SocGen's Edwards Sees Return to Double-Digit Global Inflation

法兴银行爱德华兹：全球通胀或重返两位数 持续的财政赤字与地缘政治能源冲击可能将主要经济体推入1970年代式的两位数通胀，而央行也面临难以避免的债务货币化局面。 法国兴业银行（Société Générale）策略师阿尔伯特·爱德华兹（Albert Edwards）探讨了他的市场观点以及他作为华尔街最著名的常年看空人士之一的职业生涯。他阐述了其标志性的“冰河时代”（Ice Age）论点在2008年后因量化宽松如何演变，以及为何转向MMT风格的财政注资与地缘政治能源冲击面临重新引发两位数通胀的风险。爱德华兹将当前的AI资本支出与1990年代末的电信热潮进行了类比，并警告称，承受重压的消费者和受到挤压的企业利润率可能会引发经济衰退，并逆转极度高企的市场估值。 长期担任卖方看空分析师需要拿捏好风险预警的分寸，使客户既能对下行风险进行压力测试，又不会因过于激进的末日言论而产生排斥。 (0:00) 阿尔伯特·爱德华兹的研究风格侧重于高度精炼的短篇报告，专门针对买方投资者紧张的时间安排量身定制。 (5:40) 最初的“冰河时代”论点认为，西方经济体将重蹈日本资产负债表衰退的覆辙，从而导致结构性反通胀和收益率走低。 (5:40) 2008年后的量化宽松通过全面推高资产价格改变了大盘的估值动态，但行业板块内部的分化仍印证了“冰河时代”分析框架。 (14:02) 新冠疫情后从面向华尔街的QE转向面向实体经济的财政注资，打破了反通胀范式，并引发了普遍的消费物价通胀。 (20:00)

Société Générale global strategist Albert Edwards argues that the structural disinflation of the past few decades has ended, warning that fiscal overexpansion, persistent supply constraints, and corporate margin pressures will eventually drive economies back into double-digit inflation. From Quantitative Easing to Main Street Deficits (20:00) Edwards explains that his earlier 'Ice Age' framework—modeled on Japan's post-bubble experience of secular stagnation and suppressed yields—depended on post-2008 Quantitative Easing funneling liquidity predominantly into Wall Street. This regime produced housing and asset appreciation rather than consumer price inflation, creating severe intergenerational tension as younger demographics were priced out of homeownership. The shift toward Modern Monetary Theory-style policy during the COVID-19 pandemic changed this dynamic by transferring cash directly to households. Delivering fiscal stimulus into widespread physical capacity constraints and supply chain bottlenecks broke the prior disinflationary mechanism, turning asset inflation into broad consumer inflation. Fiscal Sovereignty Traps and Bond Vigilante Pressures (25:00) Edwards highlights that government budget discipline has broken down without an active recession. The United States maintains a federal deficit near 7% of GDP despite low unemployment, while debt service costs have surged to roughly 4% of GDP. Although the United States and France remain partially insulated by reserve currency status and the Eurozone framework, Edwards identifies UK gilts as particularly fragile. With the UK 30-year gilt yield rising to its highest levels since 1998, Edwards views the UK market as exceptionally vulnerable to bond vigilantes, driven by escalating welfare liabilities and the pension triple lock escalator. Echoes of 1970s Inflation and Historical Parallels (35:00) Edwards argues that the eventual endgame of unchecked deficits and swelling debt service burdens is central bank debt monetization, which he expects will recreate the double-digit inflation seen in the UK during the 1970s. While short-term trading dynamics, such as 0DTE options and persistent dip-buying, continue to support asset valuations, Edwards notes that current market euphoria mirrors past speculative peaks, including the 1997 Asian financial crisis and the dot-com bubble. AI Capital Spending and 1990s Telecom Parallels (40:00) Evaluating current market enthusiasm, Edwards compares the artificial intelligence boom to the late-1990s telecom equipment run-up rather than pure dot-com speculation. During the telecom expansion, equipment and fiber vendors posted strong short-term profits selling infrastructure picks and shovels, yet the buildout generated significant excess capacity. Edwards notes that current U.S. information technology mega-caps are shifting from robust free cash flow generation toward projected zero free cash flow by 2027 due to heavy capital spending. Citing SocGen quantitative research, he warns that while nominal tech profits are high, the growth rate of that profit momentum has begun to decelerate. Exhausted Consumers and Corporate Margin Vulnerability (50:00) Edwards maintains that broad bear markets require an underlying economic recession. While the S&P 500 enters this transition at roughly 23 times forward earnings, real U.S. household income has grown by only 0.5% year-on-year against a 2% rise in real spending, depressing the personal savings rate to 3.5%. Edwards observes that while companies generated higher profit margins post-pandemic through pass-through pricing, strained households can no longer absorb further hikes. If firms face rising petrochemical and supply input costs and are forced to compress margins, Edwards warns that subsequent cuts to payrolls and capital expenditures could push the broader economy into a downturn. Edwards leaves open the precise timing and near-term catalyst for an equity downturn, while maintaining that structural fiscal expansion and supply-side constraints make a return to high inflation and severe cyclical market stress unavoidable.

法国兴业银行（Société Générale）全球策略师Albert Edwards认为，全球宏观范式已从长期的“冰河期”低通胀彻底逆转，由于政府缺乏财政约束并不断货币化赤字，全球经济最终将重返两位数通胀。同时，美股当前由人工智能资本开支推动的高估值行情，正面临消费者支出耗竭与潜在经济衰退的严峻冲击。 卖方空头的生存法则与冰河期框架演变 (5:40) Edwards回顾了其自1982年从英格兰银行起步的金融职业生涯，并在20世纪80年代末日本资产泡沫破裂后形成了著名的“冰河期”（Ice Age）假说。该理论认为西方经济体将重蹈日本覆辙，即过度储蓄压低实际收益率、利率与通胀。虽然2008年后的量化宽松（QE）人为推高资产价格，阻碍了广泛股市估值倍数的全面缩水，但股票市场内部如期出现了防御性成长股相对于周期价值股的历史性重估。Edwards指出，在华尔街这一天然偏向乐观的卖方生态中，常年持有谨慎立场的分析师必须精准把握沟通分寸，既要为客户提示“安全出口”，又不能因极端末日论调招致排斥。 现代货币理论陷阱与两位数通胀回归 (20:00) Edwards指出，疫情前的QE资金主要流入金融市场与房地产，虽然拉大了代际财富差距并助长民粹主义，但并未立即推高居民消费价格。真正的转折点发生在疫情期间，政府转向现代货币理论（MMT）式的直接财政补贴与发钱，叠加严重的供应链瓶颈，直接打破了实体产能上限并引爆通胀。 Edwards批评称，MMT理论假定民选政府能在产能触顶时主动削减支出或加税，这在现实政治中极不现实；目前美国在极低失业率下财政赤字仍接近GDP的7%，国债利息支出升至GDP的4%。他回顾了20世纪70年代英国28%的通胀历史，并预测随着债务货币化难以避免，全球各地将重现两位数通胀。 主权债务压力与债券卫士的薄弱环节 (30:00) 随着全球公共债务占GDP比重升向不可持续的水平，债券卫士正在主权债务市场中寻找最脆弱的目标。 Edwards分析指出，美国凭借美元的全球储备货币地位享有缓冲，法国则有欧元区机制作为后盾，而英国国债（Gilts）缺乏此类保护，因双重政治与财政压力成为最薄弱的一环，其30年期国债收益率更是在2026年5月飙升至1998年以来的最高水平。此外，英国劳动力因长期患病退出的福利支出激增，叠加保护老年选民的养老金“三重锁”（Triple Lock）机制，导致财政紧缩在政治上几乎无法推行，进一步加剧了代际矛盾与主权信用风险。 AI资本开支泡沫与电信热潮的历史重演 (40:00) 针对当前市场对人工智能（AI）的极度狂热，Edwards将其直接类比为20世纪90年代末电信、媒体和科技（TMT）泡沫中的电信基础设施建设。当年铺设光纤电缆的供应商确实在短期内录得真实利润，但无节制的资本开支最终导致了产能过剩。他指出，目前美国大型科技公司的自由现金流由于激进的AI资本支出大幅缩减，预计到2027年将降至零；同时，法国兴业银行量化研究显示科技巨头的利润增速二阶导数正在放缓。Edwards引用了美联储前主席Alan Greenspan在2000年1月关于“百年一遇创新”的演讲，警示市场极度乐观往往出现在崩盘前夕。 消费者耗竭、利润挤压与宏观衰退风险 (50:00) Edwards认为，大型熊市最终都由经济衰退触发。目前标普500指数带着高达23倍的远期市盈率步入经济周期后期，一旦企业盈利预期下修，市场将缺乏估值安全垫。美国微观基本面已经显示出疲态：私营部门就业年化增长已近乎归零，实际家庭收入仅微增0.5%，而实际消费支出攀升超过2%，导致个人储蓄率暴跌至3.5%。随着消费者储蓄耗竭，企业在原材料与劳动力成本上升时将无法继续实施“贪婪通胀”（Greedflation）向下游转嫁成本，被挤压的利润空间可能引发普遍的裁员和投资削减，从而将整体经济拖入衰退并终结AI行情。 Edwards的论述强调了结构性财政赤字不可避免地会导致高通胀与债券市场危机，并警示由巨额资本开支驱动的技术热潮在消费放缓面前极度脆弱。然而，该框架尚未给出确切的市场见顶或衰退触发时点，且技术进步是否可能通过生产力跃升有效抵消通胀压力与化解债务负担，依然是未有定论的关键问题。

