Graeber Blames Managerial Feudalism for Surge in Pointless Office Work

On Bullsh*t Jobs | David Graeber | Meaningless Jobs | Royal Society of Arts | Lecture — Royal Society of Arts

Royal Society of Arts

Technological automation failed to shorten the workweek because corporate hierarchies invent administrative make-work to bolster executive status and preserve political control, leaving millions in psychologically damaging roles.

AI-assisted summary of On Bullsh*t Jobs | David Graeber | Meaningless Jobs | Royal Society of Arts | Lecture — original source. Check the original for full context.

Source published:

Key ideas

  • A UK YouGov poll inspired by David Graeber's thesis revealed that 37% of workers believe their jobs make no meaningful contribution to society, with another 13% unsure. (11:52)
  • Technological automation failed to deliver John Maynard Keynes's predicted 15-hour workweek because modern capitalism generated administrative bloat and 'managerial feudalism' rather than distributing leisure. (7:06)
  • Graeber identifies five core categories of bullshit jobs across organizations: flunkies, duct tapers, box tickers, goons, and taskmasters. (38:47)
  • Meaningless employment inflicts severe psychological harm—termed 'spiritual violence'—by stripping individuals of agency and their foundational human need for 'pleasure at being the cause.' (52:16)

Detailed notes

## Background This lecture was published on YouTube by the Royal Society of Arts on May 17, 2018. Hosted by Benedict Dellot of the RSA Future Work Centre, the session features anthropologist and London School of Economics professor David Graeber discussing his book 'Bullshit Jobs: A Theory'. According to the video description, Graeber explores why seemingly pointless jobs have proliferated across modern capitalism, how society has come to value labor as an end in itself, and what happens when human worth is untethered from mere employment.

## TL;DR In this RSA address, David Graeber challenges orthodox economic dogma by examining the widespread proliferation of 'bullshit jobs'—work that practitioners themselves recognize as entirely pointless. Graeber argues that technological productivity should have yielded John Maynard Keynes's predicted 15-hour workweek, but financialized capitalism instead generated a system of 'managerial feudalism' filled with flunkies, duct tapers, and box tickers. He details how modern society moralizes wage labor as a form of secular self-flagellation while systematically underpaying essential caregiving professions. Proposing Universal Basic Income and a paradigm shift from production/consumption to care and freedom, Graeber highlights the profound psychological toll and 'spiritual violence' inflicted when human beings are paid to feign productivity without exercising genuine agency.

## Atmosphere & style The presentation blends sharp intellectual rigor with wry, subversive humor and engaging conversational warmth. Graeber speaks with an irreverent, plainspoken style rooted in his working-class background, drawing frequent laughter from the live audience with absurd real-world workplace anecdotes. Host Benedict Dellot maintains an encouraging, structured rapport that guides the conversation into pressing policy dilemmas, leading into an audience Q&A that feels both intellectually provocative and emotionally resonant as attendees openly confront the quiet absurdities of their own careers.

## Bulletin - [11:52](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kikzjTfos0s&t=712s) A UK YouGov poll inspired by David Graeber's thesis revealed that 37% of workers believe their jobs make no meaningful contribution to society, with another 13% unsure. - [07:06](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kikzjTfos0s&t=426s) Technological automation failed to deliver John Maynard Keynes's predicted 15-hour workweek because modern capitalism generated administrative bloat and 'managerial feudalism' rather than distributing leisure. - [38:47](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kikzjTfos0s&t=2327s) Graeber identifies five core categories of bullshit jobs across organizations: flunkies, duct tapers, box tickers, goons, and taskmasters. - [52:16](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kikzjTfos0s&t=3136s) Meaningless employment inflicts severe psychological harm—termed 'spiritual violence'—by stripping individuals of agency and their foundational human need for 'pleasure at being the cause.'

## Key takeaways - [07:06](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kikzjTfos0s&t=426s) John Maynard Keynes's 1930 prediction of a 15-hour workweek failed to materialize because capitalist economies invented pointless administrative positions rather than redistributing freed-up labor. - [10:01](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kikzjTfos0s&t=601s) Contrary to the consumerism argument, real physical service jobs have remained steady at roughly 20% of the workforce for a century, while administrative and supervisory positions exploded under 'managerial feudalism.' - [14:38](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kikzjTfos0s&t=878s) Society is heavily saturated with 'second-order' bullshit work, where genuine physical labor like cleaning or security is performed solely to maintain institutions that produce nothing of value. - [18:22](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kikzjTfos0s&t=1102s) Modern capitalism has exhausted its core practical defenses—generational mobility, middle-class expansion, and technological leaps—relying instead on moral dogma that treats work as a secular duty. - [19:27](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kikzjTfos0s&t=1167s) Contemporary economic culture embraces a 'moral discount of care,' perversely ensuring that the more directly beneficial a job is to others, the lower its financial compensation. - [23:37](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kikzjTfos0s&t=1417s) Administrative expansion in higher education illustrates how corporate managerial norms manufacture unnecessary layers of flunkies who justify their existence by inventing paperwork for frontline staff. - [29:13](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kikzjTfos0s&t=1753s) Tax cuts given to wealthy 'job creators' fail to generate productive employment, instead encouraging corporate executives to hire personal flunkies to bolster their prestige. - [29:13](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kikzjTfos0s&t=1753s) A four-day workweek poses implementation risks by requiring an intrusive surveillance apparatus, making Universal Basic Income a superior mechanism to eliminate bullshit jobs. - [35:19](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kikzjTfos0s&t=2119s) Polling indicates women are roughly 10% less likely to report having bullshit jobs, often because male executives hold hollow titles while female administrative assistants perform the substantive work. - [38:47](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kikzjTfos0s&t=2327s) Pointless corporate work falls into a five-part typology: flunkies (prestige enhancers), duct tapers (temporary fixers), box tickers (metric fabricators), goons (rivalry operators), and taskmasters (unnecessary managers). - [44:20](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kikzjTfos0s&t=2660s) Universal Basic Income would dismantle vast punitive welfare bureaucracies whose functionaries endure moral anguish administering hostile eligibility criteria to vulnerable citizens. - [48:06](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kikzjTfos0s&t=2886s) Economic theory must shift from the industrial categories of 'production' and 'consumption' toward 'care' and 'freedom,' acknowledging that the working class predominantly performs caring labor. - [49:45](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kikzjTfos0s&t=2985s) Only a tiny minority of workers enjoy pointless jobs; those who do are typically completely unsupervised and entered the position fully aware of its vacuous nature. - [52:16](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kikzjTfos0s&t=3136s) Denying workers meaningful agency constitutes 'spiritual violence,' violating Karl Groos's concept of 'pleasure at being the cause' and fostering workplace depression and toxic interpersonal dynamics.

## Detailed walkthrough ### [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kikzjTfos0s&t=0s) Introduction and Welcome by Benedict Dellot

Benedict Dellot, head of the new RSA Future Work Centre, opens the RSA Thursday lunchtime event by welcoming both the live audience and viewers joining online via Twitter using the hashtag `#RSAwork`. After asking the attendees in the room to switch their mobile phones to silent, he introduces the speaker, David Graeber, professor of anthropology at the London School of Economics. Dellot notes that Graeber is well known for books such as *The Utopia of Rules*, *The Democracy Project*, and his bestselling work *Debt: The First 5,000 Years*, as well as his frequent appearances on the BBC and contributions to publications like *The Guardian*, *Strike! Magazine*, *The Baffler*, and *New Left Review*.

Dellot highlights Graeber’s breakthrough 2013 essay in *Strike!*, titled "On the Phenomenon of Bullshit Jobs," which was read over a million times and translated into 17 languages. This essay formed the basis of his new book, *Bullshit Jobs: A Theory*. Dellot frames Graeber's core thesis: meaningless work has ironically become far more prevalent in modern, profit-making capitalism than in failed communist regimes, and these jobs inflict real psychological damage on the people performing them.

- **Speaker:** David Graeber (Professor of Anthropology, London School of Economics). - **Host:** Benedict Dellot (Head of the RSA Future Work Centre). - **Key publications mentioned:** *Debt: The First 5,000 Years*, *The Utopia of Rules*, *The Democracy Project*, and *Bullshit Jobs: A Theory*. - **Initial essay:** "On the Phenomenon of Bullshit Jobs" (*Strike! Magazine*, 2013), translated into 17 languages with over one million views. - Direct quote: “David's argument is that not only are these jobs uh absurd, they are also incredibly miserable for those who have them.” — Benedict Dellot

[01:49](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kikzjTfos0s&t=109s) The Embarrassment of Meaningless Work and Taking a Publishing Risk

Taking the stage, David Graeber begins by observing that although almost nobody denies the existence of meaningless jobs when the topic is raised, modern society treats the phenomenon as an unspoken, gigantic embarrassment that is rarely acknowledged as an actual social problem. He explains how he stumbled into writing the essay after his book on debt found international success around 2010–2011. Graeber jokes about the definition of an international bestseller, describing how his book briefly hit number two on German Amazon for about three hours.

Graeber reflects on the perverse incentives of intellectual life: when an author produces an idea that captures public interest, institutions conspire to make them deliver that exact same lecture and rehash the identical material for the rest of their career. Deciding not to take the lucrative route of endlessly repeating himself, Graeber made a deliberate choice to use his newfound cultural platform to float ideas that editors would normally reject. When the newly formed *Strike! Magazine* invited him to contribute whatever he wanted for their third issue, he decided to write down a rant he had been venting at parties for over a decade.

- Direct quote: “It's almost as if the world will conspire to make sure you never do that again.” — David Graeber - Direct quote: “I thought, I'm what if I do the opposite? What if I use this as an opportunity to say things I would never normally get to say?” — David Graeber

[04:38](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kikzjTfos0s&t=278s) An Anthropologist from a Working-Class Background

Graeber attributes his sensitivity to meaningless employment to his own background. Unlike many of his academic peers, he grew up in a working-class family where people performed concrete, task-oriented work: his father was an offset photolithographer in printing, and his mother worked in garment factories. Because he feels like a stranger navigating elite institutions, he applies an anthropological lens to the middle-class professional world, leaning on the classic anthropological idea that an outsider can see structural absurdities that native insiders overlook.

At social gatherings, Graeber observed a consistent pattern: professionals would introduce their work with apologies. They admitted they did not merely find their work unfulfilling or morally objectionable, but that they literally did nothing all day. People confessed that their actual duties took perhaps two hours a week, leaving the rest of their working hours dedicated to updating Facebook, creating cat memes, and playing Minesweeper, all while maintaining the appearance of intense activity for their managers. Graeber argues that this workplace reality has transformed modern culture itself: while the 1960s produced demanding, time-intensive cultural forms like half-hour drum solos and endless Beat poetry, the last two decades have been dominated by micro-content (YouTube rants, short memes) engineered specifically to be consumed or created while pretending to work.

```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: The Emergence of Bullshit Jobs Culture accDescr: Diagram showing how technological automation led to bullshit jobs instead of leisure, shaping modern micro-culture.

subgraph MacroEcon["Macroeconomic Divergence"] A["Technological Progress & Automation"] --> B["Keynes's Prediction: 15-Hour Workweek"] A --> C["Reality: Proliferation of Pointless Roles"] end

subgraph Workplace["Daily Office Reality"] C --> D["2 Hours of Actual Task Execution"] C --> E["38 Hours of Feigned Productivity"] end

subgraph Culture["Cultural Shift"] E --> F["Cultural Forms Designed for Concealment<br>(Cat Memes, YouTube Rants, Minesweeper)"] end ```

- Direct quote: “I interrogat[e] them, you discover, no, they're literally doing nothing.” — David Graeber - Direct quote: “So basically like all these people are not really working at their jobs. So So this stuff that's circulating is all things that that they're doing when people think they're working [snorts] or at least they have to be decent enough to make some kind of pretense that they're doing something anyway.” — David Graeber

[07:06](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kikzjTfos0s&t=426s) Keynes's Broken Prediction and the Rise of Feudal Capitalist Roles

Graeber details the core thesis he advanced in the original *Strike!* essay regarding John Maynard Keynes’s famous 1930s forecast. Keynes predicted that technological advances and productivity gains would produce a 15-hour workweek by the turn of the century. While many commentators dismissed Keynes by claiming technological unemployment never materialized and that overall employment rates remained steady, Graeber argues the machines *did* replace the work—only for society to invent entirely useless positions rather than distribute leisure equitably.

Graeber categorizes entire sectors, such as telemarketing and corporate law, as modern equivalents of competing feudal armies: they exist primarily because rivals have them, generating a self-perpetuating dynamic where even the practitioners privately admit the world would be better off without their roles. He connects this to the political economy of financialized capitalism, which focuses less on manufacturing physical goods and more on extracting rent and generating debt. In this structure, elites buy political and social loyalty by placing the structurally unemployed into comfortable, mock-managerial roles. Graeber concludes by pointing out that an inaccurate public narrative prevents society from seeing this dynamic for what it truly is.

- **John Maynard Keynes's 1930 forecast:** Technology should have reduced the workweek to roughly 15 hours. - **Examples of self-serving industries:** Corporate law and telemarketing, which operate like feudal retainers hired to neutralize opposing retainers. - Direct quote: “I would say, you know, the robots have been taking our jobs for the last hundred years or so, but instead of replacing the, you know, instead of redistributing the labor in a reasonable fashion, we've simply made up completely meaningless, pointless jobs, either industries that just have no purpose to exist um other than their own existence, you know.” — David Graeber - Direct quote: “You have a certain amount of unemployed who you make fun of and then you have the structurally unemployed who you give these these meaningless jobs where you're basically buying their loyalty.” — David Graeber

[10:01](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kikzjTfos0s&t=601s) The Myth of Consumerism and the Rise of Managerial Feudalism

David Graeber challenges the standard economic explanation for why society never transitioned to a 15-hour workweek: the idea that people succumbed to consumerism, actively choosing more gadgets, iPhones, and designer sushi over hanging out with friends. This theory collapses under scrutiny because very few workers are actually employed producing sushi or iPhones. When examining the rhetoric of the burgeoning "service economy," real services—defined concretely as cutting hair, serving coffee, or doing laundry—have consistently accounted for roughly 20% of the workforce over the past century, merely shifting away from private household employment.

