Blyth Warns Eurozone Austerity Protects Banks, Shrinks Economies

Austerity: The History of a Dangerous Idea | Mark Blyth | Talks at Google — Talks at Google

Talks at Google

Slashing public budgets across interconnected economies shrinks national output and inflates debt-to-GDP ratios to absorb toxic private banking debt.

AI-assisted summary of Austerity: The History of a Dangerous Idea | Mark Blyth | Talks at Google — original source. Check the original for full context.

Source published:

Key ideas

  • Mark Blyth argues that post-2008 public debt crises were caused not by excessive welfare spending, but by the socialization of private banking sector debt after institutions leveraged at over 40 to 1 collapsed. (2:51)
  • Implementing simultaneous spending cuts triggers a macroeconomic fallacy of composition, where shrinking aggregate demand reduces national GDP and increases debt-to-GDP ratios rather than stabilizing them. (22:10)
  • Historical precedents from 1930s Germany and Japan show that extreme deflationary austerity directly fueled political radicalization and the collapse of liberal democratic institutions. (34:44)
  • The Eurozone's structural framework, based on German ordoliberalism, mathematically fails because all member states cannot simultaneously operate export surpluses without domestic-demand-driven counterpart deficits. (41:10)

Detailed notes

## Background Published on June 3, 2013, on YouTube by the Talks at Google channel, this presentation features political economist Mark Blyth discussing his book 'Austerity: The History of a Dangerous Idea', hosted by Boris Debic on behalf of Authors@Google. According to the show description, governments in Europe and the United States have mistakenly framed the financial crisis as the result of reckless public spending rather than broken banking systems, advancing draconian budget cuts that shrink economies and worsen inequality.

## TL;DR Mark Blyth dismantles the intellectual foundations and policy track record of austerity, arguing that the post-2008 fiscal crises were caused by private banking over-lending and bailouts rather than excessive public welfare spending. He demonstrates how the fallacy of composition makes cutting spending across interconnected economies self-defeating, inevitably shrinking GDP and driving debt-to-GDP ratios higher. Blyth traces the 300-year history of liberal economic skepticism toward public debt from Locke and Hume through the Bocconi School, illustrating how austerity historically exacerbated disasters like the Great Depression and the rise of fascism. Finally, through detailed international case studies, he evaluates alternative paths such as financial repression, wealth taxation, and Iceland's approach to banking insolvencies.

## Atmosphere & style The lecture combines the intellectual rigor of Ivy League political economy with the fiery, irreverent passion of Blyth's working-class Scottish upbringing. Speaking at a rapid-fire tempo punctuated with sharp wit, expletives, and vivid metaphors, he cuts through academic jargon to deliver a searing critique of financial hypocrisy. The atmosphere is engaging, direct, and conversational, transitioning seamlessly from deep philosophical history to brisk, pragmatic Q&A exchanges that leave the audience both entertained and intellectually challenged.

## Bulletin - [02:51](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM&t=171s) Mark Blyth argues that post-2008 public debt crises were caused not by excessive welfare spending, but by the socialization of private banking sector debt after institutions leveraged at over 40 to 1 collapsed. - [22:10](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM&t=1330s) Implementing simultaneous spending cuts triggers a macroeconomic fallacy of composition, where shrinking aggregate demand reduces national GDP and increases debt-to-GDP ratios rather than stabilizing them. - [34:44](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM&t=2084s) Historical precedents from 1930s Germany and Japan show that extreme deflationary austerity directly fueled political radicalization and the collapse of liberal democratic institutions. - [41:10](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM&t=2470s) The Eurozone's structural framework, based on German ordoliberalism, mathematically fails because all member states cannot simultaneously operate export surpluses without domestic-demand-driven counterpart deficits.

## Key takeaways - [02:51](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM&t=171s) US sovereign debt expansion between 2001 and 2008 stemmed from post-9/11 rate cuts, unfunded tax cuts, and war spending rather than domestic social entitlement growth. - [02:51](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM&t=171s) The 2008 financial crash originated when private-label mortgage bonds substituted for scarce US Treasuries in repo markets, triggering systemic insolvency across highly leveraged investment banks. - [13:22](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM&t=802s) The European sovereign debt crisis was driven by core European banks pursuing a moral hazard carry trade in periphery debt at leverage ratios exceeding 40 to 1, not southern profligacy. - [19:28](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM&t=1168s) Eurozone member states lack currency sovereignty and the ability to devalue, turning European Central Bank-mandated austerity into a mechanism to bail out exposed core banks. - [22:10](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM&t=1330s) Austerity commits a fallacy of composition: while an individual household or state can cut spending to save, simultaneous cuts across interconnected economies reduce aggregate national income and inflate debt ratios. - [29:31](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM&t=1771s) Anti-debt arguments have persisted virtually unchanged for 300 years since Locke, Hume, and Smith, functioning as an unthinking cyclical anxiety known as liberalism's neuralgia. - [34:44](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM&t=2084s) In 1930s Germany, Heinrich Brüning's austerity decrees caused widespread economic collapse and directly propelled the Nazi Party from 8% of the national vote to 43.3%. - [41:10](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM&t=2470s) German ordoliberalism codifies an export-driven economic constitution that mathematically requires trading partners to run current account deficits, making it unviable for the entire Eurozone to replicate. - [44:48](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM&t=2688s) The expansionary austerity hypothesis championed by Alberto Alesina was invalidated by negative IMF fiscal multipliers (-$1.50 to -$1.70) and flawed historical case studies like Canada. - [46:51](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM&t=2811s) Reinhart and Rogoff's 90% debt-to-GDP threshold, widely cited to justify European austerity programs, collapsed due to fatal spreadsheet calculation errors. - [48:20](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM&t=2900s) Viable alternatives to austerity include postwar-style financial repression with negative real interest rates, aggressive recovery of offshore tax assets, and targeted public investment. - [01:00:16](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM&t=3616s) Iceland resolved its banking collapse by allowing foreign creditor debt to default, ringfencing domestic accounts, and redirecting financial human capital into technological industries.

## Detailed walkthrough ### [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM&t=0s) Introduction and Motivation: Anger at the Welfare State Blame Game

Boris Debic opens the session on behalf of Authors@Google to introduce Mark Blyth, a faculty fellow at the Watson Institute and professor of international political economy at Brown University, where he also directs the undergraduate programs in Development Studies and International Relations. Debic highlights Blyth’s notable scholarship, including his book *Great Transformations: Economic Ideas and Institutional Change in the Twentieth Century*, the *Routledge Handbook of International Political Economy*, and the co-edited volume *Constructing the International Economy*, as well as a forthcoming project questioning liberal democracies titled *The End of the Liberal World?* Debic also notes Blyth's service on the Warwick Commission on International Financial Reform and his academic pedigree, holding a PhD from Columbia University and having taught at Johns Hopkins University from 1997 to 2009.

Taking the stage to warm applause, Blyth immediately breaks the formal academic mold with dry humor about his Scottish accent and his self-advancing slides before launching into the visceral catalyst behind writing *Austerity: The History of a Dangerous Idea*. Blyth explains that his motivation was deeply personal and born out of outrage: he grew up as an orphan raised by his paternal grandmother on the receiving end of the British welfare state. Describing himself as living proof of intergenerational social mobility by going from those beginnings to an Ivy League professorship, he rejects the popular political narrative that demonizes the welfare state as a bloated, demotivating machine. Mark Blyth states his core frustration bluntly: “I wrote this book for the following reason—I got really, really pissed off with people with lots of money telling people who don't have any money they need to pay shit back.”

[02:51](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM&t=171s) From Surplus to Crash: How US Debt Actually Exploded

Blyth attacks the narrative that public overspending created modern sovereign debt crises, pointing out that in the year 2000, global financial markets were not worried about excessive debt, but about a shortage of federal debt:

```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: The Mechanics of the 2008 Debt Explosion accDescr: Flowchart tracing the shift from the 2000 US budget surplus to the 2008 repo market collapse, bank bailouts, and resulting sovereign debt surge.

subgraph PolicyShocks["Policy Drivers (2001–2006)"] A["2000: Budget Surplus & T-Bill Shortage"] --> B["Greenspan Low Rates: Cheap Money for Assets"] B --> C["Unfunded Bush Tax Cuts & Wars of Choice"] C --> D["2006: US Debt-to-GDP Reaches 61%"] end

subgraph RepoCrunch["Repo Collateral Breakdown (2007–2008)"] D --> E["T-Bills Scarce in Repo Markets"] E --> F["AAA Mortgage Products Used as Collateral"] F --> G["Subprime Cracks: Bonds Downgraded AAA to C"] G --> H["Massive Margin Calls on Leveraged Banks"] H --> I["Liquidity Run & Insolvency (Bear Stearns)"] end

subgraph FiscalFallout["The Fiscal Aftermath"] I --> J["Too-Big-to-Fail Bank Bailouts"] J --> K["30% Collapse in OECD Tax Revenues"] K --> L["Slump Triggers Automatic Stabilizers"] L --> M["Sovereign Debt Jumps to 100% GDP"] end ```

The Clinton-era budget surplus was steadily shrinking the stock of US Treasuries, leaving investors starved of safe collateral. The subsequent explosion of debt was driven by deliberate political and monetary choices: - Alan Greenspan slashed interest rates after the 9/11 downturn, engineering asset protection and providing virtually free liquidity to asset owners. - The federal government passed two major rounds of tax cuts with no funding mechanisms. - The US launched two wars of choice completely on credit, yet not a single fiscal conservative or congressional Republican raised alarms when debt-to-GDP reached 61% by 2006.

The true tipping point came during the 2007–2008 run on the repo (repurchase agreement) market. Because US Treasuries were scarce—partly due to massive accumulation by China—Wall Street substituted AAA-rated private-label mortgage instruments as repo collateral for short-term wholesale borrowing. When underlying mortgages deteriorated, rating agencies slashed those bonds from AAA down to B and C. Highly leveraged investment institutions like Bear Stearns suddenly faced severe haircuts, requiring far more collateral to borrow the same funds. Because their asset base was fixed and leveraged at ratios where a mere 3% decline in asset value wiped out their equity, they were rendered instantly insolvent. Panic broke out like someone shouting "fire" in a crowded theater, triggering a catastrophic liquidity freeze.

When governments chose to bail out these institutions under the doctrine of "too big to fail," private losses were shifted directly onto public balance sheets. The collapse of the financial sector wiped out approximately 30% of tax revenues across OECD economies. As the real economy fell into a severe slump, spending fell, investment dried up, and automatic stabilizers (such as unemployment assistance) expanded as tax yields plummeted. Deficits spiked, driving US debt-to-GDP from 61% to 100%. Blyth rejects the notion that public profligacy caused this shift: “There was no orgy of public spending. It's a lie. I take Amtrak every day. I would've noticed an orgy of public spending.” He points out the gall of politicians demanding cuts to Social Security—a self-funded system holding a $2.3 trillion surplus that does not contribute to the federal operating deficit—to pay for debts run up by protecting the balance sheets of the ultra-wealthy.

[06:25](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM&t=385s) Transatlantic Divergence: The European Doomsday Device

Turning to the international landscape, Blyth draws a stark contrast between economies that resisted immediate austerity and those that embraced it. The United States largely refrained from slashing public spending immediately after the crash, allowing its deficit to shrink naturally toward 3% to 4% of GDP alongside an uneven, tech-shocked recovery. In contrast, the United Kingdom instituted aggressive austerity despite possessing monetary sovereignty, leaving itself with a 7% deficit, stagnant growth, and the threat of a triple-dip recession.

Europe, however, pursued austerity to its most extreme conclusion, which Blyth likens to applying leeches to an already drained patient: - Greece lost 30% of its GDP within four years—a level of economic destruction that Blyth notes the German military did not achieve during its occupation between 1941 and 1945. - Across the European periphery, austerity policies generated roughly 25 million more unemployed people than in the United States. - In assessing these crises, Blyth cautions analysts to track net debt rather than gross debt: looking at gross figures ignores both future tax receipts and public assets, the latter of which the US clearly values given the existence of the National Security Investment Act to restrict foreign asset purchases.

Blyth displays a slide pairing classic comic duo Laurel and Hardy alongside German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Nicolas Sarkozy ("Merkozy"), asserting that the European leadership directly engineered this disaster. He sets up the remainder of his lecture by preparing to dismantle the "official story" promoted by outlets such as *The Economist* and *The Financial Times*—the idea that reckless Southern European governments ran up public deficits until bond markets rebelled. Showing a chart of 10-year sovereign bond spreads, he notes that before the euro was created, investors demanded a 25% risk premium to hold 10-year Greek government bonds because a one-in-four default risk was baked into their independent currency history.

[09:09](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM&t=549s) The Official Euro Convergence Narrative

Mark Blyth opens by addressing the historical sovereign bond yields across Europe prior to monetary union. Greek bonds carried yields around 25%, a level that made total sense given the country's institutional track record: they had not run a budget surplus in half a century, and rival political factions had spent decades treating the state as spoils to plunder following their civil war. Yields in France, Italy, and the rest of the Mediterranean sat around 15%, and even broader European debt yielded north of 10%. Investors received substantial compensation simply for taking on genuine sovereign default risk.

```mermaid flowchart LR accTitle: The Official Euro Convergence Story accDescr: Chart illustrating how the creation of the ECB was supposed to eliminate sovereign risk and equalize borrowing costs across member nations. subgraph S1["Monetary Integration"] A["National Printing Presses Removed"] --> B["Single Central Bank in Frankfurt"] end subgraph S2["Theoretical Convergence"] B --> C["Inflation & Devaluation Risk Erased"] C --> D["Periphery Default Risk Equals Germany"] end subgraph S3["The Flawed Assumption"] D --> E["'Greece Becomes Germany'"] end ```

Then came the Maastricht process—laid out in the late 1980s and formalized in the 1991 monetary treaty—establishing a European monetary union. The core theory was simple: duplicate the model of the German Bundesbank across the entire continent, remove national printing presses, hand monetary policy to a single authority in Frankfurt, and extinguish individual inflation, devaluation, and default risks. As Blyth summarizes the underlying logic:

> “And once we've locked up all the printing presses in the one time deal and given them to a guy in Frankfurt, and he's the only one who can print the money, well, basically doesn't that mean that Greece becomes Germany?”

For a roughly seven-and-a-half-year stretch following the euro’s launch, markets embraced this narrative completely. Bond yield spreads across radically diverse economies—from Belgium to Italy, Greece, Spain, and Portugal—collapsed until they traded as if every one of them shared Germany's near-zero default risk.

[10:55](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM&t=655s) Current Account Imbalances and the "Profligate South" Myth

The standard explanation for why this system broke down blames reckless southern borrowers. Under monetary union, massive current account imbalances emerged: major eurozone member states ran persistent deficits while Germany built an enormous trade surplus, transforming itself into an export juggernaut. Because trade surpluses and deficits mirror each other within a closed currency area, Germany’s export engine required foreign buyers for all those German goods; as Blyth remarks, “In other words, somebody has to buy all those BMWs.”

To explain where the southern states found the funds to buy those goods, conventional wisdom pointed to fiscal profligacy. The narrative accused the "PIGS" (Portugal, Ireland, Greece, and Spain) of running wild:

> “They are spending like drunken sailors, there's no doubt about this.”

According to this view, these countries used low interest rates—made possible by European Central Bank credibility and Maastricht's debt and deficit guidelines—to award themselves double-digit annual budget growth and wage increases far exceeding productivity. As their unit labor costs spiked, their competitiveness eroded, driving them into debt while German and Dutch savings underwrote their lifestyle.

- German trade surpluses directly required counterpart deficits elsewhere in the eurozone. - Standard narratives blamed the PIGS economies for unsustainable wage hikes and domestic spending. - Maastricht rules capping debt at 60% of GDP and budget deficits at 3% gave lenders a false sense of institutional security.

[13:22](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM&t=802s) The Over-Lending Reality: A Systemic Banking Trade

Blyth directly dismantles the idea that southern debt was purely a borrower-driven crisis, countering: “You can't have over borrowing with over lending.” He evokes the mid-2000s Citibank marketing campaign, "Live Richly," noting that large financial institutions spent years urging the public to consume aggressively on credit rather than exercise prudence. The crisis in Europe was not an organic failure of southern state budgets, but rather the single largest moral-hazard trade in history, driven by core European banks.

```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: The European Bank Carry Trade and Bailout Trap accDescr: The cycle of banks chasing yields on periphery debt, over-leveraging, and getting caught without an ECB bailout. subgraph Leverage["1. The Yield Chase"] A["Yields on Periphery Debt Compress"] --> B["Banks Juice Returns with 40:1 Leverage"] B --> C["Core Assets Dumped for Periphery Paper"] end subgraph MoralHazard["2. The Systemic Gamble"] C --> D["Banks Grow Larger Than Home GDP"] D --> E["Assume European Central Bank Will Guarantee All Debt"] end subgraph Trap["3. The Dead End"] E --> F["Eurozone Precludes National Bailout Presses"] F --> G["ECB Refuses Blatant Bank Rescues"] G --> H["Catastrophic Balance Sheet Crisis"] end ```

The underlying mechanism functioned as a massive carry trade. Prior to monetary union, banks earned fat 25% coupons on Greek sovereign debt. As yield spreads collapsed toward German levels, maintaining those absolute profits required piling on enormous volume and leverage. Major banks across Germany, France, and Britain cleared safe sovereign bonds off their books and stuffed their balance sheets with Portuguese, Greek, and Spanish paper.

Operating at extreme leverage ratios around 40 to 1—leaving an equity buffer below 3%—these institutions operated with risk profiles far worse than Lehman Brothers. They assumed their sovereign governments would bail them out if trades turned sour. Even after joining the single currency cost national governments their independent printing presses, the banks believed they had engineered an even better guarantee: they were no longer simply national concerns, but systemic threats to the entire European project, leaving the ECB no choice but to step in. Blyth delivers the punchline to that miscalculation:

> “Except it's run by Jürgen Stark and a bunch of Germans. And they're not going to bail you. So when the shit hits the fan, you've got a really, really big problem.”

[17:07](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM&t=1027s) Balance Sheet Bloat and "Too Big to Fail"

The fallout left the European core's financial centers saturated with non-performing periphery assets. By 2011, French banks carried periphery exposures equal to more than 33% of France's entire gross domestic product, completely separate from their toxic Spanish real estate exposure. A single institution, the Dutch bank ING, had an asset balance sheet measuring 211% of the Netherlands' GDP, leveraged beyond 40 to 1, while its domestic state lacked the currency-printing authority to resolve a full-blown liquidity shock.

Taken together, the assets held by banks in just three nations—Germany, France, and the United Kingdom—swelled to roughly double the annual GDP of the entire European Union. Blyth contrasts this with the United States, where the combined assets of the top six "too big to fail" banks equaled 61% of national GDP. While an American failure poses severe systemic risks, Europe's hyper-leveraged institutions were so vast relative to their sponsor economies that their toxic periphery bets threatened to drag down the member states and the euro itself.

- Periphery asset exposure on French bank balance sheets topped 33% of France’s GDP. - ING's standalone asset footprint sat at 211% of Dutch GDP on leverage exceeding 40 to 1. - Total bank assets across the UK, France, and Germany alone rose to nearly 200% of the entire European Union's collective annual economic output. - The top six American banks by comparison held assets equal to 61% of US GDP.

[18:05](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM&t=1085s) Currency Sovereignty vs. The Eurozone Trap

The United States faced a massive financial contraction where the interconnections in the banking sector threatened to wipe out roughly 10% of US GDP, or about $1.4 to $1.5 trillion. Yet, because the United States possesses its own currency and issues the global reserve asset, it was fully capable of absorbing the shock and executing a bailout that totaled around $3 trillion before moving into recovery. Great Britain, despite running bank balance sheets that dwarf its GDP, at least retains its own sovereign currency and printing press.

