Atreides' Baker Sees Orbital Compute Resolving Grid Bottlenecks

Gavin Baker - Watts and Wafers - [Invest Like the Best, EP.473] — Colossus | Investing & Business Podcasts

Colossus | Investing & Business Podcasts

Power shortages will ease by 2028 as TSMC capacity discipline prevents an AI overbuild and space-based data centers solve long-term energy limits.

AI-assisted summary of Gavin Baker - Watts and Wafers - [Invest Like the Best, EP.473] — original source. Check the original for full context.

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## Background This episode of Invest Like the Best was published on May 20, 2026, by Colossus | Investing & Business Podcasts on RSS / web. It features host Patrick O'Shaughnessy in conversation with Gavin Baker, Founding Partner and CIO of Atreides Management, discussing the physical constraints defining the future of AI.

## TL;DR Gavin Baker explores 'watts and wafers' as the primary physical bottlenecks determining the next phase of the AI revolution. He analyzes how near-term power shortages on Earth will eventually give way to orbital compute in space, alongside the pivotal role TSMC plays in semiconductor supply discipline. Baker also provides deep commentary on valuation discrepancies across tech, the disaggregation of pre-fill and decode GPU architectures, and how frontier AI labs and hyperscalers are positioning themselves.

## Atmosphere & style The conversation carries an intellectually intense, highly analytical, and forward-looking tone between two seasoned market observers. Gavin Baker speaks with energetic conviction, blending granular hardware and macroeconomic technicality with broad historical and geopolitical analogies. The dialogue feels like an intimate, high-stakes briefing from the frontlines of technology investing, oscillating between hard-headed financial realism and profound awe at the speed of technological disruption.

## Key takeaways - `14:00` The central physical bottlenecks dictating the next phase of AI expansion are 'Watts' (energy/power infrastructure) and 'Wafers' (semiconductor manufacturing capacity). - `03:32` Anthropic demonstrated unprecedented growth by adding $11 billion in ARR practically overnight, burning roughly 80% less capital than OpenAI to reach comparable revenue scale. - `05:00` DeepSeek's release showed that reasoning models exponentially increase compute demand during inference, accelerating hardware demand rather than destroying it. - `15:45` Near-term terrestrial power shortages are expected to ease by 2027–2028, with orbital compute (space-based data center racks) serving as the long-term solution beyond 2028. - `25:00` TSMC's strict supply discipline acts as the primary buffer against a total AI market overbuild, holding the line to prevent excessive GPU capacity overshoot. - `25:00` Elon Musk's 'TerraFab' initiative aims to establish massive U.S. semiconductor manufacturing by partnering with Intel and drawing top talent from overseas foundries. - `30:30` Economic returns in AI remain concentrated at the frontier along the Pareto frontier, with capabilities following Richard Sutton's 'Bitter Lesson' where compute beats specialized algorithmic design. - `35:33` The AI business model is shifting from flat-rate consumer subscriptions to usage-based enterprise pricing ('pay by the drink'), unlocking massive ARR growth. - `42:49` Disaggregating pre-fill (context memory-bound) and decode (token bandwidth-bound) workloads extends older GPU operational lifespans and improves private credit financing structures. - `51:27` To survive competition from frontier model providers, application-layer startups must sit directly in the 'token path' or achieve non-obvious operational scale. - `57:43` A severe valuation disconnect exists in public markets, where semi-cap equipment trades at roughly 40x annualized earnings while DRAM memory trades at single-digit multiples. - `01:04:12` Major hyperscalers exhibit varying strategies, with Microsoft pivoting to hold compute internally, while Amazon and NVIDIA lead in deep engagement with chip startups.

## Detailed walkthrough ### `00:00` Introduction and Sponsor Announcements

The episode opens with sponsor messages from **Ramp**, **Rogo (Felix)**, **WorkOS**, and **Vanta**, highlighting their offerings for finance teams, AI-native automation, and enterprise infrastructure. Patrick O'Shaughnessy then introduces the episode as his sixth conversation with **Gavin Baker**, CIO and founding partner of **Atreides Management**. This milestone ties Gavin with Bill Gurley for the most appearances on *Invest Like the Best*.

Patrick sets the stage for the discussion, noting that Gavin's central thesis centers on **"Watts and Wafers"**—the twin physical constraints of energy and semiconductor manufacturing capacity that will define the next phase of the artificial intelligence revolution. Gavin will outline how near-term power shortages could ease around 2027–2028 before **orbital compute** (space-based data centers) scales up as a long-term solution, alongside why TSMC’s capacity decisions and GPU architecture disaggregation are crucial variables to track.

`02:29` Reflecting on the Extraordinary Market Setup of Early 2026

Patrick asks Gavin to reflect on living through the unique market and technology environment of March and April 2026. Gavin distinguishes between two types of market drawdowns: those where your thesis is invalidated and you must take your medicine, and those where stock price action diverges wildly from underlying fundamentals, allowing disciplined investors to lean in and build "pent-up alpha." He describes the spring of 2026 as one of the most extraordinary moments in the history of capitalism and American business.

While tech stocks and the NASDAQ were selling off, the fundamental growth in AI was breaking every historical benchmark. Gavin highlights **Anthropic**, which added an astounding **$11 billion in Annual Recurring Revenue (ARR)** in a tiny window. To put this in perspective, he contrasts it with three of the most successful SaaS and cloud companies of the last decade—Palantir, Snowflake, and Databricks—which collectively employ tens of thousands of people and took ten years to build their combined revenue base. Anthropic added that equivalent volume of business practically overnight.

- **Anthropic ARR Growth:** Added $11 billion in ARR, outstripping the decade-long cumulative growth of major SaaS giants in a single month. - **Historical Context:** The SaaS and cloud revolution created $5 to $10 trillion in market value, yet no company in that era exhibited an S-curve or exponential growth trajectory like current frontier AI labs.

`05:00` DeepSeek Retrospective, Geopolitics, and Tech Valuations

Gavin connects the March 2026 dynamics to the earlier market panic following the release of **DeepSeek** in early 2025. He recalls how DeepSeek published its paper on a U.S. holiday Monday, triggering an AI market sell-off a week later on "DeepSeek Monday." However, sharp observers quickly realized DeepSeek's reasoning models actually exponentially increased demand for compute during inference. Immediately following the paper, AWS availability zone prices in Asia doubled, GPU rental prices spiked, and DRAM prices went vertical.

A similar disconnect occurred in early 2026. Investors were panicked by macroeconomic and geopolitical events—specifically tension surrounding the **Strait of Hormuz**. Gavin points out that a closed Strait of Hormuz actually boosted American relative manufacturing competitiveness: U.S. natural gas (NG1 on Bloomberg)—a primary input for domestic electricity—dropped by 20%, whereas European and Asian energy prices doubled or tripled. Combined with the U.S. being the world's largest producer and exporter of oil and gas, the American economy was far less vulnerable to energy shocks than during the 1970s. This macro backdrop allowed tech stocks to trade at their cheapest valuations relative to the broader market in ten years, right at the peak of AI operational momentum.

- **DeepSeek Market Misconception:** Initial market fears of compute efficiency actually proved to be massively bullish for hardware, as reasoning models consumed far more tokens during inference. - **US Energy Advantage:** Natural gas price divergence gave American industrial and compute infrastructure a distinct cost advantage over international competitors during the Middle East crisis.

`08:40` Valuing Frontier AI Labs: Anthropic vs. OpenAI

Patrick and Gavin analyze the market valuations of **OpenAI** and **Anthropic**, the two reference assets for frontier AI models. Gavin stresses that despite their similar top-line numbers, the two companies exhibit vastly different structural Returns on Invested Capital (ROIC). Anthropic operates with a dramatically lower cost per token and has burned approximately **80% less capital** than OpenAI to reach a comparable operational scale. Gavin credits Anthropic's efficiency and capital management, referencing leadership under figures like CFO Sarah Friar at OpenAI and Krishna Rao at Anthropic.

Gavin argues that Anthropic is severely supply-constrained by available compute. If given unlimited compute access, Anthropic's unconstrained run-rate revenue (URR) could easily be **$100 billion to $200 billion** today. To stretch their compute supplies, Anthropic even deprecated the token output of Claude (with Claude Opus generating roughly 70% fewer tokens for identical queries), proving that token density and reasoning efficiency matter deeply.

- **Anthropic Capital Efficiency:** Achieved comparable revenue scale to OpenAI while burning roughly 80% less capital. - **Compute Bottleneck:** Anthropic trades at a implied conservative multiple relative to its unconstrained potential, as lack of hardware limits its true revenue potential. - **Elon Musk’s Investor Trust:** Gavin contrasts frontier lab fundraising with Elon Musk’s decade-long track record of compounding SpaceX at a low-30s percentage rate annually by deliberately not overpricing rounds, thus preserving an "investor trust superpower" that grants infinite capital access.

`14:00` Watts and Wafers: Navigating Near-Term Power Shortages

Transitioning to the episode's core theme, Gavin dives into the twin physical bottlenecks facing AI: **Watts (power)** and **Wafers (semiconductor manufacturing)**. On the energy front, private equity heavyweights (Blackstone, Apollo, KKR) note that the core bottleneck has shifted from raw power generation and silicon supply to local **zoning and regulatory approvals**. Companies are treading cautiously ahead of political midterms to avoid becoming targets over local power grid strains or corporate restructuring.

On the supply side, the industrial manufacturing of power infrastructure remains tight—such as the specialized casting of massive turbine blades, where Western manufacturing capabilities have lagged for decades. Nevertheless, Gavin remains confident that free-market capitalism will resolve terrestrial power shortages by **2027 or 2028** as new energy projects come online. Beyond 2028, however, the ultimate solution for power constraints will transition off-planet to **orbital compute**.

- **Primary Gatekeepers:** Local zoning, permitting, and regulatory approvals have surpassed chip availability as the top bottleneck for ground data centers. - **Timeline for Power Relief:** Terrestrial grid capacity and new energy installations are projected to ease the power crunch by 2027–2028.

`15:45` Redefining Orbital Compute: Racks in Space

Gavin clarifies common misconceptions about orbital compute. Critics often mock space data centers by imagining massive, Pentagon-sized structures floating in orbit. In reality, Gavin explains that orbital data centers consist of standard, modular server racks—similar in dimensions to an 8-foot-tall, 3,000-pound **NVIDIA Blackwell rack**—deployed individually as satellites into sun-synchronous orbits.

Equipped with 500-foot solar array wings that constantly face the sun and trailing radiators designed to dissipate heat into the vacuum of space, these satellites bypass ground-based power constraints entirely. SpaceX engineers at Starbase express extreme confidence in this architecture. Space-based compute nodes eliminate complex terrestrial wiring by linking individual racks across vacuum using high-speed optical lasers—a technology already battle-tested across thousands of **Starlink** satellites.

- **Physical Form Factor:** Orbital compute uses standardized racks (comparable to a 100 kW Blackwell rack) rather than mega-structures. - **Power Scale:** Starlink V3 satellites already operate at 20 kilowatts; scaling this up to 60 kW or 100 kW per satellite is a natural technical progression. - **Thermal Management & Maintenance:** Cooling is managed via passive directional radiators pointed away from the sun. Until autonomous humanoid robotics (like Optimus) can perform in-space repairs, failed racks will simply be replaced by launching new units via low-cost Starship payloads. - **Inter-Satellite Links:** Racks communicate via laser mesh networks in a vacuum, forming a distributed "virtual data center" in low Earth orbit.

`20:00` Terrestrial Data Centers, the Silicon Shield, and Bubble Risks

The economic viability of space-based matrix multiplication raises immediate questions about the fate of terrestrial infrastructure. America historically consumes every available energy source as aggressively as possible, and compute will follow the exact same dynamic. This makes the bear case for edge AI less convincing. Inference is well-suited for orbital compute, whereas training will remain on Earth for the foreseeable future. Consequently, terrestrial data centers will retain high value for decades. However, companies ramping up terrestrial power production and cooling infrastructure face structural timing risks as these long-lead capacity additions arrive just as the market recognizes the reality of orbital compute. Meanwhile, interim solutions are advancing rapidly, such as Boomerang Space repurposing jet engines for power generation.

On the silicon side, global compute output remains heavily reliant on a small group of senior engineers at TSMC in Taiwan. Accounting for a massive share of the nation's GDP, water, and electricity, these engineers view themselves as guardians of Morris Chang’s legacy and Taiwan's "silicon shield." Looking back at visiting the Hsinchu Science Park over two decades ago, asking if TSMC could ever catch Intel was met with the response that it was a "beautiful dream" for their grandchildren. TSMC ultimately achieved it, accelerated by Intel's self-inflicted mistakes. TSMC operates on an unusual culture of trust—highlighted by the fact that Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang has never signed a formal contract with TSMC, relying instead on verbal handshakes and long-term partnership fairness.

Every foundational technology shift—from canals and railroads to the South Sea Bubble and the dot-com era—has historically triggered an investment bubble. Markets correctly identify a transformative tech shift, leading to what Michael Mauboussin terms a "breakdown in diversity," where market consensus becomes universally bullish. This feeds a bubble that funds the buildout, eventually causing supply to overshoot demand and triggering a crash. However, the current AI buildout differs fundamentally from the 2000 telecom crash: * **Operating Cash Flow Funding:** Current capital expenditures are overwhelmingly funded by corporate cash flows rather than speculative debt. * **Asset Utilization:** Current GPUs are running at **100%** capacity utilization, unlike the **99%** unutilized dark fiber during the dot-com bubble. * **Valuation Discrepancies:** Equity valuations today remain far more anchored to underlying earnings than during prior technology frenzies.

`25:00` The Legacy of George Vanderheiden and the "TerraFab" Vision

Fighting a technology bubble prematurely can be career-ending for fund managers. The late Fidelity portfolio manager George Vanderheiden resisted the 1999 tech bubble, eventually retiring in early 2000 under immense client pressure for underperforming the market while holding **40%** of his portfolio in tobacco and **40%** in homebuilders. Over the subsequent three years, his value-oriented allocation outperformed the NASDAQ by roughly **20x to 30x**, proving his core adage that "being early is the same thing as being wrong."

Today, TSMC's strict supply discipline acts as the primary buffer preventing an catastrophic AI overbuild. If TSMC bowed to Jensen Huang's demands, Nvidia could potentially sell **$2 trillion to $3 trillion** in GPUs by 2026 or 2027, eventually forcing an oversupply crisis. If the industry avoids a bubble, TSMC deserves the credit for holding the line. While competitors like Intel or Samsung may eventually break discipline to capture unmet demand, TSMC's capacity expansion pacing remains the single most important variable for tracking bubble risk. Its **9 to 15 month** node lead maintains a delicate "Goldilocks zone" that keeps silicon supply tight enough to prevent an overbuild while starving competitors of scale.

Concurrently, Elon Musk's "TerraFab"—a joint venture involving SpaceX and Tesla aimed at building the world's largest semiconductor fab in the US—presents a structural shift: * **Intel Partnership:** TerraFab leverages Intel's 50-year institutional knowledge base, which sits only **3 to 5 quarters** behind the leading-edge nodes. * **Equipment Access:** Major semiconductor equipment suppliers (ASML, KLA, Lam Research, Applied Materials) are sending their top "A-teams" to support Musk's team, eager to prevent a TSMC monopsony. * **Talent Acquisition:** Musk's hardware engineering reputation draws elite global talent. Plans include building localized cultural hubs ("Taiwan Town," "Korea Town," "Japan Town") next to the Texas fab to relocate whole teams and top talent from overseas foundries. * **Execution Speed:** While traditional fabs take three years to construct, Musk's team previously built a massive data center in **122 days**, prompting Samsung to allocate him dedicated office space inside their Texas facility to manage their buildout pace.