```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: The Changing Structure of Modern Work accDescr: Diagram illustrating how real service jobs remained flat while administrative and supervisory roles exploded into managerial feudalism.

subgraph S1["Workforce Composition (100-Year Shift)"] A["Real Service Work<br/>(Haircuts, coffee, laundry)"] -->|"Remained steady"| B["~20% of Workforce"] C["Managerial & Supervisory"] -->|"Astronomical explosion"| D["Clerical / Administrative bloat"] end

subgraph S2["Managerial Feudalism"] D --> E["Rank upon rank of new intermediary roles"] E --> F["Workers who complain the most about doing nothing"] end ```

What has grown astronomically instead is the army of clerical, administrative, and supervisory workers. Graeber terms this phenomenon “managerial feudalism” or “managerial subinfeudation”—an intricate hierarchy of endless intermediary roles that never existed in the past. These supervisory layers harbor the workers who complain the loudest about having nothing meaningful to do. Reflecting on George Orwell's early speculation that the ruling class invents work simply to keep the population off the streets, Graeber observes that while nobody planned it conspiratorially, it perfectly suits the interests of those in power.

- The proportion of the workforce engaged in actual physical service has hovered around 20% for over a century. - The explosion in modern employment is almost entirely concentrated in administrative, clerical, and supervisory positions. - Graeber notes that this managerial bloating creates multiple tiers of intermediaries whose jobs lack demonstrable functional utility.

---

[11:52](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kikzjTfos0s&t=712s) Viral Confessions and the YouGov Discovery

When Graeber first published his short essay on bullshit jobs in an obscure magazine, he anticipated little fuss, yet the article triggered an unprecedented global reaction. Within weeks, the piece had been translated into a dozen languages—eventually reaching 21, including Persian, Korean, Estonian, and Portuguese—routinely crashing the publication's website. As major newspapers syndicated the column, the comments sections transformed into emotional confessionals. Corporate lawyers and financial workers admitted to empty, soul-crushing routines; one finance professional reported seeing the article forwarded to his desk twenty separate times in a single day, prompting Graeber to joke about how little work was actually getting done.

```mermaid flowchart LR accTitle: YouGov Survey on Meaningful Work accDescr: Pie-chart style breakdown of the 2015 UK YouGov poll results regarding meaningful work.

subgraph Survey["UK YouGov Poll Results"] direction TB A["37% Certain job makes NO meaningful contribution"] B["13% Unsure if job contributes"] C["50% Confident job has a purpose"] end ```

To test Graeber’s thesis empirically, YouGov conducted a survey using language lifted directly from the article: “Does your job make a meaningful contribution to society?” The results were staggering. A full 37% of British workers were certain their jobs contributed nothing of value, and another 13% were unsure, leaving only 50% who felt confident their work served a purpose. When one excludes occupations whose utility is beyond dispute—such as bus drivers, nurses, and sanitation workers—the mathematical reality is stark: “Anybody who you see sitting there in an office and you're wondering is this person secretly thinking his job doesn't need to exist. The answer is yes. He's almost certainly thinking that.”

- The initial 2013 essay spread rapidly across dozens of countries, including Iran, Brazil, and Egypt. - 37% of respondents in the UK survey stated unequivocally that their work added no value to the world. - Only half of the working population was convinced their daily labor served any genuine function.

---

[14:38](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kikzjTfos0s&t=878s) Second-Order Bullshit and the Research Dossier

Graeber argues that while it is easy for an employee to mistakenly believe their job matters when it does not, it is nearly impossible for someone to conclude their job is pointless and be wrong. Skeptics suggest managers might possess a hidden macro-level rationale that subordinates cannot see, but in practice, no one can produce concrete examples of this. Graeber illustrates the reverse through an employee at a travel magazine who spent six months writing copy and formatting photo spreads before discovering the magazine was merely a fraudulent tax write-off that was never printed or distributed.

Furthermore, society is saturated with "second-order" bullshit work: genuine, necessary labor performed purely to sustain fundamentally useless institutions. When an entire office is dedicated to financial speculation or corporate tax evasion, the cleaners, security staff, receptionists, and plant-waterers are performing real physical work, yet the ultimate end product is a zero:

> “So, you know, I started thinking, my god, like, you know, for all I know, half the work being done in our society is completely unnecessary. That if they got rid of it, it would make no difference whatsoever.”

To document this phenomenon systematically, Graeber put out a call on Twitter inviting people whose jobs could vanish without harming the world to write to a dedicated Gmail account (`doihaveabsjoborwhat@gmail.com`). He received hundreds of extensive replies, ranging from brief notes to 13-page sociological dissertations composed on company time. Graeber compiled these testimonies into a massive document, color-coding the text—using green for what employees did while pretending to work, and orange for whether their supervisors noticed—which formed the empirical bedrock of his book.

---

[18:22](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kikzjTfos0s&t=1102s) The Collapse of the Capitalist Moral Defense

Reflecting on the deeper political implications of his findings, Graeber—speaking from his background as an anti-capitalist anarchist involved in direct action movements—argues that modern capitalism is no longer sustained by practical successes, but by moral dogma. Over the past fifty years, the system justified itself through three core promises, all of which have broken down:

| Traditional Capitalist Promise | Contemporary Economic Reality | |:--- |:--- | | **Rising Tide / Generational Mobility** | Stagnant living standards; parents know their children will be worse off. | | **Broad Middle Class** | Vanishing middle class and escalating political and social instability. | | **Technological Transformation** | Sci-fi breakthroughs stalled; innovation reduced to incremental gadget updates (e.g., iPhone 7 to iPhone 8). |

Because these material promises have evaporated, the economic order relies heavily on the moralization of labor itself—the puritanical idea that work is an absolute moral duty and an end in its own right, regardless of whether the tasks performed serve any human purpose.

[19:27](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kikzjTfos0s&t=1167s) The Moral Defense of Capitalism: Debt, Suffering, and the Hair Shirt of Work

Concluding the lecture portion of his address, David Graeber argues that capitalism has lost its traditional justifications—such as generating rapid technological progress or broad-based material abundance—leaving defenders with only two core rationalizations. The first is raw political fatalism: the claim that any alternative would inevitably end in tyranny, framed simply as “well anything else would be worse. You know it's us or North Korea basically.” The second, and far more pervasive, pillar is a moral one centered on debt and labor. Ordinary people have been conditioned to believe that failing to pay a debt makes someone fundamentally immoral. As Graeber notes with dry humor, this moral stain applies exclusively to the non-wealthy: an ordinary debtor is condemned as a deadbeat, whereas someone like Donald Trump can declare bankruptcy multiple times and be elected president. Citing the economist Michael Hudson, Graeber observes that around thirty years ago, the financial elite discovered that poor people possess a genuine moral compulsion to pay their debts—a conviction the wealthy themselves do not share. Graeber contrasts this with his own career choices; despite the administrative burdens of academia, he stays in university life rather than writing fiction or freelance articles full-time because universities, unlike artistic clients, never conveniently “forget” to pay their monthly invoices.

Beyond debt, Graeber targets the modern moral ideology surrounding labor, which treats work as a form of secular self-flagellation. Society has embraced the conviction that unless an individual is toiling longer than they desire at a task they dislike, under the thumb of an unpleasant manager, they are morally deficient and undeserving of social support, empathy, or relief. Work has been transformed into a secular hair shirt whose moral worth is actively diminished if the worker extracts any personal enjoyment or social meaning from it. This logic yields the perverse social reality where the more directly beneficial a job is to other human beings—such as nursing or teaching—the less it tends to pay. Society rationalizes this under the pretext that paying teachers well would merely attract greedy individuals. This ethos of mandatory workplace suffering serves as the mirror image of modern consumer culture: enduring daily misery at work is seen as the prerequisite that morally entitles individuals to fleeting consumer indulgences. Consequently, when austerity strikes, society accepts that nurses, transit workers, and public servants must bear the cuts while the financial architects of economic collapse are shielded.

- **Michael Hudson’s insight**: Financial elites built modern financialized extraction around the realization that working-class people hold a genuine moral obligation to honor debts. - **The moral discount of care**: Under the prevailing moral calculus of labor, any intrinsic satisfaction—including the awareness of directly helping others—is treated as offsetting financial compensation, justifying lower wages for essential caregivers and public servants.

[23:37](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kikzjTfos0s&t=1417s) Administrative Bloat and the Myth of Digital Assembly Lines

Following applause, the session transitions into a seated question-and-answer discussion. The RSA moderator begins by asking Graeber to address the critique published by *The Economist* just days after his initial 2013 essay, "On the Phenomenon of Bullshit Jobs." *The Economist* had argued that seemingly pointless corporate roles are simply the digital equivalent of 19th-century assembly-line labor: highly specialized, fragmented tasks coordinating vast global supply chains, containerized shipping, and just-in-time manufacturing. In this view, office workers feel alienated not because their jobs are pointless, but because they are merely small cogs who cannot see the wider machinery that generates modern prosperity.

Graeber firmly rejects this interpretation, using the institutional evolution of higher education to expose its flaws. While industrial supply chains have grown logistically complex, university teaching remains fundamentally unchanged: professors still deliver lectures, lead seminars, assign readings, and grade student papers—merely substituting blackboards with PowerPoint slides and Moodle portals. Yet, administrative headcount has ballooned exponentially compared to the number of teachers and students. Instead of functioning as labor-saving coordinators who free scholars to think and teach, these administrative ranks create a self-justifying bureaucracy that invents endless paperwork, such as mandatory time-allocation studies, forcing academics to waste their working hours cataloging how they spend their time. Graeber argues that this explosion stems from replacing the historic guild model of academia with corporate managerialism, where status is defined by the number of subordinates one commands. As Graeber puts it: “in the corporate world it's just assumed that you know you need to have five or six flunkies or you're not a really important person.” Newly appointed deans and vice-provosts are assigned cadres of administrative assistants who, having no intrinsic function, manufacture new administrative chores for the teaching staff.

```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: The Cycle of Managerialism and Administrative Bloat accDescr: Diagram illustrating how corporate managerial norms generate administrative bloat and burden frontline workers with fabricated tasks.

subgraph CorporateNorms["Managerial Prestige Model"] A["Managerial Prestige Culture:<br/>Status requires subordinates"] --> B["Hiring of Deans, Vice-Provosts<br/>& Mid-level Managers"] B --> C["Managers Assigned<br/>Flunkies & Minions"] end

subgraph TaskCreation["Bureaucratic Fabrication"] C --> D["Need to Justify Existence:<br/>Inventing procedures & surveys"] D --> E["Time-Allocation Studies &<br/>Administrative Burdens"] end

subgraph FrontlineImpact["Academic / Operational Core"] E --> F["Frontline Teaching & Research Staff<br/>Overwhelmed with Admin"] end ```

- **U.S. Higher Education Headcount Shifts (approx. 30-year span)**: - Faculty and teaching staff: increased by ~50% - Student enrollment: increased by slightly over 50% - Senior administrators: increased by 85% - Administrative and managerial staff: increased by 240% - **Institutional disparity**: The administrative surge has occurred far more aggressively within private universities than within public institutions.

[28:21](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kikzjTfos0s&t=1701s) Seeking Near-Term Interventions Beyond Universal Basic Income

The moderator turns the discussion toward remedies, noting that the concluding chapter of Graeber's book advocates for Universal Basic Income (UBI) as a primary policy lever to dismantle bullshit jobs. The host observes that while the Royal Society of Arts also supports UBI, building the requisite political consensus and legislative infrastructure for full implementation will inevitably take considerable time. He asks Graeber what immediate, second-tier interventions could be pursued in the here and now to curb the proliferation of pointless work. Graeber begins his reply by pointing out that the systemic surge in meaningless employment is fundamentally intertwined with the mechanics of supply-side economics, recounting a conversation that gave him sudden clarity on the underlying economic drivers.

“And the reason why I asked that is because UBI for all of its merits is something which it will take time for it to become politically palatable. It will take time for it to be implemented. So what can we do in the here and now?” — RSA Moderator

[29:13](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kikzjTfos0s&t=1753s) The "Job Creator" Myth, Bureaucratic Flunkies, and the Four-Day Workweek

David Graeber turns the conventional rhetoric around tax cuts on its head. In the United States, wealthy individuals have been politically rebranded as “job creators.” Graeber points out that the political left and right share an unexamined dogma: they both agree that creating more jobs is inherently good, disagreeing only on how to create them, while completely ignoring whether those jobs produce anything of real value. When manufacturers and employers are asked whether impending tax cuts will prompt them to hire more workers, virtually none raise their hands.

