Smart Meter Teardown Exposes Remote Tariff Powers Over Spy Myths

Inside a smart meter, and the REAL problem with them. — bigclivedotcom

bigclivedotcom

While physical inspection disproves surveillance and radiation conspiracies, the units enable utilities to inflate consumer bills by remotely billing for apparent power and enforcing peak-demand penalties.

AI-assisted summary of Inside a smart meter, and the REAL problem with them. — original source. Check the original for full context.

Source published:

Key ideas

  • A teardown of a fly-tipped smart meter reveals a cellular telemetry system running standard 2G/3G/4G radio hardware, debunking persistent public conspiracy theories regarding 5G death rays, surveillance microphones, and chemical dispersal systems. (4:46)
  • The meter is equipped with a high-current latching disconnect relay that allows utility providers to remotely cut off a customer's power supply over the air if their account falls into arrears. (6:55)
  • The primary consumer risk highlighted is remote software programmability, which allows utilities to switch billing calculations from real power to apparent power (billing for reactive loads) or introduce punitive peak-demand pricing during high-load periods. (11:28)
  • Physical anti-tamper measures include carbon-loaded conductive rubber contacts that trigger an alert or 'dying gasp' cellular transmission via onboard storage capacitors if the casing is breached or power is severed. (1:35)

Detailed notes

## Background Published on YouTube by bigclivedotcom on October 26, 2018, this video features a teardown of a smart meter salvaged from a pile of fly-tipped building materials after the named utility company failed to respond to inquiries. According to the description, Clive investigates the unit's internal hardware while addressing rampant conspiracy theories concerning government spy microphones, spy cameras, chemtrails, and 5G radiation, alongside the meter's capacity for peak-demand pricing.

## TL;DR Clive disassembles a smart electricity meter, detailing its modular cellular modem, tamper-detection pads, optical interface, and massive remote disconnect relay. Along the way, he inspects the manganin shunt and mains tapping architecture, systematically debunking paranoid claims about embedded surveillance microphones, cameras, or harmful high-power radio emissions. He concludes that the genuine danger of the technology is financial rather than conspiratorial, stemming from energy suppliers' ability to remotely alter firmware to bill for apparent power and impose punitive peak-demand tariffs.

## Atmosphere & style The presentation is calm, pragmatic, and laced with dry benchtop humor as Clive methodically unscrews and probes the hardware. His steady, analytical demeanor sharply contrasts with and deflates the hyperbolic conspiracy theories he examines, grounding every claim in physical circuit traces and component datasheets. The viewing experience feels like leaning over the shoulder of an experienced electronics technician who effortlessly transitions from wry jokes about technophobia to sharp, cynical critiques of corporate utility billing practices.

## Bulletin - [04:46](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G32NYQpvy8Q&t=286s) A teardown of a fly-tipped smart meter reveals a cellular telemetry system running standard 2G/3G/4G radio hardware, debunking persistent public conspiracy theories regarding 5G death rays, surveillance microphones, and chemical dispersal systems. - [06:55](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G32NYQpvy8Q&t=415s) The meter is equipped with a high-current latching disconnect relay that allows utility providers to remotely cut off a customer's power supply over the air if their account falls into arrears. - [11:28](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G32NYQpvy8Q&t=688s) The primary consumer risk highlighted is remote software programmability, which allows utilities to switch billing calculations from real power to apparent power (billing for reactive loads) or introduce punitive peak-demand pricing during high-load periods. - [01:35](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G32NYQpvy8Q&t=95s) Physical anti-tamper measures include carbon-loaded conductive rubber contacts that trigger an alert or 'dying gasp' cellular transmission via onboard storage capacitors if the casing is breached or power is severed.

## Key takeaways - [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G32NYQpvy8Q&t=0s) The smart meter features standard heavy brass terminal blocks with a shared neutral path, rather than isolated paths to monitor line and neutral current discrepancies. - [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G32NYQpvy8Q&t=0s) An optical infrared communications port on the front panel provides a magnetic interface for on-site technicians to interrogate the meter and alter parameters. - [01:35](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G32NYQpvy8Q&t=95s) Anti-tamper protection relies on conductive carbon-loaded rubber pads pressing against gold circuit traces, breaking the circuit and triggering an alert if the housing or modem is removed. - [01:35](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G32NYQpvy8Q&t=95s) The removable modem module utilizes large cylindrical capacitors to store enough residual charge for a 'dying gasp' message when mains power is severed. - [04:46](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G32NYQpvy8Q&t=286s) The wireless module operates on standard commercial cellular standards with intermittent packet transmissions, exposing occupants to RF levels equivalent to an ordinary mobile phone. - [06:55](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G32NYQpvy8Q&t=415s) The meter contains a massive internal latching relay that remains normally closed without continuous power draw, energizing only when commanded to remotely disconnect service. - [06:55](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G32NYQpvy8Q&t=415s) An internal Hall effect sensor is positioned adjacent to the disconnect relay to detect external neodymium magnets placed to defeat or jam the mechanism. - [06:55](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G32NYQpvy8Q&t=415s) Optocouplers form an isolation barrier between the mains-referenced measurement circuitry and the low-voltage serial data lines connected to the communications modem. - [09:07](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G32NYQpvy8Q&t=547s) Current measurement is conducted across an electronically welded manganin alloy shunt integrated directly into the live busbar path. - [09:07](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G32NYQpvy8Q&t=547s) A metal oxide varistor provides transient overvoltage clamping between phase and neutral, though Clive questions the absence of visible series thermal cutoffs in case of degradation. - [11:28](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G32NYQpvy8Q&t=688s) Unlike electromechanical Ferraris-disc meters that inherently measure real power, smart meters can be remotely configured to bill for apparent power (volts multiplied by amps), penalizing consumers for reactive loads. - [11:28](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G32NYQpvy8Q&t=688s) Remote network programmability enables energy providers to dynamically implement peak-demand pricing spikes during typical evening household usage hours. - [11:28](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G32NYQpvy8Q&t=688s) The rollout relies on traditional meter readers being trained to install smart meters, effectively automating away their own long-term employment. - [13:56](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G32NYQpvy8Q&t=836s) Internal logic and cellular power are tapped on the incoming mains side before the disconnect relay, ensuring communications remain active even when customer power is remotely severed.

## Detailed walkthrough ### [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G32NYQpvy8Q&t=0s) Provenance and External Features

The teardown begins with an explanation of how the smart meter was acquired. Viewers Andy and Lucas were out walking when they stumbled across a fly-tipped pile of builder's rubble and rubbish containing a couple of discarded meters. Because a utility company's name was clearly printed on the unit, they reached out to offer them back, asking if the company was aware they had been dumped. When the company failed to respond, they forwarded the meters to Clive, which he notes “was the correct thing to do.” Clive takes care to cover the external serial numbers with tape to protect everyone involved, admitting that this is actually the second take of the video because he dismantled the meter earlier only to uncover another hidden serial number inside.

