Completely replacing fossil fuel consumption across electricity, transport, and heating demands at least 36,000 TWh of new non-fossil power, requiring the construction of roughly 586,000 power stations compared to a global operating fleet of 46,000 in 2018. (22:55)
Providing a conservative 4-week grid battery storage buffer for intermittent wind and solar requires 548 TWh of stationary capacity—equivalent to 15.6 million Hornsdale-scale batteries and roughly 30 times the battery capacity needed for the entire global EV fleet. (32:25)
Manufacturing just one generation of renewable technology requires 4.57 billion metric tons of copper, exceeding six times all historically mined copper (700 million tons) against current reported reserves of only 880 million tons. (43:26)
Existing reserves of critical battery minerals cover less than 5% of single-generation transition requirements, with grid-scale vanadium battery demand alone representing 7,101 years of 2019 global mining production. (39:04)
Detailed notes
## Background
Published on YouTube by the Sustainable Minerals Institute UQ on August 19, 2022, this seminar features Associate Professor Simon Michaux analyzing the resource implications of phasing out fossil fuels. The presentation addresses how the quantity of metals required to manufacture just a single generation of renewable technology vastly exceeds current mining production rates and known geological reserves, with copper facing especially critical shortfalls.
## TL;DR
Associate Professor Simon Michaux calculates the total physical infrastructure and raw materials required to completely replace the global fossil fuel system with non-fossil alternatives across electricity, transport, and heat. His modeling demonstrates that generating the required ~36,000 TWh of clean power demands over 586,000 new power stations and massive stationary battery buffers, creating mineral requirements that dwarf annual mining output by centuries and exceed known reserves of copper, lithium, and other critical metals. Because an initial generation of infrastructure must be mined from scratch, recycling cannot resolve these initial deficits. Michaux concludes that our industrial ecosystem is both energy- and minerals-blind, meaning society must abandon growth economics and significantly downscale industrial throughput.
## Atmosphere & style
The presentation carries a sober, clinical, and bracingly candid tone as Michaux systematically deconstructs mainstream net-zero roadmaps through raw mass-balance calculations. Delivered in a dry, matter-of-fact style punctuated by dark humor and frank skepticism regarding political wishful thinking, the talk feels like a quiet but devastating reality check. As the presentation transitions into an engaged technical Q&A, the mood settles into a serious contemplation of hard thermodynamic limits, resource exhaustion, and the profound societal restructuring required for the future.
## Bulletin
- [22:55](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBVmnKuBocc&t=1375s) Completely replacing fossil fuel consumption across electricity, transport, and heating demands at least 36,000 TWh of new non-fossil power, requiring the construction of roughly 586,000 power stations compared to a global operating fleet of 46,000 in 2018.
- [32:25](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBVmnKuBocc&t=1945s) Providing a conservative 4-week grid battery storage buffer for intermittent wind and solar requires 548 TWh of stationary capacity—equivalent to 15.6 million Hornsdale-scale batteries and roughly 30 times the battery capacity needed for the entire global EV fleet.
- [43:26](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBVmnKuBocc&t=2606s) Manufacturing just one generation of renewable technology requires 4.57 billion metric tons of copper, exceeding six times all historically mined copper (700 million tons) against current reported reserves of only 880 million tons.
- [39:04](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBVmnKuBocc&t=2344s) Existing reserves of critical battery minerals cover less than 5% of single-generation transition requirements, with grid-scale vanadium battery demand alone representing 7,101 years of 2019 global mining production.
## Key takeaways
- [02:11](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBVmnKuBocc&t=131s) The post-2005 synchronized price volatility across base metals and energy commodities represents a permanent structural shift originating from oil depletion rather than speculative market dynamics.
- [05:58](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBVmnKuBocc&t=358s) Global oil discoveries entered terminal decline after peaking in 1985, with 81% of currently producing fields declining at 5% to 7% annually and over half of all historical oil consumption occurring after 1992.
- [14:44](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBVmnKuBocc&t=884s) Because replacement infrastructure does not currently exist, the entire first generation of renewable technology and battery storage must be extracted through primary mining rather than recycling.
- [22:55](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBVmnKuBocc&t=1375s) Phasing out fossil fuels across electricity, short-range transport, and heating requires a minimum of ~36,000 TWh of non-fossil generation, with direct industrial process heat potentially demanding an additional 36,000 TWh.
- [28:10](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBVmnKuBocc&t=1690s) Global wind and solar installations operate at average capacity factors of approximately 25%, remaining idle roughly 75% of the year and requiring vast asset footprints compared to baseload thermal generation.
- [32:25](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBVmnKuBocc&t=1945s) Eliminating natural gas peaker plants necessitates massive grid-scale buffering; a conservative 4-week weather buffer demands 548 TWh of stationary chemical battery storage.
- [39:04](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBVmnKuBocc&t=2344s) Single-generation mineral requirements for renewable infrastructure create multi-century extraction deficits, including over seven millennia of current annual vanadium production.
- [41:15](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBVmnKuBocc&t=2475s) Reported global copper reserves satisfy only 19.23% of the copper needed for a single generation of renewable technology, while reserves for lithium, cobalt, and nickel cover less than 5%.
- [43:26](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBVmnKuBocc&t=2606s) Humanity has mined approximately 700 million metric tons of copper throughout history, but manufacturing one generation of renewable technology requires 4.57 billion metric tons despite declining discovery rates.
- [47:40](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBVmnKuBocc&t=2860s) Modern industrial policy remains energy- and minerals-blind, planning a transition to lower-EROI energy sources while ore grade degradation exponentially increases the energy required per ton of recovered metal.
- [01:04:57](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBVmnKuBocc&t=3897s) Because a unit-for-unit physical replacement of the fossil fuel industrial machine is geologically impossible, society will be forced to downscale industrial throughput and abandon growth economics.
- [01:10:26](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBVmnKuBocc&t=4226s) Planetary carbon capture and storage (CCS) deployment faces prohibitive energetic hurdles, demonstrating low or negative net energy return on investment at large operational scale.
## Detailed walkthrough
### [00:03](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBVmnKuBocc&t=3s) Seminar Introduction and Simon Michaux's Background
The JKMRC Friday morning seminar series opens with co-chair Katerina introducing the hybrid session held live in the lecture theatre and streamed online. After delivering the traditional acknowledgment of country on behalf of the University of Queensland and the Sustainable Minerals Institute—honoring the traditional owners, their ancestors, and ongoing connections to land—she introduces the guest speaker, Associate Professor Simon Michaux. Michaux serves as Associate Professor of Geometallurgy at the Geological Survey of Finland (GTK) in Helsinki within their Circular Economy Solutions unit.
Michaux's academic roots trace directly back to the venue: he holds a Bachelor of Applied Science in Physics and Geology from Queensland University of Technology and completed his PhD in Mining Engineering at JKMRC at UQ, where he received the Ian Morley Prize in 2006. His resume covers more than 18 years across the Australian mining industry, research and development in the private sector, three years at the University of Liège in Belgium working on circular economy and industrial recycling, and minerals intelligence work at GTK. Katerina highlights that Michaux is presenting live from Finland at 2:00 a.m. local time on the pressing issues of technology mineral scarcity and transitioning away from fossil fuels.
[02:11](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBVmnKuBocc&t=131s) Industrial Ecosystem Volatility: Metal Prices, Currencies, and Structural Breaks
Michaux begins by outlining that his talk synthesizes two major bodies of research: an earlier published report and newer, forthcoming work titled *"Assessment of Extra Capacity Required of Alternative Energy Electrical Power Systems to Completely Replace Fossil Fuels."* Before getting into the calculations, he walks the audience through the underlying historical data patterns he presented to GTK management to justify funding and conducting the investigation.
```mermaid
flowchart TD
accTitle: Structural Breaks in the Industrial Ecosystem
accDescr: Three pivotal eras of economic and resource market disruption from 1971 to 2005.
subgraph Era1["Early Monetary Shift (1970s)"]
A["1971: US decouples from Gold Standard"] --> B["1973: Oil Embargo"]
B --> C["Shift to Fiat Currencies & Petrodollar System"]
end
subgraph Era2["The 2005 Commodity Blowout"]
D["Chain reaction begins in Oil Sector"] --> E["Handover point breaks: Minerals to Manufactured Goods"]
E --> F["2005 Commodity Price Spike (Base/Precious Metals & Energy)"]
end
subgraph Era3["Long-term Structural Realignment"]
F --> G["2008 Global Financial Crisis fails to resolve volatility"]
G --> H["Structural evolution ongoing for 17+ years"]
end
C --> D
```
He presents indexed World Bank tracking data for base metals, precious metals, and primary energy commodities (oil, gas, and coal). First indexed to December 2001 (set to 100), the data reveals a long stretch of stability followed by a massive, synchronized blowout starting around 2005. Michaux underscores the macroeconomic gravity of base metal pricing: “The metal price is the handover point between those who extract metals from the ground and turn it into minerals from the ground turn them into metals and those who buy those metals and manufacture goods.” This metric serves as the literal heartbeat of modern physical industry.
He argues that this pricing upheaval was not speculative froth, but a deep structural change originating in the oil sector: “I make a case that this blowout started with a chain reaction in the oil industry and a major economic correction in 2008 was not enough to resolve the underlying volatility. So whatever this is, it is not speculation. It is structural.” This systemic realignment began 17 years prior rather than being a distant prospective issue. Pinned back to January 1970, the data reveals an earlier major dislocation: the 1971 collapse of the gold standard, followed by the 1973 oil embargo, the rise of fiat currencies, and the creation of the petrodollar system, allowing governments to print money to paper over resource constraints. Isolating base metals and energy curves confirms that the 2005 structural break occurred across the physical resource base.
[05:58](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBVmnKuBocc&t=358s) The Reality of Fossil Fuel Depletion and Peak Oil
Michaux moves directly to the target of energy transition plans: phasing out fossil fuels, and petroleum in particular. Reflecting on his initial years working in Europe, he notes that while massive funding was poured into high-level European Commission presentations in Brussels, “they were all platitudes. There was no substance to any of it.” Policy discussions suffered from a fundamental ignorance regarding humanity's actual industrial dependence on oil and its real-world physical depletion.
Looking at historical oil discoveries since 1900, the data shows that the vast bulk of global oil endowment was found decades ago, dominated by giant discoveries like Saudi Arabia's Ghawar field. By plotting discovery and production curves, Michaux demonstrates that the maximum net inventory addition occurred all the way back in 1985, after which global discoveries entered a terminal decline while production surged. Consequently, humanity has consumed more than half of all the oil ever extracted just since 1992.
Citing data from Rystad Energy, Michaux highlights that current discoveries lag far behind consumption, leading to net reserve depletion:
- 81% of currently producing oil fields are actively declining.
- These mature fields decline at an average rate of 5% to 7% per year.
- Among the top 10 producing oil fields globally today, the youngest was discovered in 1976.
- Aside from US conventional crude and Canadian oil sands, virtually all other oil producers peaked around 2018–2019.
- Excluding the United States and Iraq, overall global crude production peaked in 2016.
- Traditional swing suppliers like Saudi Arabia are already in structural decline.
Michaux stresses that this geological backdrop removes any luxury of time: “This is actually what we need to replace and what this is showing is we don't have 50 years to get into this. We really need to get into it now.”
[09:14](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBVmnKuBocc&t=554s) The Squeeze: Economic Viability Windows and Post-COVID Disruption
Turning to monthly supply-demand figures, Michaux points out that global oil production reached an all-time peak in November 2018. Shortly thereafter, the COVID-19 pandemic and resultant economic lockdowns struck, introducing massive analytical noise into the historical time series. Because of this disruption, 2019 stands as the last clean, un-distorted baseline year for energy and material planning. Crucially, despite reduced economic activity in periods, between March 2020 and mid-2022, global demand outpaced actual supply roughly 73% of the time.
```mermaid
flowchart LR
accTitle: The Narrowing Oil Viability Window
accDescr: Economic constraints bounding producer profitability and consumer affordability.
subgraph UpperBound["Consumer Ceiling"]
A["Oil Price Too High"] --> B["Crushes economic growth, drives recessions & demand destruction"]
end
subgraph LowerBound["Producer Floor"]
C["Oil Price Too Low"] --> D["Below extraction & capital costs; producers go insolvent"]
end
UpperBound -.-> E["Narrowing 'Window of Viability'"]
LowerBound -.-> E
```
Michaux examines real inflation-adjusted oil prices through the lens of a narrowing economic corridor: “The oil price needs to be high enough for producers to be economically viable, but low enough for consumers to actually access that oil in terms of in a way that allows growth to happen in the current system.” In his 2019 oil report, he warned that this viability window was pinching shut as high extraction costs clashed with consumer affordability.
Reviewing performance since 2019, he categorizes modern industrial history into distinct, volatile regimes:
1. The 2005 commodity price breakout and structural supply shifts.
2. The post-2008 era, where the global industrial framework was kept functional primarily through massive quantitative easing.
3. The post-2020 era characterized by COVID-19 lockdowns, broken logistical supply chains, and unprecedented volatility.
As the world emerges from the pandemic, Michaux asserts that there is no roadmap for whether conditions can return to normal, providing the central motivation for modeling the material requirements of an alternative, post-fossil-fuel energy system.
[11:15](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBVmnKuBocc&t=675s) Scoping the Direct Replacement of Fossil Fuel Work
Simon Michaux explains that his comprehensive report originally began as a modest 50-page document. However, his review panel repeatedly pushed back on omitted topics, causing the project to expand significantly in scale. The core objective was to determine the physical, industrial tasks currently performed by fossil fuels and evaluate the true scope of useful work required to replace them. Rather than relying on unproven concepts, Michaux assembled a catalog of non-fossil fuel systems that are already industrially stable to serve as direct replacements. From there, he modeled the total electrical power required to perform that work, from charging electric vehicle batteries to synthesizing hydrogen. While his original report scaled up the 2018 energy mix to meet the projected capacity, his updated calculations incorporate newer International Energy Agency (IEA) projections.
The scope of this investigation spans granular data across multiple industrial sectors: vehicle counts broken down by class, battery quantities and sizes, clear criteria for deploying battery-electric systems versus hydrogen fuel cells, and direct comparisons between electric and hydrogen options for both rail networks and maritime shipping fleets. He also factored in the phase-out of fossil-fueled power generation—specifically oil, gas, and coal—and industrial heating. Michaux examined whether expanding nuclear power could solve the deficit, but determined its role is fundamentally constrained. As Michaux summarizes the limitation: “The simple answer to that is we need the nuclear power plant to expand a little bit, but it cannot replace fossil fuels. It will not expand in time, and we have issues of handling spent nuclear fuel at large volumes.” Biofuels, plastics, and synthetic fertilizers were evaluated alongside power generation to create a fully integrated, internally referenced model.
- **Nuclear energy limitations:** Nuclear power cannot be deployed quickly enough to replace fossil fuels, and unresolved waste-handling challenges at scale further restrict its expansion.
- **Alternative industrial feedstocks:** The modeling includes non-fossil pathways for petrochemical derivatives, specifically examining whether biofuels and bioplastics can substitute for existing plastics and fertilizers.
---
[13:23](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBVmnKuBocc&t=803s) Modeling the Replacement Point and Policy Unreality
Michaux outlines his methodological approach, contrasting it sharply with conventional energy transition studies. Standard analyses typically look only one or two years ahead at incremental market adoption, completely ignoring long-range structural realities. Michaux instead modeled the distinct future state when the existing industrial paradigm has been entirely replaced: the point where every power generation system seen on a daily commute is renewable, all vehicles operate on either batteries or hydrogen fuel cells, and economic growth can theoretically resume.
He highlights the deep disconnect between political targets and physical reality, pointing to aggressive policy pledges that collapsed under scrutiny. Specifically, the European Commission announced in 2017 an ambition to replace 100% of the fossil fuel system by 2030—a target Michaux notes is impossible given that 2030 was only eight years away at the time of his lecture. Facing this physical reality, European policymakers quietly backed off to suggest that perhaps only a third of the system would be replaced by 2030, though without articulating what that one-third actually comprised. Michaux explains that by first quantifying the complete, mature replacement system, researchers can finally break down realistic timelines and establish what is practically achievable versus what is sheer fantasy.
```mermaid
flowchart TD
accTitle: System Replacement Modeling Flow
accDescr: Diagram showing the workflow from quantifying current fossil fuel work to calculating technical units and raw mineral demands.
subgraph CurrentSystem["1. Baseline Reality (2018)"]
FFWork["Quantify Useful Work<br/>Done by Fossil Fuels"]
Mix["84.5% Primary Energy from Fossil Fuels<br/>Less than 1% Electric Fleet"]
end
subgraph TechAllocation["2. Non-Fossil Allocation"]
EV["Short-Range Fleet<br/>Battery Electric (BEV)"]
H2["Long-Range Transport<br/>Hydrogen Fuel Cell (FCEV)"]
Buffer["Intermittent Grid Storage<br/>Stationary Batteries"]
end
subgraph ResourceImpact["3. Physical Resource Demands"]
Pwr["Total Electrical Power &<br/>Electrolysis Generation"]
Mining["Raw Mineral Sourcing<br/>(1st Generation via Mining)"]
end
[14:44](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBVmnKuBocc&t=884s) The Genesis of the Study and the Missing Baseline Data
The entire research initiative originated from an informal conversation over coffee in 2018 with management, who casually asked what volume and types of minerals would be needed to supply Europe's planned battery gigafactories. Michaux quips about the hazards of having coffee with leadership, noting that what seemed like a straightforward question quickly unraveled into an exhaustive research journey when he discovered that foundational data was either completely absent or published in formats that could not be cross-referenced or scaled.
To establish the genuine physical scope of replacing internal combustion engines across passenger cars, commercial trucks, railways, commercial shipping, and aviation, Michaux set up four parallel calculations: the United States, Europe, China, and the globe as an aggregate. Gathering Chinese data required extraordinary legwork: a Chinese colleague traveled to China, directly accessed internal government databases, and translated the primary figures into English. Contextualizing these calculations against the 2018 baseline reveals why current supply chains are wholly unprepared: fossil fuels accounted for 84.5% of primary energy, and electric vehicles constituted less than 1% of the global automotive fleet.
Because the replacement infrastructure does not yet exist, circular-economy assumptions fall flat. As Michaux pointed out to European officials: “The first generation, at the very least, has yet to be manufactured, and it will have to be sourced from mining.” This basic reality blindsided Brussels planners who had assumed recycling could supply the required materials. Moreover, because wind and solar are weather-dependent and currently rely on the natural gas grid as a swing buffer, phasing out fossil fuels mandates enormous stationary energy storage. Michaux calculated that the battery storage required to buffer intermittent renewable generation is roughly 30 times larger than the storage needed for the entire electric vehicle fleet.
- **Baseline energy share (2018):** 84.5% of global primary energy was sourced from fossil fuels.
- **EV market penetration (2018):** Less than 1% of the global fleet was electrified.
- **Grid storage buffer:** Phasing out natural gas peaker plants requires stationary battery backup approximately 30 times greater in capacity than the total battery capacity of the EV fleet.
- **Core takeaway:** Michaux highlights the summary box from his report: “Current plans are not large enough in scope. The task before us is much larger than the current paradigm allows for.”
---
[18:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBVmnKuBocc&t=1080s) Vehicle Electrification vs. Hydrogen: Physics and Scaling Realities
Michaux's global calculation evaluated a baseline fleet of 1.4 billion vehicles (noting this is conservative and likely closer to 1.5 or 1.6 billion today) traveling slightly under 16 trillion kilometers annually as of 2018. To his surprise, basic figures like total global fleet size and annual kilometers traveled were absent from existing transition literature, forcing him to assemble the primary estimates himself. He modeled the full transportation fleet under two scenarios—100% battery electric versus 100% hydrogen fuel cell—to expose their comparative mechanical and thermodynamic trade-offs.
```mermaid
flowchart LR
accTitle: Battery Electric vs Hydrogen Trade-offs
accDescr: Visual comparison of mass efficiency and electrical input requirements between battery-electric and hydrogen fuel cell systems.
subgraph MassEfficiency["Mass to Energy Ratio"]
EV_Mass["EV Battery Mass<br/>(3.2x heavier)"]
H2_Mass["Hydrogen Tank Mass<br/>(3.2x lighter for same range)"]
H2_Mass -.->|"Saves payload weight"| EV_Mass
end
subgraph EnergyEfficiency["Generation Electricity Required"]
EV_Elec["Direct Battery Charging<br/>(1.0x baseline power)"]
H2_Elec["Electrolysis Production<br/>(2.5x more electricity)"]
EV_Elec -.->|"More energy-efficient"| H2_Elec
end
```
The engineering comparison revealed two stark mathematical constraints: an electric vehicle battery requires 3.2 times the mass of an equivalent hydrogen fuel tank system to deliver the same energy, meaning a hydrogen fuel cell vehicle goes 3.2 times further per unit of fuel-storage weight. Conversely, because hydrogen is an energy carrier rather than a source, green hydrogen synthesized via water electrolysis requires 2.5 times more electrical energy than charging an equivalent EV battery directly. Balancing these physical trade-offs dictates an operational split:
1. **Short-range urban transport (<100 km):** Passenger cars, delivery vans, and city buses should be battery-electric. Across 14 trillion vehicle-kilometers annually, this fleet requires **65.19 terawatt-hours (TWh)** of batteries. Michaux notes that prominent institutional models such as the World Economic Forum cite battery requirements in mere *gigawatt-hours* (GWh) because they severely underestimated the global vehicle count.
2. **Long-range and heavy freight:** Class 8 heavy commercial vehicles (semi-trailers), intercity rail, and maritime shipping cannot afford the deadweight penalty of massive batteries and must run on hydrogen fuel cells. Meeting this demand requires an annual production of **200 million metric tons of hydrogen**, creating a massive secondary electrical demand for industrial electrolyzers.
Looking beyond ground transport, Michaux notes that the massive electrical load required to synthesize fuel causes the true infrastructure cost to skyrocket. For aviation and petrochemicals, batteries and hydrogen are poorly suited, making biomass and biofuels the only plausible alternative to preserve aviation and produce bioplastics.
- **Global vehicle activity (2018 baseline):** 1.4 billion vehicles traveling approximately 15.9 to 16 trillion kilometers per year.
- **Weight penalty:** A lithium-ion traction battery is 3.2 times heavier than a hydrogen fuel tank of identical energy output.
- **Round-trip thermodynamic penalty:** Generating hydrogen via electrolysis requires 2.5 times more electrical energy than direct battery charging for equivalent transport work.
- **Global battery demand for urban fleet:** 65.19 TWh of stationary and vehicular battery storage (contrasting with mainstream reports projecting only gigawatt-hour requirements).
- **Annual hydrogen requirement for heavy fleet:** 200 million metric tons of green hydrogen per year.
[21:38](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBVmnKuBocc&t=1298s) Boundary Conditions, Environmental Limits, and Uncounted Industrial Energy
Discussing the broader ecological footprint of modern production, Simon Michaux highlights how petrochemical industrial fertilizers are driving severe land degradation, underscoring that human industry is already extracting far too much from the biosphere. To manage this crisis, he argues for a genuine sustainability audit that integrates hard boundary conditions for biodiversity alongside economic sustainability. Michaux points out that this tension is currently playing out in political battles such as the debates in the Finnish Parliament over logging quotas. As Michaux puts it: “The forestry industry here is as powerful as the mining industry in Australia.” There is intense political arm-wrestling over harvest limits because society has yet to establish an agreed framework for what can safely be extracted from nature.
Michaux then shifts to the energy ledger, cautioning that published power-generation requirements for a green transition are systematically underestimated. Most calculations account solely for electricity drawn directly from the utility power grid, completely omitting the enormous volumes of coal and gas consumed on-site as feedstocks and process heat in heavy manufacturing. Incorporating that direct industrial consumption represents a massive accounting effort, meaning the headline electrical figures he presents are decidedly conservative.
- Petrochemical industrial fertilizers cause severe land degradation, signaling that extraction already exceeds ecological thresholds.
- Sustainability audits must enforce dual boundary conditions: economic sustainability and biodiversity sustainability.
- In Finland, intense political conflict surrounds forestry harvest limits, mirroring the political weight of mining in Australia.
- Current transition models capture only grid electricity, ignoring vast amounts of on-site industrial coal and natural gas consumption.
[22:55](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBVmnKuBocc&t=1375s) The 36,000 TWh Requirement and the 586,000 Power Station Challenge
Synthesizing the core tasks needed to eliminate fossil fuels—charging electric vehicle batteries, producing hydrogen for fuel cells, replacing thermal fossil generation, heating buildings, and converting coal-fired steelmaking—yields a minimum global electricity demand of approximately 36,000 terawatt-hours (TWh). Compared to total global electrical generation in 2018 of roughly 26,000 TWh, replacing fossil fuels requires constructing an electrical infrastructure substantially larger than the entire system humanity built over the past century. Furthermore, rough estimates for replacing industrial on-site gas and coal feedstocks suggest another 36,000 TWh could be required on top of that baseline, making the 36,000 TWh target a bare-minimum floor.
```mermaid
flowchart TD
accTitle: Replacement Energy Infrastructure Scale
accDescr: Diagram contrasting the 2018 power station fleet against the projected non-fossil power fleet needed for 36000 TWh.
subgraph CurrentFleet["2018 Power Fleet"]
A["46,000 total power stations<br>(all fuel types)"] --> B["26,000 TWh generation"]
end
subgraph FutureFleet["Target Replacement Fleet"]
C["36,000 TWh baseline demand"] --> D["586,000 new non-fossil stations<br>(average size)"]
D --> E["10x+ increase in total stations"]
end
```
To deliver 36,000 TWh using projected renewable and non-fossil splits, Michaux calculates that the world would need to construct 586,000 new non-fossil power stations of average unit size. The existing global fleet across all fuel types sits at approximately 46,000 power stations, meaning the replacement fleet requires more than a tenfold expansion in physical facilities. Explaining this discrepancy, Michaux emphasizes that renewable generation suffers from a far lower energy return on energy invested (EROI) than traditional fossil assets. As Michaux summarizes: “So, we're talking about making an electrical power system substantially larger than the existing power system with energy that's very expensive and fragile.”
- Baseline non-fossil electrical demand calculation: ~36,000 TWh (compared to ~26,000 TWh total global generation in 2018).