Giving money to poor or middle-class people directly stimulates demand for tangible goods and services—such as food, shoes, or even swimming pools—which in turn creates real employment. By contrast, handing windfalls to the rich does not generate demand for products they cannot sell. If wealthy executives face social or political pressure to create jobs with their extra capital, they respond by hiring flunkies to bolster their personal prestige: “about half of the people who work as civil servants now are basically in, you know, bureaucrats are basically there to make poor people feel bad about themselves. And in the same way, about half the bureaucrats in private companies are there to make rich people feel good about themselves.” Executive status and pay are tied directly to the headcount beneath them, creating an incentive to build corporate empires staffed by functionaries whose main task is making their bosses feel important.

```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: The Mechanics of Economic Stimulus and Job Creation accDescr: Diagram contrasting how capital given to the working class produces real demand versus how tax cuts to the rich generate bullshit jobs.

subgraph WorkingClass["Direct Capital to Poor & Middle Class"] A["Cash to Ordinary People"] --> B["Demand for Essentials & Consumer Goods<br>(Food, Shoes, Swimming Pools)"] B --> C["Real Productive Employment"] end

subgraph CorporateWealthy["Tax Cuts Handed to the Rich"] D["Tax Cuts to 'Job Creators'"] --> E["No Consumer Demand for New Goods"] E --> F["Executives Seek Status & Empire-Building"] F --> G["Proliferation of Flunkies & Bureaucrats<br>(Bullshit Jobs)"] end ```

When asked whether a four-day working week could solve this crisis, Graeber expresses ambivalence. While he supports working less, he laments the moralized cult of work where one cannot advocate for time off simply because it would be enjoyable; instead, it must always be justified by an ulterior economic motive, such as reducing unemployment. More critically, Graeber fears enforcement would require an oppressive new surveillance apparatus. In an era of casualized, contract, and salaried labor—where workers like university professors are paid monthly and expected to be available constantly—capping hours cannot simply be achieved by turning a 9-to-5 into a 9-to-3. He warns that policing non-standard work hours would spawn a massive regulatory bureaucracy composed of the very bullshit jobs it aims to eliminate: “I think that that it might compound the problem in that way just to figure out how to enforce it. I mean if you can think of maybe there are ways to enforce it I don't know about I I'd be very interested in hearing and discussing it but I'm suspicious and that's why I think basic income would do the same thing better.”

[33:29](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kikzjTfos0s&t=2009s) Audience Straw Poll and the Opening Q&A Batch

The session moderator opens the floor to the audience but first conducts an impromptu straw poll, asking attendees to raise their hands if they have ever worked, or are currently working, in a bullshit job and are willing to admit it. The overwhelming response prompts surprise and laughter from the stage, leading the moderator to joke toward the venue's own staff: “Any RSA staff? You're fired.”

The moderator collects an initial round of three questions from the audience: - **Louise Parry** asks whether survey data or email correspondence revealed a gender difference, wondering if women might be less likely to admit to having a bullshit job because men are more tightly wedded to their occupational identities. - **An audience member** asks whether a mechanism like zero-based budgeting could be applied to employment—essentially terminating all roles on December 31st and deciding on January 1st which jobs are genuine and how many people are actually required to do them. - **Another audience member** notes that beyond the obvious roles, she would like more concrete examples of what kinds of work David Graeber classifies as bullshit jobs.

[35:19](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kikzjTfos0s&t=2119s) Gender Dynamics, Administrative Realities, and Bank Box-Ticking

Graeber tackles the question of gender first, highlighting that polling data showed a clear 10 percent gap: women were significantly less likely to report having bullshit jobs. Graeber argues this reflects reality rather than self-reporting bias: “women are much less likely to have jobs actually. Uh which is interesting because a lot of people when they first hear the concept, especially men obviously, assume that they're mainly talking about women's jobs.” While critics often assume made-up office positions are female-dominated secretarial roles, the power dynamics of traditional offices frequently disguise the truth. In many offices, a male manager occupies a hollow title while an administrative assistant does the substantive labor. To illustrate, Graeber recounts the story of an anthropology graduate who went to Afghanistan to study belly dancing, ended up as an administrative assistant, and wound up synthesizing five contradictory military blueprints into the official NATO withdrawal plan because her superiors dumped the work on her desk.

Addressing the proposal of zero-based budgeting or "flushing out" useless jobs, Graeber points out that management already subjects blue-collar and wage workers to brutal Taylorism, extreme efficiency pressures, and speedups without any fat to trim: - Workers at delivery firms like UPS endure relentless optimization where every second is tracked and measured. - At the very same companies, senior managers simultaneously hire flunkies to sit in offices doing nothing simply to project authority.

Graeber notes that corporations actively resist trimming managerial bloat. He shares the testimony of an efficiency and bank security expert whose career captures this structural resistance: “He says, you know, I I don't have a job. I identify other people's jobs, but then I realize I do have a job because they never actually act on any of my suggestions. I'm a box sticker. I'm here to like make it seem like they're doing something they're not actually doing.” For fifteen years, this specialist wrote proposals to automate tasks and eliminate redundant administrative headcount, only for department heads to systematically block every recommendation because automated efficiency would shrink the size of their managerial empires.

Turning to the audience member's request for examples, Graeber begins to reflect on the submissions he received, noting a striking absence of complaints from frontline service workers. Rather than looking down on client needs or viewing service tasks as pointless, workers reserve the bullshit label for administrative and bureaucratic layers.

[38:47](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kikzjTfos0s&t=2327s) A Typology of Bullshit Jobs: Flunkies, Duct Tapers, Box Tickers, Goons, and Taskmasters

David Graeber clarifies that people doing difficult service work—such as baristas serving coffee—might dislike the customers they interact with, but they do not view their own labor as useless. Rather, the perception of meaninglessness thrives in clerical and administrative environments where employees simply have no meaningful assignments. Drawing from the testimonies he collected, Graeber breaks these down into a five-part typology of bullshit jobs. The first category is "flunkies," whose purpose is merely to make someone else feel or look important. A prime example is a receptionist hired at a small publishing company receiving only two calls a day; while the existing staff could easily answer the phone, the firm hires a full-time receptionist because, as Graeber notes, without one, “you're not a real company.”

```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Typology of Bullshit Jobs accDescr: Graeber's five categories of meaningless employment in modern organizations. subgraph Typology["The Five Typologies of Bullshit Jobs"] F["<b>Flunkies</b><br>Hired to make superiors or firms look important (e.g., redundant receptionists)"] D["<b>Duct Tapers</b><br>Hired to manage crises caused by system defects instead of fixing the root problem"] B["<b>Box Tickers</b><br>Create paper trails and surveys to create the illusion of organizational action"] G["<b>Goons</b><br>Aggressive roles that exist only because institutional rivals employ them"] T["<b>Taskmasters</b><br>Supervise workers who do not require oversight and invent busywork"] end ```

The second group is "duct tapers," workers employed to clean up damage from structural defects rather than fixing the defect itself. Graeber shares an anecdote from his time teaching at Goldsmiths, University of London, when the shelves in his office collapsed. It took ages for a carpenter to arrive, only for Graeber to discover that the university employed just one carpenter on staff, alongside another man whose entire full-time job was to apologize for the carpenter being too busy to show up. To audience laughter, Graeber quips that management could have simply fired the apologizer and hired a second carpenter, comparing the dynamic to placing a bucket beneath a leaky ceiling and paying someone to empty it every hour. The third category, "box tickers," perform administrative rituals to give the illusion of institutional action. One testimony came from an employee in the entertainment department of a care home who spent her days administering elaborate surveys, entering data, and assembling matching colored binders documenting what activities the residents wanted—leaving her with no actual time to entertain anyone.

The final two categories reflect competitive escalation and managerial excess. "Goons" operate in industries that workers themselves believe should not exist, but persist because competitor organizations employ them—such as public relations, corporate marketing, and telemarketing. As Graeber remarks, “I never ran into a single telemarketer who didn't think their job shouldn't exist, you know.” Lastly, "taskmasters" are unnecessary supervisors. Typically, these are skilled practitioners promoted into middle management who realize the personnel beneath them can perform the work without oversight. Trapped in a dilemma where they are forbidden from taking on front-line tasks themselves, taskmasters often hesitate to manufacture arbitrary performance indicators and targets because they know that imposing box-ticking rituals will actively distract their staff and degrade actual output.

- **Flunkies**: Receptionists, door attendants, and assistants whose real role is organizational prestige. - **Duct Tapers**: Employees patching over fixable institutional faults (e.g., full-time apologizers instead of maintenance staff). - **Box Tickers**: Staff compiling compliance reports, surveys, and metrics that go unread while preventing actual service delivery. - **Goons**: Aggressive or promotional roles (e.g., corporate PR, commercial telemarketing) driven by competitive arms races. - **Taskmasters**: Managers overseeing self-sufficient teams who must invent busywork to justify their own positions.

---

[42:45](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kikzjTfos0s&t=2565s) Audience Questions: Quantifying Waste, Universal Basic Income, and Valuing Real Work

The RSA session opens to a round of audience questions examining the financial, political, and social implications of Graeber’s thesis. The first questioner asks whether Graeber has quantified the aggregate financial cost of bullshit jobs across society. If companies are already paying billions for useless work, the questioner suggests, those private overhead expenditures could potentially answer the standard objection that Universal Basic Income (UBI) is unaffordable: rather than raising taxes, society could redirect the money corporations and governments already spend paying people to do nothing. Graeber responds with enthusiasm, noting that the government sector likewise spends vast sums on redundant administrative roles that could be dismantled.

Laura Partridge follows with a question on social status and the division of labor. She notes that high-status, highly compensated roles like corporate lawyers often involve significant bullshit elements, whereas critically necessary, non-bullshit jobs—such as nursing and primary teaching—are consistently undervalued. She asks how society can elevate and preserve the social standing of authentic caregiving and educational labor. A third audience member follows up on the economic accounting side, asking how eliminating bullshit jobs would affect Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Because unnecessary jobs are counted in GDP at the cost of their compensation, the questioner asks whether instituting basic income to stop this wasteful overhead would trigger a measurable shift in standard macroeconomic indicators.

---

[44:20](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kikzjTfos0s&t=2660s) Bureaucracy, Basic Income, and Redefining Economic Value as Caring Labor

Addressing the questions, Graeber agrees that a basic income would dismantle huge swaths of coercive state bureaucracy. Under current welfare regimes, public administrators are forced into adversarial roles where they cannot act humanely; Graeber highlights bureaucrats whose daily assignment is demanding three forms of identification from unhoused individuals before turning them out into the cold. These employees often hate their jobs and suffer severe moral anguish, but face disciplinary action if they attempt to act ethically. With an unconditional basic income, Graeber argues, these workers could leave harmful roles behind to form klezmer bands or restore antique furniture, leaving both themselves and the public far happier.

Turning to GDP, Graeber argues that prevailing economic indicators are completely untethered from reality: “Almost everything about these indicators is just fantastical and has no relation to actual value.” The market efficiency narrative celebrated by orthodox economics is largely a myth. To resolve this, society must abandon the traditional dichotomy between "production" and "consumption." Most necessary human labor does not involve manufacturing physical artifacts from scratch, but rather sustaining and caring for the world: “First of all, most work doesn't produce anything. You know, I say always say this, it's like um uh you you make a cup once, right? But you wash it a thousand times.”

Graeber illustrates this point by recalling an intervention he made during a London Underground strike, when certain orthodox Marxists dismissed tube staff because ticket sellers do not produce surplus value for capital and would be obsolete in a ticket-free communist society. Tube office staff responded by cataloging what their working hours actually consist of: locating lost children, managing medical emergencies, de-escalating conflicts with disruptive individuals, and safeguarding lost personal property. Graeber stresses that even classic urban transport roles are fundamentally caregiving labor—akin to nursing or tasks historically categorized and devalued as "women's work"—aimed at maintaining human safety and continuity rather than producing commodities.

[48:06](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kikzjTfos0s&t=2886s) The Caring Classes and Redefining Value

David Graeber addresses a question regarding how society can raise the social status of genuinely worthwhile work. He argues that we must examine the tacit theories of value people hold in their minds, which clearly depart from market logic: workers recognize that being paid handsomely to perform a role does not make the work socially valuable. Graeber contends that all value-producing labor is fundamentally an extension of care: “I mean all value producing labor is an extension of care.” Even infrastructure work like bridge building exists because someone cares that people can safely cross a river. He suggests that society should return to what has historically been coded as women's work as the paradigm for value-producing labor, noting that modern unrest often stems from a "revolt of the caring classes." With the historical decline of factory dominance, it has become apparent that the proletariat has always predominantly performed caring labor—such as transport workers on the London Underground—and political organizing should coalesce around this reality.

