Boeing CEO Defends 737 Max Design, Rebuffs Calls to Resign

CNBC Television

Dennis Muilenburg maintains that Boeing followed standard certification rules and will break the crash failure chain with a dual-sensor software update while refusing to admit the original MCAS design was flawed.

AI-assisted summary of Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg answers questions at the company's shareholder meeting — original source. Check the original for full context.

Source published: 2019-04-29

Key ideas

Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg defended the original 737 MAX engineering and FAA certification procedures, firmly refusing to label the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) as flawed and framing post-crash updates as standard continuous safety improvements. (13:56)
The company's software update converts MCAS into a dual-sensor system, eliminating its reliance on single angle-of-attack (AOA) telemetry to break the fatal chain of events seen in the Lion Air and Ethiopian Airlines crashes. (2:11)
Boeing announced that the previously optional AOA disagree alert will now be installed as standard equipment across all new 737 MAX aircraft and retrofitted to existing airline fleets free of charge. (6:14)
Muilenburg rejected calls for his resignation, citing his 34-year career at Boeing and reiterating that company priorities center on recertifying the fleet rather than publicizing airline financial compensation figures. (4:51)

Detailed notes

## Background Published on YouTube by CNBC Television on April 29, 2019, this video captures Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg addressing reporters and shareholders during the company's annual meeting. According to the description, Muilenburg answers questions following the fatal crashes of the 737 MAX 8 aircraft, assuring stakeholders that software modifications will restore the plane's safety and rebuild public trust.

## TL;DR Addressing the aftermath of the Ethiopian Airlines and Lion Air tragedies, Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg expresses sorrow for the victims while defending the company's engineering standards and the baseline certification of the 737 MAX. When pressed aggressively by journalists regarding design flaws, single-sensor vulnerabilities, and calls for his resignation, Muilenburg refuses to concede that MCAS was fundamentally defective or that Boeing bypassed certification rigor. Instead, he frames the disasters as complex chains of events involving multiple operational factors and pilot checklists, while committing to a software update that introduces dual-sensor inputs and makes the angle-of-attack disagree alert standard equipment.

## Atmosphere & style The session feels remarkably tense, defensive, and corporate, dominated by a stark contrast between incisive journalistic cross-examination and polished public-relations deflection. Muilenburg maintains an unyielding, measured composure, leaning heavily on formal procedural language, continuous improvement paradigms, and operational statistics even as reporters voice visible exasperation. Watching the exchange feels like an exercise in executive crisis management under extreme pressure, where sharp demands for admissions of human and mechanical failure consistently bounce off rigid, risk-averse corporate messaging.

## Bulletin - [13:56](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xOQmQpKHVWA&t=836s) Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg defended the original 737 MAX engineering and FAA certification procedures, firmly refusing to label the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) as flawed and framing post-crash updates as standard continuous safety improvements. - [02:11](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xOQmQpKHVWA&t=131s) The company's software update converts MCAS into a dual-sensor system, eliminating its reliance on single angle-of-attack (AOA) telemetry to break the fatal chain of events seen in the Lion Air and Ethiopian Airlines crashes. - [06:14](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xOQmQpKHVWA&t=374s) Boeing announced that the previously optional AOA disagree alert will now be installed as standard equipment across all new 737 MAX aircraft and retrofitted to existing airline fleets free of charge. - [04:51](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xOQmQpKHVWA&t=291s) Muilenburg rejected calls for his resignation, citing his 34-year career at Boeing and reiterating that company priorities center on recertifying the fleet rather than publicizing airline financial compensation figures.

## Key takeaways - [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xOQmQpKHVWA&t=0s) Boeing opened the shareholder meeting by expressing grief for the victims of Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 and Lion Air Flight 610, emphasizing that global fleet safety remains the company's core mission. - [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xOQmQpKHVWA&t=0s) A specialized entry-into-service protocol is planned for the 737 MAX return, featuring dedicated Boeing field support teams embedded with customer airlines alongside supplemental pilot training packages. - [02:11](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xOQmQpKHVWA&t=131s) Muilenburg acknowledged that uncommanded MCAS activation triggered by faulty AOA data was a common link in both crashes, asserting that Boeing takes responsibility for severing that failure link. - [02:11](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xOQmQpKHVWA&t=131s) Boeing leadership defended the original design and certification processes, maintaining that baseline evaluations were fully compliant with established safety protocols and FAA standards. - [04:51](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xOQmQpKHVWA&t=291s) Muilenburg dismissed suggestions that he should step down as CEO, stating his duty is to lead Boeing through the crisis and reaffirm its commitment to engineering integrity. - [06:14](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xOQmQpKHVWA&t=374s) Boeing clarified that MCAS was designed as a handling qualities mechanism to mimic earlier 737 models at high angles of attack rather than an anti-stall system, which is why it was omitted from pilot differences training. - [06:14](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xOQmQpKHVWA&t=374s) The cockpit AOA disagree alert will be made standard across all existing and future 737 MAX aircraft at no cost, though Boeing noted primary flight displays prioritize airspeed, altitude, and attitude. - [08:44](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xOQmQpKHVWA&t=524s) Boeing's baseline system safety analysis explicitly assumed flight crew intervention would occur during abnormal conditions, treating pilot reactions as an integral component of system safety. - [10:18](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xOQmQpKHVWA&t=618s) Muilenburg argued that the standard runaway stabilizer memory checklist and electric trim cutout switches were the intended countermeasures for MCAS activation, claiming those procedures were not completely executed during the accidents. - [11:24](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xOQmQpKHVWA&t=684s) Reporters challenged Boeing on high cockpit workload and pilot awareness, questioning whether Boeing placed unreasonable expectations on crews who were unaware MCAS existed after the system repeatedly fired. - [11:24](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xOQmQpKHVWA&t=684s) Muilenburg resisted identifying MCAS as the sole trigger of the accidents, arguing that aviation disasters stem from multifaceted chains of events that require awaiting official investigation findings. - [13:10](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xOQmQpKHVWA&t=790s) Boeing declined to share specific financial reimbursement figures or contractual terms for grounded airline customers, stating fleet recertification must take priority before resolving operational claims. - [13:56](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xOQmQpKHVWA&t=836s) Despite ongoing software rewrites and intense press scrutiny, Muilenburg declined to characterize the physical design as flawed, presenting the changes instead as Boeing's ongoing pursuit of continuous learning.