- Preliminary estimates of on-site industrial coal and gas consumption suggest an additional ~36,000 TWh may ultimately be required.
- Current global power station fleet: approximately 46,000 stations.
- Required non-fossil power stations of average size: 586,000 units (>10x current operating fleet).
- Primary structural drivers: low energy return on energy invested (EROI) and low capacity factors of renewable generation assets.
[26:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBVmnKuBocc&t=1560s) Modeling the 2050 Energy Split: Assumptions and Technology Allocations
To model the future technology mix, Michaux relies on long-range 2050 projections published by the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) and the International Energy Agency (IEA), layering on physical boundary constraints derived from his own research. Under this framework, all fossil fuels are completely phased out. Hydroelectric capacity is projected to expand by 115% relative to 2018 output, and nuclear power generation is assumed to double. In contrast, biomass-fired combined heat and power (CHP) is capped at current capacity because harvesting rates already overextend forest ecosystems, making further expansion ecologically unviable.
Geothermal power is assumed to triple globally. In Finland, this includes initiatives to drill geothermal borehole grids spaced every 20 meters across Helsinki to supply district heating and remove building thermal loads from the grid. After accounting for hydro, nuclear, biomass, and geothermal, all remaining required capacity is split equally between solar and wind, in line with IEA projections. Wind is apportioned as 70% onshore and 30% offshore, while solar is divided into 90% photovoltaic (PV) and 10% concentrated solar thermal. Michaux clarifies that these allocations represent the aspirational policy projections of international agencies rather than an assessment of logistical feasibility.
- Fossil fuels: 100% phased out across all sectors.
- Hydroelectric generation: expands by 115% over 2018 levels.
- Nuclear energy: capacity doubles relative to 2018 baseline.
- Biomass CHP: frozen at current levels due to ecological harvesting constraints.
- Geothermal energy: triples globally (including 20-meter borehole networks planned across Helsinki).
- Wind allocation (IEA split): 70% onshore, 30% offshore.
- Solar allocation (IEA split): 90% photovoltaic arrays, 10% concentrated solar thermal.
[28:10](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBVmnKuBocc&t=1690s) Real-World Capacity Factors, Unit Multipliers, and EROI Realities
Evaluating empirical operating data from 2018, Michaux stresses the disparity between theoretical nameplate capacity and actual annual production. While nuclear power serves as the most dependable and dense performer, it depends on an intricate, highly technical value chain that severely constrains rapid scale-up. Conversely, wind and solar arrays across the globe achieved average capacity factors of only about 25% across 2018, remaining idle for roughly 75% of the year due to weather, diurnal cycles, and seasonal shifts.
```mermaid
flowchart LR
accTitle: Power Generation Comparison for 1000 TWh
accDescr: Physical units required to generate 1000 TWh annually across coal, wind, and solar PV.
A["1,000 TWh annual output"] --> B["142 Coal-fired plants"]
A --> C["12,309 Wind arrays<br>(~10 turbines each)"]
A --> D["30,000 Solar PV arrays"]
```
To illustrate what low capacity factors mean for physical infrastructure, Michaux contrasts the hardware required to generate 1,000 TWh of annual electrical output across different asset types. Achieving this output with baseload fossil generation requires 142 average-sized coal-fired power stations. Delivering the identical 1,000 TWh via weather-dependent technologies requires either 30,000 average solar PV installations or 12,309 wind turbine arrays (where each array averages roughly 10 turbines). Every single installation demands raw materials, site civil works, continuous maintenance, and eventual decommissioning. As Michaux warns: “So, renewables have a much lower energy return on energy invested ratio than fossil fuels, and they and the the truth is, they may not be strong enough to power the next industrial era.”
- 2018 actual capacity utilization: wind and solar operated ~25% of the year, sitting idle ~75% of the time.
- Asset requirements to generate 1,000 TWh/year:
- 142 standard coal-fired power plants.
- 12,309 wind turbine arrays (averaging ~10 turbines per array).
- 30,000 utility-scale solar PV installations.
- Each renewable installation requires discrete site fabrication, grid interconnections, recurring maintenance, and end-of-life replacement.
[29:46](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBVmnKuBocc&t=1786s) Grid Balancing Realities and the 548 TWh Storage Buffer
Electrical grids require instantaneous balance between supply and demand to maintain stability and prevent equipment damage. Reviewing generation profiles from Canada, Michaux illustrates that nuclear provides an unmoving, flat baseline, while hydroelectric generation can be throttled only within a narrow operational envelope. Meanwhile, wind and solar fluctuate erratically across hours and days; peak wind surges often arrive during deep valleys in power demand. To keep grids stable today, operators rely on gas-fired peaker plants that throttle up and down at will. Phasing out gas requires a completely new grid-scale buffering mechanism. While flywheels and molten salts are discussed, North American and European planners overwhelmingly expect to rely on stationary chemical battery storage systems.
Intermittency compounds severely across seasons. In Germany, winter solar insolation collapses to a fraction of summer highs, while wind generation swings widely across week-to-week periods. To prevent continuous blackouts in heavy industrial processes like metal smelters, Michaux evaluates the buffer capacity required to bridge extended periods of poor weather and seasonal deficits. Although peer-reviewed energy literature often cites a 12-week buffer as necessary for a full winter, Michaux adopts a conservative four-week window applied strictly to the 72% combined share of wind (38%) and solar (34%). Even under this restrictive assumption, the stationary battery buffer requires 548 TWh of storage capacity. As Michaux observes: “Now, this is the elephant in the room. It it is mentioned in the literature every now and then, but it is not part of the discussions when they pass platitudes amongst themselves when they're talking about the circular economy.”
- Grid stability requires constant balancing: nuclear runs as an inflexible baseline, hydro adjusts within a narrow band, and natural gas currently buffers wind and solar swings.
- German solar insolation demonstrates severe seasonal collapse during winter months alongside week-to-week wind volatility.
- Industrial continuous-load facilities (e.g., smelters) require a minimum 4-week uninterrupted power reserve.
- While literature advocates up to 12 weeks of total system storage for winter, a 4-week buffer for wind (38%) and solar (34%) alone requires 548 TWh of battery capacity.
- The immense raw-material requirement for a 548 TWh stationary battery buffer is systematically omitted from mainstream circular economy policies.
[32:25](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBVmnKuBocc&t=1945s) The True Scale of Grid Buffering and Battery Demand
Many contemporary feasibility studies examine only an isolated slice of the energy transition, missing the systemic picture. To illustrate the scale of stationary storage required for a resilient grid, Simon Michaux points to South Australia's Hornsdale Power Reserve—the famous 100-megawatt battery installation built by Elon Musk. The European Union frequently cites Hornsdale as proof of concept, arguing that because it succeeded in Australia, the model can simply be duplicated across Europe.
```mermaid
flowchart TD
accTitle: Power Storage Buffer Scale Comparison
accDescr: Diagram contrasting the Hornsdale Power Reserve capacity with global 4-week buffer requirements and the EV fleet.
subgraph Hornsdale["Reference Installation"]
H["Hornsdale Power Reserve<br>(100 MW capacity)"]
end
subgraph GlobalBuffer["Global 4-Week Buffer Requirement"]
N["15,635,478 Equivalent Hornsdale Stations"]
end
subgraph Comparison["Relative Market Capacity"]
EV["Global Electric Vehicle Fleet"]
N -->|"~30x capacity of"| EV
end
```
When modeled globally to supply an essential four-week buffer across planetary power grids, the numbers become astronomical. The global power system would require approximately 15,635,478 equivalent installations. That single buffer translates to roughly 30 times the battery capacity of the entire projected global electric vehicle fleet, revealing that the true market demand for batteries dwarfs standard mainstream projections.
- The global grid requires 15,635,478 Hornsdale-scale (100 MW) battery installations to maintain a 4-week power buffer.
- This stationary grid buffer alone represents approximately 30 times the total battery capacity needed for the global EV fleet.
- As Simon Michaux remarks on mainstream energy studies: “A lot of the studies being presented are only a a piece of the pie, and they're or or they've got the very edge of it, and for that reason, they can't that they're actually facing the wrong direction.”
---
[33:29](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBVmnKuBocc&t=2009s) Methodology: Calculating Metals per Generation of Tech
Transitioning from his foundational report into a peer-reviewed research paper, Michaux sets out to compute the total mass of metals necessary to build a single generation of renewable infrastructure capable of completely phasing out fossil fuels. To establish baseline metal intensities, he relies on International Energy Agency (IEA) reports detailing the material contents of individual technology units, alongside IEA market share forecasts for 2040.
These projections encompass evolving market shares across different battery chemistries for light-duty vehicles, heavy-duty commercial vehicles, and utility-scale stationary storage. While Michaux acknowledges that these calculations are relatively crude because they treat broad classes uniformly despite many proprietary variations, he stresses that this level of granularity is more than adequate for estimating macro-level fleet demand. For photovoltaic power, the analysis assumes 100% crystalline silicon panels—representing roughly 90% of the projected 2040 solar market—because reliable material intensity data for alternatives like cadmium telluride (CdTe) could not be verified. From these assumptions, baseline manufacturing quotas were established across electric vehicles, hydrogen fuel-cell heavy transport (trucks, freight rail, maritime vessels), wind turbines, solar panels, and grid buffers.
- Baseline data sources include the International Energy Agency (IEA) 2040 market share and unit metal-intensity reports.
- Solar panel modeling assumes 100% crystalline silicon, matching 90% of projected market volume.
- Technology classes mapped include battery EVs, hydrogen fuel cells for freight rail and maritime vessels, onshore/offshore wind, solar PV, and stationary grid batteries.
---
[35:39](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBVmnKuBocc&t=2139s) Case Study: Estimating Wind Turbine Metal Requirements
To demonstrate the underlying calculation pipeline, Michaux breaks down the methodology applied to wind generation. The workflow begins with total terawatt capacity targets for both onshore and offshore installations. By dividing this required capacity by the actual output delivered by an average plant in 2018 (with an average installed capacity of 37.2 megawatts), the model calculates the number of physical plants required, which is then converted into individual 3-megawatt turbine units.
```mermaid
flowchart LR
accTitle: Wind Turbine Metal Calculation Workflow
accDescr: Step-by-step pipeline from global capacity target to total metal requirement by metal type.
A["Target Capacity (TW)<br>(Onshore & Offshore)"] --> B["Average Plant Output<br>(37.2 MW basis)"]
B --> C["Turbine Count<br>(3 MW unit basis)"]
C --> D["Market Share Split<br>(DFIG, PM, etc.)"]
D --> E["Metal Intensity<br>(kg / MW)"]
E --> F["Total Fleet Metal Demand<br>(by metal type)"]
```
From there, the four primary wind generator configurations projected by the IEA for 2040—including doubly-fed induction generators with gearboxes (GB-DFIG) and permanent magnet systems (PM)—are separated into onshore and offshore market shares. Each configuration carries a specific metal-intensity footprint measured in kilograms per megawatt. By multiplying the unit counts by their respective material footprints and aggregating across types, Michaux derives the final tonnage of each metal needed to manufacture the global wind fleet.
- Average operational plant size benchmarked at 37.2 MW based on 2018 performance data.
- Unit conversions standardized against a 3 MW turbine equivalent.
- Modeling accounts for four primary generator architectures (including gearbox DFIG and permanent magnet generators) split between onshore and offshore marine environments.
- As Simon Michaux explains: “That was the calculation circuit that's been done for each of the systems looked at.”
---
[39:04](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBVmnKuBocc&t=2344s) Total Metal Demand vs. Annual Mining Production
Michaux scales this calculation circuit across all requisite infrastructure: onshore and offshore wind, crystalline silicon solar, newly constructed nuclear plants, hydroelectric facilities, and geothermal installations. For transport, vehicle bodies and hydrogen fuel-cell requirements were evaluated (with platinum accounted for in fuel cells, while other proprietary catalyst data remained inaccessible). Finally, the massive battery requirements for both electric vehicles and stationary grid storage were tabulated across traditional battery metals—lithium, nickel, cobalt, and graphite—alongside copper, manganese, and redox metals.
```
Total Metal Required = Wind + Solar + Nuclear + Hydro + Geothermal + Transport + Batteries
```
Summing every asset yields the total mass of metals demanded to build just one operational generation of post-fossil infrastructure. When matched against global 2019 mining extraction rates reported by the United States Geological Survey (USGS) and the German Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources (BGR)—chosen because 2019 represents the last stable pre-COVID baseline—the results show staggering multi-century and multi-millennial deficits. For example, supplying the vanadium needed for grid-scale vanadium redox flow batteries would require 7,101 years of global mining production at 2019 rates.
- 2019 mining statistics from the USGS and BGR serve as the uncorrupted pre-pandemic baseline.
- Vanadium demand for stationary redox flow batteries requires 7,101 years of 2019 global mining output.
- As Simon Michaux states regarding timelines: “Uh so the idea that we're going to do this in 7 or 8 years is very amusing.”
---
[41:15](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBVmnKuBocc&t=2475s) The Reserve Deficit, Recycling Realities, and Mining Bottlenecks
A common counterargument is that society will simply open more mines. However, comparing total transition metal demand against reported global reserves reveals fundamental physical constraints. For copper, total known global reserves cover only 19.23% of what is needed to manufacture a single generation of renewable technology—meaning more than 80% of required copper has not even been discovered as an economic reserve. For critical battery metals including lithium, cobalt, and graphite, current global reserves represent less than 5% of single-generation requirements.
| Metal Category | Demand vs. Known Global Reserves |
|:--- |:--- |
| **Copper** | Current global reserves cover only **19.23%** of 1st-generation demand |
| **Battery Metals** *(Lithium, Cobalt, Graphite)* | Current global reserves cover **< 5%** of 1st-generation demand |
| **Vanadium** | Exceeds thousands of years of production; massive reserve deficit |
This problem is compounded by product lifecycles: renewable units survive only 8 to 25 years before requiring decommissioning and replacement. While Michaux's ongoing modeling will quantify recycling yields, he estimates recycling will realistically recover perhaps 30% of select metals, which cannot bridge the primary supply gap for the first build-out.
Because lithium-ion chemistries face impossible raw material barriers, grid and transport systems must pivot toward alternatives like sodium-ion or fluoride chemistries. Yet finding new deposits to feed any chemistry faces harsh geological bottlenecks: out of every 1,000 mineral deposits discovered, only one or two ever become operational mines, and developing a newly discovered deposit into an active, producing mine takes between 15 and 20 years.
- Known global copper reserves can deliver only 19.23% of the copper needed for the first generation of equipment.
- Reported reserves for lithium, cobalt, and battery-grade graphite satisfy less than 5% of single-generation requirements.
- Renewable assets degrade within 8 to 25 years, creating continuous replacement demand where recycling can likely provide only around 30% circular yield for select metals.
- Exploration discovery rate: only 1 to 2 out of every 1,000 discovered mineral deposits mature into working commercial mines.
- The lead time from initial mineral discovery to commercial mine production spans 15 to 20 years.
- As Simon Michaux highlights regarding the reserve shortage: “We don't have enough copper for one generation.”
[43:26](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBVmnKuBocc&t=2606s) The Impossibility of Copper Demand and Falling Discovery Rates
Simon Michaux frames the harsh reality of mining economics: for every ten producing mines operating, two or three will inevitably fail due to shifting market conditions. To contextualize the scale of metal extraction needed ahead, he presents historical benchmarks for copper. Prior to 2020, total cumulative global mining from 4000 BC onward amounted to an estimated 700 million tons of copper. Yet under conventional assumptions of continuous economic growth, society expects to mine that identical amount—another 700 million tons—in just the next 22 years. While current reported copper reserves stand at roughly 880 million tons (equivalent to about 30 years of current production), manufacturing merely one single generation of renewable technology units requires an astronomical 4.57 billion tons of copper.
```mermaid
flowchart TD
accTitle: Historical vs Required Copper Production
accDescr: Comparison of historical mined copper, current reserves, and metal requirements for one renewable generation.
subgraph RenewableReq["Renewable Transition"]
D["1st Gen Renewable Hardware<br><b>4,570 Mt (4.57 Bt)</b>"]
E["Next Generation Replacement<br>Repeat cycle every ~20 years"]
end
A -.->|"Equal volume required in 22 yrs"| B
C -->|"Deficit of ~3.69 Bt"| D
D -->|"Short operational lifespan"| E
```
Michaux underscores that this single generation demand is more than six times the entire quantity mined across all human history, and because these technologies degrade, society will somehow have to replicate that extraction roughly twenty years later. He stresses: “The message here is we need to look at this and maybe come up with a different plan.” Making matters worse, global exploration trends over the past 15 years reveal that while exploration expenditure has risen dramatically, the actual number of new copper discoveries has steadily declined. Reality is beginning to bite as geological limits collide with projected consumption.
- Cumulative copper extracted across human history (4000 BC to 2020): ~700 million metric tons.
- Forecast copper required over the next 22 years for standard growth: 700 million metric tons.
- Total reported global copper reserves: 880 million metric tons (~30 years of supply).
- Copper required for one generation of renewable technology: 4.57 billion metric tons (>6× all copper ever mined).
- Discovery trajectory: exploration budgets have increased, but the total number of significant mineral strikes has steadily declined over 15 years.
---
[45:12](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBVmnKuBocc&t=2712s) Minerals as the New Oil and the Planetary Stewardship Bottleneck
Explaining how industrial society reached this bottleneck, Michaux displays a breakdown of all mined metal ores by mass. The overwhelming bulk is iron ore, complemented by a modest segment of common industrial metals such as aluminum, manganese, chromium, copper, and zinc. Tucked away in the corner is a tiny black square representing critical technology metals. For 150 years, global infrastructure was constructed using steel and common metals, powered by cheap fossil fuels. Now, policymakers envision an energy system where “minerals are the new oil,” expecting unprecedented physical volumes to emerge out of that minuscule technology-metal slice. Unlike iron and copper, these technology minerals do not occur in massive bulk deposits, which is the foundational physical problem driving volume shortfalls.
Reviewing the overarching stewardship of Earth, Michaux contrasts societal conditions 500 years ago—a small human population, a vast reservoir of virgin natural resources, and a minor pollution footprint—with today’s industrial ecosystem. Modern society was constructed over a century on the back of oil, the most calorifically dense, inexpensive energy source known, supplemented by cheap credit and seemingly limitless minerals. Today, humanity finds itself in the inverse trap: a massive population, heavily depleted resource reserves, and an enormous pollution stream. Now society attempts to construct a far more complex technological infrastructure with expensive energy, a debt-saturated financial system, and acute mineral shortages in a deteriorating environment. Summarizing the predicament, Michaux observes: “So at this point I'm going to say this is probably not going to go as planned.”
---
[47:40](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBVmnKuBocc&t=2860s) Core Conclusions: An Energy- and Minerals-Blind Industrial Ecosystem
Delivering his synthesis, Michaux points out that replacing fossil fuels requires generating at least 36,000 terawatt-hours of additional non-fossil power, translating into roughly 586,000 new power stations—more than ten times the current global utility fleet. Because wind and solar are intermittent, establishing a standard four-week buffer requires 548 terawatt-hours of battery capacity, which is roughly 30 times larger than the entire projected global electric vehicle fleet's storage requirements. The task is vastly harder than anticipated: renewable systems suffer from a substantially lower Energy Return on Energy Invested (EROEI) than fossil fuels and may not possess the net energy density needed to run industrial society. Simultaneously, declining mineral ore grades force operators to expend exponentially more energy per unit of recovered metal just as energy supplies turn inelastic and expensive.
```mermaid
flowchart TD
accTitle: Systemic Challenges of the Green Energy Transition
accDescr: Compounding bottlenecks in power generation, grid buffering, mineral extraction, and industrial assumptions.
subgraph PowerAndBuffer["Power & Storage Demands"]
G1["Additional Non-Fossil Power<br>>36,000 TWh"]
G2["586,000 New Power Stations<br>(>10x current fleet)"]
G3["4-Week Grid Battery Buffer<br>548 TWh (~30x EV fleet)"]
G1 --> G2
G1 --> G3
end
subgraph MiningConstraints["Geological & Energy Limits"]
M1["Declining Ore Grades"]
M2["Escalating Energy Input per Unit Metal"]
M3["Lower EROEI of Renewables"]
M1 --> M2
M3 -.->|"Inelastic, expensive power"| M2
end
subgraph IndustrialBlindness["Institutional Blindness"]
B1["Minerals Blindness & Energy Blindness"]
B2["Assumption of Infinite Growth on Finite Earth"]
B3["Renaissance in Exploration vs Lack of Time"]
B1 --> B2
B2 --> B3
end
Michaux critiques the broader economic mindset for assuming ongoing technological breakthroughs will effortlessly extract scarce resources without understanding deposit mineralogy. Technological advancement in mining is slow, capital-intensive, and historically reliant on massive economies of scale to stay profitable. The root problem is systemic: “So the snapshot answer is our industrial ecosystem is minerals blind as well as energy blind.” While nuclear power remains vital, it cannot physically scale rapidly enough to serve as the sole replacement; similarly, biofuels are needed for aviation and petrochemical feedstocks but cannot replace total petroleum demand. As a result, alternative battery chemistries must be pursued, metals will drastically appreciate in market value, and an exploration renaissance is inevitable—though society lacks the long lead time required to explore, permit, and construct new mines. Concluding his lecture, Michaux offers a Finnish thank you: “Kiitos, which is Finnish for thank you. So, questions.”
- Additional non-fossil power generation required: >36,000 TWh.
- Additional power generation facilities required: 586,000 units (>10× existing infrastructure).
- Grid buffer requirement (4-week supply): 548 TWh of battery storage (~30× global EV fleet demand).
- Structural bottlenecks: lower EROEI in renewables, falling ore grades, and slow, capital-heavy mining innovation cycles.
- Institutional flaws: current industrial planning does not account for mineral physical limits or non-linear scaling constraints.
---
[50:48](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBVmnKuBocc&t=3048s) Q&A: The Viability of E-Kerosene, Aviation Physics, and Nuclear Fusion
The seminar transitions to a Q&A session facilitated by the host, taking questions alternatively from online viewers and the room. An audience member named Steve speaks up, describing the presentation as “fantastic talk and terrifying at the same time,” admitting concern for the future his three daughters face. Steve asks two core questions: first, whether synthetic e-kerosene derived from green hydrogen could resolve the aviation fuel dilemma; second, given the vast capital entering nuclear fusion, whether fusion could solve the looming energy supply crisis.
Michaux addresses aviation fuels by explaining that his research deliberately focused on concepts supported by defensible, hard technical data rather than speculative promises. While synthetic e-kerosene can technically be synthesized via hydrogen processing, establishing the upstream green hydrogen infrastructure is an extraordinary logistical hurdle in its own right, before factoring in transportation and storage inefficiencies. On aviation design, liquid fuels remain mandatory due to basic aeronautical geometry. Gaseous or liquid hydrogen requires bulky, pressurized cylindrical tanks that cannot physically fit into standard aircraft wing cavities. Moving fuel storage into the passenger cabin drastically diminishes payload capacity, rendering mass commercial transport non-viable. Furthermore, current electric planes remain restricted to very small aircraft carrying negligible passenger loads over short regional distances, with no pathway to transport 500 passengers across 8,000 kilometers.
Turning to nuclear fusion, Michaux acknowledges its promise while noting the longstanding running joke: “So fusion has always sort of been like 10 years away for the last 50 years.” While commending the engineering feats achieved so far, he cautions that even if laboratory breakeven were conquered immediately, transitioning from a scientific demonstration to an industrially viable, commercialized reactor fleet takes decades. By comparison, standard coal-fired power stations take five to six years to build using established engineering workflows, whereas industrial fusion deployment would realistically take 20 to 30 years minimum, leaving society constrained by lack of time. He summarizes his analytical threshold: “I like the idea of fusion, but you've actually got to show me a viable industrial scale units before I can actually include it in a study like this.” He notes similar developmental delays apply to generation IV fission reactors.
- Synthetic e-kerosene requires a massive prerequisite hydrogen production, storage, and transport ecosystem that is logistically challenging.
- Hydrogen storage geometry prevents wing storage, requiring cylindrical cabin tanks that severely compromise passenger capacity and payload economics.
- Current electric aviation is restricted to small, low-capacity craft incapable of long-haul passenger operations (e.g., carrying 500 passengers across 8,000 km).
- Nuclear fusion remains decades away from commercial utility-scale deployment due to severe engineering hurdles and multi-decade build-out timelines.
[54:30](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBVmnKuBocc&t=3270s) Methodology, Electric Vehicle Mileage, and Omitted Materials
Simon Michaux addresses questions about his methodology and boundary conditions. He notes that while nuclear energy was incorporated into the modeling simulations, he had hoped to include thorium fuel cycles but was unable to obtain the necessary data to complete that analysis.
Turning to how he determined battery capacity requirements, Michaux explains that he performed a backward calculation starting from the global fleet size and vehicle classifications. He estimated the annual mileage across classes, calculated the power consumption per kilometer or per 100 kilometers for an equivalent electric vehicle (such as an EV passenger car), and derived the required electrical power demand:
```mermaid
flowchart LR
accTitle: Bottom-Up Vehicle Fleet Calculation
accDescr: Diagram tracing the reverse calculation from vehicle counts to electrical demand.
subgraph FleetData["Fleet Data"]
A["Global Vehicle Count & Fleet Size"]
B["Estimated Annual Kilometers Traveled"]
end
subgraph DemandModel["Demand Model"]
C["Power Consumption Rate (per 100 km)"]
D["Total Electrical Power & Battery Capacity"]
end
A --> B
B --> C
C --> D
```
He freely acknowledges the limitations of this bottom-up approach, emphasizing its straightforward nature: “It didn't include any of the sophistications of energy of charging. It was actually quite a a crude calculation.” Yet despite the simplicity, Michaux points out that when his calculations underwent external auditing, the auditors could neither invalidate his methodology nor suggest viable improvements.
Michaux then addresses an audience question regarding whether civil works—such as the massive concrete foundations and reinforcing steel for wind turbines—were accounted for in his material projections. He confirms they were deliberately left out. Although he gathered preliminary data on cement and rebar, his review panel found the data inconsistent across regions and technologies, prompting him to omit them to preserve data integrity. As a result, his published figures underestimate the physical requirements, meaning the real transition will require even more material than stated.
When asked how governments might respond when power and energy prices inevitably surge, Michaux responds with blunt skepticism: “I suppose they'll have another meeting. And uh maybe we'll release a memo. I don't know. I'm very cynical about what they might or might not do. They're not they're not that smart.”