To transform how society values labor, Graeber proposes replacing the foundational economic categories of "production" and "consumption" with "care" and "freedom." Care work is defined as labor that maintains and expands the freedom of others, with play serving as the ultimate paradigm of freedom because play is activity undertaken for its own sake. Caring for children, for example, aims to enable them to play. Shifting our conceptual vocabulary away from market output and consumption toward care and freedom allows society to properly recognize and elevate meaningful labor.

```mermaid flowchart LR accTitle: Paradigm Shift from Market Economy to Caring Economy accDescr: Flowchart contrasting market concepts of production and consumption with Graeber's model of care and freedom.

subgraph StandardModel["Market Model"] P["Production"] --> C["Consumption"] end

subgraph CareModel["Human Value Model"] CR["Care<br>(Preserves & Enhances)"] --> F["Freedom<br>(Exemplified by Play)"] end ```

[49:45](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kikzjTfos0s&t=2985s) The Rare Workers Who Enjoy Pointless Jobs

As the session nears its conclusion, the moderator takes two final questions from the audience. A female attendee asks about the psychological health impact on individuals trapped in bullshit jobs who must endure the cognitive strain of "living a lie" every day. Immediately following, audience member Steve Soden asks whether Graeber’s research uncovered people who actually enjoy their pointless positions, pointing out that corporate environments often seem full of happy people receiving a steady paycheck, enjoying a social construct, and casually passing time without demanding oversight.

Graeber responds first to Soden's question about contented workers. He cites research from the Netherlands indicating that approximately 6% of workers acknowledge their jobs lack social value yet still find personal fulfillment in them. In some cases, he jokes, these workers simply prefer the office because they dislike their families, or they enjoy picking up casual skills. However, the rare individuals who wrote in expressing genuine happiness in useless roles shared two distinct characteristics: they knew exactly what they were getting into from the outset (such as substitute teaching or certain French civil service postings), and they were relatively unsupervised. Under these conditions, an individual can treat the role as empty time and repurpose it for autonomous pursuits, such as learning Chinese or becoming an artist. Graeber emphasizes, however, that while economists assume most people would gladly take money for nothing, these happy cases represent a tiny minority.

- Dutch survey data indicates only about 6% of people in pointless roles report being personally fulfilled by them. - Contented workers in meaningless roles typically experience zero supervision and entered the job with open eyes.

[52:16](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kikzjTfos0s&t=3136s) "Pleasure at Being the Cause" and Spiritual Violence

Graeber turns to the psychological toll of meaningless work, challenging the orthodox economic view of human nature. Mainstream economics treats humans as effort-minimizing, reward-maximizing calculators who should naturally rejoice when paid to do nothing. Yet empirical testimonies reveal profound suffering: “The astounding thing is just how miserable so many people are and the misery is compounded by the that they don't feel justified in being miserable for that very reason.” Workers feel they have no right to complain, anticipating that peers would scoff at their misery over getting paid to do nothing, which induces guilt and isolation.

To explain this psychological distress, Graeber draws on the work of German psychologist Karl Groos and the concept of "the pleasure at being the cause." Infants first experience self-awareness and agency when they realize they can cause predictable external outcomes—such as knocking a pencil and watching it roll. Groos identified this delight in intentional cause-and-effect as the core foundation of human autonomy. When psychological experiments artificially strip this agency away immediately after a child discovers it, the child displays extreme distress, curling up or becoming catatonic. Graeber identifies the systematic withholding of meaningful agency as a form of "spiritual violence":

> “The spiritual violence is when you take that away.”

In modern society, where personal identity is intertwined with answering "what do you do?", denying an individual any tangible social contribution effectively erodes their sense of self. A bullshit job functionally mimics clinical depression by enforcing artificial purposelessness, which Graeber links to rising rates of workplace depression, stress, and toxic social dynamics.

[55:04](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kikzjTfos0s&t=3304s) Toxic Dynamics, "Hannibal," and Concluding Remarks

To illustrate the psychological contrast between purposeful and pointless work, Graeber recounts the testimony of an informant he calls "Hannibal." Hannibal divides his working life between two distinct activities: - For most of the week, Hannibal works with a volunteer team developing diagnostic technology for tuberculosis (TB)—critical, life-saving labor for which funding is nearly impossible to secure. - For one or two days a week, Hannibal writes pharmaceutical business and marketing strategy reports, earning around £10,000 per document—reports intended solely for pharmaceutical executives to brandish at one another and that go largely unread.

Hannibal observed that on the TB diagnostic project, where everybody understands the value of their labor, team members treat one another with genuine camaraderie, mutual respect, and cooperation. Conversely, within the corporate marketing sphere, despite high compensation, participants subject one another to abusive rituals, sadistic deadline panic, and constant screaming. Graeber observes that when workers know their output has zero real-world consequence, anxiety and interpersonal cruelty paradoxically escalate as people frantically try to justify their roles.

The moderator closes the event by thanking David Graeber. The host remarks that the book offers a breath of fresh air in discussions about the future of work: while conventional debates obsess over automation wiping out jobs, Graeber’s work highlights the more pressing reality that economies will likely keep producing an abundance of positions—they will simply be pointless unless society actively reorganizes its relationship to work. The session concludes with warm applause from the RSA audience.

## Notable quotes > [48:06](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kikzjTfos0s&t=2886s) all value producing labor is an extension of care. — David Graeber

> [23:37](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kikzjTfos0s&t=1417s) in the corporate world it's just assumed that you know you need to have five or six flunkies or you're not a really important person. — David Graeber

## Mentioned David Graeber, Benedict Dellot, Royal Society of Arts, RSA Future Work Centre, London School of Economics, The Utopia of Rules, The Democracy Project, Debt: The First 5,000 Years, Bullshit Jobs: A Theory, Strike! Magazine, John Maynard Keynes, George Orwell, YouGov, Michael Hudson, The Economist, Donald Trump, Louise Parry, Laura Partridge, Steve Soden, Karl Groos, UPS, NATO, London Underground, Goldsmiths, University of London

## Video description Why do so many people spend their working lives doing jobs they believe are pointless?

Anthropologist and bestselling author David Graeber explores the phenomenon of “bullshit jobs” work that even the people doing it may believe is unnecessary or meaningless.

Following the huge response to his 2013 essay On the Phenomenon of Bullshit Jobs, Graeber joined the RSA to examine why seemingly pointless jobs have proliferated, what this tells us about the modern economy, and how society has come to value work as an end in itself.

He explores our relationship with work, productivity and capitalism, and asks what would happen if we stopped measuring people's value by how much they work.

Speaker: David Graeber, anthropologist, author and Professor at the London School of Economics

Explore more from the Royal Society of Arts Discover our latest ideas, events and work: https://www.thersa.org/

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For commercial licensing enquiries relating to any RSA films please email our licensing partners London Screen Archives at screenheritage@filmlondon.org.uk

[Source](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kikzjTfos0s)

中文简报

格雷伯指责管理封建主义导致无意义办公室工作激增 技术自动化未能缩短每周工作时间,因为企业科层体制虚构出行政无用功以提升高管地位并维持政治控制,导致数百万人深陷损害心理健康的角色之中。 在皇家文艺学会(RSA)的本次演讲中,大卫·格雷伯(David Graeber)通过审视“狗屁工作”(从业者自身也认为毫无意义的工作)的大量滋生,对传统经济学教条提出了质疑。格雷伯认为,技术生产力本应带来约翰·梅纳德·凯恩斯(John Maynard Keynes)所预言的每周15小时工作制,但金融化资本主义却催生了一套充斥着家丁、补漏者和填表者的“管理封建主义”体系。他详细阐述了现代社会如何将雇佣劳动道德化为一种世俗的自戕修行,同时系统性地低估必要照料行业的薪酬。格雷伯倡导推行全民基本收入,并推动范式从生产与消费转向照料与自由,强调当人类受雇假装高效却无法行使真正能动性时,所遭受的深重心理折磨与“精神暴力”。 受大卫·格雷伯观点启发而展开的一项英国YouGov民调显示,37%的劳动者认为自己的工作对社会毫无意义贡献,另有13%表示不确定。 (11:52) 技术自动化未能兑现约翰·梅纳德·凯恩斯预言的每周15小时工作制,因为现代资本主义带来的是行政膨胀与“管理封建主义”,而非分配闲暇。 (7:06) 格雷伯指出了遍布各类组织的五大类狗屁工作:家丁、补漏者、填表者、打手以及工头。 (38:47) 毫无意义的雇佣劳动剥夺了个体的能动性以及作为“因”而产生满足感这一人类根本需求,从而造成严重的心理创伤——即所谓的“精神暴力”。 (52:16)

Source quotes

[48:06] David Graeber: all value producing labor is an extension of care. [23:37] David Graeber: in the corporate world it's just assumed that you know you need to have five or six flunkies or you're not a really important person.

Original transcript

[0:00] Uh my name is Benedict Delot. I'm the [0:02] head of the new RSA future work center [0:04] and I'm delighted to welcome you all [0:06] here today for the RSA Thursday [0:08] lunchtime event. Before we begin, could [0:11] I ask you to turn your mobiles to [0:13] silent? We're filming and live streaming [0:15] today as always. So a very big welcome [0:18] to all of you who are joining us on [0:19] Twitter. The hashtag for the event is [0:22] RSA work. Um please do join the [0:24] discussion even if you're in the room. [0:26] Um, and I'm absolutely delighted to [0:28] welcome today's speaker, David Greyber. [0:30] David needs very little introduction, so [0:32] I'll keep this brief. David is a [0:34] professor of anthropology at the LSC. [0:37] His many books include The Utopia of [0:39] Rules, The Democracy Project, and the [0:42] bestselling Debt: The First 5,000 Years. [0:45] A frequent guest on the BBC, um, he [0:47] writes for, among others, The Guardian, [0:49] Strike, The Baffler, and New Left [0:52] Review. His strike essay on the [0:54] phenomenon of jobs which was [0:56] published in 2013 touched such a nerve [0:59] that was read over a million times and [1:01] translated into 17 different languages. [1:04] Um his new book jobs a theory [1:08] expands on this concept and it outlines [1:10] how rather ironically meaningless work [1:13] has become more associated with [1:16] latter-day capitalism profit-making [1:18] capitalism than it has with failed [1:20] communist states. [1:22] David's argument is that not only are [1:25] these jobs uh absurd, they are also [1:27] incredibly miserable for those who have [1:29] them. And we'll be looking closely at [1:31] David's theory as part of our new future [1:33] work center. So without further ado, [1:35] please give a very warm welcome to [1:37] David. [1:39] [applause] [1:49] All right. Well, thanks so much uh for [1:52] that introduction. Um, I guess I've [1:54] already talked a little bit about this [1:56] very subject here before, but [1:59] we really can't talk about it enough [2:02] because it's it's it's a strange thing [2:05] that [2:08] this is not considered a social problem. [2:10] And I I've spent some years one reason I [2:12] wrote this book is because [2:16] it's [2:17] there seems to be this peculiar way in [2:20] which if you mention this to people you [2:22] know almost no one will deny it but at [2:25] the same time [2:27] it is no one quite knows what to do with [2:30] it. It's like this gigantic [2:31] embarrassment in our society. I thought [2:34] I would I would start by talking a [2:36] little bit about how I kind of got on to [2:38] this topic to begin with. [2:40] Um, [snorts] [2:41] some years ago, back in 2000, 2011, [2:46] 2010, I wrote a book on debt and that [2:49] book did fairly well. It wasn't actually [2:50] a bestseller, but um I guess [2:54] internationally it did pretty well. Um, [2:58] as I said, it's an international [2:59] bestseller, which means I think it was [3:01] like it was number two on German Amazon [3:03] for about three hours, [3:06] [laughter] [3:06] so it counts. Uh but you know the book [3:09] did fairly well and um there's a funny [3:13] thing where if you say something that a [3:16] number of people consider interesting, [3:18] new sort of unusual u and you show you [3:22] have a capacity to do that. It's almost [3:25] as if the world will conspire to make [3:27] sure you never do that again. Uh they [3:29] will try to make you give the same talk, [3:31] write the same book, do essays based on [3:34] you for the rest of your life. In fact, [3:35] that's what you really get paid for, not [3:37] the original book, but going out and [3:38] lecturing about it. And um one reason [3:40] I'm often not particularly rich is [3:43] because I decided I wasn't going to do [3:45] that. I thought, I'm what if I do the [3:47] opposite? What if I use this as an [3:49] opportunity to say things I would never [3:52] normally get to say? I thought of all [3:54] those ideas I had for articles that were [3:56] always rejected or I didn't even think [3:59] to send to people because I knew they [4:01] would be. I thought maybe I can cash in, [4:04] you know. Um, so anytime somebody said, [4:06] "Oh, we really want you to write [4:07] something for our new periodical." And I [4:08] would say, "What about?" And they'd say, [4:10] "Anything?" I would say, "Really? [4:13] Anything?" [laughter] Okay. So, I'd get [4:16] out, you know, some piece that was a [4:18] drunken party rant I'd been going on [4:20] about for 10 years and no one would [4:21] conceivably publish. and and and it [4:23] would put that there and some of them, [4:25] you know, did what you kind of think [4:27] they would do, but some of them kind of [4:29] took off and and and this one was just [4:32] not like anything I'd ever seen. It was [4:38] I say how I got on to it. I consider [4:41] myself something of an anthropologist [4:43] even in the world of anthropologist [4:45] because I I don't really come from that [4:46] kind of background. That is to say the [4:49] academic millu. I I was brought up in a [4:52] workingclass family and among people who [4:55] actually did stuff and um you know uh [4:59] task orientation was a big thing. Um and [5:03] my father was a worked in printing was a [5:05] offset photoithography. My mother worked [5:07] in garment factories for a lot of her [5:09] life. So, so I'm kind of a stranger in [5:12] the world uh the worlds which I [5:14] traverse. And as a result, I mean the [5:18] whole idea of anthropology is that [5:20] strangers have a certain insight that [5:22] natives don't. Uh [clears throat] [5:25] so one thing I kept noticing was this [5:28] strange phenomena of people who are [5:30] apologetic of what they do for a living. [5:33] Not just because they thought it was [5:34] evil. Some of them do. Uh but but just [5:37] because they don't actually do anything. [5:39] you uh you you you run into people at [5:41] parties and you say, "Well, you know, [5:43] I'm an anthropologist." And they think [5:44] that's interesting. And say, "What do [5:45] you do?" And they say, "Oh, nothing [5:47] really, [5:48] and you think they're just being modest, [5:50] right?" But but [laughter] [5:52] you interrogate them, you discover, no, [5:54] they're literally doing nothing. [5:56] [snorts] [5:56] A lot of these guys, they work for two [5:58] hours a week, and it's like, "Don't