Mark Blyth argues that post-2008 public debt crises were caused not by excessive welfare spending, but by the socialization of private banking sector debt after institutions leveraged at over 40 to 1 collapsed. (2:51)
Implementing simultaneous spending cuts triggers a macroeconomic fallacy of composition, where shrinking aggregate demand reduces national GDP and increases debt-to-GDP ratios rather than stabilizing them. (22:10)
Historical precedents from 1930s Germany and Japan show that extreme deflationary austerity directly fueled political radicalization and the collapse of liberal democratic institutions. (34:44)
The Eurozone's structural framework, based on German ordoliberalism, mathematically fails because all member states cannot simultaneously operate export surpluses without domestic-demand-driven counterpart deficits. (41:10)
Detailed notes
## Background
Published on June 3, 2013, on YouTube by the Talks at Google channel, this presentation features political economist Mark Blyth discussing his book 'Austerity: The History of a Dangerous Idea', hosted by Boris Debic on behalf of Authors@Google. According to the show description, governments in Europe and the United States have mistakenly framed the financial crisis as the result of reckless public spending rather than broken banking systems, advancing draconian budget cuts that shrink economies and worsen inequality.
## TL;DR
Mark Blyth dismantles the intellectual foundations and policy track record of austerity, arguing that the post-2008 fiscal crises were caused by private banking over-lending and bailouts rather than excessive public welfare spending. He demonstrates how the fallacy of composition makes cutting spending across interconnected economies self-defeating, inevitably shrinking GDP and driving debt-to-GDP ratios higher. Blyth traces the 300-year history of liberal economic skepticism toward public debt from Locke and Hume through the Bocconi School, illustrating how austerity historically exacerbated disasters like the Great Depression and the rise of fascism. Finally, through detailed international case studies, he evaluates alternative paths such as financial repression, wealth taxation, and Iceland's approach to banking insolvencies.
## Atmosphere & style
The lecture combines the intellectual rigor of Ivy League political economy with the fiery, irreverent passion of Blyth's working-class Scottish upbringing. Speaking at a rapid-fire tempo punctuated with sharp wit, expletives, and vivid metaphors, he cuts through academic jargon to deliver a searing critique of financial hypocrisy. The atmosphere is engaging, direct, and conversational, transitioning seamlessly from deep philosophical history to brisk, pragmatic Q&A exchanges that leave the audience both entertained and intellectually challenged.
## Bulletin
- [02:51](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM&t=171s) Mark Blyth argues that post-2008 public debt crises were caused not by excessive welfare spending, but by the socialization of private banking sector debt after institutions leveraged at over 40 to 1 collapsed.
- [22:10](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM&t=1330s) Implementing simultaneous spending cuts triggers a macroeconomic fallacy of composition, where shrinking aggregate demand reduces national GDP and increases debt-to-GDP ratios rather than stabilizing them.
- [34:44](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM&t=2084s) Historical precedents from 1930s Germany and Japan show that extreme deflationary austerity directly fueled political radicalization and the collapse of liberal democratic institutions.
- [41:10](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM&t=2470s) The Eurozone's structural framework, based on German ordoliberalism, mathematically fails because all member states cannot simultaneously operate export surpluses without domestic-demand-driven counterpart deficits.
## Key takeaways
- [02:51](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM&t=171s) US sovereign debt expansion between 2001 and 2008 stemmed from post-9/11 rate cuts, unfunded tax cuts, and war spending rather than domestic social entitlement growth.
- [02:51](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM&t=171s) The 2008 financial crash originated when private-label mortgage bonds substituted for scarce US Treasuries in repo markets, triggering systemic insolvency across highly leveraged investment banks.
- [13:22](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM&t=802s) The European sovereign debt crisis was driven by core European banks pursuing a moral hazard carry trade in periphery debt at leverage ratios exceeding 40 to 1, not southern profligacy.
- [19:28](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM&t=1168s) Eurozone member states lack currency sovereignty and the ability to devalue, turning European Central Bank-mandated austerity into a mechanism to bail out exposed core banks.
- [22:10](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM&t=1330s) Austerity commits a fallacy of composition: while an individual household or state can cut spending to save, simultaneous cuts across interconnected economies reduce aggregate national income and inflate debt ratios.
- [29:31](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM&t=1771s) Anti-debt arguments have persisted virtually unchanged for 300 years since Locke, Hume, and Smith, functioning as an unthinking cyclical anxiety known as liberalism's neuralgia.
- [34:44](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM&t=2084s) In 1930s Germany, Heinrich Brüning's austerity decrees caused widespread economic collapse and directly propelled the Nazi Party from 8% of the national vote to 43.3%.
- [41:10](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM&t=2470s) German ordoliberalism codifies an export-driven economic constitution that mathematically requires trading partners to run current account deficits, making it unviable for the entire Eurozone to replicate.
- [44:48](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM&t=2688s) The expansionary austerity hypothesis championed by Alberto Alesina was invalidated by negative IMF fiscal multipliers (-$1.50 to -$1.70) and flawed historical case studies like Canada.
- [46:51](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM&t=2811s) Reinhart and Rogoff's 90% debt-to-GDP threshold, widely cited to justify European austerity programs, collapsed due to fatal spreadsheet calculation errors.
- [48:20](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM&t=2900s) Viable alternatives to austerity include postwar-style financial repression with negative real interest rates, aggressive recovery of offshore tax assets, and targeted public investment.
- [01:00:16](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM&t=3616s) Iceland resolved its banking collapse by allowing foreign creditor debt to default, ringfencing domestic accounts, and redirecting financial human capital into technological industries.
## Detailed walkthrough
### [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM&t=0s) Introduction and Motivation: Anger at the Welfare State Blame Game
Boris Debic opens the session on behalf of Authors@Google to introduce Mark Blyth, a faculty fellow at the Watson Institute and professor of international political economy at Brown University, where he also directs the undergraduate programs in Development Studies and International Relations. Debic highlights Blyth’s notable scholarship, including his book *Great Transformations: Economic Ideas and Institutional Change in the Twentieth Century*, the *Routledge Handbook of International Political Economy*, and the co-edited volume *Constructing the International Economy*, as well as a forthcoming project questioning liberal democracies titled *The End of the Liberal World?* Debic also notes Blyth's service on the Warwick Commission on International Financial Reform and his academic pedigree, holding a PhD from Columbia University and having taught at Johns Hopkins University from 1997 to 2009.
Taking the stage to warm applause, Blyth immediately breaks the formal academic mold with dry humor about his Scottish accent and his self-advancing slides before launching into the visceral catalyst behind writing *Austerity: The History of a Dangerous Idea*. Blyth explains that his motivation was deeply personal and born out of outrage: he grew up as an orphan raised by his paternal grandmother on the receiving end of the British welfare state. Describing himself as living proof of intergenerational social mobility by going from those beginnings to an Ivy League professorship, he rejects the popular political narrative that demonizes the welfare state as a bloated, demotivating machine. Mark Blyth states his core frustration bluntly: “I wrote this book for the following reason—I got really, really pissed off with people with lots of money telling people who don't have any money they need to pay shit back.”
[02:51](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM&t=171s) From Surplus to Crash: How US Debt Actually Exploded
Blyth attacks the narrative that public overspending created modern sovereign debt crises, pointing out that in the year 2000, global financial markets were not worried about excessive debt, but about a shortage of federal debt:
```mermaid
flowchart TD
accTitle: The Mechanics of the 2008 Debt Explosion
accDescr: Flowchart tracing the shift from the 2000 US budget surplus to the 2008 repo market collapse, bank bailouts, and resulting sovereign debt surge.
subgraph PolicyShocks["Policy Drivers (2001–2006)"]
A["2000: Budget Surplus & T-Bill Shortage"] --> B["Greenspan Low Rates: Cheap Money for Assets"]
B --> C["Unfunded Bush Tax Cuts & Wars of Choice"]
C --> D["2006: US Debt-to-GDP Reaches 61%"]
end
subgraph RepoCrunch["Repo Collateral Breakdown (2007–2008)"]
D --> E["T-Bills Scarce in Repo Markets"]
E --> F["AAA Mortgage Products Used as Collateral"]
F --> G["Subprime Cracks: Bonds Downgraded AAA to C"]
G --> H["Massive Margin Calls on Leveraged Banks"]
H --> I["Liquidity Run & Insolvency (Bear Stearns)"]
end
subgraph FiscalFallout["The Fiscal Aftermath"]
I --> J["Too-Big-to-Fail Bank Bailouts"]
J --> K["30% Collapse in OECD Tax Revenues"]
K --> L["Slump Triggers Automatic Stabilizers"]
L --> M["Sovereign Debt Jumps to 100% GDP"]
end
```
The Clinton-era budget surplus was steadily shrinking the stock of US Treasuries, leaving investors starved of safe collateral. The subsequent explosion of debt was driven by deliberate political and monetary choices:
- Alan Greenspan slashed interest rates after the 9/11 downturn, engineering asset protection and providing virtually free liquidity to asset owners.
- The federal government passed two major rounds of tax cuts with no funding mechanisms.
- The US launched two wars of choice completely on credit, yet not a single fiscal conservative or congressional Republican raised alarms when debt-to-GDP reached 61% by 2006.
The true tipping point came during the 2007–2008 run on the repo (repurchase agreement) market. Because US Treasuries were scarce—partly due to massive accumulation by China—Wall Street substituted AAA-rated private-label mortgage instruments as repo collateral for short-term wholesale borrowing. When underlying mortgages deteriorated, rating agencies slashed those bonds from AAA down to B and C. Highly leveraged investment institutions like Bear Stearns suddenly faced severe haircuts, requiring far more collateral to borrow the same funds. Because their asset base was fixed and leveraged at ratios where a mere 3% decline in asset value wiped out their equity, they were rendered instantly insolvent. Panic broke out like someone shouting "fire" in a crowded theater, triggering a catastrophic liquidity freeze.
When governments chose to bail out these institutions under the doctrine of "too big to fail," private losses were shifted directly onto public balance sheets. The collapse of the financial sector wiped out approximately 30% of tax revenues across OECD economies. As the real economy fell into a severe slump, spending fell, investment dried up, and automatic stabilizers (such as unemployment assistance) expanded as tax yields plummeted. Deficits spiked, driving US debt-to-GDP from 61% to 100%. Blyth rejects the notion that public profligacy caused this shift: “There was no orgy of public spending. It's a lie. I take Amtrak every day. I would've noticed an orgy of public spending.” He points out the gall of politicians demanding cuts to Social Security—a self-funded system holding a $2.3 trillion surplus that does not contribute to the federal operating deficit—to pay for debts run up by protecting the balance sheets of the ultra-wealthy.
[06:25](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM&t=385s) Transatlantic Divergence: The European Doomsday Device
Turning to the international landscape, Blyth draws a stark contrast between economies that resisted immediate austerity and those that embraced it. The United States largely refrained from slashing public spending immediately after the crash, allowing its deficit to shrink naturally toward 3% to 4% of GDP alongside an uneven, tech-shocked recovery. In contrast, the United Kingdom instituted aggressive austerity despite possessing monetary sovereignty, leaving itself with a 7% deficit, stagnant growth, and the threat of a triple-dip recession.
Europe, however, pursued austerity to its most extreme conclusion, which Blyth likens to applying leeches to an already drained patient:
- Greece lost 30% of its GDP within four years—a level of economic destruction that Blyth notes the German military did not achieve during its occupation between 1941 and 1945.
- Across the European periphery, austerity policies generated roughly 25 million more unemployed people than in the United States.
- In assessing these crises, Blyth cautions analysts to track net debt rather than gross debt: looking at gross figures ignores both future tax receipts and public assets, the latter of which the US clearly values given the existence of the National Security Investment Act to restrict foreign asset purchases.
Blyth displays a slide pairing classic comic duo Laurel and Hardy alongside German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Nicolas Sarkozy ("Merkozy"), asserting that the European leadership directly engineered this disaster. He sets up the remainder of his lecture by preparing to dismantle the "official story" promoted by outlets such as *The Economist* and *The Financial Times*—the idea that reckless Southern European governments ran up public deficits until bond markets rebelled. Showing a chart of 10-year sovereign bond spreads, he notes that before the euro was created, investors demanded a 25% risk premium to hold 10-year Greek government bonds because a one-in-four default risk was baked into their independent currency history.
[09:09](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM&t=549s) The Official Euro Convergence Narrative
Mark Blyth opens by addressing the historical sovereign bond yields across Europe prior to monetary union. Greek bonds carried yields around 25%, a level that made total sense given the country's institutional track record: they had not run a budget surplus in half a century, and rival political factions had spent decades treating the state as spoils to plunder following their civil war. Yields in France, Italy, and the rest of the Mediterranean sat around 15%, and even broader European debt yielded north of 10%. Investors received substantial compensation simply for taking on genuine sovereign default risk.
```mermaid
flowchart LR
accTitle: The Official Euro Convergence Story
accDescr: Chart illustrating how the creation of the ECB was supposed to eliminate sovereign risk and equalize borrowing costs across member nations.
subgraph S1["Monetary Integration"]
A["National Printing Presses Removed"] --> B["Single Central Bank in Frankfurt"]
end
subgraph S2["Theoretical Convergence"]
B --> C["Inflation & Devaluation Risk Erased"]
C --> D["Periphery Default Risk Equals Germany"]
end
subgraph S3["The Flawed Assumption"]
D --> E["'Greece Becomes Germany'"]
end
```
Then came the Maastricht process—laid out in the late 1980s and formalized in the 1991 monetary treaty—establishing a European monetary union. The core theory was simple: duplicate the model of the German Bundesbank across the entire continent, remove national printing presses, hand monetary policy to a single authority in Frankfurt, and extinguish individual inflation, devaluation, and default risks. As Blyth summarizes the underlying logic:
> “And once we've locked up all the printing presses in the one time deal and given them to a guy in Frankfurt, and he's the only one who can print the money, well, basically doesn't that mean that Greece becomes Germany?”
For a roughly seven-and-a-half-year stretch following the euro’s launch, markets embraced this narrative completely. Bond yield spreads across radically diverse economies—from Belgium to Italy, Greece, Spain, and Portugal—collapsed until they traded as if every one of them shared Germany's near-zero default risk.
[10:55](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM&t=655s) Current Account Imbalances and the "Profligate South" Myth
The standard explanation for why this system broke down blames reckless southern borrowers. Under monetary union, massive current account imbalances emerged: major eurozone member states ran persistent deficits while Germany built an enormous trade surplus, transforming itself into an export juggernaut. Because trade surpluses and deficits mirror each other within a closed currency area, Germany’s export engine required foreign buyers for all those German goods; as Blyth remarks, “In other words, somebody has to buy all those BMWs.”
To explain where the southern states found the funds to buy those goods, conventional wisdom pointed to fiscal profligacy. The narrative accused the "PIGS" (Portugal, Ireland, Greece, and Spain) of running wild:
> “They are spending like drunken sailors, there's no doubt about this.”
According to this view, these countries used low interest rates—made possible by European Central Bank credibility and Maastricht's debt and deficit guidelines—to award themselves double-digit annual budget growth and wage increases far exceeding productivity. As their unit labor costs spiked, their competitiveness eroded, driving them into debt while German and Dutch savings underwrote their lifestyle.
- German trade surpluses directly required counterpart deficits elsewhere in the eurozone.
- Standard narratives blamed the PIGS economies for unsustainable wage hikes and domestic spending.
- Maastricht rules capping debt at 60% of GDP and budget deficits at 3% gave lenders a false sense of institutional security.
[13:22](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM&t=802s) The Over-Lending Reality: A Systemic Banking Trade
Blyth directly dismantles the idea that southern debt was purely a borrower-driven crisis, countering: “You can't have over borrowing with over lending.” He evokes the mid-2000s Citibank marketing campaign, "Live Richly," noting that large financial institutions spent years urging the public to consume aggressively on credit rather than exercise prudence. The crisis in Europe was not an organic failure of southern state budgets, but rather the single largest moral-hazard trade in history, driven by core European banks.
```mermaid
flowchart TD
accTitle: The European Bank Carry Trade and Bailout Trap
accDescr: The cycle of banks chasing yields on periphery debt, over-leveraging, and getting caught without an ECB bailout.
subgraph Leverage["1. The Yield Chase"]
A["Yields on Periphery Debt Compress"] --> B["Banks Juice Returns with 40:1 Leverage"]
B --> C["Core Assets Dumped for Periphery Paper"]
end
subgraph MoralHazard["2. The Systemic Gamble"]
C --> D["Banks Grow Larger Than Home GDP"]
D --> E["Assume European Central Bank Will Guarantee All Debt"]
end
subgraph Trap["3. The Dead End"]
E --> F["Eurozone Precludes National Bailout Presses"]
F --> G["ECB Refuses Blatant Bank Rescues"]
G --> H["Catastrophic Balance Sheet Crisis"]
end
```
The underlying mechanism functioned as a massive carry trade. Prior to monetary union, banks earned fat 25% coupons on Greek sovereign debt. As yield spreads collapsed toward German levels, maintaining those absolute profits required piling on enormous volume and leverage. Major banks across Germany, France, and Britain cleared safe sovereign bonds off their books and stuffed their balance sheets with Portuguese, Greek, and Spanish paper.
Operating at extreme leverage ratios around 40 to 1—leaving an equity buffer below 3%—these institutions operated with risk profiles far worse than Lehman Brothers. They assumed their sovereign governments would bail them out if trades turned sour. Even after joining the single currency cost national governments their independent printing presses, the banks believed they had engineered an even better guarantee: they were no longer simply national concerns, but systemic threats to the entire European project, leaving the ECB no choice but to step in. Blyth delivers the punchline to that miscalculation:
> “Except it's run by Jürgen Stark and a bunch of Germans. And they're not going to bail you. So when the shit hits the fan, you've got a really, really big problem.”
[17:07](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM&t=1027s) Balance Sheet Bloat and "Too Big to Fail"
The fallout left the European core's financial centers saturated with non-performing periphery assets. By 2011, French banks carried periphery exposures equal to more than 33% of France's entire gross domestic product, completely separate from their toxic Spanish real estate exposure. A single institution, the Dutch bank ING, had an asset balance sheet measuring 211% of the Netherlands' GDP, leveraged beyond 40 to 1, while its domestic state lacked the currency-printing authority to resolve a full-blown liquidity shock.
Taken together, the assets held by banks in just three nations—Germany, France, and the United Kingdom—swelled to roughly double the annual GDP of the entire European Union. Blyth contrasts this with the United States, where the combined assets of the top six "too big to fail" banks equaled 61% of national GDP. While an American failure poses severe systemic risks, Europe's hyper-leveraged institutions were so vast relative to their sponsor economies that their toxic periphery bets threatened to drag down the member states and the euro itself.
- Periphery asset exposure on French bank balance sheets topped 33% of France’s GDP.
- ING's standalone asset footprint sat at 211% of Dutch GDP on leverage exceeding 40 to 1.
- Total bank assets across the UK, France, and Germany alone rose to nearly 200% of the entire European Union's collective annual economic output.
- The top six American banks by comparison held assets equal to 61% of US GDP.
[18:05](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM&t=1085s) Currency Sovereignty vs. The Eurozone Trap
The United States faced a massive financial contraction where the interconnections in the banking sector threatened to wipe out roughly 10% of US GDP, or about $1.4 to $1.5 trillion. Yet, because the United States possesses its own currency and issues the global reserve asset, it was fully capable of absorbing the shock and executing a bailout that totaled around $3 trillion before moving into recovery. Great Britain, despite running bank balance sheets that dwarf its GDP, at least retains its own sovereign currency and printing press.
```mermaid
flowchart LR
accTitle: Sovereign Central Banking vs. The Eurozone Straitjacket
accDescr: Contrasts the policy toolkit of a sovereign currency issuer with the limited options available to a Eurozone member state during a banking crisis.
subgraph US_UK["Sovereign Currency (US / UK)"]
A["Bank Insolvency Shock"] --> B["Central Bank Action"]
B --> C["Asset Swap & Liquidity Injection"]
C --> D["Recapitalize & De-lever"]
end
subgraph Eurozone["Eurozone Members"]
E["Bank Insolvency Shock"] --> F{"Available Exits?"}
F -->|"No Printing Press"| G["Cannot Inflate"]
F -->|"No National Currency"| H["Cannot Devalue"]
F -->|"ECB Refusal"| I["Austerity & Squeeze"]
end
```
By contrast, continental Europe is in a far more precarious situation. In France, just three banks—BNP Paribas, Crédit Agricole, and Société Générale—command assets equal to 250% of French GDP, hold severely impaired balance sheets, and operate without a national central bank to print money. The European Central Bank does not function as a true central bank; rather, it acts like a glorified currency board that initially refused to buy sovereign bonds or mutualize debt, leaving member states to face crises on their own. When hit by a financial crisis, an economy typically has four exit routes: inflate, devalue, absorb bad assets via a true central bank, or impose austerity. Because Eurozone members lack their own currencies and printing presses, they were trapped into squeezing their public finances through austerity and hoping liquidity tricks like the Long-Term Refinancing Operations (LTROs) would kick the can down the road.
- The US banking crisis took out roughly 10% of GDP ($1.4–$1.5 trillion), but total bailout interventions around $3 trillion resolved it because the US prints the world's reserve currency.
- In France, the asset base of BNP Paribas, Crédit Agricole, and Société Générale exceeds 250% of the nation's entire GDP.