## Background 本期节目由彭博（Bloomberg）旗下的 Odd Lots 播客频道于 2026 年 5 月 15 日在 RSS 及各大网络平台发布。节目简介指出，在卖方机构长期担任唱衰的空头极其艰难，而法国兴业银行（Société Générale）的传奇策略师阿尔伯特·爱德华兹（Albert Edwards）凭借看空声誉屹立数十年；本期对谈聚焦于他为何预见双位数通胀即将来临、买方对研报的注意力瓶颈，以及空头如何在机构中维持职业生涯而不被解雇。 ## TL;DR 法国兴业银行策略师阿尔伯特·爱德华兹结合数十年市场周期经验，回顾了其著名的“冰河期”假说如何在量化宽松下演变为结构性分化，并指出随着央行将印钞转向 MMT 式的直接财政注水，以及各国政府面对产能瓶颈与赤字失控的无能为力，全球终将通过恶性通胀来稀释债务，迎来“两位数通胀”时代。与此同时，他将眼下火热的 AI 资本开支军备竞赛与 2000 年电信光纤泡沫进行了深度类比，指出英伟达等“卖铲人”虽然赚取实利，但科技巨头自由现金流正被吞噬，且盈利增长的二阶导数已开始掉头向下。更危险的隐患潜藏于非 AI 实体经济中：美国消费者储蓄率已耗尽至 3.5% 的极度脆弱水平，在新一波成本推动型通胀袭来时，企业再也无法向下游转嫁涨价，高利润率的崩塌势必引发裁员与实体经济衰退，进而拖垮整个美股估值幻觉。 ## Atmosphere & style 整场对话散发着华尔街资深老兵特有的冷峻、克制与英式黑色幽默，丝毫没有末日论调的歇斯底里，反而在调侃自嘲中透露出洞悉周期兴衰的超然。爱德华兹身穿花衬衫，谈笑风生地将自己比作古罗马战车上提醒凯撒“你只是凡人”的奴隶，与主持人关于空头野餐、黑白镜头滤镜的幽默插科打诨形成了绝妙张力。然而在轻松谈笑的表象之下，是数据与逻辑层层剥茧后的刺骨寒意；特别是节目尾声主持人在后记中警醒反思——当坚定的老牌空头都坦言“没那么看跌”，而市场开始畅想盈利奔向无穷大时，听众能清晰感受到那种身处宏大周期顶峰、暴风雨即将来临前的诡异平静。 ## Bulletin - `35:00` 法兴银行传奇策略师 Albert Edwards 警告，欧美在充分就业下财政赤字常态化高居 GDP 的 7%，叠加利息支出激增，最终只能走向债务货币化，全球各大经济体终将重返两位数通胀（10% 以上）。 - `26:30` 本轮能源与地缘冲击使“TACO”（特朗普最后总会认怂）交易失效，伊朗冲突导致亚洲与欧洲化肥及大宗供应链面临断裂，通胀互换利率大幅飙升，输入型通胀已不可避免。 - `42:30` AI 算力基建与 2000 年电信泡沫同构，天量 CapEx 军备竞赛正吞噬科技巨头的现金流，预测显示到 2027 年大型科技股自由现金流整体恐趋近于零。 - `50:00` 美国个人储蓄率暴跌至 3.5%，消费者已被“彻底榨干”，面对新一轮成本冲击，企业无法继续转嫁涨价，畸高利润率恐遭大幅压缩并诱发非 AI 实体经济衰退。 ## Key takeaways - `10:00` 卖方大空头的核心职能不是迫使客户清仓，而是在牛市狂欢中扮演“提醒凯撒只是凡人”的清醒警钟，为机构投资者提供假设压力测试与逃生路线思考。 - `13:00` 爱德华兹的“冰河期”理论原本预言长期停滞与通缩将带来全盘去估值化，但央行十余年非常规 QE 人为托举了大盘，使该理论主要转化为防御股与成长股相对价值股的极致估值溢价。 - `20:00` 传统 QE 仅是将流动性注入华尔街，催生金融资产与房地产通胀并加剧财富不平等；而疫情期间的 MMT 式财政直升机撒钱直达实体经济，在供应链受阻的产能极限期引爆了消费品大通胀。 - `23:45` MMT 的理论前提是在触及产能极限时主动加税踩刹车，但在政治现实中，民选政客绝无勇气收回民众福利，导致赤字与基本经济周期彻底脱钩。 - `30:00` 英国因年轻劳动力长期患病退出就业以及养老金“三重保障”机制，福利开支濒临失控，在缺乏特权储备货币与区域联盟庇护下，沦为债券义警惩戒全球主权债的最脆弱目标。 - `35:00` 美国政府利息支出已翻倍至 GDP 的 4%，在无法通过税收弥补亏空的数学现实下，央行与政客在财政主导格局中除了默许高通胀以稀释债务外别无他法。 - `42:30` 当前 AI 繁荣与 2000 年 TMT 泡沫中的电信光纤基建如出一辙，“卖铲人”英伟达短期赚取真金白银，但巨额资本开支正严重恶化巨头资产负债表与未来现金流结构。 - `45:00` 划时代的技术变革并不排斥惨烈的估值崩盘，格林斯潘在 2000 年初盛赞百年一遇创新加速后数周纳斯达克泡沫即告破裂，表明技术潜能无法豁免资产价格过度透支的惩罚。 - `47:15` 科技板块盈利规模虽然仍在增长，但增长的二阶导数已经拐头向下，动量减退叠加散户狂热接盘，呈现出周期晚期典型的脆弱结构。 - `50:00` 标普 500 指数在衰退边缘维持在 23 倍的高估值，剥离 AI 后的实体就业与实际收入停滞，高估值与经济基本面的严重错配构成了潜在黑天鹅触发点。 - `55:40` 央行官员长期执迷于死板的 2% 通胀目标并迷信持续 QE，正如保罗·沃尔克所指出的，1% 至 3% 的温和波动完全处于统计误差与良性范畴，过度干预反而加剧系统风险。 - `57:15` 当老牌大空头 Albert Edwards 都坦言短期看不到崩盘催化剂，同时市场舆论陷入 AI 带来的“盈利走向无穷大”叙事时，往往构成了市场周期见顶的极端情绪指标。 ## Detailed walkthrough ### `00:00` 卖方的空头悖论：在乐观主义的华尔街寻找反向思考 在金融市场与华尔街的生态中，“空头”往往背负着特殊的角色定位。普通投资者常戏谑空头的存在不过是为了在社交媒体上制造惊悚标题、或者为了售卖付费投资通讯以吸引点击。但如果一名分析师身处大型卖方（sell-side）机构，却长期以看空著称，其生存难度堪称地狱级别。华尔街与现代投资业天生自带乐观倾向——资本必须配置，资金必须寻找未来的增长点；更重要的是，作为“卖方”，机构的核心使命在于向客户推销金融产品，如果分析师整天高喊“什么都别买”，不仅与投行卖出资产的主业相冲突，逻辑上也显得格格不入。 然而，正如主持人所言，高水平空头的真正价值恰恰在于为大型买方机构提供不可或缺的“压力测试”（stress test）。当整个市场被单向情绪所裹挟，所有分析师都在竞相兜售科技股与繁荣叙事时，机构投资者极其需要一个扎实、深刻的反向视角来审视自身逻辑的脆弱点。能够在这种生态下生存、并连续13年蝉联 Extel 调查评选全球顶尖宏观分析师称号的传奇策略师，正是法国兴业银行（Société Générale）的全球策略师阿尔伯特·爱德华兹（Albert Edwards）。 此时的市场环境呈现出一种极其诡异的错位：一方面，全球股市处于令人难以置信的高位；另一方面，债券市场遭遇猛烈抛售，例如录制当下英国30年期国债（Gilt）收益率正飙升至近数十年来的历史性高点。与此同时，地缘政治动荡、高额财政赤字以及对 AI 颠覆性冲击的担忧充斥着新闻头条，悲观情绪测量指标与实际狂热的市场走势之间拉开了一道巨大的鸿沟。 - 卖方机构的天生偏向：投资需要押注未来，空头言论通常与卖方分销金融资产的商业模式直接对抗。 - 买方阅读研报的实际需求：机构投资者并不指望直接照搬买卖建议，而是借由高质量的异见来检验自己的投资假设。 - 市场宏观背离：股市创出极端高位的同时，长端国债收益率大幅飙升，政治与经济风险被风险资产选择性忽视。 --- ### `05:00` 走出“熊洞”：被误读的空头与“冰河期”范式 面对主持人的调侃，阿尔伯特·爱德华兹幽默地回应道，自己平时深居简出，今天终于被银行“放出了熊洞”（let out of the bear cage）。不同于一些动辄对“末日博士”标签暴跳如雷的经济学家，爱德华兹十分坦然，打趣称“只要还有人愿意跟我说话，我就谢天谢地了”。但他特别澄清了一点：大众和财经媒体之所以牢牢给自己贴上“大空头”的标签，是因为外界只关注到了他对股票市场的长期看衰，却忽视了他在过去数十年里实际上是一个坚定的“主权政府债券长期多头”（government bond bull）。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 冰河期理论推演路径 accDescr: 展示从信贷泡沫破裂到长期通缩及股市估值收缩的传导机制 subgraph Phase1 ["第一阶段：泡沫与传导"] A["信贷泡沫破裂 (日本1990s / 西方2000s)"] --> B["资产负债表衰退 (辜朝明理论)"] B --> C["过度储蓄压低实际收益率 (长期停滞)"] end subgraph Phase2 ["第二阶段：金融市场演变 (冰河期)"] C --> D["初期：低通胀压低债券收益率<br/>推动股票PE估值扩张"] D --> E["临界点：极低通胀逼近通缩边缘"] E --> F["终局：国债牛市延续<br/>但股票遭遇估值收缩 (PE Contraction)"] end ``` 爱德华兹回顾了自己的职业生涯：他于1982年进入金融界，最初在英格兰银行（Bank of England）任职，随后转战买方机构。正是在买方的亲身经历，让他深刻领悟到买方客户的时间极度匮乏，根本不会耐着性子阅读冗长晦涩的投行研报；因此他一直坚持撰写言简意赅、只需三四分钟即可读完的短评，这也是其研究广受欢迎的重要原因。 1988年，爱德华兹加入卖方机构克莱沃特·本森（Kleinwort Benson，后为 Dresdner Kleinwort），并在那里工作了近20年。在这段时期，他密切见证了日本资产泡沫的破裂，以及野村证券首席经济学家辜朝明（Richard Koo）所定义的“资产负债表衰退”（balance sheet recession）。当时西方主流经济学家纷纷傲慢地指责日本应对迟缓，主张日本应当通过快速清算资本存量来摆脱通缩；爱德华兹却敏锐地意识到，日本并非犯错，它只是在信贷周期的演进中比西方整整领先了十年。一旦西方世界的信贷泡沫破裂，西方央行绝不会遵从他们教训日本的做法，而是会同样选择疯狂降息和印钞以阻止经济滑向深渊。 在此洞察的基础上，爱德华兹在1996至1998年间（经历了亚洲金融危机及俄罗斯 GKO 国债危机之后）正式构建了著名的“冰河期”（Ice Age）理论假说。该理论将拉里·萨默斯（Larry Summers）后来普及的“长期停滞”（Secular Stagnation，即储蓄过剩压低中性利率与实际收益率）嫁接到资本市场定价模型中。爱德华兹指出，在通胀与利率初期回落阶段，低利率确实会推动股票估值（P/E）扩张；但随着经济陷入日本式的通缩边缘，这种因果关系将被彻底颠覆——极端低通胀不但无法再提振估值，反而会带来残酷的“市盈率压缩”（P/E contraction）。这一长周期的资产定价范式不仅贯穿了他自2000年以来的核心分析框架，也构成了他“股票大空头、债券大多头”独特市场形象的底层逻辑。 ### `10:00` 卖方策略师的生存之道与“提醒凯撒的奴隶” 访谈由买方与卖方之间读写研究报告的习惯切入。买方投资经理每天都被海量的研究报告淹没，注意力极其有限，因此卖方分析师逐渐摸索出图表密集、精炼短小的写作风格；如今在社交媒体时代，大众的注意力水平几乎退化到了和买方交易员相同的程度。这就引出了一个核心问题：作为一家投资银行（法兴银行）的常年看空策略师，阿尔伯特·爱德华兹（Albert Edwards）的工作定位到底是什么？在华尔街普遍偏好多头、预测经济衰退一旦错误便极易被解雇的环境下，一个大空头究竟如何定义“成功”，又凭借什么立足数十年？ 爱德华兹回忆起在克莱因沃特-本森（Kleinwort Benson）经历纳斯达克泡沫破裂前夕的圆桌午餐会。当时菲利普斯与德鲁资产管理公司（Phillips & Drew Asset Management）的负责人托尼·戴（Tony Dye）因为过早看空科技股而备受煎熬——其境遇与杰里米·格兰瑟姆（Jeremy Grantham）以及芝加哥的加里·布林森（Gary Brinson，两人后来均归入瑞银旗下）极为相似。托尼·戴在餐桌上当面问克莱因沃特的股票主管：“我完全赞同阿尔伯特的观点，但你们为什么还没开除他？”爱德华兹指出，金融圈有一种天生且自发的乐观倾向（analyst optimism bias），股票分析师往往对自己覆盖的行业与个股满怀热情；如果一个卖方经济学家敢大胆预测经济衰退却预测落空，通常很快就会被扫地出门。 能够长期生存下来，爱德华兹靠的是摸索出的一套与客户沟通的策略。他提到 1990 年代末克莱因沃特有一位科技分析师对诺基亚（Nokia）和爱立信（Ericsson）极度看空，尽管最终被证明是对的，但他因在客户面前情绪过激、“狂拍桌子”，把客户得罪殆尽，险些丢掉饭碗。爱德华兹的生存秘诀在于：清晰表达个人观点供客户参考校准，但绝不咄咄逼人，绝不激怒客户。他形容自己的角色就像古罗马凯撒大帝在战车凯旋时身后站着的奴隶，那位奴隶唯一的职责就是不断在凯撒耳边低语提醒：“你只是凡人，你终将死去。”客户即便身为多头、必须全额投资去市场上跳舞（正如花旗前 CEO 查克·普林斯所言“只要音乐不停就得继续跳舞”），也依然渴望倾听爱德华兹的预警，以此作为风险对冲与心理防线，弄清楚自己究竟该站在舞厅中央狂欢，还是靠近紧急逃生通道跳舞。 - 卖方研究写作风格受制于买方有限的注意力跨度，强调图表密集与言简意赅。 - 华尔街天生具备强烈的乐观倾向，唱空并出错的经济学家极易遭遇清洗。 - 诺基亚与爱立信空头分析师的教训：看对市场但激怒客户同样会危及职业生涯。 - 策略师的真正定位不是强迫客户平仓，而是扮演“提醒凯撒只是凡人”的清醒警钟。 --- ### `13:00` 冰河时代假说为何脱轨：量化宽松与结构性分化 面对外界长期以来针对他“长期看空股市却屡屡踏空”的批评，爱德华兹直面回应了其著名的“冰河时代”（Ice Age）假说在股票市场的走势轨迹。从 2000 年互联网泡沫破裂起，债券收益率持续下行，股票收益率（earnings yield）也确实如其预期的“日本化”进程一样开始走高。然而，这套逻辑原本预言的股票全盘去估值化（derating），最终被前所未有的央行干预彻底打破。 在爱德华兹看来，真正打乱股票去估值进程的正是量化宽松（Quantitative Easing, QE）。美联储及全球央行不仅在 2008 年金融危机时期推行 QE，甚至在随后的十余年里让非常规货币政策常态化，其直接目标就是人为推高所有资产价格。不过，爱德华兹强调，“冰河时代”假说在股市内部结构上依然极为精准地兑现了：那些受益于超低债券收益率的防御性板块和长期成长股，其估值不仅没有受挫，反而相比周期股和深度价值股享受了前所未有的巨大市盈率溢价。因此，即便宏观上忽视大盘下跌风险的股票基金经理，如果顺应了他提出的西方“日本化”（Japanification）趋势并重仓高质量成长与防御板块，在结构市中同样获得了极为丰厚的回报。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 冰河时代假说在量化宽松下的演变路径 accDescr: 展示了从低利率预期到全面资产通胀及板块结构分化的逻辑推导 subgraph Macro["宏观驱动因素"] A["长期低利率趋势<br/>西方'日本化'假说"] --> B["超常规央行干预<br/>长达十余年的 QE"] end subgraph EquitySplit["股市分化结果"] B --> C["大盘层面整体推高<br/>资产价格被人为托举"] B --> D["结构层面极致分化<br/>估值重估与溢价悬殊"] end subgraph SectorImpact["板块表现差异"] D --> E["防御性 & 成长板块<br/>享受历史级高估值溢价"] D --> F["周期股 & 价值板块<br/>持续承压与低估值锁定"] end ``` - 2000 年后债券收益率持续走低，原本正沿着日本股市泡沫后的估值压缩轨迹演绎。 - 央行长达十年的量化宽松（QE）扭曲了宏观定价机制，阻断了权益市场的全盘去估值化。 - “冰河时代”假说在行业相对配置中依然有效，低利率环境下成长股与防御股的溢价被推至极致。 --- ### `18:00` 日本化与日本国债的“寡妇交易”逆转 讨论进一步延伸到“西方日本化”假说的源头——日本自身以及日本国债（JGB）市场的历史演进。在 2010 年代，做空日本国债曾被金融界戏称为“寡妇制造者”（Widow Maker），因为无数对冲基金依据传统宏观经济学框架，看到日本政府债务对 GDP 的比例不断飙升、债务规模膨胀至不可持续的水平，纷纷下注做空日本国债并押注收益率飙升；然而现实却是债务越高，日本国债收益率反而一路下行，长期停留在零利率甚至负利率区间。爱德华兹在那场长期博弈中做出了正确判断，即在资产负债表衰退与通缩结构下，庞大的债务存量根本不会倒逼国债收益率走高。 然而，新冠疫情（COVID-19）之后，维持了数十年的底层逻辑发生了根本性动摇。不仅是全球主要发达经济体遭遇通胀卷土重来，连长期深陷通缩泥潭的日本自身，其名义利率与债券收益率也打破了沉寂几十年的停滞状态，重新步入上升通道。这一转变意味着此前维系全球资产定价逻辑二十余年的“低通胀、低利率、债务无害化”框架正面临彻底重构。 - 日本国债（JGB）做空交易之所以成为“寡妇制造者”，是因为庞大债务存量并未带来收益率上升，反而在通缩压力下走向零乃至负利率。 - 爱德华兹曾准确指出债务比率与国债收益率短期内不存在正相关，力挺低利率长期的判断。 - 疫情后日本及全球发达市场打破了近三十年的通缩惯性，债券收益率普遍回升，促使旧有的日本化定价模型发生质变。 ### `20:00` 从华尔街到实体经济：大通胀与 MMT 范式转移的必然性 在探讨后疫情时代全球利率为何全面反弹——不仅席卷英国，甚至连长期处于超低利率的日本也未能幸免，从而宣告“冰河时代”（Ice Age）式长期低通胀与零利率彻底终结——时，阿尔伯特·爱德华兹（Albert Edwards）指出，这一转折并非由疫情凭空引发，而是在疫情前夕就已经埋下伏笔。早在 2020 年初大流行暴发前，他就曾在报告中预测，下一次经济衰退将标志着市场告别数十年来行之有效的“冰河时代”旧范式，长期下行的债券收益率神话即将画上句号。之所以做出这一判断，核心症结在于旧机制早已走入死胡同：在此之前，央行推行的量化宽松（QE）资金几乎全被注入了“华尔街的血管”中。外界宣称 QE 没有造成通胀的论调完全是无稽之谈——QE 实际上制造了极其惊人的通胀，只不过这种通胀体现在房产和金融资产上，属于“人们普遍乐见的通胀”，只要你手里拥有资产就不会抱怨；然而，这却导致了严重的财富不平等与代际撕裂，年轻一代彻底失去了买房立足的希望，进而催生出席卷全球的民粹主义浪潮。 与此同时，欧美经济在疫情前夕已经无限逼近实质性通缩，欧洲大批主权债券陷入负利率泥潭，全面坠入“日本化”（Japanification）陷阱，美国亦步亦趋。爱德华兹当时就断定，当下一次衰退来袭，政策制定者势必会转向现代货币理论（MMT）式的“直升机撒钱”，把由央行印钞兜底的真金白银直接注入“实体经济与寻常百姓（Main Street）的血管”——也就是通过直接减税、向每家每户寄送支票等财政扩张手段来刺激经济。爱德华兹自称在学术流派上非常博采众长（“quite Catholic”），既非原教旨货币主义者也非教条凯恩斯主义者，甚至对 MMT 的很多分析深表赞同；但他重点强调，读过斯蒂芬妮·凯尔顿（Stephanie Kelton）的名著《赤字迷思》（*The Deficit Myth*）的人都该明白，MMT 有一个绝不可违背的前提：你可以肆意印钞财政扩张而不引发通胀，前提是“产能未触及上限”；一旦撞上产能瓶颈，就必须立即刹车。然而在疫情期间，全球供应链遭受严重封锁，经济正处于有史以来产能受限最严重的脆弱时刻。在这种极端关头搞大规模直升机撒钱，在爱德华兹看来简直是“荒谬至极、彻底发疯”（batshit crazy），广义货币供应量（M2）的急剧失控早早就昭示了恶性通胀的必然来临。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 从华尔街资产通胀到实体经济消费通胀的演变路径 accDescr: 展示旧量化宽松模式如何推升资产价格并最终转向现代货币理论引发消费通胀 subgraph OldParadigm["旧范式：金融资产通胀"] QE["央行实施 QE"] --> WallSt["流动性注入华尔街"] WallSt --> AssetBubble["推高金融资产与房价"] AssetBubble --> Inequality["加剧财富分化与代际矛盾"] end subgraph Transition["转折催化"] Inequality --> Populism["民粹主义政治崛起"] DeflationRisk["欧洲负利率与通缩陷阱"] --> Populism end subgraph NewParadigm["新范式：MMT 财政撒钱"] Populism --> Stimulus["直接发支票与减税"] Stimulus --> MainSt["流动性直通实体大众"] Bottleneck["疫情供应链产能极限瓶颈"] --> CPI["供需脱节：全面消费品通胀爆发"] MainSt --> CPI end ``` - **华尔街 vs. 实体经济**：过去的 QE 仅仅通胀了资产阶级拥有的金融资产与不动产，大众在生活成本上感知滞后，却被剥夺了代际上浮空间；MMT 式财政政策则打破了这一隔离墙，让央行直接为大众账户垫付资金。 - **理论前提的落空**：MMT 赖以成立的防线是“面临产能约束时必须即刻收紧”，而现实政策却在产能供给遭严重破坏的疫情锁国期间全力踩下油门。 --- ### `23:45` 财政扩张的政治死结：赤字失控与被捆绑的民选政客 主持人追问，这是否暴露了 MMT 或当前宏观政策最致命的逻辑漏洞——即在政治现实中，民选政府真的有能力在触及产能极限时主动停手、甚至加税收紧财政吗？爱德华兹斩钉截铁地表示，这就是整个政策处方彻底崩溃的核心所在：从政治基因上来说，民选政客“天生就不可能做到这一点”。当好日子需要结束、当通胀逼迫政客必须从民众手中收回福利、上调税率时，没有哪个通过选票上台的官员有勇气这么做。这种绝望的财政失控甚至在疫情暴发前就已经成型：在特朗普的第一任期内，美国联邦财政赤字就已经与基本经济现实彻底脱钩，在没有危机、没有衰退的繁荣期，赤字率便已逼近 GDP 的 6%。 如今，国际货币基金组织（IMF）的数据显示，在失业率处于历史低位的充分就业状态下，美国财政赤字竟然常态化高居 GDP 的 7%。放眼大西洋彼岸的英国，情况同样令人窒息。英国国债收益率一路被推向 28 年以来的历史最高点，原因并非英国政客没有尝试推行财政纪律，而是因为他们在走钢丝：一边是虎视眈眈、随时准备惩罚任何财政鲁莽行为的债券卫士（Bond Vigilantes），另一边则是对生活成本危机极度不满、随时准备在选战中将执政党赶下台的愤怒选民。针对主持人调侃那些被高税收吓跑而“逃亡去迪拜”的富人，爱德华兹纠正道，这里政客面临的不是谁去迪拜的问题，而是自己马上就要被选民“扫地出门”。如今的选民对任何形式的紧缩都毫无容忍度，以至于民选官员几乎必须寄希望于遭遇一场像当年希腊、西班牙或意大利那样生死存亡的欧元区式主权债务危机，才可能拥有政治资本去推行人人皆知必要、却谁也不敢触碰的紧缩重整方案。 - **脱离周期的财政赤字**：以往 6% 到 7% 的巨额赤字只在经济大萧条或战时出现，如今欧美即便处于失业率极低的充分就业周期，赤字率依然固化在 7% 左右。 - **英国政治走钢丝**：长期国债收益率刷新近三十年高位，凸显了政府既无法有效取悦严苛的债市，又因选民抗拒而无法削减开支的治理僵局。 --- ### `26:30` 能源冲击与地缘政治：为什么“TACO”交易在这次失效了？ 讨论随后延伸到欧洲的应对机制。主持人提及亚当·图兹（Adam Tooze）在通讯中引用的 TS Lombard 宏观图表，该图表展示了 2022 年欧洲能源危机期间各国财政补贴与能源减税的规模是何等庞大。如今随着原油与能源价格再度抬头，欧洲是否还能故技重施？爱德华兹给出了完全否定的答案。他强调，尽管眼下欧洲天然气价格尚未回到 2022 年的极端峰值，尽管像西班牙等国仍在不顾欧盟委员会警告强行削减增值税（VAT），但整个欧洲的财政缓冲垫（buffers）早已被彻底耗尽。 更深层的危机则在于欧美与亚洲在地缘政治冲击下的剧烈分化。爱德华兹借用了 1970 年代初美国财长约翰·康纳利（John Connally）的名言“美元是我们的货币，却是你们的麻烦”，将当下的局势尖锐概括为：**“这场战争是美国的战争，但承受代价的却是你们。”** 美国的天然气价格几乎波澜不惊（虽然像波士顿等马萨诸塞州地区的汽油价格依然超过 2 美元），但欧洲尤其是亚洲正在承受致命创伤。亚洲绝大多数化工衍生品极度依赖波斯湾地区，例如印度高达 80% 的合成氨（Ammonia）来自海湾地区；随着尿素与玉米价格的比率冲向平流层，亚洲的化肥与粮食供应链正面临灭顶之灾。 金融市场也终于开始从自欺欺人中惊醒。在冲突初期，5年/5年期远期通胀互换（5y5y inflation swaps）甚至一度下挫，但近期无论是 2 年期还是 5y5y 互换利率都在疯狂飙升，市场正痛苦地意识到这场危机将长期化。针对《金融时报》专栏作家罗伯特·阿姆斯特朗（Robert Armstrong）曾提出的“TACO 交易”（即“特朗普总在最后关头认怂退让”，Trump Always Chickens Out），爱德华兹引用了一句绝妙的俏皮话：**“由于伊朗的卷入，现在是‘一个巴掌拍不响’（It takes two to taco / tango）”**——特朗普即便想故技重施宣布政策 180 度大转弯，只要伊朗不配合他的舞步，这场缓和就根本不可能发生。爱德华兹生动描绘了法国兴业银行（Société Générale）内部早会上的戏剧性温差：股票分析师们依旧盲目唱多，债券团队态度摇摆，而大宗商品研究员们“几乎快在麦克风前泣不成声”，因为他们无比清楚化肥、粮食、原油等全面供给紧缩带来的通胀海啸已然不可逆转，正疯狂敲响大门。 - **“TACO”交易的破产**：原本押注地缘摩擦会随特朗普妥协而迅速消退的投机逻辑全面失灵，面对意识形态与地缘诉求完全不在同一频道的伊朗对手，单方面的政治作秀无法化解实体供应链的断裂。 - **商品团队的绝望预警**：法兴银行的大宗商品分析师对即将来临的输入型物价冲击深感无力，与股市依旧沉浸在乐观幻觉中的多头情绪形成了刺眼而荒诞的反差。 ### `30:00` 英国财政困境与代际撕裂的“三重锁” 探讨英国乃至整个欧洲的宏观瓶颈时，核心困境集中在两个层面：一是生产能力持续滑坡，制造业不断被来自中国的竞争吞噬；二是数字产业在技术浪潮中疲态尽显，尤其在人工智能（AI）领域完全无法跟上美国的步伐。虽然舆论普遍呼吁政府必须削减财政赤字，但实际推行却阻力重重。在资本能够自由流动的全球化时代，征收财富税的难度早已人尽皆知，特别是当今社会的巨额财富大多来自股票市场而非传统的工资劳动收入，使得加税空间极其受限。 英国面临着极为特殊的社会福利顽疾。疫情暴发后，大量年轻人被开具长期患病证明而退出劳动力市场，甚至无需履行求职义务，直接导致英国的福利支出账单急剧膨胀、濒临失控。尽管工党政府在议会拥有压倒性多数席位，但在推进任何实质性改革时依然步履维艰，面对党内议员的公开反叛与公众的抗议浪潮，政策频频上演尴尬的“发卡弯式大掉头（U-turns）”。与此同时，福利膨胀并不单单发生在年轻群体，老年人的冬季取暖补贴以及与通胀紧密绑定的养老金“三重保障（triple lock）”制度，更是让财政雪上加霜。 这种不对称的政策倾斜严重加剧了代际之间的敌意与对立。年轻一代背负着高昂的生活成本，难以跨过购房门槛，眼睁睁看着老年群体在“三重保障”的庇护下安享收益——养老金每年按照平均工资涨幅、物价通胀率或 2.5% 中的最高者上调。这种机制实际上构成了一个不断攀升的“实际收益自动扶梯”，在长远来看无论如何都是无法持续的财政重担。 - **年轻劳动力流失**：疫情后大批年轻人被归入长期患病（permanently sick），不必寻找工作即可申领救济，使英国福利支出失控。 - **养老金“三重保障”（Triple Lock）**：英国养老金上浮机制以工资增速、物价通胀与 2.5% 底线三者中取最高值，被爱德华兹直斥为“显然完全无法维系（clearly totally unaffordable）”。 - **政治推行动能匮乏**：即便工党坐拥庞大议会多数，面对党内后座议员造反与民意反弹，财政整固措施依旧寸步难行。 --- ### `32:38` 债券义警苏醒：挑选最脆弱的“操场小孩” 放眼全球，债务滚雪球的现象绝非英国独有。美国国会预算办公室（CBO）对美国公共债务占 GDP 比例的预测曲线已经直冲云霄、走向无穷大。国际货币基金组织（IMF）对此的审视更为严峻，在测算中债务恶化速度唯一能比美国更快的竟是极度特殊的中国，IMF 甚至直接将美中两国列为“两大重灾区（the two basket cases）”。然而在实际的金融防线中，法国的财政数据虽比英国更糟，却享有欧元区机制的大伞庇护；美国负债虽然庞大，却手握美元这一全球绝对储备货币的霸权盾牌。 沉睡已久的“债券义警（Bond Vigilantes）”已经彻底被激怒。他们从桌子底下翻出那本落满灰尘的莱因哈特与罗戈夫（Reinhart & Rogoff）的经典著作，警惕地盯着各国突破 100% GDP 的警戒线。尽管公立部门近年来背负巨债，很大程度上是承担了从居民与企业部门转移过来的过剩债务，但债券义警们可不会讲情面，他们正在全球市场中搜寻那个最容易击破的目标，准备狠狠给对方“来上一记痛揍（give them a bloody good kicking）”，以此杀一儆百。 没有坚厚护城河庇护的英国金边债券（Gilt）市场，不幸沦为了这个“操场上最弱小、最容易挨揍的小孩”。资深投资人比尔·格罗斯（Bill Gross）多年前曾警告金边债券市场不是坐在坚硬的岩石上，而是“坐在一桶随时可能爆炸的硝酸甘油（nitroglycerin）之上”。当市场出现原油价格回落但金边债券收益率反常飙升的背离走势时，清晰地发出了警报：一旦斯塔默（Keir Starmer）政府出现政治动荡，英国主权债市或将首当其冲遭遇血洗。