tell [6:00] my boss, but you could do the whole [6:01] thing, and they'll do two hours, and [6:03] otherwise, I I basically update my [6:05] Facebook profile, and you know, I make [6:07] cat memes." [6:08] um play mind sweeper a lot. Um so [6:13] actually um one of the conclusions of my [6:15] book as be skipping ahead but I is that [6:17] a lot of the the sort of forms of [6:20] popular culture that have emerged in the [6:22] last 20 years you know back in the 60s [6:24] we had a lot of forms of popular culture [6:27] that took a lot of time you know like [6:29] the halfhour drum solo or um beat poetry [6:33] that goes on forever and and and now you [6:36] know it's all this stuff that like cat [6:38] memes or YouTube rants or uh they're all [6:41] things that you can do while you're [6:42] pretending to do something else. [6:46] [laughter] So basically like all these [6:48] people are not really working at their [6:49] jobs. So So this stuff that's [6:51] circulating is all things that that [6:53] they're doing when people think they're [6:55] working [snorts] or at least they have [6:56] to be decent enough to make some kind of [6:58] pretense that they're doing something [7:00] anyway. So so you meet these people and [7:02] and you know I thought well how how [7:03] common is this? [7:06] I seem to run into them a lot. So, you [7:08] know, these people said a strike [7:10] magazine. It was this new magazine. They [7:11] had it was their third issue, I think. [7:13] And they said, "Oh, come just write [7:14] something interesting, something, you [7:16] know, we wouldn't normally get does [7:18] whatever you like." So, I said, "Okay, [7:19] I'm going to I'm going to try it out." [7:21] Um, so I wrote this piece called On the [7:22] Phenomena of Jobs. And I [7:25] suggested that this is the reason why we [7:28] don't have a 15-hour work week. And [7:31] Kanes famously predicted in the 30s that [7:33] we were almost up on the time that we [7:35] should be working certainly half what [7:37] we're doing now probably considerably [7:39] less. And if you look at the kind of [7:41] jobs that existed in Kansas's time well [7:43] we have eliminated a lot of them. He [7:45] talked about technological unemployment [7:47] in the 1930s and a lot of people thought [7:49] well you know wasn't really true. You [7:51] know everybody's been saying the robots [7:53] are going to take our jobs you know for [7:55] the last h 100red years or so. [7:57] Unemployment stays about the same in the [7:59] long run. Well, you know, maybe it's not [8:02] such a threat. But I I would make the [8:04] opposite argument. I would say, you [8:05] know, the robots have been taking our [8:07] jobs for the last hundred years or so, [8:09] but instead of replacing the, you know, [8:11] instead of redistributing the labor in a [8:13] reasonable fashion, we've simply made up [8:16] completely meaningless, pointless jobs, [8:18] either industries that just have no [8:20] purpose to exist um other than their own [8:24] existence, you know. Um, it's actually [8:26] one of the categories of jobs I [8:28] ended up making up because a lot of [8:29] people sent in descriptions of this. [8:31] Things like corporate law or um [8:35] telemarketing. You don't need a [8:36] telemarketer unless your your your [8:38] competitor has one, right? You don't [8:40] need a corporate lawyer unless you [8:41] somebody else has one. It's a little [8:43] like feudal lords, you know, you need [8:44] feudal lords to protect you from other [8:46] feudal lords. Um, but so there are these [8:49] industries that sort of feed off [8:50] themselves, but everybody in it secretly [8:52] thinks they don't need to exist. I mean, [8:54] I've never met a corporate lawyer who [8:56] really felt that that it's a good thing [8:58] that there are corporate lawyers in the [8:59] world, which is interesting. I mean, [9:01] obviously that's something to do with [9:02] the kind I would need, right? But [9:04] nonetheless, I mean, it's a considerable [9:06] number of them that that feel this way. [9:08] Um, [snorts] [9:09] all right. So, so, so I wrote this up. I [9:11] said, well, maybe that's it. Uh, maybe [9:13] it's political. Maybe, you know, the [9:15] reason nobody does anything about this [9:17] is because it's actually pretty [9:18] convenient to a system of finance-based [9:21] capital where you're not even [9:23] concentrating on making stuff and and [9:25] selling stuff as much as extracting [9:27] rents or create artificially creating [9:29] debt. You know, this is all the sort of [9:31] perfect division of labor for that. You [9:33] have a certain amount of unemployed who [9:35] you make fun of and then you have the [9:37] structurally unemployed who you give [9:39] these these meaningless jobs where [9:41] you're basically buying their loyalty. [9:42] you know um you put them in these mock u [9:46] managerial positions. There's the [9:48] interesting thing and this is actually [9:51] part of the argument that I should [9:52] underline. We have a false narrative [9:55] about what happened which makes it [9:57] possible for people not to not to [9:59] perceive what's going on. The narrative [10:01] is the reason we aren't working a 20 or [10:04] 15 hour week is because we fell in for [10:06] consumerism. You know we had a choice [10:08] between more leisure time and more [10:09] stuff. So, you know, everybody wanted [10:11] iPhones and designer sushi and, you [10:13] know, and we chose that over over more [10:15] time to hang out with our friends. Um, [10:18] the problem is it doesn't really work. [10:20] First of all, uh, you know, there's not [10:23] that many people involved in in sushi [10:25] and iPhones and so forth, and most of [10:27] the new jobs that have been created [10:29] aren't really related to that. In fact, [10:32] if you look at actual service, the the [10:34] rise of the service economy rhetoric [10:36] comes with this. you look at actual [10:37] service and I found some people who [10:39] break down real service as in you know [10:41] giving people haircuts serving people [10:43] coffee um laundry you know things like [10:46] that if you look at actual service the [10:48] numbers have been pretty much the same [10:49] for the last 100 years u it's been about [10:51] 20% about 20% of the workforce does [10:54] service and it used to be they were more [10:55] likely to do it for a private household [10:57] but other than that you know the sheer [10:59] numbers are about the same what's gone [11:02] up just astronomically is the number of [11:06] clerical ical administrative [11:08] and supervisory workers, managers. Um [11:12] there's what I call managerial [11:14] subinfudation or managerial feudalism. [11:16] We have rank on rank of these new [11:18] intermediary roles that never used to [11:20] exist. Um those are the guys that that [11:23] seem to complain the most about not [11:25] doing anything. Anyway, so I wrote this [11:27] and it was all intuitive. I didn't [11:28] really know how many of these people [11:29] there were. I seem to meet them a lot. [11:31] Uh, so I said almost as a joke, well [11:34] maybe that's the reason we don't have a [11:35] 15 hour week. Maybe we're just making up [11:36] these jobs or as if I mean [11:39] nobody planned it quite but you know it [11:41] seems to suit the purposes of those in [11:43] power. Uh or will actually was the first [11:46] person to argue that he said they're [11:47] just making up jobs to keep people off [11:49] the street. Uh [snorts] but I suggested [11:52] maybe he's right. And I had never seen a [11:56] reaction like this. This was a very [11:57] obscure periodical. Um, I'd never heard [12:00] of it even before I published in it. And [12:02] and um, you know, within a matter of [12:06] weeks it had been translated. I think [12:08] now it's up to 21 languages. I think in [12:10] the first couple weeks we got 12. It [12:12] just came out in Persian actually. Um, I [12:15] saw apparently they have a problem with [12:17] jobs in Iran now. Um, but um, [12:20] you know, it's all over the world. [12:21] There's Korea, Estonia, you know, uh, [12:24] Brazil there was a huge Egypt. Anyway, [12:27] um, so there's a huge hol and and and [12:29] the site kept crashing. Uh, then then [12:32] newspapers started running it as a [12:34] column and picking it up and I looked at [12:36] the comment sections and the comment [12:37] sections were just amazing. I mean, [12:39] there are all these people like writing [12:40] these confessionals, you know, oh my [12:42] god, it's true. I'm I'm a corporate [12:44] lawyer. I I contribute nothing to [12:46] society. I I suffer. I, you know, [12:48] [laughter] [12:49] nobody knows my misery. Um, this kind of [12:52] thing. And I realized that there's a [12:54] social problem that just nobody is [12:56] paying attention to. I got people [12:57] writing to me too saying, "Yeah, I've [12:59] been read I I work in the financial [13:00] services industry and you know, I've [13:02] been passing it around. This thing has [13:04] come across my desk at least 20 times [13:05] today." And I was like, "God, you guys [13:07] really aren't doing much, are you?" [13:10] Okay. [laughter] [13:11] Um, so with that, um, came the [13:15] realization that the problem was worse [13:17] than I thought. But I was still thinking [13:19] okay 15% maybe maximum 20% of all jobs [13:24] would be like this. Um eventually [13:26] someone did a survey at yuggov and they [13:29] took stuff actually out of out words [13:32] that I'd used in the piece does your job [13:34] make a meaningful contribution to [13:36] society. Uh they discovered 37% of [13:40] people in this country believe that it [13:41] does not were certain that it does not. [13:44] 13% were unsure. only 50% were quite [13:46] sure their job does do something which [13:49] actually is pretty amazing if you think [13:50] about it because you know think about [13:52] all the jobs that no one would possibly [13:55] say that uh you know if you're a bus [13:57] driver uh you know you're doing [13:59] something you might hate your job but [14:00] but you're not going to say it's useless [14:01] and pointless and why am I doing this [14:03] people need to move around um if you're [14:06] a nurse if you're a you know think of [14:08] all the jobs that that obviously need to [14:11] be done so the conclusion you know would [14:14] have to be that Anybody who you see [14:16] sitting there in an office and you're [14:17] wondering is this person secretly [14:20] thinking his job doesn't need to exist. [14:22] The answer is yes. He's almost certainly [14:25] thinking that. [laughter] [14:26] Um it's really high. And then you think [14:28] about all right these are the people who [14:30] know it, right? And just assume let's [14:31] forget about that 13% who aren't sure. [14:33] Let's just drop them and just look at [14:35] the 30% who are definitely sure their [14:36] their job doesn't contribute anything. [14:38] All right. Um those are the ones who are [14:41] aware of it. It's easy to see how you [14:43] could not be aware that your job is [14:45] pointless, but it's much harder to see [14:47] how you could think your job is [14:48] pointless and be wrong. You [snorts] [14:49] know, it's possible that you're [14:50] fulfilling some function that your boss [14:52] understands that you don't. And people [14:54] keep saying that's possible to me, but I [14:56] keep asking what would be an example of [14:57] that. You know, someone in that [14:59] situation and no one can really come up [15:02] with one. I mean, I so it's possible, [15:04] but there really aren't very many. On [15:06] the other hand, it's really easy to see [15:07] how you could think you're doing [15:08] something and and you're not. Um, and [15:12] there are people, some of the people [15:13] wrote to me and I got amazing stories. [15:16] Like there's one person who worked for a [15:18] travel magazine. Um, and she'd worked [15:20] for there for about six months until she [15:22] realized a travel magazine doesn't [15:24] really exist. The whole thing was some [15:26] sort of tax scam. And you know, they're [15:28] all there writing copy and putting [15:30] photographs and laying things out, but [15:32] the thing was never produced. You know, [15:33] she said, you know, I fly a lot and I've [15:35] never seen this magazine. [laughter] [15:37] finally she like looked into it and [15:38] realized that you know it's not real. So [15:41] now that's an extreme example but that [15:43] the equivalent can happen and probably [15:45] does happen quite a bit. And then you [15:47] have to think about all the people who [15:51] actually do real work in support of that [15:54] kind of pointless meaningless [15:56] employment. You know here's somebody of [15:58] a law firm that's doing some sort of [16:00] fraudulent tax scam or something like [16:02] that. Well they got an office. [16:04] Somebody's got to water the plants [16:05] right? That's a real job. Somebody's got [16:07] to clean the place. Somebody's got to do [16:09] security and community reception. So, [16:11] they're doing real work, but they're [16:12] doing real work in support of [16:15] So, you know, I started thinking, my [16:17] god, like, you know, for all I know, [16:19] half the work being done in our society [16:21] is completely unnecessary. That if they [16:23] got rid of it, it would make no [16:25] difference whatsoever. [16:27] Um, so I ended up saying, "All right, [16:31] this obviously deserves to be picked up [16:33] on a [16:35] need to do some research and see what [16:37] kind of jobs these are and and who these [16:39] people are, what they're really doing." [16:40] So, I ended up um I have a lot of [16:43] followers on Twitter, so I figured, all [16:44] right, it's a biased sample, but, you [16:46] know, it'll give me some good stories. [16:48] So, I said, "All right, have you ever [16:49] had a really pointless job? a job that, [16:51] you know, if it were to vanish, either [16:53] it would make no difference or the world [16:55] would be a slightly better place. All [16:57] right. Um, so tell me all about it. You [17:00] know, I set up a Gmail account. Do I [17:02] have a BS job or what? Uh, Gmail doesn't [17:05] allow you to use in the title, [17:07] right? And, um, I set that up and sure [17:09] enough, I got hundreds and hundreds of [17:11] of replies. Um, some of which were [17:14] pointless. Um, and and kind of missed [17:15] the point a little bit. And um and some [17:18] of them were short and you know some of [17:21] them were just a sentence or two. Some [17:22] of them were 13 pages long and people [17:24] write these long work histories of [17:26] detailed psychological and sociological [17:28] analysis. Yeah. They had a lot of time [17:29] on their hands. How did this happen? [17:31] [laughter] [17:32] Um really useful. The book kind of wrote [17:34] itself in that way. So I ended up um you [17:37] know I I I put them all in a gigantic [17:40] word file and then I colorcoded them for [17:41] content which was really fun. Um, you [17:44] know, I green was for like what I do [17:47] when people think I'm working and orange [17:49] was for does my boss know and what is my [17:51] supervisor? Yeah. So I so I'd cod it [17:53] that way and [snorts] um I used that as [17:56] my database and I ended up writing this [17:57] book. But um I think we're going to do a [17:59] dialogue format. Maybe I've been talking [18:01] too long already or um [18:04] if you find [18:05] Okay, I'll just I'll just I mean there's [18:07] a lot of things I could say. Um I could [18:11] go through the typology but um I think [18:15] the political implications of all this [18:18] are something that I I would like to [18:19] emphasize. Um [18:22] one reason that I wrote this book, you [18:25] know, I'm [18:28] I'm a anti- capitalist anarchist [18:30] personally. I've been involved in direct [18:32] action movements for a long time and um [18:36] and it always seems to me that [18:37] capitalism is being held together more [18:39] by moral arguments than anything else at [18:42] this point because most of the old [18:43] practical arguments don't really apply. [18:45] You know, for the last 50 years said, [18:48] well, you know, capitalism creates great [18:50] inequality, but at least, you know, it [18:52] lifts all boats and even poor people [18:55] know their children will be doing better [18:57] off in the next generation. And nobody [18:59] believes that anymore. That's not [19:00] obviously not true. Um the other [19:02] argument was it creates a big strong [19:04] middle class and that leads to political [19:05] stability and that's clearly not the [19:08] case. Um the other one was [19:10] technological. You know, well we're all [19:13] going to be on Jupiter in a few years [19:15] and there's going to be endless [19:16] inventions. Capitalism is huge engine [19:18] for creativity and you know instead we [19:21] just get like iPhone 7, iPhone 8. Uh but [19:24] um all the sci-fi stuff just it used to [19:27] happen but capitalism seemed to stop [19:29] producing that stuff all of a sudden. Um [19:32] so none of those things are true. So in [19:35] a large way I think the only two [19:37] arguments left are well anything else [19:40] would be worse. You know it's us or [19:42] North Korea basically. Uh and the other [19:45] argument is [19:48] well [19:49] it's basically moral. It's just like [19:51] people really do believe that if you [19:55] don't pay your debts, you're a bad [19:57] person. I mean, unless you're rich, in [19:58] which case it doesn't matter somehow. Uh [20:00] but you know, if you're Donald Trump and [20:02] you go bankrupt, they elect you [20:03] president. But um [laughter] you know, [20:05] if you're an ordinary person, you're a [20:07] dead beat and a bad person. Um and [20:11] so so that one really works. People feel [20:13] that, you know, you really have to pay [20:14] your debts. doesn't matter if you've [20:15] been maneuvered into it, which is a [20:17] really really convenient thing for the [20:19] guys who are running a financialized [20:21] system, right? Um, Michael Hudson [20:24] actually made the argument that, you [20:26] know, 30 years ago, rich people [20:29] discovered that poor people actually [20:30] feel they should pay their debts. Um, [20:32] which had never occurred to them because [20:33] they don't, right? Um, it's true. I [20:36] mean, I I people ask me why I'm a [20:39] professor, you know, they say, "Why [20:40] don't you become a writer? You you know, [20:42] it would be more fun. You'd set your own [20:43] hours. you want have to do all this [20:44] admin work. And I always say, well, you [20:46] know, there's there's one thing about [20:48] academia which isn't true of being a [20:51] musician, being an artist, being a [20:52] writer, any of those things, which is [20:56] they never ever pretend they just forgot [20:58] to pay you [21:00] every month. There it is like clockwork, [21:02] you know, and anything like, you know, [21:05] where they have any excuse not to pay [21:07] their debt to you, they won't do it. Um, [21:09] I mean, it's just amazing. That's why we [21:11] have agents, you know, I could tell you [21:12] stories. Uh but all right so so dad is [21:17] one thing and um the other one is is is [21:21] work. Oh they really seem to have [21:25] convinced people that if you aren't [21:27] working harder than you want to be [21:28] working at something you don't [21:30] particularly enjoy uh preferably under [21:33] the orders of somebody you don't like. [21:35] Um then you're just a bad person. You [21:37] know you don't deserve help. You don't [21:39] deserve relief. No one should love you. [21:41] Um [laughter] and and how that happened [21:44] is one of the things I've tried to [21:46] investigate over the course of the book. [21:48] [snorts] Um you know how it is that we [21:50] see work as this kind of a act of [21:52] self-obnigation. It's a secular hair [21:55] shirt. It's supposed to be suffering to [21:57] the point where you know if you get [21:59] anything out of work it lowers the value [22:01] rather than making it better. Um to the [22:04] even the knowledge that you are helping [22:05] other people. So there's this perverse [22:07] idea that not only is it generally true [22:10] and there exceptions to every rule, but [22:11] it is generally true that the more your [22:13] work benefits others, the less you're [22:15] likely to get paid for it, but people [22:17] think that's okay. You know, in fact, a [22:18] lot of people think that's right. Well, [22:20] we shouldn't pay teachers too much. You [22:22] don't want people who are greedy [22:23] teaching our children, you know, that [22:24] sort of thing. Um, and you know, that [22:26] comes out of this idea that work should [22:28] be suffering and self anything you get [22:30] out of it mitigates it it's it it [22:32] selfsacrificed value. And that is the [22:34] flip side of a ser system of [22:36] consumerism. So you know we deserve our [22:38] our f of consumer pleasures because we [22:40] spend most of the day suffering u and [22:42] and therefore the uselessness of work [22:44] actually adds to its value in some in [22:47] some perverse way unconscious way rather [22:49] rather than enhancing it. Um something [22:52] like that must be going on. you know why [22:54] is it that it's considered acceptable [22:57] that you know nurses and you know the [23:00] guy who gives you trade information or [23:02] people actually help you in some way [23:03] should pay the cost of austerity and [23:05] bankers shouldn't you know how does that [23:07] make any kind of moral sense to anyone [23:09] um it's it's can only be through some [23:12] sort of logic well you guys are [23:13] self-sacrificing go self-sacrifice you [23:15] know [23:17] and so what I was trying to do is to [23:20] take aim at that kind of moral argument [23:22] I wrote one book about that you [23:24] um that seemed to work fairly well. So [23:25] this is my contribution to the debate [23:27] about work. [23:30] [applause] [23:37] Take a seat. [23:38] Thank you. [23:41] Thanks very much, David. Um, I thought [23:43] we might begin by maybe teasing out this [23:46] distinction between jobs that are [23:48] and jobs that are just highly [23:50] specialized because I think when you [23:52] when you first published your 2013 [23:54] essay, you had [23:55] a uh a reply from the Economist [23:58] magazine. [23:58] Oh yes. [23:59] Which which pointed out that okay, our [24:01] economy is becoming more complex. [24:03] With a more complex economy, you have [24:04] specialized jobs. And in those [24:05] specialized jobs, it's harder to see [24:08] where you fit as a small cog in a big [24:10] machine, leading people to think that [24:11] their job maybe isn't that worthwhile. [24:14] Do you have any thoughts on on on that [24:17] notion of complexity? [24:18] Yeah. Um I I could [24:21] contextualize this. The piece came out [24:24] and I think two days later, maybe it was [24:26] three, the economist already had a reply [24:29] out, which is pretty amazing [24:31] considering, you know, I don't think the [24:32] economist normally reads strike [24:35] magazine, let alone feels obliged to [24:38] like write instant replies to their [24:39] arguments. Uh, but you know, they they [24:41] sense something was a threat. Uh but [24:43] what they made the argument the argument [24:46] they made was that this is the digital [24:50] equivalent of assembly line labor. You [24:53] know our wealth in the period of [24:55] industrialization was based on these [24:57] assembly line jobs where people were [24:58] just you know doing one thing all day [25:00] long and it was horrible and alienating [25:02] but you know that it it made me meant we [25:04] had cars and and planes and things and [25:06] and nowadays they said this is the same [25:08] thing. you know, they've robbitized a [25:09] lot of the production, but you have [25:11] these complex supply chains and just in [25:14] time production and and and [25:16] containerized shipping, all you know, [25:18] all this globalized stuff, it's really [25:20] hard to coordinate. Um, so even though [25:23] the actual production has been [25:24] increasingly digitized, you need these [25:26] people sort of toiling in the [25:28] communicative mills. Uh, so these are [25:30] and and their jobs are all chopped up [25:32] into tiny pieces like the assembly line [25:34] was. So they might think, "Oh, I'm not [25:36] doing anything." But you know in the big [25:38] picture this is the basis of our our our [25:40] wealth and prosperity. Um I think the [25:43] best counterargument to that um is my [25:46] own experience in universities uh where [25:50] I think the I don't have the figures for [25:52] the UK but I know in the US [25:55] number of professors [25:57] general lecturers and teaching staff has [25:59] gone up by 50% students have gone up [26:02] about the same slightly more [26:05] administrators in terms of big shot [26:07] administrators 85% administrative staff [26:10] have gone up by 2% 40%. This has [26:13] exploded. It's actually much more in [26:15] private universities too than in public [26:16] ones. Um, so all right, to take the [26:19] economist argument, this has teaching [26:22] become twice or three times as [26:24] complicated as it was 30 years ago. I [26:27] mean, what is the academic equivalent of [26:30] supply global supply chains? I mean, [26:32] we're just basically doing the same [26:33] thing. We're just sitting there. I mean, [26:35] we have PowerPoint instead of a [26:36] blackboard. I don't I'm a lite, but [26:38] everyone else does. um you know we get a [26:40] Moodle page yeah but basically it's the [26:42] same thing we go to seminars we teach we [26:44] lecture we we talk to people um we we [26:47] grade papers um so it's clearly [26:51] something else is going on you know and [26:53] in fact what you see in academia is the [26:55] opposite rather than having this huge [26:58] apparatus of people so as to make us [27:00] superefficient and and in our teaching [27:04] actually you know these guys were [27:06] supposed to be saving us labor because [27:08] they're doing our administst [27:08] ministrative work so we don't have to so [27:10] in theory we can go off and think great [27:12] thoughts are doing exactly the opposite [27:14] they're making up administrative stuff [27:16] for us to do so we have more of admin [27:18] too um so my my interpretation is [27:21] exactly the opposite that you know [27:23] essentially you have a corporatized [27:24] model you know managerialism means that [27:27] it's no longer the guild model which [27:30] universities used to be one of the few [27:32] remaining examples of the old medieval [27:34] system where people selforganize in a [27:36] very hierarchical fashion um so it's no [27:38] longer the idea of people producing [27:39] something in this case knowledge um who [27:41] are training new new scholars you have [27:43] managers running it but managers feel [27:45] they're like they deserve to be [27:47] something like what they would get get [27:49] something like what they would get in [27:50] the corporate world in the corporate [27:51] world it's just assumed that you know [27:53] you need to have five or six flunkies or [27:55] you're not a really important person [27:57] [snorts] u so so you know they hire [27:59] these guys as like deanits or vice [28:01] provos or whatever and and they they [28:03] immediately assign them three or four [28:05] minions and and then they figure out [28:08] what those minions are going to do. U so [28:10] what do they do? They end up making up [28:12] work for us to do. So suddenly I have to [28:13] do time allocation studies all the time [28:15] about what I'm doing with my time rather [28:17] than spending my time actually teaching [28:18] or or learning anything. [28:21] Just turning the attention to solutions. [28:23] So in the last chapter of the book, you [28:26] actually land on UBI as a potential [28:28] solution to riders of jobs. [28:31] And that's actually something the RSA is [28:34] an advocate of, but for slightly [28:35] different reasons, I would say. Yes. [28:39] But if if you had a second intervention, [28:41] if you had a second way of addressing [28:43] jobs, what would it be? And the [28:44] reason why I asked that is because [28:46] UBI for all of its merits is something [28:48] which it will take time for it to become [28:51] politically palatable. It will take time [28:52] for it to be implemented. So what can we [28:55] do in the here and now? [28:57] Well, I mean, I think a lot of [29:01] jobs really has to do with supply side [29:03] economics. Um, I had a sort of one of [29:08] those moments of exceptional clarity [29:10] where somebody says something so simple [29:11] and obvious that you're like, "Oh, [29:13] right." You know, uh, I can just flip [29:14] that on his head. And, um, someone [29:17] pointed out that, you know, all these [29:19] tax cuts in America. Uh, they always [29:22] ask, you know, they've redefined rich [29:24] people as job creators. And when people [29:27] ask, why are there so many [29:28] jobs? One thing I always point out is [29:30] the only thing that left and right seem [29:32] to agree on is that more jobs is always [29:34] good, right? Um they disagree on how you [29:36] create them, but they never say more [29:38] jobs that actually do something, right? [29:40] They they assume that jobs will [29:41] necessarily be good or else they [29:43] wouldn't exist, which is obviously [29:44] untrue. Um but it's particularly [29:48] true in the case of of just handing [29:52] money to rich people because you think [29:53] they're job creators. Someone pointed [29:55] out, and this is this is my sort of [29:57] Eureka moment, uh they were saying, [29:59] well, you know, they asked a bunch of [30:01] manufacturers and other other employers, [30:04] you know, if you get this tax cut you're [30:06] about to be handed, are you going to [30:07] hire more workers? And very few of them [30:10] put up their hands. Um [30:12] and and one reason for that is they ask [30:14] manufacturers because if you hand money [30:17] to poor people, you know, they will buy [30:19] food and other necessities. um maybe [30:22] they'll buy shoes. If you if you give [30:24] money to middle class people, they might [30:26] put in a swimming pool, but you're still [30:27] employing people to put in swimming [30:29] pools. But, you know, it will create [30:31] jobs. It'll create demand for actual [30:33] stuff or services that a lot of people [30:35] want. If you just give money to rich [30:37] people and say, "Okay, you're job [30:39] creators. Here's a lot of money. Go off [30:41] and create some jobs." Well, they're [30:42] unlikely to create shoes and swimming [30:45] pools that they can't sell to anybody. [30:47] But if they feel pressure to hire [30:49] somebody, what are they going to do? [30:51] They're going to hire a bunch of funkies [30:53] to make them feel good about themselves. [30:54] I mean, it's the obvious thing to do. [30:56] And and I I realize that that's another [30:59] little formula I put together that about [31:01] half of the people who work as civil [31:03] servants now are basically in, you know, [31:06] bureaucrats are basically there to make [31:08] poor people feel bad about themselves. [31:11] And in the same way, about half the [31:12] bureaucrats in private companies are [31:14] there to make rich people feel good [31:16] about themselves. uh feel important, you [31:18] know, have their own little empires and [31:20] you know, the importance of an executive [31:22] is often measured by how many people [31:24] they have working under them. Often [31:25] their pay is directly related to that. [31:28] What do you expect they're going to do? [31:28] Do you have any thoughts on the growing [31:32] growing demands for a 4 day working [31:33] week? Is that a way of solving this or [31:35] is this just saying well let's have four [31:37] days