- Eurozone members are stripped of the power to devalue their currency or inflate away debt burdens.
[19:28](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM&t=1168s) The Bernanke Maneuver vs. Eurozone Contagion
The United States resolved its crisis through what can be termed "a Bernanke," an aggressive maneuver where the Federal Reserve directly removed toxic assets from commercial bank balance sheets and parked them on its own books. Disguised under obscure acronyms like Maiden Lane II and the Term Auction Facility that completely sailed past an oblivious Congress, this policy flooded the banking system with liquidity and permitted banks to recapitalize while deleveraging. Rather than simple money printing, this constituted an asset swap combined with liquidity support, allowing institutions to rebuild until their operational leverage dropped from peaks of 30-to-1 down to manageable levels, with the expectation that the Fed could later sell recovered assets back into the market.
The ECB, however, was both "constitutionally and intellectually incapable of making that move." As sovereign bond yields spiked, the bond markets began pricing in an outright breakup of the single currency. Because European banks are tied to one another, an insolvency in Spain or France inevitably cascades directly into German institutions like Deutsche Bank.
```mermaid
flowchart TD
accTitle: Sovereign Bank Run and Interbank Contagion
accDescr: Shows the chain reaction where dumping one peripheral country's sovereign debt triggers forced selling and contagion throughout the core European banking system.
subgraph Liquidation["Cascading Asset Sell-Off"]
A["Greek Debt Impairment"] -->|"Dumped at 20% face value"| B["2% Portfolio Loss"]
B -->|"Balance Books"| C["Dump Portuguese Debt"]
C -->|"Prices Crash to Zero"| D["Dump Irish Debt"]
end
subgraph SystemicCrisis["Core Contagion"]
D --> E["12% Bank Portfolio Loss"]
E --> F["Plunging Bank Share Prices"]
F --> G["Collapse of SocGen & Deutsche Bank"]
end
```
To prevent this systemic domino effect, policymakers weaponized austerity to engineer a backstop against a bond-market bank run. If a heavily exposed bank tried to offload Greek debt trading at 20 cents on the dollar, it would immediately book a catastrophic loss, forcing it to liquidate Portuguese and then Irish paper to plug the hole. Wiping out the value of those peripheral assets would gut roughly 12% of a lender's asset base and wipe out 11% of Eurozone GDP, cratering bank equities and igniting a currency-union-wide bank run. Describing the true motive behind peripheral sacrifice, Mark Blyth explains: “Because this is about saving Societe Generale, and it is about saving Deutsche Bank from their own over-borrowing and over-lending mistakes.”
[22:10](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM&t=1330s) The Fallacy of Composition and Mario Draghi's Bluff
Austerity cannot solve structural banking failures. Slashing Greek public sector spending to prehistoric levels does nothing to heal the impaired balance sheet of Société Générale. You cannot maintain a rigid gold-standard-style monetary framework within a modern democracy without inciting severe political backlashes reminiscent of the 1920s, nor can liquidity loans permanently fix insolvency.
The turning point for the crisis arrived not when budgets were slashed, but when ECB President Mario Draghi famously promised to do "whatever it takes." Bond yields dropped instantly upon that declaration, despite the ECB executing virtually no bond purchases in the six months that followed. This market reaction proved that investors never cared about firing 30,000 Greek civil servants; their panic stemmed purely from Euro breakup risk, and providing a credible central-bank backstop resolved that panic overnight.
```mermaid
flowchart LR
accTitle: The Paradox of Simultaneous Fiscal Consolidation
accDescr: Illustrates how cutting public expenditure across an economy shrinks national income and causes debt-to-GDP ratios to rise.
A["Initial Debt/GDP: 80% (4/5)"] --> B["Cut Government Spending in Half"]
B --> C["National Income Shrinks: GDP Drops to 4"]
C --> D["New Debt/GDP: 100% (4/4)"]
```
The underlying economic flaw of austerity is the fallacy of composition: everyone cannot cut spending at once and expect their economies to grow. Mark Blyth illustrates this arithmetic disaster:
> “So imagine the economy with an 80% debt-to-GDP ratio, and turn it into a simple fraction of four over five. Now imagine that 40% of the five is government expenditure. You want to cut in half... On a constant stock of debt, your debt-to-GDP ratio just went from 0.8 to 1.”
Because saving requires income, cutting public spending across the board suppresses aggregate revenue, leaving every country that implemented an austerity program with more debt relative to GDP than when they started, whereas non-austerity nations like the United States saw their burdens shrink.
- Mario Draghi brought down European bond yields simply by establishing the credibility of the ECB's backstop, without spending money on bond purchases.
- Across Europe, every nation that subjected itself to austerity experienced an increase in its debt-to-GDP ratio.
- Non-cutting nations managed to reduce their relative debt loads through baseline income generation.
[23:55](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM&t=1435s) Liberalism's Emetic Economics: From John Locke to David Hume
To understand why European leadership embraced such self-defeating policies, one must examine the philosophical foundations of early liberalism, a tradition Blyth describes as "liberalism’s emetic economics"—from the word *emetic*, meaning to induce vomiting. In the fifth chapter of the *Second Treatise of Government*, John Locke served as the intellectual propagandist for the rising English merchant class that ousted the monarch to claim property rights over land, labor, and capital. This institutional shift commodified resources, dispossessed the peasantry, and produced "vagabonds"—literally men freed from feudal bondage who had been stripped of their traditional legal status and land access.
Free markets inevitably generate extreme disparities in wealth and income, creating a fundamental political dilemma:
```mermaid
flowchart TD
accTitle: The Liberal State Dilemma
accDescr: Traces the paradox identified by Locke and Smith where property owners need a strong state to protect wealth from the poor, but fear the state's power to tax.
A["Merchant Class Creates Untrammeled Markets"] --> B["Massive Income & Wealth Inequality"]
B --> C["Need for Strong State: Police the Dispossessed"]
C --> D["Adam Smith's Warning: 1 Rich Man vs. 500 Poor"]
D --> E{"The Lockean Dilemma"}
E -->|"State is Strong Enough to Protect"| F["State is Strong Enough to Expropriate (Taxes)"]
E -->|"To Avoid Taxes"| G["State Resorting to Public Debt"]
```
Markets do not emerge spontaneously from the soil; they require state power and parliamentary legislation to turn serfs into wage laborers. Furthermore, property owners require the state's coercive force to protect their assets from the impoverished masses. Quoting Adam Smith's *The Wealth of Nations*, Blyth notes: “for every rich man, there must be 500 poor, and that rich man must sleep always with the strong arm of the civil magistrate at his side, for he is always regarded with jealousy and envy.”
This produces the core liberal paradox: property owners desperately need the state to police domestic inequality, but the very state powerful enough to safeguard their property is also powerful enough to seize it through taxation. To avoid paying taxes to finance this protection, the merchant class turned to public borrowing. Writing on money and interest, philosopher David Hume argued that while money is neutral in the long run, short-term stimulus works because merchants are "the most useful race of men" who channel capital efficiently. Through this logic, liberalism fell in love with public debt: it functions as a mechanism for merchants to demand armed protection from the sovereign while refusing to surrender their private wealth in taxes.
[26:38](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM&t=1598s) Debt Instruments, Crowding Out, and Adam Smith's Paradox
Blyth illustrates how government debt instruments initially seemed like an extraordinary, risk-free bargain for wealthy property owners. A private individual lends the state a million pounds to fund their own military protection, and in ten years, the state repays the million pounds plus interest. It looks like an unbeatable deal with unlimited upside and zero downside. However, early liberal thinkers spotted an immediate structural danger: crowding out. David Hume argued that to entice investors, the sovereign must offer an interest rate higher than the market rate. As a consequence, capital, gold, and silver are drained from commercial enterprise into government paper, leaving the nation indebted, subordinate to foreign creditors, and ultimately bankrupted. Debt offers an attractive mechanism to finance the state citizens reluctantly require, yet it brings the terrifying prospect of national ruin.
```mermaid
flowchart TD
accTitle: The Mechanics of Debt and Crowding Out
accDescr: Flowchart illustrating how government debt crowds out productive private capital according to early liberal theorists.
subgraph DebtIssuance["Sovereign Borrowing"]
A["Sovereign offers high interest rates"] --> B["Attracts private wealth to fund defense"]
end
subgraph CrowdingOut["Market Distortion"]
B --> C["Capital & bullion pulled from commerce"]
C --> D["Underlying productive economy shrinks"]
end
subgraph Crisis["Fiscal Failure"]
D --> E["Debt burden on smaller economy"]
E --> F["National insolvency and ruin"]
end
```
Adam Smith took up these exact concerns, tying them to the fundamental identity of classical economics that savings equals investment ($S = I$). For Smith, human beings—whom Blyth jokingly characterizes as "parsimonious Scots"—are naturally hardwired to save. As Blyth quotes from Smith: “Where there is tolerable security, a man would be perfectly crazy if he did not employ as investment all his available capital.” Yet Smith also understood the class-based reality of state power, candidly acknowledging in Book Two of *The Wealth of Nations*: “Civil government, insofar as it is instituted, is instituted for the defense of the rich against the poor, or for those who have property against those who have none.”
To pay for this defensive apparatus, Smith initially toyed with progressive taxation, reasoning that those with the most property have the most skin in the game. But recognizing that this meant the wealthy would bear the heaviest tax load, Smith hastily retreated. He proposed instead what modern conservatives advocate: a national consumption tax on ordinary goods while exempting luxuries—sparing yachts while taxing corn flakes. Because consumption taxes never raise sufficient revenue, Smith reluctantly conceded that states must turn to debt. Yet that concession trapped him in Hume’s dilemma: public debt perverts natural parsimony, diverting savings from productive investment into sovereign paper, shrinking the private economy, and marching the country toward bankruptcy.
[29:31](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM&t=1771s) Liberalism's Neuralgia and the Rebuttal of British History
Blyth notes that the arguments against public debt heard today are carbon copies of arguments made three centuries ago: “Now, when you hear the same arguments repeated for 300 years without modification regardless of any facts in fact in them, you should generally be suspicious.” He diagnoses this cyclical anxiety as "liberalism’s neuralgia," for which austerity serves as the default, unthinking aspirin—prescribed automatically regardless of whether it actually cures the condition.
The historical record directly contradicts these dire 18th-century predictions. Hume warned that Britain would face economic collapse by roughly 1780 due to debt accumulation. Instead, the British state borrowed relentlessly to finance global conflicts, culminating in a national debt-to-GDP ratio of 240% at the close of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815. Rather than imploding under this unprecedented debt load, the British economy spent the century from 1815 to 1914 dominating global trade and expanding at an unprecedented rate, directly puncturing modern debt-threshold claims such as the 90% cliff popularized by Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff.
- Hume predicted economic collapse by around 1780 due to rising public debt.
- British debt peaked at 240% of GDP in 1815 following the Napoleonic Wars.
- Between 1815 and 1914, Britain established global industrial and imperial dominance instead of collapsing.
[30:27](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM&t=1827s) The Two Traditions of Liberalism: Ricardo vs. Mill
Out of the 19th-century debate emerged two distinct strands of liberal thought regarding public expenditure:
```mermaid
flowchart TD
accTitle: The Two Traditions of Liberalism
accDescr: Split from classical thought into Ricardian-Austrian economics and Mill-Keynesian economics.
Root["Classical Liberal Dilemma"] --> Ricardo["David Ricardo"]
Root --> Mill["John Stuart Mill"]
Ricardo -->|"Denial of state necessity"| Austrian["Austrian Economics & Liquidationism"]
Mill -->|"Acceptance of state & public finance"| Keynes["Keynesian Economics"]
```
1. **The Ricardian Tradition:** David Ricardo represented the faction that insists society cannot live with the state, refuses to pay for it, and pretends it is unnecessary. This line of thought flowed directly into 20th-century Austrian economics.
2. **The Millian Tradition:** John Stuart Mill accepted both that the state is indispensable and that society must pay for it. Mill warned that leaving social reproduction entirely to unfettered markets creates compounding inequalities that ultimately destroy the market mechanism itself. This tradition formed the bedrock of Keynesianism.
[31:07](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM&t=1867s) The Emetic Response: Schumpeter and American Liquidationism
When the Great Depression hit, the Ricardian-Austrian worldview manifested as what Blyth terms "the emetic response" or American liquidationism. Blyth displays an iconic Depression-era photograph of an impoverished soup-kitchen bread line standing directly in front of a billboard depicting a smiling middle-class family declaring "There's no way like the American Way."
At Harvard, Austrian-born economist Joseph Schumpeter championed the liquidationist doctrine. In Schumpeter’s framework, an economy possesses an invisible, long-run capital structure that policymakers must never manipulate. Business cycles turn toxic when government-backed banks issue excessive credit, distorting price signals and tricking entrepreneurs into malinvestments. Once the artificial credit dries up, the economic system must undergo an aggressive purge. Blyth describes this philosophy as a cycle of credit binging followed by mandatory purging: “So you basically have the boom, and then you have to have the slump, and you have to go barf and you have to get it all out and let the clock reset, and off you go.”
[32:21](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM&t=1941s) The Treasury View, the Gold Standard, and Ricardian Equivalence
The British establishment adopted an equally austere, though more polite, stance known as the "Treasury View." During the 1920s, Chancellor of the Exchequer Winston Churchill confronted the economic wreckage of World War I, which had destroyed roughly 60% of British national wealth. Britain faced a critical monetary crossroad regarding its return to the gold standard:
- **Returning at a lower parity:** This would devalue the pound, stimulating domestic manufacturing and exports, but foreign and domestic holders of sterling assets would see their wealth diluted, risking capital flight.
- **Returning at pre-war parity (high exchange rate):** This protected the wealth of sterling creditors but made exports uncompetitive, immediately driving one million British workers into unemployment that endured for a decade.
When David Lloyd George proposed state public works programs to alleviate mass unemployment, the Treasury responded with a memorandum drafted by Hubert Henderson that dismissed public intervention. The Treasury argued on the basis of what later became known as Ricardian equivalence: borrowing to spend today guarantees higher taxes tomorrow, causing rational actors to curtail spending and rendering fiscal stimulus zero-sum. Furthermore, the memorandum claimed that state investment merely crowds out private initiative and noted a chronic absence of "suitable public works"—the 1920s equivalent of what the Obama administration later termed a lack of "shovel-ready projects."
Meanwhile, practical reality was outpacing classical theory. Blyth cites economist Joan Robinson's biting assessment of the divergent approaches to the slump: “She says that, ‘in 1936, Keynes was writing down what might cause unemployment while Herr Hitler was curing it.’”
[34:44](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM&t=2084s) The 1930s Precedent: Simultaneous Contraction and Radical Politics
Mark Blyth disputes the common historical misconception that early Nazi support came strictly from southern German Catholics, pointing out that voters were industrial workers and miners. Looking at the global landscape of the early 1930s, Blyth draws a direct parallel to the modern Eurozone crisis. Back then, Takahashi Korekiyo—the intellectual precursor to the Bank of Japan's modern "Abenomics" monetary and fiscal stimulus—served as finance minister, but the global mainstream took the opposite path. The five largest economies in the world engaged in simultaneous spending cuts. As each country slashed budgets at once, global GDP collapsed while the nominal stock of debt remained constant, driving debt-to-GDP ratios skyward. In Great Britain, the debt-to-GDP ratio stood at 170% in 1930; after round after round of austerity cuts, it climbed to 190% by 1933 and continued to rise.
```mermaid
flowchart TD
accTitle: Austerity Spiral to Political Collapse
accDescr: Flowchart showing how simultaneous spending cuts shrank GDP, exploded debt ratios, and triggered radical political reactions in Germany and Japan.
subgraph EconomicSpirals["The Deflationary Trap"]
A["Simultaneous Spending Cuts across Major Economies"] --> B["Global GDP Shrinks"]
B --> C["Debt-to-GDP Ratios Skyrocket"]
end
subgraph PoliticalFallout["Political Catastrophe"]
C --> D["Germany: Brüning's 200 Emergency Decrees"]
C --> E["Japan: Deep Military Budget Cuts"]
D --> F["Nazi Vote Surges from 8% to 43.3%"]
E --> G["Military Assassinations of Financial Elite"]
end
```
In Germany, short-term American capital had flooded in following the 1923 hyperinflation, temporarily making Germany the fastest-growing and most stable economy in Europe. However, a renegotiation of war debt gave sovereign reparations seniority, and American investors pulled their capital out to chase higher interest rates (around 7% in banks) and the 1928–1929 stock market boom on Wall Street. As capital fled, Chancellor Heinrich Brüning attempted to balance the budget by hacking away at public spending, issuing roughly 200 emergency austerity decrees. This dynamic fueled the explosive rise of the Nazi Party, which was the sole political faction openly campaigning against austerity:
- In 1928, the National Socialists were a written-off fringe party polling around 8%.
- By 1930, their share jumped to approximately 18%.
- By 1933, they seized 43.3% of the vote.
The political fallout was even bloodier in Imperial Japan. Because the military constituted the largest single expenditure in the Japanese budget, civilian-led budget balancing fell directly upon military appropriations. In response, by 1930 the Japanese military began assassinating the civilian financial elite. As Blyth dryly observes, “You can rack up quite a body count doing this if you piss off the military enough.” In short order, military officers assassinated two prime ministers, two finance ministers, several cabinet-level officials, and half a dozen senior bankers. As Blyth emphasizes, “So the lesson learned on this was simultaneous contractions, when everybody else is doing it, is zero sum against everybody else, and leads to really nasty politics.”
---
[36:58](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM&t=2218s) Keynes, Liquidity Traps, and the Fallacy of Composition
Keynesian economics and the catastrophic events of the interwar years thoroughly discredited austerity by exposing profound fallacies of composition and non-scalability in labor and financial markets. Blyth explains that microeconomic logic cannot simply be scaled up: what holds true for two or ten individuals is utterly false when applied to 20 million workers across five interconnected national economies. Economic behavior in a downturn is driven by fear, not virtuous thrift. Faced with uncertainty, economic agents develop myopic, short-term horizons; they ignore decades of past prosperity and obsess over immediate distress, looking anxiously at their neighbors for cues. Recessions linger because nobody wants to step out and invest first.
Austerity relies on an "emetic" model—the puritanical notion that an economy must binge and then purge to cleanse itself. It assumes that once a society curtails consumption, households save, and savings automatically translate into productive investment. Yet in a deep slump, holding cash is the only rational choice. When everyone attempts to hoard liquidity at the same instant, a systemic paradox emerges: one entity can be liquid only if another is willing to be illiquid. The result is a prolonged liquidity trap where an entire economy freezes for over a decade. Quoting John Maynard Keynes's *General Theory*, Blyth reiterates that consumption is the ultimate object of all economic life.
Blyth sums up the hard-won political and economic lessons that the world understood by 1940 but subsequently abandoned:
- “Democracy is asset insurance for the rich.”
- “Don't skimp on the payments.”
- “Redistribution of debt is reinsurance for democracy, and austerity is anorexia for the economy.”
---
[38:32](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM&t=2312s) The German Sonderweg: Ordoliberalism and Export Fetishism
Why did policymakers forget the lessons of the 1930s? Blyth argues the amnesia stems from Germany, an economy that is not Anglo-Saxon liberal, but rather the world's original developmental state, operating far closer to the Japanese model than to Britain or the United States. Following the 1873 "Founders' Crisis" (*Gründerkrise*) stock market crash, free-market liberalism was discredited in Germany. Economic thinker Friedrich List challenged British free-trade orthodoxy, observing that had the British followed their own advice regarding comparative advantage, they would still be weaving wool blankets for Flanders instead of ruling the seas and producing steel without native iron ore.
Under Otto von Bismarck, Germany instituted the "marriage of iron and rye," combining southern industrial power with northern agrarian interests. The state expropriated agricultural surpluses to purchase capital machinery, reverse-engineered it, and built a massive, export-driven industrial base supported by universal banks and forced domestic savings.
| Economic Dimension | Anglo-American Keynesian Model | German Ordoliberal Model |
|:--- |:--- |:--- |
| **Primary Economic Engine** | Domestic consumption & internal demand | External demand & export manufacturing |
| **Wage & Price Policy** | High wages bolster aggregate demand | Wage restraint preserves export price competitiveness |
| **Monetary Authority Focus** | Dual mandate: employment and price stability | Strict inflation fighting via independent central bank |
| **State Economic Role** | Discretionary countercyclical spending | Rigid rule-setting to enforce market competition (*Ordnung*) |
Because Germany's engine of demand lies outside its own borders, Keynesian domestic demand management makes no sense to German planners. Stimulating domestic consumption merely raises domestic wages and prices, threatening to price an export like a BMW out of world markets by inflating its price from $50,000 to $100,000. Blyth argues that post-war German obsession with price stability is not truly rooted in the collective trauma of 1920s hyperinflation; that is a convenient myth. In reality, sound money and an independent central bank exist to preserve price competitiveness abroad. Post-war Freiburg School thinkers, notably Walter Eucken, codified this approach into Ordoliberalism: an "economic constitution" based on rigid rules rather than discretionary political management, prioritizing product competition and monetary discipline over consumption.
---
[41:10](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM&t=2470s) The Eurozone's Structural Failure: "You Can't All Be Germany"
Blyth explains that the governing architecture of the European Union is nothing other than generalized Ordoliberalism writ large across an entire continent. Discretionary politics have been subordinated to rigid bureaucratic mandates:
- The unelected European Commission holds genuine executive power, whereas the European Parliament functions as a powerless talking shop.
