The Big Short (2015) - Jared Vennett's Pitch to Front Point Partners (Jenga Blocks Scene) [HD 1080p]

Extractor

AI-assisted summary of The Big Short (2015) - Jared Vennett's Pitch to Front Point Partners (Jenga Blocks Scene) [HD 1080p] — original source. Check the original for full context.

Source published: 2016-11-20

Key ideas

Jared Vennett pitches FrontPoint Partners on shorting the housing market using credit default swaps, offering asymmetric returns between 10:1 and 20:1. (3:13)
Underlying mortgage bond default rates have increased from 1% to 4%, with an 8% default rate projected to collapse BBB tranches to zero. (1:07)
Banks disguise unsold, low-rated BBB and BB tranches by bundling them into Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs) that receive artificial 92% to 93% AAA ratings from agencies. (3:13)
Mark Baum decides to pursue boots-on-the-ground due diligence to verify the reality of the housing bubble and determine the systemic exposure of major investment banks. (6:35)

Detailed notes

## Background Published on YouTube by the channel Extractor on November 20, 2016, this video showcases the iconic Jenga blocks scene from the 2015 film The Big Short. According to the description, the scene features Mark Baum, Danny Moses, Vinny Daniel, and Porter Collins meeting with Deutsche Bank's Jared Vennett to hear his pitch on credit default swaps and his illustration of collateralized debt obligations.

## TL;DR Deutsche Bank trader Jared Vennett pitches Mark Baum and his FrontPoint Partners team on shorting the United States housing market using credit default swaps. Using a Jenga tower on a conference table, Vennett illustrates how subprime mortgage-backed securities have been loaded with toxic, low-FICO debt that will trigger a systemic collapse if default rates climb to eight percent. An explanatory cutaway featuring chef Anthony Bourdain compares repackaged Collateralized Debt Obligations to days-old fish disguised in a seafood stew. After the Jenga tower dramatically crashes across the table, Baum—motivated by a desire to profit from predatory bank greed—decides to send his team into the field to investigate whether the housing bubble is real.

## Atmosphere & style The scene crackles with kinetic energy, cynical humor, and sharp-elbowed Wall Street bravado as Vennett's shameless showmanship collides with FrontPoint's hard-nosed skepticism. Fourth-wall breaks and vivid analogies lend an irreverent, fast-paced rhythm to what is fundamentally an alarming financial autopsy. As the physical wooden blocks teeter and collapse across the table, the room's mood shifts from amused disbelief to a tense, morally charged realization of impending economic catastrophe.

## Bulletin - [03:13](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xbiDrzTd8fE&t=193s) Jared Vennett pitches FrontPoint Partners on shorting the housing market using credit default swaps, offering asymmetric returns between 10:1 and 20:1. - [01:07](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xbiDrzTd8fE&t=67s) Underlying mortgage bond default rates have increased from 1% to 4%, with an 8% default rate projected to collapse BBB tranches to zero. - [03:13](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xbiDrzTd8fE&t=193s) Banks disguise unsold, low-rated BBB and BB tranches by bundling them into Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs) that receive artificial 92% to 93% AAA ratings from agencies. - [06:35](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xbiDrzTd8fE&t=395s) Mark Baum decides to pursue boots-on-the-ground due diligence to verify the reality of the housing bubble and determine the systemic exposure of major investment banks.

## Key takeaways - [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xbiDrzTd8fE&t=0s) Jared Vennett approaches FrontPoint Partners after facing widespread ridicule from other Wall Street firms for attempting to short the US housing market. - [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xbiDrzTd8fE&t=0s) Vennett unashamedly frames the short opportunity as pure financial profit rather than standard investment caution. - [01:07](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xbiDrzTd8fE&t=67s) Vennett uses a physical Jenga tower to illustrate how mortgage-backed securities have shifted from federally guaranteed AAA bonds to multi-tranche private label structures. - [01:07](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xbiDrzTd8fE&t=67s) The lowest tranches absorb first losses but have been heavily diluted with subprime loans featuring low FICO scores, zero income verification, and exploding adjustable rates. - [01:07](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xbiDrzTd8fE&t=67s) A rise in subprime default rates to 8% represents an existential tipping point that will trigger total collapse across entire BBB-rated structures. - [03:13](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xbiDrzTd8fE&t=193s) Credit default swaps serve as insurance policies on mortgage bonds that provide highly asymmetric 10:1 to 20:1 payouts upon failure. - [03:13](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xbiDrzTd8fE&t=193s) Vennett openly acknowledges profiting off the failure of bonds issued by his own firm, comparing his role to selling fire insurance on a burning house. - [03:13](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xbiDrzTd8fE&t=193s) Unsold, risky BBB and BB tranches are repackaged into CDOs, enabling banks to pass off toxic debt under misleading 92% to 93% AAA ratings. - [03:13](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xbiDrzTd8fE&t=193s) Anthony Bourdain compares CDOs to a restaurant's seafood stew, where old, unsellable fish is repurposed and disguised as a fresh meal to avoid financial losses. - [03:13](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xbiDrzTd8fE&t=193s) Over $500 billion in private housing bonds were issued in the prior year alone, widely misconstrued by financial institutions as safe as US Treasuries. - [06:35](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xbiDrzTd8fE&t=395s) The Jenga tower collapses completely, physically visualizing the fragility of America's housing debt structure. - [06:35](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xbiDrzTd8fE&t=395s) Vennett faces intense internal ridicule at Deutsche Bank, where colleagues refer to him as 'Chicken Little' while the bank remains heavily long on mortgage debt. - [06:35](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xbiDrzTd8fE&t=395s) Mark Baum sees the short trade as an opportunity to profit from the reckless greed and negligence of major commercial banks. - [06:35](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xbiDrzTd8fE&t=395s) FrontPoint Partners commits to direct field investigation to confirm whether a true housing bubble exists and quantify the systemic exposure of major banks.

## Detailed walkthrough ### [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xbiDrzTd8fE&t=0s) The Pitch Begins: An Unorthodox Scent of Money

Jared Vennett of Deutsche Bank arrives at FrontPoint Partners alongside his assistant, Chris, and his quantitative analyst to present a short trade on the United States housing market. Before the presentation even begins, Vennett’s aggressive, swaggering persona fills the conference room. When questioned by Mark Baum’s team about how many people he has already approached, Vennett admits to having pitched a few players, though their reactions ranged from furious dismissals to outright ridicule. Mark Baum’s team notes that many investors likely brought him in solely to laugh at what seemed like an absurd idea, but Baum clarifies his own skeptical stance: “That's not what this is. That's just how Mark is.” Vennett leans into the skepticism, sniffing the air theatrically. When asked if the smell is his cologne or opportunity, Vennett cuts straight to the core: “No. Money.”