## Detailed walkthrough ### [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xOQmQpKHVWA&t=0s) Opening Remarks on the 737 MAX and Return to Service

Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg opens the shareholder meeting by expressing profound sorrow on behalf of the company for the lives lost in the Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 and Lion Air Flight 610 tragedies. He emphasizes that Boeing recognizes the immense gravity of the disasters and the devastating grief suffered by the victims' families and loved ones. Stressing that passenger safety is the company's foremost priority, Muilenburg puts the scale of Boeing's global operations into perspective: each day, 5.3 million passengers fly safely on Boeing aircraft; at any given moment, more than 2,900 Boeing 737s are in the air carrying nearly half a million people; and around the world, a 737 takes off or lands approximately every 1.5 seconds.

Muilenburg outlines Boeing's ongoing technical and operational path forward, stating that the company is collaborating closely with airline customers and global aviation regulators to certify and implement an updated software package. Once passenger flights are cleared to resume, Boeing intends to treat every returning aircraft with an entry-into-service protocol, deploying dedicated field support teams to all 737 MAX operators to provide real-time operational assistance. In parallel, Boeing is preparing supplemental educational materials and enhanced training regimens for airline pilots. Reaffirming confidence in the company's core operations, Muilenburg concludes his introductory remarks by thanking Boeing employees for their dedication to safety, quality, and integrity.

“Through the work we are doing now in partnership with our customers and regulators to certify and implement the software update, the 737 MAX will be one of the safest airplanes ever to fly,” Muilenburg asserts.

- Over 2,900 Boeing 737 airplanes are airborne at any given moment worldwide, carrying roughly 500,000 passengers. - A Boeing 737 aircraft lands or departs somewhere in the world roughly every 1.5 seconds. - Entry-into-service plans include deploying Boeing technical teams directly to all MAX airline operators alongside enhanced pilot training packages.

[02:11](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xOQmQpKHVWA&t=131s) Owning the MCAS Failure Chain and Technical Design Standards

Opening the question-and-answer session, a reporter challenges Muilenburg on his previous remarks that Boeing “owns” the situation, pressing him on what specific mistakes the company takes responsibility for and why reluctant passengers should trust the 737 MAX after the software modification. Muilenburg responds by maintaining that Boeing has respected the integrity of the official accident investigations and provided steady engineering support throughout. He explains that both crashes involved a complex sequence of events, but acknowledges that a shared element was the uncommanded activation of the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) triggered by erroneous angle-of-attack (AOA) sensor data.

When pressed specifically on whether this constitutes a fundamental design mistake, Muilenburg defends the original development process. He insists that thorough engineering reviews confirmed MCAS was conceived, verified, and certified entirely in compliance with Boeing's established safety protocols and regulatory standards. While insisting that Boeing has identified no technical flaw or procedural gap in the baseline certification criteria, he reiterates that the software modification eliminates the risk of single-sensor activation, thereby severing that fatal link in the failure sequence.