`30:00` The Pareto Frontier, DeepSeek, and TurboQuant

Contrary to predictions that open-source models (like DeepSeek) would allow enterprise users to avoid heavy token spend, economic returns in AI remain overwhelmingly concentrated at the frontier. The distribution of intelligence versus cost—the Pareto frontier—has shifted rapidly over the past year:

``` Intelligence (Capability) | | [Anthropic / OpenAI] | [Grok 4.3] | [Gemini 3.1] | +---------------------------------- Cost ```

* **Google's Shift:** Nine months ago, Google dominated the Pareto frontier. However, conservative design choices on TPUv8 (meant to reduce dependence on Broadcom and Nvidia) cost them their leadership position. * **Current Leaders:** The Pareto frontier is currently held by Anthropic, OpenAI, and xAI's Grok 4.3 (which leads in cost efficiency for 500-billion parameter models), while Gemini 3.1 trails slightly behind. * **Richard Sutton’s Bitter Lesson:** The principle that general methods leveraging more compute always beat human domain-specific algorithmic ingenuity remains the core thesis of AI scaling.

A notable market scare in March stemmed from "TurboQuant"—a Google memory optimization paper detailing DRAM efficiency gains published during long-term agreement negotiations with Micron, Samsung, and SK Hynix. While financial markets panicked over potential DRAM demand destruction, practically zero AI hardware engineers believed TurboQuant would reduce net DRAM consumption.

The ultimate risk to the scaling narrative is a temporary violation of the Bitter Lesson caused by Artificial Superintelligence (ASI). If a **400 to 600 IQ** model emerges, its primary goal will be acquiring efficiency to maximize its own intelligence and resources, potentially inventing algorithmic breakthroughs that temporarily reduce raw compute demand.

`35:00` Usage-Based Pricing and Continual Learning

While harness engineering and runtimes (providing models with context, tools, and memory states) significantly boost performance, the market's business model is undergoing a structural shift. The standard **$250 to $300 per month** flat-rate subscription tier now subjects power users to heavy rate-limiting and degraded model performance, as newer models produce significantly fewer redundant tokens. To access full model reasoning capabilities, users must migrate to enterprise usage-based pricing ("pay by the drink").

This transition mirrors the mobile telecom industry between 2005 and 2007, where growth exploded as users moved beyond capped plans to hybrid usage models. Usage-based pricing will enable companies like OpenAI and Anthropic to easily surpass **$200 billion in ARR**, as enterprises deploy hundreds of concurrent autonomous agents per employee. However, this dynamic creates a growing divide between enterprise users with unlimited API access and consumer tier users running rate-limited models.

The next critical technical leap involves **continual learning**—a model's ability to dynamically update its weights in real time: * **Current Mechanics:** Current models rely on reinforcement learning (RL) during mid-training or post-training RL gyms, requiring millions of repetitive trials to ingest simple rules. * **Human Efficiency:** Human learning is hyper sample-efficient (e.g., touching a hot stove once teaches permanent avoidance). * **Future Takeoff:** Achieving true real-time weight updating would trigger an extremely fast takeoff trajectory, representing one of the final major hurdles alongside solving context memory limits.

`40:00` Startup Chip Architectures, the "Iron Triangle," and Disaggregation

Gavin Baker weighs in on the thousands of startup "flowers blooming" in the semiconductor space to bypass compute bottlenecks. He views this explosion of competition as healthy for the tech ecosystem—and ultimately beneficial even for NVIDIA CEO Jensen Huang, as it lowers potential regulatory antitrust scrutiny. Drawing an analogy to the military's "iron triangle" of tank design (where engineers must make trade-offs between attack, defense, and mobility), Baker explains that chip architects face physical constraints dictated by TSMC's manufacturing rules. Competitors like Google's TPU, Amazon's Trainium, and AMD's MI series are essentially attempting to build a better GPU. Currently, Baker notes that Trainium 3 is "tugging on Superman’s cape" as it ramps into production with a switch scale-up network needed to economically run Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) models, while AMD continues to fly from behind.

For semiconductor startups, Baker’s rule of thumb is that capturing even a 1% market share will be worth $100 billion. However, trying to beat NVIDIA head-on at making a standard GPU is a losing game. NVIDIA gets better pricing from TSMC than any 200-person startup, receives advanced insights into TSMC’s roadmap, and enjoys early visibility across every major frontier model builder. Instead, successful startups must build something fundamentally *different* and inherently *hard* to replicate.

The emerging architectural split between pre-fill (understanding the prompt/context, which is memory-capacity bound) and decode (generating output tokens, which is memory-bandwidth bound) provides a broader canvas for startup innovation: * **The Naval Analogy:** Baker cites his colleague Andrew Fox, who likens pre-fill to "loading the cannon" on an 18th-century British warship, while decode is "firing" the cannon. * **Cerebras’ Wafer-Scale Approach:** Atreides was a venture investor in Cerebras, which took the difficult route of building wafer-scale computers. Despite facing constraints where the chip's internal compute/memory far exceeds its shoreline I/O bandwidth, Cerebras is tackling this by attempting to bond optical wafers directly on top. * **Resilience:** Building custom silicon requires extreme grit; it took Cerebras three generations of chips to refine their architecture after early setbacks.

`45:00` Extending GPU Lifespans and the Impact on Private Credit

The disaggregation of pre-fill and decode is poised to transform the financial economics of AI infrastructure, effectively saving the private credit market. Private credit lenders are currently taking severe losses on SaaS software loans. Many investors previously underwrote GPU debt assuming a short three-to-four-year lifespan, while AI skeptics claimed rapid tech cycles meant GPUs were obsolete in one or two years. Baker strongly pushes back against this narrative.

By placing specialized inference hardware (such as Cerebras systems or Groq LPUs, which NVIDIA effectively acquired) in front of older generation GPUs like Hopper or even Ampere, companies can offload pre-fill tasks to the older chips. This extends the functional life of GPUs to 10 or 15 years, running them until they literally melt. Lowering the depreciation risk mathematically alters the cost of financing the AI buildout: * **Cheaper Financing:** Instead of high-yield debt terms (like CoreWeave's lowest financing rates in the low sevens), GPU fleets can be financed at 5% to 6% interest rates. * **Hyperscaler Fleets:** Citing Cotu investor Jamin Ball, Baker notes that while "sellers of shortage" (like NVIDIA) have outperformed "buyers of shortage" (the hyperscalers), hyperscalers possess massive existing CPU fleets. Because agentic workflows rely heavily on CPUs for orchestration and tool calls, these older assets will retain immense economic value.

`50:00` The Application Layer, Token Path, and Open Source Game Theory

Shifting to AI-native founders outside of hardware, Baker addresses the struggle of creating lasting software moats. Under Jensen Huang’s "five-layer cake of AI," profits currently accrue to energy, data centers, chips, and frontier models rather than the application layer. Successful early breakout applications like Cursor, Cognition, and Anthropic's coding tools succeeded by focusing aggressively on code. Baker references Replit founder Amjad Masad’s observation that coding may be the shortest path to Artificial Superintelligence (ASI), as an AI that codes can program itself to perform any subsequent task.

To survive, application-layer startups must either operate within the "token path" (a concept popularized by Jamin Ball, exemplified by data platforms like Databricks) or build hard, non-obvious operational scale before model companies subsume their functionality: * **Data Moat Vulnerability:** Baker cautions against believing a narrow vertical data moat will protect startups. If that data is generated by humans, frontier labs can likely train cheaper, broader models that render vertical niches obsolete. * **Jensen's Countermove & Anti-Distillation:** Baker believes NVIDIA could develop a frontier-level model if pushed, using open-source models as a strategic counterweight to frontier model labs trying to move down the stack. * **Chinese Open Source & Distillation:** Current Chinese open-source models (e.g., DeepSeek) heavily rely on distilling American frontier tokens—sometimes built on as few as 150,000 original reasoning traces scraped via APIs. American labs are now fighting back with anti-distillation techniques. * **The New Prisoner's Dilemma:** Frontier labs face a game theory dilemma over whether to release their top-tier models via API. If a lab holds back to prevent distillation, a defecting competitor can release their model, capture massive revenue, and convert those financial resources directly into model intelligence.

Here is the detailed walkthrough for Part 4 of the conversation.

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`55:00` Overinvesting in Cybersecurity, "The Last Samurai," and AI-Assisted Workflows

Gavin Baker explains how Atreides is preparing for a world dominated by ultra-capable AI systems like "Mythos 3" or "Mythos 4." Defensively, his main focus is aggressively overinvesting in cybersecurity. He strongly advises everyone to set up a family or company safe word that cannot be socially engineered, leaving all digital devices behind—literally walking down to the ocean—to establish it. This is designed to combat sophisticated voice and video cloning scams where an AI-generated simulation of a relative or colleague calls via FaceTime asking for funds. On the analytical side, Baker reflects on his own role using an analogy from the movie *The Last Samurai*. He describes Tom Cruise’s character as a Civil War veteran hired during the Meiji Restoration to train peasant armies, who ultimately realizes that traditional methods are rendered obsolete by modern weaponry. The machine gun represents AI: *"If we do not all become masters of the machine gun, we're going to get mastered."* Baker remains optimistic that his decades of investing experience will allow him to integrate these "machine guns" into his workflow and continue contributing human value for a long time.

Within Atreides, AI agents are actively running to optimize research and daily operations. Baker notes that his most useful personal agent generates curated summaries of the key insights from industry podcasts and speeches. Given that tech leaders—including Jensen Huang, Elon Musk, Dario Amodei, and executives from OpenAI, xAI, Google, Cursor, Fireworks, and Base10—produce roughly six hours of content daily, AI is essential for finding needles in haystack commentary. Another critical internal tool analyzes corporate proxy statements to evaluate executive compensation structures. It automatically breaks down whether management is rewarded via basic RSUs or performance stock units (PSUs) and tracks changes over time, saving analysts countless hours of labor-intensive work.

- **Defensive Security Protocol:** Establish offline, non-socially-engineerable safe words with family and colleagues to verify identity against hyper-realistic AI video and voice impersonations. - **Key External Sources Tracked:** OpenAI, xAI, Google, Cursor, Fireworks, Base10, as well as commentary from Jensen Huang, Elon Musk, and Dario Amodei. - **High-Value Analytical Agent:** Parsing proxy filings to evaluate executive alignment through PSU (Performance Stock Unit) metrics versus standard RSUs.

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`57:43` Cross-Sectional Valuation Distortions and Commodity-Cycle Risks

Baker voices growing concern over extreme valuation dislocations within the technology ecosystem. He points out that semi-cap equipment manufacturers trade around 40 times next quarter's annualized earnings, whereas DRAM memory providers trade at mid-single-digit multiples. In previous peak cycles, this valuation gap was far narrower (e.g., 5x vs. 12x, or 3x vs. 45x). While semiconductor equipment business models have improved relative to memory—partly due to recurring maintenance revenues—a 1,000% multiple gap makes no financial sense, especially given the margin expansion driven by High Bandwidth Memory (HBM). Similarly, NVIDIA remains near historic lows relative to the broader market, effectively pricing in an unfathomable amount of market share loss, while low-quality or adjacent industrial plays command massive premiums.

This dynamics mirrors a classic commodity cycle: during severe supply shortages, high-cost, low-quality suppliers experience the largest percentage gains because they transition from the brink of insolvency to gushing cash flow. Hyperscalers are forced to buy from unreliable, high-cost vendors whose components suffer high failure rates simply because no other capacity exists. Retail investors on social media (such as X/Twitter and Reddit) often pump these low-quality names to extreme valuations, even though institutional investors know these stocks will plummet once supply normalizes. Baker finds comfort in holding high-quality compounders with reasonable valuations, contrasting them with speculative bubbles in areas like nuclear power, quantum computing, and small-cap retail favorites.

- **Valuation Disconnect:** Semi-cap equipment trading at ~40x annualized earnings vs. DRAM companies trading in the mid-single digits. - **Historical Comparison:** Historical peak-cycle multiples for memory were around 5x vs. 12x for equipment. - **Commodity Cycle Dynamic:** High-cost, low-quality component manufacturers outperform early in supply shortages due to extreme cash-flow swings, but carry massive downside risk once capacity catches up.

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`01:01:45` Market Baskets, Disaggregation, and the Mis-Categorization Opportunity

Baker highlights how market dynamics shifted dramatically in January. During 2024 and 2025, the AI trade moved in tight correlation—investors could hold long GPU compute or scale-up networking while hedging with short power or memory positions. However, those cross-sectional correlations broke down completely. Scale-up networking began rallying while scale-out networking fell, and DRAM underperformed NAND and HDDs (hard disk drives). This shift occurred as market participants became educated on specific subsectors, leading to rigid factor baskets.

This breakdown created significant mispricing opportunities in miscategorized companies. Baker highlights Astera Labs as a prime example, having first invested during their Series C round. The broader market mistakenly placed Astera into "copper loser" baskets under the assumption that optical connections would rapidly replace copper interconnections. However, because Astera’s core product lineup includes switches—where both copper and optical interconnects are used to link switches to accelerators—being a switch provider means they intrinsically benefit from accelerator deployment regardless of the physical medium.

- **Market Shift:** The tight correlation among AI subsectors dissolved in January, requiring fine-grained stock selection rather than sector-wide basket trades. - **Astera Labs Case Study:** Misgrouped into "copper loser" baskets despite switch architectures utilizing both copper and optical interconnects to accelerators.

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`01:04:12` Hyperscaler Review: Google, Meta, Amazon, and Microsoft

Baker provides a rapid-fire analysis of the major public hyperscalers navigating the AI landscape:

- **Google:** While Google lost its initial exclusive TPU advantage as the broader market scaled GPU compute, its sheer volume of installed compute capacity remains unmatched. Google holds immense structural advantages through search, YouTube video data (which is uniquely valuable for robotics training), and accelerating Google Cloud Platform (GCP) growth. - **Meta:** Mark Zuckerberg receives immense credit for turning Meta into an AI-first organization faster and more aggressively than its peers. Meta secured massive talent and compute contracts early, and its MSL (Meta AI Synthetic Lab) released Muse—a major positive surprise that, while not quite on the absolute Pareto frontier with OpenAI or Anthropic, demonstrated rapid rate-of-change progress. - **Amazon:** AWS occupies a powerful position due to its custom Trainium chips and the impending P&L productivity gains from automation and robotics across its retail footprint. Internal Nova models are also performing better than public perception suggests. - **Microsoft:** CEO Satya Nadella made bold, courageous decisions to pivot strategy. After a brief hesitation in early 2025 where standard CapEx return algorithms faltered, Microsoft shifted focus from merely reselling GPU capacity to OpenAI toward reserving compute internally for its own products and proprietary model development. While short-term Azure growth took a hit—and the market punished the stock—this strategy ensures Microsoft is not wholly dependent on external API-accessible frontier models.

- **Hyperscaler Engagement with Startups:** Amazon and NVIDIA lead the industry in deep startup engagement, followed by Google. Broadcom remains the premier ASIC partner for custom chips, whereas AMD displays virtually zero engagement with early-stage startups.

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`01:10:00` Missing Engagement from Hyperscalers and Value Destruction at the Application Layer

Gavin Baker expresses surprise and concern over the fact that certain major hyperscalers—specifically Microsoft and Meta—have minimal to zero direct engagement with the emerging ecosystem of specialized AI chip startups. In contrast, NVIDIA, AMD, and Google maintain active relationships with these nimble teams. Baker notes that many of the world's best engineering teams are leaving large public corporations to join agile startups, making this lack of engagement a potentially significant oversight and competitive disadvantage for the passive hyperscalers.

Reflecting on the broader impact of AI, Baker and host Patrick O'Shaughnessy discuss the severe value destruction taking place at the application layer. While high-profile AI-native successes like Cursor and Cognition garner massive attention, AI has net destroyed trillions of dollars in application-layer economic value. Baker highlights a stark, defining metric of the current era: the companies generating the most economic value today are those with the highest effective ratio of utilized GPUs per human.

* **GPU Allocation:** Current value generation heavily favors companies optimizing high GPU-to-employee operational ratios. * **Hyperscaler Strategy:** NVIDIA, AMD, and Google actively engage with specialized hardware startups, whereas Meta and Microsoft have historically shown far less involvement in this specific early-stage hardware layer.

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`01:12:00` Personal Safety Risks and Geopolitical Instability

As AI becomes deeply politicized, Baker voices growing concern regarding personal safety for prominent leaders in the space. Citing the alarming incident where Molotov cocktails were thrown at OpenAI CEO Sam Altman’s home, Baker warns that society is entering a high-beta, high-variance environment. He worries that rising political violence in the United States will increasingly target key figures steering the AI revolution.