```mermaid flowchart LR accTitle: Sovereign Central Banking vs. The Eurozone Straitjacket accDescr: Contrasts the policy toolkit of a sovereign currency issuer with the limited options available to a Eurozone member state during a banking crisis. subgraph US_UK["Sovereign Currency (US / UK)"] A["Bank Insolvency Shock"] --> B["Central Bank Action"] B --> C["Asset Swap & Liquidity Injection"] C --> D["Recapitalize & De-lever"] end subgraph Eurozone["Eurozone Members"] E["Bank Insolvency Shock"] --> F{"Available Exits?"} F -->|"No Printing Press"| G["Cannot Inflate"] F -->|"No National Currency"| H["Cannot Devalue"] F -->|"ECB Refusal"| I["Austerity & Squeeze"] end ```

By contrast, continental Europe is in a far more precarious situation. In France, just three banks—BNP Paribas, Crédit Agricole, and Société Générale—command assets equal to 250% of French GDP, hold severely impaired balance sheets, and operate without a national central bank to print money. The European Central Bank does not function as a true central bank; rather, it acts like a glorified currency board that initially refused to buy sovereign bonds or mutualize debt, leaving member states to face crises on their own. When hit by a financial crisis, an economy typically has four exit routes: inflate, devalue, absorb bad assets via a true central bank, or impose austerity. Because Eurozone members lack their own currencies and printing presses, they were trapped into squeezing their public finances through austerity and hoping liquidity tricks like the Long-Term Refinancing Operations (LTROs) would kick the can down the road.

- The US banking crisis took out roughly 10% of GDP ($1.4–$1.5 trillion), but total bailout interventions around $3 trillion resolved it because the US prints the world's reserve currency. - In France, the asset base of BNP Paribas, Crédit Agricole, and Société Générale exceeds 250% of the nation's entire GDP. - Eurozone members are stripped of the power to devalue their currency or inflate away debt burdens.

[19:28](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM&t=1168s) The Bernanke Maneuver vs. Eurozone Contagion

The United States resolved its crisis through what can be termed "a Bernanke," an aggressive maneuver where the Federal Reserve directly removed toxic assets from commercial bank balance sheets and parked them on its own books. Disguised under obscure acronyms like Maiden Lane II and the Term Auction Facility that completely sailed past an oblivious Congress, this policy flooded the banking system with liquidity and permitted banks to recapitalize while deleveraging. Rather than simple money printing, this constituted an asset swap combined with liquidity support, allowing institutions to rebuild until their operational leverage dropped from peaks of 30-to-1 down to manageable levels, with the expectation that the Fed could later sell recovered assets back into the market.

The ECB, however, was both "constitutionally and intellectually incapable of making that move." As sovereign bond yields spiked, the bond markets began pricing in an outright breakup of the single currency. Because European banks are tied to one another, an insolvency in Spain or France inevitably cascades directly into German institutions like Deutsche Bank.

```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Sovereign Bank Run and Interbank Contagion accDescr: Shows the chain reaction where dumping one peripheral country's sovereign debt triggers forced selling and contagion throughout the core European banking system. subgraph Liquidation["Cascading Asset Sell-Off"] A["Greek Debt Impairment"] -->|"Dumped at 20% face value"| B["2% Portfolio Loss"] B -->|"Balance Books"| C["Dump Portuguese Debt"] C -->|"Prices Crash to Zero"| D["Dump Irish Debt"] end subgraph SystemicCrisis["Core Contagion"] D --> E["12% Bank Portfolio Loss"] E --> F["Plunging Bank Share Prices"] F --> G["Collapse of SocGen & Deutsche Bank"] end ```

To prevent this systemic domino effect, policymakers weaponized austerity to engineer a backstop against a bond-market bank run. If a heavily exposed bank tried to offload Greek debt trading at 20 cents on the dollar, it would immediately book a catastrophic loss, forcing it to liquidate Portuguese and then Irish paper to plug the hole. Wiping out the value of those peripheral assets would gut roughly 12% of a lender's asset base and wipe out 11% of Eurozone GDP, cratering bank equities and igniting a currency-union-wide bank run. Describing the true motive behind peripheral sacrifice, Mark Blyth explains: “Because this is about saving Societe Generale, and it is about saving Deutsche Bank from their own over-borrowing and over-lending mistakes.”

[22:10](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM&t=1330s) The Fallacy of Composition and Mario Draghi's Bluff

Austerity cannot solve structural banking failures. Slashing Greek public sector spending to prehistoric levels does nothing to heal the impaired balance sheet of Société Générale. You cannot maintain a rigid gold-standard-style monetary framework within a modern democracy without inciting severe political backlashes reminiscent of the 1920s, nor can liquidity loans permanently fix insolvency.

The turning point for the crisis arrived not when budgets were slashed, but when ECB President Mario Draghi famously promised to do "whatever it takes." Bond yields dropped instantly upon that declaration, despite the ECB executing virtually no bond purchases in the six months that followed. This market reaction proved that investors never cared about firing 30,000 Greek civil servants; their panic stemmed purely from Euro breakup risk, and providing a credible central-bank backstop resolved that panic overnight.

```mermaid flowchart LR accTitle: The Paradox of Simultaneous Fiscal Consolidation accDescr: Illustrates how cutting public expenditure across an economy shrinks national income and causes debt-to-GDP ratios to rise. A["Initial Debt/GDP: 80% (4/5)"] --> B["Cut Government Spending in Half"] B --> C["National Income Shrinks: GDP Drops to 4"] C --> D["New Debt/GDP: 100% (4/4)"] ```

The underlying economic flaw of austerity is the fallacy of composition: everyone cannot cut spending at once and expect their economies to grow. Mark Blyth illustrates this arithmetic disaster: > “So imagine the economy with an 80% debt-to-GDP ratio, and turn it into a simple fraction of four over five. Now imagine that 40% of the five is government expenditure. You want to cut in half... On a constant stock of debt, your debt-to-GDP ratio just went from 0.8 to 1.”

Because saving requires income, cutting public spending across the board suppresses aggregate revenue, leaving every country that implemented an austerity program with more debt relative to GDP than when they started, whereas non-austerity nations like the United States saw their burdens shrink.

- Mario Draghi brought down European bond yields simply by establishing the credibility of the ECB's backstop, without spending money on bond purchases. - Across Europe, every nation that subjected itself to austerity experienced an increase in its debt-to-GDP ratio. - Non-cutting nations managed to reduce their relative debt loads through baseline income generation.

[23:55](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM&t=1435s) Liberalism's Emetic Economics: From John Locke to David Hume

To understand why European leadership embraced such self-defeating policies, one must examine the philosophical foundations of early liberalism, a tradition Blyth describes as "liberalism’s emetic economics"—from the word *emetic*, meaning to induce vomiting. In the fifth chapter of the *Second Treatise of Government*, John Locke served as the intellectual propagandist for the rising English merchant class that ousted the monarch to claim property rights over land, labor, and capital. This institutional shift commodified resources, dispossessed the peasantry, and produced "vagabonds"—literally men freed from feudal bondage who had been stripped of their traditional legal status and land access.

Free markets inevitably generate extreme disparities in wealth and income, creating a fundamental political dilemma:

```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: The Liberal State Dilemma accDescr: Traces the paradox identified by Locke and Smith where property owners need a strong state to protect wealth from the poor, but fear the state's power to tax. A["Merchant Class Creates Untrammeled Markets"] --> B["Massive Income & Wealth Inequality"] B --> C["Need for Strong State: Police the Dispossessed"] C --> D["Adam Smith's Warning: 1 Rich Man vs. 500 Poor"] D --> E{"The Lockean Dilemma"} E -->|"State is Strong Enough to Protect"| F["State is Strong Enough to Expropriate (Taxes)"] E -->|"To Avoid Taxes"| G["State Resorting to Public Debt"] ```

Markets do not emerge spontaneously from the soil; they require state power and parliamentary legislation to turn serfs into wage laborers. Furthermore, property owners require the state's coercive force to protect their assets from the impoverished masses. Quoting Adam Smith's *The Wealth of Nations*, Blyth notes: “for every rich man, there must be 500 poor, and that rich man must sleep always with the strong arm of the civil magistrate at his side, for he is always regarded with jealousy and envy.”

This produces the core liberal paradox: property owners desperately need the state to police domestic inequality, but the very state powerful enough to safeguard their property is also powerful enough to seize it through taxation. To avoid paying taxes to finance this protection, the merchant class turned to public borrowing. Writing on money and interest, philosopher David Hume argued that while money is neutral in the long run, short-term stimulus works because merchants are "the most useful race of men" who channel capital efficiently. Through this logic, liberalism fell in love with public debt: it functions as a mechanism for merchants to demand armed protection from the sovereign while refusing to surrender their private wealth in taxes.

[26:38](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM&t=1598s) Debt Instruments, Crowding Out, and Adam Smith's Paradox

Blyth illustrates how government debt instruments initially seemed like an extraordinary, risk-free bargain for wealthy property owners. A private individual lends the state a million pounds to fund their own military protection, and in ten years, the state repays the million pounds plus interest. It looks like an unbeatable deal with unlimited upside and zero downside. However, early liberal thinkers spotted an immediate structural danger: crowding out. David Hume argued that to entice investors, the sovereign must offer an interest rate higher than the market rate. As a consequence, capital, gold, and silver are drained from commercial enterprise into government paper, leaving the nation indebted, subordinate to foreign creditors, and ultimately bankrupted. Debt offers an attractive mechanism to finance the state citizens reluctantly require, yet it brings the terrifying prospect of national ruin.

```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: The Mechanics of Debt and Crowding Out accDescr: Flowchart illustrating how government debt crowds out productive private capital according to early liberal theorists.

subgraph DebtIssuance["Sovereign Borrowing"] A["Sovereign offers high interest rates"] --> B["Attracts private wealth to fund defense"] end

subgraph CrowdingOut["Market Distortion"] B --> C["Capital & bullion pulled from commerce"] C --> D["Underlying productive economy shrinks"] end

subgraph Crisis["Fiscal Failure"] D --> E["Debt burden on smaller economy"] E --> F["National insolvency and ruin"] end ```

Adam Smith took up these exact concerns, tying them to the fundamental identity of classical economics that savings equals investment ($S = I$). For Smith, human beings—whom Blyth jokingly characterizes as "parsimonious Scots"—are naturally hardwired to save. As Blyth quotes from Smith: “Where there is tolerable security, a man would be perfectly crazy if he did not employ as investment all his available capital.” Yet Smith also understood the class-based reality of state power, candidly acknowledging in Book Two of *The Wealth of Nations*: “Civil government, insofar as it is instituted, is instituted for the defense of the rich against the poor, or for those who have property against those who have none.”

To pay for this defensive apparatus, Smith initially toyed with progressive taxation, reasoning that those with the most property have the most skin in the game. But recognizing that this meant the wealthy would bear the heaviest tax load, Smith hastily retreated. He proposed instead what modern conservatives advocate: a national consumption tax on ordinary goods while exempting luxuries—sparing yachts while taxing corn flakes. Because consumption taxes never raise sufficient revenue, Smith reluctantly conceded that states must turn to debt. Yet that concession trapped him in Hume’s dilemma: public debt perverts natural parsimony, diverting savings from productive investment into sovereign paper, shrinking the private economy, and marching the country toward bankruptcy.

[29:31](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM&t=1771s) Liberalism's Neuralgia and the Rebuttal of British History

Blyth notes that the arguments against public debt heard today are carbon copies of arguments made three centuries ago: “Now, when you hear the same arguments repeated for 300 years without modification regardless of any facts in fact in them, you should generally be suspicious.” He diagnoses this cyclical anxiety as "liberalism’s neuralgia," for which austerity serves as the default, unthinking aspirin—prescribed automatically regardless of whether it actually cures the condition.

The historical record directly contradicts these dire 18th-century predictions. Hume warned that Britain would face economic collapse by roughly 1780 due to debt accumulation. Instead, the British state borrowed relentlessly to finance global conflicts, culminating in a national debt-to-GDP ratio of 240% at the close of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815. Rather than imploding under this unprecedented debt load, the British economy spent the century from 1815 to 1914 dominating global trade and expanding at an unprecedented rate, directly puncturing modern debt-threshold claims such as the 90% cliff popularized by Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff.

- Hume predicted economic collapse by around 1780 due to rising public debt. - British debt peaked at 240% of GDP in 1815 following the Napoleonic Wars. - Between 1815 and 1914, Britain established global industrial and imperial dominance instead of collapsing.

[30:27](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM&t=1827s) The Two Traditions of Liberalism: Ricardo vs. Mill

Out of the 19th-century debate emerged two distinct strands of liberal thought regarding public expenditure:

```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: The Two Traditions of Liberalism accDescr: Split from classical thought into Ricardian-Austrian economics and Mill-Keynesian economics.

Root["Classical Liberal Dilemma"] --> Ricardo["David Ricardo"] Root --> Mill["John Stuart Mill"]

Ricardo -->|"Denial of state necessity"| Austrian["Austrian Economics & Liquidationism"] Mill -->|"Acceptance of state & public finance"| Keynes["Keynesian Economics"] ```

1. **The Ricardian Tradition:** David Ricardo represented the faction that insists society cannot live with the state, refuses to pay for it, and pretends it is unnecessary. This line of thought flowed directly into 20th-century Austrian economics. 2. **The Millian Tradition:** John Stuart Mill accepted both that the state is indispensable and that society must pay for it. Mill warned that leaving social reproduction entirely to unfettered markets creates compounding inequalities that ultimately destroy the market mechanism itself. This tradition formed the bedrock of Keynesianism.

[31:07](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM&t=1867s) The Emetic Response: Schumpeter and American Liquidationism

When the Great Depression hit, the Ricardian-Austrian worldview manifested as what Blyth terms "the emetic response" or American liquidationism. Blyth displays an iconic Depression-era photograph of an impoverished soup-kitchen bread line standing directly in front of a billboard depicting a smiling middle-class family declaring "There's no way like the American Way."

At Harvard, Austrian-born economist Joseph Schumpeter championed the liquidationist doctrine. In Schumpeter’s framework, an economy possesses an invisible, long-run capital structure that policymakers must never manipulate. Business cycles turn toxic when government-backed banks issue excessive credit, distorting price signals and tricking entrepreneurs into malinvestments. Once the artificial credit dries up, the economic system must undergo an aggressive purge. Blyth describes this philosophy as a cycle of credit binging followed by mandatory purging: “So you basically have the boom, and then you have to have the slump, and you have to go barf and you have to get it all out and let the clock reset, and off you go.”

[32:21](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM&t=1941s) The Treasury View, the Gold Standard, and Ricardian Equivalence

The British establishment adopted an equally austere, though more polite, stance known as the "Treasury View." During the 1920s, Chancellor of the Exchequer Winston Churchill confronted the economic wreckage of World War I, which had destroyed roughly 60% of British national wealth. Britain faced a critical monetary crossroad regarding its return to the gold standard:

- **Returning at a lower parity:** This would devalue the pound, stimulating domestic manufacturing and exports, but foreign and domestic holders of sterling assets would see their wealth diluted, risking capital flight. - **Returning at pre-war parity (high exchange rate):** This protected the wealth of sterling creditors but made exports uncompetitive, immediately driving one million British workers into unemployment that endured for a decade.

When David Lloyd George proposed state public works programs to alleviate mass unemployment, the Treasury responded with a memorandum drafted by Hubert Henderson that dismissed public intervention. The Treasury argued on the basis of what later became known as Ricardian equivalence: borrowing to spend today guarantees higher taxes tomorrow, causing rational actors to curtail spending and rendering fiscal stimulus zero-sum. Furthermore, the memorandum claimed that state investment merely crowds out private initiative and noted a chronic absence of "suitable public works"—the 1920s equivalent of what the Obama administration later termed a lack of "shovel-ready projects."

Meanwhile, practical reality was outpacing classical theory. Blyth cites economist Joan Robinson's biting assessment of the divergent approaches to the slump: “She says that, ‘in 1936, Keynes was writing down what might cause unemployment while Herr Hitler was curing it.’”

[34:44](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM&t=2084s) The 1930s Precedent: Simultaneous Contraction and Radical Politics

Mark Blyth disputes the common historical misconception that early Nazi support came strictly from southern German Catholics, pointing out that voters were industrial workers and miners. Looking at the global landscape of the early 1930s, Blyth draws a direct parallel to the modern Eurozone crisis. Back then, Takahashi Korekiyo—the intellectual precursor to the Bank of Japan's modern "Abenomics" monetary and fiscal stimulus—served as finance minister, but the global mainstream took the opposite path. The five largest economies in the world engaged in simultaneous spending cuts. As each country slashed budgets at once, global GDP collapsed while the nominal stock of debt remained constant, driving debt-to-GDP ratios skyward. In Great Britain, the debt-to-GDP ratio stood at 170% in 1930; after round after round of austerity cuts, it climbed to 190% by 1933 and continued to rise.

```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Austerity Spiral to Political Collapse accDescr: Flowchart showing how simultaneous spending cuts shrank GDP, exploded debt ratios, and triggered radical political reactions in Germany and Japan. subgraph EconomicSpirals["The Deflationary Trap"] A["Simultaneous Spending Cuts across Major Economies"] --> B["Global GDP Shrinks"] B --> C["Debt-to-GDP Ratios Skyrocket"] end subgraph PoliticalFallout["Political Catastrophe"] C --> D["Germany: Brüning's 200 Emergency Decrees"] C --> E["Japan: Deep Military Budget Cuts"] D --> F["Nazi Vote Surges from 8% to 43.3%"] E --> G["Military Assassinations of Financial Elite"] end ```

In Germany, short-term American capital had flooded in following the 1923 hyperinflation, temporarily making Germany the fastest-growing and most stable economy in Europe. However, a renegotiation of war debt gave sovereign reparations seniority, and American investors pulled their capital out to chase higher interest rates (around 7% in banks) and the 1928–1929 stock market boom on Wall Street. As capital fled, Chancellor Heinrich Brüning attempted to balance the budget by hacking away at public spending, issuing roughly 200 emergency austerity decrees. This dynamic fueled the explosive rise of the Nazi Party, which was the sole political faction openly campaigning against austerity: - In 1928, the National Socialists were a written-off fringe party polling around 8%. - By 1930, their share jumped to approximately 18%. - By 1933, they seized 43.3% of the vote.

The political fallout was even bloodier in Imperial Japan. Because the military constituted the largest single expenditure in the Japanese budget, civilian-led budget balancing fell directly upon military appropriations. In response, by 1930 the Japanese military began assassinating the civilian financial elite. As Blyth dryly observes, “You can rack up quite a body count doing this if you piss off the military enough.” In short order, military officers assassinated two prime ministers, two finance ministers, several cabinet-level officials, and half a dozen senior bankers. As Blyth emphasizes, “So the lesson learned on this was simultaneous contractions, when everybody else is doing it, is zero sum against everybody else, and leads to really nasty politics.”

---

[36:58](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM&t=2218s) Keynes, Liquidity Traps, and the Fallacy of Composition

Keynesian economics and the catastrophic events of the interwar years thoroughly discredited austerity by exposing profound fallacies of composition and non-scalability in labor and financial markets. Blyth explains that microeconomic logic cannot simply be scaled up: what holds true for two or ten individuals is utterly false when applied to 20 million workers across five interconnected national economies. Economic behavior in a downturn is driven by fear, not virtuous thrift. Faced with uncertainty, economic agents develop myopic, short-term horizons; they ignore decades of past prosperity and obsess over immediate distress, looking anxiously at their neighbors for cues. Recessions linger because nobody wants to step out and invest first.

Austerity relies on an "emetic" model—the puritanical notion that an economy must binge and then purge to cleanse itself. It assumes that once a society curtails consumption, households save, and savings automatically translate into productive investment. Yet in a deep slump, holding cash is the only rational choice. When everyone attempts to hoard liquidity at the same instant, a systemic paradox emerges: one entity can be liquid only if another is willing to be illiquid. The result is a prolonged liquidity trap where an entire economy freezes for over a decade. Quoting John Maynard Keynes's *General Theory*, Blyth reiterates that consumption is the ultimate object of all economic life.

Blyth sums up the hard-won political and economic lessons that the world understood by 1940 but subsequently abandoned: - “Democracy is asset insurance for the rich.” - “Don't skimp on the payments.” - “Redistribution of debt is reinsurance for democracy, and austerity is anorexia for the economy.”

---

[38:32](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM&t=2312s) The German Sonderweg: Ordoliberalism and Export Fetishism

Why did policymakers forget the lessons of the 1930s? Blyth argues the amnesia stems from Germany, an economy that is not Anglo-Saxon liberal, but rather the world's original developmental state, operating far closer to the Japanese model than to Britain or the United States. Following the 1873 "Founders' Crisis" (*Gründerkrise*) stock market crash, free-market liberalism was discredited in Germany. Economic thinker Friedrich List challenged British free-trade orthodoxy, observing that had the British followed their own advice regarding comparative advantage, they would still be weaving wool blankets for Flanders instead of ruling the seas and producing steel without native iron ore.