“We know that in both accidents there was a chain of events that occurred; one of the links in that chain was the activation of the MCAS system because of erroneous angle-of-attack data, that was a common link in both accidents,” Muilenburg states. “We know that we can break that link in the chain, that is a link that we own, it's our responsibility to eliminate that risk, and the software update does exactly that.”

```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: MCAS Failure Chain and Software Resolution accDescr: Flowchart illustrating how erroneous sensor data led to MCAS activation in the accidents and how Boeing's software update breaks the chain.

subgraph AccidentChain["Accident Sequence"] A["Erroneous Angle-of-Attack (AOA) Data"] --> B["MCAS Activation Link"] B --> C["Chain of Failure Events"] end

subgraph BoeingFix["Boeing Remediation"] D["Software Update & Verification"] -->|"Breaks failure link"| B D --> E["Cross-Checks Multiple Sensors"] D --> F["Enhanced Pilot Training Materials"] end ```

[04:51](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xOQmQpKHVWA&t=291s) Questions on Executive Accountability and Resignation

A reporter confronts Muilenburg directly, asking whether, given the corporate crisis and the urgent need to rebuild trust with passengers and airlines, he has considered resigning as Boeing's chief executive. Muilenburg rejects the suggestion, turning the focus back to his personal history and operational commitments. He notes that he has spent his entire 34-year career at Boeing, emphasizing that both he and the company's workforce acutely understand that human lives depend on their engineering and operational rigor.

Describing his recent interactions across the company, Muilenburg mentions touring the Renton, Washington factory where the 737 MAX is assembled, where he spoke directly with factory line workers, test pilots, and flight control engineers. He insists that Boeing's internal culture remains fundamentally dedicated to safety and quality, arguing that his duty is to steer the organization through the aftermath of the accidents rather than step aside.

“My clear intent is to continue to lead on the front of safety and quality and integrity, that's who we are as a company and I think it's really important to continue to stress that,” Muilenburg insists.

[06:14](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xOQmQpKHVWA&t=374s) Pilot Disclosure and the Angle-of-Attack Disagree Alert

The briefing moves to why Boeing implemented MCAS on the 737 MAX without proactively detailing the system in pilot manuals or airline documentation, and why the angle-of-attack disagree alert was inactive on many delivered airplanes. Muilenburg clarifies Boeing's engineering intent, pushing back against public characterizations of MCAS as an anti-stall protection mechanism. He explains that MCAS was designed strictly as a flight handling qualities tool to ensure the MAX felt identical to previous 737 generations during high-angle-of-attack maneuvers. Because it was integrated into the baseline handling characteristics of the aircraft rather than conceived as an independent system requiring discrete procedural handling, it was not treated as a separate training item during pilot differences instruction.

Addressing the inactive cockpit disagree light, Muilenburg acknowledges ongoing scrutiny and announces that Boeing will make the AOA disagree alert standard equipment across all existing and future 737 MAX aircraft, retrofitting delivered planes free of charge. However, he downplays its operational significance, explaining that an AOA disagree alert does not dictate flight crew actions. In commercial transport flight decks, primary flight displays prioritize altitude, airspeed, pitch, roll, and heading. Muilenburg underscores that airspeed, altitude, and physical cues such as the stick shaker provide the necessary tactile and audible warnings to prompt proper pilot response during unreliable flight situations.

“It's a system that's designed to provide handling qualities for the pilot that meet pilot preferences; we want the airplane to behave in the air similar to the previous generation of 737s,” Muilenburg explains.

- MCAS was engineered to replicate previous-generation 737 flight feel at elevated angles of attack, not as a standalone anti-stall system. - The AOA disagree alert will become a standard, cost-free feature on all 737 MAX deliveries and retrofits. - Commercial cockpit primary displays prioritize altitude, airspeed, attitude (pitch and roll), and heading rather than raw AOA sensor telemetry.

[08:44](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xOQmQpKHVWA&t=524s) Single-Sensor Architecture and System Safety Assumptions

A journalist challenges Muilenburg on the decision to rely on a single angle-of-attack sensor input to drive MCAS, arguing that the vulnerability of a single sensor failure should have been foreseen during development. The reporter also raises growing skepticism from the flying public following whistleblower reports to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and Congress concerning certification shortcuts, asking how Boeing can re-establish credibility without admitting that fundamental mistakes were made.

Muilenburg stands by the original engineering assessments, asserting that the baseline MCAS design satisfied all internal Boeing criteria and FAA certification protocols that have governed commercial aviation for decades. He explains that aviation safety assessments do not evaluate mechanical and software architectures in isolation; rather, they combine engineering components with anticipated flight crew intervention during abnormal events. He points out that pilot responses to system anomalies are fundamentally baked into standard system safety analyses across the commercial airline industry.

“When we design a system, understand that these airplanes are flown in the hands of pilots, and in some cases our system safety analysis includes not only the engineering design, but also the actions that pilots would take as part of a failure scenario,” Muilenburg explains.

[10:18](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xOQmQpKHVWA&t=618s) Dual-Sensor Updates and the Runaway Stabilizer Checklist

Dennis Muilenburg highlights Boeing’s ongoing software remediation, pointing out that the company has identified a clear path forward by converting MCAS into a dual-sensor feed to ensure the 737 MAX remains among the safest aircraft flying. A reporter immediately cuts in to challenge his premise, noting Muilenburg's earlier assertion that the system functioned as intended. The reporter presses him on how Boeing could have intentionally designed an automated flight-control system that could trigger 21 separate times, repeatedly forcing the airplane's nose downward until entering an unrecoverable dive.

