Kremlin Tech Operation Storm-1516 Weaponizes AI to Disrupt Western Elections

Bloomberg Originals

Russian intelligence uses cheap deepfakes and narrative laundering through foreign influencers to destabilize Western democracies as platforms weaken moderation.

AI-assisted summary of How to Spot a Russian Deepfake | Bloomberg Investigates — original source. Check the original for full context.

Source published: 2026-05-21

Detailed notes

## Background Published on YouTube by Bloomberg Originals on May 4, 2026, this episode of Bloomberg Investigates explores how Russia-based disinformation groups are utilizing artificial intelligence to sow doubt and political instability globally. According to the page description, Bloomberg documented over 190 fabricated narratives from a group named Storm-1516, detailing their use of fake whistleblowers, AI-generated faces, and global influencers to target Ukraine and international elections.

## TL;DR The investigation uncovers the inner workings of Storm-1516, a modern Russian disinformation network backed by intelligence services and overseen at high Kremlin levels. The group uses AI technology, digital face-swapping, and African diaspora actors to launder fabricated narratives—such as false sexual assault allegations against German Vice Chancellor Robert Habeck and fake ballot-shredding videos—into mainstream public discourse. By tricking influencers and foreign lawmakers into repeating these lies, the operation seeks to undermine democratic elections and weaken international support for Ukraine.

## Atmosphere & style The piece carries an urgent, investigative, and sobering tone that feels like a high-stakes journalistic exposure of invisible digital warfare. It balances intimate personal distress—such as Robert Habeck's panic over a ruined reputation—with meticulous, clinical breakdowns of AI artifacts like blinking patterns and voice syncing. The overall mood is unsettling and cautionary, leaving the viewer with a stark awareness of how easily reality can be manipulated in the modern information age.

## Key takeaways - [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X9GQiouEdJ8&t=0s) Robert Habeck was targeted during an election campaign by a fabricated video alleging sexual assault using an old 2017 photo. - [02:22](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X9GQiouEdJ8&t=142s) The fabricated video contained technical deepfake artifacts such as erratic blinking, shifting pupils, and out-of-sync audio. - [02:22](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X9GQiouEdJ8&t=142s) Investigative facial recognition matched the facial features in the video to Russian Olympic figure skater Yulia Lipnitskaya. - [03:58](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X9GQiouEdJ8&t=238s) Storm-1516 is a Russian intelligence-backed disinformation apparatus linked to the GRU and overseen by Kremlin official Sergei Kiriyenko. - [06:30](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X9GQiouEdJ8&t=390s) Storm-1516 operates a narrative laundering engine that plants false stories on custom sites and amplifies them through state media and influencers. - [06:30](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X9GQiouEdJ8&t=390s) The group heavily utilizes a whistleblower format, employing actors such as members of the West African diaspora in St. Petersburg modified with AI audio filters. - [06:30](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X9GQiouEdJ8&t=390s) Disinformation narratives targeting Volodymyr Zelenskyy with false corruption claims successfully influenced U.S. congressional debates on Ukraine aid. - [10:30](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X9GQiouEdJ8&t=630s) Pro-Russian influencers like Chay Bowes amplified fake videos, including a debunked clip showing the alleged shredding of AfD election ballots. - [12:02](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X9GQiouEdJ8&t=722s) Following these disinformation efforts, the far-right AfD doubled its vote share while the Green Party faced losses leading to Habeck's resignation. - [13:36](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X9GQiouEdJ8&t=816s) Storm-1516 expanded significantly following changes at platform X and the shutdown of the US DOJ Foreign Influence Task Force.

## Detailed walkthrough ### [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X9GQiouEdJ8&t=0s) The Allegation Against Robert Habeck

In late 2024, Robert Habeck, leader of the German Green Party and Vice Chancellor of Germany, was in the middle of a high-stakes election campaign when a damaging video emerged online. The video featured a young woman alleging that Habeck had sexually assaulted her years earlier during a 2017 visit to a school, where he had been photographed alongside students for a local newspaper. Habeck recalls the immense panic he felt upon seeing the claim, fearing that if major media outlets picked up the story, his career would be shattered and he would be unable to show his face in public.

The allegation, however, was completely fabricated. It was part of a broader, highly coordinated campaign orchestrated by a group inside Russia designed to sow chaos and undermine democratic processes. We are currently experiencing a "golden age of disinformation," where Russian actors systematically exploit social media platforms, leverage political influencers, and deploy AI-generated media to blur the lines of reality.

- The original 2017 photo was taken during Habeck's visit to a school in the northernmost German state of Schleswig-Holstein, where he served as a regional minister. - The family of the actual student pictured in 2017 publicly refuted the video, confirming the assault claims were entirely false.

---

[02:22](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X9GQiouEdJ8&t=142s) Spotting a Deepfake

Upon closer inspection, the video revealing the assault claims contains clear technological flaws. On a mobile screen, the clip might pass as authentic to an unsuspecting user scrolling casually, but analyzing it on a larger display exposes obvious artifacts. The young woman’s eyes blink erratically, her pupils shift size while she speaks, and her facial movements fail to sync naturally with her voice output.

Despite these telltale signs, the goal of these videos is not to produce a masterpiece of digital filmmaking. Instead, their purpose is speed, scalability, and narrative penetration—getting ordinary people to doubt facts, converse about the scandal, and consider the possibility that it might be true.

- Investigative techniques using facial recognition software matched the AI-manipulated facial features in the video to Yulia Lipnitskaya, a famous Russian figure skater who won a medal at the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics. - Investigators assess that bad actors overlaid Lipnitskaya's face onto a real actor before animating it with AI software.

---

[03:58](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X9GQiouEdJ8&t=238s) Inside Storm-1516

The operation behind these manufactured scandals is known as **Storm-1516**, a modern disinformation apparatus linked directly to Russian intelligence services. Backed by the GRU (Russia's military intelligence agency), the operation is believed to be overseen at the highest Kremlin levels by Sergei Kiriyenko, Vladimir Putin's First Deputy Chief of Staff.

This strategy builds on a long history of active measures dating back to the Soviet era, when the KGB deployed information warfare to defeat Western adversaries without direct military conflict. Modern campaigns merge legitimate news items with emotional, highly polarizing topics—such as sexual assault allegations against public figures—to exploit societal divisions.

> "Disinformation is absolutely central to Soviet strategy for defeating what the KGB calls 'the main enemy'—that is the United States—without firing a shot."

- Historical precedent includes Soviet-era disinformation tactics, such as propagating the conspiracy theory that HIV was created in a U.S. military laboratory. - Western government agencies uniquely identified and publicly named Storm-1516 directly, a rare move in intelligence reporting.