Under Otto von Bismarck, Germany instituted the "marriage of iron and rye," combining southern industrial power with northern agrarian interests. The state expropriated agricultural surpluses to purchase capital machinery, reverse-engineered it, and built a massive, export-driven industrial base supported by universal banks and forced domestic savings.

| Economic Dimension | Anglo-American Keynesian Model | German Ordoliberal Model | |:--- |:--- |:--- | | **Primary Economic Engine** | Domestic consumption & internal demand | External demand & export manufacturing | | **Wage & Price Policy** | High wages bolster aggregate demand | Wage restraint preserves export price competitiveness | | **Monetary Authority Focus** | Dual mandate: employment and price stability | Strict inflation fighting via independent central bank | | **State Economic Role** | Discretionary countercyclical spending | Rigid rule-setting to enforce market competition (*Ordnung*) |

Because Germany's engine of demand lies outside its own borders, Keynesian domestic demand management makes no sense to German planners. Stimulating domestic consumption merely raises domestic wages and prices, threatening to price an export like a BMW out of world markets by inflating its price from $50,000 to $100,000. Blyth argues that post-war German obsession with price stability is not truly rooted in the collective trauma of 1920s hyperinflation; that is a convenient myth. In reality, sound money and an independent central bank exist to preserve price competitiveness abroad. Post-war Freiburg School thinkers, notably Walter Eucken, codified this approach into Ordoliberalism: an "economic constitution" based on rigid rules rather than discretionary political management, prioritizing product competition and monetary discipline over consumption.

---

[41:10](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM&t=2470s) The Eurozone's Structural Failure: "You Can't All Be Germany"

Blyth explains that the governing architecture of the European Union is nothing other than generalized Ordoliberalism writ large across an entire continent. Discretionary politics have been subordinated to rigid bureaucratic mandates: - The unelected European Commission holds genuine executive power, whereas the European Parliament functions as a powerless talking shop. - The single largest administrative organ in Brussels is the Competition Commission. - The European Central Bank has a single, unyielding mandate: suppressing inflation, even while the continent suffers from devastating deflation.

This institutional setup operates entirely on the German conviction that politicians cannot be trusted with economic discretion because they inevitably manufacture inflationary cycles. While this framework fits an export-driven powerhouse, generalizing it across the entire Eurozone produces a catastrophic fallacy of composition. Trade balances require mathematical symmetry: for Germany to run massive export surpluses, other nations must run equivalent import deficits. As Blyth observed on current account data, Germany's surplus was the exact mirror image of Southern Europe's deficits.

This model functioned only as long as cross-border bank lending masked the underlying imbalances. Once the private banking bubble burst, European authorities demanded that every peripheral country slash wages, embrace structural reform, and mimic the German model: > “Tell me, how is Greece and Portugal going to make an Audi? And even if they did, who are they going to sell it to? Who's going to buy it? Imagine the Competition Commission gets its way and everybody becomes more competitive, and they all make exports. Who's going to buy all this crap? The over-tapped American consumer? We're already spending too much already. So you end up with an economy and an economic structure, an economic model for an entire continent which literally cannot work.”

[43:21](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM&t=2601s) The Schuldenbremse and the Bocconi School of Public Finance

Mark Blyth points to the German concept of the *Schuldenbremse*, or constitutional debt brake, which mandates that nobody can ever run more than a minimal deficit. This effectively requires nearly every government to run a structural budget surplus, a demand Blyth dismisses as pure mathematical absurdity. Even though it is arithmetically impossible for every nation to run a surplus simultaneously, European policymakers have codified it into legal rules regardless. This obsession with deficit restriction connects directly to the intellectual lineage of postwar Italy. Luigi Einaudi, who served as post-war Italy’s first prime minister and head of the Bank of Italy, founded the Bocconi School of Public Finance in Milan. The Bocconi School became celebrated for advancing public choice theory—the premise that states are inherently untrustworthy, rent-seeking institutions. Blyth quips that growing up in Italy might make anyone cynical about the state, but Bocconi theorists generalized this Italian institutional dysfunction into a universal economic truth. They championed the European Union not as an expression of popular will, but explicitly as a disciplinary straitjacket designed to override local democratic processes and suppress public expenditures.

When the economics department at the University of Cambridge blew apart during the 1970s intellectual battles known as the Cambridge capital controversies, British economics lost its dominance to American departments. The only European economics department at the time with the mathematical chops to engage with the Americans was Bocconi. Because Bocconi’s faculty were already philosophically committed to viewing state intervention as inherently destructive, they aligned seamlessly with the American turn toward neoliberalism. This institutional alignment transformed Bocconi into an ideological transmission belt running straight from Milan to Harvard.

As Mark Blyth emphasizes: > “And they were hard-wired for seeing the state as a bad thing at exactly the time that liberal economics went in the same direction, when it went neoliberal.”

```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Ideological Transmission of Austerity Thinking accDescr: Flowchart tracing public choice theory from the Bocconi School to Harvard and into European crisis policy.

subgraph Origin["Postwar Milan"] A["Bocconi School of Public Finance<br>(Luigi Einaudi)"] B["Public Choice Theory & EU as External Disciplinary Device"] A --> B end

subgraph Transmission["Academic Convergence"] C["Cambridge Capital Controversies<br>(UK Cambridge collapses)"] D["Bocconi pairs with US Neoliberal Economics"] B --> D C --> D end

subgraph Policy["Harvard & European Policy"] E["Harvard Economics Department<br>(Alberto Alesina)"] F["Expansionary Austerity Hypothesis<br>adopted by ECB & G20"] D --> E E --> F end ```

[44:48](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM&t=2688s) The Expansionary Austerity Hypothesis and the Ikea Couch Parable

That Milan-to-Harvard pipeline leads directly to Alberto Alesina, former chair of Harvard’s economics department, who developed the theory of "expansionary austerity." Blyth likens Alesina’s framework to Joseph Schumpeter’s punitive "emetic economics" and traces its foundations back to David Ricardo's Ricardian equivalence: the premise that public debt operations are neutral because rational agents anticipate future taxation. Under this theory, spending cuts purportedly stimulate economic growth by restoring "confidence." Blyth mocks the psychological assumptions embedded in the model through a vivid thought experiment: imagine an ordinary citizen trapped in a collapsing economy, their partner already out of work, their own job hanging by a thread, and their future precarious. Yet rather than panicking about unemployment, the model insists that ordinary citizens lie awake in bed consumed with anxiety over the national debt.

The government then signals deep, credible cuts to public spending. In the model, the citizen possesses full rational expectations, intuitively understands the true structural equation governing the macroeconomy, and knows all its underlying coefficients. The citizen calculates lifetime expenditures and reasons that spending cuts today guarantee lower taxes twenty years down the road. Discounting that future windfall back to the present, the citizen suddenly feels flush with disposable income, rushes out to Ikea, purchases a new couch, and single-handedly cures the recession. Stripped of its sophisticated mathematical formalisms, Blyth insists this is the actual causal logic of expansionary austerity. When austerity proponents cite 1980s case studies like Ireland, Sweden, Denmark, or Canada to validate this theory, Blyth counters that their timelines are inverted. Canada's famous turnaround was not caused by fiscal contraction leading to growth; rather, the Canadian dollar depreciated 40% against the US dollar between 1976 and 1986 just as the US economy—which absorbed 75% of Canadian exports and was nine times Canada's size—boomed. Canada grew first through export demand, and only then balanced its budget.

As Mark Blyth explains: > “Cutting in a slump produces a bigger slump.”

- Alesina’s confidence model assumes households make intertemporal tax adjustments across a 20-year horizon based on current fiscal contractions. - Historical precedents cited by austerity advocates routinely confound the causal order: countries experienced export-led expansions first, followed by budget consolidation. - The Canadian dollar (*the Loonie*) devalued by 40% between 1976 and 1986, positioning Canada's commodity-export economy to capture massive US growth between 1986 and 1992.

[46:51](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM&t=2811s) The Great Bait-and-Switch and the Breakdown of the Model

Despite its empirical failings, this expansionary framework was embraced by the European Central Bank (ECB), the EU’s Economic and Financial Affairs Council (Ecofin), and G20 finance ministers in 2009, culminating in the ECB’s 2010 report. Blyth notes with disbelief that this document literally recycled 18th- and 19th-century classical arguments directly from David Hume, Adam Smith, David Ricardo, and John Stuart Mill to justify the Greek bailouts and across-the-board austerity packages. Blyth characterizes this program as the greatest bait-and-switch operation in modern history: private debt recklessly accumulated by over-leveraged commercial banks was transferred wholesale onto public balance sheets. The public, who had relied on welfare state protections, was suddenly handed the bill for systemically irresponsible financiers who were politically untouchable.

Cracks in the consensus soon appeared. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) broke ranks after calculating fiscal multipliers in the European periphery: slashing public spending by $1.00 did not lower debt; instead, it wiped out $1.50 to $1.70 of economic output. This dynamic created negative convexity, causing debt-to-GDP ratios to spiral upward as denominators collapsed. Meanwhile, the Eastern European "Rebel Alliance"—Romania, Estonia, Bulgaria, Latvia, and Lithuania—attempted to "blow up the Death Star" of debt through internal devaluations, resulting in economic devastation. The academic pillar of austerity crumbled as well during "Excelgate," when a graduate student discovered fatal spreadsheet coding errors in Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff’s influential study claiming growth drops off sharply when debt exceeds 90% of GDP. These policy errors left southern Europe trapped under chronic 25% unemployment, an outcome Blyth argues is politically unsustainable.

As Mark Blyth puts it: > “Because what's actually happened is all that private debt that was generated by the banking system through over-lending is now on the public balance sheet.”

- The IMF found fiscal spending multipliers in the periphery were negative $1.50 to $1.70 for every dollar cut, expanding rather than shrinking debt loads. - "Excelgate" discredited Reinhart and Rogoff's 90% debt-to-GDP threshold by exposing coding mistakes, selective omissions, and flawed weighting formulas. - Youth and structural unemployment in parts of Southern Europe stabilized near permanent 25% rates.

[48:20](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM&t=2900s) Three Ways Out: Financial Repression, Taxing Wealth, and Hippocratic Economics

Blyth outlines three alternative routes to resolve the crisis. The first is financial repression, an approach historically deployed after World War II. Under this mechanism, heavily leveraged commercial banks stuffed with sovereign debt are forced by regulatory mandates to hold even more government bonds at suppressed yields. Central banks then deliberately engineer positive inflation targets, creating negative real interest rates. After World War II, this "liquidation tax" amortized the equivalent of 40% of US GDP in a single decade while the broader economy boomed. Financial repression systematically punishes creditors while offering relief to debtors. Blyth reveals that he took out an enormous mortgage on the expectation that inflation will inevitably eat away half the real debt burden over time.

The second solution is direct taxation of concentrated private capital and offshore shelters. Blyth points out the absurdity of the US carried interest tax loophole, which enabled private equity executives like Mitt Romney to pay an effective 15% rate while ordinary salaried employees face marginal rates of 30%. Blyth argues that governments must dismantle offshore tax havens, which hold an estimated $27 trillion in untaxed assets concentrated across just five jurisdictions. Reclaiming this wealth would easily eliminate fiscal shortfalls without gutting public services like local fire departments. Finally, Blyth appeals to "Hippocratic economics"—the doctrine of *first, do no harm*. While doom-mongers predicted the United States would collapse under its profligate federal spending, the US cleaned up bank balance sheets, stabilized debt, fostered renewed lending, and returned to growth. In contrast, Britain faced a decade of stagnation, Ireland forfeited an entire generation to bail out private banking liabilities, and the European periphery was reduced to economic misery.

As Mark Blyth summarizes the core political fight: > “Somebody got all the benefits, then they cost all the costs, now they want somebody to pay for the costs while they keep all the benefits.”

- Post-WWII financial repression reduced US national debt by an amount equal to 40% of GDP across ten years through negative real yields. - An estimated $27 trillion in private global wealth resides untaxed in five major tax haven jurisdictions. - While the UK and Eurozone pursued fiscal contraction, US stabilization and growth demonstrated the superiority of avoiding self-inflicted austerity.

[50:52](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM&t=3052s) Q&A: Hedging and Investing in an Era of Financial Repression

Following enthusiastic applause, Blyth apologizes for running slightly long, joking that he has been "talking faster than JFK on speed." An audience member opens the question-and-answer session by asking how ordinary people can capitalize on an inflationary environment, noting that taking out massive mortgages is problematic given the severe local real estate bubble in Silicon Valley.

Blyth shifts into what he calls his "financial adviser mode" to discuss asset management under positive inflation and financial repression. He explains that generating real returns under high inflation is challenging, but historical models exist. During the late 1970s and early 1980s, the most successful corporate entities were diversified conglomerate trusts that held small, varied stakes across an entire economy. He draws a direct parallel to the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, whose unofficial operating ethos is to own half a percent of every unanchored asset on Earth. Because an investor cannot reliably anticipate which specific sectors will generate upside during an inflationary rebalancing, the most effective defense is maximal structural diversification—mirroring broad index funds or holding conglomerates—to construct a protective barbell against monetary debasement.

As Mark Blyth tells the audience: > “So what you should be is maximally diversify.”

[51:57](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM&t=3117s) The Myth of Hyperinflation and the German Saving Obsession

Mark Blyth addresses the widespread economic paranoia that any degree of inflation inevitably accelerates into hyperinflation, dismissing the idea out of hand: “So we have this story about the least degree of inflation leads to some kind of infinity curve hyper-convexity where, boom, off it goes. And it's simply not true.”

To explain where this pervasive fear originates, Blyth offers personal background about marrying into a German family. He jokes about his 71-year-old retired father-in-law (*Schwiegervater*), whom he describes as a classic German hardwired for saving: he is retired, yet he continues to save money constantly rather than spending it, terrified of inflation. Blyth recounts researching the Weimar hyperinflation while writing his book and discovering that it was actually a deliberate government policy aimed at frustrating the French over World War I reparations. Contrary to popular historical memory, the hyperinflation ended within eight months, the entire economy stabilized inside twelve months, and it was followed by five years of solid growth. It was only later—when the Brüning administration imposed brutal austerity policies that threw the economy off a cliff—that the Nazis came to power. Furthermore, throughout the entire postwar period up until around 1980, European economies consistently ran positive rates of inflation alongside positive real rates of economic growth.

- The German hyperinflation was ended within 8 months, and stabilization took roughly 12 months. - The Weimar Republic experienced 5 years of post-stabilization growth before austerity precipitated the economic collapse that aided the Nazi rise to power. - Post-WWII Europe sustained positive growth alongside positive inflation until roughly 1980.

---

[53:20](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM&t=3200s) The Real Mechanics of Japan's Lost Decades

An audience member asks about Japan, noting that economists like Paul Krugman frequently cite it to argue that a country can sustain massive debt levels for decades without disaster. Blyth disagrees with typical Keynesian monetary interpretations, arguing instead that Japan's long-running stagnation is deeply structural. While Richard Koo's *The Holy Grail of Macroeconomics* correctly identifies the surface problem as a "balance sheet recession"—where over-leveraged firms quietly pay down debt with central bank monetization rather than expanding—Blyth points to Sven Steinmo's *The Evolution of the Modern State* for the definitive root cause: “I think what goes on in Japan is actually deeply structural.”

```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Structural Causes of Japanese Stagnation accDescr: Flowchart tracing Japan's economic stagnation from the 1985 Plaza Accord through real estate bubbles, corporate restructuring, and demographic hoarding of government bonds.

subgraph ExternalShock["External Shock & Outsourcing"] PA["1985 Plaza Accord: Yen Appreciates"] Outsource["Firms Move Production to SE Asia<br>(Vietnam, Malaysia)"] PA --> Outsource end

subgraph DomesticReaction["Broken Contract & Asset Bubble"] Broken["Cradle-to-Grave Welfare Broken"] Bubble["Mass Speculation in Real Estate"] Pop["Real Estate Bubble Bursts (Early 1990s)"] Outsource --> Broken Broken --> Bubble Bubble --> Pop end

subgraph DemographicStagnation["Demographics & Debt Traps"] Hoard["Aging Population Hoards Stimulus Cash"] Bonds["Postal & Bank Accounts Buy JGBs"] Transfer["Intergenerational Bond Transfers"] Pop --> Hoard Hoard --> Bonds Bonds --> Transfer end ```

Blyth traces this structural unraveling back to the 1985 Plaza Accord, when the United States forced West Germany and Japan to appreciate their currencies against the dollar because American exports were being crushed (accompanied by widespread American xenophobia and hysteria over Japan taking over the world, satirized by Blyth referencing Michael Crichton's *Rising Sun*). Because Japan's economy was completely export-dependent—"Germany on steroids"—Japanese manufacturers responded to the strong yen by relocating physical plants, equipment, and entire supplier networks to second-tier Asian tigers like Malaysia and Vietnam.

This move fundamentally broke Japan's domestic social contract, which had traditionally provided cradle-to-grave welfare inside the firm. Facing the sudden loss of employment security, Japanese workers sought alternative retirement assets and flooded money into domestic real estate, inflating a massive property bubble that eventually burst the banking sector. Sociologically, an aging cohort facing unemployment with a minimal state safety net refused to spend government stimulus checks. Instead, they hoarded the money under mattresses or deposited it into post offices and banks, which in turn used the deposits to purchase Japanese Government Bonds (JGBs). Because older demographics have an exceptionally low propensity to consume, 80-year-olds do not liquidate these bonds; they pass them intact to the next generation, transforming public debt into an intergenerational wealth transfer.

---

[56:48](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM&t=3408s) Why Ireland and the European Periphery Cannot Escape

An audience member asks how an individual European Union member state like Ireland can fix its own economy given the heavy structural constraints placed upon it. Blyth answers bluntly: “They can't.” Unlike Argentina in 2001, which merely maintained a currency board peg to the US dollar and could simply abandon the peg because the physical Argentine peso still existed, Ireland surrendered its national currency completely. Reintroducing a domestic Irish pound would require an impossible scenario: freezing time with a government time machine, vacuuming physical euro banknotes out of every citizen's wallet, stamping them as new national currency, and unfreezing time directly into an immediate currency and banking collapse.

Moreover, currency devaluation only helps economies that possess diversified, globally competitive industrial goods to export. While northern Italy has world-class competitive export industries (with regional fiscal transfers supporting the struggling south), peripheral economies like Greece and Portugal have virtually no major exports beyond basic commodities like olive oil, which faces zero-sum competition against larger producers like Spain and Italy. Devaluation in such countries would merely trigger import-driven hyperinflation without generating an export boom.

Turning to Ireland, Blyth argues that its official recovery and debt-to-GDP numbers are completely distorted: “The debt to GDP figures you see in Ireland are a big, fat lie.” Ireland books the corporate profits of multinational tech corporations routed through minimal Dublin offices—often tiny setups of 25 staff taking advantage of the 12.5% corporate tax rate—as domestic services exports on its national balance of payments. Underneath this artificial accounting, Ireland absorbed the immense private liabilities of its failed banking sector into the National Asset Management Agency (NAMA), an off-balance-sheet "super bad bank" holding toxic assets that will never recover their value. When these hidden obligations are factored in, Blyth remarks, Ireland's true economic situation is actually worse than Greece's.

- Abandoning a currency peg (like Argentina in 2001) differs fundamentally from leaving the Eurozone, which requires inventing and circulating a new paper currency from scratch. - Greece, Portugal, and Ireland lack major manufactured export capacity, meaning currency devaluation would primarily inflate import costs. - Ireland's balance of payments is artificially inflated by multinational corporate profit routing taxed at a 12.5% rate. - Ireland shifted toxic bank assets into NAMA off the official balance sheet.

---

[59:54](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM&t=3594s) Iceland and the Genesis of the Shadow Banking Crisis

An audience member asks Blyth for his assessment of how Iceland handled its catastrophic banking collapse. Blyth opens his response with a sardonic summary: “Iceland is a brilliant example of no good deed goes unpunished.” He recalls his early involvement as a member of the Warwick Commission on International Financial Reform just as the financial crash erupted, noting how policymakers and analysts suddenly realized the crisis was centered in the shadow banking system—prompting Blyth at the time to begin investigating what a "shadow bank" actually was.