of a job and then three [31:38] days escaping that? [31:40] Yeah. Well, that is the problem. I mean [31:42] the I I used to embrace cutting down the [31:46] working week as the primary way of [31:49] addressing these kind of problems or [31:50] just as a good thing in general. You [31:52] know, it's it shows something about the [31:54] cult of work that you have to embrace [31:57] cutting down work time not because it [32:00] would be nice not to work so much but [32:02] for some other reason. You can't just [32:04] say everybody's working too hard. Let's [32:06] take a day off. No, that's just taboo. [32:08] So you have to say, oh, it'll reduce [32:09] unemployment or, you know, it'll have [32:12] some other beneficial effect, but it [32:13] can't be good in itself. Um, but I yeah, [32:16] I used to embrace cutting down the [32:18] working week, and I do think that would [32:19] be a good thing. Um, the problem to me [32:22] is how to it's not so much that people [32:25] will do jobs but do them less. [32:28] It's that you'll need to create a whole [32:30] bureaucracy to enforce it. [32:32] And [32:35] a lot of my anarchist friends who I talk [32:38] about this with are themselves in [32:40] casualized or contract work and you know [32:43] they say well you know back when [32:44] everybody was working 9 to5 or a very [32:46] large proportion of people were it makes [32:48] sense you can just pass a legislation [32:50] say okay now it's 9 to3 uh [snorts] but [32:53] now you can't do that I mean look at me [32:55] I I'm paid by the mons to like work all [32:57] the time basically um and and there's [33:00] just no way the government could [33:02] regulate how much I work without [33:05] creating a vast bureaucracy of [33:07] surveillance and and and and employ [33:09] people in what would basically turn into [33:11] jobs. Um so so I think that [33:14] that it might compound the problem in [33:16] that way just to figure out how to [33:17] enforce it. I mean if you can think of [33:19] maybe there are ways to enforce it I [33:20] don't know about I I'd be very [33:22] interested in hearing and discussing it [33:24] but I'm suspicious and that's why I [33:26] think basic income would do the same [33:27] thing better. [33:29] So, we've got a little bit more time um [33:31] for a discussion. Why don't we open up [33:32] to a Q&A? But before we do, I just [33:34] wanted to do a very quick straw poll. Um [33:36] I think you know the question that's [33:37] coming, [33:38] which is if have you ever, including [33:41] currently, worked in a job, and [33:43] you're willing to admit it. [33:46] Oh, there we go. [33:46] Oh, blime me. I did not expect that. [33:48] [laughter] [33:49] Any RSA staff? [33:52] You're fired. [laughter] [33:53] Yeah. So um if we could maybe take to [33:56] begin with um questions in batches of [33:58] three if that's okay [34:00] and if you could keep them very very [34:02] concise and just say your name along [34:03] with your question. So this lady here, [34:06] this gentleman here and the lady at the [34:08] back just in the Yeah, there you go. [34:16] Hi, my name is Luis Parry. Um, did you [34:18] notice a difference in the people who [34:20] are sending their emails in in terms of [34:21] the difference between men and women in [34:23] terms of uh would women, just my theory, [34:26] it' be less likely to say that they have [34:28] a BS job uh versus men being refusing to [34:32] give up their identity is this is what I [34:33] do, who I am. [34:36] And then this gentleman, [34:38] um, is there an equivalent that you see [34:40] to something like zero budgeting? [34:42] zerobased budgeting where at the end of [34:45] the year everyone's out of a job and you [34:47] figure out on January the 1st what jobs [34:49] are real and and who how many folks you [34:52] need to do them because if what you're [34:54] saying is true there's a lot of folks [34:55] that need flushing out really [34:58] even if it's to have a life of leisure [35:01] and the lady here [35:04] I'm I think my experience must be very [35:06] limited can you give me some more [35:08] examples of what these people what you [35:10] mean by jobs Okay. Yeah. [35:12] Apart from the very obvious ones, there [35:14] must be lots of less obvious. [35:16] So, let me take those. That's three. [35:18] Shall I shall I proceed? [35:19] Gender differences. [35:20] Gender differences. Well, that's really [35:22] interesting because that's one of the [35:22] few things that the surveys actually [35:24] asked. They didn't ask a lot of things [35:26] that you really wish they'd asked. Um, [35:29] like what kind of job do you have? But, [35:31] um, they did ask they did break it down [35:34] by gender. And sure enough, there was a [35:35] 10% spread. Women were much less likely [35:38] to say they had jobs. I think [35:40] that's because women are much less [35:41] likely to have jobs actually. [35:43] Uh which is interesting because a lot of [35:46] people when they first hear the concept, [35:47] especially men obviously, assume that [35:50] they're mainly talking about women's [35:51] jobs. They'll say, "Oh, you know, they [35:53] made up all these like meaningless [35:54] office jobs to give women jobs." It's [35:56] not that way at all. And and but but [35:58] partly it's also because of the [36:00] dynamics. I mean, in a lot of [36:03] traditional jobs, you have women in what [36:05] look like a job, but they're [36:07] the one who is actually doing the work [36:09] for the their the person they're working [36:10] for, you know? So, a classic secretary, [36:13] you know, it's just like the the boss [36:14] who has the job. I I gave the [36:17] example in the book of a a friend of [36:19] mine who um was an anthropology major, [36:21] went to anthrop uh Afghanistan to study [36:24] belly dancing and ended up becoming a [36:27] administrative assistant and finally [36:29] wrote the NATO withdrawal plan from [36:32] [laughter] [36:32] you know while in theory employed as a [36:35] secretary [snorts] somebody just threw a [36:37] said oh there's five of them they're all [36:39] contradictory here you synthesize them [36:40] somehow so she ended up doing the [36:42] military strategy so yeah so so often in [36:45] in gendered cases, you don't know who's [36:47] got the job and who doesn't. [36:49] But I'm assuming that people who do the [36:51] jobs are the ones who really know. [36:54] Okay. So, in terms of Yeah. How to find [36:58] out who's really useful? I mean, it's a [37:01] real problem because [37:04] even if you do this, who's going to [37:05] enforce it? Um, the fascinating thing is [37:09] they're constantly doing, you know, [37:11] cutting the fat, doing speedups on [37:13] salaried and blue collar workers. So, [37:15] you know, if you're working for UPS, if [37:17] you're a driver, if you're a delivery [37:19] guy, if you're, you know, those guys are [37:21] being tailorized and, you know, putting [37:23] on huge pressure, there's no at [37:25] all there, right? But, but at the same [37:27] time, the same guys who are doing that [37:28] are just hiring flunkies to sit around [37:30] the office making them look good, who do [37:32] nothing. Um and and [37:35] so so this question of power and I don't [37:37] think it's as hard to identify them. Um [37:40] I there's one guy it always sticks in my [37:43] head. He's a bank security and [37:45] efficiency guy. And um he says, you [37:48] know, I I don't have a job. I [37:50] identify other people's jobs, [37:52] but then I realize I do have a [37:53] job because they never actually act on [37:56] any of my suggestions. [laughter] [37:59] I'm a box sticker. I'm here to like make [38:01] it seem like they're doing something [38:03] they're not actually doing. For 15 [38:05] years, I've gone through and said, [38:06] "Here's how you trim the fat here." And [38:08] somebody says, "What?" But my empire [38:10] would contract, you know. [laughter] No. [38:12] And and people block it. And they say, [38:14] "No, we can't computerize that. You fire [38:16] 15 people, you know." [snorts] So [38:18] there's all this stuff done by hand. [38:20] Even in large corporations, it doesn't [38:21] need to be for these reasons. Um so it's [38:24] a really interesting thing to look at [38:26] the power dynamics and how they work [38:27] themselves out. And uh uh in terms of [38:29] examples um well um in terms of the kind [38:34] of people who wrote things into me, the [38:37] interesting thing was the absence of [38:39] service jobs. You don't really see [38:41] people being judgmental and saying like [38:44] why why are people buying this [38:46] It's stupid, you know, or like you know, [38:47] I serve coffee. I hate the people, you [38:49] know, maybe they do hate them, but they [38:50] don't actually see it as useless. Um so [38:54] it wasn't that. it was much more people [38:57] in kind of clerical administrative jobs [39:00] who just don't have any assignments. Um [39:02] I I actually ended up with a typology of [39:04] of five I can just go over quickly to [39:06] give you a sense. So there's flunkies. [39:08] We've talked about that. So that would [39:09] be like a receptionist at a company that [39:11] doesn't need a receptionist. You know, [39:12] some companies obviously do, but some, [39:14] you know, you'll have a small publishing [39:16] firm where they get two calls a day. [39:18] It's not like they couldn't take it [39:19] themselves, right? Uh but if you don't [39:21] have a receptionist, you're not a real [39:22] company. So they have to hire someone [39:24] just sits there all day, you know. Um [39:26] and so there's a lot of that sort of [39:29] thing. Um [39:31] then there's um duct tapers. Duct tapers [39:34] are basically there's a problem, but [39:35] instead of fixing it, they hire someone [39:36] to clean up the damage. So, uh, the [39:38] example I always like to give of that [39:40] was, um, it was one point the shelves [39:43] collapsed in my office when I was [39:44] working at Goldsmiths and, um, it took [39:46] ages for the carpenter to show up and, [39:49] um, realize they only had one carpenter, [39:51] but they had another guy whose entire [39:53] job was to apologize for the fact that [39:55] the carpenter was too busy to come. [39:57] [laughter] [39:58] It's like, uh, you couldn't fire him and [40:00] hire like another carpenter. [laughter] [40:03] So, that would be a duct taper. Um, I [40:05] always say it's like, you know, you you [40:07] there's a hole in the roof and instead [40:09] of actually fixing it, you just get a [40:11] bucket and hire somebody to empty it [40:12] every hour. Um, all right. So, so, so [40:15] that's a duct taper. And then you have [40:17] box stickers who are basically there so [40:19] that you can say you're doing something [40:20] that you're not doing. Like the guy who [40:22] is the efficiency expert whose [40:23] recommendations were never taken up. [40:25] But, but a lot of there's one person who [40:27] example of that who works in a care home [40:30] and her job she's in the entertainment [40:32] branch. of her job is to give people [40:33] elaborate surveys about what sort of [40:36] entertainment they would like to have. [40:38] And she has to spend so much time [40:39] gathering this information, tabulating [40:41] it, feeding the computer, taking another [40:42] manual copy that has to be put in a [40:44] binder of the right color. And um you [40:46] know, she doesn't have any time to [40:47] actually entertain anybody. So that's a [40:50] kind of classic example. Um she kind of [40:52] sneaks off on her own time. It's a [40:54] little way like us academics. If we read [40:56] a book, that's considered our special [40:58] leisure activity that you know um we're [41:00] getting away with on the slide. Um so so [41:03] there's box ticking and um let me see [41:07] there's goons. Um I had to make this [41:09] category up because it wouldn't have [41:11] occurred to me normally. They're they're [41:13] basically what I was saying about [41:14] industries that don't really need to [41:16] exist according to people who work in [41:18] them except you need them because other [41:21] people have them. So, a lot of PR, [41:23] marketing, um, you know, a lot of, um, a [41:28] lot of telemarketers, like I never ran [41:31] into a single telemarketer who didn't [41:32] think their job shouldn't exist, you [41:34] know. Um, and [41:37] so, so, so there's a whole industries [41:39] that kind of feed off themselves. Uh, so [41:42] there's a lot of that. Um, [41:45] and, um, finally, there are task [41:48] masters. And task masters are they're [41:50] fall into various categories but mainly [41:52] they're people who supervise people who [41:53] don't need supervision. And I got a lot [41:56] from that. I mean people who are middle [41:58] managers who are saying you know I have [41:59] total job. Um you know I used [42:02] to do this job so that I did it well. [42:03] They kicked me upstairs to management [42:05] and now I'm supposed to you know [42:07] supervise these guys doing what I know [42:09] perfectly well they would do if I wasn't [42:11] here you know. So and then they have a [42:13] dilemma because like I want to do [42:15] something. So some of them actually say [42:16] well I tried allocating myself work when [42:18] no one was looking but then my boss [42:19] caught me so they can't do that. So you [42:22] know the obvious thing to do would be to [42:24] like make up box ticking rituals for [42:26] them to do like you know make up some [42:27] sort of performance figures and make [42:30] sure they meet their targets but you [42:31] know they they they're close enough to [42:32] the work that they know that that would [42:34] make them spend time doing that instead [42:37] of their job. So it would have a [42:38] negative effect. So they're kind of in a [42:40] bind you know. So so that would be a [42:41] task message. Those are examples of of [42:43] what a job might be like. [42:45] Should we try and get three more in? [42:47] Maybe even more. So, this gentleman [42:48] here. [42:48] Oh, wow. Lots of people. [42:50] At the back, Laura at the back, and this [42:52] gentleman here. [42:57] I wonder about if you've quantified how [42:59] much money the society is spending on [43:01] these jobs. And is that money [43:04] enough to answer the usual criticism of [43:06] UBI that it's never that it's [43:09] unaffordable because we have to tax [43:11] people more? So rather than taxing [43:13] people more, if we could just persuade [43:14] these companies somehow to pay people [43:17] for not doing anything at all, wouldn't [43:18] that be a a better solution? [43:20] That's a very nice idea. Not to mention [43:23] government. There's like a lot of you [43:24] could get rid of those guys, too. [43:34] I'm Laura Partridge. Um, my question is [43:36] about the non-bullshit jobs. Um, so you [43:39] mentioned jobs like uh being a [43:41] corporate lawyer um that actually have [43:43] in many respects quite a lot of uh [43:45] social status and I was wondering how we [43:48] preserve the social status of [43:49] non-bullshit jobs like being a nurse or [43:51] a teacher. [43:52] Yeah. Uh good question. Okay, one more. [43:56] It's a variation of the previous one. [43:57] What would be the impact on GDP? [44:00] Because BS jobs valued at cost go into [44:04] GDP with the same logic that people have [44:06] power many BS employees. [44:09] So do we need to do basic income and [44:12] give people money so that they stop [44:14] wasting overhead and what the effect on [44:16] the GDP is? [44:18] Yeah, that's very interesting question. [44:20] Okay. Well, the first um question wasn't [44:22] a question so I'll just say yeah. [44:24] [snorts] [44:25] [laughter] [44:27] quantify. [44:28] Yeah. Well, that would be a very [44:30] interesting question. Um I mean you also [44:32] have to think about government there [44:34] because I mean a h you well I mean [44:36] people say this about UBI in general, [44:38] right? Um it would massively