The Big Short (2015) - FrontPoint Partners confronts Morgan Stanley Risk Assessors and S&P

Extractor

AI-assisted summary of The Big Short (2015) - FrontPoint Partners confronts Morgan Stanley Risk Assessors and S&P — original source. Check the original for full context.

Source published: 2017-03-07

Key ideas

Subprime mortgage delinquencies are surging across the country, yet subprime bond prices are anomalously increasing rather than declining. (0:14)
Deutsche Bank issued a margin call requiring FrontPoint Partners to post an additional $1.9 million in collateral by market close. (0:14)
Morgan Stanley risk assessors pressured FrontPoint to liquidate their short positions, arguing that committing years of insurance payments toward a housing collapse is not prudent. (0:14)
An S&P executive admitted that the agency rubber-stamps AAA ratings on subprime securities because issuing banks would otherwise take their business to Moody's. (2:17)

Detailed notes

## Background This clip was published on YouTube by the channel Extractor on March 7, 2017. Drawing from the 2015 film The Big Short, the page description highlights FrontPoint Partners' clashes with risk managers over housing Armageddon trades and their fiery accusation that credit rating agencies operate as commercial "rating shops" selling AAA stamps for fees.

## TL;DR As nationwide mortgage defaults surge, FrontPoint Partners faces baffling price increases on subprime mortgage bonds alongside an immediate $1.9 million margin call from Deutsche Bank. Internal Morgan Stanley risk assessors pressure the desk to liquidate their short positions, prompting Mark Baum to instruct his team to dismiss the risk managers entirely. Baum and his associates then march over to Standard & Poor's to confront executive Georgia Hale over why toxic bonds still retain pristine AAA marks. Pressed on whether the agency ever denies investment banks their desired ratings, Hale openly admits that refusing to grant top grades would simply drive lucrative underwriting fees down the block to Moody's.

## Atmosphere & style The scene crackles with rising panic, intense cynicism, and biting dark comedy. It begins in a claustrophobic trading desk environment fraught with disbelief and institutional friction before pivoting into a tense, surreal interrogation at Standard & Poor's. Mark Baum's righteous moral outrage clashes sharply with corporate complacency and calculated self-interest, creating an unnerving realization of systemic corruption.

## Bulletin - [00:14](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mwdo17GT6sg&t=14s) Subprime mortgage delinquencies are surging across the country, yet subprime bond prices are anomalously increasing rather than declining. - [00:14](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mwdo17GT6sg&t=14s) Deutsche Bank issued a margin call requiring FrontPoint Partners to post an additional $1.9 million in collateral by market close. - [00:14](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mwdo17GT6sg&t=14s) Morgan Stanley risk assessors pressured FrontPoint to liquidate their short positions, arguing that committing years of insurance payments toward a housing collapse is not prudent. - [02:17](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mwdo17GT6sg&t=137s) An S&P executive admitted that the agency rubber-stamps AAA ratings on subprime securities because issuing banks would otherwise take their business to Moody's.