[01:00:16](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM&t=3616s) Moral Hazard, Bank Concentration, and the Icelandic Alternative

Mark Blyth reflects on how his perspective evolved while writing his book. Initially, he accepted the prevailing consensus that institutions were simply "too big to fail" because of systemic interconnectedness. By the time he finished his research, however, he realized that governments should have let insolvent banks collapse. While Blyth acknowledges the massive real-world costs of lost GDP and spiking unemployment that accompany bank failures, he emphasizes that the post-crisis reality is worse: even though banks have deleveraged, the global banking system is far more concentrated now than it was in 2007. Mega-institutions like Citigroup are even larger, while the European banking system represents that vulnerability on steroids. In effect, the state has provided these financial giants with a license to operate an extortion racket against the public taxpayer.

```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Systemic Moral Hazard Loop accDescr: Diagram illustrating how mega-banks avoid criminal liability to prevent systemic collapse, creating institutional moral hazard.

subgraph Bank["Bank Operations & Misconduct"] A["Financial Institution commits severe crimes<br>(e.g., money laundering, terror financing)"] B["Regulators issue cash fines instead of criminal indictments"] end

subgraph System["Systemic Vulnerability"] C["Criminal charge legally triggers mandatory institutional withdrawal<br>(e.g., CalPERS pulling funds)"] D["Mass capital flight threatens whole financial sector"] end

A --> B A -.->|"Threat of criminal charges"| C C --> D D -.->|"Forces regulatory lenience"| B ```

Blyth cites UBS as a premier example of this systemic injustice. The bank was fined $1.2 billion for illicit activities involving money laundering for drug cartels and financing terrorism—crimes that would land ordinary citizens in prison. Yet institutions receive mere fines because of systemic legal exposure: if an American or US-licensed broker-dealer bank has a corporate officer charged with criminal liability, major institutional investors such as CalPERS are legally required to withdraw their capital immediately. If large pension funds pull their assets, the bank immediately collapses, endangering the entire financial structure. As Blyth summarizes: “So you're basically playing systemic moral hazard as a business model.”

Contrasting this with Iceland, Blyth points out that Iceland chose to let its over-leveraged banks fail. Because the vast majority of that debt was held by external foreign creditors, the primary loss fell on outside investors rather than domestic society. Crucially, this unleashed unexpected positive domestic externalities: - Financial engineers and quantitative analysts who had spent years designing complex derivatives were suddenly forced to enter the real productive economy. - These displaced experts launched new startups and technological ventures, transforming Iceland into a major hub for online gaming—capitalizing on cold ambient temperatures to run underground server farms and using domestic math and software engineering talent. - Consequently, Iceland’s domestic economy rebounded, bringing unemployment down to just about one percentage point higher than Germany’s, compared to stagnant double-digit unemployment figures elsewhere in Europe. - However, after managing the recovery and paying back debts responsibly, the reformist government was voted out of office, and the very political actors who originally inflated the banking bubble were re-elected, proving that “no good deed goes unpunished.”

---

[01:02:52](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM&t=3772s) The Australian Anomaly: Commodities, China, and the Housing Bubble

An audience member from Australia asks about their country's avoidance of the Great Recession, noting two competing domestic explanations: whether Australia was saved by aggressive Keynesian government stimulus checks or by the Western Australian mining boom feeding Chinese demand. Blyth dismisses the stimulus explanation immediately, affirming that the commodity-driven Chinese connection is the sole reason: “The second one is completely right.”

Blyth notes that because capital controls make direct trading of the Chinese currency difficult, market participants track shadow currency markets comparing the Chinese yuan to the Australian dollar, which move in lockstep. Unlike common American rhetoric about China "owning" the United States—where China simply holds roughly 17% of US Treasury bills in an advantageous trade where the US exchanges low-yielding paper for manufactured consumer goods—China functionally owns Australia’s real asset base. Chinese industrial demand has aggressively consumed commodities out of Western Australia at the height of a historic super-cycle.

This commodity windfall has distorted the domestic Australian economy, particularly the housing market: - Real estate prices have soared to extreme levels, pushing standard homes in Perth to roughly 2 million Australian dollars. - In Sydney, the price-to-income multiple has climbed to 13 to 1, meaning an average three-bedroom apartment requires thirteen times household income, demanding family inheritance and multiple incomes just to enter the market. - This dynamic has inflated a massive real estate bubble sustained almost entirely by Chinese liquidity. - Blyth cautions that if China's growth engine slows or the commodity cycle drops, Australia faces severe structural fallout, emphasizing: “All bubbles pop. It is just a question of time.”

---

[01:04:53](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM&t=3893s) Brazil’s Developmental Welfare State and the Politics of Growth

Asked about the BRIC economies and the path Brazil should follow, Blyth argues that Brazil’s contemporary model is exceptional: “Brazil needs to do what Brazil's been doing, which is awesome.” He outlines the historical context of Brazilian political economy, which was long plagued by one of the highest Gini coefficients in the world and severe structural inequality. Because domestic stability was chronically threatened by the alternating risks of military coups or communist uprisings, domestic elites routinely avoided investing within the country. Instead, they placed their fortunes in secure overseas institutions like Citibank at modest returns, while spending exorbitant sums at home on private kidnap insurance and heavily fortified compounds.

```mermaid flowchart LR accTitle: Brazil's Developmental Growth Loop accDescr: Flowchart detailing the Brazilian economic strategy using state development loans to fund domestic multinationals and social welfare programs.

subgraph StateFinance["State Capital Allocation"] A["BNDES<br>(Development Bank)"] B["National Champions<br>(e.g., Embraer)"] end

subgraph Redistribution["Redistribution & Demand"] C["Corporate Tax Receipts<br>from Global Operations"] D["Bolsa Família Program"] E["Expanded Domestic Middle Class"] end

A -->|"Low-cost financing"| B B -->|"Global expansion profits"| C C -->|"State social funding"| D D -->|"Income compression & purchasing power"| E E -.->|"Domestic economic growth"| A ```

This dynamic shifted when Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and the Workers' Party came to power. Recognizing that democracy effectively serves as "asset insurance for the rich," the government constructed a developmental welfare architecture: - The Brazilian National Development Bank (BNDES)—whose lending portfolio is twice the size of the World Bank—subsidized domestic corporations like Embraer and major industrial conglomerates to make them globally competitive multinationals. - The state leveraged taxes on those expanded corporate overseas profits to finance *Bolsa Família*, building a comprehensive social safety net where none had previously existed. - This simultaneous compression of the income distribution and elevation of baseline incomes created a domestic consumer middle class while marginalizing traditional landed elites. - To handle the resulting influx of international speculative capital chasing high domestic interest rates, which drove up the Brazilian real and hurt domestic exporters, Brazil implemented targeted inward capital controls—requiring upfront transaction taxes and security deposits to weed out short-term speculative carry-trade money while welcoming long-term direct investment.

Despite headwinds from an appreciating currency and broader macroeconomic slowdowns, Blyth concludes that Brazil's developmental strategy over the preceding decade was an extraordinary success. Boris Debic concludes the event by thanking Blyth, drawing final applause from the Google audience.

## Notable quotes > [36:58](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM&t=2218s) Redistribution of debt is reinsurance for democracy, and austerity is anorexia for the economy. — Mark Blyth

> [44:48](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM&t=2688s) Cutting in a slump produces a bigger slump. — Mark Blyth

> [36:58](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM&t=2218s) Democracy is asset insurance for the rich. — Mark Blyth

> [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM&t=0s) I wrote this book for the following reason—I got really, really pissed off with people with lots of money telling people who don't have any money they need to pay shit back. — Mark Blyth

## Mentioned Mark Blyth, Boris Debic, Alan Greenspan, George W. Bush, Bill Clinton, Bear Stearns, Angela Merkel, Nicolas Sarkozy, Jürgen Stark, Ben Bernanke, Mario Draghi, John Locke, David Hume, Adam Smith, Lehman Brothers, ING, BNP Paribas, Crédit Agricole, Société Générale, Deutsche Bank, Citibank, Bundesbank, Federal Reserve, European Central Bank, Authors@Google, Watson Institute, Brown University, Great Transformations: Economic Ideas and Institutional Change in the Twentieth Century, Austerity: The History of a Dangerous Idea, The Wealth of Nations, Second Treatise of Government, David Ricardo, John Stuart Mill, Joseph Schumpeter, Winston Churchill, David Lloyd George, Hubert Henderson, Joan Robinson, John Maynard Keynes, Takahashi Korekiyo, Heinrich Brüning, Friedrich List, Otto von Bismarck, Walter Eucken, Luigi Einaudi, Alberto Alesina, Mitt Romney, Paul Krugman, Richard Koo, Sven Steinmo, European Commission, European Parliament, Ecofin, International Monetary Fund, Bocconi School of Public Finance, Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, The Evolution of the Modern State, The Holy Grail of Macroeconomics, Michael Crichton, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, Plaza Accord, Rising Sun, National Asset Management Agency (NAMA), Warwick Commission on International Financial Reform, Citigroup, UBS, CalPERS, BNDES, Embraer, Bolsa Família, World Bank

## Video description Governments today in both Europe and the United States have succeeded in casting government spending as reckless wastefulness that has made the economy worse. In contrast, they have advanced a policy of draconian budget cuts--austerity--to solve the financial crisis. We are told that we have all lived beyond our means and now need to tighten our belts. This view conveniently forgets where all that debt came from. Not from an orgy of government spending, but as the direct result of bailing out, recapitalizing, and adding liquidity to the broken banking system. Through these actions private debt was rechristened as government debt while those responsible for generating it walked away scot free, placing the blame on the state, and the burden on the taxpayer.

That burden now takes the form of a global turn to austerity, the policy of reducing domestic wages and prices to restore competitiveness and balance the budget. The problem, according to political economist Mark Blyth, is that austerity is a very dangerous idea. First of all, it doesn't work. As the past four years and countless historical examples from the last 100 years show, while it makes sense for any one state to try and cut its way to growth, it simply cannot work when all states try it simultaneously: all we do is shrink the economy. In the worst case, austerity policies worsened the Great Depression and created the conditions for seizures of power by the forces responsible for the Second World War: the Nazis and the Japanese military establishment. As Blyth amply demonstrates, the arguments for austerity are tenuous and the evidence thin. Rather than expanding growth and opportunity, the repeated revival of this dead economic idea has almost always led to low growth along with increases in wealth and income inequality. Austerity demolishes the conventional wisdom, marshaling an army of facts to demand that we recognize austerity for what it is, and what it costs us.

About the Author: Mark Blyth is a faculty fellow at the Watson Institute, professor of international political economy in Brown's Political Science Department, and director of the University's undergraduate programs in development studies and international relations.

He is the author of Great Transformations: Economic Ideas and Institutional Change in the Twentieth Century; editor of The Routledge Handbook of International Political Economy: IPE as a Global Conversation, which surveys different schools of IPE around the globe; and co-editor of a volume on constructivist theory and political economy titled Constructing the International Economy. He is working on a new book that questions the political and economic sustainability of liberal democracies, called The End of the Liberal World?

Blyth is a member of the Warwick Commission on International Financial Reform. He is a member of the editorial board of the Review of International Political Economy, and his articles have appeared in journals such as the American Political Science Review, Perspectives on Politics, Comparative Politics, and World Politics.

He has a PhD in political science from Columbia University and taught at Johns Hopkins University from 1997 to 2009.

This talk was hosted by Boris Debic on behalf of Authors@Google.

[Source](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM)

中文简报

布莱斯警告:欧元区紧缩政策保护银行并导致经济萎缩 在相互关联的经济体中大幅削减公共预算会导致国民产出萎缩,并推高债务与GDP的比率,以此吸收有毒的私人银行债务。 Mark Blyth剖析了紧缩政策的思想基础与政策实践,认为2008年后的财政危机是由私人银行过度放贷和救助造成的,而非过度的公共福利支出。他指出,合成谬误使得相互关联的经济体削减开支的做法适得其反,不可避免地导致GDP萎缩并推高债务与GDP之比。Blyth追溯了从洛克(Locke)、休谟(Hume)到博科尼学派(Bocconi School)300年来自由主义经济学对公共债务的怀疑史,阐释了紧缩政策在历史上如何加剧大萧条和法西斯主义抬头等灾难。最后,通过详尽的国际案例研究,他评估了金融抑制、财富税以及冰岛处理银行破产模式等替代路径。 Mark Blyth认为,2008年后的公共债务危机并非源于过度的福利开支,而是在杠杆率超过40倍的机构倒闭后,私人银行业债务被社会化所导致的。 (2:51) 同时推行开支削减会引发宏观经济上的合成谬误,即总需求萎缩会降低国家GDP并推高债务与GDP之比,而非使其趋于稳定。 (22:10) 20世纪30年代德国和日本的历史先例表明,极端的通缩性紧缩政策直接加剧了政治激进化,并导致自由民主体制的崩溃。 (34:44) 基于德国秩序自由主义的欧元区结构性框架在数学上是不可行的,因为若没有国内需求驱动的对应赤字,所有成员国不可能同时实现出口顺差。 (41:10)

Reading summary

Political economist Mark Blyth argues that austerity is a dangerous, ideologically driven economic fallacy that misdiagnoses a systemic private banking crash as a crisis of sovereign overspending, resulting in self-defeating budget cuts that shrink national economies. The Banking Carry Trade and the Sovereign Debt Myth (13:22) Blyth rejects the conventional narrative that bloated welfare states or reckless southern European borrowers caused the post-2008 debt crisis. Instead, he traces the crisis to an enormous carry trade executed by core European financial institutions. Prior to the crash, major banks in Germany, France, and Britain cleared safe sovereign bonds from their books to chase yield on peripheral debt (such as Greek, Spanish, and Portuguese paper), juicing returns through extreme leverage reaching up to 40-to-1. By 2011, French banks held peripheral exposures equivalent to more than 33% of France's gross domestic product, while the standalone balance sheet of the Dutch bank ING swelled to 211% of Dutch GDP. When these leveraged real estate and sovereign bets soured, the ensuing bailouts socialized private financial liabilities onto public balance sheets. In Blyth's view, political leaders orchestrated a historic bait-and-switch: private banking sector losses were transferred to the state, and the resulting sovereign debt spikes were dishonestly blamed on public sector profligacy, leaving ordinary citizens to pay the bill through gutted public services. The Eurozone Straitjacket and the Fallacy of Composition (22:10) Austerity fails due to the fallacy of composition: what might seem prudent for an individual household is catastrophic when applied to an entire economy, because one actor's spending is another actor's income. Cutting government spending in a synchronized downturn reduces national output faster than it amortizes debt. Blyth demonstrates this mathematically: if public expenditures are halved during a slump, the denominator (GDP) shrinks while nominal debt stays flat, causing the debt-to-GDP ratio to escalate rather than fall. This was demonstrated when simultaneous global cuts in the 1930s caused debt ratios to soar and created fertile ground for political extremism. This structural trap is uniquely severe within the Eurozone, which institutionalized German ordoliberalism across diverse economies. Because Germany's persistent export surpluses mathematically require counterpart trade deficits in other member states, demanding that peripheral nations simultaneously slash wages and emulate Germany's export model is an arithmetic impossibility. Lacking national printing presses, currency devaluation tools, or a central bank authorized to mutualize debt, peripheral countries were locked into destructive internal devaluations until European Central Bank President Mario Draghi halted panic by pledging to do 'whatever it takes.' The Intellectual Failure of Expansionary Austerity (44:48) Blyth links modern austerity doctrines to early liberal thinkers like John Locke, David Hume, and Adam Smith, who viewed state borrowing with deep suspicion and feared the crowding out of private capital. This skepticism culminated in Alberto Alesina's theory of 'expansionary austerity,' which claimed that aggressive government cuts stimulate growth by restoring market confidence. Proponents argued that rational citizens, anticipating future tax reductions resulting from current spending cuts, immediately increase their consumption. Blyth ridicules this logic through the scenario of an insecure worker rushing out to purchase an Ikea couch to cure a national recession. This intellectual consensus crumbled under empirical scrutiny. The International Monetary Fund subsequently acknowledged that fiscal multipliers in the European periphery sat between 1.5 and 1.7, meaning that every dollar cut from public budgets destroyed up to $1.70 of economic output. The academic foundation suffered another blow during 'Excelgate,' when spreadsheet errors were uncovered in Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff's study that had purported to prove economic growth stalls once debt-to-GDP crosses a 90% threshold. Alternative Resolutions: Financial Repression and Wealth Taxation (48:20) Rather than inflicting economic contraction, Blyth points to historical precedents for resolving sovereign overhangs. Following World War II, the United States utilized financial repression, using regulatory mandates to require domestic banks to hold sovereign bonds while central banks maintained low nominal yields alongside moderate inflation. This engineered negative real interest rate liquidated debt equivalent to 40% of US GDP within a decade, without halting economic expansion. Blyth also advocates directly taxing concentrated private wealth and cracking down on offshore tax havens, which house an estimated $27 trillion in untaxed assets across five primary jurisdictions. Finally, Blyth warns that preserving mega-institutions under 'too big to fail' doctrines creates severe moral hazard. Megabanks have grown larger and more concentrated since 2007, leaving governments vulnerable to systemic extortion unless financial concentration is dismantled. Blyth concludes that democratic welfare institutions serve as essential insurance for wealth and property, and that starving them through austerity undermines political stability. However, the analysis leaves unresolved how peripheral Eurozone nations can regain competitiveness without sovereign currencies, and whether global regulators can practically implement financial repression and tax harmonisation across competing jurisdictions.

Source quotes

[36:58] Mark Blyth: Redistribution of debt is reinsurance for democracy, and austerity is anorexia for the economy. [44:48] Mark Blyth: Cutting in a slump produces a bigger slump. [36:58] Mark Blyth: Democracy is asset insurance for the rich. [0:00] Mark Blyth: I wrote this book for the following reason—I got really, really pissed off with people with lots of money telling people who don't have any money they need to pay shit back.

