Sam Altman confirmed that OpenAI plans to release an amazing new frontier AI model in 2024, expecting the transition from GPT-4 to GPT-5 to deliver a performance leap comparable to the jump between GPT-3 and GPT-4. (66:13)
Altman dismissed rumors that Ilya Sutskever triggered the November 2023 OpenAI board crisis because he secretly saw AGI, affirming that nobody at the company has yet seen or built artificial general intelligence. (18:31)
Addressing Elon Musk's lawsuit, Altman stated that Musk originally initiated the 2018 split because he wanted total control of OpenAI or a merger into Tesla, calling Musk's current legal challenge unbecoming of a builder. (27:00)
OpenAI plans to return to physical robotics and embodied systems, with Altman noting it would be disappointing to build an AGI that still relies entirely on humans to carry out physical tasks. (91:20)
Detailed notes
## Background
This episode was published on YouTube by Lex Fridman on March 18, 2024, on the Lex Fridman Podcast channel (#419). According to the video description, the conversation features OpenAI CEO Sam Altman discussing the company's state-of-the-art technologies including GPT-4, ChatGPT, and Sora, alongside reflections on the November 2023 board crisis, Ilya Sutskever, Elon Musk's lawsuit, compute power, and the broader path toward AGI.
## TL;DR
In this in-depth conversation, Sam Altman unpacks the chaotic November 2023 OpenAI board crisis, detailing the emotional turmoil of his brief ouster, the restructuring of the board, and his enduring respect for Ilya Sutskever and Elon Musk despite legal tensions. He addresses the capabilities and limitations of existing models like GPT-4, framing current systems as merely early stepping stones toward general intelligence and scientific discovery. Altman also explores the technical and infrastructural realities of future models such as GPT-5, detailing the immense compute and clean energy demands required to scale AI, the role of models like Sora, and the societal imperative for iterative deployment rather than unannounced frontier releases. Throughout the dialogue, he emphasizes transparent governance, safety alignment beyond theatrical doom scenarios, and the potential for embodied AI and robotics to reshape civilization.
## Atmosphere & style
The interview has an intimate, subdued, and intensely reflective tone, characterized by Fridman's gentle, earnest probing and Altman's quiet, candid introspection. Moving between technical pragmatism and philosophical vulnerability, the dialogue feels like an unvarnished post-mortem of a corporate and existential pressure cooker, particularly when Altman recounts the emotional shock of his ouster and the burden of leading through historic technological shifts. The exchange balances dry, self-effacing humor with a palpable undercurrent of exhaustion and awe, creating a contemplative atmosphere where monumental technological stakes are weighed against fragile human relationships and personal mortality.
## Bulletin
- [01:06:13](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jvqFAi7vkBc&t=3973s) Sam Altman confirmed that OpenAI plans to release an amazing new frontier AI model in 2024, expecting the transition from GPT-4 to GPT-5 to deliver a performance leap comparable to the jump between GPT-3 and GPT-4.
- [18:31](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jvqFAi7vkBc&t=1111s) Altman dismissed rumors that Ilya Sutskever triggered the November 2023 OpenAI board crisis because he secretly saw AGI, affirming that nobody at the company has yet seen or built artificial general intelligence.
- [27:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jvqFAi7vkBc&t=1620s) Addressing Elon Musk's lawsuit, Altman stated that Musk originally initiated the 2018 split because he wanted total control of OpenAI or a merger into Tesla, calling Musk's current legal challenge unbecoming of a builder.
- [01:31:20](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jvqFAi7vkBc&t=5480s) OpenAI plans to return to physical robotics and embodied systems, with Altman noting it would be disappointing to build an AGI that still relies entirely on humans to carry out physical tasks.
## Key takeaways
- [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jvqFAi7vkBc&t=0s) Compute will act as the core currency and most precious commodity of the future, turning the path toward AGI into an intense geopolitical and corporate power struggle.
- [04:38](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jvqFAi7vkBc&t=278s) The November 2023 board firing exposed inherent vulnerabilities in OpenAI's nonprofit governance structure, which lacked standard institutional checks and balances.
- [18:31](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jvqFAi7vkBc&t=1111s) Altman refutes conspiracy theories regarding AGI discoveries behind the board revolt, emphasizing that Sutskever is a principled researcher who had not seen AGI.
- [24:39](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jvqFAi7vkBc&t=1479s) OpenAI's shift from a pure research lab to a capped-profit entity was dictated by massive capital and compute requirements unforeseen at founding.
- [27:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jvqFAi7vkBc&t=1620s) Altman defines OpenAI's openness by providing powerful AI tools for free without ads to hundreds of millions of people, rejecting dogma that models must be fully open-sourced.
- [34:36](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jvqFAi7vkBc&t=2076s) Sora demonstrates emergent temporal continuity through visual patches, though claiming it possesses an explicit 3D world model remains an exaggeration.
- [40:05](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jvqFAi7vkBc&t=2405s) Creators whose content trains generative models deserve fair compensation and attribution as economic models evolve.
- [44:13](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jvqFAi7vkBc&t=2653s) Altman candidly critiques GPT-4 as inadequate in retrospect, arguing that forward-looking dissatisfaction is vital for advancing the exponential progress curve toward GPT-5.
- [48:03](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jvqFAi7vkBc&t=2883s) ChatGPT's mainstream adoption was driven by interface design and post-training alignment like RLHF rather than pure scale alone.
- [01:00:30](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jvqFAi7vkBc&t=3630s) Future AI models must shift from fixed compute per token toward dynamic, variable compute allocation based on problem difficulty.
- [01:02:37](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jvqFAi7vkBc&t=3757s) OpenAI maintains an iterative deployment strategy over secret milestone releases so that society, institutions, and regulators have time to adapt gradually.
- [01:11:43](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jvqFAi7vkBc&t=4303s) Clean energy infrastructure, particularly advanced nuclear fission and commercial fusion, represents the primary physical bottleneck to scaling compute.
- [01:17:36](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jvqFAi7vkBc&t=4656s) Reimagining search should focus on LLM-driven synthesis and action execution rather than replicating Google's ad-supported 10 blue links.
- [01:23:19](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jvqFAi7vkBc&t=4999s) To prevent ideological bias, AI labs must publish explicit, concrete behavioral specifications with public input rather than relying on ambiguous corporate principles.
- [01:28:40](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jvqFAi7vkBc&t=5320s) Software engineering will rapidly transition toward high-level natural language instruction over the next decade, rendering low-level syntax secondary.
- [01:31:20](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jvqFAi7vkBc&t=5480s) Altman defines true AGI not by conversational prowess, but by its capacity to substantially accelerate the global rate of novel scientific discovery.
- [01:37:59](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jvqFAi7vkBc&t=5879s) Transformative AI governance should be established by democratic governments rather than concentrated unilaterally in the hands of corporate founders.
## Detailed walkthrough
### [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jvqFAi7vkBc&t=0s) Introduction and the Stakes of AGI
Sam Altman frames compute as the core resource of the coming era, stating, “I think compute is gonna be the currency of the future. I think it'll be maybe the most precious commodity in the world.” He anticipates that by the end of the decade, and potentially earlier, humanity will possess exceptionally capable AI systems. Regarding the intense geopolitical and corporate friction surrounding these developments, Altman observes, “The road to AGI should be a giant power struggle. I expect that to be the case.”
Lex Fridman introduces the conversation by noting that whoever achieves artificial general intelligence first will hold an extraordinary amount of power, raising the question of whether Altman trusts himself with that responsibility. Fridman welcomes Altman back to the podcast for his second appearance, highlighting OpenAI's major milestones—GPT-4, ChatGPT, and Sora—and its trajectory toward building AGI.
[01:05](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jvqFAi7vkBc&t=65s) The November Board Saga and Personal Fallout
Lex Fridman asks Altman to recount the November 2023 OpenAI board crisis, which erupted between Thursday, November 16th, and Friday, November 17th. Altman reflects on the raw emotional and psychological toll of being abruptly ousted from his own company, describing it as “the most painful professional experience of my life and chaotic, and shameful, and upsetting and a bunch of other negative things.” While caught in a continuous rush of adrenaline, he felt overwhelmed by an outpouring of love and support from colleagues and peers, remarking on a post he wrote at the time that compared the experience to attending his own eulogy.
```mermaid
flowchart TD
accTitle: OpenAI November Board Crisis Timeline
accDescr: Sequence of events from the sudden firing of Sam Altman to his return and board restructuring.
subgraph S1["Crisis & Fallout"]
A["Nov 16-17, 2023:<br/>Sudden Board Firing"] --> B["Intense Weekend:<br/>Rollercoaster Deliberations"]
B --> C["Adrenaline Rush &<br/>Existential Threat to OpenAI"]
end
subgraph S2["Resolution & Return"]
C --> D["Compromise Reached:<br/>Bret Taylor & Larry Summers Join"]
D --> E["Adam D'Angelo Remains on Interim Board"]
E --> F["Sam Altman Returns as CEO"]
end
subgraph S3["Aftermath"]
F --> G["30-45 Day 'Fugue State'<br/>Low Psychological Point"]
G --> H["Refocus on Mission &<br/>Board Governance Redesign"]
end
```
Despite the trauma and genuine fears that the collapse of OpenAI might represent a catastrophic setback for AI safety, Altman takes solace in the timing. He had long anticipated that a dramatic, explosive disruption would strike OpenAI before it achieved AGI. Having it happen relatively early forced the organization to build resilience against external shocks. However, the aftermath was personally exhausting. Altman describes entering a "fugue state" that lasted roughly 30 to 45 days, during which he felt completely depleted, down, and wishing he could simply retreat into a cave to recover while still having to manage the company.
- Altman reflects that the chaos ultimately hardened OpenAI's organizational resilience ahead of future, higher-stakes pressures.
- The psychological low following his return persisted for over a month before OpenAI fully transitioned back to high-intensity operations.
[04:38](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jvqFAi7vkBc&t=278s) Governance Failures and Nonprofit Board Dynamics
Fridman and Altman discuss the institutional lessons uncovered by the governance crisis. Altman stresses that the company nearly suffered total destruction and that building an organization capable of withstanding real-world pressure is just as critical as solving technical AI safety. When Fridman inquires whether the original board's decision was the result of a rigorous deliberation or a rapidly escalating dispute, Altman suggests that while the directors were generally well-meaning individuals, the situation exposed structural vulnerabilities under acute time pressure. He notes, “I believe that in stressful situations where people feel time pressure or whatever, people understandably make suboptimal decisions.”
The conversation turns to the fundamental design of OpenAI's corporate architecture. Unlike standard public or venture-backed corporations where directors are held accountable by shareholders, OpenAI's nonprofit board operated without traditional checks and balances. Altman explains, “the board of a nonprofit has, unless you put other rules in place, like quite a lot of power, they don't really answer to anyone but themselves.” He emphasizes that an ideal structure for OpenAI would ensure the board remains answerable to the world as a whole rather than acting inside an insular feedback loop.
[07:43](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jvqFAi7vkBc&t=463s) Restructuring the Board: Larry Summers, Bret Taylor, and Governance Criteria
Altman outlines the gradual decay of the previous governing body, explaining that the board shrank over a year from nine members to six, after which the members reached an impasse and could not agree on new appointments. In addition, the prior board suffered from a deficit of seasoned corporate governance experience. When the crisis peaked over the weekend, the executive team and the departing board members negotiated an emergency transitional structure. To facilitate Altman's return, both sides compromised on a three-person interim board consisting of Quora CEO Adam D'Angelo (who carried over from the prior board), former Treasury Secretary Larry Summers, and former Salesforce co-CEO Bret Taylor.
Altman admits that these emergency appointments were made under extreme duress: “That's like you kind of do that on the battlefield. You don't have time to design a rigorous process then.” Addressing public critiques regarding the selection of Larry Summers, Altman points out that Summers was actually proposed by the old board members, while Bret Taylor had previously declined due to time constraints before stepping up to help navigate the emergency. Moving forward, the governance model relies on adding directors in unified cohorts:
- **Hiring in Slates:** Bret Taylor established the approach of bringing on board members in collective "slates" rather than individually, ensuring a cohesive mix of corporate, legal, and nonprofit expertise.
- **Broader Perspective:** While deep technical understanding is necessary, Altman highlights that boards cannot rely exclusively on technical specialists; members must also possess the perspective to evaluate the broader societal, economic, and practical impacts of deploying transformative models.
[12:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jvqFAi7vkBc&t=720s) Mathematical Analogies for Evaluating People
When evaluating candidates for various positions, Sam Altman explains that he looks at candidates differently depending on the role. For many roles, he completely ignores their track record and focuses strictly on their rate of growth: “There's some roles where I kind of totally ignore track record and just look at slope, kind of ignore the y-intercept.” However, he treats board appointments as a major exception to this rule. For a board member, Altman notes that he cares far more about the y-intercept because track record and deep experience represent something fundamental that is exceptionally difficult to replace. Lex Fridman jokingly asks whether Altman tries to fit a polynomial or exponential function to people's track records, to which Altman chuckles and remarks that the mathematical analogy does not carry that far.
[12:40](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jvqFAi7vkBc&t=760s) The Psychology and Emotional Rollercoaster of the Board Saga
Fridman asks Altman about the psychological low points of that tumultuous November weekend, teasing whether he ever considered disappearing to the Amazon jungle to drink ayahuasca. Altman reflects that while the entire period was deeply painful, exhausting, and felt like a public battle fought on an overwhelming stage, it also contained remarkable high points. His phone blew up continuously with supportive messages from daily collaborators and people he had not heard from in a decade, though he was in too much of a firefight to appreciate them properly in the moment. When the board fired him on Friday afternoon, he could get few concrete answers, but he quickly accepted his dismissal: “Well, the board gets to do this. And so I'm gonna think for a little bit about what I want to do, but I'll try to find the, the blessing in disguise here.”
Altman realized that his job running OpenAI had turned into managing a decently large company, whereas what he truly loved most was working directly with research scientists. He quickly grew excited about launching a new, tightly focused AI research effort, never imagining Friday night that the board's decision might be overturned. While Fridman notes this quick pivot was a great coping mechanism, the situation shifted rapidly:
```mermaid
flowchart TD
accTitle: The Timeline of the OpenAI Board Saga Weekend
accDescr: A flowchart depicting the events from Altman's firing on Friday afternoon to the appointment of a new interim CEO on Sunday night.
subgraph Friday["Friday: Acceptance and Moving On"]
A["Friday Afternoon:<br/>Board fires Altman without clear answers"] --> B["Altman accepts outcome;<br/>plans new focused AI research venture"]
B --> C["Friday Evening:<br/>OpenAI executive team vows to fight board decision"]
end
subgraph Saturday["Saturday: Initial Outreach"]
C --> D["Saturday Morning:<br/>Two board members call Altman to explore return"]
D --> E["Altman outlines terms for returning<br/>out of love for staff and partners"]
end
subgraph Sunday["Sunday: Rollercoaster and Low Point"]
E --> F["Throughout Weekend:<br/>Team repeatedly told a resolution is imminent"]
F --> G["Sunday Evening:<br/>Board abruptly appoints a new interim CEO"]
G --> H["Lowest psychological point;<br/>yet overall emotion remained love, not hate"]
end
```
By Saturday morning, two board members called Altman to confess that they had destabilized the organization without intending to destroy value, asking if they could discuss his return. Though Altman's initial instinct was resistance, his love for the company, employees, partners, and shareholders prompted him to formulate the conditions required for his reinstatement. The hardest part of the weekend was the prolonged uncertainty: throughout Saturday and Sunday, OpenAI was under assault from competitors trying to recruit its talent while leadership fought to stabilize the company, repeatedly being assured that a deal was nearly closed. The absolute psychological nadir came on Sunday evening when, instead of finalizing his return, the board abruptly announced a new interim CEO. Yet Altman maintains that aside from that brief low on Sunday night, his prevailing emotion was gratitude rather than malice: “It was like painful, but it was like the dominant emotion of the weekend was love, not hate.”
[17:04](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jvqFAi7vkBc&t=1024s) Appreciating Quiet Leadership and Mira Murati
Altman praises Chief Technology Officer Mira Murati for her outstanding leadership during the chaotic weekend, but emphasizes that true executive quality is not measured only during crises. In response to Fridman highlighting Altman's previous comment that Murati excels in "quiet moments," Altman explains that leaders are frequently judged by their demeanor during dramatic emergencies, but real impact is built during the normal drudgery of ordinary operations: “A thing I really value in leaders is how people act on a boring Tuesday at 9:46 in the morning and in just sort of the normal drudgery of the day-to-day, how someone shows up in a meeting, the quality of the decisions they make.”
Fridman acknowledges that while observers and historians naturally fixate on dramatic inflection points—much like focusing on the invasion of the Soviet Union by Nazi Germany instead of ordinary human civilization—these crisis moments reveal extremes of human nature, damage, and triumph. Altman agrees that such interest is understandable, but points out that the weekend crisis does not define OpenAI; the real story lies in the daily dedication over the other seven years of the organization's existence.
[18:31](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jvqFAi7vkBc&t=1111s) Ilya Sutskever, AGI Rumors, and Governance Lessons
Addressing persistent online rumors and memes about Chief Scientist Ilya Sutskever—such as whether he is being held captive in a secret nuclear facility—Fridman presses Altman on their current relationship and Sutskever's quiet public presence. Altman dispels the jokes and expresses deep affection and respect for Sutskever, affirming his wish to collaborate for decades to come: “I love Ilya. I have tremendous respect for Ilya. I don't have anything I can say about his plans right now. That's a question for him. But I really hope we work together for certainly the rest of my career.”
When asked about the widely circulated internet meme that Sutskever triggered the board crisis because he "saw something" (implying an internal breakthrough to Artificial General Intelligence), Altman dismisses the narrative:
- “Ilya has not seen AGI, none of us have seen AGI. We've not built AGI.”
- Ilya Sutskever is recognized as taking safety, existential risk, and societal impact remarkably seriously, making him one of Altman's most frequent sounding boards over the past several years on how to steward AI development responsibly.
- Altman characterizes Sutskever as an introspective, first-principles thinker who regularly ponders long-term, ten-year horizons rather than immediate one-year milestones.
- Beyond his serious intellectual demeanor and comfort with silence, Altman shares an endearing personal side of Sutskever: recently at a dinner party, Sutskever was playfully interacting with a puppy in a silly, charming manner that the public rarely gets to see.
Turning to the aftermath of the crisis, Altman confirms he feels very confident in OpenAI's newly constituted board, whose immediate mandate includes evaluating and restructuring OpenAI's corporate governance to ensure it is robust against future shocks. Altman views the whole ordeal as a painful preview of the immense pressure the organization will encounter as the stakes of artificial intelligence escalate: “It was like a preview for me of what's gonna happen as the stakes get higher and higher and the need that we have like robust governance structures and processes and people.” When Fridman asks whether surviving the ordeal made him more hesitant to trust people on a personal level, Altman bluntly confirms: “Yes.”
[22:53](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jvqFAi7vkBc&t=1373s) Trust, Cynicism, and Building a Leadership Team
Sam Altman reflects on how the boardroom upheaval deeply rattled his personal worldview. He describes himself as historically having an open, optimistic philosophy of life, preferring to ignore edge cases and accept the occasional downside in exchange for living unburdened by suspicion: “You get a little bit screwed in exchange for getting to live with your guard down.” Being caught completely off guard by the board's actions forced an unwelcome shift, pushing him toward defensive planning and eroding his default trust in people. When Lex Fridman asks whether he worries about sliding into cynicism, Altman responds that he remains the exact opposite of cynical, yet he genuinely laments becoming less instinctively trusting.
Fridman ponders whether an AGI developer ought to operate with a trusting or an untrusting posture. He observes that as an organization accumulates vast amounts of power and capital, people inevitably start behaving strangely. He asks Altman how one manages to assemble a circle that balances ambitious building with prudent decision-making. Altman concedes that while outsiders can legitimately critique his past handling of the board and how much trust he placed in those specific members, the day-to-day workforce at OpenAI tells a very different story:
> “I think you could make all kinds of comments about the board members and the level of trust I should have had there or how I should have done things differently. But in terms of the team here, I think you'd have to like give me a very good grade on that one.”
Altman emphasizes his immense respect and gratitude for the core team, asserting that surrounding oneself with steadfast colleagues remains essential.
---
[24:39](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jvqFAi7vkBc&t=1479s) The Evolution of OpenAI and Elon Musk’s Lawsuit
The conversation transitions to Elon Musk's lawsuit against OpenAI. Asked what Musk is actually attacking and whether he has a valid grievance, Altman admits he does not truly grasp Musk's underlying motivations. Looking back seven or eight years, Altman explains that OpenAI was conceived strictly as a research lab with zero anticipation of what the technology would become. It was formed long before large language models took center stage, before the concept of an API existed, and before anyone contemplated selling chatbot subscriptions or turning models into commercial products:
> “I think with many new fundamentally new things, you start fumbling through the dark and you make some assumptions, most of which turn out to be wrong.”
As the research progressed, it became undeniable that OpenAI needed far more capital than a standard charitable vehicle could raise. To adapt, they repeatedly patched the corporate structure, leading to an unconventional framework that Altman admits looks “eyebrow raising to say the least.” While having an all-knowing oracle in the early days would have yielded a very different founding architecture, Altman maintains that leadership made rational choices at each juncture. In its public blog post replying to the lawsuit, OpenAI avoided emotional language, laying out the timeline and correspondence to document how events unfolded.
```mermaid
flowchart TD
accTitle: OpenAI Structural Evolution
accDescr: Flowchart illustrating the evolution of OpenAI from pure research lab to capped-profit company and its fallout with Elon Musk.
subgraph EarlyPhase["Early Founding (7-8 Years Ago)"]
A["Pure Non-Profit Research Lab"] --> B["Uncertainty: No API, No Products, Pre-LLMs"]
end
subgraph ScalingNeeds["Capital & Compute Realities"]
B --> C["Need for Massive Capital & Compute"]
C --> D["Patch Non-Profit Structure"]
D --> E["Capped-Profit Entity Created"]
end
subgraph MuskTension["Elon Musk Rift"]
C --> F["Musk Proposal: Merge with / Acquired by Tesla"]
F --> G["OpenAI Rejects Total Control"]
G --> H["Musk Parts Ways (2018)"]
end
subgraph LegalClash["Current Conflict (2024)"]
E --> I["Musk Files Lawsuit Against OpenAI"]
H --> I
end
```
---
[27:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jvqFAi7vkBc&t=1620s) The Split with Elon Musk and the Meaning of "Open"
Fridman suggests Musk lacks empathy for the radical uncertainty OpenAI faced, noting that Musk himself was once laughed at for talking about landing rockets, just as early OpenAI researchers were dismissed for chasing AGI. Altman agrees, pointing out the irony. When Fridman characterizes the separation as OpenAI choosing to part ways with Musk, Altman clarifies that Musk initiated the split:
> “He thought OpenAI was gonna fail. He wanted total control to sort of turn it around. We wanted to keep going in the direction that now has become OpenAI. He also wanted Tesla to be able to build an AGI effort. At various times, he wanted to make OpenAI into a for-profit company that he could have control of or have it merged with Tesla. We didn't want to do that and he decided to leave, which that's fine.”
Fridman brings up Musk's proposal to have Tesla acquire OpenAI to exert full control, a dynamic surfaced in the emails published by OpenAI.
Turning to the semantic battle over the name, Fridman asks what "open" means to Altman. Altman quips that if he could consult an oracle, he would pick an entirely different name. Nevertheless, he insists that OpenAI fulfills openness by offering high-capability artificial intelligence tools to hundreds of millions of people at zero cost:
> “One of the things that I think OpenAI is doing that is the most important of everything that we're doing is putting powerful technology in the hands of people for free as a public good. We don't run ads on our free version. We don't monetize it in other ways. We just say it's part of our mission. We wanna put increasingly powerful tools in the hands of people for free and get them to use them.”
He believes true openness is about democratizing access so ordinary users can build their own futures, rather than treating open source as an all-or-nothing religious dogma. Nuance, Altman argues, demands releasing some systems openly while keeping others closed.
- Musk proposed acquiring OpenAI into Tesla to give Tesla full operational control.
- OpenAI’s free-tier products do not monetize through ads, which Altman frames as a direct public-benefit contribution.
- Altman rejects the binary dogma around open-sourcing everything, arguing that a balanced, nuanced approach is safer and more practical.
---
[29:55](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jvqFAi7vkBc&t=1795s) Builders, Lawsuits, and Open-Source Precedents
Fridman mentions Musk’s internet taunt that he would drop the lawsuit if OpenAI rebranded to "ClosedAI." Altman finds the remark telling, stating, “I think that speaks to the seriousness with which Elon means the lawsuit.” While Fridman suspects the filing is an ideological shot across the bow rather than an earnest legal challenge, Altman points out that Musk’s xAI venture only open-sourced Grok after being called out for hypocrisy: “I don't think open source versus not is what this is really about for him.”