Inspecting the meter's exterior reveals standard security and electrical arrangements. The lower terminal cover unclips, revealing holes meant for a tamper-evident sealing wire and crimp. Behind the cover sit four heavy brass terminals arranged as live in, common neutral in the middle, and live out. Clive expresses surprise at finding a shared neutral block rather than isolated neutral paths, remarking: “The common neutral bit surprises me I thought they might actually monitor live and neutral current flow independently to detect if people are trying to bypass a meter in somewhere.” The front housing features a push-button keypad, likely provided for prepayment customers who fall behind on their electricity bills and need to enter numeric top-up codes to restore credit. In addition, an optical infrared communication port ringed by a magnetic collar is present on the front fascia, allowing utility meter readers to slap on an optical probe to interrogate the unit and alter system parameters.

```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Smart Meter Functional Architecture accDescr: Diagram illustrating the mains power path, metering components, and isolated communications modem.

subgraph MainsPath["Mains Power Path"] LIN["Live In"] --> RELAY["High-Current Disconnect Relay"] RELAY --> SHUNT["Current Sense Shunt"] SHUNT --> LOUT["Live Out"] NEUT["Common Neutral"] end

subgraph MeterCore["Main Meter Board"] PSU["Low-Voltage Power Supply"] HALL["Hall Effect Magnetic Sensor"] BATT["3.6V Primary Lithium Cell"] OPTO["Opto-Isolators"] IR["Infrared Optical Port"] KEY["Prepayment Keypad"] end

subgraph ModemModem["Cellular Modem Module"] HDR["10-Pin Data Header"] ARM["ARM Microcontroller"] SIM["Manx Telecom SIM Card"] CAPS["Dying Gasp Capacitors"] ANT["PCB Trace Antenna / Ext Port"] end

MainsPath --> PSU PSU --> MeterCore MeterCore <--> OPTO OPTO <--> HDR HDR <--> ModemModem ```

[01:35](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G32NYQpvy8Q&t=95s) The Wireless Modem and Anti-Tamper Mechanisms

Dismantling the upper bay exposes the detachable wireless communications modem module that provides the meter's smart functionality. Removing the cover reveals a deliberate physical security system: carbon-loaded conductive rubber pads built into the outer casing press directly down against exposed, gold-flashed contacts on the circuit board below. Clive demonstrates that pulling either the outer lid or the module off breaks this continuous circuit, which triggers an internal anti-tamper flag or immediately radios home to alert the utility company that unauthorized access has occurred. Beside the module header sits a 10-pin interface connector handling low-voltage power and bidirectional serial communications between the meter core and the radio hardware.

Prying open the carrier module reveals a standard, plain white SIM card. Clive wagers that the connectivity is powered by Manx Telecom, noting that regardless of where one is in the world, the Isle of Man provider has historically served as a massive roaming data backbone for mobile and telemetry applications due to its early pioneer status in telecommunications. The module also features an auxiliary SMA-style antenna jack cutout through the side of the case for rural installations where indoor cellular reception is poor. Internally, the modem board hosts an ARM processor, a cellular modem baseband chip, an auxiliary wireless chip possibly intended for short-range Bluetooth or in-home display pairing, and an etched PCB trace antenna. Dominating the board are two massive cylindrical capacitors, which Clive suspects are reserve storage components:

> “Some modems have the facility that if they lose power they will use the residual charge of capacitor to just send a little logging off cord or an error code maybe that is an anti tamper device if you were to suddenly unplug us it holds enough charge on these big capacitors to actually send a message saying and tamper detected...”

- Tamper detection relies on flexible, carbon-loaded rubber bridging blocks resting against gold-plated circuit pads. - The cellular radio board incorporates its own dedicated ARM processing core and an etched, rugged circuit-board trace antenna. - The unit accepts an optional external cellular antenna lead for properties located in signal dead zones. - Dual storage capacitors provide "dying gasp" energy reserves so the modem can transmit a final distress signal if mains power is severed.

[04:46](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G32NYQpvy8Q&t=286s) Conspiracy Theories vs. Cellular Reality

Clive pauses the disassembly to confront the wide range of bizarre public panics and online conspiracy theories surrounding the rollout of smart meters. He takes aim at pervasive claims that smart meters bathe households in dangerous 5G death rays, cause cancer, harbor clandestine microphones to eavesdrop on homeowners' private conversations, or secretly disperse mood-altering chemical aerosols into living spaces. He compares these fears to recurring historical technophobia, arguing: “It's the blue light from the streetlights and it's all Gatos just any random thing the attention seekers jump on it and their claim it's bad.”

Addressing the electromagnetic reality, he points out that the radio module inside the meter is nothing more exotic than standard 2G, 3G, or 4G cellular hardware identical to an everyday mobile telephone. Rather than continuously beaming high-power radiation into the home, the meter merely checks into the mobile cell tower at scheduled intervals to exchange packet data or send updated consumption readings. He points out that leaving a mobile phone sitting on an ordinary living room table exposes an occupant to the exact same transmission strengths as the meter mounted away inside an external service box or under the stairs.

[06:55](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G32NYQpvy8Q&t=415s) Main Board Disassembly and High-Voltage Switchgear

Removing the front casing and peeling back the rubber keypad membranes brings the high-voltage main board into view. Dominating the lower half of the assembly are heavy brass terminal lugs accompanied by a massive internal power latching relay. This heavy-duty contactor allows the electricity supplier to remotely sever a consumer's power supply over the air if an account falls into arrears. Clive clips a multimeter in diode/continuity test mode across the relay contacts to establish its default resting state. As anticipated, the switch is normally closed, establishing that the meter draws no continuous holding current while the customer is connected and only pulses the solenoid when commanding a disconnect.

Nestled immediately beside the relay mechanism stands an upright semiconductor that Clive identifies as a Hall effect magnetic sensor. This component serves as an anti-fraud measure, detecting whether a consumer has placed an ultra-strong neodymium magnet against the plastic meter enclosure in an attempt to magnetically stall the disconnect relay or distort the measurement circuitry. The main board also hosts a self-contained low-voltage switch-mode power supply and an optical isolation barrier. Optocouplers sit across the division separating the mains-referenced circuitry from the low-voltage communication lines feeding the modem module, protecting the radio hardware from high-voltage transients while facilitating two-way serial data transmission. Soldered directly to the board is a 3.6-volt primary lithium cell designed to maintain clock memory and internal logging during an outage; probing the cell reveals an active reading of 3.65 volts, showing it remains in prime condition.

> “I would expect that maybe normally closed and only powered when they want to disconnect you because that would take the load off it it is it's normally bridging through and it's only when they power that but it's going to disconnect you that makes sense.”

[09:07](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G32NYQpvy8Q&t=547s) Current Shunt, Transient Protection, and RF Sensing

Clive examines the heavy-current busbar path leading through the meter to understand how electricity consumption is sampled. Rather than using an inductive current transformer (CT) coil or measuring along the raw copper busbar, the phase conductor features a dedicated slug of specialized metal—likely manganin—electronically welded directly into the line. This precision shunt provides a calibrated, temperature-stable resistance over a compact physical span, across which sensitive metering chips can monitor voltage drop to calculate instantaneous current. Clive notes that concentrating the resistance into this small welded segment must generate some localized heat under heavy continuous loads.

Turning to the surge suppression circuitry, Clive spots a massive Metal Oxide Varistor (MOV) wired directly between incoming phase and neutral to clamp overvoltage spikes. However, he observes a concerning absence of series thermal cutoffs or fuses nearby, raising doubts about fire safety should the varistor degrade from repeated surges:

> “So does that mean that if this metal oxide varistor is to gradually feel over time if that's what it is it would actually potentially get quite hot in there without anything to cut out not sure that seems a bit odd...”

He scans the layout for any RF sniffer tracks or dedicated radio-frequency jammer detection coils designed to flag attempts to disrupt the meter's communications using handheld transmitters, but finds only a few unused surface test pads. The construction appears to be a robust double-sided or multi-layer printed circuit board using dedicated metering application-specific integrated circuits situated alongside the primary shunt.

- Current measurement is handled by a welded low-resistance shunt alloy slug spliced into the primary live busbar. - Transient surge protection relies on a heavy-duty MOV bridging line and neutral, though lacking obvious thermal disconnect protection. - The main PCB uses either multi-layer or dense double-sided routing with dedicated current-sensing logic adjacent to the power rail.

[11:28](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G32NYQpvy8Q&t=688s) Internal Electronics and the Real Threat of Smart Tariffs

Examining the printed circuit board, Clive points out components marked as Hall effect sensors optimized for current sensing, along with a resistor network used for voltage sensing to correlate with that current. Looking over the board, he observes a large shield over what appears to be a standard switch-mode power supply, noting wryly that there is no spy microphone to be seen: “I'm not seeing a microphone in here that will please the conspiracy theorists or maybe it wouldn't please the conspiracy theorists.”

```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Smart Meter vs Traditional Meter Measurement Capabilities accDescr: Flowchart contrasting how mechanical meters measure real power versus how smart meters can be programmed to measure apparent power or enforce time-of-use tariffs.

subgraph Mech["Traditional Mechanical Meter"] M1["Rotating Ferraris Disc"] --> M2["Measures V x I Phase Relationship"] M2 --> M3["Bills for Real Power (Watts)"] end

subgraph Smart["Remotely Programmed Smart Meter"] S1["Voltage & Current Sensors"] --> S2{"Remote Firmware / Tariff Mode"} S2 -->|"Apparent Power Mode"| S3["Raw V x I (VA) — Ignores Phase Angle"] S2 -->|"Peak Demand Mode"| S4["Time-of-Use Rate Hikes (e.g., Dinner Time)"] end ```

Clive turns to what he considers the genuine, frustrating issue with the rollout: the high degree of remote control suppliers have over these units. Traditional Ferraris-wheel electromechanical meters are inherently accurate at measuring real power because their spinning disc naturally accounts for the phase relationship between voltage and current. Smart meters, however, can be commanded over the network to alter their measurement methodology. Specifically, they can be configured to ignore power factor entirely, calculating apparent power instead by taking the raw current and simply multiplying it by the line voltage.