Original transcript

[0:00] BORIS DEBIC: Welcome everybody. [0:02] I am extremely pleased to welcome today Mark Blyth. [0:07] Mark Blyth will share with us his insights into austerity as [0:13] it takes shape in the European Union. [0:17] Let me read a little bit from his biography. [0:20] Mark Blyth is a faculty fellow at the Watson Institute, [0:24] professor international political economy in Brown's [0:27] political science department, and director of the [0:29] university's Undergraduate Programs in Development [0:33] Studies and International Relations. [0:36] He's also the author of "Great Transformations-- [0:39] Economic Ideas and Institutional Change in the [0:42] 20th Century." [0:43] He's the editor of the "Routledge Handbook of [0:46] International Political Economy," co-editor of a [0:50] volume on constructivist theory on political economy [0:53] titled "Constructing the International Economy," and [0:57] he's working also on a new book that questions the [1:00] political and economic sustainability of liberal [1:03] democracies, called "The End of the Liberal [1:06] World." That's dramatic. [1:10] Blyth is a member of the Warwick Commission on [1:12] International Financial Reform. [1:14] He is a member of the editorial board of the "Review [1:17] of International Political Economy." And his articles [1:21] have appeared in journals such as "The American Political [1:25] Science Review," "Perspectives in Politics," "Comparative [1:29] Politics," and "World Politics." He has a Ph.D. in [1:32] political science from Columbia University, and [1:35] taught at Johns Hopkins University from 1997 to 2009. [1:41] Please give a hand to Mark Blyth. [1:43] MARK BLYTH: Thank you. [1:45] Cheers. [1:50] Is this mic on? [1:51] Yes? [1:51] Can you hear me? [1:52] Hello? [1:52] Right. [1:54] So I have a Scottish accent. [1:55] There's surprise number one. [1:58] And those slides started to change themselves, which is [2:00] surprise number two. [2:02] OK, how am I going to start this? [2:06] Why did I write this book? [2:07] I wrote this book for the following reason-- [2:09] I got really, really pissed off with people with lots of [2:11] money telling people who don't have any money they need to [2:14] pay shit back. [2:16] That's basically it. [2:17] I grew up on the butt end of the British welfare state. [2:20] I'm an orphan, and I was raised by my paternal [2:22] grandmother. [2:23] So I am the greatest living example of inter-generational [2:26] social mobility you're ever going to see, because I'm a [2:29] freaking Ivy League professor. [2:30] So I went from there to there. [2:32] How did I do that? [2:33] Because of this thing that gets blamed called the welfare [2:36] state, that bloated, paternalist, out of control, [2:39] incentivizing, demotivating piece of crap called the [2:43] welfare state. [2:44] Now, why is this a completely bullshit story? [2:47] Well, that's not, but why does it turn into a bullshit story? [2:49] It turns into a bullshit story for the following reason-- [2:51] back in 2000, the number one concern of financial markets [2:54] globally was there wasn't going to be enough federal [2:56] debt, because we had balanced the budget. [2:59] Seriously, the number one concern was there wouldn't be [3:01] enough T-bills. [3:02] So fast-forward 13 years, ah, we're all freaking out. [3:06] Now, in between, a couple interesting things happened. [3:09] So you have a balanced budget, which basically means over [3:11] time, as the economy grows, your debt [3:13] stock is going to shrink. [3:14] And that's why people had a problem with it. [3:16] So you're going through a period of rapid growth. [3:17] This was the tech boom period, all this sort of stuff. [3:20] And then there's 9/11. [3:22] So there's a little dip in the economy and a guy called [3:24] Greenspan comes along and says, let's cut interest rates [3:26] and essentially do asset protection for everybody who [3:29] has bought assets by giving them more or less free money. [3:31] So then we decide on top of that we're going to [3:33] have two tax cuts. [3:34] Why? [3:34] Because we just need more money. [3:36] Screw it. [3:36] We're just going to do it. [3:37] Let's have some tax cuts. [3:38] No corresponding way of paying it off, or whatever, we'll [3:41] just take the tax cuts. [3:42] And then we'll decide to fight two wars of choice for dubious [3:45] political reasons without raising any taxes. [3:47] That'll be a good one. [3:48] So by the time you get to 2006, there's [3:50] 61% debt to GDP already. [3:53] I don't remember anybody in Congress, particularly [3:55] Republicans, jumping up and down about the crazy level of [3:57] federal debt in 2006. [4:00] And then in 2007 and 2008, there's a [4:03] run on the repo markets. [4:04] Basically, the hidden story of the financial crisis that [4:06] nobody really talks about-- it's actually quite simple-- [4:08] is that because there was a shortage of T-bills, because, [4:11] in fact, many of them were in China, because they keep [4:13] buying a lot of them, we started to use AAA mortgage [4:16] products as collateral for short term financial deals in [4:19] the repo markets. [4:20] As the housing crisis happened, those bonds that [4:23] made up those instruments fell from AAA to B to C. [4:27] At that time, that meant that if you were a heavily [4:29] leveraged financial organization-- a Bear Sterns, [4:31] for example-- [4:32] and you were using these things as pledges and as repo [4:35] collateral, as they fell in value, you had to use more and [4:38] more of them to borrow the same amount of money. [4:40] Unfortunately, you couldn't do that, because there's a fixed [4:42] stock of the assets. [4:43] And they're hugely levered. [4:44] This meant a 3% return against their asset base, rendered [4:47] them effectively insolvent. [4:48] Once everybody figured this out, you shout fire in a [4:51] crowded theater, everybody freaks out, [4:53] heads for the exits. [4:54] You get a liquidity crunch. [4:55] You've got a financial crisis. [4:56] We decided to bail out the system rather than let it [5:00] fail, because it was too big to fail. [5:02] The costs of doing so were basically a 30% drop in tax [5:06] revenue across the OECD countries, because the [5:08] financial sector had become so big, particularly in the [5:10] United States and the United Kingdom, that it was [5:12] generating huge amounts of taxes. [5:14] At the same time, the economy slows down as the liquidity [5:16] crunch hits the real economy and affects lending and [5:18] borrowing and spending. [5:20] Consumer expenditures trend down, as do consumer [5:22] expectations, as do investment expectations. [5:24] You get caught in a slump. [5:26] Once you get caught in a slump, automatic transfers in [5:28] the economy mean that benefits go up at the same time as tax [5:31] revenues go down. [5:32] So you're going to have a bigger deficit. [5:34] As you have a bigger deficit, you multiply that over time, [5:36] you issue more debt, you go from 61% to 100% debt to GDP. [5:40] That's why we're here. [5:42] There was no orgy of public spending. [5:45] It's a lie. [5:46] I take Amtrak every day. [5:48] I would've noticed an orgy of public spending. [5:50] If there was an orgy on public spending, it was on asset [5:53] protection and income protection for the people who [5:56] had made out with the most for the past 30 years when we [5:59] bailed out those assets. [6:00] That's actually what happened. [6:02] Now, here's the inequity of the [INAUDIBLE] in this whole [6:04] thing-- why is it that social security, which isn't even [6:07] part of federal budget calculations on the deficit, [6:09] which, by the way, has a $2.3 trillion surplus, that has to [6:13] be cut so we can pay back the debt accrued by bailing out [6:16] some of the richest people in our society and [6:19] ensuring their assets? [6:20] Does anybody else think that's total horse shit? [6:22] Because I really do, and that's why I wrote this book. [6:25] Now, here's the weird thing. [6:27] We're actually not in that much of a mess. [6:29] It's been a sticky recovery. [6:30] It's been a technological shock to a lot of service jobs [6:33] that we didn't expect, et cetera. [6:34] But nonetheless, we haven't been cutting them. [6:36] Because of that, the federal deficit's projected to be [6:38] around 3% next year-- [6:40] even with a margin of error in the projection, say 4%. [6:43] Britain has its own currency, like us, and has been cutting, [6:47] been doing austerity. [6:48] Having done that, it's now looking at 7%, totally [6:51] [INAUDIBLE] [6:52] growth, and a possible triple-dip recession. [6:54] Europe has been cutting like there's no tomorrow. [6:57] They've got the leaches on the corpse and they're [6:59] opening up the veins. [7:00] Greece has lost 30% of GDP in four years. [7:03] The German army didn't manage that between '41 and '45. [7:08] That's how much damage has been done by this. [7:11] So the question is the following-- [7:12] why is it that Europe, particularly the European [7:15] Union, the part that we think of as the most kind of, if you [7:18] will, welfare-statish-friendly transer, et cetera, suddenly [7:22] became this huge doomsday device for this enormous [7:24] experiment on austerity, which so far has cost around 30% of [7:28] GDP in the periphery and has generated 25 million extra [7:32] unemployed in comparison to the United States? [7:35] Seems like something to investigate. [7:38] So, there's a standard picture of Europe in terms of its [7:40] fiscal balances. [7:41] As you can see, the United States around here, 2012. [7:44] By the way, always look at the net figure, because if you [7:46] look at the gross figure, that assumes [7:48] that nobody pays taxes. [7:50] And given that we all just wrote checks just a little [7:52] while ago, that would tell you that you really shouldn't look [7:54] at that one. [7:55] It also it seems the country has no assets. [7:57] And if that's the case, why do we have the National Security [7:59] Investment Act to stop people buying assets? [8:03] So obviously, look at the net one. [8:04] So you look at the net one, where are you? [8:06] Well, basically, everybody's kind of in the [8:07] mire, more or less. [8:10] So what brought about this fine mess? [8:12] Age check in the room. [8:13] Anybody who's giggling now is over the age of 40. [8:17] On the left, we have Laurel and Hardy, and on the right, [8:20] we have Angela Merkel and Sarkozy. [8:22] There we go. [8:23] I put that in purely for comedic values, just to make [8:26] sure everyone is paying attention. [8:28] And actually, they did bring about this fine mess, so that [8:29] is a serious point. [8:31] So what's the story here? [8:32] Well, there's an official story. [8:33] It's what I call story one, and this is the sort of [8:35] vaguely sophisticated version that you get if you read [8:38] things like "The Economist," "The Financial Times," et [8:40] cetera, et cetera. [8:41] And I'm going to tell you why it's total crap, because it's [8:43] not really true at all. [8:44] So there's story one and story two. [8:46] So here's the official story, story one. [8:47] You do this by looking at this. [8:49] This is interest rate convergence over [8:50] 10 year bond spreads. [8:52] So if you go back in the day before there was this thing [8:54] called the Euro, when everybody had their own [8:56] currency, if you were buying a bit of Greece on 10 years, [8:59] there's a 25% risk premium you're getting paid for [9:03] holding that. [9:03] That means that basically there's a one in four chance [9:06] they're going to default. [9:08] Why would you price that in? [9:09] Well, because they haven't run a budget surplus in 50 years. [9:13] Because they've been taking turns to steal the state and [9:15] using other people's rents and revenues to do it since they [9:18] basically ended the Civil War, so why would you not price [9:22] this at 25%? [9:23] Then have a look at the French, the Italians, the rest [9:26] of the Mediterranean, it's strained around 15%. [9:28] This whole [INAUDIBLE] in here, over 10%. [9:30] That's a lot. [9:31] You're getting paid a lot for just holding a 10 year debt. [9:34] Now, that reflects the real price of the bond, the real [9:37] risk of default that's in the bond. [9:39] Now, the official story goes like this-- [9:41] around 1991 there was this wonderful treaty called the [9:43] Maastricht Treaty. [9:44] Well, that's '86. [9:45] '91 is the Monetary Treaty. [9:47] And we decided that we're going to build this monetary [9:49] union in Europe. [9:50] And what did that mean? [9:51] It meant basically that you're going to have this German bank [9:54] called the Bundesbank generalized [9:56] across the whole area. [9:57] All the people that currently have inflation and exchange [10:00] rate risk and default risk no longer will have it because [10:03] we're going to take away their printing presses. [10:05] And once we've locked up all the printing presses in the [10:07] one time deal and given them to a guy in Frankfurt, and [10:10] he's the only one who can print the money, well, [10:12] basically doesn't that mean that Greece becomes Germany? [10:15] Doesn't that mean that Italy becomes Germany? [10:16] Because after all, they can't inflate [10:18] their way out of trouble. [10:19] So you get rid of that risk. [10:20] You can't devalue your way, which is a backdoor way of [10:23] solving the same problem. [10:24] All you can either do is deflate-- austerity-- [10:27] which is politically unpalatable, or you basically [10:30] sort your economy out and everybody kind of becomes [10:32] German, and that's the great plan. [10:34] And you can see how this is represented [10:35] in this risk premium. [10:36] There's where the Euro comes in. [10:38] And then there's a 7 and 1/2 year period where basically [10:41] all of these countries-- think about how diverse this is-- [10:43] everyone from Belgium to Italy to Greece to Spain to Portugal [10:47] have basically got exactly the same default risks. [10:50] Now, that's kind of odd if you think about it for more than [10:52] two minutes. [10:53] So what's behind this? [10:55] Well, the story goes like this. [10:57] Basically, what's undermining this-- if you go back to the [11:00] end here and you see where the spreads go up right, why does [11:02] it all start to go wrong? [11:04] Well, if you have a look here, your current account and [11:05] balances, exports and imports. [11:07] And you'll find that what you've got here is most [11:09] countries in the Euro, the major countries, are basically [11:12] running deficits all the way through. [11:14] And the only one that starts to run a surplus here is [11:17] Germany, which picks up just as the Euro comes in and [11:20] becomes the export powerhouse. [11:22] Now, when you control for the size of the German economy [11:24] relative to everybody else, what you begin to realize is [11:27] that their surplus is the counterpart [11:29] everybody else's deficit. [11:30] In other words, somebody has to buy all those BMWs. [11:34] And if you're buying all those BMWs, you're not making your [11:36] own [INAUDIBLE] [11:37] and selling them back to the Germans. [11:39] So you start to get these current account imbalances. [11:41] But that begs the question-- [11:42] where did all these guys in the south get the money to buy [11:44] the BMWs in the first place? [11:46] Well, that's your story about lax public finances. [11:49] This is these countries that are spending too much. [11:51] So look, it's the PIGS-- [11:52] Ireland, Spain, Greece, Portugal. [11:54] The Netherlands we'll put in a bracket, right? [11:56] But basically, look-- a huge amount. [11:57] That's 10% year on year annual growth of government [12:00] expenditure. [12:00] They are spending like drunken sailors, there's no doubt [12:03] about this. [12:05] Now, what made this possible? [12:06] As I said before, this is the ECB, being Deutschbank Uber [12:09] Alles, taking inflation and devaluation [12:11] risk off the table. [12:13] And also, the Maastricht criteria for Euro gives [12:16] credible rules against sovereign misbehavior. [12:19] You can have a 60% debt load, 3% deficit, [12:22] and variable inflation. [12:23] And as I said, the yields converge, and the countries [12:26] over-borrow. [12:27] As we saw in those last three slides, they're basically [12:29] spending too much money. [12:31] But then what does that do to your competitiveness? [12:34] Well, it's going to obviously hit your competitiveness. [12:36] If you're spending that much money and you've got a huge [12:38] trade imbalance, you've got to be basically awarding yourself [12:41] way above productivity wage increases. [12:43] And look at what you've got. [12:44] Ireland, Spain, Italy, Greece, Cyprus, Malta, Portugal. [12:48] The PIGS again. [12:49] And look at these massive labor cost changes over the [12:51] last 7 year period. [12:53] You're awarding yourself pay increase you [12:54] can not hope to cash. [12:56] So this is all a very convincing story, right? [12:59] And what made this possible? [13:00] Well, of course, what made it possible is cheap debt. [13:02] Because as those yields [13:04] converge, look what's happening. [13:05] Portugal is borrowing. [13:07] Spain is borrowing. [13:08] Greece is borrowing. [13:08] Ireland is borrowing. [13:09] Look who's actually in surplus. [13:11] The Germans and the Netherlands. [13:13] So their savings are financing their consumption. [13:16] So these countries have massively over-borrowed. [13:19] With the take-home being the southern countries have [13:21] borrowed too much. [13:22] Now, have a look at this network diagram. [13:24] It's kind of interesting, because there's a question [13:25] mark there for a reason. [13:27] There's Portugal. [13:28] Relative sizely economy 123 billion euros. [13:31] Spain, 345. [13:33] Italy, very big-- nearly half a trillion. [13:35] But pretty much all of their bonds are domestically held. [13:38] 60% are long-term domestic. [13:40] The ones that are 10-year rollover escalate by 10%. [13:43] Look at this. [13:44] Look who's popped up here, with a trillion dollars of [13:47] crap assets lying on their balance sheet. [13:49] It's the Brits, the world's largest financial entrepot. [13:52] And look who's up here. [13:54] It's those prudential Germans, who save a lot and tell [13:57] everyone to upgrade their scales. [13:59] They've got half a trillion of debt going on. [14:01] So what do you mean the southern countries have [14:03] borrowed too much? [14:05] There's a rather large problem with this story. [14:07] You can't have over borrowing with over lending. [14:11] This is actually a Citibank advertisement. [14:15] Some of you who are over the age of 16 may remember this. [14:18] The largest ever advertising campaign for a finance company [14:22] in the world was Citi's campaign, "live richly," from [14:26] 2003 to 2006. [14:28] It didn't invite you to save up money. [14:30] It didn't invite you to be prudential. [14:32] It said live richly. [14:34] It didn't even say be rich. [14:37] You kind of have to have rich before you spend it unless [14:40] you've just got a giant line of credit. [14:43] So let's run that story again. [14:46] Here's the greatest moral hazard trade in human history. [14:48] Remember the whole story I told you about the ECB and [14:50] credibility and all the rest of it? [14:52] Here's why it's complete horse shit. [14:53] Because what actually happened was this-- [14:55] I'm a large European bank. [14:57] I know that I've got a sovereign behind me that, if I [15:00] become really big, I'll become too big to fail. [15:04] Which basically gives me a license for doing whatever the [15:07] hell I want because then it will all be bailed. [15:09] It gives me a funding cost advantage, and it means that [15:12] basically I can lever up well beyond human reason with [15:15] pretty much no consequences. [15:17] And the more powerful I become, the bigger threat I am [15:19] to that sovereign. [15:21] And eventually, if the sh-- hits the fan, well, you know, [15:23] I'll get bailed out. [15:23] It's totally fine. [15:24] So imagine I know there's this thing called the Euro coming [15:27] in, and you're all other European banks, and you know [15:31] that you could earn a nice little bit of coupon buying [15:34] this Greek bond at 25%. [15:36] There aren't that many of them-- it's a [15:37] thinly traded market. [15:38] But if you can get it, if you lose, fine. [15:40] But the upside's great-- [15:41] 25%. [15:42] Now, what happens if everybody really believes this Euro [15:45] story and everybody starts to converge down? [15:47] Well, I'm going to make less and less money on [15:49] those bonds over time. [15:50] So a quick bit of math up in your head. [15:53] How would you make even more money on a declining spread? [15:56] You've go to use volume, you've got to use leverage. [15:59] So what you do is you basically get the balance [16:01] sheet of your bank and you cram it with as much periphery [16:04] debt as you possibly can. [16:05] You take all your nice, safe German, Dutch bonds and you [16:08] throw them out. [16:09] And you pile on as much Greek debt and as much Portuguese [16:11] debt and as much French debt as you can. [16:14] And you turbo charge that, running operating leverage of [16:16] around 40 to 1, which means your equity cushion is less [16:19] than 3% percent of your asset footprint. [16:22] You make Lehman Brothers look like a prudentially run [16:25] organization. [16:27] And you do this because you've got a guarantee. [16:29] The guarantee is the state. [16:30] The state will come and rescue you. [16:31] You get in trouble, you're fine. [16:33] Except there's a slight flaw in the plan. [16:34] What happens when the Euro comes in? [16:37] You have to give up your printing press. [16:38] So that means your state can't bail you out anymore. [16:41] Well, that's even better. [16:42] Because then I become a systemic risk. [16:44] I'm not just a risk to France, I become a risk to the entire [16:48] European banking system. [16:49] Score! [16:50] I've got the ECB over a bottle. [16:52] I can do whatever I want because they're going to have [16:54] to bail me. [16:55] Except it's run by Jurgen Stark and a bunch of Germans. [16:59] And they're not going to bail you. [17:01] So when the shit hits the fan, you've got a really, really [17:03] big problem. [17:04] Which is where we are now. [17:07] Core banks get stuffed with periphery debts gone bad, a [17:09] result of over landing. [17:11] Foreign banks consolidated claims on Greece, Ireland, [17:13] Italy, Portugal, and Spain in 2011, last time they published [17:16] any reliable figures. [17:18] French banks have over 33% of GDP equivalent on their [17:22] balance sheets in periphery assets that aren't coming back [17:25] anytime soon. [17:26] Add in the Spanish real estate loans they've got on there-- [17:29] run. [17:30] And you have a SocGen account. [17:34] Netherlands, one bank, ING, 211% of GDP [17:38] is its asset footprint. [17:39] Leverage ratio is over 40 to 1. [17:41] That alone is 30% of Dutch GDP. [17:43] They don't have a printing press anymore. [17:46] Are you beginning to see the problem? [17:48] The result is assets held by banks in Germany, France, and [17:52] the UK are about double the annual GDP