Rippling’s Conrad Accuses Deel CEO of Funding Corporate Espionage

Rippling创始人Conrad指控Deel CEO资助商业间谍活动 这家估值170亿美元的初创公司公开指控竞争对手系统性窃取其CRM数据，以防止商业间谍沦为被普遍接受的行业常态。 在这次坦诚的访谈中，Rippling首席执行官Parker Conrad分享了在被Zenefits粗暴解雇后，激发其“复仇幻想”创业之旅的原始且往往阴暗的动机。他详细讲述了背负职业“红字”融资的严酷现实、与David Sacks激烈的媒体战，以及他如何将愤怒转化为卓越的运营执行力。Conrad还剖析了他反传统的领导法则——包括亲力亲为的“深入现场”（Go and See）理念、聘用前创业者的价值，以及涉及竞争对手Deel的极具戏剧性、宛如电影情节般的商业间谍纠纷。 在被 Zenefits 暴力解雇后，Parker Conrad 带着强烈的“复仇幻想”创立了 Rippling，将受挫带来的负面动机转化为极强的执行力，最终将公司打造成估值 170 亿美元的后台软件巨头。 (0:00) 由于 Zenefits 时期遗留的声誉“红字”，Rippling 的 A 轮融资极具争议，红杉资本在做出投资决策前甚至详尽访谈了约 50 位 Zenefits 前高管以还原事实真相。 (7:04) Rippling 推行“亲临现场（Go and See）”的核心领导原则，主张高管必须深入一线诊断运营危机；Conrad 本人至今仍是唯一的“全权管理员”，亲自执行全球薪资发放与日常费用审批以保持对产品的极致敏感。 (21:22) Conrad 详细曝光了竞争对手 Deel 收买内部员工窃取 CRM 销售线索的商业间谍丑闻，Rippling 随后通过设置“Deel 反叛者”虚假 Slack 频道蜜罐固定铁证，并在爱尔兰法院获得紧急搜查令展开突袭调查。 (60:06)

Following his contentious ouster from Zenefits, Parker Conrad leveraged negative motivation and an unconventional, operational-level leadership style to build Rippling into a $17 billion enterprise software provider. Negative Motivation and the Rebuilding from Zenefits (0:00) Parker Conrad admits that Rippling originated as a 'revenge fantasy' after he was fired from Zenefits and subjected to an aggressive media campaign led by board member David Sacks. Silicon Valley insiders largely wrote off his career, and fundraising a Series A proved contentious due to his professional reputation. While some venture capitalists canceled meetings following calls with Sacks, Sequoia Capital conducted in-depth diligence by interviewing roughly 50 former Zenefits executives, leading to a competitive round. Early investors like Mamoon Hamid initially worried that Conrad's motivation was 'dark,' though his executive team welcomed the focus. Over time, that anger subsided into the satisfaction of building the company. Conrad disputes common startup tropes, asserting that failure is not inherently educational and advising aspiring entrepreneurs against starting companies due to the severe toll on mental health and personal relationships. Contrarian Management: 'Go and See' and Detail Orientation (21:22) Rejecting the traditional model where a CEO manages strictly through detached department heads, Conrad operates through first principles and direct involvement. Rippling institutionalized the 'Go and See' principle, requiring leaders to diagnose systemic flaws at the ground level. For example, during an operational crisis with payroll tax discrepancies, Conrad and senior leadership spent a week working as frontline agents, answering support tickets and calling tax agencies directly to identify core software bugs. Conrad continues to serve as the sole 'full admin' for Rippling's internal account, personally running multi-country payroll for 4,000 employees and approving expense reimbursements over $10. He argues that using the product as a controller or accountant exposes friction points that legacy competitors overlook. Rippling notes that a study using LinkedIn data indicated its clients require approximately half the administrative, HR, IT, and finance staff of peers using competing systems. Executive Hiring, Speed, and the Ex-Founder Advantage (33:05) Conrad emphasizes homegrown talent over external 'upleveling,' maintaining an executive core that includes early employees and long-time collaborators. When vetting outside senior hires, he presents candidates with internal investor memos and evaluates them on their skepticism and willingness to probe operational weaknesses. He also requests six references, speaks with two, and leans heavily on off-list blind calls. When personnel mismatches occur, Conrad notes that managers almost always delay terminations longer than they should. To prevent scale from eroding organizational pace, Conrad rejects binary trade-offs presented by middle managers, pushing teams to find alternative paths that accomplish competing goals simultaneously. Rippling aggressively recruits ex-founders to manage individual product lines within its integrated suite. Conrad explains that former founders naturally tolerate extreme constraints and high-pressure asks because they have managed cash runway and sales deficits firsthand. Corporate Espionage Allegations Involving Deel (52:11) Rippling publicly accused competitor Deel of corporate theft after internal Slack screenshots surfaced in media inquiries and a prospective client received an unsolicited retention message from Deel CEO Alex Bouaziz immediately after a Rippling demo. Rippling partnered with Salesforce leadership to analyze Slack search logs, identifying an active employee who was allegedly transmitting daily CRM opportunities, pricing terms, and prospect objections to Bouaziz. To confirm the leak, Rippling staged a honeypot by circulating a legal letter referencing a fictitious Slack channel named 'Deel Defectors,' which the suspect searched for within hours. Rippling obtained an ex-parte civil search order from an Irish court to seize the employee's phone. According to the employee's subsequent affidavit, he panicked, ran into a bathroom, performed a factory reset, and attempted to flush the device before fleeing. The affidavit alleged that Deel attorneys instructed him to destroy his devices and offered relocation to Dubai. Conrad stated Rippling made the case public to prevent corporate espionage from becoming standard industry practice. Reflecting on Rippling's growth, Conrad cautions that startup frameworks do not readily transfer across companies or eras. Despite building a product suite conceptually adjacent to Zenefits, changes in market assumptions over four years meant strategies that drove his previous venture failed at Rippling, demonstrating that conventional startup advice often prepares founders for past dynamics rather than current realities.

Rippling 联合创始人兼首席执行官 Parker Conrad 在经历被 Zenefits 解雇的职业低谷后，将复仇驱动力转化为重构底层软件的动力，凭借反常规的“深入一线”管理模式与复合产品架构，将公司带至 170 亿美元估值；同时，他选择公开反击竞争对手 Deel 的不正当窃密行为，以遏制行业道德底线的滑落。 从公关风波到千亿野心的复仇动力 (0:00) Conrad 坦承创办 Rippling 始于一种极端的“复仇幻想”。他此前被 Zenefits 激烈解雇，并面临董事会与继任者 David Sacks 持续的舆论攻势。尽管 Conrad 承认作为 CEO 应对当时公司的增长失误负责，但他指责管理层刻意将管理疏漏定性为恶意的合规违规。当时硅谷舆论普遍认为他的职业生涯已彻底终结，为了保护心理健康，他长达五到六年不阅读任何相关媒体报道。这种深陷低谷的经历反而为他提供了极度聚焦的动力：要么就此认输，要么在完全相同的领域打造一家数百亿美元的企业来证明批评者是错的。 在启动 Rippling 的 A 轮融资时，Conrad 背负着 Zenefits 事件留下的职业污名，尽管有 Gary Tan、Sam Altman 以及 YC 社区成员的早期支持，顶级风投机构依然非常谨慎。红杉资本合伙人 Mike Vernal 当时指出，推进或放弃这笔投资的理由完全相同；为此红杉深度访谈了约 50 名 Zenefits 前高管以还原事实。Conrad 将自己的复仇逻辑比作《南方公园》中的“内裤侏儒”理论——第 1 步打造庞大业务，第 3 步完成复仇，而第 2 步的实际关联却是一片空白。随着 Rippling 如今扩张至 4,000 名员工、估值达 170 亿美元，Conrad 表示昔日的愤怒已逐渐退居幕后，被专注构建业务的激情所取代，但他依然坚决反驳硅谷推崇的“失败是财富”理论，坚持认为成功带给人的认知远多于失败。 深入一线的反常规管理与细节执念 (21:22) Conrad 强烈排斥由职业经理人层层汇报的传统 CEO 管理法则，主张从第一性原理出发，并推行“去现场看”（Go and See）的核心领导原则。在 Rippling 早期遭遇税务运营的系统性危机时，因申报错误率高于竞品，大量客户收到了税务机构就微小差额发出的催缴函。为彻底解决这一隐患，Conrad 与其首席运营官及业务主管清空了一整周的日程，亲自扮演一线税务运营专员，直接接单并致电各级税务机构排查系统漏洞。他强调，若管理者不亲自参与底层的手工流程，根本不可能精准定位复杂的系统缺陷。 即使 Rippling 规模已达数千人，Conrad 依然保持着对底层细节的深度参与。他是公司内部系统唯一的“最高管理员”（full admin），亲自为跨数十个国家的员工运行薪酬流程、配置 IT 权限与福利策略，并逐笔审批所有超过 10 美元的报销申请。他指出此举并非为了微观管理，而是为了像一名极其严格的财务主管一样亲自测试并打磨产品。根据 Rippling 援引领英数据所做的分析，由于消除了繁琐的数据录入等“行政税”，使用该平台的客户公司在人力资源、IT 和财务等综合行政岗位上所需的人数，仅为采用竞品平台的同类企业的一半左右。 任用前创业者与追求非线性迭代速度 (40:02) 在团队搭建上，Conrad 极为推崇内部提拔的“本土人才”，其首席营收官为公司第 8 号员工，首席运营官则是其大学挚友。这种稳定性与风险投资机构惯常要求的“引入外部高管升级团队”截然不同。在物色外部高级管理人员时，Conrad 采取非常规的面试策略：提前向候选人提供公司的投资备忘录与核心业务数据，并在面试前半段完全由候选人主动提问，以此考察对方能否敏锐洞察业务的核心痛点。同时，他会要求候选人提供 6 位推荐人但仅随机抽取 2 位，转而着重依赖名单之外的隐蔽背景调查（blind references），并在发现人选不合适应果断解雇，避免管理犹豫带来损耗。 针对集成式“复合软件”（compound software）多业务线同时推进的复杂性，Rippling 大量引入前创业者（ex-founders）统领细分产品。Conrad 认为，传统经理人面对海量积压问题只会按常规进度进行裁剪，而前创业者经历过现金流枯竭与销售困局的生死考验，能承受极高压力并接受“不合理的要求”。在管理决策中，Conrad 坚决抵制非此即彼的虚假二选一模式，要求团队在符合物理规律与法律的前提下探索同时完成多项任务的第三条路径，通过不断攻克看似不可逾越的障碍来实现组织效能的复利式加速。 阻击 Deel 商业窃密与确立行业行为红线 (52:11) 谈及与 Deel 的摩擦，Conrad 澄清两家公司主要在海外名义雇主（EOR）领域竞争，而在更广阔的薪酬管理市场，Rippling 的主流对手实为 ADP、Workday 及 Paycom 等传统巨头。双方矛盾源于一起数据泄露事件：此前有记者向 Rippling 出示了一组被恶意剪裁且脱离上下文的内部 Slack 截图，同时有潜在客户反映在刚结束 Rippling 的产品演示数小时内，便收到了 Deel 首席执行官 Alex Bouaziz 的直接挽留讯息。Rippling 随后通过 Salesforce 高管协助调取了底层的 Slack 搜索日志，锁定了内部一名在职员工正在系统性地向 Bouaziz 传输包含销售商机、客户名单及报价明细的 CRM 数据。 为坐实证据，Rippling 团队设计了一个“蜜罐陷阱”：在发给 Deel 法律团队及首席财务官的信函中附上一张涂黑的 Slack 截图，伪称公司存在一个名为“Deel 叛逃者”（Deel Defectors）的秘密频道。该涉案员工在信件发出后数小时内便开始在内部系统疯狂搜索该关键词。获取确凿证据后，Rippling 利用爱尔兰法院的单方民事搜查令（ex-parte search order）突击扣押其电子设备，该员工当场反锁在洗手间试图将手机重置并冲入马桶，随后逃跑。根据该员工后续提交的宣誓书，Deel 律师曾指示其销毁设备并提出协助其全家移居迪拜以规避法律管辖。Conrad 强调，之所以选择将此案全盘公开，是为了防止商业窃密沦为科技行业的默认潜规则，避免企业被迫卷入恶性的间谍与反间谍内耗之中。 Parker Conrad 的管理实践展现了由逆境反弹引发的强韧生命力，但他同样提醒，初创企业的经验往往因时代背景与初始条件的变迁而难以生搬硬套。尽管他在复仇执念下打破了诸多常规商业教条，但随着企业规模的建立，原初的情绪宣泄最终让位于对产品底层逻辑的敬畏；而面对商业竞争中的道德失序，如何通过公开透明的法律手段守住底线，是其给科技行业带来的深层思考。

[7:04] Mike Vernal: There's one reason to do this deal and there's one reason not to do this deal, and they're the same reason. [10:00] David Sacks: If you're ever in kind of one of these media [sh*t] fights, you want to attack, attack, attack, attack. And if the other guy rolls over and cries, 'Uncle,' that means it's working. And you want to keep attacking. [13:03] Parker Conrad's Wife: Oh, they [f*ck]ed you. Don't even read it. [13:03] Parker Conrad: Don't do it. It's a terrible idea. [40:02] Parker Conrad: There's ultimately only one person in the organization who cares about speed, and it's you as the CEO. [52:11] Parker Conrad: It's not that Deel was spying. It's that they were stealing. Yeah, it was just theft pure and direct from the CEO of the company. [54:31] Parker Conrad: I believe that this company was built on this foundation of theft from competitors. [60:06] Parker Conrad: Mebbstein, we need you to write a cold email that's going to have a 100% S1 to S2 conversion rate.