- FrontPoint team members present: Mark Baum, Danny Moses, Vinny Daniel, and Porter Collins. - Deutsche Bank team: Jared Vennett, his assistant Chris, and quantitative analyst Jiang. - Market sentiment at the time: Investors previously approached by Vennett had laughed him out of the room, believing the housing market to be unshakable.

[01:07](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xbiDrzTd8fE&t=67s) The Jenga Tower: Anatomy of a Subprime Mortgage Bond

Vennett turns to a physical Jenga tower assembled on the conference table to visually explain how the mortgage bond market evolved from simple, low-risk securities into ticking time bombs. He explains that traditional mortgage bonds were straightforward bundles of thousands of AAA-rated mortgages guaranteed by the federal government. Modern private-label mortgage-backed securities, however, are layered into tranches: AAA bonds sit at the top and get paid first, while the lower-rated BBB, BB, and B tranches sit at the bottom. While the lower tiers yield higher payouts, they absorb the first defaults. Vennett bluntly states that Wall Street degraded these bottom tranches into toxic debt defined by rock-bottom FICO scores, zero income verification, and exploding adjustable-rate mortgages.

```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Subprime Mortgage Bond Tranche Structure accDescr: Diagram showing the hierarchy of mortgage bond tranches from AAA at the top down to the lowest B tranches absorbing first losses.

subgraph BondStructure["Private Mortgage Bond Tranches"] AAA["AAA Tranche: Highest Rating / Paid First"] AA["AA & A Tranches: Middle Risk"] BBB["BBB Tranche: Highly Vulnerable"] B["BB & B Tranches: Lowest Tier / First Loss / Dog Sh*t"] end

Underlying["Underlying Mortgages: Subprime, No-Doc, Low FICO, ARMs"] Underlying --> B B --> BBB BBB --> AA AA --> AAA ```

Vennett pulls blocks out of the lower sections of the tower to physically demonstrate the structural rot inside the securities. He points out that default rates have already climbed from 1% to 4%, and that an increase to 8% will cascade through the entire structure, sending even BBB tranches to zero. When Baum asks how he can be so certain of the calculations, Vennett leans into shameless showmanship, pointing to his quantitative analyst and claiming the man won a national math competition in China and speaks no English. The analyst, breaking the fourth wall, directly counters Vennett’s racist hype: “Actually, my name's Jiang and I do speak English. Jared likes to say I don't because he thinks it makes me seem more authentic, and I got second in that national math competition.”

- Structural default threshold: Default rates have risen from 1% to 4%; if they hit 8%, the entire structure breaks down and BBB tranches collapse to zero. - Underlying loan composition: Mortgages filled with FICO scores below 550, unverified income ("no-doc" loans), and adjustable rates. - Quoted assessment on bond quality: “Somewhere along the line, these B's and double B's went from a little risky to dog shit.” — Jared Vennett - Quoted outlook on default risk: “If they go to eight, it's Armageddon.” — Mark Baum

[03:13](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xbiDrzTd8fE&t=193s) Credit Default Swaps, Secret Contagion, and Bourdain’s Stew

Vennett introduces the financial vehicle for executing the trade: credit default swaps (CDS). He explains that CDS acts like an insurance policy on mortgage bonds, offering asymmetrical returns of 10-to-1 or even 20-to-1 when the bonds fail. When the FrontPoint team challenges his motives—pointing out that his own bank collects massive underwriting fees selling these bonds—Vennett does not pretend to hold any institutional loyalty, describing himself as a pragmatist looking to capitalize on a burning house: “I'm standing in front of a burning house and I'm offering you fire insurance on it.” He further reveals that when banks cannot sell risky low-tier tranches, they pool the unsold BBB and BB tranches together into Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs). Once packaged, rating agencies slap a 92% to 93% AAA rating on these toxic bundles under the illusion of diversification.

The scene transitions to an explanatory aside with chef Anthony Bourdain preparing a seafood stew in a professional kitchen. Bourdain breaks down CDOs using a culinary analogy: on Sunday, a chef has fresh fish ordered on Friday (the subprime mortgage bonds) that did not sell. Rather than throwing the rotting fish out and taking a loss, a crafty chef throws the two-to-three-day-old halibut and trimmings into a seafood stew, seasoning it and selling it as a brand-new dish. Bourdain concludes that the CDO is simply Wall Street's way of disguising rotting, unmarketable debt as a pristine, high-end investment.

