Gopinath Says AI Capital Demands and Deficits End Low Rate Era

戈皮纳斯：AI资本需求与赤字终结低利率时代 企业在人工智能领域前所未有的支出叠加持续的财政赤字，推高了中性利率，使得政府在面临下一次经济冲击时缺乏为市场提供托底的财政能力。 Gita Gopinath 与主持人 Tracy Alloway 和 Joe Weisenthal 共同分析了推动全球债券市场摆脱2008年后超低利率格局的根本性机制转变。她指出，自然利率（R*）上升、疫情后持续的财政赤字，以及AI基础设施建设争夺资本与实体资源的庞大资金需求，共同终结了长期停滞时代。Gopinath 解释了美债边际买家从对价格不敏感的央行转向对市场敏感的私人机构，如何导致收益率波动加剧。她同时提醒，高额债务负担、AI生产力提升可能不及预期，以及不断缩减的政府财政空间，正在动摇市场关于未来遭遇经济冲击时国家将提供无休止托底的假设。 哈佛大学教授吉塔·戈皮纳特（Gita Gopinath）指出，不断攀升的全球公共债务已成为当前金融体系中最严峻的结构性风险，庞大的财政赤字叠加AI热潮巨大的资本支出需求，正式终结了“长期停滞”（Secular Stagnation）时代。 (5:00) AI热潮正通过金融与实体双重渠道引发“挤出效应”：今年迄今AI相关企业发债已占投资级公司债发行的50%和高收益债的近40%，同时对能源与熟练劳动力的争夺直接推高了中性实际利率（R*）。 (10:00) 全球宏观格局已从昔日的“全球储蓄过剩”转向资本稀缺与实际利率上升阶段，目前海外持有的美股规模相对除美国外全球GDP的比例，已达到2000年互联网泡沫峰值的两倍。 (25:00) 戈皮纳特警告，在公共债务接近历史高位且财政空间大幅缩减的背景下，投资者押注政府持续兜底的“BLISS交易”难以维系；若AI未能兑现预期的生产率提升，极可能成为引爆主权债务危机的导火索。 (50:00)

Harvard professor and former IMF First Deputy Managing Director Gita Gopinath argues that a structural regime shift has ended secular stagnation, driving global interest rates higher through unprecedented public debt, altered central bank behavior, and intense capital demand from artificial intelligence. The Death of Secular Stagnation and R-Star (5:00) Gopinath identifies elevated public debt as the most concerning structural development in global finance. She explains that the neutral rate of interest (R*) has risen from a pre-pandemic baseline of roughly 0.5% to at least 1.0%, and potentially higher. This shift reflects persistent medium-term inflation expectations, larger fiscal risk premia, and strong private investment demand driven by artificial intelligence. The global economy has diverged sharply from the pre-2020 quantitative easing era. Where price-insensitive central banks once suppressed long-term yields, central banks are now conducting quantitative tightening, leaving price-sensitive private institutions and hedge funds as the marginal buyers of sovereign debt. Simultaneously, baseline fiscal policy in the United States has