[0:00] Rippling was born out of kind of this [0:02] like revenge fantasy. That's what kind [0:04] of got the company going and it's [0:06] certainly what what kept me going for [0:09] the first couple years. I love the [0:11] people I work with. I sort of really [0:13] like the problems that we're solving. I [0:15] feel like we're, you know, making a [0:17] difference for customers in this sort of [0:18] small way for their companies and that's [0:20] all extremely motivating. But early on, [0:23] you know, it's it's a grind. People come [0:24] to me all the time. They're like, "Oh, [0:25] I'm like thinking about doing, you know, [0:26] starting a company. What do you think?" [0:28] And my advice is always like, "Don't do [0:29] it. It's a terrible idea. [0:39] [music] [0:48] Okay, in this episode you're going to [0:50] hear from Parker Conrad. He's one of the [0:53] most compelling CEOs in Silicon Valley [0:55] in my opinion. He runs Ripling. It's an [0:58] amazing back office software company. [1:00] It's a $17 billion market cap with 4,000 [1:03] employees. Incredibly successful. Almost [1:06] everyone, including myself, never [1:08] thought he would get this company off [1:09] the ground. And that's because he was [1:12] very violently fired from his last [1:14] company's benefits. And I remember when [1:17] that went down and I thought, man, he's [1:18] done. He'll never get up off the mat. [1:20] And I'm really impressed he has and and [1:22] how well he's done. He's also had a lot [1:24] of drama with a competitor deal very [1:26] recently who was spying on information [1:29] inside his systems and there's a lawsuit [1:31] and arrests and all kinds of drama [1:33] around that. So there's lots of good [1:34] drama in here for you who are into that. [1:37] But in between the drama, there's some [1:39] pearls of scale up CEO wisdom. He's not [1:42] your typical CEO. He rethinks things [1:44] from scratch in a way that I find [1:46] compelling. I like the way he thinks [1:48] about hiring. I think it's quite [1:50] interesting how his company has over 100 [1:53] former founders in it. I like the way he [1:55] thinks about scaling without getting [1:57] sclerotic. 4,000 people is pretty big. [2:00] It's still moving fast. Very hard to do. [2:02] And I like how his chip on his shoulder [2:05] can supercharge his whole career. And [2:06] that can supercharge yours, too. So, [2:08] he's going to get into that. Parker's [2:10] basically written the book on turning [2:12] your darkest professional moment into [2:14] your greatest competitive advantage. I [2:16] hope you like it. How you doing? [2:19] >> Doing pretty good. [2:20] >> At Sequoia, one of the things they [2:22] always talk about is they like founders [2:25] with chips on their shoulders. Do you [2:27] have a chip on your shoulder? [2:28] >> I think so. Um I think it's like, you [2:31] know, maybe faded a little bit over [2:33] time. You know, I tried very hard to [2:35] keep it honed to razor sharpness, but I [2:37] think certainly Rippling was born out of [2:40] kind of this like revenge fantasy. Um, [2:43] and like that's what kind of got the [2:45] company going and it's certainly what [2:48] what kept me going for the first couple [2:50] years. You know, there are a lot of [2:51] other things that I love about my job. I [2:53] love the people I work with. I sort of [2:55] really like the problems that we're [2:57] solving. I feel like we're, you know, [2:58] making a difference for customers in [3:00] this sort of small way for their [3:02] companies and that's all extremely [3:03] motivating. But, but yeah, early on, you [3:06] know, it's it's a grind when you're [3:08] starting a company. And, uh, this wasn't [3:10] like my first rodeo. It's my third and [3:13] doing it the third time around. I think [3:15] they're really like it was helpful to [3:18] have this like extra bit of motivation [3:20] that was there for me every night when I [3:23] went to bed and like every morning when [3:25] I woke up. [3:26] >> Do you think that you have exacted [3:29] revenge on those doubters and those [3:32] people who did you wrong or not? And do [3:36] you think you'll ever put that to bed in [3:38] your own brain or is it is it a source [3:41] of constant motivation for the rest of [3:43] your life? [3:44] >> I don't know. It's so um Have you ever [3:46] seen there's a South Park episode? The [3:48] the Underpants Gnomes. [3:50] >> I love it's my favorite episode. [3:52] >> So it's sort of Yeah, Underpants for for [3:54] people who aren't familiar with it. You [3:56] know, the kids sort of follow these [3:57] gnomes that are like stealing everyone's [3:59] underpants and they follow them to their [4:00] secret underground layer and they're [4:02] like, "Why are you stealing everyone's [4:04] underpants?" And there's this sort of [4:05] secret plan for world domination. And [4:07] it's like step one like steel [4:08] underpants, step three, world [4:11] domination. And the kids are like, [4:13] "What's step two?" And they're like, "Oh [4:15] [ __ ] we never really we never really [4:16] thought about that." And sometimes I [4:18] think it's a little bit like that with [4:20] me where it was like, you know, I felt [4:21] like when things went south at Zenits, I [4:24] wasn't allowed to talk about it and the [4:27] entire story was being written by sort [4:31] of my antagonists, you know, that were [4:33] just saying all the stuff that, you [4:35] know, I felt wasn't wasn't true, wasn't [4:37] actually was going on, like it was [4:38] unfair and I couldn't do anything about [4:40] it. And so for me there was always kind [4:42] of this idea where I was like step one [4:45] build this like multiundred billion [4:48] dollar outcome in like the exact same [4:51] space and by doing it in exactly the [4:53] opposite way of everything that they [4:54] said was like the right way to do it and [4:57] then like step three was like somehow [4:59] like you know get get like revenge on [5:01] all of them and like step two was like [5:03] always sort of like vaguely like how's [5:05] like A connected to B was like sort has [5:07] always been sort of unclear. The [5:09] company's a lot of fun, you know, like I [5:10] I started out and [5:12] >> not just revenge. [5:13] >> Yeah. I mean, everyone sort of told me, [5:14] well, you need to develop actually early [5:16] on like our our our series A investor, [5:20] you know, I I was very open about these [5:22] motivations and and Mimoon was like, [5:25] "Hey, that's kind of dark. Like, maybe [5:27] you should maybe you should talk to [5:28] someone about that." And actually, [5:29] there's like an exec coach that came in [5:30] and I talked to this guy and you know, [5:32] he was sort of constantly like, "You [5:34] need to have all these positive [5:35] motivations and no negative [5:36] motivations." and he went and he did [5:38] sort of interviews with all of my direct [5:40] reports of the company and one of his [5:43] questions was like, "How do you feel [5:44] about the fact that Parker is like [5:46] motivated in these ways?" And and [5:48] everyone was like, "I hope he never [5:49] loses it." And so there was definitely [5:51] like [5:52] >> that element of it. Um but like over [5:55] over time I think you know despite all [5:59] of my attempts to sort of like focus my [6:02] anger on this stuff I think that yeah [6:05] like the a lot of you know sort of [6:07] dayto-day is like you know all of that [6:09] stuff is very distant and it's much more [6:12] about sort of the excitement of what [6:14] we're building and the problems that [6:16] we're solving and the people that I work [6:19] with who I really enjoy working with. [6:20] >> Yes or no? Have you exacted revenge on [6:25] your antagonist from Zenitz? [6:28] >> I don't think so. [6:29] >> Will you at some point answer that [6:31] question as a yes? And at what point is [6:34] that a yes? [6:35] >> I'm not sure that there is any [6:38] just$undred [6:39] >> billion dollar IPO kind of thing. It's [6:42] like, okay, check. I was right. I don't [6:45] think that that I'm not sure that like [6:47] one leads to the other, you know, and I [6:50] think that you don't necessarily get [6:52] that kind of satisfaction, [6:54] >> but also [6:56] everything sort of fades with time. It [6:59] stops [7:00] >> being the thing that is like the focus [7:02] of what you're doing every single day. [7:04] >> I remember when that whole thing went [7:05] down [7:08] and then I remember you got your series [7:10] A and I thought, [7:13] okay, you had a Someone painted a [7:15] scarlet letter on you and I was like [7:18] it's going to be hard for him to raise [7:19] again and you raised. You talk about [7:22] that fund raise and [7:25] how did it go down like getting over [7:27] that must have been non-trivial. [7:30] >> It was a weird process because um there [7:35] were definitely like I mean at the time [7:37] Ripling was doing really well. I mean [7:39] like the numbers we kind of showed [7:40] everyone our numbers and the numbers [7:42] were I think quite impressive [7:43] >> and you and you had personally you know [7:46] angel funded it I assume you seated it. [7:48] I I I did some amount and then and then [7:51] we raised a seed round where we had a [7:53] bunch of like really early believers a [7:55] lot and a lot of them were [7:57] >> former ZS seed investors [7:59] >> y [8:00] >> who really who backed me again [8:02] >> and a lot of sort of people in the YC [8:04] community YC partners initialized Gary [8:07] Tan Sam Alman all those guys [8:09] >> you're doing the A you got the scarlet [8:11] letter [8:11] >> and so then we went out to raise to [8:13] raise our series A [snorts] and it was [8:15] it was very controversial and there you [8:17] know there were like every firm was [8:19] really interested because the numbers [8:20] were so good. Um, and I think there were [8:23] a couple of firms that went really deep [8:26] like the basically at the at the time [8:28] our the partner at Sequoia Mike Vernal [8:31] who was looking at the deal um Mike came [8:34] to me and he said look there's one [8:36] reason to do this deal and there's one [8:38] reason not to do this deal and they're [8:40] the same reason. Um, and that was what [8:42] everyone was trying to figure out. And, [8:44] and I think, you know, Sequoia [8:47] went really deep and, you know, I think [8:50] Mike told me that, you know, you guys [8:51] did, I mean, because Sequoia always does [8:53] this just incredibly deep diligence. you [8:56] know, talked to like 50 different [8:58] executives or people in management [9:00] positions at ZFenefits to really [9:02] understand the picture and came away [9:04] with a lot of conviction that they felt [9:06] like okay we you know we Sequoia feel [9:09] very very comfortable with this. [9:10] Unfortunately, we didn't end up working [9:13] with Sequoia at that point. It was a [9:14] little bit later. Yeah. Um but a couple [9:16] of other firms did that as well and [9:19] there were a couple that kind of just [9:21] like backed out and you know one firm [9:24] sort of lead guy there you know called [9:26] up David David Sachs and you know I got [9:30] a phone call on a Sunday night said hey [9:32] so and so spoke with David we've got to [9:34] cancel the meeting on a Monday you know [9:36] like it was just that there was sort of [9:38] a more superficial amount of diligence [9:41] on it. there were these two camps. Um, [9:43] and uh, and you know, but even so, there [9:46] were enough people in the camp of like [9:49] we're excited about the business and not [9:51] concerned about the history that the [9:54] round was like really competitive and [9:56] got done [9:57] >> nice, [9:57] >> you know, on great terms. We were pretty [9:59] excited about it. [10:00] >> When was the last time you saw David? [10:01] >> I have not spoken to him since about a [10:05] week before I left. [10:07] >> I see. I've sort of like seen him across [10:10] the room at a conference since then. [10:12] >> Is there anything you want to say to him [10:13] today? [10:15] >> Uh [10:17] pro probably not a great idea. [10:19] >> How about I'll say it for you. I told [10:22] you so. [laughter] [10:24] >> I don't actually I don't actually think [10:25] that that's what I think like if I was [10:28] talking to David, it would really be [10:31] like why, you know, like why? Like I [10:34] look at it, it just it feels like it was [10:36] so unnecessary. Yeah. [10:38] >> You know, like like even in a world [10:40] where they were like, "Hey, we've got to [10:41] make a change." [10:43] Like those types of things are usually [10:45] not accompanied by the type of character [10:48] assassination like and it was like [10:52] deep and prolonged [10:55] effort like they hired people [snorts] [10:57] and those people were were sort of doing [10:59] this in the media like pitching stories [11:01] but like week after week after week and [11:03] that is just like it's unusual it's [11:05] expensive it's