- Credit default swap payout profile: Asymmetric returns ranging from 10:1 to 20:1 upon bond failure. - CDO alchemy: Bundling unsold BBB, BB, and B rated tranches together to obtain an artificial 92–93% AAA rating from credit rating agencies. - Subprime market scale: Over $500 billion in housing bonds issued in the prior year alone, held by major institutions treating them as safe as U.S. Treasuries. - Quoted summary of the products: “Mortgage bonds are dog shit. CDOs are dog shit wrapped in cat shit.” — FrontPoint Partners analyst

[06:35](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xbiDrzTd8fE&t=395s) The Jenga Collapse and the Decision to Investigate

Vennett returns to the Jenga tower to demonstrate the inevitable outcome. As he removes block after block representing the collapsing tranches, the entire structure suddenly crashes down across the conference table: “That's America's housing market.” He urges Baum to take action, telling him to sack up and sign the deal before walking out of the room.

In the immediate aftermath, Baum’s team is deeply split. Danny Moses and Vinny Daniel suspect that Vennett is running a con, trying to unload a toxic position because Deutsche Bank has too much skin in the game. Baum, however, is captivated by the prospect. He expresses raw fury at the commercial banking system that has spent decades gouging everyday consumers with 25% credit card interest rates and un-dischargeable student debt: “Then this guy walks into my office and says, 'Those same banks got greedy. They lost track of the market and I can profit off of their stupidity.' Fuck yeah, I want him to be right.” Instead of blindly committing capital, Baum insists on boots-on-the-ground due diligence to answer two core questions before the rest of Wall Street wakes up.

- Internal dissent at Deutsche Bank: Colleagues mock Vennett, labeling him "Chicken Little" and "Bubble Boy" because the entire department remains heavily long on mortgage bonds. - Team skepticism: Suspicions arise that Vennett is looking to offload his own firm's risk onto a hedge fund. - The two guiding investigative questions: 1. Is there an actual housing bubble? 2. If there is, how exposed are the major investment banks? - Quoted motivation for taking the trade: “I can't hate him. He is so transparent in his self-interest and I kind of respect him.” — Mark Baum

## Notable quotes > [03:13](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xbiDrzTd8fE&t=193s) I'm standing in front of a burning house and I'm offering you fire insurance on it. — Jared Vennett

> [03:13](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xbiDrzTd8fE&t=193s) Mortgage bonds are dog shit. CDOs are dog shit wrapped in cat shit. — FrontPoint Partners analyst

## Mentioned The Big Short, Jared Vennett, FrontPoint Partners, Deutsche Bank, Mark Baum, Steve Eisman, Danny Moses, Vinny Daniel, Porter Collins, Chris, Jiang, Anthony Bourdain, Wall Street, Credit Default Swap (CDS), Collateralized Debt Obligation (CDO), Jenga, FICO, U.S. Treasuries

## Video description "You smell that? What is that?..." "Your cologne?" "No" "Opportunity" "No. Money"

Danny Moses, Vinny Daniel, Porter Collins, and Mark Baum (based on Steve Eisman) decide to meet with Vennett to listen to his sales pitch: Credit Default Swap on Mortgage Backed Bonds and his illustration of Collateralized Debt Obligations.

[Source](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xbiDrzTd8fE)

中文简报

《大空头》（2015）- 贾里德·维内特向前锋合伙公司推介（叠叠乐积木场景）[HD 1080p] 德意志银行交易员贾里德·维内特向前锋合伙公司的马克·鲍姆及其团队推介利用信用违约互换做空美国房地产市场。维内特在会议桌上用叠叠乐积木塔直观展示了次级住房抵押贷款支持证券是如何充斥着有毒、低FICO评分的债务，一旦违约率攀升至8%，就将引发系统性崩溃。插播的解释性画面中，大厨安东尼·波登将重新打包的担保债务凭证比作伪装在海鲜炖汤中的放置多日的死鱼。在积木塔轰然倒塌散落桌面后，出于从掠夺成性的银行贪婪中获利的动机，鲍姆决定派团队实地调查房地产泡沫是否属实。贾里德·维内特向前锋合伙公司推介利用信用违约互换做空房地产市场，提供10:1至20:1的非对称回报。 (3:13) 底层抵押贷款债券的违约率已从1%上升至4%，预计8%的违约率将导致BBB级分档归零。 (1:07) 银行将未售出的低评级BBB和BB级分档捆绑打包成担保债务凭证（CDO），并从评级机构获得虚假的92%至93%的AAA评级，以此掩人耳目。 (3:13) 马克·鲍姆决定展开实地尽职调查，以核实房地产泡沫的真实性并查明大型投资银行面临的系统性风险敞口。 (6:35)

Reading summary