reduce the [44:42] number of bureaucrats which who you [44:43] wouldn't have to pay but you know you [44:45] would have to pay them. You pay them [44:46] basic income like everybody else. Uh but [44:49] you know they'd be much happier. Uh [44:51] because one of the thing I found from [44:53] these um studies is I got a lot of [44:55] people who work in government who [44:59] I guess the way I always put it is you [45:01] know when you have somebody who you kind [45:02] of wonder how they live with themselves [45:04] you know I'm the guy who demands that [45:06] homeless people show three forms of ID [45:07] or we kick you back on the street again. [45:09] You know that sort of person often they [45:11] can't actually they really feel [45:12] terrible. they know just how bad it is [45:14] at what they're doing and they they're [45:16] in this terrible quandry, you know, and [45:18] the system is set up so they can't act [45:20] ethically. You know, if they try, they [45:21] get in trouble. Uh so so those guys, you [45:24] know, they can all of UBI, they can all [45:26] go off and, you know, form a Klesmer [45:29] band or decide to restore antique [45:31] furniture, you know, or whatever it is [45:33] they decide they want to do, and they'll [45:34] be happier, and and then we'll all be [45:36] happier to see the end of them. Um so so [45:41] which relates to another issue about UBI [45:43] in terms of quantification. I mean we [45:45] and this goes back to the the that [45:48] question about um gross domestic product [45:51] is essentially we would just have to [45:54] change our our way of measuring this [45:56] stuff. Um I think all our indicators are [45:59] clearly way out of kilter and and one of [46:02] the things that shows is that you know [46:04] these market efficiencies people talk [46:06] about you know are a myth. It's uh it's [46:10] it's a story we tell ourselves. Almost [46:13] everything about these indicators is [46:15] just fantastical and has no relation to [46:17] actual value. We uh I I actually make [46:20] some suggestions in the book and then [46:21] I've developed it elsewhere uh in a [46:24] recent talk in France where I think that [46:26] we need to just change our basic [46:28] terminology about value and how we think [46:30] about it. Um I think production and [46:32] consumption, you know, are terms that we [46:34] just need to get rid of. First of all, [46:36] most work doesn't produce anything. You [46:38] know, I say always say this, it's like [46:41] um uh you you make a cup once, right? [46:43] But you wash it a thousand times. You [46:46] know, most most labor is is not about [46:48] making stuff. It's about keeping things [46:49] the same, maintaining things, taking [46:51] care of people, taking care of animals [46:52] and plants, taking care of uh uh even [46:55] tube workers, you know, I there's this [46:57] huge debate about whether tube workers [46:58] have jobs. Uh which uh I got [47:02] involved with because people drew me [47:03] into some Marxists actually were saying, [47:06] well, they're not producing value for [47:07] capitalism, that's why they're trying to [47:09] fire them all. This is during a tube [47:10] strike. And um you know and obviously in [47:13] a communist society the we wouldn't need [47:16] to ticket takers because you know or [47:19] ticket booths because we wouldn't have [47:21] tickets because we wouldn't be charging [47:22] people. Transportation would be free. So [47:23] these are jobs, right? And and [47:26] um the two ticket office workers put up [47:29] a very nice response basically, not [47:32] directly to these guys, but but to the [47:34] idea that they're doing useless labor. [47:36] Uh where they pointed out like, okay, [47:38] fine. You know, don't have any ticket [47:39] officers like, well, let's just hope you [47:41] don't lose your kids, you know, let's [47:43] just hope there isn't an accident. Don't [47:45] need to deal with an annoying drunk. and [47:47] they sort of like went into all the [47:48] things, you know, didn't leave your [47:50] computer on the table, you know, they [47:53] went into all the things these guys [47:54] actually do. And it's all caregiving [47:56] labor, you know, I mean, they don't do, [47:58] you know, even these sort of classic [47:59] proletarian jobs. They're really, you [48:02] know, much more like nurses or, you [48:04] know, it's just like what we think of as [48:05] women's work is what they're actually [48:06] doing. Um, it's we don't count it as [48:09] work, so we don't imagine they're doing [48:10] anything, you How good to Laura's point, [48:13] how do we [48:14] strengthen that social status of jobs [48:16] that really are worthwhile? [48:17] Yeah, I think we just need to look at [48:20] why people say their jobs are [48:22] I mean, what is the tacet theory of [48:23] value they've got in their heads? Um [48:26] because it's clearly not market. You [48:27] know, here I am being paid a lot of [48:28] money to do something. I don't think [48:30] it's worthwhile. Um there must be some [48:33] notion of social value here. And I think [48:35] caregiving labor is a great example of [48:37] that. That's so uh you know I think even [48:39] if you build a bridge you build a bridge [48:40] because you care that people can get [48:42] across the river. I mean all value [48:44] producing labor is an extension of care. [48:46] So I think we need to go back to what's [48:48] classically been women's work as the [48:50] paradigm for value producing labor. So, [48:52] so I actually tried to develop this in a [48:55] theory of the revolt of the caring [48:57] classes that a lot of social unrest is [49:00] uh you know the proletariat is [49:02] essentially [49:03] it's become clearer now that factories [49:06] are no longer as important you know [49:08] proletariat is always mainly involved in [49:10] caring labor like the tube workers and [49:12] much more than we thought that's a sort [49:14] of center of it and and we need to [49:16] organize around that conception of value [49:18] so I suggested that instead of [49:20] production and consumption We substitute [49:22] care and freedom. Perhaps caregiving and [49:25] care is really that work we do which [49:27] maintains and increases other people's [49:29] freedom of which the paradigm would be [49:31] play right because play is action done [49:33] for itself because like what is [49:35] caregiving labor? You take care of kids [49:36] so they can play, right? I mean that's [49:39] so we need to rethink production and [49:40] consumption and get rid of those terms [49:42] and and think about care and freedom. [49:43] It's [49:45] I think we've got time for one maybe [49:47] even two if we're very quick. [49:49] This is my nose and feminism. Um, a lot [49:51] of hands here. This lady here and this [49:52] gentleman here. [49:56] We have to be super quick with this, I [49:57] think. [49:58] Oh, are we already done? [50:01] Um, what do you think the um [50:04] psychological [snorts] health impact is [50:07] on people who have these BS jobs and [50:10] know that they have these BS jobs [50:11] because essentially they're aware of the [50:13] fact that every day of their lives [50:14] they're living a lie. [50:17] Yeah. Yeah. [50:18] Shall I just take that one directly or [50:19] should we do more? [50:20] Um just yeah if we just just take one [50:22] more and then we'll [50:23] Steve Soden here. Um I I just wonder if [50:25] you if anything came out in the research [50:27] from people who actually loved their BS [50:28] jobs because yeah it's a very a you get [50:32] paid b you've got a social construct to [50:35] work in. Um you're probably dealing with [50:37] people that you like. I mean I deal with [50:40] a lot of companies and I look around and [50:41] I see a lot of happy people doing [50:44] nothing. I mean, if if the boss really [50:46] wanted to be ruthless, he could get rid [50:47] of them. But they're actually very happy [50:49] and and leading pretty fulfilled lives, [50:52] actually. [50:53] Statistically, I ask the second one. [50:55] First of all, we do we have another [50:56] question or [50:56] No, I think I think we [50:57] just those two. Okay. [50:59] Um All right. Well, the second one is [51:01] easy. I because the some of the there [51:03] was another one in Holland where they [51:04] actually did the numbers and it seems [51:06] like 6% of jobs are are jobs where the [51:11] person doesn't think there's a point but [51:12] is finds it fulfilling. Anyway, um I [51:15] think you know some of those people hate [51:17] their families. You [laughter] [51:20] just like learning new skills like the [51:22] people who work with what does it [51:24] matter? Um that's but the the ones who [51:28] actually sent in testimonies about it, [51:30] which there weren't that many, but there [51:31] were a few, were the the two things they [51:35] had in common were they knew what they [51:38] were getting into. So they were things [51:39] like substitute teacher. Nobody expects [51:41] that's going to be real job, right? Or [51:43] French civil servant, you know, [51:44] something like that. Um [laughter] [51:47] and [51:49] relatively unsupervised. either you're [51:51] the boss or you don't have anybody [51:53] breathing over your shoulder. So, you [51:55] know, in a circumstance like that, you [51:58] know, you could say, okay, I'm a [51:59] substitute teacher. Kids don't expect me [52:01] to do anything. Nobody expects I'll [52:02] learn Chinese, you know, I'll become an [52:04] artist, you know. So, so if you could [52:06] repurpose the time to something useful, [52:08] yes, but the surprising thing is that, [52:11] you know, that's what we think people [52:13] should think and mostly they don't. And [52:16] that gets to the second uh the first [52:18] question which is you know we have this [52:20] assumption about human nature that [52:21] people want something for nothing that [52:23] you know e economists make it into a [52:25] science you know we're trying to put out [52:26] the least amount of effort and resources [52:28] to get the most back from it in if if [52:30] economists were right like most people [52:33] with jobs would be delighted [52:35] you know I'm getting paid to do nothing [52:37] this is great you know but they're not [52:39] um the astounding thing is just how [52:42] miserable so many people are and the [52:44] misery is compounded by the that they [52:46] don't feel justified in being miserable [52:48] for that very reason. I should be happy. [52:50] If I told people why I'm miserable, they [52:52] would say, "What what are you [52:53] complaining about?" You know, but but in [52:55] fact, it shows that there's something [52:56] about our assumptions about human nature [52:58] that is profoundly misconceived. Um I go [53:01] back in the book to um this guy named Gr [53:04] uh the German psychologist came up the [53:07] idea of the pleasure at being the cause. [53:09] You first infants first become aware of [53:11] themselves as discrete entities [53:12] independent of the world when they [53:14] realize they can have predictable [53:15] effects. You know, if I move that way [53:16] again, the pencil will move again. You [53:18] know, when you first figure that out, [53:20] you're just totally happy. Apparently, [53:21] the kids has this incredible joy [53:24] realizing they can have predictable [53:25] effects for the world. The argument is [53:26] that that sort of sense of delight in [53:28] being able to cause things to happen is [53:30] the sort of foundation of our sense of [53:32] auton of being of being an autonomous [53:35] thing. Um and if [53:37] concept of spiritual violence, haven't [53:38] you in your book? [53:39] Right. [53:40] Yeah. The spiritual violence is when you [53:41] take that away. [53:42] Yeah. [53:42] Um and and and you know, psychologists [53:44] being cruel [53:46] and sadistic creatures, they they you [53:49] know, say, "All right, let's see what [53:51] happens if you like have it figure that [53:53] out and then immediately take it away [53:54] again." [laughter] And then of course [53:56] the kids just go catatonic. You know, [53:58] they freak out. They get really upset [53:59] and then they just become incredibly [54:01] depressed and have no motivation to do [54:03] anything and curl up into a ball. And [54:05] essentially the argument is that's [54:06] what's happening to people in [54:07] jobs. You know your basic sense of being [54:09] people you ask somebody what do you do? [54:11] Uh you know uh they usually assume you [54:14] mean for a living right? Um [snorts] [54:16] they don't say like I make model boats [54:18] for my kids you know uh they they they [54:21] even if that's the thing that's most [54:22] important to them. Um so so so if you [54:25] you know that sense of of I am [54:27] contributing to the world in some way is [54:29] really important to people's sense of [54:31] being a self. So in a way you're just [54:32] taking away their something fundamental [54:34] about their being. Um and and the fact [54:37] that you don't understand why this is [54:39] upsetting you so much seems to compound [54:41] it. So yeah, you hear about depression [54:43] and in a way what is depression? A sense [54:45] of meaninglessness and purposelessness [54:46] and lack of motivation. Well, that's [54:48] what a job is. It's objectively [54:50] mimicking depression. So not surprising [54:52] rates of depression go up as these [54:54] things become more common. Uh stress and [54:56] anxiety becomes really big. Um, a lot of [54:59] people said who had had both kinds of [55:01] jobs or who had both simultaneously. [55:04] There was one guy I thought was really [55:05] interesting. Uh, I call him Hannibal in [55:07] the book. He's a guy who, um, works most [55:11] of the week on diagnostic technology for [55:15] TB, which is, you know, basically you [55:17] can't get anybody to pay you for, but [55:18] it's really useful. He has a team of [55:20] people who are volunteers who work on [55:21] this. And then once or twi, one or two [55:24] days a week, he writes what he describes [55:25] as business reports. um or [55:28] marketing strategy for pharmaceutical [55:31] corporations. So, you know, executives [55:33] can wave things and front of each other [55:35] and nobody even reads them. But he gets, [55:37] you know, 10,000 pounds a pop for these [55:38] things. Um and he says that, you know, [55:41] uh it's a totally different world when [55:43] everybody knows they're doing something [55:44] useful. They treat each other with [55:46] respect. There's camaraderie. There's [55:48] cooperation. as soon as you're doing [55:50] you know, no matter how much [55:51] you're paid and everybody's like [55:53] screaming at each other and freaking out [55:55] and like all these weird sat masochistic [55:58] rituals and deadlines and you know, it's [56:00] just totally people just abuse each [56:02] other incredibly when they and the more [56:04] they all secretly know it doesn't matter [56:06] at all whether we really get this done, [56:08] the more they get stressed out of the [56:10] deadlines and the worse they treat each [56:12] other. [56:13] Well, a lovely note to end on. Um yeah, [56:16] we do have to um call time [56:18] unfortunately. Um thank you very much [56:19] David for a really excellent talk and [56:21] Q&A. Um I think [56:23] really enjoy. [56:24] Yeah, it was really good. I think the [56:25] book is is genuinely a breath of fresh [56:28] air for this debate because I think most [56:29] people walk into the room when they hear [56:31] the terms future of work and good work. [56:33] They think about automation, lack of [56:35] jobs in the future. But actually what [56:36] you're saying is we're probably going to [56:38] continue to have a lot of jobs. They're [56:39] just going to be And that's [56:41] that's the big issue. [56:41] Something about it, which we can do. So, [56:43] um before we shoot off, um please give [56:46] David a big round of applause. [56:49] [applause]