like a lot of effort. I [11:07] remember it went down. I remember the [11:09] media. They wrote they they wrote some [11:10] things that were very tough. They [11:12] basically blamed a lot of stuff on you. [11:15] I don't remember the prolonged, but why [11:17] do you think they thought that was a [11:19] good idea? I mean, they're relatively [11:21] rational economic actors. Some of this I [11:25] think is like David and some of this you [11:27] sort of see in the way that David I mean [11:30] is like you know very successful [11:34] as sort of this more political type of [11:37] actor and I remember David came to me at [11:40] one point [11:41] >> we know at Zens when we were having our [11:43] own sort of conflict with ADP we ended [11:45] up in in some litigation with them and [11:48] David told me he said look here's the [11:50] thing if you're ever in kind of one of [11:53] these media [ __ ] fights, [11:56] you want to attack, attack, attack, [11:59] attack. [12:00] >> And if the other guy [12:02] >> rolls over and cries, "Uncle," [12:05] >> that means it's working. And you want to [12:07] keep attacking, attacking, attacking, [12:10] attacking. And and I think that that was [12:13] like his playbook. Like that was like [12:15] sort of the way it operated. And you [12:18] know, and and some of it, it wasn't it [12:20] wasn't just that like they blamed me for [12:22] everything. I mean like look ultimately [12:23] I'm the CEO. I I you know I am [12:25] responsible for things. It was the way [12:27] that things that were mistakes, you [12:30] know, that were like, hey, we we thought [12:32] this was what we were supposed to do and [12:35] it was something else were instead the [12:38] legal word for this would be like, [12:41] you know, like there's some intentional [12:42] kind of thing [12:44] >> for what was I think in retrospect [12:47] much more just sort of accidental like [12:49] as companies are growing quickly and you [12:53] know little things that you know you [12:54] sort of don't recognize. as or just [12:57] unaware as like things that are h you [12:59] know suddenly are like actually you [13:01] overlooked something. [13:03] >> How did you feel like when you first saw [13:05] it? I assume you didn't have a heads up. [13:08] You saw it like was it anger? Was it [13:11] confusion? What did you say to your [13:13] wife? Like what was going on inside the [13:16] four walls of your body? [13:17] >> One of the things that happened right [13:19] before the announcement is um I was like [13:23] so depressed about the whole thing. [13:25] Yeah, [13:26] >> that I stopped looking at the media and [13:30] I didn't read [13:32] stories about me or about Ripling for [13:35] like [13:37] five or six years from that point. It [13:39] was a long time [13:40] >> or or Zenits. [13:42] >> Um and my wife would always read them. [13:44] And so when the announcement came out, [13:46] there was a press release that that we [13:48] had drafted and it was sort of one of [13:49] these sort of anodine things that was [13:51] like, hey, look, company needs new type [13:53] of leadership. [13:55] >> Parker, you know, like great job taking [13:58] it this far. Yep. [13:59] >> David coming in wants to spend more time [14:01] with his family. Typical stuff. [14:02] >> Typical stuff. and [laughter] and uh and [14:05] instead they just like David issued a [14:08] different press release and the the [14:09] press release was like [14:12] this company has a whole bunch of [14:13] compliance problems. It's because you [14:16] know Parker doesn't care about [14:17] compliance. He's not here anymore. [14:19] >> Yeah. [14:20] >> And it went south from there. And I [14:22] remember, you know, when it came out, um [14:24] I mean, it was such a shock. Um it was [14:27] just very unexpected. And then it it [14:29] just got worse from there. And it was [14:30] actually my wife that read it and turned [14:32] to me and said, "Oh, they they [ __ ] [14:34] you." Like, don't. She was like, "Don't [14:36] even read it. Like, don't look at it." [14:37] It was deeply depressing. I mean, there [14:39] were like really really dark moments. [14:42] And some of like the chip on the [14:43] shoulder was kind of like I'm either [14:47] there was sort of this one [14:50] little ray of light, this one path out [14:53] which was like, [14:55] you know, build this company and make it [14:57] successful or like it's just all over [15:00] and you kind of give up. And it was kind [15:02] of like it felt like those were the two [15:03] choices and like that and that was [15:07] very hard and very depressing, but it [15:08] was also like very clarifying and very [15:10] motivating that I felt like okay like [15:12] this is like this is the only thing that [15:14] I'm here for and this is the only thing [15:16] that I care about is like making this [15:19] thing work. [15:20] >> Okay. [15:21] >> A lot of people listening are founder [15:25] CEOs. People want to be CEOs. You've [15:28] been through some crises in some [ __ ] [15:30] shows. Yeah, [15:31] >> I have two advice for people [15:35] crisis going on. [15:37] Most CEOs hit some big [ __ ] show crises [15:41] during their tenure. Any advice? [15:44] >> People come to me all the time. They're [15:45] like, oh, I'm like thinking about doing, [15:46] you know, starting a company. What do [15:47] you think? And my advice is always like, [15:48] don't do it. It's a terrible idea. [15:51] [clears throat] And like I and people [15:52] always sort of laugh. They're like, [15:53] haha. But like it it's very like it's [15:56] very real. Like I do think that it is [15:59] like like much much harder than people [16:02] expect. It's not just that it's hard to [16:04] be successful. It's that it's sort of [16:07] really kind of soul destroying like even [16:09] when you're successful and very hard to [16:11] kind of manage your psychology through [16:14] through that that process and people [16:16] come out the other end. And there's a [16:18] lot of you know there's a lot of I think [16:21] talk about you know failure being sort [16:23] of this positive thing that you learn a [16:25] lot from. And actually I think you don't [16:28] learn a whole lot from failure and you [16:31] learn a lot more from success. And [16:33] [clears throat] it's really hard. You [16:35] know, usually I think people I see many [16:37] more people that do something like this [16:39] and don't succeed and it sort of like [16:41] destroys a lot. you know, it destroys [16:45] marriages, relationships, [16:48] um, you know, ambitions, you know, like [16:52] people kind of come out like a shell [16:55] their former selves and and so it's not [16:57] something that I that I'd recommend. [16:59] >> I kind of agree. I describe HubSpot as [17:01] like two steps forward, one giant step [17:04] back, two steps forward, one giant step [17:06] back, like [17:07] >> over and over again. [17:08] >> It was, it looked smooth and easy from [17:10] the outside, but man, it was a grind. It [17:12] was not easy and there were there were a [17:15] lot of moments where I really hated my [17:16] job. [17:17] >> Yeah. [17:17] >> Um you feel the same way? [17:20] >> Yeah. I mean I would say that um one [17:22] thing that was that was different about [17:24] Ripley. I think in part because of the [17:27] experience at Zenits is like people [17:29] sometimes ask me like you know what I [17:30] learned and and you know sort of there's [17:33] like insucently I'm kind of like I [17:35] didn't learn anything like you know [17:36] Zenits failed for dumb reasons and like [17:38] there was nothing to learn from that. [17:40] Um, but I I do think that like, you [17:43] know, over time you sort of slowly [17:45] accumulate a kind of pattern recognition [17:47] about like what matters and what doesn't [17:50] and and that can that makes things a [17:54] little bit easier because there are a [17:55] lot of things that come up [17:57] >> where you're like this probably doesn't [17:59] matter. Yeah. you know, and when it [18:01] sucks, but like it's nowhere's near and [18:03] and and no matter how bad things have [18:05] ever been at Ripley, they have never [18:07] come even close to how bad things were [18:10] in the sort of 6 months, [18:12] >> like you know, right after the end of [18:14] Zettz or when when I left Zenetss and so [18:16] everything kind of pales in comparison [18:18] and and that is always uh that's sort of [18:22] comforting in a way. What [18:24] >> you brought something up, what matters [18:26] and what doesn't? like what matters that [18:29] people don't think matter and what [18:30] doesn't matter that people think [18:31] matters. I mean sort of the advantage of [18:34] having done something before I think you [18:36] start to have good judgment about what [18:39] is you know because so many of the [18:41] things that come up are probably like [18:44] doesn't matter y [18:45] >> not going to make a difference and some [18:47] things come up are like oo that one's [18:49] going to count [18:50] >> and I think it's hard for firsttime CEOs [18:55] to really see the difference between [18:57] those it feels like everything's going [18:58] to matter and and that's part of why [19:00] it's like so overwhelming and awful. [19:02] >> Yeah. [19:03] >> Um and some of the things really [19:04] actually do matter. Um [19:05] >> what really matters? [19:08] >> I think getting your strategy right, [19:10] like where are we headed in the bus and [19:13] getting the right people on the team are [19:16] really important things and a lot of [19:19] other stuff can fall by the wayside. [19:21] >> Yeah. I mean, those things matter. [19:22] >> Getting like your mission set up so [19:24] people can get excited about the darn [19:26] thing. [19:27] >> Yeah. [clears throat] I'm trying to [19:27] think like I mean I think like there are [19:30] little little things that go wrong that [19:32] feel very consequential in the moment [19:33] that you start to realize over time [19:36] don't matter and like if you're not [19:38] growing that that obviously matters. At [19:42] Ripling it took us like two years to get [19:45] to a point where things started working. [19:47] >> Yeah. Hub was about that too. And like [19:49] for two years it was sort of this [19:52] exercise to try and like basically beg [19:55] the team not to leave until until things [19:57] started working. Yeah. But there was [19:59] also like [20:00] >> zero doubt in my mind that it was going [20:03] to work. And that that was sort of a big [20:05] difference because like I sort of knew [20:08] >> that like if you built these things and [20:11] got and got to this sort of, you know, [20:14] this island of product market fit that [20:17] was admittedly pretty far over the edge [20:19] of the horizon line, but like I knew [20:21] that there was land out there and and [20:24] that if you could get there, this was [20:26] going to work. And I, you know, had [20:27] having seen what was working and why at [20:30] Zenits, I just had like unshakable [20:34] conviction that this was. And so there [20:36] was never a doubt that was going to [20:36] work. And it was merely about like [20:38] whether like quite frankly we could keep [20:41] prevent everyone from quitting [20:43] >> like before we we got there. And so [20:46] early on actually like you know trying [20:47] to just keep the team together [20:50] >> mattered a lot. and and and at that [20:52] point whether it was like working today [20:54] or not like didn't so much in the this [20:57] very specific context of the company [20:59] that I was building and I think for a [21:01] lot of other companies that's not true [21:02] because like you know you might believe [21:05] that things are going to work but you're [21:07] probably wrong or you know like you're [21:08] if you have a lot of conviction about it [21:10] your conviction is like misplaced. Yeah, [21:12] >> maybe mine was too but I you know like I [21:14] was sort of crazy enough or believed [21:16] that I had reasons to believe that this [21:18] was going to work. Parker, um, [21:22] >> you're kind of a contrarian along a lot [21:24] of lines. That's one of the things I've [21:25] always liked about you. What do people [21:28] have totally wrong about being a CEO? [21:32] Like there seems to be sort of a [21:34] rulebook around it that is kind of [21:37] getting rethought these days and I feel [21:39] like you're rethinking pieces of it. [21:40] What What's all wrong about CEOing? Um, [21:46] >> what do these founder CEOs, what [21:48] mistakes are they making? [21:50] >> Well, I'll tell you. Um, I mean, I don't [21:53] know. I know so little about like any [21:56] business that's not my own. So, it's [21:58] hard it's hard for me to have like big [22:00] opinions about like sort of the [22:02] ecosystem. But I think that like one [22:04] thing that I that I um sort of believe [22:08] in that that maybe is becoming like you [22:11] know more more sort of um more more of [22:15] the conventional