Deutsche Bank salesman Jared Vennett pitches a short position against the United States housing market to FrontPoint Partners, contending that subprime mortgage bonds and collateralized debt obligations are structurally unsound and primed for systemic collapse. Structural Fragility of Subprime Mortgage Tranches (1:07) Using a physical Jenga tower as an analogy, Vennett outlines how modern private-label mortgage-backed securities strayed from traditional, federally guaranteed AAA-rated bonds. Modern securities are layered into tranches where top-tier AAA bonds are paid first, while lower BB and B tiers absorb initial losses. According to Vennett, Wall Street degraded these bottom tranches with toxic debt characterized by adjustable-rate mortgages, unverified 'no-doc' income loans, and FICO scores falling below 550. Vennett demonstrates that defaults in the underlying loans have already climbed from 1% to 4%. He argues that if default rates reach 8%, the losses will cascade through the structure, wiping out BBB tranches entirely. While FrontPoint manager Mark Baum observes that an 8% default rate would represent catastrophic failure, Vennett relies on quantitative analysis from his analyst Jiang to assert that the collapse is structurally inevitable. CDO Repackaging and Credit Default Swaps (3:13) To exploit this vulnerability, Vennett proposes purchasing credit default swaps (CDS), which operate as insurance policies against failing mortgage bonds and offer projected asymmetric payouts ranging from 10:1 to 20:1. When questioned on why he is betting against products his own bank underwrites, Vennett frames himself as a pragmatist selling fire insurance on a burning building. Over $500 billion in housing bonds were issued in the prior year alone, with institutional investors treating them as safe as U.S. Treasuries. Vennett further reveals that when investment banks cannot sell low-tier BBB, BB, and B tranches, they pool them into Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs). Credit rating agencies then assign an artificial 92% to 93% AAA rating to these bundled products under the premise of diversification. In an explanatory culinary analogy, chef Anthony Bourdain likens CDOs to a seafood stew where unsold, two-to-three-day-old fish is seasoned and repackaged as an entirely new high-end dish rather than discarded at a loss. FrontPoint Partners' Skepticism and Investigation Strategy (6:35) After Vennett collapses the Jenga tower to illustrate the market's eventual trajectory and departs, FrontPoint Partners evaluates the pitch with acute skepticism. Team members Danny Moses and Vinny Daniel suspect a potential con, questioning whether Vennett is simply trying to offload toxic exposure because Deutsche Bank remains heavily long on mortgage bonds, with colleagues dismissing Vennett as 'Chicken Little.' Despite the suspicion, Baum is drawn to the asymmetric trade, driven by resentment toward major commercial banks that have profited heavily off high consumer interest rates. Baum decides not to commit capital immediately, directing the team to conduct field due diligence to independently confirm whether an actual housing bubble exists and measure how deeply exposed major investment banks are to its potential rupture. The presentation leaves FrontPoint Partners weighing the prospect of unprecedented profits against the risk of bank manipulation. The viability of the short trade rests on unresolved field research: verifying whether real-world mortgage default rates match Vennett's data and determining the exact exposure of major financial institutions.

精炼阅读摘要

德意志银行的贾里德·维内特（Jared Vennett）向前锋伙伴（FrontPoint Partners）推销做空美国房地产市场的信用违约互换（CDS），指出底层资产严重劣化的次级抵押贷款证券正走向系统性崩溃。尽管多数主流机构将该做空设想视作无稽之谈，维内特仍主张利用次贷违约风险博取高达10至20倍的非对称赔付。次贷证券的层级劣化与违约临界点 (1:07) 维内特利用积木塔（Jenga）直观拆解了抵押贷款支持证券（MBS）的结构性病灶。传统的抵押贷款债券通常由联邦政府担保的高评级贷款构成，而新兴的私人次贷证券则分化为不同受偿顺序的层级：顶层为优先受偿的AAA级，底层则是率先承担违约损失的BBB、BB与B级。维内特指出，华尔街投行为追求高收益，已向底层注入大量FICO信用评分低于550分、未经收入核实（无证明贷款）以及利率前低后高的浮动利率贷款（ARM），使中低层级彻底沦为高危资产。在违约传导路径上，维内特强调底层违约率已从1%的历史常态攀升至4%；若违约率进一步升至8%，整个结构便会连锁塌陷，使BBB级债券价值直接归零。马克·鲍姆（Mark Baum）据此判定8%的违约率无异于“末日决战”。尽管维内特在引荐其量化分析师江（Jiang）时带有表演性质的虚构包装，但江出面证实了底层测算的数学逻辑，确认违约激增正直接侵蚀证券的安全根基。 CDO的包装运作与评级失真 (3:13) 针对投行难以直接脱手的底层劣质资产，维内特揭示了华尔街借助担保债务凭证（CDO）进行的金融伪装。当银行无法售出BBB、BB及B级高风险债券碎片时，便将这些滞销资产重新打包构建成CDO；在评级机构所谓分散风险的模型假设下，这些拼凑起来的毒性资产包竟能获得高达92%至93%的AAA顶级评级。厨师安东尼·波登（Anthony Bourdain）在场景解说中以“海鲜杂烩炖汤”作比：餐馆将周五进货且到周日仍未售出、即将变质的鱼肉下脚料重新调味加工，作为高价新菜推向顾客。波登指出，CDO的本质正是投行将无人问津的变质债务重新包装成看似安全的顶级投资品。仅在上一年度，此类房地产债券的发行规模就突破了5000亿美元，且被各大金融机构视同美国国债般稳健持有，前锋伙伴团队因此将其定性为多层包装的毒性资产。信用违约互换的非对称博弈与利益冲突 (3:13) 为押注这一资产链条的断裂，维内特向前锋伙伴推销信用违约互换（CDS）。CDS充当了针对抵押贷款债券的“火灾保险”，在底层资产违约时能提供10:1乃至20:1的非对称回报倍数。面对鲍姆团队关于德意志银行自身承销此类债券所产生的利益冲突质疑，维内特毫无保留地承认自己属于没有制度忠诚的务实投机者，将其比喻为“站在着火的房子前向路人出售火灾险”。这一激进立场在德意志银行内部同样遭遇强烈抵触。由于该行整个部门依然重仓持有抵押贷款多头头寸，同事普遍将维内特嘲讽为大惊小怪的“忧天杞人”（Chicken Little）与“泡泡男孩”（Bubble Boy）。这种极度公开的追逐私利态度，既加深了前锋伙伴对其转嫁母行风险的怀疑，也反向强化了该交易提案的真实吸引力。从制度愤怒转向现场尽职调查 (6:35) 在维内特抽走积木导致模型轰然倒塌后，前锋伙伴团队内部对是否接盘产生了激烈分歧。丹尼·莫西斯（Danny Moses）与文尼·丹尼尔（Vinny Daniel）高度怀疑这是一场骗局，担忧维内特只是想替陷入过深风险的德意志银行转移有毒头寸。然而，鲍姆对大商业银行长年向大众索取25%信用卡高息及不可免除学生贷款的行径深恶痛绝，因而极其渴望从大银行因贪婪而忽视市场规律的愚蠢中牟利。鲍姆最终并未在维内特的激将下盲目签约，而是要求团队在采取行动前开启实地尽职调查。他确定了必须查明的两个核心问题：一是美国底层房地产市场是否确实存在巨大的虚假泡沫，二是若泡沫属实，各大投资银行深陷其中的实际风险敞口究竟有多大。维内特的推演虽然从数学模型与分档结构上剖析了次级抵押贷款证券的致命脆性，但前锋伙伴依然对投行的自利动机和头寸转嫁保持警惕。该推介并未促成冲动注资，而是推动团队转向一线尽职调查，以求证底层违约实情及华尔街机构的真实涉险程度。