---

[06:30](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X9GQiouEdJ8&t=390s) Narrative Laundering and Whistleblower Formats

Dr. Darren Linvill, Professor and Co-Director of the Media Forensic Hub at Clemson University, describes Storm-1516 as a sophisticated "narrative laundering" engine. The process begins by planting a manufactured story on a custom-built website or social media channel. The group then systematically layers the narrative across public discourse using state media organs, digital networks, and third-party influencers until the public accepts and repeats the story naturally.

``` [Fabricated Story] ➔ [Purpose-Built Website] ➔ [State Media & Influencers] ➔ [Public Integration] ```

To maximize believability, Storm-1516 heavily relies on a "whistleblower format," featuring actors posing as concerned insiders, government workers, or investigative journalists. The group frequently recruits members of the West African diaspora living in St. Petersburg to act in these clips, using subtle AI audio filters to alter vocal signatures and conceal identities.

- Narratives frequently target Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, falsely alleging that he uses foreign aid to purchase luxury items, such as multi-million-dollar yachts. - These fabrications successfully penetrated U.S. political debates, with American lawmakers repeating the claims when arguing against Ukraine funding packages.

---

[10:30](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X9GQiouEdJ8&t=630s) The Campaign Against German Leadership

Following the 2024 U.S. presidential election, Storm-1516 pivoted heavily toward European nations, where public support for Ukraine remained strong. The video targeting Robert Habeck was widely circulated by German-language commentators and prominent pro-Russian influencers, including Irish independent writer Chay Bowes.

- **Chay Bowes** routinely amplifies Storm-1516 materials to massive online audiences, railing against perceived corruption in Ukraine. - In another campaign, influencers shared a fake video purporting to show election workers systematically shredding ballots marked for the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party. - The ballot-shredding video amassed half a million views on Bowes' page and nearly 4 million views on a separate post, forcing German election authorities to issue public statements debunking the clip due to incorrect paper texture and typography.

---

[12:02](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X9GQiouEdJ8&t=722s) Political Outcomes and Disinformation Impact

The political landscape in Germany shifted noticeably around the time of these campaigns. The pro-Russian AfD party captured 21% of the vote—more than double its share from four years prior—while the Green Party suffered electoral losses, leading to Robert Habeck's resignation from his parliamentary seat.

Habeck expressed intense relief upon discovering that mainstream media outlets declined to cover the false sexual assault claims. Efforts to restrict the post on the platform X within Germany successfully limited its local reach, though the clip remained accessible internationally.

- The AfD has officially called for closer diplomatic ties with Moscow and the immediate removal of Western economic sanctions against Russia. - While the targeted campaign against Habeck failed to achieve widespread virality locally, experts note the overall cumulative effect of Russian disinformation continues to succeed broadly across international populations.

---

[13:36](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X9GQiouEdJ8&t=816s) Moderation, Regulation, and the Future

The rapid rise of Storm-1516 coincides with dramatic changes in platform moderation and government oversight. The group expanded significantly starting in August 2023, following Elon Musk's acquisition of X in 2022. Concurrently, regulatory efforts in the United States receded after the U.S. Department of Justice shut down the FBI's Foreign Influence Task Force, which had previously coordinated multi-agency responses to foreign disinformation.

With American federal agencies stepping back from active foreign influence monitoring, European regulators are left carrying the responsibility of tracking Storm-1516, exposing foreign fabrications, and enforcing platform compliance.

> "They've mapped up the rate at which they've been targeting elections, not just in the United States, but around the world... I think in many ways they're just getting started."

## Notable quotes > [03:58](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X9GQiouEdJ8&t=238s) Disinformation is absolutely central to Soviet strategy for defeating what the KGB calls 'the main enemy'—that is the United States—without firing a shot.

> [13:36](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X9GQiouEdJ8&t=816s) They've mapped up the rate at which they've been targeting elections, not just in the United States, but around the world... I think in many ways they're just getting started.

## Mentioned Robert Habeck, German Green Party, Germany, Schleswig-Holstein, Storm-1516, Yulia Lipnitskaya, Sochi Winter Olympics, GRU, Sergei Kiriyenko, Vladimir Putin, Kremlin, KGB, United States, Dr. Darren Linvill, Media Forensic Hub, Clemson University, St. Petersburg, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Ukraine, Chay Bowes, Alternative for Germany, AfD, X, Elon Musk, U.S. Department of Justice, FBI, Foreign Influence Task Force, Bloomberg, Bloomberg Originals

[Source](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X9GQiouEdJ8)