- The single largest administrative organ in Brussels is the Competition Commission.
- The European Central Bank has a single, unyielding mandate: suppressing inflation, even while the continent suffers from devastating deflation.
This institutional setup operates entirely on the German conviction that politicians cannot be trusted with economic discretion because they inevitably manufacture inflationary cycles. While this framework fits an export-driven powerhouse, generalizing it across the entire Eurozone produces a catastrophic fallacy of composition. Trade balances require mathematical symmetry: for Germany to run massive export surpluses, other nations must run equivalent import deficits. As Blyth observed on current account data, Germany's surplus was the exact mirror image of Southern Europe's deficits.
This model functioned only as long as cross-border bank lending masked the underlying imbalances. Once the private banking bubble burst, European authorities demanded that every peripheral country slash wages, embrace structural reform, and mimic the German model:
> “Tell me, how is Greece and Portugal going to make an Audi? And even if they did, who are they going to sell it to? Who's going to buy it? Imagine the Competition Commission gets its way and everybody becomes more competitive, and they all make exports. Who's going to buy all this crap? The over-tapped American consumer? We're already spending too much already. So you end up with an economy and an economic structure, an economic model for an entire continent which literally cannot work.”
[43:21](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM&t=2601s) The Schuldenbremse and the Bocconi School of Public Finance
Mark Blyth points to the German concept of the *Schuldenbremse*, or constitutional debt brake, which mandates that nobody can ever run more than a minimal deficit. This effectively requires nearly every government to run a structural budget surplus, a demand Blyth dismisses as pure mathematical absurdity. Even though it is arithmetically impossible for every nation to run a surplus simultaneously, European policymakers have codified it into legal rules regardless. This obsession with deficit restriction connects directly to the intellectual lineage of postwar Italy. Luigi Einaudi, who served as post-war Italy’s first prime minister and head of the Bank of Italy, founded the Bocconi School of Public Finance in Milan. The Bocconi School became celebrated for advancing public choice theory—the premise that states are inherently untrustworthy, rent-seeking institutions. Blyth quips that growing up in Italy might make anyone cynical about the state, but Bocconi theorists generalized this Italian institutional dysfunction into a universal economic truth. They championed the European Union not as an expression of popular will, but explicitly as a disciplinary straitjacket designed to override local democratic processes and suppress public expenditures.
When the economics department at the University of Cambridge blew apart during the 1970s intellectual battles known as the Cambridge capital controversies, British economics lost its dominance to American departments. The only European economics department at the time with the mathematical chops to engage with the Americans was Bocconi. Because Bocconi’s faculty were already philosophically committed to viewing state intervention as inherently destructive, they aligned seamlessly with the American turn toward neoliberalism. This institutional alignment transformed Bocconi into an ideological transmission belt running straight from Milan to Harvard.
As Mark Blyth emphasizes:
> “And they were hard-wired for seeing the state as a bad thing at exactly the time that liberal economics went in the same direction, when it went neoliberal.”
```mermaid
flowchart TD
accTitle: Ideological Transmission of Austerity Thinking
accDescr: Flowchart tracing public choice theory from the Bocconi School to Harvard and into European crisis policy.
subgraph Origin["Postwar Milan"]
A["Bocconi School of Public Finance<br>(Luigi Einaudi)"]
B["Public Choice Theory & EU as External Disciplinary Device"]
A --> B
end
subgraph Transmission["Academic Convergence"]
C["Cambridge Capital Controversies<br>(UK Cambridge collapses)"]
D["Bocconi pairs with US Neoliberal Economics"]
B --> D
C --> D
end
subgraph Policy["Harvard & European Policy"]
E["Harvard Economics Department<br>(Alberto Alesina)"]
F["Expansionary Austerity Hypothesis<br>adopted by ECB & G20"]
D --> E
E --> F
end
```
[44:48](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM&t=2688s) The Expansionary Austerity Hypothesis and the Ikea Couch Parable
That Milan-to-Harvard pipeline leads directly to Alberto Alesina, former chair of Harvard’s economics department, who developed the theory of "expansionary austerity." Blyth likens Alesina’s framework to Joseph Schumpeter’s punitive "emetic economics" and traces its foundations back to David Ricardo's Ricardian equivalence: the premise that public debt operations are neutral because rational agents anticipate future taxation. Under this theory, spending cuts purportedly stimulate economic growth by restoring "confidence." Blyth mocks the psychological assumptions embedded in the model through a vivid thought experiment: imagine an ordinary citizen trapped in a collapsing economy, their partner already out of work, their own job hanging by a thread, and their future precarious. Yet rather than panicking about unemployment, the model insists that ordinary citizens lie awake in bed consumed with anxiety over the national debt.
The government then signals deep, credible cuts to public spending. In the model, the citizen possesses full rational expectations, intuitively understands the true structural equation governing the macroeconomy, and knows all its underlying coefficients. The citizen calculates lifetime expenditures and reasons that spending cuts today guarantee lower taxes twenty years down the road. Discounting that future windfall back to the present, the citizen suddenly feels flush with disposable income, rushes out to Ikea, purchases a new couch, and single-handedly cures the recession. Stripped of its sophisticated mathematical formalisms, Blyth insists this is the actual causal logic of expansionary austerity. When austerity proponents cite 1980s case studies like Ireland, Sweden, Denmark, or Canada to validate this theory, Blyth counters that their timelines are inverted. Canada's famous turnaround was not caused by fiscal contraction leading to growth; rather, the Canadian dollar depreciated 40% against the US dollar between 1976 and 1986 just as the US economy—which absorbed 75% of Canadian exports and was nine times Canada's size—boomed. Canada grew first through export demand, and only then balanced its budget.
As Mark Blyth explains:
> “Cutting in a slump produces a bigger slump.”
- Alesina’s confidence model assumes households make intertemporal tax adjustments across a 20-year horizon based on current fiscal contractions.
- Historical precedents cited by austerity advocates routinely confound the causal order: countries experienced export-led expansions first, followed by budget consolidation.
- The Canadian dollar (*the Loonie*) devalued by 40% between 1976 and 1986, positioning Canada's commodity-export economy to capture massive US growth between 1986 and 1992.
[46:51](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM&t=2811s) The Great Bait-and-Switch and the Breakdown of the Model
Despite its empirical failings, this expansionary framework was embraced by the European Central Bank (ECB), the EU’s Economic and Financial Affairs Council (Ecofin), and G20 finance ministers in 2009, culminating in the ECB’s 2010 report. Blyth notes with disbelief that this document literally recycled 18th- and 19th-century classical arguments directly from David Hume, Adam Smith, David Ricardo, and John Stuart Mill to justify the Greek bailouts and across-the-board austerity packages. Blyth characterizes this program as the greatest bait-and-switch operation in modern history: private debt recklessly accumulated by over-leveraged commercial banks was transferred wholesale onto public balance sheets. The public, who had relied on welfare state protections, was suddenly handed the bill for systemically irresponsible financiers who were politically untouchable.
Cracks in the consensus soon appeared. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) broke ranks after calculating fiscal multipliers in the European periphery: slashing public spending by $1.00 did not lower debt; instead, it wiped out $1.50 to $1.70 of economic output. This dynamic created negative convexity, causing debt-to-GDP ratios to spiral upward as denominators collapsed. Meanwhile, the Eastern European "Rebel Alliance"—Romania, Estonia, Bulgaria, Latvia, and Lithuania—attempted to "blow up the Death Star" of debt through internal devaluations, resulting in economic devastation. The academic pillar of austerity crumbled as well during "Excelgate," when a graduate student discovered fatal spreadsheet coding errors in Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff’s influential study claiming growth drops off sharply when debt exceeds 90% of GDP. These policy errors left southern Europe trapped under chronic 25% unemployment, an outcome Blyth argues is politically unsustainable.
As Mark Blyth puts it:
> “Because what's actually happened is all that private debt that was generated by the banking system through over-lending is now on the public balance sheet.”
- The IMF found fiscal spending multipliers in the periphery were negative $1.50 to $1.70 for every dollar cut, expanding rather than shrinking debt loads.
- "Excelgate" discredited Reinhart and Rogoff's 90% debt-to-GDP threshold by exposing coding mistakes, selective omissions, and flawed weighting formulas.
- Youth and structural unemployment in parts of Southern Europe stabilized near permanent 25% rates.
[48:20](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM&t=2900s) Three Ways Out: Financial Repression, Taxing Wealth, and Hippocratic Economics
Blyth outlines three alternative routes to resolve the crisis. The first is financial repression, an approach historically deployed after World War II. Under this mechanism, heavily leveraged commercial banks stuffed with sovereign debt are forced by regulatory mandates to hold even more government bonds at suppressed yields. Central banks then deliberately engineer positive inflation targets, creating negative real interest rates. After World War II, this "liquidation tax" amortized the equivalent of 40% of US GDP in a single decade while the broader economy boomed. Financial repression systematically punishes creditors while offering relief to debtors. Blyth reveals that he took out an enormous mortgage on the expectation that inflation will inevitably eat away half the real debt burden over time.
The second solution is direct taxation of concentrated private capital and offshore shelters. Blyth points out the absurdity of the US carried interest tax loophole, which enabled private equity executives like Mitt Romney to pay an effective 15% rate while ordinary salaried employees face marginal rates of 30%. Blyth argues that governments must dismantle offshore tax havens, which hold an estimated $27 trillion in untaxed assets concentrated across just five jurisdictions. Reclaiming this wealth would easily eliminate fiscal shortfalls without gutting public services like local fire departments. Finally, Blyth appeals to "Hippocratic economics"—the doctrine of *first, do no harm*. While doom-mongers predicted the United States would collapse under its profligate federal spending, the US cleaned up bank balance sheets, stabilized debt, fostered renewed lending, and returned to growth. In contrast, Britain faced a decade of stagnation, Ireland forfeited an entire generation to bail out private banking liabilities, and the European periphery was reduced to economic misery.
As Mark Blyth summarizes the core political fight:
> “Somebody got all the benefits, then they cost all the costs, now they want somebody to pay for the costs while they keep all the benefits.”
- Post-WWII financial repression reduced US national debt by an amount equal to 40% of GDP across ten years through negative real yields.
- An estimated $27 trillion in private global wealth resides untaxed in five major tax haven jurisdictions.
- While the UK and Eurozone pursued fiscal contraction, US stabilization and growth demonstrated the superiority of avoiding self-inflicted austerity.
[50:52](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM&t=3052s) Q&A: Hedging and Investing in an Era of Financial Repression
Following enthusiastic applause, Blyth apologizes for running slightly long, joking that he has been "talking faster than JFK on speed." An audience member opens the question-and-answer session by asking how ordinary people can capitalize on an inflationary environment, noting that taking out massive mortgages is problematic given the severe local real estate bubble in Silicon Valley.
Blyth shifts into what he calls his "financial adviser mode" to discuss asset management under positive inflation and financial repression. He explains that generating real returns under high inflation is challenging, but historical models exist. During the late 1970s and early 1980s, the most successful corporate entities were diversified conglomerate trusts that held small, varied stakes across an entire economy. He draws a direct parallel to the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, whose unofficial operating ethos is to own half a percent of every unanchored asset on Earth. Because an investor cannot reliably anticipate which specific sectors will generate upside during an inflationary rebalancing, the most effective defense is maximal structural diversification—mirroring broad index funds or holding conglomerates—to construct a protective barbell against monetary debasement.
As Mark Blyth tells the audience:
> “So what you should be is maximally diversify.”
[51:57](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM&t=3117s) The Myth of Hyperinflation and the German Saving Obsession
Mark Blyth addresses the widespread economic paranoia that any degree of inflation inevitably accelerates into hyperinflation, dismissing the idea out of hand: “So we have this story about the least degree of inflation leads to some kind of infinity curve hyper-convexity where, boom, off it goes. And it's simply not true.”
To explain where this pervasive fear originates, Blyth offers personal background about marrying into a German family. He jokes about his 71-year-old retired father-in-law (*Schwiegervater*), whom he describes as a classic German hardwired for saving: he is retired, yet he continues to save money constantly rather than spending it, terrified of inflation. Blyth recounts researching the Weimar hyperinflation while writing his book and discovering that it was actually a deliberate government policy aimed at frustrating the French over World War I reparations. Contrary to popular historical memory, the hyperinflation ended within eight months, the entire economy stabilized inside twelve months, and it was followed by five years of solid growth. It was only later—when the Brüning administration imposed brutal austerity policies that threw the economy off a cliff—that the Nazis came to power. Furthermore, throughout the entire postwar period up until around 1980, European economies consistently ran positive rates of inflation alongside positive real rates of economic growth.
- The German hyperinflation was ended within 8 months, and stabilization took roughly 12 months.
- The Weimar Republic experienced 5 years of post-stabilization growth before austerity precipitated the economic collapse that aided the Nazi rise to power.
- Post-WWII Europe sustained positive growth alongside positive inflation until roughly 1980.
---
[53:20](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM&t=3200s) The Real Mechanics of Japan's Lost Decades
An audience member asks about Japan, noting that economists like Paul Krugman frequently cite it to argue that a country can sustain massive debt levels for decades without disaster. Blyth disagrees with typical Keynesian monetary interpretations, arguing instead that Japan's long-running stagnation is deeply structural. While Richard Koo's *The Holy Grail of Macroeconomics* correctly identifies the surface problem as a "balance sheet recession"—where over-leveraged firms quietly pay down debt with central bank monetization rather than expanding—Blyth points to Sven Steinmo's *The Evolution of the Modern State* for the definitive root cause: “I think what goes on in Japan is actually deeply structural.”
```mermaid
flowchart TD
accTitle: Structural Causes of Japanese Stagnation
accDescr: Flowchart tracing Japan's economic stagnation from the 1985 Plaza Accord through real estate bubbles, corporate restructuring, and demographic hoarding of government bonds.
subgraph ExternalShock["External Shock & Outsourcing"]
PA["1985 Plaza Accord: Yen Appreciates"]
Outsource["Firms Move Production to SE Asia<br>(Vietnam, Malaysia)"]
PA --> Outsource
end
subgraph DomesticReaction["Broken Contract & Asset Bubble"]
Broken["Cradle-to-Grave Welfare Broken"]
Bubble["Mass Speculation in Real Estate"]
Pop["Real Estate Bubble Bursts (Early 1990s)"]
Outsource --> Broken
Broken --> Bubble
Bubble --> Pop
end
subgraph DemographicStagnation["Demographics & Debt Traps"]
Hoard["Aging Population Hoards Stimulus Cash"]
Bonds["Postal & Bank Accounts Buy JGBs"]
Transfer["Intergenerational Bond Transfers"]
Pop --> Hoard
Hoard --> Bonds
Bonds --> Transfer
end
```
Blyth traces this structural unraveling back to the 1985 Plaza Accord, when the United States forced West Germany and Japan to appreciate their currencies against the dollar because American exports were being crushed (accompanied by widespread American xenophobia and hysteria over Japan taking over the world, satirized by Blyth referencing Michael Crichton's *Rising Sun*). Because Japan's economy was completely export-dependent—"Germany on steroids"—Japanese manufacturers responded to the strong yen by relocating physical plants, equipment, and entire supplier networks to second-tier Asian tigers like Malaysia and Vietnam.
This move fundamentally broke Japan's domestic social contract, which had traditionally provided cradle-to-grave welfare inside the firm. Facing the sudden loss of employment security, Japanese workers sought alternative retirement assets and flooded money into domestic real estate, inflating a massive property bubble that eventually burst the banking sector. Sociologically, an aging cohort facing unemployment with a minimal state safety net refused to spend government stimulus checks. Instead, they hoarded the money under mattresses or deposited it into post offices and banks, which in turn used the deposits to purchase Japanese Government Bonds (JGBs). Because older demographics have an exceptionally low propensity to consume, 80-year-olds do not liquidate these bonds; they pass them intact to the next generation, transforming public debt into an intergenerational wealth transfer.
---
[56:48](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM&t=3408s) Why Ireland and the European Periphery Cannot Escape
An audience member asks how an individual European Union member state like Ireland can fix its own economy given the heavy structural constraints placed upon it. Blyth answers bluntly: “They can't.” Unlike Argentina in 2001, which merely maintained a currency board peg to the US dollar and could simply abandon the peg because the physical Argentine peso still existed, Ireland surrendered its national currency completely. Reintroducing a domestic Irish pound would require an impossible scenario: freezing time with a government time machine, vacuuming physical euro banknotes out of every citizen's wallet, stamping them as new national currency, and unfreezing time directly into an immediate currency and banking collapse.
Moreover, currency devaluation only helps economies that possess diversified, globally competitive industrial goods to export. While northern Italy has world-class competitive export industries (with regional fiscal transfers supporting the struggling south), peripheral economies like Greece and Portugal have virtually no major exports beyond basic commodities like olive oil, which faces zero-sum competition against larger producers like Spain and Italy. Devaluation in such countries would merely trigger import-driven hyperinflation without generating an export boom.
Turning to Ireland, Blyth argues that its official recovery and debt-to-GDP numbers are completely distorted: “The debt to GDP figures you see in Ireland are a big, fat lie.” Ireland books the corporate profits of multinational tech corporations routed through minimal Dublin offices—often tiny setups of 25 staff taking advantage of the 12.5% corporate tax rate—as domestic services exports on its national balance of payments. Underneath this artificial accounting, Ireland absorbed the immense private liabilities of its failed banking sector into the National Asset Management Agency (NAMA), an off-balance-sheet "super bad bank" holding toxic assets that will never recover their value. When these hidden obligations are factored in, Blyth remarks, Ireland's true economic situation is actually worse than Greece's.
- Abandoning a currency peg (like Argentina in 2001) differs fundamentally from leaving the Eurozone, which requires inventing and circulating a new paper currency from scratch.
- Greece, Portugal, and Ireland lack major manufactured export capacity, meaning currency devaluation would primarily inflate import costs.
- Ireland's balance of payments is artificially inflated by multinational corporate profit routing taxed at a 12.5% rate.
- Ireland shifted toxic bank assets into NAMA off the official balance sheet.
---
[59:54](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM&t=3594s) Iceland and the Genesis of the Shadow Banking Crisis
An audience member asks Blyth for his assessment of how Iceland handled its catastrophic banking collapse. Blyth opens his response with a sardonic summary: “Iceland is a brilliant example of no good deed goes unpunished.” He recalls his early involvement as a member of the Warwick Commission on International Financial Reform just as the financial crash erupted, noting how policymakers and analysts suddenly realized the crisis was centered in the shadow banking system—prompting Blyth at the time to begin investigating what a "shadow bank" actually was.
[01:00:16](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM&t=3616s) Moral Hazard, Bank Concentration, and the Icelandic Alternative
Mark Blyth reflects on how his perspective evolved while writing his book. Initially, he accepted the prevailing consensus that institutions were simply "too big to fail" because of systemic interconnectedness. By the time he finished his research, however, he realized that governments should have let insolvent banks collapse. While Blyth acknowledges the massive real-world costs of lost GDP and spiking unemployment that accompany bank failures, he emphasizes that the post-crisis reality is worse: even though banks have deleveraged, the global banking system is far more concentrated now than it was in 2007. Mega-institutions like Citigroup are even larger, while the European banking system represents that vulnerability on steroids. In effect, the state has provided these financial giants with a license to operate an extortion racket against the public taxpayer.
```mermaid
flowchart TD
accTitle: Systemic Moral Hazard Loop
accDescr: Diagram illustrating how mega-banks avoid criminal liability to prevent systemic collapse, creating institutional moral hazard.
subgraph Bank["Bank Operations & Misconduct"]
A["Financial Institution commits severe crimes<br>(e.g., money laundering, terror financing)"]
B["Regulators issue cash fines instead of criminal indictments"]
end
A --> B
A -.->|"Threat of criminal charges"| C
C --> D
D -.->|"Forces regulatory lenience"| B
```
Blyth cites UBS as a premier example of this systemic injustice. The bank was fined $1.2 billion for illicit activities involving money laundering for drug cartels and financing terrorism—crimes that would land ordinary citizens in prison. Yet institutions receive mere fines because of systemic legal exposure: if an American or US-licensed broker-dealer bank has a corporate officer charged with criminal liability, major institutional investors such as CalPERS are legally required to withdraw their capital immediately. If large pension funds pull their assets, the bank immediately collapses, endangering the entire financial structure. As Blyth summarizes: “So you're basically playing systemic moral hazard as a business model.”
Contrasting this with Iceland, Blyth points out that Iceland chose to let its over-leveraged banks fail. Because the vast majority of that debt was held by external foreign creditors, the primary loss fell on outside investors rather than domestic society. Crucially, this unleashed unexpected positive domestic externalities:
- Financial engineers and quantitative analysts who had spent years designing complex derivatives were suddenly forced to enter the real productive economy.
- These displaced experts launched new startups and technological ventures, transforming Iceland into a major hub for online gaming—capitalizing on cold ambient temperatures to run underground server farms and using domestic math and software engineering talent.
- Consequently, Iceland’s domestic economy rebounded, bringing unemployment down to just about one percentage point higher than Germany’s, compared to stagnant double-digit unemployment figures elsewhere in Europe.
