quality. To substantiate this, Friedman highlights a December 1976 study by British physician Dr. Max Gammon, who spent five years investigating the National Health Service (NHS). Gammon documented that the voluntary system developed over the preceding two centuries was eradicated in favor of centralized state financing, leading to stagnation. During the first thirteen years of the NHS, not a single new hospital was built in Britain, and by 1976, the country actually had fewer hospital beds than when the service was inaugurated in July 1948—with two-thirds of the remaining beds situated in facilities constructed before 1900 under private medicine.

Gammon formulated what he termed the “theory of bureaucratic displacement,” an extension of Parkinson’s Law positing that when a bureaucracy assumes control of an enterprise, inputs climb while output drops, and useless administrative tasks displace productive labor. Between 1965 and 1973, NHS hospital staff expanded by 28 percent, with administrative and clerical personnel surging by 41 percent. Yet the primary measure of output—the average number of beds occupied daily—declined by 11 percent. This reduction was not caused by a shortage of patients, as roughly 600,000 people were continuously stranded on NHS waiting lists. Friedman points to notorious British scandals regarding delays for elective or postponable procedures; patients regularly faced three-year waits for heart bypass surgery, with some dying before reaching the operating table.

Faced with these conditions, British medical professionals have steadily fled abroad. Annual physician emigration equals approximately one-third of the country's graduating medical school classes. Meanwhile, political pressures within Britain push to extinguish the remaining vestiges of private practice, even as ordinary citizens increasingly turn to voluntary private health insurance and nursing home schemes to compensate for the state’s deficiencies. Assessing these dynamics, Friedman remarks: “In addition to the fact that the ultimate result of a government takeover is less resources, you invariably get lower quality and a lower quantity of medical care.”

```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Gammon's Theory of Bureaucratic Displacement accDescr: Flowchart showing how state bureaucracy in the NHS increased inputs while decreasing healthcare output between 1965 and 1973.

subgraph Inputs["Inputs (1965–1973)"] A["Hospital Staff: +28%"] B["Clerical & Admin Staff: +41%"] end

subgraph Bureaucracy["Bureaucratic Process"] C["Bureaucratic Displacement<br/>(Useless work displaces useful work)"] end

subgraph Outputs["Outputs & Consequences"] D["Daily Occupied Beds: -11%"] E["600,000 Patients on Waiting Lists"] F["Physician Emigration:<br/>1/3 of annual graduates"] end

Inputs --> C C --> Outputs ```

- In the first thirteen years of the NHS, zero new hospitals were constructed in Great Britain. - By 1976, Britain possessed fewer hospital beds than it had in July 1948. - Two-thirds of all NHS hospital beds in 1976 were located in facilities built prior to 1900 by private enterprise. - From 1965 to 1973, total hospital staff grew by 28%, and administrative and clerical staff increased by 41%. - Over that same 1965–1973 window, the daily average of occupied hospital beds fell by 11%. - The British waiting list for hospital admissions stood at approximately 600,000 people, with delays for bypass surgery reaching three years. - Emigration of British-trained doctors annually equaled roughly one-third of the nation’s graduating medical classes.

---

[17:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rWlk9HreE7U&t=1020s) Dr. Gunnar Biörck on Swedish Socialized Medicine

Friedman turns to Sweden, drawing upon the testimony of Dr. Gunnar Biörck, professor of medicine at the Karolinska Institute, head of medicine at a major Stockholm hospital, and personal physician to the King of Sweden. Acknowledging his Rochester, Minnesota audience, Friedman quips that being in Minnesota ought to qualify him to pronounce a Swedish surname properly, though physical proximity alone clearly does not suffice. He quotes extensively from a paper Biörck delivered at the University of Chicago in 1976, titled *How to Be a Clinician in a Socialist Country*, which exposed the political and bureaucratic encroachment overtaking Scandinavian medicine.

Biörck explained that a parallel private sector poses an existential threat to state-administered medicine, because as long as patients retain the right to pay for a doctor of their choice, their confidence in individual practitioners exposes the shortcomings of the subsidized state apparatus. Swedish politicians consequently sought to suppress the private alternative entirely. Biörck described a staggering proliferation of administrators at every level of incompetence, noting that the Swedish Board of Health and Welfare had published a 60-page manual simply attempting to outline a formula for calculating physician staffing in clinical departments.

Most fundamentally, Biörck lamented the destruction of the traditional clinical ethos. For millennia, the patient was the direct client and employer of the healer; under state medicine, the government claims ownership of the employment relationship and dictates the terms of practice. Biörck warned that these state mandates would soon reach far beyond wages and shift hours to dictate certified drugs and invade the core doctor-patient relationship. Framing the stakes of this transformation, Biörck wrote: “The book is a fascinating monument over the total absurdity into which legislators, administrators and trade-union representatives have finally brought a previously simple and efficient machinery.”

- Dr. Gunnar Biörck held major leadership positions as professor at the Karolinska Institute, clinical department chief in Stockholm, and royal physician to the King of Sweden. - The Swedish Board of Health and Welfare issued a 60-page manual solely dedicated to computing the number of doctors needed to staff a single hospital clinical department. - Biörck argued that socialized healthcare inevitably moves from regulating hours, wages, and drugs to controlling the clinical choices within the patient-physician relationship.

---

[19:36](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rWlk9HreE7U&t=1176s) The American Scene and the Real Causes of Rising Hospital Costs

Bringing the focus home to the United States, Friedman addresses the domestic regulatory environment, pointing to the expansion of Medicare and Medicaid, the rise of PSROs (Professional Standards Review Organizations), HMOs, and proposals to impose legislative caps on hospital costs. He mentions that the morning’s newspaper reported President Jimmy Carter’s plan to submit a national health insurance bill to Congress. Friedman observes that political proposals for universal coverage endlessly herald incoming benefits while remaining silent on the bill. No magic pot of money exists; the American public must foot the entire bill, either paying directly or having their money siphoned through a bureaucratic apparatus that extracts a hefty administrative toll.

Friedman acknowledges that a portion of the rising cost of hospital care is artificial and wasteful—spurred directly by government funding through Medicare and Medicaid, which drove price inflation and fraud. However, he vigorously disputes the popular narrative that escalating costs are primarily due to administrative greed, medical price gouging, or newly discovered hospital inefficiencies. Hospitals, he notes with dry humor, have always been inefficient, and doctors have always been self-interested, just like the rest of the human race; they did not suddenly undergo a moral decline that caused costs to spike.

The dominant driver of higher hospital expenses, Friedman contends, is that the American public has actively chosen to purchase more and better medical care. Facilitated by the widespread adoption of voluntary private hospital and health insurance—a major American market innovation—patients demanded advanced medical procedures, sophisticated diagnostic equipment, and higher-quality interventions. He compares the post-war escalation of hospital expenditures to the massive increase in automobile spending during the 1920s and 1930s, when outlays jumped not because cars became arbitrarily overpriced, but because consumers wanted better vehicles and the market responded to their demands. As Friedman summarizes the true source of paying for healthcare: “There is only one source from which the costs can be paid, and that is the American people.”

- Public debate over national health insurance focuses on promised entitlements while concealing that the entire cost is ultimately extracted from the taxpayers. - Escalating per-day hospital charges stem largely from an increase in the number, variety, and technological complexity of medical procedures, diagnostic tests, and clinical services. - The expansion of private voluntary health insurance in the United States served as the market mechanism allowing consumers to express demand for higher-tier medical care. - Friedman rejects the premise that hospital cost increases are primarily caused by sudden shifts in doctor greed or institutional inefficiency, drawing a direct economic parallel to the growth of consumer spending on automobiles in the 1920s and 1930s.

[22:46](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rWlk9HreE7U&t=1366s) The Appropriate Limits of Government in Medical Care

Milton Friedman argues that the rising cost of healthcare is largely driven by public demand for expanded services and diverse treatment options. Even if consumers make choices that seem unwise or wasteful, Friedman insists that personal liberty must take precedence: “Now maybe customers have been silly. Maybe they've been foolish and wasting their money in various directions. But I think one of the freedoms we still ought to preserve in this country is the freedom for people to be foolish with their own money.” Turning to the central question of government intervention, he asserts that aside from traditional public health functions where distinct collective problems arise, there is no justification for a special governmental role in personal medical care. The state's general expansion into medicine merely mirrors its intrusion across the entire economy, noting wryly that citizens still have another ten days of work before they finish paying off government expenses and can begin earning for themselves.

In Friedman's view, the government's legitimate functions in medicine should mirror its functions in any other industry: enforcing laws against fraud and deception, and offering emergency relief to those facing catastrophic hardship. Just as the state might aid families devastated by floods, hurricanes, or sudden disability, it may appropriately assist individuals plunged into dire medical distress. Beyond catastrophic relief, however, he maintains there is no valid rationale for public financing. Ordinary healthcare costs remain well within reach of the average American household, and unpredictable expenses are already handled through private insurance arrangements—which at the time covered eighty percent of all hospital bills. Friedman acknowledges that private plans could be improved through mechanisms like expanded major medical coverage, higher deductibles, and co-insurance, but emphasizes that market innovation will continue to refine these tools.

- The rise in medical expenditures is primarily propelled by consumer appetite for varied, advanced services rather than an intrinsic failure of the market. - Government's legitimate domain is strictly limited to public health measures, fraud prevention, and emergency assistance for individuals experiencing catastrophic distress. - Third-party private insurance covers roughly 80 percent of hospital bills, providing an effective vehicle for families to budget against risk.

[26:07](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rWlk9HreE7U&t=1567s) Healthcare Affordability and the Abolition of Physician Licensure

To illustrate that medical expenses do not exceed the capacity of the average family, Friedman puts national healthcare spending into perspective alongside ordinary consumer goods. Total medical expenditures equal less than two-thirds of what Americans spend on housing and less than three-quarters of what they spend on automobiles. Furthermore, the nation spends roughly 40 percent as much on alcohol and tobacco—habits overwhelmingly proven to worsen health and inflate medical bills—as it does on healthcare in total. While defending the right of individuals to harm themselves at their own expense, Friedman stresses that these numbers prove healthcare is entirely affordable for the public. The genuine crisis in modern medicine, he contends, is not caused by a lack of government intervention, but by government involvement itself.

Consequently, Friedman puts forward a radical remedy: abolishing all government subsidies, eliminating regulations, and ending the licensure of physicians. He traces the monopoly power of the American Medical Association directly to state licensure laws, which restrict who may legally practice medicine. Recognizing that this proposal strikes most listeners as shocking, Friedman references the detailed analysis he published sixteen years earlier with his wife in *Capitalism and Freedom*. In that work, he reviewed occupational licensing across trades—from beauticians and morticians to professional wrestlers—and deliberately tested his thesis against medicine because it represents the strongest conceivable case for licensing:

```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: The Licensure Monopoly Dilemma accDescr: Chart illustrating how medical licensure leads inevitably to monopoly power or socialized medicine.

subgraph StateControl["The Mechanism of Licensure"] A["State Grants Licensure Authority"] --> B["Organized Medicine / AMA Control"] B --> C["Restricted Entry & Monopoly Power"] end

subgraph Outcomes["The Physician's Dilemma"] C --> D["Oppose Monopolistic Restrictions?"] C --> E["Support Unlicensed Practice?"] D -.->|"Incompatible"| E C --> F["Result: Floodtide Toward Socialized Medicine"] end ```

He challenges the physicians in the audience to confront their own internal contradiction, stating: “They cannot believe both, because to believe both is to say that two and two make five.” If doctors simultaneously oppose AMA-style monopolistic abuses yet insist on banning unlicensed practice, they are ignoring the fact that licensure itself creates the monopoly. Friedman warns that maintaining licensure guarantees that either organized medicine or the federal government will wield monopolistic control, making complete socialized medicine inevitable.

- Medical spending is dwarfed by expenditures on housing and automobiles, and amounts to only two and a half times what Americans voluntarily spend on tobacco and alcohol. - The monopoly power of organized medicine rests upon state-enforced medical licensure restricting market entry. - The elimination of licensure is presented not as a thoughtless notion, but as the only viable mechanism to secure higher quality, lower costs, and broader access while averting socialized medicine.

[31:05](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rWlk9HreE7U&t=1865s) The Trend Toward Collectivism and the FDA Question

Friedman warns that piecemeal adjustments will not solve the structural defects of modern healthcare: “We are facing drastic problems. They will not lend themselves—I guess I have to use medical analogies—they will not lend themselves to Band-Aid solutions.” Instead, the medical dilemma must be seen as part of a forty-year drift toward a collectivist society. Nevertheless, he expresses optimism that public skepticism toward government competence is growing. Whenever advocates insist that government must manage healthcare, Friedman challenges them to point out a single major federal initiative that actually met its goals, citing the obvious failures of public housing, federal welfare programs, and urban renewal efforts to eliminate poverty, dependence, or urban decay.

Following enthusiastic applause at the conclusion of his lecture, the floor opens for questions. The first questioner humorously refers to Friedman's "non-controversial comments" regarding the absence of any role for government in private medicine, and asks for his perspective on the regulatory powers of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the work it carries out. Friedman begins his answer by gesturing toward the medical specialists in attendance, noting that the heart specialists in the room know firsthand the practical consequences of FDA delays and restrictions.

[33:22](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rWlk9HreE7U&t=2002s) The Harmful Impact of FDA Drug Regulations

Milton Friedman concludes his assessment of the Food and Drug Administration by highlighting the tangible human cost of its regulatory delays. He points out that several highly effective beta blockers are readily available to patients across Great Britain, Canada, and the rest of the world, yet remain completely barred from the United States due to FDA roadblocks. Friedman notes that reputable physicians have estimated that making those drugs accessible in America would save roughly 10,000 lives every single year. While acknowledging that the agency undoubtedly keeps some harmful drugs off pharmacy shelves, he contends that this benefit is heavily outweighed by the agency's obstruction of life-saving therapeutics.

The regulatory apparatus, Friedman argues, has driven the costs of pharmaceutical research and development to astronomical heights, forcing valuable medical research out of the United States and into foreign jurisdictions. By demanding prolonged testing cycles and imposing suffocating hurdles, the agency has created a net negative for public health. Summarizing the agency’s historical record, Friedman delivers a scathing verdict: “So I think the FDA has been an unmitigated disaster over the past twenty years.”

- Reputable medical estimates indicated that approving overseas beta blockers could save approximately 10,000 American lives annually. - Stifling FDA requirements drastically escalated the costs of discovering and developing new drugs, pushing clinical research abroad.

[34:17](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rWlk9HreE7U&t=2057s) Budgetary Hurdles and the Fallacy of National Health Insurance

An audience member asks Friedman for a pragmatic assessment of whether national health insurance is likely to pass within the next two years. Friedman responds that the near-term chances are slim, though he laments that this resistance stems from fiscal constraints rather than sound economic philosophy. The federal government faces soaring expenditures, with a looming federal budget projected at $500 billion and an annual deficit exceeding $50 billion during the fourth year of an economic expansion. Given that competing proposals for national health insurance carry price tags ranging anywhere from $30 billion to $70 billion, the sheer budgetary strain makes immediate enactment politically prohibitive.

Friedman vigorously rejects the idea that a groundswell of grassroots public demand is pushing the country toward such legislation. In his view, the supposed public outcry is entirely synthetic, manufactured and packaged much like a Madison Avenue marketing blitz for a brand of toothpaste. While individuals might initially find the prospect of having someone else pay their medical bills appealing, citizens understand that taxes will ultimately fund the system. Instead, the real momentum originates from special interest groups, including segments of the medical community eager to tap into federal money.