[56:22](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBVmnKuBocc&t=3382s) Engaging Policy Makers and the Physics of Economic Scale
Michaux describes a workshop he recently hosted at the Geological Survey of Finland (GTK) to break through bureaucratic inertia. He convened approximately 30 leaders spanning the Finnish Parliament, industry, and academia into a single room. Alongside resource analyst Nate Hagens, Michaux delivered an unvarnished briefing on upcoming material bottlenecks. Following lunch, he challenged the group directly:
> “And they went off to lunch, but when they came back from lunch, I told them there was no such thing as a free lunch, and we went into a workshop. And so I gave them the problem and made them fix it.”
Although the attendees could not solve the resource puzzle during the workshop, the exercise forced a frank and open discussion on mineral constraints, demonstrating that smaller, agile nations like Finland are beginning to confront reality faster than larger blocs. Across Europe, leaders are waking up to supply shortages as they face real-world domestic production targets. Despite presenting these sobering conclusions to varied political audiences, Michaux notes that not one critic has offered a coherent counter-argument or invalidated his empirical figures.
Michaux reflects on the fundamental thermodynamic vulnerabilities facing massive geopolitical superpowers such as the United States, China, Germany, and France. Viewing economies through an ecological and biological lens, he stresses that structural scale and complexity directly depend on net energy availability: “If the energy reduces, the system must shrink in size and it has to become less complex. So we might see these large economies balkanize as a consequence of a low energy future.” Because political leaders are generally unable to digest such concepts upfront, they will have to experience the contractions firsthand before seeking guidance.
When asked whether his projections accounted for industrial energy flexibility or demand-side management, Michaux clarifies that he ran a baseline, unadjusted calculation. He designed the report as an open benchmark for others to build upon: “The idea is that someone's going to pick up my report and say, 'Brave attempt, but we can do better.' And then someone's going to actually do a more sophisticated calculation or a series of works.”
[59:24](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBVmnKuBocc&t=3564s) Audience Q&A: Tailings Dams, Environmental Fallout, and Limits to Growth
Neville Plint, Director of the Sustainable Minerals Institute, addresses Michaux, thanking him for quantifying data that exposes how detached policymakers are from physical reality. Plint observes that mainstream decarbonization strategies rely on ungrounded optimism: “I've now put a box in all my presentations that I call the miracle box and it happens in about 2040 and suddenly we we just flicker across into into renewables.” Plint poses two critical questions:
- What are the environmental consequences and rehabilitation burdens of massively expanding mining operations—such as global copper mines—as examined by the Complex Orebodies Program at SMI?
- How must global consumption patterns change, and who will be forced to reduce demand, rather than merely assuming an identical one-for-one substitution of fossil technologies with renewable hardware?
Michaux answers by dismantling the common assumption that mining tailings dams can bypass primary extraction. While he conducts research on tailings re-processing, he stresses that the high-grade, commercially viable material was extracted long ago; tailings cannot match the volumes required to replace conventional open pits and underground mines. Regarding the broader ecological damage, Michaux warns of unprecedented disruptions, even as he notes that net energy constraints will likely halt industrial overexpansion before it peaks:
> “I think there's going to come a point when mining is going to eclipse industrial agriculture in its impact on uh life systems on the planet if we keep going. I don't think we will keep going cuz we don't have the energy. Energy is the master resource.”
Addressing consumption, Michaux recalls pushback during a presentation to Wilton Park (which reports to the UK Foreign Office and House of Lords), where participants demanded solutions rather than just warnings. In response, he published an alternative framework, arguing that the circular economy in its present conceptual form is impractical. Addressing overconsumption requires changing our fundamental social contract and throwing out deliberate obsolescence: “At the moment we design them to wear out so we can buy them again. And they're not designed to be recycled. So they're designed to be thrown away.” Because consumption debates readily veer from empirical analysis into emotional territory, Michaux acknowledges he has largely avoided prescribing social policy in his technical reports.
Finally, attendee Sam joins the floor, commenting that reading Michaux's data-rich report a second time remains “just as terrifying” as the first. Sam compares the current warnings to the 1972 Club of Rome *The Limits to Growth* report, recalling how its authors erred by assuming reported mineral reserves represented the totality of Earth's deposits, predicting widespread depletion by the year 2000. Sam begins asking how Michaux's data avoids conflating reported reserves with ultimate geological resources, setting up a fundamental challenge to the global energy transition plan.
[01:04:57](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBVmnKuBocc&t=3897s) Limits to Growth and the Need to Shrink the System
An audience member challenges Assoc Prof Simon Michaux, noting that his research directly confronts entrenched industrial plans, economic positions, and deeply held ideologies, which inevitably invites vicious attacks. Pointing out that pushback seems to have already begun, the questioner asks Michaux two things: what his plan is for handling this inevitable blowback, and how his findings connect to the classic *Limits to Growth* debate.
Michaux responds by reflecting on the original *The Limits to Growth* model and its 2008 30-year update, which mapped real-world data from 1970 to 2000 against its "standard run." The observed data tracked the projected curves closely, showing that the model was conceptually sound. The only major failing of *The Limits to Growth* was timing: because trends unfold over a century, predicting the exact decade of collapse is nearly impossible. Michaux explains that his own calculations take a very simple, direct approach: calculating how much raw metal would be required if our goal is to replace the existing fossil-fuel industrial system unit-for-unit with renewable technologies.
Because the required volumes of minerals are physically unobtainable, the conclusion is straightforward: society will not replicate the current scale of technology. “So the idea of say growth economics for example is about to be phased out whether we like it or not,” Michaux explains, noting that consumerism, materialism, and their underlying social structures will have to be abandoned. The entire purpose of his report is to demonstrate the fatal flaws of the existing paradigm so that society can establish an honest baseline of physical boundary conditions and build a realistic plan.
```mermaid
flowchart TD
accTitle: Paradigm Shift in Resource Consumption
accDescr: Flowchart illustrating the limits of current growth economics and the required shift toward realistic boundary conditions.
subgraph Current ["Current Economic Model"]
A["Infinite Growth & Consumerism"] --> B["Attempt 1:1 Replacement of Fossil Fleet"]
B --> C["Severe Metals & Mineral Deficit"]
end
subgraph Transition ["Physical Reality"]
C --> D["Failure of Full-Scale Deployment"]
D --> E["Phase Out Growth Economics"]
end
subgraph Future ["Emerging Paradigm"]
E --> F["Define Real Boundary Conditions"]
F --> G["Shrink System & Deploy Fewer Tech Units"]
end
```
- In 2008, an update to *The Limits to Growth* verified that actual global resource and industrial trends from 1970 to 2000 closely matched the original 1972 standard run scenario.
- Michaux stresses that rather than guessing exact timelines, his research quantifies the literal metal mass needed to substitute the current machinery of industrial civilization.
- Because a 1:1 hardware replacement is mathematically impossible, humanity will be forced to manufacture far fewer technology units and significantly downscale industrial throughput.
---
[01:07:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBVmnKuBocc&t=4020s) Institutional Pushback, GTK Mandate, and "Escape Plan" Frontiers
When asked about the backlash he has personally experienced, Michaux acknowledges there have been "a few screams of pain," but notes that critics have struggled to mount effective counterarguments because his work relies directly on blue-chip industry data: “In fact I've used their data.” Most institutional pushback has amounted to patronizing scolding—amounting to little more than telling him, "you're a very naughty boy. Could you please stop doing that?"
Crucially, his employer—the Geological Survey of Finland (GTK)—fully backs his research. Michaux secured their support by laying out a blunt future scenario: by 2024 or 2025, European automakers and battery manufacturers facing crippling supply bottlenecks will demand answers from geological surveys as to why no one warned them. Because Finland holds the largest battery-mineral portfolio among European surveys, GTK would have been the first organization targeted for failing to sound the alarm. Recognizing this risk, management granted him a free mandate to investigate the bottleneck independently.
Even so, Michaux maintains an "escape plan" of backup research projects should the politics around renewable energy policy become untenable:
1. **Soil Regeneration and Agricultural Mineral Balance**: Current industrial farming practices degrade the land rapidly—sterilizing roughly 0.8 cubic meters of soil for every bushel of wheat brought to market. Michaux envisions GTK collaborating with biological institutions like Luke (Natural Resources Institute Finland) or the Natural Resources Research Institute (NRRI) to restore soil mineral balances and revitalize agricultural food webs.
2. **Paleoclimate Decoupling**: Analyzing climate records over tens or hundreds of thousands of years to mathematically isolate and decouple industrial emissions from natural baseline climate variations.
3. **The Minerals Atlas**: A value-chain tracing framework using analytical spectra from X-ray fluorescence (XRF) and X-ray diffraction (XRD) to classify and track mineral-to-metal flows through successive manufacturing stages.
Michaux remarks humorously that he has not yet needed this exit strategy: “If I was going to get shot at, it would have happened by now.”
---
[01:10:26](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBVmnKuBocc&t=4226s) Carbon Capture Realities and Seminar Conclusion
The session moderator steps in to wrap up the event due to time constraints, noting that several questions remain online and encouraging participants to contact Michaux directly. Before closing, the host poses a final question: what is the long-term viability of carbon capture and storage (CCS), given its enormous theoretical storage capacity but finite limits?
Michaux explains that while CCS processes function reliably in small-scale laboratory and pilot demonstrations, serious questions remain regarding net energy efficiency, energy return on investment (EROI), and parasitic energy loads: “And like everything else, it works on small on a small scale, but is it viable in terms of the effort that that you put in as compared to the effort you get out?” Constructing and operating CCS infrastructure at a planetary scale consumes massive amounts of energy and carbon itself. The technology is only partially developed, and scaling it to make a meaningful dent in emissions runs directly into the same constraint that plagues the broader transition: society is simply running out of time. He welcomes anyone to prove his skepticism wrong with hard data.
The host thanks Michaux for an engaging, wide-ranging presentation, expressing regret that the discussion could not take place in person to run even longer. In closing, the host announces the following week's seminar at the lecture theatre: a team from Mintek in South Africa, led by Dr. Mehdi Safari, presenting on recent technological assessments and developments in fine and coarse particle flotation systems.
## Notable quotes
> [47:40](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBVmnKuBocc&t=2860s) So the snapshot answer is our industrial ecosystem is minerals blind as well as energy blind. — Simon Michaux
> [56:22](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBVmnKuBocc&t=3382s) If the energy reduces, the system must shrink in size and it has to become less complex. So we might see these large economies balkanize as a consequence of a low energy future. — Simon Michaux
> [22:55](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBVmnKuBocc&t=1375s) So, we're talking about making an electrical power system substantially larger than the existing power system with energy that's very expensive and fragile. — Simon Michaux
> [01:04:57](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBVmnKuBocc&t=3897s) So the idea of say growth economics for example is about to be phased out whether we like it or not. — Assoc Prof Simon Michaux
> [09:14](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBVmnKuBocc&t=554s) The oil price needs to be high enough for producers to be economically viable, but low enough for consumers to actually access that oil in terms of in a way that allows growth to happen in the current system. — Simon Michaux
## Mentioned
Simon Michaux, Katerina, Sam, Dr. Mehdi Safari, Neville Plint, Nate Hagens, Elon Musk, Julius Kruttschnitt Mineral Research Centre (JKMRC), Sustainable Minerals Institute (SMI), University of Queensland (UQ), Queensland University of Technology (QUT), Geological Survey of Finland (GTK), University of Liège, Luke (Natural Resources Institute Finland), Natural Resources Research Institute (NRRI), Mintek, World Bank, European Commission, European Union, Finnish Parliament, UK Foreign Office, House of Lords, Wilton Park, Club of Rome, World Economic Forum, Rystad Energy, International Energy Agency (IEA), International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), United States Geological Survey (USGS), German Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources (BGR), Hornsdale Power Reserve, The Limits to Growth, Ghawar oil field, Minerals Atlas, Complex Orebodies Program, Ian Morley Prize
## Video description
The quantity of metal required to make just one generation of renewable tech units to replace fossil fuels, is much larger than first thought. Current mining production of these metals is not even close to meeting demand. Current reported mineral reserves are also not enough in size. Most concerning is copper as one of the flagged shortfalls. Exploration for more at required volumes will be difficult, with this seminar addressing these issues.
Associate Professor Simon Michaux of the Geological Survey of Finland argues that phasing out fossil fuels through a direct, unit-for-unit replacement with renewable hardware is physically unachievable due to severe mineral shortages, low energy returns, and unprecedented grid-buffering requirements.
Power Generation Scale and Capacity Factor Realities (22:55)
Phasing out fossil fuels requires replacing the actual industrial work they perform, which Michaux calculates demands a minimum baseline of 36,000 terawatt-hours of non-fossil electricity—well exceeding total global electricity generation of roughly 26,000 terawatt-hours in 2018. Because this baseline excludes on-site coal and gas used directly as industrial feedstock and process heat in heavy manufacturing, actual requirements could run substantially higher.
The 548 TWh Grid Storage Buffer (28:10)
Because wind and solar averaged capacity factors of only about 25% across 2018, delivering 1,000 terawatt-hours annually requires 12,309 wind turbine arrays or 30,000 utility-scale solar PV installations, compared to 142 conventional coal-fired power stations. Furthermore, modern grids rely on throttling natural gas plants to buffer fluctuations; phasing out gas necessitates vast stationary storage.
Severe Geological and Mining Reserve Deficits (29:46)
To bridge extended seasonal collapses in solar and wind output, Michaux models a conservative four-week buffer covering the 72% combined wind-and-solar generation share, requiring 548 terawatt-hours of battery capacity. Globally, this is equivalent to roughly 15.6 million 100-megawatt Hornsdale Power Reserve installations, or approximately 30 times the total battery storage needed for the entire projected electric vehicle fleet.
Transport Trade-Offs and Exploration Bottlenecks (39:04)
Calculating the total metal demand to construct a single generation of renewable technology reveals catastrophic deficits against both annual mining output and known economic reserves. Grid-scale vanadium flow batteries would require 7,101 years of 2019 global vanadium extraction. Known global copper reserves cover only 19.23% of the 4.57 billion tons required for one generation of hardware, while lithium, cobalt, and battery-grade graphite reserves cover less than 5% of single-generation needs.
Limits to Growth and System Contraction (18:00)
Transport fleet modeling shows distinct thermodynamic constraints: battery-electric systems are efficient for short urban trips under 100 kilometers, but hydrogen fuel cells save critical payload mass in long-range freight despite requiring 2.5 times more primary electricity for electrolysis. Bridging mineral deficits by opening new mines faces long lead times, as only one or two in a thousand discoveries become operating mines over a 15- to 20-year development cycle amid declining discovery rates.
Michaux concludes that society cannot replicate current industrial and consumption scale on renewable technologies alone, necessitating a transition away from growth-focused consumerism toward hard ecological and energetic boundary conditions. His model omits concrete and structural rebar civil works due to regional data variance, and he acknowledges that unproven technologies like commercial nuclear fusion and planetary carbon capture will not deploy quickly enough to bridge immediate fossil depletion timelines.
## Background
本内容由昆士兰大学可持续矿产研究所（Sustainable Minerals Institute UQ）于 2022 年 8 月 19 日在 YouTube 平台上发布。视频记录了芬兰地质调查局的 Simon Michaux 副教授受邀所作的学术研讨会，主题聚焦于制造替换化石燃料的第一代可再生能源技术装备所需的庞大金属用量，并指出当前矿业产能与探明储量（尤其是铜等关键金属）存在巨大硬缺口。
## TL;DR
Simon Michaux 副教授通过详实的自下而上工程模型，系统测算了彻底替代化石燃料所需的技术单元规模及金属消耗量。研究发现，仅为平抑风电和光伏的间歇性波动配置 4 周的电网储能缓冲，就需要高达 548 TWh 的固定电池容量，规模是全球电动汽车电池总需求的 30 倍。此外，制造单代绿色设备所需的铜等基础金属，远超人类数千年来的累计开采量及已知地下探明储量。Michaux 指出，现代社会不仅存在“能源盲”，更深陷“矿物盲”，依赖无限增长的消费主义经济模式必将撞上物理边界，整个工业系统未来或将被迫收缩与去中心化。
## Atmosphere & style
整场研讨会充满了一种冷峻、清醒且带有黑色幽默的末世警示氛围。Michaux 从芬兰凌晨两点远程连线，操着一口务实而犀利的口吻，将一串串惊人的宏观数据平实道出，既有工程师拆解物理常识的笃定，又带有一种旁观政策制定者盲目狂热时的调侃与无奈。观众在震撼与不安之间屏息聆听，互动环节甚至有人直言内容令人“叹服又恐惧”，整场讲座仿佛一场刺破绿色转型幻象、直面残酷物理现实的硬核思想冷水澡。
## Bulletin
- [41:15](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBVmnKuBocc&t=2475s) 制造仅第一代全面替代化石能源的绿色基础设施所需的金属总量远超已知储量：全球铜已知储量仅能满足约 19.23% 的单代需求，锂、钴、石墨储量均不足需求的 5%。
- [29:46](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBVmnKuBocc&t=1786s) 摆脱化石燃料调峰后，仅按极度保守的 4 周冬季电网储能缓冲计算，全球需配置 548 TWh 固定储能容量，约为全部电动汽车车队电池总需求的 30 倍（相当于 1560 万座南澳 100MW 储能电站）。
- [05:58](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBVmnKuBocc&t=358s) 人类历史开采全部石油中有一半在 1992 年后消耗，81% 的常规油田已进入减产衰退期；若剔除美国致密油与伊拉克增量，全球石油常规产能早在 2016 年便已见顶。
- [23:05](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBVmnKuBocc&t=1385s) 可再生能源能源回报率（EROEI）过低且年均有效运行率仅约 25%，年发电 1,000 TWh 需 12,309 个风电阵列或 30,000 个光伏阵列，替代化石能源需新建 58.6 万座新型发电站，是现有全网电站总数的 10 倍以上。
## Key takeaways
- [02:11](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBVmnKuBocc&t=131s) 工业生态系统的金属与能源价格早在 2005 年就发生了脱钩大失控（blowout），表明当前工业体系并非面临未来危机，而是早在 17 年前就已步入结构性断裂期。
- [09:14](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBVmnKuBocc&t=554s) 石油工业的可行性窗口正迅速闭合，油价长期在消费者承受不起与生产者无法盈利的极端间摇摆，缺乏 50 年的从容转型过渡期。
- [15:42](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBVmnKuBocc&t=942s) 第一代可再生能源装备无法依赖循环回收，所有基础金属与矿石必须 100% 依赖新采矿业开采，这直接打破了政策决策层所设想的闭环循环经济幻觉。
- [18:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBVmnKuBocc&t=1080s) 基于能量密度与转化效率的物理分工，城市短途交通应全面由电池驱动（需 65.19 TWh 电池），而重卡、货运铁路与海运等长途重载则需转向氢燃料电池（年需 2 亿吨氢气）。
- [21:38](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBVmnKuBocc&t=1298s) 为完全替代化石燃料承担的直接发电与工业有用功，全球非化石电力基准需求至少为 36,000 TWh，若计入重工业现场消耗的直接热能与原料，负荷将进一步翻倍。
- [29:46](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBVmnKuBocc&t=1786s) 由于可再生能源间歇性以及电网必须毫秒级实时供需平衡，剔除天然气调峰后配置 4 周的冬季备用缓冲是避免重工业电网硬瘫痪的极简底线。
- [38:47](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBVmnKuBocc&t=2327s) 按 2019 年矿业实际开采速度测算，仅制造支撑电网储能的全钒液流电池，就需要消耗整整 7,101 年的全球钒年产量。
- [43:26](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBVmnKuBocc&t=2606s) 过去数千年人类累计开采约 7 亿吨铜，而制造一代替代化石燃料的可再生设备需 45.7 亿吨铜（超历史总开采量 6 倍），且近 15 年来全球铜矿勘探发现率断崖式下滑。
- [41:15](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBVmnKuBocc&t=2475s) 矿石品位持续下滑与高能耗开采形成恶性循环，地质勘探中每发现 1,000 个矿床仅有 1-2 个能建成矿山，且新矿投产周期长达 15-20 年，无法匹配紧迫的脱碳时钟。
- [45:10](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBVmnKuBocc&t=2710s) 过去 150 年的工业体系建立在大宗铁矿与化石燃料之上，锂、钴等技术金属在地壳中赋存极微，无法像大宗矿物一样无限量且低成本地扩张产出。
- [01:01:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBVmnKuBocc&t=3660s) 尾矿库二次再选在能量投入产出比上极为低效，无法弥补初级硬岩矿产缺口，单纯指望技术微调无法填补万亿级金属赤字。
- [56:35](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBVmnKuBocc&t=3395s) 若净能源供给不可逆地萎缩，依据系统生态学，中美欧等超级经济体将不得不降低自身体系复杂度并走向巴尔干化与去中心化收缩。
- [01:04:57](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBVmnKuBocc&t=3897s) 人类根本无法完成等体量替换现有化石工业体系的工程任务，必须废除计划性报废并摒弃以无限扩张消费为导向的传统经济学模型。
- [50:39](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBVmnKuBocc&t=3039s) 航空电子煤油需耗费天量氢能基建且物流损耗巨大，而核聚变与第四代裂变堆面临数十年商用工程化壁垒，无法在当前转型窗口期内提供即时救赎。
## Detailed walkthrough
### [00:03](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBVmnKuBocc&t=3s) 开场介绍与演讲嘉宾背景
昆士兰大学（University of Queensland）可持续矿产研究所（Sustainable Minerals Institute）JKMRC 举办的周五晨间系列研讨会如期召开，本次讲座采用现场（演讲厅）与线上结合的形式。主持人 Katerina 代表主办方向所有原住民土地托管者致敬，随后向听众隆重介绍了本期主讲人 Simon Michaux 副教授。
Simon Michaux 目前任职于芬兰地质调查局（GTK，位于赫尔辛基）的循环经济解决方案部门，担任地质冶金学副教授。他的学术根基与昆士兰大学渊源颇深：本科毕业于昆士兰科技大学物理与地质学专业，随后在昆士兰大学 JKMRC 取得采矿工程博士学位，并于 2006 年荣获 Ian Morley 奖。他在澳大利亚采矿业的私营部门拥有超过 18 年的研发经验，曾在比利时列日大学进行了为期 3 年的循环经济与工业回收研究，并在加入 GTK 当前部门前从事过矿产情报（minerals intelligence）工作。
Michaux 的长期研究目标是推动循环经济转型为更具实用性的工业生态系统，以应对“技术矿物短缺”与“摆脱化石燃料转型”这两大交织挑战。Katerina 特别提及，为了这场研讨会，身在芬兰的 Michaux 是在当地时间凌晨两点连线出席，对其敬业精神表达了由衷谢意。
---
### [02:11](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBVmnKuBocc&t=131s) 工业生态系统的脉搏：金属价格与能源异动
Michaux 接过麦克风后切入正题。他指出今天的报告结合了两项研究：一部分是此前发布的报告，另一部分则是正在发表过程中的新成果，论文题为《完全替代化石燃料所需替代能源电力系统额外容量的评估》（Assessment of extra capacity required of alternative energy electrical power systems to completely replace fossil fuels）。在正式展示核心模型前，他先亮出了几组历史走势规律——这些数据正是他最初用来游说管理层立项支持本研究的关键论据。
```mermaid
flowchart LR
accTitle: 工业生态系统金属与经济断层链
accDescr: 展示从金本位脱钩到2005年金属价格失控的结构性演变
subgraph Phase1["货币与能源脱钩 (1970年代)"]
A["1971: 美元脱钩黄金<进入法定货币时代>"] --> B["1973: 第一次石油危机<以印钞应对成本上升>"]
end
subgraph Phase2["结构性裂变 (2000年代)"]
C["2001: 基准稳定期"] --> D["2005: 金属价格全面失控 (Blowout)"]
D --> E["2008: 全球金融危机<重大经济修正无法消除波动>"]
end
Phase1 -.-> Phase2
```
世界银行持续跟踪基本金属、贵金属以及能源（石油、天然气、煤炭）的价格变动，借此评估整个工业生态系统的健康状况。Michaux 将这些金属价格以 2001 年 12 月为基准（设为 100）进行归一化重叠，结果揭示出：在经历了一段相对稳定的时期后，整个体系在 2005 年左右发生了剧烈的大失控（blowout）。
“The metal price is the handover point between those who extract metals from the ground and turn it into minerals from the ground turn them into metals and those who buy those metals and manufacture goods. So you're looking at the heartbeat of the industrial ecosystem.” Michaux 强调。
这种异动绝非短期投机，其实质是整个系统的结构性断层。2008 年的重大经济修正完全未能消除潜在的剧烈波动，说明工业生态系统的演变早从约 17 年前（2005年）便已开始，并非未来才会出现的虚幻风险。进一步将数据基准拉回至 1970 年 1 月后，可以清楚看到两次系统性裂震：
- 第一次发生在 1970 年代初美国货币与黄金脱钩，随后爆发了 1973 年的石油禁运，各国通过印钞转为法定货币（fiat currency）掩盖成本；
- 第二次则是 2005 年采矿业基本金属与能源价格同步出现的结构性大暴走。
---
### [05:58](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBVmnKuBocc&t=358s) 石油开采现状与资源枯竭真相
Michaux 谈到当前欧洲与全球的脱碳雄心时表达了深刻担忧。七八年前他常到布鲁塞尔参加欧盟委员会的会议，目睹了海量资金砸入这些高端演示文稿中，但其内容基本都是“陈词滥调，毫无实质内容”。决策层高呼淘汰化石燃料并全面替代，却对现代文明对化石燃料的真实依赖度和脆弱性缺乏最基本的客观认知。
从 1900 年至今的全球石油勘探史来看，绝大多数具有开采价值的巨型油田均在数十年前就被发现了（其中包括沙特阿拉伯的加瓦尔油田/Ghawar，人类历史上已知的最大油田）。若分析累计百分比曲线，红线（勘探发现）早在数十年前见顶，蓝线（实际开采量）仍在爬升，两者之差（绿线）代表的净库存增加早在 1985 年就已迎来峰值，此后储量持续净消耗。极为惊人的事实是：人类有史以来开采的所有石油中，有一半是在 1992 年之后被消耗掉的。
根据挪威咨询机构雷斯塔能源（Rystad Energy）的详尽研究：
- 当前全球 81% 的在产常规油田已进入减产衰退期，平均年衰减率高达 5% 至 7%；
- 在当今产量最大的前十个油田当中，最“年轻”的一个早在 1976 年就已被发现，此后再无同等级别的接替者；
- 全球石油与天然气的新勘探发现量严重萎缩，绝大多数年份的消耗速度远远跑赢发现速度。
全球开采曲线在 2018 年至 2019 年达到历史极值。如果从产油国结构来看，除极少数仍在扩张产量的国家之外，其他所有产油国（包括沙特阿拉伯）均已在 2019 年或更早陷入下行轨道。若剔除美国非常规致密油与伊拉克的产量，全球石油产量早在 2016 年就已经见顶。世界根本没有所谓 50 年的从容缓冲期来慢条斯理地搞能源转型，资源告急迫在眉睫。
---
### [09:14](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBVmnKuBocc&t=554s) 宏观走势与关闭的“可行性窗口”
Michaux 梳理了生产量与消费量的动态关联：全球石油生产的绝对高点出现在 2018 年 11 月，随后暴发的新冠疫情彻底打乱了所有工业运行轨迹。疫情封控带来的数据扭曲让后续走势变得极其反常，以至于 2019 年可能成为很长一段时间内人类所能获得的最后一组“合理常态数据”。即便在疫情冲击下，自 2020 年 3 月以来，全球对石油的需求仍然有 73% 的时间超过了供应。
在通胀调整后的油价曲线上，Michaux 指出了一个关键困局：油价始终在“消费者承受不起的高位”与“生产者无法盈利的低位”之间剧烈摇摆。石油价格必须足够高，开采商才有动力和利润进行高风险勘探与资本开支；但油价又必须足够低，社会大众与工业下游才能负担得起，从而维系经济增长。
“And so, the idea was the the oil industry window of viability was closing.” Michaux 解释道。他在 2019 年的报告中便已提出该核心论断，表明维系现有能源系统的经济窗口正在快速闭合。
随着疫情封锁和供应链中断，全球能源市场被进一步割裂。Michaux 将近期历史划分为三个清晰的时代特征：
- **第一阶段（2005年起）**：由于基本金属与油气勘探成本上升引发的金属与能源市场暴走；
- **第二阶段（2008年金融危机后）**：依靠央行大规模量化宽松（QE）与流动性强行维持运转的脆弱平衡；
- **第三阶段（2020年起）**：全球疫情封控叠加严重的供应链紊乱，彻底打碎了原有平衡。
这表明，世界根本无法简单地“重返常态”，我们正面临前所未有的工业裂变期。这正是他投入海量工作去精确测算新能源替代系统真实规模的底层动力所在。
### [11:15](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBVmnKuBocc&t=675s) 报告缘起与替代化石能源的物理任务界定
Simon Michaux 介绍了他撰写的研究报告的背景。这项研究最初只是一份 50 页的简短报告，但由于评审专家组不断提出质疑，认为遗漏了诸多关键议题，导致报告内容不断扩充，最终演变成如今极其庞大的体量。研究的核心出发点非常直接：在工业体系中，化石能源究竟承担了哪些具体的物理任务？真正的“有用功”（useful work）范围到底有多大？如果彻底淘汰化石燃料，必须由哪些非化石能源系统来直接替代，并且这些系统必须在工业层面上具备技术可行性与稳定性。
明确了替代系统后，Michaux 计算了支撑所有这些替代系统所需的总电力规模，包括为动力电池充电、制备氢气等所消耗的全部电力。最初的研究是基于 2018 年的全球能源结构进行同比例放大，而本次演讲展示的则是基于国际能源署（IEA）预测数据升级后的下一代能源结构。该报告将以下所有内容整合进一个具有内部数据交叉引证的完整框架中：
- 按类别划分的全球车辆保有量，以及所需动力电池的数量与规格
- 电动汽车（EV）与氢燃料电池（Hydrogen Fuel Cell）的最佳应用边界判定
- 针对电气化系统与氢能系统的铁路运输和海运船队规模测算与横向对比
- 如何逐步淘汰用于发电和供暖的石油、天然气与煤炭
- 对扩建核电站机组潜力的评估：Michaux 指出核电确实需要适度扩张，但根本不可能完全替代化石燃料，因为核电的建设周期无法及时跟上需求，同时大规模处理乏核燃料也面临着难以克服的现实困境
- 对生物燃料（biofuels）能否拯救能源危机的评估，结论是“完全不能”（The answer is no），此外报告还深入分析了塑料与化肥工业的替代路径
```mermaid
flowchart TD
accTitle: Fossil Fuel Replacement Framework
accDescr: Flowchart illustrating the replacement of fossil fuels by electric batteries, hydrogen, biofuels, and limited nuclear power.