- However, after managing the recovery and paying back debts responsibly, the reformist government was voted out of office, and the very political actors who originally inflated the banking bubble were re-elected, proving that “no good deed goes unpunished.”
---
[01:02:52](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM&t=3772s) The Australian Anomaly: Commodities, China, and the Housing Bubble
An audience member from Australia asks about their country's avoidance of the Great Recession, noting two competing domestic explanations: whether Australia was saved by aggressive Keynesian government stimulus checks or by the Western Australian mining boom feeding Chinese demand. Blyth dismisses the stimulus explanation immediately, affirming that the commodity-driven Chinese connection is the sole reason: “The second one is completely right.”
Blyth notes that because capital controls make direct trading of the Chinese currency difficult, market participants track shadow currency markets comparing the Chinese yuan to the Australian dollar, which move in lockstep. Unlike common American rhetoric about China "owning" the United States—where China simply holds roughly 17% of US Treasury bills in an advantageous trade where the US exchanges low-yielding paper for manufactured consumer goods—China functionally owns Australia’s real asset base. Chinese industrial demand has aggressively consumed commodities out of Western Australia at the height of a historic super-cycle.
This commodity windfall has distorted the domestic Australian economy, particularly the housing market:
- Real estate prices have soared to extreme levels, pushing standard homes in Perth to roughly 2 million Australian dollars.
- In Sydney, the price-to-income multiple has climbed to 13 to 1, meaning an average three-bedroom apartment requires thirteen times household income, demanding family inheritance and multiple incomes just to enter the market.
- This dynamic has inflated a massive real estate bubble sustained almost entirely by Chinese liquidity.
- Blyth cautions that if China's growth engine slows or the commodity cycle drops, Australia faces severe structural fallout, emphasizing: “All bubbles pop. It is just a question of time.”
---
[01:04:53](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM&t=3893s) Brazil’s Developmental Welfare State and the Politics of Growth
Asked about the BRIC economies and the path Brazil should follow, Blyth argues that Brazil’s contemporary model is exceptional: “Brazil needs to do what Brazil's been doing, which is awesome.” He outlines the historical context of Brazilian political economy, which was long plagued by one of the highest Gini coefficients in the world and severe structural inequality. Because domestic stability was chronically threatened by the alternating risks of military coups or communist uprisings, domestic elites routinely avoided investing within the country. Instead, they placed their fortunes in secure overseas institutions like Citibank at modest returns, while spending exorbitant sums at home on private kidnap insurance and heavily fortified compounds.
```mermaid
flowchart LR
accTitle: Brazil's Developmental Growth Loop
accDescr: Flowchart detailing the Brazilian economic strategy using state development loans to fund domestic multinationals and social welfare programs.
subgraph StateFinance["State Capital Allocation"]
A["BNDES<br>(Development Bank)"]
B["National Champions<br>(e.g., Embraer)"]
end
subgraph Redistribution["Redistribution & Demand"]
C["Corporate Tax Receipts<br>from Global Operations"]
D["Bolsa Família Program"]
E["Expanded Domestic Middle Class"]
end
A -->|"Low-cost financing"| B
B -->|"Global expansion profits"| C
C -->|"State social funding"| D
D -->|"Income compression & purchasing power"| E
E -.->|"Domestic economic growth"| A
```
This dynamic shifted when Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and the Workers' Party came to power. Recognizing that democracy effectively serves as "asset insurance for the rich," the government constructed a developmental welfare architecture:
- The Brazilian National Development Bank (BNDES)—whose lending portfolio is twice the size of the World Bank—subsidized domestic corporations like Embraer and major industrial conglomerates to make them globally competitive multinationals.
- The state leveraged taxes on those expanded corporate overseas profits to finance *Bolsa Família*, building a comprehensive social safety net where none had previously existed.
- This simultaneous compression of the income distribution and elevation of baseline incomes created a domestic consumer middle class while marginalizing traditional landed elites.
- To handle the resulting influx of international speculative capital chasing high domestic interest rates, which drove up the Brazilian real and hurt domestic exporters, Brazil implemented targeted inward capital controls—requiring upfront transaction taxes and security deposits to weed out short-term speculative carry-trade money while welcoming long-term direct investment.
Despite headwinds from an appreciating currency and broader macroeconomic slowdowns, Blyth concludes that Brazil's developmental strategy over the preceding decade was an extraordinary success. Boris Debic concludes the event by thanking Blyth, drawing final applause from the Google audience.
## Notable quotes
> [36:58](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM&t=2218s) Redistribution of debt is reinsurance for democracy, and austerity is anorexia for the economy. — Mark Blyth
> [44:48](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM&t=2688s) Cutting in a slump produces a bigger slump. — Mark Blyth
> [36:58](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM&t=2218s) Democracy is asset insurance for the rich. — Mark Blyth
> [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQuHSQXxsjM&t=0s) I wrote this book for the following reason—I got really, really pissed off with people with lots of money telling people who don't have any money they need to pay shit back. — Mark Blyth
## Mentioned
Mark Blyth, Boris Debic, Alan Greenspan, George W. Bush, Bill Clinton, Bear Stearns, Angela Merkel, Nicolas Sarkozy, Jürgen Stark, Ben Bernanke, Mario Draghi, John Locke, David Hume, Adam Smith, Lehman Brothers, ING, BNP Paribas, Crédit Agricole, Société Générale, Deutsche Bank, Citibank, Bundesbank, Federal Reserve, European Central Bank, Authors@Google, Watson Institute, Brown University, Great Transformations: Economic Ideas and Institutional Change in the Twentieth Century, Austerity: The History of a Dangerous Idea, The Wealth of Nations, Second Treatise of Government, David Ricardo, John Stuart Mill, Joseph Schumpeter, Winston Churchill, David Lloyd George, Hubert Henderson, Joan Robinson, John Maynard Keynes, Takahashi Korekiyo, Heinrich Brüning, Friedrich List, Otto von Bismarck, Walter Eucken, Luigi Einaudi, Alberto Alesina, Mitt Romney, Paul Krugman, Richard Koo, Sven Steinmo, European Commission, European Parliament, Ecofin, International Monetary Fund, Bocconi School of Public Finance, Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, The Evolution of the Modern State, The Holy Grail of Macroeconomics, Michael Crichton, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, Plaza Accord, Rising Sun, National Asset Management Agency (NAMA), Warwick Commission on International Financial Reform, Citigroup, UBS, CalPERS, BNDES, Embraer, Bolsa Família, World Bank
## Video description
Governments today in both Europe and the United States have succeeded in casting government spending as reckless wastefulness that has made the economy worse. In contrast, they have advanced a policy of draconian budget cuts--austerity--to solve the financial crisis. We are told that we have all lived beyond our means and now need to tighten our belts. This view conveniently forgets where all that debt came from. Not from an orgy of government spending, but as the direct result of bailing out, recapitalizing, and adding liquidity to the broken banking system. Through these actions private debt was rechristened as government debt while those responsible for generating it walked away scot free, placing the blame on the state, and the burden on the taxpayer.
That burden now takes the form of a global turn to austerity, the policy of reducing domestic wages and prices to restore competitiveness and balance the budget. The problem, according to political economist Mark Blyth, is that austerity is a very dangerous idea. First of all, it doesn't work. As the past four years and countless historical examples from the last 100 years show, while it makes sense for any one state to try and cut its way to growth, it simply cannot work when all states try it simultaneously: all we do is shrink the economy. In the worst case, austerity policies worsened the Great Depression and created the conditions for seizures of power by the forces responsible for the Second World War: the Nazis and the Japanese military establishment. As Blyth amply demonstrates, the arguments for austerity are tenuous and the evidence thin. Rather than expanding growth and opportunity, the repeated revival of this dead economic idea has almost always led to low growth along with increases in wealth and income inequality. Austerity demolishes the conventional wisdom, marshaling an army of facts to demand that we recognize austerity for what it is, and what it costs us.
About the Author: Mark Blyth is a faculty fellow at the Watson Institute, professor of international political economy in Brown's Political Science Department, and director of the University's undergraduate programs in development studies and international relations.
He is the author of Great Transformations: Economic Ideas and Institutional Change in the Twentieth Century; editor of The Routledge Handbook of International Political Economy: IPE as a Global Conversation, which surveys different schools of IPE around the globe; and co-editor of a volume on constructivist theory and political economy titled Constructing the International Economy. He is working on a new book that questions the political and economic sustainability of liberal democracies, called The End of the Liberal World?
Blyth is a member of the Warwick Commission on International Financial Reform. He is a member of the editorial board of the Review of International Political Economy, and his articles have appeared in journals such as the American Political Science Review, Perspectives on Politics, Comparative Politics, and World Politics.
He has a PhD in political science from Columbia University and taught at Johns Hopkins University from 1997 to 2009.
This talk was hosted by Boris Debic on behalf of Authors@Google.
布莱斯警告:欧元区紧缩政策保护银行并导致经济萎缩
在相互关联的经济体中大幅削减公共预算会导致国民产出萎缩,并推高债务与GDP的比率,以此吸收有毒的私人银行债务。
Mark Blyth剖析了紧缩政策的思想基础与政策实践,认为2008年后的财政危机是由私人银行过度放贷和救助造成的,而非过度的公共福利支出。他指出,合成谬误使得相互关联的经济体削减开支的做法适得其反,不可避免地导致GDP萎缩并推高债务与GDP之比。Blyth追溯了从洛克(Locke)、休谟(Hume)到博科尼学派(Bocconi School)300年来自由主义经济学对公共债务的怀疑史,阐释了紧缩政策在历史上如何加剧大萧条和法西斯主义抬头等灾难。最后,通过详尽的国际案例研究,他评估了金融抑制、财富税以及冰岛处理银行破产模式等替代路径。
Mark Blyth认为,2008年后的公共债务危机并非源于过度的福利开支,而是在杠杆率超过40倍的机构倒闭后,私人银行业债务被社会化所导致的。 (2:51)
同时推行开支削减会引发宏观经济上的合成谬误,即总需求萎缩会降低国家GDP并推高债务与GDP之比,而非使其趋于稳定。 (22:10)
20世纪30年代德国和日本的历史先例表明,极端的通缩性紧缩政策直接加剧了政治激进化,并导致自由民主体制的崩溃。 (34:44)
基于德国秩序自由主义的欧元区结构性框架在数学上是不可行的,因为若没有国内需求驱动的对应赤字,所有成员国不可能同时实现出口顺差。 (41:10)
Reading summary
Political economist Mark Blyth argues that austerity is a dangerous, ideologically driven economic fallacy that misdiagnoses a systemic private banking crash as a crisis of sovereign overspending, resulting in self-defeating budget cuts that shrink national economies.
The Banking Carry Trade and the Sovereign Debt Myth (13:22)
Blyth rejects the conventional narrative that bloated welfare states or reckless southern European borrowers caused the post-2008 debt crisis. Instead, he traces the crisis to an enormous carry trade executed by core European financial institutions. Prior to the crash, major banks in Germany, France, and Britain cleared safe sovereign bonds from their books to chase yield on peripheral debt (such as Greek, Spanish, and Portuguese paper), juicing returns through extreme leverage reaching up to 40-to-1. By 2011, French banks held peripheral exposures equivalent to more than 33% of France's gross domestic product, while the standalone balance sheet of the Dutch bank ING swelled to 211% of Dutch GDP.
When these leveraged real estate and sovereign bets soured, the ensuing bailouts socialized private financial liabilities onto public balance sheets. In Blyth's view, political leaders orchestrated a historic bait-and-switch: private banking sector losses were transferred to the state, and the resulting sovereign debt spikes were dishonestly blamed on public sector profligacy, leaving ordinary citizens to pay the bill through gutted public services.
The Eurozone Straitjacket and the Fallacy of Composition (22:10)
Austerity fails due to the fallacy of composition: what might seem prudent for an individual household is catastrophic when applied to an entire economy, because one actor's spending is another actor's income. Cutting government spending in a synchronized downturn reduces national output faster than it amortizes debt. Blyth demonstrates this mathematically: if public expenditures are halved during a slump, the denominator (GDP) shrinks while nominal debt stays flat, causing the debt-to-GDP ratio to escalate rather than fall. This was demonstrated when simultaneous global cuts in the 1930s caused debt ratios to soar and created fertile ground for political extremism.
This structural trap is uniquely severe within the Eurozone, which institutionalized German ordoliberalism across diverse economies. Because Germany's persistent export surpluses mathematically require counterpart trade deficits in other member states, demanding that peripheral nations simultaneously slash wages and emulate Germany's export model is an arithmetic impossibility. Lacking national printing presses, currency devaluation tools, or a central bank authorized to mutualize debt, peripheral countries were locked into destructive internal devaluations until European Central Bank President Mario Draghi halted panic by pledging to do 'whatever it takes.'
The Intellectual Failure of Expansionary Austerity (44:48)
Blyth links modern austerity doctrines to early liberal thinkers like John Locke, David Hume, and Adam Smith, who viewed state borrowing with deep suspicion and feared the crowding out of private capital. This skepticism culminated in Alberto Alesina's theory of 'expansionary austerity,' which claimed that aggressive government cuts stimulate growth by restoring market confidence. Proponents argued that rational citizens, anticipating future tax reductions resulting from current spending cuts, immediately increase their consumption. Blyth ridicules this logic through the scenario of an insecure worker rushing out to purchase an Ikea couch to cure a national recession.
This intellectual consensus crumbled under empirical scrutiny. The International Monetary Fund subsequently acknowledged that fiscal multipliers in the European periphery sat between 1.5 and 1.7, meaning that every dollar cut from public budgets destroyed up to $1.70 of economic output. The academic foundation suffered another blow during 'Excelgate,' when spreadsheet errors were uncovered in Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff's study that had purported to prove economic growth stalls once debt-to-GDP crosses a 90% threshold.
Alternative Resolutions: Financial Repression and Wealth Taxation (48:20)
Rather than inflicting economic contraction, Blyth points to historical precedents for resolving sovereign overhangs. Following World War II, the United States utilized financial repression, using regulatory mandates to require domestic banks to hold sovereign bonds while central banks maintained low nominal yields alongside moderate inflation. This engineered negative real interest rate liquidated debt equivalent to 40% of US GDP within a decade, without halting economic expansion.
Blyth also advocates directly taxing concentrated private wealth and cracking down on offshore tax havens, which house an estimated $27 trillion in untaxed assets across five primary jurisdictions. Finally, Blyth warns that preserving mega-institutions under 'too big to fail' doctrines creates severe moral hazard. Megabanks have grown larger and more concentrated since 2007, leaving governments vulnerable to systemic extortion unless financial concentration is dismantled.
Blyth concludes that democratic welfare institutions serve as essential insurance for wealth and property, and that starving them through austerity undermines political stability. However, the analysis leaves unresolved how peripheral Eurozone nations can regain competitiveness without sovereign currencies, and whether global regulators can practically implement financial repression and tax harmonisation across competing jurisdictions.
Source quotes
[36:58] Mark Blyth: Redistribution of debt is reinsurance for democracy, and austerity is anorexia for the economy.
[44:48] Mark Blyth: Cutting in a slump produces a bigger slump.
[36:58] Mark Blyth: Democracy is asset insurance for the rich.
[0:00] Mark Blyth: I wrote this book for the following reason—I got really, really pissed off with people with lots of money telling people who don't have any money they need to pay shit back.
Original transcript
[0:00] BORIS DEBIC: Welcome
everybody.
[0:02] I am extremely pleased to
welcome today Mark Blyth.
[0:07] Mark Blyth will share with us
his insights into austerity as
[0:13] it takes shape in the
European Union.
[0:17] Let me read a little bit
from his biography.
[0:20] Mark Blyth is a faculty fellow
at the Watson Institute,
[0:24] professor international
political economy in Brown's
[0:27] political science department,
and director of the
[0:29] university's Undergraduate
Programs in Development
[0:33] Studies and International
Relations.
[0:36] He's also the author of "Great
Transformations--
[0:39] Economic Ideas and Institutional
Change in the
[0:42] 20th Century."
[0:43] He's the editor of the
"Routledge Handbook of
[0:46] International Political
Economy," co-editor of a
[0:50] volume on constructivist theory
on political economy
[0:53] titled "Constructing the
International Economy," and
[0:57] he's working also on a new
book that questions the
[1:00] political and economic
sustainability of liberal
[1:03] democracies, called "The
End of the Liberal
[1:06] World." That's dramatic.
[1:10] Blyth is a member of the
Warwick Commission on
[1:12] International Financial
Reform.
[1:14] He is a member of the editorial
board of the "Review
[1:17] of International Political
Economy." And his articles
[1:21] have appeared in journals such
as "The American Political
[1:25] Science Review," "Perspectives
in Politics," "Comparative
[1:29] Politics," and "World Politics."
He has a Ph.D. in
[1:32] political science from Columbia
University, and
[1:35] taught at Johns Hopkins
University from 1997 to 2009.
[1:41] Please give a hand
to Mark Blyth.
[1:43] MARK BLYTH: Thank you.
[1:45] Cheers.
[1:50] Is this mic on?
[1:51] Yes?
[1:51] Can you hear me?
[1:52] Hello?
[1:52] Right.
[1:54] So I have a Scottish accent.
[1:55] There's surprise number one.
[1:58] And those slides started to
change themselves, which is
[2:00] surprise number two.
[2:02] OK, how am I going
to start this?
[2:06] Why did I write this book?
[2:07] I wrote this book for the
following reason--
[2:09] I got really, really pissed off
with people with lots of
[2:11] money telling people who don't
have any money they need to
[2:14] pay shit back.
[2:16] That's basically it.
[2:17] I grew up on the butt end of
the British welfare state.
[2:20] I'm an orphan, and I was
raised by my paternal
[2:22] grandmother.
[2:23] So I am the greatest living
example of inter-generational
[2:26] social mobility you're ever
going to see, because I'm a
[2:29] freaking Ivy League professor.
[2:30] So I went from there to there.
[2:32] How did I do that?
[2:33] Because of this thing that gets
blamed called the welfare
[2:36] state, that bloated,
paternalist, out of control,
[2:39] incentivizing, demotivating
piece of crap called the
[2:43] welfare state.
[2:44] Now, why is this a completely
bullshit story?
[2:47] Well, that's not, but why does
it turn into a bullshit story?
[2:49] It turns into a bullshit story
for the following reason--
[2:51] back in 2000, the number one
concern of financial markets
[2:54] globally was there wasn't going
to be enough federal
[2:56] debt, because we had balanced
the budget.
[2:59] Seriously, the number one
concern was there wouldn't be
[3:01] enough T-bills.
[3:02] So fast-forward 13 years, ah,
we're all freaking out.
[3:06] Now, in between, a couple
interesting things happened.
[3:09] So you have a balanced budget,
which basically means over
[3:11] time, as the economy
grows, your debt
[3:13] stock is going to shrink.
[3:14] And that's why people had
a problem with it.
[3:16] So you're going through a
period of rapid growth.
[3:17] This was the tech boom period,
all this sort of stuff.
[3:20] And then there's 9/11.
[3:22] So there's a little dip in the
economy and a guy called
[3:24] Greenspan comes along and says,
let's cut interest rates
[3:26] and essentially do asset
protection for everybody who
[3:29] has bought assets by giving them
more or less free money.
[3:31] So then we decide on top
of that we're going to
[3:33] have two tax cuts.
[3:34] Why?
[3:34] Because we just need
more money.
[3:36] Screw it.
[3:36] We're just going to do it.
[3:37] Let's have some tax cuts.
[3:38] No corresponding way of paying
it off, or whatever, we'll
[3:41] just take the tax cuts.
[3:42] And then we'll decide to fight
two wars of choice for dubious
[3:45] political reasons without
raising any taxes.
[3:47] That'll be a good one.
[3:48] So by the time you get
to 2006, there's
[3:50] 61% debt to GDP already.
[3:53] I don't remember anybody in
Congress, particularly
[3:55] Republicans, jumping up and down
about the crazy level of
[3:57] federal debt in 2006.
[4:00] And then in 2007 and
2008, there's a
[4:03] run on the repo markets.
[4:04] Basically, the hidden story of
the financial crisis that
[4:06] nobody really talks about-- it's
actually quite simple--
[4:08] is that because there was a
shortage of T-bills, because,
[4:11] in fact, many of them were in
China, because they keep
[4:13] buying a lot of them, we started
to use AAA mortgage
[4:16] products as collateral for short
term financial deals in
[4:19] the repo markets.
[4:20] As the housing crisis happened,
those bonds that
[4:23] made up those instruments
fell from AAA to B to C.
[4:27] At that time, that meant that
if you were a heavily
[4:29] leveraged financial
organization-- a Bear Sterns,
[4:31] for example--
[4:32] and you were using these things
as pledges and as repo
[4:35] collateral, as they fell in
value, you had to use more and
[4:38] more of them to borrow the
same amount of money.
[4:40] Unfortunately, you couldn't do
that, because there's a fixed
[4:42] stock of the assets.
[4:43] And they're hugely levered.
[4:44] This meant a 3% return against
their asset base, rendered
[4:47] them effectively insolvent.
[4:48] Once everybody figured this
out, you shout fire in a
[4:51] crowded theater, everybody
freaks out,
[4:53] heads for the exits.
[4:54] You get a liquidity crunch.
[4:55] You've got a financial crisis.
[4:56] We decided to bail out the
system rather than let it
[5:00] fail, because it was
too big to fail.
