Imperial Sugar Ignores Dust Hazards Before Explosion Kills 14

USCSB

Imperial Sugar's failure to install dust collection on a newly enclosed conveyor trapped explosive airborne particles, triggering a catastrophic chain reaction of secondary explosions fueled by decades of accumulated spills.

AI-assisted summary of Inferno: Dust Explosion at Imperial Sugar — original source. Check the original for full context.

Source published: 2009-10-05

Key ideas

On February 7, 2008, a catastrophic series of sugar dust explosions at the Imperial Sugar refinery near Savannah, Georgia, killed 14 workers, injured dozens, and destroyed the facility's packaging buildings. (0:08)
A 2007 stainless steel enclosure installed over an underground silo conveyor belt trapped sugar dust at explosive concentrations, which ignited from an overheated bearing and triggered violent secondary explosions throughout the complex. (3:20)
Despite internal records dating back to the late 1950s documenting dust explosion risks, Imperial Sugar failed to rectify widespread sugar spillage and inadequate dust collection systems prior to the disaster. (5:38)
The disaster reinforced the U.S. Chemical Safety Board's push for mandatory federal combustible dust standards based on NFPA codes, leading OSHA to announce rulemaking in April 2009. (7:57)

Detailed notes

## Background Published by the USCSB (U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board) on YouTube on October 5, 2009, this safety video examines the February 7, 2008, disaster at the Imperial Sugar refinery near Savannah, Georgia. The video explains how a catastrophic series of sugar dust explosions occurred, resulting in the fatal burning of fourteen workers.

## TL;DR The video breaks down the catastrophic February 2008 industrial disaster at the Imperial Sugar refinery in Port Wentworth, Georgia, which claimed 14 lives and destroyed the facility. Investigators explain how a 2007 modification enclosing a conveyor belt without dust collection allowed sugar dust to reach explosive concentrations, igniting via an overheated bearing. The primary blast dislodged tons of accumulated sugar and overhead dust throughout the packaging complex, triggering devastating secondary explosions that buckled concrete and trapped workers in darkness. The CSB highlights decades of internal awareness and unheeded warnings, concluding with recommendations for plant redesign and an urgent call for OSHA to establish a mandatory federal combustible dust standard.

## Atmosphere & style The presentation carries the grim, authoritative gravity characteristic of CSB investigative documentaries, blending calm technical breakdowns with harrowing computer animations of the explosion and structural collapse. Statements from CSB Chairman John Bresland and Lead Investigator John Vorderbrueggen lend an air of sober clinical accountability, systematically exposing systemic organizational complacency. The contrast between mundane industrial operations—spilled sugar and routine conveyor clogs—and the sheer violence of the secondary fireballs creates a tense, chilling viewing experience that emphasizes the avoidable human cost of regulatory neglect.

## Bulletin - [00:08](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jg7mLSG-Yws&t=8s) On February 7, 2008, a catastrophic series of sugar dust explosions at the Imperial Sugar refinery near Savannah, Georgia, killed 14 workers, injured dozens, and destroyed the facility's packaging buildings. - [03:20](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jg7mLSG-Yws&t=200s) A 2007 stainless steel enclosure installed over an underground silo conveyor belt trapped sugar dust at explosive concentrations, which ignited from an overheated bearing and triggered violent secondary explosions throughout the complex. - [05:38](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jg7mLSG-Yws&t=338s) Despite internal records dating back to the late 1950s documenting dust explosion risks, Imperial Sugar failed to rectify widespread sugar spillage and inadequate dust collection systems prior to the disaster. - [07:57](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jg7mLSG-Yws&t=477s) The disaster reinforced the U.S. Chemical Safety Board's push for mandatory federal combustible dust standards based on NFPA codes, leading OSHA to announce rulemaking in April 2009.

