BOE's Greene Holds Rates as Compounding Supply Shocks Risk Sticky Inflation

英国央行官员格林主张维持利率 警惕复合供应冲击引发粘性通胀 英国央行政策制定者梅根·格林警告称，反复出现的供应中断正在拉低英国的通胀感知门槛，并迫使企业转向基于状态的定价，导致尽管经济增长疲弱，第二轮通胀风险依然持续存在。 在本期节目中，英国央行货币政策委员会（MPC）委员梅根·格林探讨了由能源危机、英国脱欧以及地缘政治冲突等连续复合型供应冲击所带来的货币政策挑战。她解释了英国通胀预期与企业定价行为如何发生转变，迫使央行官员重新审视那些假定供应中断仅为暂时现象的传统框架。尽管英国潜在经济增长依然疲弱，格林阐述了为何她支持维持限制性政策立场以防范第二轮通胀风险，同时她还讨论了来自美国的国际溢出效应以及央行政策工具的局限性。 疫情以来，外部国际溢出效应约占英国收益率曲线全部波动的半数，导致金融状况高度暴露于美国市场走势等全球力量之下。 (7:30) 尽管伦敦市中心显得繁华忙碌，但英国潜在GDP增长依然非常疲弱（约每季度0.2%），然而严重的供应端乏力意味着哪怕只是微弱的需求增长也可能引发通胀。 (10:00) 反复的供应冲击已将英国家庭和企业对通胀的感知门槛从4%降至3.0%至3.5%之间，形成了非对称敏感性，使消费者对价格超预期上涨的反应要强烈得多。 (15:00) 英国企业的定价机制已从传统的定期调整永久转向实时的“状态依存定价”，加快了第二轮通胀效应对消费者的传导速度。 (15:00) 与以30年期抵押贷款为主的美国市场不同，英国主要依赖2年期和5年期固定利率，这意味着随着家庭原有固定利率陆续到期置换，政策利率的变动会迅速转化为偿债阻力。 (20:00)

Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee member Megan Greene argues that persistent, compounding supply shocks have lowered public inflation attention thresholds and altered pricing behavior, undermining the traditional central banking doctrine of looking through supply disruptions. Compounding Supply Shocks and Second-Round Persistence (15:00) Orthodox central banking doctrine instructs policymakers to look through negative supply shocks because interest rate adjustments influence aggregate demand rather than physical supply constraints. Greene contends that this approach fails when an economy experiences continuous, compounding shocks. When supply disruptions become recurring, public attention shifts non-linearly: Bank of England research indicates that the UK inflation awareness threshold has ratcheted down from 4.0% to between 3.0% and 3.5%, with households reacting far more aggressively to upside surprises than to downside relief. Simultaneously, corporate price-setting has shifted from scheduled calendar reviews to real-time state-dependent pricing, speeding up the transmission of cost spikes to consumers. As repeated shocks become embedded in forward-looking inflation expectations, second-round effects threaten to trigger persistent wage-price spirals, forcing monetary authorities to lean against price pressures even when economic growth is subdued. Structural Capacity Erosion and Policy Transmission (20:00) The UK faces compounding supply vulnerabilities due to a chronic, structural business underinvestment trend originating in the 2008 Global Financial Crisis and exacerbated by post-Brexit frictions. Consequently, while underlying quarterly GDP growth is sluggish at 0.2%, even that modest pace risks generating inflation because domestic supply capacity has degraded. Although accumulating labor market slack currently resembles conditions in 2011 more than the tight market of 2022, Greene argues that policymakers must act preemptively, as waiting for definitive statistical confirmation of second-round wage-price spirals guarantees acting too late. Transmission of policy rates into the UK real economy is also shaped by real estate financing structures. Unlike the 30-year fixed, non-portable mortgages common in the United States, the UK market is concentrated in 2-year and 5-year fixed-rate products. While this structure transmits interest rate tightening into domestic activity more rapidly, it creates protracted debt-servicing headwinds as households face substantial payment increases when refinancing off historical lows. Global Spillovers and Rate Decision Rationale (40:00) UK financial conditions are heavily dictated by external macroeconomic developments. Greene notes that international spillovers—primarily from the US and Eurozone—now account for approximately half of all UK gilt yield curve movements, up from one-third prior to the pandemic. Market movements follow US inflation prints and Nonfarm Payrolls closely, reflecting global assumptions that central banks move in tandem with the Federal Reserve. Despite identifying asymmetric upside risks and an energy price ratchet effect, Greene justified voting to hold the policy rate rather than hike further. She stated that monetary policy is already restrictive, and a pause allows the committee to evaluate imminent energy price data and assess whether existing policy tightness is sufficient to suppress second-round effects if geopolitical disruptions in the Middle East subside. Analytical Adaptation to Knightian Uncertainty (42:30) Volatile supply environments have forced the Bank of England to modify its modeling frameworks. Rather than evaluating structural supply and total factor productivity once a year, staff now monitor supply-side movements continuously. Furthermore, because traditional demand-driven decompositions leave an unexplained wedge when explaining inflation surges, the Monetary Policy Committee has increasingly replaced single central point forecasts with multi-scenario analysis to operate under Knightian uncertainty. Regarding potential supply tailwinds, the Bank maintains a conservative stance. Baseline three-year projections intentionally exclude explicit upward productivity adjustments for Artificial Intelligence, citing only nascent empirical evidence of labor market reallocation. Greene stresses that correcting structural supply deficiencies falls entirely within the remit of elected governments, while the central bank must adhere strictly to its primary 2% price stability mandate. Greene concludes that central banking has permanently shifted away from predictable, demand-led cycles toward managing recurrent supply shocks driven by economic statecraft and climate transitions. However, the exact mechanisms for resolving the unexplained modeling wedges in inflation persistence and calibrating policy when demand tools cannot remedy structural capacity erosion remain open challenges.