Friedman strongly urges his audience to discard deceptive terminology, dismantling the phrase piece by piece: it is not national because it serves individuals; it does not foster health because socialized medicine worsens care; and it is not insurance because it represents an outright government subsidy. He issues a direct warning to physicians who believe they can safely accommodate socialized medicine for temporary financial advantage: “You may ride it for a time, but sooner or later, you are going to be on the bottom instead of on the top.”

- The federal budget was projected to hit $500 billion, running an annual deficit over $50 billion. - Proposed national health insurance schemes were estimated to add between $30 billion and $70 billion in new government expenditures. - Organized medicine was criticized for weakening its principled resistance in hopes of capturing federal payouts, ignoring the long-term threat of state control.

[38:01](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rWlk9HreE7U&t=2281s) Licensure as a False Guarantee of Medical Quality

A questioner in the audience presses Friedman on his controversial stance against occupational medical licensure, asking how the public could be protected from quackery and undertrained practitioners without government certification. Friedman pushes back by asking how many people actually choose their family doctor by opening the Yellow Pages and sticking a pin into the list of licensed names. The existence of a medical license, he argues, offers no meaningful assurance of current competence: “A man who was licensed thirty years ago may be thoroughly incompetent now.”

Friedman emphasizes that doing away with mandatory government licensing does not mean legalizing fraud or deception. A practitioner who falsely claims to be a graduate of Harvard Medical School would remain fully subject to civil suits and criminal prosecution for fraud and misrepresentation. Other complex professions, such as architecture in many states, flourish without mandatory state licensing because consumers and clients rely on rigorous institutional vetting.

Consumers routinely evaluate complex products through reputable intermediaries—whether buying a shirt from a trusted department store or purchasing a car from an established dealer. In the medical sphere, patients do not evaluate individual doctors in a vacuum; they trust institutions like the Mayo Clinic because the clinic has a powerful commercial and reputational incentive to hire and retain only top-tier medical talent. In a market unencumbered by licensure restrictions, hospital group practices would have multiplied, creating far superior private mechanisms for quality control and selection.

```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Quality Assurance Under Licensure vs Market Reputation accDescr: Diagram contrasting government licensure with institutional reputation and market vetting mechanisms.

subgraph StateLicensure["Government Licensure Model"] L1["State Medical Board License"] --> L2["One-Time Screening Exam"] L2 --> L3["No Guarantee of Ongoing Competence"] L3 --> L4["Barriers to Supply & Entry"] end

subgraph MarketReputation["Market & Institutional Model"] M1["Voluntary Certification & Training"] --> M2["Reputational Intermediary (e.g., Mayo Clinic)"] M2 --> M3["Ongoing Institutional Vetting"] M2 --> M4["Fraud & Misrepresentation Protections"] M3 --> M5["Accountable Quality & Greater Supply"] end ```

[41:15](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rWlk9HreE7U&t=2475s) Organized Medicine and Cartel Control Over Physician Supply

Continuing his critique of state licensing, Friedman exposes how occupational licensure functions as an engine of monopoly power for organized medicine. By controlling who enters the medical profession, the American Medical Association (AMA) long maintained the ability to suppress competition and insulate low-quality practice. For decades, the AMA actively discouraged medical malpractice suits, punishing physicians who dared to testify against negligent peers by stripping them of their hospital credentials.

Friedman points out that restricting entry cannot easily be accomplished at the final licensing examination; once a candidate has completed medical school and an internship, boards find it exceedingly difficult to deny them a license indefinitely. The true bottleneck is created far earlier, at the admissions gate of medical schools. Friedman highlights the deliberate policy enforced by organized medicine during the 1930s to sharply restrict the total output of doctors: “Licensure was the key to this because the licensure laws in almost every state, as result of the pressure of organized medicine, required that nobody may be licensed who is not a graduate of an approved medical school.”

Because every state licensing board accepts the approved list established by the AMA’s Council on Medical Education and Hospitals, the AMA effectively dictates the capacity of medical education nationwide, keeping doctor numbers artificially low and securing cartel-like control over the supply of health care.

- State licensing statutes uniformly mandate graduation from an accredited medical school. - Accreditation is dictated exclusively by the AMA Council on Medical Education and Hospitals, granting organized medicine gatekeeping authority over total physician supply. - The AMA historically retaliated against doctors who testified in malpractice lawsuits by revoking their hospital admitting credentials.

[43:05](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rWlk9HreE7U&t=2585s) Licensure and the Restrictive Definition of Medical Practice

Continuing his critique of government regulation in healthcare, Milton Friedman emphasizes that every time one examines the structural problems of the profession, occupational licensure emerges as the pivotal element. Licensure does not merely certify standard competency; it serves as a legal barrier designed to prohibit what the law designates as the unauthorized practice of medicine. Friedman contends that a substantial array of routine medical tasks could be handled just as competently by medical technicians who lack the exhaustive, expensive training required of full physicians. While the medical field has seen a slight increase in the deployment of technicians in recent years, Friedman argues that widespread adoption remains severely obstructed by statutory definitions that dictate what constitutes medical practice and criminalize unauthorized care.

Friedman concludes his thoughts on certification by acknowledging his own passion for the topic and drawing a distinction between genuine consumer protection and statutory monopolies. As he remarks to the audience: “You started me on a subject on which I could go a long time, but perhaps I've said enough to suggest that it isn't quite as simple as it may seem at the outset, that a label of good housekeeping is not the same thing.” By conflating government licensure with an objective, voluntary seal of quality, the public often overlooks how restrictive medical definitions artificially constrain the supply of care and distort the efficient division of labor between doctors and auxiliary staff.

- Medical licensure primarily acts as an enforcement mechanism to prevent the unauthorized practice of medicine. - Restrictive legal definitions of medical practice prevent the optimal, widespread utilization of medical technicians and physician time.

---

[43:56](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rWlk9HreE7U&t=2636s) Covering the Uninsured: Negative Income Tax vs. Earmarked Welfare

A woman in the audience poses a direct question regarding the uninsured population, observing that while Friedman cited an eighty percent coverage rate under private insurance, a significant minority remains vulnerable. She asks what specific proposal Friedman offers to protect those who fall below the poverty line, lack union representation, and work outside large corporate employers that offer group coverage. Friedman responds unequivocally that there should be no specialized medical program created for this group. Instead, he reiterates his longstanding proposal to dismantle the existing mosaic of welfare programs and replace them entirely with a comprehensive negative income tax. Under this mechanism, any household falling below an established income floor would receive a direct cash grant sufficient to maintain a baseline standard of living.

```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Welfare Approaches Comparison accDescr: Diagram contrasting targeted welfare benefits with Milton Friedman's negative income tax proposal.

subgraph Piecemeal["Current Fragmented Welfare System"] A["Government Bureaucracy"] -->|"Targeted Aid"| B1["Housing Subsidies"] A -->|"Targeted Aid"| B2["Food Stamps"] A -->|"Targeted Aid"| B3["Medical Care Entitlements"] A -->|"Targeted Aid"| B4["Clothing Allowances"] end

subgraph NIT["Friedman's Market Solution"] C["Negative Income Tax (Direct Cash Floor)"] --> D["Unrestricted Cash to Recipient"] D --> E["Individual Consumer Choice"] E --> F["Purchase Private Medical Insurance"] E --> G["Purchase Living Necessities"] end ```

Friedman argues that poverty is fundamentally a shortage of cash rather than a shortage of any specific good, and he rejects the paternalistic premise behind targeted in-kind welfare subsidies. In his view, providing fragmented, earmarked allotments for housing, food, clothing, and medical care restricts individual freedom and creates bureaucratic waste. If poor citizens are given sufficient basic income directly, they can purchase the exact same private health insurance available to everyone else in the market. As Friedman summarizes his core philosophy of poverty relief: “The problem of poverty is money, and we ought to have a program under which we assure a minimum level of income and then let people spend it the way they want.” The questioner and the room warmly affirm the response, bringing the session to a close with an appreciative audience member calling out, “Absolutely. Good answer. Thank you.”

- Approximately twenty percent of the population at the time lacked coverage due to poverty, lack of union membership, or absence of employer-provided group health plans. - Friedman advocates replacing piecemeal welfare arrangements with a negative income tax delivering unrestricted cash. - Recipients under a cash-floor model retain consumer autonomy, enabling them to purchase ordinary private insurance on the open market.

## Notable quotes > [22:46](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rWlk9HreE7U&t=1366s) I think one of the freedoms we still ought to preserve in this country is the freedom for people to be foolish with their own money. — Milton Friedman

> [43:56](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rWlk9HreE7U&t=2636s) The problem of poverty is money, and we ought to have a program under which we assure a minimum level of income and then let people spend it the way they want. — Milton Friedman

> [02:45](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rWlk9HreE7U&t=165s) In industry after industry, producers who protest most strongly their belief in free markets have fostered and helped produce government takeover, government regulation, government control. — Milton Friedman

> [11:54](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rWlk9HreE7U&t=714s) In addition to the fact that the ultimate result of a government takeover is less resources, you invariably get lower quality and a lower quantity of medical care. — Milton Friedman

> [33:22](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rWlk9HreE7U&t=2002s) I think the FDA has been an unmitigated disaster over the past twenty years. — Milton Friedman

> [38:01](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rWlk9HreE7U&t=2281s) A man who was licensed thirty years ago may be thoroughly incompetent now. — Milton Friedman

## Mentioned Milton Friedman, Bill Keating, Mayo Foundation, Mayo Clinic, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), American Medical Association (AMA), Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), Abraham Flexner, Flexner Report, Ross-Loos Medical Group, Group Health Association, National Health Service (NHS), Dr. Max Gammon, Parkinson's Law, Dr. Gunnar Biörck, Karolinska Institute, Swedish Board of Health and Welfare, Jimmy Carter, Professional Standards Review Organizations (PSROs), Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs), Capitalism and Freedom, Food and Drug Administration (FDA), AMA Council on Medical Education and Hospitals

## Video description Increasing government involvement in medical care will take us toward fully socialized medicine. This trend is clearly against the interests of patients, physicians, and other health care personnel. There is, of course, no such thing as "free" health care--you either pay for it directly, or via the tax system, with bureaucrats taking their usual cut along the way. The reality of the situation is that government involvement in the economics of medical care leads directly to higher costs for that care. There is no special role for government in medical care. Government should do there only what it does in other fields: Enforce laws against fraud and deception, and offer some assistance (comparable to flood or tornado relief) to those in extreme medical distress. Recorded at Mayo Foundation, Rochester, MN ©1978 / 45:26.

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[Source](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rWlk9HreE7U)

中文简报

弗里德曼呼吁废除医生执照制度以遏制公费医疗 废除州级医师执照制度和公共补贴是阻止向公费医疗转变的唯一途径,因为行业医疗组织的准入限制人为压低了供给并推高了成本。 米尔顿·弗里德曼在演讲中指出,政府对医疗保健不断扩大的干预,不可避免地会导致英国国民保健制度(NHS)等公费体系中出现的效率低下、行政臃肿和资源匮乏。他认为,美国医疗费用的上涨虽然受到消费者对高端医疗需求的推动,但受到美国医学会垄断行为的严重扭曲,该协会利用州级执照制度限制医生供给。为恢复效率和自由,弗里德曼提出了激进的自由市场改革方案,包括废除医疗执照制度,并用负所得税取代官僚化的福利项目,从而使贫困人群有能力购买私人医疗保险。 政府对医疗保健的补贴不可避免地会引发监管连锁反应,从价格管制逐步升级到临床监督,最终以完全的公费医疗收场。 (0:36) 对英国NHS的分析揭示了“官僚置换”的实际发生:在1965年至1973年间,行政人员增长了41%,而每日占用的医院床位却下降了11%。 (11:54) 米尔顿·弗里德曼呼吁彻底废除医疗执照制度,指出这是国家强制执行的机制,确保了美国医学会对医生供给的垄断。 (26:07) 为了保障无医保人群,弗里德曼反对定向医疗福利,转而支持负所得税,认为直接发放现金可以保留消费者购买私人保险的自主权。 (43:56)

Reading summary

Milton Friedman contends that escalating medical expenditures and the drift toward socialized medicine are driven by government subsidies and monopolistic professional regulations rather than market failures. He argues that genuine reform requires deregulating healthcare, ending physician licensure, and addressing poverty through direct cash assistance rather than state-administered medicine. Subsidies, Monopolistic Control, and Budgetary Starvation (0:36) Friedman argues that public healthcare financing, accelerated by Medicare, Medicaid, and federal agency spending, inevitably compels the state to impose fee caps and police clinical decisions, ultimately terminating in complete socialized medicine. He observes that this regulatory trajectory has been facilitated by medical producers themselves. Decades of restrictive policies by the American Medical Association (AMA), particularly following the 1910 Flexner Report, granted organized medicine gatekeeping control over medical school accreditation and curtailed the physician supply. Organized medicine also suppressed innovative delivery structures, including prepaid health plans and multidisciplinary group clinics like the Mayo Clinic model, which Friedman claims would have otherwise spread nationwide to lower costs and elevate quality. Friedman warns that the apparent windfall of government subsidies is purely transitory. Once an industry is fully subordinated to state control, politicians redirect capital toward uncaptured sectors to win new political support, leaving nationalized health systems starved of resources. He notes that economic analyses of Great Britain's post-war National Health Service (NHS) demonstrated that socialized medicine resulted in lower total healthcare spending than would have occurred under a private market system. Bureaucratic Displacement in Socialized Systems (11:54) To evaluate the real-world performance of state-run medicine, Friedman draws upon international evidence from Great Britain and Sweden. Citing a December 1976 study by British physician Dr. Max Gammon, Friedman outlines the "theory of bureaucratic displacement," wherein administrative processes steadily displace productive clinical care. Between 1965 and 1973, NHS hospital staff grew by 28 percent and administrative staff rose by 41 percent, while the primary measure of output—daily occupied hospital beds—declined by 11 percent. During this era, roughly 600,000 patients languished on waiting lists, delays for heart bypass surgeries reached three years, and annual doctor emigration equaled one-third of Britain's medical graduating classes. Friedman points to similar structural dysfunction in Sweden, citing testimony from Dr. Gunnar Biörck of the Karolinska Institute. Biörck documented severe administrative growth, including a 60-page official manual created solely to calculate clinical physician staffing. Crucially, Biörck argued that socialized medicine destroys the traditional patient-physician relationship by transforming the doctor into an employee of the state, subordinating clinical decisions, wages, working hours, and approved pharmaceuticals to bureaucratic control. Consumer Demand and Rising Healthcare Costs (19:36) Friedman disputes the conventional claim that rising hospital costs stem primarily from provider greed or institutional inefficiency. Instead, he asserts that the primary driver has been the voluntary choice of American consumers to purchase more sophisticated, higher-quality medical care through private insurance mechanisms. He equates this post-war spending growth to the massive expansion of consumer automobile expenditures during the 1920s and 1930s, where higher spending reflected consumer appetite for technologically superior vehicles rather than arbitrary price gouging. Rejecting claims that healthcare is broadly unaffordable, Friedman notes that national medical expenditures equal less than two-thirds of housing spending, less than three-quarters of automobile spending, and only two and a half times what Americans voluntarily spend on alcohol and tobacco. Consequently, he contends that the legitimate role of government in medicine is limited to conventional public health functions, enforcing legal protections against fraud, and providing emergency financial aid for families experiencing catastrophic distress. Licensure Barriers and Free-Market Alternatives (26:07) As a structural remedy, Friedman advocates eliminating government subsidies, dismantling Food and Drug Administration (FDA) barriers that delayed life-saving therapeutics—such as overseas beta blockers estimated by physicians to save 10,000 American lives annually—and abolishing mandatory physician licensure. He argues that licensure does not guarantee ongoing medical competence; rather, it functions as a cartel mechanism that enables the AMA to suppress medical school admissions, restrict the supply of care, and prevent medical technicians from performing routine procedures. In place of state licensing, Friedman argues that market reputation and institutional accountability provide superior consumer protections. Patients rely on institutions like the Mayo Clinic because clinics possess commercial and reputational incentives to hire competent personnel, while fraudulent claims remain subject to criminal and civil law. Addressing the approximately 20 percent of Americans lacking private health insurance, Friedman rejects earmarked welfare entitlements in favor of a negative income tax. By providing direct, unrestricted cash grants to households below an income floor, poor families gain the autonomy to purchase private insurance on the open market. Friedman concludes that piecemeal reforms cannot solve American healthcare's structural problems without reversing the broader drift toward collectivism. While audience members pressed him on public safety under an unlicensed market and the political viability of dismantling health programs, Friedman maintains that voluntary competition, institutional vetting, and a cash-based negative income tax offer the only viable defense against administrative stagnation.