## Key takeaways - [00:08](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jg7mLSG-Yws&t=8s) The Imperial Sugar refinery explosion in Port Wentworth, Georgia, was the deadliest industrial dust explosion in the United States in decades, resulting in 14 deaths and dozens of severe injuries. - [00:08](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jg7mLSG-Yws&t=8s) The disaster's scale was driven by secondary dust explosions that lofted decades of settled overhead dust and spilled sugar into an advancing firestorm across multiple buildings. - [01:32](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jg7mLSG-Yws&t=92s) Spilled granulated sugar routinely accumulated inches deep across processing areas, while milling machines operated with undersized, poorly maintained dust collectors lacking ductwork to conveyors. - [01:32](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jg7mLSG-Yws&t=92s) Standard plant housekeeping compounded hazards by using compressed air to blow sugar off packaging machinery, dispersing fine particles onto elevated beams, ductwork, and light fixtures. - [03:20](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jg7mLSG-Yws&t=200s) A 2007 equipment modification enclosing the silo conveyor belt in stainless steel panels to prevent food contamination inadvertently trapped airborne dust in an unventilated space, allowing it to reach explosive concentrations. - [03:20](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jg7mLSG-Yws&t=200s) A chute clog caused rapid sugar accumulation inside the sealed enclosure, where airborne dust encountered an ignition source likely caused by an overheated conveyor bearing. - [03:20](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jg7mLSG-Yws&t=200s) Worker evacuation was severely compromised because the facility had never held emergency drills, and the primary explosion severed lighting circuits, leaving workers trapped in dark, smoke-filled stairwells. - [05:38](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jg7mLSG-Yws&t=338s) Imperial Sugar management had documented awareness of combustible dust hazards dating back to the 1950s, including a 1961 explosion that caused structural damage to the powdered sugar mill room. - [05:38](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jg7mLSG-Yws&t=338s) Decades of minor localized fires fostered management complacency, obscuring the catastrophic risk of a propagating, facility-wide explosion. - [05:38](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jg7mLSG-Yws&t=338s) Plant leadership learned of OSHA's Combustible Dust National Emphasis Program four months before the disaster, but an internal audit weeks before the blast confirmed tons of sugar remained spilled on floors. - [05:38](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jg7mLSG-Yws&t=338s) The CSB issued formal recommendations directing Imperial Sugar to rebuild the refinery to NFPA standards, implement strict dust management protocols, and establish regular evacuation drills. - [07:57](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jg7mLSG-Yws&t=477s) Following repeated CSB recommendations and the Port Wentworth tragedy, OSHA announced formal rulemaking in April 2009 to develop a comprehensive general industry combustible dust standard.

## Detailed walkthrough ### [00:08](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jg7mLSG-Yws&t=8s) The Disaster at Port Wentworth