英格兰银行货币政策委员会外部委员梅根·格林指出，在连续且复合的负向供给冲击下，传统央行“穿透”暂态冲击的教条已经失效。公众对通胀敏感度的上升与企业状态依存定价机制，使得即使英国本土需求疲弱，通胀预期仍面临脱锚与二阶效应粘性风险，迫使货币政策必须保持紧缩以防范上行风险。 供给冲击常态化与穿透教条失效 (15:00) 传统央行理论主张对能源或外部地缘导致的供给冲击予以“穿透”，因为以利率为核心的货币政策工具仅能调节总需求，无法修复物理供应链或化解贸易地缘摩擦。然而格林强调，当供给冲击从偶发事件演变为接二连三的浪潮时，这一教条便难以成立。英格兰银行的研究显示，公众对物价波动的感知具有高度非线性和不对称性：英国企业与家庭对通胀的感知阈值已从历史上习惯的4.0%下降至3.0%–3.5%，并且对通胀上行超预期的敏感度显著高于对下行缓和的反应。 这种过度关注触发了微观经济主体的制度性转变。后疫情时代，企业定价模式已由传统的按日历固定周期调价转向“状态依存定价”，一旦成本突破临界点即迅速转嫁给终端用户。多轮冲击由此逐渐内生化为中长期通胀预期，使得工资与物价的螺旋压力形成粘性二阶效应。这打破了单一冲击可自我出清的假设，迫使央行不得不通过压制需求来锚定预期。 弱需求下的滞胀隐忧与房贷传导 (10:00) 格林解释其主张维持当前限制性利率的背景在于英国经济独特的微观矛盾。虽然底层GDP表现疲软（环比季度增速仅约0.2%），且劳动力市场正在积累闲置（更接近2011年失业率达8%时的低迷状态，而非2022年疫后复苏的紧绷格局），但英国潜在供给侧同样极度萎缩，导致轻微的需求反弹即可诱发通胀。决策者小组调查显示企业一年期价格预期已停止下行，薪酬增长放缓不及预期，家庭通胀预期依然高企，呈现典型的滞胀特征。 与此同时，英国独特的抵押贷款结构深刻影响了货币政策传导。不同于美国以30年期不可跨房转移的固定利率贷款为主，英国市场高度集中于2年期和5年期固定利率产品。这一机制固然使央行加息在18至24个月的政策滞后期内更直接地渗透进实体经济，但即使进入降息周期，大量按旧低利率签约的家庭在贷款到期重签时仍面临月供陡增的“再融资断崖”，持续对居民可支配收入和宏观总需求构成下行压制。 外部溢出效应与单一物价目标 (7:30) 英国宏观金融条件受到国际溢出效应的显著制约。格林透露，疫情暴发前，英国国债收益率曲线的变动中约有三分之一由外部驱动；而疫情暴发后，受美国与欧元区溢出影响的比例已升至约二分之一。美联储的紧缩立场与美国通胀、非农就业数据能够迅速收紧英国金融条件。针对国债市场波动与政府债务付息增加，英格兰银行更倾向于将其视作整体金融条件的实质性收紧，而非财政主导带来的直接通胀脉冲。 面对外部冲击与国内政治周期，格林强调英格兰银行与美联储具有本质不同的政策授权。英国财政部每年11月下达的法定指令明确规定，MPC的首要单一目标是在中期内实现2%的通胀目标；唯有在满足价格稳定的前提下，支持政府经济政策才作为从属目标。因此，在评估地缘冲突及溢出效应时，政策考量必须严格服从于物价达标的单一底线。 结构性产能损耗与供给干预边界 (30:00) 从长期供给来看，英国经济面临自2008年金融危机以来持续低迷的商业投资赤字，叠加脱欧摩擦，导致钢铁等核心工业产能遭受侵蚀，基础物资高度依赖进口。对于生成式人工智能（AI）这一潜在的积极正向供给冲击，格林指出央行初步监测显示高AI暴露行业的招聘需求出现相对放缓，但缺乏直接解释青年失业率上升的实证依据。英格兰银行在基准三年期预测中审慎地维持了标准投资驱动假设，并未直接计入AI对潜在生产率的额外上调提振。 关税、出口管制等“经济治国方略”与气候转型已使供给冲击制度化，迫使英国央行从年度静态评估转向实时供给端建模，并以多情景分析替代单一预测来应对“奈特氏不确定性”。格林与节目主持人一致认为，解决深层供给瓶颈、调整环保监管或制定产业政策属于民选立法机构的专属职权，缺乏民主授权的独立央行既不拥有修复物理供给的政策工具，也不应擅自逾越边界介入供给端分配。 在负向供给冲击与地缘经济割裂常态化的新周期中，英格兰银行已转向运用多情景管理防范通胀上行风险，但其核心困境依然未解：货币政策只能通过压制总需求来间接遏制通胀心理，却无力扭转物理供应链瓶颈与生产力长期损耗。面对不可控的外部地缘波动与国内产出代价，央行如何在刚性物价目标与疲弱经济基本面之间取得平衡，仍是一个缺乏完美方案的长期挑战。

## Background 本期节目由 Bloomberg 于 2026 年 5 月 11 日在 RSS / 网页播客平台发布。节目简介指出，疫情以来全球央行普遍面临供给侧冲击难题，随着供应链断裂、俄乌冲突及中东战局接踵而至，传统的“穿透暂时性冲击”策略愈发难以为继；英格兰银行货币政策委员会（MPC）外部委员 Megan Greene 在节目中深入探讨了多重供给冲击的叠加效应、一阶与二阶效应机制，以及即便英国经济增长底层疲软，她为何仍全力聚焦于通胀上行风险。 ## TL;DR 英格兰银行货币政策委员会（MPC）外部委员 Megan Greene 深入拆解了在连续负向供给冲击成为新常态的背景下，英国央行面临的政策两难。她指出英国经济不仅总需求偏弱，长期投资不足与地缘冲击更导致潜在供给能力严重受损，而社会公众对通胀敏感阈值的下移与企业转向“状态依存定价”，极易引发顽固的第二轮效应（工资-物价螺旋）。由于货币工具只能调节需求而无法打通霍尔木兹海峡或修复供应链，英格兰银行不得不打破单一中心基准预测模式，转向不赋予概率权重的多情景推演与极端风险管理。尽管通胀上行风险高企，Greene 解释了近期投票维持基准利率不变的权衡，即等待关键能源走势明朗，在已具约束力的限制性利率立场下采取审慎观察策略。 ## Atmosphere & style 整场对话在专业硬核的宏观推演与老友叙旧式的轻松幽默之间自如切换。两位主持人调侃 Greene 从“金融推特大V”摇身一变进入央行“亲手灌香肠”的身份转变，而 Greene 则以坦诚、接地气且极富穿透力的口吻，解密英国央行内部的决策机制与闭门争论。现场氛围充满知性张力与现实紧迫感，既有央行技术官僚面对“奈特不确定性”和有限工具箱时的理智克制，也弥漫着在全球地缘经济博弈全面重构供给底座时代的深层忧患。 ## Bulletin - `10:00` 英格兰银行货币政策委员会（MPC）外部委员 Megan Greene 指出，英国底层季调 GDP 增速仅约 0.2%，经济呈现出需求与供给“双弱”的格局，微小的需求刺激都会直接推高通胀。 - `15:00` 公众对通胀的注意力阈值已从过去的 4% 永久性下移至 3.0%–3.5%，同时企业普遍转向“状态依存定价”，使外部供给冲击向终端物价的传导速度显著加快。 - `07:35` 英国金融条件受海外外溢影响严重，疫情后英债收益率变动中已有高达 50% 纯粹由境外因素（主要是美国宏观数据与美联储预期）驱动。 - `43:20` 面对连续负向供给冲击与“奈特不确定性”，央行放弃了传统的单一点预测，转向不对各情景赋予固定概率的风险管理模式，优先考量政策误判的灾难性代价。 - `52:16` 尽管通胀风险完全偏向上行，Greene 仍投票维持利率不变，主要考虑到当前政策立场已具备限制性，并希望利用未来 6–8 周的窗口期观察能源与地缘局势的发展。 ## Key takeaways - `05:00` 英格兰银行 MPC 实行 5 名内部管理层与 4 名外部独立专家的 9 人架构，外部委员在物理办公上与内部隔离以防范群体思维，且议息表决实行彻底公开透明的实名投票制。 - `10:00` 与美联储拥有就业与通胀的“双重使命”不同，英格兰银行的法定首要职责只有将中期通胀持续稳定在 2%，经济增长属于次要从属目标。 - `30:00` 英国经济长期存在资本投资匮乏，这一疲软并非源于脱欧，早在 2008 年全球金融危机后便已显现，对全要素生产率和潜在产出造成了深远拖累。 - `12:35` 公众在通胀认知上存在显著不对称性，对通胀超预期上行极度敏感，而对下行反应迟钝，微观主体的通胀预期脱锚正在加剧第二轮效应风险。 - `20:00` 供给冲击在经济中的传导分为直接效应、间接效应和第二轮效应（工资-物价螺旋），货币政策对直接效应通常选择穿透，但必须提前对第二轮效应进行主观研判与干预。 - `23:00` 英国房贷以 2 年和 5 年期固定利率为主，导致央行降息周期中出现悖论：早期低息房贷到期重置，反向导致部分家庭实际偿债支出激增，进而压制了消费复苏。 - `26:00` AI 是当前宏观地平线上极少数潜在的正向供给冲击，理论上可推动全要素生产率跃升并平抑物价，但其落地的确切时间节点充满极高不确定性，尚未被纳入央行未来三年的基准预测。 - `35:00` 英国电力边际定价机制与天然气高度绑定，且缺乏类似美国的能源自给能力，导致本土通胀对全球能源价格波动的敞口极其脆弱。 - `40:00` 美国通胀与非农数据在影响英国金融条件的指标中位居前列，即便基本面缺乏直接因果，市场对美联储行动的被动跟随仍会收紧英国国内金融环境。 - `46:48` 地缘经济博弈（如关税、制裁）与气候转型风险使得连续的负向供给冲击成为新常态，传统经济学教科书教导的对供给冲击“直接穿透（look through）”策略已基本失效。 - `50:00` 货币政策属于典型的需求侧调节工具，既无法打通霍尔木兹海峡也无法解决产业空心化，解决供给侧瓶颈涉及深刻的利益再分配，属于民选政府而非独立央行法定权责。 ## Detailed walkthrough ### `01:18` 岁月的馈赠与宏观变局：从财经社媒走向权力中枢 节目开场，主持人 Tracy Alloway 和 Joe Weisenthal 展开了一番关于“变老”的幽默互动。Tracy 感慨道，年龄增长有一大妙处：曾经一同成长、相识多年的同龄人与朋友，逐渐走上了极为重要的高位，甚至掌握了实权。Joe 极力赞同这一观察。Tracy 调侃伦敦的社交圈文化——在伦敦上过大学的人总爱把“我和那个人读过同一所大学”（I went to uni with that person）挂在嘴边，仿佛所有伦敦人彼此之间都带着校友光环。而今天节目的主角正是两位主持人的老熟人。在许多市场人士与老牌受众的记忆中，她曾是“金融推特”（Finance Twitter）上极为活跃的分析师，也长期为各大主流财经媒体撰写专栏；如今，她已正式出任英格兰银行货币政策委员会（Monetary Policy Committee, 简称 MPC）的外部委员（External Member）——她就是 Megan Greene。 两位主持人指出，当下探讨货币政策正处于一个极具戏剧性与挑战性的历史关口。全球经济仍未彻底摆脱疫情后剧烈通胀浪潮的余波，许多主要经济体的通胀率尚未顺利回归目标水平，部分国家甚至重启了加息周期。与此同时，中央银行独立性在多国再度沦为政治博弈的焦点，录制当周恰逢英国地方选举，政治气候微妙。此外，外部供给冲击接踵而至，美联储理事 Christopher Waller 近期在一篇题为《一个接一个的暂时性冲击》（One transitory shock after another）的演讲中提及地缘政治（如中东紧张局势）对油价及通胀路径的冲击，使“暂时性”这一标签变得愈发难以捉摸。录音时间为 5 月 6 日，就在上周英格兰银行宣布维持基准利率不变后，30 年期英国国债（Gilt）收益率却在录制前一天飙升至 1998 年以来的最高水平。央行政策利率与长期债券市场之间的显著张力，构成了当下宏观决策者面前极为棘手的图景。 ### `05:00` 从推特分析师到央行决策者：做香肠与 MPC 的独特架构 Megan Greene 随后加入对话。谈及从公开评述宏观经济、在推特上指点江山转向真正参与货币政策制定，Megan 笑着回应道，得知自己在两位主持人心中仍是“核心老牌金融推特人”，感到十分亲切，尽管“推特可从没帮我付过账单”。如今由于监管与职责要求，她的个人推特账号基本退化成了波士顿红袜队（Boston Red Sox）的棒球观赛碎碎念。她坦言，在场外分析和预测央行行长们的一举一动，与真正坐进会议室“亲手灌香肠”（making the sausage myself）之间存在天壤之别，后者的肩头沉淀着巨大且具体的政策责任。Joe 顺势打趣称，此前彼得森国际经济研究所所长 Adam Posen（同为美国籍学者）也曾出任英格兰银行 MPC 外部委员并多次做客节目，“看来我和 Tracy 未来也有希望去英国央行任职”。 Megan 详细拆解了英格兰银行货币政策委员会独特的权力架构。MPC 共有 9 名委员，每六周召开一次议息会议并对基准利率进行投票表决。其构成具有极其鲜明的制衡色彩： ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee Structure accDescr: Diagram showing the 9-member composition of the Bank of England MPC split into 5 internal and 4 external members. subgraph MPC["英格兰银行货币政策委员会 (MPC, 共9人)"] subgraph Internals["5名内部委员 (Internals)"] A["央行行长 (Governor)"] B["副行长们 (Deputy Governors)"] C["首席经济学家 (Chief Economist)"] end subgraph Externals["4名外部委员 (Externals)"] D["Megan Greene 及其他独立外部专家<br>(来自学术界、企业界或海外背景)"] end end Internals ---|不同办公区域 / 严防群体思维| Externals ``` - **内部委员（5人）**：包括央行行长、副行长以及首席经济学家。他们属于央行的常设执行管理层，部分人在央行体系内一步步晋升成长，部分人中途引入，但均直接负责央行的日常运营。 - **外部委员（4人）**：刻意从央行体制外选拔聘任。外部委员可以来自完全不同的行业，也可以来自其他国家（Megan 本人兼具美国背景与英国国籍）。历史上 MPC 几乎总有一位美国人席位，这虽非硬性规定，但已成传统。 - **防范“群体思维”（Anti-Groupthink）机制**：为了杜绝内部串通与抱团妥协，外部委员在物理办公空间上与内部管理层完全隔离，坐在央行大楼的不同区域。外部委员通常带来截然不同的视角——学术派擅长理论模型，而 Megan 则带来了私营部门的企业运营与商业周期视角。 - **高度透明的实名投票机制**：不同于美联储（只公布少数异议者、依赖隐晦的点阵图）或欧洲央行（对外展现内部一致、不公开具体反对票归属），英格兰银行对每一次议息投票的每一张票数都彻底公开披露，实名记录每位委员的主张。在英国央行，委员公开发表异议（dissents）是极其常见且健康的常态，这践行了决策者个人对其选票独立承担责任的制度设计。 ### `07:35` 国际外溢效应与英格兰银行的核心使命 针对 Tracy 提出的核心疑问——作为一名具有国际与美国背景的经济学家，在 MPC 内部究竟更侧重于向同僚解释美国政策的传导，还是深入钻研英国本土复杂的微观数据？Megan 坦言，刚上任时并没有人递给她一本“英国经济操作指南”，她必须以最快速度适应英国本土数据统计口径的独特性。但她的核心专长与精力分配，正是在于把握外部世界对英国本土经济的“外溢效应”（spillovers）。 Megan 指出了一个至关重要的量化现实：英国是一个极度开放的小型开放经济体，其国内金融状况深受海外因素左右。 - **国债收益率曲线的海外驱动力**：在新冠疫情暴发之前，英国国债（Gilt）收益率曲线的变动中，大约有三分之一（1/3）是由纯粹来自英国境外的因素驱动的（绝大多数来自美国，部分来自欧元区）。 - **疫情后的外溢强化**：疫情暴发以来，这一外部驱动比例已经骤增至大约一半（1/2）。这意味着，英国国内金融条件的收紧或放松，有高达 50% 受到英格兰银行完全无法掌控的海外动态影响。 此外，伴随着过去一年各经济体在关税壁垒、地缘政治与经济治国方略（economic statecraft）上的角力，国际贸易维度的溢出冲击也成为政策制定中必不可少的评估变量。