精炼阅读摘要

经济学家米尔顿·弗里德曼(Milton Friedman)主张,美国医疗成本的攀升与体制危机并非自由市场的失败,而是源于政府财政补贴所诱发的行政干预,以及美国医学会(AMA)借助执照制度构建的行业垄断;若走向全民公费医疗,必将导致医疗资源匮乏与服务质量劣化,唯一的治本之道在于取消防疫与防欺诈之外的行政干预、废除医师执照垄断,并通过“负所得税”以现金直接托底贫困群体的基本保障。 政府补贴陷阱与公费医疗弊端 (0:36) 弗里德曼指出,政府对医疗领域的财政资助(如Medicare与Medicaid)不可避免地会触发价格管制,随后升级为对诊疗方案与医护人员的行政监督,最终必然滑向完全公有化的医疗体制。他警告,政府初期的资金倾斜只是暂时的政治诱饵,一旦某一行业被国家彻底接管,政治资本就会转向争夺其他未控制领域的选票,已被国有化的行业反而会面临预算缩减与资源匮乏。英国国家医疗服务体系(NHS)三十年的运行历史印证了这一规律:自二战后创立起的13年间,英国未新建一座医院;截至1976年,全国医院床位总量少于1948年创立之初,且三分之二的床位仍设在1900年前由私人资本建造的旧设施中。在马克斯·加蒙(Max Gammon)博士提出的“官僚替代效应”下,1965至1973年间NHS医院总员工增加28%,行政人员激增41%,但日均占用床位数反而下降11%;约60万人滞留在候诊名单上,心脏搭桥手术等待期长达三年,每年外流的英国医生人数相当于当年医学院毕业生总数的三分之一。瑞典卡罗琳医学院(Karolinska Institute)的古纳尔·比约克(Gunnar Biörck)博士的证言同样显示,为了消灭揭露公共部门效率低下的私立对比标杆,国家医疗体制动用繁冗官僚规范压制独立执业,甚至编制长达60页的手册来计算科室医生配额,彻底瓦解了患者直接聘请医生的传统契约与信任。 医疗支出增长与大众消费选择 (19:36) 针对美国本土医疗费用的持续上升,弗里德曼反驳了医疗机构道德滑坡或贪婪定价的舆论叙事,认为这主要是公众自愿选择购买更多、更高品质医疗服务的结果。伴随着二战后私人自愿医疗保险这一市场创新的普及,患者有能力也有意愿追求更先进的诊疗器械与优质护理。他将二战后医院支出的增长类比于1920至1930年代汽车消费的激增:支出扩大并不是因为产品虚假溢价,而是市场对大众提升生活水准需求的自然响应。尽管政府补贴确实助长了价格通胀与欺诈浪费,但所有账单终究是由美国纳税人买单,全民健保提案承诺的丰厚福利掩盖了其高昂的税收代价。弗里德曼援引消费统计指出,美国家庭完全具备自行承担医疗费用的能力:全美医疗总支出不足住房支出的三分之二,少于汽车支出的四分之三,而公众在明确损害健康的烟酒上的开销就相当于医疗总支出的40%。在私人商业保险已经覆盖约80%住院账单的背景下,常规且不可预见的医疗风险已能通过市场化工具对冲。他认为政府正当职能应严格限定于公共卫生、打击欺诈以及对遭遇严重意外灾难的个体提供紧急救济,缺乏对个人日常医疗费用进行公共统筹的经济依据。 医师执照垄断与创新模式受阻 (26:07) 弗里德曼强调,医疗服务供给受限的根源在于美国医学会(AMA)借助各州执照法建立的法定垄断。1910年《弗莱克斯纳报告》(Flexner Report)出台后,AMA完全垄断了医学院认证标准与执业许可,并在1920和1930年代系统性地打压跨学科综合团队诊所、医生与医院联合体以及预付费医疗模式(如早期受到法律压制的Ross-Loos医疗集团与华盛顿健康协会Group Health Association)。弗里德曼推断,享誉世界的梅奥诊所(Mayo Clinic)若非建立在1910年报告发布之前,其先进的团队式门诊体制必会在萌芽阶段就被行业垄断势力扼杀。针对执照能保障医疗质量的传统观念,弗里德曼提出质疑。他指出,三十年前通过一次性考核的医生在今日可能已完全不胜任,消费者在现实中依赖的是梅奥等信誉机构的品牌筛选,而非行政执照。强制执照的真正职能在于从医学院招生源头卡死医生供给,限制“医疗行为”的法定定义,从而阻碍医疗技术人员分担常规诊疗工作。取消强制执照并不会让欺诈行为合法化,反诉与刑事追责机制依然有效;唯有打破门槛准入限制,才能降低看病成本并激发出更多高效的医疗协作模式。 撤销行政干预与负所得税方案 (33:22) 在具体监管机构层面,弗里德曼将食品药品监督管理局(FDA)定性为一场灾难。由于FDA严苛繁琐的审批程序与拖延,数种早已在英国、加拿大等地成熟应用的β受体阻滞剂被长期阻隔在美国市场之外,医学专家评估这些延误每年导致约10,000名美国患者失去生存机会,同时迫使大量创新药物研发迁往海外监管环境。行政机构名义上旨在防止药物危害,其造成的延误与阻碍所导致的生命损失却远超过潜在益处。在回答如何保障未被私人医保覆盖的20%低收入人群时,弗里德曼坚决反对量身定制专门的政府医疗救济项目。他主张彻底废除复杂的碎片化实物福利体系,代之以统一的“负所得税”(Negative Income Tax)。弗里德曼指出,贫困的核心是缺乏现金而非缺乏某种特定物资;通过向收入低于贫困线的家庭直接发放不受限制的现金补助,不仅能大幅削减官僚机器的行政摩擦与家长式管控,还能保障低收入者的个人尊严,让他们像其他公民一样在竞争性市场上自主选购符合自身需求的私人医疗保险。 弗里德曼总结指出,医疗体系的异化是美国整体社会滑向集体主义统制趋势的一部分。尽管拟议中的全国健康保险计划面临着联邦预算高达5000亿美元、年赤字逾500亿美元的严峻财政阻力,但其真正的危险在于剥夺个人经济自由,并逐步让医护人员沦为官僚机构的附庸。他警示医疗专业人员切勿为了短期的财政红利而与国家管制妥协,唯有全面拆除执照壁垒并转向市场竞争,才能真正维护医患双方的长远福祉。