wisdom today um is I've [22:18] always struggled with the idea that as a [22:21] CEO you're supposed to kind of manage [22:22] top down through a set of deputies and [22:26] you know you you hire people who are [22:27] knowledgeable about this area you trust [22:30] them and you let them kind of do their [22:32] thing. Um, and that's just never worked [22:34] for me. Like what's what's what's worked [22:36] is [22:37] >> you kind of have to reason from first [22:41] principles. And and you could do that [22:42] with some of your lieutenants who can [22:44] help you through it to sort of convince [22:46] yourself of exactly what the right [22:49] approach is in in that area. And and you [22:51] have to have like real on an on the [22:54] ground understanding of what's actually [22:56] going on um yourself. Um, and if you [22:59] don't have that, like that's the only [23:01] thing that's that's worked for me. [23:03] >> Um, and it's really it's tough to scale. [23:06] It's tough to scale that. You know, it's [23:08] it's hard it's hard on you. I think it's [23:10] hard on some of the other people, but [23:11] it's the it's the only thing that's sort [23:13] of um [23:15] worked for me and the only thing that [23:16] it's the thing that's really worked for [23:17] Ripling. Um, and so we have a leadership [23:20] principle that we've formalized on this [23:22] that we call go and see. That's that's [23:24] basically like look if you're it's true [23:26] for me but it's also true for you know [23:28] executives and and managers that like [23:31] you know you've got to you've got to go [23:33] right to the ground [23:35] >> cold face. [23:36] >> Yeah. And get that's a good way of [23:38] saying it, right? Um and you've got to [23:41] you know something there was a point in [23:43] time where things were just like really [23:46] going wrong with tax operations and like [23:50] you know we're we're a payroll company. [23:51] One of the things that we do is we do, [23:53] you know, we do these sort of quarterly [23:55] filings for clients and, you know, there [23:58] are thousands of agencies across the [24:00] country that you need to send these to [24:01] and there are a million little things [24:03] that can go wrong and if anything's off [24:05] by like a penny, clients get like angry [24:07] letters about this and it's really bad. [24:10] things were going wrong. Like the notice [24:12] the rate at which clients were getting [24:13] notices from Rippling we knew was like [24:15] higher than the notice rate at other [24:18] companies and it was like a an [24:20] existential threat to the business and [24:22] like that was something where there was [24:23] some muscle memory for me that this was [24:25] actually something that would kill the [24:26] company [24:27] >> that matters. It was something that [24:28] matters. Um, you know, the only thing [24:30] that worked to solve it was, you know, [24:34] was what happened is I got, you know, [24:36] like me and my COO and like, you know, [24:40] the person running the team and like [24:41] someone else. We sort of wiped out our [24:43] calendars and we sat down and we said [24:45] for the next week, you know, we're going [24:48] to just be tax ops agents. And so, we're [24:51] literally going to, you know, because [24:53] there was this growing backlog of [24:54] notices that needed to be addressed that [24:56] clients were sending us. And we're just [24:58] going to pick from the queue and start [25:00] figuring out like calling up the tax [25:03] agency. Why did the client get this [25:06] notice? What happened? You know, why did [25:07] they believe that, you know, the the [25:10] amount was wrong or the money didn't get [25:12] there or the filing was not on time or [25:14] something? and and then reverse engineer [25:16] it in our systems and be like and it was [25:18] just like doing doing the actual work of [25:21] doing it was the only and then sort of [25:23] like by doing that we developed this [25:25] understanding of like what was broken [25:27] about the process what was broken about [25:28] the systems what were the changes that [25:30] need to be made [25:31] >> but it was like impossible to diagnose [25:33] or understand without sitting there and [25:36] doing that. [25:37] >> Okay. on the matters thing. It seems to [25:40] me from just listening to you and I also [25:42] spoke to a couple people on your team, a [25:45] lot of things matter. And then one of [25:47] the insights I think you've had is [25:49] details matter from the CEO on down and [25:52] you're in the details in a big way for a [25:55] company that has four four or 5,000 [25:57] employees. Is that fair to say? [26:00] >> Um [26:01] >> I think more more so than me for sure. [26:04] It seems like you are like you sit in [26:06] the middle of the engineering floor. It [26:08] sounds like you are on the coal face for [26:11] somebody in a pretty goodiz [26:12] organization. [26:13] >> I certainly try to be and so I I [26:16] >> that's I view that as like a huge [26:18] compliment if you know from from the [26:20] team. I think the place where I try and [26:22] do that the most and what's what's maybe [26:26] sort of most unusual about Ripling is is [26:29] that I'm the the only like full admin [26:33] for Ripling in Ripling and so like I run [26:36] payroll for the entire company across [26:38] dozens of countries. I manage sort of [26:41] like benefits and you know a lot of like [26:44] you know IT policies and other stuff [26:45] within within the system. [26:47] >> Yep. you know, approve expense [26:49] reimbursements, things like that. Um, [26:51] >> I was similar to HubSpot. I was a very [26:54] active user of HubSpot, one of the most [26:56] active users for many. [26:58] >> So, I think that's important. It's like [26:59] one of the things like people, you know, [27:01] learn when they join Ripple is like the [27:03] CEO approves every expense reimbursement [27:05] over $10. And the reason for that is [27:08] like not [clears throat] that I'm like [27:10] this jerk that's like harassing people [27:13] about their expenses. It's that I'm [27:16] trying to actually use the product in [27:18] the same ways that that clients would [27:20] that like a diligent [27:22] >> controller or you know sort of [27:24] accountant yeah [27:25] >> would use the system and help review it [27:27] in the same ways that they would and try [27:28] and use that to sort of iterate and [27:30] improve on things over time. There are a [27:32] lot of things that that we get wrong as [27:34] a company. But I do think that that that [27:37] element is like a little bit of a [27:38] superpower because I I know that, [27:42] you know, the CEOs of, you know, ADP or [27:46] >> they're not doing that [27:47] >> or whatever, they've never run payroll [27:49] in their lives. Like never. um you know [27:53] there's a a sort of on the ground [27:55] understanding of the system and that you [27:57] know that doesn't mean that you know we [27:58] always get everything right but I think [28:00] that um you know it's a it's a sort of [28:03] control on the system and and one of the [28:07] ways that it play one of the things that [28:08] I'm most proud about is that we did this [28:10] study where we we looked at companies [28:13] that use rippling and companies that use [28:16] anything other than rippling and some of [28:18] them use like [28:19] >> modern systems [28:22] competitors of ours that are sort of [28:23] more recent market entrance. Some of [28:24] them use the more old school systems and [28:27] you just look at how many people those [28:29] companies have in HR, IT and finance [28:32] roles and GNA roles within the [28:34] organization based on LinkedIn data. And [28:37] what you find is that the companies that [28:38] use Ripling at any given size range, so [28:41] you you have to look at it by company [28:43] size obviously, you know, companies that [28:45] use Rippling have about half the people [28:48] in those functions than companies that [28:50] use anything else. [28:51] >> I love that. Um, I love that s and [28:53] that's look I think that that you know [28:54] it's not that you know our pitch is not [28:56] like hey like you know like lay off [28:58] people if you use Ripley it's those [29:00] extra headcount they they represent all [29:03] of this administrative burden they they [29:05] represent attacks on your business [29:07] because those are people that are just [29:10] moving data between systems dealing with [29:13] administrative pain [29:15] >> that you could instead redeploy for [29:18] things that matter within your business. [29:20] Parker, so you're in the details. You [29:22] just talked about your own CEO journey [29:24] from like the four of you to there's 40 [29:27] of you to 400 of you, 4,000 of you. [29:30] Somehow you've managed to stay in the [29:32] details. How has your job changed? What [29:34] advice do you give to that founder with [29:36] 40 people on how to scale it? How did [29:40] your job change and how did your [29:42] daytoday change? I think probably the [29:45] most important thing was the like the [29:49] people a level below me. And honestly, I [29:52] think that probably like their jobs have [29:54] changed a lot more [29:55] >> interesting [29:56] >> than than mine has because [29:58] >> the executive team at Ripling has been [30:01] like pretty like stable over time. Um [30:05] there's been like there's been some [30:06] turnover but I think you know a lot of [30:09] the people that are there you know like [30:11] our CRO was the eighth person in the [30:15] company and you know my COO joined when [30:18] you know right after the series A but he [30:20] and I you know had known each other [30:21] since college so we've been friends for [30:23] a long time [30:24] >> you know there have been a bunch of [30:26] people that have sort of been there a [30:27] long time and so there's just I think a [30:30] lot of trust um and uh I think every you [30:34] how everyone's kind of grow like [30:35] everyone's sort of grown in in the in [30:37] their in their function and in their [30:38] job. [30:39] >> Okay. [30:39] >> Over time, [30:40] >> one of the things I've noticed, Parker, [30:41] VCs do as soon as they make their [30:43] investment, like the first thing they [30:44] say is like, "We got to uplevel the [30:46] team." [30:47] >> Yeah. [30:47] >> And when I look at the best companies, a [30:50] lot of the management teams are kind of [30:52] homegrown. Like a lot of HubSpot's [30:54] management team been there since the [30:56] pretty early days. Uh what do you think [30:59] of that advice? I think Homegrown's [31:01] really underrated. Home Road's [31:02] underrated, but also like if the people [31:05] sometimes the people that you're trying [31:07] to grow are not going to make it [31:09] sometimes, you know? And so I think what [31:11] I would say is like hiring people that [31:14] you just are you're really close to. I [31:17] mean, it's weird to say, but hiring [31:18] people that like you've worked with, [31:20] that you're friends with, that you enjoy [31:23] working with, like [31:23] >> really lowers the risk. [31:24] >> Really underrated, actually. [31:26] >> Lowers the risk. It's underrated. Yeah. [31:28] and and so [31:29] >> went to school with. [31:31] >> Yeah. There are people that we brought [31:32] in that, you know, we hired that were [31:34] not like that that have been [31:35] unbelievably successful as well. [31:37] >> Yeah. [31:38] >> Um [31:39] >> but there is something to the fact that [31:41] like um you know for the for a long time [31:45] Ripley CMO he's now stepped into a [31:48] different role but was this guy Matt [31:49] Epstein who was like you know I worked [31:52] with him as CMO at my first company. He [31:55] was CMO at Zens. He joined Riplane, was [31:58] CMO at Ripley, like it was just this [32:00] longstanding like professional [32:02] relationship that I had and um and [32:06] there's some there's sort of something [32:07] to that. I feel like I have a pretty [32:09] good sense of whether someone's going to [32:12] make it or not and I'm sort of wondering [32:14] like how would I do, you know, your job [32:17] at Sequoa and advise like an [32:20] entrepreneur on their team. I would have [32:22] a lot of humility about it and I would [32:23] be like, man, I just don't I don't know [32:25] how I would explain that or judge that. [32:27] And and one of the problems I think for [32:29] investors is I think it's actually [32:30] really hard to do from the outside. And [32:33] so even if you have like done it [32:35] yourself, you know, you're just not [32:38] spending enough time at the company to [32:41] really know about this exec and whether [32:43] they're going to make it. And so the [32:46] advice is like maybe not all that [32:47] useful. And then you know if you're if [32:50] you're an entrepreneur that's doing this [32:51] for the first time it just I don't see [32:54] how anyone figures I mean look