当 Joe 询问英格兰银行与美联储双重使命（充分就业与物价稳定）的区别时，Megan 明确阐述了英格兰银行的法定使命：维持物价稳定，即在“中期内以可持续的方式实现 2% 的通胀目标”（achieve price stability of 2% inflation sustainably over the medium term）。 ### `10:00` 英国央行的单一本分与英国经济的“双弱”现实 Megan Greene 明确阐述了英格兰银行与美联储在职责设定上的核心差异：美联储拥有通胀与就业的“双重使命”（Dual Mandate），而英国央行只有一个绝对的首要法定职责——物价稳定（维持通胀在 2%），支持政府经济增长等其他目标完全是次要从属的。谈及英国当前的宏观图景，主持人 Joe Weisenthal 与 Tracy Alloway 抛出一个直观的困惑：作为不住在英国的观察者，新闻头条里充斥着能源危机、贸易摩擦和关税冲击的悲观论调，但走在伦敦市中心街头，餐馆爆满、商场人头攒动，景象异常繁华。Greene 幽默地回应称，那通常只发生在“周二到周四”，因为到了周一和周五，人们多选择居家办公，伦敦街头就冷清得多。 回归经济现实，Greene 坦言，自她三年前加入英国央行货币政策委员会（MPC）以来，英国经济一直非常疲软。长期以来，多数经济学家受传统理论影响，习惯完全从需求侧来审视经济冷热；然而，英国的困境不仅是需求弱，**供给侧同样极度脆弱**。英国不仅有月度 GDP 数据（这让看惯季度数据的美国宏观分析师感到新奇），央行还会根据多项微观调查构建基础 GDP 增长指标（Underlying GDP），该指标显示季度实际增速仅为微弱的 0.2%。正是由于供给端被连续多轮供给冲击打得残破不堪，经济的潜在产出极为低下。这意味着，如果此时盲目刺激需求，哪怕微幅的需求上升都会立刻演变为通胀压力。 - **法定职责划分**：英格兰银行将物价稳定列为绝对的 primary mandate（首要使命），政府的经济增长诉求仅为 secondary（次要使命）。 - **微观增长底色**：英国基础季调 GDP 增速目前仅为 0.2% 左右，处于极度疲软状态。 - **结构性困境**：不仅工业部门受全球竞争（如中国制造业）挤压，非人工智能（AI）领域的企业投资也极其低迷，供给侧增长天花板被大幅压低。 --- ### `12:35` 通胀回落进程停滞与第二轮效应的隐忧 尽管经济增长几乎停滞，Greene 依然坚定投票支持维持利率不变，这一决定的关键就在于通胀的内在韧性。Greene 指出，必须审视外部新冲击爆发前（即近期中东地缘动荡与伊朗战事推高能源价格之前）英国经济的真实初始状态。在过去的近五年时间里，英国通胀率几乎全处于 2% 的目标水平之上（五年内仅有一到两个月达标），这主要是新冠疫情以及俄乌冲突等连续负向供给冲击累积的结果。当通胀好不容易展现出向 2% 收敛的迹象时，其回落速度却远慢于央行预期，甚至在多个前瞻性指标上出现了停滞（stalling out）。 英国央行内部高度关注两项底层调研：其一是“决策者小组”（Decision Maker Panel, DMP）调查，该调查直接询问企业对未来一年的价格预期和薪资增长预期，结果显示企业的价格预期不再继续下行，而薪资增长预期的降幅也远低于央行模型估算；其二是央行遍布全英各地的代理人网络（Agents）对企业年度调薪协议（pay settlements）所做的实地走访，调薪增幅虽略有放缓但依旧在高位盘整。与此同时，英国家庭部门的通胀预期自年初以来持续偏高，已经脱离了根据历史通胀出清水平推算的合理区间。高企的家庭通胀预期倒逼员工在薪资谈判中要求更高补偿，反过来又支撑了企业的定价底气，这种相互强化形成了顽固的“第二轮效应”（second-round effects）。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 英国通胀第二轮效应机制图 accDescr: 展示连续供给冲击如何通过家庭通胀预期、工资设定与企业定价形成通胀顽固性循环。 subgraph Shocks["外生供给冲击"] S1["连续负向供给冲击<br/>(疫情 / 俄乌冲突 / 中东局势)"] end subgraph Channel["微观传导链条"] E["家庭通胀预期超额抬升"] W["工资涨幅回落停滞<br/>(DMP调查与薪资协议高企)"] P["企业转为状态依存定价<br/>(加价频率与幅度上升)"] end subgraph Outcome["宏观后果"] R["去通胀进程停滞<br/>通胀韧性超出模型预测"] end S1 --> E E --> W W --> P P --> R R -.反哺通胀感知.-> E ``` --- ### `15:00` “迷你通胀浪潮”与状态依存定价的恶性循环 主持人指出，如果经济体不断经历所谓的“暂态冲击”（transitory shocks），或者接连遭遇一波又一波的“迷你通胀浪潮”（mini waves of inflation），公众与企业的心理防线就会被彻底重塑。Greene 对此深表赞同，并披露了英国央行的关键行为经济学研究发现：冲击的绝对幅度与发生频率决定了通胀的粘性。两年前英国通胀一度冲上 11%，登上了所有报纸头条，在超市货架前人人自感通胀切肤之痛，这使得整个社会对物价波动的敏感度（attentiveness）发生根本性位移。 研究表明，公众对通胀存在一个“感知门槛”。过去在低通胀时代，通胀率只有超过 4% 才会引起社会广泛关注；而如今，这一注意阈值已下移至 **3% 到 3.5%** 的区间。一旦通胀踏入该门槛，消费者对价格上涨的神经就会高度紧绷。此外，公众在认知上存在不对称性——对通胀超预期上行（upside surprises）极其敏感，而对通胀下行（downside surprises）则迟钝得多。在供给侧，企业的定价机制也发生了深刻变异：疫情前，大多数企业按照固定的时间表（如按年或按季度）周期性调价；但在连续冲击后，企业全面转向了“状态依存定价”（state-dependent pricing）模式，即一旦上游成本或通胀预期出现抬升，便立即、高频次地将成本直接转嫁给终端消费者。当企业普遍采用状态依存定价时，通胀预期向实际物价的传导速度会成倍加快，使央行面对新一轮能源冲击时陷入“通胀上行、增长下挫”的极度被动境地。 - **感知门槛位移**：社会对通胀的心理敏感阈值从过去的 4% 永久性下移至 3.0%–3.5%，轻微的上行扰动就会立刻被居民感知。 - **非对称感知**：公众对通胀“超预期上升”的警惕与反应幅度远大于“超预期下降”。 - **定价范式转变**：企业定价机制由传统的按日历周期定价，普遍转向敏锐的“状态依存定价”，使外部冲击向物价的传导渠道更加通畅且迅猛。 ### `20:00` 供给冲击的三个传导阶段与央行的应对难题 当被问及在公众对通胀异常敏感、企业又更倾向于直接提价的环境下，央行究竟应该防患于未然还是静待通胀显现时，梅根·格林（Megan Greene）阐述了英格兰银行审视供给冲击在经济中传导的三阶段分析框架。第一阶段是“直接效应”（direct effects），例如能源价格暴涨直接推高所有人的账单。在英国，由于存在英国天然气和电力市场办公室（Ofgem）设立的居民能源价格上限机制，英国家庭在当年7月前暂时受到保护，随后才会迎来账单上调。格林指出，货币政策通常需要18到24个月才能真正传导至实体经济，存在明显的滞后性。如果央行仅对直接效应立即加息，等政策起效时为时已晚，反而会徒增不必要地压制经济活动的风险，因此央行对此类直接冲击的标准操作通常是“选择穿透”（look through）。 第二阶段是“间接效应”（indirect effects），即使用能源的企业将成本转嫁出去。食品生产是一个典型例子：由于化肥和冷链运输都是高能耗环节，能源成本上涨最终会推高食品价格。央行学界对于是否应该遏制间接效应尚未达成完全共识，常规做法是出于政策滞后性考虑，仅对部分间接效应进行逆向调节。 最为致命的则是第三阶段——“第二轮效应”（second-round effects）。此时，物价的持续上涨开始从根本上改变工人的工资诉求和企业的定价行为。居民因购买力缩水要求涨薪（"我的钱越来越不经花了，你们必须给我加薪"），而企业在答应加薪后，又以劳动力成本上升为由进一步提价，从而诱发危险的“工资-物价螺旋”（wage-price spiral）。格林回顾了英国历史上的历次供给冲击（2008年、2011年、2014年和2022年），指出每一次都引发了不同程度的第二轮效应： - 2022年的冲击令人记忆犹新且最具创伤性，但当时英国刚走出新冠疫情，需求旺盛且劳动力市场极度紧张； - 当前英国经济的现实是需求疲软，劳动力市场不仅存在闲置且仍在继续走弱，因此第二轮效应的强度理论上不会达到2022年的极端水平； - 但格林强调“这并不能带来多少安慰”，因为即便在劳动力市场极其疲软、失业率高达8%的2011年，英国依然出现了明显的第二轮效应。如今的经济基本面正处于2022年与2011年之间； - 直接效应与间接效应极易通过模型测算，但第二轮效应很难提前精准度量。如果等确凿数据出来后再行动必然为时已晚，因此货币政策委员会（MPC）必须提前做出前瞻性的主观研判（proactive judgment），在萌芽阶段提前遏制。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 供给冲击在经济中的传导阶段与央行应对逻辑 accDescr: 展示直接效应、间接效应与第二轮效应的传导机制及货币政策的介入差异 subgraph Direct["第一阶段：直接效应"] A["直接能源冲击"] --> B["能源账单上涨<br/>(受Ofgem价格上限延后)"] B -.-> C["央行应对：选择穿透<br/>(政策存在18-24个月时滞)"] end subgraph Indirect["第二阶段：间接效应"] A --> D["企业生产与运输成本推高<br/>(如高能耗的食品与化肥)"] D --> E["消费品价格全面上涨"] E -.-> F["央行应对：选择性逆向对冲"] end subgraph SecondRound["第三阶段：第二轮效应 (最核心风险)"] E --> G["居民购买力下降<br/>要求提高名义工资"] G --> H["企业为转嫁用工成本<br/>再度调高终端售价"] H --> G H -.-> I["央行应对：提前做出主动判断<br/>坚决出手遏制工资-物价螺旋"] end ``` ### `23:00` 英美房贷机制差异与“降息周期中的偿债压力攀升” 针对英美两国货币政策传导效率的理论分歧，访谈探讨了房贷结构的决定性作用。普遍观点认为，美国绝大多数家庭锁定的是30年期固定利率房贷，导致美联储加息对存量房贷家庭“牙齿不够锋利”；而在英国等盎格鲁-撒克逊国家，房贷利率重置更为频繁。格林证实，英格兰银行深入研究了这一传导机制。虽然英国历史上也曾流行过更长期限的固定利率或纯浮动利率，但目前的房贷市场主要由2年期和5年期固定利率主导（伴随部分浮动利率），这确实使得英国的货币政策传导速度显著快于美国。 然而，两国之间还存在一个根本性的机制差异——房贷的可迁移性（portability）。在英国，购房者换房时可以将原有的优惠利率房贷“打包带走”（port mortgage），而美国购房者一旦搬家就必须放弃原有的极低利率重新贷款，导致美国房地产市场出现了严重的因利率锁定而导致的供给冻结。英国房地产市场同样面临供给瓶颈，但成因截然不同。 这种特有的房贷结构在当前的降息周期中引发了一种反直觉的宏观悖论：尽管英格兰银行已经启动降息，英国消费者却没有像预期那样增加支出。其核心症结在于： - 大批居民在过去超低利率时期签署的5年期固定利率房贷陆续到期； - 尽管央行基准利率正从高位回落，但新重置的房贷利率依然远高于5年前的水平，导致这部分家庭的实际偿债支出（debt servicing costs）出现报复性暴增； - 加上此前通胀高企留下的心理创伤，英国消费者在面对新的能源波动时心态高度谨慎，倾向于“存钱以备不时之需，而这个‘不时之需’可能就是眼下”。 - 这使央行面临两难平衡：一方面必须将防范通胀上行风险放在首位，另一方面又不得不提防居民捂紧钱包导致消费与经济增长陷入超预期萎靡。 ### `26:00` AI是通缩幽灵还是潜在的正向供给冲击？ 话题随后转向了驱动长期物价走势的技术变量——人工智能（AI）。市场有一种流行叙事认为，AI可能成为一股强大的通缩力量：若AI大规模替代工作岗位，将引发居民收入下降与支出萎缩，从而向全球经济注入持续的通缩压力。格林透露，英格兰银行针对AI对英国劳动力市场的影响进行了专题研究。数据显示，在那些对AI暴露程度较高的行业中，招聘职位空缺确实出现了初步的放缓迹象。 但格林对将此简单归因为“AI抢走饭碗”持谨慎态度。目前英国青年失业率居高不下，大学毕业生求职艰难，外界很容易将其与AI的冲击联系在一起，但英格兰银行的研究并未找到直接支持这一因果链条的确凿证据。 从宏观供给侧来看，格林指出，过去几年重创英国经济的几乎全都是负向供给冲击（negative supply shocks），而AI代表了地平线上唯一可能出现的“潜在正向供给冲击”（positive supply shock）。如果AI能够推动全要素生产率（TFP）的跃升，将从根本上重塑经济的潜在增长极限。 - 英格兰银行对AI与就业关联的初步结论：高AI暴露度行业的职位空缺略有减少，但尚无充分证据表明青年高失业率是由AI直接造成的。 - AI在央行预测中的地位：作为近年来极少数能够改善生产效率的正向供给冲击，理论上可缓解长期通胀压力，但实际落地的时间节奏充满极大不确定性。 ### `28:30` 供给侧审视的常态化与英国长期生产力隐忧 在探讨供给侧的过程中，格林分享了英格兰银行内部工作机制的一项戏剧性演变。她透露，当她刚加入货币政策委员会时，央行对经济供给侧的正式深度评估“每年仅进行一次”（once a year）。当时大家普遍默认一国的潜在生产能力和全要素生产率是极度稳定的慢变量，一年组织一次全方位的深度研讨便已足够。主持人打趣追问这是否意味着央行过去每年都有专门的“供给侧周”，全员坐在一起集中头脑风暴。格林笑着确认，以前确实是一年一度的重大专题议题。然而随着外部环境剧变，英国接二连三遭受供给冲击，供给侧的波动远超传统理论假设，如今MPC已经将供给侧分析变成了“随时随地进行”的日常必备工作。 尽管分析频率大幅提升，但在英格兰银行目前的基准预测模型中，关于未来三年的生产率假设并未纳入任何关于AI提升效率的主观判断（仅包含少许常规资本投资的常规假定）。格林坦言自己也不确定这种过于保守的模型设定是否准确，但AI见效的精准时间节点（timing）确实是最难量化的难题。 对话最后转向了英国供给侧更深层次的结构性隐忧。主持人指出，供给侧问题可以细分为两类：一类是突发且不可抗拒的外部价格扰动（如全网电价暴涨），另一类则是国家核心生产能力的慢性衰竭。