of the entire EU. [17:58] Here's the too big to fail USA. [18:00] Top six bank assets, 61% of GDP. [18:03] Any one of them fails, even allowing for systemic [18:05] interconnections, you're going to take out 10% of US GDP. [18:08] That's about $1.4 trillion, $1.5 trillion. [18:12] That's a lot, but when you've got your own currency, you've [18:14] got the global reserve asset, we can deal with that. [18:16] We can bail it. [18:17] We've done it. [18:18] That's what we did. [18:18] It cost of a $3 trillion all told, that's it. [18:20] We're now in recovery mode. [18:24] At least the Brits have their own currency. [18:26] There's British GDP. [18:29] That's the size of their banks. [18:32] You should be very, very afraid now. [18:36] Now let's have a look at this one. [18:38] Here's France. [18:40] BNP Paribas, Agricole, Generale. [18:42] These three banks alone are taking you up to 250% of GDP, [18:47] and they don't have a printing press, and they're seriously [18:50] impaired with bad assets. [18:52] And now here's the kicker. [18:53] You know that ECB? [18:55] It's a fake central bank. [18:56] It's really a currency board. [18:57] Because what it does is it says, we're not doing bond [19:00] buying, we're not mutualizing debt, you have to look after [19:04] the problem yourself. [19:05] So when you have a financial crisis, [19:06] you've got four exists. [19:07] You can either inflate-- [19:09] whoops, you don't have a printing press. [19:11] You can devalue-- [19:12] whoops, don't have your own currency. [19:14] Or you can do austerity. [19:15] You can squeeze and hope you stabilize public finances, add [19:20] liquidity, keep the can kicking down the road-- this [19:23] is LTROs, all the loans that have been given to the banks. [19:25] But at the end of the day, you cannot do a Bernanke. [19:28] So what's a Bernanke? [19:29] A Bernanke is when you go into the banking system and you [19:32] grab the shitty assets on their books and you put them [19:35] on the Federal Reserve's balance sheet. [19:37] And you call them things like Maiden Lane 2, and the [19:40] Termloan Auction Facility 3, and a bunch of completely [19:44] opaque nonsense that nobody will ever understand unless [19:47] they spend time looking into this. [19:49] Congress, who basically don't understand anything, are [19:51] completely oblivious to what's going on-- [19:53] you then flush the entire system out with as much [19:56] liquidity as you can, and you allow them to recapitalize as [19:59] they de-lever. [20:00] Which is why the operational leverage of the American banks [20:02] is now about 50 to 1 rather than 30 to 1 at the height of [20:05] the crisis. [20:06] They've rebuilt, they've recapitalized, they've cleaned [20:08] their balance sheet. [20:09] As the economy recovers, you know all those [20:11] assets that you bought? [20:12] Guess what? [20:13] Those houses in Glendale one day will have value again, and [20:16] you sell them back to the banks. [20:18] It's not a money pump. [20:19] It's an asset swap with liquidity. [20:22] The ECB can't do that. [20:24] It is constitutionally and intellectually incapable of [20:27] making that move. [20:28] Consequently, what the markets were pricing is as yields were [20:31] spiking was the possibility of a breakup of the Euro. [20:34] Because if any one of those banks goes down, it doesn't [20:37] stop at Spain. [20:39] It doesn't stop at France. [20:40] It goes all the way back to the German banks. [20:44] If that goes bad, it's game over for the core European [20:46] banks, which is why we really have austerity policies. [20:50] It's about stopping a bank run around the bond market. [20:53] This is why you've got to keep the Greeks in at all costs. [20:55] Because if you're a bank, and you've got 2% of your assets [20:58] in Greek debt-- [20:59] say you're exposed to Greece heavily. [21:01] How are you going to get rid of that? [21:02] Well, you can't. [21:02] You can sell it on the hedge funds basically at 20% on the [21:05] face value. [21:06] Or you can hope it doesn't go bad. [21:08] But imagine you wake up one day, and you think, this is [21:10] going to go bad. [21:10] You want to sell it, so you sell it first. [21:12] The minute all those contracts hit the floor, what [21:14] happens to the price? [21:15] Everybody else dumps theirs and they go to the floor. [21:17] You've now made a 2% loss to your portfolio. [21:19] How do you balance it back? [21:20] You sell the next asset class before it goes down. [21:23] Hi, Portugal, how are you this morning? [21:25] So you dump Portugal. [21:26] And as those prices go to zero, what do you do? [21:28] You look around and you go, shit, what have I got left? [21:30] Let's dump the Irish, then. [21:31] So you throw the Irish on the floor, prices go to zero. [21:34] You've now knocked 11% of Euro-zone GDP and probably [21:37] about 12% of your portfolio. [21:39] You do that on the lending portfolio of a highly levered [21:41] bank, what's going to happen to its share price once people [21:44] figure out? [21:47] So you're going to have a huge panic that's caused by a [21:49] sovereign bank run, right the way through a currency union, [21:52] something that is supposed to be theoretically impossible. [21:55] That's what this has always been about. [21:57] That's why you keep the Greeks in. [21:58] That's why you're willing to destroy 30% of GDP. [22:01] Because this is about saving Societe Generale, and it is [22:04] about saving Deutsch Bank from their own over borrowing and [22:07] over lending mistakes. [22:10] Consequences. [22:11] You can't solve a banking problem with budget cuts. [22:13] You can cut Greek's public spending to Neolithic levels. [22:16] It's not going to make a damn bit of difference to SocGen's [22:19] balance sheet. [22:20] You can't run a gold standard in a democracy. [22:22] We tried this in the 1920s. [22:23] It really didn't work too well-- ended up with a few [22:26] political parties that were kind of nasty. [22:28] You can't solve a solvency problem with a liquidity [22:30] instrument. [22:31] But God bless Mario, he's been trying. [22:34] You just add enough liquidity and hope the problem goes away [22:36] by saying, I'll do whatever it takes. [22:38] That's what he said six months ago, the yields came down. [22:40] Since then, he's actually done nothing, and yet the yields [22:43] have gone down, proving one thing-- it's about the [22:46] credibility of bank policy. [22:47] It's not about cutting the budget. [22:49] The markets aren't craving an extra 30,000 civil servants [22:53] being thrown out of work in Greece. [22:55] They're worried about the Euro breaking up. [22:57] So once you give a credible guarantee, you do a [23:00] Bernanke-lite, all of the market pressures are relieved. [23:03] That was what was lacking the whole time. [23:06] And the most important one is you can't all cut at once and [23:11] expect to grow. [23:12] Why not? [23:13] Because in order to save, you need to have income [23:15] from which to save. [23:16] So if everybody simultaneously cutting, [23:18] nobody's generating income. [23:20] So imagine the economy with an 80% debt to GDP ratio, and [23:23] turn it into a simple fraction of four over five. [23:26] Now imagine that 40% of the five is government [23:28] expenditure. [23:29] You want to cut in half. [23:29] You're really going to credibly [23:30] commit to cut the budget. [23:32] So you just turn that into four over four. [23:34] On a constant stock a debt, your debt to GDP ratio just [23:37] went from 0.8 to 1. [23:39] Every single country that's undergone an austerity program [23:42] now has more debt than when they started. [23:44] Any country the hasn't cut, including the United States, [23:47] now has proportionately less. [23:49] The evidence is in. [23:51] And the tragedy is it was all avoidable, and [23:53] we knew this already. [23:55] So why did anybody, especially in Europe, ever think this was [23:58] a good idea? [23:59] For that, you have to kind of have to go back in time. [24:01] And it's still about two rival stories. [24:03] This time it's not ECB credibility versus the moral [24:06] hazard trade. [24:07] It's something far more spooky. [24:09] The first one I like call liberalism's emetic economics, [24:13] emetic being a wonderful word meaning to throw up. [24:16] And what's this all about throwing up. [24:18] You go back to John Locke's "Treatise on Government." The [24:21] fifth chapter is really fascinating. [24:22] John Locke is this guy who's basically the intellectual [24:24] propagandist of a bunch of guys who want to kill the king [24:26] and take all the property for themselves. [24:28] They're called the merchant classes, and these are the [24:30] guys that then set up markets and land, labor, capital, [24:33] private property, throw people off the land, [24:35] all the rest of it. [24:36] You ever heard the word vagabond? [24:37] It means a man without bondage. [24:39] Why bondage? [24:40] Because basically, you've been thrown off your land, so you [24:42] basically had your status removed from you. [24:44] So basically, the English Revolution sets up the markets [24:47] in private probably, et cetera. [24:48] And then there's a problem, because the minute you do [24:50] this, you recognize that untrammeled markets lead to [24:52] massive income and wealth inequalities. [24:54] Which is great if you happen to be the guy at the top of [24:56] the pile, and not so great if you're at the bottom. [24:58] So unfortunately, then you need a sate. [24:59] Why do you need a state? [25:00] To make markets, in the first place. [25:02] The notion that they pop out of the ground fully formed is [25:05] a nice fiction, but simply not true. [25:07] In order to turn serfs into workers, you actually need [25:10] acts of parliament and legislation. [25:12] The state makes these things happen. [25:14] But here's the kicker. [25:15] You need to state to police the inequalities that the [25:17] market makes possible. [25:18] Because if you don't-- [25:20] poor Adam Smith on this one-- "for every rich man"-- this is [25:23] out of "The Wealth of Nations"-- [25:24] "for every rich man, there must be 500 poor, and that [25:27] rich man must sleep always with the strong arm of the [25:30] civil magistrate at his side, for he is always regarded with [25:33] jealousy and envy." [25:36] So you need that state to police the inequality. [25:38] But here's the Lockean kicker. [25:39] This is why we have the Second Amendment. [25:41] Any state strong enough to police those inequalities is [25:43] strong enough to come and take your money. [25:46] So you've got a dilemma running into this. [25:47] You need this state, you can't live without it, but at the [25:50] same time, you can't live with it, because you're afraid of [25:52] the damn thing. [25:53] So how are you going to do this? [25:54] And how are you going to pay for it? [25:55] Because most people don't want to pay any taxes. [25:57] Well, that's where this guy comes in, David Hume. [26:00] He has a wonderful essay on money and on interest. [26:03] He talks about merchants being the most useful race of men, [26:06] because when you give it to them, even though money's [26:08] neutral in the long run, if you give it to him and his [26:10] friends, it goes to the right places really fast. [26:13] So basically, you think of money in a Keynesian way from [26:15] Hume, which is short-term stimulus is long-run neutral, [26:18] but really because you give it to my [26:19] friends rather than losers. [26:21] Now, what he comes up with is the problem [26:23] with government debt. [26:24] Liberalism loves debt, because, if you think about [26:26] it, it's a free option for the state. [26:28] So you're the state, I'm the merchant, I've got lots of [26:30] inequality in my society-- [26:32] I'm worried about people coming and [26:33] burning my house down. [26:34] So I say to you, you need to protect me. [26:36] And you say, you need to pay me. [26:37] And I say, I don't want to pay taxes. [26:38] You say, ah, I have this thing called a debt instrument. [26:40] It's fabulous. [26:41] You go, how does that work? [26:42] Well, it works like this. [26:43] You give me a better paper, and I'll give [26:45] you a million pounds. [26:46] Brilliant. [26:47] OK, what happens now? [26:48] In 10 years time, I'll give you the million back, and I'll [26:50] pay you interest. [26:52] What are you going to say? [26:53] So I'll lend you the money you need to protect me, and then [26:56] you'll give me it back and you'll give me interest. [26:59] Fabulous. [26:59] It's a free option. [27:00] Unlimited upside, zero downside. [27:02] Problem. [27:04] Original argument against it. [27:06] Crowding out. [27:07] In order for this to work, you're going to offer a rate [27:09] of interest higher than the market would produce. [27:11] So everybody goes in to government debt. [27:13] Because of this, as Hume says, all the gold and silver [27:15] necessary for commerce gets crowded out of the economy, [27:18] finds its way into debt securities, the whole nation [27:20] ends up in hock, eventually you have to sell yourself to [27:23] foreigners, and you end up with a [27:24] bankruptcy of the nation. [27:26] So easy money and crowding out. [27:27] The downside of debt means that it's an attractive way of [27:31] paying for the state you need but you don't want, but at the [27:33] same time, a terrifying one. [27:34] Because at the end of the day, it's going to result in the [27:36] ruin of the nation. [27:37] Adam Smith picks up on this one. [27:39] For him, it's all about why we actually save and invest, why [27:42] x equals i in economics to this day. [27:44] Savings equals investment. [27:45] Why is this? [27:46] Well, for him, it's because we're all parsimonious Scots, [27:48] we're all hardwired to save. [27:50] There's a wonderful line where he says, "where there is [27:54] tolerable security, a man would be perfectly crazy if he [27:57] did not employ as investment all his available capital." [28:00] So basically, you take the money, you invest, it [28:02] automatically produces economic growth. [28:04] Well, he also recognizes this whole thing about inequality [28:07] in the state. [28:07] My favorite line from Adam Smith. [28:10] "Civil government, insofar as it is instituted, is [28:12] instituted for the defense of the rich against the poor, or [28:16] for those who have property against those who have none." [28:18] That is not Karl Marx. [28:20] That is Adam Smith, end of Book Two of "The Wealth of [28:23] Nations," quote, unquote. [28:25] Now, he recognizes then that you're going to have to pay [28:27] for this, so he goes to taxation. [28:28] But the forward of "The Wealth of Nations" starts off with [28:30] progressive taxes. [28:31] It's totally nuts. [28:32] So here, look, see the people who have got the most stuff? [28:35] They have the most skin in the game. [28:37] They should pay the most taxes. [28:38] And then he goes, wait a minute-- that would mean the [28:40] rich would pay the most taxes. [28:41] Well, we can't have that. [28:42] So then he backs off immediately and turns around [28:44] and argues for exactly what the Republicans [28:46] are arguing to do-- [28:47] a national consumption tax on everything except luxuries. [28:52] So your yacht is fine, but your corn flakes [28:54] are going to be taxed. [28:55] Problem with this. [28:56] Well, it never raises enough revenue. [28:58] And he recognizes that. [28:59] So he's like, shit, what am I going to do? [29:00] And he goes, I suppose there has to be debt. [29:02] But the problem with debt is exactly as Hume's pointed out. [29:05] Everybody's going to invest in the debt markets, the [29:07] underlying economy is going to crumble. [29:09] Because of that you'll end up with more debt on a smaller [29:11] economy, and eventually the whole nation gets bankrupted. [29:14] So what do you end up with? [29:15] Debt perverting parsimony, therefore savings doesn't lead [29:19] to investment doesn't lead to growth. [29:21] All very convincing, and it's all exactly the same story as [29:23] we hear now. [29:24] Now, when you hear the same arguments repeated for 300 [29:26] years without modification regardless of any facts in [29:28] fact in them, you should generally be suspicious. [29:31] The result is you can't live with it, can't live without [29:35] it, don't want to pay for it. [29:36] So I like to call this liberalism's neuralgia and the [29:38] aspirin of austerity. [29:40] You reach for it regardless of if it does you any good. [29:42] But it's a 300-year-old trip. [29:44] Now, how do we know that these guys are wrong about this? [29:46] Well, basically, at the time they were writing, Hume [29:49] predicted the collapse of the British economy by, I [29:52] think it was, 1780. [29:54] And in fact, what happened was they went from the relatively [29:56] low debt levels that they had, but they were accumulating, [29:58] all the way to the highest debt that they ever had, which [30:01] was 240% of GDP at the end of the Napoleonic Wars. [30:04] So never mind 80%, 100%, whatever. [30:07] Back in the day, they had 240% debt to GDP [30:09] at the end of 1815. [30:11] What happened to the British economy after 1815 until 1914? [30:16] It ran the hold goddamn world and expanded faster than [30:20] anyone ever thought humanly possible. [30:22] Reinhart and Rogoff 95%, my ass. [30:27] Now, this creates two liberal stories that go through the [30:31] 19th century. [30:31] Story one, David Ricardo. [30:33] You can't live with it, and you don't want to pay for it, [30:35] and you pretend you don't need it. [30:37] Second one. [30:37] This is John Stuart Mill, handsome fellow. [30:39] I know. [30:41] Accepting the need for it, and also accepting the [30:44] need to pay for it. [30:45] Because if you don't pay for it, then you get into a [30:47] problem, because if you basically leave the state out [30:49] of the equation, you cannot rely on markets to do anything [30:52] except the inequalities that will undermine markets in the [30:55] long-run themselves. [30:57] So you get these two very different versions of [30:59] liberalism come out of this. [31:00] This one goes to the Austrian economist. [31:03] This one goes to the Keynesians. [31:04] That's basically the way it splits down the middle. [31:07] Now, along came the Great Depression. [31:10] I love this picture. [31:11] It's absolutely emblematic. [31:12] It's one of my favorite slides of the Great Depression-- [31:15] the bread line at the same time as the, no way like the [31:17] American way. [31:18] So reality, theory, facts, whatever. [31:21] Now, here's the first one. [31:23] I like to call this the emetic response, American [31:25] liquidationism. [31:26] This is Joseph Schumpeter. [31:27] And by the way, he actually looked like that. [31:29] This is not an exaggeration. [31:31] He really did. [31:32] And he, in the 1920s, had come over from Austria and [31:35] basically taken up residence running Harvard's economics [31:37] department. [31:38] And the basic story was there's the long run capital [31:41] structure of the economy, you can't really see it, you don't [31:43] know what's going on, you should never intervene. [31:46] What happens is that banks, there are booms and bust [31:48] business cycles. [31:49] Banks have a problem, particularly when the bank is [31:51] backed by the government. [31:52] They produce too much credit, entrepreneurs get confused [31:55] about price signals, they invest in things they [31:57] shouldn't, you end up producing things you're never [31:59] going to need, the credit pump dries up, and eventually you [32:01] have this purging that needs to happen. [32:03] So you binge on credit and then you purge. [32:06] This is version one of austerity. [32:08] Because of this misallocation of capital because of credit, [32:11] you end up with too much in the wrong type of investment [32:13] in the capital structure. [32:14] So you basically have the boom, and then you have to [32:16] have the slump, and you have to go barf and you have to get [32:18] it all out and let the clock reset, and off you go. [32:21] Now, the British had a version of this, which, you know, of [32:23] course, the British are a bit more polite than this, so they [32:25] wouldn't be emetic. [32:26] So they have the treasury view, which is a [32:28] more austere response. [32:29] And it's very similar, but again, it's these arguments [32:32] from the 1700s brought back. [32:33] So the basic idea is that free trade is welfare-enhancing. [32:36] Well, the Brits would say that, because they were 50% of [32:39] the global economy at that point in time, and most of [32:41] their free trade was done with empire. [32:43] But putting that to one side, I'm sure the Indians thought [32:46] it was free trade when they showed up, [32:47] and so did the Chinese. [32:48] But anyway, 1910 to 1920s, this is Churchill when he was [32:52] Chancellor of the Exchequer, the finance minister. [32:54] He comes out with this memorandum written by a guy [32:56] called Henderson that basically responds to a guy [32:58] called Lloyd George's thing about, can we do something [33:01] about unemployment? [33:02] The problem had been this-- [33:03] Britain's the largest economy in the world, World War I [33:05] spanked 60% of its national wealth. [33:07] They're on the gold standard. [33:09] Basically, exchange rate clever mechanism for the [33:11] global economy. [33:12] They have a choice. [33:13] If they go back on the gold standard with a high exchange [33:15] rate, it protects all the people who hold sterling [33:17] paper, because you're not devaluing their assets. [33:20] If you go back on a low one, it benefits the domestic [33:23] economy because you'll get an export boost and your domestic [33:25] economy will go up. [33:26] But all the people holding sterling paper will freak out [33:28] because you've devalued their assets. [33:29] So they'll dump them. [33:30] So you've got a run on the pound and a run on the [33:32] exchanges, so you're screwed either way. [33:34] So what did they do? [33:35] They went back on a high exchange rate. [33:36] The result? [33:37] An instant extra million unemployed that [33:38] lasted for a decade. [33:40] So that was one of the lynch pins in the global economy [33:42] that caused the Great Depression. [33:44] So lots of people are saying, can't we do [33:45] anything about this? [33:46] Can't we do something about unemployment? [33:48] And along came the memorandum that says, no-- and there's an [33:50] argument called Ricardian Equivalence-- [33:51] and spending now is going to be zero sum against taxes in [33:54] the future. [33:55] So if you know that, the minute you do it, it nullifies [33:58] its own effects, so don't even try it. [34:00] Second thing, and this is particularly true on [34:01] investment, if government presumes to do the job of the [34:05] private sector, the private sector will let it do it, but [34:07] then it will do it at a cost. [34:08] Because it's still not investing, so it's zero sum [34:10] against itself. [34:11] And the last one you may remember from the Obama [34:14] stimulus was the lack of shovel-ready projects. [34:17] Remember that language? [34:18] It's written in there-- it was called the lack of suitable [34:20] public works. [34:21] Now, here's