On the evening of February 7, 2008, at 7:15 p.m., a violent series of sugar dust explosions tore through the Imperial Sugar Refinery in Port Wentworth, Georgia, situated just outside Savannah. Fueled by heavy accumulations of combustible sugar dust and sugar that had spilled from packaging and processing machinery, fireballs ripped through the complex. The structural forces were immense: thick concrete floors heaved upward and structural brick walls collapsed directly into stairwells and personnel work areas.

```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Imperial Sugar Explosion Progression accDescr: Sequence of events leading from chute blockage in the conveyor enclosure to devastating secondary explosions across the facility. subgraph Primary["Primary Event (Silo Tunnel)"] A["Sugar Clump Blocks Chute"] --> B["Sugar Spills & Dust Trapped in Stainless Steel Enclosure"] B --> C["Overheated Bearing Ignites Airborne Dust"] C --> D["Primary Explosion Rips Enclosure Apart"] end subgraph Secondary["Secondary Explosions (Packing Buildings)"] D --> E["Vents into Packing Buildings"] E --> F["Lofts Decades of Spilled Sugar & Settled Dust"] F --> G["Chain Reaction of Secondary Explosions"] G --> H["Concrete Buckles & Traps Workers in Darkened Inferno"] end ```

The collapsing walls and structural debris severely compromised escape pathways, leaving workers trapped as fires spread swiftly through the shattered complex. Eight plant employees were killed immediately on site, and six more succumbed later to extensive burns while being treated at a regional burn center. Dozens of additional employees suffered serious injuries, and the massive packing buildings of the historic facility were completely destroyed.

CSB Chairman John Bresland underscored the historic and deadly magnitude of the disaster: “The accident at Imperial Sugar was the deadliest industrial dust explosion in the United States in decades.” He emphasized that the incident starkly illustrates the severe hazards posed by combustible industrial dusts. CSB Lead Investigator John Vorderbrueggen echoed this assessment regarding the operational state of the refinery, stating, “There were significant accumulations of sugar dust and spilled granulated sugar on surfaces throughout this facility. Conditions were set for a catastrophic accident.”

- Eight workers perished at the facility during the initial blast and collapse. - Six workers died from their wounds later at a regional burn center. - Dozens of workers sustained injuries; the sprawling sugar packing buildings were declared a total loss.

---

[01:32](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jg7mLSG-Yws&t=92s) Plant Operations and Uncontrolled Dust Accumulation

First opened in 1917, the sprawling Port Wentworth facility expanded over nearly a century into one of the largest sugar refining and packaging operations in the United States. Granulated sugar produced in the refinery was stored in three 100-foot-tall silos before being transferred to the packing buildings for retail and commercial distribution. The plant also milled granulated sugar into specialty varieties, including brown sugar and powdered sugar, routing product across the site via an intricate transportation network of bucket elevators, screw conveyors, and conveyor belts.

Throughout these transport and packaging processes, product constantly spilled from the equipment onto the workroom floors. In several locations, the piles of loose sugar sat many inches deep. This spilled material contained fine particles that drifted into the air. When crushing machines such as hammer mills pulverized granulated sugar into fine powdered sugar, even greater volumes of dust were generated. Although these machines were fitted to a dust collection system, the system was severely undersized, poorly maintained, and lacked any duct connections to the bucket elevators and transfer conveyors. Consequently, vast clouds of sugar dust escaped unchecked into the operational workspace.

Plant housekeeping procedures only aggravated the problem. Packaging workers routinely relied on compressed air to blow accumulated sugar off their packaging equipment, dispersing fine dust particles into the air. Over years of operation, dense dust settled onto elevated, inaccessible overhead structural surfaces, including air ducts, building beams, and lighting fixtures. Facility cleaning schedules were far too infrequent to keep the accumulated dust layers below recognized hazardous thresholds.

---

[03:20](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jg7mLSG-Yws&t=200s) The Enclosure Modification and the Fatal Chain Reaction

Below the massive sugar silos ran an underground tunnel where granulated sugar poured from silo discharge chutes onto an expansive steel conveyor belt. Clumps of hardened sugar frequently plugged the discharge chutes, obstructing the continuous flow, spilling material onto the tunnel floor, and dispersing dust into the atmosphere. Because the tunnel was vast and well ventilated, this liberated airborne dust historically stayed dispersed below the minimum explosive concentration.