Beyond billing for reactive loads, remote programmability allows energy companies to manipulate dynamic tariffs. Clive warns that customers will be lured into switching with promises of initial cost savings, only for suppliers to leverage small print that permits unilateral metering changes. During periods of high wholesale electricity prices, suppliers can penalize consumers through peak demand pricing: “...they could introduce peak demand so when they're paying a lot more for the electricity they penalize you directly by saying if you use too much power round about the time you're cooking tea this unit will charge you twice as much during that period of time...”

Finally, Clive laments the social cost of the technology on the utility workforce. Traditional meter readers are being "upskilled" by large outsourcing firms to install these new digital devices: “...they're basically being taught how to install the meter that's replacing their job and once all the meters have been installed what they're going to do are they're gonna lay them off...”

- **Core Sensing Components:** Hall effect current sensors and a dedicated precision resistor divider network for mains voltage measurement. - **Power Calculation Abuse:** Ability to switch remotely from real power ($W$) to apparent power ($VA$), charging domestic customers for inductive or capacitive reactive power. - **Dynamic Pricing Risks:** Remote activation of punitive time-of-use or peak-demand multipliers during typical evening cooking hours. - **Labor Impact:** Manual meter readers are trained to install the very hardware engineered to automate them out of employment.

---

[13:56](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G32NYQpvy8Q&t=836s) Circuit Topology and Debunking Conspiracy Theories

Tracing the remainder of the meter's internal architecture, Clive notes that the device is heavily integrated and functional even if the wireless communications module is disconnected. Underneath the shielding sits a substantial microprocessor handling the calculations. The meter incorporates a primary mains disconnect relay, filtering stages, and basic anti-tamper switches.