```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: MCAS Activation and Emergency Procedure Flow accDescr: Diagram showing the sequence from sensor activation to pilot checklist intervention and Boeing's planned dual-sensor update.

subgraph FailureScenario["MCAS Incident Sequence"] A["Erroneous Sensor Input"] --> B["Repeated MCAS Activations"] B --> C["Nose-Down Pitch Command"] end

subgraph PilotResponse["Cockpit Checklist Protocol"] C --> D["Runaway Stabilizer Checklist (Memory Item)"] D --> E["Power & Pitch Management"] E --> F["Engage Stabilizer Cutout Switches"] end

subgraph ProposedFix["Boeing Software Update"] G["Dual-Sensor Feed"] --> H["Break the Accident Link"] end ```

Muilenburg counters by framing the software behavior within the broader end-to-end operational procedures established for the flight deck. He explains that an erroneous MCAS activation is addressed by the standard runaway stabilizer procedure, which pilots are required to know as a memory item. Pointing to the checklist documented in the preliminary accident report for Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302, he outlines the required crew actions regarding pitch management, power settings, and flipping the stabilizer cutout switches to disable electric trim after an uncommanded activation. In his assessment of the flights, Muilenburg emphasizes that breakdowns occurred in operational execution: “If you look through that checklist it calls out actions that would be taken around power management and pitch management of the airplane; it also refers to the cutout switches that after an activation that was not pilot-induced that you would hit the cutoff switches, and in some cases those procedures were not completely followed.”

- Boeing’s software fix introduces a dual-sensor feed for MCAS, eliminating single angle-of-attack sensor reliance. - The reporter highlighted that MCAS activated 21 times on Lion Air Flight 610. - Boeing’s intended mitigation for uncommanded nose-down trim relied on the existing runaway stabilizer memory items and electric trim cutout switches.

---

[11:24](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xOQmQpKHVWA&t=684s) The "Chain of Events" Debate and Pilot Workload

The press conference grows increasingly tense as reporters dispute Muilenburg's reliance on pilot checklists. A reporter points out that across three separate flights, crews struggled intensely to recognize the malfunction or execute the steps in time: on an earlier Lion Air leg, an off-duty jump-seat captain had to intervene to save the aircraft; on the subsequent fatal Lion Air flight, the crew never identified the root problem; and the Ethiopian Airlines crew attempted the checklist procedures but were still unable to regain control. The reporter confronts him directly on cockpit workload: “Were you overly confident in pilots' abilities given the circumstance, particularly when they didn't know MCAS was there in the first place?”

Muilenburg rejects single-cause blame, repeating his insistence that aviation disasters are historically rooted in an interconnected sequence of events with multiple contributing elements. While acknowledging that Boeing owns the engineering side of the equation, he defines MCAS merely as one link among many: “There are factors that we can control in the design, and in this case that common link related to the MCAS system and its activation, we're gonna break that link and this will prevent accidents like this from happening again.” When a reporter follows up by asking whether the crashes could have occurred at all in the absence of MCAS, Muilenburg refuses to concede that the software was the primary trigger, reiterating that “there is no singular item; it's a chain of events.” He urges the media to refrain from public speculation, allow official accident investigation authorities to complete their work, and trust the integrity of the decades-long continuous improvement process that has made commercial aviation the safest mode of travel.

- Lion Air Flight 610 was preceded by an incident on the same airframe where an off-duty jump-seat captain helped the crew isolate the stabilizer trim. - The Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 crew attempted the published emergency steps but could not manually trim the aircraft to counter the dive. - Muilenburg defended Boeing’s record by insisting the continuous improvement paradigm across commercial aviation must rely on formal accident investigations rather than speculative conclusions.

---

[13:10](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xOQmQpKHVWA&t=790s) Airline Compensation and Grounding Fallout

Shifting from flight dynamics to financial fallout, a reporter asks Muilenburg how Boeing intends to compensate airline customers who have lost millions of dollars due to the worldwide grounding of the 737 MAX fleet. Muilenburg responds by stating that the company deeply regrets the severe disruption inflicted on carrier operations and the traveling public. He shares that he has had direct personal conversations with airline leadership across the globe and that Boeing technical teams are embedded on-site with customer airlines every day to assist with fleet management.

Muilenburg declines to disclose proprietary financial details or individual contractual negotiations, keeping the focus squarely on returning the airplane to active service. He stresses that the company’s airline partnerships remain resilient despite the commercial crisis, setting a firm operational sequence: “The first focus here is safely getting the MAX back up and flying, and then we'll address the follow-on issues.”

- Boeing deployed dedicated field support teams to work alongside grounded airline customers daily. - Specific airline reimbursement packages, operational damages, and compensation amounts were kept confidential during ongoing discussions.

---

[13:56](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xOQmQpKHVWA&t=836s) Refusal to Concede a Flawed Design

A reporter cuts through Muilenburg’s procedural explanations with an incisive critique, noting that despite Boeing's constant reiteration that design and certification protocols were strictly followed, the physical design produced by those processes was undeniably broken. Pointing out that Boeing engineers are actively writing and flight-testing fixes for specific, obvious design deficiencies, the reporter demands accountability: “Can you admit that the design was flawed, never mind the processes you went through and you did the best you could, but what you came up with in the end was flawed, was it not?”