抛开外部冲击不谈，英国本土的商业投资长期低迷，去工业化趋势令人担忧——从最后一家传统钢铁厂的关闭，到媒体报道英国未来甚至可能破天荒地需要从国外进口食用盐，这些迹象无不透露出英国底层生产能力的空心化危机。 ### `30:00` 长期供给恶化与供给冲击的通胀黏性 在评估英国经济供给侧的长期恶化时，梅根·格林（Megan Greene）指出了长期投资不足的深层问题。虽然很多人习惯把英国投资匮乏归咎于脱欧（Brexit），脱欧确实雪上加霜，但这种投资低迷实际上早在 2008 年全球金融危机（GFC）爆发后就已显现。缺乏投资对潜在经济增长和全要素生产率增长构成了持久拖累。英国央行内部模型通常假设生产率增速最终会反弹至历史长期趋势水平，但格林明确表示自己对这一假设持怀疑态度，认为实际风险“完全偏向下行”。 当负向供给冲击连续不断地降临，原本属于短期的扰动最终也会转化为对长期潜在产出的永久性削弱。传统上，央行行长们面对负向供给冲击的标配应对方法是“直接忽略”（look through），将其视为不可控且暂时的外部扰动。英国央行既没有能力解决霍尔木兹海峡（Strait of Hormuz）的封锁，也无法逆转脱欧进程；货币政策工具本质上只能用来调节需求端，无法凭空创造或修复供给侧。以往的央行教科书教导决策者在制定政策时只需盯紧潜在通胀和底层经济增速即可。 然而，眼下的现实已然生变：当负向供给冲击一波未平一波又起，家庭和企业对通胀的注意力被大幅放大。企业调价的频率显著增加；尤其是食品和能源通胀，在微观主体感知中具有极高的显性度（salience）。这两项生活必需品价格的接连上涨，正在深深渗入民众的通胀预期之中，并最终通过工资谈判和日常产品重新定价固化下来。这种恶性循环造成了顽固的“通胀黏性”（inflation persistence），也是格林在当前地缘危机甚至更早之前就始终保持警惕的根源所在。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 供给冲击导致通胀黏性的传导机制 accDescr: 解释连续的负向供给冲击如何通过微观感知进入预期，最终转化为结构性通胀黏性。 subgraph Shocks["外部与供给冲击"] A["长期投资不足\n(始于全球金融危机)"] --> C["潜在产出下降\n生产率拖累"] B["连环负向供给冲击\n(地缘局势/大宗商品)"] --> C end subgraph Perception["微观行为转变"] C --> D["食品与能源等高感知价格飙升"] D --> E["通胀注意力强化\n企业提价频率上升"] end subgraph WagePrice["预期与定价螺旋"] E --> F["长期通胀预期松动"] F --> G["工资谈判与重新定价强化"] G --> H["通胀黏性固化\n(货币政策不得不保持紧缩)"] end ``` - **投资低迷时点**：英国整体资本投资的疲软并非脱欧专属，自 2008 年全球金融危机之后便已成形。 - **生产率假设**：央行基准模型默认生产率会自发向长期趋势收敛，但格林认为下行风险极大，这一假设可能过于乐观。 - **央行工具局限**：利率等货币工具是典型的需求侧杠杆，既打不通霍尔木兹海峡，也扭转不了国际地缘格局。 - **感知显著性**：频繁的价格波动使得企业调价机制从以往的黏性模式转向更高频率的定价反应。 --- ### `35:00` 英国能源脆弱性、财政约束与国债义勇军 对话随后切入外来观察者常见的一个困惑：英国明明拥有北海油田（North Sea oil），为何在能源价格波动面前依然表现得如此脆弱？格林澄清说，英国虽然拥有一定的本土油气产出，但规模早已无法使其自给自足。更关键的症结在于能源结构的传导链条：英国经济高度依赖天然气，而俄乌冲突爆发时暴涨的正是天然气；雪上加霜的是，英国电力市场的电价定价机制与天然气价格直接挂钩。相比于目前基本实现能源独立的美国，英国能源系统对国际现货市场的暴露程度极为严重。 ```mermaid flowchart LR accTitle: 英国电力与天然气价格的脆弱性传导 accDescr: 展示地缘政治冲击如何通过天然气价格放大并传导至整个英国电力系统。 A["地缘政治危机\n(天然气供应冲击)"] --> B["欧洲/全球天然气现货价格飙升"] B --> C["英国电力边际定价机制\n(电价与天然气挂钩)"] C --> D["全英工商业与居民\n用电成本系统性抬升"] ``` 关于财政纪律与通胀预期的关系，主持人半开玩笑地以“美联储式的敏感回避”做铺垫，向格林提问英国各届政府在财政整顿上的乏力（例如养老金的“三重锁”保护政策/Triple Lock）是否加剧了通胀上行风险。格林按照央行委员的法定职责回应：在做模型测算和经济预测时，央行不评判具体财政政策的优劣，而是将议会已立法的政策原样代入模型作为外生前提。针对财政承诺推升通胀的质疑，格林指出其直接影响往往首先体现在主权融资成本（即国债收益率）上。就在受访前一天，英国长端国债利率刚刚经历一轮上升，背后夹杂了霍尔木兹海峡危机推升通胀预期、Truth Social 上的言论扰动，以及地方选举前夕投资者针对规模较小、流动性相对有限的英国国债市场（Gilt market）的仓位调整。 从早年活跃在社交媒体上的宏观经济分析师（“Economist Meg”）转变为英国央行货币政策委员会委员后，格林被问到如今在真实掌管利率时是否会为“国债义勇军”（Bond Vigilantes）感到夜不能寐。格林笑着表示，自己既不做噩梦，也不怀念在网上发推讨论他们的日子。在她眼中，金融市场“有时是有效的，有时则大错特错”。央行内部有专门的团队持续与市场投资者沟通，摸清他们头寸背后的逻辑，以及他们对央行未来路径的期待。最后，面对长期国债收益率攀升是否会导致巨额利息支出转化为财政主导（Fiscal Dominance）并带来二次通胀冲动的追问，格林表示她更倾向于从金融条件（financial conditions）的角度来审视：国债收益率抬升从宏观上看是在收紧金融环境，进而传导并抑制整体经济活动，最终需要货币政策委员会就此评估是否需要作出针对性的政策应对。 - **能源对比**：与美国坐拥能源独立不同，英国天然气储备与产出有限，且电价联动机制放大了天然气冲击。 - **三重锁与财政假设**：养老金“三重锁”（Triple Lock）等法定刚性支出直接并入央行基础预测，不属于央行可以随意干预的自由变量。 - **英国国债特征**：相对于规模庞大且深度极强的美国国债（UST），英国国债市场更为垂直利基（niche），极易因地缘政治外溢、海外言论或国内地方选情产生流动性挤压和定价波动。 - **市场对话机制**：英国央行设立了专门的投资者沟通部门，用于解构市场持仓情绪与投资者对货币政策预期的背离程度。 ### `40:00` 美联储溢出效应与英国央行的法定职责 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 美联储政策对英国金融条件的溢出机制 accDescr: 展示美国经济数据和货币政策如何跨市场传导并收紧英国国内金融环境的路径。 subgraph US["美国市场与美联储"] A["美国经济数据发布<br/>(CPI / 非农就业报告)"] --> B["美联储加息预期升温"] B --> C["美债收益率上升<br/>(U.S. Treasuries)"] end subgraph UK["英国市场与央行响应"] C --> D["英债收益率联动走高<br/>(U.K. Gilts)"] D --> E["英国国内金融条件收紧"] E --> F["影响英国央行政策限制度评估<br/>与2%通胀目标路径"] end ``` 在讨论政府国债票面利息支出的规模时，Megan Greene 指出，国债收益率上升所带来的财政支出增加（即所谓利息支付脉冲），本身并不构成足以推高通胀的显著动能；央行在评估这部分影响时，主要仍是通过广义金融条件（Financial Conditions）的渠道来进行审视。 随后话题转向美国货币政策的跨国溢出效应。当被问及若美国过早加息将如何波及英国时，Greene 解释称，美国国债（U.S. Treasuries）市场与英国国债（Gilts）市场之间存在极强的联动性。如果统计影响英国金融条件的宏观经济指标意外指数（Surprises），最关键的自然是英国本土通胀数据，但排在第二位的恰恰是美国通胀数据，第三位很可能是美国非农就业报告（Nonfarm Payrolls）。尽管从基本面来看，美国数据直接左右英国金融条件缺乏清晰的因果逻辑，但市场参与者往往默认“美联储是全球最大经济体的央行，美联储行动，其他央行就必须跟随”。虽然 Greene 个人并不完全认同这种盲从假设，但资本市场所带来的实际溢出效应不可忽视：一旦美联储加息带动美国金融条件收紧，英国金融条件也会随之被动收紧，进而直接影响货币政策委员会对当前政策限制性（Restrictiveness）程度的判断以及实现 2% 通胀目标的节奏。 针对英国央行（Bank of England）成立初衷是否会牵制独立性的疑问——主持人提到英国央行最早是为了支持政府融资而设立——Greene 澄清了央行的法定职责边界： - **主要法定目标**：中期内持续将通胀稳定在 2% 水平； - **次要目标**：在不违背 2% 通胀目标的前提下，支持政府的经济政策目标。 这一职责范围由英国财政部在每年 11 月进行年度审查和设定，近年来边缘细节略有微调。几年前英国央行介入平抑市场风波虽为政府提供了一定支持，但那属于金融稳定职责，与支持政府政策目标的法律授权无关。Greene 直言，在她任期内，通胀仅有一两个月触及过 2%，因此 MPC 全员目前都在竭尽全力攻坚通胀，“次要目标根本尚未提上日程，控制通胀是眼下的绝对核心”。 --- ### `43:20` 奈特不确定性下的 MPC 决策机制与情景推演 谈及货币政策委员会（MPC）内部的决策运作，曾历经学术界、企业界与央行多重角色的 Greene 分享了央行内部鲜为人知的深层研讨细节。MPC 每六周召开一次议息会议，每两次会议中会有一次编制并发布经济预测报告。而在近期这一轮会议中，面对极端动荡的环境，委员会做出了一个打破传统的决定：不再提供单一的基准经济预测（Central Forecast），而是直接给出了三种截然不同的情景设定（Scenarios），且不对任何一种情景赋予发生概率的权重。这些情景主要围绕能源期货价格曲线的演变路径以及随后可能引发的二阶效应展开。 Greene 坦言，在以往的岁月里，仅仅制作一份中心预测远没有现在复杂。如今全球经济面临着典型的“奈特不确定性”（Knightian Uncertainty）——即完全无法用概率衡量的彻底未知与不可预测性。在此背景下，预测轮次往往需要经历长达三周的高强度闭门研讨。MPC 委员不仅要借助内部研究团队的大量研究简报和多重宏观模型来测定经济当前的起点，还必须引入多种不同的政策反应函数（Policy Rules）与市场利率曲线，反复推演：“如果我们置身于某一种世界情景中，我们应当如何作答？如何向公众进行政策沟通？” 此外，Greene 强调了 MPC 独特的内部委员与外部委员（Externals vs. Internals）并存机制。公开表达异议（Dissent）并反映在投票记录中是十分健康的常态，委员们经常在极其重要的核心议题上产生激烈争论。正是这种充满张力、不刻意追求一团和气的碰撞，才确保了最终决策具备更强的鲁棒性。 --- ### `46:48` 供给冲击常态化与央行框架的根本转向 对于韩国央行行长申铉松（Hyun Song Shin）提出的“央行理论往往落后于实践、全球央行正步入全新变革周期”的观点，Greene 深表赞同，并指出我们其实“早已身处这一全新时代”。她提及自己与前 MPC 委员 Kristin Forbes 的一次交流：Forbes 曾感叹自己整个委员任期内从未投票赞成过任何一次利率变动，而 Greene 经历的却是一个接一个过山车般的紧凑周期——加息周期、维持高利率周期、降息周期，以及突发地缘冲击后的未知变局。过去那种在平静宏观环境下微调政策的日子已经彻底成为历史。 ```mermaid flowchart LR accTitle: 传统范式与新型供给冲击时代的央行决策对比 accDescr: 对比传统宏观环境下微调预测与新时代面对连续负向供给冲击时采用的情景与风险管理框架。 subgraph Legacy["传统央行范式"] L1["单次孤立冲击"] --> L2["'穿透看破' (Look Through)"] L2 --> L3["精细化基准点预测<br/>(关注第3年通胀微小差异)"] end subgraph Modern["新时代央行挑战"] M1["地缘经济博弈 / 贸易限制 / 气候转型"] --> M2["接踵而至的连续负向供给冲击"] M2 --> M3["打破'穿透'教条"] M3 --> M4["情景分析与风险管理<br/>(计算误判代价与极值损失)"] end ``` Greene 明确提出，连续不断的负向供给冲击已成为结构性常态，央行旧有的理论底座正在失效： - **地缘经济博弈（Economic Statecraft）**：大国越来越多地将经济手段作为外交政策工具，如加征关税、出口管制、对外投资限制等，在微观与宏观上都会直接转化为供给端的负向冲击； - **气候变化双重风险**：不论是物理风险（极端天气破坏生产），还是绿色转型的调整风险，一旦风险实质化，全部表现为负向供给冲击； - **“穿透”理论失效**：传统宏观理论一直告诫央行对供给冲击要“穿透看破”（Look Through），因为加息管不了供应链断裂；但当冲击接踵而至、波浪式持续袭来时，这种鸵鸟策略已不再适用； - **告别点预测，转向风险管理（Risk Management）**：在充满不确定性的世界里，纠结于预测期第三年的通胀率是高了还是低了 0.1 个百分点毫无意义。现代央行的核心思考方式必须转向“如果我们误判了经济所处的状态，政策失误的代价会有多惨烈？我们该如何最大限度减少极端灾难成本？” 当主持人追问央行除情景分析外是否需要新工具来解决“利率只能管需求、管不了供给”的硬伤时，Greene 坦率承认央行现有的工具箱非常有限，“手里有什么就只能用什么”。一旦中央银行开始直接干预经济的供给侧结构，往往就不可避免地滑向对资源配置和行业利益做出选择的政治经济学旋涡。 ### `50:00` 供给冲击的叠加效应与前瞻指引的局限 在探讨结构性经济难题时，梅根·格林（Megan Greene）强调，决定利益分配与谁胜谁负不是独立央行的职责，而是民选政客的使命，因此许多根源性方案必须由政府而非央行来推行。格林指出，当前最核心的挑战在于理解多重供给冲击所产生的“乘数效应”，而非将它们孤立看待。