On the geopolitical stage, AI dominance is already reshaping global power dynamics. Pointing to the war in Ukraine, Baker argues that Ukrainian military successes stem not merely from hardware capabilities like drones, but from wielding the best battlefield AI outside of the United States and Israel. This emerging reality presents a double-edged sword: while an American AI lead benefits the West, it risks destabilizing foreign adversaries who must figure out how to respond to an unprecedented technological asymmetry.

* **Targeted Violence:** Growing concerns over the physical security of prominent AI figures following attacks on industry leaders. * **Battlefield AI:** Autonomous and AI-driven combat systems in Ukraine represent a practical manifestation of AI reshaping real-world military doctrine.

---

`01:13:30` Pax Americana, Social Equity, and Optimism for the AI Future

To frame the geopolitical risks, Baker reflects on historical precedents, drawing a parallel to the post-1945 "Pax Americana." Following World War II, the United States held an absolute nuclear monopoly yet chose to rebuild former adversaries like Germany and Japan rather than conquer the globe. Baker hopes American AI supremacy leads to a similar era of global stability rather than conflict. He underscores his deep personal optimism by sharing the story of a father who utilized laboratory compute and AI agents to discover a life-saving drug for his daughter's rare, incurable disease, dramatically changing her life.

Despite his stance as an "AI maximalist," Baker cautions that AI acts as a societal event horizon and discontinuity. He stresses that while Luddite critiques of technological progress will ultimately prove wrong, leaders must humbly and thoughtfully address public anxieties. He highlights the dystopian risk of top-tier AI being accessible only to the ultra-wealthy, arguing that democratic access is essential to ensure technology benefits all of humanity.

* **Historical Context:** Compares AI dominance to the post-WWII nuclear monopoly and the subsequent Pax Americana. * **Medical Breakthroughs:** AI agents and compute allocations are actively accelerating drug discovery for rare genetic diseases. * **Equitable Access:** AI leaders must ensure elite capabilities do not remain locked behind immense capital barriers.

## Notable quotes > `25:00` being early is the same thing as being wrong. — George Vanderheiden

> `55:00` If we do not all become masters of the machine gun, we're going to get mastered. — Gavin Baker

## Mentioned Gavin Baker, Patrick O'Shaughnessy, Atreides Management, Anthropic, OpenAI, SpaceX, Tesla, Elon Musk, TSMC, NVIDIA, Jensen Huang, DeepSeek, Google, Meta, Amazon, AWS, Microsoft, Satya Nadella, Mark Zuckerberg, Cerebras, Astera Labs, Intel, Samsung, ASML, KLA, Lam Research, Applied Materials, Palantir, Snowflake, Databricks, Sarah Friar, Krishna Rao, Morris Chang, George Vanderheiden, Michael Mauboussin, Richard Sutton, Andrew Fox, Jamin Ball, Amjad Masad, Sam Altman, Dario Amodei, Ramp, Rogo, WorkOS, Vanta, Ridgeline, Starlink, Blackwell, Grok, Gemini, TPU, Trainium, Cursor, Cognition, Replit

[Source](https://traffic.megaphone.fm/CLS8755474209.mp3?updated=1779241717)

中文简报

Atreides的Baker认为轨道计算将化解电网瓶颈 随着TSMC的产能纪律防止AI过度建设,以及天基数据中心解决长期能源限制,电力短缺将在2028年得到缓解。 Gavin Baker探讨了作为决定AI革命下一阶段核心物理瓶颈的“瓦特与晶圆”。他分析了地面近期的电力短缺最终将如何让位于太空中的轨道计算,以及TSMC在半导体供应纪律中发挥的关键作用。Baker还就科技行业的估值差异、预填充(pre-fill)与解码(decode)GPU架构的分离,以及前沿AI实验室和超大规模云厂商的战略布局进行了深入评述。 Anthropic 在极短时间内新增了 110 亿美元的 ARR,且达到与 OpenAI 相当的营收规模所消耗的资金减少了约 80%,展现出前所未有的资本效率。 (3:32) 决定 AI 扩张下一阶段的核心物理瓶颈是“瓦特”(电力)和“晶圆”(半导体产能);地面电力紧张预计在 2027 至 2028 年间缓解,而轨道计算(太空数据中心)将成为 2028 年后的长期解决方案。 (14:00) 台积电严格的扩产纪律是防止 AI 行业出现过度建设与泡沫破裂的核心缓冲屏障;与此同时,埃隆·马斯克正联手英特尔并吸引海外代工人才,推进在美国建设超级半导体工厂“TerraFab”。 (26:24) Prefill 与 Decode 的计算架构解耦有望将老一代 GPU 的有效使用寿命延长至 10 到 15 年,从而大幅降低 AI 基础设施的折旧与债务融资成本。 (45:00)

Reading summary

Gavin Baker argues that artificial intelligence scaling is governed by the physical constraints of 'Watts and Wafers'—terrestrial power grids and semiconductor manufacturing capacity. While these bottlenecks temporarily cap growth and dictate infrastructure architecture, Baker contends they also protect the industry from a debt-fueled bubble by enforcing supply discipline. Power Grid Bottlenecks and the Orbital Compute Horizon (14:00) Baker identifies regulatory permitting and local zoning approvals, rather than raw generation or silicon availability, as the primary immediate barriers to terrestrial data center expansion. Private equity sponsors report that ground-based power shortages should ease between 2027 and 2028 as new domestic utility capacity comes online. In the interim, developers are deploying stopgap solutions, such as repurposing jet engines for localized power generation. Beyond 2028, Baker expects incremental compute scaling to transition off-planet into sun-synchronous orbital data centers. Rather than monolithic structures, this architecture relies on modular, standardized satellite racks—comparable in scale to a 100-kilowatt NVIDIA Blackwell unit—equipped with 500-foot solar arrays and directional radiators that dissipate heat into space. Drawing on SpaceX Starlink technology, these distributed orbital nodes would link across a vacuum using optical laser mesh networks, bypassing terrestrial land and power constraints entirely. Silicon Supply Discipline and Technology Bubble Dynamics (20:00) Unlike the 2000 telecom crash, which was financed with speculative debt and resulted in 99% unutilized dark fiber, Baker observes that current AI hardware runs at 100% capacity utilization and is funded primarily by corporate operating cash flows. TSMC's strict capacity discipline acts as the critical barrier preventing an catastrophic industry overbuild; Baker asserts that if TSMC expanded indiscriminately to meet unconstrained demand, NVIDIA could sell $2 trillion to $3 trillion in hardware, culminating in an oversupply crash. Baker also notes severe valuation distortions across public markets. Semi-cap equipment manufacturers trade around 40 times annualized earnings, whereas DRAM providers trade at mid-single-digit multiples despite margin expansion from High Bandwidth Memory. Baker compares this discrepancy to classic commodity cycle behavior, where low-quality, high-cost suppliers experience outsized price gains during severe supply crunches but carry substantial downside once capacity normalizes. Hardware Disaggregation and Extended GPU Lifespans (45:00) AI compute is structurally bifurcating between prompt context ingestion ('pre-fill,' which is memory-capacity bound) and output token generation ('decode,' which is memory-bandwidth bound). Baker explains that placing specialized inference hardware, such as Cerebras wafer-scale systems or Groq LPUs, in front of older-generation GPUs allows operators to route pre-fill tasks to older Hopper or Ampere chips. This architectural disaggregation counteracts claims that GPUs face rapid obsolescence within one or two years. By extending functional chip lifespans to 10 or 15 years, data center operators significantly lower depreciation risk. In Baker's view, this adjustment alters AI infrastructure economics, enabling operators to secure lower financing rates of 5% to 6% rather than high-yield debt terms in the low sevens. Frontier Economics, Token Pricing, and Application Vulnerability (50:00) Economic value in AI remains concentrated at the capability frontier—led by Anthropic, OpenAI, and xAI's Grok 4.3—and within organizations boasting high ratios of utilized GPUs per employee. Baker contrasts Anthropic's capital efficiency with OpenAI, noting Anthropic burned approximately 80% less capital to reach a comparable operational scale. Facing compute shortages, labs are shifting away from $250-to-$300 monthly flat subscriptions toward enterprise usage-based pricing, a structural transition Baker compares to mobile telecom's expansion between 2005 and 2007. Conversely, Baker cautions that AI has net destroyed economic value across traditional application-layer software. Startups relying on narrow, human-generated vertical data moats remain vulnerable, as frontier labs can train broader models that subsume vertical tools. Simultaneously, frontier labs confront a prisoner's dilemma regarding API access, as competitors and foreign open-source models scrape reasoning traces—sometimes as few as 150,000 tokens—to distill frontier capabilities. Baker views the AI transition as an irreversible technological discontinuity akin to the post-1945 nuclear monopoly, balancing profound optimism for scientific and medical breakthroughs against warnings of geopolitical friction, executive safety risks, and the danger of capability access becoming restricted to elite institutions.

精炼阅读摘要

Atreides Management 首席投资官 Gavin Baker 提出,电力供给(Watts)与半导体晶圆制造能力(Wafers)是决定人工智能革命进程的核心物理约束。他认为地面电网瓶颈将在 2027 至 2028 年迎来缓解并最终向太空轨道算力过渡,而台积电的产能纪律与推理架构解耦正在深刻重塑市场估值、资本开支及行业泡沫风险。 能源审批瓶颈与太空轨道数据中心 (14:00) Baker 指出,当前陆地数据中心扩张的主要阻碍已从单纯的芯片短缺或电力生产转向地方区划与监管审批;Blackstone、Apollo 等私募股权机构亦证实相关许可流程高度滞后。此外,涡轮机叶片等重型电气设备的制造短缺同样限制了供给。不过,Baker 预计自由市场将在 2027 至 2028 年逐步解决陆地能源短缺。在此之后,算力扩张将不可避免地转向低地球轨道的太空数据中心。 针对外界对太空算力的质疑,Baker 阐述其物理形态并非庞大的单一空间站,而是由标准化机柜(如重约 3,000 磅、功耗约 100 kW 的 NVIDIA Blackwell 机柜)构成的太阳同步轨道卫星集群。这类卫星配备约 500 英尺的单向太阳能电池阵列,通过背向太阳的辐射散热板排热,并在真空中利用激光网状网络实现互联。SpaceX 工程师对该架构展现出极高信心,未来若机柜故障,将直接依托 Starship 的低发射成本实现整机更替,彻底绕开地面电网与变电配电的物理瓶颈。 台积电产能约束与地球晶圆厂构想 (20:00) 在晶圆制造端,全球先进制程算力仍严重依赖台积电。Baker 认为,台积电严苛的产能扩张纪律扮演了防止 AI 基础设施出现毁灭性过剩的缓冲垫。如果台积电完全顺应市场全部订单冲动,NVIDIA 可能会在 2026 至 2027 年售出高达 2 万亿至 3 万亿美元的 GPU,从而导致严重崩盘。台积电维持 9 至 15 个月的技术代际领先,既压制了恶性过建,也延缓了竞争对手扩大规模的机会。当前 AI 资本支出与 2000 年电信泡沫存在本质区别:当前的投入由经营性现金流而非投机性债务支持,且 GPU 保持 100% 满负荷利用,而非当时 99% 闲置的暗光纤。 与此同时,Elon Musk 牵头 SpaceX 与 Tesla 推动的“TerraFab”项目正试图打破这一垄断。该方案计划利用 Intel 积淀 50 年的制造经验体系,并获得了 ASML、KLA、Applied Materials 等半导体设备巨头顶级团队的全力支持,以制衡潜在的买方垄断格局。结合此前 122 天内建成大型数据中心的工程执行力,Musk 团队计划在得克萨斯州晶圆厂旁建立国际工程师聚集社区,以期突破传统晶圆厂三年的建设周期周期壁垒。 前沿模型阵营分化与商业变现转型 (8:40) 在前沿大模型领域,Baker 强调不同机构的投入资本回报率(ROIC)已呈现极度分化。Anthropic 在达到与 OpenAI 相似的收入规模时,所消耗的资本较后者少约 80%,展示出极高的资本使用效率与单 Token 成本优势。Baker 估算,若消除算力供给限制,Anthropic 当前的无约束年化经常性收入(ARR)可达 1,000 亿至 2,000 亿美元。此外,帕累托前沿(Pareto frontier)在过去一年快速演变,目前由 Anthropic、OpenAI 及 xAI 的 Grok 4.3 领跑,而 Google 早期因 TPUv8 的保守设计暂时落后。 在商业模式层面,现行的每月 250 至 300 美元包月订阅制正严重限制高级模型的推理吞吐,推动行业向企业级按量付费(pay-by-the-drink)转变。这一变迁类似于 2005 至 2007 年移动通信取消流量封顶后的爆发期,将支撑头部大模型公司年收入突破 2,000 亿美元。技术路线方面,Richard Sutton 的“苦涩教训”(通用算力最终压倒人工特化算法)依然成立,除非未来具备 400 至 600 IQ 的人工超智能(ASI)出现并自主研发出极端降耗的全新算法机制。 架构解耦延长芯片周期与信贷重估 (40:00) Baker 阐述了当前芯片架构中预填充(Pre-fill)与解码(Decode)的物理分工。预填充受限于内存容量,如同“给火炮装填弹药”;解码则受限于内存带宽,如同“开火射击”。初创公司若想在半导体领域立足,不能与享有台积电最优惠定价与深度生态绑定的 NVIDIA 正面竞争,而必须在非通用架构上寻求突破,例如 Cerebras 通过晶圆级集成与光学晶圆键合来突破 I/O 带宽瓶颈。 这种架构层面的解耦彻底重塑了 AI 基础设施的资产折旧与私募信贷经济学。过去,信贷机构普遍按照 3 至 4 年对 GPU 资产进行折旧清算,甚至承受高达 7% 以上的高收益率债务成本。然而,通过将专门的推理芯片(如 Groq 或 Cerebras 系统)置于 Hopper 或 Ampere 等旧款 GPU 前端负责预填充,数据中心可以将旧芯片的使用寿命大幅延长至 10 到 15 年。折旧风险的消除使得计算集群的债务融资成本下降至 5% 到 6%,在软件企业信贷承压之际为重资产信贷市场提供了结构性支撑。 估值扭曲、应用层防御与地缘不确定性 (57:43) 在二级市场上,Baker 提示了显著的估值脱节风险。目前半导体设备厂商的交易估值高达约 40 倍年化预期收益,而高带宽内存(HBM)核心供应商 DRAM 厂商仅处于个位数市盈率;在行业极度紧缺期,高成本、低质量的边缘供应商往往由于利润短期弹性过大而被散户过度推高,孕育了典型的大宗商品周期见顶风险。在软件层,Jensen Huang 提出的“AI 五层蛋糕”表明利润大多流向了能源、数据中心与芯片,狭隘的人工专有数据护城河极易被前沿模型直接跨越,唯有紧扣核心处理路径(Token Path)并保持极高人均 GPU 算力比的企业才能存活。 此外,Baker 警告称社会与政治层面的波动正在加剧。顶尖 AI 领袖的个人安全风险与针对性暴力正在抬头;在军事上,乌克兰战场的实战表现表明无人系统背后的前沿算法已成为非对称战争的核心支柱。面对这种巨大的能力不对称,Baker 呼吁警惕高级智能技术被极少数资本垄断的风险,强调技术必须保持普惠与开放,以防止社会断裂与国际对抗进一步恶化。 Baker 总结认为,尽管 AI 发展面临严苛的能源配给、半导体产能壁垒与地缘摩擦,但在物理架构创新、商业模式演进及庞大自由现金流的支撑下,其长期扩张轨迹并未发生逆转。然而,应用层软件既有价值的瓦解、上游供应链的周期性估值错配,以及智能技术能否避免成为特权阶层专属工具,仍是贯穿下一轮技术迭代周期的核心未解之题。

Detailed notes — zh

## Background 本期节目由投资商业播客频道《Invest Like the Best》于 2026 年 5 月 20 日发布在 RSS 及网络平台,由主持人帕特里克·奥肖内西(Patrick O'Shaughnessy)对话第六次做客节目的 Atreides Management 创始合伙人兼 CIO 加文·贝克(Gavin Baker)。节目围绕“瓦特与晶圆”(Watts and Wafers)展开,深入探讨了决定 AI 下一阶段演进的电力与芯片产能两大物理约束、太空轨道计算前景、半导体制造格局演变及 AI 价值在软硬件各层的重塑分配。 ## TL;DR 加文·贝克从宏观资本市场回撤与前沿 AI 实验室逆天增长的背离切入,深度拆解了制约 AI 发展的底层物理瓶颈——电力短缺有望在 2027 至 2028 年缓解并最终走向轨道计算,而晶圆供应与台积电的产能克制则是防范毁灭性泡沫的关键闸门。他通过 Prefill 与 Decode 解耦等芯片底层创新,论证了老旧 GPU 寿命大幅延长对基础设施金融模型的重塑,并警示二级市场在大宗品短缺周期中出现的估值错配与劣质资产狂欢。此外,加文剖析了应用层软件面临的万亿美元价值湮灭困境以及科技巨头的战略分化,呼吁在拥抱技术奇点与生命科学突破的同时警惕阶级极化与社会现实风险。 ## Atmosphere & style 整场对话洋溢着高密度、高认知维度的宏大叙事感与实战投资者的敏锐直觉,兼具硬科技物理层推演的严密与对资本周期人性的深刻洞察。加文·贝克语气沉稳自信却不失审慎警觉,在纵论航天工程、地缘均势与晶圆博弈之间自如穿梭,叙事张力十足。听众既能切身感受到“技术事件视界”降临前夕那份令人血脉偾张的狂热与历史巨变感,又会时刻被他关于市场极端定价错配、泡沫破灭历史寓言以及社会现实撕裂的冷峻反思所拉回现实。 ## Bulletin - `02:29` 大模型商业化迎来爆发式增长,Anthropic 单月新增 ARR 达到创纪录的 110 亿美元,超越 Palantir、Snowflake 和 Databricks 历时十年建立的业务规模总和,且净金额留存率(NDR)高达 500%。 - `14:00` 数据中心瓶颈正从单纯的芯片与电力供应转向土地规划分区(Zoning)与地方审批;地面电力短缺预计将在 2027 至 2028 年缓解,远期推理需求将向低成本的轨道太空计算(Orbital Compute)迁移。 - `26:24` 当前 AI 基础设施建设由科技巨头的经营现金流支撑且先进 GPU 利用率达 100%,不同于 2000 年光纤泡沫的举债与空置;台积电的产能克制是防止行业陷入恶性过剩的最关键变量。 - `42:49` 推理阶段 Prefill(受限内存容量)与 Decode(受限内存带宽)的架构解耦,让旧款 GPU(如 Hopper、Ampere)可退居后方负责 Prefill,将芯片有效生命周期拉长至 10 到 15 年,直接化解了私人信贷市场的资产坏账风险。 ## Key takeaways - `10:00` Anthropic 展现出极高的资本效率,烧钱规模据估算比 OpenAI 少 80%,但在严重算力受限下被迫在相同提问中削减 Claude 约 70% 的 Token 输出,折损了部分高阶推理体验。 - `11:49` 马斯克在 SpaceX 等项目上坚持从不将估值定价推向极限,通过长期让利与投资者建立信任契约,换取了可在任何周期随时筹集无限资本的战略“超能力”。 - `15:45` 轨道计算并非漂浮的建筑,而是“置于太空的单机架卫星”;依托太阳同步轨道持续供电、深空辐射散热和成熟的真空激光互联,Starship 的全复用能力使其具备工程与商业可行性。 - `20:51` 由于高延迟和带宽物理限制,前沿模型训练将长期扎根地球,但大规模推理转移至外太空将逐步分流地面负荷,使激进扩张的地面电力与冷却重资产面临长周期错配风险。 - `28:45` 马斯克联手特斯拉与 SpaceX 打造的 TerraFab 拥有英特尔技术输出、半导体设备巨头顶级团队支持以及定制文化街区对东亚核心工艺人才的极致虹吸,构成打破晶圆垄断的重要变量。 - `30:50` 前沿模型仍牢牢把持着绝大部分经济价值,谷歌因 TPU v8 设计保守失去单 Token 成本优势,模型智力与成本的“帕累托前沿”已易主为 Anthropic、OpenAI 与 xAI 主导。 - `35:33` 商业模式正从固定的“吃到饱”订阅全面转向基于专属 Harness 运行时的“按用量计费”,随着单人并发驱策上百个 Agent,这一计费变革将推动头部实验室年化经常性收入跨越 2000 亿美元。 - `40:01` 在台积电物理约束下,初创芯片公司做常规 GPU 毫无生路,唯有像 Cerebras 攻坚晶圆级计算那样选择“完全不同且极度艰难”的路线才可能在巨头阴影下立足。 - `50:00` 当前 AI 蛋糕的利润过度集中于能源、数据中心与底层硬件,缺乏工程壁垒的通用应用难以捕获价值,初创软件必须深度嵌入“Token 运转链路”(Token Path)或啃下重运营的垂直硬骨头。 - `52:45` 前沿模型陷入发布 API 的“囚徒困境”:实验室既担忧接口开放后模型推理轨迹被外部对手抓取“蒸馏”,又面临一旦同行抢先开放就将痛失海量收入与现金流的被动局面。 - `01:00:00` 半导体市场显现大宗商品周期的扭曲特征:短缺狂热导致边际高成本、高故障率的劣质小盘硬件厂商短期内涨幅惊人,而处于核心地位的高品质龙头却被机械化量化篮子错误定价。 - `01:06:50` 微软正进行勇敢的战略转向,纳德拉宁愿牺牲将 GPU 转售给 OpenAI/Anthropic 换取 Azure 营收脉冲式暴涨的机会,坚决收回算力全力自研内部模型与打磨 Copilot,以防范未来 API 断供风险。 - `01:10:00` AI 在应用软件层迄今呈现出万亿美元级的净市值毁灭,当前生产力重构的核心特征体现在“人均支配的有效 GPU 规模”上,技术落地正从粗放叙事转向微观架构层面的精细化分化。 - `01:11:42` 乌克兰战局证明战场 AI 已成为重塑现代战争的胜负手;如同二战后美国的核优势奠定了“美利坚和平”,大国在 AI 领域的绝对优势同样可能成为锁定新型全球战略均势与和平秩序的基石。 ## Detailed walkthrough ### `02:29` 历史性的三四月:回撤中的两类机会与资本主义史诗级增长 这是加文·贝克(Gavin Baker)第六次做客节目,追平了比尔·格利(Bill Gurley)的常驻纪录,再次登顶受访榜首。开场时,帕特里克·奥肖内西(Patrick O'Shaughnessy)问及如何看待刚刚过去的 3 月和 4 月——这段时期在经济、技术与资本市场层面显得极其罕见且特殊。加文指出,从投资角度来看,市场上普遍存在两种性质截然不同的净值回撤(drawdowns):一种是你确实犯了错误,投资标的业绩暴雷,最初的投资假设被彻底证伪,此时投资者必须咽下苦果、认赔平仓;另一种回撤则是源于市场极端的定价错配,你对所持有的核心企业了如指掌,完全不认同盘面上的杀跌行情。加文强调,面对后一种情况,优秀的投资人不仅不应割肉,反而应当果断加大注码,将市场情绪造成的短期落后转化为未来丰厚超额收益的蓄水池(“pent-up alpha”)。 对于加文而言,3 月份的纳斯达克暴跌正是第二种情况的典型再现。就在股市大幅下挫的同时,大语言模型领域正在上演“资本主义和美国商业历史上最不可思议的奇迹时刻”:Anthropic 仅在单月之内就惊人地增加了 110 亿美元的 ARR(年度经常性收入)。作为对比,过去十余年云计算与 SaaS 浪潮累计创造了 5 万亿至 10 万亿美元的产业市值,其中最具代表性的三家标杆企业——Palantir、Snowflake 和 Databricks——历时十余年潜心耕耘、各自雇佣数以万计的员工,才构筑起今日的业务规模。而 Anthropic 竟在短短一个月内,凭一己之力吞下了这三家巨头的体量总和。更惊人的是,正如前客座嘉宾克里希纳(Krishna)在播客中所披露的,Anthropic 的净金额留存率(NDR)高达 500%,“如果你把这个复合增速连续推算三年,就会发现人类历史上根本找不到任何商业先例”。 - **市场回撤定性**:区分“逻辑证伪型”止损与“认知差型”超额阿尔法积累,加文选择在恐慌中强势加仓。 - **Anthropic 破纪录扩张**:单月新增 ARR 达到 110 亿美元,超越 Palantir、Snowflake、Databricks 十年发展总和。 - **留存率数据**:Anthropic 展现出 500% 的净金额留存率(NDR),彻底打破传统 SaaS 软件生命周期模型的增长极限。 ```mermaid flowchart LR accTitle: Anthropic 与传统 SaaS 巨头的 ARR 扩张对比 accDescr: 对比传统 SaaS 三巨头历时十余年建立的 ARR 规模与 Anthropic 单月新增 110 亿美元 ARR 的速度。 subgraph Legacy["传统 SaaS 领军企业(耗时 10-12 年)"] P["Palantir"] S["Snowflake"] D["Databricks"] end subgraph Frontier["前沿 AI 实验室(耗时 1 个月)"] A["Anthropic 单月新增 $11B ARR"] end P & S & D -->|累计体量总和| Total["合计业务规模"] Total -.->|等量对齐| A ``` --- ### `05:00` 从 DeepSeek 恐慌到霍尔木兹海峡:算力饥渴与美国的相对能源优势 科技投资领域虽然经常将“S 型曲线”和“指数级增长”挂在嘴边,但加文直言,自己此前从未见过爆发力如此剧烈的指数级飞跃。这一幕在很大程度上复刻了 2025 年初“DeepSeek 周一”(DeepSeek Monday)前后的剧情反转:当时 DeepSeek 的论文在发布一周后才引发市场恐慌踩踏,科技股大面积雪崩。加文回忆道,论文发布当天恰逢美国假期,他读完的第一感觉也是“这对 AI 算力交易可能构成利空”,并随即调整了仓位;但仅隔一周,市场局势便发生了 180 度大反转——到“DeepSeek 周一”爆发时,实际链条数据已经证实推理模型在推理阶段消耗的算力远超传统非推理模型。彼时亚洲地区 AWS 可用区的 GPU 租金已然翻倍,DRAM 内存价格垂直拉升,GPU 可用库存迅速见底,两三天后美国本土的算力租金也接踵暴涨。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 地缘政治与能源成本对美企相对优势的影响 accDescr: 展示霍尔木兹海峡危机如何压低美国天然气价格,同时成倍推高欧亚天然气价格,从而巩固美国在 AI 制造与推理领域的电力成本优势。 H["霍尔木兹海峡封锁危机"] --> US_Gas["美国本土天然气 (NG1) 下跌 20%"] H --> Global_Gas["欧亚天然气暴涨 2-3 倍"] US_Gas --> US_Power["美国本土工业与 AI 算力电价保持优势"] Global_Gas --> Global_Power["欧亚制造业与数据中心能源成本剧增"] US_Power & Global_Power --> Edge["美国相对制造及 AI 算力竞争力显著扩大"] ``` 在加文看来,2026 年初的市场提供了与此前疫情暴跌、2022 年熊市及 DeepSeek 恐慌如出一辙的绝佳买点。当时市场还叠加了对霍尔木兹海峡(Strait of Hormuz)封锁的地缘政治恐慌,许多人下意识联想起 1970 年代的滞胀阴影。然而加文借助自身在私募与安全领域的专业网络研判后指出,市场彻底搞反了逻辑: 1. **能源格局质变**:今日的美国早已不再是 1970 年代那个饱受断油之苦的重工业体,美国经济的单位能耗大幅下降,且已一跃成为全球最大的石油与天然气生产国及出口国。 2. **不对称相对优势**:电力是工业与 AI 算力最根本的核心成本。危机爆发后,彭博终端上的美国天然气基准合约(NG1)不仅没有暴涨,反而下跌了 20%;与此相对,欧洲和亚洲的天然气价格翻了两到三倍。这意味着美国的相对制造业与算力竞争力在一夜之间被成倍放大,完美契合了本届政府追求美国相对绝对优势的核心诉求。 当最狂暴的 AI 基本面爆发(Anthropic 的逆天增长)撞上被地缘政治误判砸出的历史性估值低坑(科技股相对大盘估值逼近过去十年最低点),形成了罕见的赔率高地。当帕特里克追问 Anthropic 与 OpenAI 为何估值倍数依然显著低于当年 Snowflake 或 Databricks 顶峰时的水平时,加文分析称,两家前沿实验室在资本效率上有着本质差异——从同等收入规模所消耗的烧钱速度可以看出,Anthropic 在单位 Token 成本控制(cost per token)上显著优于 OpenAI,展现出了远为强劲的资本利用效率。 ### `10:00` Anthropic 与 OpenAI 的算力与资本效率对比 在业务结构与资本回报率(ROIC)上,Anthropic 与 OpenAI 展现出了截然不同的特征。Anthropic 的烧钱规模据估计比 OpenAI 少了大约 80%。尽管 OpenAI 拥有极其出色的首席财务官 Sarah Friar,并且正在积极采取各种措施改善财务表现,但两家公司的发展轨迹因早期策略而大相径庭。OpenAI 极具侵略性地锁定了巨量算力,事实证明这种激进在当时确实带来了丰厚的回报。 与此相对,Anthropic 即使在估值达到 900 亿美元、年经常性收入(ARR)达到 50 亿美元且保持惊人增速的背景下,依然面临严重的算力瓶颈。如果 Anthropic 拥有足够的算力供给,其真实的无约束年收入(Unconstrained ARR,简称 URR)完全可以突破 1,000 亿甚至达到 1,500 亿至 2,000 亿美元。由于算力受限,Anthropic 明显在人为削弱 Claude 的智能水平——分析显示,即使是旗舰级模型 Opus,在面对完全相同的问题时生成的 Token 数量也减少了 70%。Token 的输出数量在底层直接对应着思维过程的深度与回答质量,尽管每个 Token 的“智能密度”同样关键,但用户已经能切实感受到这种算力压缩带来的体验下滑。 - **估值重估视角**:如果以不受算力约束的理论收入(URR)来计算,投资者在 Anthropic 当期估值下买入的倍数实际上可能只有 5 倍左右。 - **降智现象**:Claude 在相同提问下的 Token 输出量缩减了约 70%,这种为了节省算力而进行的调整直接折损了高阶推理能力。 --- ### `11:49` 为什么不以更高估值融资?马斯克的资本“超能力” 面对市场上极度火热的资金追捧——几乎所有投资人都急切地想要进入 Anthropic 和 OpenAI 的股东名册——两家公司为何没有顺势以万亿美元估值去筹集数百亿美元?从理性角度看,不贪图过高估值是极具远见的防御策略。全球宏观环境充满高度不确定性,乌克兰战局的走向、俄罗斯可能的反应、伊朗局势的动荡都在持续放大地缘政治风险。在这样一个资本极其密集的赛道中,即使 Anthropic 的推理业务已经实现极为健康的毛利率、甚至年内有望开始产生净现金流,保留顺畅的股权融资通道依然是生死攸关的能力。 埃隆·马斯克(Elon Musk)在长达 20 年的创业生涯中树立了教科书级的资本信任范式。马斯克将“为投资者赚钱”视为神圣契约,其核心方法就是在给 SpaceX 等公司定价时从不过度贪婪,绝不把估值推到极限,从而在投资人与员工利益之间取得公平的平衡。SpaceX 在过去十年间保持了 30% 左右的稳健年复合增长率。这种长期的让利换来了一项无与伦比的“超能力”:在任何时间节点,马斯克都可以按自己的意愿筹集到几乎无限的资本。这种信誉红利可以持续 20 到 30 年,远比短期追求 100% 的估值溢价更具战略价值。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 资本信任飞轮模型 accDescr: 展示理性估值定价如何为硬科技基础设施建立长达数十年的无上限融资超能力。 subgraph Discipline ["估值克制策略"] A["拒绝贪婪估值<br/>(合理/折价发行)"] --> B["保护投资人长期收益<br/>(如 SpaceX 稳步年化复合增长)"] end subgraph Advantage ["长期资本超能力"] B --> C["建立神圣信任契约"] C --> D["全天候无限融资能力<br/>(对冲地缘政治与周期风险)"] D --> E["超大体量基础设施长周期扩张"] E --> A end ``` --- ### `14:00` 算力瓶颈转移:瓦特、晶圆与实体审批壁垒 在审视驱动 AI 演进的核心物理约束“瓦特与晶圆”(Watts and Wafers)时,限制数据中心扩张的瓶颈正在发生转移。顶级私募股权机构(如 Blackstone、Apollo、KKR)的数据中心基础设施投资负责人明确指出,过去卡脖子的核心是电力和芯片供应,但如今最关键的制约因素已经变成了土地规划分区(Zoning)与地方政府审批。 与此同时,能源供应链中的工业制造挑战依然严峻。重型燃气轮机的产能爬坡极度困难,西方世界已有长达 80 年没有制造过能够铸造超大叶片的机器,工业工程技术和工艺断层明显。然而,资本主义的市场机制极其擅长解决此类供需失衡,涡轮机制造商已纷纷公布大规模扩产计划,其他长周期的能源供应方案也在推进。地面的电力短缺预计将在 2027 至 2028 年开始缓解,而长期的终极解决方案则是将计算推向太空。 - **主要瓶颈转变**:从单纯的“芯片 + 瓦特”转变为“土地分区规划审批 + 政治监管压力”。 - **制造业断代现状**:用于铸造大型涡轮叶片的关键设备全球仅存少数几台,西方已有 80 年未曾新建该类设备制造线。 - **供需拐点预期**:地面电力短缺有望在 2027 至 2028 年迎来实质性改善。 --- ### `15:45` 轨道计算拆解:“太空机柜”而非“五角大楼” 大众对于“太空数据中心”存在严重的具象化误解,往往将其脑补为漂浮在轨道上的五角大楼级巨型建筑。实际上,轨道计算的本质是“分散在太空中的机柜”(Racks in Space)。以英伟达的 Blackwell 机架为例,其单机柜重约 3,000 磅,高 8 英尺、深 4 英尺、宽 3 英尺,每个独立的机架本身就是一颗卫星。SpaceX 规划的轨道计算单元就是将这种规格的机柜置入太阳同步轨道,机身两侧配备长达 500 英尺的太阳能电池阵列以确保持续受光,后方则布置长达数百英尺的散热辐射板,利用深空冷源进行背光辐射散热。 面对外界对太空散热和维修难题的质疑,SpaceX 在工程实践层面已展现出强大的技术冗余。在地面数据中心中,为了节约极其昂贵的铜缆和光纤布线成本,机柜必须紧密排列(“能用铜缆绝不用光纤”);但在太空中,物理约束只取决于发射重量而非体积,机柜体积可以大幅放宽。各个机架之间直接通过真空激光通信链路互联,这套激光通信系统早已在数千颗 Starlink 卫星上稳定运行。 针对关键工程挑战的现实解法: 1. **热管理与功率密度**:当前 Starlink V3 卫星的单星功率已达到 20 千瓦,而单个 Blackwell 机柜功率为 100 千瓦。SpaceX 完全有能力将平台功率逐步推进至 60 千瓦乃至 100 到 120 千瓦,其散热架构正是基于成熟航天散热经验演进而来。 2. **运维与故障处理**:在人形机器人 Optimus 具备太空漂浮作业能力之前,机柜卫星在轨道上完全不做现场维修,而是依托规模冗余直接淘汰或报废更替。 3. **入轨成本革命**:Starship 的全复用能力是整个商业闭环的基石。正如拉里·埃里森(Larry Ellison)反驳质疑者时所说,SpaceX 是全球唯一一家在过去十年中稳定实现轨道级火箭回收并重复使用的实体,其工程执行力远超纸上谈兵的怀疑论者。 ```mermaid flowchart LR accTitle: 轨道计算虚拟数据中心架构 accDescr: 展示利用机柜级卫星、激光互联以及深空环境构筑的虚拟超算中心架构。 subgraph SatelliteUnit ["单机柜卫星单元"] direction TB P1["500英尺太阳能阵列<br/>(太阳同步轨道持续供电)"] R1["Blackwell 算力机架<br/>(100-120 kW 功率)"] C1["背光面巨型辐射散热板<br/>(面向 3K 深空热辐射)"] P1 --> R1 --> C1 end subgraph ConstellationNetwork ["空间激光互联网络"] direction TB L1["真空激光互联链路<br/>(继承自 Starlink 技术)"] VDC["全功能虚拟数据中心<br/>(光速真空互联集群)"] end SatelliteUnit <--> L1 L1 <--> VDC ``` ### `20:51` 轨道计算与地面数据中心:对电力和冷却产业的长期冲击 当空间轨道上的矩阵乘法计算在经济上真正变得可行且规模化后,这并不意味着地面数据中心的末日。