Detailed notes — zh

## Background 该视频由 YouTube 频道 Extractor 于 2016 年 11 月 20 日发布。视频内容选自电影《大空头》（The Big Short），展示了贾里德·韦内特（Jared Vennett）向马克·鲍姆（Mark Baum）及其 FrontPoint Partners 团队推销针对住房抵押贷款支持证券的信用违约互换（CDS），并通过叠叠乐积木生动解说担保债务凭证（CDO）运作机制的经典场景。 ## TL;DR 德意志银行交易员韦内特借用叠叠乐积木与数学模型，向鲍姆团队揭露了美国房地产抵押贷款支持证券与 CDO 中充斥的劣质次贷骗局，断言违约率达到 8% 时整个金融系统将彻底崩溃。名厨安东尼·波登以烹饪剩鱼做炖汤的隐喻，生动拆解了银行将滞销垃圾债券包装成 AAA 级资产的恶劣行径。面对推销，鲍姆团队虽满腹狐疑，但出于对华尔街贪婪盲目的愤怒与暴利做空的机会，决定立即奔赴一线开展实地调查以验证泡沫的真伪。 ## Atmosphere & style 全片节奏凌厉紧凑，充满黑色幽默、犀利讽刺与强烈的戏剧张力。韦内特张扬、玩世不恭且赤裸裸追逐利润的推销风格，与鲍姆团队从警惕防备到被惊人真相震撼的凝重反应形成鲜明碰撞；第四面墙的打破与生动隐喻更是穿透了复杂的金融迷雾。整段对手戏既带有对金融巨鳄盲目贪婪的冷酷嘲讽，又弥漫着一场系统性灾难山雨欲来前的焦灼与躁动。 ## Bulletin - [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xbiDrzTd8fE&t=0s) 德意志银行交易员贾里德·韦内特向 FrontPoint 团队展示模型指出，全美房贷违约率已自 1% 攀升至 4%，若达到 8% 将导致大批 BBB 级抵押贷款支持证券直接归零。 - [02:30](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xbiDrzTd8fE&t=150s) 韦内特极力推荐通过信用违约互换（CDS）进行做空，该保险合约成本极低，违约爆发后的赔付比率可达 10:1 至 20:1。 - [04:25](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xbiDrzTd8fE&t=265s) 华尔街将滞销的 B 级至 BBB 级次级垃圾债券打包为担保债务凭证（CDO），评级机构不假思索地赋予其高达 92% 至 93% 的 AAA 评级。 - [06:35](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xbiDrzTd8fE&t=395s) 马克·鲍姆团队决定不单凭推销词下注，而是立即前往次贷源头展开实地调研，以核实全美房市泡沫真实性及投行的实际风险敞口。 ## Key takeaways - [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xbiDrzTd8fE&t=0s) 早期的住房抵押贷款支持证券（MBS）多由美国政府直接担保的优质 AAA 贷款打包，但现代私人发行版本已被切分为多层级（Tranches）的高风险结构。 - [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xbiDrzTd8fE&t=0s) 在分层证券中，AAA 级优先获得偿付，而底层 B 级与 BB 级债券最先承担断供违约风险，且大量底层资产充斥着无收入证明与浮动利率的劣质次贷。 - [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xbiDrzTd8fE&t=0s) 全美房贷断供违约率已升至 4%，数据测算显示一旦违约率触及 8%，系统性传导将让包括 BBB 级在内的整个中间层债券彻底击穿崩盘。 - [02:30](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xbiDrzTd8fE&t=150s) 韦内特利用华尔街对亚裔数学能力的刻板印象推销其量化模型，但该模型确实揭示出主流机构普遍忽视的断供风险。 - [02:30](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xbiDrzTd8fE&t=150s) 信用违约互换（CDS）作为针对债券违约的保险合约，因市场坚信房市稳固而价格极低，潜在做空赔付回报率高达 10 到 20 倍。 - [02:30](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xbiDrzTd8fE&t=150s) 投资银行受巨额承销佣金驱动，选择系统性无视潜在风险，甚至有标称 65% AAA 的债券底层包含高达 95% 信用分低于 550 的垃圾贷款。 - [04:25](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xbiDrzTd8fE&t=265s) 银行通过将无人接盘的 B 级、BB 级与 BBB 级垃圾债券重新集中打包成 CDO，以规避资产负债表计提亏损并掩盖真实风险。 - [04:25](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xbiDrzTd8fE&t=265s) 评级机构依据所谓“分散化资产池”的名义，将 92% 至 93% 的 CDO 份额不加严查地评为最高安全等级的 AAA。 - [04:25](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xbiDrzTd8fE&t=265s) 电影借名厨安东尼·波登将 CDO 比作餐厅将三天未卖出的变质旧鱼做成海鲜炖汤，形象揭露金融机构再包装劣质资产的本质骗局。 - [04:25](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xbiDrzTd8fE&t=265s) 前一年全美发行的房贷支持证券规模高达 5000 亿美元，全美主流评级机构、大银行与政府监管陷入了长期的集体麻痹与失职。 - [06:35](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xbiDrzTd8fE&t=395s) 德银内部多数团队大举做多房地产并嘲笑看空者，韦内特通过推倒 Jenga 积木形象展示违约传导如何让整个美国房地产市场轰然倒塌。 - [06:35](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xbiDrzTd8fE&t=395s) 马克·鲍姆深恶银行利用高额信用卡利率与沉重学生贷款剥削大众，因而产生利用华尔街傲慢愚蠢进行反向获利的强烈动机。 - [06:35](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xbiDrzTd8fE&t=395s) 鲍姆团队最终确立两大调研核心：实地核查全美房地产是否存在系统性泡沫，以及量化评估华尔街各银行面临的真实风险敞口。 ## Detailed walkthrough ### [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xbiDrzTd8fE&t=0s) 德意志银行的推销开场与积木模型解析来自德意志银行（Deutsche Bank）的交易员贾里德·韦内特（Jared Vennett）带着他的助手兼量化分析师来到 FrontPoint Partners 的办公室。面对马克·鲍姆（Mark Baum）及其团队成员丹尼·莫西斯（Danny Moses）、温尼·丹尼尔（Vinny Daniel）和波特·柯林斯（Porter Collins），韦内特一进门就嗅探着空气，夸张地宣称自己闻到了“金钱的味道”，而不是古龙水或虚无缥缈的机会。当被问及此前向多少人推销过这笔交易时，韦内特含糊其辞地说“有几个人表现出了兴趣”，但随即闪回的记忆画面揭露了真相：其他投行高管不仅痛骂他疯了，还直截了当地让他滚蛋。面对鲍姆团队的当面拆穿，韦内特坦承很多人见他只是为了看笑话，但鲍姆冷淡地打断他，示意他展示真正的内容。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 抵押贷款支持证券层级结构 accDescr: 展示从最高层级 AAA 到最底层 B 级的现金流分配与违约吸收顺序 subgraph Tranches["MBS 债券分层结构 (Jenga 积木)"] AAA["AAA 级（最安全，优先获得偿付）"] AA["AA / A 级（中等风险）"] BBB["BBB 级（较低评级，容易受违约波及）"] B["B / BB 级（最底层，承担首批违约损失）"] end CashFlow["借款人房贷月供现金流"] --> AAA AAA --> AA AA --> BBB BBB --> B DefaultRisk["断供违约风险"] -.->|"率先吸收损失"| B B -.->|"穿透至上一层"| BBB ``` 为了直观展示现代房贷证券的脆弱性，韦内特搬出了一整套叠叠乐（Jenga）积木。他解释道，最初的住房抵押贷款支持证券非常简单，是由成千上万份由美国政府担保的优质 AAA 级房贷打包而成；但现代的房贷证券全由私人机构发行，并被切割成了不同层级（Tranches）。顶部评级最高的 AAA 级最先获得本息偿付，而最底层的 B 级债券则最后获得还款，并承担最先出现的违约损失。高收益伴随着极高的风险，但在近年来，底层的这些 B 级和 BB 级资产已经彻底沦为垃圾。韦内特毫不客气地把积木抽出来比作垃圾并扔进垃圾桶，直指这些贷款充斥着极低的 FICO 信用分、无收入验证（No-income verification）以及浮动利率。韦内特向震惊的众人抛出了严酷的现实数据：全美的房贷违约率已经从原本正常的 1% 飙升到了 4%。如果断供违约率进一步攀升至 8%，整个抵押贷款支持证券的底层和中层将被彻底打穿，大批 BBB 级债券的价值将直接归零。面对这如同末日降临般的测算，韦内特兴奋地将其视为一生难遇的暴利良机，并断言道：“如果违约率达到8%，那就是世界末日。”