expanded toward structural deficits near 7% of GDP. Dual Crowding-Out Mechanisms from AI Investment (10:00) Private capital absorption by AI firms is exerting direct upward pressure on borrowing costs across the economy. Citing Apollo Global Management data, co-host Tracy Alloway notes that AI-related borrowing accounts for roughly 50% of investment-grade and nearly 40% of high-yield corporate issuance year-to-date, with companies prioritizing infrastructure financing regardless of prevailing interest rates out of fear of obsolescence. Gopinath outlines two operational mechanisms for this crowding out: a real-rate channel and an inflation channel. The real-rate channel represents direct financial competition, in which immense private demand for capital lifts real yields independently of inflation. The inflation channel stems from real-resource competition for physical grid infrastructure, energy, and skilled labor. Gopinath views the real-rate channel as currently dominant, noting that while higher rates from productive private capex can lift GDP, higher borrowing costs fueled by unproductive public deficits pose severe macroeconomic risks. Fragmented Supply Chains and Capital Duplication (28:00) A structural reallocation of capital is underway as global trade policy shifts from cost-efficiency toward national security and resilience. Governments and corporations are engaging in capital duplication across strategic sectors, including domestic energy generation, expanded defense budgets, and localized semiconductor fabrication. This broad-based drive for self-reliance materially increases global demand for capital, outpacing the steady supply of savings generated by aging demographics. Simultaneously, global investment remains heavily skewed toward U.S. equities, where foreign holdings relative to rest-of-world GDP have reached approximately twice the peak recorded during the 2000 dot-com era. This heavy concentration reinforces capital scarcity across the rest of the