[5:02] The costs of doing so were
basically a 30% drop in tax
[5:06] revenue across the OECD
countries, because the
[5:08] financial sector had become so
big, particularly in the
[5:10] United States and the United
Kingdom, that it was
[5:12] generating huge amounts
of taxes.
[5:14] At the same time, the economy
slows down as the liquidity
[5:16] crunch hits the real economy
and affects lending and
[5:18] borrowing and spending.
[5:20] Consumer expenditures trend
down, as do consumer
[5:22] expectations, as do investment
expectations.
[5:24] You get caught in a slump.
[5:26] Once you get caught in a slump,
automatic transfers in
[5:28] the economy mean that benefits
go up at the same time as tax
[5:31] revenues go down.
[5:32] So you're going to have
a bigger deficit.
[5:34] As you have a bigger deficit,
you multiply that over time,
[5:36] you issue more debt, you go from
61% to 100% debt to GDP.
[5:40] That's why we're here.
[5:42] There was no orgy of
public spending.
[5:45] It's a lie.
[5:46] I take Amtrak every day.
[5:48] I would've noticed an orgy
of public spending.
[5:50] If there was an orgy on public
spending, it was on asset
[5:53] protection and income protection
for the people who
[5:56] had made out with the most for
the past 30 years when we
[5:59] bailed out those assets.
[6:00] That's actually what happened.
[6:02] Now, here's the inequity of the
[INAUDIBLE] in this whole
[6:04] thing-- why is it that social
security, which isn't even
[6:07] part of federal budget
calculations on the deficit,
[6:09] which, by the way, has a $2.3
trillion surplus, that has to
[6:13] be cut so we can pay back the
debt accrued by bailing out
[6:16] some of the richest people
in our society and
[6:19] ensuring their assets?
[6:20] Does anybody else think that's
total horse shit?
[6:22] Because I really do, and that's
why I wrote this book.
[6:25] Now, here's the weird thing.
[6:27] We're actually not in
that much of a mess.
[6:29] It's been a sticky recovery.
[6:30] It's been a technological shock
to a lot of service jobs
[6:33] that we didn't expect,
et cetera.
[6:34] But nonetheless, we haven't
been cutting them.
[6:36] Because of that, the federal
deficit's projected to be
[6:38] around 3% next year--
[6:40] even with a margin of error
in the projection, say 4%.
[6:43] Britain has its own currency,
like us, and has been cutting,
[6:47] been doing austerity.
[6:48] Having done that, it's now
looking at 7%, totally
[6:51] [INAUDIBLE]
[6:52] growth, and a possible
triple-dip recession.
[6:54] Europe has been cutting like
there's no tomorrow.
[6:57] They've got the leaches on
the corpse and they're
[6:59] opening up the veins.
[7:00] Greece has lost 30% of
GDP in four years.
[7:03] The German army didn't manage
that between '41 and '45.
[7:08] That's how much damage has
been done by this.
[7:11] So the question is
the following--
[7:12] why is it that Europe,
particularly the European
[7:15] Union, the part that we think of
as the most kind of, if you
[7:18] will, welfare-statish-friendly
transer, et cetera, suddenly
[7:22] became this huge doomsday
device for this enormous
[7:24] experiment on austerity, which
so far has cost around 30% of
[7:28] GDP in the periphery and has
generated 25 million extra
[7:32] unemployed in comparison
to the United States?
[7:35] Seems like something
to investigate.
[7:38] So, there's a standard picture
of Europe in terms of its
[7:40] fiscal balances.
[7:41] As you can see, the United
States around here, 2012.
[7:44] By the way, always look at the
net figure, because if you
[7:46] look at the gross figure,
that assumes
[7:48] that nobody pays taxes.
[7:50] And given that we all just wrote
checks just a little
[7:52] while ago, that would tell you
that you really shouldn't look
[7:54] at that one.
[7:55] It also it seems the country
has no assets.
[7:57] And if that's the case, why do
we have the National Security
[7:59] Investment Act to stop
people buying assets?
[8:03] So obviously, look
at the net one.
[8:04] So you look at the net
one, where are you?
[8:06] Well, basically, everybody's
kind of in the
[8:07] mire, more or less.
[8:10] So what brought about
this fine mess?
[8:12] Age check in the room.
[8:13] Anybody who's giggling now
is over the age of 40.
[8:17] On the left, we have Laurel and
Hardy, and on the right,
[8:20] we have Angela Merkel
and Sarkozy.
[8:22] There we go.
[8:23] I put that in purely for comedic
values, just to make
[8:26] sure everyone is paying
attention.
[8:28] And actually, they did bring
about this fine mess, so that
[8:29] is a serious point.
[8:31] So what's the story here?
[8:32] Well, there's an
official story.
[8:33] It's what I call story one,
and this is the sort of
[8:35] vaguely sophisticated version
that you get if you read
[8:38] things like "The Economist,"
"The Financial Times," et
[8:40] cetera, et cetera.
[8:41] And I'm going to tell you why
it's total crap, because it's
[8:43] not really true at all.
[8:44] So there's story one
and story two.
[8:46] So here's the official
story, story one.
[8:47] You do this by looking
at this.
[8:49] This is interest rate
convergence over
[8:50] 10 year bond spreads.
[8:52] So if you go back in the day
before there was this thing
[8:54] called the Euro, when everybody
had their own
[8:56] currency, if you were buying a
bit of Greece on 10 years,
[8:59] there's a 25% risk premium
you're getting paid for
[9:03] holding that.
[9:03] That means that basically
there's a one in four chance
[9:06] they're going to default.
[9:08] Why would you price that in?
[9:09] Well, because they haven't run
a budget surplus in 50 years.
[9:13] Because they've been taking
turns to steal the state and
[9:15] using other people's rents and
revenues to do it since they
[9:18] basically ended the Civil War,
so why would you not price
[9:22] this at 25%?
[9:23] Then have a look at the French,
the Italians, the rest
[9:26] of the Mediterranean, it's
strained around 15%.
[9:28] This whole [INAUDIBLE]
in here, over 10%.
[9:30] That's a lot.
[9:31] You're getting paid a lot for
just holding a 10 year debt.
[9:34] Now, that reflects the real
price of the bond, the real
[9:37] risk of default that's
in the bond.
[9:39] Now, the official story
goes like this--
[9:41] around 1991 there was this
wonderful treaty called the
[9:43] Maastricht Treaty.
[9:44] Well, that's '86.
[9:45] '91 is the Monetary Treaty.
[9:47] And we decided that we're going
to build this monetary
[9:49] union in Europe.
[9:50] And what did that mean?
[9:51] It meant basically that you're
going to have this German bank
[9:54] called the Bundesbank
generalized
[9:56] across the whole area.
[9:57] All the people that currently
have inflation and exchange
[10:00] rate risk and default risk no
longer will have it because
[10:03] we're going to take away
their printing presses.
[10:05] And once we've locked up all
the printing presses in the
[10:07] one time deal and given them
to a guy in Frankfurt, and
[10:10] he's the only one who can
print the money, well,
[10:12] basically doesn't that mean that
Greece becomes Germany?
[10:15] Doesn't that mean that Italy
becomes Germany?
[10:16] Because after all, they
can't inflate
[10:18] their way out of trouble.
[10:19] So you get rid of that risk.
[10:20] You can't devalue your way,
which is a backdoor way of
[10:23] solving the same problem.
[10:24] All you can either do is
deflate-- austerity--
[10:27] which is politically
unpalatable, or you basically
[10:30] sort your economy out and
everybody kind of becomes
[10:32] German, and that's
the great plan.
[10:34] And you can see how this
is represented
[10:35] in this risk premium.
[10:36] There's where the
Euro comes in.
[10:38] And then there's a 7 and 1/2
year period where basically
[10:41] all of these countries-- think
about how diverse this is--
[10:43] everyone from Belgium to Italy
to Greece to Spain to Portugal
[10:47] have basically got exactly
the same default risks.
[10:50] Now, that's kind of odd if you
think about it for more than
[10:52] two minutes.
[10:53] So what's behind this?
[10:55] Well, the story goes
like this.
[10:57] Basically, what's undermining
this-- if you go back to the
[11:00] end here and you see where the
spreads go up right, why does
[11:02] it all start to go wrong?
[11:04] Well, if you have a look here,
your current account and
[11:05] balances, exports and imports.
[11:07] And you'll find that what
you've got here is most
[11:09] countries in the Euro, the major
countries, are basically
[11:12] running deficits all
the way through.
[11:14] And the only one that starts
to run a surplus here is
[11:17] Germany, which picks up just
as the Euro comes in and
[11:20] becomes the export powerhouse.
[11:22] Now, when you control for the
size of the German economy
[11:24] relative to everybody else, what
you begin to realize is
[11:27] that their surplus is
the counterpart
[11:29] everybody else's deficit.
[11:30] In other words, somebody has
to buy all those BMWs.
[11:34] And if you're buying all those
BMWs, you're not making your
[11:36] own [INAUDIBLE]
[11:37] and selling them back
to the Germans.
[11:39] So you start to get these
current account imbalances.
[11:41] But that begs the question--
[11:42] where did all these guys in the
south get the money to buy
[11:44] the BMWs in the first place?
[11:46] Well, that's your story about
lax public finances.
[11:49] This is these countries that
are spending too much.
[11:51] So look, it's the PIGS--
[11:52] Ireland, Spain, Greece,
Portugal.
[11:54] The Netherlands we'll put
in a bracket, right?
[11:56] But basically, look--
a huge amount.
[11:57] That's 10% year on year annual
growth of government
[12:00] expenditure.
[12:00] They are spending like drunken
sailors, there's no doubt
[12:03] about this.
[12:05] Now, what made this possible?
[12:06] As I said before, this is the
ECB, being Deutschbank Uber
[12:09] Alles, taking inflation
and devaluation
[12:11] risk off the table.
[12:13] And also, the Maastricht
criteria for Euro gives
[12:16] credible rules against sovereign
misbehavior.
[12:19] You can have a 60% debt
load, 3% deficit,
[12:22] and variable inflation.
[12:23] And as I said, the yields
converge, and the countries
[12:26] over-borrow.
[12:27] As we saw in those last three
slides, they're basically
[12:29] spending too much money.
[12:31] But then what does that do
to your competitiveness?
[12:34] Well, it's going to obviously
hit your competitiveness.
[12:36] If you're spending that much
money and you've got a huge
[12:38] trade imbalance, you've got to
be basically awarding yourself
[12:41] way above productivity
wage increases.
[12:43] And look at what you've got.
[12:44] Ireland, Spain, Italy, Greece,
Cyprus, Malta, Portugal.
[12:48] The PIGS again.
[12:49] And look at these massive labor
cost changes over the
[12:51] last 7 year period.
[12:53] You're awarding yourself
pay increase you
[12:54] can not hope to cash.
[12:56] So this is all a very convincing
story, right?
[12:59] And what made this possible?
[13:00] Well, of course, what made it
possible is cheap debt.
[13:02] Because as those yields
[13:04] converge, look what's happening.
[13:05] Portugal is borrowing.
[13:07] Spain is borrowing.
[13:08] Greece is borrowing.
[13:08] Ireland is borrowing.
[13:09] Look who's actually
in surplus.
[13:11] The Germans and the
Netherlands.
[13:13] So their savings are financing
their consumption.
[13:16] So these countries have
massively over-borrowed.
[13:19] With the take-home being the
southern countries have
[13:21] borrowed too much.
[13:22] Now, have a look at this
network diagram.
[13:24] It's kind of interesting,
because there's a question
[13:25] mark there for a reason.
[13:27] There's Portugal.
[13:28] Relative sizely economy
123 billion euros.
[13:31] Spain, 345.
[13:33] Italy, very big-- nearly
half a trillion.
[13:35] But pretty much all of their
bonds are domestically held.
[13:38] 60% are long-term domestic.
[13:40] The ones that are 10-year
rollover escalate by 10%.
[13:43] Look at this.
[13:44] Look who's popped up here, with
a trillion dollars of
[13:47] crap assets lying on their
balance sheet.
[13:49] It's the Brits, the world's
largest financial entrepot.
[13:52] And look who's up here.
[13:54] It's those prudential Germans,
who save a lot and tell
[13:57] everyone to upgrade
their scales.
[13:59] They've got half a trillion
of debt going on.
[14:01] So what do you mean the southern
countries have
[14:03] borrowed too much?
[14:05] There's a rather large problem
with this story.
[14:07] You can't have over borrowing
with over lending.
[14:11] This is actually a Citibank
advertisement.
[14:15] Some of you who are over the age
of 16 may remember this.
[14:18] The largest ever advertising
campaign for a finance company
[14:22] in the world was Citi's
campaign, "live richly," from
[14:26] 2003 to 2006.
[14:28] It didn't invite you
to save up money.
[14:30] It didn't invite you
to be prudential.
[14:32] It said live richly.
[14:34] It didn't even say be rich.
[14:37] You kind of have to have rich
before you spend it unless
[14:40] you've just got a giant
line of credit.
[14:43] So let's run that story again.
[14:46] Here's the greatest moral hazard
trade in human history.
[14:48] Remember the whole story I told
you about the ECB and
[14:50] credibility and all
the rest of it?
[14:52] Here's why it's complete
horse shit.
[14:53] Because what actually
happened was this--
[14:55] I'm a large European bank.
[14:57] I know that I've got a sovereign
behind me that, if I
[15:00] become really big, I'll become
too big to fail.
[15:04] Which basically gives me a
license for doing whatever the
[15:07] hell I want because then
it will all be bailed.
[15:09] It gives me a funding cost
advantage, and it means that
[15:12] basically I can lever up well
beyond human reason with
[15:15] pretty much no consequences.
[15:17] And the more powerful I become,
the bigger threat I am
[15:19] to that sovereign.
[15:21] And eventually, if the sh-- hits
the fan, well, you know,
[15:23] I'll get bailed out.
[15:23] It's totally fine.
[15:24] So imagine I know there's this
thing called the Euro coming
[15:27] in, and you're all other
European banks, and you know
[15:31] that you could earn a nice
little bit of coupon buying
[15:34] this Greek bond at 25%.
[15:36] There aren't that many
of them-- it's a
[15:37] thinly traded market.
[15:38] But if you can get it,
if you lose, fine.
[15:40] But the upside's great--
[15:41] 25%.
[15:42] Now, what happens if everybody
really believes this Euro
[15:45] story and everybody starts
to converge down?
[15:47] Well, I'm going to make
less and less money on
[15:49] those bonds over time.
[15:50] So a quick bit of math
up in your head.
[15:53] How would you make even more
money on a declining spread?
[15:56] You've go to use volume, you've
got to use leverage.
[15:59] So what you do is you basically
get the balance
[16:01] sheet of your bank and you cram
it with as much periphery
[16:04] debt as you possibly can.
[16:05] You take all your nice, safe
German, Dutch bonds and you
[16:08] throw them out.
[16:09] And you pile on as much Greek
debt and as much Portuguese
[16:11] debt and as much French
debt as you can.
[16:14] And you turbo charge that,
running operating leverage of
[16:16] around 40 to 1, which means your
equity cushion is less
[16:19] than 3% percent of your
asset footprint.
[16:22] You make Lehman Brothers look
like a prudentially run
[16:25] organization.
[16:27] And you do this because you've
got a guarantee.
[16:29] The guarantee is the state.
[16:30] The state will come
and rescue you.
[16:31] You get in trouble,
you're fine.
[16:33] Except there's a slight
flaw in the plan.
[16:34] What happens when the
Euro comes in?
[16:37] You have to give up your
printing press.
[16:38] So that means your state can't
bail you out anymore.
[16:41] Well, that's even better.
[16:42] Because then I become
a systemic risk.
[16:44] I'm not just a risk to France,
I become a risk to the entire
[16:48] European banking system.
[16:49] Score!
[16:50] I've got the ECB
over a bottle.
[16:52] I can do whatever I want because
they're going to have
[16:54] to bail me.
[16:55] Except it's run by Jurgen Stark
and a bunch of Germans.
[16:59] And they're not going
to bail you.
[17:01] So when the shit hits the fan,
you've got a really, really
[17:03] big problem.
[17:04] Which is where we are now.
[17:07] Core banks get stuffed with
periphery debts gone bad, a
[17:09] result of over landing.
[17:11] Foreign banks consolidated
claims on Greece, Ireland,
[17:13] Italy, Portugal, and Spain in
2011, last time they published
[17:16] any reliable figures.
[17:18] French banks have over 33% of
GDP equivalent on their
[17:22] balance sheets in periphery
assets that aren't coming back
[17:25] anytime soon.
[17:26] Add in the Spanish real estate
loans they've got on there--
[17:29] run.
[17:30] And you have a SocGen account.
[17:34] Netherlands, one bank,
ING, 211% of GDP
[17:38] is its asset footprint.
[17:39] Leverage ratio is
over 40 to 1.
[17:41] That alone is 30%
of Dutch GDP.
[17:43] They don't have a printing
press anymore.
[17:46] Are you beginning to
see the problem?
[17:48] The result is assets held by
banks in Germany, France, and
[17:52] the UK are about double the
annual GDP of the entire EU.
[17:58] Here's the too big
to fail USA.
[18:00] Top six bank assets,
61% of GDP.
[18:03] Any one of them fails, even
allowing for systemic
[18:05] interconnections, you're going
to take out 10% of US GDP.
[18:08] That's about $1.4 trillion,
$1.5 trillion.
[18:12] That's a lot, but when you've
got your own currency, you've
[18:14] got the global reserve asset,
we can deal with that.
[18:16] We can bail it.
[18:17] We've done it.
[18:18] That's what we did.
[18:18] It cost of a $3 trillion
all told, that's it.
[18:20] We're now in recovery mode.
[18:24] At least the Brits have
their own currency.
[18:26] There's British GDP.
[18:29] That's the size of
their banks.
[18:32] You should be very,
very afraid now.
[18:36] Now let's have a look
at this one.
[18:38] Here's France.
[18:40] BNP Paribas, Agricole,
Generale.
[18:42] These three banks alone are
taking you up to 250% of GDP,
[18:47] and they don't have a printing
press, and they're seriously
[18:50] impaired with bad assets.
[18:52] And now here's the kicker.
[18:53] You know that ECB?
[18:55] It's a fake central bank.
[18:56] It's really a currency board.
[18:57] Because what it does is it says,
we're not doing bond
[19:00] buying, we're not mutualizing
debt, you have to look after
[19:04] the problem yourself.
[19:05] So when you have a
financial crisis,
[19:06] you've got four exists.
[19:07] You can either inflate--
[19:09] whoops, you don't have
a printing press.
[19:11] You can devalue--
[19:12] whoops, don't have your
own currency.
[19:14] Or you can do austerity.
[19:15] You can squeeze and hope you
stabilize public finances, add
[19:20] liquidity, keep the can kicking
down the road-- this
[19:23] is LTROs, all the loans that
have been given to the banks.
[19:25] But at the end of the day,
you cannot do a Bernanke.
[19:28] So what's a Bernanke?
[19:29] A Bernanke is when you go into
the banking system and you
[19:32] grab the shitty assets on their
books and you put them
[19:35] on the Federal Reserve's
balance sheet.
[19:37] And you call them things like
Maiden Lane 2, and the
[19:40] Termloan Auction Facility 3,
and a bunch of completely
[19:44] opaque nonsense that nobody will
ever understand unless
[19:47] they spend time looking
into this.
[19:49] Congress, who basically don't
understand anything, are
[19:51] completely oblivious to
what's going on--
[19:53] you then flush the entire
system out with as much
[19:56] liquidity as you can, and you
allow them to recapitalize as
[19:59] they de-lever.
[20:00] Which is why the operational
leverage of the American banks
[20:02] is now about 50 to 1 rather than
30 to 1 at the height of
[20:05] the crisis.
[20:06] They've rebuilt, they've
recapitalized, they've cleaned
[20:08] their balance sheet.
[20:09] As the economy recovers,
you know all those
[20:11] assets that you bought?
[20:12] Guess what?
[20:13] Those houses in Glendale one day
will have value again, and
[20:16] you sell them back
to the banks.
[20:18] It's not a money pump.
[20:19] It's an asset swap
with liquidity.
[20:22] The ECB can't do that.
[20:24] It is constitutionally and
intellectually incapable of
[20:27] making that move.
[20:28] Consequently, what the markets
were pricing is as yields were
[20:31] spiking was the possibility
of a breakup of the Euro.
[20:34] Because if any one of those
banks goes down, it doesn't
[20:37] stop at Spain.
[20:39] It doesn't stop at France.
[20:40] It goes all the way back
to the German banks.
[20:44] If that goes bad, it's game
over for the core European
[20:46] banks, which is why we really
have austerity policies.
[20:50] It's about stopping a bank run
around the bond market.
[20:53] This is why you've got to keep
the Greeks in at all costs.
[20:55] Because if you're a bank, and
you've got 2% of your assets
[20:58] in Greek debt--
[20:59] say you're exposed to
Greece heavily.
[21:01] How are you going to
get rid of that?
[21:02] Well, you can't.
[21:02] You can sell it on the hedge
funds basically at 20% on the
[21:05] face value.
[21:06] Or you can hope it
doesn't go bad.
[21:08] But imagine you wake up one day,
and you think, this is
[21:10] going to go bad.
[21:10] You want to sell it, so
you sell it first.
[21:12] The minute all those contracts
hit the floor, what
[21:14] happens to the price?