（“If they go to eight, it's Armageddon.”） - 早期住房抵押贷款证券由数千份 AAA 级房贷打包组成，并享有美国联邦政府的直接担保。 - 现代住房抵押贷款支持证券由私人机构发行，采用分层结构（Tranches），优先偿付 AAA 级，底层 B 级承担首批违约风险。 - 次级贷款特征包括：处于垫底水平的 FICO 信用评分、完全缺乏收入核实、普遍采用可调利率贷款（ARM）。 - 当时房贷违约率已从 1% 上涨至 4%，模型预测一旦违约率触及 8%，BBB 级债券价值将彻底归零。 --- ### [02:30](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xbiDrzTd8fE&t=150s) 量化专家登场与信用违约互换（CDS）的暴利机制面对如此耸人听闻的灾难性预测，鲍姆的团队充满怀疑，追问为什么华尔街没有任何人在讨论这件事，以及韦内特是否真的对自己的数学模型有百分之百的把握。为了证明数学测算的绝对严谨，韦内特戏剧性地把身旁的华裔量化分析师推到台前，大肆利用华尔街对亚裔数学能力的刻板印象进行背书。他声称对方叫“杨”（Yang），不仅赢过全中国数学竞赛冠军，而且连一句英文都不会讲。紧接着，电影打破了“第四面墙”，量化分析师直接面对镜头向观众澄清吐槽：他的真实名字叫江（Jiang），不仅母语是英语，而且在数学竞赛中其实只拿了第二名；韦内特之所以当众撒谎，只是觉得这样能让这套数字模型显得更加真实神秘。随后，韦内特正式亮出了他的做空工具——信用违约互换（Credit Default Swap，简称 CDS）。他解释称，CDS 本质上就像是给这堆岌岌可危的积木购买的火灾保险；由于各大机构认定房贷坚不可摧，这份保单极其廉价，一旦房贷证券违约崩盘，做空者将获得 10 比 1 甚至 20 比 1 的惊人赔付比例。当被问及为什么庞大的投资银行业对此视而不见时，韦内特指出银行为了赚取天文数字的承销佣金，早已被眼前的暴利蒙蔽。面对温尼质疑韦内特本人也隶属于大银行、利润同样丰厚时，韦内特反讥对方的衣着品味，并冷酷地声明自己虽然在银行工作，但思考方式绝非墨守成规的机构思维，他直言：“我正站在一栋着火的房子面前，而我正在向你们兜售火灾保险。”（“I'm standing in front of a burning house and I'm offering you fire insurance on it.”）当鲍姆团队质疑这些底层债券如果真如韦内特所说的那么烂，发行该产品在法律层面上根本行不通时，韦内特揭露了更黑暗的真相：市场上根本没有人知道债券里到底装了什么。他曾亲眼见过许多表面上标称有 65% AAA 评级的债券，底层资产实际上有 95% 是由信用分低于 550 分的劣质次级贷款拼凑而成的弥天大谎。 - 信用违约互换（CDS）在性质上相当于针对债券违约的保险合约，做空成功时回报率可高达 10 倍至 20 倍。 - 投资银行由于沉迷于销售房贷支持证券所带来的巨额承销手续费，选择系统性无视潜在的违约风险。 - 部分评级高达 AAA 的结构化债券中，高达 95% 的底层资产是由 FICO 信用分低于 550 的次级次贷构成。 --- ### [04:25](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xbiDrzTd8fE&t=265s) CDO 与海鲜炖汤：次级垃圾债券的再包装骗局为了彻底打破 FrontPoint 团队的认知，韦内特进一步揭开了华尔街如何处理滞销垃圾资产的内幕。当次级抵押贷款证券中的 B 级、BB 级以及 BBB 级由于风险过高而无法在公开市场上卖出时，银行绝不会老老实实将其计入资产负债表承担亏损；相反，他们把这批卖不出去的垃圾全部集中堆砌在一起，打包构成一个全新的金融衍生品——担保债务凭证（Collateralized Debt Obligation，简称 CDO）。评级机构仅仅因为资产池被“分散化”拼凑，便不假思索地为这堆垃圾贴上 92% 到 93% 的 AAA 评级。韦内特毫不留情地将其称为让一场局部房产危机演变成全国性经济崩溃的核心元凶。 ```mermaid flowchart LR accTitle: 担保债务凭证 (CDO) 的再包装运作流程 accDescr: 展示滞销的次级垃圾债券如何通过 CDO 结构重新包装获得 AAA 评级 subgraph UnsoldBonds["滞销的垃圾级房贷证券"] B1["B 级债券"] B2["BB 级债券"] B3["BBB 级债券"] end subgraph CDOPackage["打包与评级再造"] Pool["组合资产池 (宣称风险已充分分散)"] Agencies["评级机构 (标普 / 穆迪)"] end subgraph FraudResult["最终产品"] AAA_CDO["新 CDO 产品: 92%~93% 评定为 AAA 级"] end B1 --> Pool B2 --> Pool B3 --> Pool Pool --> Agencies Agencies -->|"不加审核直接放行"| AAA_CDO ``` 此时，已故名厨安东尼·波登（Anthony Bourdain）作为特邀解说在厨房场景中现身，用一个生动的餐饮业隐喻解释了 CDO 的运作机制：如果一名大厨在周五订购了新鲜的海鲜（代表最初的房贷证券），到了周日还有大批像比目鱼这样不新鲜的鱼没卖出去，精明且缺乏道德底线的大厨绝不会将它们扔进垃圾桶承担损失，而是会把这些存放了三天的变质海鲜剁碎，扔进锅里做成海鲜炖汤（Seafood Stew）。客人们浑然不知自己吃下的是腐烂变质的旧鱼，反而将其当作一道精致的高档新菜，而这正是 CDO 的全部秘密。听完解释后，震惊的丹尼将这一逻辑总结为一句金融史上著名的刺耳讽刺：“所以房贷债券是狗屎，CDO 就是裹着猫屎的狗屎。”（“So, mortgage bonds are dog shit. CDO's are dog shit wrapped in cat shit.”）面对整个系统性的疯狂，鲍姆团队陷入难以置信的沉思：去年仅住房抵押贷款就有整整 5000 亿美元的规模，如果全美顶级金融机构都把这些随时会归零的 CDO 当作像美国国债一样坚不可摧的资产，那就意味着全美的评级机构、华尔街投行乃至联邦政府全都陷入了集体失职与沉睡。 - 银行将无法出售的 B 级、BB 级和 BBB 级次级债券重新打包，构造为担保债务凭证（CDO）。 - 评级机构以“资产池已充分多样化”为借口，将高达 92% 至 93% 的 CDO 份额赋予最高信用等级 AAA。 - 仅在前一年，全美发行的住房抵押贷款相关证券规模就高达 5000 亿美元，主流机构普遍将其视作具备国债级安全性的优质资产。 --- ### [06:35](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xbiDrzTd8fE&t=395s) 积木倒塌与 FrontPoint 团队的实地调查决议推销进入最终高潮，韦内特在积木塔上演示违约传导的毁灭性链条。他在 FrontPoint 团队凝重的注视下，逐一抽出底层代表各类评级的积木：“A级归零，B级归零，BB级归零，BBB级归零。”随着关键支撑被尽数剥离，整座高耸的积木塔轰然倒塌，木块砸在桌上四散崩落。韦内特指着一地狼藉冷冷地总结道：“这就是美国的房地产市场。”（“That's America's housing market.”）他坦言自己所在的德银部门全部在严重做多这些资产，甚至私下嘲弄他为宣扬虚假危机的“小鸡莉莉”（Chicken Little）和“泡泡男孩”（Bubble Boy）。在留下购买 CDS 的合作提议后，韦内特带着助手离开了会议室。韦内特走后，FrontPoint 内部爆发了激烈的争论。丹尼和温尼本能地感到强烈的防备与怀疑，认为韦内特参与过深，很可能是陷入泥潭后试图将风险敞口倾倒给他们。然而，身为团队领袖的马克·鲍姆却展现出了异常复杂且动摇的心态。面对下属的质问，鲍姆直白地承认自己打心底希望韦内特是对的，因为大型银行常年用 25% 的高昂信用卡利率盘剥普通民众，用沉重的学生贷款让无数家庭永世不得翻身。如今这帮傲慢贪婪的华尔街巨鳄因为自己的盲目自大迷失了方向，这让鲍姆产生了强烈的道德快感与复仇冲动，他毫不掩饰地咆哮道：“那些银行利欲熏心，他们失去了对市场的感知，而我能利用他们的愚蠢来大赚一笔。去他的，我当然希望他是对的！”（“Those same banks got greedy. They lost track of the market and I can profit off of their stupidity. Fuck yeah, I want him to be right.”）鲍姆指出，韦内特是个毫无掩饰自身利益的投机分子，这种赤裸裸的自私反而比道貌岸然的投行更值得信任。但作为理性的对冲基金管理者，他们不能单凭推销词下注，而是必须迅速查明两个最本质的核心问题：全美究竟是否存在巨大的房地产泡沫？如果存在，华尔街各大银行的涉险敞口到底有多大？由于意识到一旦逻辑被市场其他机构察觉，全美拥有几百万资金的对冲基金都会蜂拥挤入这一赛道，鲍姆团队决定立即赶赴次级房贷泛滥的源头进行实地调研。 - 韦内特所在的德意志银行交易部门全员重仓做多房地产，并将坚持看空的韦内特嘲讽为“小鸡莉莉”与“泡泡男孩”。 - 马克·鲍姆团队对银行体系的系统性剥削（如 25% 的信用卡高利贷与不可免除的学生贷款）抱有极大的道义愤怒。 - 团队最终确立了两大调查核心指标：全美房地产市场的泡沫真实性，以及各大主流投行对该资产的实际风险敞口。 ## Notable quotes > [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xbiDrzTd8fE&t=0s) 如果违约率达到8%，那就是世界末日。 — 贾里德·韦内特 ## Mentioned Jared Vennett, Mark Baum, Danny Moses, Vinny Daniel, Porter Collins, Anthony Bourdain, Jiang, Steve Eisman, Deutsche Bank, FrontPoint Partners, Standard & Poor's, Moody's, Credit Default Swap, Collateralized Debt Obligation, Mortgage Backed Securities, Jenga ## Video description "You smell that? What is that?..." "Your cologne?" "No" "Opportunity" "No. Money" Danny Moses, Vinny Daniel, Porter Collins, and Mark Baum (based on Steve Eisman) decide to meet with Vennett to listen to his sales pitch: Credit Default Swap on Mortgage Backed Bonds and his illustration of Collateralized Debt Obligations. [Source](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xbiDrzTd8fE)

Source quotes