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Sovereign Debt Vulnerability to Bond Vigilantes accDescr: A comparison showing how the US and France have protective umbrellas while the UK gilt market is left vulnerable to bond vigilantes. subgraph Protected["主权护城河防护"] US["美国: 债务直奔无穷大"] -->|受美元全球储备货币地位庇护| SafeUS["免遭直接毁灭性挤兑"] FR["法国: IMF财政赤字数据更差"] -->|受欧元区联合机制大伞庇护| SafeFR["享有区域联盟安全网"] end subgraph Exposed["脆弱目标暴露"] UK["英国金边债券 (Gilt)"] -->|缺乏特权储备地位或联盟保护| Target["'操场上最弱的小孩'"] end BV["债券义警 (Bond Vigilantes)<br/>目睹债务突破100% GDP大关"] -->|寻求定点打击以惩戒全场| Target Target --> Shock["面临类似'硝酸甘油'般的收益率暴冲危机"] ``` --- ### `35:00` 范式思考的消亡与“重回两位数通胀” 在信息高度压缩、政局瞬息万变的快节奏环境下，投资者似乎越来越难以像 2000 年代初提出“冰河期假说（Ice Age thesis）”那样，构建长达数年乃至数十年的宏观范式。当前股票市场陷入了近乎狂热的“逢跌买入（buy on dips）”教条之中：近期股市录得超过 10% 的反弹，竟是历史上经历 10% 回调后速度最快的一次修复。大众普遍笃信美联储永远会在背后兜底，甚至天真地认为经济衰退已被彻底消灭，即便出现衰退也只是源于疫情这种不可抗力，全然淡忘了 2008 年金融危机其实是长期经济扩张积攒失衡后必然引爆的苦果。 爱德华兹坚持认为，建立长周期宏观主题不仅可能，而且至关重要。未来的终局主线已经昭然若揭：无节制的财政失禁、孱弱无力的政治决断，最终将迫使中央银行与货币当局不得不开启债务货币化印钞大潮。以美国为例，政府每年的利息支出竟然已经高达 GDP 的 4%，而在短短十年前，这一数字还与欧元区类似，徘徊在 2% 左右。 面对这笔在数学上根本无法通过税收填补的债务亏空，政策制定者最终只会剩下一条路走——那就是通过通胀把债务稀释掉。亲历过 1970 年代英国高达 28% 通胀率的爱德华兹语出惊人：他坚信全球各大经济体终将重返“两位数通胀（double-digit inflation）”时代。在财政主导（fiscal dominance）成为既定事实的世界里，央行官员即便在修辞上会极力粉饰，绝口不用“债务货币化”这一敏感词汇，但行动上除了默许并制造恶性通胀来赖掉巨额债务外，早已别无选择。 - **极端反弹速度**：股市在经历 10% 回调后上演了历史最快速度的 10%+ 强劲反弹，折射出全市场对“美联储看跌期权（Fed Put）”的盲目笃信。 - **美国偿债成本翻倍**：美国联邦政府利息支出已攀升至 GDP 的 4%，相比十年前 2% 左右的水平翻倍。 - **重磅预言**：爱德华兹认定，在财政主导格局下，通过通货膨胀稀释债务是无法避免的唯一结局，全球将再度见证两位数（10% 以上）的恶性通胀。 --- ### `37:25` 历史失忆症：从亚洲奇迹破灭到 AI 泡沫狂欢 金融市场近年来正呈现出惊人的历史失忆症。对于新入行的年轻分析师或新兴客户而言，哪怕只是谈论 2008 年雷曼兄弟倒闭的惨状，在他们听来也像是提及 1930 年代大萧条或奥地利信贷银行（Creditanstalt）崩盘一样古老而陌生。投机交易的期限被压缩到了极致，市场上甚至充斥着各类连资深从业者都感到难以理喻的“零日到期期权（0DTE）”狂赌。 自 1982 年便投身金融界的老兵爱德华兹，有着亲历过数轮历史幻灭的独特记忆。1996 年，正当世界银行把泰国经济作为典范、大肆出版《泰国经济奇迹：可持续增长与发展》之类的著作时，爱德华兹便敏锐地撰文直指所谓的“亚洲奇迹”不过是一碰就碎的纸牌屋，这甚至一度导致他被马来西亚政府列入禁止入境黑名单。到了 1990 年代末美股互联网泡沫最盛期，他在全美巡回推介看空逻辑时，其首席经济学家老板甚至不得不在现场死死按住愤怒的客户，以防对方冲上来把他打得鼻青脸肿（"punching my lights out"）。 眼下席卷华尔街的 AI 投资热潮，在爱德华兹眼中不过是同一出戏码的又一次重演。“我听过这套故事太多次了，”面对科技泡沫的重现，他感叹道。年轻一代固然可以因为没有沉重的历史包袱而保持盲目乐观，但代际经验的缺失也意味着市场注定会再度在同一个坑中翻车。两位主持人在打趣中指出，播客开播十年来彼此的胡子也开始长满白发，爱德华兹随即戏谑地建议不如直接把摄像镜头调成黑白画面，在幽默互嘲中道尽了周期轮转与岁月沧桑。 ### `42:30` AI 热潮与电信泡沫：资本开支狂欢下的“卖铲人”逻辑 主持人将话题引向人工智能（AI）与 2000 年互联网泡沫（Dot-com Bubble）的历史对照。市场上反驳泡沫论的主流观点认为，如今的科技巨头拥有实实在在的盈利能力和巨额利润，估值倍数也远未达到当年互联网公司那种纯概念炒作的离谱水平。阿尔伯特·爱德华兹（Albert Edwards）指出，最贴切的历史类比并不是那些没有收入的纯网站概念股，而是当年更广泛的“TMT”（电信、媒体与科技）中的电信基础设施板块。当年电信巨头们在全美各地挖掘沟渠、铺设光纤电缆，掀起了一场席卷全行业的资本开支（CapEx）狂潮；这与如今各大科技巨头倾注数百上千亿美元采购英伟达（Nvidia）芯片、兴建算力中心如出一辙。 爱德华兹解释道，正如当年售卖线缆的公司一样，英伟达等半导体芯片制造商在如今的淘金热中扮演着“提供铁锹和铲子”的角色，这些硬件供应商确实坐拥真实的巨额利润。但真正的致命隐患在于“叙事过于诱人所引发的资本狂欢”：市场近乎无条件地向这些科技企业提供极低成本的资金（尽管甲骨文等公司的融资成本已不再那么低廉），企业随后便将天量现金挥霍在未来十年都未必能实现商业回报的 CapEx 上。其结果是美国大型科技股（Mega-caps）的资产负债表发生根本性恶化，曾经源源不断的自由现金流正在被吞噬殆尽，有预测甚至显示到 2027 年这批巨头的整体自由现金流可能趋近于零。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: AI投资狂热与电信泡沫演进路径 accDescr: 展现从低成本资金和叙事推演到资本开支过剩及现金流枯竭的过程 subgraph 叙事与资本投入 A["高确定性叙事驱动<br/>（AI / 早期光纤通信）"] --> B["充裕/低成本资金涌入"] B --> C["巨额 CapEx 军备竞赛<br/>（买芯片/挖沟铺光纤）"] end subgraph 产业链分化与财务恶化 C --> D["卖铲人短期赚取真金白银<br/>（如 Nvidia / 线缆厂商）"] C --> E["巨头资产负债表恶化<br/>自由现金流被资本开支吞噬殆尽"] E --> F["长期投资回报率存疑<br/>盈利二阶导数开始掉头向下"] end ``` - **TMT 泡沫的电信镜鉴**：2000 年互联网泡沫不仅是虚幻的网站，还伴随着大规模光纤铺设等实体 CapEx 繁荣，这与当下的 GPU 算力基建完全同构。 - **自由现金流的急剧衰竭**：爱德华兹引用的图表显示，曾经作为“印钞机”的美国大型科技股，其巨额自由现金流可能在 2027 年前后降至零，这彻底改变了科技巨头的基本面防御属性。 --- ### `45:00` 格林斯潘的“世纪创新”神话与必然降临的估值破裂 为了说明“伟大的划时代技术”与“惨烈的股市崩盘”完全可以并存，爱德华兹特地拿出了一段他在投资笔记中摘录的名人名言。这段话出自美联储前主席艾伦·格林斯潘（Alan Greenspan）于 2000 年 1 月 13 日在纽约经济俱乐部的公开演讲：“回过头来看，我们将意识到美国经济当时正经历着一场百年一遇的创新加速期，它以前所未有的速度推动了生产力、产出、企业利润和股票价格的飞跃发展。”令人唏嘘的是，就在格林斯潘发表这番盛赞创新浪潮的讲话后不久，以科技股为主的纳斯达克指数便遭遇了毁灭性的历史级崩盘。 爱德华兹笑称，这段被格林斯潘和伯南克等人极力想从公众记忆中抹去的名言，是他近期在参加传奇空头杰里米·格兰瑟姆（Jeremy Grantham）的新书《Making of a Perma Bear》发布会时重温的。他自嘲道：“我平时很懒，不怎么读书，但既然要去参加他的新书发布会，我就觉得最好还是硬着头皮读一下。”主持人随后巧妙地抛出一个关于熊市的幽默冷笑话：“当空头们开新书派对时，那算是一场野餐吗？”（双关著名童谣《泰迪熊的野餐》（Teddy Bears' Picnic））。爱德华兹欣然大笑，并严肃强调：AI 确实极具变革性，格林斯潘当年对科技革新的判断在技术维度上也完全正确，但“技术具备革命性”绝不意味着“股票市场不会发生雪崩”。 - **格林斯潘的精准“预言”与讽刺现实**：2000 年 1 月 13 日格林斯潘盛赞科技创新引发的生产力与股价奇迹，数周之后纳斯达克泡沫即告破裂。 - **技术变革与资产泡沫的脱钩**：即便 AI 在未来十年重塑人类生产力，当前资产价格透支未来的程度与过度投资的风险，依然足以触发深度的市场崩溃。 --- ### `47:15` 动量交易的局限、二阶导数见顶与散户主导的脆弱韧性 主持人进一步追问市场的历史违背感：2010 年代中期量化宽松（QE）逐渐退出，美联储停止降息甚至开启缩表，但美股依然长盛不衰；如今利率环境更是彻底告别了“冰河时代”的超低利率，美股却依旧屡创新高，这是否动摇了爱德华兹过去的逻辑框架？爱德华兹回应称，疫情前长达数年的 QE 主要是点燃了自我强化的趋势，使得动量交易（Momentum Investing）成为历史上最赚钱的策略之一。爱德华兹打趣地提到，量化分析主管安迪·拉普索恩（Andy Lapthorne）上个月刚和他共事满 30 年，安迪的工位离他很近，“甚至最近总想把桌子搬得离我远几张”。安迪的量化模型表明动量投资本身没有问题，如果爱德华兹是一个需要维持高仓位的公募基金经理，他也乐意顺应动量，但核心在于必须通过技术面和宏观拐点来捕捉离场信号。 爱德华兹指出，目前科技板块最值得警惕的宏观变化在于“盈利增长的二阶导数已经开始掉头向下（Second derivative is starting to turn over）”。利润规模目前虽然仍在健康增长，但其增速的加速度已经放缓，“动量的动量正在减退（The momentum of the momentum is starting to slow）”，因为任何商业逻辑都无法永远保持抛物线式的狂飙。在资产泡沫晚期，即便是最坚定的多头，也必须警惕这种增长动能边际衰减的警讯。此外，爱德华兹将美股在利率攀升下依旧坚挺的动力归结为散户投资者的狂热接盘：从早期的解禁交易（Liberation Trade）开始，散户往往比机构投资者更早冲入市场，凭借“逢跌买入”的惯性一次次将大盘拉回历史高位，但这也往往构成了历史重大熊市爆发前夕典型的市场生态。 - **动量的动量放缓（Momentum of the Momentum）**：科技股净利润规模仍在扩张，但盈利增速的边际变化率（二阶导）已由加速转为减速，无法支撑永续的抛物线估值。 - **散户驱动的结构性风险**：在机构保持审慎的背景下，散户资本成为维持市场动量的主导力量，不断为多头趋势注入流动性，放大了市场反转时的脆弱性。 ### `50:00` 估值错配、被榨干的消费者与潜在的黑天鹅衰退 经济周期见顶时往往伴随着典型的衰退风险：资产处于极度错误的估值与前瞻市盈率（Forward PE）之上，随后价格暴跌。在正常周期中，诸如铜业股等周期股在盈利峰值时的市盈率通常非常低（比如 4 倍左右），市场对价格崩塌有所防备与记忆；然而在泡沫期，像标普 500 指数在衰退边缘时却能维持在 23 倍的前瞻市盈率。这意味着市场不仅用着错误的前瞻盈利预测，还挂着严重错配的高市盈率，完全不承认经济可能陷入衰退。除去随时可能因意外事件破灭的 AI 资本支出叙事，剥离 AI 后的美国实体经济其实相当疲弱：去年在 GDP 维持在 2% 到 3% 之间稳健增长的同时，私营部门非农就业人数同比增速却已滑落至零。 更为严峻的隐患来自美国消费端。过去一年中，美国实际家庭收入同比仅增长 0.5%，但实际消费支出增速仍超过 2%。支撑这种背离的唯一原因就是储蓄率的急剧消耗——美国个人储蓄率在过去一年中从超过 5% 暴跌至 3.5%。纵观历史，储蓄率比这更低的时期只有两次：一次是疫情期间人们疯狂花掉救济支票（降至 2.5%），另一次则是 2008 年全球金融危机前的信贷泡沫期。当前的美国消费者已经被“彻底榨干（totally tapped out）”。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 成本推动型通胀下的企业利润挤压机制 accDescr: 展示消费者储蓄耗尽背景下，成本上升如何迫使企业压缩利润并最终引发裁员与衰退 subgraph MacroShock ["宏观冲击与消费现状"] A["新一轮成本推动型通胀<br>(如油价、原材料)"] B["消费者储蓄率暴跌至 3.5%<br>实际收入同比仅增 0.5%"] end subgraph CorporateImpact ["企业端传导"] C["无法顺畅向下游转嫁涨价<br>(告别疫情时期的贪婪通胀)"] D["企业畸高利润率遭受严重挤压"] end subgraph RecessionRisk ["衰退连锁反应"] E["削减资本开支与裁员"] F["非 AI 实体经济坠入衰退<br>最终拖垮 AI 科技板块"] end A & B --> C C --> D D --> E E --> F ``` 上一次通胀袭来时，企业借机大肆提价并迎来了前所未有的“贪婪通胀（Greedflation）”（圣路易斯联储曾指出零售、批发和建筑业是最大的推手）。但那时消费者手握疫情补贴支票，企业能够轻易转嫁成本；而如今储蓄耗尽，面对新一波成本推动，企业恐将无法继续转嫁涨价压力，其“荒谬且骇人”的高利润率将被大幅压缩。一旦利润缩水，企业势必会以裁员和削减投资作为回应。这正是当前无人预料的黑天鹅：油价与成本压力可能会让剥离 AI 后的脆弱经济直接跌入衰退，并顺带将 AI 板块一并拉下神坛。 ### `53:50` 职业生涯中最恐慌的时刻：2007 年 CDO 泡沫与伯南克的失职 当被问及漫长职业生涯中何时最接近“按下恐慌按钮”时，Albert Edwards 坦言自己总习惯紧盯着恐慌按钮，总在预判转角处的危机。但他指出，眼下最让他感到反向不安的，反而是自己居然“没有过去那么看跌”，甚至难以找到股市立即崩盘的催化剂。而回顾过往，他最担忧的时刻是 2006 至 2007 年的次贷危机前夕。 当时尽管他不甚了解复杂的加密货币或 AI 技术细节，但他下功夫彻底摸清了担保债务凭据（CDO）的底层逻辑。他在 2007 年参加了一场 CDO 行业峰会，惊讶地发现业内人士不仅毫无乐观情绪，反而弥漫着极度恐慌。当时美联储主席本·伯南克（Ben Bernanke）面对房地产泡沫的质疑，公开宣称“我不接受存在泡沫的前设，历史上从未出现过全国范围的房价下跌”，Albert Edwards 认为这种表态极其荒唐，直言其根本不称职。尽管伯南克后来因研究大萧条而被视为救市的合适人选，但他关于大萧条的学术论文中对前期的信贷泡沫只字未提。 ### `55:40` 央行官员的盲目执念与通胀目标的荒谬 Albert Edwards 对央行官员群体的表现提出了尖锐批评。他打趣道，自从自己离开英国央行（Bank of England）后，那里的行员素质才有了显著提升。在他看来，央行官员常常出于善意的救市初衷，却因不愿承认错误而不断把事情搞得更糟。除了危机初期的首轮量化宽松（QE）尚有依据外，后续长期沉迷 QE 完全是一场灾难。 