global financial system while embedding elevated valuations into passive benchmark indexes. Sovereign Debt Vulnerabilities in Advanced Economies (35:10) Gopinath explains that for advanced economies issuing debt in their own currencies, a debt crisis will not appear as an outright default or reserve exhaustion. Instead, it would materialize as a severe credit crunch: soaring borrowing costs, suppressed investment, asset repricing, and a prolonged debt overhang that drags down productivity and growth. Attempts by central banks to artificially cap long-term yields through yield curve control would likely fail, fueling inflation expectations and damaging central bank credibility. While developed economies survived recent shocks due to pandemic-era fiscal buffers totaling roughly 25% of GDP, Gopinath cautions that the investor expectation of perpetual state guarantees—termed the 'bliss trade'—is becoming unviable. With public debt near historic peaks and Chinese domestic investment contracting in 2025 amid property sector distress, advanced governments face genuine physical resource constraints and severely limited room for future fiscal interventions. The sustainability of high public debt loads depends directly on the productivity promise of artificial intelligence. If AI fails to deliver substantial macroeconomic productivity gains to offset high interest burdens, sovereign debt narratives risk unravelling into higher risk premia and systemic economic strain.

哈佛大学教授、IMF前第一副总裁Gita Gopinath指出，全球主权债券收益率飙升标志着后危机时代“长期停滞”格局的终结，主因是高额公共债务、央行量化紧缩与人工智能投资热潮推高了中性利率。她警告称，当前全球主权债务的可持续性高度押注于AI的生产率回报，一旦技术红利未能如期兑现，高负债发达经济体可能面临严重的信贷紧缩与债务重估风险。 中性利率上升与长期停滞终结 (5:00) Gopinath认为，在当前各类地缘与宏观波动中，最令人担忧的结构性问题是全球公共债务水平的高企。她将美国10年期国债收益率的走高归结为三项核心推力：首先，中期通胀预期的抬升促使中性实际利率（R*）从疫情前约0.5%的基准回升至至少1.0%；其次，美国预计将持续维持接近GDP 7%的高额财政赤字，导致投资者要求更高的期限溢价与风险补偿；最后，AI基础设施建设所激发的庞大私人资本开支，正进一步将中性利率推向更高水平。这些变化宣告了此前以私人投资匮乏为特征的长期停滞期彻底结束。 面对为何高负债在2020年前未引发市场恐慌的疑问，Gopinath解释称债券市场的底层微观结构已发生质变。