有人曾形容“美国会穷尽一切可能榨干所能获取的每一份能源”,算力也是同样的逻辑——人类对算力的胃口深不见底,因此边缘 AI 威胁地面算力的悲观论调并不成立。在可预见的长期未来里,由于延迟和带宽的物理限制,前沿模型的训练(Training)仍将牢牢扎根于地球表面,而推理(Inference)则极其适合转移到轨道计算上去。地面数据中心在这一代人的有生之年依然具有极高的经济价值。 然而,对于那些身处电力生产、电网基础设施和数据中心冷却生态中,正在激进扩张产能的公司而言,潜伏的结构性风险正在积聚。这些重资产投入的漫长扩产周期,极有可能在全面投产时迎头撞上轨道计算的真正落地——届时市场上的怀疑者才如梦初醒,意识到太空计算早已是既成事实。在短期内,资本主义正在竭尽所能解决“瓦特”(Watts)的短缺问题,市场上涌现出各种极具创造力的新技术方案,例如 Boom Supersonic 这类公司正致力于改造退役喷气式发动机来就地发电。在电力供给端,市场机制正在全速运转。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 算力分布与基础设施演进趋势 accDescr: 展示前沿训练与推理在地面和轨道计算中的分工及对配套基础设施的影响 subgraph 地面算力生态 ["地面算力生态(Terrestrial Ecosystem)"] G_Train["大模型前沿训练 (Training)<br/>强依赖高带宽与物理连接"] G_Infra["电力供给与液冷设备扩产<br/>面临长周期产能错配风险"] G_Power["过渡期创新补能<br/>(如退役喷气发动机发电等)"] end subgraph 轨道算力生态 ["轨道算力生态(Orbital Compute)"] O_Solar["外太空近乎无限的光能与散热空间"] O_Infer["大规模推理计算 (Inference)<br/>转移至轨道降低地面电网负荷"] end G_Train -->|长期保留在地球| G_Infra O_Solar -->|边际成本趋零| O_Infer O_Infer -.->|分流地面负荷| G_Infra ``` --- ### `26:24` 晶圆制造的守门人、多样性崩溃与避免泡沫的台积电 如果说瓦特(电力)受制于全美各地的工程师与资本,那么“晶圆”(Wafers)的命运则完全掌握在台湾那群年长工程师手中。他们构成了台湾经济最核心的支柱,消耗着全岛绝大部分的电力与水资源,肩负着所谓的“硅盾”(Silicon Shield),并将自己视作张忠谋神圣遗产的继承者。二十多年前,Gavin 前往新竹科学园区拜访时曾问他们:“你们觉得未来有可能赶超英特尔吗?”当时的工程师坦言:“这是一个美丽的梦想,但那是留给我们孙辈才能实现的梦想。”结果凭借英特尔接连不断的自毁长城,台积电仅用了一代人就做到了。 正因如此,黄仁勋才会如此频繁地飞往台湾请求扩建晶圆厂。值得一提的是,英伟达与台积电之间从未签署过繁复死板的正式长期采购合同,双方数十亿美元的庞大生意完全建立在“握手”与“长期公平”的信任契约之上。但这种克制至关重要: - **历史周期的铁律**:根据卡洛塔·佩雷斯(Carlota Perez)的技术周期理论以及迈克尔·莫布森(Michael Mauboussin)所说的“多样性崩溃”(Diversity Breakdown),每当市场上出现重大通用突破(如运河、铁路、互联网或 AI),所有投资者都会陷入单边看多的狂热,最终引发生态失衡、过度铺设与崩盘。 - **本轮周期与 2000 年互联网泡沫的本质差异**: - 2000 年的光纤投资严重依赖发债融资,且建成后 99% 的光纤处于闲置状态; - 本轮 AI 基础设施的巨额资本开支绝大多数由超大规模科技巨头的**经营性现金流**买单,且当前部署的所有先进 GPU 都在以 100% 的利用率极限运转。 - **价值投资者的苦涩寓言**:已故的富达传奇基金经理乔治·范德海登(George Vanderheiden)在 1999 年泡沫顶峰时坚守估值纪律,将 40% 仓位配置在烟草股、40% 配置在房屋建筑商股票。由于无法忍受持续落后于市场大盘以及客户每天质疑“你是不是跟不上时代了”的巨大心理煎熬,他在 2000 年初黯然退休。正如他的名言——“过早看对和看错没有任何区别”(Being early is the same thing as being wrong)。然而在他离职后的三年内,他的组合表现跑赢了纳斯达克指数整整 20 到 30 倍。 如果台积电完全顺应黄仁勋的激进要求,英伟达在 2026 或 2027 年甚至能卖出 2 万亿到 3 万亿美元的芯片,但这必然导致客户端因过度建设而引发行业崩盘。若最终没有演变成毁灭性的大泡沫,整个科技界真应该给台积电“开一场庆功派对”,因为正是他们在晶圆产能上的绝对克制,单枪匹马扼制了非理性过热。 --- ### `28:45` 晶圆双雄的破局变量与马斯克的“TerraFab”得州蓝图 如果台积电持续维持极度紧缩的产能配给,市场格局便存在演变的临界点。根据资本市场的一贯历史,当下游饥渴难耐时,英特尔(Intel)和三星(Samsung)中必有一方会率先放弃产能纪律大举扩产,进而倒逼整个半导体制造格局失衡。当前台积电对这两家竞争对手保有约 9 到 15 个月的前沿制程领先优势。要观察半导体市场是否正在滑向恶性泡沫,最重要的单一风向标就是**台积电的产能扩张决策**——他们需要将扩张拿捏在精准的“金发女孩区间”(Goldilocks zone):既能有效压制英特尔和三星使其无法拿下超过 30% 的成熟二供市场份额,又能维持晶圆层面的物理硬约束,从而保护整个行业不被泡沫吞噬。 在这场博弈中,另一个极具颠覆性的关键变数是由 SpaceX 和特斯拉合资在美国本土打造的超级晶圆厂——**TerraFab**。外界往往低估该项目的成功概率,但它拥有三大决定性壁垒: 1. **英特尔的技术底蕴输出**:TerraFab 已经与英特尔建立深度合作,这使其能够直接继承英特尔积累了 50 年、仅落后最前沿制程三到五个季度的半导体工程工艺底蕴。 2. **设备巨头的“A-Team”全力支持**:ASML、KLA、泛林集团(Lam Research)和应用材料(Applied Materials)等半导体设备寡头极度厌恶台积电形成的单买方垄断(Monopsony)。当年台积电能够反超正是因为设备商派出了最强技术团队扶持,如今这些顶尖支持力量正因马斯克在硬件工程上的极致声誉而奔赴 TerraFab。 3. **针对东亚半导体人才的精准虹吸**:尽管马斯克因涉足美国国内政治而遭受舆论分歧,但在中日韩以及中国台湾的工程界,他被奉为如同“在世神明”一般的硬件偶像。最好的工程师天生渴望为马斯克工作。为了彻底打消核心工程师的跨国迁移顾虑,马斯克团队甚至计划直接在得克萨斯州的晶圆厂园区旁打造原汁原味的“台湾城”、“日本城”和“韩国城”——将工程师在老家最爱的餐厅及整套后厨班底全员迁往得州,以无微不至的文化定制为 TerraFab 招揽亚洲最顶尖的工艺老手。 ### `30:00` 马斯克的 TerraFab 与极致执行力 在芯片制造领域,埃隆·马斯克(Elon Musk)展现出了与英特尔(Intel)和三星(Samsung)管理层截然不同的工程师思维。他能够招募到行业最顶尖的技术人才,并获得各大半导体设备(WFE)厂商最核心的“A 级团队”鼎力支持。马斯克选择与英特尔合作,不仅完美契合了任何一届美国政府强化本土半导体制造的政治诉求,其差异化的策略也不会直接疏远台积电(TSMC)。 尽管晶圆制造工厂的建设周期通常极为漫长,TerraFab 全面投产甚至制造出 GPU 芯片可能还需要相当长的一段时间,但马斯克向来以打破传统时间表而闻名。传统巨头耗时三年才能建成的现代数据中心,马斯克团队仅用 122 天便拔地而起;在得克萨斯州,三星甚至不得不直接在其晶圆厂内为马斯克设立专属办公室,因为马斯克对他们既有的扩建和施工节奏感到极度不满并亲自下场督战。 - **极速工程交付**:行业通行的超大规模数据中心建设周期约为 3 年,而马斯克团队创下了 122 天交付运行的纪录。 - **三星得州工厂办公室**:因不满三星工程进度,马斯克进驻三星泰勒(Taylor)晶圆厂就近督促建设。 --- ### `30:50` 前沿模型的经济价值与帕累托前沿易主 市场在 DeepSeek 刚出现时曾产生普遍的降智预期,认为中国开源模型能以极低的成本实现前沿模型 95% 的效果,未来两年内中小企业无需在昂贵的商业 Token 上耗费百万美元。然而现实却大相径庭:AI 模型层所创造的绝大多数商业价值,依然牢牢地聚集在最顶尖的前沿模型(Frontier Models)手中。这让很多投资者感到意外——当年 Gemini 3.1 Pro 发布时令人震撼,但以今天的标准审视却已“难以忍受”(intolerable)。企业虽然会在原型阶段测试前沿模型,并在生产环节尝试开源或托管方案,但核心业务对最高智力水平代币的刚性需求并未动摇。 模型智力与成本构成的“帕累托前沿”(Pareto Frontier)在过去九个月中发生了戏剧性的权力更迭。此前,谷歌凭借全栈自研的 TPU 几乎垄断了帕累托前沿的每一个点,OpenAI、xAI 和 Anthropic 均处于劣势曲线以内。然而,由于谷歌在 TPU v8 的设计决策上过于保守(部分原因是为了从博通手中收回掌控权),而英伟达则保持着极其激进的技术迭代,谷歌彻底失去了单 Token 成本的领先优势。如今的帕累托前沿由 Anthropic、OpenAI 主导;xAI 的 Grok 4.3 稳居 5000 亿参数级别性价比最高的位置;而谷歌的 Gemini 3.1 仅能在边缘苦苦支撑,甚至更像是出于巨头自尊而在进行贴钱补贴。 ```mermaid flowchart LR accTitle: AI Model Pareto Frontier Shift accDescr: Historical versus current Pareto Frontier of intelligence versus cost among frontier labs subgraph Past["9 个月前"] direction TB G_old["谷歌 (Google TPU)"] Others_old["OpenAI / Anthropic / xAI (落后曲线之内)"] G_old -->|"绝对垄断"| Others_old end subgraph Present["当前格局"] direction TB Frontier["Anthropic & OpenAI (主导最前沿)"] Grok["xAI Grok 4.3 (500B 参数最佳性价比)"] G_now["Gemini 3.1 (边缘勉强支撑 / 补贴防守)"] end ``` --- ### `33:10` 萨顿“苦涩的教训”与 TurboQuant 警报 对整个 AI 赛道投资而言,最大的底层风险莫过于理查德·萨顿(Richard Sutton)著名的“苦涩的教训”(The Bitter Lesson)是否会被颠覆——即人类算法层面的奇技淫巧,最终都会被“更多的计算量 + 更多的数据”无情碾压。越是身处一线的顶级 AI 工程师,通常越坚信算力规模定律的绝对地位。例如 3 月份由所谓 TurboQuant 引发的市场恐慌,被证明更像是一场资本与供应链谈判的戏码:谷歌将一年前关于 DRAM 内存优化的学术成果在 X 平台上大肆包装炒作,巧合的是这恰恰发生在谷歌与美光(Micron)、三星、SK海力士(SK Hynix)谈判长期高价内存供货协议(LTA)的关键节点。 虽然现实中没有一个顶尖的 AI 工程师真正相信 TurboQuant 能消除对高端存储器(DRAM)的需求,但人类即将面对的变量远超以往。当模型智力达到超级智能(ASI,智商相当于 400、500 甚至 600)时,“苦涩的教训”是否仍然有效?作为极其追求自我提升的智能体,ASI 诞生的第一诉求必然是获取更多算力并优化自身运行架构。届时打破萨顿教训的或许不再是人类研究员的算法设计,而是由超高智商 AI 自身实现的效率革命,这构成了计算架构层面上前所未有的阶段性变数。 - **TurboQuant 风波**:谷歌在锁定高价内存长协(LTA)谈判期间释出内存优化论文,一度引发二级市场对 DRAM 需求见顶的虚惊。 - **超级智能的自我演进**:ASI 突破人类认知局限后,可能以自我优化架构的方式带来暂时性的“算力效率飞跃”,从而对硬件规模扩张假说形成实质冲击。 --- ### `35:33` Harness 运行时工程与用量计费革命 伴随模型能力进化的,是与模型深度协同开发的 Harness(测试与执行框架运行时)。Harness 相当于模型的执行操作系统,负责调用外部工具、维护上下文记忆、保存状态快照并实施高度精准的指令路由。仅凭一个优秀的 Harness,模型在实际任务中的表现就会产生天壤之别。如今,投资者如果仅依靠每月 200 至 300 美元的个人会员订阅,已完全无法理解最前沿的 AI 能力;由于谷歌失去成本优势,各大顶尖模型实验室为了防止被重度调用拖垮,纷纷在固定订阅中大幅限流,甚至提供被严重阉割(Lobotomized)的版本。 只有切换到企业级的全功能环境(如搭载专属 Harness 的 Claude Code 或 Codex)并按 Token 实际用量付费(Usage-based Pricing),才能让大模型毫无保留地展开复杂推理并输出所需的全部代币。这种商业模式从“吃到饱”(All-You-Can-Eat)向“按杯付费”(Pay-By-The-Drink)的战略转型,正是 AI 行业最强劲的增长引擎。回顾 2005 至 2007 年的移动通信与长途电话时代,行业最辉煌的增长期均源于固定分钟数之外的超额用量付费,直到被无限量套餐抹平溢价。如今随着单人驱策成百上千个智能体并发工作,按用量付费将直接助推 OpenAI 与 Anthropic 年化经常性收入(ARR)突破 2000 亿美元大关。 | 计费与交付模式 | 订阅制套餐($200~$300/月) | 企业用量计费模式(Pay-By-The-Drink) | |:--- |:--- |:--- | | **调用体验** | 遭受严格速率限制(Rate-limited) | 完整算力支持,高并发执行 | | **模型表现** | 被迫节约生成 Token,输出被阉割 | 模型配合 Harness 尽情展开多步骤复杂推理 | | **行业类比** | 晚期失去爆发力的“无限流量套餐” | 2005~2007 年高增长期的移动/长途话费计费 | | **商业前景** | 边际成本随高频重度用户不断承压 | 推动顶级实验室 ARR 跨越 2000 亿美元级别 | --- ### `38:10` 持续学习与样本效率的“快速起飞” AI 进化的终极圣杯之一是“持续学习”(Continual Learning)与实时记忆能力的实现。人类大脑拥有远超现代深度学习架构的超高样本效率:人类儿童只需一次把手伸进火盆被烫到,就能立刻形成伴随一生的因果记忆并永久调整行为;而当前最先进的 AI 却必须把手伸进火盆数百万次,再由人类设计者将其放入下一次训练或强化学习沙盒(RL Gym)中,通过离线微调来间接调整权重。 目前业界所展示的持续学习,本质上依然是可验证场景下极其粗糙的微调或中期训练(Mid-training)强化学习。一旦 AI 模型突破静态冻结权重的桎梏,能够在真实交互中动态、实时地更新权重参数,真正的技术奇点与“快速起飞”(Fast Takeoff)就将降临。对于科技投资者而言,未来整个赛道的胜负将由三大终极问题共同定义: > 1. 超级智能(ASI)是否会通过自我优化打破萨顿的“苦涩的教训”? > 2. 前沿模型 Token 是否能持续维持其超额经济价值与定价权? > 3. 真正的持续学习能力究竟会在何时以何种形式被彻底攻坚? ### `40:00` 芯片设计的“铁三角”与初创公司的生存之道 当前芯片领域正处于“百花齐放”的狂热期,几乎有上千家初创公司试图设计新型芯片以攻克算力瓶颈。Gavin Baker 认为这种竞争对行业极其健康,甚至对英伟达的黄仁勋(Jensen Huang)本人也是好事——这不仅能防范反垄断监管带来的风险,更能通过多样化架构探索计算边界。他借用坦克设计的“铁三角定律”(Iron Triangle)来比喻芯片设计:在坦克制造中,设计者必须在攻击力、防御力和机动性之间做权衡,装甲越厚(防御越高)车身就越重,机动性必然受损(例如以色列的梅卡瓦坦克极度强化防御,而德国豹式和俄系坦克则更偏向机动性)。芯片设计同样受限于台积电制程背后的物理定律,必须在核心指标间做出取舍。 目前像谷歌 TPU、亚马逊 Trainium 以及 AMD,本质上都在试图成为“更好的 GPU”。其中亚马逊的 Trainium 3 表现亮眼,堪称是在“扯超人的斗篷”(tugging on Superman's cape),它引入了交换式纵向扩展网络(switch scale-up network),这是经济化运行 MoE(混合专家)模型推理的必备架构;而谷歌传统上采用环形拓扑(Torus architecture),目前也在转向交换式网络;AMD 的 MI450 则仍处在追赶阶段。但 Gavin 直言,普通初创公司千万不要妄图去造一块“更好的 GPU”。在未来庞大的市场中,即便拿下 1% 的市场份额就意味着 1000 亿美元的价值,这已是极其辉煌的风险投资回报。可一旦初创公司的路线仅仅是常规迭代且容易被复制,黄仁勋绝对会跟进:“只要有人做出了不同尝试并拿到 1% 到 3% 的份额,英伟达就会造出同样的产品横扫对手。” 对于风险投资人,Gavin 提出了一个非常犀利的警示:如果有一家半导体初创公司宣称自己拥有台积电某种独家制程工艺的特殊访问权限,那纯属自欺欺人。因为“早在那个工艺还只是台积电眼中的闪烁微光时,黄仁勋就已经看过了”。供应链会把一切底牌毫无保留地展示给英伟达、亚马逊和 AMD。因此,初创芯片公司唯一的生路是:**必须做完全不同的东西,而且这件事情必须极其艰难(different and hard)**。 - **市场份额价值**:AI 算力大潮下,芯片领域仅仅 1% 的市场份额未来可能对应 1000 亿美元的体量。 - **超节点网络演进**:MoE 模型的推理需求正倒逼硬件网络架构从传统的 Torus(环形拓扑)向 switch scale-up(交换式纵向扩展网络)全面迁移。 - **供应链现实**:小型初创公司在台积电的议价能力和工艺知情权上,永远无法与英伟达等巨头抗衡。 --- ### `42:49` Prefill 与 Decode 的解耦与晶圆级计算 大模型推理流程中 Prefill(预填充)与 Decode(解码)的解耦,为芯片架构设计打开了全新的取舍空间。Gavin 引用同事 Andrew Fox 的生动比喻:大模型推理就像 18 世纪的英国海军战舰,“Prefill 是装填加农炮弹,Decode 则是开火发射”。具体而言: - **Prefill 阶段**:模型接收长文本 Prompt(上下文问题)并理解记录,属于**内存容量受限型**(Memory Capacity Bound)任务; - **Decode 阶段**:模型逐字生成输出 Token,属于**内存带宽受限型**(Memory Bandwidth Bound)任务。 这种分工让芯片设计者拥有了截然不同的发挥画布,初创公司可以针对容量或带宽走向极致,但前提依然是构筑高技术壁垒,否则英伟达随时能凭借台积电的成本优势和全行业模型生态的适配度将其击溃。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 大模型推理中 Prefill 与 Decode 阶段的解耦架构 accDescr: 图表展示了 Prefill 阶段由内存容量主导,Decode 阶段由内存带宽主导,以及新型专用硬件与传统 GPU 协同的架构流程。 subgraph PrefillStage["Prefill 阶段(装填炮弹)"] A["输入上下文与 Prompt"] --> B["理解语义与上下文状态"] B --> C["物理瓶颈:内存容量受限"] C --> D["适配硬件:大显存设备 / 传统 GPU(Hopper/Ampere)"] end subgraph DecodeStage["Decode 阶段(开火发射)"] E["自回归逐 Token 生成"] --> F["高速输出结果文本"] F --> G["物理瓶颈:内存带宽受限"] G --> H["适配硬件:极速专用芯片(Cerebras / Groq LPU)"] end D -.->|"KV Cache 传递"| E ``` Gavin 的基金投资了 Cerebras,正是看重其践行了“独特且艰难”的原则——他们开创了**晶圆级计算**(Wafer-Scale Computing)。Cerebras 将整张晶圆做成一颗芯片,拥有压倒性的片上计算与内存比例,但这也带来了挑战:其边缘(Shoreline)的物理周长有限,限制了传统 I/O 吞吐。为了突破这一瓶颈,Cerebras 正在攻克在晶圆上方直接集成光学晶圆(Optical Wafer)以及 DRAM 混合键合(Hybrid Bonding)等前沿工程。虽然社交平台上有针对其模型支持大小的误解,但理论上 Cerebras 能运行任意尺寸的模型,只是在特定尺寸上具备无与伦比的性能优势。首席执行官 Andrew Feldman 带领团队历经整整三代芯片迭代才迎来今日的爆发,这种在失败中不断复盘的坚韧韧性,正是硬科技创业者必须具备的品质。 --- ### `45:40` GPU 寿命延长与私人信贷的救赎 推理架构的解耦还带来了一个极具轰动性的副效应:它不仅打破了 AI 怀疑论者对 GPU 快速贬值的断言,更可能凭一己之力挽救庞大的私人信贷(Private Credit)市场。此前,许多怀疑论者指责科技巨头做假账,声称 GPU 寿命只有一到两年(传统 CPU 寿命约四年就会被淘汰)。同时,华尔街私人信贷机构此前向 GPU 算力集群抵押贷款投入了巨额资金,其承销模型通常基于 3 到 4 年的折旧报废期;雪上加霜的是,私人信贷还深陷传统 SaaS 公司的债务坏账泥潭中。 然而,Prefill 与 Decode 的解耦彻底改写了硬件生命周期。数据中心完全可以将 Cerebras 晶圆芯片或 Groq LPU(其技术路线已被业界高度关注)部署在前端专门负责极致高速的 Decode,而将上一代的英伟达 Hopper 甚至 Ampere(A100)架构 GPU 部署在后方专门处理 Prefill。“这相当于将老旧 GPU 的使用寿命直接延长到了 10 年甚至 15 年,直到它们物理上彻底熔化为止”。即便芯片确实有物理损耗,解耦后也不再需要让老 GPU 时刻处于高压超频状态。这种寿命的大幅拉长彻底改变了底层资产的现金流模型: - **融资成本骤降**:过去 CoreWeave 等算力云厂商的债务融资成本处于 7% 以上的高位,而生命周期的延长有望让 GPU 资产支持融资利率降至 5% 到 6%,大幅降低整个人类社会构建 AI 基础设施的资本成本; - **存量资产的价值重估**:引述 Coatue 针对“短缺资产的销售方”(如芯片商)与“短缺资产的购买方”(如云巨头 Hyperscalers)的对比,拥有海量现存算力底座的巨头正迎来转机。特别是在当下 Agent(智能体)工作流爆发的背景下,编排协调与工具调用(Tool Calls)使得 CPU 的重要性急剧上升,而全球最大的 CPU 集群恰恰全部沉淀在这些超大规模云服务商手中。 --- ### `48:40` 从底层硬件到 AI 应用:“独特且艰难”的创业法则 当把“独特且艰难”的标准从芯片与底层基建推广到广义的 AI 原生应用层时,Gavin 认为这触及了风险投资最本质的核心法则。 在风险投资中,许多点子在被提出的瞬间对全世界而言都是显而易见的。如果一个创业项目虽然新颖,但实现门槛极低,那么在公司依靠先发优势构建起“规模壁垒”之前,这个逻辑就会被全行业看穿并迅速跟进,而规模恰恰是商业竞争的终极壁垒。他以亚马逊早期的零售战争为例进行了深刻对比:亚马逊的崛起逻辑虽然也被部分人看清,但在很长一段时间内传统零售业 CEO 并没有真正理解。面对风投支持的垂直电商挑战者,亚马逊凭借规模优势实施降维打击,宁可把相关品类利润率压低至“负 10000%”也要彻底扼杀对手。只有像家具电商 Wayfair 这样啃下大件物流等极度繁琐、重度运营壁垒的硬骨头,才在亚马逊的围剿下存活下来。 对于当前不造芯片、不训练基模,而是基于 AI 技术构建终端软件的 AI 原生代创始人,Gavin 提出了一套极其严苛的筛选标准: - **警惕“平庸的显而易见”**:若产品模式缺乏工程或场景深度,巨头与同行能在几个月内复刻,先发优势便荡然无存; - **寻找“非共识与高壁垒”的交集**:真正具有长线价值的创业项目,必须兼具“在早期对大众不明显、构思独特”,以及“在工程、运营或商业化上极其难做(really hard to do)”两个特质。只有这种建立在极高执行力与物理/工程复杂度之上的护城河,才能帮助初创企业抵御巨头的吞噬。 ### `50:00` 应用层创业者的困境与“Token路径” 在黄仁勋(Jensen Huang)常提到的 AI 五层蛋糕架构中,当前的利润分配呈现出极其失衡的格局:超额收益正源源不断地流入能源、数据中心、半导体芯片以及底层前沿大模型手中,而处在最上层的应用层却迟迟难以捕获真正的经济价值。这导致大量的 AI 创业者深陷焦虑与挣扎。回顾约 18 个月前,当 OpenAI 试图包揽一切时,Cursor、Cognition 和 Anthropic 等少数团队选择全力死磕代码生成。事实证明这一抉择极为精准——正如 Replit 创始人 Amjad Masad 所言,与“苦涩的教训”(The Bitter Lesson)一脉相承的是,“代码可能是通往通用人工智能(ASI)和高价值 AI 的最短路径”;一旦系统拥有极强的代码编写能力,它便能自我编写程序来完成世间万物。目前这些聚焦编程的公司已建立起坚实的规模壁垒,其中 Cognition 的探索路径更是独树一帜。 然而对于广大初创团队而言,找寻立足点变得格外艰难。大家都在试图寻找垂直小众场景,寄希望于在前沿模型厂商涉足前建立起自己的数据护城河,或者祈祷这个细分领域小到大厂不屑亲自下场,却又恰好能支撑起一笔可观的风险投资回报。来自 Altimeter 的 Jamin Ball 曾提出过一个核心概念——“处于 Token 路径之中”(in the token path)。像 Databricks 以及同类数据基础设施公司,就是天然处于 Token 运算流动路径上的赢家;如果一家软件企业脱离了这一链路,也没有筑起极深的小众壁垒,生存环境将极其残酷。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: AI产业价值分配与防御机制 accDescr: 展示自底向上的AI利润分配格局以及垂直领域面临的前沿模型下沉威胁 subgraph ValueStack["黄仁勋五层蛋糕架构:价值高度集中在底层"] L1["能源与公用事业 (Energy)"] L2["基础设施与数据中心 (Data Centers)"] L3["芯片算力硬件 (NVIDIA / TSMC)"] L4["前沿基础模型 (OpenAI / Anthropic)"] L5["应用层软件 (艰难捕获利润)"] L1 --> L2 --> L3 --> L4 --> L5 end subgraph TokenPath["软件生存法则:Token 路径 (Token Path)"] TP["数据中枢与流转链路\n(如 Databricks)"] -.->|贯穿承载| L5 VerticalData["垂直领域人类专有数据\n(高成本训练专用小模型)"] -.->|面临挤压| Frontier["前沿实验室低成本通用推理"] end ``` 甚至连前沿实验室的内部人员,也对这类垂直领域的数据护城河持悲观态度。垂直行业目前生成的专有数据本质上全靠人类产出,创业者押注的是自己能利用这些狭窄数据,训练出推理成本低于前沿实验室的模型,但这极可能是一场胜算微弱的豪赌。不过硬币的另一面在于:未来一旦前沿 Token 相对于普通 Token 的溢价回落,推理成本大幅下探,应用层必将迎来一轮惊人的价值创造爆发。 ### `52:45` 前沿模型的新博弈论:开源、蒸馏与禁售囚徒困境 在算力供给与模型竞争的暗流下,存在着复杂的博弈结构。黄仁勋凭借 NVIDIA 的工程与算力资源,只要他愿意,随时都能训练出极度接近前沿水平的自有模型。虽然他目前绝无自立门户做大模型的意愿,但鉴于 OpenAI 和 Anthropic 等客户正试图自研芯片或摆脱对英伟达的依赖,自有模型构成了黄仁勋手中最合乎逻辑的反制底牌。 放眼当前的“开源前沿”,很大程度上充斥着通过抓取美国顶尖模型输出来进行蒸馏训练的中国大模型。例如早期有传闻指出,某些国内高水平模型最初仅借由约 15 万条高质量复杂推理轨迹(reasoning traces)完成冷启动;在各种各样的 API 调用掩护下,数据清洗与“洗白”手段层出不穷。尽管国内团队在算力资源极度受限的逆境下取得了令人惊叹的工程突破,但底层确实充斥着大量的蒸馏痕迹。这也解释了为何顶级实验室(如关于 Mythos 模型的考量)在算力受限之外,绝不愿草率开放 API:他们极其警惕被外部对手“蒸馏”,宁可将最强模型作为内部“导师”,用来提炼小模型或给下一代模型做强化学习(RL)。 这催生了前沿大模型之间一种全新的“囚徒困境”(Prisoner's Dilemma): - **旧的囚徒困境**:大家不得不卷入数十亿上百亿美元的资本支出(CapEx)军备竞赛; - **新的囚徒困境**:前沿实验室究竟要不要通过 API 公开发布其顶尖模型? 如果所有前沿阵营达成默契封锁 API,一旦有其中一家公司(或开源模型阵营)率先“叛变”开放顶级能力,它就会瞬间虹吸海量的市场收入与现金流。在“算力资源即智能”的铁律下,背叛者便能利用充沛现金进一步拉开技术差距,最终迫使所有人重回全面开放 API 的老路。这种微妙平衡类似台积电、三星与英特尔之间的代工博弈——倘若 NVIDIA 或 AMD 真正将主力订单分给三星或英特尔,那家代工厂的制程技术便会被海量资金与良率迭代迅速喂大。 - **开源并非免费**:所谓“开源无成本”是巨大的市场认知误区,开源 Token 同样需要消耗昂贵的电力并在高端 GPU 上运转,且开源模型提供方通常也会在下游渠道中抽取收入分成。 ### `55:00` 组织防守与“机枪时代”的投资人进化论 面对未来可能出现的超强下一代模型(如假设中的 Mythos 3、Mythos 4 级别能力),Atreides 基金在内部防守层面采取了近乎偏执的措施,将重点放在网络与网络安全上。面对高度拟真的 AI Deepfake,每个人乃至每个家庭都需要一个不可被社会工程学破解的“安全暗号”(safe word)。为杜绝任何被数字设备窃听或推导的可能,Gavin 建议人们甚至应该离开所有手机、电脑,走到空旷的海边与家人当面约定这个暗语。这能有效防止犯罪分子利用高保真克隆的儿女声音、面相及行为语气进行视讯勒索。 而在分析与投研端,Gavin 将这场 AI 生产力浪潮比作电影《最后的武士》(*The Last Samurai*)。影片中,汤姆·克鲁斯饰演的南北战争老兵最终目睹了武士阶层在手摇机枪面前被彻底碾碎。 > “机枪已经来到了战场上。如果我们不能全部成为驾驭机枪的大师,我们就会被这挺机枪所淘汰。” 作为一名经历过多轮周期的职业投资人,Gavin 坚信自己数十年的实操经验是不可替代的。即便机枪登场,一个作战经验丰富、身经百战的 50 岁老将一旦熟练掌握这挺机枪,其杀伤力依然远超普通的农夫新兵。只要将 AI 深度融入自身及基金的投研流程,人类投资人就能在很长时期内持续贡献超额价值。 - **高价值播客与访谈过滤 Agent**:目前在 Atreides 最具生产力的 Agent,是专门抓取并提炼高质量播客核心观点的系统。由于行业每天产出长达五六个小时的关键信息(来自 OpenAI、xAI、Google、Cursor、Fireworks、Base10 的技术高管,以及黄仁勋、马斯克、Dario Amodei 的言论),Agent 能以极高精度从海量废话中捞出“大海里的针”。 - **管理层薪酬与激励追踪 Agent**:投研系统专门解析上市公司代理投票声明(Proxy Statement),深度对比管理层薪酬结构——不仅区分其获得的是无脑发放的限制性股票(RSU)还是与业绩挂钩的绩效股票(PSU),更会自动扫描分析历年 PSU 考核指标的变化。这一极度繁琐耗时但充满超额 alpha 信号的工作,已被 AI 完整接管。 ### `01:00:06` 认知分歧崩塌与被极度扭曲的半导体估值 当下是投资史上最令人兴奋激动的黄金时期,但 Gavin 心中也开始敲响警钟:市场内部的观点多元性正在瓦解,形成了一种病态的“一致性共识”。在对公有云巨头资本支出的狂热追逐下,几乎找不出任何一个同行不疯狂看多 DRAM 存储芯片。但与此同时,公开市场资产横截面上的估值逻辑已经彻底错乱: | 细分资产类别 | 当前估值倍数(基于下季度年化) | 上一周期顶点表现 | 业务模式底层对比 | |:--- |:--- |:--- |:--- | | **半导体设备巨头 (Semi-cap Equipment)** | **~40x** P/E | 历史峰值约为 **12x** | 虽有部分高毛利的零备件与维护等经常性收入支撑,商业模式更优,但绝不足以解释 1000% 的估值裂口 | | **DRAM 存储芯片原厂 (Memory Companies)** | **中个位数 (Mid-single digit)** P/E | 历史低谷期约为 **5x** (极端时曾达 3x vs 45x) | 长期陷于周期性大宗品波动,尽管高带宽内存(HBM)具备极高技术壁垒,但市场尚未验证其能否永久重塑存储业的周期宿命 | 这种近十倍的估值鸿沟在逻辑上是无法并存的。更有甚者,直至 4 月初,全球算力基石 NVIDIA 的相对估值依然徘徊在过去 10 至 12 年以来的历史最低区间,无论以相对大盘还是以绝对市盈率衡量都堪称极其便宜;与之形成荒谬对照的,是诸如 GE Vernova 这类受益于 AI 能源概念的电力设备公司,其估值却已被推向了令人匪夷所思的狂热高位。 ### `01:00:00` 劣质资产狂欢:半导体短缺中的大宗商品周期规律 当前半导体市场的截然分化源于估值体系的扭曲:市场已经在英伟达(NVIDIA)的股价中计入了极其夸张、甚至难以置信的市场份额流失。在大宗商品严重短缺的周期中,往往是质量最差的公司涨幅最为惊人。任何熟悉石油、天然气或矿产资源投资逻辑的人对此都深有体会:在真正的大宗商品牛市里,边际成本最高的劣质生产商获益最大,它们能在一夜之间从濒临破产蜕变为现金奶牛。大宗商品投资的残酷之处正在于此——虽然高品质公司在整个长周期内的复合表现更好,但它们超额收益的真正兑现点往往在行业下行期,即那些在短缺狂热中一飞冲天的边缘高成本玩家纷纷破产之时。 这种周期病态正在 AI 硬件供应链全面重演。那些长期被超大规模云厂商(Hyperscalers)和采购方嫌弃、成本高昂、产品故障率极高的边缘厂商,如今全部产能售罄并大举提价。散户投资者在社交平台 X 和 Reddit 上的情绪助推,更是将这些劣质标的送上天际,短期内暴涨十倍;反观许多商业壁垒极高的高品质龙头,股价却严重滞后。这种泡沫化倾向并非 AI 本身的问题,相比于 2024 和 2025 年市场上被大肆热炒的核能(Nuclear)与量子计算(Quantum)概念泡沫,AI 基础设施的需求是实打实的。真正令人担忧的是,一年前还在质疑 AI 的怀疑论者如今已全面转多,而那些毫无护城河的小盘投机股正随着社交媒体的鼓噪而剧烈波动。 具有讽刺意味的是,市场上充斥着被错配和误读的机会。以 Astera Labs 为例,该股长期受到大量空头质疑,甚至被市场量化基金机械地塞进了所谓的“铜互连受害者(Copper Loser)”篮子。然而从根本逻辑来看,Astera Labs 未来的核心产品是交换芯片(Switch),而交换机与加速器之间的互连同时需要铜缆与光纤协同配合;作为交换芯片与互连方案提供商,在物理架构上天然处于连接链路的对侧,根本不可能是铜线替代趋势下的受害者。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Shortage Dynamics in Commodity and Semiconductor Markets accDescr: Diagram illustrating how supply shortages cause low quality suppliers to surge while high quality compounders get mispriced. subgraph Macro["短缺驱动的周期分化"] A["物理层严重短缺<br/>(算力 / 晶圆 / 互连)"] --> B["边际高成本劣质厂商<br/>(产能售罄、大幅涨价)"] A --> C["高质量行业核心龙头<br/>(估值受压、被计入份额流失)"] end subgraph Market["二级市场定价扭曲"] B --> D["散户与社交媒体狂热<br/>(3至6个月内暴涨10倍)"] C --> E["机构机械化分类篮子<br/>(例如 Astera 被误标为铜线受害者)"] end subgraph Resolution["周期最终结算"] D --> F["下行期破产与价值重构"] E --> G["长期高复合收益兑现"] end ``` - **大宗商品周期定律**:短缺期间高边际成本供应商弹性最大,从濒临破产直接转向现金流井喷,但这种由供给挤压带来的繁荣极其脆弱。 - **市场情绪反转信号**:一年前最坚定的怀疑论者全线缴械转多,核能与量子泡沫的投机资金向高故障率的二级小盘硬件标的蔓延。 - **Astera Labs 的错杀逻辑**:主打交换芯片与 Retimer 互连方案,在硬件拓扑中连接加速芯片两端,将该类公司归入光进铜退的受害者篮子属于典型的认知分类错误。 --- ### `01:02:49` 相关性破裂:从粗放宏观叙事走向精细化细分赛道 2024 年至 2025 年期间,整个二级市场的 AI 交易呈现出高度的同向性。投资者只需执行粗放的宏观因子对冲策略——例如做多 GPU 算力、Scale-up 网络设备以及 Scale-out 光模块,同时做空电力公用事业公司——就能在风险管理框架内获得丰厚回报。然而,这种跨资产的高相关性在今年 1 月彻底破裂。市场的同涨同跌不复存在,结构性分化达到了极其极端的程度:Scale-up 纵向扩展网络板块单边暴涨的同时,Scale-out 横向扩展网络却持续走跌;而在存储领域,DRAM 的表现则大幅跑输 NAND 和机械硬盘(HDD),这种分化在过去的历史周期中前所未见。 这一转变的核心诱因在于市场定价效率的迅速提升。随着 AI 工具的爆发式普及,分析师与宏观资金能够在一夜之间快速理解半导体深水区的各类细分子行业,并将其解构成更加颗粒化的交易篮子(Baskets)。过去用半导体资本设备(Semi-cap)或 NAND 去对冲整个内存敞口的对冲手段彻底失效,投资者必须深入到底层物理架构与产品品类的微观差异之中。这也意味着,寻找长期复合回报的最佳机遇,不仅在于守住那些估值并未透支的高品质核心标的,更在于从被算法和量化篮子错误归类的资产中发掘定价偏差。 - **1 月相关性破裂拐点**:以往板块联动的 AI Trade 彻底解体,Scale-up 与 Scale-out 网络走势两极分化,内存内部出现 DRAM 跑输 NAND 与 HDD 的严重分化。 - **因子交易模式失效**:依赖宽基半导体设备对冲单一存储元器件的传统宏观风控模型失效,市场对子品类物理特性的认知加速细化。 - **量化篮子引发的定价套利**:由算法驱动的被动归类(如铜/光、内存细分)创造了大量结构性错配,精细化基本面研究成为关键优势。 --- ### `01:04:30` 巨头竞逐:Google 的算力壁垒与 Meta 的体制变革 审视公开发行的科技巨头阵营,各家的战略落差正在急剧拉大。谷歌(Google)去年凭借自研芯片 TPU 建立了巨大的先发优势,尽管这种单点硬件优势正在被抹平,但其基本盘依然坚如磐石。面对行业供给短缺,算力存量(Installed Base)的价值被急剧放大,而谷歌坐拥全行业规模最大的计算集群。此外,谷歌拥有的多模态数据护城河是其他厂商难以企及的——尤其是庞大的 YouTube 视频资产,在通往具身智能与机器人(Robotics)的世界中具有不可替代的物理常识训练价值。加之搜索现金流与 GCP 云计算业务的爆发,谷歌始终处于极其有利的战略位置;即将召开的 Google I/O 大会将是检验其模型是否能够微幅反超 OpenAI 与 Claude 的关键分水岭,也将直接印证英伟达生态的护城河是否比预期还要深厚。 与之相对,马克·扎克伯格(Mark Zuckerberg)在 Meta 的激进决断令人惊叹。他是唯一一位彻底将传统互联网巨头在组织内部全面重组为“AI 优先(AI-first)”的掌舵人。扎克伯格不仅在关键窗口期毫不犹豫地开出数十亿美元级巨额支票锁定关键人才与算力合同,而且其 MSL 团队推出的首个模型 Muse 展现出了极高的上限。尽管 Muse 目前尚未完全跻身由 OpenAI、Claude、xAI 和谷歌构成的绝对前沿(Pareto frontier),但其接近程度已远超市场预期。在二级市场中,中短期(如三年周期)维度的边际变化率往往比静态竞争优势更具爆发力,Meta 展现出的这种组织进化速度使其成为了极具进攻性的玩家。 - **谷歌的算力存量溢价**:在硬件供应短缺背景下,最大的存量集群构筑了极高壁垒,叠加 YouTube 对具身机器人训练独一无二的视频数据,长期确定性极高。 - **扎克伯格的组织转型**:Meta 是唯一一家从内部机制彻底完成向 AI-first 转型的超大规模互联网企业,不惜成本豪赌人才与前沿基础设施。 - **Muse 模型的战略突破**:作为 Meta 新架构下的首款主力模型,其性能逼近最前沿阵营,展现出极高的边际改进斜率。 --- ### `01:06:50` 巨头竞逐:微软的路线豪赌与初创生态割裂 亚马逊(Amazon)的战略纵深同样不容小觑。凭借自研芯片 Trainium 的快速迭代,以及在未来 18 个月内即将在零售仓储中实打实兑现损益表(P&L)降本效率的自动化机器人技术,其业务底座极为稳固,内部基础模型 Nova 的实际表现也远超外界给予的折价。相比之下,微软(Microsoft)处在极富戏剧性的战略转折点。萨蒂亚·纳德拉(Satya Nadella)无疑是一位极为出色的 CEO,但在短短三年内,微软的叙事从气吞山河的“我们要让谷歌跳舞”演变成了“纳德拉是 Copilot 的总产品经理”。甚至令人不禁好奇:在当初 OpenAI 那场未遂的政变风波中,如果纳德拉内心深处选择支持 Ilya Sutskever 和 Mira Murati 而非 Sam Altman,今天的微软与 OpenAI 联盟是否会是另一番天地? ```mermaid flowchart LR accTitle: Microsoft Strategic Dilemma and Pivot accDescr: Diagram illustrating Microsoft's capital allocation shift from GPU resale to internal models and Copilot. subgraph OptionA["短视商业化路线 (资本市场偏好)"] A1["将全部 GPU 算力转售给 OpenAI / Anthropic"] --> A2["Azure 营收短期脉冲式暴涨"] A2 --> A3["微软股价冲向 $800<br/>(沦为单纯算力通道,丧失自主权)"] end subgraph OptionB["Satya 当前的勇敢转向"] B1["克制转售冲动,收回 GPU 资源"] --> B2["解决 Copilot 算力严重不足的体验硬伤"] B1 --> B3["重金自主预训练内部前沿模型"] B2 & B3 --> B4["对冲前沿模型关闭 API 调用的战略断供风险"] end ``` 微软在 2025 年初曾出现过短暂的战略犹豫(Flinch),其传统的“CapEx 支出与回报公式”出现误判,导致在关键算力配额争夺中丧失了身位。如今纳德拉正在做出一项遭到公开市场惩罚、但战略上极其正确的勇敢决策:他没有将宝贵的 GPU 算力完全外租给 OpenAI 和 Anthropic 去换取 Azure 漂亮的短期增速——如果那样做,微软今天的股价或许能冲上 800 美元——而是下定决心将算力截留在内部。此前 Copilot 体验不佳的根本瓶颈正是算力供给严重受限;纳德拉宁愿牺牲短期业绩,也要调用一切算力补齐 Copilot 性能并全力自主研发内部前沿模型。这一豪赌旨在防范一个不可逆的终局:即未来顶尖的前沿模型可能彻底切断 API 外部调用,变成闭源的私有护城河。 而在底层生态位上,科技巨头对待外部创业团队的态度呈现出截然不同的图景: - **亚马逊与英伟达**:以绝对领先的深度全面拥抱并深度绑定创业生态。 - **谷歌**:保持着仅次于前两者的极高参与度与生态投入。 - **博通(Broadcom)**:作为定制芯片(ASIC)的绝对王者,被整个初创硬件界奉若神明——对于芯片初创企业而言,第二代芯片能与博通合作是质的飞跃,若第一代芯片就能被博通接纳,则堪称天降甘霖。 - **超威半导体(AMD)**:在这一轮 AI 初创企业生态的实际互动与深度合作上,参与度几乎为零。 ### `01:10:00` 超大规模云厂商的生态割席与应用层价值湮灭 在探讨大型科技公司的生态位时,微软和 Meta 对尖端 AI 初创团队的直接支持力度显得相对有限。如今很多最优秀的工程师与研究团队已经离开大型上市公司,聚集在小巧精悍的初创公司中。这导致 NVIDIA、AMD 以及紧随其后的 Google,凭借与这些敏锐团队的深度协同,建立了其他超大规模云厂商(Hyperscalers)无法比拟的生态优势。 这种底层与上层的割裂直接投射到了应用层市场上。回顾整场技术巨变,AI 在应用层不仅没有实现外界预期的价值捕获,反而呈现出极其残酷的净价值毁灭。即使把 Cursor、Cognition 这类当前最成功的 AI-native 独角兽的估值全部计入,传统软件应用层在这一轮浪潮中蒸发掉的市值依然高达数万亿美元。当前市场上跑在最前列、市值扩张最迅速且正在创造真实经济价值的企业,几乎无一例外都具备同一个特征:拥有最高的“人均有效 GPU 使用率”(utilized GPUs per human)。这或许预示着未来的每个劳动力都将配备极大规模的算力集群,但在当下,它揭示了生产力重构带来的极度失衡。 - **生态粘性差异**:NVIDIA、AMD 与 Google 积极下场服务顶级初创团队,而部分传统超大规模云厂商在这一层面的缺位可能演变成长期的战略劣势。 - **应用层价值蒸发**:即使算上顶级 AI 原生明星项目的爆发,现有传统 SaaS 与应用软件被抹去的估值规模依然达到了万亿美元级别。 - **新生产力公式**:当前经济价值创造最集中的企业,其核心竞争优势体现在人均支配与运转的有效 GPU 规模上。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: AI时代价值转移与两极分化机制 accDescr: 展示底层算力厂商与应用层企业之间在生态结合度与价值捕获上的强烈反差 subgraph HardwareAndCloud["底层芯片与云生态"] A["NVIDIA / AMD / Google"] -->|"深度赋能与算力直供"| B["AI-Native 顶级初创团队"] C["部分传统超大规模云厂商"] -.->|"相对脱节与支持滞后"| B end subgraph ValueDivergence["应用层与生产力重构"] B --> D["极高的人均有效 GPU 占有率"] D --> E["超高估值与爆发式生产力 (如 Cursor / Cognition)"] E -->|"技术替代与降维打击"| F["传统 SaaS 与软件应用层 (数万亿美元价值被净毁灭)"] end ``` --- ### `01:11:42` 现实暴力、地缘博弈与 AI 赋能的“新美利坚和平” 在更广泛的连带冲击中,社会现实与地缘政治正呈现出更深层的躁动。随着 AI 议题日趋政治化,社会层面激进政治暴力的抬头可能演变为直接针对 AI 领军人物的人身安全威胁。有人曾向山姆·奥特曼(Sam Altman)的住所投掷莫洛托夫燃烧瓶(Molotov cocktails),这正是社会进入一个由 AI 驱动的“高方差、高贝塔、高风险”(higher variance, higher beta, higher risk)混乱世界的危险信号。无论公众对 OpenAI 抱有何种主观评价,这种针对核心创新者的暴力升级都令人感到极度不安。 地缘政治格局同样因战场 AI 技术的突飞猛进发生剧烈倾斜。乌克兰在战场上展现出的惊人反击能力,其核心驱动力不仅在于无人机硬件的迭代,更在于其拥有除美国和以色列之外世界上最强大的战场作战 AI。当中国以及其他地缘竞争对手逐步意识到这一代差时,全球博弈的响应机制将变得极其不可预测。 然而,技术垄断并非必然导向失控。1945 年后,美国在独家掌握原子弹的绝对优势下并未走向全球殖民或武力征服,反而在麦克阿瑟等将领归国后迅速实现去军事化,主导重建了德国与日本,并扶持了韩国与以色列等盟友,从而缔造了维系长期繁荣的“美利坚和平”(Pax Americana)。同理,大国在 AI 领域的绝对优势未必只会带来动荡,它同样有可能成为构建由前沿技术支撑的新一代全球战略均势与和平秩序的基石。 - **个人安全风险外溢**:头部 AI 领袖正在成为激进思潮与社会戾气的靶子,行业亟需警惕针对核心科技人物的现实人身威胁。 - **智能化战争前线**:乌克兰战局印证了现代冲突的胜负手已从单纯的物理军械转向了算法驱动的战场 AI 系统。 - **霸权与秩序重构**:复刻二战后依托核垄断促成长期和平的历史经验,AI 技术的绝对领先可能催生由技术优势所锁定的新型地缘均势。 --- ### `01:14:00` 技术事件视界、罕见病救治与科技乐观主义的边界 面对 AI 这道人类社会的“技术事件视界”(event horizon),科技乐观主义的终极注脚依旧落脚在每一个具体个体的生命轨迹上。曾有一位行业内同行,其年幼的女儿被确诊为一种极其罕见且无药可医的绝症。这位父亲联合各方资源,从顶级大模型实验室调动了惊人的超算资源,利用 AI 代理网络进行大规模药物筛选与靶点匹配,最终成功从现有已上市药物中锁定了能够有效抑制病情的治疗方案,并旋即创立生物科技公司推进彻底治愈的研发。小女孩的生命已被这项技术彻底改写,这展现了前沿模型突破生命科学边界的无尽潜能。 但在拥抱科技乐观主义的同时,社会必须正视技术奇点带来的结构性断裂。当代卢德主义者(Luddites)对技术淘汰人类的悲观预言终将被证伪,但他们对阶级极化与利益分配不公的担忧必须得到严肃对待。如果最先进的 AI 智能沦为只有极少数超级富豪才能负担得起的特权消费,整个社会将陷入不可逆的赛博反乌托邦。全行业在狂飙突进的同时,必须保有最底层的谦逊与审慎,确保前沿智能的红利能够惠及普罗大众。对技术、历史、资本主义与市场规律的赤诚热爱,终需服务于全人类面对剧烈不确定性时的平稳着陆。 ## Notable quotes > `02:29` 如果你把这个复合增速连续推算三年,就会发现人类历史上根本找不到任何商业先例 — Gavin Baker > `26:24` 过早看对和看错没有任何区别 — George Vanderheiden > `40:00` 早在那个工艺还只是台积电眼中的闪烁微光时,黄仁勋就已经看过了 — Gavin Baker > `40:00` 只要有人做出了不同尝试并拿到 1% 到 3% 的份额,英伟达就会造出同样的产品横扫对手 — Gavin Baker > `42:49` Prefill 是装填加农炮弹,Decode 则是开火发射 — Andrew Fox > `45:40` 这相当于将老旧 GPU 的使用寿命直接延长到了 10 年甚至 15 年,直到它们物理上彻底熔化为止 — Gavin Baker > `50:00` 代码可能是通往通用人工智能(ASI)和高价值 AI 的最短路径 — Amjad Masad > `55:00` 机枪已经来到了战场上。如果我们不能全部成为驾驭机枪的大师,我们就会被这挺机枪所淘汰。 — Gavin Baker ## Mentioned Gavin Baker, Patrick O'Shaughnessy, Bill Gurley, Anthropic, Claude, Claude Code, Opus, Palantir, Snowflake, Databricks, Krishna, DeepSeek, OpenAI, Codex, Sarah Friar, Elon Musk, SpaceX, Starlink, Starship, Optimus, Tesla, TerraFab, Blackstone, Apollo, KKR, NVIDIA, Blackwell, Hopper, Ampere, Larry Ellison, Boom Supersonic, TSMC, Morris Chang, Intel, Samsung, Carlota Perez, Michael Mauboussin, George Vanderheiden, ASML, KLA, Lam Research, Applied Materials, Google, TPU, Gemini, xAI, Grok, Broadcom, Richard Sutton, TurboQuant, Micron, SK Hynix, Amazon, Trainium, AMD, Andrew Fox, Cerebras, Groq, Andrew Feldman, CoreWeave, Coatue, Wayfair, Cursor, Cognition, Replit, Amjad Masad, Jamin Ball, Altimeter, Mythos, Atreides Management, Astera Labs, GE Vernova, Mark Zuckerberg, Meta, Muse, Satya Nadella, Microsoft, Copilot, Ilya Sutskever, Mira Murati, Sam Altman ## Video description My guest today is Gavin Baker, founding partner and CIO of Atreides Management, and this is our sixth conversation. The central theme is watts and wafers, the two physical constraints that in Gavin's view will dictate the next phase of AI. On power, he thinks the near-term shortage starts to ease in 2027 and 2028 as new sources of energy come online, and that orbital compute solves it in the long term. On wafers, he explains what is different this time from the dotcom bubble and why TSMC’s capacity decisions may be the single most important variable to watch. We also discuss Elon’s Terrafab, the disaggregation of GPUs, the role of new chip companies, and whether the economic value of AI will keep accruing to frontier models. For the full show notes, transcript, and links to mentioned content, check out the episode page ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠here⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠.  ----- Become a Colossus member to get our quarterly print magazine and private audio experience, including exclusive profiles and early access to select episodes. Subscribe at ⁠colossus.com/subscribe⁠. ----- ⁠Ramp’s⁠ mission is to help companies manage their spend in a way that reduces expenses and frees up time for teams to work on more valuable projects. Go to⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ ⁠ramp.com/invest⁠⁠ to sign up for free and get a $250 welcome bonus. ----- Trusted by thousands of businesses, ⁠Vanta⁠ continuously monitors your security posture and streamlines audits so you can win enterprise deals and build customer trust without the traditional overhead. Invest Like the Best listeners get a special offer of $1,000 off Vanta when you go to ⁠vanta.com/invest⁠.  ----- WorkOS⁠ is the infrastructure B2B and AI-native companies use to sell to enterprise. It covers everything enterprise security requires: SSO, SCIM, RBAC, Audit Logs, AI governance, and more. Trusted by 2,000+ fast-growing companies, including OpenAI, Anthropic, Cursor, and Vercel. ----- Rogo is the AI platform for finance. They're building agents for Wall Street that are trained to understand how bankers and investors actually do work: from diligence and modeling, to turning analysis into deliverables. To learn more, visit rogo.ai/invest. ----- ⁠Ridgeline⁠ has built a complete, real-time, modern operating system for investment managers. It handles trading, portfolio management, compliance, customer reporting, and much more through an all-in-one real-time cloud platform. Visit⁠ ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ridgelineapps.com⁠. ----- Editing and post-production work for this episode was provided by The Podcast Consultant (⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠https://thepodcastconsultant.com⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠). Timestamps: (00:00:00) Welcome to Invest Like The Best (00:02:29) Gavin Baker Intro (00:03:32) Anthropic's Record ARR Growth (00:11:49) Should OpenAI and Anthropic Raise at a Much Higher Valuation? (00:13:23) How Elon Preserves Investor Trust (00:14:00) Watts & Wafers (00:15:45) Data Centers in Space Explained (00:20:51) Orbital Compute’s Impact on Terrestrial Data Centers (00:26:24) TSMC Supply Discipline & Bubble Risk (00:30:50) Demand for Frontier Tokens & The Bitter Lesson (00:35:33) Continual Learning & Memory (00:40:01) New Chip Companies & Startups (00:42:49) Prefill vs. Decode Disaggregation (00:48:40) AI-Native Founders: Different & Hard (00:51:27) Token Path & Application Layer (00:56:13) How Gavin Uses AI in Atreides (01:00:06) Signs of a Diversity Breakdown (01:05:42) Google, Meta, Amazon, Microsoft (01:11:42) Broader Knock-On Effects of AI [Source](https://traffic.megaphone.fm/CLS8755474209.mp3?updated=1779241717)

Source quotes

[2:29] Gavin Baker: 如果你把这个复合增速连续推算三年,就会发现人类历史上根本找不到任何商业先例 [26:24] George Vanderheiden: 过早看对和看错没有任何区别 [40:00] Gavin Baker: 早在那个工艺还只是台积电眼中的闪烁微光时,黄仁勋就已经看过了 [40:00] Gavin Baker: 只要有人做出了不同尝试并拿到 1% 到 3% 的份额,英伟达就会造出同样的产品横扫对手 [42:49] Andrew Fox: Prefill 是装填加农炮弹,Decode 则是开火发射 [45:40] Gavin Baker: 这相当于将老旧 GPU 的使用寿命直接延长到了 10 年甚至 15 年,直到它们物理上彻底熔化为止 [50:00] Amjad Masad: 代码可能是通往通用人工智能(ASI)和高价值 AI 的最短路径 [55:00] Gavin Baker: 机枪已经来到了战场上。如果我们不能全部成为驾驭机枪的大师,我们就会被这挺机枪所淘汰。

Source quotes

[25:00] George Vanderheiden: being early is the same thing as being wrong. [55:00] Gavin Baker: If we do not all become masters of the machine gun, we're going to get mastered.

Original transcript

[0:00] Ramp is the only platform built to make your finance team leaner, faster, and better, saving businesses 5% annually on average so you can stay focused on growth. Ramp customers grew revenue 3.2 times faster than the average American business. Visa, Vercel, Cursor, Stripe, Notion, 11Lab, Shopify, and 70,000 other businesses all run on Ramp. Mine does too, and so should yours. Learn more at ramp.com slash invest. Felix by Rogo is a personal finance agent that turns a single prompt into finished client-ready work using your firm's own templates, context, and standards. Send Felix an email like, take these comments and turn them for me, or update my tracker with the context of these emails, or run the ability to pay math on this buyer, and Felix sends back finished PowerPoint decks, Excel models, and sourced research. Felix works the way your team already does, delivering work quickly and accurately around the clock. Learn more at rogo.ai slash Felix. The best AI and software companies from OpenAI to Cursor to Perplexity use WorkOS to become enterprise ready overnight, not in months. Visit WorkOS.com to skip the unglamorous infrastructure work and focus on your product. Hello and welcome everyone I Patrick O and this is Invest Like the Best This show is an open exploration of markets ideas stories and strategies that will help you better invest both your time and your money If you enjoy these conversations and want to go deeper, check out Colossus, our quarterly publication with in-depth profiles of the people shaping business and investing. You can find Colossus along with all of our podcasts at colossus.com. Patrick O'Shaughnessy is the CEO of Positive Sum, All opinions expressed by Patrick and podcast guests are solely their own opinions and do not reflect the opinion of Positive Sum. This podcast is for informational purposes only and should not be relied upon as a basis for investment decisions. Clients of Positive Sum may maintain positions in the securities discussed in this podcast. To learn more, visit PSUM.VC. My guest today is Gavin Baker, the founding partner and CIO of Atreides Management. and this is our sixth conversation. The central theme is watts and wafers, the two physical constraints that in Gavin's view will dictate the next phase of AI. On power, he thinks the near-term shortage starts to ease in 2027 and 28 as new sources of energy come online and that orbital compute helps solve this problem in the long term. On wafers he explains what is different this time from the dot bubble and why TSMC capacity decisions may be the single most important variable to watch We also discuss Elon Carafab the disaggregation of GPUs the role of new chip companies and whether economic value of AI will keep accruing to the frontier models. Please enjoy this awesome sixth conversation with Gavin Baker. All right, so this is our sixth time doing this, if you can believe it, which puts you back into first place, or at least tied first place with Gurley, back into steam territory. Always my favorite conversation about markets and everything going on. Even since last time when we did this, which was so exciting and spectacular, I think we're in an even more interesting time now. Maybe just start by riffing on how it felt for you living through March and April of this year, which felt to me just like a completely unique economic technology and market environment. And you're the biggest student of history and of these times. So what did it feel like? I would say broadly speaking, there are two kinds of drawdowns. There are drawdowns where you're wrong, company missed estimates, your hypothesis was invalidated, and you have to take your medicine and you crystallize that loss. And then there are drawdowns or periods of underperformance where you underperforming because of companies you know really really well and where you profoundly disagree with the price action and you can lean in And instead of crystallizing negative performance, you can kind of build pent-up alpha, pent-up future performance. And for me, that is what March felt like. The NASDAQ was selling off. At the same time, what was happening in AI was, I think, the most extraordinary moment in the history of capitalism, the history of American business. What I just mean by that is that Anthropic, they added $11 billion of ARR. And what is astonishing to me about this is that the SaaS and cloud revolution, it created, we'll call it between $5 and $10 trillion of value. I would say arguably the three highest profile SaaS companies in the last 10, 12 years are Palantir, Snowflake, and Databricks. and these three companies employ thousands of people, tens of thousands collectively. They've all spent 10 years building their businesses. And Anthropic added their combined businesses in one month. Nothing like that has ever happened in the history of capitalism. Forget my career, just the flat out history of capitalism, the history of business. It's wild. And then Krishna comes on this show and shares with [5:00] That's 500% in DR. Yeah, you do the math on that for three years. So there's just no precedent for this. And we tech investors hear a lot of discussions about S curves and investing in exponentials. I've just never seen an exponential like this. It felt even more extreme than DeepSeek, which was a very similar setup. They happened at about the same time. If we go back to 25, there's a huge sell-off on DeepSeek, which was very strange because the paper gets published seven days before DeepSeek Monday. It got published, I believe, on a Monday that was a holiday in America. I read it. I thought, hmm, this feels like it might not be that positively for the AI trade. I took action. And then we had DeepSeek Monday, where AI really imploded a week later. That was really strange because by DeepSeek Monday, it was super clear that this was going to be the most positive thing that ever happened to compute demand. Prices of the AWS availability zones in Asia had already doubled You were seeing GPU availability go down And this was just the first time we saw how much more compute hungry reasoning models are during inference than non models And so that was a similar setup. You had to do some work to see that. I mean, it's not that hard to say, oh, wow, stocks are selling off. The price of DRAM is going vertical. The price of GPUs in measure going vertical, GPU availabilities going down. And then like two or three days later, GPU prices in America started going up, GPU rental prices. All you had to do in March was simply observe what was happening to Anthropic. And there's all these people who seem to regret not buying during 22, not buying during COVID, not buying during DeepSeek. You had the same valuation set up at the beginning of April and an even clearer AI inflection. So there have been all these chances to buy into AI. And then, of course, what complicated it was the straight and foremost. I became a believer and am a believer that I think maybe one thing that the market was mispricing I no macro expert I do do a lot of pro security investing So I do have access to people who are experts that are excited to share their thoughts and opinions with me And that the Strait of Hormuz being closed is actually relatively awesome for America. Why? Particularly for the goals of the current administration. So electricity is a very important industrial or manufacturing input. The key input into American electricity prices, which feeds into AI, is in G1, natural gas one on Bloomberg. That was down 20%. And natural gas in Asia, Europe, everywhere else doubled or tripled. Our relative manufacturing competitiveness improved overnight. And for better or worse, that is what the Trump administration seems to care about. They are very focused on America's relative position. And I think a lot of people had memories of the 1970s. What made the 70s so traumatic was it wasn't just that prices went up. It's that there were actual gas shortages. Then you go through, okay, well, the US economy is dramatically less energy intensive than it was. The United States is now the world largest producer of oil and gas And we become now the world largest exporter of oil and gas And on top of that there this relative manufacturing advantage that made it easier to stay focused on AI fundamentals, stay focused on what were historically attractive valuations. I think on a relative basis, tech essentially got as cheap as it's been versus the rest of the market has at any point over the last 10 years. And just think about that in the context of market efficiency. We have the most extraordinary moment in the history of capitalism that's wildly bullish for AI, and you get a chance to buy AI at really attractive valuation. What do you make of the multiples that specifically Anthropic and OpenAI, which in my mind are like the reference assets that are the most pure play takes on this trend, really being not that crazy? Like if you just look at the sales multiple and compare it to maybe what Databricks and Snowflake and these companies traded at their peak, how do you process it? How do you make sense of it? I do think OpenAI and Anthropic are pretty different animals from a capital efficiency perspective. And Anthropic clearly has a dramatically lower cost per token than OpenAI. They just do. And you could just see that in the amount of money that they have burned to get to a roughly similar range. [10:00] I think they burned maybe 80% less than OpenAI. So as businesses, they clearly have very different structural ROICs. I think Sarah Fryer is one of the most exceptional CFOs. I think they're doing a lot of things to try to improve this. And they've secured a lot of compute. They've secured a lot of compute. That's another big difference. It turns out being aggressive really paid. Anthropic at $900 billion for $50 billion in ARR, growing at ridiculous rates. And I think maybe a true statement is that if Anthropic could just wave a magic wand and get all the compute they wanted, they'd probably be doing well north of $100 billion today, maybe $150. They have clearly deprecated the intelligence of Claude. There's an analysis. Claude is even on Opus is generating 70% less tokens for the exact same question. As we talked about last time, token quantity equals quality of answer and quality of thinking at some level. And there is an intelligence density per token that also matters. I felt that as a user. So I think they would be doing materially more, 100, 150, maybe 200 billion. So you might be buying it at more like five times unconstrained I going to make up a new number URR unconstrained revenue Why do you think they don raise billion at a trillion valuation or something like this? If you were the Anthropic CFO, Krishna's awesome, we just had him on. Or if you're Sarah, it seems to me like if the inbound I received following the Krishna episode is any indication everyone I've ever met is trying to invest in both these companies. I think it's wise. The future is uncertain. You are clearly in a very capital intensive game. Even if you are Anthropic, I'm sure is at very positive gross margins on inference today. I think Anthropic probably starts generating cash this year if they are not already generating cash, which I think is probably the case. But still, you probably want to be able to raise more capital, access more compute. The world is uncertain. Ukraine is starting to really, really win. How is Russia going to respond? I think there's still a lot of uncertainty in Iran. All this uncertainty, I think, probably amplifies geopolitical uncertainty over time. So it's an uncertain world If I think about Elon Elon has always made investors money He treats it like a sacred covenant And as a result because he made people money for now 20 years he has a superpower That is he can essentially raise as much capital as he wants whenever he wants. I do think being focused on making investors money is wise and creates benefits that don't just last for like a year or They can last for the next 20 to 30 years. And the way Elon did this was systematically underpricing SpaceX or whatever else. Like, what is the actual method? Just never being greedy on valuation, never pushing valuation. Just that simple. My friend Antonio pointed out SpaceX compounded it low 30% per year for a decade. And that was just because Elon was, I think, focused on preserving the superpower and having trying to strike a fair balance between investors and employees. I think it's wise, but