Inspecting the passive components around the input circuitry, he spots an apparent Class-Y capacitor, which seems unusual given that the unit lacks an earth connection, suggesting it may be coupling high frequencies across to the incoming neutral or phase line for filtering. Tracing the power supply path through a resistor and an inductor, Clive determines that the meter’s internal logic draws its operating power directly from the incoming mains side rather than the metered load terminals. This ensures that opening the internal disconnect relay to cut off a customer's power does not inadvertently kill power to the meter’s own processor and remote communications.

```mermaid flowchart LR accTitle: Internal Mains Tapping and Isolation Architecture accDescr: Schematic flow showing how the internal smart meter logic taps power before the disconnect relay to maintain connectivity when customer power is killed.

Inlet["Incoming Phase & Neutral"] --> PowerTap["Internal Meter PSU"] PowerTap --> Logic["Microprocessor & Cellular Modem"] Inlet --> Relay["Mains Disconnect Relay"] Logic -->|"Remote Trip Command"| Relay Relay --> Terminals["Phase Out to Consumer"] ```

Reflecting on the device's construction, Clive dismisses the sensationalist rumors that circulate around smart meter rollouts. The meter contains no surveillance gear, no optical lenses, and produces no dangerous radiation; the physical anti-tamper mechanisms are actually simpler than anticipated, relying primarily on switch levers rather than complex perimeter wire-trap detection. Assessing the unit overall, he concludes: “It's boring in the sense that it's just heavily integrated and there's not much to see,” closing out the teardown by confirming the meter is simply a well-engineered, robust piece of industrial electronics whose real threat lies in its billing software rather than urban myths.

- **Internal Power Draw:** Tapped ahead of the main isolation relay so the microcontroller and modem stay alive and reachable even if the customer is disconnected remotely. - **Conspiracy Claims Addressed:** - *Harmful Radiation:* None beyond standard cellular modem data transmissions. - *Audio Surveillance:* No microphones present. - *Visual Spying:* No cameras or lenses installed on the boards. - **Tamper Protection:** Relies on straightforward microswitches to flag enclosure opening, without overly elaborate defenses against terminal-probe bypassing.

## Mentioned bigclivedotcom, Manx Telecom, ARM, Alexa, YouTube

## Video description A look at the insides of a modern smart meter with wireless modem. This meter was found amongst a pile of fly-tipped building materials. The company named on it was contacted but failed to respond, so that means we can take it to bits. I've covered the serial number as I usually do with shady things, to avoid the wrath of angry midgets. While I'm inside I also investigate the conspiracy theories about:- Government spy microphones. (Like Alexa for instance.) Chemtrail brain control chemicals. Spy cameras. Brain irradiating 5G death waves. The ability of the meter to be programmed to read apparent power and apply peak demand pricing.

If you enjoy these videos you can help support the channel with a dollar for coffee, cookies and random gadgets for disassembly at:- http://www.bigclive.com/coffee.htm This also keeps the channel independent of YouTube's advertising algorithms allowing it to be a bit more dangerous and naughty.

[Source](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G32NYQpvy8Q)

中文简报

拆解智能电表:击破间谍谣言,揭示远程电价控制风险 物理检测虽打破了监控与辐射阴谋论,但这类设备却让公用事业机构能通过远程按视在功率计费并实施用电高峰罚款,从而推高用户电费账单。 Clive拆解了一台智能电表,详细展示了其模块化蜂窝调制解调器、防篡改触点、光电接口以及大型远程断电继电器。在此过程中,他检查了锰铜分流器和市电抽头结构,系统性地驳斥了有关内置监控麦克风、摄像头或有害高功率射频辐射的偏执传言。他得出结论认为,该技术的真正危险源于经济层面而非阴谋论,即能源供应商有能力通过远程修改固件,按视在功率计费并征收惩罚性的高峰用电电费。 对一台遭非法倾倒的智能电表进行拆解后发现,其蜂窝遥测系统采用标准的2G/3G/4G无线电硬件,驳斥了公众长期流传的关于5G致命射线、监控麦克风以及化学喷洒系统的阴谋论。 (4:46) 该电表配备了一个大电流自锁式断开继电器,一旦用户账户欠费,公用事业供应商即可通过无线网络远程切断用户的电力供应。 (6:55) 指出消费者面临的主要风险在于软件的远程可编程性,公用事业机构借此可将计费计算从有功功率改为视在功率(对无功负载计费),或在高负荷期间引入惩罚性高峰需求定价。 (11:28) 物理防篡改措施包括充碳导电橡胶触点;若外壳被强行打开或电源被切断,板载储能电容会触发报警或发出蜂窝网络“断电告警”(dying gasp)传输。 (1:35)

Reading summary

A teardown of a discarded smart meter by Clive of bigclivedotcom demonstrates that public fears regarding domestic surveillance and lethal radiation are unfounded, while identifying the genuine threat in suppliers' remote control over billing formulas and dynamic tariffs. Physical Security and Communications Architecture (1:35) The meter integrates a detachable cellular communications board connected to the main unit via a 10-pin interface and isolated through optocouplers. The radio module features an ARM processor, an etched PCB trace antenna, an auxiliary SMA antenna port for low-reception areas, and a plain SIM card. Physical anti-tamper security relies on carbon-loaded conductive rubber pads that press against gold-flashed circuit pads; removing either the outer housing or the modem breaks the connection to flag an intrusion. To ensure alerts can be transmitted during power cuts or physical disconnection, the modem board incorporates two large storage capacitors that provide 'dying gasp' reserve energy to send final telemetry messages. Technical Reality Versus Surveillance Conspiracies (4:46) Clive explicitly rejects pervasive online claims alleging that smart meters emit harmful 5G radiation, trigger cancer, harbor covert listening microphones, or disperse mood-altering chemical aerosols. Physical inspection confirms the absence of microphones, optical lenses, or exotic transmission systems. The communications hardware operates using standard 2G, 3G, or 4G cellular protocols identical to commercial mobile phones. Because the device only contacts local cell towers at scheduled intervals to transmit telemetry packets, Clive points out that an occupant experiences equal or greater electromagnetic exposure from an ordinary smartphone left on a living room table than from a meter housed inside an external service box. High-Voltage Switchgear and Surge Safety (6:55) Power path management is handled by a heavy-duty latching disconnect relay. Multi-meter continuity testing confirms the relay is normally closed, meaning it draws no continuous holding current during standard operation and only receives an electrical pulse when the utility commands a remote service disconnection. To prevent consumers from stalling the relay or distorting measurement circuitry with external neodymium magnets, a Hall effect sensor is mounted adjacent to the contactor. Current measurement utilizes a precision manganin alloy slug electronically welded into the primary live busbar rather than an inductive coil. Clive raises safety concerns regarding the surge suppression circuitry. While a heavy-duty Metal Oxide Varistor (MOV) bridges incoming phase and neutral to clamp voltage spikes, it lacks adjacent thermal cutoffs or fuses, which could pose an overheating hazard if the component degrades after repeated surges. Remote Tariff Exploitation and Workforce Impact (11:28) Clive argues that the most serious issue with smart metering lies in remote programmability. Traditional electromechanical Ferraris meters measure real power in watts ($W$) by physically factoring in the phase relationship between voltage and current. In contrast, smart meters can be reconfigured remotely to calculate apparent power in volt-amperes ($VA$), billing domestic consumers directly for reactive power drawn by inductive or capacitive loads. Remote firmware control also enables suppliers to unilaterally institute peak-demand pricing, penalizing customers with higher rates during high-wholesale periods such as evening cooking hours. Clive also highlights the labor consequence of the rollout, observing that traditional meter readers are being retrained by outsourcing companies to install the digital hardware that will permanently automate their jobs. The teardown concludes that the smart meter is a robust, heavily integrated piece of industrial electronics whose primary risks stem from utility pricing power and remote network control rather than popular health and surveillance myths.