## Key takeaways - [00:14](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mwdo17GT6sg&t=14s) FrontPoint Partners observes a sharp disconnect between soaring nationwide mortgage defaults and rising subprime mortgage bond prices. - [00:14](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mwdo17GT6sg&t=14s) Deutsche Bank demands FrontPoint supply $1.9 million in margin by the close of the trading day to support its credit default swap positions. - [00:14](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mwdo17GT6sg&t=14s) Despite worsening subprime loan performance, credit rating agencies Moody's and Standard & Poor's continue to maintain AAA ratings on mortgage bonds and CDOs. - [00:14](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mwdo17GT6sg&t=14s) Mark Baum attributes the rating agencies' inaction to their status as publicly traded corporations, arguing they prioritize stock prices and corporate earnings over objective risk assessment. - [00:14](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mwdo17GT6sg&t=14s) Morgan Stanley risk managers intervene at FrontPoint, attempting to convince Kathy Tao to force the liquidation of the fund's short trades. - [00:14](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mwdo17GT6sg&t=14s) Mark Baum rejects the risk assessors' oversight entirely, ordering Vinnie Daniel to tell the Morgan Stanley executives to fuck off. - [02:17](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mwdo17GT6sg&t=137s) During a meeting with FrontPoint, S&P executive Georgia Hale defends the agency's inaction by claiming delinquency rates remain within predictive mathematical models. - [02:17](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mwdo17GT6sg&t=137s) FrontPoint challenges S&P on whether its analysts actually review raw loan-level data, highlighting that lenders have granted mortgages without proper vetting. - [02:17](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mwdo17GT6sg&t=137s) Mark presses Georgia on whether S&P has ever refused to grant an issuing investment bank the exact percentage of AAA ratings it requested. - [02:17](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mwdo17GT6sg&t=137s) Georgia confirms a structural conflict of interest: S&P awards requested ratings because issuing banks will take their lucrative business to Moody's if S&P refuses. - [02:17](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mwdo17GT6sg&t=137s) Mark argues that credit rating agencies should accept earning less revenue rather than compromise their standards and sell inflated ratings for fees. - [02:17](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mwdo17GT6sg&t=137s) Georgia pushes back on FrontPoint's moral posturing, pointing out that Mark's fund holds massive credit default swap positions and stands to gain financially from the downgrades they demand.

## Detailed walkthrough ### [00:14](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mwdo17GT6sg&t=14s) Margin Calls and Morgan Stanley Risk Assessors

The FrontPoint Partners trading desk descends into chaos as the team struggles to comprehend the disconnect between market reality and bond pricing. Mortgage defaults across the country have spiked dramatically, yet subprime mortgage bond prices are bizarrely rising instead of crashing. On the phone, Deutsche Bank is aggressively demanding an additional $1.9 million in collateral by market close to cover FrontPoint's short positions. Mark Baum demands an explanation as the team vents their disbelief that bonds backed by deteriorating subprime loans are somehow being marked as more valuable. When Mark asks whether credit rating agencies like Moody's and Standard & Poor's have begun downgrading the collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) or mortgage bonds, the team confirms that nothing has changed—the tranches remain stamped with pristine AAA ratings. Mark angrily rails against the agencies, convinced their public corporate status has reduced them to prioritizing their own bottom line and stock prices over objective risk analysis.

Matters worsen when the team informs Mark that Morgan Stanley risk assessors have descended on their office. The risk managers have pulled in Kathy Tao to pressure FrontPoint into liquidating their credit default swaps, arguing that locking up capital to fund years of premiums in anticipation of a housing crash is completely irresponsible. When Mark asks what Kathy has said, the desk reports that she hasn’t yielded yet, only asking whether this trade is merely another one of Mark's ideological crusades. Refusing to back down, Mark gives Vinnie Daniel explicit marching orders on how to handle the bank's oversight. Mark instructs him: “Okay. I want you to walk back in there and, very calmly and very politely, tell the risk assessors to fuck off.” Mark then arranges to rendezvous with the team at Standard & Poor’s offices to confront an agency executive named Georgia, while Vinnie enters the conference room and delivers Mark's directive verbatim to the assembled Morgan Stanley executives.