subgraph FossilFuels["淘汰化石燃料所承担的工业有用功"]
FF1["交通运输 (内燃机)"]
FF2["工业发电与供暖 (煤炭/石油/天然气)"]
FF3["石化工业 (塑料/化肥/航空)"]
end
subgraph ReplacementSolutions["非化石能源替代路径"]
RS1["动力电池与电网扩容"]
RS2["电解水制氢 (氢能经济)"]
RS3["核电小幅扩建 (无法全面替代)"]
RS4["生物燃料与生物质化工"]
end
FF1 --> RS1
FF1 --> RS2
FF2 --> RS1
FF2 --> RS3
FF3 --> RS4
```
---
### [13:22](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBVmnKuBocc&t=802s) 脱离实际的宏观政策与被忽视的基础矿物需求
在阐述研究方法时，Michaux 强调当前的主流政策思维是“以最快速度淘汰化石燃料，越快越好”。然而，现有的绝大多数研究往往局限于预测未来一两年的短期市场动态，完全缺乏真正的长期全局规划。Michaux 的建模理念则直奔终局：假设未来某一刻，我们每天通勤所见的现有工业系统被 100% 彻底替换——所有电力均来自可再生能源，所有交通工具非电即氢，随后经济重归增长态势。
面对这种宏大愿景，政策制定者的预测却显得脱节而盲目。Michaux 带着调侃的语气谈到欧盟委员会（European Commission）：“Now, the European Commission, bless their cotton socks, would actually make a prediction like they wanted a 100% system replacement by 2030.” 欧盟在 2017 年夸下海口称要在 2030 年实现系统 100% 替换，但如今距离 2030 年仅剩 8 年，这绝无可能实现；于是他们又改口称届时或许能替换三分之一，但却从未说清到底是“什么的”三分之一。
这一切研究的导火索，源于 2018 年 Michaux 与管理层喝咖啡时的一次闲聊。他打趣道千万别随便跟管理层喝咖啡，因为对方会把你说的话当真，然后让你去落地执行。当时管理层提出了一个看似简单的问题：为了供应欧洲计划筹建的动力电池超级工厂（gigafactories），到底需要什么种类、多少数量的基础矿物？正是这个看似人畜无害的问题，让 Michaux 迅速发现，全球现有公开信息中存在着巨大的数据黑洞，要么关键数据完全缺失，要么现有数据格式根本无法用于工程计算，他不得不从底层开始搜集并填补所有空白。
---
### [15:42](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBVmnKuBocc&t=942s) 第一代可再生系统的冷酷现实：无法回收，全靠采矿
为了摸清全面淘汰化石燃料的真实工程体量，Michaux 针对内燃机车队（包括乘用车、卡车、铁路、远洋海运及航空）开展了全方位测算。他并行设立了四套独立核算模型：美国、欧洲、中国以及全球总体。在获取中国数据时，Michaux 透露了一段充满波折的幕后经历：他的一位中国女性朋友亲自前往中国，设法查阅并调取了大量中国政府官方数据库，将庞大的统计数据翻译成英文，这段经历让他至今记忆犹新。
通过并行测算不同区域与全球各技术单元的数量、规模及最优配比，Michaux 揭示了残酷的现实基准：
- 2018 年全球一次能源消费中，高达 84.5% 依然依赖化石燃料
- 全球汽车车队中电动汽车的占比不足 1%
这一数据击碎了许多人的幻象。由于我们要替换的绝大部分庞大工业体系至今根本尚未建造，因此在起步阶段根本不存在废旧组件可供循环利用。Michaux 严肃地指出：“The first generation, at the very least, has yet to be manufactured, and it will have to be sourced from mining.” 这句常识性的基本判断直接把欧盟委员会的官员们彻底吓懵了，因为在此之前他们从未将二者联系起来。
此外，电网的剧烈扩张以及风能、太阳能高波动性所催生的储能问题同样极为棘手。目前全球电网主要依赖天然气调峰作为缓冲池；一旦剔除天然气，就必须建设规模极其庞大的新型储能系统。根据极其保守的估计，仅满足电网缓冲所需的储能规模，就将是全部电动汽车电池需求总量的 30 倍左右。Michaux 在幻灯片的小黑框中写下了一句醒目的核心结论：“Current plans are not large enough in scope. The task before us is much larger than the current paradigm allows for.”（当前的规划在规模上远远不够，摆在我们面前的任务远超现有范式的容纳能力。）
---
### [18:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBVmnKuBocc&t=1080s) 电动与氢能的技术分工：短途靠电池，长途靠氢能
根据 Michaux 的底层推算，2018 年全球机动车保有量约为 14 亿辆（他指出该估算已相对保守，如今可能已达 15 亿甚至 16 亿辆），全年总行驶里程略低于 16 万亿公里。令 Michaux 极为震惊的是，此前各大机构花费巨资制作的研究报告中，竟然没有一份认真统计过全球车辆保有量这一最基础的底层数据，他只能亲自动手测算。
在比较了全系统纯电方案与全系统氢燃料电池方案后，Michaux 得出了一组关键物理特征的对比：
- **重量与续航密度**：电动汽车电池组的重量约为等效氢气罐重量的 3.2 倍。这意味着在相同储能设备自重的前提下，氢燃料电池的行驶里程可达电池的 3.2 倍，续航时间也延长 3.2 倍。
- **制备综合能效**：氢气不是一次能源，而是能量载体。如果不用天然气重整制氢，就必须依赖电解水。电解水制氢所消耗的电能，是直接给等效电动车电池充电所需电量的 2.5 倍。
基于这一物理权衡，Michaux 构建了严密的能源分工逻辑：
```mermaid
flowchart LR
accTitle: Transport Decarbonization Division of Labor
accDescr: Diagram splitting short-range transport into EV batteries and long-range transport into hydrogen fuel cells.
subgraph Urban["城市短途交通 (<100 km)"]
U1["乘用车 / 商用面包车"]
U2["市内配送卡车 / 公交车"]
end
subgraph LongHaul["长途城际重载交通"]
L1["半挂重卡 (Class 8 HCV)"]
L2["城际铁路货运"]
L3["远洋航运全船队"]
end
Urban -->|"能量转换效率高"| TechEV["纯电动方案 (EV)<br>总需 65.19 TWh 电池"]
LongHaul -->|"储能能量密度高"| TechH2["氢燃料电池方案<br>年需 2 亿吨氢气"]
```
- **短途运输全面采用电动车**：所有城市内部运行的乘用车、商用轻型客车、配送货车和公交车，其单次运距约在 100 公里以内，年累计行驶里程约 14 万亿公里。要支撑这套庞大的短途电动化车队，全球需要总容量高达 **65.19 太瓦时（TWh）** 的电池。
- **长途重载全面采用氢燃料电池**：所有长途半挂车、8 级重型货车（Class 8 HCV）、城际铁路货运列车以及整个远洋海运船队，均应转为氢燃料电池驱动。按保守估计，这每年需要消耗 **2 亿吨氢气**，构成一个完整的“氢能经济体系”。
Michaux 强调，其他机构在预测电池需求时普遍停留在吉瓦时（GWh）级别，而他的计算结果却是太瓦时（TWh），二者相差上千倍。他直言不讳地质疑道：“One of us has got our numbers badly wrong, and so I ordered the World Economic Forum like where do they get their numbers from?” 他查阅世界经济论坛（WEF）等机构的数据来源后发现，对方几乎是凭空编造了听起来好听的数字，完全严重低估了全球机动车队的真实规模，从而导致下游预测全面失真。
随着电池制造与电解水制氢所需的天量电力需求叠加在一起，能源转型的“账单”开始呈几何级数暴增。Michaux 转向对生物质燃料的讨论，他指出生物燃料虽然无法撑起整个能源系统，但它或许是维持航空运输业持续运转、以及为生物塑料等高分子化工提供原料的最合理物理出路。
### [21:38](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBVmnKuBocc&t=1298s) 生态审计的缺失与工业用能的保守测算
西蒙·米肖（Simon Michaux）指出，石化工业肥料在土地退化方面正演变成极其严峻的问题，人类目前从自然环境中索取的资源已经严重超标。他强调，社会亟须建立一套真正的可持续性审计体系，其边界条件不仅要涵盖经济可行性，更必须将生物多样性约束纳入其中。目前这类评估机制完全缺位，米肖借用芬兰当前的政治角力做生动说明：芬兰林业在该国的影响力堪比澳大利亚的采矿业，议会内部目前正为森林到底能允许砍伐多少原料而大打出手。米肖直言：“我们必须就‘我们究竟能从自然环境中提取多少资源’展开一场毫无遮掩的实质探讨。”
谈及全球电力系统的替代规模时，米肖特别说明他给出的数据严重偏向保守。因为在现实工业生产中，绝大多数重工业环节（如冶炼、化工）是直接在厂区就地消耗煤炭和天然气来提供热能与动能，并未计入公共电网的负荷；现有电网统计数据仅仅反映了从大电网直接取电的部分。要全面测算制造业背后的就地化石燃料替代量，是一项体量庞大的额外工程。即便只考虑基准电气化任务，全球也需要约 36,000 太瓦时（TWh）的非化石电力，这仅仅是一个门槛极低的“起步底线”。
- 石化肥料对土地退化造成持续负面影响，索取上限已逼近生态承载极值。
- 芬兰议会正就林业采伐极限爆发激烈政治拉锯，折射出资源榨取的现实约束。
- 重工业多在现场直接烧煤、烧气，导致现有电网替代估算严重低估了真实的工业用能。
- 基础非化石电力替代需求至少为 36,000 TWh，若补齐现场工业原料与热能，需求可能翻倍。
### [23:05](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBVmnKuBocc&t=1385s) 可再生能源的低 EROI 与电厂扩张困境
根据主流转型机构对未来能源构成的规划，要填补这 36,000 TWh 的电力缺口，全球必须建造约 586,000 座平均规模的新型非化石发电站。米肖提供了一个令人震惊的对比坐标：当前全球所有的运行发电站总数仅约为 46,000 座。换句话说，未来需要建造的发电站数量是现有设施总数的十倍以上。导致这一几何级膨胀的根本原因在于能源投资回报率（EROI）的断崖式下跌：可再生能源的能量密度和转换产出远不及化石燃料，且实际运行效率受自然规律严密制约。
以 2018 年全球电厂的真实全年运行数据为例，无论是光伏还是风电，平均有效发电时长仅占全年的 25% 左右，其余 75% 的时间均处于闲置或无效发电状态。若要提供每年 1,000 TWh 的电力，不同能源方案对基建数量的要求呈现天壤之别：
- 燃煤发电厂只需 142 座。
- 太阳能光伏阵列需要 30,000 个。
- 风力发电机阵列（每个阵列约 10 台机组）需要 12,309 个。
每一个发电设备阵列不仅需要从零开始开采金属、制造部件、现场施工并联入电网，在其数十年的寿命周期内还需持续维保，并在报废后进行昂贵的退役拆解。米肖严肃地警示：“可再生能源的能量投资回报率远低于化石燃料，而事实真相是，它们可能根本没有足够的力量来驱动下一个工业时代。”
```mermaid
flowchart TD
accTitle: 产生 1000 太瓦时年发电量所需电站基建数量对比
accDescr: 对比传统煤电、集中式风电阵列与光伏阵列在相同发电量要求下的基建单元数量差距。
subgraph Fossil["传统化石能源"]
A["142 座平均规模煤电厂"]
end
subgraph Renewables["可再生能源（有效运行率仅约 25%）"]
B["12,309 个风电机组阵列<br/>(每个阵列约 10 台风机)"]
C["30,000 个集中式光伏阵列"]
end
Output["目标：每年提供 1,000 TWh 电力"]
A --> Output
B --> Output
C --> Output
```
### [26:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBVmnKuBocc&t=1560s) 2050 年能源结构假设与转型任务的规模
为了推演可行性，米肖参考了国际可再生能源署（IRENA）针对 2050 年能源构成的官方预测报告，并融合国际能源署（IEA）推荐的比例和第一阶段研究的现实经验，建立了一套严格的转型情景假设。该情景彻底淘汰所有化石燃料，并在现有资源上限内对各类清洁能源设定了发展路径：
- **水力发电**：在 2018 年产量基础上大幅扩张 115%。
- **核电**：装机容量在 2018 年水平上翻倍（米肖指出核能虽然单机表现最为优异，但其受限于极为脆弱且漫长的全产业链瓶颈）。
- **生物质能**：维持现有热电联产装机不变，因为人类当前的生物质采伐已处于“滑雪超速失控”的状态，进一步扩张将直接摧毁生态底线。
- **地热能**：发电量实现翻三倍（芬兰目前正探索在赫尔辛基全市每隔 20 米钻孔建立地热供暖管网，以此卸载电网负荷）。
- **风能与太阳能**：扣除上述基荷与特定能源后，其余庞大电力缺口由风电和光伏平分。其中新增风电按 70% 陆上风电、30% 海上风电划分；新增太阳能按 90% 光伏（PV）、10% 聚光光热（Solar Thermal）划分。
米肖坦言这些规划比例毫无实际工业落地的便利性可言，纯粹是决策机构“一厢情愿的愿望清单”。纵观 2018 年全球电力总供应量才不过 26,000 TWh，而未来仅为电动车充电、燃料电池制氢、替代既有油气煤发电、建筑供暖以及钢铁去煤化，就需要打造一个远大于现有电网、且能源特性极度昂贵而脆弱的新系统。如果再考虑将全球重工现场消耗的天然气与煤炭原料全面电气化，其用电需求还得在此基础上再追加 36,000 TWh。
### [29:46](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBVmnKuBocc&t=1786s) 电网间歇性平衡与被忽视的 4 周储能缓冲
电力系统的基本物理法则是“发受同步”，发用电必须维持毫秒级的动态平衡，否则电网频率偏离将迅速损坏电网硬件。米肖展示了加拿大电网数周内的典型负荷曲线：夜间用电骤降，白日陡峰上升，核电与煤电受物理特性限制只能稳定输出基荷，水力发电调节幅度十分狭窄。而居于系统顶层的风电和光伏却具有极其不可测的随机波动，甚至频频出现“用电低谷期风电出力达到峰值”的反向错配。
在当今电网中，这种巨大的供需鸿沟全靠响应迅捷的天然气调峰电站随启随停来抹平。一旦彻底清除化石燃料天然气，整个文明就必须寻求全新的缓冲机制。虽然学术界常探讨飞轮或熔盐储能，但欧美各国的战略决策者在实际推演中近乎一面倒地押注于“大型固定式电池储能设施”。
可再生能源不仅存在日内短时波动，更受制于残酷的季节周期。米肖展示了德国全年的太阳辐照度曲线：冬季太阳能产出断崖式下跌，且极易遭遇连续阴雨与无风期。对于像金属冶炼厂这种一旦停电就会导致熔炉凝固报废的重工业，系统必须配置长周期的能量冗余。学术文献通常认为度过严冬需要 12 周的全系统储能缓冲，而米肖在计算中采取了极致保守的方案：仅为风能与光伏发电量单独配置 4 周的冬季备用缓冲，完全不考虑其他发电环节。
即便在这样压缩到极致的设定下，按照光伏占 34%、风电占 38% 的结构折算，全球仅用于平抑可再生能源波动的固定式电池缓冲容量就高达 548 TWh。米肖犀利地抨击了当前的政策探讨：“这就是房间里那头被刻意无视的大象；它偶尔在学术论文中闪现，但当政客们互相吹捧并高谈阔论所谓的‘循环经济’时，却从没有真正面对过这个致命漏洞。”
- 电网供需必须实时精准对称，传统电网完全依赖天然气机组的灵活性作为安全缓冲垫。
- 欧美战略规划全面依赖固定式电池储能设施来承担脱碳后的调峰任务。
- 德国全年光照数据揭示了光伏发电无法摆脱的严重冬季低谷与阴雨天断崖。
- 依照 4 周极简风光缓冲标准计算，全球固定储能容量需求仍高达 548 TWh。
### [32:25](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBVmnKuBocc&t=1945s) 储能缓冲缺口与第二阶段研究的核心目标
当前许多关于可再生能源转型的学术研究往往只关注“拼图的一角”，或者仅仅触及最边缘的部分，导致其规划方向完全背道而驰。Simon Michaux 举例指出，南澳大利亚由 Elon Musk 旗下特斯拉建造的霍恩斯代尔储能电站（Hornsdale Power Reserve）容量为 100 兆瓦（MW）。欧盟目前正频繁将该电站作为基准案例宣传，认为既然澳大利亚能做成，欧洲乃至全球也能以此模式复制。然而经过精确测算，要为全球电网提供一个仅能维持 4 周的电网储能缓冲期，全球总共需要建设多达 15,635,478 座类似规模的储能电站。
这一缓冲电站规模所代表的电池容量，大约是整个全球电动汽车车队所需电池总容量的 30 倍。换言之，全球实际所需的固定式储能电池市场规模，远比社会各界目前所认知的大得多。第一份报告的结论在此处收口，紧接着展开的是当时正在同行评审中的第二份研究报告。这项新研究的核心目的是：精确计算为了淘汰化石燃料、制造出支撑全球运行的“仅仅第一代”可再生能源技术装备，人类究竟需要挖掘并提炼多少金属。
```mermaid
flowchart TD
accTitle: 全球4周电网缓冲储能规模对比
accDescr: 对比全球电动汽车总电池容量与4周电网储能缓冲容量的巨大差距
subgraph EV["电动交通网络"]
A["全球电动汽车车队总电池容量"]
end
subgraph Grid["电网储能网络 (4周缓冲)"]
B["霍恩斯代尔储能电站 (100 MW) 规模"]
C["全球所需总数: 15,635,478 座电站"]
B --> C
end
A -.->|"约 30 倍容量需求"| C
```
- 南澳大利亚霍恩斯代尔储能电站容量：100 MW
- 全球 4 周电网缓冲期所需同级别电站数量：15,635,478 座
- 电网 4 周缓冲所需的电池容量约为全球全部电动汽车容量的 30 倍
- 第二份研究核心：量化生产“第一代”可再生能源转型设备所需的金属总量
---
### [33:51](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBVmnKuBocc&t=2031s) 数据来源、未来技术预测与风电机组测算方法
为了量化各项设备的金属消耗，Michaux 采用了国际能源署（IEA）发布的数据报告。IEA 详细列出了各类技术单机设备的金属含量，并对 2040 年轻型车、重型车以及电网储能电池化学成分的市场份额给出了官方预测。尽管每种电池大类内部存在诸多细分变体，此类按类别粗略估计的方法在对应全球车队与机组规模的总金属测算时已具备足够的解析度。对于太阳能光伏系统，行业预测到 2040 年约 90% 的市场份额将被晶硅电池占据；由于无法获取碲化镉（CdTe）等薄膜光伏系统的完整数据，研究设定所有光伏面板均为晶体硅。
在建立整体生产清单后，计算覆盖了各类装备：电动汽车及其车载电池、氢燃料电池重卡、货运铁路机车、远洋海运船队、陆上及海上风电机组、太阳能电池板以及底层的电网储能缓冲电池。Michaux 详细拆解了风力涡轮机的测算逻辑：
1. 确定全球所需的总装机容量（太瓦/TW）；
2. 根据 2018 年全球单座风电场的平均实际发电量与平均装机容量（37.2 MW），计算所需风电场总数与每年新增容量；
3. 将装机容量折算为以 3 兆瓦（MW）标准涡轮机为单位的总台数；
4. 结合 IEA 对 2040 年陆上与海上四种不同涡轮机发电技术（如双馈感应发电机 DFIG、永磁发电机 PM 等）的市场占比预测；
5. 根据每种机型每兆瓦所需的金属含量（kg/MW），分别算出陆上与海上的分项金属消耗量，最后汇总得出全球风电系统的单项金属总需求。
---
### [38:47](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBVmnKuBocc&t=2327s) 转型总金属需求对比：矿产年产量与千百年开采周期
通过将上述计算路线扩展到光伏面板、核电站扩建、水电站建设、地热发电厂、电动汽车、氢燃料电池（仅统计到所含铂金）以及储能电池，Michaux 汇总出了一份全口径矩阵表格。除了钴、锂、石墨、镍等传统电池金属外，所有基础结构与电气金属均被纳入。虽然这是一份宏观视角的估算，实际需求规模大概率会更庞大、更复杂，但已足以揭示严峻的现实。
将替代化石燃料所需的第一代设备总金属量，对比美国地质调查局（USGS）和德国联邦地球科学与自然资源研究所（BGR）公布的 2019 年全球矿业实际年产量（2019 年为疫情前最后一个数据稳定的基准年），得出的开采年限令人震惊。例如，仅仅为了满足全钒液流电池（Vanadium Redox Flow Battery）的储能需求，按照 2019 年的全球开采速率，需要整整 7,101 年的钒产量。面对政界和公众普遍预期的进度，Simon Michaux 嘲讽道：“So the idea that we're going to do this in 7 or 8 years is very amusing.”