[0:00] 贾里德·韦内特: 如果违约率达到8%，那就是世界末日。

Source quotes

[3:13] Jared Vennett: I'm standing in front of a burning house and I'm offering you fire insurance on it. [3:13] FrontPoint Partners analyst: Mortgage bonds are dog shit. CDOs are dog shit wrapped in cat shit.

Original transcript

[0:00] You smell that? [0:02] You smell that? I smell money. [0:06] This is amazing. [0:11] Okay. Hi. How are you? [0:14] Have a seat. [0:14] Okay. Mr. Bennett from Deutsche Bank. We [0:17] have [0:27] So, how many people have you talked to [0:29] about this trade? [0:30] A few. There's definitely some interest. [0:33] Oh, my boss would have my ass. [0:35] Are you crazy? [0:36] Get lost. [0:36] [ __ ] you. [0:38] Which is why you're here talking to us. [0:40] Wrong number. Sounds like there's a lot [0:42] of interest. [0:42] All right. A few people have invited us [0:45] in just to laugh at me on this deal. Is [0:46] that you? No. [0:47] Is that what this is? [0:48] That's not what this is. That's just how [0:50] Mark is. [0:51] Let's see what you got. [0:52] I'm sorry. [0:53] You smell that? What is that? [0:55] What? [0:55] What's that smell? [0:56] A cologne. [0:58] No. [1:01] Opportunity. [1:02] No. Money. [1:04] Okay. [1:05] I smell money. [1:06] Okay, [1:07] Chris. God damn it. Sorry. [1:13] This is your basic mortgage bond. All [1:15] right. The originals were simple. They [1:18] were just thousands of AAA mortgages [1:20] bundled together, guaranteed by the US [1:23] government. The modern ones are [1:24] different. They're private and they're [1:26] made up of layers of tanches. [1:33] The highest level AAA's getting paid [1:35] first. The lowest rated B's getting paid [1:37] last, taking on defaults first. Now, [1:39] obviously, if you're buying bees, you [1:41] can make more money, but they're a [1:42] little risky. Sometimes they fail. [1:47] Chris, [1:52] somewhere along the line, these B's and [1:53] double B's went from a little risky to [1:56] dog [ __ ] Where's the trash behind you? [1:59] I'm talking rock bottom FICO scores, [2:04] no income verification, [2:06] adjustable rates, dog [ __ ] [2:10] The default rates are already up from 1 [2:12] to 4%, fellas. And if they rise to 8%, [2:15] and they will, a lot of these triple B's [2:18] are going to zero, too. And that you're [2:20] too close, [2:22] is an opportunity. [2:24] Okay. You're saying that at 8% the bonds [2:26] fail and we are already at 4%. [2:28] That's right. [2:28] If they go to eight, it's Armageddon. [2:31] Yeah, that's right. [2:32] How come nobody's talking about this? [2:34] You're completely sure of the math. [2:36] Look at him. That's my quant. [2:39] You're what? [2:40] My quantitative. [2:42] My math specialist. Look at him. You [2:44] notice anything different about him? [2:46] Look at his face. [2:47] That's pretty racist. [2:48] Look at his eyes. I'll give you a hint. [2:50] His name's Yang. [2:53] He won a national math competition in [2:55] China. He doesn't even speak English. [2:59] Yeah, I'm sure of the math. [3:03] Actually, my name's Jang and I do speak [3:06] English. Jared likes to say I don't [3:08] because he thinks it makes me seem more [3:09] authentic. and I got second in that [3:12] national math competition. [3:13] So, you're offering us a chance to short [3:15] this pile of blocks. How? [3:18] With something called a credit default [3:20] swap. [3:22] It's like insurance on the bond. And if [3:24] it goes bust, you can make 10 to one, [3:26] even 20 to one return. And it's already [3:28] slowly going bust. [3:30] 10 to one. 20 to1. No way. [3:32] And no one's paying attention. [3:35] No one is paying attention because the [3:38] banks are too busy getting paid obscene [3:40] fees to sell these bonds. [3:42] But wait, you are the bank. I mean, you [3:44] work for the bank. I bet your margins [3:46] are pretty nice and fat. [3:47] Let's not talk about my margins, by the [3:48] way. Being nice and fat. That's a nice [3:51] shirt. Do they make it for men? [3:53] Aren't you the bank? [3:54] I work for the bank. I don't think like [3:56] a bank. Big bank, small bank. I like to [3:58] make money. All right. Let me put it [4:01] this way. I'm standing in front of a [4:03] burning house and I'm offering you fire [4:05] insurance on it. [4:06] How can these underlying bonds be as bad [4:09] as you say? It