[21:15] Everybody else dumps theirs
and they go to the floor.
[21:17] You've now made a 2% loss
to your portfolio.
[21:19] How do you balance it back?
[21:20] You sell the next asset class
before it goes down.
[21:23] Hi, Portugal, how are
you this morning?
[21:25] So you dump Portugal.
[21:26] And as those prices go to
zero, what do you do?
[21:28] You look around and you go,
shit, what have I got left?
[21:30] Let's dump the Irish, then.
[21:31] So you throw the Irish on the
floor, prices go to zero.
[21:34] You've now knocked 11% of
Euro-zone GDP and probably
[21:37] about 12% of your portfolio.
[21:39] You do that on the lending
portfolio of a highly levered
[21:41] bank, what's going to happen to
its share price once people
[21:44] figure out?
[21:47] So you're going to have a huge
panic that's caused by a
[21:49] sovereign bank run, right the
way through a currency union,
[21:52] something that is supposed to
be theoretically impossible.
[21:55] That's what this has
always been about.
[21:57] That's why you keep
the Greeks in.
[21:58] That's why you're willing
to destroy 30% of GDP.
[22:01] Because this is about saving
Societe Generale, and it is
[22:04] about saving Deutsch Bank from
their own over borrowing and
[22:07] over lending mistakes.
[22:10] Consequences.
[22:11] You can't solve a banking
problem with budget cuts.
[22:13] You can cut Greek's public
spending to Neolithic levels.
[22:16] It's not going to make a damn
bit of difference to SocGen's
[22:19] balance sheet.
[22:20] You can't run a gold standard
in a democracy.
[22:22] We tried this in the 1920s.
[22:23] It really didn't work too well--
ended up with a few
[22:26] political parties that
were kind of nasty.
[22:28] You can't solve a solvency
problem with a liquidity
[22:30] instrument.
[22:31] But God bless Mario,
he's been trying.
[22:34] You just add enough liquidity
and hope the problem goes away
[22:36] by saying, I'll do whatever
it takes.
[22:38] That's what he said six months
ago, the yields came down.
[22:40] Since then, he's actually done
nothing, and yet the yields
[22:43] have gone down, proving one
thing-- it's about the
[22:46] credibility of bank policy.
[22:47] It's not about cutting
the budget.
[22:49] The markets aren't craving an
extra 30,000 civil servants
[22:53] being thrown out of
work in Greece.
[22:55] They're worried about the
Euro breaking up.
[22:57] So once you give a credible
guarantee, you do a
[23:00] Bernanke-lite, all of the market
pressures are relieved.
[23:03] That was what was lacking
the whole time.
[23:06] And the most important one is
you can't all cut at once and
[23:11] expect to grow.
[23:12] Why not?
[23:13] Because in order to save,
you need to have income
[23:15] from which to save.
[23:16] So if everybody simultaneously
cutting,
[23:18] nobody's generating income.
[23:20] So imagine the economy with an
80% debt to GDP ratio, and
[23:23] turn it into a simple fraction
of four over five.
[23:26] Now imagine that 40% of
the five is government
[23:28] expenditure.
[23:29] You want to cut in half.
[23:29] You're really going to credibly
[23:30] commit to cut the budget.
[23:32] So you just turn that
into four over four.
[23:34] On a constant stock a debt, your
debt to GDP ratio just
[23:37] went from 0.8 to 1.
[23:39] Every single country that's
undergone an austerity program
[23:42] now has more debt than
when they started.
[23:44] Any country the hasn't cut,
including the United States,
[23:47] now has proportionately less.
[23:49] The evidence is in.
[23:51] And the tragedy is it was
all avoidable, and
[23:53] we knew this already.
[23:55] So why did anybody, especially
in Europe, ever think this was
[23:58] a good idea?
[23:59] For that, you have to kind of
have to go back in time.
[24:01] And it's still about
two rival stories.
[24:03] This time it's not ECB
credibility versus the moral
[24:06] hazard trade.
[24:07] It's something far
more spooky.
[24:09] The first one I like call
liberalism's emetic economics,
[24:13] emetic being a wonderful word
meaning to throw up.
[24:16] And what's this all
about throwing up.
[24:18] You go back to John Locke's
"Treatise on Government." The
[24:21] fifth chapter is really
fascinating.
[24:22] John Locke is this guy who's
basically the intellectual
[24:24] propagandist of a bunch of guys
who want to kill the king
[24:26] and take all the property
for themselves.
[24:28] They're called the merchant
classes, and these are the
[24:30] guys that then set up markets
and land, labor, capital,
[24:33] private property, throw
people off the land,
[24:35] all the rest of it.
[24:36] You ever heard the
word vagabond?
[24:37] It means a man without
bondage.
[24:39] Why bondage?
[24:40] Because basically, you've been
thrown off your land, so you
[24:42] basically had your status
removed from you.
[24:44] So basically, the English
Revolution sets up the markets
[24:47] in private probably,
et cetera.
[24:48] And then there's a problem,
because the minute you do
[24:50] this, you recognize that
untrammeled markets lead to
[24:52] massive income and wealth
inequalities.
[24:54] Which is great if you happen
to be the guy at the top of
[24:56] the pile, and not so great
if you're at the bottom.
[24:58] So unfortunately, then
you need a sate.
[24:59] Why do you need a state?
[25:00] To make markets, in
the first place.
[25:02] The notion that they pop out of
the ground fully formed is
[25:05] a nice fiction, but
simply not true.
[25:07] In order to turn serfs into
workers, you actually need
[25:10] acts of parliament
and legislation.
[25:12] The state makes these
things happen.
[25:14] But here's the kicker.
[25:15] You need to state to police
the inequalities that the
[25:17] market makes possible.
[25:18] Because if you don't--
[25:20] poor Adam Smith on this one--
"for every rich man"-- this is
[25:23] out of "The Wealth
of Nations"--
[25:24] "for every rich man, there must
be 500 poor, and that
[25:27] rich man must sleep always with
the strong arm of the
[25:30] civil magistrate at his side,
for he is always regarded with
[25:33] jealousy and envy."
[25:36] So you need that state to
police the inequality.
[25:38] But here's the Lockean kicker.
[25:39] This is why we have the
Second Amendment.
[25:41] Any state strong enough to
police those inequalities is
[25:43] strong enough to come
and take your money.
[25:46] So you've got a dilemma
running into this.
[25:47] You need this state, you can't
live without it, but at the
[25:50] same time, you can't live with
it, because you're afraid of
[25:52] the damn thing.
[25:53] So how are you going
to do this?
[25:54] And how are you going
to pay for it?
[25:55] Because most people don't
want to pay any taxes.
[25:57] Well, that's where this guy
comes in, David Hume.
[26:00] He has a wonderful essay on
money and on interest.
[26:03] He talks about merchants being
the most useful race of men,
[26:06] because when you give it to
them, even though money's
[26:08] neutral in the long run, if
you give it to him and his
[26:10] friends, it goes to the right
places really fast.
[26:13] So basically, you think of money
in a Keynesian way from
[26:15] Hume, which is short-term
stimulus is long-run neutral,
[26:18] but really because
you give it to my
[26:19] friends rather than losers.
[26:21] Now, what he comes up
with is the problem
[26:23] with government debt.
[26:24] Liberalism loves debt, because,
if you think about
[26:26] it, it's a free option
for the state.
[26:28] So you're the state, I'm the
merchant, I've got lots of
[26:30] inequality in my society--
[26:32] I'm worried about people
coming and
[26:33] burning my house down.
[26:34] So I say to you, you
need to protect me.
[26:36] And you say, you
need to pay me.
[26:37] And I say, I don't want
to pay taxes.
[26:38] You say, ah, I have this thing
called a debt instrument.
[26:40] It's fabulous.
[26:41] You go, how does that work?
[26:42] Well, it works like this.
[26:43] You give me a better paper,
and I'll give
[26:45] you a million pounds.
[26:46] Brilliant.
[26:47] OK, what happens now?
[26:48] In 10 years time, I'll give you
the million back, and I'll
[26:50] pay you interest.
[26:52] What are you going to say?
[26:53] So I'll lend you the money you
need to protect me, and then
[26:56] you'll give me it back and
you'll give me interest.
[26:59] Fabulous.
[26:59] It's a free option.
[27:00] Unlimited upside,
zero downside.
[27:02] Problem.
[27:04] Original argument against it.
[27:06] Crowding out.
[27:07] In order for this to work,
you're going to offer a rate
[27:09] of interest higher than the
market would produce.
[27:11] So everybody goes in
to government debt.
[27:13] Because of this, as Hume says,
all the gold and silver
[27:15] necessary for commerce gets
crowded out of the economy,
[27:18] finds its way into debt
securities, the whole nation
[27:20] ends up in hock, eventually you
have to sell yourself to
[27:23] foreigners, and you
end up with a
[27:24] bankruptcy of the nation.
[27:26] So easy money and
crowding out.
[27:27] The downside of debt means that
it's an attractive way of
[27:31] paying for the state you need
but you don't want, but at the
[27:33] same time, a terrifying one.
[27:34] Because at the end of the day,
it's going to result in the
[27:36] ruin of the nation.
[27:37] Adam Smith picks
up on this one.
[27:39] For him, it's all about why we
actually save and invest, why
[27:42] x equals i in economics
to this day.
[27:44] Savings equals investment.
[27:45] Why is this?
[27:46] Well, for him, it's because
we're all parsimonious Scots,
[27:48] we're all hardwired to save.
[27:50] There's a wonderful line where
he says, "where there is
[27:54] tolerable security, a man would
be perfectly crazy if he
[27:57] did not employ as investment
all his available capital."
[28:00] So basically, you take the
money, you invest, it
[28:02] automatically produces
economic growth.
[28:04] Well, he also recognizes this
whole thing about inequality
[28:07] in the state.
[28:07] My favorite line from
Adam Smith.
[28:10] "Civil government, insofar
as it is instituted, is
[28:12] instituted for the defense of
the rich against the poor, or
[28:16] for those who have property
against those who have none."
[28:18] That is not Karl Marx.
[28:20] That is Adam Smith, end of Book
Two of "The Wealth of
[28:23] Nations," quote, unquote.
[28:25] Now, he recognizes then that
you're going to have to pay
[28:27] for this, so he goes
to taxation.
[28:28] But the forward of "The Wealth
of Nations" starts off with
[28:30] progressive taxes.
[28:31] It's totally nuts.
[28:32] So here, look, see the people
who have got the most stuff?
[28:35] They have the most
skin in the game.
[28:37] They should pay the
most taxes.
[28:38] And then he goes, wait a
minute-- that would mean the
[28:40] rich would pay the most taxes.
[28:41] Well, we can't have that.
[28:42] So then he backs off immediately
and turns around
[28:44] and argues for exactly
what the Republicans
[28:46] are arguing to do--
[28:47] a national consumption tax on
everything except luxuries.
[28:52] So your yacht is fine,
but your corn flakes
[28:54] are going to be taxed.
[28:55] Problem with this.
[28:56] Well, it never raises
enough revenue.
[28:58] And he recognizes that.
[28:59] So he's like, shit, what
am I going to do?
[29:00] And he goes, I suppose
there has to be debt.
[29:02] But the problem with debt is
exactly as Hume's pointed out.
[29:05] Everybody's going to invest
in the debt markets, the
[29:07] underlying economy is
going to crumble.
[29:09] Because of that you'll end up
with more debt on a smaller
[29:11] economy, and eventually the
whole nation gets bankrupted.
[29:14] So what do you end up with?
[29:15] Debt perverting parsimony,
therefore savings doesn't lead
[29:19] to investment doesn't
lead to growth.
[29:21] All very convincing, and it's
all exactly the same story as
[29:23] we hear now.
[29:24] Now, when you hear the same
arguments repeated for 300
[29:26] years without modification
regardless of any facts in
[29:28] fact in them, you should
generally be suspicious.
[29:31] The result is you can't live
with it, can't live without
[29:35] it, don't want to pay for it.
[29:36] So I like to call this
liberalism's neuralgia and the
[29:38] aspirin of austerity.
[29:40] You reach for it regardless of
if it does you any good.
[29:42] But it's a 300-year-old trip.
[29:44] Now, how do we know that these
guys are wrong about this?
[29:46] Well, basically, at the time
they were writing, Hume
[29:49] predicted the collapse of the
British economy by, I
[29:52] think it was, 1780.
[29:54] And in fact, what happened was
they went from the relatively
[29:56] low debt levels that they had,
but they were accumulating,
[29:58] all the way to the highest debt
that they ever had, which
[30:01] was 240% of GDP at the end
of the Napoleonic Wars.
[30:04] So never mind 80%,
100%, whatever.
[30:07] Back in the day, they
had 240% debt to GDP
[30:09] at the end of 1815.
[30:11] What happened to the British
economy after 1815 until 1914?
[30:16] It ran the hold goddamn world
and expanded faster than
[30:20] anyone ever thought
humanly possible.
[30:22] Reinhart and Rogoff
95%, my ass.
[30:27] Now, this creates two liberal
stories that go through the
[30:31] 19th century.
[30:31] Story one, David Ricardo.
[30:33] You can't live with it, and you
don't want to pay for it,
[30:35] and you pretend you
don't need it.
[30:37] Second one.
[30:37] This is John Stuart Mill,
handsome fellow.
[30:39] I know.
[30:41] Accepting the need for it,
and also accepting the
[30:44] need to pay for it.
[30:45] Because if you don't pay for
it, then you get into a
[30:47] problem, because if you
basically leave the state out
[30:49] of the equation, you cannot rely
on markets to do anything
[30:52] except the inequalities that
will undermine markets in the
[30:55] long-run themselves.
[30:57] So you get these two very
different versions of
[30:59] liberalism come out of this.
[31:00] This one goes to the
Austrian economist.
[31:03] This one goes to
the Keynesians.
[31:04] That's basically the way it
splits down the middle.
[31:07] Now, along came the
Great Depression.
[31:10] I love this picture.
[31:11] It's absolutely emblematic.
[31:12] It's one of my favorite slides
of the Great Depression--
[31:15] the bread line at the same time
as the, no way like the
[31:17] American way.
[31:18] So reality, theory,
facts, whatever.
[31:21] Now, here's the first one.
[31:23] I like to call this the emetic
response, American
[31:25] liquidationism.
[31:26] This is Joseph Schumpeter.
[31:27] And by the way, he actually
looked like that.
[31:29] This is not an exaggeration.
[31:31] He really did.
[31:32] And he, in the 1920s, had come
over from Austria and
[31:35] basically taken up residence
running Harvard's economics
[31:37] department.
[31:38] And the basic story was there's
the long run capital
[31:41] structure of the economy, you
can't really see it, you don't
[31:43] know what's going on, you
should never intervene.
[31:46] What happens is that banks,
there are booms and bust
[31:48] business cycles.
[31:49] Banks have a problem,
particularly when the bank is
[31:51] backed by the government.
[31:52] They produce too much credit,
entrepreneurs get confused
[31:55] about price signals, they
invest in things they
[31:57] shouldn't, you end up producing
things you're never
[31:59] going to need, the credit pump
dries up, and eventually you
[32:01] have this purging that
needs to happen.
[32:03] So you binge on credit
and then you purge.
[32:06] This is version one
of austerity.
[32:08] Because of this misallocation of
capital because of credit,
[32:11] you end up with too much in the
wrong type of investment
[32:13] in the capital structure.
[32:14] So you basically have the boom,
and then you have to
[32:16] have the slump, and you have to
go barf and you have to get
[32:18] it all out and let the clock
reset, and off you go.
[32:21] Now, the British had a version
of this, which, you know, of
[32:23] course, the British are a bit
more polite than this, so they
[32:25] wouldn't be emetic.
[32:26] So they have the treasury
view, which is a
[32:28] more austere response.
[32:29] And it's very similar, but
again, it's these arguments
[32:32] from the 1700s brought back.
[32:33] So the basic idea is that free
trade is welfare-enhancing.
[32:36] Well, the Brits would say that,
because they were 50% of
[32:39] the global economy at that point
in time, and most of
[32:41] their free trade was
done with empire.
[32:43] But putting that to one side,
I'm sure the Indians thought
[32:46] it was free trade when
they showed up,
[32:47] and so did the Chinese.
[32:48] But anyway, 1910 to 1920s, this
is Churchill when he was
[32:52] Chancellor of the Exchequer,
the finance minister.
[32:54] He comes out with this
memorandum written by a guy
[32:56] called Henderson that basically
responds to a guy
[32:58] called Lloyd George's thing
about, can we do something
[33:01] about unemployment?
[33:02] The problem had been this--
[33:03] Britain's the largest economy
in the world, World War I
[33:05] spanked 60% of its
national wealth.
[33:07] They're on the gold standard.
[33:09] Basically, exchange rate clever
mechanism for the
[33:11] global economy.
[33:12] They have a choice.
[33:13] If they go back on the gold
standard with a high exchange
[33:15] rate, it protects all the
people who hold sterling
[33:17] paper, because you're not
devaluing their assets.
[33:20] If you go back on a low one,
it benefits the domestic
[33:23] economy because you'll get an
export boost and your domestic
[33:25] economy will go up.
[33:26] But all the people holding
sterling paper will freak out
[33:28] because you've devalued
their assets.
[33:29] So they'll dump them.
[33:30] So you've got a run on the
pound and a run on the
[33:32] exchanges, so you're
screwed either way.
[33:34] So what did they do?
[33:35] They went back on a high
exchange rate.
[33:36] The result?
[33:37] An instant extra million
unemployed that
[33:38] lasted for a decade.
[33:40] So that was one of the lynch
pins in the global economy
[33:42] that caused the Great
Depression.
[33:44] So lots of people are
saying, can't we do
[33:45] anything about this?
[33:46] Can't we do something
about unemployment?
[33:48] And along came the memorandum
that says, no-- and there's an
[33:50] argument called Ricardian
Equivalence--
[33:51] and spending now is going to be
zero sum against taxes in
[33:54] the future.
[33:55] So if you know that, the minute
you do it, it nullifies
[33:58] its own effects, so
don't even try it.
[34:00] Second thing, and this is
particularly true on
[34:01] investment, if government
presumes to do the job of the
[34:05] private sector, the private
sector will let it do it, but
[34:07] then it will do it at a cost.
[34:08] Because it's still not
investing, so it's zero sum
[34:10] against itself.
[34:11] And the last one you may
remember from the Obama
[34:14] stimulus was the lack of
shovel-ready projects.
[34:17] Remember that language?
[34:18] It's written in there-- it was
called the lack of suitable
[34:20] public works.
[34:21] Now, here's the second story
that comes out of the John
[34:24] Stuart Mill tradition.
[34:25] Basically, it's not
about Keynes right
[34:27] in the general theory.
[34:28] There's a wonderful line by an
[34:29] economist called June Robinson.
[34:30] She says that, "in 1936, Keynes
was writing down what
[34:33] might cause unemployment while
Herr Hitler was curing it."
[34:38] There's a certain element
of teaching
[34:39] birds how to fly here.
[34:41] And the two critical cases
here were the Germans--
[34:43] as it says here.
[34:44] There's a story that basically
it was all sort of like
[34:46] Catholics in the south that
voted for Germany.
[34:47] No it's not.
[34:48] They were industrial workers.
[34:49] They were miners.
[34:50] And then here's a guy called
Takahashi Korekiyo, who is the
[34:53] guy who was the guru for the
Japanese Central Bank's
[34:55] Abenomics policy at the
moment of massive
[34:58] monetary and fiscal stimulus.
[34:59] So this is a guy from '34.
[35:01] So what actually happens here
is very similar to what's
[35:03] going on in the Euro-zone.
[35:04] You have simultaneous
contractions of the five
[35:06] largest economies
in the world.
[35:08] Everybody cuts at once.
[35:09] GDP shrinks, constant stock
of debt goes up.
[35:12] The British debt to GDP ratio
in 1930 was 170%.
[35:16] By 1933, despite repeated rounds
of cuts, it was 190%.
[35:21] It continued to go up.
[35:22] In Germany, what happened was,
after short-term capital
[35:25] United States, post the '23
inflation, had made Germany
[35:29] the most stable and fastest
growing economy in Europe at
[35:31] that point in time.
[35:32] There was a swap in the
agreement governing war debts.
[35:35] The main war debts
got seniority.
[35:37] The American capital pulled out
to take advantage of the
[35:40] stock market boom in 1928,
'29 and a federal
[35:44] interest rate increase.
[35:46] If you get 7% per sticking it
in a bank, so why would you
[35:48] put it in Germany?
[35:49] A lot of capital goes
flying out.
[35:50] To balance the budget, a guy
called Bruning comes in as the
[35:53] chancellor, and he starts
hacking away at the budget.
[35:56] So he issues somewhere in the
region of about 200 emergency
[35:58] austerity decrees.
[36:00] At that point in time, there's
a minor party that everyone
[36:02] had written off.
[36:03] They got 8% of the vote in
1928, or thereabouts.
[36:06] By 1930, it was up
to I think 18%.
[36:08] By 1933, it had 43.3%
of the vote.
[36:12] It was the only party arguing
against austerity.
[36:14] I don't think I need to tell
you what they were called.
[36:18] Japan was even worse.
[36:20] The brunt of civilian
expenditures, the brunt of
[36:23] public expenditure cuts
in Japan were
[36:26] borne by the military.
[36:28] They were the biggest
item in the budget.