中文简报

克里姆林宫技术行动Storm-1516将AI武器化以扰乱西方选举俄罗斯情报部门利用廉价深度伪造技术并通过外国网络红人洗白叙事，在各平台削弱内容审核之际破坏西方民主国家的稳定。该调查揭露了Storm-1516的内部运作机制。这是一个由情报机构支持并受克里姆林宫高层监督的现代俄罗斯虚假信息网络。该组织利用AI技术、数字换脸以及非洲裔侨民演员，将捏造的叙事——例如针对德国副总理Robert Habeck的不实性侵指控和伪造的碎纸机销毁选票视频——洗白并推入主流公共舆论。通过诱导网络红人和外国议员传播这些谎言，该行动企图破坏民主选举并削弱国际社会对乌克兰的支持。德国副总理兼绿党领导人罗伯特·哈贝克（Robert Habeck）在竞选期间遭遇伪造视频攻击，造假者利用其2017年的旧照片捏造了性侵丑闻，旨在扰乱德国民主选举。 (0:00) 该造假视频存在眨眼异常和唇音不同步等明显的深度伪造（deepfake）瑕疵，人脸识别分析显示其面部特征被叠加替换为俄罗斯奥运花滑选手尤利娅·利普尼茨卡娅（Yulia Lipnitskaya）。 (2:22) 调查认定幕后操盘者为受俄罗斯军事情报局（GRU）支持的虚假信息组织“Storm-1516”，据信该机构受克里姆林宫高官谢尔盖·基里延科（Sergei Kiriyenko）监管，专门通过制造网络谣言瓦解西方社会信任。 (3:58) Storm-1516 通过构建假网站与雇佣配合 AI 音频滤镜的“告密者”演员实施叙事洗白，此前其捏造的乌克兰总统泽连斯基贪腐谣言甚至一度渗透并影响了美国国会关于对乌援助的辩论。 (6:30)

Reading summary

A Russian intelligence-linked disinformation apparatus known as Storm-1516 is leveraging AI-generated media, narrative laundering, and online influencer networks to disrupt democratic processes across Western nations. Anatomy of an AI Fabrication (2:22) In late 2024, German Vice Chancellor and Green Party leader Robert Habeck was targeted during an election campaign by a fabricated video alleging he had sexually assaulted a student in 2017. While the accusation was grounded in an authentic 2017 photograph from a school visit in Schleswig-Holstein, the student's family publicly refuted the claim as completely false. Digital forensics revealed that the video was an AI composite: investigators used facial recognition software to determine that the facial features of Russian Olympic figure skater Yulia Lipnitskaya had been overlaid onto an actor and animated with AI software. Technological imperfections were readily visible on larger screens, including erratic blinking, shifting pupil sizes, and unnatural audio-visual synchronization. However, investigators point out that Storm-1516 does not prioritize cinematic realism. The primary objective is speed, scalability, and narrative penetration—introducing scandalous assertions into public discourse to sow doubt and provoke debate among casual social media users. Storm-1516 and Narrative Laundering (6:30) Western intelligence agencies have directly identified Storm-1516 as an operation backed by Russia's military intelligence service (GRU) and reportedly overseen by Sergei Kiriyenko, Vladimir Putin's First Deputy Chief of Staff. Rooted in Soviet-era 'active measures' designed to undermine adversaries without direct military confrontation, the operation modernizes information warfare by grafting emotional controversies onto existing societal divisions. According to Dr. Darren Linvill of Clemson University's Media Forensic Hub, the group functions as a sophisticated narrative-laundering pipeline. Operations typically plant fabricated claims on bespoke websites before circulating them through state media networks and paid or sympathetic online influencers. Storm-1516 frequently deploys a 'whistleblower format' featuring paid actors—often recruited from the West African diaspora in St. Petersburg—who pose as officials or journalists using AI audio filters to obscure vocal signatures. Similar campaigns successfully entered mainstream U.S. political debates, such as debunked assertions that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy purchased luxury yachts using foreign aid funds. Influencer Amplification in German Politics (10:30) Following the 2024 U.S. elections, Storm-1516 pivoted toward European targets, seeking to erode public backing for Ukraine. In Germany, the Habeck video and other fabrications were circulated by pro-Russian commentators, including Irish independent writer Chay Bowes. Bowes and aligned accounts also amplified a staged video depicting election workers shredding ballots cast for the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party, generating millions of views before German election officials debunked the footage due to incorrect paper texture and typography. Although the campaign targeting Habeck was restricted on X within Germany and ignored by mainstream domestic media, the broader information landscape coincided with significant political shifts. The AfD, which advocates lifting sanctions on Russia and forging closer ties with Moscow, doubled its electoral share to 21%, while losses for the Green Party culminated in Habeck resigning his parliamentary seat. Experts emphasize that even when individual local narratives fail to go viral, the cumulative output of Russian disinformation continues to influence wider international attitudes. Diverging Regulatory and Moderation Oversight (13:36) Storm-1516 accelerated its operations following Elon Musk's 2022 purchase of X, scaling up noticeably from August 2023 onward amid weakened content moderation standards. At the same time, official American countermeasures retreated after the U.S. Department of Justice disbanded the FBI's Foreign Influence Task Force, which had previously coordinated inter-agency tracking of foreign influence operations. This domestic pullback by U.S. federal authorities has shifted the burden of monitoring Storm-1516 and enforcing platform compliance largely onto European regulatory bodies. Analysts warn that rather than slowing down, Russian disinformation actors are expanding their operational tempo across global elections. While the technological flaws of modern Russian deepfakes remain detectable under scrutiny, Storm-1516 relies on volume, laundering networks, and platform deregulation rather than digital perfection to achieve political impact, leaving European authorities to shoulder enforcement as U.S. federal monitoring recedes.