精炼阅读摘要

电子工程师 Clive 对废弃智能电表的硬件拆解表明,公众围绕所谓辐射杀伤或间谍监听的恐慌毫无技术根据,该设备本质上是高度集成的标准蜂窝数据终端。Clive 指出,智能电表的真正威胁在于供电公司获得的单向远程控制权,包括任意切换视在功率计费、引入惩罚性峰值电价,以及对传统抄表工人岗位的技术性淘汰。 模块化通信与反篡改硬件架构 (1:35) 智能电表的通信功能由一个独立的插拔式无线电调制解调器模块提供。该模块搭载专用的 ARM 微处理器、基带芯片、PCB 板载天线、可选的外接 SMA 天线接口,以及一张常见于跨国物联网漫游的 Manx Telecom SIM 卡。为防止物理入侵,外壳采用了由导电橡胶块按压在主板镀金触点上的防拆触发结构;一旦外壳被掀开或模块被拔出,通路断开即会记录异常。板上还并联了两个大容量圆柱形电容,Clive 推测其作为“垂死喘息”(dying gasp)储能单元,在主电源被意外或恶意切断时,能利用残存电量向供电公司后台发送最后的离线或告警数据报文。 在供电与隔离设计上,电表内部逻辑与通信电路的低压开关电源直接并联在进线端,位于主断路继电器之前。这意味着即便供电公司远程断开用户的输出电源,电表的微控制器与无线通信模块依然保持带电在线。高压主回路与低压控制模块之间通过光电耦合器实现电气隔离,防止高压瞬变损坏射频逻辑。此外,主板上焊接了一颗用于断电时维持时钟和日志记录的 3.6 伏一次锂电池,万用表实测读数为 3.65 伏,处于良好备用状态。 破除技术恐慌与电磁辐射现实 (4:46) Clive 结合拆解结果直接回应了网络上针对智能电表的各流言。针对智能电表会发射致命 5G 射线、引发癌症、秘密安装麦克风窃听室内对话或释放化学气溶胶等传言,他将其归为典型的历史性“技术恐惧症”,正如过去人们对路灯蓝光的非理性恐慌一样。内部硬件结构清晰显示,电表内部既不存在任何微型拾音麦克风或光学镜头,也没有任何神秘未知的非常规元器件。 在射频辐射方面,电表使用的无线电模块就是普通的 2G、3G 或 4G 蜂窝硬件,与日常手机完全一致。智能电表绝非持续性向室内发射大功率高能辐射,而是以预设的时间间隔与基站进行短时间的数据包握手,上报用电读数。Clive 强调,将手机放置在客厅茶几上所承受的射频暴露,与安装在室外电表箱或楼梯间深处的智能电表相比毫无本质区别,渲染电表电磁辐射危害纯属脱离实际的博眼球行为。 计量机制、磁干扰防护与元件隐患 (6:55) 电表的高压开关与计量通路依赖厚实的黄铜端子与一组大型磁保持继电器。Clive 使用万用表检测确认继电器静止触点为常闭状态,这意味着在正常连通供电期间线圈不需要持续通电维持,仅在执行远程跳闸断电时才施加脉冲激励,从而降低内部功耗。紧邻继电器位置垂直安装了一颗霍尔效应磁传感器,专门用于防欺诈检测——一旦用户试图在塑料外壳外部吸附强力钕磁铁以卡死继电器或干扰计量,传感器便会立即向后台发出告警。 在电流采样方面,电表并未采用传统的互感器(CT)线圈,而是在火线主母排中直接电子束焊接了一块专用合金分流器(推测为锰铜合金)。计量芯片通过监测这一微小已知阻抗两端的精密压降来计算实时电流,在高负荷持续运行时该处会产生一定局部发热。在防浪涌部分,进线火线与零线之间跨接了一只大型金属氧化物压敏电阻(MOV);但 Clive 表达了对安全裕度的担忧,因为该压敏电阻周围未见串联的温度保险丝或热切断保护,若压敏电阻在长期反复电网浪涌中性能退化发生短路,存在局部过热甚至起火的电气安全隐患。 核心隐患:动态电价操控与劳工冲击 (11:28) 在 Clive 看来,智能电表真正令人不安的风险并非硬件本身,而是公用事业机构通过远程固件与计量软件获得的非对称权力。传统带有旋转铝盘的机械式感应电表天生只能根据电压与电流的相位关系计量真实消耗的有功功率(瓦特)。然而,智能电表拥有完全被远程重新配置的能力,电力公司可以通过下发指令改变计算规则,直接忽略功率因数并以纯粹的电压乘以电流(伏安)按视在功率收费,从而将家庭感性或容性无功负载转变为额外账单成本。 与此同时,远程控制能力为电力供应商操纵动态分时电价提供了便利工具。Clive 警告称,供电公司往往以初期省钱为诱饵吸引用户更换智能电表,随后利用合同细则强制推行峰值需求电价;在傍晚做饭等全民用电高峰期,供应商可以直接将该时段电价翻倍,对普通家庭施加惩罚性账单。此外,这种自动化改造也带来了严峻的社会问题:大量传统上门抄表工人被外包公司以“技能提升”为名培训去安装智能电表,实质上是亲手安装替代自身工作的自动化硬件,面临电表普及后即被裁员的困境。 智能电表从本质上讲是一台高度集成、布局严密的工业级测量与通信终端,拆解彻底粉碎了针对其硬件间谍行为和电磁危害的阴谋论。然而,其技术闭源与单向远程干预机制将计量规则与定价裁量权完全让渡给了公用事业公司,用户真正面临的挑战在于如何防范不透明的动态费率盘剥与无功功率计费风险。

Detailed notes — zh

## Background 该视频由知名硬件拆解博主 bigclivedotcom 于 2018 年 10 月 26 日发布在 YouTube 平台上。视频记录了他对一台在建筑垃圾堆中捡到、且原电力公司未认领的现代无线智能电表进行逆向拆解的全过程,并在简介中说明将借此实测检验诸如间谍麦克风、化学控制脑波、5G 致命辐射以及远程视在功率计费等流行阴谋论与技术争议。 ## TL;DR Big Clive 通过层层拆解深入剖析了现代无线智能电表的内部硬件构造,包括带有防拆导电橡胶触点的外壳、配备“临终喘息”大电容与蜂窝 SIM 卡的无线通信模块,以及集成金属分流器与常闭高压跳闸继电器的主控电路。拆解实物彻底粉碎了坊间关于电表内置麦克风、摄像头或超额 5G 致命辐射等荒诞的民间阴谋论。然而 Clive 指出,智能电表真正令人担忧的“恶心隐患”在于其远程固件重编程能力:供电公司不仅能借此实行高峰惩罚性需求电价,还能通过强行切换至不计相位角的视在功率(apparent power)算法增加收费,同时电表的普及也正导致传统抄表工人面临被迫“自我淘汰”的职场困境。 ## Atmosphere & style 视频洋溢着典型的 Big Clive 式英式幽默与冷静扎实的硬核极客风。博主一边挥舞螺丝刀熟练探查复杂的强电与射频电路,一边以辛辣讽刺的语调逐一戳穿耸人听闻的阴谋论谎言,整场拆解既解气又充满揭秘感。从轻松调侃垃圾堆寻宝,到严肃剖析电力公司利用远程编程在计费算法上“割韭菜”的制度现实,观看过程既有纯粹硬件探秘的快感,又带有一层对现代公用事业垄断控制的深刻反思与无奈。 ## Bulletin - [01:35](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G32NYQpvy8Q&t=95s) 拆解显示智能电表具备精巧的物理防拆机制,外壳与通信模块均设有导电橡胶触点,一旦被撬开便会断路并触发远程报警,内置大电容可在断电瞬间提供数秒续航发送“临终喘息”告警。 - [04:44](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G32NYQpvy8Q&t=284s) 硬件检查彻底推翻了 5G 辐射、内置麦克风窃听与喷放化学气体等阴谋论,该设备仅搭载常规蜂窝调制解调芯片且只在定期上报读数时发射无线信号,内部亦无任何音频传感器。 - [06:48](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G32NYQpvy8Q&t=408s) 智能电表内部配备常闭高压继电器与高阻分流测量块,电路供电直接取自火线输入端,确保电表在远程跳闸切断用户供电后自身仍能保持在线运行与通信。 - [11:28](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G32NYQpvy8Q&t=688s) 智能电表真正的潜在隐患在于电力公司的远程计费控制权,供应商不仅可切换为视在功率计量来惩罚非阻性负载,还能引入高峰需求计费在用电尖峰时段加倍收费。 ## Key takeaways - [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G32NYQpvy8Q&t=0s) 被测智能电表来源于建筑垃圾堆,外壳配有火线输入、共用零线及火线输出端子,并设有预付费充值键盘与红外巡检通信口。 - [01:35](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G32NYQpvy8Q&t=95s) 外壳与调制解调器底层均配有导电橡胶垫,压接在 PCB 镀金触点上,拆卸或拔出模块会瞬间触发防篡改断路告警。 - [01:35](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G32NYQpvy8Q&t=95s) 无线通信模块包含 ARM 处理器、蜂窝调制芯片与短距通信芯片,并配备用于偏远弱信号环境的外置天线接口。 - [01:35](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G32NYQpvy8Q&t=95s) 模块板载大容量“临终喘息”(Dying Gasp)电解电容,断电或强拆时能靠残余电荷维持数秒向基站发送最终下线告警。 - [04:44](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G32NYQpvy8Q&t=284s) 智能电表仅使用常规移动蜂窝网络定期上报读数,平均辐射强度显著低于随身携带的智能手机,5G 辐射致病说纯属谣言。 - [04:44](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G32NYQpvy8Q&t=284s) 正面显示面板背面仅有背光液晶屏、键盘胶片与红外收发管,完全不存在网传的窃听麦克风、摄像头或化学药剂装置。 - [06:48](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G32NYQpvy8Q&t=408s) 主回路采用常闭功率继电器切断欠费供电,正常用电时线圈不耗电以降低能耗,旁置霍尔传感器以防外力磁干扰。 - [06:48](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G32NYQpvy8Q&t=408s) 电路板焊接了一颗不可充电的备用锂电池,实测电压 3.65 V,专门维持掉电时钟运行与底层数据记忆。 - [06:48](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G32NYQpvy8Q&t=408s) 电流测量采用火线串联的高阻合金分流块,但板载金属氧化物压敏电阻(MOV)缺乏热熔断保护,老化击穿可能引发火灾隐患。 - [11:28](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G32NYQpvy8Q&t=688s) 相比机械电表精准测量有功功率,智能电表可被远程重置为视在功率计算,忽略相位差直接将电压电流相乘,增加非阻性负载用户的账单。 - [11:28](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G32NYQpvy8Q&t=688s) 智能电表赋予电力公司推行尖峰费率(Peak Demand Pricing)的能力,可在傍晚做饭等高峰用电时段直接加倍收费。 - [11:28](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G32NYQpvy8Q&t=688s) 电网智能化改造促使抄表工人被培训去安装取代自身岗位的电表,全网铺开后面临严重的结构性裁员危机。 - [13:56](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G32NYQpvy8Q&t=836s) 整表低压供电直接跨接在输入电源侧,由电力公司承担表身功耗,并确保继电器切断负载后通信与主控芯片永不失联。 ## Detailed walkthrough ### [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G32NYQpvy8Q&t=0s) 捡来的智能电表与拆解背景 Big Clive 拿出一台现代无线智能电表进行拆解。这只电表是 Andy 和 Lucas 在散步时于一堆被随意倾倒(fly-tipped)的建筑垃圾与废料中偶然发现的。表壳上印有相关电力公司的名称,他们曾主动发消息联系该公司询问:“你们还要不要这只电表?我们在垃圾堆里捡到了,想确认你们是否知情。”然而对方完全没有回复。于是,他们顺理成章地将电表转寄给了 Clive——Clive 打趣称“这是最正确的做法”。 为了“保护无辜者以及保护我自己”,Clive 预先遮挡了表壳外部的序列号。但这已经是该视频录制的第二版(Take 2),因为在第一次录制中,他拆到内部时赫然发现了另一个未遮挡的序列号。 Clive 对研究这只电表的各项安全设计、防篡改机制以及是否符合预期的安全标准充满了浓厚兴趣。 - **接线端子布局**:底部的密封盖可拆卸,配有穿铅封钢丝的孔洞与压接铅封槽;下方共有四个粗壮的接线端子,从左至右依次为火线输入(Live In)、共用零线(Common Neutral,占据中间两孔)和火线输出(Live Out)。 - **零线设计的疑问**:采用共用零线让 Clive 略感意外,因为他原本预期智能电表会对火线和零线的电流进行独立监测,从而防止有人通过旁路(bypass)绕过计量窃电。 - **外部交互接口**:正面配有物理键盘,推测是专为欠费预付费用户准备的充值界面,用户购买额度后输入一串代码即可恢复或增加用电余额;表盘上还带有现代电表标配的红外通信口,周围装有环形磁铁吸附盘,方便电力巡检人员贴上读取设备调取运行参数。 --- ### [01:35](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G32NYQpvy8Q&t=95s) 无线调制解调器(Modem)与防拆机巧 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 智能电表防拆机与通信模块架构 accDescr: 展示防拆导电橡胶触点、调制解调器与通信天线之间的连接关系 subgraph AntiTamper ["防拆监测机制 (Anti-Tamper)"] A["底盖/外壳导电橡胶垫"] -->|"受压接触"| B["PCB 沉金防拆触点"] B -->|"弹开断路"| C["触发防篡改标志 / 告警"] end subgraph ModemModule ["无线通信模块 (Wireless Modem)"] D["10 针主板接口"] -->|"电源与数据"| E["ARM 处理器 & 调制解调芯片"] E --> F["板载大容量电容 (Dying Gasp)"] E --> G["PCB 印刷板载天线"] E --> H["外置天线接口 (弱信号环境)"] E --> I["全白 SIM 卡 (Manx Telecom)"] end C -.->|"告警信号"| E ``` 拨开外壳后,内部露出了独立的无线蜂窝通信调制解调器(Modem)模块。表壳结构中隐藏着极为精巧的防拆报警机制:保护盖内侧粘有导电碳橡胶垫(carbon-loaded rubber pad),当外壳合紧时,碳垫紧压在主板镀金触点(gold-flash contacts)上;一旦有人撬开或拆卸外盖,触点断开,电表便会立即记录防拆警报,甚至自动给电力公司基站发送偷电/拆机警告“直接把你供出去”。调制解调器模块底部同样设计了对应的碳垫与双金触点,只要模块被拔出,就会立刻触发断开感应。 拔出调制解调器后,可以看到其通过一组 10 针连接器与主板连接,用于传输电源与双向数据。翻开 SIM 卡槽保护片,里面插有一张没有任何花哨印刷的纯白 SIM 卡,隐约可见部分卡号。Clive 推测它很可能来自英国著名的曼岛电信(Manx Telecom),因为无论身处世界何地,这家历史悠久的运营商在全球移动蜂窝网络的数据服务与漫游穿透方面都是行业巨头。 - **天线设计**:模块自带 PCB 走线印刷天线,做工坚固规整;侧面还预留了一个外部天线接口,以便将电表安装在地下室或偏远弱信号环境时引出高增益外置天线。 - **芯片方案**:通信板上搭载了一颗 ARM 架构主控芯片、一颗蜂窝调制解调芯片,以及另一颗独立的短距离通信芯片(推测可能用于本地蓝牙调试或短距红外/射频编程)。 - **“临终喘息”电容(Dying Gasp Capacitors)**:板上并排装有两颗体积巨大的电解电容。Clive 解释其功能类似于“临终喘息”机制,若外部电网突然断电或有人强行拔出模块,电容储存的残余电荷足以维持芯片工作几秒钟,迅速向基站发出最后的登出代码或“检测到非法拆卸”警报。 --- ### [04:44](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G32NYQpvy8Q&t=284s) 击碎阴谋论:5G 辐射、窃听器与化学气体 Clive 在拆卸表壳螺丝的同时,顺带辛辣讽刺了社会上流传的各种有关智能电表的荒诞阴谋论。