- 光伏面板设定：基于 2040 年预测，统一假设 100% 采用晶硅路线（实际占市场 90% 份额）
- 平均风电场基准装机容量（2018 年数据）：37.2 MW
- 风机换算基准：3 MW 单机功率
- 风机技术类型分类：涵盖齿轮箱双馈发电机（GB-DFIG）、直接驱动永磁发电机（DD-PMSG）等
- 氢燃料电池计算限制：由于数据缺失，目前仅统计了其中的铂（Platinum）需求
- 生产所需全钒液流电池对应的钒金属：相当于 2019 年全球矿产量开采 7,101 年
---
### [41:15](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBVmnKuBocc&t=2475s) 资源储量枯竭危机、替代化学路线与采矿开发的漫长现实
针对矿业行业常有的盲目乐观论调——“多开几个矿山不就解决了吗？”，Michaux 直接将总需求量与全球已探明的官方可采储量（Global Reserves）进行了硬碰硬的比对。结果表明，不仅是年产能不足，地下已知的全部矿产储量在物理规模上也完全不够。以电气化核心的铜为例，全球已探明的全部铜储量，仅能满足制造第一代绿色基础设施所需总铜量的 19.23%。这甚至还没算上装备老化后的替换周期——这些设备的物理寿命仅在 8 到 25 年之间，到达寿命后必须全部报废并重新生产。
即便将回收纳入考量，Michaux 指出正在进行的新研究预计部分金属的回收率或许能达到 30% 左右，但绝对无法做到 100%，矿石开采与材料损耗的客观规律无法回避。更致命的是关键电池材料：当前锂、钴、石墨的全球已知总储量，均不足制造第一代设备所需数量的 5%。这迫使工业界必须放弃现有的锂离子路线，转而开发氟化物或钠离子等新化学体系。然而，地质勘查无法一蹴而就，任何新资源的勘探与投产都受到极严苛的工业周期约束。关于指望短期内大规模开辟新矿山的设想，Simon Michaux 告诫道：“Now to for those who think that it's going to be easy, for every thousand deposits discovered only one or two become mines.”
| 金属/矿物类型 | 相对 2019 年全球矿产年产量或已知储量的缺口状态 | 行业关键现实 / 潜在替代路径 |
|:--- |:--- |:--- |
| **钒 (Vanadium)** | 生产所需电网储能电池需消耗 **7,101 年** 的 2019 年全球矿产量 | 全钒氧化还原液流电池在大规模电网储能中的需求量过于庞大 |
| **铜 (Copper)** | 全球当前已知总储量仅能满足第一代设备需求的 **19.23%** | 甚至不足以支持单代可再生能源设备的完整部署，存在绝对物理硬缺口 |
| **锂、钴、石墨 (Li, Co, C)** | 全球当前已知总储量均 **低于所需总量的 5%** | 必须在推进现有体系的同时，紧急研发布局钠离子（Sodium）、氟化物（Fluoride）等替代电池 |
- 设备服役寿命约束：风机、光伏、电池等设备寿命仅为 8 至 25 年，退役后需重新制造
- 预期回收率天花板：部分金属预期回收率最高仅在 30% 左右，无法填补巨大的绝对差额
- 找矿成功率极低：地质勘探中每发现 1,000 个矿床/矿点，仅有 1 到 2 个最终能建设成为商业矿山
- 矿山建设周期漫长：从一个新矿床被发现，到最终建成一座正常运转的矿山，通常需要 15 至 20 年的时间跨度
### [43:26](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBVmnKuBocc&t=2606s) 铜资源的严峻现实：储量赤字与勘探枯竭
采矿业的现实极其残酷，每 10 座投入运营的矿山中，就会有两到三座因市场波动和恶劣的经济环境而倒闭。在这样的背景下，全球铜资源的供需缺口显得尤为惊人。根据估算，从公元前 4000 年到 2020 年，人类在几千年的历史中总共开采了约 7 亿吨铜。然而，为了维持既有的经济增长轨道，全球在未来短短 22 年内就需要开采同样数量（7 亿吨）的铜。
更严峻的冲突在于能源转型的需求。当前全球已探明的铜储量约为 8.8 亿吨，按现有的消耗速度仅够维持约 30 年的生产。但若要制造替换化石能源所需的一代可再生能源技术装备，仅铜一项就需要高达 45.7 亿吨——这是整个人类历史累计开采总量的 6 倍以上。并且，这些设备的使用寿命有限，大约 20 年后又必须全部重新制造一遍。
与庞大需求背道而驰的是勘探成效的断崖式下跌。在过去的 15 年间，尽管全球在勘探领域投入了巨额资金，但新发现铜矿的数量却在持续下降。勘探支出与矿床发现数量之间的剪刀差，表明矿产资源的物理现实正在对脱碳构想形成严酷的阻击。正如 Simon Michaux 副教授所强调的：“The message here is we need to look at this and maybe come up with a different plan.”（这里的核心信息是，我们需要正视这个问题，也许得拿出一个截然不同的方案）。
- **历史开采总量（公元前 4000 年–2020 年）**：约 7 亿吨铜
- **常规经济增长需求（未来 22 年）**：7 亿吨铜
- **当前全球已探明储量**：8.8 亿吨铜（仅够开采约 30 年）
- **制造一代可再生能源装备所需铜**：45.7 亿吨（历史累计开采量的 6 倍以上）
- **勘探现状**：近 15 年来勘探投入不断增加，但新发现矿床数量持续下滑
---
### [45:10](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBVmnKuBocc&t=2710s) 技术金属的微小占比与“全盘失衡”的工业生态
人类之所以陷入如今的资源死局，根本原因在于现代工业体系对不同矿物形态的依赖发生了根本性逆转。从全球开采的所有金属矿石体积图景来看，绝大部分质量被铁矿石占据；紧随其后的是铝、锰、铬、铜、锌等基础工业金属；而锂、钴、稀土等所谓的“技术金属”（Technology Metals），仅占右上角一个极微小的黑框。过去 150 年间建立的工业生态系统，依靠的是以钢铁和基础金属为主体、以化石燃料为动力的开采架构。
```mermaid
flowchart TD
accTitle: Metal Mining Distribution
accDescr: Diagram showing the overwhelming mass of iron ore and base metals compared to tiny volume of tech metals needed for green transition.
subgraph BulkMetals["大宗金属与能源（过去 150 年基础）"]
Iron["铁矿石（占开采质量的绝大部分）"]
Base["基础金属（铝、锰、铬、铜、锌）"]
Fossil["充沛廉价化石燃料（石油/煤炭）"]
end
subgraph TechMetals["转型技术金属（右上角微小黑块）"]
Min["锂、钴、稀土、高纯镍等"]
end
BulkMetals -->|"试图以大宗体量扩张"| TechMetals
TechMetals -.->|"物理现实瓶颈：非大宗赋存、低品位、高能耗"| Crisis["资源扩张遇阻"]
```
然而，当前能源转型却试图把矿物当成“新的石油”，要求未来整个工业生态的动力全部从右上角的微小黑框中产出，并且期望其供应量迅速扩张到大宗金属的量级。但技术金属的成矿地质特征决定了它们绝不会像铁或铜那样以超大规模型态广泛富集，这正是金属供给出现海量差额的物理根源。
回顾人类文明的生态占位，500 年前的人类系统体量很小，拥有庞大的自然资源储备，排放的污染羽流极其微弱；随后，人类依靠世界历史上能量密度最高、极其便宜的化石能源（石油）、无限扩张的信用体系以及看似无限的矿产，花费了一个多世纪建起庞大而复杂的工业帝国。而今天，人类系统极度庞大且背负着债务累累的脆弱金融系统，自然资源大幅耗竭，伴随着巨大的污染洪流和恶化的自然环境。在这种境况下，人类却试图依靠极其昂贵且不稳定的能源，去构建一个更复杂的新系统。Simon Michaux 坦率地指出：“So at this point I'm going to say this is probably not going to go as planned.”（所以在这一点上我想说，事情恐怕很难按预想的计划推进）。
---
### [47:40](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBVmnKuBocc&t=2860s) 综合结论：双重盲区下的脱碳挑战与矿业复兴
在总结其模型研究时，Simon Michaux 串联了一系列关键数据与核心结论，指出当前工业界存在致命的“能源盲”（Energy Blind）与“矿物盲”（Minerals Blind）：
1. **装机与储能缺口巨大**：全球为替代化石能源需要额外提供至少 3.6 万太瓦时（TWh）的非化石电力，按拟议的能源结构需要建设 58.6 万座新电站（是目前总数的 10 倍以上）。由于风能和太阳能的间歇性，需要配备至少 4 周缓冲容量的电网储能，这对应 548 太瓦时（TWh）的电池容量，约为全球整个电动汽车车队所需电池量的 30 倍。
2. **能源回报率与品位双重挤压**：可再生能源系统的能源回报率（EROEI）远低于化石能源体系，可能根本不足以完全替代化石燃料。与此同时，全球矿石品位不断下降，每生产单位金属所需的能量急剧攀升，而此时能源本身的供应正变得昂贵且缺乏弹性。
3. **技术替代面临物理瓶颈**：矿业技术研发周期长且耗资巨大，过度依赖规模经济苟延残喘；核能对工业运转至关重要，但无法作为通用能源无限扩大规模；生物燃料可能是维系航空运输与塑料化工的唯一手段，但也无法扩容到替代石油的量级；开发锂电池之外的新电池化学体系固然势在必行，但每种化学体系都需要特定的矿产支撑。
4. **矿业大复兴与时间的赛跑**：现有的矿产储量和开采速度完全无法支撑一代可再生能源装备的制造。各类金属的价值势必大幅上涨，全球即将迎来一轮找矿和采矿的大复兴（Renaissance in Exploration），但寻找和建设新矿需要漫长的时间，而这正是人类目前最匮乏的资源。
Simon Michaux 最终以一句芬兰语致谢词“Kiitos”结束了演讲，直言：“So the snapshot answer is our industrial ecosystem is minerals blind as well as energy blind.”（概括而言，我们的工业生态系统不仅是能源盲，同时还是矿物盲）。
---
### [50:39](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBVmnKuBocc&t=3039s) 问答环节：电子煤油的航空局限与可控核聚变的时间陷阱
进入现场与线上问答环节，现场听众 Steve 首先提问，坦言讲座内容让人“既赞叹又感到恐惧”（fantastic talk and terrifying at the same time），甚至让人开始为下一代的生活前景感到忧虑。Steve 提出了两个具体的技术路线问题：第一，航空脱碳是否可以采用基于氢能合成的电子煤油（e-kerosene）？第二，近年来资本大量涌入受控核聚变技术，它是否能成为未来的终极解决方案？
针对航空问题，Simon Michaux 解释称自己的模型优先采用具备可靠、可辩护数据（Defendable Information）的方案，许多概念承诺极高但缺乏坚实数据支撑。针对氢基合成燃料（如电子煤油），他指出：
- 制造电子煤油必须先大规模制氢，但仅是建立一套满足基本需求的氢经济，在工程和物流上就已经是巨大的梦魇，还不包括存储与长途运输的极端损耗。
- 如果航空燃料能维持常温液体形式，在技术上确实可行；但如果直接使用氢燃料，储氢罐必须做成巨大的圆柱体或球体，无法塞进机翼，只能放置在机舱内与乘客争夺空间，这会彻底摧毁客机运营的经济载荷。
- 现有的电动航空仅适用于载客量极少、航程极短的小型飞机，根本不可能支撑运载 500 名乘客飞行 8000 公里的洲际干线飞行。
谈及可控核聚变，Simon Michaux 幽默地指出：“Fusion has always sort of been like 10 years away for the last 50 years.”（在过去 50 年里，核聚变一直处在‘还有 10 年就实现了’的状态）。他向从事聚变研究的科研人员致敬，承认攻破的工程难题极其伟大，但指出了时间尺度上的硬伤：
- 现代工业建造一座技术完全成熟的燃煤电站，如同运转良好的机械，大约需要 5 到 6 年。
- 即使假定明天就有人在实验室彻底攻克了核聚变，要想将其工程化并建造出具有工业规模的商用核聚变反应堆，至少需要 20 到 30 年。
- 在研究中纳入某种技术的前提，是必须拿出能稳定运行的工业级实体装置；第四代裂变核反应堆面临的也是同样的推广周期瓶颈。归根结底，时间才是最无法逾越的屏障。
### [54:30](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBVmnKuBocc&t=3270s) 模型计算方法与被剔除的基础建设材料
在回答有关模拟细节的问题时，Simon Michaux 解释了其模型对电池容量与车辆行驶里程的推算逻辑。他采用的是自下而上、逆向推导的计算方法：从全球车辆总数及其尺寸规格入手，估算出每类车辆全年的行驶公里数；若将这一现有运输网络完全替换为电动系统，则根据每百公里消耗的电量反推出支撑该里程所需的总电力负荷与电池规模。Michaux 坦言这是一套没有计入复杂充电效率特性的“粗略计算”，但他强调：“But when I got audited, they couldn't find any way to improve it or fault what I did.”（但当我接受审查审计时，他们根本找不到任何可以改进的地方，也挑不出我计算中的任何漏洞）。
关于海上及陆上风力涡轮机基座所需的水泥和钢筋，Michaux 证实这些材料目前并未计入最终报告。他最初收集了相关数据，但同行评审小组认为现有数据口径不一致，最终决定将其剔除。这意味着实际的材料需求比报告呈现的数字还要庞大。当被观众问及能源价格失控时政府会作何反应，Michaux 讽刺地表示政客们大概只会再开一次会或发一份备忘录，并直言自己对此非常悲观：“They're not that smart.”（他们没那么聪明）。
- **电池容量估算路径**：从车辆保有量、车辆体量及年行驶里程出发，换算为电能需求，逆向推导电池原材料总量。
- **未纳入统计的关键材料**：风机基座所需的庞大水泥与加固钢筋（reinforcing steel），因评审专家认为数据源不够一致而被保守剔除。
- **工业负荷弹性（industrial energy flexibility）**：目前尚未纳入模型，后续工作期待学界在此框架基础上展开更精细的建模。
---
### [56:35](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBVmnKuBocc&t=3395s) 芬兰闭门研讨会与大国系统未来的“巴尔干化”
Michaux 分享了他此前一周在芬兰地质调查局（GTK）组织的一场闭门研讨会。他将来自芬兰议会、工业界、私营部门以及学术界的约 30 位核心人物召集在同一个房间内，与 Nate Hagens 一道向他们展示了极为严峻的资源数据。午餐回来后，Michaux 明确告诉大家“天下没有免费的午餐”，随即展开工作坊让与会者直面问题并设法解决。虽然他们未能给出解决方案，但这促成了一场极其坦诚公开的对话，表明欧洲决策层正逐步意识到矿产短缺的现实。Michaux 指出，尽管报告让许多人坐立难安，但至今没有一个人能从逻辑或数据上驳倒他的推导，因为全部计算均严格立足于市场现有真实数据与工程实际。
```mermaid
flowchart TD
accTitle: 复杂系统能量输入与规模关系示意图
accDescr: 展示当能量输入充足与匮乏时，大型国家系统的规模与结构变化路径。
subgraph HighEnergy["高能时代 (High Energy Future)"]
A["高能量输入"] --> B["超大规模系统与高复杂度"]
B --> C["中美德法等超级经济体维持集权运转"]
end
subgraph LowEnergy["低能时代 (Low Energy Future)"]
D["化石能源衰退 / 可再生能源受限"] --> E["可用净能量大幅下降"]
E --> F["系统复杂度被迫降低与规模收缩"]
F --> G["超级大国面临巴尔干化与去中心化分割"]
end
```
谈及全球地缘格局，Michaux 从生物学原理切入，剖析了中国、美国、德国和法国等超级大国的结构危机。从系统生态学来看，系统的规模和复杂度直接取决于注入其中的能量总量。如果未来的净能源供给不可避免地萎缩，现有庞大而复杂的工业社会就必须缩小规模并降低复杂度。Simon Michaux 明确推断：“So we might see these large economies balkanize as a consequence of a low energy future.”（因此，我们可能会看到这些大型经济体在低能源未来的冲击下走向巴尔干化和碎片化）。他同时无奈地表示，这类深层次系统规律政客通常听不进去，只能等待现实撞墙后由学者进行辅导。
---
### [59:24](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBVmnKuBocc&t=3564s) 内维尔·普林特提问：矿业环境代价与“2040奇迹盒子”
昆士兰大学可持续矿业研究所所长 Neville Plint 参与提问。他高度评价了 Michaux 梳理的扎实数据，认为这撕破了各利益相关方不切实际的幻想。Plint 幽默地指出，在各类“2050净零排放”汇报中，人们对实现路径几乎毫无概念，逼得他在自己的演讲胶片中专门画了一个方框：“I've now put a box in all my presentations that I call the miracle box and it happens in about 2040 and suddenly we just flicker across into renewables.”（我现在在所有演示文稿里都加了一个框，我管它叫‘奇迹盒子’，它发生在2040年左右，然后突然之间我们就神奇地切换到了可再生能源）。
随后，Plint 提出了两个核心议题：
1. **采矿的环境承载力**：根据复杂矿体（complex orebodies）研究，急剧扩建矿山（尤其是铜矿）伴随着严峻的生态破坏与极高的闭坑复垦成本，生态系统能否承受？
2. **消费端的削减**：人类的一切消费本质上都是能源的物化。要化解资源死局，除了“替代能源”，更必须“削减消费”。究竟需要在何种程度上压缩谁的消费？
---
### [01:01:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBVmnKuBocc&t=3660s) 尾矿再选的局限、采矿业生态冲击与工业设计变革
针对 Plint 的提问，Michaux 首先打破了“尾矿库再选（re-mining tailings dams）能拯救供给”的行业幻想。他本人参与过多项尾矿提炼研究，现实是尾矿中品位最高、最具有经济开采价值的金属早在当年就被榨干了；即便能从中回收部分副产物，其所投入的能量、工程量与产出不成比例，根本无法替代传统硬岩采矿。谈及采矿的环境破坏，Michaux 发出警告：“I think there's going to come a point when mining is going to eclipse industrial agriculture in its impact on life systems on the planet if we keep going.”（我认为如果照此继续下去，采矿活动对地球生命系统的破坏终将超过工业化农业）。但他随即指出，这种极端破坏可能不会发生，因为人类届时根本没有足够的净能源来支撑如此荒谬规模的采掘扩张——“Energy is the master resource”（能源是主宰一切的核心母资源）。
对于削减消费这一议题，Michaux 回忆自己在面向英国上议院做汇报（Wilton Park 会议）时曾遭到激烈抨击，参会精英直接要求他“不要只呈现负面现实，必须给出解决方案，否则无法继续交流”。Michaux 强调现行的“循环经济”概念脱离物理实际，纯属空中楼阁。要真正解决消费问题，必须彻底重写社会契约并颠覆现有的制造范式：
- **终结计划性报废（planned obsolescence）**：现有商业逻辑是故意将产品设计得容易老化磨损，以迫使消费者重复购买；未来的物品必须按超长寿命标准设计。
- **面向回收的拆解设计**：当代工业品并非为了循环而制造，其复杂结构从设计之初就决定了其归宿是垃圾填埋场。
- **摆脱情绪化争议**：改变人类对物质与金属的依赖不仅是技术问题，更牵涉深层的伦理与情绪反弹，这正是绝大多数数据模型往往避开该领域的原因。
---
### [01:03:56](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBVmnKuBocc&t=3836s) 来自萨姆的质询：《增长的极限》与资源储量陷阱
现场参会者 Sam 随后发言。他表示在提前阅读报告手稿及现场听讲的过程中感到“触目惊心”（just as terrifying the second time around）。Sam 进而抛出了一个尖锐的历史对照：这套逻辑与罗马俱乐部在 1970 年代发表的著名报告《增长的极限》（The Limits to Growth）高度相似。当时多位知名经济学家和系统分析师基于数学推演，预测全球所有关键金属将在 2000 年左右消耗殆尽，但该预测最终落空。
Sam 指出，《增长的极限》当年犯了一个“本科生级别的低级失误（undergraduate blunder）”，即错误地将矿业公司对外公布的“已探明经济储量”（reserves）等同于地壳中实际存在的金属总量，而事实上探明储量仅仅是地下总资源中微不足道的一部分。Sam 进而向 Michaux 发出质问：报告是否避开了混淆“储量”（reserves）与“资源量”（resources）的陷阱？如果这套推演哪怕只有一半成立，都将从根本上彻底摧毁现有的整个能源转型路线图。
### [01:04:57](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBVmnKuBocc&t=3897s) 增长的极限与经济范式的重构
提问者指出，西蒙·米肖（Simon Michaux）的研究触及了当前的政策规划、既得利益格局与意识形态，必然会招致猛烈的攻击，甚至这种反弹可能已经出现。他向米肖提出两个问题：如何看待经典的“增长的极限”（Limits to Growth）问题？以及这份报告发布后的下一步走向是什么？
米肖回应称，《增长的极限》在 2008 年曾进行过数据更新，研究人员将 1970 年至 2000 年的真实历史数据代入最初的标准运行模型（Standard Run），发现现实轨迹与预测曲线高度契合。这证明报告在概念框架上是完全正确的；他们真正搞错的只是时间节点——这种跨越百年的宏观趋势，究竟会在哪一年彻底撞墙，至今没有人能给出确切答案。米肖强调，自己的计算仅仅是建立在一个假设之上：如果我们试图用现有的系统去一比一替代化石能源体系，究竟需要制造多少技术单元、消耗多少金属？
由此得出的显而易见结论是：我们根本无法完成这种规模的替代。人类社会拥有的技术单元数量必然会缩水，整个工业生态系统必须以某种方式收缩。未来的实际走向绝不会像当前的宏图规划那样发展，无论人们是否情愿，以无限增长为基础的经济学模式都将走向终结。伴随物质主义与消费主义的经济模式及相关社会构想必须被废弃。这项工作的核心目标，正是揭示现有范式的致命短板，唯有在看清真正的物理边界条件后，人类才能制定出切实可行的新方案。
> “The economic model behind materialism and, you know, consumerism and the social constructs associated with that will have to go.” —— Simon Michaux
### [01:07:02](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBVmnKuBocc&t=4022s) 来自业界的阻力、管理层的支持与后备研究计划
谈及报告发布后引发的现实反弹，米肖风趣地表示，台下确实出现过一些“痛苦的尖叫”。但由于他引用的全都是权威蓝筹机构（Blue-chip sources）自身的公开数据，反驳者很难在逻辑上击倒他。大部分反对声音仅停留在道德施压层面，类似于“你是个非常淘气的坏孩子，能不能别再讲这些了？”
米肖所在的芬兰地质调查局（GTK）管理层对他给予了坚定支持。米肖说服管理层的逻辑非常务实：到 2024 年或 2025 年，欧洲制造电动汽车和动力电池的工业巨头必然会质问各国的地质调查机构，为何没有提前预警如此显而易见的资源瓶颈。芬兰在地质调查中掌握着全欧洲最为丰富的电池矿产组合，一旦出事必定首当其冲被推上风口浪尖。管理层迅速认识到了严重性，不仅完全认可他的推论，还赋予他全权开展此类研究的权限与自由度。
即使未来环境变得过于严苛，米肖也准备好了退路与多项科研储备，以便随时转向新领域：
- **电池化学与地质冶金**：继续深化新型电池化学体系、动力电池退役回收以及地质冶金学（Geometallurgy）的现有项目。
- **工业化农业退化土地修复**：针对现代农业每生产一蒲式耳小麦就会导致约 0.8 立方米土壤退化/失活的现状，计划推动 GTK 与芬兰自然资源研究所（Luke）或 NRRI 等生命系统机构合作，进行土壤矿物平衡测算，协助重建土壤食物网（Food web）。
- **古气候变化脱耦分析**：分析过去数千年至数十万年的历史古气候数据，尝试将工业革命以来的气候变化从中剥离解耦。
- **矿物图谱（Minerals Atlas）系统**：构建覆盖整个工业价值链的矿物图谱，利用 X 射线荧光光谱（XRF）和 X 射线衍射（XRD）等光谱分析技术，追踪从原生矿石、提炼金属到最终工业产品的整个演进链路。
米肖总结道，这项研究已经公开运行了数年，如果真的会招致毁灭性打击，早就应该发生了，因此目前他的“逃跑计划”尚未真正派上用场。
> “The way I convinced my management was pointing out that in 2024 or 2025 the captains of industry in Europe who are making electric vehicles and their batteries will turn to the geological surveys of Europe and say why did you not tell us about this very obvious problem?” —— Simon Michaux
### [01:10:26](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBVmnKuBocc&t=4226s) 碳捕集与封存技术（CCS）的局限与研讨会结语
```mermaid
flowchart TD
accTitle: CCS Scaling Bottleneck Analysis
accDescr: Analysis showing the transition from small-scale lab success to large-scale deployment constraints for Carbon Capture and Storage.
subgraph Lab["实验室与示范规模"]
A["小规模技术验证<br/>机理可行"]
end
subgraph Hurdles["工程化放大挑战"]
B["能量投入产出比<br/>(Effort In vs Effort Out)"]
C["部署碳足迹<br/>建造与运维碳消耗"]
end
subgraph Outcome["宏观现实限制"]
D["无法应对紧迫时间窗口"]
E["地质封存空间巨大但有限"]
end
A --> B
A --> C
B --> D
C --> D
D --> E
```
在研讨会尾声，主持人因线上问题众多而挑选了最后一个核心问题：鉴于碳捕集与封存（CCS）的理论封存潜力巨大但终究有限，从长远来看，它能否被视为一种可持续的气候缓解手段？
米肖根据自己参加多场专业研讨会的观察指出，CCS 技术与其他许多绿色技术如出一辙——在小规模实验室或示范项目中运作良好，但在向工业级规模放大（Scaling）时面临严峻挑战。评估 CCS 的核心在于两点：其一，整个捕集系统的“投入产出比”（Effort in vs effort out）是否合算？其二，为了制造、运输、建设并运行这些庞大的 CCS 基础设施，本身需要消耗并排放多少碳？米肖直言，目前 CCS 的研发进程只能算“走到了一半”，远未成熟，而人类面临的最残酷现实依然是“我们没有足够的时间了”。当然，他也坦承如果未来有人能拿出颠覆性的突破推翻他的观点，他乐见其成。
主持人随后对米肖的精彩报告表达了由衷感谢，并遗憾他未能亲自到场展开更持久的线下探讨。会议最后预告了下周在演播厅举行的下一场学术研讨会：届时将由来自南非 Mintek 公司的 Mehdi Safari 博士团队主讲，探讨微细粒与粗粒浮选系统（Fine and coarse particle flotation systems）的技术评估与最新进展。
> “And like everything else, it works on a small scale, but is it viable in terms of the effort that you put in as compared to the effort you get out?” —— Simon Michaux
## Notable quotes
> [47:40](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBVmnKuBocc&t=2860s) So the snapshot answer is our industrial ecosystem is minerals blind as well as energy blind. — Simon Michaux
> [01:01:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBVmnKuBocc&t=3660s) I think there's going to come a point when mining is going to eclipse industrial agriculture in its impact on life systems on the planet if we keep going. — Simon Michaux
> [41:15](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBVmnKuBocc&t=2475s) Now to for those who think that it's going to be easy, for every thousand deposits discovered only one or two become mines. — Simon Michaux
> [15:42](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBVmnKuBocc&t=942s) Current plans are not large enough in scope. The task before us is much larger than the current paradigm allows for. — Simon Michaux
> [01:04:57](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBVmnKuBocc&t=3897s) The economic model behind materialism and, you know, consumerism and the social constructs associated with that will have to go. — Simon Michaux
## Mentioned
Simon Michaux, Katerina, Neville Plint, Mehdi Safari, Nate Hagens, Elon Musk, 昆士兰大学可持续矿产研究所 (SMI JKMRC), 芬兰地质调查局 (GTK), 世界银行 (World Bank), 欧盟委员会 (European Commission), 雷斯塔能源 (Rystad Energy), 国际能源署 (IEA), 国际可再生能源署 (IRENA), 世界经济论坛 (WEF), 美国地质调查局 (USGS), 德国联邦地球科学与自然资源研究所 (BGR), 罗马俱乐部 (Club of Rome), 芬兰自然资源研究所 (Luke), 自然资源研究所 (NRRI), Mintek, 霍恩斯代尔储能电站 (Hornsdale Power Reserve), 加瓦尔油田 (Ghawar), 《增长的极限》 (The Limits to Growth)
## Video description
The quantity of metal required to make just one generation of renewable tech units to replace fossil fuels, is much larger than first thought. Current mining production of these metals is not even close to meeting demand. Current reported mineral reserves are also not enough in size. Most concerning is copper as one of the flagged shortfalls. Exploration for more at required volumes will be difficult, with this seminar addressing these issues.