在量化宽松（QE）时期，主要央行作为价格不敏感的买家压低了国债收益率并抑制了波动；而在当下的量化紧缩（QT）阶段，国债边际买家已转变为对收益率变动高度敏感的对冲基金及非银私营机构，导致市场在巨额债券供应面前表现出显著更强的波动性和利率敏感度。 AI资本开支对公共资源的双重挤出 (10:00) 科技巨头对算力基础设施的激烈争夺改变了信贷配置。引用Apollo首席经济学家Torsten Slok的数据，年初至今与AI相关的债券发行已占全部投资级公司债发行的50%，并在垃圾债中接近40%。由于科技企业担心在模型迭代上落后半步就会陷入永久劣势，这种强烈的错失恐惧（FOMO）使其在融资时不计利率成本，削弱了传统货币紧缩对企业投资的抑制作用。同时，全球资本高度集中于美股，外国投资者持有的美股资产规模相对于世界其他地区GDP的比例已达历史高位，约为2000年互联网泡沫峰值的两倍。 Gopinath确认，AI投资潮正通过两条路径对经济产生“挤出效应”：一是金融层面的挤出，高评级科技企业债券大量分流市场流动性，直接拉高了真实中性利率；二是实体层面的挤出，算力建设对能源、电网设施与熟练劳动力的抢夺造成物理瓶颈，加剧了通胀压力。她评估认为，当前真实利率的攀升主要由AI资本需求驱动；如果实际利率上升伴随着生产率的真正飞跃，将有助于稀释债务，但若被非生产性财政支出主导，则会恶化宏观脆弱性。 安全优先与重复配置加剧资金短缺 (28:00) 全球经济逻辑正经历从追求效率与最低成本的传统供应链分工，向以国家安全与自主可控为导向的根本转向。各国不再假定贸易伙伴能持续无条件供应基础物资，进而在多领域推行资本的重复建设。这一重构集中发生在三大安全领域：确保本土发电独立性的能源投资、扩大国防制造与军工储备，以及推动半导体晶圆厂回流和关键稀土供应链布局。 这种为了保障产业链韧性而进行的重复投资，在宏观层面上大幅拉高了全球资本需求。讨论指出，尽管全球老龄化人口在退休储蓄上的积累在理论上提供了资本供给，但这一来源已被政府与企业的竞相借贷迅速吞噬，2000年代初期的“全球储蓄过剩”已被资本相对稀缺和真实利率上行的现实所取代。 发达市场债务隐忧与非常规干预风险 (35:10) 历史上主权国家化解高债务主要依赖增长、通胀稀释或违约重组三条路径，但在选民反对财政紧缩的背景下削减债务举步维艰。虽然英国、法国与日本等发达经济体主权债收益率压力骤增，但Gopinath指出，对于发行本币债务的发达经济体而言，主权债务危机不会呈现为外汇耗尽后的直接硬违约，而是会表现为剧烈的信贷紧缩、借款成本跳升、投资锐减以及经济活力陷入停滞。 针对部分市场人士呼吁央行重启收益率曲线控制（YCC）以压制借贷成本的主张，Gopinath发出严厉警告。她强调，除非面临零利率下限刺激需求，否则脱离物价稳定目标的硬性限价会令市场迅速消化财政主导风险，导致通胀预期失锚与通胀风险溢价暴增，不仅会摧毁央行独立性，最终反而会推高名义与实际利率。此外，随着公共债务触及上限，以往政府全面托底家庭与企业损失的机制（BLISS）已失去财政空间。 债务可持续性对AI生产率预期的依赖 (50:00) 在审视引发系统性主权债务危机的潜在触发点时，Gopinath明确指向了市场对AI生产率的过高预期。当前全球债务可持续性模型均深度隐性依赖未来的经济高增长假设。尽管发达经济体在疫情期间投放了约占GDP 25%的财政救助，且AI投入在短期内支撑了全球贸易与经济韧性，但政府已耗尽后续弹药，宏观环境已逼近物理资源边界，无法在下一轮冲击中复制无通胀后果的巨额刺激。 因此，一旦AI未能带来宏观层面的生产率爆发——例如年均提升2个百分点的乐观预测落空，或受困于大语言模型幻觉与落地瓶颈——支撑庞大主权债务的逻辑支柱将发生动摇，诱发债券市场的剧烈重新定价。与此同时，中国在2025年出现的国内固定投资历史上首次绝对下滑及房地产持续低迷，使其经常账户顺差主要由国内消费受抑而非高投资驱动，进一步加剧了全球贸易摩擦与外部宏观的不确定性。 本期讨论表明，全球主权利率中枢上行不仅是通胀粘性的体现，更是中性利率上移、资本重复配置与公共债务扩张共同作用的长期体制重塑。金融市场与主权资产负债表实际上已与AI的技术变现紧密绑定；在财政政策缓冲耗尽且资源面临刚性约束的背景下，若生产率未能迎来实质性跃升，发达经济体将面临借贷成本居高不下与隐性信用收缩的双重考验。