他援引保罗·沃尔克（Paul Volcker）临终前对美联储的严厉抨击指出：通胀根本无法被如此精确地衡量，在 1% 到 3% 之间的波动完全是可以接受的。当年实际通胀在统计误差范围内降至 1% 附近时，美联储却执迷于将其硬推回 2% 的死板目标，这完全是画蛇添足。主持人也赞同并指出，回顾 2010 年代后期的低通胀时期，体感非常良好，大众与学者对“通胀过低”的无病呻吟向来令人费解。 - 沃尔克观点：通胀在 1% 到 3% 区间只要不出现加速失控就属正常，机械追求 2% 忽略了统计误差。 - Edwards 建议：必须对各国央行行长的权力实施更为严格的约束与限制。 ### `57:15` 节目尾声与主持人的后记反思：周期见顶的信号？ 访谈结束后，两位主持人 Joe Weisenthal 与 Tracy Allaway 进行了深度复盘。他们打趣道，Albert Edwards 虽然在报告中总是描绘灾难、被读者认为极度悲观，但现实中却是一个穿着花衬衫、性格开朗温和的乐天派。 ```mermaid flowchart LR accTitle: 周期顶部情绪对照 accDescr: 主持人总结的两个表明市场可能接近顶部的极端信号 subgraph Signal1 ["超级空头视角"] A["Albert Edwards<br>(常年大空头)"] --> B["坦言看不到崩盘催化剂<br>情绪罕见地并不悲观"] end subgraph Signal2 ["奇点与无限盈利叙事"] C["Joe 正在阅读<br>《奇点临近》"] --> D["幻想算力与资本投资正反馈<br>产生'盈利走向无穷大'的狂热"] end B & D --> E{"典型的周期见顶信号？"} ``` 在后记探讨中，主持人谈到了两个极具代表性的现象： 1. **高露洁（Colgate）财报的印证**：Tracy 提到高露洁管理层在财报电话会议中指出，受石化原料上涨影响，包装成本大幅飙升，公司选择下调全年利润率指引来自行消化成本。当分析师追问为何不直接提价时，管理层语焉不详，直接建议分析师调低财务模型中的利润率假设。这与 Edwards 提出的“消费者无力承担涨价、企业利润率将遭挤压”的逻辑完全吻合。 2. **“盈利走向无穷大”的顶部狂热**：Joe 分享了自己在飞往伦敦前重读雷·库兹韦尔（Ray Kurzweil）2004 年出版的《奇点临近》（*The Singularity is Near*）的感受。书中关于计算机加速进化带动更多投资的正反馈理论，让他一度联想到 AI 是否会让企业盈利直接“奔向无穷大”。然而 Joe 随即警醒：当市场上最坚定的老牌空头 Albert Edwards 都觉得找不到看空的由头，而主持人自己也开始畅想盈利无限时，这类播客节目的录制时间点，往往正是市场周期的最顶峰。 ## Notable quotes > `05:00` 只要还有人愿意跟我说话，我就谢天谢地了。 — Albert Edwards > `10:00` 我完全赞同阿尔伯特的观点，但你们为什么还没开除他？ — Tony Dye > `10:00` 你只是凡人，你终将死去。 — Albert Edwards > `20:00` 荒谬至极、彻底发疯（batshit crazy） — Albert Edwards > `26:30` 这场战争是美国的战争，但承受代价的却是你们。 — Albert Edwards > `26:30` 由于伊朗的卷入，现在是‘一个巴掌拍不响’（It takes two to taco / tango） — Albert Edwards > `32:38` 坐在一桶随时可能爆炸的硝酸甘油（nitroglycerin）之上 — Bill Gross > `37:25` 我听过这套故事太多次了 — Albert Edwards > `45:00` 回过头来看，我们将意识到美国经济当时正经历着一场百年一遇的创新加速期，它以前所未有的速度推动了生产力、产出、企业利润和股票价格的飞跃发展。 — Alan Greenspan > `47:15` 盈利增长的二阶导数已经开始掉头向下（Second derivative is starting to turn over） — Albert Edwards > `53:50` 我不接受存在泡沫的前设，历史上从未出现过全国范围的房价下跌 — Ben Bernanke ## Mentioned Albert Edwards, Joe Weisenthal, Tracy Allaway, 法国兴业银行 (Société Générale), 英格兰银行 (Bank of England), 克莱沃特·本森 (Kleinwort Benson), 辜朝明 (Richard Koo), 野村证券 (Nomura), 拉里·萨默斯 (Larry Summers), 托尼·戴 (Tony Dye), 杰里米·格兰瑟姆 (Jeremy Grantham), 加里·布林森 (Gary Brinson), 诺基亚 (Nokia), 爱立信 (Ericsson), 查克·普林斯 (Chuck Prince), 斯蒂芬妮·凯尔顿 (Stephanie Kelton), 《赤字迷思》(The Deficit Myth), 国际货币基金组织 (IMF), 约翰·康纳利 (John Connally), 罗伯特·阿姆斯特朗 (Robert Armstrong), 亚当·图兹 (Adam Tooze), TS Lombard, 美国国会预算办公室 (CBO), 莱因哈特与罗戈夫 (Reinhart & Rogoff), 比尔·格罗斯 (Bill Gross), 基尔·斯塔默 (Keir Starmer), 英伟达 (Nvidia), 甲骨文 (Oracle), 艾伦·格林斯潘 (Alan Greenspan), 本·伯南克 (Ben Bernanke), 保罗·沃尔克 (Paul Volcker), 安迪·拉普索恩 (Andy Lapthorne), 雷·库兹韦尔 (Ray Kurzweil), 《奇点临近》(The Singularity is Near), 高露洁 (Colgate) ## Video description <p data-renderer-start-pos="111">Making a long career as a bear at a sell-side institution is tough. Generally financial markets have done quite well which means forecasting doom and gloom is, usually, only tenable for so long. Which is why we wanted to talk to one of the most successful bears out there. Soci&eacute;t&eacute; G&eacute;n&eacute;rale has let Albert Edwards out of the bear cage for today's episode. Edwards knows his reputation as a bear is well deserved: He believes, among other things, double-digit inflation is in the offing. We also talk about the attention span of readers on the buy-side, what success looks like for a bear, and how a bear avoids getting fired.</p> <p data-renderer-start-pos="737">Read more:<br><a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-05-14/boeing-wins-200-jet-plane-order-from-china-trump-says?utm_medium=referral&utm_source=podcast&utm_campaign=odd_lots&utm_content=article" data-renderer-mark="true" data-is-router-link="false" data-testid="link-with-safety">Boeing Falls After Trump Unveils Smaller China Aircraft Order</a><br><a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-05-14/boe-s-pill-says-strong-iran-price-pressures-warrant-rate-rise?utm_medium=referral&utm_source=podcast&utm_campaign=odd_lots&utm_content=article" data-renderer-mark="true" data-is-router-link="false" data-testid="link-with-safety">BOE&rsquo;s Pill Says Strong Iran Price Pressures Warrant Rate Rise</a></p> <p data-renderer-start-pos="873">Only <a href="http://bloomberg.com/" data-testid="inline-card-resolved-view">Bloomberg - Business News, Stock Markets, Finance, Breaking & World News</a> subscribers can get the Odd Lots newsletter in their inbox each week, plus unlimited access to the site and app. Subscribe at&nbsp; <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/subscriptions/oddlots?in_source=oddlotspodcast" data-renderer-mark="true" data-is-router-link="false" data-testid="link-with-safety">bloomberg.com/subscriptions/oddlots</a></p> <p data-renderer-start-pos="1045"><a href="http://bloomberg.com/subscriptions/oddlots" data-renderer-mark="true" data-is-router-link="false" data-testid="link-with-safety">Subscribe to the Odd Lots Newsletter</a><br><strong data-renderer-mark="true">Join the conversation:</strong> <a href="https://discord.gg/oddlots" data-renderer-mark="true" data-is-router-link="false" data-testid="link-with-safety">discord.gg/oddlots</a></p><p>See <a href="https://omnystudio.com/listener">omnystudio.com/listener</a> for privacy information.</p> [Source](https://podtrac.com/pts/redirect.mp3/tracking.swap.fm/track/UVBrz8bN8aM2Xe47PEPu/traffic.omny.fm/d/clips/e73c998e-6e60-432f-8610-ae210140c5b1/8a94442e-5a74-4fa2-8b8d-ae27003a8d6b/17364f35-3bd0-469d-b500-b44a0132582f/audio.mp3?in_playlist=982f5071-765c-403d-969d-ae27003a8d83)

[5:00] Albert Edwards: 只要还有人愿意跟我说话，我就谢天谢地了。 [10:00] Tony Dye: 我完全赞同阿尔伯特的观点，但你们为什么还没开除他？ [10:00] Albert Edwards: 你只是凡人，你终将死去。 [20:00] Albert Edwards: 荒谬至极、彻底发疯（batshit crazy） [26:30] Albert Edwards: 这场战争是美国的战争，但承受代价的却是你们。 [26:30] Albert Edwards: 由于伊朗的卷入，现在是‘一个巴掌拍不响’（It takes two to taco / tango） [32:38] Bill Gross: 坐在一桶随时可能爆炸的硝酸甘油（nitroglycerin）之上 [37:25] Albert Edwards: 我听过这套故事太多次了 [45:00] Alan Greenspan: 回过头来看，我们将意识到美国经济当时正经历着一场百年一遇的创新加速期，它以前所未有的速度推动了生产力、产出、企业利润和股票价格的飞跃发展。 [47:15] Albert Edwards: 盈利增长的二阶导数已经开始掉头向下（Second derivative is starting to turn over） [53:50] Ben Bernanke: 我不接受存在泡沫的前设，历史上从未出现过全国范围的房价下跌

[35:00] Albert Edwards: The end game for me... I can remember 28% inflation in the UK in the '70s. I certainly think we go back everywhere to double-digit inflation. [45:00] Alan Greenspan: In retrospect, we will look back and recognize that the US economy was experiencing a once-in-a-century acceleration of innovation... [50:00] Albert Edwards: The consumer is totally tapped out... If these margins start coming down because they can't pass on these price increases, will they then react to that by cutting jobs and cutting investment?