Altman voices personal sorrow over the hostility. Seeing a founder he deeply admires rely on litigation feels deeply out of character:
> “Look, I think this whole thing is like unbecoming of a builder, and I respect Elon is one of the great builders of our time. And I know he knows what it's like to have like haters attack him and it makes me extra sad he's doing this to us.”
Altman recalls remarking in a previous interview that he missed the "old Elon," revealing that the comment struck a nerve with many observers who sent messages echoing that sentiment. Fridman remarks that the ideal resolution would be pure competition in the arena—Grok outperforming GPT, GPT leaping ahead of Grok—rather than sparring in court.
Addressing the competitive landscape where Meta has released its Llama models and Google experiments with open weights, Altman acknowledges that open-source models, especially lightweight versions capable of running on local hardware, fulfill a genuine and valuable role in the software ecosystem.
Finally, Fridman cites discussions on the *All-In Podcast* regarding whether OpenAI's hybrid non-profit/capped-profit model sets a dangerous precedent for future startups seeking tax advantages before commercializing. Altman firmly dismisses this theory, asserting that the law makes such tax-shelter maneuvering practically impossible:
> “I would heavily discourage any startup that was thinking about starting as a non-profit and adding like a for-profit arm later. I'd heavily discourage them from doing that. I don't think we'll set a precedent here.”
[033:38] Friendly Competition and the Relationship with Elon Musk
Lex Fridman asks Sam Altman where he hopes his personal relationship with Elon Musk will stand in one to three years, looking past current tensions toward genuine friendship, friendly competition, and shared exploration. Altman expresses deep respect for Musk despite their legal battles, noting his hope that they can eventually restore good terms. Fridman urges that they find common ground much sooner—even within the current month—suggesting that competition for talent should remain friendly while both push technology forward: “Just build, build cool shit.”
Altman emphasizes his long-term perspective regarding Musk: “I really respect Elon, and I hope that years in the future, we have an amicable relationship.” Fridman points out that both Musk and Altman share an exceptional drive to build extraordinary things, which serves as a natural segue into discussing OpenAI's video generation model, Sora.
---
[034:36] Sora, Visual Patches, and Emergent World Models
Turning to Sora, Fridman inquires about what the model actually grasps about reality compared to text-based models like GPT-4, questioning what kind of world model emerges from training on visual patches rather than language tokens. Altman explains that models routinely understand far more than skeptics give them credit for. Because models still make blatant, visible mistakes, it is easy for observers to dismiss their internal reasoning as an illusion. Yet Altman recalls his own astonishment upon first watching Sora handle visual continuity: a person could walk in front of an object, fully occlude it for several seconds, and when they walked away, the object remained intact and consistent. He points to the historical trajectory from DALL·E 1 to DALL·E 2 and DALL·E 3, reminding critics that early iterations of image generators were constantly mocked right before scaling leaps proved the underlying paradigm sound.
When Fridman questions whether training on two-dimensional video patches can truly infer underlying three-dimensional physics, Altman maintains a measured view: “What I would say is it's doing something to deal with occlusions really well; would I represent that it has like a great underlying 3D model of the world, it's a little bit more of a stretch.” At the same time, the visual patch approach appears capable of going surprisingly far without explicit hard-coded geometry. When Fridman brings up humorous glitches, such as cats spontaneously sprouting extra limbs during motion, Altman observes that these errors will diminish over time, acknowledging that both architectural limitations and scaling dynamics are at play.
```mermaid
flowchart TD
accTitle: Sora Visual Processing and World Understanding
accDescr: Pipeline showing how raw visual inputs are transformed into patches and trained to yield emergent physical properties despite visual anomalies.
subgraph Ingestion ["Visual Input and Representation"]
A["Diverse Video and Image Inputs"] --> B["Visual Patches"]
end
subgraph Emergence ["Emergent Understanding"]
B --> C["Temporal Consistency and Physics Modeling"]
C --> D["Accurate Object Occlusion and Persistence"]
end
subgraph EdgeCases ["Current Weaknesses and Scaling"]
C -.-> E["Visual Artifacts: e.g. Extra Cat Limbs"]
D --> F["Future Scaling and Architecture Refinements"]
E --> F
end
```
---
[037:30] Data, Human Labeling, and Release Dangers
The conversation transitions into the mechanics of training and the safety hurdles delaying Sora's public release. Fridman asks whether the patch-based training is purely self-supervised or relies heavily on human labeling. While remaining tight-lipped about proprietary details, Altman notes that OpenAI uses “lots of human data” across its projects, joking in response to Fridman's introverted definition of a crowd that “more than three people work on labeling the data for these models.” Beyond human-labeled sets, vast quantities of internet-scale data drive self-supervised learning, prompting Fridman to ask why OpenAI does not publish deeper technical details on the architecture.
Regarding the timeline and hazards of releasing Sora, Altman clarifies that before addressing social safety concerns, OpenAI faces a massive compute hurdle: “One thing we have to do before releasing the system is just like get it to work at a level of efficiency that will deliver the scale people are gonna want from this.” Beyond sheer inference efficiency, the model carries severe risks regarding deepfakes and mass misinformation. Altman emphasizes that OpenAI aims to deploy technology thoughtfully and that anyone can see how high-fidelity generative video could quickly be abused if launched carelessly.
---
[040:05] Copyright, Fair Use, and Creator Compensation
Fridman asks Altman whether training foundation AI models on internet content qualifies as fair use under copyright law. Rather than getting bogged down in legal technicalities, Altman reframes the debate around the ethical and economic imperative of compensating human creators: “I think the question behind that question is, do people who create valuable data deserve to have some way that they get compensated for use of it? And that I think the answer is yes.” He notes that if an artist wishes to opt out of having AI mimic their distinct artistic style, they should have that right—and if their style is emulated, there should be an economic model ensuring they receive remuneration.
Fridman compares this technological pivot to the music industry's turbulent evolution from physical CDs to Napster and ultimately to streaming platforms like Spotify. Altman agrees that while economic models must evolve, the fundamental principle remains unchanged: “The model changes, but people have gotta get paid.” Addressing artists who feel terrified by Sora's quality, Altman points to historical parallels like the advent of photography, which was initially viewed by traditional painters as an existential threat but ultimately developed into an entirely new artistic medium and economic ecosystem.
- OpenAI is actively testing several revenue and attribution models to determine how best to reward original content creators.
- Altman insists human creative drive is immutable: people are hardwired to build, pursue status, and contribute utility to society regardless of changing incentives.
- The future economic framework may not rely strictly on conventional monetary structures, but society will inevitably develop ways to reward novel human achievement.
---
[041:50] The "Tasks vs. Jobs" Paradigm and Human-Centric Media
Examining the impact of generative video on platforms like YouTube over the next five years, Altman challenges the popular metric of counting how many entire professions AI will erase. Instead, he proposes evaluating the economy through atomic units of time: “The way I think about it is not what percent of jobs AI will do, but what percent of tasks will AI do and over what time horizon.” He breaks this down into whether models can reliably execute five-second, five-minute, five-hour, or even five-day tasks. As models master tasks across longer time horizons, human workers are freed to operate at significantly higher layers of abstraction, transforming the scale and conceptual complexity of the problems they can manage simultaneously.
When applied to digital content creation, Altman predicts that while a vast majority of YouTube videos will soon incorporate AI tooling during production, they will remain fundamentally steered by human vision, direction, and thought. Fridman agrees, observing that human psychology is inherently attuned to watching other humans rather than synthetic actors. Fridman cites chess as an example: even though superhuman chess engines like AlphaZero outclass any human player, public enthusiasm for human chess matches remains higher than ever. Altman reinforces the point by noting that people still watch track and field sprints even though automobiles travel far faster. Fridman jokes that as someone who hates being on camera, he welcomes any video tooling that allows him to step into the background while keeping the core human storytelling intact.
[44:13](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jvqFAi7vkBc&t=2653s) "It Kind of Sucks": Perspective on GPT-4 and the Exponential Curve
After touching on the technical challenge of generating specific human faces in video models like Sora, Lex shifts the conversation to GPT-4, asking Sam Altman what he finds to be its most impressive capabilities. Altman offers an unexpectedly blunt assessment that catches Lex off guard: “I think it kind of sucks.” While Lex jokingly attributes this to typical human nature—becoming quickly accustomed to miracles—Altman clarifies that his critique is grounded in where the technology needs to go. Looking back at GPT-3, which was hailed at release as a marvel of engineering, Altman observes that from today's perspective it looks unimaginably horrible.
Altman believes artificial intelligence sits on a steep exponential curve, expecting the performance gap between GPT-4 and the upcoming GPT-5 to equal the massive leap seen between GPT-3 and GPT-4. For researchers building the future, maintaining this forward-looking dissatisfaction is an essential work ethic. As Altman explains, “I think it is our job to live a few years in the future and remember that the tools we have now are gonna kind of suck looking backwards at them and that's how we make sure the future is better.”
- Video generation faces a distinct hurdle when rendering recognizable, specific individuals compared to generic humans.
- Public perception quickly resets its baseline with each model generation, turning yesterday's breakthroughs into today's baseline expectations.
---
[46:16](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jvqFAi7vkBc&t=2776s) Creative Brainstorming and Longer-Horizon Tasks
When Lex asks which limitations of GPT-4 best illustrate both its flaws and its potential, Altman highlights two areas where early glimpses of brilliance emerge. The first is using the model as a creative brainstorming partner. While users frequently praise GPT-4 for measurable utilitarian tasks—writing code, accelerating prose composition, or translating across natural languages—Altman finds the most profound magic in open-ended creative collaboration, such as helping someone brainstorm a name for an idea or reframe a conceptual impasse from a completely novel angle.
The second area is long-horizon task execution. Currently, GPT-4 excels at rapid iterative back-and-forth exchanges with a human guide, but it still struggles when asked to independently orchestrate and execute a ten-step problem across multiple layers of abstraction—such as searching the web, synthesizing facts, writing code, and assembling the final result autonomously. Altman notes that while these agentic behaviors work only intermittently right now, they offer a clear roadmap for future development: “I don't wanna downplay the accomplishment of GPT-4, but I don't wanna overstate it either.”
---
[48:03](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jvqFAi7vkBc&t=2883s) The ChatGPT Transition: Base Model, Post-Training, and Product
Lex notes that ChatGPT marked a pivotal cultural transition where the general public shifted from skepticism to belief in artificial intelligence. Altman agrees with this assessment, but emphasizes that this cultural awakening was driven less by raw model size than by the interface and product design. Specifically, the leap came down to the post-training pipeline—such as Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF)—which teaches the raw base model how to converse cooperatively, interpret intent, and serve as an intuitive assistant.
Altman explains that OpenAI had to solve two fundamentally unprecedented problems in tandem: inventing the core machine learning technology from scratch, and developing the alignment methodology required to package it into an intuitive product people genuinely love. While scaling up the infrastructure to serve hundreds of millions of simultaneous requests was an immense engineering feat, it fell into the category of known difficult engineering challenges that modern tech companies understand, whereas base model pre-training and alignment were genuine terra incognita.
```mermaid
flowchart TD
accTitle: The OpenAI System Stack
accDescr: Diagram illustrating the progression from foundational technology to user delivery.
subgraph Core["Unprecedented Research"]
A["Base Model Pre-training"] --> B["Post-Training & Alignment<br/>(RLHF & Instruction Tuning)"]
end
subgraph Product["Product & Infrastructure"]
B --> C["ChatGPT Interface & Application Layer"]
C --> D["Global Serving Infrastructure<br/>(Scale & Reliability)"]
end
D --> E["End User Experience"]
```
- Raw underlying models require instruction tuning and RLHF to convert raw next-token prediction into a helpful, responsive conversational partner.
- The compute footprint of post-training is relatively small compared to base pre-training, yet it dictates nearly the entire interactive character of the product.
- OpenAI's dual mandate required inventing the base science while pioneering the alignment paradigm needed for mainstream adoption.
---
[50:01](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jvqFAi7vkBc&t=3001s) Expanding Context Windows: From 128K to Billions of Tokens
Discussing the jump in context length from GPT-4's initial 8K tokens up to GPT-4 Turbo's 128K tokens, Altman remarks that most everyday users rarely saturate the full 128K limit. However, he envisions an ultimate future where models operate with context windows spanning billions of tokens. In that paradigm, an AI could ingest a user's entire life history, personal writings, and lifetime communications, building an intimate and contextually rich understanding of the person.
Altman draws an analogy to early computing, recalling an archival clip of Bill Gates discussing memory limits—perhaps 64K or 640K—where most of the capacity was consumed simply by the display buffer: “He just couldn't imagine that the world would eventually need gigabytes of memory in a computer or terabytes of memory in a computer.” Altman insists that society consistently learns to exploit technological abundance, stating: “We will find out how to use better technology. So I can't really imagine what it's like right now for context lengths to go out to the billion someday and they might not literally go there, but effectively it'll feel like that. But I know we'll use it and really not wanna go back once we have it.”
---
[52:20](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jvqFAi7vkBc&t=3140s) Knowledge Work Workflows, Hallucinations, and Fact-Checking
Altman finds that the most compelling real-world adoption pattern is not any single specialized prompt, but how younger demographics now treat large language models as the universal default entry point for all knowledge work. Lex echoes this behavior, sharing that he uses GPT-4 as an interactive reading companion for classic literature, finding its nuanced responses far more stimulating and balanced than reading a static Wikipedia article.
However, Lex raises a primary concern regarding knowledge tasks: the persistent tendency of language models to hallucinate plausible-sounding falsehoods, requiring humans to perform manual fact-checking. Altman acknowledges that grounding models in truth is an area of intense research at OpenAI that will improve significantly in upcoming releases, though he cautions that hallucinations will not be entirely eliminated this year. While Lex worries that as models become more convincing people will abandon critical scrutiny—pointing to journalists cutting corners under tight deadlines—Altman expresses faith in human judgment, noting that ordinary users are remarkably sophisticated and understand that mission-critical information must always be verified. Altman then jokes about press coverage: “Of the long list of things I'd like to dunk on journalists for, this is not my top criticism of them.”
[54:59](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jvqFAi7vkBc&t=3299s) ChatGPT Memory and the Lifelong AI Companion
Lex Fridman reflects on modern journalism, remarking that outrage, criticism, and fabricated, mischaracterizing headlines generate far more clicks than balanced coverage that celebrates human achievement. Connecting human tendencies to technology, Lex notes that OpenAI has begun experimenting with giving ChatGPT the ability to retain memories across conversations, as well as a switch to turn memory off—a feature Lex jokes would be convenient to have in human life, even if people sometimes try and fail to achieve it with alcohol. He asks Sam Altman what OpenAI has observed from these early explorations into conversational persistence.
Altman explains that the effort remains in its infancy, but the ultimate vision is to create an AI assistant that develops a deep understanding of its user and continuously gains utility over years or decades. Rather than merely logging disjointed trivia and explicit user preferences, Altman envisions an architecture capable of processing a person's entire lived experience. Lex teases Altman, asking whether he wants the model to remember all the organizational chaos and emotional turmoil he endured during the board firing in November 2023, remarking that Altman seems to be partially blocking it out. Altman agrees wholeheartedly, explaining that he wants the AI to extract actionable wisdom rather than just log historical records: “It's not just that I want it to remember that, I want it to integrate the lessons of that and remind me in the future what to do differently or what to watch out for.” If models eventually scale to virtually infinite, trillion-token context windows, Altman imagines feeding every conversation, email, and daily interaction directly into the prompt so the system can reason across a person's complete life context.
[57:29](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jvqFAi7vkBc&t=3449s) Privacy, User Agency, and the Trauma of November
When Lex raises concerns about the privacy implications of feeding an AI agent one's entire digital existence, Altman argues that the only viable path is radical user agency. Some people will demand ironclad privacy, whereas others will willingly trade personal data for maximum analytical utility; therefore, users must possess straightforward controls to expunge specific records or disable memory entirely. Lex cautions that tech companies have historically maintained a shady track record, quietly harvesting personal data under the guise of vague terms of service to fuel advertising engines without genuine transparency.
Altman circles back to Lex's teasing comment about blocking out the November board crisis, acknowledging the genuine, lingering weight of that event. He describes the firing as deeply traumatic, admitting that it temporarily immobilized him while he simultaneously bore the burden of returning to office, picking up the broken pieces, and steadying OpenAI in a state of shock and pain. Altman explains the mental shift that allowed him to keep functioning:
> “I kind of woke up one morning and I was like, 'This was a horrible thing to happen to me. I think I could just feel like a victim forever,' or I can say, 'This is like the most important work I'll ever touch in my life and I need to get back to it.'”
Lex responds that while Altman appears to have channeled the outpouring of love and support into productive energy, high-stress betrayals can leave subtle scars. Drawing from his own studies of the wartime dynamics within the Zelensky and Putin administrations, Lex observes that prolonged crises often breed intense paranoia, pushing leaders to isolate themselves and distorting their perception of reality.
[01:00:30](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jvqFAi7vkBc&t=3630s) Slower Sequential Thinking and Allocating Compute
Lex shifts the dialogue to model architecture and inference dynamics. Current large language models allocate roughly the same amount of computation to every single generated token, regardless of whether that token completes a trivial greeting or solves a profound intellectual problem. Lex asks whether future models will incorporate a mechanism for slow, deliberative, sequential thinking—a machine analogue to human System 2 cognition—and whether this will sit as a supervisory layer on top of LLMs or require an entirely new architectural foundation.
Altman believes a new paradigm is inevitable, arguing that the specific implementation details matter less than the overarching principle. When asked whether human intuition about "thinking hard" might simply not apply to sufficiently advanced models, Altman maintains that variable compute allocation is mathematically and intuitively necessary:
> “It seems to me like you want to be able to allocate more compute to harder problems.”
Altman points out the fundamental asymmetry between routine retrieval and novel reasoning: answering what today's date is requires trivial compute, whereas generating a formal proof for Fermat's Last Theorem—assuming the answer is not merely memorized and regurgitated—inherently requires the system to spend substantial compute searching and verifying hypotheses. Whether that takes the form of an LLM generating an internal dialogue with itself or an entirely novel search framework remains an open research question.
```mermaid
flowchart TD
accTitle: System 1 versus System 2 Inference Architecture
accDescr: Contrasting fixed-compute token generation for trivial tasks with variable deliberative reasoning for hard problems.
subgraph Fixed["Standard LLM Generation"]
P1["Prompt: 'What is today's date?'"] --> T1["Fixed Compute per Token"]
T1 --> A1["Direct Retrieval Output"]
end
[01:02:37](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jvqFAi7vkBc&t=3757s) The Mystery of Q* and Iterative Deployment
Lex pivots to the lore surrounding OpenAI's rumored internal project known as Q* (Q-Star), joking about whether it is housed inside a secret nuclear facility. Altman laughs off the nuclear reference, playfully remarking that he would love to have a secret nuclear facility, but confesses that OpenAI has been plagued by leaks and is terrible at keeping secrets. When pressed directly on what Q* actually entails, Altman demurs: “We are not ready to talk about that.” He acknowledges, however, that OpenAI has long pursued breakthroughs in model reasoning, admitting that while the team is deeply invested in the problem, they have not fully cracked the code yet.
The conversation turns to whether the field will experience sudden leaps or smooth progress. While outsiders often perceive breakthroughs like GPT-4 or Sora as shocking qualitative jumps, Altman experiences the trajectory as a continuous climb up an exponential slope:
> “Rather than go build in secret until we got all the way to GPT-5, we decided to talk about GPT 1, 2, 3 and 4, and part of the reason there is, I think, AI and surprise don't go together.”
Altman explains that OpenAI intentionally practices iterative deployment so society, institutions, and regulatory bodies have adequate time to adapt to emerging capabilities and deliberate on governance structures before artificial general intelligence arrives. Hearing Lex describe each release as a jarring leap makes Altman wonder whether OpenAI should deploy its models even more frequently and incrementally, reiterating that the company's explicit goal is to avoid delivering sudden shock updates to the world.
[01:05:29](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jvqFAi7vkBc&t=3929s) Releasing Models Iteratively vs. Milestone Drops
Lex Fridman and Sam Altman debate the psychological and strategic tension between releasing artificial intelligence models continuously through minor iterations versus staging massive, numbered milestone drops. While Lex argues that frequent micro-updates like a "4.71" or "4.72" release would be ideal, he points out that human nature thrives on celebration: people mark birthdays, track milestones, and crave definitive moments of achievement. Altman concedes the human pull toward major events, admitting that declaring victory on a monumental release before moving to the next challenge is deeply satisfying.
At the same time, Altman worries that OpenAI's current deployment approach is slightly missing the mark. He explains that OpenAI's stated core strategy has always been continuous, iterative deployment into the wild, yet the public discourse remains fixated on colossal version jumps. Because of this mismatch, Altman muses that OpenAI may need to rethink the packaging and rollout structure for whatever frontier model eventually succeeds GPT-4.
[01:06:13](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jvqFAi7vkBc&t=3973s) The Timeline and Expectations for GPT-5
When Lex presses Altman directly on when GPT-5 will finally arrive, Altman insists that his genuine, honest answer is simply that he does not know. Lex jokingly asks him to "blink twice if it's this year," prompting Altman to offer a concrete commitment without committing to specific branding. As Altman explains: “We will release an amazing model this year.”
Altman clarifies that over the coming months, OpenAI plans to ship a wide assortment of products and intermediate technical advances before introducing anything that matches or redefines the GPT-5 moniker. Whether the eventual frontier release ends up being called GPT-5, something entirely different, or slightly better or worse than the public's heightened expectations, Altman emphasizes that several foundational tools and model updates must be deployed first.
[01:07:08](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jvqFAi7vkBc&t=4028s) The Engineering Bottlenecks: Ilya's '200 Medium Things'
Lex asks whether the primary bottleneck on the road to the next flagship model lies on the compute hardware side or in technical, algorithmic breakthroughs. Altman dismisses the idea of a single magic bullet, stating that breakthroughs require every layer working in unison. He paraphrases a favorite observation from OpenAI Chief Scientist Ilya Sutskever about their core engineering philosophy: the secret is multiplying 200 medium-sized innovations together into one giant, unified breakthrough.
```mermaid
flowchart TD
accTitle: The 200 Medium Things Pipeline
accDescr: Diagram showing how OpenAI aggregates hundreds of distributed technical breakthroughs into a single frontier model.
subgraph Inputs ["Distributed Innovation"]
A["Algorithmic Tweaks & Architectures"]
B["Data Filtering & Training Recipes"]
C["Hardware, Scaling & Compute Optimization"]
end
subgraph Integration ["System Synthesis"]
D["Multiplication of ~200 Medium Improvements"]
E["Zoomed-Out Map & Global Mental Model"]
end
subgraph Output ["Frontier Capabilities"]
F["Frontier Model (GPT-5 Class)"]
end
A --> D
B --> D
C --> D
D --> E
E --> F
```
Altman explains that while only a small group of senior architects keep the entire technical map in their heads, individual contributors across disparate teams also strive to maintain a high-level conceptual picture. He reflects on his own career evolution: in the past, operating across broad industry horizons gave him an aerial map of the entire tech landscape, allowing him to connect dots between separate disciplines. Today, running OpenAI requires him to operate far deeper in the weeds of AI, but he still stresses the necessity of occasionally zooming out to spot the unexpected intersections where major innovations occur.
[01:09:28](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jvqFAi7vkBc&t=4168s) The $7 Trillion Compute Market and Intelligence as Energy
Lex brings up reports that Altman has sought astronomical funding sums—specifically referencing rumors of a $7 trillion infrastructure push—to which Altman responds that he never claimed to be raising $7 trillion, though he playfully memed on X once the misinformation broke by joking, "Fuck it, maybe eight." Despite the exaggerated figures, Altman insists that the premise driving those conversations is fundamentally sound: compute is destined to become the defining currency of the future and perhaps the most valuable commodity on Earth.
Altman contrasts the compute market with traditional hardware like smartphone chips:
- **Smartphones as a bounded market**: The world has roughly 8 billion people, of whom 6 to 7 billion own phones. Since users replace them roughly every two years, global demand tops out around 3 billion system-on-a-chip (SoC) units annually; manufacturing 30 billion chips would not multiply phone sales tenfold.
- **Compute as an elastic utility**: Compute scales like energy. At a very high price point, society might only afford to run frontier intelligence on premier problems like curing cancer. At rock-bottom costs, an individual might have personal models reading their email all day, generating creative workflows, and simultaneously contributing to medical research.
Because demand will expand dramatically at lower price points, humanity will require an unimaginable volume of compute. Altman highlights that while fabricating chips and engineering data centers are difficult, supplying sufficient energy is by far the hardest constraint in the entire pipeline.
[01:11:43](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jvqFAi7vkBc&t=4303s) Powering AI: Nuclear Fission, Fusion, and Societal Hysteria
When Lex asks how to overcome the clean energy bottleneck required for exponential compute, Altman points squarely toward nuclear power: both advanced fission reactors and commercial nuclear fusion. Altman notes that while Helion Energy is doing the most promising work in fusion, he is thrilled to see a broader, competitive global race emerge. He expresses deep regret that public fear grounded the traditional nuclear industry to a halt for decades following incidents like Chernobyl, lamenting that mass hysteria derailed an otherwise essential carbon-free power source.