在过去的通胀成因拆解中，标准经济学分析模型往往无法完全解释通胀的演变路径，中间始终存在一段无法解释的“楔子”（wedge）。这种偏差有时源于政策制定者的主观研判，有时则是未知的盲区，央行必须对这些“楔子”保持好奇，深入探究多重供给冲击如何扭曲了传统的传导机制。 主持人随后谈及美联储可能迎来新任理事凯文·沃什（Kevin Warsh），而沃什向来对“前瞻指引”（forward guidance）持怀疑态度；若美联储未来更彻底地放弃对债券市场的前瞻指引，是否会给英国央行评估美债溢出效应增加难度。格林对此回应称，英国央行在评估外溢效应时，绝不仅仅依赖美联储的口头指引，更依赖对美国宏观基本面和实体经济的独立研判。在她看来，前瞻指引有其特定的适用场景，但央行并不需要时刻依赖它，政策沟通方式的不同并不会阻碍英国央行对美国经济及其溢出影响的理解。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 供给冲击与央行决策边界 accDescr: 展示民选官员与独立央行在应对多重供给冲击时的分工与边界。 subgraph GovRole ["民选政府职责"] A["结构性与分配问题"] --> B["产业政策 / 关税 / 法规调整"] B --> C["决定胜者与败者"] end subgraph BoERole ["央行分析与决策边界"] D["多重供给冲击叠加"] --> E["通胀分解中出现未知'楔子'"] E --> F["评估外溢效应与宏观基本面"] F --> G["权衡限制性货币政策立场"] end ``` --- ### `52:16` 为何投票维持利率不变：在滞后与上行风险间权衡 主持人提出一个尖锐的问题：既然格林在整场对话中对通胀风险保持高度警惕，且公众与企业的通胀预期更容易被激发，那为何她在上周的货币政策委员会会议中投票支持按兵不动（维持利率不变），而不是直接加息？格林坦言这是一个非常合理的质疑——因为等到真正观测到物价与薪资的“二阶效应”（second-round effects）确凿证据时，往往为时已晚。她解释道，支撑她投下维持利率票的核心逻辑在于：未来六到八周乃至两三个月内，市场将迎来关键的数据与事件进展。 尽管这些即将出炉的新信息未必能确凿证实二阶效应，但能提供有关能源价格走向的明确线索，而能源正是驱动经济与通胀预期的核心变量。格林分析指出，当前英国央行的政策立场本身已处于限制性区间，虽然限制程度并非极度严苛；假定地缘冲突迅速平息、霍尔木兹海峡完全恢复通航，现有的限制性利率或许足以平抑已经萌芽的二阶效应。尽管她坚信当前的风险完全偏向上行（存在类似“棘轮效应”的单向抬升风险），但在当前节点稍作等待、观察战争如何演变并研判其对经济的传导路径，是更为审慎且合理的防守姿态。 - **限制性政策立场**：目前的基准利率已具备约束力，理论上有可能在外部冲击缓解时自然吸收部分通胀压力。 - **信息窗口期**：未来数月内能源市场的波动与地缘局势变化，将提供关键的决策参照。 - **单向上行风险**：无论是能源价格还是潜在的二阶连锁反应，通胀面临的风险“完全在上方”（entirely on the upside）。 --- ### `54:10` 播客复盘：经济治国术与供给侧受损时代的央行困境 在访谈结束后的复盘环节，主持人乔·维森塔尔（Joe Weisenthal）与特雷西·阿洛威（Tracy Alloway）首先开玩笑地表达了对格林在英国央行舒适独立办公室的羡慕，随后迅速切入采访的核心精髓。阿洛威指出，战后现代经济学和中央银行学长期专注于“需求侧管理”，默认只要消费者有信心花钱、总需求保持健康，经济就能顺畅运行；面对后疫情时代层出不穷的供给侧冲击，这套传统工具箱显得捉襟见肘。虽然理论上大流行、地缘战争等事件看似是彼此离散的孤立冲击，但正如格林所言，全球已经步入“经济治国术”（economic statecraft）全面崛起的时代。 乔·维森塔尔强调，“经济治国术”是整场访谈最一针见血的提法。一旦主权政府普遍将经济工具、关税、供应链回流（reshoring）以及建立本土冗余产能作为地缘政治博弈的手段，供给侧冲击就不再是一次性的偶发事件，而演变成长期持续的结构性格局。面对持续的供给侧受损，社会面临一个制度性悖论：若央行现有工具不足以解决供给瓶颈，是否应该赋予央行新工具？然而，解决供给瓶颈往往涉及修改工厂环保法规、调整最低工资标准或放宽伦敦的住房规划管制，这类具有强烈利益再分配属性的决定绝不可能交给未经民选的央行技术官僚。乔进而半开玩笑地提出，或许政策决策机制本身需要创新，比如在全球局势瞬息万变的当下，央行是否应该从“按月议息”转变为“按周决议”，以更具创造性的方式直面供给主导的新现实。 ## Notable quotes > `05:00` 推特可从没帮我付过账单 — Megan Greene > `05:00` 在场外分析和预测央行行长们的一举一动，与真正坐进会议室‘亲手灌香肠’之间存在天壤之别 — Megan Greene > `07:35` 中期内以可持续的方式实现 2% 的通胀目标 — Megan Greene > `20:00` 我的钱越来越不经花了，你们必须给我加薪 — Megan Greene > `23:00` 存钱以备不时之需，而这个‘不时之需’可能就是眼下 — Megan Greene > `35:00` 有时是有效的，有时则大错特错 — Megan Greene > `40:00` 美联储是全球最大经济体的央行，美联储行动，其他央行就必须跟随 — Megan Greene > `40:00` 次要目标根本尚未提上日程，控制通胀是眼下的绝对核心 — Megan Greene > `46:48` 如果我们误判了经济所处的状态，政策失误的代价会有多惨烈？我们该如何最大限度减少极端灾难成本？ — Megan Greene > `46:48` 手里有什么就只能用什么 — Megan Greene ## Mentioned Tracy Alloway, Joe Weisenthal, Megan Greene, Christopher Waller, Adam Posen, Kristin Forbes, 申铉松 (Hyun Song Shin), Kevin Warsh, 英格兰银行 (Bank of England), 货币政策委员会 (Monetary Policy Committee, MPC), 美联储 (Federal Reserve), 欧洲央行 (ECB), 英国天然气和电力市场办公室 (Ofgem), 决策者小组 (Decision Maker Panel, DMP), 彭博社 (Bloomberg), Odd Lots, 彼得森国际经济研究所 (PIIE), 波士顿红袜队 (Boston Red Sox), Truth Social, 英国国债 (Gilt), 美国国债 (U.S. Treasuries), 霍尔木兹海峡 (Strait of Hormuz) ## Video description <p>Ever since Covid, central banks around the world have had the same problem. They have tools that are designed to modulate demand, but so many challenges have involved the supply side of the economy. Whether we're talking about supply chain disruptions, the war in Ukraine, and now the war in Iran, these are all issues for which monetary policy is of limited value. Of course, the temptation is to "look through" these events, recognizing the fact that these disruptions don't say much about the actual underlying state of the economy. But when we get one shock after another, it gets harder and harder to keep using words like "transitory." On this episode we speak with Megan Greene, an external member of the Monetary Policy Committee at the Bank of England. We talk about the compounding effects of all these shocks (including the trade war and Brexit), how she's thinking about the first- and second-order effects of each, and why for now, despite the underlying weakness of the UK economy, she remains squarely focused on the risks of higher inflation.</p> <p><a href="http://bloomberg.com/subscriptions/oddlots" data-link-cookie="1" data-destination="http://bloomberg.com/subscriptions/oddlots">Subscribe to the Odd Lots Newsletter</a><br>Join the conversation: <a href="https://discord.gg/oddlots" data-destination="https://discord.gg/oddlots">discord.gg/oddlots</a></p><p>See <a href="https://omnystudio.com/listener">omnystudio.com/listener</a> for privacy information.</p> [Source](https://podtrac.com/pts/redirect.mp3/tracking.swap.fm/track/UVBrz8bN8aM2Xe47PEPu/traffic.omny.fm/d/clips/e73c998e-6e60-432f-8610-ae210140c5b1/8a94442e-5a74-4fa2-8b8d-ae27003a8d6b/a7009176-dd7f-474d-916a-b44700369509/audio.mp3?in_playlist=982f5071-765c-403d-969d-ae27003a8d83)

[5:00] Megan Greene: 推特可从没帮我付过账单 [5:00] Megan Greene: 在场外分析和预测央行行长们的一举一动，与真正坐进会议室‘亲手灌香肠’之间存在天壤之别 [7:35] Megan Greene: 中期内以可持续的方式实现 2% 的通胀目标 [20:00] Megan Greene: 我的钱越来越不经花了，你们必须给我加薪 [23:00] Megan Greene: 存钱以备不时之需，而这个‘不时之需’可能就是眼下 [35:00] Megan Greene: 有时是有效的，有时则大错特错 [40:00] Megan Greene: 美联储是全球最大经济体的央行，美联储行动，其他央行就必须跟随 [40:00] Megan Greene: 次要目标根本尚未提上日程，控制通胀是眼下的绝对核心 [46:48] Megan Greene: 如果我们误判了经济所处的状态，政策失误的代价会有多惨烈？我们该如何最大限度减少极端灾难成本？ [46:48] Megan Greene: 手里有什么就只能用什么

[10:00] Megan Greene: Underlying GDP, which is what we tend to look at and we build it based on a bunch of surveys, that's pretty weak—0.2% growth per quarter. So that's not significant. That said, the supply side of the economy is also pretty weak. And so if you had more demand than that, that could actually end up becoming inflationary. [25:00] Megan Greene: When I first started, we only looked at it once a year because it's not supposed to move around that much... Now we do it all the time because obviously the supply side moves more than we had expected. [30:00] Megan Greene: We have tools that are uniquely designed for demand problems. They can't really address supply side problems. And so we always learned to just look through them... I think that when you keep having negative supply shocks... that eventually gets embedded into people's expectations and then their wage and price setting. [42:30] Megan Greene: I would say that the model where we have externals and internals and where dissent is totally normal does work... In fact, often we don't agree on important things and that comes out in our votes.