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When you're running a business, the best days are the ones where priorities stay on track. For midsize and large companies, risk can affect multiple parts of the organization at once, from property and liability to cyber and regulatory challenges. At that level managing risk becomes an ongoing discipline At the Hartford the focus is on helping businesses manage risk before it turns into something more disruptive And when losses do happen, that work is paired with insurance coverage shaped by years of underwriting, risk engineering, and claims experience. Learn more at thehartford.com slash risk mitigation. Policies provided by Hartford Fire Insurance Company and its property and casualty affiliates, Hartford, Connecticut. Bloomberg Audio Studios. Podcasts. Radio. News. Hello and welcome to another episode of the Odd Thoughts Podcast. I'm Tracey Allaway. And I'm Joe Weisenthal. Joe, I think a lot of people don't understand the role of bears in finance and markets. It's to create headlines for tweeting, right? Well, technically it's to sell newsletters. I was going to say it's to get emails open, right? That's right. So I think, you know, being a bear who's selling a newsletter, we can all kind of see the business model there. But if you an analyst at a big sell firm and you known as a bear that seems incredibly difficult to me because like the tendency on Wall Street and investment and finance is towards optimism right You have to place bets on the future. You have to put your money to work. And if you're managing to be a sort of like long run bear at a big sell side institution, that's pretty impressive to me. Oh, so you're selling. Yes. You're selling. They call it the sell side. and if you know there's all these financial instruments that the financial institution has and you're the bear it's like well i'm not going to buy anything you know what else it's the sell side you're supposed to have something to sell not selling other people to sell the clue is truly in the name but the other thing that's very impressive is if you're a long-run bear at a sell-side institution who also manages to be the top-ranked macro analyst in your category for 13 years in a row, that's pretty impressive, right? It is impressive. And this gets to another important point, which is people like to read. And I think about this even with podcasts and other forms of any sort of media, whether it's formal media and a PDF that a bank sells or a news organization, people like to consume ideas And it doesn mean they going to consume the ideas and say oh this was convincing buy sell But they like to hear a range of ideas They like to have their thought process influenced They like to stress test their own ideas against others To me, the role of a true bear on Wall Street is for big investors and institutional clients to actually test some of their thinking. You know, if you have a bunch of analysts who are trying to pitch you tech stocks at the moment, like you want to hear an opposing viewpoint that says, well, maybe here is the downside scenario. Well, here's the other thing right now. We're recording this in early May 2026, which is that equity markets around the world are very high. Some would say bizarrely high, but they're very high for various reasons we could get into. Bonds have been selling up very much. And that's sort of the story we're here in the UK. Right. now and the headlines are all about generally how much guilt yields keep spiking. But we're in this moment in which I would say there is a real mismatch, but between I would say gloom, which you could pick your poison. Why are you gloomy? You're gloomy because the AIs are going to take us are going to destroy the world. You're gloomy because the war in Iran, you're gloomy because high deficits, et cetera. You're gloomy because politics in so many countries seems to be deteriorated. There's plenty of reason for gloom out there. [5:00] And yet, you know, you're losing if you're not in the stock market, etc. It is just a very weird time. But yes, there is this weird mismatch, depending on how you look at it, between sentiment across many different attempts to measure sentiment and what at least certain parts of the market are doing. Yeah, I think that's exactly right. And also, you know, you mentioned bond yields going up. So we're recording this on May 6th. The 30-year UK guilt, we're in London still, by the way, hit like its highest since 1998 or something yesterday. And you're absolutely right. There does seem to be a tension between all these little glimmers of inflation that are out there and what's going on in the equity market, because you would expect with rates possibly going up that equities were going to take a hit. But anyway, we do, in fact, have the perfect guess. That's right. Someone who is very well known, not just for being a bear, but also for having very long term sort of paradigm views on the relationship between bonds and equities. Someone we've been reading for a very long time, probably since the beginning of our careers. We finally convinced him to come on the podcast. I gave it away earlier when I said the top ranked XTEL survey macro analyst 13 times in a row But we are of course going to be speaking with Albert Edwards who is the global strategist over at SockGen Hi there Thank you so much for coming on OnLots It a pleasure I don get out much This is a real treat. They've let you out of the bear cave. Exactly. That's right. Why don't you go ahead and explain? Well, first of all, I should ask, when people introduce you as a well-known bear, does it grate you the way it seems to grate some other people? I remember Nouriel Roubini would always get upset if you called him Dr. doom. Do you get upset? No, I'm pleased to be introduced at all and anyone's still speaking to me, quite frankly. Okay. Is it a deserved reputation? It's deserved in the sense that the media has more latched onto or had more latched onto my bearish views on equity markets, but not my bullish views on government bonds. Now, I joined the sell side. So I've been working in finance since 1982. I joined the Bank of England just over the road here. But I joined after a little stint on the buy side, which is why, by the way, I write such short notes, because I've actually had to read these notes on the buy side over the years. And I know the clients and readers aren sitting there waiting for them And if they can read them in about three four minutes they not going to read them at all But I joined the sell side in 1988 at Kleinwaltz became Dresden Kleinwaltz I was there for almost 20 years. But I saw the back end of the Japanese bubble. And I saw what Richard Kuh at Nomura used to describe the balance sheet recession in Japan and how it unraveled. And by the time we got to it, and how Western economists were saying, you're doing it all wrong in Japan. You should be just liquidating the capital stock and get to get rid of this deflation. And I was thinking, well, firstly, actually, what's happening in Japan is they're just ahead of you, 10 years ahead of you in the West, because their credit bubble was a lot earlier. And when it bursts in the West, you won't be doing what you're recommending that they do. You'll be slashing rates, you'll be doing everything to stop recessions. But the key thing about Japan. So the back end of 1998, when I thought this is coming to the West, I developed what I call the Ice Age view, which is secular stagnation thesis, which is essentially Laurence Summers the excess of savings over investment driving down real yields and bond yields and causing a re of valuations But we saw in Japan after a while that actually here inflation and bond yields and interest rates would carry on coming down. But after a while, it wouldn't cause any more P expansion. Actually, quite the reverse. Inflation got so low and so close to deflation, it would cause P contraction. so what I was trying to do is bolt on a financial market view onto the secular stagnation thesis and that ran all the way from 1996 I ran with it I thought it was coming immediately after the Asian crisis you mentioned guilt heels being their highest since 1998 I can remember that the aftermath of the Asian crisis the Russian GKO crisis this is where longevity helps by the way I might not be able to remember what happened yesterday, but I can remember 20 years ago quite well. And then from 2000 onwards, you started to see, as bond yields got lower, problems were merging within the equity markets. So that was basically the Ice Age thesis. And it worked very... So although I was an equity bear and well-known for that, I was very much a bond bull, government bond bull. I'm glad you said, just reflecting, I'm glad you said, [10:00] You said the point about having come from the buy side and understood the attention spans of readers and how that informed your view of the sell side, because that's something that I've said or thought many times. Having started my career, a lot of what I learned to write was from reading sell side research. And I figured that, OK, the sell side analysts are writing for people who are just inundated with notes. Their inboxes are filled with all kinds of notes. They must know what the type of content that the buy side is willing to read. Chart heavy, often concise, etc. And so early on in my journalism career, I figured, okay, if this is how the sell side writes, it's probably a good idea to sort of crib some of these ideas because they understand the realities of shortened attention spans and so forth. And now with social media, everyone has the attention span essentially of a buy side trader. What's your job? You know, Tracy introduced you as a strategist. Setting aside your views specifically, what does success look like? Why do you have a role at the bank and what is the purpose of your job Why am I employed And actually And I don mean that from like why you employed like if you gotten the equity call et cetera Why is this an important role though to have at a bank Well, I remember in the run-up to the NASDAQ bubble bursting, we were having our round table lunches at Kleinwalt's. And Tony Dye then, who was head of Philips and Drew Asset Management, who had become bearish too early, a bit like Jeremy Grant, the value orientated, and his co-conspirator out in Chicago, what's his name, Brinson, who both had come under the umbrella of UBS. I remember him saying to the head of equities at Kleinwaltz, well, I totally agree with what Albert's saying, but why haven't you fired him? Because that's what happens to most bears or most analysts who get it wrong, not on the bullish side, but if you're an economist, and call a recession on the sell side, and you're wrong, you're usually out pretty quickly. There's such a bias towards optimism. And it's not just confected. It's natural. It's like an analyst covering a stock. Inevitably, they're going to be usually enthusiastic about their sector and stock So there is a natural bias And part of my role I mean I developed it over the years in that even when I getting it wrong how to avoid getting fired. We had an analyst at Kleinwaltz in the late 90s. He was a tech analyst. He was very bearish on Nokia and Ericsson. He was right. He was pounding the table with analysts, sorry, with their clients. and he p***ed off the client so much, he almost got fired. And the secret is to develop strategies. This is my view for what it's worth. They know my, they can calibrate what I'm thinking. I'm not too much in their face. I'm not annoying them too much. And I'm a bit like Caesar always used to have a slave right behind him whose job it was to say to Caesar, you are mortal. You are mortal. I thought you were going to say you're a bit like Caesar. I was like, whoa, wait a second. No, I'm the slave. Right. I'm the wage slave and the actual slave. Often those slaves themselves were terminated in pretty horrendous fashion themselves. But if the clients even clients who are bulls would want to hear what I saying just to know what to be watching out for in the back of mind They got to to be fully invested They got to participate But hey we got to keep dancing as the Chuck Prince thing. But should we be dancing near the fire escapes or in the center of the room? That sort of thing. All of that makes a lot of sense. And I want to get into the risks that you're seeing now. But before we do, just going back to the Ice Age thesis. So on the equity side, Explain what went wrong, because this is the thing that you're criticized for and you're sort of known for is you've had a bearish view on equities for a very, very long time. It didn't work out. What happened? Well, what happened from 2000 onwards, if you look at charts of bond yields carrying on falling, equity yields did start to rise. So you did have that exactly what you saw in Japan. Now, what derails the derating of equities, in my view, is certainly quantitative easing. So the green and the, it wasn't just used once in 2008 when you were in your heyday. Well, you're in your heyday now, of course, but you were in another heyday. Another heyday, the older heyday. Another heyday. But how it persisted all the way [15:00] through over the next 10 years. And that basically inflated, and that was the job of QE, to inflate all asset prices. Where the ice age continued to work was within the equity market because sectors which were benefited from lower bond deals, such as defensives or growth sectors, did extraordinarily well and re-rated to huge P premiums versus cyclicality or value stocks. So even though the equity manager might ignore what I'm saying at the macro level, well, the market's not going down, actually within the equity market, it was still very, very relevant, this Japanification of the West theme. Whether you're planning a big tech event, launching a new campaign, or just stocking up on team gear, finding the right promotional products makes all the difference. 4imprint offers thousands of options from on apparel and premium drinkware to tech totes and giveaways so you can find the right fit for any audience purpose or budget You can customize it all your logo your message your look and many items come with no setup charge to help you save. 