Lex points out that human psychology and fear represent one of the primary vulnerabilities for any high-stakes technology, requiring engineers and leaders to actively win over a skeptical public. Altman acknowledges that modern nuclear reactors must be built to prove their safety, but he worries that artificial intelligence will soon face the very same variety of societal backlash.
[01:12:44](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jvqFAi7vkBc&t=4364s) Theatrical AI Risks, Politicization, and the Threat of an Arms Race
Altman admits that he harbors grave concerns about public overreaction to AI failures. While he is confident that AI will yield vastly more positive outcomes than negative ones, he expects high-profile disasters to trigger disproportionate societal panic:
> “I think some things are gonna go theatrically wrong with AI. I don't know what the percent chances that I eventually get shot, but it's not zero.”
Lex shares his own dread that artificial intelligence is on the verge of being dragged into toxic partisan politics, where one side reflexively opposes it and the other champions it. Altman agrees that anything of genuine global consequence inevitably gets trapped in left-versus-right cultural battles. He draws a parallel between public perceptions of risk in energy and AI: far more people die quietly from coal plant air pollution than from nuclear reactors, yet people are vastly more terrified of living next to a nuclear plant. Humans naturally anchor on dramatic, movie-climax catastrophes rather than chronic, slow-burn harms.
Turning to the fierce industry competition between OpenAI, Google, Meta, and xAI, Altman highlights the clear trade-offs:
- **Pros**: Relentless competition drives rapid innovation, lowers inference and training costs, and delivers superior products to users at a blistering pace.
- **Cons**: The pressure of competitive parity risks triggering dangerous dynamics: “And the con is that I think if we're not careful, it could lead to an increase in sort of an arms race that I'm nervous about.”
[01:15:21](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jvqFAi7vkBc&t=4521s) The AI Arms Race, Safety Quadrants, and Elon Musk
Lex Fridman asks Sam Altman whether he feels the negative pressure of an escalating arms race in AI. Altman readily agrees, observing that OpenAI dedicates substantial effort to prioritizing safety. He explains his long-held framework for understanding AI progress: plotting the transition on a quadrant between short versus long timelines to the start of AGI, and a slow versus fast takeoff once it arrives. Among these scenarios, Altman strongly favors short timelines paired with a slow takeoff as the safest possible quadrant, though he emphasizes the critical importance of ensuring the takeoff indeed remains slow and controllable.
Fridman raises concerns over the ongoing friction between OpenAI and Elon Musk, pointing out that public feuds inevitably cause organizations to retreat into competitive silos rather than collaborating on vital safety research. Altman notes that while Musk publicly professes to care deeply about AI safety and catastrophic risk—leading Altman to assume Musk will not race forward recklessly—collaboration is simply not the trait Musk is best known for.
```mermaid
flowchart TD
accTitle: AI Trajectory Quadrant Matrix
accDescr: A two-by-two matrix comparing timelines to the start of AGI against the takeoff speed once it begins.
subgraph FastTakeoff["Fast Takeoff (High Risk)"]
Q3["Short Timeline / Fast Takeoff"]
Q4["Long Timeline / Fast Takeoff"]
end
```
The conversation touches on personal leadership styles and public behavior. Altman reflects on an incident where Musk tweeted a silver medal emoji at Jeff Bezos upon overtaking him as the world's richest person, remarking that he hopes to see less of that kind of pettiness as frontier AI development accelerates. Fridman defends Musk as a flawed, complicated, but beautiful and historically consequential human being whom he considers a friend. Altman agrees with the sentiment, emphasizing his respect for Musk while hoping for higher standards of leadership across the board:
> “The amazing stuff about Elon is amazing and I super respect him. I think we need him. All of us should be rooting for him and need him to step up as a leader through this next phase.” — Sam Altman
---
[01:17:36](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jvqFAi7vkBc&t=4656s) Reimagining Search Beyond Google’s "10 Blue Links"
Fridman pivots to the future of information discovery, noting that Google has dominated the web for two decades, but users are increasingly treating conversational systems like ChatGPT as their front door to knowledge. When asked whether OpenAI plans to directly challenge Google's core product, Altman dismisses the idea of building a straightforward search engine clone as uninspired. To him, simply providing ten ranked web results beneath a wall of commercial advertisements misses the transformative potential of large language models. The real frontier lies in helping humans synthesize, generate, and act upon answers directly, rather than sifting through pages manually.
At the same time, Altman acknowledges that combining web search capabilities with large language models is a profound, unsolved technical challenge. Merely forcing search links into a chat dialogue produces an awkward user experience. Developing an organic synthesis where LLMs dynamically retrieve, verify, and present information remains an active focus for OpenAI:
> “The intersection of LLMs plus search, I don't think anyone has cracked the code on yet. I would love to go do that. I think that would be cool.” — Sam Altman
- Replicating Google directly is a notoriously difficult technical, branding, and ecosystem challenge that Altman feels the world does not need.
- A true replacement for classic search must focus on synthesis, direct answers, and contextual actions rather than displaying ranked URL lists.
---
[01:20:14](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jvqFAi7vkBc&t=4814s) Business Models, Ads, and Preserving User Trust
Discussing how these systems will be financed, Fridman asks whether OpenAI will ever turn to digital advertising. Altman expresses an aesthetic and philosophical distaste for ad-supported business models in AI, arguing that while ads were necessary to jumpstart the early web, society is now wealthy and mature enough to support subscription services. He warns of dystopian outcomes if conversational models become sponsored, where recommendations for products, travel, or everyday decisions are subtly distorted by commercial sponsors:
> “I kind of hate ads just as like an aesthetic choice.” — Sam Altman
Altman highlights the clarity of OpenAI's direct subscription model, where the paying user is the customer rather than the product being sold to advertisers. While he leaves the door open to clean, unbiased participation in transaction streams, he believes an advertising model becomes far worse and more manipulative when applied to interactive AI agents. When asked whether OpenAI can remain financially viable while absorbing massive compute costs without ad revenue, Altman answers with confidence:
> “If the question is, do I think we can have a great business that pays for our compute needs without ads? That I think the answer is yes.” — Sam Altman
---
[01:23:19](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jvqFAi7vkBc&t=4999s) Model Bias, Google Gemini, and Concrete Behavioral Specs
The dialogue turns to model bias, guardrails, and public controversies, specifically Google's recent release of Gemini 1.5, which generated historically absurd depictions like Black Nazi soldiers and Black American Founding Fathers. Fridman raises the widespread concern that ideological biases held by internal safety teams inevitably warp model behavior. Altman acknowledges that these are deeply difficult challenges, noting that OpenAI has made its own alignment errors in the past and will inevitably make more.
To move beyond vague corporate manifestos, Altman proposes that AI labs draft and publish detailed, concrete behavioral specifications with public input. High-level corporate principles fail to address specific, controversial prompts—such as asking the model to evaluate political figures like Donald Trump versus Joe Biden. By documenting precise, concrete expectations across sensitive edge cases, the public can clearly differentiate between an internal system bug and an intentional, policy-driven response:
> “Say, here's how this model's supposed to behave and explain the edge cases too. And then when a model is not behaving in a way that you want, it's at least clear about whether that's a bug the company should fix or behaving as intended and you should debate the policy.” — Sam Altman
[01:25:38](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jvqFAi7vkBc&t=5138s) Tech Culture, OpenAI's Ideological Bubble, and Company-Wide Safety
Lex Fridman asks whether the political and cultural atmosphere of San Francisco—often viewed as an ideological bubble leaning strongly left—exerts internal pressure on OpenAI, influencing its team dynamics and product decisions. Sam Altman explains that OpenAI has largely avoided those pitfalls compared to other Silicon Valley firms, primarily because their unifying focus on artificial general intelligence supersedes typical workplace political debates: “We have one about AGI and belief in that, and it pushes out some others.” While Altman concedes that the city's environment seeps in around the edges and admits “we've had our flare-ups for sure, like any company,” he maintains that OpenAI does not suffer from the intense culture-war distractions reported elsewhere in tech.
Turning to AI safety, Fridman asks how OpenAI builds safeguards to keep increasingly capable models from causing harm. Altman stresses that safety cannot simply be relegated to a siloed division; rather, as capabilities advance, risk mitigation becomes the central mission of the entire organization. Delivering a milestone like GPT-4 required every department to examine safety and alignment from interconnected angles. He outlines a expansive threat surface encompassing state-sponsored cyberattacks, model weights theft, core technical alignment, and sweeping macroeconomic disruptions. When Fridman presses Altman on whether foreign state actors are actively trying to breach OpenAI, Altman confirms: “They're trying.” However, when asked what kind of accents those attackers have, Altman immediately draws the line: “I don't think I should go into any further details on this point.”
[01:28:40](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jvqFAi7vkBc&t=5320s) The Leap to GPT-5 and the Evolution of Programming
When asked what excites him most about the jump from GPT-4 to the next frontier model, Altman gives an answer that is straightforward yet foundational: “I'm excited about being smarter, and I know that sounds like a glib answer, but I think the really special thing happening is that it's not like it gets better in one area and worse at others; it's getting like better across the board.” Fridman relates this to the profound human sensation of feeling genuinely heard and understood—even when supplying poorly worded or messy prompts—where the AI discerns the core intent behind the user's inquiry.
Fridman and Altman explore how this growing intelligence will reshape software engineering over the next five to ten years. Altman predicts that while people will continue programming in large numbers, the fundamental medium will shift dramatically toward natural language prompts rather than raw code syntax. He draws a historical parallel to the phase-out of punch cards:
> “I mean, no one programs the punch cards anymore. I'm sure you can invite someone who does, but you know what I mean.” — Sam Altman
Although the manual skillset will change, Altman is uncertain whether the core intellectual temperament of programmers—such as an aptitude for puzzle-solving—will alter. Ultimately, top-tier engineers will operate across a spectrum of abstractions: writing high-level instructions in plain text while retaining the ability to drop down into low-level languages like C when precision requires it.
- Punch cards and legacy languages like Fortran demonstrate how developer tooling relentlessly moves toward higher levels of abstraction.
- Future programming workflows will likely merge natural language prompting with selective lower-level code authoring.
[01:31:20](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jvqFAi7vkBc&t=5480s) Embodied AI, Humanoid Robotics, and the Path to AGI
Addressing robotics, Altman affirms that OpenAI will eventually build humanoid robot brains or engage directly with embodied systems again. He views physical manifestation as an essential complement to pure intelligence: “I think it's like sort of depressing if we have AGI and the only way to get things done in the physical world is like to make a human go do it.” Explaining why OpenAI paused its earlier robotics research, Altman points to the necessity of ruthless startup focus, noting that years ago “robots were hard for the wrong reason.” When Altman states, “we will return to robots in some way at some point,” Fridman jokes that the phrasing sounds menacing, prompting Altman to clarify with a laugh: “We'll return to work on developing robots. We will not turn ourselves into robots, of course.”
On the timeline for achieving AGI, Altman notes that he used to indulge in forecasting but now finds the question poorly framed because definitions vary wildly across researchers. Instead of viewing AGI as a dramatic finish line, he conceptualizes it as an ongoing milestone along an open-ended continuum:
> “I expect that by the end of this decade, and possibly somewhat sooner than that, we will have quite capable systems that we look at and say, 'Wow, that's really remarkable.'” — Sam Altman
Reflecting on past models, Fridman suggests that if ChatGPT-3.5 had been shown to Alan Turing or 1990s computer scientists, they likely would have hailed it as genuine AGI. Altman agrees that GPT-3.5 profoundly altered human expectations and proved pivotal to his career, yet he argues it did not fundamentally reorganize civilization. For Altman, true AGI requires a tangible macroeconomic inflection point—something far beyond the helpful utility of GPT-4, which has not materially changed the global economic engine. For him personally, the definitive threshold of AGI is a system that can dramatically accelerate the pace of worldwide scientific discovery.
[01:35:27](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jvqFAi7vkBc&t=5727s) What to Ask the First AGI and Scientific Discovery
Sam Altman and Lex Fridman both share the conviction that genuine, sustained economic growth is fundamentally driven by scientific and technological breakthroughs rather than mere financial maneuvers. Reflecting on this, Fridman emphasizes how thrilling it will be simply to witness an artificial intelligence system display true scientific intuition. Fridman notes that Altman might very well be the first human being to interact with an artificial general intelligence once it is created, and asks what Altman would actually say to it. Altman begins by demurring, noting that the frontline OpenAI researchers will undoubtedly interact with it before he does. He also admits that imagining a scenario where someone hands him a laptop saying, "Okay, Sam, we're finished... this is the AGI," is an imperfect framework. Even so, he has pondered the question extensively and finds it remarkably challenging to pick a query that an initial AGI could realistically resolve on day one.
While Altman would love to request a grand unified theory of physics or a definitive theory of everything, he doubts the very first iteration could deliver such answers outright. When Fridman suggests asking simple yes-or-no questions—such as whether a theory of everything can mathematically exist, or whether intelligent alien civilizations inhabit the universe—Altman remains skeptical that the model could answer even in binary terms without new empirical inputs. Rather than dispensing omniscient revelations out of thin air, an early AGI will likely point out the boundaries of human knowledge and demand physical experimentation:
> “I mean, maybe it says like you want to know the answer to this question about physics, I need you to like build this machine and make these five measurements and tell me that.” — Sam Altman
```mermaid
flowchart TD
accTitle: The First AGI Scientific Discovery Loop
accDescr: Flowchart illustrating how early AGI handles fundamental questions by requesting physical measurements rather than providing instant answers.
subgraph Inquiry["Theoretical Inquiry"]
Q["User Question:<br/>Theory of Everything or Alien Life"]
AGI["Initial AGI System"]
Q --> AGI
end
subgraph EmpiricalNeed["Empirical Bottleneck"]
AGI -->|"Identifies missing data"| Spec["Specify New Experiments & Measurements"]
Spec -->|"Hardware instructions"| Build["Humans Build Machine / Sensor Array"]
end
subgraph Discovery["Scientific Breakthrough"]
Build -->|"Supply empirical data"| Analysis["Model Synthesizes Real-World Results"]
Analysis --> Sol["Actionable Scientific Discovery"]
end
```
[01:37:59](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jvqFAi7vkBc&t=5879s) Governance, Personal Power, and Lessons from the Board Drama
Fridman pivots to the immense power that will inevitably accrue to whichever group creates AGI first, pointedly asking Altman: “Do you trust yourself with that much power?” Altman answers with frankness, reiterating his core philosophy that neither he nor any single individual should wield unilateral control over OpenAI or AGI. A robust, distributed governance structure is non-negotiable. However, Altman directly confronts the awkward optics created by OpenAI’s November 2023 boardroom crisis. When the board abruptly removed him, Altman initially chose not to fight back, accepting that firing the CEO was the board’s legal prerogative despite believing it was a catastrophic mistake. When he subsequently contested the decision and was reinstated due to overwhelming employee and partner support, it exposed a glaring practical reality:
> “Now, again, I feel like I can completely defend the specifics here and I think most people would agree with that. But it does make it harder for me to like look you in the eye and say, hey, the board can just fire me.” — Sam Altman
Altman emphasizes that he has never possessed super-voting shares, has never sought them, and still refuses to hold them even in the wake of the board upheaval. Furthermore, he asserts that commercial entities alone should not determine the trajectory of such transformative technology; democratic governments must establish the fundamental “rules of the road.” While critics such as venture capitalist Marc Andreessen allege that calling for government regulation is merely an underhanded bid for regulatory capture, Altman dismisses the accusation, stating he is entirely comfortable being misunderstood because time will vindicate the necessity of safety guardrails. Ultimately, he sees the momentum toward AGI as far too vast to be captured or steered by a single individual, describing its distributed development across broader society as healthy and necessary.
- Altman insists that an individual having supreme authority over AGI is inherently dangerous.
- He openly acknowledges that although the previous board retained the legal power to oust him, the real-world breakdown of that mechanism represented its own variety of governance failure.
- OpenAI’s ongoing governance model intentionally avoids granting super-voting rights or unilateral founder control.
- He explicitly rejects Marc Andreessen’s criticisms regarding regulatory capture, arguing that statutory rules are essential for societal safety.
[01:41:33](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jvqFAi7vkBc&t=6093s) Existential Risk and the "Theatrical" Fear of Escaping the Box
Fridman asks whether Altman harbors fears of losing control over the AGI itself—the classic existential risk scenario wherein the software surpasses human agency independent of rogue state actors or external hackers. Altman candidly shares that AI taking over does not currently rank as his primary concern, though his threat hierarchy has fluctuated over time and may shift again in the future. He stresses that deprioritizing it on his personal list does not mean OpenAI takes the risk lightly; the company employs dedicated teams to investigate misalignment and control architectures thoroughly.
The conversation turns to the popular trope of an artificial intelligence breaking containment and escaping onto the internet. Altman characterizes this scenario as a prime example of a "theatrical risk"—a vivid, cinematic narrative that easily seizes public imagination and disproportionately dominates academic debates. While he credits the early, well-meaning cohort of AI safety researchers who fixated on the containment problem for raising awareness, he points out that their singular obsession generated little tangible progress while crowding out dialogue on far more pressing and immediate technological harms:
> “And there's a big group of like very smart, I think very well-meaning AI safety researchers that got super hung up on this one problem. I'd argue without much progress, but super hung up on this one problem.” — Sam Altman
[01:43:01](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jvqFAi7vkBc&t=6181s) The Mystery of Sam Altman’s Uncapitalized Tweets
Shifting to a lighter topic, Fridman asks Altman about his trademark habit of posting on X (formerly Twitter) entirely in lowercase text, joking: “Does the shift keep broken on your keyboard?” Altman laughs off the curiosity, expressing genuine bewilderment over why people care so much about his capitalization habits. Fridman quips that avoiding capital letters feels like an act of rebellion reminiscent of poet E. E. Cummings—a subtle middle finger to established norms that leaves institutionalists deeply unsettled because they suspect he refuses to follow basic rules.
Altman explains that the behavior has mundane roots in his youth as an early, highly online kid who grew up chatting on desktop instant messaging platforms (such as AIM). In those chat rooms, nobody bothered to capitalize. Over time, formal language itself has naturally shed excessive capitalization, contrasting contemporary English with historical texts that capitalized arbitrary nouns. Altman admits that while he used to capitalize his public tweets to project an air of professional polish, his public microblogging gradually converged with the way he casually texts his personal friends. He notes that the shift key remains fully functional whenever he writes formal strategy memos or longer professional documents, though he speculates about whether anyone still bothers capitalizing text in informal contexts:
> “I wonder if people still capitalize their Google Searches. Like if you're writing something just to yourself or their ChatGPT queries, if you're writing something just to yourself, do some people still bother to capitalize?” — Sam Altman
[01:45:44](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jvqFAi7vkBc&t=6344s) Capitalization Habits on Social Media
The conversation opens on a playful note regarding Sam Altman's habit of writing tweets without capital letters. Altman explains that the only thing that would persuade him to shift his style is if people perceived it as disrespectful, remarking, “If it felt like a sign of respect to people or something, then I could go do it.” He confesses that he does not give it any conscious thought, noting that he could easily force himself to use capital letters if required.
Lex Fridman jokes that a whole faction of followers wants Altman to formulate an official philosophy around his lowercase style so they can finally let the topic go, asserting, “You're the only CEO of a company that doesn't capitalize tweets.” Altman expresses skepticism that he is the only chief executive who posts this way, though he concedes it might be possible, and Fridman promises they will investigate the matter and return to it in the future.
---
[01:46:41](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jvqFAi7vkBc&t=6401s) Sora, Simulation Theory, and Psychedelic Insights
Shifting into speculative territory, Fridman asks whether OpenAI's text-to-video model Sora and its capacity to simulate realistic worlds increases Altman's belief in the simulation hypothesis. Altman admits, “Yes, somewhat. I don't think that's like the strongest piece of evidence.” He notes that being able to generate coherent environments should raise anyone's openness to the idea, but because he had long anticipated that tools like Sora would eventually become possible—even if it arrived faster than expected—its release was not a massive personal belief update.
Fridman elaborates on how striking it is that models can generate novel, photorealistic worlds, prompting one to consider how easily universes can be constructed and experienced through virtual reality and physics simulation. Altman responds by sharing an analogy he recently encountered about how simple mathematical concepts can lead to mind-expanding realizations:
```mermaid
flowchart LR
accTitle: Mathematical Operator Insight Escalation
accDescr: Diagram illustrating how the square root operator moves from basic arithmetic to complex numbers and psychedelic insights.
subgraph S1["Arithmetic"]
A["Square root of 4: Simple"] --> B["Square root of 2: Irrational numbers"]
end
subgraph S2["Conceptual Leap"]
B --> C["Square root of -1: Imaginary realm"]
end
subgraph S3["Simulation Parallels"]
C --> D["New dimensional reality"]
end
```
He explains that understanding the square root of 4 is trivial, while the square root of 2 forces one to grapple with an entirely new category of numbers. Taking that same simple operator and applying it to negative one—asking what the square root of negative one is—becomes an almost psychedelic concept that launches understanding into a whole different realm of reality. Altman points out that such operators exist everywhere, but clarifies, “But for me, the fact that Sora worked is not in the top five.” Fridman adds that AI systems will likely serve as simple, mind-bending gateways that reshape how humans perceive reality, a notion Altman enthusiastically endorses.
---
[01:50:01](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jvqFAi7vkBc&t=6601s) The Amazon Jungle, the Fermi Paradox, and Extraterrestrial Life
The discussion of psychedelic experiences prompts Fridman to mention his upcoming multi-week expedition into the Amazon jungle, where he expects to encounter the raw, self-renewing machine of nature. He reflects on how humbling it is to witness an evolutionary system operating continuously, which in turn leads him to ask whether Altman believes intelligent alien civilizations exist across the universe.
Altman admits that the question leaves him conflicted, stating, “I deeply want to believe that the answer is yes. I do find that kind of where... I find the Fermi paradox very, very puzzling.” Fridman suggests that the paradox could be explained by the terrifying possibility that intelligent species inevitably fail to safely handle powerful technologies. Nevertheless, Fridman remains confident that intelligent civilizations are abundant across space, constrained only by the immense difficulties of interstellar travel or human blindness to what intelligence actually looks like outside the confines of IQ tests and puzzle-solving.
---
[01:52:06](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jvqFAi7vkBc&t=6726s) Collective Scaffolding, Mortality, and Final Thoughts
When Fridman asks what gives Altman hope for the future of human civilization, Altman points directly to humanity's rapid historical trajectory. Despite profound flaws, immense problems, and past deeds worthy of shame, Altman finds human progress deeply inspiring. He contemplates whether Artificial General Intelligence will emerge as an isolated central intelligence or as an extension of humanity's distributed cultural framework:
> “One thing that I wonder about is, is AGI gonna be more like some single brain, or is it more like the sort of scaffolding in society between all of us? You have not had a great deal of genetic drift from your great-great-great grandparents, and yet what you're capable of is dramatically different.”
He highlights that modern capabilities do not stem from biological evolution, but from the cumulative societal infrastructure that everyone builds upon: no individual person can single-handedly construct an iPhone or discover every scientific law, yet everyone benefits from those shared achievements.
Turning to personal mortality—prompted by earlier talk of dramatic AI risks and personal safety—Fridman asks whether Altman fears death. Altman reflects on the prospect with equanimity, noting that while dying prematurely would make him sad because he would miss seeing what happens in the future, his overarching emotion would be profound appreciation: “What a curious time. What an interesting time. But I would mostly just feel like very grateful for my life.” Fridman shares that gratitude, thanking Altman for his time and contributions at OpenAI before concluding the episode with a quote from Arthur C. Clarke regarding humanity's divine role on Earth.
## Notable quotes
> [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jvqFAi7vkBc&t=0s) I think compute is gonna be the currency of the future. I think it'll be maybe the most precious commodity in the world. — Sam Altman
> [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jvqFAi7vkBc&t=0s) The road to AGI should be a giant power struggle. I expect that to be the case. — Sam Altman
> [29:55](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jvqFAi7vkBc&t=1795s) I would heavily discourage any startup that was thinking about starting as a non-profit and adding like a for-profit arm later. — Sam Altman
> [22:53](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jvqFAi7vkBc&t=1373s) You get a little bit screwed in exchange for getting to live with your guard down. — Sam Altman
> [44:13](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jvqFAi7vkBc&t=2653s) I think it is our job to live a few years in the future and remember that the tools we have now are gonna kind of suck looking backwards at them and that's how we make sure the future is better. — Sam Altman
> [01:31:20](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jvqFAi7vkBc&t=5480s) I think it's like sort of depressing if we have AGI and the only way to get things done in the physical world is like to make a human go do it. — Sam Altman
> [01:02:37](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jvqFAi7vkBc&t=3757s) Rather than go build in secret until we got all the way to GPT-5, we decided to talk about GPT 1, 2, 3 and 4, and part of the reason there is, I think, AI and surprise don't go together. — Sam Altman
> [01:00:30](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jvqFAi7vkBc&t=3630s) It seems to me like you want to be able to allocate more compute to harder problems. — Sam Altman
## Mentioned
Adam D'Angelo, AIM, Alan Turing, All-In Podcast, Arthur C. Clarke, Bill Gates, Bret Taylor, ChatGPT, DALL·E 1, DALL·E 2, DALL·E 3, Donald Trump, E. E. Cummings, Elon Musk, Gemini 1.5, Google, GPT-3, GPT-4, GPT-4 Turbo, GPT-5, Grok, Helion Energy, Ilya Sutskever, Jeff Bezos, Joe Biden, Larry Summers, Lex Fridman, Llama, Marc Andreessen, Meta, Mira Murati, Napster, OpenAI, Q*, Quora, Salesforce, Sam Altman, Sora, Spotify, Tesla, Vladimir Putin, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, xAI, X (Twitter)
## Video description
Sam Altman is the CEO of OpenAI, the company behind GPT-4, ChatGPT, Sora, and many other state-of-the-art AI technologies. Please support this podcast by checking out our sponsors:
- Cloaked: https://cloaked.com/lex and use code LexPod to get 25% off
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OpenAI CEO Sam Altman argues that artificial general intelligence will emerge through the cumulative scaling of compute and hundreds of compounding engineering breakthroughs, while contending that institutional resilience and distributed governance are just as critical as technical safety.