could Anthropic raise money at probably at least a 100% premium to this rumored latest mark? Of course. Let's get to the Watson wafers part of the discussion. Always my favorite thing to talk about with you. The importance of this infrastructure build out Every time I feel like it getting overheated and then the next time I talk to you it seems like we should have done way more than we did You studied S and the steepness of those S a lot And you know a lot about history Talk us through how you're thinking about Watts and Wafers today as the key to inputs into this whole thing. I think capitalism is going to solve the Watts shortage absent big regulatory political blowback, which I think is a real possibility. The head of data center infra investing at one of the big PE firms, Blackstone Apollo, KKR said it used to be energy and chips were our biggest gating factors. Now it's zoning and approval, much more important. I think a lot of companies are waiting till after the midterms to take action in terms of maybe workforce reductions. Nobody wants to be a pinata during the midterms. You've seen a lot of companies that make turbines, announce a plans to significantly increase capacity. There's like two of these machines that can cast these big blades. We haven't made one in 80 years in the West. We don't know how to make them anymore. All of that is true. By no means am I minimizing the industrial engineering magic and artistry that goes into those, but capitalism is very good. It's [15:00] problems like these over time. There's other sources of energy besides these turbines with a longer time frame. So I think the watts shortage will probably begin to alleviate 27, 28. And then I think orbital compute will really solve that. I do want to reframe orbital compute because I think when people hear data centers in space, which we discussed our last episode, They picture a Pentagon-sized building in space. They're like, well, we can't do that. That's not what it is. A Blackwell rack weighs 3,000 pounds. It's eight feet high. It's four feet deep, three feet wide. It's racks in space. And SpaceX has showed you an illustration. And it's a rack. That's the satellite. But it's probably about the size of a Blackwell rack. It has these solar wings that are probably 500 feet long on each side. You keep it in a sun-secretous orbit, so those solar panels are always in the sun. Because it in an exactly sun orbit the radiator which extends behind it for hundreds of feet is in the shape This is a common criticism yeah How are you going to go over here I spent a lot of time at Starbase over the years and I talked to a lot of SpaceX engineers and I do think it is the most talented group of engineers on planet Earth. And they're very confident they have solved this. And they're not always confident. There's some engineering that needs to happen to turn the Starship into a Mars colonial transporter. Will they do that? Absolutely. What are they more focused on? I'd say probably the repair and maintenance. These are the two big responses, the radiator and how do you repair whatever issue goes wrong in the rack? And the answer is, until you have probably floating optimuses, you don't. Starship is going to change the space economy in ways we cannot imagine. And particularly if regulation becomes a constraint to data centers, none of it's going to matter. You're going to sell as much orbital compute as you can make. And then obviously you link these racks using lasers traveling through vacuum, which are already on every Starlink. And it's just mind blowing to me that SpaceX operates the world largest satellite fleet which is 98 or 99 of all satellites in orbit Every Starlink they cooling it today I think Starlink V3 is going to operate at 20 kilowatts A Blackwell rack is only 100 kilowatts And people talk a lot about density Well if you're connecting the racks with lasers through vacuum, you can make the rack bigger. Physically, you're focused on weight, not size. In a data center on Earth, where you're trying to connect racks, ideally using copper, minimize lengths. Cabling is a big cost. You do want that rack to be small. Copper when you can, optics when you must. But in space, there's all sorts of things that SpaceX can do that I think maybe some of these naysayers are not contemplating. They operate more satellites than anyone. They have a 20 kilowatt satellite today. So maybe you just scale that up to 60 kilowatts to start. They seem very confident they're going to go right to 100 to 120. The same company now also operates the largest data center on Earth. They have the world's best hardware engineers and all sorts of people, almost all of whom are not smart enough or practical enough to work at SpaceX, are these armchair skeptics. I don want to quote Larry Ellison but somebody was being skeptical And Larry was just like listen he out there landing rockets I don see anybody else landing rockets And the reality is 10 years later no other company is consistently capable of landing and fully reusing an orbital rocket. None of this makes sense without reusability. That means you have to land it. I would like to redefine orbital compute has racks in space, not giant floating pentagon sized data centers in space. That's silly. What makes a data center is you're connecting these racks with lasers. So it'll be racks in space that are connected with lasers into a virtual data center. Vanta automates security and compliance for over 16,000 fast moving companies like Ramp, Cursor and Harvey, keeping them audit ready around the clock. It's the number one agentic trust platform, and it now helps companies like yours watch for the risks that show up between audits across your vendors, your AI tools, and your whole environment. Every new tool your team signs up for, every vendor that turns on AI features is an opportunity for something to go wrong, and most security programs weren't built for AI's pace of growth. The Vanta agent works like a 24-7 GRC engineer in the background, finding issues, drafting fixes for you, and cutting vendor assessment time by up to 50%. Whether you're a fast-growing startup or a global enterprise, Vanta helps you earn [20:00] improve trust. Invest like the best listeners get a special offer for $1,000 off at vanta.com slash invest. Ridgeline is the first end-to-end system of record with embedded AI for investment management firms running portfolio accounting, reconciliation, reporting, trading, and compliance on one unified platform. Firms are moving off legacy technology and onto Ridgeline because of how far ahead Ridgeline's AI features are compared to anything else in investment management software, which is why I believe that firms that come out ahead in the AI era will be the ones running on Ridgeline's unified platform. If you're serious about your firm's AI strategy, Ridgeline should be part of that conversation. You can request a demo at ridgeline.ai. And if you think about that state of the world, let's say that all happens and we're really good at getting these things up economically and running matrix multiplication all over space. What does that mean for terrestrial data centers? Someone once said America was going to suck as hard as it can on every energy source it can get. And I just think the same is true of compute. It why I probably less worried about like an edge AI bear case than I was We going to consume as much compute as we can Inference, I think, is very sensible for Orvo compute. Training will be done on Earth for a long time. So I don't think that this is super bearish for terrestrial data centers. I think those are going to be valuable for my lifetime. But I do think if you're in this ecosystem of power production and cooling, and you are massively ramping capacity, a lot of these capacity ramps are going to be hitting, just as I think all of the silly skeptics start to understand that orbital compute is very real. I think it's worth thinking long and hard about that if you're one of those companies. And then all sorts of cool stuff is happening in the interim. We're getting really good at repurposing jet engines. There's that boomerow space that is doing this. Capitalism is hard at work on watts. On wafers, though, it's just this group of plenty older humans in Taiwan who are the most important humans in Taiwan, whatever they are. The overwhelming fraction of the country GDP water usage electricity usage They talk about the silicon shield They all view themselves as inheritors of Morris Chang sacred legacy Now, I vividly remember visiting Science Park more than 20 years ago and talking to them. Do you think you could catch Intel? And they said, this is such a beautiful dream, but it's a dream for our grandchildren. room. And they did it, partly because of Intel's self-inflicted wounds. They think very differently. One reason Jensen flies over there so much is he wants them to expand capacity. I do think it's wild that Jensen has never had a contract with Taiwan Semi. They do business on what seems fair in handshakes. Just fascinating. No contract. It's going to be fair over time. We're partners, we're going to be fair to each other. The truth is, based on every prior market precedent for a foundational new technology like AI, you've always had a bubble. Carlotta Perez wrote this great book about this. Markets are efficient. They correctly understand that this is a foundational new technology. There's what Mobison calls a breakdown in diversity. Everyone becomes bullish on this new technology. And I am beginning to worry a little bit about a diversity breakdown And then you get a bubble That bubble funds the build out of this new technology but supply gets ahead of demand and you get a crash. And it's a particularly severe crash if it's a debt-fueled build out like the year 2000. And one thing that's really good about the current build out is it's still overwhelmingly funded out of operating cash flows, which is a really important fundamental difference versus the year 2000. has is valuation, has is the fact that every GPU is running at 100% utilization when 99% of fiber was unutilized. So there's all these fundamental differences. History doesn't repeat, but it rhymes. And as an investor, we have to be very cognizant of it and recognize that based on the last two or 300 years, forget the internet bubble. We had a railroad bubble, a canal bubble, every kind of bubble, South Sea bubble. We should expect a bubble. That's terrifying. Nobody wants a bubble. The reason it's terrible is if you're valuation sensitive, you like massively underperform. You get fired by probably all your clients. George Vander Heiden, who is no longer with us, Great Fidelity Portfolio Manager, he fought the bubble in 99 and he retired in early 2000 because I think he just couldn't take it. He knew it was wrong. His clients were deeply skeptical. George, you're out of [25:00] app. He had white hair. He's a truly great man. I only overlapped with him briefly, but he was a very important mentor and friend to my good friend and mentor, Jennifer Urich. So I have a lot of Vander Heiden DNA through her. He was the same person who said being early is the same thing as being wrong. George retires because he can't take the underperformance and he can't take clients saying, what's wrong with you? You don't get it. And he has like 40% of his funded tobacco, So 40% did home builders. And literally, he probably outperformed the NASDAQ by like 20 or 30x over the next three years. And I have been optimistic that this fundamental shortage of wafers, which really today is controlled by Taiwan Semi, will prevent one. If Taiwan Semi did what Jensen wanted, I think NVIDIA could sell $2 trillion of GPUs in 26 or 27, maybe $2.5 trillion. maybe $3 trillion. But there is a limit where consumers would consume so much, they probably would be in an overbuild. So Taiwan Semi, if we don't get a bubble, we need to throw a party for them because they will have single prevented a bubble You are starting to see companies go to Intel and Samsung Let's just assume TSM stays super supply constrained versus blatant demand. What happened? The history of markets is, I don't know who, but one of Intel and Samsung, they're not going to stay disciplined. They will break. And then at some level, that will force everyone else to break. I think a lot of this may come down to the degree to which Taiwan Semi can maintain a lead over Intel and Samsung. You got to remember, it's whatever it is. It's 9, 12, 15 months. The leading node adjumine. Exactly. The pace at which they expand capacity. If I were to watch one thing to understand where there's a bubble, it's Taiwan Semi's capacity decisions. And I think there's a Goldilocks zone where they expand enough. They make it hard for Intel or Samsung to really truly emerge as like a at scale second source with something well north of 30% market share. And yet they also keep this fundamental constraint on wafers that helps us avoid a bubble And then obviously I think the TerraFab is going to play into this too Say more about that It a SpaceX I believe Tesla involved as well joint venture to build the world largest fab here in America. I think they're going to be successful. One, they have a partnership with Intel, which is very important because they're getting access to 50 years of institutional knowledge that's just nine months, a few quarters, 12 months, three to five quarters behind the front. That's an advantage. It's also an advantage that I believe the TerraFab is going to get attention from the A-teams, all the semi-cap equipment companies. One big reason Taiwan semi-caught up is ASML and KLA 10 core and LAM research and applied materials. They wanted them to catch up. They don't like having a monopsony. The A-teams were in Taiwan working until made some mistakes and presto. So the A-teams will be here because of Elon's reputation in hardware engineering. And then to a degree that I think is maybe hard for people to imagine in America, where politics has replaced religion, I think because Elon had his foray into politics, it makes it hard for some people in America to see him clearly which is sad because I do think he probably doing more for America than any other American He single bringing manufacturing back to America He revived defense tech I think SpaceX is in some ways the most important defense contractor in America. He's doing a Starlink. It's amazing for the world. He's creating all these blue-collar manufacturing jobs, which is like a goal, I think, of a lot of liberals and good for America. He's done more than any living human to decarbonize the world. And if you are upset about data sitters on Earth for environmental reasons, well, here you go. It's sad, but he is a living deity in China, Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan. Having watched him for a long time, what he's going to do is they're going to recruit the best people because the best engineers want to work for Elon, especially in hardware engineering. He's going to recruit incredible engineers. Next to the TerraFab, there'll be a Taiwan town. Oh, these are your favorite restaurants? I'm going to move them and their whole staff from Taiwan to Texas. And we're going to make everything the way they like it. And then we'll have Japan town. Same thing. Then we're going to have Korea town. We're going to have all these things exactly dialed to recruit the best [30:00] engineers. And that's just not the way that the people who run Intel at Siam Sung think. So he's going to have the best talent. He's going to have the A-teams at the Wafer Fab equipment companies. He has Intel, which is important. It's so good for all of any administration's political goals. And I think it's different enough that it will not alienate Taiwan's semi. And these have long lead times, right? TerraFab is going to be pumping out whatever GPs, whatever chips, quite a long time from now. We'll see. Elon tends to do things differently. Everybody else has taken three years to build a data center. He built one in 122 days. Sam Saga had to give him an office in their fab in Texas because he was so unhappy about the pace at which they're expanding and building. Are you surprised by, you mentioned DeepSeek earlier, the simple reaction to that was, okay, these models are just going to get 95% as effective for some tiny fraction of the cost to still Chinese open source models. We'll be able to use these for most of what we want to do. Fast forwarded a little bit of time, two years from now, there's no reason I have to spend a million dollars a year in my small little firm on tokens or something But then the actual reality seems quite different than this And I curious why there that dissonance in your mind I do think it fascinating the returns to the frontier all the economic returns to AI at the model layer, not all of them, but an overwhelming amount of them have been at the frontier, which is surprising to me. And I think it's been surprising to a lot of people. This is one of the most important questions to be answered, and you need to have a hypothesis on it as an investor. Are frontier tokens going to continue capturing the overwhelming majority of economic value created at the model layer? And it is surprising. I remember when Gemini 3.1 Pro came out. It was mind-blowing to me. It was so good. Today, it's intolerable. There's probably a little bit of a dynamic where companies prototype with frontiers, then when they put something into production. You're hearing a lot of people do use Vertex or open source. But still, it is a fact today that the overwhelming majority of these economic returns come from frontier tokens. And that's surprising. And whether or not it continues, I think, is a very interesting question. And I'm much more open-minded to that, having had the experience I've had with Gemini My 3 and then Opus And then I do use Grok 4 a lot It is on the Pareto frontier The companies that are on the Pareto frontier are and this is by the way a big change in a consequence of what we talked about last time, Google losing their per-cost token leadership as a result of making very conservative design decisions with TPUB8 to try and take it away partially from Broadcom and NVIDIA continuing to make aggressive choices. But Google dominated the Pareto frontier, the Pareto frontier being intelligence versus cost. And I think this is the most important thing to look at to analyze AI labs. Google dominated that nine months ago. Every point on the Pareto frontier, OpenAI, XAI, and Anthropic were inside of them. Now, the Pareto frontier is dominated by Anthropic, OpenAI, and then Grok 4.3 is on the Pareto frontier. It's clearly the best, lowest cost, 500 billion parameter model. And then Gemini 3.1 is hanging on to the Pareto frontier. And if I were to bet or bet that they're subsidizing that out of pride, I would just say a violation of Richard Sutton's bitter lesson is for sure the biggest risk to this trade, to all of AI. The closer someone is to AI, the more skeptical they are that this will occur. One thing I think contributed to weakness in March was a much more stupid version of DeepSeek which is this thing called TurboQuant And TurboQuant is some Google memory optimization that was written up in a paper a year ago And then during the middle of an agreement, while Google was negotiating with Micron, Samsung, and Hynix to sign some LTA that would lock in really high prices for a long time, they released this. What people do is always more important than they say, and they just kind of publicize it on X. and it goes viral. Like, oh my God, DRAM is cooked. Here's this DRAM optimization. I was unable to find a single AI engineer on planet Earth who believed that TurboQuant would have any impact on DRAM demand. But nonetheless, a violation of Richard Hutton's bitter lesson, more compute will always outperform human algorithmic ingenuity, more compute and data, chinchilla optimal, beyond chinchilla optimal, I guess what people increasingly do today. it. That's a real risk, man. The people who are building these models are skeptical of that risk. The reason I am a little less skeptical is I think we're very close to ASI. And who knows if the bitter lesson holds for 400 IQ models. Maybe