Detailed notes — zh

## Background 本视频由 Free To Choose Network 于 2016 年 3 月 21 日在 YouTube 平台发布,记录了经济学家米尔顿·弗里德曼 1978 年在明尼苏达州梅奥基金会的演讲。视频简介指出,政府对医疗保健不断加深的干预将导致完全公有化的医疗体系,这直接违背了患者和医护人员的利益,不仅会抬高医疗成本,也无法带来真正的“免费”医疗;政府在医疗领域应仅限于打击欺诈及提供灾难性救济。 ## TL;DR 弗里德曼在演讲中深入剖析了医疗经济学,指出政府通过 Medicare、Medicaid 等财政补贴介入医疗后,必然演变为价格管制和对行医规范的全面干预,最终滑向低效的公有化医疗。他以英国 NHS 的“官僚替代定律”和瑞典公费医疗为例,说明政府垄断会导致医疗投入萎缩、排队积压以及医患关系异化。针对美国医疗成本上涨,他认为核心诱因在于政府扭曲与民众对高品质服务的自愿选择,并提出彻底废除美国医学会(AMA)操纵的医师执照垄断、推行负所得税保障贫困人口购买力的激进市场化解药。 ## Atmosphere & style 整场演讲充满思辨交锋与智性魅力,弗里德曼的台风沉稳自信、幽默辛辣且极具穿透力。置身于医学重镇梅奥诊所的讲台,他面对台下大批专业医师与学者,毫无保留地直击行业痛点,向听众习以为常的“行医执照”与政府兜底观念发起逻辑攻势。现场气氛在震撼、会心大笑与热烈掌声中转换,问答环节的你来我往更展现了弗里德曼将复杂经济学原理化为常识常理的强大论辩感染力。 ## Bulletin - [00:55](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rWlk9HreE7U&t=55s) 弗里德曼指出政府介入医疗财政必然导致价格管制与执业干预,最终走向低效且资源匮乏的全面公有化医疗体系。 - [11:54](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rWlk9HreE7U&t=714s) 英国 NHS 实践印证了“官僚替代定律”:1965 至 1973 年间公立医院行政人员暴增 41%,日均占用床位反而下降 11%,排队等待手术名单达 60 万人。 - [25:08](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rWlk9HreE7U&t=1508s) 美国家庭在烟酒上的挥霍高达全国医疗总支出的 40%,且 80% 的住院账单已由私人商业保险覆盖,表明大众完全有能力自主承担日常医疗开支。 - [27:13](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rWlk9HreE7U&t=1633s) 弗里德曼提出最为激进的市场化药方:彻底废除医师执业执照制度,击碎美国医学会(AMA)借助政府公权力构建的准入垄断。 - [43:56](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rWlk9HreE7U&t=2636s) 针对贫困人口的医疗救济,弗里德曼反对任何专项定向补贴,主张推行“负所得税”直接发放现金,让低收入者自主在市场上选购医疗服务与保险。 ## Key takeaways - [00:55](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rWlk9HreE7U&t=55s) 政府对医疗费用的财政补贴必然引致对医疗价格和具体执业行为的行政管制,最终滑向完全公有化的社会主义医疗。 - [02:45](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rWlk9HreE7U&t=165s) 医疗领域的垄断往往由行业自身推动,美国医学会(AMA)长期打着提升质量的旗号,实质上在限制供给与压制高效的医疗组织形态。 - [05:38](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rWlk9HreE7U&t=338s) 梅奥诊所的成功得益于其诞生早于 1910 年《弗莱克斯纳报告》,此后群体联合行医与预付制模式长期遭到美国医学会的合谋扼杀。 - [08:55](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rWlk9HreE7U&t=535s) 政府全面接管行业后边际政治选票递减,政客会将注意力转向新领域,导致既有国有化医疗体系陷入长期的预算紧缩与资源匮乏。 - [11:54](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rWlk9HreE7U&t=714s) 英国 NHS 陷入“官僚替代定律”,机构被官僚接管后投入激增而实际产出下降,行政冗员激增并伴随严重的医疗积压与医生外流。 - [17:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rWlk9HreE7U&t=1020s) 瑞典公费医疗的困境表明,行政管制消灭了患者自由选择医生的权利,导致医患关系从传统的委托契约异化为国家行政支配。 - [19:36](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rWlk9HreE7U&t=1176s) 美国医疗总支出的增长主要反映了公众对更多、更先进诊疗手段的自愿消费升级,而非医院突发性低效或医生贪婪所致。 - [22:46](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rWlk9HreE7U&t=1366s) 除公共卫生外部性外,政府在医疗领域的正当职能仅限于打击欺诈瞒骗以及提供类似自然灾害救济性质的灾难性大病援助。 - [25:08](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rWlk9HreE7U&t=1508s) 美国医疗支出总额尚不及住房支出的三分之二,结合烟酒高消费数据,证明常规医疗开支并未超出普通家庭的经济承受极限。 - [27:13](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rWlk9HreE7U&t=1633s) 医师执照制度是组织化医学维持垄断权力的核心工具,打破这一制度才能真正激发市场竞争并降低医疗成本。 - [33:22](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rWlk9HreE7U&t=2002s) FDA 的过度审批监管推高了新药研发成本并迫使科研外流,其延误 β 受体阻滞剂等药物上市造成的间接生命损失巨大。 - [34:17](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rWlk9HreE7U&t=2057s) 所谓“全民健康保险”既非全民也不保健康,其实质是利益集团游说推动的政府直接财政补贴,公众并无真正的全民健保需求。 - [38:01](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rWlk9HreE7U&t=2281s) 在缺乏执照垄断的市场中,机构品牌声誉(如梅奥诊所)与民事反欺诈法律能更有效地筛选医疗质量,而非依靠一张几十年前颁发的执照。 - [41:30](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rWlk9HreE7U&t=2490s) 美国医学会通过控制各州官方认可的医学院名单,在源头上人为压低医学生录取规模以限制行业医生总量供给。 - [43:05](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rWlk9HreE7U&t=2585s) 法律对“非法行医”的严苛界定阻碍了专业医疗技术人员分担常规操作,大幅抬高了基础护理的供给成本。 - [43:56](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rWlk9HreE7U&t=2636s) 贫困问题的本质单纯是资金匮乏,应当通过“负所得税”保障最低现金收入,坚决反对设立家长式的专项医疗补贴。 ## Detailed walkthrough ### [00:55](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rWlk9HreE7U&t=55s) 医疗保健走向政府控制的连锁反应 讲座在主持人比尔·基廷(Bill Keating)对米尔顿·弗里德曼的热情引介与掌声中拉开序幕。弗里德曼随即直奔主题,探讨医疗保健领域的经济学问题。他指出,当前医疗领域最显著的特征就是政府干预的持续加深,而这种干预呈现出一种不可逆转的连锁反应特征——迈出一步便不可避免地引发下一步。最初,政府的介入主要体现为财政支出的急剧膨胀,联邦医疗保险(Medicare)、联邦医疗补助(Medicaid)以及卫生、教育及福利部(HEW)的各项医疗支出呈几何级数增长,在全美医疗总支出中所占的比重从微不足道迅速攀升至举足轻重的份额。 然而,单纯的资金注入绝不可能止步于财政层面。弗里德曼深入剖析道,政府一旦开始为医疗服务买单,就必然要求对医疗收费标准实施价格管制,因为任何负责任的政府在花钱时都必须关注其采购服务的成本与价值。更深层的危机在于,对价格的控制又不可避免地延伸为对医疗实践本身的监管,进而直接插手医护人员的日常行医规范与执业行为。弗里德曼在此做出严肃预判:“如果这种趋势继续下去,它将不可避免地导致完全公有化的社会主义医疗。”他明确指出,无论是已经落地的干预政策还是未来的公有化趋势,都从根本上违背了患者、执业医师以及广大医护人员的切身利益。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 政府介入医疗领域的演变路径 accDescr: 展示从政府资金注入逐步演变为全面医疗公有化及资源匮乏的连锁机制 subgraph S1["行政管控递进"] A["政府扩张支出<br/>(Medicare与Medicaid)"] --> B["管控医疗收费价格"] B --> C["干预医护执业规范与行为"] C --> D["走向全面公有化医疗体系"] end subgraph S2["政治机制与资源后果"] D --> E["接管后选票边际递减<br/>政治注意力转向新领域"] E --> F["既有公有医疗遭遇预算紧缩与资源匮乏"] end ``` ### [02:45](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rWlk9HreE7U&t=165s) 行业自身对管制的推动与美国医学会的垄断 弗里德曼强调,医疗领域向政府管制的倾斜绝非孤立事件,而是整个社会用政府强制管制取代自由市场自愿协作这一广泛历史潮流的缩影。令人讽刺的是,在几乎所有行业中,推动并促成政府接管与管制的,往往正是那些口口声声高喊坚信自由市场竞争的行业内部生产者。最早的历史先例是铁路行业,当年的铁路大亨们一手促成了州际商务委员会(ICC)的成立,最终画地为牢;近期的典型则是钢铁行业,钢铁巨头们虽然将自由企业制度挂在嘴边,却极力游说政府设立进口限制和关税壁垒。 弗里德曼进一步指出,这种生产商利用国家机器巩固自身利益的现象在医疗界不仅同样存在,而且尤为严重。美国走向公有化医疗的巨大推力,核心正是来自美国医学会(AMA)数十年来推行的政策。尽管医学会领导层打着“提高医疗服务质量”的高尚旗号,但其实际政策效果却是严厉限制新力量进入医疗市场,人为压低了医疗服务的供应总量与潜在质量,并粗暴扼杀了最高效的医疗服务和分发模式。弗里德曼在此直击要害地评价道:“美国的医疗服务供应取得了巨大的进步;这是一项伟大的成就,但这成就的取得是在克服了美国医学会许多所谓最大努力的前提下实现的,而不是因为有了它。” - **铁路行业前车之鉴**:铁路经营者主动推动成立州际商务委员会(ICC),成为行业游说招致监管反噬的早期典型。 - **钢铁行业保护主义**:口头上主张自由企业,行动上积极争取联邦进口配额与高额关税。 - **美国医学会(AMA)的垄断实质**:打着提升行业水平的旗号,实质上提高准入门槛、限制医师供给、打击更具经济效率的医疗组织形态。 ### [05:38](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rWlk9HreE7U&t=338s) 梅奥诊所的启示与有组织医学对群体行医的压制 置身于罗切斯特的梅奥基金会,弗里德曼指出梅奥诊所(Mayo Clinic)正是反思美国医疗发展道路的绝佳范例。梅奥诊所创建于19世纪末或20世纪初,其创立的决定性契机在于它早于1910年诞生。1910年,亚伯拉罕·弗莱克斯纳发布了著名的《弗莱克斯纳报告》(Flexner Report),正是这份针对全美医学院的报告,奠定了有组织医学界对全美医学教育与医疗执业实施全面垄断控制的基础。在此之后,美国医学会利用这一庞大特权,在20世纪20年代与30年代竭尽所能地打压群体联合行医(Group Practice)模式,而这种模式恰恰是梅奥诊所成功的基石。 弗里德曼断言,如果梅奥兄弟推迟到1920年代或30年代才尝试创立诊所,这一举世闻名的医疗机构根本不可能发展壮大。放眼全美,凡是试图推行医生合伙、医院与医师团队协作,乃至探索预付制医疗(Prepaid Care)的机构,绝大多数都被美国医学会绞杀在摇篮里;仅有少数如杜鲁斯诊所(Duluth Clinic)得以幸存,而华盛顿健康合作组织(Group Health Association)更是不得不借助反垄断法将美国医学会告上法庭并最终胜诉才勉强立足。弗里德曼指出,如果美国医学会没有长期滥用这种垄断权力,美国医疗本应普遍沿着梅奥诊所的路径演进,即通过医院与医生联合团队提供兼具高质量与平民化成本的医疗服务。 - **1910年《弗莱克斯纳报告》**:成为美国医学界强化准入壁垒、收紧医学院资质与医师执照发行的历史转折点。 - **梅奥模式的生存特例**:梅奥兄弟因起步于报告出台前而得以成形,后来的同类群体行医与预付制医疗机构均遭遇医学会的合谋抵制。 - **反垄断法律交锋**:华盛顿健康合作组织不得不针对美国医学会发起反垄断诉讼,才撕开了体制的一道裂缝。 ### [08:55](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rWlk9HreE7U&t=535s) 政府资金的“甜蜜陷阱”与英国全民医疗的教训 弗里德曼转而揭示了医疗供给方为何会对政府干预“投怀送抱”。政府介入之初,医疗机构和从业人员看到的是一个庞大的全新资金来源,这种政府财政的“诱人花蜜”屡屡诱使行业领袖支持那些最终反噬自身的政策。许多在自身企业运营中极具远见的商业精英与行业泰斗,一旦面对公共政策议题就变得目光短浅,常常为了眼前的微小利益去推动长期来看极度有害的管制措施。美国医学会对此表现出一种深刻的“精神分裂”:一方面高调抗议公有化医疗,另一方面却通过其下属的医疗费用委员会等行动推波助澜。 然而,这种从国库套取充沛资源的红利期只是过眼云烟。弗里德曼解释了公有化背后冷酷的政治经济学逻辑:当政府初次接管某项事业时,为了实现政治动员,资金往往极为充足;但一旦全面接管完成,该领域便再也无法提供额外的边际政治选票。政治家为了赢得新的选举,必须将预算转移并开辟新的接管领域,导致已被国有化的原有行业陷入资源饥渴与预算匮乏。弗里德曼举出英国在二战后推行全民公费医疗体制(NHS)已历经三十年的深刻教训:多项严谨研究显示,对照战前居民收入与医疗支出的比例规律,在历经三十年的公有化管理后,英国目前在医疗保健上的实际总投入,远远低于如果在原有私立自愿体系下本该达到的资金规模。 > 如需继续了解下一部分(例如弗里德曼对医疗成本暴涨成因的剖析及现场答问),请随时告知。 ### [11:54](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rWlk9HreE7U&t=714s) 英国国民医疗服务体系(NHS)与“官僚替代定律” 米尔顿·弗里德曼(Milton Friedman)指出,通过对比其他国家居民在医疗上的收入支出占比可以明确估算:如果英国没有建立国家主导的医疗供应体系,今天英国投入到医疗领域的资金总量本该大得多。政府全面接管医疗不仅会导致总资源投入减少,还会必然带来医疗质量与数量的双重下滑。 弗里德曼援引了英国医生马克斯·甘蒙博士(Dr. Max Gammon)在耗时五年研究英国国民医疗服务体系(NHS)后,于 1976 年 12 月发表的关于英国公共医疗供给的调查报告。报告指出,NHS 的建立使中央集权的政府资金与控制覆盖了英国几乎所有的医疗服务,历经两百年发展起来的民间自愿筹资与供给体系几乎被全盘摧毁。甘蒙在报告中明确写道:“在国民医疗服务体系运行的最初十三年里,英国实际上没有建造任何新医院;到 1976 年,英国的医院床位数甚至少于国民医疗服务体系在 1948 年 7 月刚接管时的数量。”弗里德曼补充说,英国现存的医院床位中,有整整三分之二来自 1900 年之前由私营医疗和民间力量修建的医院。 不仅如此,甘蒙还提出了所谓的“官僚替代定律”(theory of bureaucratic displacement),作为帕金森定律(Parkinson's Law)的延伸:每当一个机构被政府这类官僚机构接管时,往往会出现投入增加而产出下降的现象,无用的工作会挤占有用的工作。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Gammon's Theory of Bureaucratic Displacement accDescr: NHS staffing and bureaucracy rose while occupied hospital beds fell, leading to a massive surgical backlog. subgraph INPUT["医疗资源投入 (1965-1973)"] direction TB A1["医院总员工数增长 28%"] A2["行政文书人员激增 41%"] end subgraph OUTPUT["实际产出与服务"] direction TB B1["日均占用床位数下降 11%"] B2["排队候诊名单达 60 万人"] end INPUT -->|"官僚机制替代效应"| OUTPUT ``` 甘蒙列举了 1965 年至 1973 年这八年间英国公立医院的数据:全院员工人数上升了 28%,行政和文职人员增幅更达 41%;但衡量产出的“日均占用床位数”反而下降了 11%。甘蒙特别强调,床位闲置绝非因为缺乏患者,当时始终有大约 60 万人排队等待住院床位。英国医疗界充斥着择期或可延期手术漫长等待的丑闻,例如心脏搭桥手术往往需要等待整整三年,甚至有人在轮到手术前就已离世。面对这种恶化,英国医生选择“用脚投票”,每年移民海外的英国医生数量已达到医学院年毕业生人数的三分之一。 - NHS 原本允许公立体系外存在极有限的私人执业,但当时英国政界正面临巨大压力,试图彻底消灭私人行医,强制所有医疗活动必须进入公有化领域。 - 作为应对政府供给不足的反弹,英国民间自发兴起了自愿医疗保险制度,并建设疗养院等设施作为补充。 --- ### [17:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rWlk9HreE7U&t=1020s) 瑞典的公费医疗困境与医患关系的异化 弗里德曼随后将目光转向瑞典,引用了卡罗琳斯卡学院(Karolinska Institute)医学教授、斯德哥尔摩一家大型医院内科主任、时任(或曾任)瑞典国王御医的贡纳尔·比约克博士(Dr. Gunnar Biörck)的论述。比约克于 1976 年在芝加哥大学发表了一篇题为《如何在社会主义国家当好一名临床医生》(*How to Be a Clinician in a Socialist Country*)的论文。 比约克在论文中剖析道,即使公立医疗获得了纳税人巨额的财政补贴,一个自由竞争的市场依然会对社会主义公共服务构成持续威胁。只要人们依然愿意付费去自由选择医生,那种源自患者对特定医生的个人偏好与信任所构成的质量内涵就无法被轻易剥离;因此,“消灭这种自由选择的机会,便成为了瑞典医疗政客的新目标”。比约克痛批,各类行政监管的引入直接造成了“各层级平庸无能的医疗行政人员如癌细胞般疯长”。当时瑞典福利委员会甚至专门编印了一本厚达 60 页的册子,试图用公式推算每个临床科室需要配备多少名医生。 在比约克看来,几千年来行医的基本格局始终是“患者作为医生的雇主与委托人”,但如今国家以某种形式自居为雇主,对医生的执业条件横加指责与规范。这种干预不仅限于工作时长、薪资报酬和核准药品,最终还会侵入医患关系的方方面面。比约克在文中发出警示:“如果今天的战斗不打且打不赢,明天将不再有仗可打。” --- ### [19:36](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rWlk9HreE7U&t=1176s) 剖析美国医疗成本上涨的真正根源 回到美国本土,弗里德曼指出,专业听众对于当时医疗体系的变化并不陌生——联邦医疗补助(Medicaid)与联邦医疗保险(Medicare)持续膨胀,医疗专业审评组织(PSROs)和健康维护组织(HMOs)铺开,限制医院开支上限的提案也在酝酿中。就在演讲当天早晨的报纸上,还刊登了卡特总统计划在不久的将来向国会提交全民健康保险法案的消息。政客们开出这些药方的借口始终如一:医院成本上涨失控,普通美国人无力承担,必须依靠睿智的政府官僚来消除暴涨的成本。 弗里德曼反驳道,鼓吹国家医疗的言论永远只字不提买单的成本。成本的承担者只有一个人群,那就是美国人民自身;真正的区别只在于:“资金是经过官僚层层经手并被扣掉大笔‘折扣回扣’,还是由人民自己直接为自己的需求买单”。 弗里德曼分析,医院成本上升中确实有一部分属于不必要且不可取的增长,那正是政府扩大 Medicare 和 Medicaid 支出的直接恶果,不仅催生了大量腐败丑闻,还推高了市场物价。然而,整体医疗成本上升的绝大部分,反映的是数以百万计的普通美国人对消费内容的自愿选择,也是美国民间自愿健康险普及的结果。 住院日均费用上涨的主要原因并非物价涨幅超出了通胀,而是诊疗手段数量、种类与复杂度的爆发式增长,以及检查项目与医疗服务品质的大幅提升。这种成本上涨,与 20 世纪 20 至 30 年代美国人在汽车上的消费激增同属一个逻辑——大众渴望购买更多、更好的医疗服务,而市场正在响应这种需求。弗里德曼打趣道,成本上升不是因为医院效率低下(医院向来效率低下,并未突然变得更糟),也不是因为医生变得更贪婪:“当然,医生是贪婪的——我们所有人都是贪婪的;我们人人都贪心——但他们并没有变得比以往更加贪婪。”问题的核心始终在于公众需求的提升以及政府干预所带来的扭曲。 ### [22:46](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rWlk9HreE7U&t=1366s) 政府在医疗保健中的正当角色 米尔顿·弗里德曼(Milton Friedman)指出,医疗费用的上涨在很大程度上是因为人们对拓展服务范围和提供多样化医疗服务的需求增加了。