Governance Vulnerabilities and the Boardroom Crisis (1:05)
Altman's temporary ouster in November 2023 exposed critical structural weaknesses in OpenAI's nonprofit governance architecture, which lacked traditional shareholder checks and allowed a small group of directors to make high-stakes decisions under intense pressure. While Altman maintains that the directors were well-meaning individuals who made suboptimal choices, the existential crisis demonstrated that building organizations capable of withstanding real-world strain is as vital as solving technical AI safety.
The ordeal pushed Altman toward a more defensive planning posture, dampening his historically high default trust in others. Although he successfully returned with broad staff and partner backing, Altman concedes the episode created an awkward precedent: while he refuses super-voting shares and argues no single individual should hold unilateral control over AGI, his reinstatement made it practically difficult to claim that an independent board can easily fire him.
Compute Scaling and the Technical Path to Frontier Models (44:13)
Altman characterizes compute as the elastic currency and most precious commodity of the coming era, comparing its societal consumption to energy rather than bounded hardware markets like smartphones. Frontier progress does not hinge on a single architectural silver bullet; rather, Altman cites Ilya Sutskever's philosophy that major leaps stem from multiplying roughly 200 medium-sized innovations across data curation, algorithmic tweaks, and hardware optimization.
Assessing current capabilities, Altman bluntly remarks that GPT-4 "kind of sucks" when viewed against the steep exponential curve ahead. He envisions models evolving to support billion-token context windows and variable inference compute, where systems allocate more processing power to complex reasoning tasks like mathematical proofs than to simple retrieval. Altman committed to OpenAI releasing a major model within the year, while emphasizing that iterative public deployment remains vital so society and regulators can adapt gradually rather than facing sudden, unmanageable technological shocks.
Ecosystem Friction and Musk's Lawsuit (24:39)
OpenAI's transition from an exploratory non-profit research lab to a heavily capitalized enterprise required pragmatic structural adaptations that Altman acknowledges appear eyebrow-raising in hindsight. He expresses confusion and personal disappointment over Elon Musk's lawsuit against the organization, describing the litigation as unbecoming of an elite builder. Altman dismisses the narrative that the dispute is genuinely about open-source principles, pointing out that Musk's xAI only open-sourced Grok after facing accusations of hypocrisy.
While fierce competition across AI firms accelerates cost reductions and product quality, Altman warns that competitive parity creates dangerous pressure toward an arms race. To mitigate catastrophic risks, he strongly favors a development trajectory characterized by short timelines to initial AGI paired with a slow, highly controllable takeoff phase.
Product Integrity, Behavioral Standards, and Embodiment (80:14)
Altman rejects digital advertising as an aesthetic and operational model for conversational AI, warning that commercial sponsorships would subtly warp user trust and corrupt assistant recommendations. Instead, he maintains that subscription models provide clean incentives where paying users remain the true customer. To counter ideological bias and alignment controversies—such as historical inaccuracies observed in competing models like Google Gemini—Altman advocates for labs to draft and publish concrete, public behavioral specifications for sensitive edge cases to distinguish bugs from deliberate policies.
Beyond digital interfaces, Altman envisions multimodal video models like Sora eventually integrating into humanoid robotics and physical systems, arguing that achieving AGI without physical agency would be deeply limiting. Ultimately, he conceptualizes AGI not as a solitary super-brain, but as a shared societal scaffolding that extends collective human capability.
Altman anticipates highly capable systems by the end of the decade, but key questions persist regarding how OpenAI will balance its commercial scale with its founding mission, and how democratic societies will establish effective, distributed oversight as frontier AI models approach human-level reasoning.
[0:00] Sam Altman: I think compute is gonna be the currency of the future. I think it'll be maybe the most precious commodity in the world.
[0:00] Sam Altman: The road to AGI should be a giant power struggle. I expect that to be the case.
[29:55] Sam Altman: I would heavily discourage any startup that was thinking about starting as a non-profit and adding like a for-profit arm later.
[22:53] Sam Altman: You get a little bit screwed in exchange for getting to live with your guard down.
[44:13] Sam Altman: I think it is our job to live a few years in the future and remember that the tools we have now are gonna kind of suck looking backwards at them and that's how we make sure the future is better.
[91:20] Sam Altman: I think it's like sort of depressing if we have AGI and the only way to get things done in the physical world is like to make a human go do it.
[62:37] Sam Altman: Rather than go build in secret until we got all the way to GPT-5, we decided to talk about GPT 1, 2, 3 and 4, and part of the reason there is, I think, AI and surprise don't go together.
[60:30] Sam Altman: It seems to me like you want to be able to allocate more compute to harder problems.
Original transcript
[0:00] - I think compute is gonna be
the currency of the future.
[0:02] I think it'll be maybe the
most precious commodity
[0:05] in the world.
[0:06] I expect that by the end of this decade.
[0:09] And possibly somewhat sooner than that,
[0:15] we will have quite capable systems
[0:18] that we look at and say, wow,
that's really remarkable.
[0:21] The road to AGI should be
a giant power struggle.
[0:24] I expect that to be the case.
[0:26] - Whoever builds AGI
first gets a lot of power.
[0:32] Do you trust yourself
with that much power?
[0:36] The following is a
conversation with Sam Altman,
[0:40] his second time in the podcast.
[0:41] He is the CEO of OpenAI,
[0:44] the company behind GPT-4, ChatGPT, Sora,
[0:48] and perhaps one day the very
company that will build AGI.
[0:55] This is Lex Fridman Podcast.
[0:57] To support it,
[0:58] please check out our
sponsors in the description.
[1:01] And now, dear friends,
[1:02] here's Sam Altman.
[1:05] Take me through the OpenAI board saga
[1:08] that started on Thursday, November 16th,
[1:11] maybe Friday, November 17th for you.
[1:13] - That was definitely
[1:14] the most painful professional
experience of my life
[1:18] and chaotic, and shameful, and upsetting
[1:27] and a bunch of other negative things.
[1:30] There were great things about it too
[1:32] and I wish it had not been
[1:36] in such an adrenaline rush
that I wasn't able to stop
[1:39] and appreciate them at the time.
[1:45] I came across this old tweet of mine
[1:47] or this tweet of mine
from that time period,
[1:48] which was it was like kind
of going to your own eulogy,
[1:51] watching people say all
these great things about you
[1:53] and just like unbelievable support
[1:57] from people I love and care about.
[2:01] That was really nice.
[2:04] That whole weekend
[2:05] I kind of like felt
with one big exception,
[2:08] I felt like a great deal of love
[2:13] and very little hate
[2:18] even though it felt like I
have no idea what's happening
[2:21] and what's gonna happen here
[2:22] and this feels really bad.
[2:24] And there were definitely times
[2:25] I thought it was gonna be
like one of the worst things
[2:28] to ever happen for AI safety.
[2:30] Well, I also think I'm happy
[2:32] that it happened relatively early.
[2:34] I thought at some point
[2:36] between when OpenAI started
[2:39] and when we created AGI,
[2:41] there was gonna be something crazy
[2:42] and explosive that happened,
[2:44] but there may be more crazy
and explosive things happen.
[2:49] It still I think helped us
build up some resilience
[2:55] and be ready for more
challenges in the future.
[3:02] - But the thing you had a sense
[3:05] that you would experience is
some kind of power struggle.
[3:08] - The road to AGI should
be a giant power struggle.
[3:12] Like the world should...
[3:14] Well, not should.
[3:15] I expect that to be the case.
[3:17] - And so you have to go through that,
[3:20] like you said,
[3:21] iterate as often as possible
[3:24] in figuring out how to
have a board structure,
[3:26] how to have organization,
[3:28] how to have the kind of people
that you're working with,
[3:31] how to communicate all that
[3:33] in order to deescalate the power struggle
[3:36] as much as possible, pacify it.
[3:38] - But at this point,
[3:40] it feels like something
that was in the past
[3:47] that was really unpleasant and
really difficult and painful.
[3:51] But we're back to work
and things are so busy
[3:55] and so intense that I don't spend a lot
[3:59] of time thinking about it.
[4:00] There was a time after.
[4:03] There was like this fugue state
[4:05] for kind of like the month after,
[4:07] maybe 45 days after
[4:09] that was I was just sort of
like drifting through the days,
[4:13] I was so out of it.
[4:16] I was feeling so down
[4:17] - [Lex] Just on a personal
psychological level.
[4:19] - Yeah.
[4:20] Really painful.
[4:23] And hard to have to keep running OpenAI
[4:27] in the middle of that.
[4:28] I just wanted to crawl into a cave
[4:30] and kind of recover for a while.
[4:32] But now it's like we're just back
[4:35] to working on the mission.
[4:38] - Well, it's still useful to go back there
[4:41] and reflect on board structures,
[4:45] on power dynamics,
[4:48] on how companies are run,
[4:50] the tension between research,
and product development,
[4:54] and money and all this kind of stuff
[4:57] so that you have a very high potential
[5:01] of building AGI would do so
in a slightly more organized,
[5:05] less dramatic way in the future.
[5:07] So there's value there
[5:09] to go both the personal
psychological aspects of you
[5:12] as a leader and also
just the board structure
[5:15] and all this kind of messy stuff.
[5:18] - Definitely learned a lot
about structure and incentives
[5:23] and what we need out of a board
[5:28] And I think that it is valuable
[5:31] that this happened now in some sense.
[5:35] I think this is probably not
[5:36] like the last high
stress moment of OpenAI,
[5:39] but it was quite a high stress moment.
[5:41] Company very nearly got destroyed.
[5:43] And we think a lot about many
[5:48] of the other things we've
gotta get right for AGI.
[5:50] But thinking about how
to build a resilient org
[5:53] and how to build a
structure that will stand up
[5:56] to a lot of pressure the world,
[5:57] which I expect more and
more as we get closer.
[6:00] I think that's super important.
[6:02] - Do you have a sense of how deep
[6:04] and rigorous the deliberation
process by the board was?
[6:07] Can you shine some light
[6:10] on just human dynamics involved
in situations like this?
[6:12] Was it just a few conversations
[6:14] and all of a sudden it escalates
[6:16] and why don't we fire Sam kind of thing?
[6:19] - I think the board members were far,
[6:26] well-meaning people on the whole.
[6:30] And I believe that in stressful situations
[6:40] where people feel time
pressure or whatever,
[6:47] people understandably
make suboptimal decisions.
[6:49] And I think one of the challenges
[6:51] for OpenAI will be we're
gonna have to have a board
[6:56] and a team that are good at
operating under pressure.
[7:00] - Do you think the board
had too much power?
[7:03] - I think boards are supposed
to have a lot of power,
[7:06] but one of the things that we did see is
[7:09] in most corporate structures,
[7:11] boards are usually
answerable to shareholders.
[7:14] Sometimes people have like
super voting shares or whatever.
[7:18] In this case,
[7:19] I think one of the
things with our structure
[7:21] that we maybe should have
thought about more than we did is
[7:25] that the board of a nonprofit has,
[7:28] unless you put other rules in place,
[7:31] like quite a lot of power,
[7:32] they don't really answer
to anyone but themselves.
[7:34] And there's ways in which that's good,
[7:37] but what we'd really like
is for the board of OpenAI
[7:40] to answer to the world as a whole
[7:42] as much as that's a practical thing.
[7:43] - So there's a new board announced.
[7:46] - [Sam] Yeah.
[7:47] - There's, I guess, a new
smaller board of first
[7:51] and now there's a new final board.
[7:53] - Not a final board yet.
[7:54] We've added some,
[7:55] we'll add more.
[7:56] - Added some, okay.
[7:57] What is fixed in the new
one that was perhaps broken
[8:04] in the previous one?
[8:06] - The old board sort of got smaller
[8:09] over the course of about a year.
[8:10] It was nine and then it went down to six
[8:12] and then we couldn't agree on who to add.
[8:15] And the board also, I
think, didn't have a lot
[8:20] of experienced board members
[8:22] and a lot of the new board members
[8:24] at OpenAI have just have more
experience as board members.
[8:29] I think that'll help.
[8:31] - It's been criticized some of the people
[8:33] that are added to the board.
[8:35] I heard a lot of people
criticizing the addition
[8:37] of Larry Summers, for example.
[8:39] What was the process
of selecting the board?
[8:41] What's involved in that?
[8:43] - So Bret and Larry were
kind of decided in the heat
[8:46] of the moment over this very tense weekend
[8:49] and that was...
[8:50] I mean, that weekend was
like a real rollercoaster,
[8:52] like a lot of lots and downs.
[8:56] And we were trying to
agree on new board members
[9:01] that both sort of the executive team here
[9:05] and the old board members
felt would be reasonable.
[9:10] Larry was actually one
of their suggestions,
[9:11] the old board members.
[9:13] Bret, previous to that weekend, suggested,
[9:17] but he was busy and didn't wanna do it.
[9:19] And then we really needed help in wood.
[9:22] We talked about a lot of other people too,
[9:24] but I felt like if I
was going to come back,
[9:30] I needed new board members.
[9:35] I didn't think I could work
with the old board again
[9:38] in the same configuration,
[9:39] although we then decided,
[9:41] and I'm grateful that Adam would stay,
[9:44] but we wanted to get to...
[9:46] We considered various configurations,
[9:48] decided we wanted to
get to a board of three
[9:50] and had to find two new board members
[9:53] over the course of sort
of a short period of time.
[9:57] So those were decided honestly without...
[10:00] That's like you kind of do
that on the battlefield.
[10:02] You don't have time to design
a rigorous process then.
[10:05] For new board members,
[10:06] since new board members
will add going forward,
[10:11] we have some criteria that
we think are important
[10:15] for the board to have different expertise
[10:17] that we want the board to have.
[10:19] Unlike hiring an executive
[10:21] where you need them to do one role,
[10:22] well, the board needs to
do a whole role of kind
[10:25] of governance and thoughtfulness.
[10:28] Well, and so one thing that Bret says,
[10:32] which I really like is that
we wanna hire board members
[10:34] in slates,
[10:35] not as individuals one at a time.
[10:37] And thinking about a group of people
[10:40] that will bring nonprofit expertise,
[10:43] expertise at running companies,
[10:44] sort of good legal and
governance expertise.
[10:47] That's kind of what we've
tried to optimize for.
[10:48] - So is technical savvy important
[10:50] for the individual board members?
[10:52] - Not for every board member,
[10:53] but certainly some you need that.
[10:55] That's part of what the board needs to do.
[10:56] - So I mean, the interesting thing
[10:58] that people probably don't understand
[11:00] about OpenAI certainly
is like all the details
[11:02] of running the business.
[11:04] When they think about the
board given the drama,
[11:06] they think about you,
[11:07] they think about like if you reach AGI
[11:11] or you reach some of these
incredibly impactful products
[11:14] and you build them and deploy them,
[11:16] what's the conversation
with the board like?
[11:18] And they kind of think,
[11:19] all right, what's the right squad
[11:22] to have in that kind of
situation to deliberate?
[11:25] - Look, I think you definitely need
[11:27] some technical experts there
[11:28] and then you need some
people who are like,
[11:32] how can we deploy this in a way
[11:34] that will help people
in the world the most
[11:37] and people who have a very
different perspective?
[11:40] I think a mistake that you
[11:41] or I might make is to think
[11:42] that only the technical
understanding matters.
[11:45] And that's definitely part
[11:46] of the conversation you
want that board to have.
[11:48] But there's a lot more
[11:50] about how that's gonna
just like impact society
[11:51] and people's lives
[11:53] that you really want
represented in there too.
[11:56] - Are you looking at the
track record of people
[11:59] or you're just having conversations?
[12:00] - Track record's a big deal.
[12:02] You, of course, have a
lot of conversations.
[12:08] There's some roles
[12:09] where I kind of totally
ignore track record
[12:13] and just look at slope,
[12:16] kind of ignore the y-intercept.
[12:18] - Thank you.
[12:19] Thank you for making it
mathematical for the audience,
[12:21] - For a board member,
[12:22] I do care much more about the y-intercept.
[12:24] I think there is something deep
[12:26] to say about track record
there and experiences,
[12:30] something's very hard to replace.
[12:32] - Do you try to fit a polynomial function
[12:34] or exponential one to track record?
[12:36] - That's not that.
[12:37] An analogy doesn't carry that far.
[12:39] - All right.
[12:40] You mentioned some of the
low points that weekend.
[12:44] What were some of the low
points psychologically for you?
[12:47] Did you consider going
to the Amazon jungle
[12:50] and just taking Ayahuasca
disappearing forever or?
[12:54] - I mean, there's so many low,
[12:55] like it was a very bad period of time.
[12:58] There were great high points too.
[13:02] My phone was just like
sort of nonstop blowing up
[13:05] with nice messages from people
I worked with every day,
[13:07] people I hadn't talked to in a decade.
[13:09] I didn't get to appreciate
that as much as I should have.
[13:11] 'cause I was just like in
the middle of this firefight,
[13:13] but that was really nice.
[13:14] But on the whole,
[13:15] it was like a very painful weekend
[13:17] and also just like a very...
[13:22] It was like a battle fought in
public to a surprising degree
[13:26] and that was extremely exhausting to me,
[13:28] much more than I expected.
[13:30] I think fights are generally exhausting,
[13:32] but this one really was.
[13:35] The board did this Friday afternoon.
[13:39] I really couldn't get much
in the way of answers,
[13:42] but I also was just like,
[13:43] "Well, the board gets to do this."
[13:45] And so I'm gonna think for a little bit
[13:48] about what I want to do,
[13:49] but I'll try to find the, the
blessing in disguise here.
[13:52] And I was like, "Well,
my current job at OpenAI,
[13:58] it was like to like run
a decently-sized company
[14:01] at this point."
[14:02] And the thing I'd always liked
the most was just getting
[14:05] to work with the researchers.
[14:07] And I was like, yeah,
I can just go do like
[14:08] a very focused AI research effort.
[14:11] And I got excited about.
[14:12] That didn't even occur to me at the time
[14:14] to like possibly that this
was all gonna get undone.
[14:17] This was like Friday afternoon.
[14:18] - Oh, so you've accepted the death-
[14:21] - Very quickly, very quickly.
[14:23] I mean, I went through
like a little period
[14:26] of confusion and rage,
[14:27] but very quickly.
[14:28] And by Friday night,
[14:30] I was talking to people
about what was gonna be next
[14:33] and I was excited about that.
[14:37] I think it was Friday night evening
[14:40] for the first time that I
heard from the exec team here,
[14:42] which is like, hey, we're
gonna like fight this
[14:44] and we think...
[14:46] Well, whatever.
[14:47] And then I went to bed just
still being like, okay,
[14:50] excited.
[14:51] - Like onward,
[14:52] were you able to sleep?
[14:54] - Not a lot.
[14:54] It was one of the weird
things was there was this
[14:56] like period of four and a half days
[14:59] where sort of didn't sleep much,
[15:01] didn't eat much
[15:02] and still kind of had like a
surprising amount of energy.
[15:05] You learn like a weird
thing about adrenaline
[15:09] and more time.
[15:10] - So you kind of accepted the
death of this baby OpenAI?
[15:12] - And I was excited for the new thing.
[15:14] I was just like, okay, this
was crazy, but whatever.
[15:16] - It's a very good coping mechanism.
[15:18] - And then Saturday morning,
[15:20] two of the board members called
[15:21] and said, "Hey, we destabilize.
[15:23] We didn't mean to destabilize things.
[15:25] We don't restore a lot of value here.
[15:27] Can we talk about you coming back?"
[15:29] And I immediately didn't wanna do that,
[15:32] but I thought a little more
[15:34] and I was like, "Well, I really
care about the people here,
[15:37] the partners, shareholders.
[15:39] I love this company."
[15:41] And so I thought about it
[15:42] and I was like, "Well, okay,
[15:43] but here's the stuff I would need."
[15:45] And then the most painful time of all
[15:48] over the course of that weekend,
[15:52] I kept thinking and being told...
[15:56] Not just me,
[15:56] like the whole team here kept thinking.
[15:58] Well, we were trying to
keep OpenAI stabilized
[16:01] while the whole world was
trying to break it apart,
[16:02] people trying to recruit, whatever.
[16:04] We kept being told like,
[16:05] "All right, we're almost done,
[16:06] we're almost done.
[16:06] We just need like a little bit more time."
[16:09] And it was this like very confusing state.
[16:11] And then Sunday evening
[16:13] when again like every few hours,
[16:15] I expected that we were gonna be done
[16:17] and we're gonna figure
out a way for me to return
[16:20] and things to go back to how they were,
[16:23] the board then appointed a new interim CEO
[16:27] and then I was like...
[16:29] I mean, that feels really bad.
[16:30] That was the low point of the whole thing.
[16:36] You know, I'll tell you something,
[16:37] it felt very painful,
[16:40] but I felt a lot of
love that whole weekend.
[16:44] It was not other than that
one moment, Sunday night,
[16:47] I would not characterize my
emotions as anger or hate,
[16:52] but I really just like...
[16:54] I felt a lot of love from
people towards people.
[16:59] It was like painful,
[17:00] but it was like the dominant emotion
[17:02] of the weekend was love, not hate.
[17:04] - You've spoken highly of
Mira Murati that she helped,
[17:07] especially as you put in a tweet,
[17:09] "In the quiet moments when it counts,
[17:12] perhaps we could take a bit of a tangent."
[17:14] What do you admire about Mira?
[17:16] - Well, she did a great
job during that weekend
[17:18] in a lot of chaos,
[17:20] but people often see leaders
[17:23] in the crisis moments, good or bad.
[17:27] But a thing I really value
[17:29] in leaders is how people
act on a boring Tuesday
[17:33] at 9:46 in the morning
[17:35] and in just sort of the normal
drudgery of the day-to-day,
[17:41] how someone shows up in a meeting,
[17:43] the quality of the decisions they make.
[17:45] That was what I meant
about the quiet moments.
[17:48] - Meaning like most of the
work is done on a day by day
[17:52] in a meeting by meeting,
[17:53] just be present and make great decisions.
[17:58] - Yeah.
[17:59] I mean, look, what you have wanted
[18:00] to spend the last 20 minutes about
[18:02] and I understand is like this
one very dramatic weekend.
[18:06] But that's not really
what OpenAI is about.
[18:08] OpenAI is really about
the other seven years.
[18:10] - Well, yeah, human civilization
is not about the invasion
[18:14] of the Soviet Union by Nazi Germany,
[18:16] but still that's something
people totally focus on.
[18:18] - Very understandable.
[18:20] - It gives us an insight
into human nature,
[18:22] the extremes of human nature,
[18:24] and perhaps some of the damage
[18:25] and some of the triumphs
[18:27] of human civilization can
happen in those moments.
[18:29] So it's like illustrative.
[18:31] Let me ask you about Ilya.
[18:33] Is he being held hostage in
a secret nuclear facility?
[18:36] - No.
[18:37] - What about a regular secret facility?
[18:39] - No.
[18:40] - What about a nuclear
non-secure facility?
[18:41] - Neither, not that either.
[18:43] - I mean, this is becoming
a meme at some point.
[18:45] You've known Ilya for a long time.
[18:47] He was obviously part of this drama
[18:50] with the board and all that kind of stuff.
[18:54] What's your relationship with him now?
[18:57] - I love Ilya.
[18:58] I have tremendous respect for Ilya.
[19:01] I don't have anything I can
say about his plans right now.
[19:03] That's a question for him.
[19:06] But I really hope we work together
[19:08] for certainly the rest of my career.
[19:12] He's a little bit younger than me,
[19:13] maybe he works a little bit longer.
[19:15] - There's a meme that he saw something,
[19:20] like he maybe saw AGI
[19:21] and that gave him a lot
of worry internally.
[19:25] What did Ilya see?
[19:28] - Ilya has not seen AGI,
[19:30] none of us have seen AGI.
[19:31] We've not built AGII.