Muilenburg firmly refuses to label the system flawed. He restates that the 737 MAX was engineered to achieve specific handling and flying qualities for pilots, with MCAS functioning as an integral component of that control law. He maintains that comprehensive engineering and safety retrospectives confirm Boeing followed the exact protocols that have historically created safe aircraft: “We have gone back and confirmed again as we do the safety analysis, the engineering analysis, that we've followed exactly the steps in our design and certification processes that consistently produce safe airplanes.”

Instead of admitting an error in design judgment, Muilenburg reframes the subsequent engineering overhauls as standard continuous learning. He insists that Boeing never views safety as a finished goal, arguing that an engineering culture willing to modify systems and make continual enhancements across all airplane programs is what keeps aviation safe. He concludes by stating that this ongoing pursuit of safety improvements is Boeing's primary responsibility and forms the foundation of re-earning the trust of regulators, airline partners, and the flying public.

- Muilenburg reiterated that MCAS was designed to replicate handling and flying qualities familiar to 737 flight crews. - Internal engineering reviews confirmed adherence to historical Boeing design and FAA certification pathways. - Boeing characterizes the modifications to MCAS software logic as continuous safety improvements rather than corrections to a defective system.

## Notable quotes > [08:44](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xOQmQpKHVWA&t=524s) When we design a system, understand that these airplanes are flown in the hands of pilots, and in some cases our system safety analysis includes not only the engineering design, but also the actions that pilots would take as part of a failure scenario — Dennis Muilenburg

> [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xOQmQpKHVWA&t=0s) Through the work we are doing now in partnership with our customers and regulators to certify and implement the software update, the 737 MAX will be one of the safest airplanes ever to fly — Dennis Muilenburg

## Mentioned Dennis Muilenburg, Boeing, Boeing 737 MAX, Boeing 737, Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302, Lion Air Flight 610, Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS), Angle-of-Attack (AOA) sensor, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), United States Congress, Renton, Washington factory, CNBC Television

## Video description Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg answers questions at the company's shareholder meeting after a series of plane crashes involving the company's 737 Max 8 aircraft. Muilenburg assured shareholders that the plane is safe after a software fix and the company will rebuild trust.

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[Source](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xOQmQpKHVWA)

中文简报

波音CEO为737 Max设计辩护，拒绝辞职呼声丹尼斯·米伦伯格坚持认为波音遵循了标准认证规则，并将通过双传感器软件更新打破坠机故障链，同时拒绝承认原MCAS设计存在缺陷。在应对埃塞俄比亚航空和狮子航空空难的后续影响时，波音首席执行官丹尼斯·米伦伯格向遇难者表达哀悼，同时为公司的工程标准和737 MAX的基准认证进行辩护。当记者就设计缺陷、单传感器漏洞以及要求其辞职的呼声进行追问时，米伦伯格拒绝承认MCAS存在根本性缺陷或波音规避了严格的认证程序。相反，他将这些空难定性为涉及多种操作因素和飞行员检查清单的复杂事件链，同时承诺推出引入双传感器输入的软件更新，并将迎角不一致警报列为标准配置。波音首席执行官丹尼斯·米伦伯格为737 MAX最初的工程设计及FAA认证程序进行辩护，坚决拒绝将机动特性增强系统（MCAS）定性为存在缺陷，并将坠机后的更新定性为标准且持续的安全改进。 (13:56) 该公司的软件更新将MCAS转变为双传感器系统，消除了对单一迎角（AOA）遥测数据的依赖，以打破狮子航空和埃塞俄比亚航空坠机事件中的致命事件链。 (2:11) 波音宣布，此前作为选配的迎角不一致警报现在将作为所有新造737 MAX飞机的标准配置安装，并免费为现有航空公司机队进行改装。 (6:14) 米伦伯格拒绝了要求其辞职的呼声，提及自己在波音34年的职业生涯，并重申公司的重点是重新获得机队认证，而非公布航空公司的经济赔偿数额。 (4:51)

Source quotes

[8:44] Dennis Muilenburg: When we design a system, understand that these airplanes are flown in the hands of pilots, and in some cases our system safety analysis includes not only the engineering design, but also the actions that pilots would take as part of a failure scenario [0:00] Dennis Muilenburg: Through the work we are doing now in partnership with our customers and regulators to certify and implement the software update, the 737 MAX will be one of the safest airplanes ever to fly