[Source](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBVmnKuBocc)
Source quotes
[47:40] Simon Michaux: So the snapshot answer is our industrial ecosystem is minerals blind as well as energy blind.
[61:00] Simon Michaux: I think there's going to come a point when mining is going to eclipse industrial agriculture in its impact on life systems on the planet if we keep going.
[41:15] Simon Michaux: Now to for those who think that it's going to be easy, for every thousand deposits discovered only one or two become mines.
[15:42] Simon Michaux: Current plans are not large enough in scope. The task before us is much larger than the current paradigm allows for.
[64:57] Simon Michaux: The economic model behind materialism and, you know, consumerism and the social constructs associated with that will have to go.
Source quotes
[47:40] Simon Michaux: So the snapshot answer is our industrial ecosystem is minerals blind as well as energy blind.
[56:22] Simon Michaux: If the energy reduces, the system must shrink in size and it has to become less complex. So we might see these large economies balkanize as a consequence of a low energy future.
[22:55] Simon Michaux: So, we're talking about making an electrical power system substantially larger than the existing power system with energy that's very expensive and fragile.
[64:57] Assoc Prof Simon Michaux: So the idea of say growth economics for example is about to be phased out whether we like it or not.
[9:14] Simon Michaux: The oil price needs to be high enough for producers to be economically viable, but low enough for consumers to actually access that oil in terms of in a way that allows growth to happen in the current system.
Original transcript
[0:03] Morning everyone. Welcome to the next
[0:05] installment of the JKMRC Friday morning
[0:08] seminar series
[0:10] that take place here at the lecture
[0:12] theater, but also online as is the case
[0:15] this morning.
[0:17] My name is Katerina and myself and
[0:18] Corina are co-chairs organizing the
[0:20] seminar series this year. So before we
[0:23] start on behalf of the University of
[0:24] Queensland and the Sustainable Minerals
[0:26] Institute, we'd like to respectfully
[0:28] acknowledge all traditional owners and
[0:30] their custodianship of the lands on
[0:32] which we all meet today.
[0:34] We pay our respects to their ancestors
[0:35] and their descendants who continue
[0:37] cultural and spiritual connection to
[0:38] country and we recognize their valuable
[0:41] contributions to Australian and global
[0:42] society.
[0:46] It is our pleasure to introduce our
[0:47] today's speaker, Professor Simon
[0:49] Michaux, who holds the position of
[0:51] Associate Professor of Geometallurgy at
[0:53] the Geological Survey of Finland, also
[0:55] known as GTK in Helsinki in the Circular
[0:59] Economy Solutions unit. He holds a
[1:02] Bachelor of Applied Science degree in
[1:03] Physics and Geology from the Queensland
[1:05] University of Technology and a PhD in
[1:08] Mining Engineering from JKMRC here at
[1:11] UQ. He was also the recipient of the Ian
[1:14] Morley Prize in 2006.
[1:17] He has over 18 years of combined work
[1:20] experience in the Australian mining
[1:21] industry in research and development
[1:24] working in the private sector and even 3
[1:26] years in Belgium at the University of
[1:28] Liège
[1:29] where he research circular economy and
[1:31] industrial recycling. So his work
[1:33] experience in Finland at the GTK also
[1:36] includes having worked in the minerals
[1:37] intelligence before joining the current
[1:40] unit.
[1:41] Simon's overall long-term objectives
[1:43] include the development and
[1:44] transformation of the circular economy
[1:46] into a more practical system for the
[1:48] industrial ecosystem to navigate the
[1:51] twin challenges of the scarcity of
[1:53] technology minerals and the
[1:54] transitioning away from fossil fuels.
[1:57] Things that he will talk about today. So
[1:59] no word of a lie, it is 2:00 a.m. in the
[2:01] morning.
[2:02] So thank you so much for joining us and
[2:05] still saying yes to presenting today.
[2:08] The floor is all yours, Simon. Thank
[2:10] you.
[2:11] All good. Okay. So
[2:14] Excuse me.
[2:15] What I'm going to show you today is a
[2:17] combination of two pieces of work. The
[2:19] first one was the report that Tim was
[2:21] referring to earlier and the second half
[2:23] of the work is work that has is in the
[2:25] process of being published.
[2:27] The title is assessment of extra
[2:29] capacity required of alternative energy
[2:31] electrical power systems to completely
[2:33] replace fossil fuels.
[2:37] Before we actually get to the actual
[2:38] work, I'm going to
[2:40] show you a couple of patterns that I
[2:42] showed my management to convince them to
[2:45] do this work in the first place.
[2:48] These are the metal prices
[2:51] that the World Bank tracks to look at
[2:54] the health of the industrial ecosystem.
[2:57] The base metals, precious metals and
[2:59] energy oil, gas and coal.
[3:01] Now, I've overlaid these metal prices
[3:05] to the number 100 and the month of
[3:08] December 2001. And so what I've done
[3:11] here is to show periods of relative
[3:13] stability. Now there's two very
[3:15] important points to come up here. So
[3:18] we've got a relative period of stability
[3:20] and in
[3:22] around 2005 we had a blowout.
[3:25] Now this is quite important. The metal
[3:29] price is the handover point between
[3:30] those who extract metals from the ground
[3:34] and turn it into minerals from the
[3:37] ground turn them into metals and those
[3:38] who buy those metals and manufacture
[3:40] goods.
[3:42] So you're looking at the heartbeat of
[3:43] the industrial ecosystem.
[3:45] So
[3:46] I make a case that this blowout
[3:49] started with a chain reaction in the oil
[3:51] industry and uh
[3:53] a major economic correction in 2008 was
[3:57] not enough to resolve the underlying
[3:59] volatility. So whatever this is, it is
[4:01] not speculation. It is structural.
[4:04] And so the industrial ecosystem is
[4:08] evolving and this change started 17
[4:11] years ago. It's not something that might
[4:14] happen in our future.
[4:16] So
[4:18] I took the same data, but now I've
[4:19] actually pinned it to January 1970 and
[4:22] the number 100. You can still see
[4:24] there's the pinpoint. We've got data
[4:26] back to 1960.
[4:28] And this shows the
[4:32] blowout of what actually happened when
[4:33] the United States
[4:35] currency decoupled from the gold
[4:37] standard.
[4:38] And uh
[4:40] so
[4:42] and
[4:43] a few a few years later the 1973 oil
[4:46] embargo happened and they were able to
[4:49] throw money at it to solve their
[4:50] problems just by printing money.
[4:52] So all currencies became fiat.
[4:56] And so that's zooming in right on that
[4:58] point there.
[4:59] So you can sort of see there's actually
[5:00] two points the industrial ecosystem has
[5:03] had quite a big change.
[5:07] So this is again January 1970 and the
[5:09] number 100, but this is just base
[5:11] metals. So this is to show Yeah, Rick,
[5:14] how you doing?
[5:16] So
[5:17] So
[5:18] yeah, anyway, so this is just to show
[5:21] base metals. This is the mining
[5:22] industry.
[5:24] So these patterns can be seen in not in
[5:26] the mining industry as well.
[5:28] So you see a period of stability, but
[5:30] then we had the blowout in 2005.
[5:32] These are the energy resources 1970
[5:35] again. So you can sort of see it's a
[5:37] pretty clear pattern.
[5:40] So there's our blowout in 2005
[5:43] and there's the decoupling from the gold
[5:45] standard and there's the petrodollar.
[5:47] And that's zooming in on it.
[5:49] So
[5:50] all right, so the system is changing. It
[5:53] is valid to look at this stuff.
[5:58] So
[5:59] we wish to replace oil.
[6:02] We're going to phase out fossil fuels.
[6:04] And when I came to Europe
[6:07] 7 or 8 years ago, I used to just go to
[6:09] the European Commission and I in
[6:11] Brussels and sit in on these meetings
[6:14] with the most amazing amount of money
[6:15] was actually put into these
[6:17] presentations, but
[6:18] they were all platitudes. The there was
[6:21] no substance to any of it.
[6:23] Now we actually want to phase out fossil
[6:25] fuels
[6:27] and we want to transition away and we
[6:28] want to replace it with a new system.
[6:31] There is very little understanding of
[6:32] what fossil fuels is doing for us now,
[6:34] like what is our dependency and also our
[6:37] vulnerability
[6:38] to it. So this is actually the discovery
[6:41] of
[6:42] oil
[6:44] back to 1900.
[6:47] And as you can see most of the
[6:50] oil has been discovered in the decades
[6:52] past.
[6:54] And this is this tall party is the
[6:56] Ghawar deposit in Saudi Arabia, the
[6:58] largest oil deposit the world has ever
[7:00] known.
[7:01] The chart on the right is the same data,
[7:03] but now it's put in a cumulative percent
[7:05] curve. Now
[7:09] red is discoveries
[7:11] and blue is production and green is the
[7:13] difference between the two.
[7:15] Since
[7:16] um maximum
[7:19] point of net
[7:21] inventory add happened in 1985 and since
[7:24] then it's been declining.
[7:26] The other point here is half of all oil
[7:29] ever produced has been produced since
[7:30] 1992.
[7:32] So
[7:34] to actually zoom in on the last couple
[7:36] years in particular, this is a study
[7:37] from Rystad.
[7:39] We've actually got
[7:41] we're not discovering that much oil and
[7:43] gas these days compared to a couple of
[7:45] decades ago. And in fact I've got a
[7:47] chart that shows that most of the time
[7:50] we're actually using more oil than we're
[7:51] discovering. So we're depleting.
[7:54] 81% of the existing producing fields are
[7:56] in decline
[7:57] and they're declining at an average rate
[7:59] of 5 to 7%.
[8:03] Of the largest 10 modern producing
[8:05] fields, the youngest was discovered in
[8:06] 1976.
[8:08] So here's oil production at the moment.
[8:11] Um
[8:13] So as as this this is everyone. So as
[8:15] you can see there is a peak in 2019
[8:18] 2018, but this could be an artifact of
[8:21] COVID.
[8:22] To split it up, these are the countries
[8:24] that are actually still expanding.
[8:27] Uh
[8:29] Well there's only five countries.
[8:31] However,
[8:32] everyone here except for the United
[8:34] States conventional oil and the Canadian
[8:36] tar sands
[8:38] they are expanding but everyone else on
[8:39] this chart actually peaked in 2019. That
[8:42] could be an artifact of COVID. In fact
[8:44] COVID has provided the perfect
[8:46] camouflage. We actually don't know and
[8:48] we will not know for another couple of
[8:49] years.
[8:51] So but if United States and Iraq were
[8:52] excluded then global oil production
[8:54] would have peaked in 2016.
[8:56] Everyone else is in decline
[8:58] including Saudi Arabia. That's the pink
[9:01] line across here. So this is actually
[9:03] what we need to replace and what this is
[9:06] showing is we don't have 50 years to get
[9:11] into this. We really need to get into it
[9:12] now.
[9:14] Here's where we're at the moment. So
[9:16] this is
[9:17] production and consumption.
[9:19] The current peak at the moment is
[9:21] November 2018.
[9:23] And then a few months later we had
[9:26] COVID
[9:27] and the COVID lockdowns and that has
[9:28] provided an artifact in the system that
[9:31] is just not sensible anyway, shape or
[9:33] form. 2019 might be the last sensible
[9:35] year of data that we've seen for a long
[9:36] time.
[9:37] So since March 2020 though,
[9:40] demand exceeded supply 90 73% of the
[9:44] time.
[9:45] So here's oil price.
[9:47] Now this has been adjusted for
[9:49] inflation.
[9:50] So there's a couple of points where
[9:52] we're bouncing between the oil price is
[9:54] too high for consumers and too low for
[9:56] producers.
[9:57] The oil price needs to be
[9:59] high enough for producers to be
[10:01] economically viable, but low enough for
[10:03] consumers to actually access that oil in
[10:05] terms of
[10:07] um in a way that allows growth to happen
[10:10] in the current system. So, this is what
[10:12] I actually published in 2019 in my oil
[10:14] report. And so, the idea was the the oil
[10:18] industry window of viability was
[10:20] closing. And so, how have things
[10:23] happened since then? Well, that's what
[10:24] we look like now.
[10:26] This
[10:27] gray band is the COVID pandemic
[10:29] lockdown.
[10:30] So, I've got I now split things up into
[10:32] eras. This pattern was created as a
[10:34] consequence of the blowout in the metals
[10:36] in 2005 market that I showed earlier.
[10:40] The chart in the middle is created as a
[10:43] consequence of a system held together
[10:45] with quantitative easing.
[10:47] And third pattern has been created as a
[10:50] consequence of the lockdowns and the
[10:53] supply chain disruptions, which has
[10:54] completely cooked everything.
[10:57] So, we've got multiple eras. So, when we
[10:59] come out of the COVID pandemic formally,
[11:02] right?
[11:03] What will be another era again? Do we
[11:05] return to normal or or what? No one
[11:08] knows what's actually going to happen.
[11:10] So, that is
[11:11] the motivation to actually study
[11:15] what is this system replacing and what
[11:17] is the practicalities. So, this is the
[11:19] report that I actually
[11:21] wrote.
[11:23] This actually started out as a short
[11:25] short 50-page report,
[11:27] but my review panel kept giving me a
[11:29] hard time about things that were not
[11:30] included and it blew out to the size it
[11:32] is now.
[11:33] So, okay, physical tasks that were done
[11:37] in
[11:38] industrially by fossil fuels, that what
[11:40] really happened here?
[11:41] And what was the true scope of useful
[11:44] work? So, if we were to knock out fossil
[11:46] fuels, what useful work would have to be
[11:48] done in its place? So, then I assembled
[11:51] all the non-fossil fuel systems that I
[11:53] could get hold of to actually replace
[11:55] the work in direct replacement that are
[11:56] actually industrially stable.
[11:59] And then I calculated the quantity of
[12:01] electrical power we would need to do all
[12:03] that, charge electric batteries,
[12:05] make the hydrogen, etc.
[12:08] Now, the original study had an energy
[12:10] mix the same as 2018 scaled up to the
[12:13] new capacity. Since then, and what I'm
[12:15] showing today is the next generation of
[12:17] energy mix that's based on an
[12:20] IEA projection.
[12:23] So, in this report, we have number of
[12:25] vehicles by class,
[12:26] number and size of batteries, an
[12:28] understanding of when you'd use an
[12:29] electric vehicle and when you'd use a
[12:31] hydrogen fuel cell,
[12:33] estimates of
[12:35] both rail and the maritime shipping
[12:37] fleet for both electrical systems and
[12:39] hydrogen systems, which means you can
[12:41] compare the two.
[12:42] And how do we phase out power generation
[12:45] for say oil, gas, and coal and heating?
[12:49] I also examine the possibility of
[12:52] expanding the nuclear power plant fleet.
[12:53] Like, is this possible?
[12:56] And the the simple answer that is we
[12:58] need the nuclear power plant to expand a
[13:00] little bit, but it cannot replace fossil
[13:02] fuels. It will not expand in time, and
[13:04] we have issues of handling spent nuclear
[13:07] fuel at large volumes.
[13:09] So, then there was an assessment of
[13:11] biofuels. Can biofuels save us? The
[13:13] answer is no.
[13:15] And plastics and fertilizers were looked
[13:17] at as well. So, all of that is in one
[13:19] place internally referenced.
[13:22] So,
[13:23] how did
[13:24] what was the approach here? So, we're
[13:26] going to phase out fossil fuels and
[13:28] we're going to implement
[13:30] things as fast as possible.
[13:32] Faster the better. So much so, it's
[13:34] going to be very difficult to predict.
[13:35] All other studies have looked at what we
[13:37] might do next year or the year after in
[13:39] terms of market implementation. There
[13:42] was no long-range planning at all.
[13:45] But there'll come a point when the
[13:47] existing system that you see when you
[13:49] drive to work each morning
[13:51] is fully replaced. That is, all power
[13:54] that you see is generated with renewable
[13:55] systems, and all vehicles will either be
[13:57] an electric vehicle or a hydrogen fuel
[13:59] cell vehicle.
[14:01] And after that, presumably, we would see
[14:03] economic growth once more.
[14:06] So, I'm modeling that point there.
[14:09] Now, the European Commission, bless
[14:11] their cotton socks,
[14:13] would actually make a prediction like
[14:15] they wanted a 100% system replacement by
[14:18] 2030.
[14:19] They made this statement in 2017.
[14:22] 2030 is now eight years away.
[14:25] It's not going to happen.
[14:26] So, now they're talking about maybe a
[14:29] third of the system isn't going to be
[14:31] replaced by then. Now, a third of what?
[14:34] So,
[14:35] we you take the the estimates of the
[14:37] full system, and then we can actually
[14:39] sort of carve it up in terms of time,
[14:41] whether it's practical or not.
[14:43] So,
[14:44] this was the plan. So, what does fossil
[14:46] fuels do for us now? How much will we
[14:48] need?
[14:49] And how many units are we looking at?
[14:51] But the base of all of it
[14:53] is what quantity of minerals will be
[14:55] needed to do this. This all started with
[14:59] a cup of coffee with management in 2018.
[15:03] You know, you got to you got to watch it
[15:04] when you have coffee with you guys cuz
[15:05] they they will listen to what you say
[15:06] and they'll wander off and do things
[15:08] like this.
[15:10] So,
[15:11] what they wanted to know was what
[15:13] quantity of minerals
[15:15] and what kind of minerals will be needed
[15:17] to source the gigafactories of Europe.
[15:21] The plan's battery gigafactories of
[15:23] Europe. And what seemed like an
[15:25] innocuous question at the time, it
[15:26] became very clear very soon that
[15:30] vast sections of information just simply
[15:32] was missing.
[15:34] Or the information that was available
[15:35] wasn't in a form that was useful. So, I
[15:37] had to actually sort of go off and fill
[15:38] in the gaps. And that was the first
[15:40] piece of work.
[15:42] The calculation output like this.
[15:44] So, what was the true scope to phase out
[15:46] fossil fuels?
[15:48] And so, I looked at the internal
[15:49] combustion engine fleet, cars, trucks,
[15:52] rail, maritime shipping, and aviation. I
[15:55] did it for the United States, Europe,
[15:57] China. Now, this was interesting. I
[16:00] actually had a a friend of mine who is
[16:02] Chinese, and she actually went to China
[16:05] and actually accessed a whole lot of
[16:07] government databases.
[16:09] And I actually got data from the Chinese
[16:11] government and then got it translated
[16:12] into English. And that was um
[16:15] that that was an experience, let me tell
[16:17] you.
[16:18] Uh and the fourth calculation was the
[16:20] globe together, everything together.
[16:22] So, there's four calculations running in
[16:24] parallel.
[16:26] And that gave us the number and size of
[16:27] required technical units.
[16:30] And the question of what proportional
[16:31] mix.
[16:32] To put this in context, in 2018, 84%
[16:35] 84.5% of primary energy was still fossil
[16:38] fuel based.
[16:40] And less than 1% of the vehicle fleet
[16:42] was electric.
[16:44] So, that means the vast majority of the
[16:46] system
[16:47] that we seek to replace has yet to be
[16:49] constructed. And as it's not been
[16:51] constructed, we can't recycle it.
[16:54] The first generation, at the very least,
[16:56] has yet to be manufactured, and it will
[16:57] have to be sourced from mining.
[17:00] Now, this is this very very basic
[17:02] question really shocked the European
[17:04] Commission guys. They they had not put
[17:07] this put two and two together.
[17:10] And so, that went to the required power
[17:13] grid expansion. Uh the needed number of
[17:15] batteries.
[17:17] There was also the issue of required
[17:19] power storage to manage intermittent
[17:21] supply.
[17:22] Uh wind and solar are highly
[17:24] intermittent, and at the moment, the gas
[17:26] industry is the buffer.
[17:28] Uh I'll talk a little bit about this
[17:29] this later, but
[17:31] you remove the gas industry, we need a
[17:32] new buffer. And so, even at a very very
[17:35] conservative estimate of what is needed,
[17:38] that power storage system
[17:41] uh is much much larger than the like 30
[17:44] times larger what the electric vehicles
[17:46] will require.
[17:48] If you couldn't be bothered reading the
[17:49] report, just read this little black
[17:51] square here. Current plans are not large
[17:53] enough in scope. The task before us is
[17:55] much larger than the current paradigm
[17:56] allows for.
[18:00] Based on calculation, went like this for
[18:01] the globe.
[18:02] There'll be 1.4 billion vehicles.
[18:05] Now, that estimate is low. It's probably
[18:07] close to 1.5, maybe even 1.6 by now.
[18:10] But that was what I was able to assemble
[18:12] at the time.
[18:14] That estimate of global vehicles, I
[18:16] couldn't find in a report. So, I
[18:17] actually had to go out and estimate it
[18:19] myself. And that surprised me. The
[18:21] basics have not been done here.
[18:23] And that that's what was a A lot of
[18:25] money been put into, you know, getting
[18:27] people to do these sorts of studies, and
[18:29] they completely missed that.
[18:30] Anyway, those vehicles traveled a little
[18:32] under 16 trillion kilometers in the year
[18:34] 2018.
[18:36] So,
[18:38] the whole system was modeled for
[18:39] electric being electric vehicle, and the
[18:41] whole system was also modeled as a
[18:42] hydrogen fuel cell. So, I was able to
[18:44] compare
[18:46] um
[18:47] if in efficiencies, and I came up with
[18:49] this interesting
[18:51] concept. So,
[18:53] an electric vehicle system requires a
[18:54] battery that is 3.2 times the mass of
[18:58] the equivalent hydrogen fuel tank.
[19:01] So, what that means is for the same
[19:03] energy storage mass, your hydrogen fuel
[19:05] cell can go 3.2 two times as far or will
[19:08] last 3.2 times as long.
[19:12] But hydrogen is not an energy source,
[19:15] it's an energy carrier. You've got to
[19:17] make the hydrogen. And if you're not
[19:19] going to use gas to do it, then you've
[19:21] got to fall back on
[19:23] electrolysis using electricity.
[19:25] And to do that,
[19:27] we needed 2.5 times the electricity to
[19:29] make the hydrogen compared to charging
[19:33] the equivalent electric vehicle
[19:35] battery system.
[19:37] So, you put those two together, and we
[19:38] get this. All short-range transport
[19:40] should be electric vehicles. Anything
[19:42] that uh stays in a city.
[19:45] All passenger cars, commercial vans,
[19:47] delivery trucks, buses, anything with a
[19:49] short range of say like 100 km.
[19:51] They'll travel 14 trillion kilometers
[19:54] across a year, but to do this, we will
[19:56] need 65.19
[19:58] terawatts of batteries.
[20:01] Now, this is where it gets interesting
[20:03] cuz all other studies I've seen compare
[20:05] the quantity of batteries needed in
[20:08] terms of gigawatt hours.
[20:10] So, I'm terawatt hours.
[20:13] One of us has got our numbers badly
[20:15] wrong, and so I ordered the World
[20:17] Economic Forum like where do they get
[20:18] their numbers from?
[20:20] And it turns out they just plucked the
[20:21] numbers out of the air because they
[20:22] sounded good.
[20:24] They've badly underestimated size of the
[20:26] global
[20:28] fleet, and that's how it's rippled out
[20:30] from there.
[20:31] All long-range vehicles should be
[20:33] powered by hydrogen fuel cells. All
[20:35] semi-trailers, class H HCV trucks, all
[20:39] freight that goes between cities on the
[20:42] in the rails.
[20:43] Uh all the entire maritime shipping
[20:45] fleet should all be hydrogen.
[20:47] Now, that's a conservative estimate, but
[20:49] we will need 200 million tons of
[20:50] hydrogen annually. That's a hydrogen
[20:52] economy.
[20:54] So, here's our systems put together.
[20:56] Though that's the electric vehicle
[20:57] fleet, those cars
[20:59] and
[21:01] those batteries will need that amount of
[21:02] power.
[21:04] This is the amount of power we need to
[21:05] phase out other industrial actions.
[21:08] And this is the hydrogen economy. Those
[21:11] vehicles travel that distance consuming
[21:13] that amount of hydrogen, but to
[21:15] manufacture it, we would need that
[21:17] amount of electricity.
[21:19] And it's Now now the the bill starting
[21:22] to mount up here.
[21:24] I looked at biofuels. Now, biofuels may
[21:26] be the most sensible way to keep the
[21:28] aviation industry going.
[21:30] It also could be the best way to keep
[21:32] the plastics industry going with
[21:33] bioplastics.
[21:35] We also may need the biomass industry to
[21:38] make fertilizer
[21:39] for for um
[21:42] and
[21:43] uh
[21:43] petrochemical industrial fertilizers are
[21:46] becoming a problem in terms of land
[21:48] degradation.