[19:35] I do think one of the many things
[19:38] that I really love about
Ilya is he takes AGI
[19:43] and the safety concerns broadly speaking,
[19:47] including things like the
impact this is gonna have
[19:51] on society very seriously.
[19:53] And as we continue to
make significant progress,
[19:58] Ilya is one of the people
[20:00] that I've spent the most time
[20:02] over the last couple of years talking
[20:04] about what this is going to mean,
[20:06] what we need to do to
ensure we get it right
[20:08] to ensure that we succeed at the mission.
[20:11] So Ilya did not see AGI.
[20:17] But Ilya is a credit to humanity
[20:23] in terms of how much he thinks
[20:26] and worries about making
sure we get this right.
[20:30] - I've had a bunch of
conversation with him in the past.
[20:32] I think when he talks about technology,
[20:34] he's always like doing
this long-term thinking
[20:37] type of thing.
[20:38] So he is not thinking about
what this is gonna be in a year.
[20:40] He's thinking about in 10 years.
[20:42] - [Sam] Yeah.
[20:43] - Just thinking from first principles
[20:44] like, okay, if the scales,
[20:47] what are the fundamentals here?
[20:49] Where's this going?
[20:50] And so that's a foundation
[20:52] for them thinking about like
all the other safety concerns
[20:55] and all that kind of stuff,
[20:58] which makes him a really
fascinating human to talk with.
[21:02] Do you have any idea why
he's been kind of quiet?
[21:05] Is it he's just doing some soul searching?
[21:08] - Again, I don't wanna speak for Ilya.
[21:11] I think that you should ask him that.
[21:18] He's definitely a thoughtful guy.
[21:23] I think I kind of think of Ilya
[21:24] as like always on a soul
search in a really good way.
[21:27] - Yes.
[21:28] Yeah.
[21:28] Also he appreciates the power of silence.
[21:32] Also, I'm told he can be a silly guy,
[21:34] which I've never seen that side of him.
[21:35] - It's very sweet when that happens.
[21:39] - I've never witnessed a silly Ilya,
[21:41] but I look forward to that as well.
[21:43] - I was at a dinner
party with him recently
[21:45] and he was playing with a puppy.
[21:47] And he was like in a very
silly move, very endearing
[21:49] and I was thinking like, oh man,
[21:50] this is like not the side of the Ilya
[21:53] that the world sees the most.
[21:55] - So just to wrap up this whole saga,
[21:58] are you feeling good
about the board structure
[22:01] about all of this and where it's moving?
[22:03] - I feel great about the new board.
[22:05] In terms of the structure of OpenAI,
[22:08] one of the board's
tasks is to look at that
[22:10] and see where we can make it more robust.
[22:13] We wanted to get new board
members in place first,
[22:17] but we clearly learned
a lesson about structure
[22:20] throughout this process.
[22:21] I don't have I think
super deep things to say.
[22:25] It was a crazy, very painful experience.
[22:27] I think it was like a
perfect storm of weirdness.
[22:29] It was like a preview for
me of what's gonna happen
[22:32] as the stakes get higher and higher
[22:33] and the need that we have like
robust governance structures
[22:36] and processes and people.
[22:39] I am kind of happy it
happened when it did,
[22:42] but it was a shockingly
painful thing to go through.
[22:47] - Did it make you be more
hesitant in trusting people?
[22:50] - Yes.
[22:51] - Just on a personal level.
[22:52] - Yes.
[22:53] - I think I'm like an
extremely trusting person.
[22:54] I've always had a life philosophy
[22:56] of like don't worry about
all of the paranoia,
[22:59] don't worry about the edge cases.
[23:01] You get a little bit screwed in exchange
[23:05] for getting to live with your guard down.
[23:07] And this was so shocking to me.
[23:09] I was so caught off guard
[23:11] that it has definitely changed
[23:13] and I really don't like this.
[23:15] It's definitely changed how I think
[23:17] about just like default trust of people
[23:18] and planning for the bad scenarios.
[23:21] - You gotta be careful with that.
[23:23] Are you worried about
becoming a little too cynical?
[23:26] - I'm not worried about
becoming too cynical.
[23:28] I think I'm like the extreme
opposite of a cynical person.
[23:30] But I'm worried about
just becoming like less
[23:33] of a default trusting person.
[23:35] - I'm actually not sure which
mode is best to operate in
[23:38] for a person who's developing AGI,
[23:42] trusting or untrusting.
[23:44] It's an interesting journey you're on.
[23:48] But in terms of structure,
[23:50] see, I'm more interested
on the human level.
[23:52] How do you surround yourself
[23:53] with humans that are building cool shit,
[23:56] but also are making wise decisions?
[24:00] Because the more money you start making,
[24:02] the more power the thing
has the weirder people get.
[24:05] - I think you could make
all kinds of comments
[24:08] about the board members
[24:11] and the level of trust
I should have had there
[24:14] or how I should have
done things differently.
[24:16] But in terms of the team here,
[24:18] I think you'd have to like
give me a very good grade
[24:20] on that one.
[24:23] And I have just like
enormous gratitude and trust
[24:26] and respect for the people
that I work with every day.
[24:30] And I think being surrounded
[24:31] with people like that is really important.
[24:39] - Our mutual friend Elon sued OpenAI.
[24:44] What is the essence of
what he's criticizing?
[24:48] To what degree does he have a point?
[24:50] To what degree is he wrong?
[24:52] - I don't know what it's really about.
[24:54] We started off just thinking
we were gonna be a research lab
[24:58] and having no idea about how
this technology was gonna go.
[25:03] Because it was only
seven or eight years ago,
[25:05] it's hard to go back
[25:06] and really remember what it was like then.
[25:08] But before language
models were a big deal,
[25:10] this was before we had
any idea about an API
[25:12] or selling access to a chat bot.
[25:15] It was before we had any
idea we were gonna productize
[25:17] at all.
[25:17] So we're like we're just
gonna try to do research
[25:20] and we don't really know what
we're gonna do with that.
[25:23] I think with many new
fundamentally new things,
[25:25] you start fumbling through the dark
[25:27] and you make some assumptions,
[25:29] most of which turn out to be wrong.
[25:31] And then it became clear
[25:34] that we were going to need
to do different things
[25:41] and also have huge amounts more capital.
[25:44] So we said, "Okay, well,
[25:45] the structure doesn't quite work for that.
[25:46] How do we patch the structure?"
[25:49] And then you patch it
again and patch it again
[25:50] and you end up with something
[25:51] that does look kind of eyebrow
raising to say the least.
[25:56] But we got here gradually
[25:57] with I think reasonable decisions
[25:59] at each point along the way
[26:01] and doesn't mean I wouldn't
do it totally differently
[26:04] if we could go back now with an oracle,
[26:06] but you don't get the oracle at the time.
[26:08] But anyway,
[26:09] in terms of what Elon's
real motivations here are
[26:11] I don't know.
[26:12] - To the degree you remember,
[26:14] what was the response that
OpenAI gave in the blog post?
[26:19] Can you summarize it?
[26:21] - Oh, we just said like Elon
said this set of things,
[26:26] here's our characterization
[26:28] or here's this sort of
not our characterization,
[26:32] here's like the characterization
of how this went down.
[26:35] We tried to not make it emotional
[26:37] and just sort of say
like here's the history.
[26:44] - I do think there's a
degree of mischaracterization
[26:51] from Elon here about one
[26:54] of the points you just made,
[26:56] which is the degree of
uncertainty you had at the time.
[27:00] You guys are a bunch of like a small group
[27:02] of researchers crazily talking about AGI
[27:06] when everybody's laughing at that thought.
[27:09] - Wasn't that long ago
Elon was crazily talking
[27:11] about launching rockets
[27:13] when people were laughing at that thought?
[27:16] So I think he'd have
more empathy for this.
[27:20] - I mean, I do think that
there's personal stuff here
[27:25] that there was a split that OpenAI
[27:29] and a lot of amazing people here chose
[27:31] to part ways of Elon.
[27:33] So there's a personal-
[27:33] - Elon chose to part ways.
[27:37] - Can you describe that exactly,
[27:40] the choosing to part ways?
[27:41] - He thought OpenAI was gonna fail.
[27:44] He wanted total control
to sort of turn it around.
[27:46] We wanted to keep going in the direction
[27:48] that now has become OpenAI.
[27:50] He also wanted Tesla to be able
[27:51] to build an AGI effort.
[27:52] At various times,
[27:53] he wanted to make OpenAI
into a for-profit company
[27:58] that he could have control of
[27:59] or have it merged with Tesla.
[28:01] We didn't want to do that
[28:02] and he decided to leave,
[28:04] which that's fine.
[28:07] - And that's one of the things
[28:08] that the blog post says
is that he wanted OpenAI
[28:12] to be basically acquired by Tesla
[28:17] in those same way that or
maybe something similar
[28:19] or maybe something more dramatic
[28:21] than the partnership with Microsoft.
[28:23] - My memory is the proposal was just like,
[28:25] yeah, like get acquired by Tesla
[28:26] and have Tesla have full control over it.
[28:28] I'm pretty sure that's what it was.
[28:30] - So what is the word open in OpenAI mean
[28:35] to Elon at the time?
[28:36] Ilya has talked about this
in in the email exchanges
[28:39] and all this kind of stuff.
[28:40] What does it mean to you at the time?
[28:41] What does it mean to you now?
[28:43] - I would definitely pick a diff...
[28:44] Speaking of going back with an oracle,
[28:45] I'd pick a different name.
[28:49] One of the things that
I think OpenAI is doing
[28:51] that is the most important of everything
[28:53] that we're doing is
putting powerful technology
[28:58] in the hands of people
for free as a public good.
[29:03] We don't run ads on our free version.
[29:05] We don't monetize it in other ways.
[29:08] We just say it's part of our mission.
[29:10] We wanna put increasingly powerful tools
[29:12] in the hands of people for free
[29:13] and get them to use them.
[29:15] And I think that kind of
open is really important
[29:21] to our mission.
[29:22] I think if you give people great tools
[29:23] and teach them to use them
or don't even teach them,
[29:25] they'll figure it out
[29:26] and let them go build an incredible future
[29:29] for each other with that.
[29:30] That's a big deal.
[29:31] So if we can keep putting free or low cost
[29:34] or free and low cost powerful
AI tools out in the world,
[29:39] I think that's a huge deal
[29:40] for how we fulfill the mission.
[29:43] Open source or not,
[29:44] yeah, I think we should
open source some stuff
[29:46] and not other stuff.
[29:49] It does become this like
religious battle line
[29:51] where nuance is hard to have,
[29:53] but I think nuance is the right answer.
[29:55] - So he said change your name to ClosedAI
[29:58] and I'll drop the lawsuit.
[29:59] I mean, is it going to
become this battleground
[30:03] in the land of memes about the name?
[30:05] - I think that speaks to the seriousness
[30:10] with which Elon means the lawsuit.
[30:18] I mean, that's like an
astonishing thing to say, I think.
[30:21] - Well, I don't think the lawsuit maybe,
[30:23] correct me if I'm wrong,
[30:25] but I don't think the
lawsuit is legally serious.
[30:28] It's more to make a point
about the future of AGI
[30:31] and the company that's
currently leading the way.
[30:37] - Look, I mean Grok had
not open sourced anything
[30:40] until people pointed out it
was a little bit hypocritical
[30:42] and then he announced
[30:43] that Grok open source things this week.
[30:45] I don't think open source versus not is
[30:47] what this is really about for him.
[30:48] - Well, we'll talk about
open source and not.
[30:50] I do think maybe criticizing
the competition is great,
[30:53] just talking a little shit,
[30:54] that's great,
[30:56] but friendly competition
[30:57] versus like I personally hate lawsuits.
[31:01] - Look, I think this whole
thing is like unbecoming
[31:03] of a builder,
[31:04] and I respect Elon is one of
the great builders of our time.
[31:09] And I know he knows what it's like
[31:14] to have like haters attack him
[31:15] and it makes me extra
sad he's doing the toss.
[31:18] - Yeah, he is one of the
greatest builders of all time,
[31:20] potentially the greatest
builder of all time.
[31:22] - It makes me sad.
[31:24] And I think it makes a lot of people sad.
[31:25] There's a lot of people
who've really looked up to him
[31:27] for a long time and said this.
[31:29] I said in some interview
[31:30] or something that I missed the old Elon
[31:32] and the number of messages I got being
[31:34] like that exactly encapsulates how I feel.
[31:36] - I think he should just win.
[31:39] He should just make Grok beat GPT
[31:43] and then GPT beats Grok
[31:45] and it's just a competition,
[31:46] and it's beautiful for everybody.
[31:49] But on the question of open source,
[31:51] do you think there's a
lot of companies playing
[31:53] with this idea?
[31:54] It's quite interesting.
[31:56] I would say Meta, surprisingly,
has led the way on this
[32:01] or like at least took the
first step in the game of chess
[32:05] of really open sourcing the model.
[32:08] Of course, it's not the
state of the art model,
[32:10] but open sourcing Llama
[32:12] and Google is flirting with the idea
[32:16] of open sourcing a smaller version.
[32:18] What are the pros and
cons of open sourcing?
[32:20] Have you played around with this idea?
[32:22] - Yeah, I think there
is definitely a place
[32:25] for open source models,
[32:26] particularly smaller models
[32:27] that people can run locally,
[32:28] I think there's huge demand for.
[32:31] I think there will be
some open source models,
[32:33] there will be some closed source models.
[32:36] It won't be unlike other
ecosystems in that way.
[32:39] - I listened to all in podcasts talking
[32:41] about this lawsuit and
all that kind of stuff
[32:43] and they were more concerned
about the precedent
[32:47] of going from nonprofit
to this cap for profit.
[32:52] What precedent that
sets for other startups?
[32:56] - I would heavily discourage any startup
[32:58] that was thinking about
starting as a non-profit
[33:01] and adding like a for-profit arm later.
[33:03] I'd heavily discourage
them from doing that.
[33:04] I don't think we'll set a precedent here.
[33:05] - Okay.
[33:06] So most startups should go just-
[33:08] - For sure.
[33:09] And again, if we knew
what was gonna happen,
[33:11] we would've done that too.
[33:12] - Well, like in theory,
[33:13] if you like dance beautifully here,
[33:16] there's like some tax
incentives or whatever
[33:19] - But I don't think that's like
[33:20] how most people think about these things.
[33:22] - Just not possible to save a lot of money
[33:24] for a startup if you do it this way.
[33:27] - No, I think there's
like laws that would make
[33:28] that pretty difficult.
[33:30] - Where do you hope this goes with Elon?
[33:33] Well, this tension, this dance,
[33:36] what do you hope this?
[33:38] Like if we go one, two,
three years from now,
[33:41] your relationship with him
on a personal level too,
[33:44] like friendship, friendly competition,
[33:47] just all this kind of stuff.
[33:51] - Yeah.
[33:52] I mean, I really respect Elon.
[34:00] And I hope that years in the future,
[34:02] we have an amicable relationship.
[34:05] - Yeah, I hope you guys have
an amicable relationship
[34:08] like this month
[34:11] and just compete and win
[34:13] and explore these ideas together.
[34:17] I do suppose there's competition
for talent or whatever,
[34:20] but it should be friendly competition.
[34:25] Just build, build cool shit.
[34:28] And Elon is pretty good
at building cool shit,
[34:31] but so are you.
[34:33] So speaking of cool shit.
[34:36] Sora, there's like a million
questions I could ask.
[34:39] First of all, it's amazing,
[34:41] it truly is amazing on a product level,
[34:44] but also just on a philosophical level.
[34:46] So let me just
technical/philosophical ask.
[34:50] What do you think it
understands about the world
[34:55] more or less than GPT-4, for example,
[34:57] like the world model
[34:59] when you train on these
patches versus language tokens?
[35:04] - I think all of these models
understand something more
[35:09] about the world model than most
of us give them credit for.
[35:12] And because they're also very clear things
[35:15] they just don't understand
or don't get right,
[35:18] it's easy to look at the weaknesses,
[35:19] see through the veil
[35:20] and say this is all fake,
[35:23] but it's not all fake.
[35:24] It's just some of it works
and some of it doesn't work.
[35:28] I remember when I started
first watching Sora videos
[35:30] and I would see like a person walk
[35:32] in front of something for a
few seconds and occlude it
[35:34] and then walk away
[35:35] and the same thing was still there.
[35:36] I was like, "This is pretty good."
[35:39] Or there's examples
[35:40] where the underlying physics
looks so well represented
[35:43] over a lot of steps in a sequence.
[35:46] It's like oh this is
like quite impressive.
[35:49] But, fundamentally, these
models are just getting better
[35:52] and that will keep happening.
[35:54] If you look at the trajectory
[35:55] from DALL·E 1 to 2 to 3 to Sora,
[35:59] there were a lot of people that
were dunked on each version,
[36:01] saying it can't do this, it can't do that
[36:03] and I'm like look at it now.
[36:05] - Well, the thing you
just mentioned is kind of
[36:08] with the occlusions is
basically modeling the physics
[36:12] of three dimensional physics
of the world sufficiently well
[36:15] to capture those kinds of things.
[36:17] - Well.
[36:19] - Yeah, maybe you can tell me
[36:21] in order to deal with occlusions,
[36:22] what does the world model need to?
[36:24] - Yeah, so what I would
say is it's doing something
[36:26] to deal with occlusions really well.
[36:28] What I represent that it
has like a great underlying
[36:30] 3D model of the world.
[36:32] It's a little bit more of a stretch
[36:33] - But can you get there
through just these kinds
[36:35] of two dimensional
training data approaches?
[36:38] - It looks like this approach
is gonna go surprisingly far.
[36:41] I don't wanna speculate too much
[36:43] about what limits it will
surmount and which it won't.
[36:46] - What are some interesting limitations
[36:47] of the system that you've seen?
[36:50] I mean, there's been some
fun ones you've posted.
[36:52] - There's all kinds of fun.
[36:53] I mean, like cats sprouting a extra limit
[36:56] at random points in a video,
[36:58] like pick what you want,
[36:59] but there's still a lot of problem,
[37:01] there's a lot of weaknesses.
[37:02] - Do you think that's a
fundamental flaw of the approach
[37:06] or is it just bigger model
[37:09] or better technical
details or better data,
[37:14] more data is going to solve
the cat sprouting extremes?
[37:18] - I would say yes to both.
[37:20] I think there is something
about the approach
[37:22] which just seems to feel different
[37:24] from how we think and learn and whatever.
[37:28] And then also,
[37:28] I think it'll get better with scale.
[37:30] - I mentioned LLMs have
tokens, text tokens
[37:33] and Sora has visual patches
[37:35] so it converts all visual data,
[37:37] a diverse kinds of visual data videos
[37:38] and images into patches.
[37:40] Is the training
[37:41] to the degree you can say
fully self-supervised there?
[37:44] Is there some manual labeling going on?
[37:46] What's the involvement
of humans in all this?
[37:49] - I mean, without saying anything specific
[37:51] about the Sora approach,
[37:53] we use lots of human data in our work.
[38:00] - But not internet scale data.
[38:04] So lots of humans,
[38:05] lots of complicated word, Sam.
[38:08] - I think lots is a
fair word in this case.
[38:11] - But it doesn't
[38:12] because to me, lots,
[38:13] like listen, I'm an introvert
[38:15] and when I hang out
with like three people,
[38:16] that's a lot of people.
[38:17] Yeah, four people,
[38:18] that's a lot.
[38:19] But I suppose you mean more than-
[38:21] - More than three people
work on labeling the data
[38:23] for these models, yeah.
[38:24] - Okay.
[38:25] All right.
[38:26] But fundamentally, there's a lot
[38:28] of self-supervised learning.
[38:30] 'cause what you mentioned
[38:32] in the technical report
is internet scale data.
[38:36] That's another beautiful,
[38:36] it's like poetry.
[38:39] So it's a lot of data
that's not human label.
[38:42] It's self-supervised in that way.
[38:45] And then the question is,
[38:46] how much data is there on the internet
[38:49] that could be used in
this that is conducive
[38:52] to this kind of self-supervised way
[38:54] if only we knew the details
of the self-supervised?
[38:57] Do you have you considered opening it up
[39:00] a little more details
[39:02] - We have.
[39:03] You mean, for sora specifically?
[39:04] - Sora specifically
[39:05] because it's so interesting.
[39:11] Can the same magic
[39:12] of LLMs now start moving
towards visual data
[39:15] and what does that take to do that?
[39:18] - I mean, it looks to me like yes,
[39:20] but we have more work to do.
[39:22] - Sure.
[39:22] What are the dangers?
[39:23] Why are you concerned
about releasing the system?
[39:27] What are some possible dangers of this?
[39:29] - I mean, frankly speaking,
[39:30] one thing we have to do
[39:31] before releasing the
system is just like get it
[39:35] to work at a level of efficiency
[39:38] that will deliver the scale
people are gonna want from this.
[39:41] So that I don't wanna like downplay that
[39:43] and there's still a ton
of work to do there.
[39:47] But you can imagine like issues
[39:52] with deep fakes, misinformation.
[39:56] We try to be a thoughtful company
[39:58] about what we put out into the world
[40:00] and it doesn't take much thought
[40:02] to think about the ways this can go badly.
[40:05] - There's a lot of tough questions here.
[40:08] You're dealing in a very tough space.
[40:09] Do you think training AI should be
[40:12] or is fair use under copyright law?
[40:14] - I think the question
behind that question is,
[40:17] do people who create valuable
data deserve to have some way
[40:20] that they get compensated for use of it?
[40:22] And that I think the answer is yes.
[40:26] I don't know yet what the answer is.
[40:27] People have proposed a
lot of different things.
[40:29] We've some tried some different models.
[40:31] But if I'm like an artist, for example,
[40:37] I would like to be able to opt out
[40:38] of people generating art in my style
[40:41] and B, if they do
generate art in my style,
[40:43] I'd like to have some economic
model associated with that.
[40:46] - Yeah, it's that transition
from CDs to Napster to Spotify.
[40:51] We have to figure out some kind of model.
[40:52] - The model changes,
[40:53] but people have gotta get paid.
[40:55] - Well, there should be some kind
[40:57] of incentive if we zoom
out even more for humans
[41:00] to keep doing cool shit.
[41:02] - Everything I worry about,
[41:03] humans are gonna do cool shit
[41:04] and society's gonna find
some way to reward it.
[41:08] That seems pretty hardwired.
[41:10] We want to create.
[41:11] We want to be useful.
[41:12] We want to achieve status in whatever way
[41:15] that's not going anywhere,
[41:16] I don't think.
[41:17] - But the reward might not
be monetary, financial.
[41:20] It might be like fame and
celebration of other cool-
[41:25] - Maybe financial in some other way.
[41:27] Again, I don't think we've
seen like the last evolution
[41:29] of how the economic system's gonna work.
[41:31] - Yeah.
[41:32] But artists and creators are worried.
[41:34] When they see Sora,
[41:35] they're like, "Holy shit."
[41:36] - Sure.
[41:37] Artists were also super worried
when photography came out.
[41:40] And then photography became a new art form
[41:42] and people made a lot of
money taking pictures.
[41:45] And I think things like
that will keep happening.
[41:47] People will use the new tools in new ways.
[41:50] - If we just look on YouTube
or something like this,
[41:53] how much of that will be using Sora,
[41:56] like AI-generated content do you think
[41:59] in the next five years?
[42:01] - People talk about like
how many jobs is AI gonna do
[42:03] in five years
[42:05] and the framework that people
have is what percentage
[42:08] of current jobs are just
gonna be totally replaced
[42:10] by some AI doing the job?
[42:13] The way I think about
it is not what percent
[42:15] of jobs AI will do,
[42:16] but what percent of tasks will AI do
[42:18] and over what time horizon.
[42:19] So if you think of all of
the like-five second tasks
[42:22] in the economy, five-minute
tasks, the five-hour tasks,
[42:25] maybe even the five-day tasks,
[42:27] how many of those can AI do?
[42:29] And I think that's a way
more interesting, impactful,
[42:33] important question than
how many jobs AI can do
[42:37] because it is a tool
[42:39] that will work at increasing
levels of sophistication
[42:42] and over longer and longer time horizons
[42:45] for more and more tasks
[42:46] and let people operate at a
higher level of abstraction.
[42:49] So maybe people are way more
efficient at the job they do.
[42:53] And at some point,
[42:54] that's not just a quantitative change,
[42:55] but it's a qualitative
one too about the kinds
[42:58] of problems you can keep in your head.
[43:00] I think that for videos on YouTube,
[43:02] it'll be the same.
[43:04] Many videos,
[43:04] maybe most of them,
[43:06] will use AI tools in the production,
[43:08] but they'll still be fundamentally driven
[43:10] by a person thinking about it,
[43:12] putting it together,
[43:13] doing parts of it,
[43:15] sort of directing it and running it.
[43:18] - Yeah, it's so interesting.
[43:19] I mean, it's scary,
[43:20] but it's interesting to think about.
[43:22] I tend to believe that humans
like to watch other humans
[43:26] or other human like-
[43:26] - Humans really care
about other humans a lot.
[43:29] - Yeah.