虽然消费者在花钱的方向上或许显得有些盲目甚至浪费,但他强调,自由社会必须保障公民的自主权:“但我认为在这个国家,我们仍然应当保留的一项自由,就是人们有权用自己的钱去做蠢事。”(“But I think one of the freedoms we still ought to preserve in this country is the freedom for people to be foolish with their own money.”) 关于政府在医疗领域究竟扮演何种角色,弗里德曼持极其鲜明的自由市场观点。他认为,除了公共卫生(Public Health)这类存在外部性的特殊领域外,在涉及个人的常规医疗保健方面,政府没有任何特殊的立足之地。当前的医疗困境并非医疗体系特有的问题,而是过去几十年里政府规模和税负恶性膨胀大趋势的缩影。弗里德曼甚至风趣而尖锐地提醒听众:美国公民每年要辛勤工作数月,大约还要再过十天,才能彻底缴清给政府的税款,从而真正开始为自己挣钱生活。 弗里德曼主张,政府在医疗领域的职责应严格等同于其在其他所有行业中的基本职能: - 依法打击欺诈和瞒骗行为,维护市场公正与秩序。 - 向遭遇极端困境(dire distress)的群体提供救济。这种救济应当像洪灾、飓风或因残疾导致的救灾援助一样,仅针对无力承担巨额灾难性开支的极端医疗危机,绝不能扩展到常规的日常医疗融资之中。 ### [25:08](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rWlk9HreE7U&t=1508s) 医疗开支与私人保险的自足能力 弗里德曼坚决反对政府资助日常医疗。他指出,普通美国家庭完全有经济能力承担日常医疗保健费用。对于医疗费用忽高忽低、偶发性支出过大的问题,成熟的私人保险体系早就能够轻松化解。目前全美已有 80% 的住院账单是通过第三方商业保险机构支付的。虽然现行的保险机制仍有改进空间(例如推广大病医疗统筹 coverage、设立更高的免赔额 deductibles 以及提高共同保险 co-insurance 比例等),但这些都属于市场在演进中不断完善的技术细节,完全足以保障绝大多数家庭的自立。 为了破除“医疗费用昂贵到难以承受”的迷思,弗里德曼给出了一组强烈的消费数据对比: - 全美在医疗上的总支出,尚不足住房总支出的三分之二,也不到汽车总支出的四分之三。 - 更加讽刺的是,医学界早已证实吸烟和酗酒是导致疾病、抬高医疗费用的罪魁祸首,而美国人每年仅仅挥霍在烟草和酒精上的总金额,就高达全国医疗总支出的 40%。 - 弗里德曼调侃道,只要人们自掏腰包,他们当然拥有伤害自己身体的自由;但这铁一般的事实证明,医疗开支根本没有超出普通家庭的承受极限。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 家庭支出对比 accDescr: 对比美国家庭在住房、汽车、医疗以及烟酒上的支出规模 Housing["住房支出 (基准高位)"] Auto["汽车支出 (基准次高)"] subgraph MedicalComparison["医疗相关支出对比"] Medical["医疗总支出\n(不及住房的 2/3\n不及汽车的 3/4)"] TobaccoAlcohol["烟酒支出\n(达医疗总支出的 40%)"] end Housing -.-> Medical Auto -.-> Medical Medical --> TobaccoAlcohol ``` ### [27:13](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rWlk9HreE7U&t=1633s) 彻底的市场化药方:废除医生执照垄断 针对医疗系统当前的弊病,弗里德曼直言不讳地指出,问题源于政府的介入,因此绝不能将这些问题当成进一步扩大政府干预的借口。他提出的根本解药是“一步到位”:彻底废除政府规管、取消政府补贴,并抛出了全场最具震撼力、最激进的观点——彻底废除医生执业执照制度(licensure of physicians)。 弗里德曼解释道,这一主张的核心在于击碎美国医学会(American Medical Association, AMA)长达数十年的垄断特权。正是由于政府掌控了行医执照的发放机制,才使得 AMA 能够将执照垄断作为准入壁垒,全面压制行业竞争。全场听众对这一论点反应强烈,弗里德曼随即自嘲地提到自己在十六年前(1962年)与妻子合著的《资本主义与自由》(*Capitalism and Freedom*)一书:“我很讨厌给自己做广告……你们懂的,我们嘴上说讨厌,其实心里爱得很——我在大约十六年前与妻子协助下合写了一本书,叫做《资本主义与自由》。”(“I hate to advertise myself... you know, we hate it but we love it--in a book, which I wrote with the assistance of my wife some sixteen years ago, called Capitalism and Freedom.”)书中虽然分析了美容师、殡葬师、职业摔角手等各种荒谬的职业执照,但他意识到,唯有正面迎战最坚固的堡垒——医学执照,才能击破特权。 弗里德曼向台下的医生们直接发出了逻辑挑战: - 如果询问医生是否支持 AMA 过去四五十年来的垄断行径,大家出于公心往往会表示“反对”。 - 但如果询问医生是否支持允许无执照者行医,大家又会异口同声地表示“反对”。 - 弗里德曼严肃地指出,这二者不可兼得,同时支持这两点无异于“相信二加二等于五”。只要执照制度存在,垄断权力就必然牢牢掌握在政府或行业公会手中,真正的自由竞争就绝无可能。唯有打破执照壁垒,才能实现质量更高、覆盖更广、费用更低的医疗体系,并阻击滑向全面医疗公有化的滚滚洪流。 ### [31:05](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rWlk9HreE7U&t=1865s) 反思大政府与现场问答开启 弗里德曼告诫听众,美国正处于决定走上全面集体主义社会还是悬崖勒马的历史十字路口。面对医疗顽疾,绝对不能使用治标不治本的“创口贴式方案”(Band-Aid solutions)。他看到公众对政府万能论的幻觉正在消退,并向鼓吹政府接管医疗的人士发出了辛辣质问: - “你是否认为联邦住房计划真正解决了低收入群体的住房问题?” - “你是否认为联邦福利计划彻底消除了贫困和对救济的依赖?” - “你是否认为联邦城市更新与重建计划成功根治了城市衰败?” 在听众席爆发的热烈掌声中,弗里德曼结束了他的主旨演讲。 随后进入现场问答环节。提问者带着幽默的口吻就其“毫无争议”的激进言论发起追问,要求弗里德曼谈谈对美国食品药品监督管理局(FDA)的监管权力及其具体工作的看法。弗里德曼环顾四周,敏锐地注意到台下坐着不少心脏专科医生,随即借此切入,准备通过心血管领域的真实案例来剖析 FDA 监管机制造成的负面代价。 ### [33:22](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rWlk9HreE7U&t=2002s) FDA 监管对新药研发与病患生命的危害 米尔顿·弗里德曼(Milton Friedman)指出,英国、加拿大以及世界其他许多国家已经广泛使用一些非常优秀的 β 受体阻滞剂(beta blockers),但由于美国食品药品监督管理局(FDA)的严苛规定,这些药物却无法在美国销售。弗里德曼援引知名医生的测算指出,如果美国能尽早引入这些 β 受体阻滞剂,每年大约可以拯救一万人的生命。 弗里德曼直言不讳地批评道:“我相信 FDA 按照现在的运作方式,造成的危害远远大于其带来的好处。”(“I believe the FDA, as it has been operating, has done vastly more harm than good.”)他承认 FDA 确实阻止了某些劣质或危险药物流入市场,但作为代价,它也同样阻挡了极其优秀的新药上市。此外,FDA 的监管导致新药研发与上市的成本大幅攀升,进而把大量前沿医学研究赶出了美国本土,迫使其流向海外。弗里德曼总结认为,在过去二十年里,FDA 的作为堪称一场“彻头彻尾的灾难”(unmitigated disaster)。 - 优秀 β 受体阻滞剂受阻于 FDA,估算导致美国每年丧失约 10,000 条生命。 - FDA 的繁琐审批大幅推高新药研发成本,迫使医药研发项目转移至国外。 --- ### [34:17](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rWlk9HreE7U&t=2057s) 全民医疗保险的前景与特权群体的推动 现场一名听众提问:即便许多人认同弗里德曼对全民医疗保险(National Health Insurance)的看法,但从务实角度来看,未来两年内美国推行全民健保的可能性究竟有多大?弗里德曼回答称,他庆幸地认为短期内通过的可能性并不高,但这并非因为大家看清了道理,而是单纯受制于财政预算压力。目前政府预算已经失控,下一财年预计高达 5000 亿美元;在经济处于扩张期的第四年,美国仍面临超过 500 亿美元的财政赤字。而各种版本的全民健保提案开销惊人,无论预估是 300 亿、400 亿还是高达 700 亿美元,当前预算根本无法承受。 弗里德曼进一步指出,公众对全民健保并没有真正意义上的广泛需求。人们总以为政府推行此类项目是因为民意汹涌,但他反驳道:“胡说八道……这种需求完全是被生拉硬扯制造出来的,就像麦迪逊大道为推销一款新牙膏而策划的广告活动一样。”(“Nonsense... the demand has to be drummed up and developed the way in which Madison Avenue develops a campaign for a new toothpaste.”)大众虽然潜意识里希望别人替自己买单,但并不傻,知道最终成本必会落到纳税人头上。真正的推手是各路特殊利益集团,包括医学界内部希望获取更多资金支持的力量。 弗里德曼批评医学界放弃了原则性反抗,甚至纠正了提问中的措辞:“让我们别再叫它全民医疗保险了,它根本不是全民医疗保险;它没有什么‘全民’可言,它是针对个人的;它更没有什么‘医疗’可言,因为它会让医疗服务变得更差,让美国人民的健康状况进一步恶化;它也不是什么‘保险’,而纯粹是政府的直接补贴与支出。”(“Let's not call it national health insurance. It's not national health insurance. There is nothing national about it; it's for individual people. There is no health about it because it will make medical care less good; it will make the health of the American people worse. And there is no insurance about it because it's simply a government payout, government subsidization.”)他警告医生们不要企图顺水推舟配合这种“社会化医疗”(socialized medicine),短期内或许能获得一些利益,但最终整个行业必将从浪尖跌落谷底。 - 宏观财政制约:次年预算预计达 5000 亿美元,在经济扩张第 4 年仍有超 500 亿美元赤字。 - 各种全民健保提案支出预估在 300 亿至 700 亿美元不等。 --- ### [38:01](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rWlk9HreE7U&t=2281s) 医师执照制度对质量保障的虚妄与市场声誉机制 另一位提问者表示,听到弗里德曼说执照制度(licensure)有害,尤其在医学领域弊大于利,令在场很多人大为震惊;听众质疑,如果没有执照制度,该如何遏制庸医误人、防止缺乏资质者在人命关天的紧急情况下胡作非为。弗里德曼首先幽默反问:“你认识的人里面,有几个是通过翻开电话黄页、在所有执业医生名单上拿一根针随便乱扎来选医生的?”他强调,拥有执照根本不能保证医疗水准,一个三十年前拿到执照的人,今天完全可能医术低劣。 弗里德曼阐述了自由市场中保障质量的替代机制: 1. **反欺诈与法律制裁**:取消执照并不意味着允许弄虚作假。如果有人冒充哈佛医学院毕业生挂牌行医,理应以欺诈和虚假陈述罪被起诉。没有了统一执照,公众反而会更细致地审查医生的具体资质。事实上,很多高技能职业(如多数州的建筑师)不强制要求执照,照样能依靠专业训练健康发展。 2. **中间机构与品牌声誉担保**:正如消费者买衬衫、买汽车无法直接判断品质,而是依靠有声誉的百货公司或汽车经销商提供背书一样,患者来到梅奥诊所(Mayo Clinic)就医,信任的是梅奥的品牌,因为梅奥有着极强的内在动力去挑选最优秀、受过最佳训练的医生。如果没有执照限制,类似梅奥这样的医院联合诊所模式本可以发展得更繁荣,提供更严格的质量筛选。 3. **消除劣质医疗与医疗事故诉讼**:长久以来,执照制度和医疗行会反而包庇了劣质医疗。过去医疗事故诉讼之所以极少,是因为美国医学会(AMA)暗中压制,任何敢于在法庭上作证的医生都会面临被剥夺医院执业特权的报复。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 医疗行业准入控制机制 accDescr: 展示美国医学会如何通过控制医学院认证间接掌控医师执照与行业供应 subgraph AMA_Control["行业准入垄断链条"] A["美国医学会 (AMA)<br>医学教育与医院委员会"] -->|"制定认证标准"| B["受认可的医学院名单"] B -->|"各州法规绑定"| C["各州官方认证医学院名单"] C -->|"严格限制招生名额"| D["源头限制医学生供应"] end subgraph State_Licensure["医师执照颁发"] D --> E["极高门槛的医学考试与实习"] E --> F["获得正式医师执业执照"] end ``` 弗里德曼一针见血地指出执照制度的核心本质:“为什么执照制度如此关键?因为它是组织化医疗力量的权力基石;没有它,他们就失去了为非作歹的权力。”(“Why is licensure so essential? Because it is the key to the power of organized medicine. Without it, they would have no power to do harm.”)他解释说,行会无法在考试环节轻易卡掉一个已读完医学院并完成实习的学生;因此,控制行业供应的最有效手段,是在人们入学之前就把门关死。压倒性的证据表明,医学会在 20 世纪 30 年代曾蓄意推行压低医生数量的政策。其手段正是通过各州执照法规定:只有经认可的医学院毕业生才有资格考取执照,而各州“认可”的名单,无一例外与美国医学会医学教育与医院委员会(Council on Medical Education and Hospitals)制定的名单完全一致,从而完成了对医疗从业门槛的源头垄断。 ### [43:05](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rWlk9HreE7U&t=2585s) 医师执照制度与医疗技术人员的限制 米尔顿·弗里德曼(Milton Friedman)深入剖析了医疗执照制度所带来的深层结构性问题。他指出,只要仔细审视医疗体系的种种限制,就会发现“核心要素始终是执照制度”。执照制度不仅用于限制准入门槛,更关键的作用在于界定并打击所谓的“非法行医”(unauthorized practice of medicine)。许多在场的业内人士都很清楚,现实中有大量的常规医疗操作,完全可以由那些未接受过完整顶尖医学训练的专业医疗技术人员(medical technicians)来胜任。 尽管近年来医疗技术人员的使用有所增加,但制度层面的阻碍依然严重。弗里德曼强调,阻碍更有效利用医疗技术人员、进而解放专业医生的主要瓶颈,正是法律对“何为医疗行为”以及“何为未经授权非法行医”的严苛界定。他带着幽默与无奈表示,这个话题一旦展开可以说上很久,但眼下这些足以说明问题绝非表面看起来那么单纯:一个盖有官方认可印章的资质标签,并不能真正等同于卓越的医疗服务和合理的资源配置。 - 执照制度的核心作用在于法律上排他性地垄断医疗实践,阻止非执业医师提供替代性基础护理。 - 许多本可由医疗技术人员高效完成的医疗流程,因法律界定被强制要求由高成本的专业医师执行。 - 弗里德曼总结道:“Now moreover, licensure is critical to preventing the unauthorized practice of medicine.” ### [43:56](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rWlk9HreE7U&t=2636s) 负所得税方案与贫困人口的医疗保障 现场一位女士向弗里德曼提出疑问:既然全美约有80%的人口已经通过私人医疗保险获得了保障,那么对于剩下20%目前没有保险、且生活在贫困线以下切实无力负担的人群,弗里德曼有什么具体的解决方案?提问者特别提到,这些人既不属于工会组织,也没有受雇于能提供团体健康保险的大型企业,处在制度的夹缝之中。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Negative Income Tax vs Earmarked Welfare accDescr: Diagram contrasting Friedman's negative income tax model with traditional piecemeal welfare subsidies. subgraph Piecemeal["现行零散福利体系"] direction TB P1["住房补贴"] P2["食品券"] P3["医疗补助 (Medicaid)"] P4["衣物与专项救济"] end subgraph FriedmanModel["弗里德曼方案:负所得税"] direction TB NIT["负所得税 (现金发放)"] NIT --> Choice["保障基本收入底线"] Choice --> BuyIns["自主购买市场化商业医疗保险"] Choice --> BuyLife["自主安排食品、住房及其他必需品"] end ``` 弗里德曼重申了他一贯的基本主张:根本不应该针对医疗领域设立任何特殊的专项救济项目。他长期倡导用全面的“负所得税”(negative income tax)来彻底取代现行繁复低效的整套社会福利体系。依据该方案,政府应向收入低于特定标准的人群直接发放一笔现金补贴,确保其基本生活水准;而受助者完全可以从这笔款项中自主拿出一部分,去市场上购买与其他人相同的商业医疗保险。弗里德曼尖锐地批评了现行按项目细分的家长式福利体制,认为不应把钱割裂成住房专款、食品专款、衣物专款和医疗专款。他直截了当地指出,贫困的本质单纯就是“缺钱”,因此政策应当保障最低收入水平,随后将选择权和尊严交还给个人,由他们自由决定开支。这番回答赢得了提问者“好答案,谢谢”的热烈认可。 - 弗里德曼反对任何形式的单项定向福利,主张将所有福利项目整合为单一的现金转移支付(负所得税)。 - 在现金保障到位后,低收入群体能与普通公民一样在自由市场上平等选购适合自己的医疗保险。 - 针对贫困的本质与解决之道,弗里德曼有力地断言:“The problem of poverty is money, and we ought to have a program under which we assure a minimum level of income and then let people spend it the way they want.” ## Notable quotes > [02:45](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rWlk9HreE7U&t=165s) 美国的医疗服务供应取得了巨大的进步;这是一项伟大的成就,但这成就的取得是在克服了美国医学会许多所谓最大努力的前提下实现的,而不是因为有了它。 — Milton Friedman ## Mentioned Milton Friedman, Bill Keating, Dr. Max Gammon, Dr. Gunnar Biörck, Jimmy Carter, Abraham Flexner, American Medical Association, Interstate Commerce Commission, Medicare, Medicaid, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Mayo Clinic, Duluth Clinic, Group Health Association, National Health Service, Karolinska Institute, Food and Drug Administration, Capitalism and Freedom, Flexner Report ## Video description Increasing government involvement in medical care will take us toward fully socialized medicine. This trend is clearly against the interests of patients, physicians, and other health care personnel. There is, of course, no such thing as "free" health care--you either pay for it directly, or via the tax system, with bureaucrats taking their usual cut along the way. The reality of the situation is that government involvement in the economics of medical care leads directly to higher costs for that care. There is no special role for government in medical care. Government should do there only what it does in other fields: Enforce laws against fraud and deception, and offer some assistance (comparable to flood or tornado relief) to those in extreme medical distress. Recorded at Mayo Foundation, Rochester, MN ©1978 / 45:26. 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Source quotes