wouldn't be legal. [4:10] Nobody knows what's in them. Nobody [4:13] knows what's in the bonds. I've seen [4:14] some that are 65% AAA rated that I know [4:18] for a fact are filled with 95% subprime [4:21] [ __ ] with FICO below 550. [4:24] Get the [ __ ] out of here. [4:25] You want me to really blow your mind? [4:26] When the market deems a bond too risky [4:28] to buy, what do you think we do with it? [4:30] Take a guess. I don't know. You tell me. [4:33] All right. You think we just warehouse [4:35] it on the books? No. We just repackage [4:38] it with a bunch of other [ __ ] that [4:39] didn't sell and put it into a CDO. [4:42] A CDO? [4:43] Yes, a CDO. [4:44] What is that? [4:45] This is where we take a bunch of B's, [4:46] double B's, and triple B's that haven't [4:48] sold and we put them in a pile. [4:52] And when the pile gets large enough, the [4:54] whole thing is suddenly considered [4:55] diversified. And then the [ __ ] at the [4:58] rating agency give it a 92 93% AAA [5:01] rating. No questions asked. [5:06] Say that again. [5:08] I collateralized debt obligation. It's [5:10] important to understand because it's [5:11] what allowed a housing crisis to become [5:13] a nationwide economic disaster. [5:16] Here's world famous chef Anthony [5:18] Bourdain to explain. [5:24] Okay. I'm a chef on a Sunday afternoon [5:26] setting the menu at a big restaurant. I [5:28] ordered my fish on Friday, which is the [5:29] mortgage bond that Michael Berry [5:31] shorted, but some of the fresh fish [5:33] doesn't sell. I don't know why. Maybe it [5:35] just came out of it has the intelligence [5:37] of a dolphin. So, what am I going to do? [5:39] Throw all this unsold fish, which is the [5:42] triple B level of the bond in the [5:43] garbage and take the loss? [5:46] No way. Being the crafty and morally [5:49] ownerous chef that I am, whatever crappy [5:51] levels of the Bond I don't sell, I throw [5:53] into a seafood stew. See, it's not old [5:56] fish. It's a whole new thing. And the [5:58] best part is they're eating three-day [6:00] old halibit. That is a CDO. [6:04] Well, I just need to know how these [6:05] could possibly be collated. [6:06] So, somehow you're like, Dora the [6:09] Explorer, and you're the first person [6:10] who has found this thing. [6:12] Hold on. So, mortgage bonds are dog [6:13] [ __ ] CDOS's are dog [ __ ] wrapped in cat [6:16] [ __ ] [6:18] Yeah, that's right. Okay. [6:20] Institutions treat these CDOS like [6:21] they're as solid as Treasury bonds and [6:23] they're going to zero. [6:25] No, it can't be right. They're they're [6:27] 500 billion in housing bonds. So last [6:29] year alone, the ratings agencies, the [6:31] banks, the [ __ ] government, they're [6:33] saying they're all asleep at the wheel. [6:35] Yeah, my whole department's long on this [6:38] stuff. [6:40] They call me Chicken Little. [6:42] They call me Bubble Boy. [6:46] A's zero, B's zero, double B's zero, [6:51] triple B's zero. [6:56] And then that happens. [6:57] What is that? [7:00] That's America's housing market. [7:05] Thank you. [7:06] [ __ ] a Jared. [7:07] Shut your [ __ ] mouth. Hang out with [7:10] you. [7:10] Good. Okay, [7:12] Zack up. Do the deal. Let's be friends. [7:15] Thank you. [7:15] No [ __ ] [7:16] All right. [7:17] You going to say no, aren't you? [7:18] No. No. I'm just evaluating right now. [7:20] Thank you. Thank you for [7:30] I don't like it. [7:33] He's playing us. [7:35] He's playing us. He's got too much skin [7:37] in the game and he's dumping his [7:38] position. [7:40] What if he's right? [7:42] You want him to be right? Yes, I do. The [7:45] banks have given us 25% interest rates [7:47] on credit cards. They have screwed us on [7:49] student loans that we can never get out [7:51] from under. Then this guy walks into my [7:54] office and says, "Those same banks got [7:56] greedy. They lost track of the market [7:58] and I can profit off of their [8:00] stupidity." [ __ ] Yeah, I want him to be [8:02] right. I [8:02] mean, how come you don't hate this guy? [8:04] He's everything you taught us not to [8:05] trust. [8:06] I can't hate him. He is so transparent [8:07] in his self-interest and I kind of [8:09] respect him. Would I buy a car from him? [8:11] No. [8:13] Is he right about the mortgage market? [8:15] Let's find out. Let's find out. [8:18] Look, it's two very simple questions. Is [8:21] there a housing bubble? And if there is, [8:23] how exposed are the banks? [8:25] Okay, [8:26] let's get on this quickly, too, because [8:27] if he's right, every loser with a couple [8:30] million bucks in a fund is going to be [8:31] jumping on this. Let's go.