[21:49] But so, we're we're already pulling too
[21:51] much out of the environment at the
[21:53] moment. So, we've got to have a genuine
[21:54] sustainability audit that has both
[21:57] economic sustainability, but also
[21:59] biodiversity sustainability
[22:01] um boundary conditions in that audit.
[22:04] And at the moment, we don't have one.
[22:05] So, we have to have a genuine discussion
[22:07] about what can we actually extract out
[22:09] of the environment. This is actually the
[22:11] punch-up that's happening in Finnish
[22:12] Parliament at the moment. The forestry
[22:15] industry here is as powerful as the
[22:17] mining industry in Australia.
[22:19] And so, there's a there's a great deal
[22:20] of arm wrestling over what can we
[22:22] actually harvest out of the forest.
[22:25] So,
[22:26] let's put the electrical power systems
[22:28] together. These electrical power systems
[22:30] that this is actually on the low side
[22:32] cuz most industrial action happens with
[22:35] the consumption of coal and gas on site,
[22:37] and then it's converted to energy on
[22:39] site. This is what's just been drawn off
[22:41] the power grid. So, there's a vast
[22:44] amount of energy associated with
[22:45] manufacturing that is not included here.
[22:48] And that is actually a huge piece of
[22:50] work to include that. So, these numbers
[22:52] I'm showing you are very much on the low
[22:53] side.
[22:55] So, we're going to put it all together.
[22:56] We need 36,000
[22:58] terawatt hours
[23:00] or thereabouts. That's a that's a very
[23:02] low estimate.
[23:05] Now, if we use the energy split which
[23:07] I'm going to show you in a few slides
[23:08] time, we need to make 586,000
[23:13] new non-fossil power stations of average
[23:15] size.
[23:17] Now, to put this in context, the current
[23:19] fleet is at 46,000.
[23:21] So, we're talking about more than 10
[23:23] times the number of power stations.
[23:26] Now, what's actually happening here is
[23:27] the energy return on energy invested for
[23:29] renewables is much lower than fossil
[23:31] fuels. That unfortunately is a reality.
[23:35] So, if we put it through the split
[23:38] um that I'm going to show in a couple of
[23:39] slides time, this is what we end up
[23:41] with.
[23:42] Now, things get interesting.
[23:44] So, what I'm showing here is the power
[23:47] storage buffer.
[23:48] So, wind and solar are highly
[23:50] intermittent.
[23:52] Uh
[23:52] uh
[23:53] supply and demand has to match.
[23:57] In the literature, they've got things
[23:58] like to get through winter, we need 12
[24:00] um 12 weeks buffer supply for the whole
[24:03] system.
[24:04] Um the the
[24:06] uh reference I settled on was a
[24:08] four-week window for the entire system
[24:12] in or the entire system across all power
[24:13] generation, but for the calculation, I
[24:16] settled on a very conservative estimate
[24:17] for just wind and solar only
[24:21] and nothing else for four weeks to to
[24:23] get us through winter. And that
[24:25] really low estimate was 548
[24:28] terawatt hours.
[24:31] So,
[24:34] these are the same numbers shown um
[24:35] graphically. So, this is what we've got
[24:37] at the moment. Uh the column on the left
[24:39] is electrical generation in 2018.
[24:42] So, that's what we can use. The white is
[24:44] what we want to phase out. And the green
[24:46] on the right is what we are going to
[24:49] phase in if we're going to keep the
[24:50] system the way it is. The tasks are
[24:54] Oh oh yes, so that that was the power
[24:56] generation in in 2018. It's 26,000
[24:59] terawatt hours. So, we're talking about
[25:01] making an electrical power system
[25:02] substantially larger than the existing
[25:05] power system with energy that's very
[25:07] expensive and fragile.
[25:09] The tasks are charge the electric
[25:11] batteries.
[25:12] Produce the hydrogen for the fuel cells.
[25:15] Uh phase out oil, gas, and coal power
[25:18] generation.
[25:19] Heating of buildings, and the sliver
[25:21] along the top is to phase out coal-fired
[25:23] coal-fired steel manufacturing. Some
[25:25] back-of-the-envelope um
[25:28] calculations about what industry is
[25:29] consuming for gas and coal as feedstocks
[25:33] on site
[25:34] uh
[25:35] appear to be this uh another 36,000
[25:38] terawatts on top of this. Now, I've yet
[25:40] to actually get those numbers together.
[25:42] Uh but this is looking like um a very
[25:45] much a lowball estimate.
[25:47] So, this is our task.
[25:49] They're the physical tasks on on the
[25:50] left, and we are boiling down to say
[25:52] 36,000 terawatts. So, for now, let's
[25:55] let's take this number and use it.
[25:58] So,
[26:00] the um Arena
[26:02] um organization has actually released a
[26:06] uh report predicting what the energy
[26:08] split's going to be in 2050.
[26:10] Um so, this is an estimate.
[26:13] Um it's very brave of them. I'll take
[26:15] it. So, I'm going to take the energy
[26:16] split for 2050 to predict to predict
[26:18] what might happen in the future, and
[26:20] I'll add some of my own
[26:23] um assumptions that I learned from the
[26:24] first report.
[26:26] So, the assumptions are all fossil fuels
[26:28] will be phased out.
[26:30] Hydro will expand by adding an extra
[26:32] 115%
[26:33] compared to 2018 production rates as in
[26:35] it will expand. Nuclear will double in
[26:38] capacity compared to 2018.
[26:40] Biowaste, we can't really expand it
[26:42] beyond what it is now uh because it's
[26:44] it's looking like we're actually over
[26:46] our skis in what we're harvesting from
[26:47] the environment. So, any extra biomass
[26:50] uh could be a problem. So, in my
[26:52] calculation, I've assumed that biomass
[26:55] combined heat and power plants will stay
[26:57] at the current capacity.
[26:59] Geothermal generation will triple. In
[27:02] Finland in particular, we are looking at
[27:04] putting a network of holes
[27:07] for geothermal heating of buildings
[27:08] every 20 m across Helsinki, and that
[27:11] will heat the buildings. And if we can
[27:13] do that, we can actually take that power
[27:15] off the grid.
[27:17] So, after the above calculations, all
[27:19] remaining new capacity will be split
[27:21] equally between solar and wind.
[27:24] That is what the IEA believes will
[27:25] happen.
[27:26] So, any new wind capacity will be split
[27:28] between uh 70% onshore wind turbines and
[27:31] 30% offshore. That is again an IEA
[27:34] recommendation.
[27:35] And new solar capacity will split
[27:37] between 90% solar photovoltaic and 10%
[27:41] solar thermal. Again, that's an IEA
[27:43] projection.
[27:46] And this is what we end up with.
[27:48] So, these are the percentage uh splits
[27:50] across the power systems.
[27:53] So,
[27:54] there's no practicality here. This is
[27:56] what they think, you know, this is what
[27:58] they think would like to happen.
[27:59] So, this is how we get 586,000
[28:03] uh power stations of average size.
[28:07] So,
[28:10] I collected some information about what
[28:11] the power stations of each of the
[28:13] different uh
[28:14] uh
[28:15] systems actually did in 2018. Not what
[28:18] they said they were going to do or they
[28:20] might do in the future, but what did
[28:21] they actually do across a year?
[28:23] Solar and wind, for example, are both
[28:25] only operating, you know, 25% of the
[28:27] time. The rest of the time, they are
[28:29] idle. And that that's just an
[28:31] unfortunate practical reality.
[28:33] So, this was the power produced by an
[28:35] average single plant in 2018. Nuclear is
[28:38] our best performer, but nuclear is at
[28:40] the
[28:41] uh end of a very complex value chain.
[28:43] And so, uh we
[28:45] I did a simulation on that, and there
[28:47] are difficulties in expanding nuclear
[28:48] system.
[28:49] So,
[28:51] the International Energy Agency believes
[28:53] that they're putting their hopes on in
[28:55] the future for wind and solar, which
[28:57] happen to be not very good compared to
[28:59] everything else. So, if we want to
[29:01] deliver 1,000 terawatt hours a year
[29:04] using these systems, you could use 142
[29:07] coal-fired power stations
[29:09] or 30,000
[29:11] solar PV arrays
[29:13] or 12,309
[29:16] wind turbine arrays of average size,
[29:19] where each array is like 10 wind uh
[29:20] windows.
[29:21] This is this is where we're getting the
[29:24] extra numbers from. So, each of these
[29:26] sites will have to be built and
[29:27] constructed and maintained, and then
[29:30] when they wear out, they need to be
[29:31] decommissioned. So, renewables have a
[29:33] much lower energy return on energy
[29:34] invested ratio than fossil fuels, and
[29:36] they and
[29:38] the the truth is, they may not be strong
[29:41] enough to power the next industrial era.
[29:45] So,
[29:46] gas and hydro, uh
[29:48] uh
[29:49] um
[29:51] power generation has to balance with
[29:52] demand. Uh supply and demand has to
[29:54] balance, otherwise the grid will age.
[29:56] This is a snapshot of Canada. Uh
[29:59] problems in Canada for uh a couple of
[30:01] weeks.
[30:02] And as you can see, it goes up and down.
[30:04] Uh power demand goes up and down. You
[30:06] know, at night, we demand less power.
[30:09] And so, they have to regulate this.
[30:12] So, the orange is nuclear, and nuclear
[30:15] can't really move much because the
[30:16] nature of what it is. Coal behaves the
[30:18] same way.
[30:20] They they are able to
[30:22] uh regulate
[30:23] um hydro, but within a a narrow
[30:25] bandwidth.
[30:27] So, wind and solar are along the top as
[30:29] well. Wind is the green, and solar is
[30:30] the yellow. And as you can see, they
[30:33] both vary
[30:34] greatly. Wind in particular varies all
[30:36] over the place. The maximum wind
[30:38] generation happened to occur in a demand
[30:40] valley.
[30:41] So, to make up the buffer,
[30:45] they use the gas industry. Gas can be
[30:46] turned on and off at will.
[30:48] Remove gas, and we need a new buffer.
[30:51] Now, the only There's a few ways we can
[30:53] look at
[30:54] our buffer. There's things like
[30:56] flywheels and molten salt, and but in
[30:58] terms of application, ease of
[30:59] application, all our strategic planners
[31:02] both in Europe and the United States
[31:04] believe or think they're going to use
[31:07] stationary battery storage facilities.
[31:11] So, but the this is this is what we
[31:13] need. So, wind and solar,
[31:15] so here is solar radiation in Germany
[31:18] across the year.
[31:20] We don't get as much sun in winter.
[31:23] And that's just reality. So, sun is it
[31:26] solar is varying not only on a
[31:28] day-to-day basis, but also in a seasonal
[31:30] basis, and it's also vulnerable to when
[31:32] it's overcast.
[31:34] So, it's actually all over the place.
[31:36] Wind varies as much as um quite a bit in
[31:40] a week-to-week and month-to-month
[31:42] past. We need at least 4 weeks buffer
[31:44] storage for industry to be operating
[31:48] reliably, things like a smelter.
[31:51] So,
[31:53] based on that calculation, the power
[31:55] that we need, and according to those
[31:56] splits, 34% will be solar PV,
[31:59] and 38% will be wind.
[32:02] So, we need 4 weeks buffer,
[32:05] that's how we get our 548
[32:07] terawatt hours. Now, this is the
[32:09] elephant in the room. It it is mentioned
[32:11] in the literature every now and then,
[32:12] but it is not part of the discussions
[32:14] when they pass platitudes amongst
[32:16] themselves when they're talking about
[32:17] the circular economy.
[32:18] Um the
[32:20] the they are very vulnerable. Uh
[32:23] um
[32:25] A lot of the studies being presented are
[32:27] only a a piece of the pie, and they're
[32:29] or or
[32:30] they've got the very edge of it, and for
[32:32] that reason, they can't
[32:33] that they're actually facing the wrong
[32:35] direction.
[32:37] So, in South Australia, we've got the
[32:39] Hornsdale power reserve, which is a um
[32:44] 100 megawatt capacity.
[32:46] Uh this is one that Elon Musk very
[32:48] famously put in. So, this is what the
[32:51] European Union is now using as the um
[32:54] standard talk about. You know, it's it's
[32:56] been done in Australia, we can do it
[32:57] here. So, in the global system, we would
[33:01] need 15,635
[33:03] and 478 such stations across the planet
[33:08] in the power grid system just for that
[33:10] 4-week buffer.
[33:12] So,
[33:13] and that is actually about 30 times
[33:17] capacity uh compared to the entire
[33:20] global electrical vehicle fleet.
[33:23] So, the market for batteries is actually
[33:25] substantially larger larger than
[33:27] currently understood. Right, so that's
[33:29] where the first report
[33:31] um finishes, and the next report now
[33:33] starts. This is a paper that's being
[33:35] published. It's in peer review at the
[33:37] moment. Um and uh so the the the purpose
[33:41] to actually is to calculate how much
[33:43] metal we will need
[33:44] to to produce one generation of these
[33:47] renewable technology units to phase out
[33:49] fossil fuels. So,
[33:51] the IEA released a report quoting how
[33:54] much metal is actually in each unit.
[33:57] So,
[33:58] and they also released a series of
[34:00] things of
[34:02] estimates in the market in 2040,
[34:05] what would the market share look like
[34:07] for battery chemistries, things like
[34:08] light-duty vehicles and heavy-duty
[34:10] vehicles, but also in power storage as
[34:12] well.
[34:14] And so, across the chemistries.
[34:17] And then the battery chemistries
[34:18] themselves, uh there's an estimate of um
[34:21] the metal content for each one.
[34:23] Uh these calculations are quite crude.
[34:26] For example, there are many variations
[34:28] within each class, but at the level of
[34:31] the global fleet metal content, this is
[34:34] just fine.
[34:35] So, these numbers that I got from this
[34:37] were projected against the numbers at
[34:39] the end of the last report.
[34:41] And so, this is um solar panels. So,
[34:45] again, the same thing. Most of the solar
[34:46] panels in 2040, like about 90%, will be
[34:50] silicon-based.
[34:51] Crystalline silicon. I could not get
[34:53] data for the cadmium telluride or or any
[34:56] of the other systems. So, my assumptions
[34:58] for my report were all solar panels are
[35:01] crystalline silicon. And that's an
[35:02] assumption. That's 90% of the market as
[35:05] projected to be in 2040.
[35:08] So, this is the number of technology
[35:10] units that we now need to manufacture.
[35:14] So, these are the electric vehicles and
[35:16] their batteries.
[35:19] These are the hydrogen fuel cells, uh
[35:22] trucks, freight locomotives for rail,
[35:25] and the maritime shipping fleet.
[35:27] These are the wind turbines.
[35:31] And these are the solar panels, and down
[35:34] the bottom is the power storage buffer.
[35:37] So,
[35:39] I put together an example to show where
[35:41] these numbers came from. So, let's look
[35:42] at wind turbines. How did I handle these
[35:45] numbers?
[35:46] So,
[35:47] you start out with what's the capacity
[35:49] required in the global system, the
[35:52] market share of units, you know, what
[35:54] what different units will be,
[35:56] number of units by type as estimated on
[35:58] the capacity required, metal content for
[36:01] each unit type, and the sum total for
[36:03] the global fleet for by metal type. That
[36:06] was the calculation circuit that's been
[36:07] done for each of the systems looked at.
[36:10] Now, it was all summed together at the
[36:11] end.
[36:12] So, here is our split that
[36:15] um we're using. So, we're going to look
[36:17] at
[36:17] uh wind. So, we have an estimate of
[36:21] terawatt capacity of
[36:24] uh wind both onshore and offshore.
[36:27] So,
[36:28] we take that capacity that we need over
[36:30] here. We then take the power produced by
[36:33] single average plant in 2018, like what
[36:35] do they actually produce? And that gives
[36:37] us the number of plants that we will
[36:38] need to deliver that. And the average
[36:40] installed capacity for those plants was
[36:42] 37.2 megawatts.
[36:45] And so, that gives us the number of new
[36:49] uh um
[36:50] annual capacity required, and then that
[36:52] can be split up into if everything was a
[36:54] 3-megawatt turbine, how many turbines
[36:56] are we looking at?
[36:58] And so, that is gives us the number of
[37:00] units that we need.
[37:02] So, then we have the IEA report that the
[37:05] told us in 2040,
[37:07] uh the split between we've got four
[37:10] four possible units for for power
[37:13] generation,
[37:14] uh electric wind turbine systems. So,
[37:17] what is the market share for both
[37:19] onshore and offshore?
[37:21] And then we have the metal content of
[37:23] each of those units.
[37:25] So, this is the units that DFIG and PM
[37:27] and what have you.
[37:29] So,
[37:31] these is what they mean. So, like GB uh
[37:33] - DFIG is gearbox double-fed induction
[37:36] generator, and so on. So, this is the
[37:38] onshore market.
[37:40] Uh the split that we've got projected
[37:43] against the needed capacity, and that
[37:45] gives us the number.
[37:48] And so, by megawatt, we've got metal
[37:50] content by megawatt. And that's the
[37:52] offshore
[37:54] um systems. So, we estimate them
[37:57] separately, and then we combine them at
[37:58] the end.
[37:59] So,
[38:01] now vertically, we've got the four units
[38:03] um
[38:04] you
[38:05] um across here, and then we've got the
[38:06] metal content per
[38:08] kilograms per megawatt.
[38:10] Well, we've summed it everything
[38:11] together. So, now we've actually got the
[38:13] resolution of what metal is needed to
[38:15] produce a single unit of uh a wind
[38:18] turbine per megawatt.
[38:21] So, then we can actually sort of well,
[38:24] for the onshore system,
[38:27] the the the total amount of metal that
[38:28] we will need for the number of wind
[38:30] turbines and the metal content, and we
[38:32] end up with this column on the far
[38:34] right, which is the total metal content
[38:37] uh by by metal.
[38:39] And we did the same thing
[38:41] uh for the offshore systems, onshore and
[38:44] offshore, and then we sum them together.
[38:47] And so, then we actually get to this
[38:50] point where
[38:52] we get these sort of two columns here.
[38:55] Metal quantity required for onshore wind
[38:57] turbines for the global system, metal
[38:59] quantity required for the
[39:01] offshore systems. That's a typo there,
[39:03] that should be offshore.
[39:04] So,
[39:06] so there's the wind turbines. This is
[39:08] metal content for solar panels.
[39:10] Metal content to construct the needed
[39:12] power nuclear power plants, hydro plants
[39:15] construction, and then the second part
[39:17] of the table is
[39:18] geothermal power plants. They will have
[39:20] to be constructed. And then we get to
[39:22] the units. Electric vehicles, this is
[39:25] what we will need to go into the
[39:26] electric vehicles, and I was able to
[39:28] estimate the platinum going into the
[39:30] hydrogen hydrogen fuel cells. Just the
[39:33] platinum, I couldn't get near the other
[39:34] information.
[39:36] And then we get to the batteries,
[39:37] batteries for electric vehicles, and
[39:38] batteries for stationary power storage.
[39:41] And these numbers are huge, you might
[39:43] notice.
[39:44] And so we're going across not just your
[39:47] classics of cobalt,
[39:49] lithium, and graphite and nickel, but
[39:51] now we've got everything else as well.
[39:53] And again, this is a crude estimate, a
[39:55] very crude estimate. The real numbers
[39:57] will probably be larger, and yes, it'll
[39:58] be more complex, but for now this will
[40:00] suffice to make a point.
[40:03] So then it all is summed together. So
[40:05] everything we need is summed together
[40:07] per metal, and that gives us this column
[40:10] here. Total metal required to produce
[40:12] one generation of technology units to
[40:15] phase out fossil fuels.
[40:17] And so that that we've got these numbers
[40:20] here. The next column is global metal
[40:22] production as it was from mining in
[40:25] 2019.
[40:28] Uh this is all from the USGS and uh the
[40:31] BGR.
[40:32] The final column is how many years of
[40:35] production at the 2019 rate
[40:39] um
[40:40] would be needed to hit the actual
[40:42] volumes needed.
[40:44] So uh 2019 is the last year before
[40:47] COVID, it's the last year of stable
[40:49] data, that's why I've used it.
[40:51] So you might notice some of these
[40:53] numbers are rather large.
[40:55] Like we will need 7,101
[40:58] years of production to produce the
[41:00] needed number of a volume of vanadium.
[41:03] That's your
[41:04] your redox batteries.
[41:06] Uh so the idea that we're going to do
[41:09] this in 7 or 8 years is very amusing.
[41:15] So then the question is, "Oh, we'll just
[41:16] open more mines. It's simple, right?"
[41:19] So here are those same numbers compared
[41:21] against reported global reserves.
[41:25] So there's the amount of metal we need,
[41:27] and there is the global reserves.
[41:29] This column
[41:31] is the proportion of metals required to
[41:34] phase out fossil fuels as a percentage.
[41:36] That is
[41:38] of the all the copper we need to make
[41:40] one generation of units,
[41:42] current global reserves will get us
[41:44] 19.23%
[41:45] of the way there. We don't have enough
[41:47] copper for one generation. Now here's
[41:50] the amusing part. Each of those
[41:52] technology units have a life cycle. They
[41:55] last between 8 years and 25 years, at
[41:57] which point they have to be
[41:58] decommissioned and replaced.
[42:00] The next piece of work which has been
[42:01] planned at the moment is if we had a
[42:04] known number of
[42:06] uh units coming offline and we knew what
[42:07] was in them,
[42:09] if we put them through recycling
[42:11] uh systems, how much could actually come
[42:13] out the other side in terms of recycled
[42:14] metal, and compare that to what's
[42:16] required for its replacement. I expect
[42:18] it's going to be something like maybe
[42:20] 30% can be recycled of some metals, but
[42:23] not all.
[42:24] Right, and so that will actually show
[42:26] exactly what is the relationship between
[42:28] mining and recycling.
[42:31] You might notice all the battery metals
[42:33] of lithium, cobalt, and graphite, and
[42:35] what have you, are all less than 5%. So
[42:38] that is global reserves as stated at the
[42:40] moment is less than 5% of what we need
[42:43] to generate one generation.
[42:45] The simple answer here is we will make
[42:47] batteries out of something else like
[42:49] fluoride or sodium. We'll get off
[42:51] lithium ion chemistry.
[42:53] And what we're trying to do is actually
[42:55] get the people around GTK to have this
[42:58] discussion. What would those
[43:00] alternatives be, and what minerals would
[43:02] they come from, and can we go and look
[43:04] for them, please?
[43:06] So
[43:08] and these systems will be running
[43:09] parallel, not instead of. We will need
[43:11] them all.
[43:12] Now to for those who think that it's
[43:14] going to be easy, for every thousand
[43:16] deposits discovered only one or two
[43:17] become mines.
[43:19] And the time to take a develop deposit
[43:22] uh discovered deposit to a functioning
[43:24] mine is between 15 and 20 years.
[43:26] And for every 10 producing mines, two or
[43:28] three will go out of business because of
[43:30] market conditions.
[43:32] So this is not going to be easy.
[43:37] So
[43:38] this is actually uh to to make a point.
[43:42] Prior to 2020,
[43:44] uh it's been estimated that the global
[43:46] system has mined 700 million tons of
[43:49] copper back to
[43:51] 4000 BC.
[43:53] So that's an estimate.
[43:56] But to keep economic growth on track the
[43:58] way they think they will have to mine
[43:59] the same 700 million tons over the next
[44:01] 22 years.
[44:04] So here's where things get interesting.
[44:05] Current copper reserves are 880 million
[44:09] tons.
[44:10] So that's what, 30 years of production?
[44:13] So better get out there and get
[44:15] exploring.
[44:16] But we want 4.57
[44:20] billion
[44:21] tons of copper, that is with a B, just
[44:24] to manufacture one generation of
[44:25] renewable technology. So this is more
[44:28] than six times
[44:30] the historical mined copper through
[44:32] history. And we need that for just one
[44:34] generation, and 20 years later we do it
[44:36] all again somehow.
[44:38] So we need The message here is we need
[44:41] to look at this and maybe come up with a
[44:42] different plan.
[44:45] How's copper discovery been going? Well,
[44:47] for the last 15 years or so, not so
[44:50] good.
[44:51] These are the number of discoveries that
[44:52] have come online. This is not the
[44:53] volume, it's the number.
[44:55] Uh so the number of strikes has been
[44:57] steadily decreasing at a time when we're
[44:59] putting more and more into exploration.
[45:03] So
[45:04] we've got a couple of trends coming
[45:06] together here, and reality is starting
[45:08] to bite.
[45:10] What's going on?
[45:12] So
[45:13] how did we get to this situation? Like
[45:15] why do we need so much stuff? And how
[45:17] how can we need so many hundreds and
[45:19] sometimes thousands of years of
[45:20] production? So here is all metal ores
[45:24] uh mined, and you can still see most of
[45:26] it is iron ore in terms of mass. Inside
[45:29] this yellow square, we've got other
[45:32] metals like aluminum, manganese,
[45:33] chromium, and copper, and zinc.
[45:36] And inside that little black square in
[45:38] the top right-hand corner is our
[45:39] technology metals.
[45:41] Right.
[45:43] Most of our system so far
[45:46] for the last 150 years has been mined
[45:49] with basically steel and your basic
[45:51] metals like manganese and aluminum with
[45:54] the assistance of fossil fuels.
[45:56] Minerals are the new oil now, so we
[45:58] actually want the future to come out of
[46:00] this black square in the top right-hand
[46:02] corner.
[46:04] So
[46:06] we want the volumes
[46:09] at an unprecedented level
[46:11] that was developed in this brown and
[46:13] yellow squares to come out of the little
[46:15] black square. So this is the level of
[46:17] expansion that is required. Now the
[46:19] nature of the minerals required for
[46:22] these technology metals, they're not
[46:23] found in bulk quantities like iron and
[46:26] copper.
[46:27] And that is the source of the problem of
[46:29] this difference in quantity.
[46:32] So what we're looking at stewardship of
[46:34] planet Earth. This is the sort of things
[46:36] that we're actually now sort of having a
[46:38] frank discussion about. So we used to
[46:40] have, 500 years ago, a small human
[46:42] system, a big pile of natural resources,
[46:45] and a small pollution plume.
[46:47] An industrial ecosystem of unprecedented
[46:50] size and complexity that took more than
[46:51] a century to build with support of the
[46:54] highest calorifically dense source of
[46:56] cheap energy the world has ever known,
[46:58] and that would be oil, in abundant
[47:00] quantities with easily available credit
[47:02] and unlimited mineral resources.