In 2007, Imperial Sugar enclosed the long conveyor belt inside stainless steel panels to guard against foreign matter contaminating the food product. However, the company failed to install a dust collection or exhaust system on the new enclosure. As a result, any sugar dust freed from the belt or chutes remained entirely trapped within the tight steel housing. On February 7, 2008, lumps of sugar clogged one of the chute discharge points, causing sugar from the adjacent silo to tumble off the moving conveyor belt and accumulate rapidly. Within the sealed space, suspended dust reached an explosive concentration.

At approximately 7:15 p.m., the concentrated sugar dust encountered an ignition source—likely an overheated conveyor bearing—and ignited. The initial blast blew the stainless steel housing apart and vented pressure straight into the packaging structures above. This primary blast lofted tons of spilled granulated sugar and settled overhead dust into dense airborne clouds. Advancing fireballs ignited the airborne fuel, triggering a violent chain reaction of secondary explosions that ripped across multiple floors. The force buckled thick concrete slabs, dumping further tons of bulk granulated and powdered sugar directly into the expanding firestorm. Emergency evacuation drills had never been carried out, and the initial explosions severed the main electrical lines powering the interior lights, plunging workers into pitch-black, smoke-filled mazes of ruined stairwells and blocked corridors.

---

[05:38](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jg7mLSG-Yws&t=338s) Historical Precedent, Warning Signs, and Industry Standards

Subsequent CSB investigations revealed that Port Wentworth plant management had been aware of sugar dust explosion risks for decades. Corporate internal records and correspondence dating back to the late 1950s explicitly discussed dust accumulation hazards and explosive properties; a 1961 facility memorandum described a dust explosion that had caused heavy structural damage to the powdered sugar mill room. Commenting on the plant's history of inaction, Vorderbrueggen remarked, “Despite the longstanding awareness of the explosive nature of sugar dust, not enough was done to manage the hazard.”

In 2006, two years prior to the disaster, the CSB had issued a nationwide combustible dust safety study urging the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) to establish a comprehensive federal combustible dust standard modeled on National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) consensus codes. In October 2007, OSHA instituted a National Emphasis Program to elevate enforcement of existing rules. Vorderbrueggen observed: “Imperial Sugar learned of the OSHA Combustible Dust National Emphasis Program four months before the devastating explosion at Port Wentworth. But management did not act effectively to control the serious dust problem in the packing buildings.” Less than two months before the Port Wentworth explosion, an internal facility audit confirmed that multiple tons of sugar were still routinely spilling across the floors.

Because decades of small localized fires fed by dust and spilled sugar had never produced a propagating, facility-wide explosion, plant management was lulled into complacency. Following its investigation, the CSB delivered explicit safety recommendations to the Imperial Sugar Company: - Design, rebuild, and operate the replacement Port Wentworth facility in strict compliance with NFPA standards. - Formulate and put into practice comprehensive combustible dust management programs, housekeeping protocols, and worker training. - Revise, modernize, and regularly drill emergency evacuation policies and procedures.

---

[07:57](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jg7mLSG-Yws&t=477s) National Regulatory Reforms

Beyond the site-specific findings, the disaster renewed urgent calls for mandatory regulatory action across all manufacturing sectors. CSB Chairman Bresland pointed out that facility owners already have access to the necessary safety guidance: “Companies can go a long way to control combustible dust within their own facilities by following the existing recommendations of the National Fire Protection Association. But it is also time for a comprehensive federal standard on combustible dust.”

In April 2009, OSHA formally announced its intent to initiate rulemaking on a general industry combustible dust standard. In its comprehensive final investigation report, the CSB urged OSHA to proceed through the rulemaking process expeditiously to establish permanent federal safeguards. Emphasizing the continuous danger facing industrial workforces across the nation, Bresland concluded: “Without regulation, enforcement and education, workers will continue to be at risk from catastrophic dust explosions.”