关于新电表利用所谓的“5G 致命辐射”会导致脑瘤或癌症的说法,Clive 直言不讳地驳斥道: > “seriously what people come out with that the same people who used to say that mobile phones you hold much your head and it's giving you brain trimmers just anything that comes out at all it's the blue light from the streetlights and it's all Gatos just any random thing the attention seekers jump on it and their claim it's bad” 他指出,这些危言耸听的眼球吸引者早年造谣手机贴着耳朵会得脑瘤,后来又攻击路灯里的 LED 蓝光有害。这台电表实际上使用的就是极其普通的标准蜂窝移动网络(与普通手机无异),由于它仅需隔一段时间上报一次读数,其在墙壁上产生的信号辐射强度甚至远远低于你随手扔在桌上的智能手机。 针对所谓“电表内置间谍麦克风偷听说话”或“政府通过电表在室内喷放化学制剂/尾迹云脑控物质”的疯狂谣言,Clive 仔细检查拆下的正面键盘外壳与显示总成,证实面板背后除了一块背光液晶屏、键盘导电胶片以及一对红外收发管外,绝无任何麦克风或可疑元器件。 --- ### [06:48](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G32NYQpvy8Q&t=408s) 主板内部电路:高压继电器、分流器与安全隐患 随着四颗螺丝被拧出,主控高压板完全裸露出来。板子上最显眼的是极其厚实粗壮的纯铜大端子,以及一只尺寸巨大的高压功率断路继电器(Contactor/Relay),电力公司可通过无线远程触发此继电器切断欠费用户的供电。 继电器旁立着一个三脚元器件,Clive 推测为霍尔效应传感器(Hall Effect Sensor),用于检测外部是否有人使用强力钕磁铁试图磁饱和继电器或干扰内部线圈工作。在主板高低压交界处,排列着多颗用于隔离通信信号的光电耦合器(Opto-isolators),以确保外界通信端口与电网高压实现电气隔离。 ```mermaid flowchart LR accTitle: 智能电表火线主回路与测量架构 accDescr: 火线进入后串联金属分流块与高压常闭继电器输出 L_IN["火线输入 (Live In)"] --> MOV["金属氧化物压敏电阻 (MOV)"] MOV -.->|"过压泄放"| N["共用零线 (Neutral)"] L_IN --> SHUNT["焊接高阻合金分流块 (Shunt)"] SHUNT -->|"毫伏级压降"| SENSE["计量采样电路"] SHUNT --> RELAY{"常闭功率继电器"} RELAY -->|"正常导通 / 远程跳闸"| L_OUT["火线输出 (Live Out)"] ``` - **内置备用锂电池**:板上焊接了一颗不可充电的圆柱形一次性锂电池(Lithium Primary Cell),设计用于保障极长工作寿命下的时钟与失电数据记忆。经 Clive 使用万用表直流电压挡实测,该电池电压读数为 **3.65 V**,处于完全饱满的巅峰状态。 - **继电器触点状态实测**:Clive 将万用表切换至二极管/蜂鸣挡测试继电器触点通断,证实其为**常闭(Normally Closed)**状态。这意味着正常用电时线圈完全不耗电,只有在电力公司下达远程切断指令时才会向线圈供电跳闸,这种设计既安全又极大降低了待机功耗。 - **火线分流电阻块(Shunt)**:在火线导电铜条上,Clive 发现了一段额外焊接进去的特殊金属块(带两根测量引线接头)。他推断这是一种控制阻值的精密分流器合金,用于在小范围内产生可供采样的压降以测量大电流,但他也困惑这种局部高阻设计在大负荷下是否会导致内部积聚额外热量。 - **MOV(金属氧化物压敏电阻)火灾隐患**:板上装有一只硕大的浪涌吸收压敏电阻(MOV),一端直接连在进线相线上,另一端直通零线。Clive 指出该回路缺乏配套的热熔断断开机制,若 MOV 长期承受电网浪涌老化劣化并击穿,可能会急剧发热起火却无法自行熔断断开,存在明显的安全隐患。 - **射频干扰防护**:Clive 仔细寻找板上是否存在专门检测 RF 射频干扰器(无线电窃电干扰仪)的内置微型天线,但在主板下半部并未发现有效天线走线,板上部分测试焊盘均处于空置悬空状态。整个电路板为高集成度设计,电流电压传感电路紧凑地围绕在分流器周围。 ### [11:28](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G32NYQpvy8Q&t=688s) 内部传感器与智能电表的真正隐患 在继续检查电表内部的传感器时,Clive 注意到一个标有“H3”的元件,推测这可能是一个霍尔效应传感器(Hall effect sensor),用于针对电流检测进行优化。电源部分看起来像是一个标准的开关电源,但他对电源上方覆盖的大型屏蔽罩感到好奇。环顾电路板,Clive 幽默地指出这里根本没有任何麦克风,这或许会让阴谋论者感到失望,又或者反而让他们更不甘心。电路板上还设有一个电阻网络,显然是用于电压感应,以便与电流检测数据进行关联计算。 随后 Clive 指出了智能电表真正令人担忧的“恶心之处”(shitty part)。与传统机械转盘电表不同——那种带转盘的老式电表非常精准,测量的是电流与电压之间的真实相位关系,即有功功率(real power);而现在的智能电表具备远程编程的能力,电力公司可以远程修改其测量方式。例如,它们可以被设置为忽略相角差,直接将原始电流乘以电压来计算视在功率(apparent power)。Clive 对此提出了强烈的警告: > “This being a smart meter, they do have a lot more control over it, they can enable various functions.” 除了计量方式的变化,智能电表还允许电力公司根据用户所选的费率方案远程下发配置。供电公司往往会以“能帮你省钱”为由推销这些新套餐,虽然首月可能确实便宜,但合同细则中往往规定供电公司有权调整计量与计费规则。未来他们完全可以引入高峰需求计费(peak demand pricing):一旦你在傍晚做晚饭的高峰时段用电过多,电表就会在这一时段收取翻倍的电费,以此来直接惩罚高负荷用电行为。 此外,Clive 还提到了行业人力层面的残酷现实:许多传统的抄表员正在被各类外包公司“提升技能”(upskilled),被安排去学习如何安装这些智能电表。换句话说,他们实际上是在学习如何亲手安装取代自己饭碗的设备。一旦全网的智能电表全部安装完毕,这些被所谓“赋能”的员工很可能直接面临裁员的命运。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Smart Meter Measurement and Pricing Control Flow accDescr: 智能电表远程控制与计费机制流程图 subgraph MeterControl["远程配置控制"] A["电力公司远程下发指令"] --> B{"计量与费率模式选择"} B -->|"模式 A: 传统计量"| C["测量有功功率 (Real Power)<br/>考虑电流与电压相位差"] B -->|"模式 B: 视在功率计量"| D["原始电流 × 电压 (Apparent Power)<br/>忽略相位关系"] end subgraph Billing["动态费率影响"] D --> E["计费增加 (惩罚非阻性负载)"] B -->|"分时/尖峰费率"| F["高峰需求计费 (Peak Demand Pricing)"] F --> G["晚间做饭高峰期加倍收费"] end ``` ### [13:56](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G32NYQpvy8Q&t=836s) 电路架构、防篡改机制与破除阴谋论 在梳理完内部的主要架构后,Clive 总结了这台电表的核心配置:一个简单的防篡改机构(anti-tamper)、一个用于切断供电的跳闸继电器(relay)、一些电源滤波电路、无线调制解调器(modem)模块,以及深藏在下方的一颗厚重的大型微处理器。即使没有无线调制解调器,该设备也能作为一台独立的普通数字电表正常工作。电路板上还出现了一颗看似 Y 级安规电容(Class-Y capacitor)的元件,但由于设备内部并没有接地线(earth),他推测它可能是用于与相线进行耦合,或者电源部分为了抵御某种外部干扰而专门做了特殊设计。 Clive 顺着电路走线进一步追踪供电路径:一个电阻连接到一个电感和一个小焊盘,推测是用于电源输入滤波,该电阻本身可能兼具保险丝(fusible resistor)的功能。通过观察可以发现,输出相线(phase out)仅用于电压监测,并不走大电流;整机内部电路的供电取自输入侧电源(incoming supply)。这种设计十分合理且“利他”——由电力公司侧承担电表自身的运行功耗,更重要的是,一旦内部继电器动作切断输出端供电,电表本身不会断电瘫痪,依然能保持运行并维持通信。 在视频的尾声,Clive 逐一反驳了流传于民间的各种智能电表阴谋论: - **有害辐射论**:根本不存在所谓的致命高频辐射。 - **窃听监控论**:板上完全没有任何麦克风硬件,不可能窃听室内谈话。 - **窥探隐私论**:没有任何内置摄像头。 就防篡改设计而言,Clive 坦言这台电表的物理防护其实比他预期的要精简,除非内部隐藏着非常高明的电子检测算法;否则如果有人企图通过缝隙塞入导线绕过计量,外壳塑料可能会发生形变并切断检测触点。整台电表在工业设计上显得十分坚固且深思熟虑(chunky and well-thought-out),虽然高度集成带来的内部构造略显平淡,但这正是现代智能电表的真实面貌。 - 电表的核心供电回路取自断路继电器之前的输入端,确保继电器切断负载后电表微处理器与通信模块依然在线。 - 设备硬件上不存在任何麦克风、摄像头或异常辐射发射源,彻底打破了坊间流传的监控谣言。 ## Mentioned Big Clive, Andy, Lucas, Manx Telecom, ARM, Alexa ## Video description A look at the insides of a modern smart meter with wireless modem. This meter was found amongst a pile of fly-tipped building materials. The company named on it was contacted but failed to respond, so that means we can take it to bits. I've covered the serial number as I usually do with shady things, to avoid the wrath of angry midgets. While I'm inside I also investigate the conspiracy theories about:- Government spy microphones. (Like Alexa for instance.) Chemtrail brain control chemicals. Spy cameras. Brain irradiating 5G death waves. The ability of the meter to be programmed to read apparent power and apply peak demand pricing. If you enjoy these videos you can help support the channel with a dollar for coffee, cookies and random gadgets for disassembly at:- http://www.bigclive.com/coffee.htm This also keeps the channel independent of YouTube's advertising algorithms allowing it to be a bit more dangerous and naughty. [Source](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G32NYQpvy8Q)

Original transcript

[0:00] a smart meter and I'd like to thank Andy [0:03] and Lucas for sending this they were out [0:06] walking discovered a pile of sort of [0:07] builder's rubble and rubbish and in [0:09] amongst it was a coupla meters and there [0:12] is a name printed in this meter they [0:14] contacted the company involved and sent [0:17] a message and said do you want your [0:18] meters back because we found them here [0:20] and we just wandered a few knew about it [0:21] and the company didn't respond so [0:23] instead they sent them to me which was [0:25] the correct thing to do I have covered [0:27] the serial numbers here to protect the [0:28] innocent and me and this is the second [0:31] tick of this video because I got a ray [0:33] inside and discovered another serial [0:35] number oh dear so let's try that again [0:37] shall we [0:38] I've kind of interests in seeing all the [0:41] safety features and seeing if it's you [0:43] know this is how we would have designed [0:45] it for for security so typical of these [0:47] meters you've got the bottom cover comes [0:49] off and they're all sealable they have a [0:52] wire goes through here and then a little [0:53] crimp goes on then just folds down out [0:55] the way we have the four terminals the [0:58] bottom here we go live in common neutron [1:00] the middle and live blackout again the [1:03] common neutral bit surprises me I [1:04] thought they might actually monitor live [1:06] and neutral current flow independently [1:07] to detect if people are trying to bypass [1:10] a meter in somewhere it has a keypad I'm [1:13] guessing this is an option for people [1:15] who have maybe formed behind their bill [1:16] and they can buy credit and type of code [1:19] and or give them X amount of credit it's [1:22] got the infrared communicator that's [1:24] quite common [1:24] most modern meters there which there's [1:27] got magnetic plate round it and you set [1:29] a little device over and it lets you [1:30] access various parameters this one has a [1:35] modem this is interesting this is a [1:38] natural smart meter and if we pull this [1:39] off it reveals for a start I should go [1:44] back to this when it reveals that if you [1:45] take the cover off this carbon nor did [1:48] Robert pad presses down onto these gold [1:52] flash contacts down here and that's that [1:54] how this unit detects if you take this [1:57] cover off at all hailer flag off in the [1:58] meter or it could send a cord to the [2:00] base and actually snitch you in if you'd [2:03] come and take that cover off [2:04] likewise when you take this off it's got [2:07] another pad that goes onto these two [2:09] gold pads and that would also tell that [2:12] the that this actually [2:13] ignore there's also a couple of ports [2:15] here with nothing in them and going to [2:17] these pads I don't know if that's for [2:18] testing purposes or it's just an [2:20] auxilary couple of contacts don't know [2:22] and then there's a 10 pin connector here [2:25] that just meets with this and presumably [2:27] does power and data let's get into this [2:30] at the Simmons to that lag I will hinge [2:33] this up there is a sim in there it's got [2:36] part of a number on it invisible there [2:38] it's a plain white sim I'm guessing it's [2:41] actually probably the local [2:43] telecommunication company here because [2:45] no matter where you're in the world one [2:46] of the biggest data companies for err [2:49] providing data services for on all the [2:53] mobile phone networks is Manx telecom [2:55] it's just an odd quirk because it's such [2:58] an old long-established company this [3:01] also has a external port facility for [3:06] the antenna which can go out the side [3:09] here so if you have a meter and remote [3:10] the key from the crew reception it can [3:12] communicate I'm just making sure there's [3:15] not too much room terminating evidence [3:16] here cautious about showing serial [3:19] numbers particularly given this meteor [3:21] has an unknown history so it's got an ER [3:24] M chip in it an ARM chip and it's got [3:28] the modem chip it's got another little a [3:32] communicator local communicator could [3:35] this before Bluetooth communication or a [3:38] short-range programming communication [3:40] not sure the unit here has two cables [3:45] coming off it's got cable coming off [3:47] from underneath that is going to this [3:48] connector there is another label under [3:51] here a shudder not sure that and there's [3:54] a little black wire coming down on to [3:56] this which is a printed circuit board [3:58] printed antenna looks quite rugged and [4:03] accurate and that's fundamentally the [4:06] modem there are a couple of really big [4:07] capacitors here I wonder if they're [4:11] dying gasp pastor there some modems have [4:15] the facility that if they lose power [4:17] they will use the residual charge of [4:19] capacitor to just send a little logging [4:21] off cord or an error code maybe that is [4:23] an anti tamper device if you were to [4:25] suddenly unplug us it holds enough [4:27] charge on these big capacitors to [4:29] actually send a message saying and [4:31] tamper detected in which case know how [4:34] it would detect itself be unplugged [4:36] because that this can only signal to the [4:39] actual meter itself interesting stuff [4:44] let's get all the stuff out the way to [4:46] make more space I should also mention [4:50] that there's a lot of paranoia about how [4:52] the new meters are using this special [4:54] radiation network called 5g and it gives [4:57] your turn sir what follow - it seriously [5:00] what people come out with that the same [5:02] people who used to say that mobile [5:04] phones you hold much your head and it's [5:06] giving you brain trimmers just anything [5:08] that comes out at all [5:09] it's the blue light from the [5:10] streetlights and it's all Gatos just any [5:13] random thing the attention seekers jump [5:16] on it and their claim it's bad [5:19] in reality this unit will transmit will [5:23] just communicate the standard stereo [5:24] network let your phone does so if your [5:27] phone was sitting the table it will be [5:28] putting a SIM set of signal strength as [5:30] this thing will on the wall and it just [5:31] occasionally checks and so let's get [5:36] these screws out yes it is this reveals [5:41] covers that bit area there it reveals [5:44] the keypad with karbonpad another [5:46] anti-tamper thing going down onto this [5:50] pad here there just in series [5:51] no they're independent hold on let's get [5:54] that off [5:57] notice the scrubbing about here cos I [5:59] just thought I'll just hide that I don't [6:01] know the pedigree of this meet up so [6:04] let's get their compound to go into that [6:05] it's got the little infrared [6:07] communicator port that goes onto these [6:09] emitters here what's that [6:12] mmm it's glossy display you can see the [6:16] back layer to the side here hey let's [6:19] get this out but this is as far as I got [6:22] last time it's not lifting out the other [6:29] thing you see is the you know that's got [6:30] microphones it's listening to your host [6:32] that's just I don't know if where this [6:35] comes from it's this conspiracy thing [6:37] that it's going to release chemicals [6:39] into your homes let's say [6:41] carefully in case I I missed and I'm [6:42] just gonna look at the back of this [6:43] before we go back into shot it's got [6:46] nothing majorly incriminating in it [6:48] right okay there goes the Hat so what do [6:55] we have here big chunky terminals very [7:02] chunky - and a big really so they can [7:04] disconnect your power if you've not paid [7:07] your bill next oh that is a that is [7:10] something down there they've just stood [7:12] that up that looks like a Hall effect [7:14] sensor possibly that may be to detect if [7:18] people are putting something near this [7:21] unit lab really big magnet trying to [7:23] maybe override the really in this [7:25] perhaps this is well shielded what is [7:27] this and that looks like it might be a [7:36] little power supply more job look of it [7:39] and right opto-isolator Zab look over [7:46] there there that are going out to the [7:48] external unit [7:51] so is this providing this and in a [7:55] communication interface that's why would [7:58] it be isolated unless it's just for [8:00] safety and then that port has just got a [8:03] basically a volu voltage supply going to [8:05] and then sort of like just switch [8:07] signals are I wonder if it communicates [8:09] two ways there's a little lithium cell [8:13] lithium primary battery these the ones [8:15] that have quite a lot of lithium in them [8:17] because they're designed for super long [8:19] life and high capacity and they're not [8:20] rechargeable let's see if that has a [8:23] voltage of a votes of typical three [8:25] volts as you'd expect off that three [8:30] point six five volts that is fully up to [8:33] spec it's working oh dear hope it [8:36] doesn't pair it and semesters [8:38] we're tracking you peaked live is this [8:42] normally closed or is this normally open [8:44] that would be interesting to know let's [8:46] say put this two diode test [8:48] I would expect that maybe normally [8:50] closed and only powered when they want [8:52] to disconnect you because that would [8:53] take the load off it it is it's normally [8:57] bridging through and it's only when they [8:59] power that but it's going to disconnect [9:00] you that makes sense [9:07] this has two taps net and a section [9:12] welded in here that's weird [9:15] oh is that for the higher resistance is [9:18] that a controlled resistance in there to [9:20] air from monitoring a little why would [9:23] they do that as opposed to just [9:25] measuring from one end to the conference [9:27] the other not really sure they do appear [9:29] to have a slug of metal in here that's [9:31] kind of going to let's say her zoom down [9:37] in that see that that's a I'm