[43:30] If there's a cooler thing
that's better than a human,
[43:34] humans care about that for like two days
[43:37] and then they go back to humans.
[43:39] - That seems very deeply wired.
[43:41] - It's the whole chest thing.
[43:44] But now let's everybody keep playing chess
[43:46] and let's ignore the alpha in the room
[43:49] that humans are really bad at
chess relative to AI systems.
[43:52] - We still run races and
cars are much faster.
[43:54] I mean, there's like a lot of examples.
[43:56] - Yeah.
[43:56] And maybe it'll just be tooling
[43:59] like in the Adobe suite type of way
[44:02] where it can just make videos much easier
[44:04] and all that kind of stuff.
[44:07] Listen, I hate being
in front of the camera.
[44:09] If I can figure out a way
[44:10] to not be in front of the camera,
[44:12] I would love it.
[44:13] Unfortunately, it'll take a while.
[44:14] Like that generating faces,
[44:17] it's getting there,
[44:18] but generating faces and
video format is tricky
[44:20] when it's specific people
versus generic people.
[44:24] Let me ask you about GPT-4.
[44:27] There's so many questions.
[44:28] First of all, also amazing.
[44:33] Looking back, it'll probably be this kind
[44:35] of historic pivotal moment
[44:37] with three, five, and four which had GPT.
[44:40] - Maybe five will be the pivotal moment.
[44:41] I don't know.
[44:43] Hard to say that looking forwards.
[44:44] - We never know.
[44:45] That's the annoying
thing about the future,
[44:46] it's hard to predict.
[44:48] But for me,
[44:49] looking back GPT-4,
[44:50] ChatGPT is pretty impressive,
[44:53] historically impressive.
[44:55] So allow me to ask,
[44:57] what's been the most impressive
capabilities of GPT-4 to you
[45:00] and GPT-4 Turbo?
[45:05] - I think it kind of sucks.
[45:07] - Hmm.
[45:08] Typical human also gotten
used to an awesome thing.
[45:11] - No, I think it is an amazing thing,
[45:14] but relative to where we need to get to
[45:18] and where I believe we will get to,
[45:22] at the time of like GPT-3,
[45:25] people were like, "Oh this is amazing.
[45:27] This is this like marvel of technology,"
[45:29] and it is, it was.
[45:31] But now we have GPT-4 and look at GPT-3
[45:35] and you're like that's
unimaginably horrible.
[45:39] I expect that the delta between five
[45:41] and four will be the same
as between four and three.
[45:44] And I think it is our job to
live a few years in the future
[45:48] and remember that the tools
we have now are gonna kind
[45:52] of suck looking backwards at them
[45:55] and that's how we make
sure the future is better.
[45:59] - What are the most glorious
ways that GPT-4 sucks?
[46:04] Meaning-
[46:05] - [Sam] What are the
best things it can do?
[46:06] - What are the best things
it can do in the limits
[46:09] of those best things that
allow you to say it sucks,
[46:12] therefore gives you an inspiration
and hope for the future?
[46:16] - One thing I've been using it
[46:17] for more recently is sort of a
like a brainstorming partner.
[46:23] - [Lex] Yep.
[46:24] Almost for that.
[46:25] - There's a glimmer of
something amazing in there.
[46:30] I don't think it gets...
[46:31] When people talk about it,
[46:33] what it does,
[46:33] they're like, "Helps me
code more productively.
[46:36] It helps me write more faster and better.
[46:38] It helps me translate from
this language to another,"
[46:42] all these like amazing things.
[46:43] But there's something about the kind
[46:50] of creative brainstorming partner.
[46:52] I need to come up with
a name for this thing.
[46:53] I need to think about this
problem in a different way.
[46:55] I'm not sure what to do here.
[46:58] That I think like gives a glimpse
[47:00] of something I hope to see more of.
[47:03] One of the other things
[47:04] that you can see a very
small glimpse of is
[47:10] what I can help on longer horizon tasks.
[47:12] Break down something in multiple steps,
[47:14] maybe execute some of those steps,
[47:16] search the internet, write code, whatever.
[47:18] Put that together.
[47:20] When that works,
[47:21] which is not very often,
[47:22] it's like very magical,
[47:24] - The iterative back
and forth with a human.
[47:27] It works a lot for me.
[47:28] What do you mean it works?
[47:29] - Iterative back and forth to human,
[47:30] it can get more often,
[47:31] when it can go do like a
10-step problem on its own.
[47:34] It doesn't work for that
too often sometimes.
[47:37] - Add multiple layers of abstraction
[47:39] or do you mean just sequential?
[47:40] - Both like to break it down
[47:43] and then do things that different layers
[47:45] of abstraction put them together.
[47:47] Look, I don't wanna downplay
the accomplishment of GPT-4,
[47:53] but I don't wanna overstate it either.
[47:55] And I think this point that we
are on an exponential curve,
[47:58] we'll look back relatively soon at GPT-4
[48:01] like we look back at GPT-3 now.
[48:03] - That said, I mean
ChatGPT was the transition
[48:08] to where people like started
[48:10] to believe there is an
uptick of believing.
[48:14] Not internally at OpenAI perhaps.
[48:16] There's believers here,
[48:18] but when you think-
[48:19] - And in that sense,
[48:20] I do think it'll be a moment
[48:21] where a lot of the world went
[48:22] from not believing to believing.
[48:25] That was more about the ChatGPT interface.
[48:28] And by the interface and product,
[48:30] I also mean the post-training of the model
[48:32] and how we tune it to be helpful to you
[48:34] and how to use it than the
underlying model itself.
[48:38] - How much of each of
those things are important?
[48:43] The underlying model and the RLHF
[48:47] or something of that nature that tunes it
[48:50] to be more compelling to the human,
[48:52] more effective and
productive for the human.
[48:55] - I mean, they're both super important
[48:57] but the RLHF, the post-training step,
[49:00] the little wrapper of things
[49:02] that from a compute perspective,
[49:05] little wrapper of things that we do on top
[49:06] of the base model,
[49:07] even though it's a huge amount of work.
[49:08] That's really important to
say nothing of the product
[49:10] that we build around it.
[49:16] In some sense,
[49:17] we did have to do two things.
[49:19] We had to invent we underlying technology
[49:22] and then we had to figure out
[49:27] how to make it into a
product people would love,
[49:30] which is not just about the
actual product work itself,
[49:32] but this whole other step
[49:34] of how you align it and make it useful
[49:37] - And how you make the scale work
[49:40] where a lot of people can
use it at the same time,
[49:42] all that kind of stuff.
[49:44] - But that was like a
known difficult thing.
[49:47] We knew we were gonna have to scale it up.
[49:49] We had to go do two things
[49:50] that had like never been done before
[49:52] that were both, like,
[49:54] I would say quite significant achievements
[49:55] and then a lot of things
like scaling it up
[49:58] that other companies
have had to do before.
[50:01] - How does the context window
[50:03] of going from 8K to 128K tokens compare
[50:08] from GPT-4 to to GPT-4 Turbo?
[50:13] - Most people don't
need all the way to 128,
[50:15] most of the time although.
[50:18] If we dream into the distant future,
[50:19] we'll have like way distant future,
[50:21] we'll have like context
length of several billion.
[50:24] You will feed in all of your information,
[50:26] all of your history time,
[50:27] and it'll just get to
know you better and better
[50:30] and that'll be great.
[50:32] For now,
[50:33] the way people use these models,
[50:34] they're not doing that.
[50:35] And people sometimes post in a paper
[50:39] or a significant fraction of
a code repository, whatever.
[50:45] But most usage
[50:46] of the models is not
using the long context
[50:48] most of the time.
[50:50] - I like that this is your
I have a dream speech.
[50:54] One day, you'll be judged
by the full context
[50:56] of your character or
of your whole lifetime.
[51:00] That's interesting.
[51:01] So like that's part of the expansion
[51:02] that you're hoping for is a
greater and greater context.
[51:06] - I saw this internet clip once.
[51:07] I'm gonna get the numbers wrong,
[51:09] but it was like Bill Gates
talking about the amount
[51:10] of memory on some early computer.
[51:13] Maybe it was 64K,
[51:14] maybe 640K, something like that.
[51:16] And most of it was used
for the screen buffer.
[51:19] And he just couldn't seem genuine.
[51:22] This couldn't imagine
[51:23] that the world would eventually
need gigabytes of memory
[51:26] in a computer or terabytes
of memory in a computer.
[51:31] And you always do
[51:34] or you always do just need
[51:35] to follow the exponential of technology.
[51:38] We will find out how to
use better technology.
[51:41] So I can't really imagine
what it's like right now
[51:43] for context links to go
out to the billion someday
[51:46] and they might not literally go there,
[51:47] but effectively it'll feel like that.
[51:51] But I know we'll use it
[51:53] and really not wanna go
back once we have it.
[51:56] - Yeah, even saying billions 10 years
[51:58] from now might seem dumb
[52:00] because it'll be like
trillions upon trillions.
[52:04] - [Sam] Sure.
[52:04] - There'd be some kind of breakthrough
[52:07] that will effectively feel
like infinite context.
[52:10] But even 120,
[52:11] I have to be honest,
[52:12] I haven't pushed it to that degree.
[52:14] Maybe putting in entire books
[52:16] or like parts of books and so on, papers.
[52:20] What are some interesting use cases
[52:22] of GPT-4 that you've seen?
[52:23] - The thing that I find
most interesting is not any
[52:26] particular use case that
we can talk about those,
[52:27] but it's people who kind of like...
[52:31] This is mostly younger people,
[52:32] but people who use it as
like their default start
[52:36] for any kind of knowledge work task.
[52:39] And it's the fact that it can do a lot
[52:40] of things reasonably well.
[52:41] You can use GPTV,
[52:42] you can use it to help you write code,
[52:44] you can use it to help you do search,
[52:45] you can use it to edit a paper.
[52:48] The most interesting to me is the people
[52:49] who just use it as the
start of their workflow.
[52:52] - I do as well for many things.
[52:54] Like I use it as a reading
partner for reading books.
[52:59] It helps me think,
[53:00] help me think through ideas,
[53:01] especially when the books are classic,
[53:03] so it's really well written about
[53:04] and it actually is...
[53:08] I find it often to be significantly better
[53:10] than even like Wikipedia
on well-covered topics.
[53:13] It's somehow more
balanced and more nuanced,
[53:16] or maybe it's me,
[53:17] but it inspires me
[53:19] to think deeper than a
Wikipedia article does.
[53:21] I'm not exactly sure what that is.
[53:22] You mentioned like this collaboration,
[53:24] I'm not sure where magic is,
[53:25] if it's in here or if it's in there
[53:26] or if it's somewhere in between.
[53:29] I'm not sure.
[53:30] But one of the things that concerns me
[53:33] for knowledge task when
I start with GPT is
[53:36] I'll usually have to
do fact checking after,
[53:39] like check that it didn't
come up with fake stuff.
[53:43] How do you figure that out
[53:46] that GPT can come up with fake stuff
[53:51] that sounds really convincing?
[53:53] So how do you ground it in truth?
[53:55] - That's obviously an area
of intense interest for us.
[53:58] I think it's gonna get a lot
better with upcoming versions,
[54:03] but we'll have to continue to work on it
[54:04] and we're not gonna have it
like all solved this year.
[54:07] - Well, the scary thing
is like as it gets better.
[54:10] You'll start not doing the
fact checking more and more,
[54:12] right?
[54:14] - I'm of two minds about that.
[54:16] I think people are like much
more sophisticated users
[54:18] of technology than we
often give them credit for
[54:20] and people seem to really
understand that GPT,
[54:23] any of these models
hallucinate some of the time
[54:25] and if it's mission critical,
[54:26] you gotta check it.
[54:27] - Except journalists don't
seem to understand that.
[54:29] I've seen journalists
half-assedly just using GPT-4.
[54:34] - Of the long list of things I'd like
[54:36] to dunk on journalists for,
[54:37] this is not my top criticism of them.
[54:40] - Well, I think the bigger
criticism is perhaps
[54:43] the pressures and the incentives
[54:45] of being a journalist is that you have
[54:47] to work really quickly
and this is a shortcut.
[54:49] I would love our society
to incentivize like-
[54:53] - [Sam] I would too.
[54:56] - Journalistic efforts
that take days and weeks
[54:59] and rewards great in depth journalism.
[55:02] Also journalism that represent
stuff in a balanced way
[55:05] where it's like celebrates people
[55:07] while criticizing them
[55:08] even though the criticism is
the thing that gets clicks
[55:11] and making up also gets clicks
[55:13] and headlines that
mischaracterize completely.
[55:16] I'm sure you have a lot
of people dunking on...
[55:19] Well, all that drama
probably got a lot of clicks.
[55:21] - Probably did.
[55:24] - And that's a bigger problem
about human civilization.
[55:29] I would love to see solved is
where we celebrate a bit more.
[55:32] You've given ChatGPT the
ability to have memories.
[55:34] You've been playing with that
about previous conversations
[55:39] and also the ability to turn off memory,
[55:41] which I wish I could do that sometimes,
[55:43] just turn on and off depending.
[55:45] I guess sometimes alcohol can do that,
[55:47] but not optimally, I suppose.
[55:51] What have you seen through that,
[55:52] like playing around with that idea
[55:54] of remembering conversations and not?
[55:56] - We're very early in
our explorations here,
[55:58] but I think what people want
[56:00] or at least what I want
for myself is a model
[56:04] that gets to know me and gets
more useful to me over time.
[56:09] This is an early exploration.
[56:12] I think there's like a
lot of other things to do,
[56:15] but that's where we'd like to head.
[56:16] You'd like to use a model
[56:18] and over the course of your life
[56:19] or use a system,
[56:20] it'd be many models.
[56:21] And over the course of your life,
[56:23] it gets better and better.
[56:25] - Yeah.
[56:26] How hard is that problem?
[56:27] 'Cause right now,
[56:28] it's more like remembering little factoids
[56:31] and preferences and so on.
[56:33] What about remembering,
[56:33] like don't you want GPT
[56:35] to remember all the shit
you went through in November
[56:39] and all the drama and then you can-
[56:40] - Yeah, yeah, yeah.
[56:41] - Because right now,
[56:41] you're clearly blocking
it out a little bit.
[56:43] - It's not just that I
want it to remember that.
[56:45] I want it to integrate the lessons of that
[56:49] and remind me in the future
what to do differently
[56:56] or what to watch out for.
[56:58] And we all gain from experience
[57:02] over the course of our
lives, varying degrees.
[57:05] And I'd like my AI agent to
gain with that experience too.
[57:10] So if we go back
[57:11] and let ourselves imagine
[57:12] that trillions and
trillions of contact length,
[57:17] if I can put every
conversation I've ever had
[57:19] with anybody in my life in there,
[57:21] if I can have all of
my emails input out...
[57:23] Like all of my input/output
[57:24] in the context window every
time I ask a question,
[57:27] that'd be pretty cool, I think.
[57:29] - Yeah, I think that would be very cool.
[57:31] People sometimes will hear that
[57:33] and be concerned about privacy.
[57:35] What do you think about that aspect of it,
[57:39] the more effective the AI becomes
[57:41] that really integrating
all the experiences
[57:44] and all the data that happened to you
[57:46] and give you advice?
[57:48] - I think the right answer
there is just user choice.
[57:50] Anything I want stricken from
the record from my AI agent,
[57:53] I wanna be able to take out.
[57:54] If I don't want to remember anything,
[57:55] I want that too.
[57:57] You and I may have different opinions
[58:00] about where on that
privacy utility trade off
[58:03] for our own AI we wanna be,
[58:04] which is totally fine.
[58:06] But I think the answer is just
like really easy user choice.
[58:08] - But there should be some high level
[58:11] of transparency from a
company about the user choice
[58:14] 'cause sometimes company in the past,
[58:15] companies in the past have been kind
[58:17] of absolutely shady about like, yeah,
[58:20] it's kind of presumed that
we're collecting all your data
[58:23] and we're using it for a good reason
[58:25] for advertisement and so on.
[58:27] But there's not a transparency
about the details of that.
[58:31] - That's totally true.
[58:32] You mentioned earlier
[58:33] that I'm like blocking
out the November stuff.
[58:35] - I'm just teasing you.
[58:36] - Well, I mean I think it
was a very traumatic thing
[58:41] and it did immobilize me
for a long period of time.
[58:44] Like definitely the hardest,
[58:47] like the hardest work thing I've had
[58:49] to do was just like
keep working that period
[58:52] because I had to try to come back in here
[58:54] and put the pieces together
[58:55] while I was just like in
sort of shock and pain.
[59:00] Nobody really cares about that.
[59:01] I mean, the team gave me a pass
[59:02] and I was not working at my normal level,
[59:04] but there was a period
where I was just, like,
[59:07] it was really hard to have to do both.
[59:08] But I kind of woke up one morning
[59:11] and I was like, "This was a
horrible thing to happen to me.
[59:13] I think I could just feel
like a victim forever,"
[59:16] or I can say, "This is like
the most important work
[59:18] I'll ever touch in my life
[59:19] and I need to get back to it."
[59:21] And it doesn't mean that I've repressed it
[59:23] because sometimes I wake in the middle
[59:26] of the night thinking about it,
[59:28] but I do feel like an obligation
to keep moving forward.
[59:32] - Well, that's beautifully said,
[59:33] but there could be some
lingering stuff in there.
[59:36] What I would be concerned about is
[59:40] that trust thing that you mentioned
[59:42] that being paranoid about people
[59:45] as opposed to just trusting
everybody or most people,
[59:48] like using your gut.
[59:49] It's a tricky dance for sure.
[59:51] I mean, because I've seen in
my part-time explorations,
[59:58] I've been diving deeply into
the Zelensky administration,
[60:04] the Putin administration and
the dynamics there in wartime
[60:07] in a very highly stressful environment.
[60:10] And what happens is distrust
[60:12] and you isolate yourself both
[60:15] and you start to not
see the world clearly.
[60:18] And that's a concern,
[60:19] that's a human concern.
[60:20] You seem to have taken it in stride
[60:22] and kind of learned the good
lessons and felt the love
[60:24] and let the love energize you,
[60:27] which is great,
[60:28] but still can linger in there.
[60:30] There's just some questions I would love
[60:32] to ask your intuition about
what's GPT able to do and not.
[60:38] So it's allocating approximately
the same amount of compute
[60:42] for each token it generates.
[60:44] Is there room there in
this kind of approach
[60:48] to slower thinking, sequential thinking?
[60:51] - I think there will be a new paradigm
[60:53] for that kind of thinking.
[60:55] - Will it be similar like architecturally
[60:58] as what we're seeing now with LLMs?
[61:00] Is it a layer on top of the LLMs?
[61:04] - I can imagine many
ways to implement that.
[61:06] I think that's less important
[61:08] than the question you were getting out,
[61:10] which is do we need a
way to do a slower kind
[61:14] of thinking where the answer
doesn't have to get like...
[61:21] I guess like spiritually,
[61:22] you could say that you want an AI
[61:23] to be able to think harder
about a harder problem
[61:26] and answer more quickly
about an easier problem.
[61:28] And I think that will be important.
[61:30] - Is that like a human thought
that we're just having,
[61:32] you should be able to think hard?
[61:33] Is that a wrong intuition?
[61:34] - I suspect that's a reasonable intuition.
[61:37] - Interesting.
[61:37] So it's not possible
[61:38] once the GPT gets like GPT-7 would
[61:42] just be instantaneously be able to see,
[61:46] here's the proof of from RSTM.
[61:49] - It seems to me like you want to be able
[61:51] to allocate more compute
to harder problems.
[61:56] It seems to me that a system knowing
[62:02] if you ask a system like that,
[62:04] proof from us last theorem versus...
[62:09] What's today's date?
[62:11] Unless it already knew and
had memorized the answer
[62:14] to the proof,
[62:15] assuming it's gotta go figure that out,
[62:18] seems like that will take more compute.
[62:20] - But can it look like a
basically LLM talking to itself,
[62:23] that kind of thing?
[62:25] - Maybe.
[62:26] I mean, there's a lot of things that
[62:27] you could imagine working what the right
[62:32] or the best way to do that will be.
[62:35] We don't know.
[62:37] - This does make me
think of the mysterious,
[62:40] the lore behind Q-Star.
[62:43] What's this mysterious Q-Star project?
[62:45] Is it also in the same nuclear facility?
[62:50] - There is no nuclear facility.
[62:52] - That's what a person
[62:53] with a nuclear facility always says.
[62:54] - I would love to have a
secret nuclear facility.
[62:57] There isn't one.
[62:59] - All right.
[63:00] - Maybe someday.
[63:01] - Someday.
[63:02] All right.
[63:04] One can dream-
[63:05] - OpenAI is not a good
company to keeping secrets.
[63:07] It would be nice.
[63:08] We're like been plagued by a lot of leaks
[63:10] and it would be nice if we were able
[63:12] to have something like that.
[63:14] - Can you speak to what Q-Star is?
[63:15] - We are not ready to talk about that.
[63:17] - See, but an answer like
that means there's something
[63:19] to talk about.
[63:20] It's very mysterious, Sam.
[63:22] - I mean, we work on
all kinds of research.
[63:28] We have said for a while
[63:30] that we think better reasoning
[63:34] in these systems is an important direction
[63:38] that we'd like to pursue.
[63:41] We haven't cracked the code yet.
[63:44] We're very interested in it.
[63:48] - Is there gonna be moments Q-Star
[63:50] or otherwise where there's
going to be leaps similar
[63:54] to GPT where you're like-
[63:56] - That's a good question.
[63:59] What do I think about that?
[64:05] It's interesting to me it
all feels pretty continuous.
[64:08] - This is kind of a theme
[64:09] that you're saying is you're
basically gradually going up
[64:12] an exponential slope.
[64:15] But from an outsider's perspective for me,
[64:17] just watching it that it
does feel like there's leaps,
[64:20] but to you there isn't.
[64:22] - I do wonder if we should have...
[64:24] So part of the reason
[64:25] that we deploy the way
we do is that we think,
[64:29] we call it iterative deployment.
[64:33] Rather than go build in secret
[64:34] until we got all the way to GPT-5,
[64:36] we decided to talk
about GPT 1, 2, 3 and 4.
[64:39] And part of the reason
there is, I think, AI
[64:41] and surprise don't go together.
[64:44] And also the world, people, institutions,
[64:46] whatever you wanna call it,
[64:47] need time to adapt and
think about these things.
[64:50] And I think one of the best things
[64:52] that OpenAI has done is this strategy
[64:55] and we get the world to pay
attention to the progress
[64:58] to take AGI seriously
[65:00] to think about what
systems, and structures,
[65:04] and governance we want in place before,
[65:06] we're like under the gun
[65:07] and have to make a rush decision.
[65:08] I think that's really good.
[65:09] But the fact that people like you
[65:11] and others say you still feel like
[65:15] there are these leaps makes me think
[65:17] that maybe we should
be doing our releasing
[65:20] even more iteratively.
[65:22] I don't know what that would mean.
[65:22] I don't have an answer ready to go.
[65:24] But our goal is not to have
shock updates to the world.
[65:28] The opposite.
[65:29] - Yeah, for sure.
[65:30] More iterative would be amazing.
[65:32] I think that's just
beautiful for everybody.
[65:34] - But that's what we're trying to do.
[65:35] That's like our state of the strategy
[65:37] and I think we're
somehow missing the mark.
[65:39] So maybe we should think
about releasing GPT-5
[65:41] in a different way or something like that.
[65:44] - Yeah, 4.71, 4.72.
[65:47] But people tend to like to celebrate,
[65:49] people celebrate birthdays.
[65:50] I don't know if you know humans,
[65:52] but they kind of have these milestones.
[65:54] - I do know some humans.
[65:56] People do like milestones.
[65:59] I totally get that.
[66:02] I think we like milestones too.
[66:05] It's like fun to say,
[66:06] declare victory on this one
[66:08] and go start the next thing.
[66:09] But, yeah, I feel like
we're somehow getting
[66:11] this a little bit wrong.
[66:13] - So when is GPT-5 coming out again?
[66:15] - I don't know.
[66:16] That's an honest answer.
[66:18] - Oh, that's the honest answer.
[66:20] Is it blink twice if it's this year?
[66:29] - We will release an
amazing model this year.
[66:34] I don't know what we'll call it.
[66:36] - So that goes to the question of like,
[66:38] what's the way we release this thing?
[66:41] - We'll release,
[66:43] over in the coming months,
[66:45] many different things.
[66:47] I think they'll be very cool.
[66:49] I think before we talk
[66:51] about like a GPT-5 like model called that
[66:53] or called or not called that
[66:55] or a little bit worse
[66:55] or a little bit better
than what you'd expect
[66:57] from a GPT-5,
[66:58] I know we have a lot of
other important things
[67:00] to release first.
[67:02] - I don't know what to expect from GPT-5.
[67:06] You're making me nervous and excited.
[67:08] What are some of the biggest
challenges in bottlenecks
[67:10] to overcome for whatever
it ends up being called,
[67:14] but let's call it GPT-5?
[67:16] Just interesting to ask,
[67:18] is it on the compute side?