Original transcript

[0:00] like to share just a few brief opening [0:01] comments all of us at Boeing are deeply [0:06] sorry for the loss of life in the [0:08] ethiopians Airlines flight 302 and Lion [0:11] Air flight 610 accidents we feel the [0:15] immense gravity of these events and we [0:17] recognize the devastation to the [0:19] families and friends of the loved loved [0:22] ones who have perished there is nothing [0:25] more important to us than the safety of [0:27] the people who fly on our airplanes [0:30] every day 5.3 million people fly safely [0:34] on Boeing airplanes on average more than [0:37] 2,900 737 airplanes are in the air with [0:41] nearly half a million passengers on [0:43] board at any given time and a 737 takes [0:48] off around the world or lands roughly [0:50] every 1.5 seconds through the work we [0:54] are doing now in partnership with our [0:55] customers and regulators to certify and [0:58] implement the software update the 737 [1:01] max will be one of the safest airplanes [1:04] ever to fly we've been in constant [1:07] contact with our customers and listening [1:09] to their needs to ensure that the fleet [1:11] is maintained appropriately and [1:13] positioned for an efficient return to [1:15] service once cleared for passenger [1:18] flights our teams will take an entry [1:20] into service approach with every plane [1:23] returning service which includes [1:24] deploying teams to all of our Macs [1:27] operators and providing dedicated [1:29] real-time operational support we also [1:32] will be providing enhanced training and [1:35] supplemental education materials for our [1:37] airline customers pilots Boeing has an [1:41] important role to play in advancing [1:42] training efforts that support safe [1:44] operations in addition to the software [1:47] upgrade that we're working on we're also [1:49] committed to going above and beyond on [1:51] training and while we focus on the safe [1:54] return to service of the Macs the [1:56] fundamentals of our market and our [1:58] business remain strong I want to thank [2:01] our team for their ongoing focus on [2:03] safety quality and integrity with that [2:07] I'll be happy to take your questions [2:11] then if you've said a couple of times we [2:13] own it [2:15] what mistakes do you own you've also [2:19] mentioned that you will earn and re earn [2:22] trust if there are a lot of passengers [2:23] who are afraid of the max why should [2:25] they trust Boeing that it will be safe [2:27] with this upgrade David I think first of [2:29] all again our commitment to safety is [2:31] unwavering and we do regret the impact [2:34] that this has had to passengers we know [2:36] we do have work to do to earn and rerun [2:39] that trust and we will I will say to the [2:42] first part of your question as we've [2:44] been part of both investigations we've [2:47] been very diligent about respecting the [2:49] integrity of the investigation process [2:52] throughout and providing technical [2:54] technical support [2:55] we know that in both accidents there was [2:58] a chain of events that occurred one of [3:01] the links in that chain was the [3:03] activation of the M caste system because [3:05] of erroneous angle-of-attack data that [3:07] was a common link in both accidents we [3:11] know that we can break that link in the [3:13] chain that is a link that we own it's [3:17] our responsibility to eliminate that [3:19] risk and the software update does [3:21] exactly that so we're focused on taking [3:24] care of that and getting the max back up [3:27] and flying safely we're going to be [3:28] working very closely with our airline [3:30] customers and with the FAA and with [3:32] regulatory authorities around the world [3:34] as we finish up the certification [3:37] process on the software update and have [3:39] safe re-entry into service we're going [3:42] to be diligently doing that airplane by [3:44] airplane with our customers I think [3:46] getting it back up and flying is [3:48] obviously a key step in rebuilding [3:49] confidence and then we'll be working [3:51] with our airline customers over time to [3:53] ensure they have the support they need [3:55] and that we rebuild public confidence as [3:57] the fleet gets back up and operating a [4:00] mistake a design mistake well what we've [4:03] seen is we've looked at the MKS [4:05] activation this erroneous angle attack [4:07] information that came in to the airplane [4:10] we've also gone back and taken a look at [4:12] the design of the MKS system itself the [4:14] original design we've confirmed that it [4:17] was designed per our standards certified [4:19] per our standards and we're confident in [4:22] that process [4:24] so it operated according to those design [4:26] and certification standards so we [4:29] haven't seen a you know a technical slip [4:31] or gap in terms of the fundamental [4:33] design and certification of the approach [4:34] that said we know this is a link in both [4:38] accidents that we can break [4:39] that's a software update that we know [4:41] how to do we own it and we will make [4:43] that update and this will make the [4:45] airplane even safer going forward and [4:47] I'm confident with that change it will [4:49] be one of the safest airplanes ever to [4:51] fly in the light of the crisis facing [4:56] your company and in the interests of re [4:58] owning the trust of the flying public [5:00] have you considered resigning I think [5:04] the important thing here again is we're [5:05] very focused on safety and I can tell [5:07] you that both of these accidents weigh [5:10] heavily on us as a company I've had the [5:12] privilege of working for the Boeing [5:13] Company for 34 years and we know that [5:17] lights depend on what we do we take that [5:19] very very seriously and I've had the [5:21] privilege of doing that for my entire [5:22] career and I can tell you that our [5:24] Boeing employees as well take that very [5:26] seriously and so I'm very focused on [5:29] safety going forward it's important that [5:32] as a company we have those clear [5:34] priorities that we're taking the right [5:36] actions that we have the right culture I [5:38] am strongly