[36:30] By 1930, the Japanese military
started to assassinate their
[36:33] financial elite.
[36:35] It took out two finance
ministers, two prime
[36:37] ministers, several cabinet-level
appointees, and
[36:40] half a dozen senior bankers.
[36:43] You can rack up quite a body
count doing this if you piss
[36:45] off the military enough.
[36:47] So the lesson learned on this
was simultaneous contractions,
[36:50] when everybody else is doing
it, is zero sum against
[36:52] everybody else, and leads to
really nasty politics.
[36:55] So Keynes and events
overturn austerity.
[36:58] What does it show us?
[36:59] It shows there are fallacies
of composition and
[37:01] non-scalability in labor
and money markets.
[37:03] What's true about 2 people or
10 people is simply not true
[37:05] about 20 million or five
interlinked economies.
[37:08] There are systemic
non-linearities and difference
[37:10] that simple cannot
be done by type.
[37:12] Investment expectations are
not about parsimony.
[37:14] They're about fear.
[37:16] And if everybody's fearful for
the future and has myopic,
[37:19] short run expectations, and we
look to each other for signals
[37:22] about whether we should be
investing next month or not,
[37:24] you discount the time series
of the 36 good periods and
[37:27] heavily weight the three
in the front.
[37:29] That's why it's hard to get
out of a recession.
[37:31] The emetic response, you binge
and then you purge, assumes
[37:34] you're at the bottom.
[37:35] People start saving again.
[37:36] You've got [INAUDIBLE]
consumption, austerity, you
[37:38] start saving.
[37:39] And the assumption is that
saving is automatically
[37:41] investment.
[37:41] But there's a drop there,
because you have to invest in
[37:44] a recession.
[37:45] Why would you want to be the
guy who takes the chance to
[37:47] invest in a recession?
[37:48] Surely you'd rather be liquid,
so everybody tries to sit on a
[37:51] liquidity all at once.
[37:52] But you can't-- in order for
you to be liquid, somebody
[37:54] else has to be illiquid.
[37:56] So you end up with
a liquidity trap.
[37:57] And that's when you get
stuck for 14 years.
[37:59] That's why the Great Depression
lasted so long.
[38:02] So because of this, rather than
curtail consumption, the
[38:05] austerity response, consumption,
to repeat the
[38:07] obvious, is the sole end
of economic activity.
[38:10] "General Theory," page 71,
if I remember correctly.
[38:13] Lessons learned.
[38:14] It all goes back to
redistribution.
[38:16] Democracy is asset insurance
for the rich.
[38:19] Don't skimp on the payments.
[38:21] That's what was going in
the '20s, and that's
[38:22] what's going on today.
[38:24] Redistribution of debt is
reinsurance for democracy, and
[38:27] austerity is anorexia
for the economy.
[38:30] That was what was
learned by 1940.
[38:32] Oh, how we forget.
[38:35] And why do we forget?
[38:36] We forget because of Germany,
because Germany is a very
[38:39] peculiar economy.
[38:41] It is not a liberal economy.
[38:42] It is much closer to Japan than
it is to anything else in
[38:45] Europe or the United States.
[38:46] It is, in fact, the original
developmental state.
[38:48] What do I mean by that?
[38:50] In 1873, there was a huge
stock market bubble in
[38:53] Germany, and it blew up.
[38:55] It was called the
Founders Crisis.
[38:56] And liberal economic ideas of
the type we've been discussing
[38:59] were completely discredited.
[39:01] At this point in time, there
was a guy called Liszt who
[39:02] comes along and says, you know,
the funny thing about
[39:04] the Brits telling us all the
story about how to get rich,
[39:07] if they had actually done that
themselves-- you know what
[39:09] their comparative advantage
was in?
[39:11] Wool.
[39:12] They would still be making
blankets for
[39:14] the people in Flanders.
[39:15] How come they're running
the world?
[39:17] How come they have the biggest
navy in the world?
[39:19] How come they make steel
when they basically
[39:21] have no iron ore?
[39:23] What the hell is
that all about?
[39:24] So he rewrote how you think
about international trade.
[39:26] And at the same time that he
did this, he, and also the
[39:29] Bismarck who was running the
place did what was called the
[39:31] marriage or iron and rye,
bringing together the
[39:33] industrialists in the south,
the agrarians in the north.
[39:36] You use the surplus from
agriculture to basically buy
[39:39] flattened equipment.
[39:40] You bring it in, you reverse
engineer it, you do it faster,
[39:42] you do it faster, you build up
German industrial capitalism.
[39:46] Big firms, big banks,
forced saving, a big
[39:48] role for the state.
[39:49] And it's all driven
by exports.
[39:52] There's your difference.
[39:53] But when you're exporting and
your sources of demand lie
[39:55] outside your economy, you don't
have to worry about
[39:57] internal demand.
[39:58] The Keynesian story makes no
sense if you're Germany.
[40:01] Why would you want to stabilize
consumption if
[40:03] you're export dependent?
[40:05] Because all you're going to
do is raise your wages and
[40:06] prices, and your BMW is going
to go from 50,000 to 100,000
[40:10] real fast, and you're not
going to sell them.
[40:12] So if you don't rely on domestic
consumption and rely
[40:14] on external consumption, the
dynamics of your economy are
[40:16] completely different.
[40:17] What do you care about
price control?
[40:20] All this stuff about the
neuralgia of the 1920s and the
[40:22] inflation experience, this is
a post-war construction.
[40:24] It's really about
remaining price
[40:26] competitive in export markets.
[40:28] So you need a strong,
independent central bank.
[40:30] What else do you care about?
[40:31] Very important--
[40:32] competition.
[40:33] You want to have competition
over products, so that you
[40:36] have BMW and Audi competing with
each other so they can
[40:39] sell more to the Chinese both
because they're competing
[40:42] against product quality.
[40:43] You don't get involved in the
Apple, Samsung, buy up patents
[40:45] and sue each other
in court crap.
[40:47] You do real competition
to get real value out
[40:50] at the end of it.
[40:51] Given that the role of the
state, these Freiburg
[40:53] liberals-- this is Walter Euken,
one of the guys who,
[40:55] post-war, reinvigorates
all this stuff.
[40:57] Because after Nazism is
discredited, they
[40:59] needed a new thing.
[41:00] And basically it was about the
economic constitution, where
[41:03] competition rather than
consumption becomes important,
[41:06] and sound money and
central bank
[41:08] independence defines the economy.
[41:10] Why is this important?
[41:11] First of all, for 30 years, this
is the entire structure
[41:14] of the Euro.
[41:17] If you think about the way the
European Union is set up, it's
[41:19] Generalized Ordoliberalism,
to give that type of
[41:22] liberalism its name.
[41:23] The commission is the important
part, not the
[41:26] parliament.
[41:27] The parliament is a talking
shop that very little
[41:29] representative rights
or power.
[41:31] Sound money is far more
important than output.
[41:33] It's all about the European
Central Bank and its policy.
[41:36] It has one target--
[41:38] fighting inflation, even if
there's a deflation going on.
[41:41] Well, what does that reflect?
[41:43] The need for cost
competitiveness.
[41:44] What is it that the
commission does?
[41:46] The commission basically
sets rules.
[41:48] What are those rules about?
[41:49] Competitiveness.
[41:50] What's the largest component
of the administrative
[41:52] architecture of Brussels?
[41:53] The Competition Commission.
[41:55] Rules rather than discretion
at all times.
[41:58] You can't trust politicians to
run the economy-- they'll run
[42:01] inflationary cycles, that
will be bad for growth.
[42:04] Yes, if seen through a
German perspective.
[42:06] But here's what it misses, a
giant fallacy of composition.
[42:09] For you to sell your BMW,
somebody else needs to be
[42:11] buying them.
[42:12] For somebody to basically be
having an export surplus,
[42:15] somebody needs to have
an important deficit.
[42:17] In the aggregate, in theory,
it balances out.
[42:19] But if you go way back to that
picture I showed of the
[42:21] current account imbalances,
there's only one company
[42:24] running a surplus.
[42:24] And the sum of that surplus is
the sum of that deficit--
[42:27] they're almost exactly
equivalent.
[42:29] So what you have here is a
situation whereby when you
[42:31] generalize the economic
principles and institutions of
[42:34] one country across the whole of
the EU, which was fine, so
[42:37] long as the banks were spending
money all over the
[42:39] place so nobody noticed,
it's fine.
[42:42] But once that credit bubble
pops, suddenly you all have to
[42:45] be Germany.
[42:46] Tell me, how is Greece
and Portugal
[42:48] going to make an Audi?
[42:50] And even of they did, who are
they going to sell it to?
[42:53] Who's going to buy it?
[42:54] Imagine the Competition
Commission gets its way and
[42:56] everybody becomes more
competitive, and
[42:57] they all make exports.
[42:59] Who's going to buy
all this crap?
[43:01] The over-tapped American
consumer?
[43:03] We're already spending
too much already.
[43:05] So you end up with an economy
and an economic structure, an
[43:08] economic model for an entire
continent which literally
[43:11] cannot work.
[43:12] It makes no sense on a global
level, and yet that's the one
[43:15] that it's pursuing.
[43:17] Competitiveness rather
than complementarity.
[43:19] And also, you then have idiotic
things like debt
[43:21] breaks, Schuldenbremse.
[43:23] This says that nobody can
ever have more than
[43:24] a 5% debt on deficit.
[43:26] Really?
[43:27] Because that means everybody has
to run a budget surplus.
[43:29] How is that going to happen?
[43:30] That's actually not
arithmetically possible, but
[43:33] it doesn't stop them writing
rules about it, even if it's
[43:36] arithmetic nonsense.
[43:38] This then leads to Italy.
[43:40] I'm getting there.
[43:41] This guy was the first Prime
Minister of Italy and head of
[43:45] the Italian Central
Bank post-war.
[43:48] He set up the Bocconi School
of Public Finance in Milan.
[43:50] The Bocconi School was famous
for two things.
[43:52] Number one, public
choice theory.
[43:54] Essentially, states are
rent seekers and
[43:56] they can't be trusted.
[43:56] Hey, if I grew up in Italy, I
would probably think that
[43:59] about the state, as
well, but they
[44:00] generalized it to everybody.
[44:02] They're also very fond of the
notion of a European Union as
[44:04] a disciplinary device overriding
local democracy and
[44:07] reigning in state spending.
[44:09] The Bocconi School are important
because when
[44:11] Cambridge--
[44:12] qua Cambridge, UK-- blew up in
the '70s intellectually and
[44:15] Cambridge and America had their
lunch in what was called
[44:18] the Cambridge Capital
controversies, the only
[44:20] economics department in Europe
that was mathematically
[44:22] sophisticated enough to play
with the Americans was the
[44:24] Bocconi School.
[44:25] And they were hard-wired for
seeing the state as a bad
[44:28] thing at exactly the time that
liberal economics went in the
[44:30] same direction, when
it went neoliberal.
[44:32] Consequence of this--
[44:33] these guys become an aircraft
carrier for austerity thinking
[44:36] that goes from Milan to Harvard,
which leads us to
[44:39] today, the financial crisis.
[44:42] This is Greenspan's mea culpa.
[44:43] I think there's a flaw in my
ideology, and it's this big.
[44:48] And we get to this guy, who's
Alberto Alesina, who, just
[44:50] like Joseph Schumpeter, is
arguing for emetic economics.
[44:53] And he, too, is the head
of the Economics
[44:54] Department of Harvard.
[44:55] He's the guy who came up with
what's called the expansionary
[44:58] austerity hypothesis.
[44:59] It's about debt and time and
consistency, which is actually
[45:01] that Ricardian equivalence
stuff all again.
[45:03] And it basically says the
following-- this is the
[45:05] confidence theory thing.
[45:06] This is why you cut spending.
[45:08] So imagine the economy is
falling around your ears, you
[45:10] don't know if you're going to
have a job tomorrow, your
[45:12] partner is already unemployed,
you really don't know about
[45:14] the future, but you really
worry about the debt.
[45:17] You just lie awake all night
worrying about the
[45:19] debt, as people do.
[45:20] So the government credibly
signals that it is going to
[45:23] massively cut government
expenditure.
[45:25] And what you do, using your
rational expectations that are
[45:27] built into your head-- well, you
know the true structural
[45:29] form of the equation governing
the economy and the value of
[45:32] the coefficients therein.
[45:33] Big assumption, but put
that to one side.
[45:35] You calculate your lifetime
budget and your lifetime
[45:38] expenditure in relation to the
fact that 20 years from now,
[45:41] because of these state spending
cuts now, you'll pay
[45:44] less taxes then.
[45:46] Thereby, you can retro-dict how
much extra money you've
[45:48] got now, and everybody goes
to Ikea and buys a couch.
[45:52] And that cures the recession.
[45:54] I am not making this shit up.
[45:56] Take away all the math, that's
what all these papers say.
[45:59] And what we actually see at
the end of it, you got all
[46:01] these countries cases
that supposedly
[46:03] show this in the '80s--
[46:04] Ireland, Sweden, Denmark, et
cetera-- and in the book I go
[46:06] through them and show that they
do nothing of the kind.
[46:09] What actually happens is,
take Canada as the
[46:11] greatest example of this--
[46:12] the Loonie takes a 40%
devaluation from '76 to '86.
[46:16] You're export dependent.
[46:17] You're a commodity exporter.
[46:19] Your major trading partner who
takes 75% of your exports is
[46:21] the United States.
[46:22] The United States' economy
is nine times the
[46:24] size of your economy.
[46:25] You have a 40% devaluation as
the American economy takes off
[46:28] like a rocket between
'86 and '92.
[46:30] What do you think is
going to happen to
[46:32] Canada's budget surplus?
[46:33] It gets massive.
[46:34] They cut and then it
led to growth?
[46:36] No.
[46:37] They grew and then they cut.
[46:39] Because that's what
your meant to do.
[46:41] Austerity date is best done in
the boom, not the slump.
[46:44] That's what all these
states actually do.
[46:46] Cutting in a slump produces
a bigger slump.
[46:49] It's really that simple.
[46:51] So this is taken up by the
European Central Bank and was
[46:53] called the Ecofin Brief
and the G20 finance
[46:56] ministers in 2009.
[46:57] It's published in
all its glory in
[46:59] the TCB's 2010 report.
[47:01] All the arguments from David
Ricardo, et cetera, and John
[47:03] Stuart and Hume and Smith, I'm
not kidding, are in that book.
[47:07] I mean, literally, you could
quote them line for line.
[47:10] It's exactly the structure of
how they did all the bailouts,
[47:13] and how they did all the stuff
in terms of bailing out
[47:14] Greece, et cetera.
[47:16] And there result of this is what
I call the greatest bait
[47:17] and switch in history.
[47:18] Because what's actually happened
is all that private
[47:21] debt that was generated by the
banking system through
[47:23] over-lending is now on the
public balance sheet.
[47:25] And to go full circle, all the
way back, that means that
[47:27] people like me, who have grown
up on the welfare state just
[47:30] now, have to pay for the
mistakes of systemically
[47:32] irresponsible bankers.
[47:34] Because you can't tax them
themselves because they're too
[47:36] politically powerful.
[47:37] That's why this is fundamentally
a problem of
[47:39] politics, and not a problem
of economics.
[47:42] Is there a way out of this?
[47:43] People have started to defect.
[47:45] The IMF has started to go.
[47:46] The IMF has calculated now that,
what happens when you
[47:49] cut $1 of public spending
in the periphery?
[47:51] You lose $1.5 to $1.7 in
spending, which is why you get
[47:55] this wonderful negative
convexity, where it goes, ah,
[47:58] which is what's happening
to periphery economies.
[48:00] You end up with more
debt, not less.
[48:02] The rebel alliance--
[48:03] Romania, Estonia, Bulgaria,
Latvia, Lithuania--
[48:05] they tried to blow
up the debt star.
[48:08] They failed.
[48:08] It's been a disaster.
[48:10] Excelgate, that's Reinhart
and Rogoff's 90%.
[48:13] There really was nothing
there to start with.
[48:15] And we have 25% permanent
unemployment in Europe.
[48:17] That is not politically
sustainable.
[48:20] So where does it all end?
[48:21] First one, financial
repression.
[48:23] You take those banks that are
heavily levered and filled
[48:25] with government bonds and you
fill them with even more
[48:27] government bonds.
[48:28] Then what you do is lower the
payment on it that you get
[48:31] from it, and you lend
to maturity.
[48:33] And then what you do is you
run a positive inflation.
[48:35] Hence, why central banks
are now moving
[48:37] to inflation targets.
[48:38] What does that do?
[48:39] It creates a negative
real interest rate.
[48:40] That cures your debt far better
than any amount of
[48:44] cutting, which actually doesn't
work because it's zero
[48:46] sum against itself.
[48:47] When did we last do this?
[48:48] End of World War II.
[48:49] The liquidation tax accounted
for the equivalent of 40% of
[48:52] American GDP being paid back in
10 years, and the American
[48:56] economy boomed at
the same time.
[48:58] So there's something very,
very important.
[49:00] That's where this
one's heading.
[49:01] Who is this bad for?
[49:03] This is totally bad
for creditors and
[49:04] really good for debtors.
[49:06] I just took on the largest
mortgage in human history
[49:08] because I fully expect
this to happen.
[49:11] I'm bar-belled.
[49:12] If the economy recovers, my
asset goes up in value.
[49:14] If there's an inflationary
cycle, it eats
[49:16] away half my mortgage.
[49:17] Screw them--
[49:18] I've been paying for
their bailouts.
[49:20] Second one.
[49:21] Higher taxes.
[49:22] Carried interest exemption.
[49:23] Mitt Romney pays 15% tax.
[49:25] I pay 30%.
[49:26] You pay 30%.
[49:26] Do you think that's fair?
[49:28] I don't think that's fair.
[49:28] I think that's coming
to an end.
[49:30] And we're going to shut down
every goddamn tax haven on the
[49:32] planet, as well.
[49:33] Because you know how much
is hidden there?
[49:35] $27 trillion in untaxed
wealth--
[49:38] estimate--
[49:39] is sitting in five tax havens.
[49:41] How many divisions does the
Cayman Islands have?
[49:45] None.
[49:45] Let's go get it.
[49:46] It's so much easier than
slashing the fire brigade.
[49:49] And the last one, if you think
about this as payback for the
[49:51] bailouts who started it all,
is Hippocratic economics.
[49:55] First do no harm.
[49:57] The United States was
meant to die.
[50:00] We had spent too much.
[50:01] We were the profligate.
[50:02] We were all going to die.
[50:03] Remember all those articles
about, oh, it's coming, the
[50:05] great end, the great crash,
the whole lot?
[50:08] We've de-levered, we've cleaned
up the balance sheets
[50:09] of the financial sector, we're
lending again, we've got
[50:11] positive growth.
[50:12] In three years' time-- we
actually have stabilized the
[50:15] debt already.
[50:15] In three years, we'll be
effectively reducing it.
[50:18] The Brits are in for a
decade of recession.
[50:21] Ireland has a lost generation
because they bailed their
[50:23] banks and they did austerity.
[50:25] Periphery Europe is stuck with
25% permanent unemployment.
[50:28] This doesn't work.
[50:30] It is a human disaster.
[50:32] But most of all,
it's politics.
[50:34] Because it's always
about one thing.
[50:35] Somebody got all the benefits,
then they cost all the costs,
[50:39] now they want somebody to pay
for the costs while they keep
[50:40] all the benefits.
[50:42] That's what this is
really all about.
[50:44] Thank you.
[50:46] [APPLAUSE]
[50:52] MARK BLYTH: Went on a bit
longer than anticipated,
[50:55] despite talking faster
than JFK on speed.
[50:57] Sorry about that.
[50:59] AUDIENCE: Much as I'd like to
take out a huge mortgage and
[51:02] buy stuff, there's something
of a bubble
[51:04] going on around here.
[51:05] Any other suggestions for how
to take advantage of this?
[51:09] MARK BLYTH: Well, as
I switch onto my
[51:11] financial adviser mode.
[51:13] How do you make money in
a positive inflationary
[51:15] environment?
[51:17] It's not easy, but it's
not impossible.
[51:19] If you have a look at companies
that did really,
[51:21] really well in the 1980s, late
'70s, early '80s, they tended
[51:26] to be sort of conglomerate
trusts.
[51:29] So they owned a little
bit of everything.
[51:30] That's like the Abu Dhabi
Investment Corporation, whose
[51:33] unofficial slogan is, we own
half a percent of everything
[51:35] that isn't nailed down
on the entire planet.
[51:37] And the idea behind it is that
you don't know where the
[51:40] upside is coming from.
[51:41] So what you should be is
maximally diversify.
[51:43] It's like an index fund.
[51:44] So basically, anything at
all that is internally
[51:47] diversified, so buying cut
shares in companies that have
[51:50] that type of structure is
probably the best way of
[51:52] bar-belling yourself
against them.
[51:54] But ultimately, you know,
investing in debt markets is
[51:57] probably a bad idea right
at this point.
[51:59] But it's still sort of-- at the
end of the day, about this
[52:01] paranoia that inflations
lead to
[52:03] hyperinflations, it's total crap.
[52:05] When I went through the book and
did the research on this,
[52:08] I wanted to--
[52:08] I'm married to--
[52:09] background information--
[52:10] I'm married into a
bunch of Germans.