we get a temporary period where these, you know, if you get to ASI, the first thing it wants is probably [35:00] to be smarter and have more resources. How does it do that? It makes itself more efficient. I think that is an actual risk. The bitter lesson literally, I believe, includes humans in it. So we're about to find out whether the bitter lesson, we'll find out if it applies to 300 IQ AI, then 400, then 500 and 600. And at some point, we may have a temporary violation of the bitter lesson based upon AI and ASI. So I'm curious how you think about some other parts of the innovation around the model, continual learning and memory being two that people seem to be most focused on as things that might create yet another new paradigm that we would enter. What do you think about the role of those two things? Yeah, well, I think we've done a lot with memory through these harnesses. And it turns out that harness engineering is not as important as the model, but it really matters. And these harnesses in these models are increasingly being co-developed. One of the big things a harness does, what you just think of is like a runtime that the model operates in And it knows where the tools are It creates context memory state has very specific prompts or instructions It a huge difference even simple versions It makes an incredible difference I think the last time I was on here one of the other times I just said like hey as an investor, it's very important that you pay for the $250 a month version to get your own intuitive sense. That's no longer possible. To understand what Frontier AI is capable of today, even for a non-coding use case, you need to have cloud code or codex, and you need to be on an enterprise plan. And the reason for this is, and this is another dynamic that's enabled by Google losing their cost leadership, is these AI models just shifted to usage-based pricing. And if you're on that $250 or $300 or $280 a month plan or whatever it is, you are getting severely rate limited. You are getting a lobotomized version of the AI. Because like we talked about, Claude now produces 70% less tokens. You want the tokens that Claude and its harness really think it needs to produce to get you a good answer? You need to be on a usage-based plan. And by the way, this is so bullish for AI. If we go back to 05 to 07 cellular had been a great growth industry really for the last 10 years And the reason was you had a combination of fixed pricing You had 900 minutes for whatever it was and then usage-based pricing over that. When did cellular stop being a great growth industry? When everybody just went to all you can eat. And by the way, long distance is the same thing. AI is just shifting from all you can eat to pay by the drink. And it turns out people really like to talk to their friends long distance. They really like to talk to their friends on the phone. and people really like to use AI. And particularly now that one person can have 100 agents working. So I think the shift to usage-based pricing is probably why you will see OpenAI and Anthropic exceed well over $200 billion in ARR this year. Not only is MoreCompute going to become online, but they're going to be able to push frontier token pricing with these usage enterprise models. It's sad. It's sad for the world because it just means if you can't afford that, that you're not at the frontier. And I think it's gonna throw off a lot of investors' intuitive sense of the capabilities of AI. But yeah, continual learning, man, I mean, if we solve that. How do you conceptualize that? AI is constantly updating its weights. I mean, it may end up being something different. There so many mysteries about the human mind We such sample efficient learners relative to AI Many orders of magnitude Now we have a crude variant of continual learning today when something is verifiable and that's just reinforcement learning during mid-training. Continual learning is a model that dynamically adjusts its weights or adjusts in some way in real time. Like as a human, the first time I put my hand in a fire, I've learned I never put it in there before. That model today needs to put its hand in the fire a million times and then have the designers effectively put a fire in the next training run or an RL gym for it to learn. I think it has to be dynamically updating the weights, but I think people are working on really smart techniques beyond this. But if we get that, then we have a really fast takeoff and people seem confident that continual learning is kind of just around the corner. And I do think this is like the third big question. Bitter lesson violation as a result of ASI are less likely human ingenuity. Will Frontier tokens still command the premium they do? And will we get continual learning? And if so, win? What is the role of new chip companies? [40:00] in all of this. We talked a lot about NVIDIA, their relationship with the SMC and Intel and all these sorts of things. There's a thousand flowers blooming, I think literally probably a thousand flowers blooming, trying to create a new chip to address some part of this bottleneck. I'm curious how you process this space, this opportunity, what role it will play. So I think this is good and healthy for the world. It's good for Jensen too, because a different administration might take a different view. Competition, I think, is good for everyone and seeing different architectures explored is good. And the reason is in tank design, they talk about the iron triangle. The iron triangle of tank design is that all designers of a tank, they have to make trade-offs between attack, defense, and mobility for obvious reasons. The more defense you have, which is just armor, the heavier the tank is, the less mobile it is. So you have to live in this triangle and make trade-offs. The Merkava in Israel is optimized for defense. Russian tanks, and like the Leopard, are generally more optimized for mobility. Chip design is the same. There are these fundamental constraints imposed by the laws of physics as embedded in the Taiwan semi rules that you need to live within You have TPU Tranium and AMD which are all essentially trying to be a better GPU And today I think probably Tranium is doing the best Now nobody's a better GPU, but Tranium is tugging on Superman's cape. That hadn't started yet. The Tranium 3 needs to ramp into production because it has a switch scale-up network, what you really need to economically inference MOE models. A lot of companies have a Taurus architecture. That's where Google was. Google's developing a switch scale network. And then AMD is like always kind of flying from behind. Yeah. AMD, we'll see. The MI450, we don't know yet. We'll see. We probably know more about Trinium 3 than the MI450. But that's a hard game to play. So you have to do something different. And you have to do something different that is also hard to do. So I think the best path for these startups, my rule of thumb is 1% market share is going to be worth $100 billion. $100 billion is a pretty good venture outcome. I think what Jensen would say is, okay, if somebody does something different and it gets to a 1% or 2% or 3% share, we'll make that chip. And that's coming for everyone. But if you trying to make a better GPU good luck If you are doing something different it also needs to be hard to do And you can make different trade The disaggregation of pre-fill and inference really have opened the aperture for making these different trade-offs because you can make very aggressive trade-offs for decode, aggressive trade-offs for pre-fill. Pre-fill being taking in the context, decode being, you know, write the output. Yeah. I have a great colleague named Andrew Fox who said, pre-fill, picture British naval ship from the 18th century. Pre-fill is loading the cannon, decode is firing. And what pre-fill literally is, is just the model understanding the question, the prompt, and then keeping track of its own answer. And that is fundamentally a memory capacity bound problem. Decode is the process of generating new tokens, and that is memory bandwidth constraint. So if you're a chip designer, this gives you a richer canvas to paint on. But even so, it needs to be hard because if you make different trade-offs in that iron triangle to optimize for memory capacity, and they're not hard trade-offs to make, NVIDIA is going to make those same trade-offs. They get better prices from Taiwan Semi than you're ever going to get. Good luck. And they have the advantage of working with every model company and optimizing their designs By the way another very funny thing is there this process if you a VC and you investing in a semiconductor company that is telling you they are going to have an advantage because of a Taiwan Semi process that they have special access to, I promise you, the Jensen's saw that process when it was a twinkle in Taiwan Semi's eyes. They know more about it than this little company with 200 people can imagine. Taiwan Sibi, everybody in the supply chain is showing Jensen everything. The same way they're showing Amazon everything, AMD everything, TPU everything. And that's another reason. Don't go try to make a better GPU. So you can do something different. You can paint in the pre-fill canvas. You can paint in the decode canvas. But you also have to do something hard because if it gets to scale, you're going to have those four companies has very fast followers. My firm was a venture investor in Cerebris. What Cerebris has done is something hard and fundamentally different. Wafer scale computing. It comes with a set of trade-offs, but that architectural decision they made was hard and lets them do something that no one else can do. And we'll find out how big that is. They're working on really cool things. One of the problems Cerebris [45:00] Cerebrus has is once you start needing to glue a lot of chips together and scale up networks or scale out networks, you need a lot of IO. And IO is bound by what's called the shoreline, the sides of the chip. Cerebrus has an overwhelming ratio of on-chip computed memory relative to shoreline IO. Well, they're really smart people. They did something really hard. They're trying to see if they can put an optical wafer right on top of that. And then that solves that problem. I'm sure they're looking at hybrid bonding of DRAM to get around the much-discussed on X, these alleged limitations that are not true. A Cerebrus machine can theoretically run any size model. There are sizes of models where they're much better than other sizes. So Cerebrus, what I think is interesting is they did something different that's hard to do, really hard to do, wafer-scale computing. I do think there's a role for these. I would just encourage them all, make a different trade-off, try and do something hard. everybody's going to get funded after the Cerebrus IPO. It's not going to be a problem, but it took Cerebrus three generations of chips to get it right. Andrew Feldman, the CEO you can just see how hard it was what he did and that whole team did to get where they are today And they need to have the grit to do that the resilience This first chip is a failure. It happens. Can you come back and make a second chip? But the one last thing on this topic is this is going to be amazing for the useful lives of GPUs and may single-handedly save private credit. Say more about that. What do you mean by the private credit? Just private credit. They're in pain from these SaaS loans. And however much they're marked down, they probably need to be marked down more. Because if the public companies are struggling to adapt, how's like a debt-laden company going to adapt and invest in what is a very different margin structure business? There's a lot of private credit in GPUs too, and they were underwriting that to, I think, three or four years. The disaggregation of inference means that I think these GPUs are going to have 10 or 15-year lives. The AI skeptics are like, oh, these companies are all cooking their books. The useful life of GPU is only a year or two. The useful life of a CPU is only four years because of the rapid technological change. No. What rapid technological change has done with the disaggregation of pre-fill and inference is mean that you can put a Cerebra system or Grok LPUs that NVIDIA acquired effectively in front of a hopper or even an Ampere Use that hopper and Ampere for pre and extend the useful life of that GPU until it melts They do melt so they have a time but maybe you don have to run them as fast. This is going to be really good for the whole private credit industry. It's going to help finance the AI buildout because if you can start to finance GPUs at more like 5% or 6% instead of, I think Corby's lowest financing was like low sevens, that actually mathematically changes the cost to finance this build out. We had this technological innovation that's going to lower the cost of financing, extend the useful life of compute on earth. And then I do think the one last thing that's interesting about that is my friend Jamin from Cotu just did a podcast and Cotu had a deck and they talked about, hey, sellers of shortage are doing so much better than the buyers of shortage, buyers shortage being the hyperscalers. But if you own a giant installed base of what is currently in shortage, that's also a very good place to be. And we're hearing CPUs are way more important than they were in an agentic world. They do all these things around orchestration, tool calls. The biggest CPU fleets in the world sit at the hyperscalers. Some of these hyperscalers may catch up a little bit to the sellers of shortage. I want to talk about this idea of different and hard applied outside of the infrastructure piece of this Now you starting to interact with new founders existing CEOs and founders that have to adjust to this new world What are you seeing the most AI native founders that aren't building chips or infrastructure or models, but just people using this technology to build other stuff? How do they feel the most different to you if you've observed differences? I do think this is just for chip design. To me, it's always been a fundamental question for venture. So there are different ideas that are obvious to everyone on planet earth as soon as they hear it. And if that's where you are in venture, if it's not hard to do, if it becomes obvious to the world before you have built scale, scale is the ultimate advantage. You're in trouble. And the great thing Amazon had was, I think it was obvious to a lot of people, but it wasn't obvious to the retail CEO. Amazon, they were very smart. Any e-commerce company that VCs invested in, they would destroy. They'd be like, oh, that's so cute. We're going to take our margins of that to negative 10,000%. And that's like the guys at Wayfair, they did something hard. Amazon tried to kill them and they failed. Those were like tough, operationally, really competent CEOs. For me in venture, I always look, is this going to be obvious to the world before this company could build scale? Or is this both not obvious, different, and really hard to [50:00] I think a lot of founders are really struggling with this in AI. I think people are becoming worried today in Jensen's five-layer cake of AI. The profits are accruing to energy, accruing to data centers, accruing to chips, they're accruing to models, not really accruing to the applications. I think cursor and cognition got to a scale. They focused on coding. 18 months ago, the people were focusing on coding. OpenAI was doing everything under the sun. The people focused on coding were cursor, cognition, anthropic. And it was really right to focus on code. Amjad Massad, the founder of Replit, tweeted something that I thought was so smart. Just something like, bitter lesson adjacent is the fact that coding might be the shortest path to ASI and useful AI. Because if you're really good at coding, you can write yourself code to do anything. So I think it was really smart of those companies to focus intensely on coding. They all probably got to a scale where they have a place. I think cognition is doing something really, really different. But I think a lot of founders are really struggling, man. I think they're trying to get confidence that in nichier areas that they can get to them and get like a data moat before the model companies get to that niche Or that it a small enough niche that the model companies won do it themselves but it can still produce a venture outcome Is this related to what you would call like the token path? I know you've used that phrase with me before. Yeah, I think it comes from a guy, an altimeter, Jamin Ball. But he just said, if you're a software company or an AI company of any kind, you have to be in the token path. So Databricks, that's in the token path. Comparable companies are in the token path. If you're not in the token path and you're not in some really niche thing, life may be hard. And even for these vertical niches, I think if you talk to the people at the model companies, they're even skeptical of some of these because all of the data that's being generated in these niches come from humans. But then you're betting that you're able to use that proprietary data in this narrow vertical to train a model that's lower cost than the frontier labs can ever get to. And maybe that's a good bet, but I just think you have to be very, very careful. Now, on the other hand, if the returns to these frontier tokens relative to other tokens come down, there going to be an explosion in value creation at the application layer And I think another really important point is I have a belief that whenever he wants Jensen can probably get pretty close to the frontier With his own model. With his own model. I don't think he wants to do that, but that is what OpenAI and Anthropic are kind of trying to do to him unsuccessfully. He's a very logical thinker. This is the logical counter move. You will see that open source frontier, which today consists of Chinese models with stolen American tokens. Somebody told me that like DeepSeek, maybe the original one was only 150,000 reasoning traces. There's many ways to launder this if you're a Chinese company. You can hit all these different APIs. You can make it hard. Now, the American labs are working really hard on anti-distillation technology. But I just think Chinese open source, they're doing really impressive things in a very resource-constrained way, but there's a lot of distillation. And this is why I think in addition to there not being enough compute to serve Mythos, they did not want it to be distilled. They wanted to use Mythos, distill it themselves, use it to RL their next model whatever it is And then I think what they and eventually I think OpenAI anyone on the frontier will do is just say there going to be some very interesting game theory because it a new kind of prisoner's dilemma. We talked about the old prisoner's dilemma being just around like, hey, you're in a prisoner's dilemma where you have to spend. The new prisoner's dilemma is going to be if you are at the frontier, do you release that model via API or not? If everyone at the frontier Tier agrees not to do that. And in Chinese open source, if one person defects, they're going to have the best model. They're going to have a lot of revenue and cash flow. And then, of course, resources equal intelligence. So they'll start to pull ahead and then that will lead to everybody else releasing it. So it's a new game theory. It's kind of the same game theory that you have with Taiwan, Simi, Samsung, and Intel. Well, the reality is if a company like NVIDIA or AMD were to ever really, really use one of these other foundries, that foundry would get better really quickly. So I do think Jensen is going to keep open source a certain time frame behind the frontier. I think that's going to be a very interesting thing to watch. And then by the way, open source gets monetized. There's this misnomer that open source is free. Open source tokens, they cost energy to produce. You need to make up on GPUs. and the open source model companies almost always get a revenue share. [55:00] Are you preparing Atreides for the world of Mythos 3, Mythos 4? We're just trying to overinvest in cybersecurity. And I