- **Collateral demand:** Deutsche Bank required an additional $1.9 million in margin by the close of trading. - **Rating agency inaction:** Despite soaring mortgage delinquencies, S&P and Moody's maintained AAA ratings on subprime mortgage bonds and CDOs. - **Internal pushback:** Morgan Stanley risk assessors argued that committing six years of insurance premiums toward a housing market collapse was an imprudent investment strategy.

```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Housing Market Disconnect and FrontPoint Conflict accDescr: Diagram showing how subprime mortgage defaults lead to margin calls and conflicts with Morgan Stanley risk assessors and S&P ratings.

subgraph MarketDivergence["Market Reality vs. Bond Pricing"] A["Subprime Mortgage Defaults Spike"] --> B["Subprime Bond Prices Mysteriously Rise"] B --> C["Deutsche Bank Demands $1.9M Collateral"] B --> D["Credit Rating Agencies Keep AAA Status"] end

subgraph InternalConflict["FrontPoint Resistance"] C --> E["Morgan Stanley Risk Assessors Pressure Kathy Tao"] E --> F["Demand FrontPoint Sell Off Short Positions"] F --> G["Mark Baum Orders Team to Dismiss Assessors"] G --> H["Confrontation with Standard & Poor's"] end ```

---

[02:17](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mwdo17GT6sg&t=137s) Confronting S&P and the Conflict of Interest

Arriving at Standard & Poor’s, Mark Baum and his associates sit down with S&P executive Georgia Hale, who is disoriented and wearing oversized dark sunglasses after having her eyes dilated during a morning eye appointment. FrontPoint immediately challenges her on why the agency has failed to downgrade subprime residential mortgage-backed securities when the underlying loans are demonstrably failing. Georgia dismisses their concerns, arguing that while delinquency rates have caused market anxiety, they remain strictly within S&P’s predictive mathematical models. When the FrontPoint team presses her on whether analysts have actually scrutinized the raw tape and loan-level data—pointing out that lenders have been handing out mortgages to anyone with a credit score and a pulse—she defensively asks what they imagine S&P staff do all day.

Mark refuses to be deflected and zeroes in on whether S&P has ever pushed back against Wall Street's investment banks. He demands to know if she can cite a single instance in the prior year where S&P reviewed the underlying loan tape and refused to give the issuing banks the exact AAA percentage they requested. Georgia initially insists that S&P is under no legal obligation to disclose its internal deliberations, but under Mark's relentless interrogation, she finally concedes the commercial reality behind their ratings. Georgia bluntly explains the structural conflict of interest driving the system: “If we don't give them the ratings, they'll go to Moody's right down the block. If we don't work with them, they will go to our competitors.”