the second story that comes out of the John [34:24] Stuart Mill tradition. [34:25] Basically, it's not about Keynes right [34:27] in the general theory. [34:28] There's a wonderful line by an [34:29] economist called June Robinson. [34:30] She says that, "in 1936, Keynes was writing down what [34:33] might cause unemployment while Herr Hitler was curing it." [34:38] There's a certain element of teaching [34:39] birds how to fly here. [34:41] And the two critical cases here were the Germans-- [34:43] as it says here. [34:44] There's a story that basically it was all sort of like [34:46] Catholics in the south that voted for Germany. [34:47] No it's not. [34:48] They were industrial workers. [34:49] They were miners. [34:50] And then here's a guy called Takahashi Korekiyo, who is the [34:53] guy who was the guru for the Japanese Central Bank's [34:55] Abenomics policy at the moment of massive [34:58] monetary and fiscal stimulus. [34:59] So this is a guy from '34. [35:01] So what actually happens here is very similar to what's [35:03] going on in the Euro-zone. [35:04] You have simultaneous contractions of the five [35:06] largest economies in the world. [35:08] Everybody cuts at once. [35:09] GDP shrinks, constant stock of debt goes up. [35:12] The British debt to GDP ratio in 1930 was 170%. [35:16] By 1933, despite repeated rounds of cuts, it was 190%. [35:21] It continued to go up. [35:22] In Germany, what happened was, after short-term capital [35:25] United States, post the '23 inflation, had made Germany [35:29] the most stable and fastest growing economy in Europe at [35:31] that point in time. [35:32] There was a swap in the agreement governing war debts. [35:35] The main war debts got seniority. [35:37] The American capital pulled out to take advantage of the [35:40] stock market boom in 1928, '29 and a federal [35:44] interest rate increase. [35:46] If you get 7% per sticking it in a bank, so why would you [35:48] put it in Germany? [35:49] A lot of capital goes flying out. [35:50] To balance the budget, a guy called Bruning comes in as the [35:53] chancellor, and he starts hacking away at the budget. [35:56] So he issues somewhere in the region of about 200 emergency [35:58] austerity decrees. [36:00] At that point in time, there's a minor party that everyone [36:02] had written off. [36:03] They got 8% of the vote in 1928, or thereabouts. [36:06] By 1930, it was up to I think 18%. [36:08] By 1933, it had 43.3% of the vote. [36:12] It was the only party arguing against austerity. [36:14] I don't think I need to tell you what they were called. [36:18] Japan was even worse. [36:20] The brunt of civilian expenditures, the brunt of [36:23] public expenditure cuts in Japan were [36:26] borne by the military. [36:28] They were the biggest item in the budget. [36:30] By 1930, the Japanese military started to assassinate their [36:33] financial elite. [36:35] It took out two finance ministers, two prime [36:37] ministers, several cabinet-level appointees, and [36:40] half a dozen senior bankers. [36:43] You can rack up quite a body count doing this if you piss [36:45] off the military enough. [36:47] So the lesson learned on this was simultaneous contractions, [36:50] when everybody else is doing it, is zero sum against [36:52] everybody else, and leads to really nasty politics. [36:55] So Keynes and events overturn austerity. [36:58] What does it show us? [36:59] It shows there are fallacies of composition and [37:01] non-scalability in labor and money markets. [37:03] What's true about 2 people or 10 people is simply not true [37:05] about 20 million or five interlinked economies. [37:08] There are systemic non-linearities and difference [37:10] that simple cannot be done by type. [37:12] Investment expectations are not about parsimony. [37:14] They're about fear. [37:16] And if everybody's fearful for the future and has myopic, [37:19] short run expectations, and we look to each other for signals [37:22] about whether we should be investing next month or not, [37:24] you discount the time series of the 36 good periods and [37:27] heavily weight the three in the front. [37:29] That's why it's hard to get out of a recession. [37:31] The emetic response, you binge and then you purge, assumes [37:34] you're at the bottom. [37:35] People start saving again. [37:36] You've got [INAUDIBLE] consumption, austerity, you [37:38] start saving. [37:39] And the assumption is that saving is automatically [37:41] investment. [37:41] But there's a drop there, because you have to invest in [37:44] a recession. [37:45] Why would you want to be the guy who takes the chance to [37:47] invest in a recession? [37:48] Surely you'd rather be liquid, so everybody tries to sit on a [37:51] liquidity all at once. [37:52] But you can't-- in order for you to be liquid, somebody [37:54] else has to be illiquid. [37:56] So you end up with a liquidity trap. [37:57] And that's when you get stuck for 14 years. [37:59] That's why the Great Depression lasted so long. [38:02] So because of this, rather than curtail consumption, the [38:05] austerity response, consumption, to repeat the [38:07] obvious, is the sole end of economic activity. [38:10] "General Theory," page 71, if I remember correctly. [38:13] Lessons learned. [38:14] It all goes back to redistribution. [38:16] Democracy is asset insurance for the rich. [38:19] Don't skimp on the payments. [38:21] That's what was going in the '20s, and that's [38:22] what's going on today. [38:24] Redistribution of debt is reinsurance for democracy, and [38:27] austerity is anorexia for the economy. [38:30] That was what was learned by 1940. [38:32] Oh, how we forget. [38:35] And why do we forget? [38:36] We forget because of Germany, because Germany is a very [38:39] peculiar economy. [38:41] It is not a liberal economy. [38:42] It is much closer to Japan than it is to anything else in [38:45] Europe or the United States. [38:46] It is, in fact, the original developmental state. [38:48] What do I mean by that? [38:50] In 1873, there was a huge stock market bubble in [38:53] Germany, and it blew up. [38:55] It was called the Founders Crisis. [38:56] And liberal economic ideas of the type we've been discussing [38:59] were completely discredited. [39:01] At this point in time, there was a guy called Liszt who [39:02] comes along and says, you know, the funny thing about [39:04] the Brits telling us all the story about how to get rich, [39:07] if they had actually done that themselves-- you know what [39:09] their comparative advantage was in? [39:11] Wool. [39:12] They would still be making blankets for [39:14] the people in Flanders. [39:15] How come they're running the world? [39:17] How come they have the biggest navy in the world? [39:19] How come they make steel when they basically [39:21] have no iron ore? [39:23] What the hell is that all about? [39:24] So he rewrote how you think about international trade. [39:26] And at the same time that he did this, he, and also the [39:29] Bismarck who was running the place did what was called the [39:31] marriage or iron and rye, bringing together the [39:33] industrialists in the south, the agrarians in the north. [39:36] You use the surplus from agriculture to basically buy [39:39] flattened equipment. [39:40] You bring it in, you reverse engineer it, you do it faster, [39:42] you do it faster, you build up German industrial capitalism. [39:46] Big firms, big banks, forced saving, a big [39:48] role for the state. [39:49] And it's all driven by exports. [39:52] There's your difference. [39:53] But when you're exporting and your sources of demand lie [39:55] outside your economy, you don't have to worry about [39:57] internal demand. [39:58] The Keynesian story makes no sense if you're Germany. [40:01] Why would you want to stabilize consumption if [40:03] you're export dependent? [40:05] Because all you're going to do is raise your wages and [40:06] prices, and your BMW is going to go from 50,000 to 100,000 [40:10] real fast, and you're not going to sell them. [40:12] So if you don't rely on domestic consumption and rely [40:14] on external consumption, the dynamics of your economy are [40:16] completely different. [40:17] What do you care about price control? [40:20] All this stuff about the neuralgia of the 1920s and the [40:22] inflation experience, this is a post-war construction. [40:24] It's really about remaining price [40:26] competitive in export markets. [40:28] So you need a strong, independent central bank. [40:30] What else do you care about? [40:31] Very important-- [40:32] competition. [40:33] You want to have competition over products, so that you [40:36] have BMW and Audi competing with each other so they can [40:39] sell more to the Chinese both because they're competing [40:42] against product quality. [40:43] You don't get involved in the Apple, Samsung, buy up patents [40:45] and sue each other in court crap. [40:47] You do real competition to get real value out [40:50] at the end of it. [40:51] Given that the role of the state, these Freiburg [40:53] liberals-- this is Walter Euken, one of the guys who, [40:55] post-war, reinvigorates all this stuff. [40:57] Because after Nazism is discredited, they [40:59] needed a new thing. [41:00] And basically it was about the economic constitution, where [41:03] competition rather than consumption becomes important, [41:06] and sound money and central bank [41:08] independence defines the economy. [41:10] Why is this important? [41:11] First of all, for 30 years, this is the entire structure [41:14] of the Euro. [41:17] If you think about the way the European Union is set up, it's [41:19] Generalized Ordoliberalism, to give that type of [41:22] liberalism its name. [41:23] The commission is the important part, not the [41:26] parliament. [41:27] The parliament is a talking shop that very little [41:29] representative rights or power. [41:31] Sound money is far more important than output. [41:33] It's all about the European Central Bank and its policy. [41:36] It has one target-- [41:38] fighting inflation, even if there's a deflation going on. [41:41] Well, what does that reflect? [41:43] The need for cost competitiveness. [41:44] What is it that the commission does? [41:46] The commission basically sets rules. [41:48] What are those rules about? [41:49] Competitiveness. [41:50] What's the largest component of the administrative [41:52] architecture of Brussels? [41:53] The Competition Commission. [41:55] Rules rather than discretion at all times. [41:58] You can't trust politicians to run the economy-- they'll run [42:01] inflationary cycles, that will be bad for growth. [42:04] Yes, if seen through a German perspective. [42:06] But here's what it misses, a giant fallacy of composition. [42:09] For you to sell your BMW, somebody else needs to be [42:11] buying them. [42:12] For somebody to basically be having an export surplus, [42:15] somebody needs to have an important deficit. [42:17] In the aggregate, in theory, it balances out. [42:19] But if you go way back to that picture I showed of the [42:21] current account imbalances, there's only one company [42:24] running a surplus. [42:24] And the sum of that surplus is the sum of that deficit-- [42:27] they're almost exactly equivalent. [42:29] So what you have here is a situation whereby when you [42:31] generalize the economic principles and institutions of [42:34] one country across the whole of the EU, which was fine, so [42:37] long as the banks were spending money all over the [42:39] place so nobody noticed, it's fine. [42:42] But once that credit bubble pops, suddenly you all have to [42:45] be Germany. [42:46] Tell me, how is Greece and Portugal [42:48] going to make an Audi? [42:50] And even of they did, who are they going to sell it to? [42:53] Who's going to buy it? [42:54] Imagine the Competition Commission gets its way and [42:56] everybody becomes more competitive, and [42:57] they all make exports. [42:59] Who's going to buy all this crap? [43:01] The over-tapped American consumer? [43:03] We're already spending too much already. [43:05] So you end up with an economy and an economic structure, an [43:08] economic model for an entire continent which literally [43:11] cannot work. [43:12] It makes no sense on a global level, and yet that's the one [43:15] that it's pursuing. [43:17] Competitiveness rather than complementarity. [43:19] And also, you then have idiotic things like debt [43:21] breaks, Schuldenbremse. [43:23] This says that nobody can ever have more than [43:24] a 5% debt on deficit. [43:26] Really? [43:27] Because that means everybody has to run a budget surplus. [43:29] How is that going to happen? [43:30] That's actually not arithmetically possible, but [43:33] it doesn't stop them writing rules about it, even if it's [43:36] arithmetic nonsense. [43:38] This then leads to Italy. [43:40] I'm getting there. [43:41] This guy was the first Prime Minister of Italy and head of [43:45] the Italian Central Bank post-war. [43:48] He set up the Bocconi School of Public Finance in Milan. [43:50] The Bocconi School was famous for two things. [43:52] Number one, public choice theory. [43:54] Essentially, states are rent seekers and [43:56] they can't be trusted. [43:56] Hey, if I grew up in Italy, I would probably think that [43:59] about the state, as well, but they [44:00] generalized it to everybody. [44:02] They're also very fond of the notion of a European Union as [44:04] a disciplinary device overriding local democracy and [44:07] reigning in state spending. [44:09] The Bocconi School are important because when [44:11] Cambridge-- [44:12] qua Cambridge, UK-- blew up in the '70s intellectually and [44:15] Cambridge and America had their lunch in what was called [44:18] the Cambridge Capital controversies, the only [44:20] economics department in Europe that was mathematically [44:22] sophisticated enough to play with the Americans was the [44:24] Bocconi School. [44:25] And they were hard-wired for seeing the state as a bad [44:28] thing at exactly the time that liberal economics went in the [44:30] same direction, when it went neoliberal. [44:32] Consequence of this-- [44:33] these guys become an aircraft carrier for austerity thinking [44:36] that goes from Milan to Harvard, which leads us to [44:39] today, the financial crisis. [44:42] This is Greenspan's mea culpa. [44:43] I think there's a flaw in my ideology, and it's this big. [44:48] And we get to this guy, who's Alberto Alesina, who, just [44:50] like Joseph Schumpeter, is arguing for emetic economics. [44:53] And he, too, is the head of the Economics [44:54] Department of Harvard. [44:55] He's the guy who came up with what's called the expansionary [44:58] austerity hypothesis. [44:59] It's about debt and time and consistency, which is actually [45:01] that Ricardian equivalence stuff all again. [45:03] And it basically says the following-- this is the [45:05] confidence theory thing. [45:06] This is why you cut spending. [45:08] So imagine the economy is falling around your ears, you [45:10] don't know if you're going to have a job tomorrow, your [45:12] partner is already unemployed, you really don't know about [45:14] the future, but you really worry about the debt. [45:17] You just lie awake all night worrying about the [45:19] debt, as people do. [45:20] So the government credibly signals that it is going to [45:23] massively cut government expenditure. [45:25] And what you do, using your rational expectations that are [45:27] built into your head-- well, you know the true structural [45:29] form of the equation governing the economy and the value of [45:32] the coefficients therein. [45:33] Big assumption, but put that to one side. [45:35] You calculate your lifetime budget and your lifetime [45:38] expenditure in relation to the fact that 20 years from now, [45:41] because of these state spending cuts now, you'll pay [45:44] less taxes then. [45:46] Thereby, you can retro-dict how much extra money you've [45:48] got now, and everybody goes to Ikea and buys a couch. [45:52] And that cures the recession. [45:54] I am not making this shit up. [45:56] Take away all the math, that's what all these papers say. [45:59] And what we actually see at the end of it, you got all [46:01] these countries cases that supposedly [46:03] show this in the '80s-- [46:04] Ireland, Sweden, Denmark, et cetera-- and in the book I go [46:06] through them and show that they do nothing of the kind. [46:09] What actually happens is, take Canada as the [46:11] greatest example of this-- [46:12] the Loonie takes a 40% devaluation from '76 to '86. [46:16] You're export dependent. [46:17] You're a commodity exporter. [46:19] Your major trading partner who takes 75% of your exports is [46:21] the United States. [46:22] The United States' economy is nine times the [46:24] size of your economy. [46:25] You have a 40% devaluation as the American economy takes off [46:28] like a rocket between '86 and '92. [46:30] What do you think is going to happen to [46:32] Canada's budget surplus? [46:33] It gets massive. [46:34] They cut and then it led to growth? [46:36] No. [46:37] They grew and then they cut. [46:39] Because that's what your meant to do. [46:41] Austerity date is best done in the boom, not the slump. [46:44] That's what all these states actually do. [46:46] Cutting in a slump produces a bigger slump. [46:49] It's really that simple. [46:51] So this is taken up by the European Central Bank and was [46:53] called the Ecofin Brief and the G20 finance [46:56] ministers in 2009. [46:57] It's published in all its glory in [46:59] the TCB's 2010 report. [47:01] All the arguments from David Ricardo, et cetera, and John [47:03] Stuart and Hume and Smith, I'm not kidding, are in that book. [47:07] I mean, literally, you could quote them line for line. [47:10] It's exactly the structure of how they did all the bailouts, [47:13] and how they did all the stuff in terms of bailing out [47:14] Greece, et cetera. [47:16] And there result of this is what I call the greatest bait [47:17] and switch in history. [47:18] Because what's actually happened is all that private [47:21] debt that was generated by the banking system through [47:23] over-lending is now on the public balance sheet. [47:25] And to go full circle, all the way back, that means that [47:27] people like me, who have grown up on the welfare state just [47:30] now, have to pay for the mistakes of systemically [47:32] irresponsible bankers. [47:34] Because you can't tax them themselves because they're too [47:36] politically powerful. [47:37] That's why this is fundamentally a problem of [47:39] politics, and not a problem of economics. [47:42] Is there a way out of this? [47:43] People have started to defect. [47:45] The IMF has started to go. [47:46] The IMF has calculated now that, what happens when you [47:49] cut $1 of public spending in the periphery? [47:51] You lose $1.5 to $1.7 in spending, which is why you get [47:55] this wonderful negative convexity, where it goes, ah, [47:58] which is what's happening to periphery economies. [48:00] You end up with more debt, not less. [48:02] The rebel alliance-- [48:03] Romania, Estonia, Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania-- [48:05] they tried to blow up the debt star. [48:08] They failed. [48:08] It's been a disaster. [48:10] Excelgate, that's Reinhart and Rogoff's 90%. [48:13] There really was nothing there to start with. [48:15] And we have 25% permanent unemployment in Europe. [48:17] That is not politically sustainable. [48:20] So where does it all end? [48:21] First one, financial repression. [48:23] You take those banks that are heavily levered and filled [48:25] with government bonds and you fill them with even more [48:27] government bonds. [48:28] Then what you do is lower the payment on it that you get [48:31] from it, and you lend to maturity. [48:33] And then what you do is you run a positive inflation. [48:35] Hence, why central banks are now moving [48:37] to inflation targets. [48:38] What does that do? [48:39] It creates a negative real interest rate. [48:40] That cures your debt far better than any amount of [48:44] cutting, which actually doesn't work because it's zero [48:46] sum against itself. [48:47] When did we last do this? [48:48] End of World War II. [48:49] The liquidation tax accounted for the equivalent of 40% of [48:52] American GDP being paid back in 10 years, and the American [48:56] economy boomed at the same time. [48:58] So there's something very, very important. [49:00] That's where this one's heading. [49:01] Who is this bad for? [49:03] This is totally bad for creditors and [49:04] really good for debtors. [49:06] I just took on the largest mortgage in human history [49:08] because I fully expect this to happen. [49:11] I'm bar-belled. [49:12] If the economy recovers, my asset goes up in value. [49:14] If there's an inflationary cycle, it eats [49:16] away half my mortgage. [49:17] Screw them-- [49:18] I've been paying for their bailouts. [49:20] Second one. [49:21] Higher taxes. [49:22] Carried interest exemption. [49:23] Mitt Romney pays 15% tax. [49:25] I pay 30%. [49:26] You pay 30%. [49:26] Do you think that's fair? [49:28] I don't think that's fair. [49:28] I think that's coming to an end. [49:30] And we're going to shut down every goddamn tax haven on the [49:32] planet, as well. [49:33] Because you know how much is hidden there? [49:35] $27 trillion in untaxed wealth-- [49:38] estimate-- [49:39] is sitting in five tax havens. [49:41] How many divisions does the Cayman Islands have? [49:45] None. [49:45] Let's go get it. [49:46] It's so much easier than slashing the fire brigade. [49:49] And the last one, if you think about this as payback for the [49:51] bailouts who started it all, is Hippocratic economics. [49:55] First do no harm. [49:57] The United States was meant to die. [50:00] We had spent too much. [50:01] We were the profligate. [50:02] We were all going to die. [50:03] Remember all those articles about, oh, it's coming, the [50:05] great end, the great crash, the whole lot? [50:08] We've de-levered, we've cleaned up the balance sheets [50:09] of the financial sector, we're lending again, we've got [50:11] positive growth. [50:12] In three years' time-- we actually have stabilized the [50:15] debt already. [50:15] In three years, we'll be effectively reducing it. [50:18] The Brits are in for a decade of recession. [50:21] Ireland has a lost generation because they bailed their [50:23] banks and they did austerity. [50:25] Periphery Europe is stuck with 25% permanent unemployment. [50:28] This doesn't work. [50:30] It is a human disaster. [50:32] But most of all, it's politics. [50:34] Because it's always about one thing. [50:35] Somebody got all the benefits, then they cost all the costs, [50:39] now they want somebody to pay for the costs while they keep [50:40] all the benefits. [50:42] That's what this is really all about. [50:44] Thank you. [50:46] [APPLAUSE] [50:52] MARK BLYTH: Went on a bit longer than anticipated, [50:55] despite talking faster than JFK on speed. [50:57] Sorry about that. [50:59] AUDIENCE: Much as I'd like to take out a huge mortgage and [51:02] buy stuff, there's something of a bubble [51:04] going on around here. [51:05] Any other suggestions for how to take advantage of this? [51:09] MARK BLYTH: Well, as I switch onto my [51:11] financial