[47:05] And now we've got a system that's a
[47:08] human system that's really large,
[47:10] a depleted natural resources uh
[47:14] uh
[47:15] portfolio compared to what we had, but
[47:17] we've now got a massive pollution
[47:18] stream. So now we seek to build an even
[47:21] more complex system with very expensive
[47:24] energy,
[47:25] a fragile finance system saturated in
[47:27] debt, not enough minerals, with an
[47:30] unprecedented number of human population
[47:32] embedded in a deteriorating environment.
[47:35] So at this point I'm going to say this
[47:37] is probably not going to go as planned.
[47:40] Conclusions.
[47:42] Uh additional non-fossil fuel power is
[47:44] estimated at 36,000 terawatt hours, it's
[47:47] probably larger.
[47:49] Proposed um energy mix translates into
[47:51] 586,000 new stations, which is more than
[47:54] 10 times what we have now.
[47:57] So as wind and solar sources are
[48:00] intermittent, we need power storage
[48:01] buffer. That power storage buffer with a
[48:03] 4-week
[48:05] uh uh
[48:06] capacity,
[48:08] uh we need 548 terawatt hours of
[48:12] battery capacity. This is about 30 times
[48:13] what the electric vehicle fleet will
[48:15] need.
[48:18] Task to transition away from fossil
[48:19] fuels is much larger than first thought.
[48:22] The energy return and energy investment
[48:24] ratio for renewable systems is much
[48:26] lower than the fossil fuel systems, and
[48:29] renewable energy may not be strong
[48:30] enough to replace fossil fuels.
[48:33] Mineral deposits are decreasing in
[48:35] grade, requiring more energy for
[48:37] extraction per unit of metal. This is
[48:39] happening at a time when energy is
[48:40] becoming more expensive and inelastic in
[48:42] supply.
[48:44] Technology development in mining is
[48:45] comparatively slow, and part requiring
[48:48] enormous amounts of capital.
[48:50] And economies of scale is the only way
[48:52] they've been able to survive. So hopes
[48:54] of future technology breakthroughs to
[48:55] somehow deliver a more commodity
[48:57] resources
[48:59] um don't seem to consider the nature of
[49:01] what mineral resources are left.
[49:04] And the current ecosystem has no concept
[49:07] of its dependency on minerals and does
[49:09] not consider uh long-term concepts like
[49:11] continuous growth in production against
[49:14] finite resources.
[49:16] So the snapshot answer is our industrial
[49:19] ecosystem is minerals blind as well as
[49:22] energy blind.
[49:24] That is changing.
[49:26] Current thinking has seriously
[49:27] underestimated the task.
[49:30] Nuclear is vital to keep the industry
[49:31] going, but cannot be scaled up as the
[49:34] universal energy source.
[49:36] Biofuels may be the only way to power
[49:38] aviation and plastics, but cannot be
[49:39] scaled up to replace petroleum.
[49:42] Battery chemistries other than lithium
[49:44] ion will be developed. Each
[49:47] with different chemistries, each
[49:48] requiring different minerals as
[49:51] sources. What are they? Can we go and
[49:53] get them?
[49:54] Current mineral reserves are not
[49:56] adequate to resource metal production to
[49:58] manufacture the generation of renewable
[50:00] energies technology units.
[50:03] Current mining is not even close to
[50:05] being appropriate, and
[50:07] the mineral reserves are also nowhere
[50:09] near enough for what we need.
[50:12] Metals of all kinds are about to become
[50:14] much more valuable.
[50:15] And so we're looking at an evolution of
[50:17] the industrial ecosystem and its market
[50:19] is likely. So there will be a
[50:21] renaissance in exploration as in we need
[50:23] to go and find some more stuff, but we
[50:25] require time to do it properly, and
[50:27] that's what we probably don't have. So
[50:30] there's a coming renaissance for the
[50:31] exploration and the mining of metals.
[50:35] Okay.
[50:36] Kiitos, which is Finnish for thank you.
[50:39] So, questions.
[50:43] Are you still there?
[50:48] Well,
[50:49] thanks Simon. This is great, and we have
[50:51] questions on
[50:53] line, which I believe you probably have
[50:56] access to, so you can
[50:58] browse them.
[51:00] And we also have questions in the
[51:02] audience. Maybe, I don't know, we'll
[51:05] take turns.
[51:06] From alternating between online and in
[51:08] the audience, but yeah, Steve.
[51:12] Thanks Simon. Um
[51:14] fantastic talk and terrifying at the
[51:16] same time. I'm already wondering
[51:18] wondering about my three girls and what
[51:21] what life they have ahead of them.
[51:23] Um
[51:24] The the
[51:26] the aviation issue,
[51:28] uh I've got two two comments,
[51:30] um which I'd like your feedback on. The
[51:32] the where aviation is going to get its
[51:33] fuel from,
[51:35] have you looked at e-kerosene, which is
[51:38] a hydrogen fuel product that's emerging?
[51:41] And then secondly,
[51:43] um
[51:44] this your talk explains some of the
[51:48] immense amounts of money that have been
[51:50] poured into
[51:52] fusion technology, and have you
[51:54] considered
[51:55] what are your thoughts about that as
[51:57] being a a solution to the future?
[51:59] Okay, aviation first. I used what I
[52:02] could actually get sensible data from.
[52:04] There's lots of concepts out there that
[52:07] are able to
[52:08] promise a lot, but they're they're very
[52:11] light on information that was
[52:13] defendable.
[52:14] Uh so there are a number of products.
[52:17] Um
[52:18] yes, you can make kerosene as a hydrogen
[52:20] byproduct from the hydrogen economy, uh
[52:23] but you've got to make the hydrogen
[52:25] first. So I did a study to show the size
[52:28] of the hydrogen economy. That in its own
[52:30] right is going to be a logistical
[52:31] nightmare, and it's very simplistic. It
[52:33] doesn't include things like storage and
[52:35] transport.
[52:36] So this whole report very very simple.
[52:38] In fact, a lot of these questions are
[52:40] answered by the the calculations are
[52:42] simple and they don't include
[52:43] everything.
[52:45] Uh so no, I didn't include that. Uh
[52:48] I did actually
[52:50] if we can have aviation fuel in liquid
[52:53] form,
[52:54] then it will work.
[52:55] You can't have a hydrogen fuel tank on
[52:58] an aircraft because it has to be round,
[53:00] a big round cylinder, and so it's not
[53:02] going to fit in the wings. So the tank
[53:03] has to sit in the cabin with the
[53:05] passengers,
[53:06] which vastly cuts down the capacity to
[53:10] um operate. And so remember, yes, there
[53:13] are electrical um aviation systems out
[53:16] at the moment, but they tend to be small
[53:17] planes and they're short range. They're
[53:19] not going to carry 500 people
[53:23] 8,000 km.
[53:25] As uh fusion, yes, I did look at fusion.
[53:27] Uh so fusion has always sort of been
[53:29] like 10 years away for the last 50
[53:31] years.
[53:32] There's a lot of hope that fusion will
[53:34] will come through.
[53:37] If they do get fusion together, it's
[53:40] some of the technical things that
[53:41] they're trying to overcome are enormous.
[53:43] Like it's
[53:45] my hat's off to them to actually get as
[53:46] far as they have.
[53:48] So let's say someone works out fusion
[53:50] tomorrow.
[53:51] At the moment we can build a coal-fired
[53:53] power station in say 5 6 years, and we
[53:55] know very well what to do. It's it's a
[53:57] well-oiled machine.
[53:59] To get to the point where we can
[54:00] actually produce a fusion
[54:02] uh nuclear power reactor
[54:04] uh in anything less than 20 or 30 years
[54:07] is going to take a while. So now we're
[54:09] back to time.
[54:11] Um
[54:12] so
[54:14] I like the idea of fusion,
[54:16] but you've actually got to show me a
[54:17] viable industrial scale
[54:20] uh units before I can actually include
[54:22] it in a study like this.
[54:25] Um I also considered fourth generation
[54:27] nuclear power. Uh same thing, but the
[54:30] simulations included that. And I wanted
[54:34] to include thorium, but I couldn't
[54:35] actually sort of get the necessary data
[54:37] to
[54:38] uh complete it. Um all right. How how
[54:41] did I estimate the journey lengths of
[54:43] battery capacity?
[54:45] So
[54:46] what I did was I started at the end and
[54:48] worked my way backwards. Number of
[54:50] vehicles and their size, and I estimated
[54:52] the kilometers they would travel
[54:54] in a year. And so to do the same work if
[54:57] the system was electric, like say you
[54:59] had an electric vehicle, let's say a
[55:01] passenger car,
[55:02] and there was an estimate of how much
[55:06] how many kilometers it actually traveled
[55:07] in a year. If it was electric, uh how
[55:10] much
[55:11] charge time
[55:13] um if it was able to consume
[55:15] uh certain amount of power per kilometer
[55:18] or per 100 km, how much electrical power
[55:20] would it need to do that? And so that
[55:22] was just the sum. It didn't include any
[55:24] of the
[55:25] uh sophistications of
[55:27] energy of charging. It was actually
[55:28] quite a a crude calculation.
[55:31] But when I got audited, they couldn't
[55:33] find any way to improve it or fault what
[55:35] I did.
[55:39] I don't appear to have included
[55:41] materials required for foundations for
[55:43] wind turbines. No, I didn't.
[55:45] No, I didn't. So uh cement and
[55:47] reinforcing steel, I did actually find
[55:49] some information for that, but one of my
[55:51] review panels said that the information
[55:53] I had collected was inconsistent, and so
[55:57] we agreed to leave it out. So yes, it'll
[55:59] require more materials again.
[56:01] Uh what do I think governments will do
[56:04] when prices of power and energy spiral
[56:06] out of control?
[56:07] I suppose they'll have another meeting.
[56:10] And uh maybe we'll release a memo.
[56:13] I don't know. I'm very cynical about
[56:15] what they might or might not do. They're
[56:16] not they're not that smart.
[56:18] I don't know.
[56:20] Um
[56:22] Okay. Um
[56:25] Do we we need to face reality and
[56:26] increase research?
[56:33] I realize we've already discussed this.
[56:34] Okay.
[56:35] Last week I actually
[56:37] held a a seminar at GTK, and I invited
[56:41] about 30 people from Finnish Parliament,
[56:44] but also from the Finnish industrial
[56:47] system uh um private sector and
[56:50] academia, and I put them all in one
[56:52] room.
[56:53] And myself and Nate Hagens presented
[56:54] some very challenging information.
[56:57] Uh and they went off to lunch, but when
[56:59] they came back from lunch, I told them
[57:00] there was no such thing as a free lunch,
[57:02] and we went into a workshop.
[57:04] And so I gave them the problem and made
[57:06] them fix it.
[57:08] And so while they didn't fix it, they
[57:09] started to get their arms around
[57:11] uh these problems, and they actually had
[57:13] a frank and open discussion about the
[57:14] issues involved. So that's possible in
[57:16] Finland.
[57:17] Uh they are slowly waking up to the
[57:20] minerals problem right across
[57:23] uh Europe. Cuz now they're actually
[57:24] trying to get to the point where they're
[57:25] going to start producing
[57:27] enough. Uh so discussions are being had,
[57:31] um
[57:32] but they're not being had
[57:34] strong enough. Now, when I've presented
[57:36] this information,
[57:38] um
[57:39] everyone I've presented it to have said
[57:41] they're all apolitical hobbits, and not
[57:43] one single person has actually come back
[57:45] with a sensible pushback at all. And no
[57:49] one's been able to refute the numbers
[57:51] either, because it's been done
[57:55] from what's available on the market
[57:56] based on what's needed and a
[58:00] bottom-up backwards calculation.
[58:02] Uh so
[58:04] um the the work I'm doing has actually
[58:06] generated a lot of discussion.
[58:09] Um I would like to see more of it. I do
[58:11] think the net position of countries like
[58:14] China
[58:15] and the United States
[58:17] and Germany and France, they're too big.
[58:21] They make
[58:22] their systems are huge,
[58:24] and uh
[58:26] from a biology point of view, the size
[58:29] and complexity of a system is related to
[58:31] the energy you put into it. If the
[58:33] energy reduces, the system must shrink
[58:35] in size and it has to become less
[58:37] complex. So we might see these large
[58:39] economies balkanize as a consequence of
[58:42] a low energy future.
[58:45] Uh that is not something that you can
[58:47] really tell a politician.
[58:49] So they've got to observe it for
[58:50] themselves, and
[58:52] you've got to mentor them after that.
[58:55] Uh
[58:56] or we prefer
[58:58] How have I considered the potential for
[59:00] industrial energy times of flexibility?
[59:02] No, I haven't done anything like that.
[59:04] At the moment, it was just a straight
[59:06] calculation.
[59:07] Uh the idea is that someone's going to
[59:09] pick up my report and say, "Brave
[59:11] attempt, but we can do better." And then
[59:12] someone's going to actually do a more
[59:14] sophisticated um calculation or or a
[59:17] series of works.
[59:20] Um
[59:21] All right. Any other questions?
[59:24] Sorry Simon, it's Neville Neville Plint
[59:25] in the audience. Thank you very much for
[59:27] the presentation and the the numbers
[59:30] that you've put together, cuz they're
[59:31] incredibly helpful for raising these
[59:35] issues with the various stakeholders
[59:37] that we deal with.
[59:38] Um and I am always surprised in those
[59:41] audiences exactly of what you said is
[59:43] how often there is no connection with
[59:45] actually what's required to achieve a
[59:48] number of goals that people are signing
[59:50] up for. Um so net zero by 2050 and um
[59:54] I've now put a box in all my
[59:56] presentations that I call the miracle
[59:57] box
[59:59] and it happens in about 2040 and
[60:01] suddenly we we just flicker across into
[60:03] into renewables.
[60:05] I think the other component There are
[60:07] two things which I'd be interested just
[60:08] to see what you thought about. Um one
[60:11] was we've started doing some work
[60:13] through BRICS complex all bodies program
[60:16] looking at the impact of these increased
[60:19] number of mines on the environmental
[60:22] impact. Um so they all come at a cost
[60:24] and what it will take to to
[60:26] rehabilitate. I mean if you just look at
[60:29] the copper expansion it's significant.
[60:31] And then the other one is when I finish
[60:33] up my conclusion is the the challenge is
[60:37] how do we change people's consumption?
[60:40] Um because everything we consume
[60:41] requires energy and we have to
[60:43] significantly reduce that. Have you had
[60:46] a look at what what level of consumption
[60:48] would be needed and by whom to try and
[60:51] address this in an alternative way
[60:53] rather than a
[60:54] just um replacement but actually have to
[60:56] do replacement and reduction.
[61:00] So uh
[61:01] the first question is uh
[61:03] the simple answer that everyone comes to
[61:07] if we need more minerals we should
[61:09] go and remind our tailings dams. Now I'm
[61:11] involved in a number of research
[61:13] projects that is actually looking at
[61:15] that.
[61:16] Um and yes we can extract metals out of
[61:19] tailings and but all the good stuff's
[61:21] already been taken out and especially
[61:23] economically viable stuff and so the
[61:24] volumes required
[61:27] compared to the effort put in for mining
[61:29] of tailings dams is not going to be
[61:32] good enough to replace conventional
[61:34] mining.
[61:35] And that is something that another thing
[61:36] we need to come to terms with. As for
[61:38] the environmental fallout of all these
[61:41] large-scale industrial systems
[61:43] I haven't actually sort of
[61:46] put together numbers to show that.
[61:49] Um but
[61:51] I do believe it's going to be
[61:52] extraordinary. I think there's going to
[61:54] come a point when mining is going to
[61:55] eclipse industrial agriculture in its
[61:58] impact
[61:59] on uh life systems on the planet if we
[62:01] keep going. I don't think we will keep
[62:03] going cuz we don't have the energy.
[62:05] Energy is the master resource.
[62:07] Uh as for consumption
[62:10] uh I got a flaming uh from uh
[62:12] um I think I was presenting to Wilton
[62:14] Park which reports to the British House
[62:17] of Lords
[62:18] and I got I got I got a flaming from uh
[62:20] um
[62:21] uh one of the guys on the call says like
[62:23] you you you you're presenting a a very
[62:25] negative picture. You've got to give us
[62:27] a solution otherwise we're not going to
[62:28] talk to you.
[62:30] Uh and so I went away and uh developed a
[62:34] um
[62:36] uh
[62:38] a a possible change in how we might
[62:40] actually go about
[62:42] um changing our relationship with
[62:45] minerals.
[62:47] And so um
[62:49] I'm going to type an answer
[62:51] in the chat if I can.
[62:55] And so that's a report that was actually
[62:57] written where we restructured the the
[62:59] circular economy in its current form is
[63:01] not going to work. It's simply not
[63:03] practical.
[63:04] And so I've put a counter answer to it
[63:07] in how we might manage our resources
[63:09] more effectively. In terms of
[63:10] consumption at the very heart of this
[63:13] there's going to be a complete change to
[63:14] our social contract of what we use
[63:17] metals for
[63:18] and when we design things we need to
[63:20] design them to last. At the moment we
[63:22] design them to wear out so we can buy
[63:23] them again.
[63:25] And they're not designed to be recycled.
[63:26] So they're designed to be thrown away.
[63:29] And so at the heart of our design
[63:31] culture and what we need things for has
[63:34] to change. That is a very complicated
[63:36] discussion
[63:37] and um it
[63:39] uh you you can get into dangerous waters
[63:42] very quickly cuz it's not data supported
[63:43] it's more emotional.
[63:45] And so no I haven't actually sort of
[63:47] done anything of consequence there. In
[63:48] fact I've avoided it so far. Maybe
[63:50] someone else can do it.
[63:53] Um
[63:56] Uh Sam it's it's Sam here. Um just a
[63:59] couple of quick things. Uh
[64:01] as I said at the beginning I was
[64:03] privileged to have read part of this
[64:04] report already. You kindly sent it to me
[64:06] but I have to say it was just as
[64:07] terrifying the second time around. So I
[64:10] agree with Steve. Um two quick
[64:12] questions. One is I'm reminded of the
[64:14] infamous report um the limits to growth
[64:17] issued by a number of distinguished
[64:19] economists in the 1970s that essentially
[64:22] took data like you've done and predicted
[64:24] that we would run out of all important
[64:26] metals by about the year 2000. Clearly
[64:29] that didn't happen. They made the
[64:31] undergraduate blunder of assuming that
[64:34] the only metals in the ground were what
[64:36] the mining companies reported as
[64:37] reserves which clearly is a is a small
[64:40] proportion of what's really there. So
[64:41] firstly I assume you haven't made that
[64:43] mistake. Uh my my second question is a
[64:48] more serious one. Um
[64:50] you essentially have produced data if
[64:52] even half of it is right
[64:54] that completely destroys all of the
[64:57] current plans entrenched positions uh in
[65:00] ideologies
[65:01] and so on which means you are going to
[65:03] get viciously attacked. Um and it sounds
[65:07] like it may have already started. What's
[65:09] your plan for dealing with that? Two
[65:11] questions the
[65:12] the old problem of limits to growth and
[65:15] what's going to happen next to your
[65:16] report?
[65:18] So the Limits to Growth report as it was
[65:20] released uh they did an update in 2008
[65:24] where they looked at it
[65:25] where they projected the data from 1970
[65:27] to the year 2000 on the standard run and
[65:30] the data
[65:31] projected onto that
[65:32] fits roughly the same pattern that shows
[65:35] conceptually the Limits to Growth report
[65:38] was conceptually correct. What they got
[65:40] it badly wrong was when.
[65:43] You know uh it's it's a trend that that
[65:46] goes across a century. So so at what
[65:48] point do we hit a problem? Um I don't
[65:50] think anyone knows that. So all I've
[65:53] done here is if we think we are going to
[65:55] replace the system as it is now now now
[66:00] how much metal will we need to
[66:02] manufacture the needed number of units
[66:04] to do that?
[66:06] So the obvious outcome is we won't do
[66:09] it.
[66:09] We will have less technology units.
[66:12] We'll we'll have to shrink the system
[66:13] somehow. And so the future will not look
[66:16] like anything like what I presented cuz
[66:19] uh um we've been moving in a particular
[66:22] direction with our industrial ecosystem
[66:24] and
[66:25] so the idea of say growth economics for
[66:27] example is about to be phased out
[66:29] whether we like it or not.
[66:31] So the economic model behind materialism
[66:34] uh and you know consumerism uh and the
[66:36] and the social constructs associated
[66:38] with that will have to go. So we've got
[66:40] a choice there and so um
[66:45] the purpose of this work is to show the
[66:47] shortcomings of the existing
[66:49] paradigm.
[66:51] So uh
[66:53] what what what will happen is we've got
[66:54] to make a better plan.
[66:56] Once we understand our true boundary
[66:57] conditions what could we really do?
[67:00] Uh as for
[67:02] uh yes there's been a few screams of
[67:03] pain when I presented this.
[67:05] Um
[67:07] but because I've actually presented data
[67:10] on stage from blue chip sources. In fact
[67:12] I've used their data.
[67:14] Um
[67:16] the push backs have not been very
[67:18] effective.
[67:20] Uh I I have been um
[67:23] thrown a few uh challenging um
[67:26] not questions but uh uh challenging uh
[67:29] comments along the lines of
[67:32] you're a very naughty boy. Could you
[67:33] please stop doing that?
[67:35] Uh it it really is that level of
[67:37] uh uh push back.
[67:40] My management understands
[67:42] and they and they back me and that's all
[67:44] I need to know. The way I convinced my
[67:46] management was pointing out that
[67:48] in 2024 or 2025
[67:51] the captains of industry in Europe who
[67:54] are making electric vehicles and their
[67:56] batteries will turn to the geological
[67:58] surveys of Europe and say why did you
[68:01] not tell us about this very obvious
[68:03] problem? Now Finland in particular has a
[68:06] portfolio of battery minerals
[68:09] more so than any other European survey.
[68:11] So we're going to be first on the
[68:14] chopping block.
[68:15] And I pointed this all out to management
[68:16] and they said yeah yeah okay we've got a
[68:17] problem and they gave me permission and
[68:19] a mandate
[68:20] to go off and explore this
[68:22] in any way I see fit.
[68:24] And so
[68:27] uh their support's been remarkable. Now
[68:29] I do have a plan. If it does get too hot
[68:32] I've already uh got a a series of
[68:36] projects I've lined up. I'm working in
[68:38] battery chemistries at the moment to
[68:41] recycling um
[68:43] of battery chemistries and also
[68:44] geometallurgy is still running.
[68:47] Um
[68:48] if it does get too ugly I'll just
[68:50] quietly leave and move on to another
[68:51] frontier.
[68:53] First frontier to look at is uh
[68:55] rehabilitating land that's been
[68:56] sterilized through industrial
[68:57] agriculture.
[68:59] So for every bushel of wheat that goes
[69:00] to the market 0.8 cubic meters of soil
[69:03] is sterilized
[69:04] uh through current methods and this is
[69:05] our land degradation. So
[69:08] uh the idea is to get GTK to partner up
[69:11] with a group that actually does life
[69:13] systems like Luke A or NRRI
[69:16] and uh do the mineral balance in the
[69:18] soil and we'll get them to reestablish
[69:20] the uh food web.
[69:23] The second thing I was going to look at
[69:25] was uh to look at the historical data
[69:28] for um uh uh the last couple thousand or
[69:31] couple hundred thousand years of how our
[69:33] climate has changed and see if I can
[69:35] actually decouple the industrial era
[69:37] from that. So, um
[69:39] and there is a very interesting project
[69:42] that's actually on the books at the
[69:43] moment where I'm actually developing
[69:45] what I call the materials um the
[69:47] minerals atlas.
[69:50] So, all minerals going into metals that
[69:53] would then go into a product across a
[69:55] value chain, I'm looking at a way of
[69:57] characterizing it so we can determine
[69:59] where in the value chain it is based on
[70:01] the data and to look at the spectra from
[70:04] say XRF and XRD to try and track as
[70:08] we've moved along those value chains.
[70:10] That's actually the next generation of
[70:11] that circle.
[70:13] Uh
[70:14] So, yes, I do have an escape plan.
[70:16] Um so far I haven't needed it though. If
[70:19] If I was going to get shot at, it would
[70:20] have happened by now.
[70:22] This this has now been running for a
[70:23] couple of years.
[70:26] Um I hate interrupting flow because this
[70:29] is great uh great discussion, but we do
[70:32] probably need to wrap up. I want to make
[70:33] an executive decision and say because
[70:36] there are still a few questions online
[70:38] for you. So, I'll encourage these people
[70:41] to perhaps reach out to you personally,
[70:45] but I do want to leave with just one
[70:46] more question. Uh I guess it's kind of
[70:49] rolling the dice.
[70:50] Um what do you think about the long-term
[70:52] impact of carbon capture storage? The
[70:55] storage capacity is huge but finite. Is
[70:58] it considered a sustainable mitigation
[71:00] method?
[71:02] So, uh the systems I've looked at so far
[71:05] um for that, I've just attended a couple
[71:08] of seminars.
[71:09] And like everything else, it works on
[71:12] small on a small scale, but is it viable
[71:15] in terms of the effort that that you put
[71:18] in as compared to the effort you get
[71:19] out? How effective are these systems?
[71:22] Uh and how much carbon will you consume
[71:25] by deploying them?
[71:27] Right? And so, how effective actually
[71:29] are they? And so, a lot of these things
[71:30] are actually uh have trouble in scaling.
[71:34] And so,
[71:35] the the I think uh
[71:38] the the simple answer is we're only part
[71:40] of the way there.
[71:41] And more needs to be done. And now we're
[71:43] back to we don't have enough time.
[71:49] Of course, someone could prove me wrong.
[71:50] And if they do, great.
[71:53] Um thanks, Simon. Um
[71:56] it would have been great to have you
[71:57] here present in person because I think
[72:00] we could have probably go on talking
[72:02] forever.
[72:04] Let us thank you one more time. Um this
[72:06] was fantastic.
[72:09] Okay.
[72:13] And next week we are back to uh seminar
[72:17] here at the lecture theater and we have
[72:19] a team from Mintek from South Africa as
[72:22] led by Dr. Mehdi Safari and they will
[72:24] discuss technological assessments on
[72:26] recent developments in fine and coarse
[72:28] particle flotation systems.
[72:30] Thank you.