The admission confirms Mark's worst suspicions: Standard & Poor's is operating not as an impartial auditor, but as a ratings shop selling high-grade stamps to preserve its client fees. When Mark tells her that if they can afford to make less money they should simply make less, Georgia retorts that she is bound by executive hierarchy and does not make company policy. She turns the moral argument back on FrontPoint, questioning their self-interest and directly asking Mark how many credit default swaps his fund owns. While Georgia points out that FrontPoint stands to profit immensely from the downgrades they are demanding, Mark stands his ground on the underlying truth of the crisis, prompting her to dismiss his crusade as pure hypocrisy.

- **Model justification:** S&P maintained that rising subprime delinquency figures fell entirely within their existing risk and pricing models. - **Competitive pressure:** S&P analysts rubber-stamped AAA ratings for investment banks out of fear that clients would take their bond-structuring fees down the block to Moody's. - **The moral impasse:** Georgia challenged FrontPoint's motives by asking, “How many credit default swaps do you own?”, concluding that Mark's short positions made him a hypocrite even if his financial assessment proved accurate.

## Notable quotes > [02:17](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mwdo17GT6sg&t=137s) If we don't give them the ratings, they'll go to Moody's right down the block. If we don't work with them, they will go to our competitors. — Georgia Hale

## Mentioned FrontPoint Partners, Morgan Stanley, Deutsche Bank, Mark Baum, Moody's, Standard & Poor's, Kathy Tao, Vinnie Daniel, Georgia Hale

## Video description "...apparently, uh, tying up six years of insurance payments in hopes of housing Armageddon is not a prudent investing." "...Okay. I want you to walk back in there and, very calmly and very politely, tell the risk assessors to **** off."

"You are selling ratings for fees...Rating Shop." "If you can afford to make less, make less."

[Source](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mwdo17GT6sg)

中文简报

《大空头》（2015）——FrontPoint Partners对质摩根士丹利风控人员与标普随着全美房贷违约激增，FrontPoint Partners不仅面临次级房贷债券价格令人费解的反常上涨，还收到了德意志银行一笔190万美元的即时追加保证金通知。摩根士丹利内部风控人员向该交易团队施压，要求其平掉做空头寸，促使Mark Baum指示团队彻底无视这些风控经理。随后，Baum及其同事实地前往标准普尔，质问高管Georgia Hale为何有毒债券仍能获得完美的AAA评级。在被追问该机构是否曾拒绝过投资银行所要求的评级时，Hale坦率承认，拒绝给予最高评级只会将丰厚的承销费拱手送给同街区的穆迪。全美次级房贷违约率大幅上升，但次级债价格却出现反常上涨而非下跌。 (0:14) 德意志银行发出追加保证金通知，要求FrontPoint Partners在收盘前追加190万美元的抵押品。 (0:14) 摩根士丹利风控人员向FrontPoint施压要求平掉空头头寸，理由是押注房市崩溃而连年支付保险费用并不审慎。 (0:14) 标普一名高管承认，该机构之所以对次级证券的AAA评级照单全收，是因为发债银行否则就会将业务转向穆迪。 (2:17)

Detailed notes — zh