looking [32:56] back I'm like I don't understand how [32:58] anyone figures their way through this [32:59] because it seems like so hard to know [33:01] having not seen it. [33:02] >> I'll tell you the one thing I've noticed [33:03] with so many of the early stage [33:05] mid-stage startups is their hit rate on [33:08] hiring that external been there done [33:10] that CMO see what is it's 50% within 18 [33:14] months. It's much harder than it looks. [33:16] people don't talk about it. What have in [33:19] in this vein, you're interviewing [33:21] somebody. What what's your filter? What [33:24] are you looking for? What's your [33:26] process? Like do you is there anything [33:29] unusual you're doing around there that [33:30] you think you might be have some [33:32] intuition that people don't [33:33] >> Here's what I do. And I don't I'm not [33:35] I'm not saying that what I do is like [33:36] the right thing to do. Yeah. [33:38] >> But usually what I do is I send [33:41] candidates all of the in investor [33:44] materials that I prepared. So I send [33:45] them like we write up a memo on the [33:47] business. There's like some metrics and [33:49] I send all of that to them ahead of time [33:51] so they have context and they show up to [33:53] the meeting and I'm just like look this [33:56] first meeting is really just a chance [33:58] for you to ask me questions. So you know [34:01] sure you had a chance to look through [34:02] this. You know what what didn't make [34:04] sense to you? What were you like I don't [34:07] think that's right. You know what did [34:09] you have questions on and let's talk [34:10] through it. And then usually we sort of [34:13] talk through their questions and and and [34:16] sort of secretly [34:18] I I I'm sort of judging them by how that [34:20] conversation progresses. And so some [34:22] people have like no questions and that's [34:25] like that's usually pretty a pretty bad [34:27] sign. Or some people have like clearly [34:29] like fake questions. Um, and some people [34:32] like actually like even very skeptical [34:34] questions are really good. Like if [34:36] they're smart, there are some people [34:38] that like they immediately get to the [34:41] core of the issue, you know, where they [34:42] they identify like the two things that [34:44] are going to really be problems. And [34:46] then and then sometimes we have a great [34:48] discussion about it because, you know, [34:50] I've got I've thought about those things [34:52] too. You know, I spent a lot of time [34:54] like here's how we're approaching it. [34:55] here's what I think and here's what [34:57] didn't work and here's what I think is [34:59] going to work and this is why this is so [35:00] important and and and sometimes the [35:03] people that ask those really challenging [35:04] questions they get it really quickly and [35:06] they're like oh yeah and that means also [35:09] that and then as a consequence of that [35:12] and I think it works because it it kind [35:14] of simulates the act what the actual [35:16] working relationship is going to be like [35:18] where we're going to have those types of [35:19] conversations [35:20] >> in our one-on-one meetings and like [35:23] >> and and that's going to work and so [35:24] that's always been the thing that's been [35:27] most telling for me. That and back [35:28] channel references. [35:29] >> Yeah. [35:30] >> You know, like not I usually ask people [35:32] like give me like six references, [35:37] not two because everyone's got two. So, [35:39] you know, give me six and then I call [35:41] two randomly from that list and then I [35:43] try really hard to find people that are [35:45] not on your list. [35:45] >> I'm the same. Yeah. [35:46] >> And that that's been really telling. Um, [35:49] the thing that I've always I don't have [35:51] a good answer for is I found it's really [35:54] hard to summon great executives on [35:57] demand. And so, [35:58] >> wait, what do you mean by that? [36:00] >> Well, it's like someone suddenly someone [36:02] leaves or someone is like it's like not [36:05] going to make it and it's, you know, and [36:07] you're like crap, I need a CTO, [36:09] >> right? [36:10] >> Yeah. our current CTO, who's amazing, [36:14] was someone that randomly [36:18] fell into my lap, you know, that that um [36:22] someone at Sequoia introduced me to and [36:25] and and it was like, wow, like this is [36:28] amazing. And it was very clear that, [36:30] >> you know, this person was exactly who we [36:32] should hire, [36:33] >> but we'd hired someone else, [36:36] >> you know, 6 months earlier. It was not [36:38] working out. And we hired that person [36:41] sort of like it was one of those things [36:43] where we had been looking for so long. [36:45] >> Yeah. You gave up, [36:46] >> you know, looking for so long. It was [36:48] like, "Oh, maybe [36:51] maybe it'll work." You know, and and we [36:53] had [36:54] >> Does that ever work? [36:55] >> Never. Never. It never does. But like, [36:57] what are you going to I mean, like we'd [36:59] been looking I don't know. I think we've [37:00] been looking for like a year, you know? [37:02] It's just [37:02] >> And all the his direct reports report to [37:04] you in the meantime, which is like [37:06] brutal. [37:07] >> Yeah. And so um and you know and and so [37:10] what I mean I'll tell you what doesn't [37:11] work is like usually like exec [37:14] recruiters don't work. [37:15] >> Okay. [37:16] >> And [37:17] >> I was just about to ask you that. Okay. [37:19] >> Exact recruiters are you know great at [37:23] sending you solid B candidates. [37:27] >> And there's always the exception that [37:29] proves the rules. So we hired our CFO [37:33] who's amazing. good person to hire [37:35] through an executive recruiter, [37:36] >> through an exec recruiter, they're like [37:37] actually like really incredible. Yeah. [37:40] >> And so there are some exceptions, but [37:43] usually they send you a lot of of B [37:45] candidates. And the problem is that I [37:48] think the really incredible people, [37:51] >> they get snatched up totally [37:52] >> before they know with an exec recruiter [37:55] like they're they're like, you know, [37:58] they've always got people pinging them. [38:00] They get a million options [38:01] >> and they've got [clears throat] they've [38:02] got relationships with people and [38:04] someone is yanking them out and like [38:05] they sort of, [38:06] >> you know, they sort of secretly whisper [38:09] to their spouse that maybe they're [38:11] thinking about leaving and there's five [38:13] people the next morning that heard about [38:14] it [38:15] >> and are already like, you know, been [38:16] talking with them for a long time and [38:18] have worked with them before and have [38:19] been nurturing them on drip marketing [38:21] campaign. [38:22] >> Make it into the [38:23] >> Okay, let me ask related to this. You [38:26] hire someone, it's a month in, you're [38:28] like, [sighs] [38:30] I might have [ __ ] this up, but it [38:33] ended up working. Has that ever [38:35] happened? [38:35] >> Never. [38:37] >> Okay. So, a month in, if you if if your [38:39] gut tells you it's not right, you [38:43] just How long do you wait? [38:45] >> Always longer than a month. [38:47] >> How long do you wait? Six months. [38:48] >> I mean, yeah. Like I mean I like and the [38:51] frustrating thing is like I see this [38:54] behavior in managers at Ripling and I [38:56] get very upset about it and very angry [38:59] about it. Like why did you why did you [39:02] [ __ ] this up? You know like like you can [39:04] see it happening. Like I have this [39:06] conversation all the time where I'm like [39:08] you know I'm like okay here's your team. [39:10] >> How many of these people right now like [39:13] tell me which of these people you would [39:15] bet your career on? and like whoa. [39:19] And it's like, well, this person and [39:21] this person. [39:23] And I'm like, none of the rest. You're [39:24] like, well, it's a tough, you know, and [39:27] I'm like, okay, get, you know, like fire [39:29] all like, let's start over, you know, [39:30] and and like, well, no, no, you, you [39:33] know, there's all kinds of reasons why, [39:34] you know, can't, you know, not yet. And [39:36] inevitably, [39:37] >> they're all gone in a year. [39:38] >> They're all gone. But it takes a long [39:40] time [39:41] >> to get there and it's so frustrating, so [39:44] infuriating. And it's like why why can't [39:47] you as a manager just do the job that we [39:49] expect of you and make the hard [39:50] decisions and I make all the same [39:52] mistakes myself like you know it's [39:54] [clears throat] like all you know [39:55] equally difficult for me when things are [39:58] not working out. [39:59] >> It sounds to me from people I've spoken [40:02] with inside of Ripley and yourself that [40:06] it was an intense startup and all [40:10] startups are pretty intense but it's now [40:12] an intense scale up. You've kept that [40:15] pace and intensity up as you scaled [40:18] through the years. Most of the founders [40:20] I work with are really struggling around [40:22] 100 150 employees. They're bringing in [40:25] new people they didn't know. Well, there [40:27] couple middle managers showing up. That [40:29] intensity and that pace doesn't seem to [40:31] scale. How have you scaled that? Well, I [40:34] think one one thing that I believe very [40:36] firmly is that there's ultimately only [40:40] one person in the organiz [40:45] and and it's you as the CEO. Um and and [40:49] so it's really one of your biggest jobs [40:51] is to sort of set the clock speed of the [40:53] organization. And the reason is is that [40:55] everyone else in the organization can [40:58] sort of solve for all of their problems [41:01] by just extending the timelines. you [41:03] know, like they can get it done to, you [41:07] know, in the ways that they want to get [41:08] it done. They can, you know, they don't [41:10] have to, you know, sort of make [41:12] unreasonable asks of people that [41:14] they're, you know, like every every [41:15] other constraint can be solved for with [41:20] more time. What happens is things start [41:22] to get like really slow and there are [41:24] real problems with that for the [41:26] organization long term, but usually not [41:29] for like any individual manager or [41:32] executive within the company. And so [41:34] you're the only natural constituency for [41:36] moving quickly. And so you really have [41:39] to be you really have to care about it [41:42] and and you have to sort of pay [41:45] attention when when people are trying to [41:48] slow it down. And so one of one of the [41:50] things that happens is like your team [41:52] will often come to you and they will [41:55] present you with what I call CEO in a [41:57] box decisions where they will say look [42:00] we can do A or we can do B like you [42:02] choose and it's this illusion of choice [42:04] >> tyranny of war. [42:05] >> Yeah. It's it's this but it's an [42:07] illusion of choice because the choice [42:08] has already been made for you because [42:10] the important choice [42:12] >> was the decision that A and B cannot [42:15] coexist. Um, and usually like my [42:19] immediate reaction when someone brings [42:21] me something like that is to just on [42:23] principle insist that we have both A and [42:26] B and like understand like what laws of [42:29] physics are violated [42:32] >> that prevent A and B from coexist. [42:34] There's like the second law of [42:35] thermodynamics problem. Sometimes it's [42:37] like it's much harder for the team to do [42:39] A and B and they would prefer not to do [42:41] that. Um, sometimes it's actually just [42:44] as simple as asking people for a third [42:47] path, you know, to like say, I don't I [42:49] don't like these options, like can we [42:51] just think a little bit harder and is [42:53] there some way to kind of get there? [42:55] When you think about like the pace at [42:58] which organizations move, [43:01] I think the natural thing is people sort [43:02] of believe, man, if you're like [43:06] tyrannical CEO that's like driving [43:08] people really hard and like you know [43:11] what's going to happen at most maybe [43:13] it's like 20% more. Patrick Collison has [43:16] this great site that he put together on [43:18] sort of like things that moved absurdly [43:20] quickly and things that moved very [43:22] slowly. And it's this example of like we [43:24] the space program to land someone on the [43:26] moon was like four years and the vaness [43:29] bus lane was like two decades or [43:30] something in San Francisco. And you sort [43:33] of look at these at two different [43:34] organizations that might both have good [43:38] well-meaning people. [43:40] >> And like you know the organization that [43:41] moves quickly it's like it it's like [43:43] orders of it's like an order of [43:44] magnitude faster. It's not like 20% [43:46] faster. It's just amazing