guessing [9:42] that is just an instead of to create a [9:45] higher resistance in a smaller area does [9:47] that result in extra heat [9:49] I'm not really sure drew I'm also [9:51] looking at this big metal oxide varistor [9:55] is there any protection about it [9:57] feelings and then going all hot and [9:59] flustered it's connected via this track [10:04] over to the phase-in derivative fission [10:07] and the other connection here looks as [10:17] though it's connecting straight to [10:18] neutral so does that mean that if this [10:21] metal oxide varistor is to gradually [10:23] feel over time if that's what it is it [10:26] would actually potentially get quite hot [10:27] in there without anything to cut out not [10:29] sure that seems a bit odd um any other [10:36] anti tempered devices I'm kind of [10:38] looking for an antenna in here I don't [10:40] know if there'll be one less that was in [10:41] the upper section because I'd expect [10:44] something to detect RF jammer circuitry [10:46] and if it detects someone trying to [10:49] interfere with a secretary by applying [10:51] an external radio signal it could [10:53] trigger something I see a couple of pads [10:55] can up here but they're not connecting [10:57] to anything [10:58] this looks like a double-sided board [11:00] doesn't look any different in that Oh [11:05] actually no is it double sided her is [11:09] hard to see because it's kind of hidden [11:11] if it's multi-layer or not um not really [11:21] enough a lot more to say about this it's [11:23] got their sensing circuitry in the [11:24] vicinity of that I'm guessing they'll [11:26] just be using dedicated air current [11:28] sensors that are optimized for that task [11:30] oh that thing is marked each three is a [11:33] problem whole effect sensor then hmm the [11:39] power supply I'm guessing then is that [11:41] going to be a standard switch would [11:42] first play why did he have this big [11:44] shield over the top of it I'm not seeing [11:48] a microphone in here that will please [11:50] the conspiracy theorists or maybe it [11:53] wouldn't please the conspiracy theorists [11:54] there's a resistor network presumably [11:57] used for the voltage sensing to [12:02] correlate to the current sensing this is [12:04] where it gets a bit shitty you see this [12:06] being a smart meter they do have a lot [12:08] more control over it they can enable [12:10] various functions traditionally that old [12:12] meter at the set of dowel that goes [12:14] round and round and seder is very [12:16] accurate that measures are the [12:19] relationship between the current and [12:20] voltage what it measures there's a real [12:22] power these things have the facility to [12:24] be programmed remotely to measure [12:26] different things and one of them is to [12:27] stare point power of react just ignores [12:31] the relationship between the voltage [12:33] between this connection this connection [12:37] and the current between this connection [12:39] this connection and it will just [12:41] basically measure raw current and [12:43] multiply by the voltage and that say [12:44] that's one of the biggest concerns I [12:46] have both these things I mentioned that [12:48] before but this is the reality of it in [12:50] here these can also be programmed [12:52] remotely depending on the tariff you [12:54] choose and you know you're going to be [12:56] talked into these air [12:57] tariffs are going to say oh it's going [12:59] to save you some money yeah it may save [13:01] you some money for the first month but [13:03] then they're going to change it they're [13:04] going to have it and written the small [13:05] print that they can change the way [13:07] you're out just as metered and when they [13:08] do that they could do things they could [13:10] introduce peak demand so when [13:13] they're paying a lot more for the [13:14] electricity they penalize you directly [13:16] by saying if you use too much power [13:18] round about the time you're cooking tea [13:20] this unit will charge you twice as much [13:23] during that period of time so they're [13:25] kind of program on that sense another [13:28] thing that I've noticed here is that [13:30] many of the meter readers are being what [13:32] they call upskilled by generic finger in [13:36] every pie companies and they're being [13:38] basically they're being told you can [13:41] dare learn how to actually install these [13:43] meters and it will give you new skills [13:44] so they're basically being taught how to [13:46] install the meter that's replacing their [13:48] job and once all the meters have been [13:50] installed what they're going to do are [13:52] they're gonna lay them off dohno all [13:56] very odd so that's it is there much else [14:00] to reveal in here that's that's [14:01] particularly interesting it's got a [14:05] simple anti-tamper it's got a little [14:07] really to disconnect the power it's got [14:08] a bit of filtering it's get them the [14:12] modem facility and that's more or less [14:14] set [14:14] I guess well it can work without the [14:16] modem it will just act as a clean meter [14:18] here because it's got a chunky little [14:19] process of stuffed under there and that [14:23] just they're the only thing I'm [14:24] wondering here then is that maybe the [14:26] power supply is somewhere more receptive [14:29] to interference in some way I'm not I'm [14:31] not really sure this looks like a [14:34] class-wide pasture but there's no earth [14:36] in this so why would that unless it's [14:38] copying it down [14:39] it's coupling it to the fears don't know [14:44] it's interesting it's boring in the [14:46] sense that it's a just heavily [14:48] integrated and there's not much to see [14:53] [Music] [14:54] this resistor comes over here to an [14:58] inductor and it's got a little pad there [15:01] wonder what that's for that is that more [15:02] filtering perhaps it may be more [15:04] filtering it might be the incoming [15:07] supply that resistor there might be [15:09] effective the fuse or Weir's again it's [15:11] para from that's what we want to see [15:14] phase out phase out is being monitored [15:18] for the voltage of the phase out but not [15:21] a significant amount current the bulk of [15:24] the power looks if I'm right in saying [15:26] that's going [15:27] from that resistor there that's kind of [15:33] going to neutral the looks like the [15:37] power is being monitored from the [15:38] incoming supply so it is the altruistic [15:40] components paying for the power that [15:42] makes sense obviously because if they [15:44] disable that really it kills power to [15:46] the output and that would effectively [15:50] stop them that would power down the [15:51] meter if they powered it from that side [15:53] that's interesting it's quite chunky um [15:58] yeah that's about it so let me think are [16:02] there any other conspiracies that could [16:04] be covered here it's there there's the [16:05] one about how it's producing harmful [16:07] radiation no it's not there's the one [16:09] where it's good listening in to your [16:10] house no it's not there's no sign of a [16:12] microphone in here and it's not got [16:14] camera in it it's a it's got anti-tamper [16:17] facilities but you know what it's less [16:19] than I thought unless they're using some [16:20] clever detection techniques I thought it [16:23] may have more to detect people stuffing [16:25] wires up the side of the things that [16:27] unless that plastics designed to give a [16:29] bit and break that connection if it does [16:31] that then oh it's interesting certainly [16:35] looks very chunky and well-thought-out [16:37] mm yeah [16:40] interesting so that's a what the inside [16:42] of a smart meter looks like