[52:12] Well, I'm only married to one,
but the whole family comes
[52:14] with them, right?
[52:17] And my [GERMAN], as I like to
call him, my father-in-law,
[52:22] [GERMAN], he's a
classic German.
[52:24] He's like 71 years old, he's
retired, and he still saves.
[52:29] What the?
[52:30] You'll die--
[52:31] what are you doing?
[52:32] Why?
[52:32] He's totally hardwired for
saving, and he's totally
[52:35] paranoid about inflation.
[52:36] So I went and read a lot about
the German hyperinflation.
[52:39] And it was deliberate government
policy to stuff the
[52:41] French over reparations.
[52:43] I mean, they did it quite
deliberately.
[52:45] And the weird about it was after
they did it, it ended in
[52:47] eight months.
[52:48] And the entire economy was
stabilized within 12.
[52:51] And then it grew
for five years.
[52:53] And then what actually happened
was austerity,
[52:55] through the economy of a cliff,
and that's when the
[52:57] Nazis came to power.
[52:58] So we have this story about the
least degree of inflation
[53:02] leads to some kind of infinity
curve hyper-convexity where,
[53:05] boom, off it goes.
[53:06] And it's simply not true.
[53:08] Post-war Europe ran positive
rates of inflation with
[53:11] positive real rates of growth
all the way through the
[53:13] postwar period until
about 1980.
[53:16] So the inflation
panic is there.
[53:20] AUDIENCE: So I've heard Krugman
and others bring up
[53:25] Japan as an example to support
these kind of arguments.
[53:28] Can you just talk a bit about
how they're able to run a high
[53:31] debt for so long and things
don't seem to--
[53:33] MARK BLYTH: Sure, sure.
[53:34] Absolutely.
[53:35] I actually think these guys
are wrong about Japan.
[53:37] I think what goes on in Japan is
actually deeply structural.
[53:39] There is a wonderful book by
guy called Sven Steinmo,
[53:42] called "The Evolution of the
Modern State." And he has a
[53:44] chapter on Japan.
[53:45] And if you ever wanted to read,
I think, the definitive
[53:46] story on Japan, this is it.
[53:48] He spent two years there on an
Abe fellowship and had access
[53:51] to all the people.
[53:52] Well, it was two books.
[53:52] It was Richard Koo's "Holy Grail
of Macroeconomics." So
[53:55] basically what happens is Japan
goes through a balance
[53:57] sheet recession.
[53:58] What's a balance sheet
recession?
[54:00] Basically, your companies are
de-levering but don't want to
[54:03] tell anyone because
if they do, there
[54:04] will be a run on them.
[54:05] And everybody's complicit
together because they've all
[54:08] over borrowed.
[54:08] So basically, you have this
kind of slow bleeding that
[54:12] goes on as it's sort of
monetized by the central bank,
[54:15] and it ends up in debt.
[54:16] So you're not growing.
[54:17] And that's sort of the obvious
part of the story.
[54:20] The less obvious part of the
story goes like this.
[54:22] Go back to 1986.
[54:24] There's a thing called
the Plaza Accord.
[54:25] The Plaza Accord was when the
United States turns around to
[54:27] its two major trading partners,
Japan and then West
[54:29] Germany, and said, our exchange
rate is too high.
[54:33] People are buying dollars, we're
doing well just now.
[54:37] And it's killing our exports.
[54:38] You guys are wiping us out.
[54:39] Remember the whole paranoia
about Japan that went on?
[54:41] They were going to take over
the world, all that.
[54:42] You ever see the film, "Rising
Sun," Michael Crichton?
[54:45] Possibly the most racist film
ever made in human history,
[54:48] but put that to one side.
[54:49] So Japan's going to take
everything over, blah, blah,
[54:51] blah, the rest of it.
[54:52] And then, of course, what
actually happens is they do
[54:55] the exchange rate thing, the
United States exchange rate
[54:56] goes down, the German one and
the Japanese one goes up.
[54:59] Now, the Japanese economy is
entirely export dependent.
[55:01] It's sort of like Germany
on steroids.
[55:03] So what they do is they move the
plant and equipment from
[55:05] the Japanese home islands out
to the second tier tigers.
[55:08] So you start to get investment
in Vietnam, Malaysia, all
[55:11] these places, and they move
the entire thing with the
[55:13] supplier networks,
the whole lot.
[55:15] Well, the way that the Japanese
welfare state was
[55:17] constructed, it was all
in-house to the firm.
[55:19] It was meant to be cradle
to grave, but the firm
[55:21] took care of you.
[55:22] Well, the firm has just broken
the social contract.
[55:24] So how did people protect
themselves?
[55:25] They wanted another asset they
could have that would have a
[55:28] positive upside, that would
retain its value, and they
[55:30] could sell it in their
retirement.
[55:31] What did they buy en masse?
[55:33] Real estate.
[55:34] So you get a giant real
estate bubble.
[55:36] The real estate bubble gets so
out of control that it popped
[55:38] and the banking system
can't support it.
[55:40] That collapses and that
starts the recession.
[55:43] But the important part is
the sociological story.
[55:46] You've got a cultural and
generational shift.
[55:48] Because you've got a very old
population who are now 45
[55:51] years old, facing unemployment,
with a very,
[55:53] very narrow safety net
for the first time.
[55:55] So what do they do when the
government gives them money to
[55:57] spend to stimulate
the economy?
[55:59] They stick it under
the mattress.
[56:01] It doesn't go anywhere.
[56:02] It gets hoarded.
[56:03] So the savings rate goes up.
[56:05] And where do they
put the savings?
[56:06] In the post office account
and in the bank account.
[56:08] And what do the bank and the
post office do with it?
[56:10] They buy government bonds.
[56:11] So that's why you end
up with this massive
[56:13] extension in debt.
[56:14] Now, the thing is, the Japanese
propensity to consume
[56:17] is really, really low,
particularly the higher up the
[56:19] demographic you get.
[56:20] So 80-year-olds are not just
buying bonds and then
[56:23] liquidating them in retirement,
they're actually
[56:25] keeping them whole and handing
them onto the next generation.
[56:28] So you've got an
inter-generational debt
[56:31] transfer going on.
[56:32] So the story that basically it's
just a monetary policy
[56:36] story in, you know, Japan,
I think that's wrong.
[56:39] I think there's actually a
deeply structural problem
[56:41] that's going on there, and it
goes all the way back to the
[56:43] Plaza Accord.
[56:44] So that's my short version of
Sven Steinmo's argument, but I
[56:47] find it quite convincing.
[56:48] AUDIENCE: How can an individual
state in the EU,
[56:51] like Ireland or something, try
to fix things for itself with
[56:54] all the constraints under it?
[56:55] MARK BLYTH: They can't.
[56:56] Look, and it's good.
[56:58] Because you're in the Euro.
[57:00] So once you're in the
Euro, it's a kind
[57:01] of a one-time game.
[57:03] Because the problem was if
you're Argentina and you tie
[57:05] yourself to the dollar, as they
did back in the day, back
[57:08] in the late 1990s into 2000, and
then you have the default.
[57:11] And they had a default because
Argentina is the graveyard of
[57:14] all bad economic policies
gone wrong, there's
[57:16] no doubt about that.
[57:17] But also because their major
trading partner is Brazil.
[57:19] And basically, the Real had a
40% exchange rate gain, and
[57:22] basically it screwed up all
their exports and the whole
[57:24] thing fell down.
[57:25] Now, because they were just on a
peg, they actually still had
[57:28] their own domestic currency.
[57:30] So they could go, to
hell with the peg.
[57:32] We've still got it.
[57:33] And then you lock up the banks
and people bang on the doors
[57:35] and all that sort of stuff.
[57:35] But you still have
your currency.
[57:37] Ireland doesn't have
a pound anymore.
[57:40] I mean, literally, the bits
of paper don't exist.
[57:43] So if you were going to
get out of the Euro--
[57:45] just think about the complexity
[57:46] of this for a second--
[57:47] you would have to kind
of freeze time.
[57:50] Everybody freezes, some kind
of government agency with a
[57:53] time machine would freeze time,
you'd go around, you'd
[57:55] vacuum up all the bills out of
everybody's wallets, the whole
[57:58] lot, and you'd stamp them all
and reissue them the new
[58:00] currency, and then you'd
unfreeze time.
[58:03] And then you would have
an economic crisis.
[58:05] So just that alone adds a level
of complexity to it
[58:08] which makes it just incredibly
difficult.
[58:11] Bigger countries like France
and Italy can do this.
[58:14] The Italian economy, North
Italy, is actually globally
[58:16] competitive, totally solvent,
the whole lot.
[58:19] The south is a basket case.
[58:21] It's a bit like the north and
south of the United States.
[58:22] Shh.
[58:23] Anyway.
[58:24] But you get transfers across
the region, that's
[58:26] what keeps it going.
[58:27] The problem is Greece has
nothing to export.
[58:30] It really doesn't.
[58:31] It has olive oil.
[58:32] But so does Italy, and they
can make more of it.
[58:34] Spain makes even more of that.
[58:36] Do you know when you buy
your EVOO and it says,
[58:38] Italian olive oil?
[58:39] It's actually Spanish olives
they've bought and they
[58:40] brought to Italy and then they
grind them and call it
[58:42] Italian olive oil.
[58:44] So that's all zero sum
against itself.
[58:46] So if you don't have something
to export, then the
[58:49] devaluation thing that you'll
get won't benefit you because
[58:51] you don't have anything.
[58:52] And all you'll do is end up with
hyperinflation because
[58:55] your imports become so
incredibly expensive.
[58:58] So Ireland, Greece, Portugal,
they are stuck because they've
[59:02] got nothing to sell.
[59:04] That's it.
[59:04] So they're kind of trapped
in this worst of
[59:06] all possible worlds.
[59:07] Ireland is really screwed
for a whole generation.
[59:11] The debt to GDP figures
you see in Ireland
[59:13] are a big, fat lie.
[59:14] Because they basically book
services exports from this
[59:17] company as exports.
[59:19] So basically, the profits
from this farm go to
[59:21] an office in Dublin.
[59:22] Has anybody ever been to
the office in Dublin?
[59:24] No?
[59:25] There's about 25 people
who work there.
[59:27] And your entire corporate
profits get declared through
[59:29] them, because you only
pay 12.5% tax.
[59:32] So that 12.5% gets booked as an
Irish services export and
[59:35] appears in their balance
of payments.
[59:37] Well, it's complete paper.
[59:38] It's nothing.
[59:39] It's complete garbage.
[59:41] And they also have all the bad
assets from their banks that
[59:43] blew up and this thing called
NAMA, which is a super bad
[59:45] bank, and that's never
coming back.
[59:47] And that's off balance sheet.
[59:49] So when you add it all together,
Ireland is actually
[59:51] worse than Greece.
[59:52] Shh.
[59:53] Just don't tell the Irish.
[59:54] AUDIENCE: Speaking of people,
what do you think about
[59:56] Iceland, how they dealt
with their financial?
[59:59] MARK BLYTH: Iceland is a
brilliant example of no good
[60:01] deed goes unpunished.
[60:05] So when I started all this off,
I was a member of this
[60:07] thing called the Warwick
Commission on Financial Form.
[60:09] And you know, the crisis
happens, and people are like,
[60:12] it's the shadow banks.
[60:13] And I'm like, what's
a shadow bank?
[60:15] I mean, you need to
do a little bit
[60:16] of catch-up on this.
[60:17] So at first, I bought
the whole narrative
[60:19] of too big to fail.
[60:20] Systemic interconnections, the
rest, the whole lot, blah,
[60:22] blah, blah, blah.
[60:23] And by the time I finished the
book, I said, no, I actually
[60:26] totally don't buy this--
[60:27] I think we should have
let them fail.
[60:28] Oh, but what about systemic
risk, all the rest of it?
[60:30] Well, I know what lost GDP is,
I know how much unemployments
[60:33] cost, I know all that.
[60:34] I know the real costs
of not bailing them.
[60:37] And more to the point, the
banking system, even though
[60:39] it's de-levered, is actually
more concentrated now than it
[60:41] was in 2007.
[60:43] So Citibank is even too
bigger to fail.
[60:46] And the European system
is that on steroids.
[60:49] So you've basically given
someone not just a banking
[60:51] license with a subsidy,
an extortion
[60:54] racket on the taxpayer.
[60:55] And that's just, it is
literally criminal.
[60:58] Best example of this--
[60:59] UBS.
[61:00] Fined $1.2 billion a few
months back for doing
[61:04] terrorism financing and money
laundering with drug dealers.
[61:08] Now, if you or I did this,
we would be in the jail.
[61:11] They get a fine.
[61:12] Why do they get a fine?
[61:14] Because if you are an investor
in an American or
[61:16] American-licensed broker/dealer
entity--
[61:18] a big bank--
[61:20] and one of your corporate
officers is charged with a
[61:23] criminal liability, you are
under legal obligation to
[61:26] withdraw your investments.
[61:28] So if UBS is actually criminally
charged, or their
[61:31] senior officers are charged.
[61:32] And then CalPERS has to
pull the money out.
[61:35] If CalPERS pulls the money out
along with everybody else,
[61:37] what happens to that bank?
[61:41] So what happens to the system?
[61:42] So you're basically playing
systemic moral hazard as a
[61:45] business model.
[61:46] This is screwed up
beyond belief.
[61:48] So Iceland, to finish
this one, basically
[61:50] let their banks fail.
[61:52] Now, a lot of the debt, most
of the debt was externally
[61:54] held, so the cost of that
went on to others.
[61:55] But here's the interesting
part of the story.
[61:57] All of the super geniuses who
were working in the banks
[62:00] engineering derivatives now
had to get a real job.
[62:03] So what happened was the
domestic economy, the real
[62:05] economy, rebounded, because all
these start-ups happened.
[62:08] Because all these really bright
people went, shit, I
[62:09] need something else to do.
[62:10] So they started doing all these
new businesses which
[62:13] didn't appear before.
[62:14] They became a huge hub for
online gaming, because you can
[62:17] stick the servers
in the ground--
[62:18] and it's bloody cold--
[62:19] and you've got all the people
with the math skills who can
[62:21] do the software engineering and
make the whole thing work.
[62:23] So there were all of these
positive externalities of
[62:25] actually letting them fail.
[62:27] Their unemployment level is
now about one point higher
[62:30] than Germany .
[62:31] Compare it with Iceland, which
is 14% on the official rate,
[62:34] and that's with migration
going out.
[62:36] So the people who did this, the
government that came in
[62:38] and basically allowed this to
happen, it's been a bit tough.
[62:41] They actually do things like
pay back the debt and are
[62:43] fiscally responsible.
[62:44] So they've just been voted out,
and the people who blew
[62:47] up the banks in the first place
are now back in power.
[62:49] No good deed goes unpunished.
[62:52] AUDIENCE: I don't know if you're
familiar with what
[62:55] happened in Australia.
[62:55] I'm from Australia.
[62:57] But people have largely missed
the financial crisis.
[63:01] And there are two
stories running.
[63:02] And I don't know if you know
which one is the--
[63:06] anyway, they're competing.
[63:07] One is saying that, well, the
government did spending and
[63:10] gave people money.
[63:11] And they spent it.
[63:12] And that saved the economy.
[63:13] And the other story running
is that, no,
[63:15] it's the mining boom.
[63:16] We just dig everything
up, sell it to
[63:18] China, China went well.
[63:19] And it has nothing to do with
what the government did.
[63:21] Have you got a view on that?
[63:22] MARK BLYTH: The second one
is completely right.
[63:24] And the way you can see this is
you can't trade the Chinese
[63:27] currency easily, because of
capital controls, et cetera.
[63:31] But what you can do is basically
look at the shadow
[63:34] markets on the Chinese
currency versus
[63:36] the Australian dollar.
[63:37] And they move like this.
[63:40] And it is because, basically,
Australia
[63:42] literally is owned by China.
[63:43] I mean, people say this about
the United States.
[63:44] Oh, China owns the USA.
[63:46] And it's like, well look, only
17% of bills are actually
[63:48] owned by China.
[63:49] And it's brilliant.
[63:50] Because for the past 30 years,
we've been giving them bits of
[63:52] paper that bear 2% net.
[63:54] And they've been giving
us televisions.
[63:56] It's a sweet deal.
[63:57] I don't know why anybody would
ever want to end it.
[63:59] It's brilliant for us.
[64:01] The Australian one is the
other way around.
[64:02] They actually do own your
assets completely.
[64:05] Because if it wasn't for the
western Australian mining
[64:07] boom, and just all the
commodities they're sucking
[64:09] out at the peak of a commodity
cycle, I mean, do you really
[64:12] think a house in Perth
would cost 2
[64:13] million Australian dollars?
[64:16] And it does.
[64:17] It's totally that.
[64:17] It's totally the mining boom.
[64:19] So what that means is either the
commodity cycle peaks or
[64:21] China slows down, Australia
is in serious trouble.
[64:24] Now, the price to income
multiples in
[64:26] Sydney are 13 to 1.
[64:29] So you need to marry two people
and have family money
[64:32] in order to get a house.
[64:34] So it's not 3 times your income,
it's 13 times your
[64:37] income for a three bedroom flat
in a nice part of Sydney.
[64:40] That's a colossal housing
bubble, and it's Chinese
[64:43] liquidity that's pumping it.
[64:44] If that every goes away, boom.
[64:47] AUDIENCE: The housing bubble
has never crashed in
[64:48] Australia, unlike
everywhere else.
[64:49] MARK BLYTH: Yeah, absolutely.
[64:50] And you know what?
[64:50] All bubbles pop.
[64:51] It is just a question of time.
[64:53] AUDIENCE: I was hoping you could
talk a little bit about
[64:55] the BRIC countries, and
especially what Brazil needs
[64:57] to be doing.
[64:58] MARK BLYTH: Brazil needs to do
what Brazil's been doing,
[65:01] which is awesome.
[65:02] So quite primer on the Brazilian
political economy.
[65:05] For years and years and years
they had one of the highest
[65:07] Gini coefficients
in the world.
[65:08] They were incredibly unequal.
[65:09] And they had a problem because
wealth being so concentrated
[65:12] meant that the people who make
effective investment decisions
[65:14] decided that their own economy
was too risky, because it
[65:16] would either be run by the
military or run by the
[65:18] communists or run out of town.
[65:20] So they would take their money
and they would put it in
[65:21] Citibank, which is
nice and secure.
[65:23] And you got a lesser rate of
return, but you don't mind
[65:25] because you own everything,
anyway.
[65:26] So that's the way it went on for
years and years, until it
[65:28] got to a point where basically
you had to spend so much money
[65:30] on private kidnap insurance and
mining your house against
[65:34] the people who would try and
kill you, that they did a deal
[65:37] with a guy called Lula.
[65:38] Lula u to run the
Worker's Party.
[65:40] So the guy who ran the Worker's
Party, the lefty guy,
[65:42] comes in and basically does
exactly as I said on the
[65:44] bottom of that slide.
[65:45] Democracy is asset insurance for
the rich-- stop skimping
[65:48] on the payments.
[65:49] So did this strategy whereby
they got BNDES, the Brazilian
[65:52] National Development Bank,
to bank-- their lending
[65:55] portfolio, by the way,
is twice the size
[65:57] of the World Bank--
[65:58] to subsidize domestic
corporations so that they
[66:01] could multinational.
[66:02] So you've got companies like
Embraer, the aircraft company,
[66:05] the big cement company, and
the others, that are now
[66:07] globally successful
corporations.
[66:09] Because of that expansion,
bankrolled by the development
[66:11] bank, what they do is they tax
the companies on their
[66:14] earnings abroad, bring that
back in, and they set up
[66:16] something called Bolsa Familia,
which is the welfare
[66:18] state that Brazil never had.
[66:20] This has squeezed the income
distribution like this at the
[66:22] same time as it has gone up,
which enables the Brazilians
[66:25] to finally build
a middle class.
[66:26] It empowers the middle class.
[66:28] And it dis-empowers the
durational land-owning elites.
[66:30] So what you end up with--
[66:32] there's a little fixey-do with
domestically high interest
[66:34] rates to keep these
guys happy.
[66:36] Well, what you've actually
done is to engineer is to
[66:38] engineer a kind of new
developmental welfare state,
[66:40] which has actually been great
for Brazilian growth and has
[66:42] actually brought down the
Gini coefficient.
[66:44] Because of this, everybody wants
to buy Brazilian assets,
[66:46] which is why the Real
is going up.
[66:48] And they're export-dependent,
so they're freaking out.
[66:50] So what they've done is they've
put inward capital
[66:52] controls on inward investment.
[66:54] And usually, the big fear is
you put your money in, they
[66:56] put up capital controls, you
can't get it out, it's
[66:58] expropriation.
[66:59] They're doing it totally
different.
[67:00] They're like, you want
to come here?
[67:01] Dead easy.
[67:02] Pay a transactions tax
and a deposit.
[67:04] Because if you're not coming in
for the long term, forget
[67:06] about sitting here earning
high interest rates just
[67:08] because you can.
[67:09] So they're making it difficult
for that money to come in.
[67:11] But as a growth node in a big
country, it is happening
[67:14] nonetheless.
[67:15] So the Real is going up, the
economy is slowing down.
[67:17] But what they've done over the
past 10 years, I think, is
[67:19] nothing short of remarkable.
[67:23] BORIS DEBIC: Thank you, Mark.
[67:24] [APPLAUSE]