## Background 本期节目由 Bloomberg 旗下的播客《Odd Lots》于 2026 年 5 月 29 日发布在 RSS 及网络平台上。节目简介指出，全球债券市场正在经历剧烈抛售与利率飙升，哈佛大学经济学教授、IMF 前第一副总裁吉塔·戈皮纳特（Gita Gopinath）做客节目，深入剖析人口老龄化、巨额公共债务以及 AI 狂潮的资本需求如何共同推高全球通胀压力，并探讨股债脱节背后的宏观隐患。 ## TL;DR 吉塔·戈皮纳特指出，全球经济已彻底终结了疫情前的“长期停滞”与全球储蓄过剩范式，自然实际利率（$R^*$）发生系统性上移。AI 基础设施的巨额资本开支与不可逆的常态化巨额财政赤字正在金融与实体双重层面对资本和资源形成激烈争夺，而央行退出购债使边际买家转变为对冲基金等高敏感资本，导致债市波动加剧。戈皮纳特警示，整个西方经济的债务可持续性正沉浸在“BLISS”式的盲目政府兜底幻想中，并将最终赌注押在 AI 的生产率神话上；一旦 AI 生产力兑现不及预期或突发外部冲击，在实体资源受限且财政空间见底的当下，恐将引爆严重的信贷紧缩与债务危机。 ## Atmosphere & style 整场对话在严密扎实的宏观经济学逻辑与轻快幽默的对谈风格间自如切换，戈皮纳特以其权威且冷静的学术框架，将看似散乱的 AI 算力热、主权发债与逆全球化梳理成一套清晰的宏观拼图。两位主持人 Tracy Alloway 与 Joe Weisenthal 则穿插着对被动指数基金“高位接盘”和个人被动卷入算力泡沫的自嘲，让严肃晦涩的收益率曲线讨论充满生动的讽刺感与现实穿透力。整体氛围从初期的“既视感”剖析，逐步推演至对全球金融体系底层脆弱性的深刻警示，带来一种平静叙事下隐藏着巨大宏观惊雷的紧绷听感。 ## Bulletin - `05:22` 中性实际利率（R*）已从疫情前的约 0.5% 跃升至 1% 以上，叠加可预见的常态化财政高赤字与私人投资回潮，全球正式宣告告别“长期停滞”（Secular Stagnation）与超低利率范式。 - `10:00` 全球债市边际买家发生结构性质变：央行退出 QE 转向缩表，对冲基金及非银机构接棒成为主力，叠加年内高达 50% 的投资级公司债流向 AI 基础设施，主权债券面临显著的资金分流与波动加剧。 - `30:00` 全球储蓄过剩彻底逆转为“资本稀缺”，各国在能源安全、防务及半导体等领域的本土化重复开支进一步推升借贷成本，目前仅靠老龄化人口积累的庞大预防性退休储蓄在暗中平抑利率失控。 - `51:30` 市场沉溺于假定政府始终会出面托底的“BLISS 交易”（庞大且持久的国家支持），但在财政空间逼近极限的环境下，若 AI 无法兑现生产率飞跃预期，主权债务的可持续性恐将成为引爆全球抛售的核心导火索。 ## Key takeaways - `00:00` 全球债券市场抛售潮标志着宏观制度性转变（regime change），疫情前持续十年的“长期低利率”共识彻底瓦解，主权借贷成本正在经历不可逆的系统性抬升。 - `03:00` AI 热潮在科技巨头中引发了极度的错失恐惧症（FOMO），使得企业不惜代价发债投资算力与数据中心，导致传统加息政策的信贷刹车机制部分失灵。 - `05:22` 吉塔·戈皮纳特指出，中性实际利率 R* 已升至 1% 以上，加上 2% 的通胀目标，名义政策利率基准锚点已抬升至 3%，过去私人投资不足的长期停滞格局彻底终结。 - `07:15` 美债边际买家从不计成本的各自主权央行（QE 时代）转变为对价格和止损极度敏感的对冲基金与非银机构（NBFI），极大放大了收益率曲线的短期剧烈波动。 - `10:00` 年内高达 50% 的投资级公司债及近 40% 的垃圾债发行与 AI 生态挂钩，科技巨头的高景气度债券正在资本市场上直接挤出主权公债的配置资金。 - `12:15` AI 投资推高利率的核心路径在于金融层面对资本的争夺（抬升均衡实际利率），而非实体供应链短缺引发的直接成本推进型通胀。 - `17:35` 货币政策制定者必须审慎区分中性利率上升的性质：全要素生产率（TFP）驱动的“良性上升”能消化债务负担，而由纯财政赤字膨胀驱动的“劣质上升”则会严重侵蚀金融稳定性。 - `20:00` 科技界设想的边际成本归零与去通胀繁荣在当下缺乏宏观数据支持，现实中并未出现生产率额外增长 2 个百分点的证据，但股市已在历史高位按“极致顺境”完美定价。 - `25:00` 全球储蓄过剩现象彻底消亡，海外资本对美股表现出前所未有的暴食性需求，外资持仓美股规模达到创纪录的 17 万亿美元，占除美国外全球 GDP 的比重是互联网泡沫峰值的两倍。 - `28:30` 逆全球化与国家安全焦虑迫使各国在能源、国防和半导体领域进行本土化重复建设，彻底终结了效率优先的全球分工模式，并从供给侧构筑了长期通胀中枢。 - `30:00` 面对几乎无限延伸的全球资本需求清单，老龄化人口带来的高额预防性退休储蓄是当前延缓全球借贷成本发生灾难性飙升的唯一宏观供给支柱。 - `37:45` 主权法币发行国的债务危机并非字面意义上的国库空虚或立即违约，而是表现为国债收益率暴涨引发的全面信贷紧缩与庞大债务积压（debt overhang），最终冻结实体投资。 - `40:00` 央行若脱离抗通胀法定职责强行对长端国债利率设定上限，不仅无法遏制借贷成本，反而会引爆通胀预期失锚，最终导致名义与实际利率报复性狂飙并丧失央行独立性。 - `42:43` 后疫情时代的经济韧性主要依靠占 GDP 约 25% 的超常规财政救助积累的私人储蓄缓冲以及 AI 基建拉动，但这两项红利在下一次危机发生时均无法复制。 - `45:20` 金融市场正深陷迷信政府无限兜底的“BLISS 交易”（庞大且持久的国家支持）中；当常规财政手段耗尽后，主权政府极有可能被迫滑向价格管制与金融抑制等激进非正统手段。 - `47:19` 中国巨额制造业贸易顺差的根源在于私人消费受抑以及房地产崩盘导致的国内投资断崖式下滑，这种供给外溢模式正面临欧洲和亚洲邻国不可避免的关税反制。 - `51:30` 西方经济增长预期与财政可持续性正深度捆绑在 AI 生产力兑现之上；若模型幻觉无法解决或生产率红利落空，主权债务偿债能力将被市场彻底质疑并诱发危机。 - `55:00` 财政承载力并非静态的赤字率数字，而是由实体资源的稀缺度决定；在劳动力与供应链紧绷的供给受限环境下继续依赖印钞兜底救市，将毫无缓冲地瞬间引发恶性通胀。 ## Detailed walkthrough ### `00:00` 全球债市抛售潮与制度性转变的序幕 节目开场时，主持人 Tracy Alloway 与 Joe Weisenthal 探讨了当下金融市场中最引人注目的核心叙事之一：全球主权债券市场的剧烈抛售以及无处不在的利率飙升。Tracy 坦言自己产生了一种强烈的“既视感”（déjà vu），因为在近期的多期播客中，她几乎都是以同样的一句话作为开场白。回顾疫情暴发前的整整十年，市场参与者和决策者普遍形成了一种惯性共识，即利率只会长期处于低位乃至更低水平；然而如今，经济学家所说的“制度性转变”（regime change）正在切切实实地发生。尽管在节目录制前的几天内收益率有所小幅回调，但全球性的利率上行大势已不可阻挡。虽然当前市场上最吸睛的头条往往被人工智能（AI）、高带宽存储芯片等科技主题占据，但如果剥离这些，全球几乎每个主要经济体利率齐齐冲高的现象，无疑是主导宏观环境的最核心主线。 ### `03:00` 短期通胀扰动还是长期结构重塑：AI 资本狂潮与长期停滞的终结 围绕本轮收益率走高，市场上存在着截然不同的定性解释。一种浅层观点认为，这仅仅是对大宗商品价格走高的条件反射——近期英国长端国债（UK Gilts）收益率一度触及 1998 年以来的最高水平，美国 10 年期国债收益率也反复逼近 5% 的关口，而这些异动表面上与国际原油价格的涨跌高度联动，因而常被归咎于能源引发的输入型通胀。然而，越来越多的宏观分析师开始提出更深层的反思：市场正在定价某种远非“暂时的”（transitory）要素，而是一场更为深刻的长期结构性（secular）巨变。这一转变的核心在于 AI 革命所吞噬的惊人资本规模——科技巨头与数据中心对资金近乎无底洞般的需求，正在对主权债券产生显著的“挤出效应”；同时，发达国家在人口老龄化背景下能否在长期维系其巨额财政融资，也遭遇了根本性拷问。 Joe 特别引用了阿波罗全球管理公司（Apollo Global Management）首席经济学家 Torsten Slok 当天发布的一份图表报告来佐证这一点。Slok 指出，AI 热潮在企业端催生了一种强烈的“错失恐惧症”（FOMO）——没有哪家科技公司承受得起自家前沿大模型比竞品落后六个月的代价。因此，企业宁可不惜一切代价砸钱建数据中心、买算力。这意味着，传统货币政策加息传导的“刹车”机制在当前周期中部分失灵：即便在高利率环境下为数据中心融资极为昂贵，但与沦为科技“永久下层阶级”的毁灭性风险相比，企业仍然会毫不犹豫地借贷并大举支出。在能源冲击、AI 资本开支激增、老龄化与医疗照护支出膨胀的多重共振下，全球经济正迎来一场需要被重新剖析的长期转变。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 驱动全球债券收益率上升的宏观因素 accDescr: 展示短期通胀与长期结构性力量共同推高全球中性利率和债券收益率的逻辑架构。 