## Background 该视频由 YouTube 频道 Extractor 于 2017 年 3 月 7 日发布。视频剪辑自电影《大空头》（The Big Short, 2015），页面简介引用了片中关于押注房地产崩溃被斥为“不审慎投资”、让风险评估员“滚蛋”以及痛斥标普等机构“出卖评级换取服务费”的经典台词。 ## TL;DR 视频展现了次级抵押贷款违约率暴涨，但次级房贷债券价格却反常上涨并导致 FrontPoint 被德意志银行追缴保证金的荒谬局面。面对母公司摩根士丹利风险管理部门强平空头头寸的施压，Mark Baum 强硬回绝并带队直奔评级机构标准普尔（S&P）对质。在一番激烈交锋中，标普主管 Georgia 最终道出行业黑幕：若不按投行要求批发 AAA 评级，客户就会转投街对面的穆迪；面对 Mark 对其沦为“评级杂货铺”的愤怒指责，Georgia 亦尖锐反讽 Mark 的正义感不过是建立在巨额做空利益上的“伪善”。 ## Atmosphere & style 全片充斥着焦躁、荒诞与极度压抑的戏剧张力。从彭博终端前暴怒骂娘、抵押品被反向追缴的混乱，到标普办公室里戴着散瞳墨镜的主管与愤怒投资团队的剑拔弩张，冷峻现实层层剥开。对话节奏凌厉、充满火药味，观者能够深切体会到底层金融体系被彻底腐蚀后的系统性荒谬，以及身处其中的主角既愤怒又无可奈何的虚无感。 ## Bulletin - [00:14](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mwdo17GT6sg&t=14s) 全美次贷违约率急剧攀升，但次贷债券价格反常走高，德意志银行要求 FrontPoint 在当日收盘前补缴 190 万美元抵押品。 - [00:14](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mwdo17GT6sg&t=14s) 摩根士丹利风险管理部门认为押注房地产崩盘锁定六年保费不属审慎投资，施压要求 FrontPoint 强平做空头寸，被 Mark 断然回绝。 - [02:17](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mwdo17GT6sg&t=137s) 标普主管 Georgia 承认，评级机构为了防止投行客户转向街对面的穆迪，被迫配合投行将劣质次贷资产包装维持在 AAA 评级。 - [02:17](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mwdo17GT6sg&t=137s) Mark 怒斥评级机构沦为出卖评级换取费用的商业杂货铺，Georgia 则反击 Mark 施压降级纯属为了个人持有的巨额做空 CDS 头寸牟利。 ## Key takeaways - [00:14](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mwdo17GT6sg&t=14s) 次级房贷违约率显著飙升，但打包而成的次级房贷债券价格未跌反涨，市场出现严重的资产与衍生品定价倒挂异象。 - [00:14](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mwdo17GT6sg&t=14s) 由于做空标的账面价格上涨，交易对手方德意志银行向 FrontPoint 施加流动性挤压，限期追加 190 万美元保证金。 - [00:14](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mwdo17GT6sg&t=14s) 底层资产虽然大面积恶化，但标普与穆迪等主流评级机构自上市后高度追逐自身利润，依旧将高风险 CDO 维持在最高档 AAA 评级。 - [00:14](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mwdo17GT6sg&t=14s) 母公司摩根士丹利的风控部门认定做空房地产的策略不符合审慎投资原则，试图强行清算 FrontPoint 手中的 CDS 互换仓位。 - [00:14](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mwdo17GT6sg&t=14s) Mark 坚定看空房贷资产，下令团队严辞拒绝摩根士丹利风控团队的平仓要求，并决定直接上门质问评级机构。 - [02:17](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mwdo17GT6sg&t=137s) 标普评级主管 Georgia 坚称抵押贷款拖欠率上升仍在标普内部数学模型与专业意见的容许范围之内。 - [02:17](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mwdo17GT6sg&t=137s) FrontPoint 质疑评级机构从未核验最底层的原始贷款明细，严重忽视了市场上零门槛滥发无抵押贷款的现实风险。 - [02:17](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mwdo17GT6sg&t=137s) 在 Mark 的步步追问下，标普承认在过去一年中几乎从未因为底层资产恶化而拒绝过大投行的 AAA 评级申请。 - [02:17](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mwdo17GT6sg&t=137s) 标普揭开了“评级寻购”（Rating Shopping）的潜规则：若不给投行发放 AAA 评级，投行就会把打包业务转包给穆迪等竞争对手。 - [02:17](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mwdo17GT6sg&t=137s) Mark 直指评级机构彻底丧失客观中立的裁判地位，其商业模式本质上是出卖评级换取承销费用的收费商店。 - [02:17](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mwdo17GT6sg&t=137s) Georgia 试图以听命于公司高层来推卸责任，遭到 Mark 对官僚体系逃避道德责任的严厉斥责。 - [02:17](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mwdo17GT6sg&t=137s) Georgia 直指 Mark 手中持有巨额空头和 CDS 头寸，其四处游说降级的道德光环背后同样充满巨大的私人牟利动机，嘲讽其为伪善的伪君子。 ## Detailed walkthrough ### [00:14](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mwdo17GT6sg&t=14s) 违约狂飙与荒唐的保证金追缴 FrontPoint Partners 团队正陷入一片混乱与极度的愤怒之中。Mark 刚从浴缸里抽身出来接通电话，急切地想找 Vinnie 问明情况。办公室这头，团队成员们守在彭博终端前破口大骂，完全无法理解眼前的数据逻辑：全美的次级抵押贷款违约率已经“穿透天花板”（gone through the roof），但市场上根本没有人跳楼，因为次级抵押贷款债券（subprime mortgage bonds）的价格不仅没有暴跌，反而还在上涨。更荒谬的是，德意志银行的 Jared Vennett 竟然打来电话，要求 FrontPoint 在收盘前追加 190 万美元的抵押品（collateral）。