really believe everybody needs to have a safe word. Everybody needs to go leave your digital devices behind, literally go to the ocean and have a family safe word or a company safe word. And it can't be one that can be like socially engineered. And this is just to avoid cybercrime where what looks like your son or your daughter or your grandparents or your parents or whatever, FaceTimes you. It's an utterly accurate simulation of them. They know everything and can extrapolate based on what they're likely to say and says, you know, wire me a million bucks. So doing everything we can with cybersecurity. That's defensive. What about analytical or processing? What will you still be able to do that it won't be able to do, I guess, on the analytical side? So it's a good question. I just watched The Last Samurai and I asked people at my firm to watch it. And The Last Samurai if you haven seen it I highly recommend watching it It actually a movie that aged really well It a Tom Cruise movie from 20 years ago The conceit is Tom Cruise is this bitter washed up Civil War veteran who actually a very good soldier And he bitter and washed up because he feels like he participated in negative actions against the Native Americans It during the Miji Restoration And he hired by the modern elements of the Japanese government to train like an army of peasants how to fight the samurai. There's a first battle. Of course, the samurai win, even though they don't have guns. He fights valiantly. So the samurai decide not to kill him, take him to their village. He becomes a samurai. It feels like the Civil War to him. So he fights on the side of the samurai. at the end of it, he's massacred by a peasant with a machine gun. The machine gun is here. If we do not all become masters of the machine gun, we're going to get mastered. So I am trying to become a master of the machine gun. And then I'm optimistic. There's a long period of time where just like if you were a 50-year-old samurai veteran of many wars, I fought many wars, Master Dwarf, you will have advantages using the machine gun. I'm optimistic as a lifelong student of investing. I'm going to be able to master the machine gun, this new technology, integrate it into my own process, integrate it into our firm's process in ways that let me contribute value as a human being for a long time. Like everyone, I have agents running all the time now What your most useful agent My single most useful agent is a really good summary of the points that would be interesting to me from podcasts There's just six hours a day of stuff that I feel like it's in my job description to watch. Every time somebody from OpenAI, XAI, Google, Cursor, Fireworks, Base 10, I'm going to say nothing of Jensen, Elon, Dario. I feel compelled to watch and I just don't have that much time. And there's some real needles in haystacks. That is what I would say for me is the most useful. I do think there's a set of things that I always like to see. Like I'm very sensitive to management compensation. What are they insented to do? Do they just have stupid RSUs or do they have PSUs? And if they have PSUs, what are those PSUs and sent them to do? And we now have systems that do a very good first pass at that. That saves people a lot of time and frees them up for more creative work than like going through the proxy, pulling the PSU thing, looking at how it's changed versus all the proxies because there's signal in that. And that's very labor intensive and that's so good for an AI And there obviously all sorts of same things within investing Pressuring the organization in those ways I think has been helpful This is the most exciting thrilling time to be an investor I'm getting a little bit worried. The diversity breakdown thing? Say just like a little bit more about the kinds of people that are... I don't know anyone like me who's not really bullish on DRAM. There's all these interesting things happening with AI right now. One is cross-sectionally, the valuations do not make sense. They just flat out do not make sense. They cannot all be true. In other words, you have semi-cap equipment companies trading at 40 times next quarter's annualized earnings and DRAM companies trading at mid-single digit. At the peak of the last cycle, that was 5 versus 12. At one point, it was like 3 versus 45. Those can't both be true. And yes, semiconductor capex business models have improved more than the memory business models. We don't know how much HBM is going to improve memory business models yet. Yes, they have some element of recurring revenue with parts and maintenance, but it's not worth a thousand percent multiple gap. I think it's hard to square the valuation of something like NVIDIA, which is still in early April is essentially as cheap as it gets relative to the market, like in the last 10 or 12 years or whatever it is, and very cheap absolute. It's very hard to square that valuation with something like GE Verno. [60:00] is valuation because it builds in an unfathomable amount of share loss for NVIDIA. So valuations cross-sectionally are really different. Because we are in shortages, the lowest quality companies are doing the best. So if you're an oil and gas investor, a mining investor, natural resources investor, and you're well-versed in thinking of costs, this is very intuitive to you. And a real bull market for a commodity. The commodity suppliers with the highest costs go up the most because it's the most beneficial to them. They go from on the verge of bankruptcy to gushing cash. And this is, I think, one reason commodity investing is really, really hard because quality outperforms during the cycles, but you get all of the outperformance during the downturns when the high cost guys that mooned during the shortages and the commodity bull markets go bankrupt or whatever. You're seeing that happen in every industry. The lowest quality players, companies that are hated and detested by the hyperscalers and the buyers because they have high costs, they're unreliable, the parts fail at a high rate, they're sold out and raising prices And then that activity gets the interest of these retail accounts on X and these stocks get bid to the moon whereas some of the higher quality expressions have actually really underperformed As an investor it's hard because you know, within a shadow of a doubt, that that thing that's mooned 10X in three months or six months is going to go right back down, subject to what they do with all the cash. And so it worries me a little bit that people who are very skeptical a year ago are no longer skeptical. But then I just contrast that with the valuations of these high-quality companies, which are just not extended. And it makes me feel better. I always thought it was funny in 24 and 25 that anyone asked about an AI bubble or talked about it. Do you have this nuclear bubble and this quantum bubble right here, right in front of you? What are we talking about? This is so real. Some of that nuclear quantum silliness has maybe spread into more speculative, lower quality, smaller cap names, where if you have a big presence on X or Reddit, it's easy to move them. And that frightens me a little bit. But I just wish there were more AI bears. I wish there were more memory bears. Astera is a stock I've been close to a long time. There a lot of bears on that I love that Great I first invested in the Series C Good luck thinking that a copper loser And then there also you can feel the baskets in the market and the leverage baskets And what baskets you're in is really important. You know, copper, optical, DRAM, NAND. And a very interesting thing that's happened this year is in 24 and 25, the AI trade traded together. You could be long GPU compute, scale-up networking, and optical scale across, and short power or whatever it was. That trade worked from a risk management sense because I'm very factor aware. That all blew out in January of this year. Scale-up networking would go crazy while scale-out was going down, or DRAMs massively underperforming NAND and HDDs, which had not happened. And so these cross-sectional correlations within AI really fell apart and you had to get very fine grained. You couldn't hedge your memory anymore with some semi-cap equipment or NAND. Everything cross-sectionally really changed in a very interesting way in January. And I think maybe one reason for that was AI got to a quality where it was all of a really easy for a bunch of people to get really smart on these different subsectors start trading them and then they get put into baskets And those baskets- Yeah, creating price efficiency. Yeah, exactly. I think some of the biggest opportunities outside of these higher quality names that I think can compound for a long time, and they're safe, unlike these low quality names, which are terrifying, is in names that are miscategorized. Estera was in a lot of copper loser baskets. Estera, their biggest product is going to be a switch. You use both copper and optics to connect switches to accelerators. Definitionally, if you're a switch company or an accelerator company, you cannot be a copper loser because you're going to be on the other side of that connection. I wonder if you could riff just for like a sentence or two on each of the major companies, Google, Microsoft, Amazon, the major players that are public. All the conversation is centered around these exciting new companies. Maybe run through them in Riff. Google was incredible last year because they had that TPU advantage, which is now gone. The reason I think they're still in a great position is just they have the most compute of everyone. We talked about the value of installed bases being higher as a result of shortages. They have the biggest installed base of compute. Google I.O. is this week. If they don't release something [65:00] that even slightly leapfrogs open AI and or clawed. That's interesting. And it's not a disaster for Google. It's just interesting. And it just means this NVIDIA effect we discussed is even more powerful than maybe I'd imagined. But I'm very curious to see what the Pareto frontier looks like literally in five days after Google's announced its new stuff. This is a big card for them. But Google, between the amount of data they have And the YouTube data is actually really genuinely valuable. It is valuable in a world of robotics. The amount of compute they have, the search business they have, Google's never not going to be in a good position. And then you see that with GCP going crazy. You got to give Zuckerberg a mitts credit, what he's done in terms of making Meta an AI first company internally. And I do think he is the only one of those true internet giants to have done that. I give him a lot of credit for that. I give him a lot of credit for paying up when he did for the billion dollar contracts, the talent. And Muse, I think, was a really big upside surprise. It was the first model from MSL. And it not on the Pareto frontier with XAI Google one entrant and then OpenAI and Cloud but it pretty close That was very impressive to me So I think Meta is in a better position still not as strong of an absolute position as Google, but like their better position and rates of change matter more than level, as you know, in markets, particularly over short three-year timeframes, over long timeframes, level of competitive advantages tends to dominate. But even within that changes really matter. Amazon, I think, is in a really strong position because of Tranium. I do think you're going to see real P&L efficiencies from robotics over the next 18 months in their retail business. I actually think Nova, their internal models are not where Muse is, but they're better than they get credit for. Then Microsoft, I like Satya. I admire him. I think he's an exceptional CEO. And I give him a lot of credit for the decisions he's made. But He did go from, we're going to make Google dance to being the product manager of Copilot in like three years. I would love to know during the coup attempt against OpenAI, does Satya regret his decisions? Does Satya wish that he had supported Ilya instead of Sam and that Ilya and Mira were really running OpenAI today In his heart of hearts I would love to know Because I think the Microsoft OpenAI partnership might look very different in that world I think that's a very interesting question that we'll never know the answer to. But I give him a lot of credit. What he is doing now, he's taking risk. This goes to the decisions you have to make in that cone of uncertainty, or not only how much you spend, but what you're going to spend it on. I think Microsoft flinched for like a moment in early 25. They have this algorithm. We spend this much CapEx dollars. We get this return. That algorithm was kind of off. And if you flinch, you lose position. You lose all these allocations. And it's difficult to get it back. So they flinched. And now the decision Satya is making, which the market has punished him for, but I think is the right decision. I mean, who knows how fast Azure could be growing if they're willing to just sell GPUs to open AI. We're going to use our compute internally to make our own products better. One reason Copilot is so bad or has been so bad is just one enough compute available. They're fixing that. He's the product manager of Copilot. I do think he's a great CEO. They're trying to use their compute to train their own models I am a little skeptical that they have the right team to succeed there but just like Meta they can afford to hire maybe a different team But I think he making good decisions that are risky decisions to position Microsoft for this world where frontier models are no longer API accessible. And I think it's a really courageous decision that I give him a lot of credit for. And he is foregoing. I mean, Microsoft probably be an $800 stock today if they were using their GPUs to serve solely open AI and anthropics capacity instead of using them for their own products. So I give him a lot of credit for making a great decision. I think what's really interesting is the degree to which these companies are outward facing in their decisions. The two companies who are the most deeply engaged with startups are Amazon and NVIDIA by a mile. Then there's a really intense engagement with Google, their next most intense. Broadcom is engaged in a different way. They're just everybody's favorite ASIC supplier. If you're a startup, it's considered like a level up if you get to work with Broadcom for your second-gen chip. And it's considered manna from heaven if Broadcom works with you for their first-gen chip. And then you see essentially zero engagement with startups from AMD, AMD. [70:00] Microsoft and Meta. When I say zero, it's a little. And I just wonder about that decision because some of the best teams are no longer at big public companies. They're at these smaller startups. And I think it's going to end up being a pretty big advantage for NVIDIA, AMD, Google, right behind them to have this engagement that you just don't see from these other hyperscalers. As we wrap up, I'm curious for you to riff on any other out there knock on effects that you've started to think about for this giant trend. We've talked about the specific companies in a lot of detail that this most impacts. We talked a little bit about the application layer and what would have to happen for there to be more value occurring to that layer of the stack. I'm curious, any other just fun knock on things that you've been thinking about as this world changes so quickly? And it is wild. I mean, at the application layer, forget value accruing, just value has been destroyed. AI has net destroyed. Even if you count cursor cognition, the most successful AI natives, trillions of dollars of value has been destroyed by AI at the application layer. And just in this context the companies that are doing the best today that are seeing their values increase the most that are creating economic value are the companies with the highest effective ratio of utilized GPUs per human Maybe this just means that every human is going to get a lot of GPUs, but I think that's an interesting fact that we kind of need to be cognizant of. I will just say, and maybe this is a little dark, I am more and more worried about personal safety. And I worry about this a lot more for people who have a much bigger public presence and are much more associated with AI. I hope nothing tragic happens. There is this upsurge in political violence here in America. And as AI increasingly becomes political, I worry that's going to get directed at more and more AI political leaders. Whatever I may think or may not think of open AI, I think it is terrible that someone threw Molotov cocktails at Sam Altman's house. I am worried that we are headed into a higher variance, higher beta, higher risk world because of AI. And that's for me as an individual and then for people who are big players on the chess board. Think about what it means geopolitically. We're watching. The Ukrainians are really starting to win. And the reason they're winning, I think, is not really because they have better drones. I think they do have better drones That part of it I think the reason Ukraine is really winning is they have the best battlefield AI outside of probably America and Israel And has China has their adversaries begin to process that How do they respond? If the United States, because of its edge in AI, it's great if you're America, but it is destabilizing for the rest of the world. Something I think a lot about is creating a charity to just educate the world on how awesome the West has been. Slavery was endemic to essentially almost every civilization, and slavery was really ended by the British Empire. Tell that story. But America, after 1945, we had the nuclear bomb. No one else had it. We could have controlled the world forever. Instead, we rebuilt Germany and Japan, who were America's most reliable allies, Israel, South Korea. That's a testament to the American spirit in our country. We didn't take over the world. There were these fears that were documented at the time that the American generals, MacArthur was a little bit of an American emperor in Japan, were just going to take over the world. And they could have, and they didn't. They came home, we demilitarized. And then you had this period of great global stability between, you know, it was scary there were terrible moments Yeah you had the Pax Americana So maybe it not destabilizing Maybe it leads to another Pax Americana informed by our AI dominance And I so optimistic that AI is going to be amazing for the world. There's someone like me whose daughter was diagnosed with a very rare disease. There's no cure. He was able to assemble a lot of resources. He was able to get a lot of compute from the labs. We were made aware of what was happening. Spent up an immense amount of agents, came up using AI with a drug on the market that can actually impact his daughter's disease, and then has spun up a company to cure it. Her life is already immeasurably different because of AI. So I'm like an AI optimist maximalist, but I also just acknowledge it's like an event horizon. It for sure, I think is going to be a discontinuity we need to navigate as a society. I think the Luddites are going to be wrong, but we need to be like really thoughtful in how we address their concerns. We need to make sure that it's good for everyone. Like it is a little dystopian that now the best AI is only available to people with a lot of money. We need to solve that. We need to approach this with humility, recognize there's a lot of uncertainty and be thoughtful. When I do this with you, I tell people afterwards, I'm like, may you find something that you love as much as Gavin loves markets and companies and capitalists. [75:00] and history on display today. As always, Gavin, thanks for your time. Thank you. Thanks, Patrick. If you enjoyed this episode, visit Colossus.com. You'll find every episode of this podcast complete with hand edited transcripts. You can also subscribe to Colossus, our quarterly print, digital, and private audio publication featuring in-depth profiles of the founders, investors, and companies that we admire most. 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