## Notable quotes > [07:57](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jg7mLSG-Yws&t=477s) Without regulation, enforcement and education, workers will continue to be at risk from catastrophic dust explosions. — John Bresland

> [07:57](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jg7mLSG-Yws&t=477s) Companies can go a long way to control combustible dust within their own facilities by following the existing recommendations of the National Fire Protection Association. But it is also time for a comprehensive federal standard on combustible dust. — John Bresland

> [05:38](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jg7mLSG-Yws&t=338s) Despite the longstanding awareness of the explosive nature of sugar dust, not enough was done to manage the hazard. — John Vorderbrueggen

## Mentioned Imperial Sugar Refinery, Imperial Sugar Company, U.S. Chemical Safety Board (CSB), Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), John Bresland, John Vorderbrueggen, Port Wentworth, Georgia, Savannah, Georgia

## Video description On February 7, 2008, fourteen workers were fatally burned in a series of sugar dust explosions at the Imperial Sugar plant near Savannah, Georgia. This CSB safety video explains how the accident occurred.

[Source](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jg7mLSG-Yws)

中文简报

帝国糖业忽视粉尘危害，引发爆炸致14人死亡帝国糖业未能在新封闭的输送带上安装除尘设备，导致爆炸性悬浮颗粒被困，并由数十年累积的散落粉尘推波助澜，引发了灾难性的连锁二次爆炸。该视频详细剖析了2008年2月发生在佐治亚州温特沃斯港帝国糖厂的灾难性工业事故，该事故夺去了14条生命并摧毁了整个厂区。调查人员解释称，2007年的一项改造对输送带进行了封闭却未配备除尘装置，致使糖粉尘达到爆炸浓度，并因过热轴承被引燃。初次爆炸震落了包装区内积存的数吨糖料和高处粉尘，触发了毁灭性的二次爆炸，导致混凝土结构变形扭曲并将工人们困于黑暗之中。美国化学品安全委员会（CSB）强调，该厂数十年来早已知晓风险却置警告于不顾，并在最后提出了重新设计工厂的建议，同时紧急呼吁美国职业安全与健康管理局（OSHA）出台强制性联邦可燃粉尘标准。 2008年2月7日，佐治亚州萨凡纳附近的帝国糖厂发生灾难性的糖粉尘连环爆炸，导致14名工人遇难、数十人受伤，并摧毁了该厂的包装楼。 (0:08) 2007年安装在地下筒仓输送带上方的不锈钢封闭装置阻隔并积聚了具有爆炸浓度的糖粉尘，随后因轴承过热而起火，并在整个厂区内引发了猛烈的二次爆炸。 (3:20) 尽管早在1950年代末的内部记录就记载了粉尘爆炸的风险，但帝国糖业在灾难发生前仍未能纠正普遍存在的糖料溢出问题以及除尘系统的不足。 (5:38) 这起灾难促使美国化学品安全委员会进一步推动基于美国国家消防协会（NFPA）规范的强制性联邦可燃粉尘标准，并促成OSHA在2009年4月宣布启动相关法规制定程序。 (7:57)

Source quotes

[7:57] John Bresland: Without regulation, enforcement and education, workers will continue to be at risk from catastrophic dust explosions. [7:57] John Bresland: Companies can go a long way to control combustible dust within their own facilities by following the existing recommendations of the National Fire Protection Association. But it is also time for a comprehensive federal standard on combustible dust. [5:38] John Vorderbrueggen: Despite the longstanding awareness of the explosive nature of sugar dust, not enough was done to manage the hazard.

Original transcript

[0:02] [Music] [0:08] Narrator: At 7:15 p.m. on February 7, 2008, [0:12] a series of violent sugar dust explosions devastated the Imperial Sugar Refinery [0:18] in Port Wentworth, Georgia, just outside Savannah. [0:23] Explosions raced through the buildings, [0:25] fueled by accumulations of combustible sugar dust and sugar that had spilled from equipment. [0:33] Thick concrete floors heaved up and brick walls were blown into stairwells and work areas, [0:39] blocking many exit routes. Fires spread rapidly. [0:44] [Sound of sirens] [0:46] Narrator: Eight workers died at the scene. [0:48] Six more died later at a regional burn center. [0:52] Dozens of others were injured. [0:55] The plant's massive sugar packing buildings were a total loss. [1:00] [Music] [1:08] Bresland: The accident at Imperial Sugar was the deadliest industrial dust explosion [1:13] in the United States in decades. [1:15] It highlights the extremely serious nature of combustible dust hazards. [1:21] Vorderbrueggen: There were significant accumulations of sugar dust [1:24] and spilled granulated sugar on surfaces throughout this facility. [1:28] Conditions were set for a catastrophic accident. [1:32] Narrator: Imperial Sugar's sprawling Port Wentworth complex began operations in 1917 [1:38] and grew to become one of the largest sugar refining and packaging facilities in the U.S. [1:45] Granulated sugar from the refinery was stored in three 100-foot tall silos [1:50] and then conveyed into packing buildings, where it was packaged for distribution. [1:56] Granulated sugar was also converted into specialty products, such as brown sugar and powdered sugar. [2:03] Sugar was transported by a complex system of bucket elevators, screw conveyors and conveyor belts. [2:13] During this process, sugar spilled onto floors throughout the work area. [2:18] In places, the spilled sugar was many inches deep. [2:22] This sugar also contained fine particles, which became airborne. [2:28] In addition, hammer mills were used to crush the granulated sugar into powdered sugar, creating even more dust. [2:36] The machines were connected to a dust collection system, but it was undersized and in disrepair. [2:44] And it was not connected to the bucket elevators and conveyors. [2:49] Significant amounts of sugar dust escaped into the work areas. [2:54] Workers routinely used compressed air to clean packaging machines, [2:58] further dispersing sugar dust throughout the buildings. [3:02] Over time, large amounts of dust accumulated on elevated, hard-to-clean surfaces, [3:09] such as ducts, beams and light