精炼阅读摘要

彭博社调查揭露，俄罗斯军事情报机构支持的虚假信息组织“风暴-1516”正利用低成本AI深度伪造技术与“叙事洗白”机制，系统性干预西方民主选举并针对德国副总理Robert Habeck等关键政要展开精准抹黑。针对哈贝克的虚假指控与深伪技术痕迹 (2:22) 在2024年末德国竞选期间，绿党领袖兼副总理Robert Habeck遭到一段指控其涉嫌性侵的恶意网络视频攻击。视频中的年轻女性声称Habeck曾在2017年视察石勒苏益格-荷尔斯泰因州一所学校时对其施暴，并借用了当时刊登在地方报纸上的真实合影。然而，照片中涉事学生的家属公开出面辟谣，证实该性侵指控完全属于捏造。尽管Habeck一度陷入担忧声誉摧毁的恐慌，但主流媒体最终未采信这一谎言。技术分析显示该视频存在典型的AI操纵瑕疵：在移动端浏览时虽可蒙混过关，但放大后会发现人物眨眼不规律、说话时瞳孔大小异常变动，以及口型与音频脱节。面部识别软件比对进一步证实，造假者将2014年索契冬奥会俄罗斯花样滑冰奖牌得主Yulia Lipnitskaya的面部特征通过AI叠加到了实际演员脸上。调查指出，这类制造深伪视频的手法并不追求完美的视觉艺术，而是旨在利用速度与规模化优势，动摇公众对客观事实的确信。 “风暴-1516”与叙事洗白机制 (3:58) 这起抹黑事件源自名为“风暴-1516”（Storm-1516）的俄罗斯现代虚假信息机构。西方情报部门已罕见地公开点名该机构，认为其直接关联俄军事情报局（GRU），并由普京的第一副幕僚长Sergei Kiriyenko在克里姆林宫高层统筹。这种信息战延续了冷战时期苏联克格勃（KGB）通过“积极措施”不费一枪一弹削弱西方对手的策略，类似历史上炮制艾滋病毒源于美国军事实验室的阴谋论手法。克莱姆森大学Darren Linvill博士将该组织的运作模式定义为“叙事洗白”：行动始于在专门搭建的伪造网站或社交账号植入假新闻，再经由俄罗斯国家媒体、特定网络与网络红人层层放大，最终使其自然融入公众讨论。为增强说服力，Storm-1516频繁采用“举报人模式”，招募居住在圣彼得堡的西非侨民扮演内部知情人，并辅以AI音频滤镜伪装声纹。此前针对乌克兰总统Zelenskyy挪用美援购买豪华游艇的假消息便出自该组织，且已成功渗透至美国国会关于援乌法案的辩论中。针对德国政坛的认知战与选举冲击 (10:30) 在2024年美国大选后，Storm-1516将重心转移至援乌意愿较强的欧洲国家。针对Habeck的指控视频被爱尔兰独立作者Chay Bowes等亲俄网络红人大量转载扩散。此外，亲俄网络还炮制了工作人员正在系统性粉碎极右翼选择党（AfD）选票的伪造视频；该视频在Bowes主页获得了50万次播放，在另一平台帖子中更斩获近400万次浏览，迫使德国选举官方根据纸张质地和排版缺陷出面紧急澄清。在虚假信息攻势展开的同时，德国政治格局出现了显著变动。亲俄且主张取消对俄制裁的极右翼选择党（AfD）在此次选举中斩获21%的选票，得票率比四年前翻倍；绿党则面临议席缩水，Habeck随后辞去了议会席位。尽管平台X根据德国本地要求对Habeck抹黑帖实施了地理屏蔽，且主流媒体保持了克制，但专家评估指出，俄罗斯认知战在国际受众中产生的累积效应仍不容小觑。平台治理倒退与跨大西洋监管断层 (13:36) Storm-1516影响力的迅猛膨胀，与社交平台审核松懈和西方国家监管调整存在直接关联。自Elon Musk于2022年收购X平台之后，该组织在2023年8月起活动显著增加。与此同时，美国国内的监管机制发生收缩，美国司法部关闭了此前负责协调多机构应对外国虚假信息的联邦调查局（FBI）外国影响力特别工作组。由于美国联邦机构撤回了主动监控外国干预的防线，目前追踪Storm-1516行径、曝光伪造内容以及强制平台履行合规义务的监管重担，几乎全部转移到了欧洲监管机构的肩上。专家警告，随着技术门槛降低与监管力量削弱，类似Storm-1516的虚假信息行动对全球选举的干预正处于加速阶段，欧洲监管方在缺乏美国联邦层面有力协同的情况下，面临着更为严峻的信息防御挑战。

Detailed notes — zh

## Background 该内容由彭博社旗下的“Bloomberg Originals”于2026年5月21日发布在YouTube平台上。视频简介指出，俄罗斯虚假信息组织已活跃数十年，如今一个名为“Storm-1516”的新组织正利用生成式人工智能加剧混乱与疑虑；彭博社深入调查并记录了该组织炮制的190多起虚假叙事，揭示其如何通过假告密者、雇佣演员及AI换脸技术针对乌克兰和各民主国家的选举发动认知战。 ## TL;DR 本期调查报道揭露了由克里姆林宫高层统筹、俄罗斯军事情报部门支持的虚假信息组织“Storm-1516”。该网络利用低成本AI深度伪造（Deepfake）技术结合真实演员，炮制出包括指控德国副总理罗伯特·哈贝克性侵、虚构泽连斯基贪腐购艇以及选票欺诈等耸人听闻的谎言。通过特设假网站、官方媒体引述和海外亲俄网络红人多层扩散的“叙事洗白”链路，这些伪造内容成功渗透进主流公共舆论并干预民主选举。随着主流社交平台审核放宽及官方监管防线收缩，这种高度工业化的虚假信息攻势不仅重创受害者，更标志着新一代AI认知战才刚刚拉开序幕。 ## Atmosphere & style 整部纪录片呈现出一种严峻、冷峻且令人不寒而栗的调查侦破基调。叙事在受害政要心有余悸的亲身自白与逐帧放大深伪破绽的技术拆解之间交替推进，营造出强烈的现实危机感。观看过程不仅让人直观体验到精密信息操纵带来的心理压迫感，更在揭示出监管防线溃退的冷酷现实后，留下对未来全球民主与真相生态深感警醒的沉重回味。 ## Bulletin - [03:58](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X9GQiouEdJ8&t=238s) 代号为 Storm-1516 的俄罗斯虚假信息组织已被证实由 GRU 支持、克里姆林宫高层统筹，已炮制超过 190 个针对乌克兰援助与西方民主选举的虚假叙事。 - [06:30](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X9GQiouEdJ8&t=390s) 该组织通过“叙事洗白”机制，利用受雇群演与 AI 换脸生成假告密者视频，再借助亲俄海外网红放大，成功将虚假游艇等腐败谣言推入美国国会政界话语体系。 - [10:30](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X9GQiouEdJ8&t=630s) 在 2024 年底德国大选期间，伪造选票与针对副总理哈贝克的性侵假视频助推了极右翼 AfD 得票率翻倍突破 21%，而绿党受挫致哈贝克辞去议员席位。 - [13:36](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X9GQiouEdJ8&t=816s) 随着 X 平台审核大幅放宽及美国司法部撤销 FBI 外国影响力工作组，欧洲正被迫独自应对俄方日益工业化的 AI 深度伪造认知战。 ## Key takeaways - [00:07](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X9GQiouEdJ8&t=7s) 德国副总理罗伯特·哈贝克在大选前夕遭遇深度伪造性侵视频指控，展示了生成式 AI 武器化对政客公信力的毁灭性杀伤力。 - [02:22](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X9GQiouEdJ8&t=142s) 虽然细致放大后可见面部动作不协调、眨眼异常等破绽，但移动端快节奏刷屏极易使普通网民在潜移默化中信以为真。 - [03:58](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X9GQiouEdJ8&t=238s) 俄方组织截取前奥运花滑选手尤利娅·利普尼茨卡娅的面孔进行 AI 换脸与德语配音，巧妙将真实参访史实与 #MeToo 议题杂糅以激发公众愤怒。 - [03:58](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X9GQiouEdJ8&t=238s) Storm-1516 被确认由俄罗斯军事情报总局（GRU）支持，并在总统办公厅第一副主任谢尔盖·基里延科统筹下运作，延续了苏联冷战认知战传统。 - [06:30](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X9GQiouEdJ8&t=390s) “叙事洗白”（Narrative Laundering）运作分为三阶段：底层制造假视频、俄官方媒体与海外网红背书介入、最终渗透整合进主流公众对话。 - [06:30](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X9GQiouEdJ8&t=390s) 该组织惯用西非侨民扮演“良心告密者”录制伪证视频，并利用 AI 调整声纹掩盖真实口音，制造选民舞弊假象。 - [06:30](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X9GQiouEdJ8&t=390s) 针对乌克兰的“泽连斯基挪用援助购买豪华游艇”等虚假叙事，成功渗透进美国国会议员公开发言，实质改变了部分民众对战事的态度。 - [10:30](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X9GQiouEdJ8&t=630s) 2024 年美国大选后，俄罗斯虚假信息战主力转向欧洲，试图削弱欧洲对乌克兰持续抵抗侵略的坚定援助意愿。 - [10:30](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X9GQiouEdJ8&t=630s) 海外亲俄网络红人（如蔡·鲍斯）充当了放大谣言的核心枢纽，其转发的德国选票粉碎虚假视频获得了数百万次浏览。 - [10:30](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X9GQiouEdJ8&t=630s) 大选结果显示信息操纵成效显著：亲俄立场的德国极右翼 AfD 得票率翻倍至 21%，而绿党重挫导致哈贝克引咎辞去联邦议员职务。 - [13:36](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X9GQiouEdJ8&t=816s) 社交平台审核弱化与美国关闭 FBI 外国影响力工作组等监管后撤，导致对 Storm-1516 的防御防线出现系统性漏洞。 - [14:30](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X9GQiouEdJ8&t=870s) 研究人员警告，结合低成本 AI 深伪与分发外包的认知战模式展现出前所未有的传播规模，其全球攻击才刚刚拉开序幕。 ## Detailed walkthrough ### [00:07](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X9GQiouEdJ8&t=7s) 针对罗伯特·哈贝克的虚假指控与深度伪造的破绽在2024年底的德国大选竞选期间，一段令人震惊的视频在社交网络上迅速浮出水面。视频针对的是德国绿党领袖、时任德国副总理罗伯特·哈贝克（Robert Habeck）。