vested in that and my clear [5:41] intent is to continue to lead on the [5:43] front of safety and quality and [5:45] integrity that's who we are as a company [5:47] and I think it's really important to [5:48] continue to stress that and we we deeply [5:52] regret what happened with these [5:53] accidents it gets to the core of our [5:54] company I've had the chance to walk the [5:56] factory floors in Renton where we build [5:59] the Macs airplanes over the last few [6:00] weeks have a chance to talk with our [6:02] test pilots I've had the opportunity to [6:04] talk with our engineers to the core of [6:07] our people they care about this business [6:09] and the safety of our airplanes that's [6:11] what I'm focused on mr. Muhlenberg this [6:15] is the first opportunity we've had to [6:17] talk to you since this unfolded why did [6:20] you put an M caste system in place in [6:22] the planes without notifying the [6:24] airlines or the pilots and why did you [6:27] not tell the pilots that the [6:29] angle-of-attack disagree warning light [6:31] was deactivated well let me take those [6:34] two questions on in to to answer [6:37] here first of all we take a look at the [6:39] original design of the EM cast system I [6:42] think in some cases in the media it's [6:44] been reported or described as an anti [6:46] stall system which it is not it's a [6:48] system that's designed to provide [6:49] handling qualities for the pilot that [6:52] meet pilot preferences we want the [6:54] airplane to behave in the air similar to [6:56] the previous generation of 737s that's a [6:59] preferred pilot feel for the airplane [7:02] how it feels as they're flying it and M [7:04] cast is designed to provide those kind [7:06] of handling qualities at high angle of [7:08] attack so it's a purposeful design it's [7:10] something that is designed to be part of [7:12] how the airplanes fly so as part of the [7:14] certification process it's not something [7:17] that's a separate procedure or something [7:19] that needs to be trained on separately [7:20] is fundamentally embedded in the [7:22] handling qualities of the airplane and [7:24] so when we train on the airplane you're [7:26] being trained on M cast it's not a [7:28] separate system to be trained on to your [7:31] second question on angle attack [7:33] sensor information certainly we've been [7:36] taking a look at some of the reports [7:37] that are out even again today taking a [7:40] look at the design of that original [7:42] system again I can confirm for you that [7:44] going forward that angle of attack [7:47] disagree signal is something that will [7:49] be standard on all of the 737 maxes [7:52] we'll also be looking at retrofitting [7:54] that on all of the airplanes and that'll [7:56] be provided at no cost I think that's an [7:59] important step forward it's also [8:01] important to understand that that angle [8:02] of attack disagree signal in the cockpit [8:05] is not something that drives pilot [8:07] action it's not something that we design [8:09] in as a primary flight display in the [8:12] flight deck of a commercial airplane [8:13] what pilots care about are things like [8:15] altitude airspeed heading pitch and roll [8:18] that's what they fly those indicators [8:21] are in the flight deck today airspeed [8:24] and altitude in particular are the [8:26] relevant items around these two cases [8:28] those are signals that are in the [8:31] cockpit today those are things that [8:32] provide audible warnings to the pilot as [8:35] well including things like stick shaker [8:37] and so that's where we focus on the [8:39] training effort going forward sir [8:44] if I can you've said that the M cast [8:48] system the angle-of-attack connecting it [8:50] to just one sensor that met your process [8:54] and yet the fact that it's only plugged [8:57] into one sensor and could fail seems [8:59] really like something that that should [9:02] have been foreseen when you talk about [9:06] re-establishing credibility with fliers [9:09] you know they are reading about reports [9:11] that whistle blow after whistle blower [9:13] have come forward to the FAA and to [9:15] Congress to say that there were problems [9:16] with the with a certification process [9:19] there were concerns about EM Cass you [9:22] had stopped short of saying that there [9:24] was a mistake made in the in the process [9:27] how do you win back trust when there are [9:28] some that feel you have a real [9:30] credibility issue when you when Boeing [9:32] has not come out and said you know we [9:34] didn't do this right yeah I think those [9:36] are very fair questions again and we've [9:38] again probed on those same questions [9:39] ourselves we've gone back and looked at [9:42] at both accidents we've done deep [9:44] assessments or airplane and the design [9:46] and we've confirmed that the um caste [9:48] system as originally designed did meet [9:50] our design and safety analysis criteria [9:53] and our certification criteria those are [9:55] standard processes that have worked for [9:57] decades and will continue to work now [10:00] that said when we design a system [10:02] understand that these airplanes are [10:03] flown in the hands of pilots and in some [10:06] cases our system safety analysis [10:07] includes not only the engineering design [10:09] but also the actions that pilots would [10:12] take as part of a failure scenario right [10:16] that's all baked into a system and and [10:18] analysis now that all said going forward [10:21] we've identified a way to improve this [10:23] is to make it a dual sensor feed that is [10:27] a change that we're making with the [10:28] software update and I'm confident that [10:30] again will create an airplane as one of [10:32] the safest in the air to fly you said [10:35] you said that it's you its operated as [10:36] design you couldn't have possibly [10:38] designed a system that would activate 21 [10:41] times pushing the nose of the plane down [10:43] to the point of an unrecoverable dive [10:45] again if you take a look at the end end [10:48] system procedure that's assigned with [10:50] this so in the case of a M cast failure [10:52] scenario there's something