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USVI, naturally in rhythm. let's talk about then japanification and within japanification japan specifically because this is an important there's a lot going on right now that's very important in the 2010s the jgb market for a long time it was characterized as the widow maker right because everyone looked at the size of the japanese debt stock and they say it's going up and up and up it's big japanese debt to GDP is getting higher and higher, and yet rates were going down. This confused a lot of people. You were correct on the call that that was actually sort of irrelevant, that actually that stock could go higher and higher, rates could keep going down. Japanese yields famously zero, probably negative in many instances. Post-COVID, however, that's changed. And now Japan, as well as every other developed market economy, the rates are going up. So this relationship... [20:00] relationship, whatever was going on has flipped. What flipped really post-COVID in your view, such that rates are going up all around the world, including in Japan, but also especially in the UK, that ice age of disinflation and lower rates has truly come to an end. I mean, what flipped, in my view, was prior to the COVID recession. By the way, before the COVID recession, I was writing in early 2020, before the pandemic came along, that actually the next recession would see a transition away from the ice age. I was moving. And it had worked for me for quite a long time. But actually, I was thinking we were going to move to a new paradigm. And the falling Bondiol story was going to stop. And the reason was, up until that point, Quantitative easing had been injected primarily and virtually entirely into the veins of Wall Street. The idea that the QE didn't create inflation was nonsense. It created loads of inflation but the sort of inflation people like in housing in financial assets Asset prices And no one complains about that unless you don own the asset prices What it caused was a lot of intergenerational tension with younger people not being able to afford, which is, we can come on to populism later, but one of the reasons populism has come along in space. So it caused lots of inequality, which even the central banks eventually realised. But what I thought would occur was the next recession when it came along, you were so close to outright deflation. And certainly, remember at that time, you were having negative bond. So much of the market was negative bond deals. Europe had quite clearly fallen into the Japanification trap. The US was heading there. I thought and predicted that we would get a flip over into a modern monetary theory type QE, where they started injecting money into the veins of Main Street and a bit into fiscal fiscal. Fiscal. So basically classic tax cuts, checks dropping on people's doorsteps paid for by monetary creation. And I didn foresee clearly the pandemic made the situation the inflationary situation on consumer prices a lot worse because of the restricted supply chains And having read, I've got a lot of sympathy with a lot of, I don't tend to have any dogmatic views, monetarist, Keynesian or whatever. I'm quite Catholic. I bring all the themes in. there's quite a lot about MMTR I agree with but reading Stephanie Kelton's book one thing was absolutely clear they were saying yes we can do this it doesn't create inflation but when you hit capacity constraints you have to stop doing it and nothing could have been more capacity constrained than global economy during the COVID so in my view it was batshit crazy to do what they were doing And it was going to create the money. You could see it from the broad money growth. So just to be clear, and I know you said we're going to skip ahead to the populism, which is a very intertwined, I would say, or many people would say, with what's going on with economic policy right now. Is the failure basically the premise that governments could ever stop the fiscal expansion once the capacity constraint is hit So you have the money drops you have the helicopter drops you have the checks you have the tax cuts arguably quite justified during the worst of the COVID. Is the core analytical error the notion that after you hit that capacity constraints, that governments have the internal capacity to say, okay, we've hit that point now where we have to raise taxes to stop the check. Democratically elected. And the democratically elected officials are capable of saying, you know what, we've hit these capacity constraints and now we have to unwind the checks. I don't think that I don't think congenitally they are able to do that. That's what I'm saying. Is that where the analysis breaks? Yeah, that that. Well, that's where the that's where the prescription breaks down. Yeah, that's where the future, if you like, is so scary because. Well, actually, in the US, for example, the budget deficit detached itself from economic reality before COVID hit in Trump's first term. And that's when you first started seeing budget deficits heading to 6% of GDP in absent of a recession or a crisis. And we're at 7% of GDP. [25:00] I was looking at the IMF numbers before I came in. There's 7% of GDP when unemployment is this low. There's no appetite. And if politicians try and do it, and I would say part of the problem with the UK at the moment, so the yields at 28-year highs, is not that they haven't tried to do it. They have tried to do it. But it's a very fine tightrope, placating the bond markets and pissing off your electorate so much that you're on your way out. To Dubai. Well, no, you're on your way out of government. Oh, okay. I thought you were saying that you're on your way out to the electorate and your high taxpayers are out to Dubai. Some of them are on their way out to Dubai and then looping back somewhere else at the moment. But you're out of government. And this is the problem, one of the problems for the UK government is the electorate won't tolerate unless there's a crisis. So almost politicians need a Eurozone type Greek, Spanish, Italian crisis to be able to implement the measures that everyone knows needs to take place But electorates currently have no appetite for I saw this amazing chart You probably saw it too because it was in Adam Tuzas' newsletter recently, but it was from TS Lombard, and it showed fiscal support during the 2022 energy crisis in Europe as a percentage of GDP. And I hadn't realized just how substantial it actually was, like energy tax cuts. And so, of course, the question now is with oil going back up and people coming under pressure, if we're going to see that same type of fiscal response? I don't think you can. Well, first of all, it's even in Europe, the rise in the gas price is nowhere near as bad as it was in 2022. And they will do stuff and they have done stuff in places like Spain, despite the European Commission warning the countries that actually you haven't got the buffers to be able to do this. They have been reducing VAT. But I quite like the quote, in the US, it's somewhat different. I was just over in Boston recently, I can see the gas price well above $2 a barrel. Especially in Massachusetts, yeah. Yeah But the natural gas price hasn really gone up in the US And winding back to that famous statement in the early 70s of this is our currency but your problem to the Europeans This is our war US war but it's your problem. Europeans and especially Asia, particularly Asia, which gets so much of its derivative chemical supplies out of the Gulf. And I saw your chart of the urea versus is the corn prize showing as absolutely stratospheric. But so much of the so much derivative chemical products come out of the Gulf, especially to Asia. I saw that 80% of India's ammonia comes from the Gulf. Now, Asia is in real, real trouble. And this is coming down. I mean, One thing I think that's really surprised me in the early part of the war was when I looked at five year versus five year inflation swaps, they'd come down. They hadn't started going up. But recently, the two year into year shot up and the five year and five year started to go up. People have started to realize this is dragging on And why the taco your former colleague Rob Armstrong who invented the taco description why the taco trade isn't working here? I saw a very nice quip, which is because Iran's involved, it takes two to taco. And Trump can announce these U-turns, but they're not effective unless Iran is also participating or dancing the same dance. So when I hear our oil analysts, our commodity analysts on our call, the equity guys are still really bullish. The bond guys are somewhere in between. The commodity guys are basically sobbing into their microphones because they know the inflation coming down the track here and fertilizers and food and everything. This is the funny thing, talking about all the commodity guys. See, doom, it's knocking on our door and everyone's like, We'll see what happens. I want to talk more. Since we're here in the UK, I mentioned the Dubai thing. And I'm actually very fascinated by this. Not Dubai, people moving to Dubai specifically per se, but the political economy generally of fiscal consolidation, which includes the possibility of leaving. And when the issue that I think people would say, [30:00] across UK and across Europe is probably twofold. One is declining productive capacity, manufacturing getting eaten by Chinese competition, and digital industry that can't keep up with what's happening in the United States, particularly with AI. Okay, you say it's obvious, and many people say it's obvious. We all know that the government needs to shrink the deficit, But it's very tough. If people can leave, wealth taxes are very difficult, almost infamously so, and particularly in an era where the big money is being made through equity markets, not through traditional wage or labor income, etc. It's great to say, obviously, fiscal consolidation is the move. But even setting aside electoral constraints, is there an obvious path towards reducing the deficit given the means through which the people with money can avoid paying tax? It is very difficult And you mentioned the UK The UK is a very specific problem in that so many young people after the pandemic have been signed off as permanently sick They don even have to look for work So the welfare bill has to a large extent gone out of control in the UK And even though the Labour government here has an overwhelming majority, it couldn't get it through Parliament, couldn't get any reform measures through Parliament. And the markets seeing that, and the number of U-turns they've had to do as their own MPs have rebelled, let alone the public rebelling, mean it's very, very difficult. And it's not just young people, right? Because there's the heating assistance that the old people and the triple lock so that the pension goes up by the maximum or the whatever the maximum of three different inflation measures are. It's the old as well, right? Yeah no absolutely And this is one of the things which exacerbates intergenerational hostility tensions is that the younger people who can get on the housing ladder see the older people protected through things like the triple lock pensions going up of wage inflation price inflation or a minimum of two and a half percent So on a real escalator and clearly totally unaffordable However when I look at the CBO and the US is just when I look at the CBO projections of US debt to GDP they go off to infinity. And you know, this is unsustainable, because infinity is not a number which is sustainable. The IMF has looked at this quite closely. The only other country to go off to infinity even quicker than the US is strangely China. And the IMF have cited the US and China as the two basket cases. Now, the UK isn't the worst miscreant in terms of its fiscal situation. France, I look at the IMF numbers, France is much worse, but it's under the protection of the euro zone umbrella. The US is much worse, but it's under the protection of the dollar, being the reserve currency. The bond vigilantes have woken up. They're pretty pissed off looking around at what's going on. They've got a dusty copy of Reinhardt and Rogoff under their desk. They're thinking we're getting, you know, we're going over 100% of GDP. We're getting near the levels of where it's a problem. And to be fair on the public sector, what they've done is transfer a lot of the excess debt which was there in the household sector and corporate sector onto their own balance sheets But you look at these and you think well actually you look the vigilantes are looking to pick someone off and give them a bloody good kicking, basically, to teach everyone else. And the guild market is the weakest. It hasn't got enough protection. It's the weakest kid in the playground. And it's going to get badly beaten up at some points. And I think Bill Gross, Bill Gross many years ago, said the gilt market was sitting on a bed of kryptonite. Not kryptonite, jelly milk. Nitroglycerin. Nitroglycerin. And when you saw the oil price come down yesterday, but the gilt yield going up, that is a real issue, especially as Starmer, Prime Minister Starmer, exits the scene at some stage soon. That's right. We're recording this also during local elections just to make sure the maximum amount of stuff possible could happen between when we record this and when it actually publishes. But actually, OK, you say the bond vigilantes have woken up and one could infer from that statement that like we are now in a longer term period where bond yields are going to be higher and inflation is possibly going to be higher. But on the other hand, it feels like the new cycle. [35:00] is so compressed nowadays and new stuff is happening all the time and there's so much chaos in global politics. It also feels really difficult to have a sort of parademic, is that a word? Paradigmatic. I like that, I like that. You're inventing words as you go along. You know, it's hard to have a longer term view on the market in the way that one could have an Ice Age thesis in the early 2000s. Is that possible for you now or are you sort of all moving in the short term like everyone else seems to be? I think it is possible. At least I'm trying to make it possible. But as you say, markets are so volatile. I was reading that the recent rally in the equity market, 10% plus rally, this was the fastest ever rebound, 10% rebound after a 10% correction. And it's particularly on the equity market, they have become so fixated with the buy on dips mantra that actually the Fed have got our backs. There will never be recessions again. If there was a recession, it's because of the pandemic. We can actually remember 2008 which is a consequence of a very long period of growth building up excesses No I think there is a place for a long theme And the long theme is actually it fiscal incontinence political weakness, and eventually, the monetary authorities having to monetize away these debts. Because in the US, when you're paying 4% of GDP as government on your interest payments, that is It's absolutely crazy. I mean, 10 years ago, I was looking at the charts. 10 years ago, it was roughly the same as the Eurozone at around 2%. It's absolutely crazy numbers. So the end game for me, I can remember 28% inflation in the UK in the 70s. I certainly think we go back everywhere to double-digit inflation. Really? There's our headline to the episode. No, I think fiscal dominance, which is there. The central bankers will have no other option. I mean, you could get some consolidation on the crisis, but I think that's where we're heading. Just monetize away this. They couch it differently I sure they won say and now we are monetizing that Yeah yeah Do you ever this happens to us do you ever talk to either new colleagues or clients for whom talking about 2008, you might as well be talking about the 1930s Great Depression, because this is like, I feel like this is happening more and more in my life, something that I take for granted. Oh, well, remember when Lehman, and I might as well be talking about Credit Anstalt or something Yeah, no, exactly. And with the retail participation in the market, you get these one day options, which I don't don't understand. It's so short term. But having I mean, one of the advantages of being in finance since 1982 is I can remember the Asian crisis, which is one of the first times I got myself into deep trouble being banned from Malaysia, Malaysia after writing. writing. Are you still banned? I don't. I love KL, so I feel for you. And this relates to the AI theme, which we could do, is going in 1996, writing that the Asian miracle was basically a pack of cards waiting to collapse. And I had on my bookshelf this book from the World Bank Thailand economic miracle sustainable growth and development And you just think I seen these so many times before going into the I remember in the late 90s going around the US saying, look, this is a huge bubble which is going to collapse. It's very similar to the Asian crisis. I'm basically my boss, the chief economist, having to restrain the clients from punching my lights out. but when I read what I do now about the AI, etc I just think, yeah I've heard this so many times maybe being young is better because you don't have that baggage. Oh, being young I think you're more of an optimist You've got a lot less grey hair in your beard than I have Yeah, but more than I had a year ago so I'm catching up quickly Do these podcasts pick up colour? The cameras here are pretty good Make it black and white I can confirm that when we started this podcast, you did not have any gray hair. And it all sort of set in over the course of 10 years. I notice more every day. [40:00] Thank you. Really watching the bottom line? You'll find standout choices at every price point so you can make a real impact while staying on budget. Plus, you'll get expert help, fast turnaround times, and their 360-degree guarantee. So you can be 4imprint certain your order will arrive on time and look exactly right. Whatever your goal, 4imprint makes it easy to find your perfect promo match. Explore the possibilities today at 4imprint.com. 4imprint. 4certain. Support for this show comes from public.com. If you're actively involved in your portfolio, you probably catch yourself repeating the same actions. Buying the dip, manually sweeping idle cash, putting on a hedge. 