这起事件起源于2017年哈贝克在德国最北部石勒苏益格-荷尔斯泰因州（Schleswig-Holstein）担任部长期间对一所学校的真实走访，当时地方报纸刊登了他与几名学生的合影。然而时隔多年，视频中一名年轻女性自称就是当年合影里的学生，公开指控哈贝克在当年前往学校视察时对她进行了性侵犯。面对这种毁灭性的指责，哈贝克在访谈中回忆道，当时内心的第一反应是：“见鬼，如果这件事情发酵并被主流媒体报道，一切就全完了，我将再也无法公开走在大街上。” 实际上，这段视频是彻底伪造的。如果普通用户在手机上漫不经心地快速刷屏，视频的第一印象看似十分真实，但这恰恰是其最具危险性的地方。调查人员指出，一旦将视频放大到大屏幕上仔细检视，其破绽便无所遁形：该女性的面部透着明显的不协调感，眨眼的方式异常怪异，眼睛在说话过程中还会微幅改变大小，脸部肌肉运动与其嘴型完全对不上。虽然这段伪造视频在电影艺术与制作层面上并不高明，但其真正的目的并非追求毫无瑕疵的艺术造诣，而是为了在社交平台上传播扩散，让普通网民去讨论、思考并潜移默化地接受它。随着研究人员深挖同类视频，多国政府官员与独立学者确认，这背后是一个已被官方点名追查的特定俄罗斯虚假信息组织。 ### [03:58](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X9GQiouEdJ8&t=238s) 幕后黑手 Storm-1516 与俄罗斯情报网络经过调查机构与政府的情报梳理，这套操盘手法被归结为一个代号为“Storm-1516”的俄罗斯组织。这并非零星的民间恶作剧，而是一套高度系统化、Backed by the GRU（俄罗斯军事情报总局）支持的全新虚假信息行动。总体行动被认为由克里姆林宫内部主导，幕后统筹者直指俄罗斯总统办公厅第一副主任谢尔盖·基里延科（Sergei Kiriyenko）。俄罗斯针对西方阵营的虚假信息战并非始于今日；早在苏联时期，KGB（克格勃）就将虚假宣传视为在“不费一枪一弹”的情况下击败主要敌人美国的核心战略，其中最臭名昭著的先例便是在冷战时期炮制出“艾滋病毒由美国秘密实验室制造”的阴谋论。调查人员对指控哈贝克的视频截图进行了面部识别软件比对，搜索结果指向了一位知名公众人物——在2014年索契冬奥会上一举成名的俄罗斯花样滑冰选手尤利娅·利普尼茨卡娅（Yulia Lipnitskaya）。显然，这并非这位奥运选手亲自接单演戏，而是操盘团队截取了利普尼茨卡娅的面部图像，利用 AI 换脸与动态合成软件将其面孔嫁接在一名称职的真实演员脸上，并配上了虚假的德语配音。Storm-1516 极为擅长将“真实事实”与“虚假指控”混合包装：他们抓取真实的历史参访记录，结合当代反性侵运动（#MeToo）中大量年轻女性勇敢揭发权贵这一极易引发社会分裂与共情的议题，精心设局引爆公众情绪。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Storm-1516 虚假叙事洗白与传播架构 accDescr: 展示从克里姆林宫高层指挥、素材伪造到多层舆论洗白并渗透入公众对话的流程。 subgraph Origin ["幕后主导与内容伪造"] A["克里姆林宫与 GRU<br/>(谢尔盖·基里延科统筹)"] --> B["物色真实事件与争议锚点"] B --> C["AI面部合成与换脸技术<br/>(如嫁接利普尼茨卡娅面孔)"] end subgraph Laundering ["叙事洗白流程 (Narrative Laundering)"] C --> D["特设虚假网站 / 假告密者视频"] D --> E["俄罗斯官方媒体介入报道"] E --> F["西方亲俄网红多层转发放大<br/>(如 Chay Bowes)"] end subgraph Integration ["社会渗透与影响"] F --> G["社交平台病毒式扩散<br/>(X / 手机信息流)"] G --> H["政界要员引用与大众舆论撕裂"] end ``` ### [06:30](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X9GQiouEdJ8&t=390s) “叙事洗白”机制与虚假告密者套路克莱姆森大学（Clemson University）媒体中心联合主任达伦·林威尔（Darren Linvill）长期监控俄罗斯网络水军。他指出，Storm-1516 运转的核心逻辑是一种名为“叙事洗白”（Narrative Laundering）的操纵链条。叙事洗白的过程就像资金洗钱一样，通常分为三个阶段： 1. **内容制造**：首先编造一个耸人听闻的故事，将其发布在专门设立的假新闻网站或通过短视频形式首发； 2. **多层介入**：利用俄罗斯国家媒体报道引用，再调动西方社会的真实网络红人（Influencers）接力转发，为虚假信息镀上可信度外衣； 3. **彻底整合**：虚假指控成功混入主流公共对话，变成普通老百姓与政界人士口口相传的谈资。 Storm-1516 最具代表性的模板是“告密者”（Whistleblower）格式。视频中往往安排一名自称“良心发现”的人士——有时是声称揭发内幕的记者，有时是安插在政府或实验室里的体制内雇员（例如在伪造视频中宣称“我们开展试验是为了救助儿童，而不是为了残害或谋杀他们”）。为了拍摄这些伪证，他们经常招募生活在圣彼得堡的西非侨民作为群演，例如伪造一段宣称“昨天我们在佐治亚州格威内特县（Gwinnett County）投票，今天又在富尔顿县（Fulton County）非法投票”的假造假选民视频。该组织甚至通过细微调整 AI 声纹来掩盖演员真实的口音与发声特征。这类信息操纵在乌克兰援助问题上表现得尤为明显。Storm-1516 长期反复深挖并摩擦公众的敏感痛点，比如编造“泽连斯基极其腐败”、“挪用西方数百亿美元援助资金中饱私囊”的假象。该组织制造虚假视频，谎称“泽连斯基通过空壳代理人暗中持有价值7500万美元的两艘豪华游艇”。这一虚假叙事不仅在社交网络上疯传，更被美国多位国会议员公开引用并大肆宣扬：“我们在乌克兰冲突上砸了半万亿美元，难道就是为了让泽连斯基手下的部长去买一艘更大的游艇？”林威尔教授指出，这正中俄罗斯下怀：他们无需强行控制民众的想法，只要持续不断地用谎言污染公共对话环境，就能实质性改变大批美国人对乌克兰战争的认知与态度。 ### [10:30](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X9GQiouEdJ8&t=630s) 德国大选定向攻击、极右翼崛起与监管防线溃败 2024年特朗普赢得美国大选后，俄罗斯虚假信息战的重心迅速转向了欧洲，因为欧洲依然是支持乌克兰抵抗侵略的最坚定支柱。针对哈贝克的攻击正是这一转向的标志性案例。虽然哈贝克澄清表示，2017年的学校访问是真实的，但合影中的真实女生及其家人早已发表公开声明斥责视频纯属无耻捏造，但普通受众在社交平台上很难有耐心去核实真伪。 Storm-1516 模式能够得逞的关键纽带是海外的亲俄网络红人。其中最突出的代表是爱尔兰籍独立记者蔡·鲍斯（Chay Bowes）。鲍斯长期充当俄罗斯虚假宣传的马前卒，频繁在社交网络上将乌克兰抨击为“彻底完蛋的失败国家”，并宣称成千上万乌克兰人正在逃离“毒枭元首的军队”。在德国大选期间，鲍斯转发了一段指控“德国大选正在系统性粉碎极右翼德国选择党（AfD）选票”的伪造视频，单条推文播放量超过50万次；另一账号转推后播放量更是逼近400万次。尽管德国选举官方迅速辟谣，详细指出伪造视频中展示的选票在纸张材质与印刷字体上均与真实选票不符，但极右翼选民的受害妄想与愤怒已被成功点燃。最终的选举结果展现了这种信息战的政治破坏力： - 德国极右翼政党 AfD 在选举中拿下 21% 的选票，支持率相比四年前翻了一倍以上；该党持极度亲俄立场，长期呼吁德国与莫斯科修好并解除对俄制裁。 - 执政联盟中的绿党得票率暴跌，罗伯特·哈贝克最终引咎辞去了联邦议院席位。 - 唯一值得庆幸的是，针对哈贝克个人的性侵伪造视频在德国境内被 X 平台应监管要求封锁，没有引发全网病毒式失控传播，让哈贝克在经历漫长的不眠之夜后稍感宽慰。但正如他所警告的：单个视频的阻截并不代表胜利，“虚假信息战的整体运行模式依然取得了成功”。在技术与监管层面，防线正在出现系统性漏洞。自从埃隆·马斯克于2022年底收购 X（原 Twitter）之后，平台审核大幅削弱，Storm-1516 恰恰在2023年8月正式起步并迎来爆发性野蛮生长；即便该视频在德国境内被屏蔽，在德国以外的 X 平台上仍可随意公开访问。更严峻的是，美国司法部在去年关停了联邦调查局（FBI）专门协调打击外国干预的“外国影响力工作组”（Foreign Influence Task Force）。随着美国官方反虚假信息机构的全面后撤，孤立无援的欧洲不得不独自承担起监控俄罗斯认知战、揭露 AI 深度伪造并规制跨国社交媒体巨头的重任。 ### [14:30](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X9GQiouEdJ8&t=870s) 愈演愈烈的影响力战役：他们才刚刚开始在俄罗斯发起的历次跨国虚假信息与舆论渗透行动中，Storm-1516 所捕获的公众关注度与吸睛规模超越了以往任何类似网络。该组织利用低成本深伪（Deepfake）技术、受雇演员、伪造的“内部告密者”视频以及多层级的“叙事洗白”链路，不仅突破了社交平台的传统内容审核防线，还在国际互联网生态中掀起了极高的讨论度。研究人员指出，该组织针对民主国家选举的攻击与干预频率正在呈爆发式递增。其攻击火力不仅高度聚焦于美国本土的关键政治选举，更将触角迅速蔓延至全球多个民主阵营国家的政治进程。面对这种高度工业化、流水线运作的虚假信息攻势，没有任何放缓的迹象；多方迹象表明，他们未来只会变本加厉地持续部署类似行动。正如专家所警示的那样，在利用前沿人工智能工具操纵全球公共叙事与制造社会分裂的漫长对抗中，“在许多方面，他们才刚刚拉开序幕”（"they're just getting started"）。 - **突破以往纪录**：Storm-1516 凭借其精密的分发网络与生成式技术结合，达成了远超传统俄罗斯虚假信息作战行动的传播范围与眼球效应。 - **攻击范围全球化**：虚假选举欺诈叙事与抹黑行动的覆盖面已由局部冲突扩大至全球各民主体制的核心选举流程。 - **持续威胁**：安全分析人士警告，随着深伪工具的迭代与外包洗白模式的常态化，此类信息操纵战术正进入更加高频与隐蔽的新阶段。 ## Notable quotes > [00:07](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X9GQiouEdJ8&t=7s) 见鬼，如果这件事情发酵并被主流媒体报道，一切就全完了，我将再也无法公开走在大街上。 — 罗伯特·哈贝克 > [03:58](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X9GQiouEdJ8&t=238s) 不费一枪一弹 > [03:58](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X9GQiouEdJ8&t=238s) 艾滋病毒由美国秘密实验室制造 > [06:30](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X9GQiouEdJ8&t=390s) 我们开展试验是为了救助儿童，而不是为了残害或谋杀他们 > [06:30](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X9GQiouEdJ8&t=390s) 昨天我们在佐治亚州格威内特县（Gwinnett County）投票，今天又在富尔顿县（Fulton County）非法投票 > [06:30](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X9GQiouEdJ8&t=390s) 泽连斯基通过空壳代理人暗中持有价值7500万美元的两艘豪华游艇 > [06:30](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X9GQiouEdJ8&t=390s) 我们在乌克兰冲突上砸了半万亿美元，难道就是为了让泽连斯基手下的部长去买一艘更大的游艇？ — 美国国会议员 > [10:30](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X9GQiouEdJ8&t=630s) 彻底完蛋的失败国家 — 蔡·鲍斯 > [10:30](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X9GQiouEdJ8&t=630s) 毒枭元首的军队 — 蔡·鲍斯 > [10:30](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X9GQiouEdJ8&t=630s) 虚假信息战的整体运行模式依然取得了成功 — 罗伯特·哈贝克 > [14:30](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X9GQiouEdJ8&t=870s) 在许多方面，他们才刚刚拉开序幕 ## Mentioned 罗伯特·哈贝克 (Robert Habeck), 德国绿党, 德国选择党 (AfD), Storm-1516, 俄罗斯军事情报总局 (GRU), 克里姆林宫, 谢尔盖·基里延科 (Sergei Kiriyenko), 尤利娅·利普尼茨卡娅 (Yulia Lipnitskaya), 达伦·林威尔 (Darren Linvill), 克莱姆森大学 (Clemson University), 弗拉基米尔·泽连斯基 (Volodymyr Zelenskyy), 蔡·鲍斯 (Chay Bowes), 唐纳德·特朗普 (Donald Trump), 埃隆·马斯克 (Elon Musk), X (原 Twitter), 联邦调查局外国影响力工作组 (FBI Foreign Influence Task Force), 美国司法部 (DOJ), 彭博社 (Bloomberg) ## Video description Russia-based groups have been found to be spreading disinformation for decades. Now a new group is capitalizing on artificial intelligence to more effectively sow doubt and chaos. Bloomberg has documented more than 190 fabricated narratives from the group, called Storm-1516. Amplified by a global network of influencers, it has targeted Ukraine as part of the Kremlin’s 12-year war on that nation, as well as elections in other democratic countries. We reveal how it works: the fake whistleblowers, actors and AI-generated faces planted on real people, and trace how a video manufactured in Russia can reach millions of people all over the world. The Most Potent Weapon in Russia’s Disinformation War: https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2026-russia-disinformation-storm-1516-videos/ Storm-1516 uses fabricated videos, phony websites and anonymous influencers to spread tales about election fraud, corruption and sexual abuse. 00:00 The allegation 02:22 Spotting a deepfake 03:58 Storm-1516 06:30 Narrative laundering 07:44 Storm-1516’s targets 10:30 The campaign against Robert Habeck 12:02 Shredded ballots 13:36 Moderation and regulation 14:30 They’re just getting started Watch more episodes of Bloomberg Investigates: https://www.youtube.com/show/VLPLqq4LnWs3olVK53n-XDSRF10i6THmbCEx?sbp=QAE%3D Bloomberg Investigates is an award-winning series that sets out to uncover the truth behind some of the most powerful stories from around the world. #Russia #Deepfakes #Documentary -------- Like this video? Subscribe: http://www.youtube.com/Bloomberg?sub_confirmation=1 Get unlimited access to Bloomberg.com for just $1.99 your first month: https://www.bloomberg.com/subscriptions?in_source=YoutubeOriginals Bloomberg Originals offers bold takes for curious minds on today’s biggest topics. Hosted by experts covering stories you haven’t seen and viewpoints you haven’t heard, you’ll discover cinematic, data-led shows that investigate the intersection of business and culture. Exploring every angle of climate change, technology, finance, sports and beyond, Bloomberg Originals is business as you’ve never seen it. Subscribe for business news, but not as you've known it: exclusive interviews, fascinating profiles, data-driven analysis, and the latest in tech innovation from around the world. Visit our partner channel Bloomberg News for global news and insight in an instant. [Source](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X9GQiouEdJ8)

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[0:07] 罗伯特·哈贝克: 见鬼，如果这件事情发酵并被主流媒体报道，一切就全完了，我将再也无法公开走在大街上。 [3:58] 不费一枪一弹 [3:58] 艾滋病毒由美国秘密实验室制造 [6:30] 我们开展试验是为了救助儿童，而不是为了残害或谋杀他们 [6:30] 昨天我们在佐治亚州格威内特县（Gwinnett County）投票，今天又在富尔顿县（Fulton County）非法投票 [6:30] 泽连斯基通过空壳代理人暗中持有价值7500万美元的两艘豪华游艇 [6:30] 美国国会议员: 我们在乌克兰冲突上砸了半万亿美元，难道就是为了让泽连斯基手下的部长去买一艘更大的游艇？ [10:30] 蔡·鲍斯: 彻底完蛋的失败国家 [10:30] 蔡·鲍斯: 毒枭元首的军队 [10:30] 罗伯特·哈贝克: 虚假信息战的整体运行模式依然取得了成功 [14:30] 在许多方面，他们才刚刚拉开序幕

Source quotes

[3:58] Disinformation is absolutely central to Soviet strategy for defeating what the KGB calls 'the main enemy'—that is the United States—without firing a shot. [13:36] They've mapped up the rate at which they've been targeting elections, not just in the United States, but around the world... I think in many ways they're just getting started.

Original transcript

[0:07] - If you're just scrolling, it looks pretty real to me [0:09] if you're not taking a very close look. [0:15] And that's why this one is so dangerous. [0:24] - Robert Habeck was the Green Party leader [0:26] and vice chancellor of Germany. [0:28] At the end of 2024, he was in the midst [0:31] of an election campaign when a video [0:34] surfaced on the internet. [0:43] - He had visited this school in Germany in 2017 [0:49] and there was a picture of him [0:51] with some students in a local newspaper. [0:55] Flash forward to 2024, [0:57] and one of the young students that he was pictured [1:00] with years before is claiming [1:03] that he had sexually assaulted her [1:05] when he visited that school. [1:16] - I said, well s---, if this is gonna break through [1:18] and it's reported in the media, everything is over [1:21] and I can't show myself on the streets. [1:24] - The important thing about this video is that it's fake. [1:29] It's one example of a slew of videos produced [1:32] by a group inside Russia. [1:35] We're in the golden age of disinformation. [1:37] Russia has really stepped up [1:39] its spread of fabricated reports. [1:42] It's targeting social media platforms [1:45] using influencers and AI-generated content. [1:49] They sow chaos, they sow doubts, [1:52] and they undermine the truth. [2:22] - When I look at her, and I'm watching