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As industries evolve faster than ever, companies need an environment that accelerates strategic growth, and Michigan delivers on that promise. From emerging startups to global enterprises, Michigan offers what executives value most a resilient innovative ecosystem diverse communities that attract top talent and a quality of life that supports work balance With our unified Team Michigan approach businesses scale faster and compete at the highest level Michigan, pure opportunity. Seize your opportunity at michiganbusiness.org. Bloomberg Audio Studios, podcasts, radio, news. Hello and welcome to another episode of the All Thoughts Podcast. I'm Tracy Allaway. And I'm Joe Wasenthal. Joe, you know one nice thing about getting old? Go on. I've been thinking about this a lot, actually. The nice thing about getting old is that a lot of people that you have known for a very long time and that you've sort of grown up with, let's say, over the years, start to get into really interesting positions and sometimes senior positions or sometimes positions of power. I love this take. Right. Yeah. There are certain people that you don't get to know or, you know, when you're in your 20s or whatever your peers or your peers and that great but they probably aren for example external members of the Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee and so forth or other such roles But as you get senior you like oh wow I know that person I recognize that name. As you guys like to say who went to university in London, I went to uni with that person. My impression is that everyone in London, quote, went to uni with literally everyone else because I've heard you and Sid say that specific phrase so many times over the last decade. No, not that often, surely. But you're absolutely right. You've sort of given the guest away. We're going to be speaking with someone that we've known for a long time. And I think a lot of people have known her for a long time from her very public role on finance Twitter. That's right. As they say, and also in various columns in different media organizations. And professional roles. And professional roles. Yeah. To me, she will always be a member of finance Twitter. That's right. But yes, various professional roles. And now she is, in fact, an external member of the Monetary Policy Committee at the Bank of England. And it's a really interesting time, of course, to be talking about monetary policy. I mean, I would say it's an interesting time. It's always an interesting time to be talking about monetary policy. But I would say it a particularly interesting time because I could list several reasons for that So obviously we are still in the wake of the incredible inflation wave that we had post And at least in much of the world inflation has not returned to target In fact, in some countries, the rate hike cycle has begun. So there's still the live issue. There is the shifting political situation in many countries in which the very premise of like, how much independence should the central bank have to operate is being re-discussed. And it is, in fact, local elections in the UK right now. That's right. We're speaking during a week about local elections. And then, of course, COVID, shock, maybe transitory, a one-off thing. Governor Christopher Waller in the U.S. He had a good speech recently called one transitory shock after another. Of course, in this case, alluding to the war on Iran. And so what does the price in oil and so forth mean for inflation? There are so many interesting questions right now for anyone in the seat of a monetary policymaker. So much. And also the interaction between monetary policy and the bond market as well, right? So we're recording this, I feel I have to say this for every episode now, on May 6. Yesterday, we saw the 30-year UK gilt yield hit its highest since 1998. And that was after the BOE decision from last week to actually hold interest rates. So there's a tension there. [5:00] We have so much to talk about. So much. Truly the perfect guest. We are, of course, going to be speaking with Megan Green. Thank you so much for coming on the show, Megan. Thank you for having me. It's great to see you guys again. It's very, very fun. Very nostalgic. What's it like to go from, I guess, thinking and writing and tweeting about economics to actually practicing economics. Yeah, setting economic policy. Yeah, so first of all, I love that you guys think of me as finance Twitter. Core, core, old school. Because I certainly was not paying any of my bills. over the years. Now, sadly, my Twitter account is relegated mostly to baseball commentary. Go Red Sox. But, you know, it's very different to go from kind of analyzing and forecasting what central bankers will do to being a central banker and, you know, making the sausage myself. So it's a very different position with a whole lot more responsibility. We like talking to Americans who have served on the MBC. Who've made it? Yeah, well, we've done, you know, Adam Pozen has been on the show. There's hope for us, Joe. A bunch of times. So it's plausible that you and I could be MPC members. What is your role? What does it mean to be an external member of the MPC at the BOE? Yeah so that a great question And the Bank of England is pretty unique for its setup this way So the Monetary Policy Committee which meets every six weeks and votes on interest rates is comprised of nine people Five are so internals and four are so-called externals. And the internal members are the governor, the deputy governors, and the chief economists. Some of them grew up at the Bank of England, some of them didn't, some of them came in, but they're all part of the executive. And then the four external members of the MPC, of which I'm one, quite intentionally came from outside the bank. And what that means exactly as you know differs in every case so it could be from outside the industry entirely it could be from outside the country as you can tell from my accent and also from my background I'm a little bit of both although actually I'm also British so I'm not sure how they're yeah I pass for it I'm not sure how they're classifying me but there's always been an American actually on the MPC it's not a rule so you and Adam aren't the first no so there have been yeah there have been others. But the idea is just to have to quite intentionally bring in different perspectives. The external members sit in a different part of the bank from the internal members so that we don't all collude and get stuck in groupthink. So the idea is to have different perspectives. I come from the private sector. Many members of the MPC come from academia. So I bring kind of the business environment corporate side of things and also from outside the country So I spend a lot of time looking at international spillovers You can see in my speeches how the UK is affected by things happening in the US and the Eurozone for example So the idea is to just fight groupthink And you can see that often in our votes, right? We're also unique for reporting who voted for what every time. And so you can see what the vote is. There's no like figuring out which dot is who. So in the US they report, but I guess in in the europe they don't right so you don't actually get those vote counts or you don't know who if they dissented or what that's right people can out themselves if they want to but at the bank of england we're fully transparent about all of that and so you can see that often there are dissents in fact after the last fed vote i had a number of friends say gosh the fed looks a lot like the npc right now because there were four dissents yeah it's quite normal to have dissents at the bank of england which is pretty different from most major central banks but it's all part of this idea of sort of personal accountability for your votes and having different perspectives on a committee. You kind of anticipated my next question, but how much of your role is viewed as sort of explaining perhaps U.S. monetary policy and its potential impact on the U.K. versus actually analyzing the U and having to know that particular economy And you know when you first joined the MPC did they hand you like a UK economic handbook that you had to like get up to speed on So no there was no handbook but I did have to get up to speed pretty quickly, including up to speed with kind of the data in the UK, which is quite different from the US. But my role really is about looking at the UK economy, trying to understand what's going on, but also understanding how there are spillovers from other places. So So by way of example, before the pandemic, when the gilt yield curve moved, about a third of that move was usually from outside the UK entirely. So mostly from the US and also the Eurozone. Since the pandemic, it's been about half of the moves in our yield curve. So financial conditions are affected pretty significantly by what we have absolutely no control over whatsoever at the Bank of England. But it's important to understand how those spillovers might happen. And you also have spillovers via trade, which obviously we've looked into a whole bunch through the past year given tariffs and economic statecraft. It occurs to me, what is the BOE's mandate? Of course, in the US it's the famous dual mandate. My understanding is the ECB is a more ostensibly singularly price mandate. What is the BOE's mandate? Yeah, so our mandate is to achieve price stability of 2% inflation sustainably over the medium term. [10:00] to that to support the goals of the government. But it really is, whereas the Fed does have a dual mandate, we really have one primary mandate and the rest is secondary to that. How would you characterize the health of the UK economy at the moment? And Joe and I get to ask this very basic question because we don't live here. And, you know, we see the headlines that everyone else does. We see headlines about energy shocks, trade and tariffs, as you mentioned. But then we walk around the city and things seem pretty crowded and people seem to be eating out and shopping. In central London where the tourists go, things look plenty active to me. That's right. How would you describe it at the moment? Yeah, particularly on a Tuesday through a Thursday, less so on a Monday or Friday when people aren't necessarily coming into the office. Look, the UK economy has been pretty weak. It's been weak since I started this role three years ago. And the The question is why it's so weak, and most economists, you guys included, I imagine, think of the economy through the demand side, because that's what we were all taught for generations, to just think about demand. And so demand is pretty weak in the UK, but actually the supply side is pretty weak as well, and as you mentioned earlier Joe has been hit by a number of successive supply shocks And so we have growth that there There some but it pretty weak And even though you have variations, we have monthly GDP data in the UK, which we don't have in the US. That was a real surprise to me. But there are variations in the monthly GDP data, but underlying GDP, which is what we tend to look at, and we build it based on a bunch of surveys, that's pretty weak, 0.2%. growth per quarter. So that's not significant. That said, the supply side of the economy is also pretty weak. And so if you had more demand than that, that could actually end up becoming inflationary. Yeah, just intuitively, you know, you mentioned the supply side and like much of the sort of developed Western world, there is the, okay, there's the struggles of the industrial sector in large part due to competition with China. There is the fact that if you're in a sector that's not AI, you're probably not getting a ton of investment. London is, London specifically at least, a decent AI hub. Okay, so we've established that the economy is somewhat weak, but you voted to hold rates So what is it about the inflationary environment such that this weakness does not call for cuts right now Yeah so part of that story is the supply side which is also incredibly weak So if you had stronger growth that could be inflationary But I think it worth thinking about where the UK economy was before the war in Iran, before we had this energy shock, because I think my and others views on where we are right now very much depends on where we started from. So before a few months ago in February, you know, we had inflation that was still above target. It was coming towards target, but was still above target. We've had inflation above target for the best part of five years now in the UK. So it's been above 2% for all but one or two months in the past five years. And that's off the back of a couple of successive shocks, particularly COVID and also the Russian invasion of Ukraine. And so as we were looking at inflation start to come down towards our 2% target, it had been coming down more slowly than we had hoped since I got here, in fact. And if you looked at some of the forward-looking indicators for wages and also for prices, those actually seem to be stalling out. So we run a survey called the Decision Makers Panel, the DMP where we ask companies about their own price expectations a year ahead and their own wage growth expectations a year ahead And their own price expectations a year ahead had pretty much stalled out so they weren really coming down anymore Also more worrisome in my view was what they thought about wages a year ahead where they thought they were going to drop a little bit from last year, so not much, not as much as we had expected. Wage growth was going to drop. Wage growth was going to drop a little bit. That's right, not wages, wage growth. And also, we have agents who are based around the country who go and talk to firms. They do a whole survey on pay settlements. and pay settlements were due to come in a bit lower this year. Pay settlement growth was due to come in a bit lower than it was last year. So this disinflationary process had signs of stalling out. Also, if you look at inflation expectations, so household inflation expectations were really elevated before Iran was invaded. In fact, up until February, they were above what you could explain looking at historical relationships between inflation outturns and inflation expectations. expectations. So it was a concern that households were thinking that inflation was going to be higher. That could feed through into wage setting, which could explain why wage growth was coming off more slowly than we'd expected, and therefore price growth was coming off more slowly than we'd expected. So there were already some signs of some persistence from previous shocks left in the economy. In fact, I'm not sure. [15:00] I've been working on a speech on second-round effects since before Iran was invaded, and part of me thought, gosh, is this going to be irrelevant in six months when I finally give this speech? Of course, it's only more relevant now. But I was already worried about some of this inflation persistence and some of the second-round effects from the last couple of negative supply shocks, even before Iran was invaded. And of course, since then, we've now had a negative supply shock, an energy shock, and that stands to push inflation up and growth down, which is a terrible situation for a central banker to be in. So just to emphasize this point is the idea that if we keep getting transitory shock after transitory shock, or if we keep getting I think you've used the word mini waves of inflationary bouts over and over and over again, expectations will be more vulnerable towards higher inflation levels. So people will be even more worried about inflation once we get like the third shock and the fourth shock. That's right. And the size of the shock matters too. So inflation was 11% a couple years ago. That was on the front page of every newspaper. Households kind of knew about it. They saw it at the grocery store. So we've done a lot of research showing that households and businesses are possibly just more attentive to inflation And particularly once inflation comes within a certain band So there a threshold It used to be no one paid attention to inflation if it was below 4%. That band has actually shifted down. So in the UK, we think that if inflation is somewhere between 3%, 3.5%, that's the threshold at which people actually notice it a lot more. So if you then have another negative supply shock and inflation go up, people will be much more sensitive to that. We also have done research showing that people are more sensitive to upside surprises in inflation than downside surprises in inflation. And so that's a concern given we're now facing rising inflation. And then for firms, when they're looking at inflation, it used to be before we had these supply shocks that firms kind of set prices on a schedule. And since the pandemic, they've shifted much more to state dependent pricing. So when inflation gets higher, they set prices more often and pass through their higher costs through the end user in the form of higher prices. And that's remained. So if you have more state-dependent pricing from firms, then actually you can get a pass-through from inflation expectations for them much more quickly. Whether you Thank you logo, your message, your look, and many items come with no setup charge to help you save. And if you're really watching the bottom line, you'll find standout choices at every price point so you can make a real impact while staying on budget. Plus, you'll get expert help, fast turnaround times, and their 360-degree guarantee. So you can be 4imprint certain your order will arrive on time and look exactly right. Whatever your goal, 4imprint makes it easy to find your perfect promo match. Explore the possibilities today at 4imprint.com. 4imprint. 