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 次级贷款违约与债券定价倒挂逻辑 accDescr: 展示次级贷款恶化却反向推高债券估值并引发保证金追缴的荒谬传导链 subgraph Market["市场异象"] A["次级房贷违约率飙升"] --> B["次级房贷债券价格反常上涨"] B --> C["评级机构坚持 AAA 评级"] end subgraph Squeeze["FrontPoint 承压"] B --> D["交易对手方追缴保证金"] D --> E["收盘前补缴 1.9M 抵押品"] F["摩根士丹利风险评估部门施压"] --> G["要求 Kathy 强制卖出空头互换"] end ``` 这种底层资产迅速恶化、衍生品价格却不降反升的严重倒挂，让整个团队深感被华尔街系统性地联合算计。底层贷款全部烂掉，由这些烂贷款打包而成的债券却变得更值钱，甚至反过来追缴做空者的保证金。Mark 愤怒地质问评级机构都在干什么，穆迪（Moody's）和标普（S&P）究竟有没有下调这些 CDO 或次级房贷债券的评级，得到的答复却是令人绝望的“完全没有，依然全都是 AAA”。在 Mark 看来，这些评级机构自从上市之后，眼里就只剩下自家的利润报表和股价。与此同时，FrontPoint 的母公司摩根士丹利（Morgan Stanley）内部也爆发了危机。摩根士丹利的风险评估人员直接找上了管理层的 Kathy，试图逼迫 FrontPoint 将持有的信用违约互换（CDS）头寸全盘抛售。团队成员转述风险评估人员的原话向 Mark 吐槽：“apparently tying up 6 years of insurance payments in hopes of housing Armageddon is not prudent investing”（显然，为了押注房地产市场的世界末日而锁定六年的保费支出，并不算审慎的投资）。Kathy 尚未做出决定，只是不断询问这是否又是 Mark 个人发起的某场堂吉诃德式的“十字军东征”。对此，Mark 下达了极其坚决的指令：让团队立刻走回会议室，“very calmly and very politely, tell the risk assessors to fuck off”（极其冷静、极其客气地叫那些风险评估人员滚蛋），随后直接动身前往标准普尔（S&P）去找负责评级的主管 Georgia 对质。 - 次级房贷违约率急剧攀升，但次级抵押贷款债券价格却反向走高。 - 德意志银行要求 FrontPoint 在当日收盘前补缴 190 万美元的抵押品。 - 穆迪与标普等主流评级机构仍将大量劣质次贷 CDO 维持在最高等级的 AAA 评级。 - 摩根士丹利风险管理部门认定该做空策略极其不审慎，施压要求 Kathy 强平头寸。 - 团队成员随后当面转达了 Mark 的原话，冷冷地通知摩根士丹利风险评估团队直接“滚蛋”。 --- ### [02:17](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mwdo17GT6sg&t=137s) 标普办公室的交锋：评级机构的收费生意 Mark 带着团队杀到了标准普尔的办公区。标普的评级主管 Georgia 戴着墨镜坐在办公桌后，抱怨自己的眼科医生日程排得太满，自己只能随便捡个空档去散瞳检查，导致整个上午都被彻底耽搁、眼前一片模糊看不清东西。简单的客套后，FrontPoint 团队直接摊牌，质问标普为何在底层资产明显迅速恶化的情况下，依旧迟迟不下调次级房贷债券的评级。Georgia 辩称，拖欠率上升确实引起了人们的担忧，但这依然在标普的“数学模型容许范围之内”，并坚称那是标普的专业意见。 FrontPoint 团队当面戳穿了这层谎言，质问 Georgia 究竟有没有拆开过原始数据带（crack the tape）、有没有逐笔核对过最底层的贷款明细——市场上只要有呼吸、有信用分的人都能借到钱，标普到底做没做过基本审核。紧接着，Mark 逼问 Georgia 能否拿出过去一年里哪怕一次由于底层资产恶化而拒绝给予投行 AAA 评级的案例或记录文件。面对无法回避的追问，Georgia 摘下墨镜，道出了评级机构不可告人的底层运作真相：“If we don't give them the ratings, they'll go to Moody's right down the block. If we don't work with them, they will go to our competitors. Not our fault, simply the way the world works.”（如果我们不给他们评级，他们就会直接走到街角对面的穆迪去。如果我们不配合，他们就会去找我们的竞争对手。这不是我们的错，世界就是这么运转的。） ```mermaid flowchart LR accTitle: 评级寻购商业模式 accDescr: 投行在评级机构之间通过威胁转移业务来强行索取 AAA 评级 Bank["投资银行<br/>(打包次级 CDO)"] -->|"支付评级服务费"| SP["标准普尔<br/>(S&P)"] SP -.->|"若拒绝给予 AAA 评级"| Bank Bank -->|"业务威胁转向"| Moody["竞争对手：穆迪<br/>(Moody's)"] Moody -->|"为了留住客户收取费用"| AAA["批发出售 AAA 评级"] ``` 这句话彻底引爆了现场。Mark 直指问题的核心——评级机构根本不是客观公正的裁判，而是在“拿评级换取服务费”（selling ratings for fees），本质上就是一家迎合投行客户的“评级杂货铺”（ratings shop）。当 Georgia 试图用“这并非我个人决定，我上面也有老板”来进行推脱时，Mark 更是毫不留情地斥责这种逃避责任的说辞，指出如果每个人都以“听命于老板”为借口，世上所有人做违法失德的烂事就都不用承担责任了。被逼到墙角的 Georgia 随即发起反唇相讥，直接反击 Mark 自身的利益动机：质问 Mark 手里到底囤了多少空头头寸与信用违约互换（CDS），认为 Mark 之所以四处逼迫机构下调评级，纯粹是为了让自己手里的做空头寸暴赚。Mark 坦然承受了这一攻击，冷冷地回击道“这并不代表我说的是错的”，而 Georgia 则给这场冲突定下了讽刺的注脚：“No, just makes you a hypocrite.”（不，这只是让你成了一个伪善的伪君子。） - 标普主管 Georgia 辩解称当前的房贷违约率仍在标普的风险模型预测范围之内。 - 标普承认由于商业竞争机制，如果不满足华尔街大投行的 AAA 评级要求，投行会立即转投对街的穆迪。 - Mark 怒斥评级机构丧失职业操守，彻底沦为出卖信用评级以牟取高额费用的“评级贩子”。 - Georgia 反戈一击，指出 Mark 大量做空次贷并持有巨额 CDS，逼迫评级下调背后同样深陷巨大的个人利益驱动。 ## Notable quotes > [02:17](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mwdo17GT6sg&t=137s) If we don't give them the ratings, they'll go to Moody's right down the block. If we don't work with them, they will go to our competitors. Not our fault, simply the way the world works. — Georgia ## Mentioned FrontPoint Partners, 摩根士丹利, 标准普尔, 穆迪, 德意志银行, Mark, Vinnie, Jared Vennett, Kathy, Georgia, CDO, CDS ## Video description "...apparently, uh, tying up six years of insurance payments in hopes of housing Armageddon is not a prudent investing." "...Okay. I want you to walk back in there and, very calmly and very politely, tell the risk assessors to **** off." "You are selling ratings for fees...Rating Shop." "If you can afford to make less, make less." [Source](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mwdo17GT6sg)

Source quotes

[2:17] Georgia: If we don't give them the ratings, they'll go to Moody's right down the block. If we don't work with them, they will go to our competitors. Not our fault, simply the way the world works.

Source quotes

[2:17] Georgia Hale: If we don't give them the ratings, they'll go to Moody's right down the block. If we don't work with them, they will go to our competitors.

Original transcript

[0:14] hi it's Mark I need to talk to Vinnie [0:16] right now we're just asking you to [0:18] explain to us you know why just how it [0:21] is that you are [ __ ] us because what [0:23] we are seeing [0:25] here Morgan Stanley building fast are we [0:29] hooked up the same computer [0:31] screen [ __ ] okay yeah one more time [0:35] okay out of the tub just Mark you there [0:39] did you hear mortgage defaults have gone [0:41] through the roof is anybody jumping off [0:42] the buildings yet why would they [0:44] subprime mortgage bond prices are up [0:45] what venet wants 1.9 million more in [0:48] collateral Buy close ven is asking us to [0:51] post collateral what the hell is going [0:52] on we don't know but do is on the phone [0:54] demanding payment call venet call that [0:56] little [ __ ] call venet tell him to get [0:58] his ass down here so stpr loans go bad [1:01] but subprime bonds which are made up of [1:02] subprime loans are more valuable I know [1:04] they want another 1.9 million by market [1:06] close what about the ratings agencies [1:08] Moody's S&P are they downgrading the [1:10] cdos or mortgage Bond where the ratings [1:12] agencies at they're the [ __ ] same [1:14] nope they're all still triaa what the [1:16] hell are you [ __ ] kidding me those [1:19] [ __ ] those [ __ ] they go [1:21] public and all they care about is their [1:22] bottom line and their [ __ ] hey Mark [1:24] that's not all the Morgan Stanley risk [1:26] guys are here they called in Kathy to [1:28] trying to convince her to make a seller [1:30] swaps apparently tying up 6 years of [1:32] insurance payments in hopes of housing [1:34] Armageddon is not prudent investing what [1:36] did Kathy say nothing yet she keeps [1:38] asking if