adviser mode. [51:13] How do you make money in a positive inflationary [51:15] environment? [51:17] It's not easy, but it's not impossible. [51:19] If you have a look at companies that did really, [51:21] really well in the 1980s, late '70s, early '80s, they tended [51:26] to be sort of conglomerate trusts. [51:29] So they owned a little bit of everything. [51:30] That's like the Abu Dhabi Investment Corporation, whose [51:33] unofficial slogan is, we own half a percent of everything [51:35] that isn't nailed down on the entire planet. [51:37] And the idea behind it is that you don't know where the [51:40] upside is coming from. [51:41] So what you should be is maximally diversify. [51:43] It's like an index fund. [51:44] So basically, anything at all that is internally [51:47] diversified, so buying cut shares in companies that have [51:50] that type of structure is probably the best way of [51:52] bar-belling yourself against them. [51:54] But ultimately, you know, investing in debt markets is [51:57] probably a bad idea right at this point. [51:59] But it's still sort of-- at the end of the day, about this [52:01] paranoia that inflations lead to [52:03] hyperinflations, it's total crap. [52:05] When I went through the book and did the research on this, [52:08] I wanted to-- [52:08] I'm married to-- [52:09] background information-- [52:10] I'm married into a bunch of Germans. [52:12] Well, I'm only married to one, but the whole family comes [52:14] with them, right? [52:17] And my [GERMAN], as I like to call him, my father-in-law, [52:22] [GERMAN], he's a classic German. [52:24] He's like 71 years old, he's retired, and he still saves. [52:29] What the? [52:30] You'll die-- [52:31] what are you doing? [52:32] Why? [52:32] He's totally hardwired for saving, and he's totally [52:35] paranoid about inflation. [52:36] So I went and read a lot about the German hyperinflation. [52:39] And it was deliberate government policy to stuff the [52:41] French over reparations. [52:43] I mean, they did it quite deliberately. [52:45] And the weird about it was after they did it, it ended in [52:47] eight months. [52:48] And the entire economy was stabilized within 12. [52:51] And then it grew for five years. [52:53] And then what actually happened was austerity, [52:55] through the economy of a cliff, and that's when the [52:57] Nazis came to power. [52:58] So we have this story about the least degree of inflation [53:02] leads to some kind of infinity curve hyper-convexity where, [53:05] boom, off it goes. [53:06] And it's simply not true. [53:08] Post-war Europe ran positive rates of inflation with [53:11] positive real rates of growth all the way through the [53:13] postwar period until about 1980. [53:16] So the inflation panic is there. [53:20] AUDIENCE: So I've heard Krugman and others bring up [53:25] Japan as an example to support these kind of arguments. [53:28] Can you just talk a bit about how they're able to run a high [53:31] debt for so long and things don't seem to-- [53:33] MARK BLYTH: Sure, sure. [53:34] Absolutely. [53:35] I actually think these guys are wrong about Japan. [53:37] I think what goes on in Japan is actually deeply structural. [53:39] There is a wonderful book by guy called Sven Steinmo, [53:42] called "The Evolution of the Modern State." And he has a [53:44] chapter on Japan. [53:45] And if you ever wanted to read, I think, the definitive [53:46] story on Japan, this is it. [53:48] He spent two years there on an Abe fellowship and had access [53:51] to all the people. [53:52] Well, it was two books. [53:52] It was Richard Koo's "Holy Grail of Macroeconomics." So [53:55] basically what happens is Japan goes through a balance [53:57] sheet recession. [53:58] What's a balance sheet recession? [54:00] Basically, your companies are de-levering but don't want to [54:03] tell anyone because if they do, there [54:04] will be a run on them. [54:05] And everybody's complicit together because they've all [54:08] over borrowed. [54:08] So basically, you have this kind of slow bleeding that [54:12] goes on as it's sort of monetized by the central bank, [54:15] and it ends up in debt. [54:16] So you're not growing. [54:17] And that's sort of the obvious part of the story. [54:20] The less obvious part of the story goes like this. [54:22] Go back to 1986. [54:24] There's a thing called the Plaza Accord. [54:25] The Plaza Accord was when the United States turns around to [54:27] its two major trading partners, Japan and then West [54:29] Germany, and said, our exchange rate is too high. [54:33] People are buying dollars, we're doing well just now. [54:37] And it's killing our exports. [54:38] You guys are wiping us out. [54:39] Remember the whole paranoia about Japan that went on? [54:41] They were going to take over the world, all that. [54:42] You ever see the film, "Rising Sun," Michael Crichton? [54:45] Possibly the most racist film ever made in human history, [54:48] but put that to one side. [54:49] So Japan's going to take everything over, blah, blah, [54:51] blah, the rest of it. [54:52] And then, of course, what actually happens is they do [54:55] the exchange rate thing, the United States exchange rate [54:56] goes down, the German one and the Japanese one goes up. [54:59] Now, the Japanese economy is entirely export dependent. [55:01] It's sort of like Germany on steroids. [55:03] So what they do is they move the plant and equipment from [55:05] the Japanese home islands out to the second tier tigers. [55:08] So you start to get investment in Vietnam, Malaysia, all [55:11] these places, and they move the entire thing with the [55:13] supplier networks, the whole lot. [55:15] Well, the way that the Japanese welfare state was [55:17] constructed, it was all in-house to the firm. [55:19] It was meant to be cradle to grave, but the firm [55:21] took care of you. [55:22] Well, the firm has just broken the social contract. [55:24] So how did people protect themselves? [55:25] They wanted another asset they could have that would have a [55:28] positive upside, that would retain its value, and they [55:30] could sell it in their retirement. [55:31] What did they buy en masse? [55:33] Real estate. [55:34] So you get a giant real estate bubble. [55:36] The real estate bubble gets so out of control that it popped [55:38] and the banking system can't support it. [55:40] That collapses and that starts the recession. [55:43] But the important part is the sociological story. [55:46] You've got a cultural and generational shift. [55:48] Because you've got a very old population who are now 45 [55:51] years old, facing unemployment, with a very, [55:53] very narrow safety net for the first time. [55:55] So what do they do when the government gives them money to [55:57] spend to stimulate the economy? [55:59] They stick it under the mattress. [56:01] It doesn't go anywhere. [56:02] It gets hoarded. [56:03] So the savings rate goes up. [56:05] And where do they put the savings? [56:06] In the post office account and in the bank account. [56:08] And what do the bank and the post office do with it? [56:10] They buy government bonds. [56:11] So that's why you end up with this massive [56:13] extension in debt. [56:14] Now, the thing is, the Japanese propensity to consume [56:17] is really, really low, particularly the higher up the [56:19] demographic you get. [56:20] So 80-year-olds are not just buying bonds and then [56:23] liquidating them in retirement, they're actually [56:25] keeping them whole and handing them onto the next generation. [56:28] So you've got an inter-generational debt [56:31] transfer going on. [56:32] So the story that basically it's just a monetary policy [56:36] story in, you know, Japan, I think that's wrong. [56:39] I think there's actually a deeply structural problem [56:41] that's going on there, and it goes all the way back to the [56:43] Plaza Accord. [56:44] So that's my short version of Sven Steinmo's argument, but I [56:47] find it quite convincing. [56:48] AUDIENCE: How can an individual state in the EU, [56:51] like Ireland or something, try to fix things for itself with [56:54] all the constraints under it? [56:55] MARK BLYTH: They can't. [56:56] Look, and it's good. [56:58] Because you're in the Euro. [57:00] So once you're in the Euro, it's a kind [57:01] of a one-time game. [57:03] Because the problem was if you're Argentina and you tie [57:05] yourself to the dollar, as they did back in the day, back [57:08] in the late 1990s into 2000, and then you have the default. [57:11] And they had a default because Argentina is the graveyard of [57:14] all bad economic policies gone wrong, there's [57:16] no doubt about that. [57:17] But also because their major trading partner is Brazil. [57:19] And basically, the Real had a 40% exchange rate gain, and [57:22] basically it screwed up all their exports and the whole [57:24] thing fell down. [57:25] Now, because they were just on a peg, they actually still had [57:28] their own domestic currency. [57:30] So they could go, to hell with the peg. [57:32] We've still got it. [57:33] And then you lock up the banks and people bang on the doors [57:35] and all that sort of stuff. [57:35] But you still have your currency. [57:37] Ireland doesn't have a pound anymore. [57:40] I mean, literally, the bits of paper don't exist. [57:43] So if you were going to get out of the Euro-- [57:45] just think about the complexity [57:46] of this for a second-- [57:47] you would have to kind of freeze time. [57:50] Everybody freezes, some kind of government agency with a [57:53] time machine would freeze time, you'd go around, you'd [57:55] vacuum up all the bills out of everybody's wallets, the whole [57:58] lot, and you'd stamp them all and reissue them the new [58:00] currency, and then you'd unfreeze time. [58:03] And then you would have an economic crisis. [58:05] So just that alone adds a level of complexity to it [58:08] which makes it just incredibly difficult. [58:11] Bigger countries like France and Italy can do this. [58:14] The Italian economy, North Italy, is actually globally [58:16] competitive, totally solvent, the whole lot. [58:19] The south is a basket case. [58:21] It's a bit like the north and south of the United States. [58:22] Shh. [58:23] Anyway. [58:24] But you get transfers across the region, that's [58:26] what keeps it going. [58:27] The problem is Greece has nothing to export. [58:30] It really doesn't. [58:31] It has olive oil. [58:32] But so does Italy, and they can make more of it. [58:34] Spain makes even more of that. [58:36] Do you know when you buy your EVOO and it says, [58:38] Italian olive oil? [58:39] It's actually Spanish olives they've bought and they [58:40] brought to Italy and then they grind them and call it [58:42] Italian olive oil. [58:44] So that's all zero sum against itself. [58:46] So if you don't have something to export, then the [58:49] devaluation thing that you'll get won't benefit you because [58:51] you don't have anything. [58:52] And all you'll do is end up with hyperinflation because [58:55] your imports become so incredibly expensive. [58:58] So Ireland, Greece, Portugal, they are stuck because they've [59:02] got nothing to sell. [59:04] That's it. [59:04] So they're kind of trapped in this worst of [59:06] all possible worlds. [59:07] Ireland is really screwed for a whole generation. [59:11] The debt to GDP figures you see in Ireland [59:13] are a big, fat lie. [59:14] Because they basically book services exports from this [59:17] company as exports. [59:19] So basically, the profits from this farm go to [59:21] an office in Dublin. [59:22] Has anybody ever been to the office in Dublin? [59:24] No? [59:25] There's about 25 people who work there. [59:27] And your entire corporate profits get declared through [59:29] them, because you only pay 12.5% tax. [59:32] So that 12.5% gets booked as an Irish services export and [59:35] appears in their balance of payments. [59:37] Well, it's complete paper. [59:38] It's nothing. [59:39] It's complete garbage. [59:41] And they also have all the bad assets from their banks that [59:43] blew up and this thing called NAMA, which is a super bad [59:45] bank, and that's never coming back. [59:47] And that's off balance sheet. [59:49] So when you add it all together, Ireland is actually [59:51] worse than Greece. [59:52] Shh. [59:53] Just don't tell the Irish. [59:54] AUDIENCE: Speaking of people, what do you think about [59:56] Iceland, how they dealt with their financial? [59:59] MARK BLYTH: Iceland is a brilliant example of no good [60:01] deed goes unpunished. [60:05] So when I started all this off, I was a member of this [60:07] thing called the Warwick Commission on Financial Form. [60:09] And you know, the crisis happens, and people are like, [60:12] it's the shadow banks. [60:13] And I'm like, what's a shadow bank? [60:15] I mean, you need to do a little bit [60:16] of catch-up on this. [60:17] So at first, I bought the whole narrative [60:19] of too big to fail. [60:20] Systemic interconnections, the rest, the whole lot, blah, [60:22] blah, blah, blah. [60:23] And by the time I finished the book, I said, no, I actually [60:26] totally don't buy this-- [60:27] I think we should have let them fail. [60:28] Oh, but what about systemic risk, all the rest of it? [60:30] Well, I know what lost GDP is, I know how much unemployments [60:33] cost, I know all that. [60:34] I know the real costs of not bailing them. [60:37] And more to the point, the banking system, even though [60:39] it's de-levered, is actually more concentrated now than it [60:41] was in 2007. [60:43] So Citibank is even too bigger to fail. [60:46] And the European system is that on steroids. [60:49] So you've basically given someone not just a banking [60:51] license with a subsidy, an extortion [60:54] racket on the taxpayer. [60:55] And that's just, it is literally criminal. [60:58] Best example of this-- [60:59] UBS. [61:00] Fined $1.2 billion a few months back for doing [61:04] terrorism financing and money laundering with drug dealers. [61:08] Now, if you or I did this, we would be in the jail. [61:11] They get a fine. [61:12] Why do they get a fine? [61:14] Because if you are an investor in an American or [61:16] American-licensed broker/dealer entity-- [61:18] a big bank-- [61:20] and one of your corporate officers is charged with a [61:23] criminal liability, you are under legal obligation to [61:26] withdraw your investments. [61:28] So if UBS is actually criminally charged, or their [61:31] senior officers are charged. [61:32] And then CalPERS has to pull the money out. [61:35] If CalPERS pulls the money out along with everybody else, [61:37] what happens to that bank? [61:41] So what happens to the system? [61:42] So you're basically playing systemic moral hazard as a [61:45] business model. [61:46] This is screwed up beyond belief. [61:48] So Iceland, to finish this one, basically [61:50] let their banks fail. [61:52] Now, a lot of the debt, most of the debt was externally [61:54] held, so the cost of that went on to others. [61:55] But here's the interesting part of the story. [61:57] All of the super geniuses who were working in the banks [62:00] engineering derivatives now had to get a real job. [62:03] So what happened was the domestic economy, the real [62:05] economy, rebounded, because all these start-ups happened. [62:08] Because all these really bright people went, shit, I [62:09] need something else to do. [62:10] So they started doing all these new businesses which [62:13] didn't appear before. [62:14] They became a huge hub for online gaming, because you can [62:17] stick the servers in the ground-- [62:18] and it's bloody cold-- [62:19] and you've got all the people with the math skills who can [62:21] do the software engineering and make the whole thing work. [62:23] So there were all of these positive externalities of [62:25] actually letting them fail. [62:27] Their unemployment level is now about one point higher [62:30] than Germany . [62:31] Compare it with Iceland, which is 14% on the official rate, [62:34] and that's with migration going out. [62:36] So the people who did this, the government that came in [62:38] and basically allowed this to happen, it's been a bit tough. [62:41] They actually do things like pay back the debt and are [62:43] fiscally responsible. [62:44] So they've just been voted out, and the people who blew [62:47] up the banks in the first place are now back in power. [62:49] No good deed goes unpunished. [62:52] AUDIENCE: I don't know if you're familiar with what [62:55] happened in Australia. [62:55] I'm from Australia. [62:57] But people have largely missed the financial crisis. [63:01] And there are two stories running. [63:02] And I don't know if you know which one is the-- [63:06] anyway, they're competing. [63:07] One is saying that, well, the government did spending and [63:10] gave people money. [63:11] And they spent it. [63:12] And that saved the economy. [63:13] And the other story running is that, no, [63:15] it's the mining boom. [63:16] We just dig everything up, sell it to [63:18] China, China went well. [63:19] And it has nothing to do with what the government did. [63:21] Have you got a view on that? [63:22] MARK BLYTH: The second one is completely right. [63:24] And the way you can see this is you can't trade the Chinese [63:27] currency easily, because of capital controls, et cetera. [63:31] But what you can do is basically look at the shadow [63:34] markets on the Chinese currency versus [63:36] the Australian dollar. [63:37] And they move like this. [63:40] And it is because, basically, Australia [63:42] literally is owned by China. [63:43] I mean, people say this about the United States. [63:44] Oh, China owns the USA. [63:46] And it's like, well look, only 17% of bills are actually [63:48] owned by China. [63:49] And it's brilliant. [63:50] Because for the past 30 years, we've been giving them bits of [63:52] paper that bear 2% net. [63:54] And they've been giving us televisions. [63:56] It's a sweet deal. [63:57] I don't know why anybody would ever want to end it. [63:59] It's brilliant for us. [64:01] The Australian one is the other way around. [64:02] They actually do own your assets completely. [64:05] Because if it wasn't for the western Australian mining [64:07] boom, and just all the commodities they're sucking [64:09] out at the peak of a commodity cycle, I mean, do you really [64:12] think a house in Perth would cost 2 [64:13] million Australian dollars? [64:16] And it does. [64:17] It's totally that. [64:17] It's totally the mining boom. [64:19] So what that means is either the commodity cycle peaks or [64:21] China slows down, Australia is in serious trouble. [64:24] Now, the price to income multiples in [64:26] Sydney are 13 to 1. [64:29] So you need to marry two people and have family money [64:32] in order to get a house. [64:34] So it's not 3 times your income, it's 13 times your [64:37] income for a three bedroom flat in a nice part of Sydney. [64:40] That's a colossal housing bubble, and it's Chinese [64:43] liquidity that's pumping it. [64:44] If that every goes away, boom. [64:47] AUDIENCE: The housing bubble has never crashed in [64:48] Australia, unlike everywhere else. [64:49] MARK BLYTH: Yeah, absolutely. [64:50] And you know what? [64:50] All bubbles pop. [64:51] It is just a question of time. [64:53] AUDIENCE: I was hoping you could talk a little bit about [64:55] the BRIC countries, and especially what Brazil needs [64:57] to be doing. [64:58] MARK BLYTH: Brazil needs to do what Brazil's been doing, [65:01] which is awesome. [65:02] So quite primer on the Brazilian political economy. [65:05] For years and years and years they had one of the highest [65:07] Gini coefficients in the world. [65:08] They were incredibly unequal. [65:09] And they had a problem because wealth being so concentrated [65:12] meant that the people who make effective investment decisions [65:14] decided that their own economy was too risky, because it [65:16] would either be run by the military or run by the [65:18] communists or run out of town. [65:20] So they would take their money and they would put it in [65:21] Citibank, which is nice and secure. [65:23] And you got a lesser rate of return, but you don't mind [65:25] because you own everything, anyway. [65:26] So that's the way it went on for years and years, until it [65:28] got to a point where basically you had to spend so much money [65:30] on private kidnap insurance and mining your house against [65:34] the people who would try and kill you, that they did a deal [65:37] with a guy called Lula. [65:38] Lula u to run the Worker's Party. [65:40] So the guy who ran the Worker's Party, the lefty guy, [65:42] comes in and basically does exactly as I said on the [65:44] bottom of that slide. [65:45] Democracy is asset insurance for the rich-- stop skimping [65:48] on the payments. [65:49] So did this strategy whereby they got BNDES, the Brazilian [65:52] National Development Bank, to bank-- their lending [65:55] portfolio, by the way, is twice the size [65:57] of the World Bank-- [65:58] to subsidize domestic corporations so that they [66:01] could multinational. [66:02] So you've got companies like Embraer, the aircraft company, [66:05] the big cement company, and the others, that are now [66:07] globally successful corporations. [66:09] Because of that expansion, bankrolled by the development [66:11] bank, what they do is they tax the companies on their [66:14] earnings abroad, bring that back in, and they set up [66:16] something called Bolsa Familia, which is the welfare [66:18] state that Brazil never had. [66:20] This has squeezed the income distribution like this at the [66:22] same time as it has gone up, which enables the Brazilians [66:25] to finally build a middle class. [66:26] It empowers the middle class. [66:28] And it dis-empowers the durational land-owning elites. [66:30] So what you end up with-- [66:32] there's a little fixey-do with domestically high interest [66:34] rates to keep these guys happy. [66:36] Well, what you've actually done is to engineer is to [66:38] engineer a kind of new developmental welfare state, [66:40] which has actually been great for Brazilian growth and has [66:42] actually brought down the Gini coefficient. [66:44] Because of this, everybody wants to buy Brazilian assets, [66:46] which is why the Real is going up. [66:48] And they're export-dependent, so they're freaking out. [66:50] So what they've done is they've put inward capital [66:52] controls on inward investment. [66:54] And usually, the big fear is you put your money in, they [66:56] put up capital controls, you can't get it out, it's [66:58] expropriation. [66:59] They're doing it totally different. [67:00] They're like, you want to come here? [67:01] Dead easy. [67:02] Pay a transactions tax and a deposit. [67:04] Because if you're not coming in for the long term, forget [67:06] about sitting here earning high interest rates just [67:08] because you can. [67:09] So they're making it difficult for that money to come in. [67:11] But as a growth node in a big country, it is happening [67:14] nonetheless. [67:15] So the Real is going up, the economy is slowing down. [67:17] But what they've done over the past 10 years, I think, is [67:19] nothing short of remarkable. [67:23] BORIS DEBIC: Thank you, Mark. [67:24] [APPLAUSE]