4certain. Support for the show comes from public.com. If you're actively involved in your portfolio, you probably catch yourself repeating the same actions. Buying the dip. Manually sweeping idle cash. Putting on a hedge. On public, you can now create AI agents that handle all these tasks on your behalf Just describe what you want to do in plain English Like if the VIX hits 25 buy a put option on the S 500 Or, if my cash balance goes above $20,000, move the excess into my direct index. You approve of the workflow, and your agent handles the rest. Monitoring the market, watching for your conditions, and executing your strategies exactly as defined. An investing platform driven by your intent, not just your clicks. You can also get full read and write access to your account via the public API. Go to public.com slash market and fund your account in five minutes or less. That's public.com slash market. Paid for by Public Investing. Brokered services by Open to the Public Investing, Inc., member FINRA and SIPC. Advisory services by Public Advisors, LLC, SEC Registered Advisor. Complete disclosures available at public.com slash disclosures. The thing about AI for business, it may not automatically fit the way your business works. At IBM, we've seen this firsthand. But by embedding AI across HR, IT, and procurement processes, we've reduced costs by millions slash repetitive tasks and freed thousands of hours for strategic work. Now we're helping companies get smarter by purchasing [20:00] AI where it actually pays off, deep in the work that moves the business. Let's create smarter business, IBM. So with people clearly caring about higher inflation more than they care about deflation, being more attuned to higher inflation and with companies more willing to reset prices in the face of higher inflation, to what degree does the BOE try to get ahead of higher inflation versus wait for it to actually emerge? Yeah, so the way that we think about these kinds of shocks propagating through the economy, it's sort of in three different phases. The first phase is kind of direct effects. So when you have an energy shock, that automatically makes energy prices higher for everyone. In the UK, we actually have a price cap for households, the off-gen price cap. And so households have been shielded from that bit until July, and then they'll see energy costs go up. So this could happen in stages. But in any case, monetary policy doesn't kick in for 18 to 24 months, so it kicks in with a lag. So if we were to respond to that right now, by the time it hits the economy, it's just too late and we could risk suppressing activity unnecessarily. So mostly you look through direct energy effects Then you think about indirect energy effects So firms that are using energy pass it on For example food production is a great example It pretty energy intensive both through fertilizer, but also transport. And so you see food prices start to go up, which I think we probably will see. And so those are indirect effects. And the jury's out a little bit amongst the central banking community on whether you should try to lean against indirect effects or not. Generally, you should try to lean against some of them, but not all of them, again, because of lags in monetary policy. The real kicker is second round effects. And that's when actually all these price increases start changing wage and price setting behavior so that you get individuals and households saying, well, I can't, my money's just not going as far anymore. You're going to have to pay me more. And then firms might say, fine, we'll pay you more, but now our costs are higher. So we're going to pass that through in higher prices. And that can turn into a bit of a spiral. We've looked at past supply shocks in the UK, and every single one of them has had second round effects, but to very differing degrees, depending on the state of the economy at the time. So in 2008, 2011, 2014, 2022, you had second round effects in all of these situations, but the economy was very different in these different periods We tend to look at 2022 because it the most recent one And I think for a lot of people kind of the most scarring one when you had energy costs go up so much And in 2022, of course, it's worth remembering we had just reopened after COVID. So you did have pretty strong demand. And also the labor market was pretty tight. That's not the case now. Actually, we have much weaker demand in the UK economy and we have a much weaker labor market. and it's continuing to weaken. So we have slack in the labor market. So that suggests that we shouldn't get the same degree of second round effects now that we did in 2022. I think that's of little comfort, actually. Those were pretty extreme second round effects. I also look at 2011 when the labor market was actually much weaker than it is now. You had unemployment of 8% in the UK and you had some second round effects then. So right now the economy is somewhere in between those two. So we will get some second round effects. It's impossible to calibrate them exactly in advance. The trick for us also is that, you know, we kind of know how to measure direct and indirect effects. We can do that pretty easily. The second round effects are pretty difficult to measure But of course if we wait until we have real concrete evidence of them we too late in responding So we going to have to make a judgment a proactive judgment in advance about the size of the second round effects that we going to want to lean against so that we can lean against them in time You know Kirsten I have a theoretical question I've been meaning to ask someone about this. When the inflation started to explode in the immediate wake of the pandemic really globally, one of the stories that people like to tell was that monetary policy would have weaker teeth or be less effective in the U.S., in part because so many American households are on 30-year fixed mortgages, unlike in much of the other Western world or the Anglosphere world, where a lot of people's mortgages reset regularly. Did that actually play out in practice? Did BOE decisions transmit quicker to the real economy because fewer households see their mortgage bill reset on a regular basis? Yeah, so we've done a lot of looking into the monetary transmission mechanism to see how the change in the structure of the UK mortgage market has affected things. Because to your point, in the UK we weren't always all on two and five year fixed mortgages. In fact, you used to have longer term fixes. You've had periods with variable mortgages. But today it's dominated by two and five years. Mostly it's two and five years. [25:00] With, I think, an increasing number of variable mortgages. And so what you find is that it does transmit a bit more quickly. But it's also very different in the U.S. In the U.K., you can port your mortgage with you, whereas in the U.S., you can't. So there's an entire supply problem in the U.S. that we don't face. We face supply problems in real estate in the U.K., but for completely different reasons. So that's a difference that's worth taking into account as well. But it's also meant, even though it's a shorter fix that we have here, it does mean that over the course of this hiking and cutting cycle, even though rates have been coming down for a while now, consumers haven't really been spending. And I think one of the reasons for that is that even though rates are coming down, as people come off a five-year fixed mortgage, their own debt servicing costs are jumping massively from where they were when they first took out the mortgage. And so even though rates are coming down, people's debt servicing costs continue to go up. And so as you're in a rate cutting cycle, you would expect consumers to spend a bit more. We're not finding that so much. So this is one potential explanation for why consumers aren't spending more It could also be scarring from previous bouts of inflation as well But that going to feed into the current conjuncture because one of the concerns of course I worried about inflation I think that paramount And I think the risks to inflation are on the upside But of course you have to offset that with the risk of weaker demand And if consumers aren't spending in the UK because they're scarred from previous experiences, then they're looking at this energy shock and probably thinking, well, no way I'm going to spend now. I'd better save for a rainy day, which, by the way, could be now. And so there is a chance that consumption and therefore growth could be even weaker than we've been expecting as well. So you have to offset that with concerns about greater inflation. Since we're talking about the consumer, I mean, it feels like one of the few potential deflationary forces out there, but still potentially a very big one is AI, right? And this idea that, well, if there are fewer jobs because of AI, then obviously people are going to be earning less and spending less, and that's going to exert deflationary pressure on many different economies. What have you seen so far in terms of the impact of AI on the job market? And how are you thinking about this, you know, kind of very new still development? Yeah, so the bank has done some research on how AI is affecting the labor market in particular And there some nascent evidence that maybe those industries that are are more exposed to AI or seeing fewer job openings than industries that are less exposed which you can imagine Use unemployment is particularly high in the UK. So I think it's quite easy to jump to a conclusion that suggests that, you know, it's very difficult to get a job if you're just coming out of uni and maybe that's an AI effect. But I think there's actually very little evidence to directly make that link. And so there isn't much evidence of that. It's not just the labor market, of course, though. As I mentioned already, I'm worried about the supply side of the UK economy. So most of the supply shocks we've seen over the past couple of years have been negative supply shocks. AI represents the one potential positive supply shock that we might see coming down the pike. And so that could be possible. We look at the supply side of the economy all the time now at the Bank of England. When I first started, we only looked at it once a year because it's not supposed to move around that much. But we've learned actually. What does that mean once a year? Did you have like supply side week or something where you all got together and thought about it? I find this very interesting. Yeah, so it's not that we didn't ever talk about it in the intro, but we did like a real deep dive on the supply side of the economy to try to measure productivity growth, total factor productivity. I mean really deep dive And it really was a once a year event And now we do it all the time because obviously the supply side moves more than we had expected We keep getting hit by supply shocks But when we look at the supply side of the economy there is no judgment that we put in on the supply side to do with AI So possibly it in our assumptions about productivity growth just through some assumption about investment. But generally, we haven't made a judgment that over the next three years, AI will meaningfully impact productivity. And I'm not sure that that's right. I think the timing of this is the hardest part. Well, actually, when I think about the term supply side or supply side shocks, I think of there are sort of two things, right? There's a supply side shock. You can't do anything. Suddenly, the price of electricity goes up everywhere. And we call that a supply side shock. And it's not great when that happens. And then there is also the sort of like core productive capacity of a country and how productive industries are and what type of investment is there and so forth. Even setting aside the shocks, the trend seems to be negative in the UK in terms of business investment. You hear about the last steel mill or whatever that's closing. I read something recently, the UK might be importing salt for the first time or whatever. In your, whether it's formerly annual but [30:00] regular studies of the supply side of the UK economy. Do you have a diagnosis or do you have an assessment about what is driving this sort of long-term deterioration? I mean, we do insofar as you can say, there hasn't been a whole lot of investment in the UK, starting with the global financial crisis. I think most people pin that on Brexit and Brexit didn't really help, but it predates Brexit. And so that has been a long-term drag on potential growth, productivity growth. We assume that productivity growth in particular will rebound to its long-term trend. And I'm not sure that that's right. I think my own view is that the risk to that is entirely on the downside. But a lack of investment is part of it. And then on top of that, I mean, I understand how you're splitting these out. But if you keep getting negative supply shocks, then eventually that does feed through into potential growth. Yeah. Sustained. Yeah, and so I think that's a concern, and the way that central bankers have approached negative supply shocks has always been, you just look through them, they're temporary. Bank of England can't do anything about the Strait of Hormuz, for example, can't actually address it. Can reverse Brexit No we have tools that are uniquely designed for demand problems They can can really address supply side problems And so we always learned to just look through them and consider sort of underlying inflation, underlying growth. And I think that when you keep having negative supply shocks and you consider that households and businesses are more attentive to inflation, that, you know, they're setting prices more often, that some kinds of inflation are more salient for households and businesses and other, particularly food and energy inflation, and we keep having increases in both of those things, then that eventually gets embedded into people's expectations and then their wage and price setting. And so that creates the kind of inflation persistence that I've been worried about even before this invasion of Iran, but now I continue to be worried about it. We be right back to tech totes and giveaways so you can find the right fit for any audience purpose or budget You can customize it all your logo your message your look and many items come with no setup charge to help you save. And if you're really watching the bottom line, you'll find standout choices at every price point, so you can make a real impact while staying on budget. Plus, you'll get expert help, fast turnaround times, and their 360-degree guarantee, so you can be 4imprint certain your order will arrive on time and look exactly right. Whatever your goal, 4imprint makes it easy to find your perfect promo match. Explore the possibilities today at 4imprint.com. 4imprint. 4certain. Support for this show comes from public.com. If you're actively involved in your portfolio, you probably catch yourself repeating the same actions. Buying the dip, manually sweeping idle cash, putting on a hedge. On public, you can now create AI agents that handle all these tasks on your behalf. Just describe what you want to do in plain English. Like, if the VIX hits 25, buy a put option on the S&P 500. Or, if my cash balance goes above $20,000, move the excess into my direct index. You approve of the workflow, and your agent handles the rest. Monitoring the market watching for your conditions and executing your strategies exactly as defined an investing platform driven by your intent not just your clicks You can also get full read and write access to your account via the public API Go to public.com slash market and fund your account in five minutes or less. That's public.com slash market. Paid for by Public Investing. Brokered services by Open to the Public Investing, Inc., member FINRA and SIPC. Advisory services by Public Advisors, LLC, SEC registered advisor. Complete disclosures available at public.com slash disclosures. So there's a lot of noise about AI, but time's too tight for more promises. So let's talk about results. At IBM, we work with our employees to integrate technology right into the systems they need. Now, a global workforce of 300,000 can use AI to fill their HR questions, resolving 94% of common questions. not noise proof of how we can help companies get smarter by putting ai where it actually pays off deep in the work that moves the business let's create smarter business ibm i'm going to ask another sort of background american visiting london i haven't been here for many years kind of question but when people talk about the uk's high here last year oh yeah i haven't lived here [35:00] Talk about the UK's high exposure to energy volatility. Why is that? Because the other thing people talk about in relation to the UK is like it does actually have North Sea oil. It does have kind of its own supply. What exactly is that vulnerability in this economy? So it has some supply, not massive amounts. And I think part of the trick is it's also very exposed to gas prices, which were what went up so dramatically when Russia invaded Ukraine. And then in the UK, electricity prices are keyed off of gas prices. So then electricity is particularly vulnerable as well. So unfortunately, I mean, the US has kind of energy independence at the moment. The UK is nowhere close to that position. I know in the US, there is an entire art to asking a monetary policy setter a question about fiscal policy because you have to do it very delicately. Otherwise, they might faint over in their chair if they're presented with something outside their remit. I don't know what exactly the norms are here about how we're supposed to phrase such questions to elicit some sort of answer. But with all that out of the way when you think about upward pressure on inflation and why you so concerned about inflation and we talked about energy and all that how much does the seeming inability of government after government to engage in fiscal consolidation, how much is that a factor when you think about the future trajectory of inflation? Yeah, so, I mean, I'll say what any rate setter will tell you. So thank you for that. I've done all the throat clearing for you. Yeah, but I mean, the way that we think about fiscal policy is we take exactly what's legislated and we put that into our models. We stipulate that it doesn't seem like there is any real impulse at fiscal consolidation or capacity right now. So what does that mean? Well, so, I mean, actually, the government has legislated some consolidation given fiscal rules. And so that is exactly what we put into our forecast. And so that's just one of the conditioning assumptions is what's legislated, we assume will happen. Okay. And then we base our forecasts off the back of that. But so just to push further some of these fiscal choices like the inviolability of say the triple lock which again I not asking you whether these are good or bad policies etc But are these contributors to the persistence of upside inflation risks So I think it contributes to government borrowing costs So we're sitting in the UK a day after long-term rates went up. Some of that is to do with the Strait of Hormuz. Some of that is to do with true social posts. Some of that may be because there are local elections coming up, and I think there's just a whole bunch of positioning around that in a guilt market, which is pretty niche and fairly small relative to the U.S. Treasury market in particular. So I think that's all worth considering as well. And that all feeds through into financial conditions. You mentioned guilt yields. Now that you've gone from sort of finance Twitter to, you know, hardcore economic practitioner, monetary policy practitioner. She did have real jobs. I know, I know, but not like not on a central bank. I'm complimenting the current role, not denigrating the previous ones. That's my intent. I'll always be economist Meg to you. That's right. But like, how do you think about bond vigilantes? Do you have nightmares? Or have you gone from tweeting about bond vigilantes to thinking about them relentlessly as you watch UK guilt yields go up No So I neither have nightmares about them nor do I wish I could tweet about them I think markets are sometimes efficient and sometimes get things totally wrong. And so we have an entire function at the bank that talks to investors to get a sense of kind of what's behind their positioning, what they think. Often it's what do they think about us? What do they think we should be doing? What do they think we will do? And I think that's all worth understanding because, like I said, sometimes they get things right. Certainly not always. Well, let me ask you a mechanical question about the bond market, which is, are the coupon payments, as we see yields rise, and this is a question for all developing economies, and it certainly leaves a little bit of an anxiety in the U.S. as well, as we see those coupon payments rise, are we anywhere near where those interest payments themselves are creating an inflationary impulse in the UK, which economists would call fiscal dominance? Yeah. I mean, I mostly look at this through financial conditions. And so if you get bond yields rising, then that's tightening financial conditions and that feeds through into the economy. And then there's a judgment to be made about what monetary policy should do about it. But