this, [2:24] I don't speak German so I don't know what she's saying, [2:27] but I'm having this sensation [2:28] of there's something wrong with her face. [2:36] - If you're just scrolling, it might look normal, [2:39] especially on a phone, [2:40] but on a big screen, it's quite clear [2:42] that her eyes aren't quite right. [2:45] She's blinking sort of oddly, [2:47] her eyes are changing size slightly as she's speaking [2:52] and her face doesn't match what she's doing with her mouth. [2:55] - It's not like a masterclass in like [2:57] filmmaking or artistry. [2:59] What it is is they can travel. [3:02] The ultimate goal is to get ordinary people talking about [3:06] it, thinking about it, considering it. [3:08] - Which is why it's so dangerous to not [3:11] take this stuff down. [3:13] When we started digging deeper [3:15] and we found more examples of similar videos, [3:19] we realized this was a distinct campaign [3:23] that other researchers had identified [3:26] as well as government officials. [3:28] - We've seen governments talk about election interference [3:30] and disinformation campaigns, [3:32] but what was really different about this is they came out [3:34] and they attributed it not just to Russia, [3:37] but to a very specific Russian group. [3:40] You almost never see that [3:58] - Storm-1516 is really a new approach [4:01] or methodology that Russia has adopted [4:04] to spread disinformation. [4:07] I spent so many hours scrolling [4:11] through social media looking at these videos, [4:13] and I realized that so many people believe these stories. [4:18] It's a very murky operation. [4:21] It's backed by the GRU, Russia's Military [4:24] Intelligence Agency. [4:26] We also believe that this effort is led overall from the [4:30] Kremlin by a man named Sergei Kiriyenko, [4:33] who is Putin's first deputy chief [4:36] of the presidential administration. [4:43] Russia has been targeting the West with fake reports [4:47] for years. [4:49] - The disinformation is absolutely central [4:53] to Soviet strategy for defeating [4:55] what the KGB calls "the main enemy" [4:57] that is the United States without firing the shot. [5:01] - Back in the Soviet period, [5:03] they invented, most famously, the conspiracy theory [5:07] that HIV was cooked up in a US lab. [5:17] And so what I did was snip the image [5:20] and then I put her through facial recognition software. [5:24] It comes up with the image [5:29] of a Russian figure skater by the name of Yulia Lipnitskaya, [5:33] who became well-known in Russia for winning a medal [5:38] during the Sochi 2014 games. [5:41] I highly doubt it's this Russian figure skater [5:44] who's acting for money, but looks like [5:46] what they've done is they've taken the images [5:47] of this woman, Yulia Lipnitskaya, [5:50] and imposed her face on a real actor [5:54] and then manipulated her face with AI animation software. [6:01] It's really important for them to mix real news [6:04] with fake news. [6:05] You know, so many young women have come out [6:08] with similar allegations against powerful men, [6:11] so they're picking up on a theme [6:13] that they know is very divisive. [6:31] - I could show you the magic [6:33] of a Storm-1516 video [6:36] and why it looks silly, but is actually genius. [6:41] - My name is Darren Linvill and I am co-director [6:44] of the hub and professor in the Department [6:46] of Communication here at Clemson. [6:47] I read Russian troll tweets until my eyes bled [6:52] and we learned just an amazing amount. [6:56] Storm-1516 is a narrative laundering campaign. [7:01] Narrative laundering starts by creating a story. [7:06] Sometimes that story is put onto a purpose-built website [7:11] and then, they use all kinds of different resources to layer [7:16] that narrative, layer that story into the conversation. [7:20] It may mean Russian state media layering those stories [7:25] into the conversation. [7:26] It definitely and [7:27] and most often involves real influencers [7:32] and those influencers then layer in that Russian narrative [7:36] until integration where it just becomes part [7:39] of the conversation [7:41] where real people are repeating it and talking about it. [7:44] You get to the point where when you see one [7:47] of these Storm-1516 narratives, you don't have [7:50] to look very hard to realize, oh yeah, that's them. [7:55] One technique that Storm-1516 very often uses [7:59] is a whistleblower format. [8:01] Maybe it's a journalist who has uncovered something [8:03] that they think is gonna blow the whistle on something. [8:06] Maybe it's someone who's placed within a government [8:11] who has a story to tell. [8:13] Yeah, we started the trials to help children, not [8:16] to injure them or murder them. [8:19] Their videos look the same. [8:21] They repeatedly use, for instance, [8:24] members of the West African diaspora community who live in [8:29] St. Petersburg as actors. [8:31] - Yesterday we voted in Gwinnett County [8:34] and today we arevoting in Fulton County. [8:36] - We've seen them use AI in some of their videos in sort [8:40] of subtle ways to mask a particular individual who's [8:44] speaking to change the vocal patterns. [8:47] There's a set of narratives [8:49] that Russia has pushed consistently over time, [8:52] issues that have cleaver points within the discourse [8:57] that the Russians want to push