called a [10:54] runaway stabilizer procedure which is a [10:56] memory item in the cockpit [10:58] if that kind of scenario occurs and you [11:00] go through the checklist and again that [11:01] checklist was published as part of the [11:03] recent Ethiopian preliminary report if [11:06] you look through that checklist it calls [11:07] out actions that would be taken around [11:09] power management and pitch management of [11:11] the airplane it also refers to the cut [11:13] out switches that after an activation [11:16] that was not pilot induced that you [11:18] would hit the cutoff switches and in [11:20] some cases those procedures were not [11:23] completely followed cell-free cases [11:25] though the pilot struggled with that [11:26] process either recognizing what was [11:28] happening or implementing those those [11:31] steps the first lion air flight there [11:34] was a jump seat captain who told the [11:36] flight crew what to do and the second [11:37] one it doesn't appear that they did that [11:38] at all [11:39] the Ethiopian folks generally followed [11:42] that checklist we're not able to recover [11:44] does that mean this said does that mean [11:46] it didn't [11:46] were you overly confident in pilot's [11:48] abilities given the circumstance [11:50] particularly when they didn't know em [11:51] Cass was there in the first place [11:52] again I'll go back to my previous [11:54] comment as we look at both accidents and [11:56] this is common to most airplane [11:58] accidents that have occurred over [11:59] history there's a chain of events there [12:01] are multiple contributing factors there [12:03] are factors that we can control in the [12:05] design and in this case that common link [12:08] related to the EM caste system and its [12:10] activation we're gonna break that link [12:12] and this will prevent accidents from [12:14] life from this like this from happening [12:16] again yes that's an important state [12:19] partner where the accident happened [12:21] without em Cass though you call it a [12:23] link it's a chain of events right there [12:25] is no singular item it's a chain of [12:27] events I think it's really important [12:29] that we all focus on letting the [12:31] investigation process run its due course [12:33] our job is to focus on safety not on [12:36] speculation we're gonna continue to [12:38] support the investigation process and I [12:41] would suggest that that is the right way [12:43] to handle this in the long run this [12:45] industry is safe because of the [12:48] integrity of the safety process and the [12:50] way these investigations are done it's a [12:52] continuous improvement process that over [12:54] the last couple of decades has continued [12:56] to dramatically improve air safety it is [12:59] the safest form of transportation in the [13:01] world because of the integrity of the [13:03] process and we're going to support the [13:05] integrity to that process and we're [13:06] going to make sure the max is the safest [13:07] airplane out there to fly [13:10] you think about a lot of airlines have [13:13] lost a lot of money because of the [13:14] grounding of the mechs can you use [13:15] anything about how you're going to [13:16] compensate them for that we're actively [13:19] engaged with all of our airline [13:20] customers and again we we deeply regret [13:22] the impact to their operations and their [13:24] customers I know it's difficult I [13:26] personally talked to many of our [13:28] customers and I can tell you our team is [13:30] out deployed with the customers on a [13:32] daily basis I won't comment on [13:34] individual discussions by airline but we [13:37] understand the the difficulty is that [13:39] this is caused I will say our [13:41] partnerships with our airline customers [13:42] are strong and we're going to be working [13:44] together on recovery efforts the first [13:46] focus here is safely getting the max [13:49] back up and flying and then we'll [13:51] address the follow-on issues Dennis [13:56] today again you've repeated this message [14:00] that the certification process and the [14:02] design process for M cast was followed [14:05] as per usual consistent with what you've [14:07] done but forget about the process the [14:12] final design of M Cass was deeply flawed [14:14] and your engineers are fixing it and [14:17] testing the fix today fixing very [14:20] specific flaws which are clear in the [14:23] flights so can you admit that the design [14:27] was flawed never mind the processes you [14:32] went through it and you did the best you [14:33] could but what you came up with in the [14:35] end was flawed was it not what I said [14:39] earlier we've designed the Macs to have [14:42] the flying qualities that were desired [14:43] in the hands of the pilots the M casts [14:46] system is part of that design effort we [14:49] have gone back and confirmed again as we [14:51] do the safety analysis the engineering [14:53] analysis that we've followed exactly the [14:55] steps in our design and certification [14:57] processes that consistently produce safe [15:00] airplanes now in in this case again as [15:03] in most accidents they're a chain of [15:05] events that occur it's not correct to [15:08] attribute that to any single item we [15:11] know there are some improvements that we [15:13] can make to M Cass and we will make [15:15] those improvements but the reason this [15:17] industry is safe is that we never stop [15:19] on making safety improvements we never [15:21] claim that we have reached the end [15:23] we are continuously across all of our [15:26] airplane programs improving safety every [15:29] day we always look for opportunities to [15:31] improve that culture that's unafraid to [15:34] go make safety improvements over time [15:37] that culture is what is driven this to [15:39] be an incredibly safe industry that is [15:42] our commitment we're not going to waver [15:43] from that we're not going to step back [15:45] from that we will continually look for [15:47] opportunities to improve safety that's [15:49] our responsibility and that's part of [15:52] relearning that trust that I talked [15:53] about earlier [16:08] you