that's a fiscal expenditure that, [40:00] that coupon payment. And so the question is, is it of a size such that that fiscal expenditure, which the screens tell us is rising when we see the rates rising, is that large enough or is there a delta there such that that actually itself creates an inflationary impulse? So no, that's not a significant impulse that we're looking at. Mostly we're just looking at it through financial conditions. Got it. Yeah. So we talked earlier about spillover from U.S. monetary policy. And it is thinkable that the U.S. could be raising rates sooner than it might be lowering rates. How would you anticipate the feed through from a tightening of U.S. monetary conditions to the U.K. at this current moment? Yeah. So as I mentioned, there's significant read through from the U.S. Treasury market into the U.K. guilt market, rightly or So if you look at economic indicators that come out and how they influence our financial conditions in the UK, the indicator, if it surprises, that influences conditions here the most is UK inflation, thank goodness. Secondly is US inflation. I think third might be nonfarm payrolls in the US. It not at all clear why these things should actually be influencing financial conditions in the UK right But I think part of that is an implicit assumption that the Fed is the world biggest economy central bank And so when the Fed does something, everybody kind of has to. I don't think that's right, actually, but you can't ignore these spillovers. So if financial conditions were to tighten in the US, that would feed through to the UK. And financial conditions, I mean, of course, the reason matters. But, you know, if it's because of rate hikes in the U.S., it could mean that our financial conditions tighten as well. And then that feeds through into kind of our view of how restrictive our monetary policy stance is and how we manage inflation towards our 2% target. Can I go back to something you said at the very beginning when I asked you about what is the remit or the objective of the central bank? And you said one thing is to support the government. And that is not like formally. I don't think that's part of the Fed. But I know that that's why the Bank of England was founded, was to be the government's bank and to facilitate financing of the government. Does that functionally change anything? Does that mean something substantively different in terms of the conduct of monetary policy within the BOE versus say another central bank when that sort of like part of your founding charter Yeah So to be clear our mandate really is 2 inflation sustainably in the medium term, subject to that to support the goals of the government. And they've changed. And this is a mandate that the Treasury sets every November. So it's once a year they look at it. And what fits in that has changed over the past couple of years on the margin. There was an incident a few years ago in which the bank and the government, the bank helped out the government a little bit. That had nothing to do with the mandate, yeah, for what it's worth. So in my time at the Bank of England, we've only hit our inflation target for one or two months maybe. And so while I've been at the Bank of England, and I think generally it's the case, really 2% inflation is the target, and we're working tirelessly to hit that. So the secondary part of the mandate, which is subject to that, we haven't achieved that yet. So that is the primary focus. Can you talk a bit more about just the decision-making process on the MPC? Because again, here, I'm going to emphasize Megan's many other jobs. You been in academia you been in business settings and now you at a central bank What are the sort of differences that you observe between how the decision making process works at those types of institutions versus a central bank what are the sort of differences that you observe between how the decision process works at those types of institutions versus a central bank This is just a long way of me asking you what the discussions are actually like Are they as vigorous as Prime Minister's questions, which is our only exposure to what policymaking looks like in the UK? Yeah, so we meet every six weeks, and every other time we produce a forecast. So when you produce a forecast, it's a more involved process. This last round was particularly interesting because we didn't produce a forecast. We said, you know what, things are so uncertain, we're just going to produce three scenarios. We're not going to give you weights on them. Who knows what's happening with energy prices? But we produced three different scenarios, and they were based on kind of what energy futures curves might look like, how energy prices might evolve, and then also second-round effects off the back of that. And so as you can imagine, in the good old days, not good old days, in the old days, when we only produced a central forecast, that was a less involved process, I would say, than now producing a bunch of scenarios to think about risk and uncertainty. And now I think we're facing kind of 90 and uncertainty, so radical unpredictability and uncertainty. So it's an incredibly involved process to produce these scenarios, to think about different states of the world. [45:00] Try to identify where we might be in these scenarios. And then, most importantly, to try to figure out how we would respond if we were in any parts of these worlds. And so to figure out our reaction function, we look at the market curve, but we also look at a whole bunch of policy rules. They're all different. And in figuring out where we forecast from, we have to figure out where we are. We've used a whole bunch of different models, get loads of updates and research notes from our fantastic staff to help inform us of where we're starting from, because that's always really important. So, you know, in a forecast round, it's about three weeks of intensive discussions and research and notes. And then figuring out how to communicate that to the outside world, I think, is really important, too. So it is a really involved process. And I would say that the model where we have externals and internals and where dissent is totally normal does work in that we certainly don't agree on everything. In fact, often we don't agree on important things and that comes out in our votes. But I think that's how you make sure that you're making the strongest decisions. This might be sort of like an abstract question You can take it however you want it A prior guest we had on the podcast a bunch of times Hyun Sung Shin recently became the head of Korea Central Bank And I read his opening speech which I thought was really interesting And he said you know central bankers like to talk about theory and putting it into practice And you have theories like independence is good and so forth These ideas you put in practice He said in reality the practice happens And then you sort of form a theory around it and that we're in a moment of historical change for central banks for many reasons. Perhaps populism, politics is changing. That might change the nature of central banks. AI, the extreme uncertainty of AI and how that's going to affect the economy, that's a source of change. And therefore, central banks, period, are going to be in a new period of the old ways. Does it feel like, whether at the BOE or general, that we're going to be entering a new era of central banking per se. Yeah, I think we already have, in fairness. So I've spoken to some of my predecessors. Kristen Forbes, I saw recently, for example, and she said, you're so lucky my entire time on the MPC, I never voted to change interest rates at all. Oh, my God. That's right. It's like inconceivable now. That's right. And so I seen a hiking cycle a holding cycle and a cutting cycle and who knows what comes next off the back of this shock And so I do think that that has changed But also you know I think getting hit by successive shocks is just here to stay. And I think you can identify some already. So if economic statecraft is how major world powers are going to operate using economic tools for foreign policy goals, those just represent negative supply shocks for someone. And so, you know, I think we will continue to have negative supply shocks, whether it's tariffs or export controls or investment controls, all of these things. And then climate change, whether it's physical risk or transition risk, if it crystallizes, that represents a negative supply shock as well. So we're no longer at a point where we can kind of say, well, one day we might have some of these things happen. I think we're already there. And so this old adage that you should just look through negative supply shocks because you can't address them directly. I don't think it works when you keep having them wave after wave. And I also think there's just a ton of uncertainty now. A lot of economists feel like they had a framework for understanding how the global economy worked, and it doesn't work anymore, but no one's quite identified the new one And so in an age when you have this much uncertainty you need to stop thinking about your very specific forecast where you do get out whether inflation 0 percentage points higher or lower in year three of your forecast It's kind of neither here nor there. It's much more about kind of scenario analysis and risk management when you're making decisions about interest rates. So figuring out if we thought we were in this state of the world and it turns out we're in a different one, how bad could we mess that up? And how do we minimize some of those costs? And that's a different way of thinking, I think, about central banking than what we had in the past. I mean, other than scenario analysis, is there anything else that central bankers should do in order to deal with supply shocks? Because this was a theme post-COVID in the US, this idea that the Fed only has an interest rate, and interest rate is not a particularly adept tool at dealing with the supply side. As you said earlier, central bankers are often, you know, they're very much trained and focused on dealing with the demand side, not necessarily the supply side of the equation. And part of that is because they don't necessarily have the right tools. Yeah, we don't really have the right tools. So we've got what we've got. Could you get tools is what I'm asking. Yeah, it's a good question. I think probably if you're making decisions about the supply side of the economy, often that comes down to questions about choosing when. [50:00] and losers. And that's not what independent central banks are here for. That's what elected politicians are there for. So I think some of these solutions have to come from elected officials and not from central banks at all. But understanding that it's the multiplicative effects of multiple supply shocks rather than just looking at them in concert is important. And also, you know, we look at decompositions of inflation over the past and you can't explain them all using standard channels. There's just kind of a wedge. And sometimes that's a judgment that we've made. And sometimes it's just an unknown. But being a bit more curious about these wedges, why haven't things panned out in a way that we can perfectly explain? Maybe there's something else going on because of these supply shocks. I think there's a lot of work to be done in that area, too. You also mentioned communicating how the central bank, how the BOE is thinking to the market, and I guess to households as well. We might have a new Fed governor very, very soon in the form of Kevin Warsh. And he is, as far as I can tell, not a fan of forward guidance. I think that's fair to say Someone pedantic is going to point out that the Fed may already have abandoned forward guidance of the bond market based off of what happened in 2022 But if we got a more formalized abandonment of forward guidance does that make your job at the BOE a lot more difficult if you're trying to judge the spillover effects from U.S. bonds? So I think we don't understand the spillovers just from what the Fed is saying about them. We're also looking at the U.S. economy and the fundamentals. So forward guidance has its place, I think you don't need it all the time. I don't think that means we won't understand what's happening in the US economy and therefore how that might spill over into the UK economy. I think there are just different approaches on this stuff. So if I look over the whole of this conversation, you're talking a lot about being wary of inflationary risks. And we talked about maybe the public and companies being more primed towards inflationary risks than they were previously. why did you vote to hold rates last week? Why didn't you? Yeah. Yeah. You know, I think given that it will take too long to get evidence for second round effects to actually address them, I think that's a fair question. You know, if you don't hike now, then when are you going to? To my mind a big contribution was that we are going to get some news over the next six weeks or so but you know over the next couple of months And a lot of that news will not be definitive evidence of second round effects but it will be evidence about energy prices which are a big feed into what's going on with the economy and with inflation. So is there a state of the world in which restrictiveness that we already have in our monetary policy stance, because we are restrictive, I think, just not hugely so, but is there a state of the world in which actually if the war ended tomorrow, the Strait of Hormuz opened up completely, whether that restrictiveness could squeeze out the second round effects that have already been kicked off by this crisis. I think it's defensible to think that possibly there are. In my view, the risk is entirely on the upside, though. There's kind of a ratchet here. I think the risk to energy prices and also second round effects are probably on the upside rather than the downside. But I do think that it's worth waiting for a little while to see kind of what happens with the progression of this war and therefore see what we can infer about how it will propagate through the economy before we make a move. Megan, it was so great to catch up with you. Congrats on the new role. I know we're a little bit late to it, but it was really great to be able to actually ask you all the questions about what you're doing right now. Yeah thanks for having me It great to see you Yeah thank you so much That was great Joe, that was really fun. That was great. I have to say, I'm a little bit jealous that Megan probably has a really nice office at the Bank of England building. I know. The Bank of England, Bank of England. I know. That would be a pretty sweet job. I think I'm going to go through my entire career without ever having my own office in a building. I know. Me too. I love my job. And I'm going to leave it at that. It would be nice to one day just have an office with a door and all that stuff. But there are a bunch of interesting things to pick out of that conversation. I mean, I thought her point about the emphasis of central banks and economics in general on the demand side historically versus the supply side. kind of captures a lot of the struggle that policymakers have had with the post-COVID economy, right? Like, all of economics is very much focused on the idea of, like, well, you need a healthy consumer who's spending, right? And going out and buying stuff versus, like, thinking about those supply-side shocks. I think she made a really good point, which is it doesn't... [55:00] It doesn't seem at least theoretically possible to truly have one supply shock after another, and they really are just independent supply shocks, right? At least it's conceivably possible. A pandemic is not the same thing as a war here, as a war there, and so forth. They could be discrete events. The sort of money line for me when she said was the rise of economic statecraft. And if once governments start using economic tools as foreign policy, and once that cycle gets going, then there begin to be reasons to think that these discrete one-off supply shocks are not just going to be things that are one and done, but that are part of a sustained new part of the world that consistent. And you see this. Obviously, I mean, the tariffs are one part of it, but all of the moves that we talked to about reshoring and strategic domestic investments for backup capacity, etc., this is what constitutes a sustained trend. And so I thought it was really just overall very interesting to hear someone like really wrestle with the reality of conducting monetary policy in a period of sustained supply side degradation shocks what have you And then the question of course is if the central bank is not the right entity to deal with these supply shocks like should it, given its existing tools, which we touched on, like should it have new tools? I mean, a lot of people would say no because that's veering into fiscal and you want governments to decide that and democratically elected governments to decide that. But on the other hand, if it keeps happening, it also feels somehow unsatisfactory to just say, well, we're going to have to deal with this with the existing toolkit. Yeah. And also, again, but it really does cut straight to the core of what we want in a democratic society. You could say, you know what? Part of the reason we have declining productivity is because regulations on setting up a new factory are burdensome. Do we want non-elected officials deciding, oh, you know what? We're going to change environmental regulations. We're going to change the minimum wage. We're going to change the protected habitat speed. Like most people would be very uncomfortable with the, we're going to change household zoning so that there could be more infrastructure in London Most people would get really uncomfortable about what it would mean for the central bank to have the capacity to address supply side problems But I think the other point is maybe there are more creative ways of doing it that we haven even thought of yet. So for instance, could you do monetary policy on a weekly basis versus a monthly decision? No, seriously. If the entire world is changing on a week to week basis, maybe you need to start making these decisions. Yeah, I don't know. My point is like there may be creative solutions out there that we haven't even thought about. Let's get on that. Let's get up working on that. All right. Shall we leave it there? Let's leave it there. This has been another episode of the Odd Thoughts podcast. I'm Tracy Allaway. You can follow me at Tracy Allaway. And I'm Jill Weisenthal. You can follow me at The Stalwart. Follow our producers, Carmen Rodriguez at CarmenArmandDash. Joel Bennett at Dashbot. Kale Brooks at Kale Brooks. And Kevin Lozano at Kevin Lloyd Lozano. And from our OddLots content, go to Bloomberg.com slash OddLots. We have a daily newsletter on all of our episodes. And you can chat about all these topics 24-7 in our Discord, discord.gg slash OddLots. And if you enjoy OddLots, if you like it when we talk to central bankers, then please leave us a positive review on your favorite podcast platform And remember if you are a Bloomberg subscriber you can listen to all of our episodes absolutely ad free All you need to do is find the Bloomberg channel on Apple Podcasts and follow the instructions there Thanks for listening Thank you. For more information, visit www.4imprint.com. [60:00] to cyber and regulatory challenges. At that level, managing risk becomes an ongoing discipline. 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