on maybe a wound [9:01] that the Russians want to rub salt in. [9:05] For instance, that Zelenskyy is corrupt, [9:08] that he is using Western aid money to buy extravagant items. [9:12] - President Zelenskyy uses proxies to hide ownership [9:16] of two years worth $75 million. [9:19] - This was a narrative [9:21] that not only went viral on social media, but it was [9:26] repeated by various US policy makers. [9:30] - We're getting easily a half a [9:31] trillion dollars in the hole for the Ukraine conflict. [9:34] Why? So that one of Zelenskyy's [9:36] ministers can buy a bigger yacht? [9:39] - It's these false Russian narratives repeated over and over [9:42] and over again, and you can't get me to believe that [9:46] that doesn't have some effect on how a large portion [9:51] of Americans view the war in Ukraine. [9:55] They're trying to not tell people what to think, [10:00] they're trying to influence the conversation. [10:07] After Trump won the election in 2024, [10:10] I think Russia really turned its focus to Europe [10:14] where the real support for Ukraine remained. [10:18] Certainly these issues are taken more seriously in Europe. [10:22] They are much more targeted by Russian disinformation. [10:37] The thing is actually this, this event was referring [10:40] to a real event, so date and time 15 years ago [10:43] they are true, so I visited a school [10:45] as a minister in the northern most part [10:48] of Germany in the state of Schleswig-Holstein. [10:50] It's not the girl who I met 15 years ago, [10:54] and the girl herself was saying, [10:56] or the family was saying, "this is just a lie, [11:00] so we have nothing to do with it." [11:01] So if you just a normal user of social media, you see it, [11:06] you might tend to believe it. [11:09] The video with the allegations against Habeck was shared [11:13] by a German language influencer who posts a lot [11:17] of Storm-1516 content. [11:19] The real core to the success [11:22] of Storm-1516 has evolved into being about the influencers. [11:27] There's one individual in particular, Chay Bowes. [11:30] This individual is a Irish journalist, [11:32] independent journalist. [11:35] We've been warning you about this corruption s--- [11:37] in this complete basket case country called [11:41] Ukraine for years. [11:42] I suppose it's all Russian disinformation too, that [11:45] tens of thousands of people [11:47] are literally running away from the narco-fuhrer's army. [11:50] - He's so clearly working on behalf [11:52] of Russian disinformation efforts, [11:55] He has regularly shared Storm-1516 content [12:00] and he shared the video alleging that ballots with votes [12:04] for the AFD were being shredded systematically. [12:13] His post got half a million views. [12:16] It was also posted by someone else and got almost 4 million views. [12:21] The German authorities called this out warning the public [12:24] not to believe it, saying the paper is different, [12:26] the typeface is different, [12:27] but you know, they have made a concerted effort here [12:31] to make this look as realistic as possible. [12:33] - Yeah, clearly it was resonating with lots of people [12:35] and the fact that it's AFD ballots being shredded, [12:38] what's, what's the narrative that plays into? [12:40] - Exactly. [12:41] Well, AFD, Germany's far right party, it is pro-Russian, [12:46] has called for closer ties with Moscow, [12:49] called for the lifting of sanctions on Russia. [12:53] In the election, the AFD got 21% of the vote, [12:55] which was over double [12:57] what they had gotten four years earlier. [13:00] On the other hand, the Green Party's vote share fell [13:03] and Robert Habeck went on to resign his parliamentary seat. [13:08] Perhaps the only silver lining for Habeck is [13:11] that the video targeting him didn't go viral, in part [13:14] because of efforts to block the post on X in Germany. [13:18] - I had to sleepless night, [13:19] but in the morning as no media was reporting about it, [13:22] I was really relieved, I can say. [13:27] Though this disgusting video was not a success, [13:30] still the whole way [13:32] of disinformation campaign is successful. [13:35] Even though the story against Habeck didn't spread, [13:38] you can still find the video on X outside Germany [13:42] and I think that's significant. [13:44] If you look at the timeline of it, [13:46] Elon Musk takes over X in 2022 [13:50] and Storm-1516 starts [13:52] to get going in August 2023 [13:56] and really just takes off. [14:00] There's also the question of regulation in the US. [14:04] Last year, the Justice Department shut down the FBI's [14:07] Foreign Influence Task Force, which was coordinating a lot [14:11] of the US government's efforts on this front [14:14] to expose foreign backed disinformation, [14:17] and I think with the US agencies standing down on this front [14:21] it's really Europe that's left monitoring it [14:24] and trying to expose it [14:25] and trying to regulate the social media giants. [14:30] Storm-1516 has captured eyeballs like no other [14:35] Russian operation before. [14:38] - We've seen them ramp up the rate at which they've been [14:42] targeting elections, not just in the United States, [14:45] but around the world, and there's every reason [14:47] to believe they'll continue to do that. [14:50] I think in many ways they're just getting started.