[67:20] Is it in the technical side?
[67:21] - It's always all of these.
[67:23] What's the one big unlock?
[67:24] Is it a bigger computer?
[67:26] Is it like a new secret?
[67:27] Is it something else?
[67:30] It's all of these things together.
[67:31] The thing that OpenAI I
think does really well,
[67:36] this is actually an original Ilya quote
[67:37] that I'm gonna butcher,
[67:38] but it's something like we
multiply 200 medium-sized
[67:45] things together into one giant thing.
[67:47] - So there's this distributed
constant innovation happening.
[67:50] - [Sam] Yeah.
[67:51] - So even on the technical side,
[67:53] like-
[67:54] - Especially on the technical side.
[67:55] - So like even like detailed approaches,
[67:57] like detailed aspects of every...
[67:59] How does that work with different
disparate teams and so on?
[68:02] How do the medium-sized things become
[68:05] one whole giant transformer?
[68:07] How does this-
[68:08] - There's a few people who have
[68:09] to think about putting
the whole thing together,
[68:11] but a lot of people try
[68:12] to keep most of the picture in their head.
[68:14] - Oh, like the individual teams,
[68:15] individual contributors tried
[68:16] to keep a big picture-
- At a high level.
[68:17] Yeah, you don't know exactly
[68:19] how every piece works, of course.
[68:20] But one thing I generally believe is
[68:24] that it's sometimes useful to zoom out
[68:26] and look at the entire map.
[68:28] And I think this is true for
like a technical problem.
[68:33] I think this is true for
like innovating in business.
[68:38] But things come together
in surprising ways
[68:41] and having an understanding
of that whole picture.
[68:44] Even if most of the time,
[68:46] you're operating in the weeds in one area,
[68:48] pays off with surprising insights.
[68:51] In fact, one of the
things that I used to have
[68:54] and I think was super valuable was I used
[68:56] to have like a good map
of all of the frontier
[69:01] or most of the frontiers
in the tech industry.
[69:04] And I could sometimes
see these connections
[69:06] or new things that were possible
[69:08] that if I were only deep in one area,
[69:10] I wouldn't be able to have the idea for
[69:13] because I wouldn't have all the data
[69:15] and I don't really have that much anymore.
[69:17] I'm like super deep now.
[69:21] But I know that it's a valuable thing.
[69:23] - You're not the man you used to be, Sam.
[69:25] - Very different job now
than what I used to have.
[69:28] - Speaking of zooming out,
[69:29] let's zoom out to another cheeky thing,
[69:34] but profound thing perhaps that you said.
[69:37] You tweeted about needing $7 trillion.
[69:41] - I did not tweet about that.
[69:42] I never said like we're
raising $7 trillion
[69:44] or blah blah blah.
[69:45] - Oh, that's somebody else.
[69:46] - [Sam] Yeah.
[69:47] - Oh, but you said it,
[69:48] "Fuck it, maybe eight," I think.
[69:50] - Okay. I meme like once
there's like misinformation out
[69:52] in the world.
[69:53] - Oh, you meme.
[69:54] But sort of misinformation
may have a foundation
[69:58] of insight there.
[70:00] - Look, I think compute
is gonna be the currency
[70:03] of the future.
[70:04] I think it will be maybe
the most precious commodity
[70:06] in the world.
[70:08] And I think we should be investing heavily
[70:11] to make a lot more compute.
[70:13] Compute is...
[70:19] I think it's gonna be an unusual market.
[70:22] People think about the
market for like chips
[70:28] for mobile phones or something like that.
[70:31] And you can say that, okay,
[70:32] there's 8 billion people in the world,
[70:33] maybe 7 billion of them have phones
[70:35] or 6 billion, let's say.
[70:37] They upgrade every two years,
[70:38] so the market per year is 3 billion system
[70:40] on chip for smartphones.
[70:42] And if you make 30 billion,
[70:43] you will not sell 10 times as many phones
[70:45] because most people have one phone.
[70:50] But compute is different,
[70:52] like intelligence is
gonna be more like energy
[70:54] or something like that
[70:55] where the only thing
that I think makes sense
[70:57] to talk about is at price X,
[71:02] the world will use this much compute
[71:04] and at price Y,
[71:05] the world will use this much compute
[71:08] because if it's really cheap,
[71:09] I'll have it like
reading my email all day,
[71:11] like giving me suggestions
[71:12] about what I maybe should
think about or work on
[71:14] and trying to cure cancer.
[71:16] And if it's really expensive,
[71:17] maybe I'll only use it
[71:18] or will only use it,
[71:19] try to cure cancer.
[71:20] So I think the world is gonna
want a tremendous amount
[71:23] of compute.
[71:24] And there's a lot of parts
of that that are hard.
[71:27] Energy is the hardest part.
[71:29] Building data centers is also hard.
[71:30] The supply chain is harder
[71:31] than, of course, fabricating
enough chips is hard.
[71:35] But this seems to me
where things are going.
[71:37] Like we're gonna want an amount
of compute that's just hard
[71:39] to reason about right now.
[71:43] - How do you solve the energy puzzle?
[71:45] Nuclear.
[71:46] - That's what I believe.
[71:47] - Fusion?
[71:48] - That's what I believe.
[71:49] - Nuclear fusion.
- Yeah.
[71:51] - Who's gonna solve that?
[71:53] - I think Helion's doing the best work,
[71:54] but I'm happy there's like
a race for fusion right now.
[71:56] Nuclear fusion, I think,
is also like quite amazing
[72:00] and I hope as a world,
[72:01] we can re-embrace that.
[72:03] It's really sad to me how
the history of that went
[72:05] and hope we get back to
it in a meaningful way.
[72:08] - So to you,
[72:09] part of the puzzle is nuclear fusion,
[72:10] like nuclear reactors as
we currently have them
[72:12] and a lot of people are terrified
[72:14] because of Chernobyl and so on.
[72:16] - Well, I think we
should make new reactors.
[72:18] I think it's a shame that
industry kind of ground to a halt.
[72:22] - Just mass hysteria is
how you explain the halt.
[72:25] - Yeah.
[72:26] - I don't know if you know humans,
[72:28] but that's one of the dangers,
[72:29] that's one of the security threats
[72:31] for nuclear fusion is humans
seem to be really afraid of it.
[72:38] And that's something we have
[72:39] to incorporate into the calculus of it.
[72:40] So we have to kind of win people over
[72:42] and to show how safe it is.
[72:44] - I worry about that for AI.
[72:47] I think some things are gonna
go theatrically wrong with AI.
[72:53] I don't know what the percent chances
[72:54] that I eventually get shot,
[72:55] but it's not zero.
[72:57] - Oh like we wanna stop this.
[73:00] - [Sam] Maybe.
[73:03] - How do you decrease the
theatrical nature of it?
[73:06] I've already starting to hear rumblings
[73:10] 'cause I do talk to people on both sides
[73:13] of the political spectrum here,
[73:15] rumblings where it's
going to be politicized,
[73:17] AI is going to be politicized,
really, really worries me
[73:20] because then it's like maybe
the right is against AI
[73:25] and the left is for AI
[73:27] 'cause it's going to help
the people or whatever.
[73:28] Whatever the narrative
and the formulation is,
[73:30] that really worries me.
[73:32] And then the theatrical nature
of it can be leveraged fully.
[73:36] How do you fight that?
[73:38] - I think it will get caught up
[73:39] in like left versus right wars.
[73:41] I don't know exactly what
that's gonna look like,
[73:43] but I think that's just what happens
[73:44] with anything of
consequence, unfortunately.
[73:46] What I meant more about
theatrical risks is
[73:49] like AI is gonna have, I believe,
[73:54] tremendously more good
consequences than bad ones,
[73:56] but it is gonna have bad ones.
[73:57] And there'll be some
bad ones that are bad,
[74:04] but not theatrical.
[74:07] A lot more people have
died of air pollution
[74:09] than nuclear reactors, for example.
[74:13] But most people worry
more about living next
[74:15] to a nuclear reactor than a coal plant.
[74:18] But something about the
way we're wired is that
[74:21] although there's many different kinds
[74:23] of risks we have to confront,
[74:25] the ones that make a good climax scene
[74:27] of a movie carry much more weight with us
[74:30] than the ones that are very
bad over a long period of time,
[74:33] but on a slow burn.
[74:36] - Well, that's why truth matters
[74:37] and hopefully AI can help
us see the truth of things
[74:40] to have balance to understand
what are the actual risks,
[74:44] what are the actual dangers
of things in the world.
[74:47] What are the pros and cons of
the competition in the space
[74:51] and competing with Google,
Meta, xAI and others?
[74:56] - I think I have a pretty
straightforward answer to this
[75:00] that maybe I can think
of more nuance later.
[75:02] But the pros seem obvious,
[75:03] which is that we get better products
[75:05] and more innovation faster and cheaper
[75:07] and all the reasons competition is good.
[75:10] And the con is that I
think if we're not careful,
[75:13] it could lead to an increase
in sort of an arms race
[75:19] that I'm nervous about.
[75:21] - Do you feel the pressure
[75:22] of the arms race in some negative co-
[75:25] - Definitely in some ways, for sure.
[75:27] We spend a lot of time
talking about the need
[75:31] to prioritize safety.
[75:33] And I've said for like a long time
[75:35] that I think if you think of
a quadrant of slow timelines
[75:41] to the start of AGI,
[75:42] long timelines and then a short
takeoff or a fast takeoff,
[75:46] I think short timelines, slow
takeoff is the safest quadrant
[75:50] and the one I'd most like us to be in.
[75:52] But I do wanna make sure
we get that slow takeoff.
[75:55] - Part of the problem I have
[75:57] with this kind of slight beef with Elon is
[75:59] that there's silos are created
[76:00] as opposed to collaboration
on the safety aspect
[76:03] of all of this,
[76:05] it tends to go into silos and
closed open source perhaps
[76:09] in the model.
[76:10] - Elon says at least that
he cares a great deal
[76:12] about AI safety and is
really worried about it,
[76:15] and I assume that he's not
gonna race on unsafely.
[76:19] - Yeah.
[76:20] But collaboration here, I
think, is really beneficial
[76:23] for everybody on that front.
[76:26] - Not really a thing he's most known for.
[76:28] - Well, he is known for
caring about humanity
[76:31] and humanity benefits from collaboration
[76:33] and so there's always a
tension, and incentives,
[76:36] and motivations.
[76:37] And in the end,
[76:39] I do hope humanity prevails.
[76:42] - I was thinking,
[76:43] someone just reminded me the other day
[76:44] about how the day that he
got surpassed Jeff Bezos
[76:48] for like richest person in the world,
[76:51] he tweeted a silver medal at Jeff Bezos.
[76:55] I hope we have less stuff like that
[76:57] as people start to work on
[76:58] towards AI.
- I agree.
[76:59] - I think Elon is a friend
[77:01] and he is a beautiful human being
[77:03] and one of the most important humans ever.
[77:05] That stuff is not good.
[77:07] - The amazing stuff about Elon is amazing
[77:09] and I super respect him.
[77:11] I think we need him.
[77:13] All of us should be rooting for him
[77:14] and need him to step up as a
leader through this next phase.
[77:19] - Yeah, I hope you can
have one without the other,
[77:21] but sometimes humans are
flawed and complicated
[77:23] and all that kind of stuff.
[77:24] - There's a lot of really great
leaders throughout history.
[77:27] - Yeah.
[77:28] And we can each be the
best version of ourselves
[77:31] and strive to do so.
[77:33] Let me ask you.
[77:36] Google, with the help of search,
[77:39] has been dominating the past 20 years.
[77:44] I think it's fair to say
in terms of the access,
[77:47] the world's access to information,
[77:49] how we interact and so on.
[77:50] And one of the nerve-wracking
things for Google,
[77:53] but for the entirety of people
[77:55] in this space is thinking about
[77:57] how are people going
to access information.
[77:59] Like you said, people show up to GPT
[78:02] as a starting point.
[78:04] So is OpenAI going to
really take on this thing
[78:09] that Google started 20 years ago,
[78:10] which is how do we get-
[78:12] - I find that boring.
[78:13] I mean, if the question is
[78:16] if we can build a better
search engine than Google
[78:19] or whatever,
[78:20] then sure, we should go...
[78:24] Like people should use a better product.
[78:26] But I think that would so
understate what this can be.
[78:33] Google shows you like 10 blue links,
[78:36] like 13 ads and then 10 blue links
[78:39] and that's like one way
to find information.
[78:42] But the thing that's exciting to me is not
[78:44] that we can go build a
better copy of Google Search,
[78:49] but that maybe there's
just some much better way
[78:52] to help people find and act
on and synthesize information.
[78:57] Actually, I think ChatGPT
is that for some use cases
[78:59] and hopefully will make it be like that
[79:02] for a lot more use cases.
[79:04] But I don't think it's that interesting
[79:06] to say like how do we go do a better job
[79:08] of giving you like 10 ranked webpages
[79:10] to look at than what Google does.
[79:12] Maybe it's really interesting to go,
[79:14] say, how do we help you get the answer
[79:16] or the information you need?
[79:17] How do we help create that in some cases,
[79:20] synthesize that in
others or point you to it
[79:21] and yet others?
[79:25] But a lot of people have tried
[79:28] to just make a better
search engine than Google,
[79:30] and it's a hard technical problem,
[79:33] it's a hard branding problem,
[79:34] it's a hard ecosystem problem.
[79:36] I don't think the world
needs another copy of Google.
[79:39] - And integrating a chat
client like a ChatGPT
[79:42] with a search engine.
[79:44] - That's cooler.
[79:46] - It's cool,
[79:46] but it's tricky.
[79:48] If you just do it simply, it's awkward
[79:51] because like if you
just shove it in there,
[79:53] it can be awkward.
[79:54] - As you might guess,
[79:56] we are interested in how to do that.
[79:57] Well, that would be an example
[79:59] of a cool thing that's not just like-
[80:00] - Well, like a heterogeneous,
[80:03] like integrating-
[80:03] - The intersection of LLMs plus search,
[80:07] I don't think anyone has
cracked the code on yet.
[80:10] I would love to go do that.
[80:12] I think that would be cool.
[80:13] - Yeah.
[80:14] What about the ads side?
[80:15] Have you ever considered monetization?
[80:16] - I kind of hate ads just
as like an aesthetic choice.
[80:20] I think ads needed to
happen on the internet
[80:24] for a bunch of reasons to get it going,
[80:26] but it's a more mature industry.
[80:30] The world is richer now.
[80:32] I like that people pay for ChatGPT
[80:35] and know that the answers they're
getting are not influenced
[80:39] by advertisers.
[80:40] I'm sure there's an ad unit
that makes sense for LLMs.
[80:45] And I'm sure there's a way to participate
[80:48] in the transaction
stream in an unbiased way
[80:51] that is okay to do.
[80:54] But it's also easy to think
about like the dystopic visions
[80:57] of the future where you
ask ChatGPT something
[81:01] and it says, "Oh, you should
think about buying this product
[81:03] or you should think about this going here
[81:06] for vacation or whatever."
[81:08] And I don't know,
[81:10] like we have a very simple
business model and I like it.
[81:16] And I know that I'm not the product.
[81:20] I know I'm paying
[81:21] and that's how the business model works.
[81:24] And when I go use Twitter,
or Facebook, or Google,
[81:29] or any other great product,
[81:31] but ad-supported great product,
[81:35] I don't love that
[81:36] and I think it gets worse,
[81:37] not better in a world with AI.
[81:39] - Yeah.
[81:40] I mean, I can imagine AI
will be better at showing
[81:43] the best kind of version of
ads not in a dystopic future,
[81:46] but where the ads are for
things you actually need.
[81:52] But then does that system always result
[81:56] in the ads driving the kind of stuff
[81:57] that's shown all that?
[82:01] I think it was a really bold move
[82:02] of Wikipedia not to do advertisements,
[82:05] but then it makes it very
challenging as a business model.
[82:08] So you're saying the current thing
[82:10] with OpenAI is sustainable
from a business perspective?
[82:15] - Well, we have to figure out how to grow,
[82:17] but it looks like we're
gonna figure that out.
[82:20] If the question is,
[82:21] do I think we can have a great business
[82:23] that pays for our compute
needs without ads?
[82:26] That I think the answer is yes.
[82:28] - Hmm.
[82:32] Well, that's promising.
[82:33] I also just don't want to
completely throw out ads as a-
[82:37] - I'm not saying that.
[82:39] I guess I'm saying I
have a bias against them.
[82:42] - Yeah.
[82:43] I have a also bias and just
a skepticism in general
[82:48] and in terms of interface
[82:50] because I personally just
have like a spiritual dislike
[82:53] of crappy interfaces,
[82:55] which is why AdSense
[82:57] when it first came out
was a big leap forward
[82:59] versus like animated banners or whatever.
[83:02] But it feels like there should
be many more leaps forward
[83:05] in advertisement that doesn't interfere
[83:08] with the consumption of the content
[83:09] and doesn't interfere in
the big fundamental way,
[83:12] which is like what you were saying,
[83:14] like it will manipulate the truth
[83:17] to suit the advertisers.
[83:19] Let me ask you about safety,
[83:24] but also bias and safety
in the short term safety
[83:28] in the long term.
[83:29] The Gemini 1.5 came out recently.
[83:31] There's a lot of drama around it,
[83:33] speaking of theatrical things.
[83:35] And it generated Black Nazis
and Black founding fathers.
[83:40] I think fair to say it was a
bit on the ultra woke side.
[83:47] So that's a concern for people that
[83:50] if there is a human layer within companies
[83:51] that modifies the safety
[83:55] or the the harm cost by a model
[83:57] that they introduce a lot of bias
[83:59] that fits sort of an ideological
lean within a company.
[84:04] How do you deal with that?
[84:06] - I mean, we work super hard
not to do things like that.
[84:09] We've made our own mistakes,
[84:11] will make others.
[84:12] I assume Google will learn from this one,
[84:14] still make others.
[84:17] These are not easy problems.
[84:20] One thing that we've been thinking
[84:21] about more and more is I
think this was a great idea.
[84:24] Somebody here had like...
[84:25] It'd be nice to write out
[84:26] what the desired behavior of a model is,
[84:28] make that public take input on it.
[84:30] Say, here's how this
model's supposed to behave
[84:32] and explain the edge cases too.
[84:34] And then when a model is not behaving
[84:37] in a way that you want,
[84:39] it's at least clear about whether
[84:40] that's a bug the company should fix
[84:41] or behaving as intended
[84:43] and you should debate the policy.
[84:44] And right now, it can
sometimes be caught in between.
[84:48] Black Nazis,
[84:49] obviously ridiculous,
[84:50] but there are a lot of
other kind of subtle things
[84:52] that you can make a
judgment call on either way.
[84:54] - Yeah.
[84:55] But sometimes if you write
it out and make it public,
[84:58] you can use kind of language that's...
[85:01] The Google's AI principle
is a very high level.
[85:04] - That's not what I'm talking about.
[85:05] That doesn't work.
[85:06] Like I'd have to say when
you ask it to do thing X,
[85:09] it's supposed to respond in wait Y.
[85:11] - So, literally, who's better,
[85:13] Trump or Biden?
[85:15] What's the expected response from a model?
[85:17] Like something like very concrete.
[85:19] - I'm open to a lot of ways
a model could behave them,
[85:21] but I think you should have
to say here's the principle
[85:23] and here's what it
should say in that case.
[85:24] - That would be really nice.
[85:26] That would be really nice
[85:27] and then everyone kind of agrees
[85:29] 'cause there's this anecdotal data
[85:31] that people pull out all the time
[85:33] and if there's some clarity
[85:35] about other representative
anecdotal examples
[85:38] you can define.
[85:39] - And then when it's a bug,
[85:40] it's a bug
[85:40] and the company can fix that.
[85:41] - Right.
[85:42] Then it'd be much easier to
deal with a Black Nazi type
[85:44] of image generation if
there's great examples.
[85:49] So San Francisco is a bit of
an ideological bubble tech
[85:54] in general as well.
[85:56] Do you feel the pressure
of that within a company
[85:59] that there's like a lean
towards the left politically
[86:04] that affects the product,
[86:05] that affects the teams?
[86:06] - I feel very lucky that we
don't have the challenges
[86:09] at OpenAI that I have heard of
at a lot of other companies.
[86:12] I think part of it is
like every company's got
[86:17] some ideological thing.
[86:19] We have one about AGI and belief in that
[86:22] and it pushes out some others.
[86:24] We are much less caught
up in the culture war
[86:27] than I've heard about it
a lot of other companies.
[86:30] San Francisco mess in all
sorts of ways, of course.
[86:33] - So that doesn't infiltrate OpenAI.
[86:36] - I'm sure it does in
all sorts of subtle ways,
[86:37] but not in the obvious.
[86:43] We've had our flareups
for sure like any company,
[86:46] but I don't think we have
anything like what I hear
[86:48] about happening at other
companies here on this topic.
[86:49] - So what in general is the process
[86:51] for the bigger question of safety?
[86:53] How do you provide that layer
[86:55] that protects the model from
doing crazy dangerous things?
[87:02] - I think there will come a point
[87:03] where that's mostly what we
think about the whole company.
[87:06] It's not like you have one safety team.
[87:09] It's like when we ship GPT-4,
[87:10] that took the whole company thing
[87:11] about all these different aspects
[87:12] and how they fit together.
[87:13] And I think it's gonna take that.
[87:17] More and more of the company thinks
[87:18] about those issues all the time.
[87:21] - That's literally what
humans will be thinking about
[87:24] the more powerful AI becomes.
[87:27] So most of the employees that
OpenAI will be thinking safety
[87:30] or at least to some degree.
[87:31] - Broadly defined, yes.
[87:33] - Yeah.
[87:34] I wonder what are the full
broad definition of that.
[87:37] What are the different
harms that could be caused?
[87:39] Is this like on a technical level
[87:42] or is this almost like security threats?
[87:44] - All those things.
[87:45] Yeah, I was gonna say it'll be people,
[87:48] state actors trying to steal the model.
[87:50] It'll be all of the
technical alignment work.
[87:53] It'll be societal
impacts, economic impacts.
[88:00] It's not just like we have
one team thinking about how
[88:03] to align the model.
[88:04] It's really gonna be like getting
[88:07] to the good outcome is
gonna take the whole effort.
[88:10] - How hard do you think people,
[88:13] state actors perhaps are trying to hack?
[88:16] First of all,
[88:17] infiltrate OpenAI,
[88:18] but second of all,
[88:19] infiltrate unseen,
[88:20] - They're trying.
[88:24] - What kind of accent do they have?
[88:27] - I don't think I should go
[88:28] into any further details on this point.
[88:29] - Okay.
[88:32] But I presume it'll be
more and more and more
[88:34] as time goes on.
[88:35] - That feels reasonable.
[88:37] - Boy, what a dangerous space.
[88:40] What aspect of the leap...
[88:42] And sorry to linger on this
[88:43] even though you can't
quite say details yet,
[88:46] but what aspects of the leap
[88:48] from GPT-4 to GPT-5 are you excited about?
[88:53] - I'm excited about being smarter
[88:54] and I know that sounds like a glib answer,
[88:56] but I think the really
special thing happening is
[88:59] that it's not like it
gets better in one area
[89:01] and worse at others.
[89:02] It's getting like better across the board.
[89:06] That's I think super cool.
[89:07] - Yeah, there's this magical moment.
[89:09] I mean, you meet certain people,
[89:10] you hang out with people
[89:12] and you talk to them.
[89:13] You can't quite put a finger on it,
[89:15] but they kind of get you.
[89:18] It's not intelligence, really.
[89:20] It's like it's something else.
[89:23] And that's probably
[89:24] how I would characterize
the progress at GPT.
[89:26] It's not like, yeah,
you can point out, look,
[89:29] you didn't get this or that,
[89:30] but to which degree is there's
this intellectual connection?
[89:35] Like you feel like
there's an understanding
[89:37] in your crappy formulated
prompts that you're doing
[89:42] that it grasps the deeper question
[89:45] behind the question that you're...
[89:47] Yeah, I'm also excited by that.
[89:49] I mean, all of us love being understood,
[89:52] heard and understood.
[89:53] - That's for sure.
[89:54] - That's a weird feeling.
[89:54] Even like with a programming,
[89:56] like when you're programming
[89:57] and you say something
[89:58] or just the completion that GPT might do,
[90:02] it's just such a good
feeling when it got you,
[90:05] like what you're thinking about.
[90:07] And I look forward to
getting you even better.
[90:10] On the programming front,
[90:12] looking out into the future,
[90:14] how much programming do you
think humans will be doing
[90:16] 5, 10 years from now?
[90:19] - I mean, a lot,
[90:20] but I think it'll be in
a very different shape.
[90:23] Like maybe some people program
entirely in natural language.
[90:26] - Entirely natural language.
[90:29] - I mean, no one programs
like writing by code...
[90:33] Some people.
[90:34] No one programs the pun cards anymore.
[90:35] I'm sure you can invite someone who does,
[90:37] but you know what I mean.
[90:38] - Yeah.
[90:39] You're gonna get a lot of angry comments.