[2:45] Milton Friedman: 美国的医疗服务供应取得了巨大的进步;这是一项伟大的成就,但这成就的取得是在克服了美国医学会许多所谓最大努力的前提下实现的,而不是因为有了它。

Source quotes

[22:46] Milton Friedman: I think one of the freedoms we still ought to preserve in this country is the freedom for people to be foolish with their own money. [43:56] Milton Friedman: The problem of poverty is money, and we ought to have a program under which we assure a minimum level of income and then let people spend it the way they want. [2:45] Milton Friedman: In industry after industry, producers who protest most strongly their belief in free markets have fostered and helped produce government takeover, government regulation, government control. [11:54] Milton Friedman: In addition to the fact that the ultimate result of a government takeover is less resources, you invariably get lower quality and a lower quantity of medical care. [33:22] Milton Friedman: I think the FDA has been an unmitigated disaster over the past twenty years. [38:01] Milton Friedman: A man who was licensed thirty years ago may be thoroughly incompetent now.

Original transcript

[0:09] Reality - captured in [0:11] user friendly symbols and [0:13] processed for understanding. [0:15] ♪ Music ♪ [0:32] The Idea Channel [0:36] I'm very glad to introduce our [0:39] speaker, Milton Friedman [0:42] as a friend. Milton, the [0:43] floor is yours. (applause) [0:55] Thank you, Bill. I'm going [0:57] to talk about the [0:58] economics of medical care. [1:01] This is an area in which, [1:03] as we all know, there has [1:05] been a trend toward ever [1:06] greater government [1:07] involvement. Chairman [1:09] Keating referred [1:10] essentially to that trend [1:11] in his comments. One step [1:15] in this area inevitably [1:17] leads to another. We have [1:19] had an expansion of [1:20] government involvement in [1:21] the spending of money; [1:23] Medicare, Medicaid funds, [1:26] expenditures by the [1:28] Department of Health, [1:29] Education, and Welfare for [1:30] other medical purposes [1:32] have been growing by leaps [1:33] and bounds. They have gone [1:35] from a very tiny portion [1:38] of total national [1:40] expenditures on medical [1:41] care to a substantial [1:42] portion. The spending for [1:45] the provision of medical [1:46] care inevitably leads to [1:48] control over the fees that [1:50] are charged for medical [1:51] care. And it should. If [1:53] government is going to [1:54] spend money, it ought to [1:55] be concerned with what it [1:56] pays for what it gets. [1:58] Control over fees [2:00] inevitably leads to [2:01] control over the practices [2:04] that are followed... over [2:06] the behavior of the [2:10] medical personnel. And if [2:13] this trend continues, it [2:14] inevitably leads to [2:15] completely socialized [2:17] medicine. I believe that [2:20] this trend, including many [2:22] of the steps that have [2:23] already been taken, is [2:25] very much against the [2:27] interests of patients, of [2:29] physicians, and of other [2:31] health care personnel. [2:34] And in the brief time I have [2:35] available today, I want to [2:36] explain why I believe the [2:39] trend is so much against [2:41] their interest, why it has [2:43] occurred, and what if [2:44] anything can be done about it. [2:45] The trend toward [2:49] increasing government [2:50] involvement in health care [2:51] is not an isolated [2:52] phenomenon; it is not [2:53] restricted to health care. [2:55] It is part of a general [2:57] trend in our society [2:59] toward replacing voluntary [3:02] free-market arrangements [3:04] by government control and [3:05] regulation. It is a trend [3:07] that is happening all [3:08] over; it has happened in [3:10] one industry after [3:11] another. There is nothing [3:13] special in this respect [3:15] about the move to [3:17] replacing private [3:19] voluntary medical [3:21] arrangements with [3:22] compulsory governmental [3:23] arrangements. This [3:24] movement in the medical [3:26] care field is not special [3:28] in another sense. [3:31] In industry after industry, [3:34] producers who protest most [3:36] strongly their belief in [3:37] free markets have fostered [3:41] and helped produce [3:42] government takeover, [3:44] government regulation, [3:45] government control. The [3:49] oldest historical case was [3:51] in the railroad industry, [3:55] where the railroad [3:58] entrepreneurs helped to [3:59] foster upon us the [4:00] Interstate Commerce [4:01] Commission and all that [4:02] followed. The same thing [4:03] has been true in every [4:04] other area. Most recently, [4:06] the steel industry, which [4:07] talked so loudly of its [4:09] belief in free enterprise, [4:11] has been strongly in favor [4:12] of government restrictions [4:13] on imports, in favor of [4:16] tariffs and the like. [4:19] In medicine, this same [4:20] process has been at work. [4:22] Indeed I would say that it [4:24] is particularly true in [4:25] medicine. A large part of [4:28] the pressure for [4:29] socialized medicine in the [4:30] United States, in my [4:31] opinion, and I may say [4:33] this is not merely [4:34] opinion; it is based on a [4:37] considerable examination [4:38] of the evidence, a large [4:40] part of the pressure has [4:42] derived from the policies [4:43] which have been followed [4:44] over the decades by the [4:46] American Medical [4:47] Association, policies [4:49] which were adopted in the [4:51] name of improving medical [4:53] care, policies which I [4:55] have no doubt that the [4:57] leaders of medicine [4:59] regarded as desirable for [5:00] improving medical care, [5:02] but policies which have in [5:04] practice had the effect of [5:07] restricting entry into [5:08] medicine, holding down [5:12] both the quantity and the [5:13] quality of medical care, [5:15] and inhibiting the most [5:17] efficient modes of [5:19] providing and distributing [5:20] medical care. There has [5:24] been great progress in the [5:25] provision of medical care [5:26] in the United States; [5:27] it has been a great [5:29] achievement, but it's been [5:31] an achievement despite [5:33] many of the best efforts [5:35] of the American Medical [5:36] Association, not because [5:37] of it. This is a [5:39] particularly appropriate [5:41] place to illustrate my [5:42] point, because the Mayo [5:45] Clinic is a shining [5:47] example of how medical [5:49] care might have developed [5:50] in the United States, if [5:51] it had not been for the [5:53] power of organized [5:54] medicine. The Mayo Clinic [5:59] started, as you all know, [6:03] in the late part of the [6:04] nineteenth century or the [6:06] early part of the [6:07] twentieth century; the [6:08] exact dating is a question [6:10] of dispute. But the [6:12] important point is that it [6:14] started before 1910. [6:16] 1910 was the year in which [6:19] there appeared the famous [6:20] Flexner Report, Abraham [6:21] Flexner's report on [6:22] American medical schools, [6:24] which provided the basis [6:25] for an enormous expansion [6:27] in the power and the [6:28] control which organized [6:30] medicine was able to [6:31] exercise over medical [6:33] education and over medical [6:35] practice. That power was [6:39] used effectively in the [6:41] 1920s, in the 1930s and [6:42] later, to hamper at every [6:45] turn the kind of group [6:47] practice that Mayo Clinic [6:51] is so successful at. [6:54] I venture to predict that if [6:56] the brothers Mayo had [7:01] tried to organize the [7:03] clinic and its practice as [7:05] they did in the 1920s or [7:07] 30s, I doubt very much [7:11] that anything comparable [7:12] to the Mayo Clinic could [7:13] ever have developed or [7:14] been achieved. If you look [7:19] at the numerous examples [7:20] around the country of [7:21] similar attempts, a few [7:23] managed to survive... the [7:26] Ruth Kluse Clinic. Many of [7:28] you know about the case of [7:29] Washington Group Health [7:31] which brought an antitrust [7:33] suit against the American [7:34] Medical Association, which [7:35] it won. Very few occasions [7:40] have groups of physicians [7:43] who wished to practice [7:44] jointly, and particularly [7:46] in a slightly different [7:47] arrangement than Mayo's [7:49] with prepaid care, they [7:51] had enormous difficulty in [7:53] getting established [7:54] because of the concerted [7:56] opposition of the American [7:59] Medical Association. [8:01] This is not the place or the [8:02] time to explain why [8:05] organized medicine took [8:07] this approach. It was [8:09] because of certain [8:10] features of individual [8:11] practice that no longer [8:12] are important, in [8:13] particular the sliding [8:14] scale which has [8:16] disappeared with the [8:17] emergence of insurance on [8:19] a wide scale. But whatever [8:22] the reason, the effects [8:24] are clear. In my opinion, [8:26] if the American Medical [8:27] Association had not [8:28] exercised the monopoly [8:30] power which it did over a [8:31] long period of time, [8:33] American medicine would [8:34] have developed very [8:35] differently than it in [8:36] fact has. It would have [8:38] developed, in my opinion, [8:39] primarily through [8:40] organizations such as the [8:41] Mayo Clinic, through joint [8:44] teams of hospitals and [8:45] physicians. And I believe [8:47] that that would have [8:48] provided more adequate, [8:51] more inexpensive, and [8:52] higher quality medical [8:54] care to the American [8:55] people. To begin with, [8:58] a greater involvement of [9:01] government in medicine may [9:03] seem to serve the [9:04] interests of at least the [9:06] purveyors of medical care [9:08] by providing an additional [9:10] source of finance. This is [9:13] the honey that has led [9:16] persons in industry after [9:18] industry to support and [9:21] promote governmental [9:23] involvement which has [9:25] reacted ultimately against [9:26] them. I have been [9:28] impressed again and again [9:29] with how often [9:31] businessmen, leaders in [9:33] various areas- who are [9:35] very farsighted when it [9:37] comes to their own [9:38] activities and concerns [9:39] within their enterprises, [9:41] are very shortsighted when [9:42] it comes to the area of [9:43] public policy and allow [9:45] themselves to be led by [9:47] small advantages to foster [9:50] and favor policies which [9:52] ultimately redound very [9:53] much to their [9:54] disadvantage. In the [9:56] medical care, the initial [10:00] inducement is that here is [10:02] a new source of money. And [10:03] presumably, this is why [10:05] organized medicine has [10:06] been schizophrenic about [10:09] the trend toward [10:10] government involvement. [10:12] It has, on the one hand, [10:13] tended to protest against [10:15] the move toward socialized [10:16] medicine. It has, on the [10:17] other hand, engaged in [10:19] activities which have [10:21] promoted that development- [10:23] most recently by a [10:25] commission established by [10:26] the American Medical [10:27] Association on the costs [10:28] of medical care, which it [10:30] would be very hard to [10:31] describe as a balanced [10:33] commission. But although [10:36] initially it might appear [10:38] as if the purveyors of [10:39] medical care could get [10:40] additional resources by [10:42] tapping the governmental [10:44] till, that is a transitory [10:46] phenomenon. When the [10:49] government is taking over [10:50] any activity, there is [10:52] more money available. But [10:54] what typically happens is, [10:55] once the government has [10:56] taken it over, the [10:58] situation changes. There [11:00] are no more votes to be [11:01] gotten by taking it over [11:02] some more. You have to [11:04] move on to new fields and [11:05] take over new areas in [11:06] order to get some new [11:08] votes. And the result of [11:09] that is that those areas [11:10] already taken over get [11:11] starved. And instead of [11:13] there being more resources [11:14] available, there are [11:15] fewer. The most obvious [11:17] example, the most striking [11:19] example is Great Britain. [11:22] As you know, national [11:24] medicine, socialized [11:25] medicine was introduced in [11:27] Britain immediately after [11:28] World War II. It is now [11:29] some thirty years old. [11:30] There have been a number [11:31] of careful studies made of [11:33] the total amount of money [11:34] now being spent in Britain [11:36] on medical care, and the [11:38] amount you might have [11:39] expected to be spent if [11:43] you still had an [11:44] essentially voluntary [11:45] private system- estimates [11:46] made by seeing what the [11:48] relationship was before [11:50] the war between income and [11:52] expenditures on medical [11:54] care, estimates made by [11:55] seeing what fraction of [11:56] income people in other [11:57] countries spend on medical [11:59] care. These estimates show [12:01] in no uncertain terms that [12:04] you would be having a [12:05] larger total sum of funds [12:07] devoted to medical care in [12:09] Great Britain today, [12:11] if you did not have a state [12:14] system of the provision of [12:15] medicine. In addition to [12:20] the fact that the ultimate [12:21] result of a government [12:22] takeover is less [12:24] resources, you invariably [12:27] get lower quality and a [12:28] lower quantity of medical [12:30] care. The experience of [12:32] the United Kingdom is [12:33] again clear. I am going to [12:36] cite from a study that was [12:37] made by a British [12:38] physician, Dr. Max Gammon, [12:40] who spent five years [12:41] studying the British [12:43] Health Service. He wrote a [12:45] report in December 1976 on [12:48] the public provision for [12:49] medical care in Great [12:50] Britain, and I quote: [12:52] "[National Health Service] [12:54] brought centralized state [12:55] financing and control of [12:57] delivery to virtually all [12:58] medical services in the [13:00] country. The voluntary [13:02] system of financing and [13:03] delivery of medical care [13:05] which had been developed [13:06] in Britain over the [13:07] preceding 200 years was [13:09] almost entirely [13:10] eliminated. The existing [13:12] compulsory system was [13:13] reorganized and made [13:15] practically universal." He [13:17] goes on: "No new hospitals [13:19] were in fact built in [13:23] Britain during the first [13:24] thirteen years of the [13:25] National Health Service [13:27] and there are now, in [13:29] 1976, fewer hospital beds [13:32] in Britain than in July [13:34] 1948 when the National [13:36] Health Service took over." [13:38] And I might add, of the [13:40] hospital beds which there [13:42] are now in Britain, [13:43] two-thirds are in [13:45] hospitals that were built [13:47] before 1900 by private [13:50] medicine and by private [13:52] activity. Mr. Gammon, in a [13:56] rather amusing way, [13:57] developed what he called a [13:58] theory of bureaucratic [14:00] displacement. He argued [14:02] that, whenever you have [14:03] any organization taken [14:05] over by a bureaucracy like [14:07] a government, what tends [14:08] to happen is that input [14:11] goes up and output goes [14:13] down, that useless work [14:15] tends to displace useful [14:16] work, in a further [14:18] extension of Parkinson's [14:19] Laws. And he illustrated [14:21] with hospital service in [14:22] the United Kingdom. [14:24] He took the eight-year period [14:26] from 1965 to 1973. In that [14:30] eight-year period the [14:31] hospital staff, the number [14:33] of people went up 28 [14:35] percent. Incidentally, [14:37] administrative and [14:38] clerical help went up 41 [14:40] percent. But what about [14:43] output? What about what [14:45] they were producing? Input [14:47] was up. Well, he measured [14:49] output by the average [14:50] number of beds occupied [14:52] daily. It turned out that [14:55] the average number of beds [14:56] occupied daily went down [14:58] by 11 percent. And he [15:01] hastened to go on to [15:02] explain that the decline [15:04] in the average number of [15:06] beds occupied was not from [15:07] want of patients; that at [15:09] all times, there was a [15:10] waiting list in the [15:12] neighborhood of 600,000 [15:14] people waiting for [15:16] hospital beds. I don't [15:18] know how many of you know [15:19] the scandals in Britain [15:20] about the waiting period [15:23] for what is regarded as [15:26] optional or postponable [15:27] surgery including, for [15:29] example, bypass operations [15:32] for heart problems. There [15:34] are stories of people who [15:36] waited three years to have [15:37] a bypass operation because [15:39] that could be postponed. [15:41] Indeed some of them [15:42] managed to die before the [15:44] operation was performed. [15:48] But 600,000 people on the [15:50] waiting list- and for more [15:53] obviously postponable [15:56] operations, the wait may be [15:58] much longer than three years. [16:00] Well, Britain is [16:02] one case. I might add also [16:05] that you know physicians [16:08] have been fleeing Britain [16:10] when they could. The [16:11] number of physicians [16:13] annually emigrating from [16:14] Great Britain to other [16:15] countries is about [16:16] one-third the number of [16:17] physicians being graduated [16:18] each year from their [16:19] medical schools. As you [16:23] also know, the process is [16:26] inexorably moving in [16:27] Britain. The National [16:30] Health Service in Britain [16:31] permitted private practice [16:32] to exist alongside state [16:35] practice, but to a very [16:36] limited extent. There is [16:38] now strong pressure and [16:40] movement to try to [16:41] eliminate private practice [16:42] altogether, and make it [16:44] compulsory that all [16:45] practice be in the [16:48] socialized sector. On the [16:49] other side of this, there [16:51] is growing up a voluntary [16:53] health insurance [16:54] arrangement with nursing [16:55] homes and the like to [16:56] supplement the inadequate [16:57] governmental provision. [17:00] Let me turn to Sweden. [17:02] I quote from a report by Dr. [17:04] Gunnar Biork, in Minnesota [17:08] I should be able to [17:09] pronounce a Swedish name, [17:10] but it takes more than [17:13] physical connection. He is [17:16] a professor of medicine at [17:18] the Karolinska Institute, [17:20] he is the head of the [17:21] department of medicine at [17:22] a major hospital in [17:23] Stockholm, he formerly [17:25] was, and maybe still is, a [17:26] physician to the king of [17:27] Sweden. He gave a paper in [17:30] 1976 at the University of [17:32] Chicago on "How to Be a [17:34] Clinician in a Socialist [17:36] Country," and I quote from [17:38] his paper: "It is obvious [17:40] that the existence of a [17:42] competing free market [17:43] constitutes a continuous [17:45] threat to the operation of [17:46] a socialist public [17:47] service, however heavily [17:49] subsidized by taxpayers' [17:51] money. The element of [17:53] quality that derives from [17:55] patients' personal [17:56] preference for and [17:57] confidence in certain [17:58] doctors cannot easily be [18:00] done away with so as long [18:02] as people are willing to [18:03] pay for a free choice of [18:05] physicians. To do away [18:07] with such opportunities, [18:08] therefore, has become a [18:10] new goal of Swedish health [18:12] care politicians. . . The [18:14] introduction of these [18:15] various regulatory [18:16] processes has resulted in [18:18] a cancerous growth in the [18:20] numbers of medical [18:21] administrators at all [18:23] levels of incompetence. [18:27] The Board of Welfare has [18:28] recently issued a 60-page [18:31] book trying to describe [18:34] how to calculate the [18:35] number of physicians [18:36] needed to cover the [18:37] necessary staff of any one [18:39] clinical department. [18:41] The book is a fascinating [18:42] monument over the total [18:44] absurdity into which [18:45] legislators, [18:46] administrators and [18:47] trade-union [18:48] representatives have [18:50] finally brought a [18:51] previously simple and [18:53] efficient machinery. [18:55] The setting in which medicine [18:57] has been practiced during [18:58] thousands of years has [19:00] been one in which the [19:01] patient has been the [19:02] client and employer of the [19:03] physician. Today the [19:05] State, in one [19:06] manifestation or the [19:08] other, claims to be the [19:09] employer and, thus, the [19:11] one to prescribe the [19:12] conditions under which the [19:13] physician has to carry out [19:14] his work. These conditions [19:16] may not, and will [19:18] eventually not be [19:19] restricted to working [19:20] hours, salaries and [19:23] certified drugs; they may [19:25] invade the whole territory [19:26] of the patient-physician [19:28] relationship. If the [19:29] battle of today is not [19:31] fought and not won, there [19:32] will be no battle to fight [19:34] tomorrow." Coming back to [19:36] the United States, I need [19:38] not tell the people in [19:39] this room what has been [19:40] happening in American [19:41] medicine. I've already [19:42] mentioned the growth of [19:44] Medicaid and Medicare, but [19:46] you all know about PSR's [19:48] and HMO's and about the [19:50] proposed lid to be placed [19:52] on hospital costs. [19:54] This morning's newspaper [19:56] carried a story that [19:57] President Carter was [19:58] planning to introduce into [20:01] congress a bill for [20:02] national health insurance [20:04] sometime in the near [20:05] future. The argument is [20:09] being made that all of [20:12] this is necessary because [20:13] there has somehow been a [20:14] terrible rise in hospital [20:16] costs which the American [20:18] people either cannot [20:19] afford, or which can [20:21] somehow be eliminated, by [20:23] wise government [20:24] bureaucrats. Most of these [20:29] stories always refer, [20:31] always deal with the [20:32] benefits that will be [20:33] received and say nothing [20:34] about who is going to pay [20:35] the costs. There is only [20:37] one source from which the [20:38] costs can be paid, and [20:39] that is the American [20:40] people. The only question [20:42] is whether they are going [20:43] to be mediated through [20:45] bureaucrats with a [20:47] substantial discount being [20:49] taken off for cash, or [20:51] whether they are going to [20:52] be spent directly by [20:54] people on their own [20:55] behalf. So far as the rise [20:57] in hospital costs, part of [20:59] it is undesirable and [21:01] unnecessary. Part of the [21:03] rise in hospital costs has [21:04] been a result of the [21:06] expansion of governmental [21:08] spending on Medicare and [21:09] Medicaid, with the result [21:11] of the many scandals that [21:12] we have had in this area [21:14] and with upward pressure [21:15] on prices. But in the [21:16] main, the rise in hospital [21:18] costs reflects primarily [21:22] the decisions on the part [21:23] of millions of American [21:24] citizens about what they [21:26] want to buy. It reflects [21:28] one of the great American [21:29] innovations, the spread of [21:31] voluntary private hospital [21:34] and health insurance among [21:36] the population at large. [21:38] The major reason for the [21:40] rise in the cost per day [21:42] of hospital care is not a [21:44] rise in prices in excess [21:46] of inflation- not at all. [21:48] The major reason is an [21:50] increase in the number and [21:52] the variety, and [21:53] complexity of the [21:56] procedures that are being [21:57] used, of the tests that [21:58] are being made, of the [21:59] services that are being [22:00] rendered to the American [22:02] citizen. The cost of [22:04] hospital care has been [22:05] going up for exactly the [22:06] same reason that the [22:08] amount of money being [22:09] spent on automobiles went [22:10] up during the 1920s and [22:11] 1930s... because, in the [22:12] main, the public at large [22:14] has wanted to buy more [22:17] medical care and the [22:18] market has been responding [22:20] to their demands. [22:22] The costs have not been rising [22:23] primarily because [22:24] hospitals are inefficient. [22:25] I have no doubt they are, [22:27] but they've been [22:28] inefficient all along. [22:29] There's been no great [22:30] increase in their [22:31] inefficiency. The costs of [22:33] medical care have not been [22:35] rising because physicians [22:36] are grasping. Of course, [22:37] physicians are grasping- [22:38] so are all of us; we're [22:40] all of us greedy- but they [22:42] have not become more [22:43] grasping and more greedy. [22:45] No, the main reason for [22:46] the rise in costs is [22:47] because there has been [22:48] pressure to expand [22:49] services and provide a [22:51] different variety. Now [22:52] maybe customers have been [22:54] silly. Maybe they've been [22:55] foolish and wasting their [22:56] money in various [22:57] directions. But I think [22:59] one of the freedoms we [23:00] still ought to preserve in [23:01] this country is the [23:02] freedom for people to be [23:03] foolish with their own [23:04] money. Now the question [23:09] is: what is the answer? [23:11] In the first place, is there [23:14] any role for government in [23:15] the medical care field at all? [23:16] In my opinion, there [23:20] is no special role for [23:22] government in the medical [23:24] care field with the [23:26] exception of the public [23:27] health activities of [23:28] government, where there is [23:29] a special problem. But I'm [23:30] now talking about private [23:32] medical care, about [23:33] personal medical care or [23:35] individuals: I believe [23:36] there is no special role [23:38] for government in the [23:39] medical care field at all. [23:41] That there is the same [23:42] role for government in [23:43] this area as there is in [23:44] every other field. And [23:46] indeed, I started out by [23:47] emphasizing what has been [23:48] happening in medicine does [23:50] not derive from anything [23:52] special to medicine other [23:54] than the activities of the [23:55] AMA. It's been applying [23:57] all across the board. [23:59] It's been part of the general [24:00] trend, whereby it will [24:03] take another ten days [24:06] before people in the [24:07] United States can stop [24:08] working to pay the [24:09] expenses of government, [24:10] and can start to work to [24:11] pay their own expenses. [24:16] What is the role of [24:17] government in the medical [24:18] care field, as in other [24:19] fields? To enforce laws [24:21] against fraud and [24:22] deception; to help people [24:24] who are in dire distress. [24:27] There is an argument to be [24:28] made about the fact that [24:30] some people may not be able, [24:33] on some cases of [24:36] emergencies, to stand very [24:38] large, major medical [24:40] bills, just as some people [24:43] may be in dire distress [24:44] because they lose their [24:45] homes with a flood or a [24:47] hurricane. Some people may [24:49] be in dire distress [24:50] because they become [24:51] disabled or otherwise. [24:53] Insofar as the government [24:55] has programs to assist [24:57] people in dire distress, [24:58] it ought to include people [24:59] in dire medical distress. [25:01] But I think there is no [25:02] other special role for [25:04] ordinary medical care, [25:06] there is no case for [25:07] government financing at all. [25:08] The costs of ordinary [25:11] medical care are well [25:12] within the means of the [25:13] average American family. [25:15] And the problem of [25:17] sometimes costs being [25:19] large and sometimes small [25:21] is currently readily [25:23] handled through the [25:24] availability of private [25:25] insurance arrangements. [25:26] Eighty percent of all [25:27] hospital bills today are [25:29] being paid through [25:30] third-party payments on [25:31] insurance. I have no doubt [25:33] that those insurance [25:34] arrangements could be [25:35] improved. I have no doubt [25:36] that they will. This is a [25:37] field in which innovation [25:39] is still going on. [25:41] I myself believe it would be [25:42] desirable to have greater [25:44] major medical coverage, [25:47] to have larger deductibles, [25:48] more co-insurance [25:50] arrangements, and other [25:51] devices. Those are [25:52] details; they can and will [25:54] be improved. But insurance [25:56] enables every family in [25:58] the United States, except [25:59] those who may have to be [26:01] on the public purse for [26:02] other reasons, to provide [26:04] for its own medical care. [26:07] Let me point out that, [26:09] although the private [26:10] expenditure on medical [26:11] care has been growing as a [26:13] percent of income, as [26:14] people have become more [26:15] affluent and have wanted [26:16] to spend more of their [26:17] money on medical care, yet [26:19] total expenditures on [26:21] medical care is less than [26:23] two-thirds as much as [26:24] total expenditures on [26:25] housing, is less than [26:27] three-quarters as much as [26:29] total expenditures on [26:30] automobiles. To put the [26:31] comparison another way, [26:34] the people of the United [26:35] States spend as much on [26:36] making themselves [26:37] unhealthy, by purchasing [26:40] cigarettes and alcohol on [26:43] which the medical evidence [26:45] is overwhelming that [26:46] that's a way to increase [26:49] your medical bills, not [26:50] reduce them. I'm not [26:53] objecting to people doing [26:54] this, because people ought [26:55] to be free to hurt [26:58] themselves as well as to [26:59] help themselves, so long [27:00] as they do it at their own [27:01] expense. But the American [27:03] people are spending on [27:04] tobacco and alcohol a sum [27:06] of money each year which [27:07] is 40 percent as much as [27:09] they are spending on [27:10] medical care in total. [27:13] So we are not talking about [27:14] sums that are beyond the [27:15] capacity of the individual [27:16] family at all. In my [27:20] opinion, the major [27:21] problems which we now have [27:22] in medicine are the result [27:23] of government involvement, [27:24] not an excuse for [27:25] additional government [27:26] involvement. And in my [27:29] opinion, the right cure [27:30] would be all the way: [27:32] no government regulation, [27:34] no government subsidization, [27:36] and take the point which [27:37] will shock most of you- [27:38] and yet which is equally [27:39] important, no licensure of [27:42] physicians. That point is [27:46] included because of the [27:47] necessity of reducing and [27:48] eliminating the monopoly [27:49] power of the American [27:50] Medical Association. That [27:52] monopoly power has derived [27:54] almost entirely from the [27:56] fact that the practice of [27:58] medicine is an activity [28:00] which can be engaged in by [28:01] only those who have [28:02] licenses from government. [28:04] And the control over that [28:06] licensure procedure is [28:07] what has enabled the [28:08] American Medical [28:09] Association to exercise [28:10] its monopoly power for [28:11] these many decades. [28:14] I realize that this is a [28:15] shocking statement to most [28:16] of you. I realize that in [28:18] the few minutes at my [28:19] disposal I cannot persuade [28:20] you of it. I only suggest [28:22] to you that it is not a [28:24] random, casual comment [28:27] which is not based on [28:28] considerable evidence, [28:29] considerable examination [28:31] of the effects of this [28:32] procedure. You will find a [28:34] full discussion, a full [28:36] case for this argument- [28:38] I hate to advertise [28:40] myself... (laughter) you know, [28:44] we hate it but we love it--in [28:47] a book, which [28:49] I wrote with the [28:51] assistance of my wife some [28:53] sixteen years ago, called [28:55] Capitalism and Freedom. [28:57] In which there is a chapter [28:58] on licensure of [28:59] occupations in which I [29:00] discuss such things as the [29:02] licensure of beauticians, [29:04] morticians, professional [29:06] wrestlers, and the like. [29:09] But there's no point [29:11] knocking over straw men. [29:12] The strongest case in [29:14] favor of licensure is in [29:16] the field of medicine, and [29:18] therefore I examined in [29:19] detail that case and found [29:21] it wanting. And I only [29:22] want to suggest one thing [29:23] to you, and particularly [29:25] to the physicians who are [29:26] in this room. If I say to [29:29] you, "Do you favor the [29:31] kind of monopolistic [29:33] practices which the [29:34] American Medical [29:35] Association has followed [29:36] over the past forty, fifty years?" [29:38] I suspect that [29:39] most of the physicians [29:40] would say, "No, I oppose them." [29:41] If I say to them, [29:43] "Are you in favor of [29:46] permitting the unlicensed [29:47] practice of medicine?" [29:49] I suspect most of the [29:50] physicians would say, "No, [29:51] I'm not in favor of that. [29:52] I am opposed to it." [29:54] I just urge on them that [29:56] they had better choose [29:57] which of those propositions [29:58] they want to believe. [29:59] They cannot [30:00] believe both, because to [30:02] believe both is to say that two [30:03] and two make five. [30:05] If we continue [30:06] with the licensure of [30:08] medical practice, then [30:10] either government or [30:12] organized medicine is [30:13] going to have monopoly [30:14] power in the field. [30:16] You cannot have a free [30:17] competitive medical field; [30:19] you cannot have an open [30:21] field and an elimination [30:24] of these monopolistic [30:25] restrictions unless you [30:27] eliminate the power of [30:28] government at that crucial [30:29] element. I don't expect to [30:31] persuade you of it. I only [30:33] want to suggest to you [30:35] that it is not really as [30:36] crack-brained and [30:37] thoughtless an idea as it [30:39] might as first appear to [30:40] you to be; that on the [30:42] contrary, in my opinion, [30:44] it would provide for [30:47] better medical care, more [30:49] widely available, at lower [30:51] cost for the bulk of the [30:52] people; and that it would [30:54] be the only effective way [30:55] of preventing what seems [30:59] to be a floodtide toward [31:01] the complete