what [43:48] >> what you can accomplish. And so maybe [43:50] the the sort of slightly more positive [43:53] way of articulating this is I think that [43:55] that people um are often capable of so [43:58] much more than they believe themselves [44:00] to be capable of. [44:02] >> And so if you can sort of challenge them [44:04] about the perceived constraints on the [44:07] problem and explain to them the impact [44:10] of being able to do A and B and why like [44:13] what happens if we could do A and B. [44:15] Startups are somewhere between [44:17] completely impossible and very very very [44:20] very hard. And there's such a narrow ray [44:22] of light that passes between those two, [44:24] right? The companies that make it [44:26] through usually at multiple points in [44:29] the journey find ways to do things that [44:32] are seemingly impossible. Yeah. Um, and [44:35] it is you have to sort of acknowledge [44:37] that what you're asking for is like [44:38] really hard and you understand that and [44:41] it's just there's no other way, you [44:43] know, and so let's sit down together and [44:45] think about whether it's possible. And [44:47] sometimes people find [44:50] clever solutions or new new reserves of [44:54] possibility to kind of get there. And if [44:56] you kind of do that enough, it compounds [45:00] >> and and like you can accomplish a lot [45:02] more than the company that isn't doing [45:05] that. [45:06] >> I had a line where somebody would bring [45:08] me something like that and I would say, [45:11] "When Moses came down from the mountain [45:14] and he had the tablet, [45:17] was there an 11th commandment that we [45:19] all missed that we couldn't do this [45:21] thing we're talking about right now?" [45:23] >> Yeah. Exactly. You know, Yeah. Like it's [45:26] not it's not a law of physics. We can [45:28] figure it out. [45:29] >> Okay. I hear you've got something like [45:32] 40 or 50 exfounders on your management [45:36] teams in your company. What's going on [45:38] with that? Why are you doing it? How do [45:40] you manage that chaos? [45:42] >> I think it's actually a lot more than [45:43] that now. Okay. Um um but [45:46] >> why? Um I think that [45:49] >> are you aqua hiring or hiring like [45:51] what's it what's the [45:53] >> sometimes we aqua hire sometimes we hire [45:56] [clears throat] [45:56] >> um it's it's a profile that we look for [45:59] um [46:00] >> you know rippling you know we sort of [46:03] coined this phrase I know HubSpot [46:05] HubSpot's been doing this for a long [46:07] time but we coined this phrase of like [46:08] compound software [46:09] >> you know I'm really mad at you about [46:10] this [46:11] >> because we are a compound star but we [46:14] never came up with a clever name [46:16] >> I like you it had totally stuck and [46:19] everyone's like Parker's the original [46:21] like we're the original [46:22] >> compact spot was doing it long before [46:25] us. [46:25] >> Well done. [46:26] >> But we um the reason that we we do this [46:29] is because I'm convinced that this is [46:32] the right way to build software and that [46:34] actually we've been building software [46:35] wrong for a couple of decades now. Um [46:38] and most people believe yeah yeah you're [46:40] doing compound software. there are some [46:42] like sales and marketing advantages to [46:44] building you know good enough but [46:46] integrated products and like that's not [46:49] it at all like I think the belief is [46:51] that actually you can build better [46:54] products by building them in this [46:56] integrated way and you can do it because [46:59] the fact that these things are deeply [47:01] integrated and seamlessly interoperable [47:03] on its own makes them better [47:05] >> but also when you're building across [47:07] like multiple applications you can [47:09] afford to invest much more deeply [47:11] in a set of capabilities that are common [47:14] to all of the applications. You know, [47:15] things like analytics and permissions [47:17] and workflows and custom objects and [47:20] stuff like that. But I think a lot of, [47:22] you know, and this was sort of the [47:23] original, like before we were this [47:25] articulate about what we were doing and [47:26] why. [47:27] >> It was one of the original founding [47:29] principles of Ripling was that we were [47:32] going to do more things, not less. And [47:34] this focus thing was [ __ ] And like, [47:36] >> you know, that was like what David [47:38] wanted us to do, but that's completely [47:39] wrong. and we should do it this way and [47:41] and so a lot of [47:43] >> same with HubSpot. We're like this whole [47:44] focus thing like should do one thing [47:46] really well. We're like no we're going [47:47] to be very thin and but we're going to [47:49] get to table stakes at some point. It [47:51] was the exact same thesis we had. [47:53] >> Yeah. So yeah, [47:54] >> but a lot of the history of the company [47:57] is trying to figure out novel solutions [48:00] for the very real challenges with that [48:03] approach because there are a lot of [48:04] reasons why it is easier to focus on one [48:07] thing along the way. A lot of problems [48:10] come up and there are bottlenecks that [48:11] develop in different parts of the [48:13] organization [48:14] and one of the places that you know a [48:17] bottleneck forms is really at the level [48:20] of sort of executive attention around [48:23] these things and so you end up you end [48:25] up needing people who can be like the [48:29] CEO of these products or who can drive [48:32] things forward who can find a path [48:34] because a lot of people who are like [48:36] very good managers and executives in in [48:40] engineering or product or whatever, what [48:42] what they do is they they come to you [48:46] with problems and so they say there's a [48:48] series of gaps we have like in order to [48:50] win here's like a long list of things we [48:53] need to do and they unroll the list and [48:54] it rolls out onto the floor and goes all [48:57] the way down the hallway, you know, and [49:00] and like we've prioritized it by sort of [49:03] most important on on down and I have a [49:07] team of this guys. And this is about one [49:10] quarter's worth of work is like, you [49:12] know, these things this far down the [49:13] list. And so we're going to do one [49:15] quarter's worth of work and we're going [49:17] to solve these things. And and and [49:20] that's what it is. And the problem is is [49:22] like, yeah, but the list goes all the [49:24] way down the hallway. And and they're [49:26] like, well, but my job is to sort of, [49:27] you know, that's your problem, right? [49:29] like you're like and so they're asking [49:31] you to find a way to make ends meet [49:34] because you know they're like their job [49:36] is just to kind of move down the list [49:38] and and then you're you're still [ __ ] [49:41] because like at the end of the day [49:42] they're going to do those things but [49:44] you're still not you still haven't [49:46] solved the problem which is like you [49:47] need to win [49:48] >> and so you need people who can find ways [49:51] to do the impossible that sort of [49:53] understand [49:55] >> look like the CEO that's asking continue [49:59] to do unreasonable things. Like I didn't [50:01] create this situation. Like the market [50:04] created like this is the reality that we [50:06] find ourselves in which is like we need [50:08] to do these things and if we don't we're [50:12] dead we're screwed. And so we need to [50:14] find some way or some alternate path or [50:17] some sort of you know there needs to be [50:19] some effort to solve the whole problem [50:21] or like it doesn't matter [50:25] you know that [50:25] >> and you think exfounders are [50:27] particularly [50:27] >> I think exfounders understand that [50:30] >> breaking the laws of physics [50:31] >> or they just they've been in situations [50:34] where they've they understand that like [50:38] yeah like it's like we either you know [50:40] they they've sat there and stared at the [50:42] dwindling bank balance while, you know, [50:45] while the sales isn't working and [50:47] they're like, "Oh shit." And like, and [50:49] they understand that like, "Yes, it's [50:50] absolutely true that like, you know, [50:53] this is a reasonable set of expectations [50:55] for the team this week, this month, this [50:58] quarter, this year, and yet if we do the [51:01] reasonable set of things, we're dead." [51:03] >> Yeah. [51:04] >> And and so like we can either give up or [51:07] we can try and find a way to accomplish [51:09] an unreasonable set of things. [51:12] >> How do you manage them though? founders [51:13] are typically a little unruly, want a [51:16] crap ton of autonomy, often don't play [51:19] with that well with others. Like, how do [51:22] you manage the chaos? [51:23] >> I don't know if I've found that to be [51:25] the because like, you know, if you're if [51:27] you started a company, I mean, look, [51:29] there's all kinds of people, but like, [51:31] you know, man, like you've got to [51:33] convince a bunch of people to work for [51:34] you, you know, that you know, when it [51:37] doesn't make any sense, [51:38] >> you know, and like there's a certain [51:40] amount of [51:43] charisma or interpersonal skills that [51:45] you've had to like develop like even if [51:47] you didn't have it. I think that that [51:49] most people are more well socialized [51:52] than that. But there there always I [51:54] guess exceptions and and we do give [51:56] people a lot of autonomy because like [51:57] the best thing in the world for me is [51:59] someone who can run with something, you [52:02] know, and and and sort of take it off my [52:04] plate. Um like that's that's ideal. So [52:07] everyone everyone's aligned on there [52:09] being that kind of autonomy. [52:11] Just switching gears briefly [52:15] um deal your main competitor [52:20] been a lot of drama around it. [52:22] Do you want to talk about it? [52:24] >> Sure. Weirdly I would say deal is a [52:27] competitor but probably not the main [52:29] one. Um you know the the companies [52:32] >> you got a lot of them. Yeah, there's a [52:34] lot of, you know, if I was like, who's [52:35] our main competitor space? [52:37] >> I would be like, man, you know, in [52:38] payroll, it's probably [52:41] >> Paycom, Payloity, ADP, [52:44] >> you know, workday for HCM, maybe, you [52:47] know, gusto down market. [52:49] >> Yep. you know, we we come up against [52:52] deal in specifically this sort of global [52:55] part of the business where you're I need [52:57] to hire someone in XYZ country and I [53:00] have like one or two people that I'm [53:02] hiring there and I don't know anything [53:03] about it and need some help but like [53:04] that's where we compete with them. But [53:07] um [53:08] >> but we have you know much much stronger [53:11] competition with these other companies. [53:15] It's just that some weird stuff [53:17] happened. [53:18] >> Yeah. Yeah. With with them. [53:19] >> Tell me about it. So, when was the first [53:21] inkling you had [53:24] that there was a spy that that someone [53:28] was spying on someone from deal was [53:30] spying on your company? [53:31] >> The weird thing about spy is like spy [53:33] makes it sound [53:34] >> it's great. It's a podcast. [53:35] >> Sort of sexy and fun. [53:37] >> That's the idea part [53:38] >> which for podcast. Great. But I think [53:39] it's really like it's not the deal was [53:42] spy. It's that they were stealing. Yeah, [53:44] it was it was just theft pure and direct [53:47] from the CEO of the company. [53:49] >> Yeah, it's worse. [53:49] >> And the the the thing that happened is [53:52] we got a reporter who was writing a [53:54] story sent us a bunch of rippling [53:57] internal Slack messages that, you know, [53:59] many of which were sort of cropped in [54:01] sort of like unflattering ways and taken [54:03] out of context and was like asking for [54:05] our comment on it. And just you know [54:07] because of the context it was it was [54:10] very clear for a bunch of reasons when [54:12] you thought about it that the only place [54:13] that this could have come from like it [54:15] had to have been deal like no one else [54:17] would have sort of known to send this [54:19] stuff to that reporter and so the [54:21] implication was the deal had you know [54:24] full access to our slack. Um and then [54:28] from there, you know, we so we sort of [54:30] knew what was going on immediately. [54:31] >> But even before that, did you have an [54:33] inkling like in some territory that they [54:35] were winning an unusual number of deals [54:37] and like how are they doing it? Was [54:39] there an inkling before that? there [54:41] really, you know, once you started [54:43] looking, you know, there were these [54:45] examples. There were like when this [54:47] story came out, you know, there were [54:50] customers that wrote into us and