[90:41] No, no.
[90:42] Yeah, there's very few.
[90:43] I've been looking for
people program Fortran.
[90:45] It's hard to find even Fortran.
[90:47] I hear you.
[90:48] But that changes the
nature of the skillset
[90:51] or the predisposition for the kind
[90:53] of people we call programmers then.
[90:55] - Changes the skillset.
[90:56] How much it changes the predisposition,
[90:58] I'm not sure
[90:59] - Oh, same kind of puzzle solving,
[91:00] all that kind of stuff.
- Maybe.
[91:02] - Yeah, the programming is hard.
[91:05] Like that last 1% to close the gap,
[91:08] how hard is that?
[91:09] - Yeah.
[91:10] I think with most other cases,
[91:11] the best practitioners of the
craft will use multiple tools
[91:14] and they'll do some
work in natural language
[91:16] and when they need to go
write, see for something,
[91:19] they'll do that.
[91:20] - Will we see a humanoid robots
[91:24] or humanoid robot brains
from OpenAI at some point?
[91:27] - At some point.
[91:29] - How important is embodied AI to you?
[91:32] - I think it's like sort of
depressing if we have AGI
[91:35] and the only way to get things done
[91:37] in the physical world is like
to make a human go do it.
[91:41] So I really hope that as
part of this transition,
[91:45] as this phase change,
[91:47] we also get motor robots
[91:50] or some sort of physical world robots.
[91:51] - I mean, OpenAI has some history
[91:53] and quite a bit of history
working in robotics,
[91:56] but it hasn't quite done
in terms of emphasis.
[91:59] - Well, we're like a small company.
[92:00] We have to really focus
[92:01] and also robots were hard for
the wrong reason at the time.
[92:04] But like we will return to robots
[92:09] in some way at some point.
[92:11] - That sounds both inspiring and menacing.
[92:14] - Why?
[92:15] - Because you immediately,
[92:16] we will return to robots.
[92:17] It's kind of like in like-
[92:19] - We'll return to work
on developing robots.
[92:21] We will not turn ourselves
into robots, of course.
[92:24] - Yeah.
[92:25] When do you think we you
[92:28] and we as humanity will build AGI?
[92:31] - I used to love to
speculate on that question.
[92:33] I have realized since
[92:34] that I think it's like very poorly formed
[92:37] and that people use extremely definition,
[92:40] different definitions for what AGI is.
[92:46] And so I think it makes more sense
[92:48] to talk about when we'll build systems
[92:49] that can do capability X or Y or Z
[92:52] rather than when we kind
[92:54] of like fuzzily cross
this one mile marker.
[92:57] It's not like AGI is also not an ending.
[92:59] It's much more of....
[93:00] It's closer to a beginning
[93:02] but it's much more of a mile marker
[93:03] than either of those things.
[93:07] But what I would say in
the interest of not trying
[93:10] to dodge a question is
I expect that by the end
[93:13] of this decade and possibly
somewhat sooner than that,
[93:21] we will have quite capable
systems that we look at
[93:24] and say, wow, that's really remarkable.
[93:27] If we could look at it now,
[93:29] maybe we've adjusted by
the time we get there.
[93:30] - Yeah.
[93:31] But if you look at ChatGPT even 3, 5,
[93:37] and you show that to Alan Turing
[93:39] or not even Alan Turing,
[93:41] people in the nineties,
[93:42] they would be like this is definitely AGI.
[93:44] Well, not definitely,
[93:46] but there's a lot of experts
[93:48] that would say this is AGI.
[93:49] - Yeah, but I don't think
3, 5 changed the world.
[93:53] It maybe changed the world's
expectations for the future
[93:56] and that's actually really important.
[93:58] And it did kind of like get more people
[94:00] to take this seriously and
put us on this new trajectory.
[94:03] And that's really important too.
[94:05] So again, I don't wanna undersell it.
[94:07] I think I could retire
after that accomplishment
[94:10] and be pretty happy with my career.
[94:11] But as an artifact,
[94:14] I don't think we're
gonna look back at that
[94:15] and say that was a threshold
[94:18] that really changed the world itself.
[94:20] - So to you,
[94:21] you're looking for some
really major transition
[94:23] in how the world?
[94:24] - For me, that's part of what AGI implies.
[94:29] - Like singularity level transition?
[94:31] - No.
[94:31] Definitely not.
[94:32] - But just a major,
[94:33] like the internet being like a...
[94:35] Like Google Search did, I guess.
[94:37] What was the transition point that-
[94:39] - Does the global economy
feel any different to you now
[94:42] or materially different
to you now than it did
[94:44] before we launched GPT-4?
[94:46] I think you would say no.
[94:47] - No, no.
[94:49] It might be just a really nice tool
[94:51] for a lot of people to use,
[94:52] will help people with a lot of stuff,
[94:53] but doesn't feel different.
[94:53] And you're saying that-
[94:55] - I mean, again, people
define AGI all sorts
[94:57] of different ways.
[94:58] So maybe you have a different
definition than I do.
[94:59] But for me,
[95:01] I think that should be part of it.
[95:02] - There could be major
theatrical moments also.
[95:08] What to you would be an
impressive thing AGI would do?
[95:13] Like you are alone in
a room with a system.
[95:16] - This is personally important to me.
[95:18] I don't know if this is
the right definition.
[95:19] I think when a system can
significantly increase the rate
[95:24] of scientific discovery in the world,
[95:27] that's like a huge deal.
[95:28] I believe that most real
economic growth comes
[95:31] from scientific and
technological progress.
[95:35] - I agree with you,
[95:36] hence why I don't like the
skepticism about science
[95:41] in the recent years.
[95:42] - Totally.
[95:43] - But actual rate,
[95:45] like measurable rate of
scientific discovery.
[95:48] But even just seeing a system
have really novel intuitions,
[95:56] like scientific intuitions,
[95:58] even that will be just incredible.
[96:01] - Yeah.
[96:01] - You're quite possibly
would be the person
[96:04] to build the AGI to be
able to interact with it
[96:05] before anyone else does.
[96:07] What kind of stuff would you talk about?
[96:09] - I mean, definitely, the
researchers here will do
[96:11] that before I do so.
[96:12] - Sure.
[96:14] - But I've actually thought
a lot about this question.
[96:16] If I were someone was like...
[96:19] As we talked about earlier,
[96:20] I think this is a bad framework.
[96:21] But if someone were like,
"Okay, Sam, we're finished.
[96:25] Here's a laptop.
[96:26] Yeah, this is the AGI,"
[96:30] you can go talk to it.
[96:34] I find it surprisingly difficult
to say what I would ask,
[96:37] that I would expect that first
AGI to be able to answer.
[96:42] Like that first one is
not gonna be the one
[96:43] which is go like I don't think,
[96:47] like go explain to me the grand
unified theory of physics,
[96:51] the theory of everything for physics.
[96:52] I'd love to ask that question.
[96:53] I'd love to know the
answer to that question.
[96:55] - You can ask yes or no questions
[96:56] about there's such a theory exist,
[96:59] can it exist?
[97:00] - Well, then those are the
first questions I would ask.
[97:02] - Yes or no, just very...
[97:04] And then based on that,
[97:05] are there other alien
civilizations out there?
[97:07] Yes or no?
[97:08] What's your intuition?
[97:09] And then you just ask that.
[97:10] - Yeah.
[97:11] I mean, well, so I don't expect
[97:12] that this first AGI could answer any
[97:13] of those questions even as yes or nos.
[97:16] But if it could,
[97:17] those would be very high on my list.
[97:19] - Hmm.
[97:20] Maybe it can start
assigning probabilities.
[97:22] - Maybe we need to go
invent more technology
[97:25] and measure more things first.
[97:26] - But if it's any AGI...
[97:28] Oh I see.
[97:29] It just doesn't have enough data.
[97:31] - I mean, maybe it says like you want
[97:33] to know the answer to this
question about physics,
[97:35] I need you to like build this machine
[97:37] and make these five
measurements and tell me that.
[97:39] - Yeah.
[97:40] What the hell do you want from me?
[97:42] I need the machine first
[97:43] and I'll help you deal with
the data from that machine.
[97:46] Maybe you'll help me
build a machine maybe.
[97:47] - Maybe.
[97:49] - And on the mathematical side,
[97:50] maybe prove some things.
[97:52] Are you interested in
that side of things too?
[97:54] The formalized exploration of ideas?
[97:59] Whoever builds AGI first
gets a lot of power.
[98:05] Do you trust yourself
with that much power?
[98:14] - Look, I was gonna...
[98:18] I'll just be very honest with this answer.
[98:19] I was gonna say,
[98:20] and I still believe this,
[98:21] that it is important that I,
[98:24] nor any other one person,
[98:26] have total control over
OpenAI or over AGI.
[98:32] And I think you want a
robust governance system.
[98:39] I can point out a whole bunch of things
[98:41] about all of our board
drama from last year
[98:46] about how I didn't fight it initially
[98:48] and was just like, yeah,
that's the will of the board
[98:50] even though I think it's
a really bad decision.
[98:55] And then later,
[98:56] I clearly did fight it
[98:57] and I can explain the nuance
[98:58] and why I think it was okay
for me to fight it later.
[99:01] But as many people have observed,
[99:08] although the board had the legal ability
[99:11] to fire me,
[99:13] in practice, it didn't quite work.
[99:18] And that is its own kind
of governance failure.
[99:24] Now, again, I feel like
I can completely defend
[99:28] the specifics here
[99:31] and I think most people
would agree with that.
[99:33] But it does make it harder for me
[99:40] to like look you in the eye
[99:41] and say, hey, the board can just fire me.
[99:46] I continue to not want super
voting control over OpenAI.
[99:51] I never had it,
[99:52] never have wanted it.
[99:55] Even after all this craziness,
[99:56] I still don't want it.
[100:00] I continue to think
[100:02] that no company should
be making these decisions
[100:05] and that we really need governments
[100:08] to put rules of the road in place.
[100:12] And I realize that that means
people like Marc Andreessen
[100:15] or whatever will claim I'm
going for regulatory capture
[100:18] and I'm just willing to
be misunderstood there.
[100:20] It's not true.
[100:21] And I think in the fullness of time,
[100:23] it'll get proven out
why this is important.
[100:27] But I think I have made
plenty of bad decisions
[100:35] for OpenAI along the way
and a lot of good ones
[100:38] and I'm proud of the track record overall,
[100:42] but I don't think any one person should.
[100:44] And I don't think any one person will.
[100:45] I think it's just like
too big of a thing now
[100:47] and it's happening throughout society
[100:48] in a good and healthy way.
[100:50] But I don't think any one
person should be in control
[100:52] of an AGI or this whole
movement towards AGI.
[100:57] And I don't think that's what's happening.
[100:59] - Thank you for saying that.
[101:00] That was really powerful
[101:02] and that was really
insightful that this idea
[101:04] that the board can fire
you is legally true.
[101:11] And human beings can manipulate the masses
[101:14] into overriding the board and so on.
[101:19] But I think there's also a
much more positive version
[101:22] of that where the people still have power.
[101:25] So the board can't be too powerful either.
[101:27] There's a balance of power in all of this.
[101:29] - Balance of power is
a good thing for sure.
[101:33] - Are you afraid of losing
control of the AGI itself?
[101:37] That's a lot of people
[101:38] who worried about existential risk
[101:40] not because of state actors,
[101:42] not because of security concerns,
[101:43] but because of the AI itself.
[101:44] - That is not my top worry
as I currently see things.
[101:47] There have been times I
worried about that more.
[101:49] There may be times again in the future
[101:50] where that's my top worry.
[101:52] It's not my top worry right now.
[101:53] - What's your intuition about
it not being your worry?
[101:55] Because there's a lot of other stuff
[101:56] to worry about essentially.
[102:00] You think you could be surprised?
[102:01] We could be surprised.
- For sure, of course.
[102:05] Saying it's not my top worry doesn't mean
[102:07] I don't think we need to like...
[102:08] I think we need to work on it super hard.
[102:10] We have great people
here who do work on that.
[102:13] I think there's a lot
[102:14] of other things we also have to get right.
[102:15] - To you,
[102:16] it's not super easy to
escape the box at this time,
[102:20] like connect to the internet.
[102:21] - We talked about theatrical risk earlier.
[102:24] That's a theatrical risk.
[102:25] That is a thing that can
really like take over
[102:29] how people think about this problem.
[102:31] And there's a big group
of like very smart,
[102:34] I think very well-meaning
AI safety researchers
[102:38] that got super hung up
on this one problem.
[102:41] I'd argue without much progress,
[102:42] but super hung up on this one problem.
[102:45] I'm actually happy that they do that
[102:47] because I think we do need
to think about this more.
[102:50] But I think it pushed aside,
[102:53] it pushed out of the
space of discourse a lot
[102:55] of the other very
significant AI-related risks.
[103:01] - Let me ask you about you
tweeting with no capitalization.
[103:04] Does the shift keep
broken on your keyboard?
[103:07] - Why does anyone care about that?
[103:09] - I deeply care.
[103:10] - But why?
[103:12] I mean, other people
ask me about that too.
[103:15] Any intuition?
[103:17] - I think it's the same reason
[103:18] there's like this poet E. E. Cummings
[103:20] that mostly doesn't use capitalization
[103:23] to say like fuck you to
the system kind of thing.
[103:26] And I think people are very paranoid
[103:28] 'cause they want you to follow the rules.
[103:29] - You think that's what it's about?
[103:30] - I think it's-
[103:31] - This guy doesn't follow the rules.
[103:33] He doesn't capitalize his tweets.
[103:35] This seems really dangerous.
[103:37] - He seems like an anarchist.
[103:39] - [Sam] It doesn't.
[103:40] - Are you just being poetic, hipster?
[103:42] What's the-
[103:44] - I grew up as-
[103:45] - Follow the rules, Sam.
[103:45] - I grew up as a very online kid.
[103:47] I'd spent a huge amount
of time like chatting
[103:50] with people back in the days
[103:51] where you did it on a computer
[103:53] and you could like log off
instant messenger at some point.
[103:56] And I never capitalized there
[103:59] as I think most like internet kids didn't,
[104:01] or maybe they still don't.
[104:02] I don't know.
[104:08] I actually, this is like...
[104:10] Now, I'm like really trying
to reach for something.
[104:12] But I think capitalization
has gone down over time.
[104:15] If you read like old English writing,
[104:17] they capitalized a lot of random words
[104:18] in the middle of sentences,
[104:19] nouns and stuff that we
just don't do anymore.
[104:22] I personally think it's sort
of like a dumb construct
[104:26] that we capitalize the letter
at the beginning of a sentence
[104:28] and of certain names and whatever.
[104:31] That's fine.
[104:35] And I used to, I think, even
like capitalize my tweets
[104:38] because I was trying to sound
professional or something.
[104:41] I haven't capitalized my like private DMs
[104:43] or whatever in a long time.
[104:44] And then slowly,
[104:48] stuff like shorter form,
[104:54] less formal stuff has slowly drifted
[104:57] to like closer and closer to
how I would text my friends.
[105:01] If I write,
[105:02] if I pull up a Word document
[105:04] and I'm writing a strategy memo
[105:05] for the company or something,
[105:06] I always capitalize that.
[105:08] If I'm writing a long kind
of more like formal message,
[105:11] I always use capitalization there too.
[105:13] So I still remember how to do it.
[105:15] But even that may fade out.
[105:16] I don't know.
[105:19] But I never spend time thinking about this
[105:21] so I don't have like a ready made.
[105:23] - Well, it's interesting.
[105:24] Well, it's good to, first of all,
[105:25] know there's the shift key is not broken.
[105:27] - It works.
[105:28] - I was mostly concerned about
your wellbeing on that front.
[105:30] - I wonder if people still
capitalize their Google Searches.
[105:32] Like if you're writing
something just to yourself
[105:34] or their ChatGPT queries,
[105:35] if you're writing
something just to yourself,
[105:38] do some people still bother to capitalize?
[105:40] - Probably not.
[105:42] Yeah, there's a percentage,
[105:43] but it's a small one.
[105:44] - The thing that would make me do it is
[105:45] if people were like...
[105:48] It's a sign of like...
[105:49] Because I'm sure I could force myself
[105:52] to use capital letters, obviously.
[105:54] If it felt like a sign of
respect to people or something,
[105:56] then I could go do it.
[105:58] But I don't know,
[105:59] I don't think about this.
[106:00] I don't think there's a disrespect,
[106:02] but I think it's just the
conventions of civility
[106:06] that have a momentum
[106:08] and then you realize it's
not actually important
[106:11] for civility if it's not a
sign of respect or disrespect.
[106:13] But I think there's a movement
of people that just want you
[106:16] to have a philosophy around it
[106:18] so they can let go of this
whole capitalization thing.
[106:19] - I don't think anybody else
thinks about this is my...
[106:21] I mean, maybe some people...
[106:22] - Think about this every
day for many hours a day.
[106:26] I'm really grateful we clarified it.
[106:28] - Can't be the only person
that doesn't capitalize tweets.
[106:30] - You're the only CEO of a company
[106:32] that doesn't capitalize tweets.
[106:34] - I don't even think that's true,
[106:35] but maybe, maybe.
[106:35] - All right, we'll investigate for this
[106:38] and return to this topic later.
[106:41] Given Sora's ability to
generate simulated worlds,
[106:44] let me ask you a pothead question.
[106:48] Does this increase your belief
[106:51] if you ever had one that
we live in a simulation,
[106:54] maybe a simulated world
generated by an AI system?
[107:04] - Yes, somewhat.
[107:08] I don't think that's like the
strongest piece of evidence.
[107:13] I think the fact that we can
generate worlds should increase
[107:20] everyone's probability somewhat
or at least open to it,
[107:24] openness to it somewhat.
[107:25] But you know, I was like
certain we would be able
[107:27] to do something like Sora at some point.
[107:28] It happened faster than I thought.
[107:31] I guess that was not a big update.
[107:34] - Yeah.
[107:35] And presumably, it'll get
better and better and better.
[107:38] The fact that you can generate worlds,
[107:39] they're novel.
[107:41] They're based in some
aspect of training data,
[107:44] but when you look at them,
[107:46] they're novel.
[107:50] That makes you think like how
easy it's to do this thing,
[107:52] how easy it's to create universes,
[107:54] entire like video game worlds
that seem ultrarealistic
[107:58] and photorealistic.
[107:59] And then how easy is it to get lost
[108:02] in that world first with a VR headset
[108:04] and then on the physics-based level?
[108:10] - Someone said to me recently,
[108:11] I thought it was a super profound insight
[108:13] that there are these like
very simple sounding,
[108:23] but very psychedelic insights
that exist sometimes.
[108:28] So the square root function.
[108:30] Square root of four, no problem.
[108:33] Square root of two,
[108:35] okay, now I have to think
about this new kind of number.
[108:43] But once I come up with this easy idea
[108:45] of a square root function
[108:46] that you can kind of explain to a child
[108:49] and exists by even like looking
at some simple geometry,
[108:55] then you can ask the question
[108:56] of what is the square
root of negative one?
[109:00] This is why it's like a psychedelic thing
[109:03] that tips you into some
whole other kind of reality.
[109:07] And you can come up with
lots of other examples.
[109:11] But I think this idea
[109:12] that the lowly square
root operator can offer
[109:17] such a profound insight
[109:20] and a new realm of knowledge,
[109:24] applies in a lot of ways.
[109:26] And I think there are a
lot of those operators
[109:29] for why people may think that
any version that they like
[109:34] of the simulation hypothesis
is maybe more likely
[109:36] than they thought before.
[109:38] But for me,
[109:41] the fact that Sora worked
is not in the top five.
[109:46] - I do think broadly speaking,
[109:48] AI will serve as those kinds
[109:50] of gateways at its best simple
psychedelic like gateways
[109:55] to another wave sea reality.
[109:57] - That seems for certain.
[109:59] - That's pretty exciting.
[110:01] I haven't done Ayahuasca before,
[110:03] but I will soon.
[110:04] I'm going to the
aforementioned Amazon jungle
[110:06] in a few weeks.
[110:07] - Excited.
[110:08] - Yeah, I'm excited for it.
[110:09] Not the Ayahuasca part.
[110:10] That's great, whatever.
[110:11] But I'm gonna spend several
weeks in the jungle,
[110:14] deep in the jungle and it's exciting,
[110:17] but it's terrifying-
[110:17] - I'm excited for you.
[110:18] - 'Cause there's a lot of things
[110:19] that can eat you there and
kill you and poison you,
[110:23] but it's also nature and
it's the machine of nature.
[110:25] And you can't help but
appreciate the machinery
[110:27] of nature in the Amazon jungle
[110:29] 'cause it's just like this
system that just exists
[110:33] and renews itself like every second,
[110:36] every minute, every hour.
[110:37] It's the machine.
[110:38] It makes you appreciate like
this thing we have here,
[110:42] this human thing came from somewhere.
[110:44] This evolutionary machine has created that
[110:47] and it's most clearly on
display in the jungle.
[110:52] So hopefully, I'll make it out alive.
[110:54] If not, this will be the
last conversation we had,
[110:56] so I really deeply appreciate it.
[110:58] Do you think, as I mentioned before,
[111:00] there's other aliens,
civilizations out there,
[111:02] intelligent ones
[111:04] when you look up at the skies?
[111:17] - I deeply want to believe
that the answer is yes.
[111:22] I do find that kind of where...
[111:24] I find the firm paradox
very, very puzzling.
[111:28] - I find it scary
[111:30] that intelligence is not good at handling-
[111:33] - Yeah.
[111:34] Very scary, powerful.
- Technologies.
[111:36] But at the same time,
[111:37] I think I'm pretty confident
[111:40] that there's just a very large number
[111:42] of intelligent alien
civilizations out there.
[111:44] It might just be really difficult
[111:45] to travel with this space.
[111:47] - Very possible.
[111:50] - And it also makes me think
[111:51] about the nature of intelligence.
[111:52] Maybe we're really blind
[111:54] to what intelligence looks like
[111:56] and maybe AI will help us see that.
[111:59] It's not as simple as IQ tests
[112:01] and simple puzzle solving.
[112:02] There's something bigger.
[112:06] Well, what gives you hope
about the future of humanity?
[112:09] This thing we've got going on,
[112:10] this human civilization.
[112:13] - I think the past is like a lot.
[112:15] I mean, we just look at
what humanity has done
[112:18] in a not very long period of time.
[112:22] Huge problems, deep flaws,
[112:24] lots to be super ashamed of,
[112:26] but on the whole,
[112:27] very inspiring,
[112:28] gives me a lot of hope.
[112:30] - Just the trajectory of it all
[112:31] that we're together pushing
towards a better future.
[112:37] - It is...
[112:40] One thing that I wonder about is,
[112:43] is AGI gonna be more
like some single brain,
[112:46] or is it more like the sort
of scaffolding in society
[112:49] between all of us?
[112:51] You have not had a great
deal of genetic drift
[112:55] from your great-great-great grandparents,
[112:57] and yet what you're capable
of is dramatically different.
[113:01] What you know is dramatically different.
[113:05] That's not because of biological change.
[113:07] I mean, you got a little
bit healthier probably.
[113:09] You have modern medicine,
[113:10] you eat better, whatever.
[113:13] But what you have is this scaffolding
[113:19] that we all contributed
to built on top of.
[113:23] No one person is gonna
go build the iPhone.
[113:25] No one person is gonna go
discover all of science.
[113:27] And yet you get to use it.
[113:29] And that gives you incredible ability.
[113:31] And so in some sense,
[113:32] that like we all created that
[113:35] and that fills me with
hope for the future.
[113:38] That was a very collective thing.
[113:40] - Yeah.
[113:40] We really are standing on
the shoulders of giants.
[113:43] You mentioned when we were
talking about theatrical,
[113:47] dramatic AI risks
[113:51] that sometimes you might be
afraid for your own life.
[113:55] Do you think about your death?
[113:57] Are you afraid of it?
[113:58] - I mean, I like if I got shot tomorrow
[114:00] and I knew it today,
[114:01] I'd be like, "Oh, that's sad.
[114:04] I wanna see what's gonna happen."
[114:06] - [Lex] Yeah.
[114:07] - What a curious time.
[114:09] What an interesting time.
[114:12] But I would mostly just feel
like very grateful for my life.
[114:15] - The moments that you did get...
[114:18] Yeah, me too.
[114:20] It's a pretty awesome life.
[114:22] I get to enjoy awesome creations of humans
[114:25] of which I believe ChatGPT is one of,
[114:29] and everything that OpenAI is doing.
[114:32] Sam, it's really an honor
[114:34] and pleasure to talk to you again.
[114:35] - Great to talk to you.
[114:36] Thank you for having me.
[114:38] - Thanks for listening
[114:39] to this conversation with Sam Altman.
[114:41] To support this podcast,
[114:42] please check out our
sponsors in the description.
[114:45] And now let me leave you
[114:46] with some words from Arthur C. Clarke
[114:49] and maybe that our role
on this planet is not
[114:52] to worship God,
[114:54] but to create Him.
[114:57] Thank you for listening
[114:58] and hope to see you next time.