socialization [31:02] of medicine. We are facing [31:05] drastic problems. They [31:08] will not lend themselves- [31:11] I guess I have to use [31:12] medical analogies- they [31:13] will not lend themselves [31:14] to Band-Aid solutions. [31:17] We have to look at the source [31:18] and the cause of our [31:19] difficulties. Again, this [31:22] problem does not stand [31:23] alone. It stands as part [31:25] of the general problem [31:26] that this nation faces, [31:29] and that is whether we are [31:30] going to continue down the [31:31] road to a completely [31:32] collectivist society in [31:33] every area, as we have [31:35] been going for the past [31:36] forty years, or whether we [31:38] are going to take thought [31:39] and halt that trend. [31:41] I believe that the public at [31:43] large, in many areas is [31:47] beginning to be more [31:48] sophisticated about what [31:50] can be accomplished [31:51] through government, and [31:53] that public opinion is [31:54] there to back us. I say to [31:56] people who say we have to [31:57] have government medicine [31:58] in there, "Would you mind [32:00] first telling me which of [32:02] the other great reforms of [32:04] government have achieved [32:05] their objectives? I take [32:06] it you mean the federal [32:07] housing program has solved [32:09] the problem of housing for [32:10] the low-income groups. [32:12] I take it you mean that the [32:13] federal welfare program [32:15] has solved the problems of [32:17] indigence and dependence, [32:19] that federal urban renewal [32:20] and reconstruction [32:23] programs have solved the [32:24] problem of urban blight." [32:26] People, after all, are [32:28] catching on. So I think it [32:31] is not entirely hopeless [32:33] that we can stop this [32:34] march and turn it back. [32:35] Thank you. (applause) [32:55] Dr. Friedman, concerning your [32:56] non-controversial [32:57] comments, that there's no [33:02] place for government in [33:03] private medicine, what are [33:06] your views on the [33:08] regulatory powers of the [33:09] FDA and the work that they [33:11] are trying to do? [33:12] Well, you have a great many [33:15] heart specialists in this [33:17] room, I think... or some. [33:20] I think if you ask them, [33:21] they will tell you that [33:22] there are some excellent [33:23] beta blockers which are [33:25] available in Great Britain, [33:26] in Canada, and in [33:28] the rest of the world- but [33:30] cannot be sold in this [33:31] country because of FDA [33:32] regulations. I have seen [33:35] estimates from reputable [33:36] physicians that the [33:37] availability of those beta [33:38] blockers would save [33:39] roughly ten thousand lives [33:40] a year. I believe the FDA, [33:43] as it has been operating, [33:45] has done vastly more harm [33:46] than good. I have no doubt [33:52] that it has prevented some [33:53] bad drugs from coming on [33:54] the market. But in [33:57] compensation for this, it [33:59] has also prevented some [34:00] very good drugs from [34:01] coming on the market. It [34:02] has made the cost of [34:03] discovering and developing [34:04] new drugs... it has [34:06] increased it enormously. [34:08] It has driven medical [34:09] research out of this [34:10] country and into other [34:11] countries. So I think the [34:12] FDA has been an [34:13] unmitigated disaster over [34:15] the past twenty years. Yes sir? [34:17] Dr. Friedman, I think [34:20] many of us would agree [34:21] with you about national [34:22] health insurance, but, [34:24] looking at it from a [34:26] pragmatic standpoint, what [34:28] do you think the [34:29] possibilities are here [34:30] within the next two years? [34:33] Of national health insurance? [34:33] Yes. Well, I [34:36] don't think they are very [34:37] good, I'm glad to say. [34:40] But they are not very good for [34:42] a reason which is not, [34:44] unfortunately, a desirable [34:47] reason. The prospects are [34:49] not very good simply [34:50] because of the budgetary [34:52] pressures. The government [34:54] budget has been rising out [34:56] of hand; it's going to be [34:58] $500 billion estimated for [34:59] next year. Here we are in [35:02] the fourth year of an [35:04] expansion with a deficit [35:05] of over $50 billion [35:06] looming, the various [35:10] national health insurance [35:11] plans that have been [35:12] proposed would involve [35:13] very large expenditures, [35:14] $30-40-50-60-70 [35:16] billion--you can get any [35:17] number you want. [35:19] As a result, in the immediate [35:21] future I do not see any [35:23] prospects of the enactment [35:26] of national health. [35:28] Moreover, there is no... [35:30] in my opinion, there is no [35:32] widespread public pressure [35:33] for national health. [35:35] You know, people are always [35:36] saying government does [35:38] these things because of an [35:39] overwhelming public [35:40] demand. Nonsense... the [35:42] demand has to be drummed [35:43] up and developed the way [35:45] in which Madison Avenue [35:46] develops a campaign for a [35:49] new toothpaste. There is [35:51] no public demand for [35:54] national health insurance. [35:55] Of course, everybody would [35:56] like to have somebody else [35:57] pay his medical bills for him, [35:59] but people aren't [36:00] that foolish and they [36:01] recognize that if you have [36:03] a national health system [36:05] they are, one way or [36:06] another, going to have to [36:07] pay the bills. And so I do [36:09] not believe there is any [36:10] very great public demand [36:11] for it. But nonetheless, [36:13] there is great pressure [36:14] for it, and the pressure [36:16] is deriving from various [36:17] special groups that have [36:18] special interests to play, [36:19] including the medical [36:21] profession. There is [36:23] pressure on the medical [36:24] profession because they [36:25] want to get more money, [36:26] and instead of there being [36:28] a principled opposition on [36:29] the part of the medical [36:30] profession to the idea of [36:32] national health insurance, [36:34] of socialized medicine- [36:35] let's not call it national [36:36] health insurance. It's not [36:38] national health insurance. [36:39] There is nothing national [36:40] about it; it's for [36:41] individual people. There [36:42] is no health about it [36:43] because it will make [36:44] medical care less good; [36:47] it will make the health of [36:48] the American people worse. [36:49] And there is no insurance [36:50] about it because it's [36:52] simply a government [36:53] payout, government [36:54] subsidization. But there [37:01] has been, so far as I can [37:02] see, a diminishing [37:04] resistance by the medical [37:05] profession itself against [37:06] national health insurance- [37:08] certainly by organized [37:09] medicine. There are a [37:10] small number of fringe [37:12] organizations of [37:13] physicians that are [37:15] strongly opposed to [37:16] national health insurance, [37:18] socialized medicine- I'm [37:19] going to stop using the [37:20] word...to socialized [37:22] medicine and they have [37:23] been producing material [37:25] and so on, but it seems to [37:27] me that it is past time [37:28] for the profession as a [37:30] whole to look ahead and [37:33] see what's coming, and [37:35] take much more effective [37:36] action than they have- [37:38] not to cooperate with it, [37:41] not to think that you are [37:42] going to be able to ride [37:43] that tide. You may ride it [37:44] for a time, but sooner or [37:45] later, you are going to be [37:48] on the bottom instead of [37:49] on the top. [37:53] But nonetheless, I think you [37:54] have a period of time in [37:55] which to do it because of [37:56] the budgetary restraints [37:58] and the pressures of [37:59] inflation. Yes sir? [38:01] Dr. Friedman, I'm fascinated [38:02] by your question, or your [38:03] statement that licensure [38:05] is something that has had [38:06] a harmful effect, [38:09] especially in the area of [38:10] medicine. I think this [38:11] probably comes as a bit of [38:13] a shocker to most of us. [38:15] How do you answer the [38:16] particular problem which [38:18] relates to control, say, [38:20] of quackery, of [38:21] inadequately trained [38:22] individuals who are [38:24] dealing with situations [38:25] where vital decisions of [38:27] course don't have the [38:28] option for the normal slow [38:31] process, of people getting [38:33] education and finding out? [38:35] What goes on during that [38:36] particular period and do [38:37] you worry about that? [38:39] Sure... you should worry [38:40] about that. Let me ask you [38:41] first a very simple [38:42] question. How many people [38:44] do you know who pick their [38:45] physician by opening the [38:46] Yellow Pages, taking all [38:47] the licensed physicians, [38:48] and taking a pin and [38:49] sticking it in? Quite a [38:51] number I would suspect [38:54] might. Maybe... I don't [38:55] know very many who do. [38:58] My point is that having a [39:00] license is no assurance of [39:01] the ability to practice [39:02] medicine. A man who was [39:04] licensed thirty years ago [39:06] may be thoroughly [39:07] incompetent now. [39:09] So licensure is no assurance [39:10] of quality. In the next [39:12] place, we have lots of [39:14] other assurances of [39:15] quality. The fact that a [39:16] man may offer himself as a [39:18] physician doesn't mean [39:19] that he can misrepresent [39:20] his training. If I hang [39:22] out a shingle saying I'm a [39:23] graduate of the Harvard [39:24] Medical School when I'm [39:25] not, then I should be sued [39:29] for fraud and [39:30] misrepresentation. So that [39:32] there's nothing about the [39:33] absence of licensure that [39:34] makes it unnecessary for [39:36] people to be able to [39:37] demonstrate their [39:38] capacities. And indeed, [39:40] you would be more inclined [39:42] under that kind of system [39:43] to look at what an [39:44] individual's [39:45] qualifications were. We [39:46] don't require licensure [39:47] for lots of skilled [39:48] professions. We don't [39:49] require licensure in most [39:50] states for an architect, [39:52] yet very few architects [39:54] are able to practice [39:55] successfully without [39:56] having good training. [39:58] In the next place, the way in [39:59] which we... and this is [40:01] why I linked this [40:02] discussion to the Mayo [40:04] Clinic, the way in which [40:05] most of us get assurance [40:06] of quality about anything [40:07] is not because we directly [40:09] can judge. If I go buy a [40:11] shirt at the store, [40:12] I can't judge the quality of [40:13] a shirt. If I buy an [40:14] automobile, I can't judge [40:15] the quality of the [40:16] automobile. We get our [40:18] assurance from the middle [40:19] man: from the department [40:21] store which stands in back [40:22] of the shirt and which has [40:23] a strong incentive to [40:24] provide me with good [40:25] shirts; from the dealer [40:27] who wants to stay in [40:28] business for a long time [40:29] selling cars... has an [40:30] incentive to provide [40:31] assurance of quality. [40:33] People who come to Mayo [40:34] get their assurance of [40:35] quality from the fact that [40:36] the Mayo Clinic has a very [40:38] strong incentive to choose [40:41] able, well-trained [40:43] physicians. In the absence [40:45] of licensure and the [40:47] restrictions on entry that [40:49] accompanied it, you would [40:50] have had a much greater [40:51] development of hospital [40:53] group practice of this [40:54] kind which would have [40:55] provided a very much more [40:57] effective technique of [41:00] selection, of quality of [41:02] medicine. Next, the fact [41:05] that you have had [41:06] licensure has made it much [41:08] more difficult over [41:09] decades to eliminate [41:12] low-quality practice. [41:15] As you know, in recent years [41:17] you have had a spate of [41:18] medical malpractice suits. [41:20] One of the main reasons [41:21] why you did not have many [41:22] more of them earlier was [41:23] because the American [41:24] Medical Association had a [41:25] concerted policy of making [41:28] it extremely difficult. [41:31] Physicians who were [41:32] willing to testify in such [41:33] cases found that they lost [41:34] their hospital [41:35] credentials. Why is [41:38] licensure so essential? [41:40] Because it is the key to [41:41] the power of organized [41:42] medicine. Without it, they [41:45] would have no power to do [41:47] harm. They would have lots [41:48] of power to do good, but [41:49] no power to do harm. [41:50] Why is that the case? Because [41:52] the key to the control of [41:53] medicine starts with who [41:55] is admitted to practice. [41:57] Now you cannot do it at [41:58] the stage of licensure [41:59] itself. If a man has [42:01] gotten through medical [42:02] school, if he has interned [42:04] and so on, it is going to [42:05] be very hard ultimately to [42:06] deny him a license; [42:10] he's going to take the exam [42:11] over and over again. [42:13] If you want to control entry- [42:14] and don't make any mistake [42:16] about this; the evidence [42:17] is overwhelming that there [42:18] was a deliberate policy on [42:19] the part of the medical [42:20] association in the 1930s [42:22] to keep down the number of [42:24] physicians; that policy [42:25] has changed in recent [42:26] years for various reasons, [42:27] but it was a policy for a [42:28] long time. The most [42:30] effective way to do it is [42:31] before people start going [42:32] into medicine. And [42:37] licensure was the key to [42:38] this because the licensure [42:39] laws in almost every [42:41] state, as result of the [42:44] pressure of organized [42:46] medicine, required that [42:47] nobody may be licensed who [42:48] is not a graduate of an [42:50] approved medical school. [42:51] And by some strange [42:52] accident, the list of [42:54] approved schools in every [42:55] state is identical with [42:57] the list of schools [42:58] approved by the Council on [42:59] Medical Education and [43:00] Hospitals of the American [43:01] Medical Association. And I [43:03] can go down a long line [43:05] and you will discover [43:06] every time you look at [43:08] this that the key element [43:09] is licensure. Now [43:10] moreover, licensure is [43:12] critical to preventing the [43:14] unauthorized practice of [43:15] medicine. You and I know, [43:17] and many of us know, that [43:18] there are many medical [43:19] practices which can [43:20] perfectly well be carried [43:22] out by people who do not [43:23] have the full training, [43:26] people who are medical [43:27] technicians. There has [43:29] been some increasing use [43:30] of them in recent years, [43:31] but one of the main [43:32] factors that has prevented [43:33] a more effective use of [43:35] medical technicians, a [43:36] more effective use of [43:37] physicians, has been the [43:39] definition of what is [43:40] medical practice and what [43:41] is unauthorized. You [43:42] started me on a subject on [43:43] which I could go a long [43:44] time, but perhaps I've [43:45] said enough to suggest [43:47] that it isn't quite as [43:48] simple as it may seem at [43:49] the outset, that a label [43:51] of good housekeeping is [43:52] not the same thing. [43:56] Yes ma'am? Dr. Friedman, you [43:58] mentioned that 80 percent [43:59] of the people in the [44:00] country are covered by [44:01] private insurance plans. [44:03] I am curious as what your [44:05] proposal would be to cover [44:06] those who presently are [44:08] not covered and those [44:10] truly who cannot afford at [44:12] this point, because they [44:13] are below the so-called [44:14] poverty level. They are [44:15] not in organized labor; [44:17] they are not a member of a [44:18] large corporation which [44:20] provides such a plan for [44:21] its employees. I said [44:22] before I do not believe [44:24] you ought to have any [44:25] special program for [44:26] medicine at all. [44:27] I believe- I have long been [44:29] in favor of substituting [44:30] for our present whole set [44:31] of welfare arrangements a [44:35] comprehensive negative [44:36] income tax which would [44:38] provide to individuals [44:39] below a level a sum of [44:43] money which would assure [44:44] that they would be able to [44:45] maintain a particular [44:46] level. There is no reason [44:47] why a part of that sum of [44:49] money could not be spent [44:50] on the purchase of the [44:51] same kind of medical [44:52] insurance everybody else [44:53] has. I have long been [44:54] opposed, and I think you [44:55] should be opposed, to [44:56] giving special sums of [44:57] money to people for [44:58] housing and another sum [44:59] for food and another sum [45:01] for clothing and another [45:02] sum for medical care. [45:04] The problem of poverty is [45:05] money, and we ought to [45:07] have a program under which [45:10] we assure a minimum level [45:12] of income and then let [45:15] people spend it the way [45:17] they want. Absolutely. [45:19] Good answer. Thank you.