this is one of your Crusades [1:40] okay I want you to walk back in there [1:42] very calmly very politely tell the risk [1:44] assessors to [ __ ] off and then meet me [1:47] over at standard and pores we're going [1:48] to talk to [1:50] Georg okay get that [ __ ] Jared vett in [1:52] this office I'm going to bash his [1:54] [ __ ] head [2:00] uh gentlemen I spoke with Mark bam he [2:03] says to [ __ ] [2:17] off I can't see a damn [2:21] thing my eye doctor's always busy I end [2:25] up taking any appointment they'll give [2:26] me then the whole morning gets shot to [2:28] hell [2:31] so all [2:33] righty front Point [2:36] Partners how can standard and pores help [2:38] you well we don't understand why the [2:41] ratings agencies haven't downgraded [2:43] subprime bonds since the underlying [2:44] loans are clearly deteriorating well the [2:47] delinquency rates do have people worried [2:49] but they're actually within our models [2:51] so says you you're convinced the [2:55] underlying mortgages in these bonds are [2:57] solid [2:58] loans that is our opinion you crack the [3:01] tape have you looked at the loan level [3:03] data what do you think we do giving [3:04] these loans to anybody with a with a [3:06] credit score in a p sir what do you [3:07] think we do here all day I'm not sure [3:09] that's why we're here here's what I [3:10] don't understand we check we recheck if [3:12] these mortgage bonds are so stable if [3:15] they are so Sol check your friend have [3:17] you ever refused to rate delusional [3:20] Georg stand behind have you ever refused [3:22] to rate any of these bonds upper [3:24] trenches triaa can we see the paperwork [3:27] on those oh I'm under no obligation to [3:29] share that information with you whoever [3:31] answer the question Georgia can you name [3:34] one time in the past year where you [3:35] checked the tape and you didn't give the [3:37] banks the AAA percentage they [3:42] wanted if we don't give them the ratings [3:44] they'll go to Moody's right down the [3:46] block if we don't work with them they [3:49] will go to our competitors not our fault [3:52] simply the way the world [3:57] Works holy [ __ ] yes now you [4:01] see and I never said that they're [4:04] selling ratings for fees they ratings [4:07] shot you can afford to make less make [4:10] less nobody said that and it is not my [4:13] decision I have a boss are you kidding [4:16] me yeah how' your boss do how how your [4:18] boss not in the kid is that the angle [4:21] you're taking so now anyone who has boss [4:23] OB just work for yourself can't be held [4:24] responsible for doing shitty and illegal [4:26] things what are you for no I am not for [4:30] Mr B I am not no and I wonder I wonder [4:34] what your incentives might be is it [4:36] maybe in your best interest to have the [4:38] ratings change is it [4:41] perhaps how many credit default swaps do [4:44] you own [4:46] H doesn't make me wrong no just makes [4:51] you a hypocrite