fixtures. [3:13] These surfaces were not cleaned often enough to always keep the dust below hazardous levels. [3:20] In the tunnel beneath the sugar silos, granulated sugar flowed through chutes onto a long steel conveyor belt. [3:28] From time to time, clumps of sugar would become stuck in one of the chutes, [3:33] blocking the flow of sugar on the belt, spilling sugar onto the floor and releasing dust into the tunnel. [3:41] But the tunnel was large and ventilated, so this airborne dust did not build up to explosive concentrations. [3:48] However, in 2007, the company enclosed the conveyor belt with stainless steel panels [3:54] to protect the sugar from possible contamination. [3:58] The enclosure was not equipped with a dust collection system. [4:02] As a consequence, sugar dust would now be trapped inside this enclosure. [4:08] On February 7, 2008, clumps of sugar were found blocking one of the discharge chutes. [4:15] Sugar from the adjacent silo likely spilled off the moving belt. [4:20] Dust likely accumulated to an explosive concentration inside the enclosure. [4:26] At about 7:15 p.m., the sugar dust contacted a nearby ignition source, likely an overheated bearing and exploded. [4:36] [Sound of explosion] [4:39] This primary explosion blew apart the enclosure. [Sound of explosions] [4:43] And vented into the packing building. [4:45] Accumulated sugar was lofted and ignited by the advancing fireballs. [Sound of explosion] [4:50] The dust clouds fueled a chain reaction of secondary explosions ... [Sound of explosions] [4:54] which swept through the buildings. [4:56] Concrete floors buckled, releasing tons of granulated and powdered sugar into the flames. [5:03] Narrator: Emergency evacuation drills had not been conducted [5:07] and the explosions had cut the power to much of the interior lighting. [5:12] In the maze of darkened and damaged stairwells and passageways, [5:16] workers desperately tried to flee the growing inferno. [5:21] [Sound of explosion] [5:28] [Music] [5:32] [Sound of sirens and helicopter rotors] [5:38] Narrator: The CSB found that correspondence dating back to the late 1950s [5:43] showed that plant managers in Port Wentworth [5:45] were aware of the explosive nature of sugar dust and the danger of dust accumulations. [5:51] As far back as 1961, a memo described a sugar dust explosion that heavily damaged the powdered sugar mill room. [6:00] Vorderbrueggen: Despite the longstanding awareness of the explosive nature of sugar dust, [6:04] not enough was done to manage the hazard. [6:07] Narrator: In 2006, the CSB issued a study of combustible dust, [6:12] which called on OSHA to establish a comprehensive combustible dust standard, [6:17] based on the current standards of the National Fire Protection Association or NFPA. [6:24] In October, 2007, OSHA began implementing a new National Emphasis Program [6:30] to increase the enforcement of existing regulations related to combustible dust. [6:36] Vorderbrueggen: Imperial Sugar learned of the OSHA Combustible Dust National Emphasis Program [6:41] four months before the devastating explosion at Port Wentworth. [6:45] But management did not act effectively to control the serious dust problem in the packing buildings. [6:52] Narrator: Less than two months before the disaster, [6:55] an internal inspection showed that many tons of sugar were still regularly spilling onto the floors. [7:01] This provided much of the fuel for the massive secondary explosions and fires. [7:06] [Sound of explosion] [7:08] Narrator: The CSB found that over the years, the Port Wentworth facility periodically experienced small fires, [7:15] fueled by spilled sugar and accumulated dust on equipment. [7:19] But none resulted in a sugar dust explosion that propagated through the plant. [7:25] Narrator: Investigators said that decades of operating without a catastrophic explosion [7:30] may have lulled managers into complacency. [7:34] In its report, the CSB issued the following recommendations to the Imperial Sugar Company. [7:40] Apply NFPA standards to the design and operation of the rebuilt Port Wentworth facility. [7:46] Develop and implement comprehensive combustible dust control, housekeeping and training programs. [7:53] Improve emergency evacuation policies and procedures. [7:57] Bresland: Companies can go a long way to control combustible dust within their own facilities [8:02] by following the existing recommendations of the National Fire Protection Association. [8:08] But it is also time for a comprehensive federal standard on combustible dust. [8:14] Narrator: In April, 2009, OSHA announced plans to begin rulemaking on a [8:19] combustible dust standard for general industry. [8:22] In its final report on the Imperial Sugar accident, [8:25] the CSB recommended that OSHA move forward expeditiously with the new standard. [8:32] Bresland: Without regulation, enforcement and education, [8:36] workers will continue to be at risk from catastrophic dust explosions. [8:42] Narrator: For further information, please visit CSB.gov. [8:47] [Music]