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Since you mentioned AI and since we're talking about historic parallels, there seem to be a lot of similarities with the dot-com bubble. Just wild enthusiasm for a new technology and this expectation that everyone's going to be making money. On the other hand, the argument against a dot-com redux is this idea that, well, tech companies have very, very heavy valuations at the moment, but they are actually earning money. And if you look at the multiples, they're nowhere near where some of the dot-com companies actually were. What's your thinking there? How much of a parallel or analogy is this I mean the main parallel I would draw is with the telecom part of the So the dot bubble was more TMT telecom media and technology. People forget it was a bit wider. But the telecom side was quite similar to what you're seeing now with AI because they actually went out and dug trenches and laid cable. there was a capex boom. And if you were selling cables in the same way you're selling, Nvidia selling semiconductor chips, you benefited from producing picks and shovels for the gold rush, essentially. There was real profits there on the telecom side, at least. But the problem is the euphoria is the narrative is so compelling that you're given, these companies are given free money, essentially, although Oracle is not quite so free anymore. But you're being given free money. And you go off and spend it on you blow it on CapEx, which isn't necessarily going to be profitable 10 years down the road. And what you've got is basically when you look at the [45:00] US IT mega caps. They've gone from being hugely free cash flow generative to zero. I saw a chart, 2027, zero. It's gone. It's been blown. Now, you might say, well, at least they're not borrowing very heavily. But actually, it's transforming their balance sheets. I just read your quote. I brought a quote along here. I wrote it down. So I didn't forget it. But it's about, it could be about the AI transformation. So not so long ago, a leading expert opined that, and I put this in my, this sort of thing I write in my notes, he opined that. In retrospect, we will look back and recognize that the US economy was experiencing a once in a century acceleration of innovation, which propelled forward productivity, output, corporate profits and stock prices at a pace not seen in generations, if ever. now that absolutely applies to what is going on now that quotes from Alan Greenspan 13th of January 2000 at the Economic Club of New York just before NASDAQ collapsed Now, all that was true. And by the way, I was reminded of that quote, reading Jeremy Grantham's book, Making of a Perma Bear, another Perma Bear. I went to his book launch. I don't read many books. I'm quite lazy. I don't read many books. But I thought, as I was going to his book launch, I better read it. I had some of these great quotes from Bernanke and Greenspan, which they would probably like to erase from people's memory. But that equally applies to now. It is absolutely transformational. It probably will be transformational. Doesn't mean you can't have a stock market collapse. Yeah. When bears have a book party, is it a picnic? Oh, that's a good one. Thank you. Sorry, I was trying to think of a bear joke. That was the best I could come up with. That's good. That's good. I like that. There's so many different directions we could go in. I want to ask you, though, something about the 2010s that I've thought a lot about. You're talking about QE. QE ended in the mid-2010s. I mean, first, they stopped cutting rates. It was a sequence, right? But then they actually started shrinking the balance sheet. It didn affect stocks Stocks just kept going up And now we look today and again stocks at least in the U but stocks are doing all very well This is despite the fact that rates are the rate picture is nothing like it was in the beginnings of what you characterized as the ice age. Did that make you question anything? Have you revised any past views in light of the fact that it turns out, evidently, that ultra low rates and quantitative easing may not have been such a precondition for these incredible equity market gains? How do you reconcile that? I think, well, certainly back in the prior to the COVID recession, the quantitative easing for quite a lengthy period, if you like, got things going, got that momentum going. And one of the most profitable ways, methods of investing is just momentum trading. I sit near our head of quant, Andy Lapthorne, who I've worked with for 30 years last month. he's actually trying to move a few desks away from me but I know looking at his quant work momentum investing is absolutely fine and actually if I was participating if I was a fund manager fully invested I be quite happy with that investment style But looking at the technicals for when to get me out, is the macro story changing? Is something changing? I've been writing recently that, yes, profits are booming in the tech sector. But actually, the second derivative is starting to turn over. because you can't go parabolic forever. The second derivative is starting to turn over. So it's still very healthy profit growth. The momentum of the momentum is slowing. The momentum of the momentum is starting to slow. All right, I'm going to go celebrate then. And when you've got bubble conditions, then is this something the bull should be looking at? Even if you're a bull, you think, well, actually, that is a change I should be watching. What I would say at the moment is I think, I think the retail in particular, which certainly after the liberation trade, came in early before the professional investors, they've been consistently the ones to drive the market back up. And it is a bit like what causes big bear markets. [50:00] are recessions. Yeah. It's when, and usually when you're at the peak of the cycle, you're on the wrong valuation, wrong forward PE, and prices collapse. If you're a copper stock, normally at the peak of earnings, you're on a PE. PE is low. You're PE on four, and so you're geared up for the collapse in prices. They have some memory there. But what tends to happen in bubbles, you end up on a 23, like the S&P, on a 23 times forward PE at the point of recession. So you have the wrong earning, forward earnings, and the wrong PE. And there's no acknowledgement that there could be a recession out there. Apart from the AI spending on investment, which could collapse at any, we've seen it before. If another deep seat comes along, something happens to blow that narrative up. But outside of that, you look at the US economy and you look at the, last year to see no employment growth when the economy is toddling along quite happily between two and three percent. And not just because of the public sector, private payrolls year on year slowed to zero You thinking yeah it is having an effect here has a positive effect in some ways on union labor costs But this is really undermining consumption So US real household incomes are up half a percent year on year half a percent Yet consumer spending in real terms is still up over 2%. Why is that? The savings ratio in the US in the last year has collapsed from over 5% this time last year to 3.5% now. That is as low as it. The only other times it's been lower is as people were spending the COVID checks. So it got down to 2.5%. or just before the 2008 global financial crisis, when you had that credit bubble, the consumer is totally tapped out. And if you get a wave of inflation coming through the economy through cost push, last time companies just whacked up their margins. They put up their prices, whacked up their margins as well in unprecedented fashion because margins sort of contracted as costs went up. They didn't. It was absolutely unprecedented greedflation. The St Louis Fed named the sectors which did it Retail wholesale and construction were the three big contributors to that whole economy level But people had pandemic checks then So companies could get away with doing it And this time around, as this wave of cost push pressure comes through, are companies going to be able to get away with it when the savings ratio is already so low? Is it going to start squeezing the corporate sector margins, which are ludicrously, obscenely inflated, in my view. And when these margins start, if these margins start coming down because they can't pass on these price increases, will they then react to that by cutting jobs and cutting investment? So could the one surprise we get is actually the economy outside of AI investment is far weaker than we think and actually could tip over into recession. Now, that could be a real surprise because that could take down the AI sector as well. It's not just an exogenous force. So I think that's an interesting black swan because no one is thinking this oil price could cause a recession One question I want to ask given your long career When were you most worried about the future Is there a particular moment looking back where you were really hitting the panic button I tend to stay very close to the panic button, a bit too close, some people say. That's your job. I get it. I tend to see problems around the corner. Actually, I was on a conference call with clients yesterday. And I said, well, probably the most bearish thing I can think of from my side is I don't feel as bearish as I have done in the past. I struggle to see an immediate catalyst for collapse. And the positive narratives are always very compelling. I remember that the time I was most worried globally was 2006, 2007, where it was obvious to me, and I don't understand much about crypto and all these complicated things or the details of AI. But I actually got to the bottom of CDOs. And this was before the big short film where they made it a bit simpler. I actually understood CDOs. I went to a CDO conference in 2007. And I was amazed that they weren't optimistic. They were getting really worried. And I [55:00] thought as a macro person when someone like Bernanke says we're asked about the housing bubble i guess i i don't accept your premise there is a bubble and there's never been a nationwide house price recession in history i just think you're an idiot you should not be in your job basically and yes he was the right person at the time when the bubble burst but if you looked at his because people said well he did the thesis on the great depression you looked at his thesis about the Great Depression. There was nothing about the credit bubble that preceded it at all. And similarly, he just did not understand the, and where the, I'm not a big fan of central bankers, or the Bank of England improved dramatically after I left it, the quality of the people there, because they're just so reluctant to admit they're just constantly screwing it up and making it worse for benevolent reasons. They're trying to make it better, but they make it a lot worse. And quantitative easing, in my view, made it, they might have been in an argument for doing the first quantitative easing but just to keep on going Paul Volcker eviscerated just before he died eviscerated the Fed by saying you know you can measure inflation that closely You got a 2 target for inflation Anywhere between one to three is OK, essentially, as long as it's not accelerating off. And this is, we're between one, broadly between one and three now. But he said we were getting down to one. With measurement errors. It was ludicrous to try and push it back up to 2%. You didn't need to do that. And personally, I just think central bankers need to be reined in quite closely. I do think in retrospect, when we look back to the sort of late 2010s era of inflation, it felt pretty good, even though we were below target. I agree, and I have a lot of thoughts. The idea of undershooting inflation is never... And I'm on record as saying this, not just in retrospect, is I've never understood people whining about too little inflation. So I have the receipts. Well, Albert, that was fantastic fun. Thank you so much for finally coming on All Thoughts. It's been a real pleasure, and I hope I haven't said to you. You're a nice guy for a bear. Bears are fun. You're a pleasant guy. Well, people who read my stuff think I'm really miserable, but I actually a very happy contented person You don seem like a miserable guy at all And I wear nice shirts to try and cheer people Cheer But I hope I haven depressed too many of you viewers I apologize about that I feel great. Joe, that was really good fun. I'm glad we could finally have him on. We've been reading Albert really, literally for decades, or at least over a decade now. Really fun to finally... His notes really are fantastic. One thing that stood out to me, you know, I was thinking about what he was saying about the U.S. savings rate and the ability of companies to push through price increases. And earlier this week, I was reading the earnings transcript for Colgate, and they were talking about packaging costs going up quite significantly because of higher petrochemicals prices and also guiding their margin lower for the full year. So basically saying that they're going to absorb the costs. And there was one analyst on the transcript who was like, well, why don't you raise prices? And they basically didn't, you know, classic executive style. They didn't really say anything. They were just like if I were you I would incorporate the lower margin guidance into your algorithm and leave it leave it at that But you know like there might be something there Totally Can I just say this is going to be the type of thing that someone says at the very top and so forth But before we flew to London, I downloaded Ray Kurzweil's The Singularity is Near book about, this is published in 2004, in which he predicts that in the first half of this century, we would have machines that are more intelligent than humans on almost every scale. But one of the things he says in the book, part of his theory, is that computers are going to keep getting better and better. And as they get better, more money will flow into computer investments because they can do more things. And there's Moore's law and all that. And that actually the rate of acceleration, the derivative of the derivative, can actually keep going up and up and up until you do get that vertical. And so now I'm thinking like we all know the stock market would not be nearly where it was, where it is right now if it weren't for AI, obviously. Right. Might be in a bear market. Might be in a recession. Yeah. The economy wouldn't be. Nothing like it is now. But now I'm like in that mood reading this. And Albert said, he's like, I feel a little weird right now because I don't know what the obvious bearish catalyst is. [60:00] In a little bit of a weird situation, I'm reading this book. It's like, what if earnings literally just go to infinity? Maybe it could happen. I don't know. I don't know. If Albert Edwards feels pretty good about stocks right now. And I'm talking about how earnings can go to infinity. This is a sign that maybe these are the types of episodes we record near the top. Okay. Shall we leave it there? Yes. Okay. This has been another episode of the All Thoughts Podcast. I'm Tracy Allaway. You can follow me at Tracy Allaway. And I'm Joe Weisenthal. You can follow me at The Stalwart. Follow our producers, Carmen Rodriguez at Carmen, Armand Daschle Bennett at Dashbot, Kale Brooks at Kale Brooks, and Kevin Lozano at Kevin Lloyd Lozano. And for more Odd Lots content, go to Bloomberg.com slash Odd Lots. We have a daily newsletter on all of our episodes. And you can chat about all these topics 24-7 in our Discord, discord.gg slash Odd Lots. And if you enjoy Odd Lots, if you want us to ask Albert Edwards where he gets his floral shirts, then please leave us a positive review on your favorite podcast platform. And remember, if you are a Bloomberg subscriber, you can listen to all of our episodes absolutely ad-free. All you need to do is find the Bloomberg channel on Apple Podcasts and follow the instructions there. Thanks for listening. Thank you For Imprint Certain, your order will show up just right, right on time. Explore more at 4imprint.com. 4imprint. 4certain. Healthcare doesn't always work great. 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