former [54:52] customers, you know, there that that [54:53] wrote into us and there was there was a [54:55] guy that was a former deal customer that [54:58] took a demo with Ripley and was talking [55:01] with us, came to us because he wanted to [55:03] switch and he spoke with a Ripling [55:05] account executive and within hours he [55:09] got a WhatsApp message from Alex [55:12] Buouies, this CEO of Deal, you know, who [55:14] he didn't know, never met before. [55:16] that was like, "Hey, I hear you're like, [55:17] you know, looking at other stuff, like, [55:18] you know, let's try and find a way to [55:20] get you, you know, [55:20] >> seems like an awful big coincidence." [55:22] >> Yeah. And he emailed at the time, and [55:24] this was before we knew anything was [55:26] going on. [55:26] >> He emailed his rep. He was like, "Whoa, [55:29] this is super weird. Like, this freaked [55:31] the hell out of me like I you know, how [55:33] did how did deal know that?" Like, you [55:35] know, and of course the rep thought [55:37] nothing of it, so it didn't go anywhere, [55:38] right? um until later you look back and [55:40] you're like, "Oh yeah, you can actually [55:42] trace the person that who's a Ripling [55:44] employee that deal started paying to [55:47] send them all of this internal steel [55:51] rippling internal data including [55:54] mostly like CRM data just like every [55:57] opportunity we were working, every [55:59] customer we were talking to, the pricing [56:01] we were offering them, the objections [56:03] they had, [56:05] >> you know, it was just every single day [56:08] just sending all of it directly to Alex. [56:11] Do you think Alex and crew targeted [56:15] someone or took an employee and got them [56:18] to work for you or there was somebody [56:20] working for you that they got to? [56:23] >> They co-opted somebody. [56:24] >> And you know the thing is that hasn't [56:26] been talked about a lot is [56:29] >> it it really seems like it was you know [56:32] wasn't wasn't just us. There were a [56:34] bunch of other companies and so you know [56:36] there was sort of [56:36] >> that they were doing it too or in the [56:38] industry large is a lot of this going [56:40] on. No, no. That that deal was doing [56:42] this. [56:42] >> I see. [56:43] >> You know, like we were not the only [56:45] ones. [clears throat] [56:46] >> And and that [56:47] >> it was a defined play. [56:49] >> Yeah. This was I I I think I believe [56:51] that this that that company was built on [56:54] this foundation [56:56] of theft from competitors [56:59] >> and that that was like a critical [57:01] component of what they're doing. And so, [57:03] you know, one of the things that we [57:05] decided to do is we decided to be [57:07] extremely public about this and come [57:10] forward. [57:10] >> Hold on. Even before that, so you get [57:12] this thing from your press guy like they [57:15] have to have access to our Slack. [57:18] >> Yeah. [57:18] >> And then you ran a honeypot operation to [57:22] kind of prove what you thought. Can you [57:24] just talk about that meeting and what [57:26] was going on? Can you just give us a [57:28] glimpse behind the scenes of what [57:30] happened in that meeting? Well, so [57:32] actually first before that, okay, [57:34] >> what happened is we needed to figure out [57:36] like who was doing this. [57:39] >> And I my assumption was that this was [57:43] probably [57:44] a former employee that left, you know, [57:48] because sometimes people leave one [57:49] company, they go to another. Yep. [57:51] >> And sometimes people like, you shouldn't [57:52] do this. It's wrong. It's legal. But [57:55] sometimes it happens that people take [57:56] some stuff on the way out. Y. And so I [57:58] was like, maybe there's someone who kind [58:00] of like, you know, did did their new [58:03] employer a favor on the way and sort of [58:05] unethically y [58:07] >> instead of, you know, what what we would [58:09] do in a situation like that is we would [58:10] say, whoa, whoa, whoa, like don't, you [58:12] know, delete that. We don't want, you [58:14] know, and and unethically they said [58:17] goody, you know, like great. And then [58:18] what we did is, you know, the the the [58:21] sort of light signature of of the [58:23] behavior that really popped up was the [58:26] search history in Slack. like what you [58:28] know there were certain searches that [58:30] this person had to have been doing. [58:31] >> So did you invite your IT guy in like [58:34] how how did it [58:35] >> well so this is the crazy thing is the [58:37] search logs in Slack are not visible to [58:42] Slack clients. Oh, you ping Salesforce [58:44] >> and so and in fact like cynically I [58:47] think they were doing it in this way [58:49] precisely to avoid detection is they [58:51] were doing searches and then getting [58:53] things from not joining the channels but [58:55] getting things from the preview from the [58:56] search from the actual searches and so [58:59] really the only way we were able to do [59:00] this is we got introduced to some like [59:04] very senior people at Salesforce who [59:07] like to their credit you know sort of [59:09] agreed to help us track this down and [59:10] they they pulled from their own internal [59:13] logs, [59:14] >> what the search history was, and it was [59:16] very clear exactly who the person was, [59:18] and that person was still an active [59:20] Ripling employee. [59:21] >> Who was the one who came up with the [59:22] idea to look at that particular thing [59:25] >> to look at the searches? [59:27] >> Yes. [59:28] >> I can't even remember, but it it was so [59:29] obvious. It was like [59:30] >> you called a meeting of a bunch of smart [59:32] people and like how are we going to [59:33] catch them? [59:33] >> It was like I mean it was a very small [59:35] team. It was like, you know, it was [59:36] like, you know, me, my my general [59:39] counsel, like, you know, the deputy GC, [59:42] you know, it was like a it was like two [59:44] or three people on legal, two or three [59:45] people in security, and it was like, [59:48] hey, [59:48] >> how are we going to catch them? [59:49] >> You know, to to get this the Slacks that [59:52] we saw, they must have done these [59:54] searches to get, you know, so we and [59:56] these are weird searches like someone [59:58] and so we've got to be able to find [60:00] this. And so then we we we clearly [60:02] there's one person that was like doing [60:03] this and it was very clear who it was. [60:06] The big kind of insight was like well [60:08] look it's actually cuz we were thinking [60:10] like is there something that we could do [60:12] where we could put something in Slack [60:15] you know like maybe like put like a fake [60:18] customer in Salesforce with a phone [60:20] number that like goes to our law firm [60:22] put that in Slack and like see if a deal [60:24] sales rep calls that phone number you [60:26] know and like kind of triangulate that [60:28] way. And it was just it was too hard to [60:30] sort of know like cuz we it was too hard [60:33] to see what deal would be doing with it. [60:36] And so the insight was realizing that [60:39] you could flip it around and you could [60:41] actually the thing that we could see was [60:43] the searches and so we could see what [60:45] this guy was searching for and so we had [60:48] to do it the other way. We had to give [60:50] some information to deal and see uh this [60:54] guy searched for it. [60:55] >> How did you get the information to deal? [60:57] So, [clears throat] you know, look, a [60:58] lot of companies that are in competing [61:01] spaces have some somewhat regular [61:04] exchange of like legal letters where, [61:07] you know, for whatever reason, you know, [61:10] they send you a letter and they're like, [61:11] "We're angry that this person joined and [61:14] make sure that they're, you know, or [61:16] this person recruited someone they [61:17] weren't supposed to recruit and, you [61:18] know, and so this is a sort of fairly [61:20] form, there's a sort of low level of [61:22] that that was kind of happening." And so [61:23] there happened to have been a letter [61:25] that they had sent us about something or [61:27] other related to a deal employee that [61:29] had joined Riplane that we had, you [61:32] know, sort of I think at the time had [61:34] decided we're not even going to bother [61:35] responding to this. But we suddenly [61:37] said, well, let's respond to it. And [61:39] when we responded to it and we said, [61:40] "Okay, we decided to put together like a [61:44] screenshot of a a Slack message." Um, [61:48] that was like basically like a a fake [61:51] Slack message. Although to make sure [61:52] that it wasn't actually fake, we [61:54] actually had someone send that Slack [61:56] message so we could we could be like, [61:58] "No, no, it was a real Slack message." [61:59] But but we put this thing together and [62:02] the Slack message what's actually the [62:04] funniest part of this is that initially [62:07] this was designed by the legal team and [62:10] man the Slack message was so boring. It [62:12] was it was like [62:13] >> no one would have cared. It was so [62:14] uninteresting [62:16] >> and so and this was a very you know [62:18] closed circle of like you weren't [62:20] allowed to tell anyone about what was [62:21] going on. And so I called up our former [62:25] CMO um who was like uh that he had moved [62:29] into a new role at Ripane. Uh but he was [62:31] like one of the things about him that's [62:33] so amazing is he's like just great at [62:36] writing coming up with like cold email [62:39] messages. And so he was always the guy [62:40] we went to when we needed like a new [62:42] cold email to send people that was and [62:45] so I called up Mebstein and I said, [62:48] "Mebbstein, we need you to write a cold [62:50] email that's going to have a 100% S1 to [62:53] S2 conversion rate that like like [62:56] definitely someone's going to have to [62:57] click on this." Yeah. [62:58] >> And he came up with the actual thing and [63:01] it was this message that sort of [63:02] suggested that there was this channel in [63:05] rippling Slack called DD defectors [63:07] >> where ex deal employees were talking [63:10] about deal maybe in ways that were [63:11] unflattering and there were you know we [63:14] sent them the message and then just for [63:15] added sort of theatrical effect we like [63:18] blacked out like key parts of it you [63:20] know to just be like really be like what [63:22] are the blacked out parts of it and and [63:24] it was included in this letter that we [63:27] sent to um their CFO who is you know the [63:31] CEO's father um and their outside [63:35] counsel um and their head of of legal [63:38] [snorts] the sort of person's title. So [63:40] there's only three people. One of them, [63:42] you know, presumably it's not the [63:44] outside council. And then the other two [63:45] are quite senior within the company. And [63:48] we sent them this letter, you know, at [63:50] like I think it was like 8:00 p.m. And [63:52] then we waited. And I remember waking up [63:55] at like 4 in the morning and checking my [63:58] Slack and and there was just all these [64:00] messages. It was like, "Holy [ __ ] they [64:02] did it." And like we were getting [64:04] >> somebody was searching on that channel. [64:06] He was searching and going in, you know, [64:09] this going into this channel and like, [64:10] you know, it's a it was purposefully a [64:12] weird search term. It never been [64:14] searched before. We checked, you know, [64:16] it was not a real channel, you know, so [64:18] there's only one way that this could [64:19] have happened. [64:20] >> Okay, now you know who it is. Your month [64:22] and a half search is over. [64:24] >> Then what happened? [64:26] >> Well, then you know [64:27] >> who approached him. [64:28] >> So this the the employee was was based [64:31] in Ireland. Yes. And Ireland has um the [64:36] Irish legal system has an extraordinary [64:38] form of relief in civil litigation that [64:42] allows you to file an exparte process. [64:44] So basically you can you don't have to [64:46] alert the other side. You can go to [64:48] court and get without the other side [64:50] being aware of it an order from the [64:52] court that's effectively sort of like a [64:54] warrant. You know in the US legal system [64:57] that exists in like a criminal case but [64:59] not in civil litigation. [65:01] Um, and so we we were able to get this [65:04] because of the sort of strength of the [65:06] evidence that sort of there was a court [65:08] order to get access to this guy's phone [65:10] and and so there was a court officer [65:14] that came to [65:15] >> police officerish person. [65:17] >> I don't know about police officer but [65:19] court officer. It was like a solicitor [65:22] is the uniform. [65:23] >> I actually don't know. But but in in in [65:25] the Irish legal system there solicitors [65:28] and barristers and you know and so maybe [65:31] more like a lawyer [65:32] >> wearing a white wig or [65:34] >> man I don't even know now. I'm going to [65:36] look that up. But anyway, you know they [65:38] showed up at the office met this guy was [65:40] take you know sort of you know went into [65:43] a room for a meeting and there was this [65:45] team array with you know sort of [65:47] forensic IT people. sort of officer of [65:49] the court said, "Look, I've got this [65:51] order for your phone." And um he uh sort [65:55] of said, "I don't have my phone with me. [65:56] I need to go get it." That turned out [65:58] not to be true. Um and then he sort of [66:02] while he was like going to get it, kind [66:03] of ran into a bathroom and locked [66:05] himself in the bathroom. And what we [66:07] later learned is that in the bathroom, [66:08] he did a factory reset on his phone, [66:10] tried to flush it down the toilet, [66:12] >> and then came out of the the bathroom. [66:15] And you know, the the court officer was [66:17] telling him, "Look, you're violating the [66:18] court order. There's, you know, this is [66:20] something that you can be in prison [66:21] for." And he ran out of the building and [66:24] took off. Yep. And then you know over [66:26] the next sort of 10 to 12 days there was [66:31] this sort of b sort of ongoing legal [66:33] process to try and get you know sort of [66:36] like real like police enforcement of [66:39] this to get this guy to get a lawyer to [66:42] sort of and you know get like contempt [66:44] charges filed. And eventually what [66:46] happened is is he um you know sort of [66:51] facing you know sort of these legal [66:53] consequences. [66:55] He eventually sort of like turned and [66:58] sort of started cooperating [67:00] >> and said that he had destroyed his [67:02] phone. But he also um he told us and [67:04] this is all you know in the sort of the [67:07] sort of court proceedings and the [67:08] affidavit that he produced. But [67:10] according to these proceedings, you [67:12] know, allegedly what happened is that he [67:15] immediately after he left our office, he [67:17] got u called Alex, the CEO of Deal, told [67:22] him what had happened. Alex said someone [67:24] would reach out to him, you know, [67:25] allegedly and and and then two attorneys [67:29] at Deal, like stab like employees of [67:32] Deal who were attorneys called him back [67:36] and they they told him to destroy his [67:38] phone. Um, which is like if you're [67:40] that's a that's a bad thing for anyone, [67:42] but it's really bad for attorneys to be [67:45] to be saying that. um um told him [67:48] destroy his phone, get a new burner [67:50] phone, um call them back, delete all of [67:53] his accounts, and they offered to [67:55] relocate him and his family to Dubai um [67:59] and get him out of the country. Dubai is [68:02] >> no extradition, [68:03] >> you know, like not a lot of extradition [68:05] options. One of those lawyers, by the [68:08] way, who was based in the UK, practiced [68:10] law in the UK, has since relocated to [68:13] Dubai himself since this all came out. [68:16] And so there was and so there was this [68:18] crazy thing where he detailed, you know, [68:19] like the the person who was doing this [68:21] detailed ex everything that happened and [68:23] how he was recruited by the CEO directly [68:26] and sent all of this information to the [68:28] CEO and was paid, how he was paid um and [68:31] and all all you know, sort of all of [68:33] this stuff. Do you think this is going [68:36] on a lot in tech? [68:38] >> I don't think it's going on a lot. And [68:41] uh look, I think the reason that we [68:43] really came forward with this, [68:45] >> yeah, you went very public. You know, [68:47] obviously there's a reason for rippling [68:49] that, you know, for the business, we [68:50] need to defend the business. But, you [68:52] know, more importantly, I do think that [68:54] if deal [68:57] sort of moves forward like in a way [68:59] that's unscathed, [69:00] there is this risk that the overton [69:03] window shifts and that this becomes [69:07] a norm. You know, that it's sort of like [69:09] ah, you know, [69:10] >> your competitor paid someone to steal [69:13] your CRM data. If you can't stand the [69:15] heat, get out of the kitchen. Yeah. You [69:17] got to be doing the same thing. And [69:19] everyone [69:19] >> set a precedent. [69:20] >> And everyone's got to have an espionage [69:22] team and a counter espionage team and [69:24] and and I just don't think that that's [69:26] the that's not the way I want the world [69:28] to work. [69:29] >> Mhm. Okay. Anything else you want to [69:32] tell the audience? Any other advice you [69:34] would give to founders and people who [69:36] want to go from four people to 40 to 400 [69:40] to 4,000 and 40,000 someday? I think [69:43] like everyone kind of needs to find [69:45] their own path through this stuff. It's [69:46] one of the things that's that's kind of [69:47] hardest. Like I don't I don't really [69:49] think that there are a lot of rules and [69:51] recipes. And so, um, you know, it's why, [69:55] um, I probably have like a lot a lot [69:58] more, you know, I there was a a point in [70:01] in my life when I was like very angry at [70:03] investors and and I think I've sort of [70:05] sort of reached some point where I [70:07] actually have a lot of empathy for [70:09] investors and like how hard it is to be [70:11] in in their position and and how [70:14] impossible the job is. Um and uh because [70:18] I think it's really hard, you know, even [70:19] if you have a lot of experience [70:21] yourself, [70:23] you know, there like people all find [70:25] their own paths and things change. Like [70:28] Ripling was like a business that was [70:31] like so close to what we were building [70:34] at benefits like it wasn't was the same [70:36] industry [70:37] slight slightly tinkered with kind of [70:40] the the sort of principle kind of the [70:43] foundational principles of sort of what [70:44] we were building but like the world was [70:47] like like four years into the future [70:51] from when I had started ZS and that one [70:54] thing like changed everything. It was [70:56] like, you know, all of the things that, [70:59] you know, or many of the things that had [71:00] worked for us at Zenovs didn't work at [71:02] Riplane and and like, you know, just [71:04] like like everything was different [71:05] because of a few changes to the starting [71:08] assumptions. And it really [71:10] >> sort of made me realize why so much of [71:13] the advice that people give out about [71:15] how to do this is so useless because [71:17] everyone is fighting yesterday's war. M [71:21] >> um you know from their own experience [71:23] and like [71:24] >> things are very different you know [71:26] things have changed just because of the [71:27] slow advance of time [71:29] >> if not because this is a completely [71:31] different business in a completely a [71:33] different industry with a totally [71:34] different set of people. [71:35] >> Um so it's it's a real struggle. Um, and [71:38] it it's probably one of the reasons why [71:41] I'm like, man, it sucks. If you have any [71:43] other any other thing that you can go [71:45] do, like maybe that's the right thing to [71:47] do instead of instead of getting [71:48] involved in this whole thing. [71:50] >> I appreciate you. Thank you on behalf of [71:52] the listeners. You're an inspiration to [71:54] many. Congrats on all your success. [71:56] Congrats on your revenge tour. [71:58] >> Well, thank you very much. [71:59] >> Appreciate you. [72:01] >> Okay. Hope you like that interview with [72:03] Parker. I really liked it. He's a smart [72:05] guy on hiring. He's got a bunch of cool [72:08] ideas. Uh, some of which I'm definitely [72:10] going to borrow. I like his idea that if [72:12] he's got a candidate that's coming to [72:14] meet him, he sends them an old board [72:16] deck or his investor memo, lets them [72:19] read it, and he spends like the first [72:21] half of the interview just talking about [72:23] that. And the reaction of the candidate [72:25] to that memo and the ideas they come up [72:27] with really says a lot about them. I [72:29] love that he does that. He relies a lot [72:32] on on reference checks. He does [72:34] something interesting there. He asks the [72:36] candidate to give him six references, [72:39] which is kind of a lot, and he only [72:41] calls two. He's trying to figure out if [72:42] they have six references or not. But [72:44] then he leans much more heavily on the [72:47] blind references. And this is something [72:48] I did as well. I would say 60% of my [72:52] decision criteria was around the the [72:55] third party references of people who [72:56] used to work for them. So, I thought [72:57] that was interesting. This is something [72:59] we didn't do at HubSpot, but I really [73:01] liked how he hires a lot of ex-founders. [73:04] And he talked about how ex-founders are [73:07] used to breaking the laws of physics. [73:10] They're used to just really tight [73:12] constraints and having to really do hard [73:14] things. And so he has them sprinkled [73:16] throughout his or he's had a lot of [73:18] success with them. He likes his senior [73:20] team to be a mix of homegrown talent and [73:23] been there, done that talent. And this [73:25] is pretty consistent across most of the [73:28] CEOs I interviewed. And I feel like it's [73:30] a little bit of conventional wisdom and [73:32] scale up land that you just hire a bunch [73:34] of been there done that people. I'm not [73:37] sure that's right. A lot of HubSpot's [73:39] team over the years was 50% homegrown [73:41] and 50% been there, done that. And that [73:43] mix I think is just about right. I took [73:46] some things away from on pace. He's at [73:49] 4,000 people. A lot of companies slow [73:52] down when you hit 4,000 people. He seems [73:55] to be keeping the pace up. And he does a [73:58] few things that I think are smart. And a [74:00] lot of the CEOs I interviewed do a [74:02] couple of these things. First, he really [74:04] tries to stay on the coal face with the [74:07] customer. He's one of the most active [74:09] users of Ripling, the product. He runs [74:11] payroll for all 4,000 employees in [74:13] Ripling. So, he stays very close to the [74:14] customer experience through that. He [74:16] stays on the coal face with the [74:18] employees, too. He sits right inside the [74:21] engineering organization where he can [74:23] see what's going on, hear what's going [74:24] on. And he talked about the CEO sets the [74:26] pace. CEO slows down, the or slows down. [74:29] CEO speeds up, the or speeds up. One of [74:31] my big takeaways on Parker is he doesn't [74:34] have a chip on his shoulder. He's got a [74:36] boulder on his shoulder. And that [74:39] boulder really drives him. He calls it [74:41] his revenge tour, the whole company. I [74:43] think this is pretty common amongst some [74:45] of the best CEOs and can be a real [74:48] motivator. And in his case, David Saxs [74:50] put a boulder on his shoulder. I have a [74:52] chip on my shoulder and I had an old [74:54] boss put it there. I had a guy work for [74:56] for a decade. When I went to resign, he [74:59] said, "You'll be nothing without me." [75:02] And this is like 30 years ago and I [75:03] still remember. And if I really want to [75:05] get fired up, I think about the day I [75:07] resigned from that company. So Boulder [75:09] on the shoulder, super useful. Channel [75:12] it. Uh I think it can be really useful [75:14] for you. My last thought on Parker and [75:16] about scale up startup land rit large. I [75:19] meet with lots and lots of founders [75:21] these days. There's a new breed of [75:23] founder I call five tool founders. Now a [75:26] great baseball player can hit, can hit [75:28] with power, can catch, can run and throw [75:32] all at an elite level. And I'm noticing [75:34] a new breed of founder who is kind of [75:36] like that. And I think Parker's one of [75:39] them. I think Brett from Sierra is one [75:41] of them. Mati from 11 Labs. Gabe from [75:44] Rogo. Darra from Deli where they're very [75:47] good at coding. They're very good at [75:51] design. They have vision. They can [75:53] recruit and they can sell. Those are all [75:56] five tools that they have in their bag. [75:58] And I'm noticing more and more of them. [76:00] And if you're one of those founders [76:02] that's deeply technical like them, but [76:04] can't quite storytell and sell, I would [76:07] work on that and [music] get some [76:09] coaching on that and get some feedback [76:10] on it because those five tool players [76:13] are worth their weight and gold. And if [76:15] you can be a five tool player, that [76:17] really opens up a lot of doors for you. [76:18] Okay, those are my thoughts. Lots of [76:20] takeaways from Parker. I'll see you on [76:22] the next episode. [76:27] >> [music]