subgraph Shocks["短期与周期性催化"] A["原油等大宗商品价格走高"] B["通胀预期反复扰动"] end subgraph Secular["长期结构性力量"] C["AI 资本开支激增<br/>（企业 FOMO 式投入）"] D["巨额主权财政赤字<br/>（如美国约 7% 赤字率）"] E["人口老龄化与<br/>长周期社会照护负担"] end subgraph MarketDynamics["微观结构与供需质变"] F["中性实际利率 (R*) 上升<br/>（从 0.5% 跃升至 1% 以上）"] G["央行退出购债 (QT)<br/>边际买家转为敏感型对冲基金"] end H["全球主权债券收益率中枢系统性抬升"] Shocks --> H Secular --> F F --> H Secular --> G G --> H ``` ### `05:22` 吉塔·戈皮纳特：R* 跃升、巨额财政赤字与长期停滞的终结 哈佛大学经济学教授、国际货币基金组织（IMF）前第一副总裁吉塔·戈皮纳特（Gita Gopinath）在加入讨论后明确指出，在当前全球面对的各种错综复杂的外部冲击中，全球公共债务高企才是真正最令人担忧的核心隐患。她详细拆解了美债收益率中枢被系统性抬高的三重逻辑驱动力： 首先，通胀中枢预期显著提高，维持稳定通胀所需的自然实际利率（即中性利率 $R^*$）已发生实质性上浮——从疫情前的约 0.5% 水平，稳步攀升至当前的 1% 甚至更高。其次，除基准实际利率抬升外，主权债券还叠加了显著的通胀风险溢价，以及由于美国等国在可预见的未来仍将维持巨额财政赤字所带来的主权供应风险溢价。第三，AI 热潮引发的巨量私人部门资本开支，正将中性利率进一步推向更高区间。戈皮纳特由此宣布，全球经济已经彻底告别了疫情前关于“长期低利率”（low for long）和“长期停滞”（secular stagnation）的旧范式： > "我认为在当前这个节点，我们正在见证长期停滞的终结。长期停滞的核心特征曾经是缺乏足够的投资，尤其是私人部门投资不足。而那如今已不再是一个问题了。" - **中性利率（$R^*$）的位移**：疫情前中性实际利率约为 0.5%，如今基准估计已上升至 1%，在 AI 资本开支刺激下可能进一步走高。 - **公共赤字常态化**：美国预计在可预见的时间范围内将持续运行接近 GDP 7% 左右的极高财政赤字水平。 - **投资范式反转**：由“缺乏私人投资”转变为私人资本与公共融资在资本市场上的直接竞争。 ### `07:15` 疫情前后的根本分野：边缘买家重组与“寡妇交易”失效 针对主权债务问题，Joe 提出了关键反问：高额公共债务在 2020 年疫情暴发前就已是人尽皆知的普遍事实，然而当时无论债务如何膨胀，利率却总能持续走低，日本甚至由于国债收益率长期被压在极低水平而诞生了著名的做空国债“寡妇交易”（widowmaker trade）。究竟是什么变量在疫情后发生了剧变，才让市场对债务水平的敏感度发生天翻地覆的逆转？ 戈皮纳特梳理了打破旧有平衡的三大关键变量： 1. **完全意外爆发的 AI 浪潮**：在疫情前，金融市场的任何定价模型中都未曾包含这轮突如其来的私人资本开支洪流。 2. **财政赤字预期的不可逆恶化**：以往市场假定高赤字只是危机时期的短期应急举措，但如今在和平与非衰退期，美国等核心经济体将常态化维持近 7% 的财政赤字，这彻底打破了先前的预期定势。 3. **边际买家（Marginal Buyer）结构的质变**：在量化宽松（QE）时代，各大央行是主权债券无条件的“兜底买家”，央行资产负债表的扩张有力压低了期限溢价。然而当下，全球央行已全面停止购债甚至开启量化紧缩（QT，如美联储缩表及日本央行缩减购债规模），主权债务的边际买家变成了对价格和流动性极度敏感的对冲基金与市场做市商。当边际买家转变为高度追求收益与风控止损的投机型资本后，全球金融市场一旦出现风吹草动，债券收益率便会表现出远超以往的剧烈波动。 ### `10:00` 美债买家变迁与 AI 繁荣对信贷市场的重塑 资本流向美国的结构正在发生根本性转变。过去美国国债的主要海外买家是外国央行，如今这些官方机构的购买步伐已经放缓，取而代之的是来自全球各地的非银金融机构（NBFI）。与具有长期战略持有倾向的央行不同，非银机构的资金流动性更强、更具投机性与波动性，这直接导致收益率曲线的整体波动显著加剧。与此同时，私人资本市场正经历一场由人工智能引发的融资风暴。 在公司债市场上，与 AI 相关的融资占比已经达到了惊人的规模。阿波罗全球管理公司（Apollo Global Management）首席经济学家托斯滕·斯洛克（Torsten Sløk）的数据显示，年内所有投资级（IG）公司债的发行中，高达 50% 与 AI 及其周边生态直接相关；甚至在高收益垃圾债市场中，AI 概念债券的占比也一路攀升至近 40%。面对这一现象，市场开始讨论资金是否正在分流：投资者是否更倾向于持有科技巨头发行的投资级债券，而非美国国债？无论是股票还是信贷市场，追逐 AI 红利的交易情绪都极其高涨，国内外资本普遍押注该板块未来在生产率提升和盈利扩张上的巨大潜能，促使巨额资金优先停泊在这一最具活力的赛道中。 - **美债海外买家更迭**：传统外国央行买家缺席，流动性更灵活、更不稳定的非银金融机构（NBFI）占据主导，导致美债曲线波动性上升。 - **AI 公司债发行激增**：年初至今投资级债券发行量的 50%、垃圾债发行量的近 40% 均流向 AI 及相关基础设施建设。 - **私营部门资产分流**：科技巨头的投资级债券凭借略高于美债的收益率与极高景气度，正在分流原属于主权债券的配置资金。 --- ### `12:15` 地缘冲突变数与“挤出效应”的两种经济学机制 在讨论利率长期高企的基准情景时，地缘政治引发的下行风险同样不容忽视。主持人与吉塔·戈皮纳特指出，中东局势的演变仍是最大变数：如果伊朗冲突持续升级且霍尔木兹海峡封锁在短期内无法解除，国际原油价格可能飙升至每桶 160 美元。这种极端的能源价格冲击不会直接带来高利率，反而可能引发严重的“需求破坏”（demand destruction），迅速将经济推入衰退，迫使美联储在收益率曲线短端以极快的速度降息。 在排除极端地缘冲击的前提下，AI 热潮对利率市场的深层冲击则体现在经济学上的“挤出效应”（crowding out）究竟通过何种路径传导。主持人提出两种不同的挤出视角： 1. **金融市场视角**：大量资质优良的高评级企业为 AI 建设发行高息债券，与政府公债争夺资本，推高真实融资成本； 2. **实体经济视角**：数据中心建设疯狂抢夺风力涡轮机、重卡运力、建筑承包商及熟练技工等实体资源，推高供应链与用工成本，加剧通胀黏性，从而迫使央行在更长时间内维持高名义利率。 戈皮纳特分析指出，这两种机制目前都在实际运作中。私营部门对资金的巨大饥渴直接拉升了实际利率（Real Rates），即使在通胀预期未发生变动的情况下，资本回报率的抬升也会迫使真实借贷成本上扬。而在实体层面，针对各类物理投入品的争夺确实在形成通胀压力，继而需要更高的名义利率（Nominal Rates）予以抑制。就当前而言，戈皮纳特认为“实际利率上升是更核心的驱动因素”；相较之下，整体通胀路径居高不下的主因仍在于能源价格波动及其向核心通胀的传导，而非纯粹由 AI 实体挤出所驱动。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: AI 资本繁荣推升利率的双重传导机制 accDescr: 展示 AI 投资如何分别通过金融资本需求与实体资源争夺推升实际利率与名义利率 subgraph FinancialChannel ["金融市场挤出渠道 (主导因素)"] A["AI 基础设施巨额融资需求"] --> B["高评级公司债供给激增"] B --> C["私人资本争夺与分流"] C --> D["推高均衡实际利率 (Real Rates / r*)"] end subgraph RealEconomyChannel ["实体经济挤出渠道 (通胀压力)"] E["数据中心建设与供应链扩张"] --> F["抢夺运力、电力装备与技术工人"] F --> G["供应链摩擦与成本推进型通胀"] G --> H["推高名义政策利率路径 (Nominal Rates)"] end ``` --- ### `17:35` 中性利率 $r^*$ 上升之辩：良性生产率驱动与恶性财政赤字 随着 AI 投资热潮推升全球实际利率，货币政策制定者面临着关键抉择。一些美联储官员已提出央行应当“看穿”（look through）AI 繁荣带来的暂时性通胀脉冲。然而，如果中性利率（$r^*$）正在发生结构性上移，政策制定者便必须审慎评估其背后的根源。 戈皮纳特指出，决定政策应对方向的核心在于甄别中性利率上升的驱动力究竟是“良性”还是“劣质”： - **良性 $r^*$ 上升**：如果利率走高源于全要素生产率（TFP）的结构性改善，企业因技术突破加大资本开支、推高投资回报率，这种上升属于健康增长。它预示着经济潜在增速加快，不仅有助于企业消化借贷成本，也能通过扩大经济体量来有效降低公共债务占 GDP 的比率。 - **劣质 $r^*$ 上升**：如果中性利率上移完全是由财政赤字失控和政府天量借债所推动，其性质则截然不同。这种资金筹集通常缺乏生产性回报，不仅无法提振长期潜在增长，反而会无端加剧金融体系的脆弱性。 - **美联储的前瞻考量**：央行不能盲目将 AI 引起的利率上升视作临时干扰，必须深入拆解潜在增长率与资本边际收益率的变化。 - **良性提升的红利**：生产率驱动的实际利率抬升能够自我消化，并通过促进名义 GDP 扩张缓解政府负债率。 - **赤字外溢的隐患**：若利率高企仅源于美国政府不断扩大的赤字融资，这种财政驱动的挤出效应将缺乏经济效益支撑，最终对宏观经济产生负向拖累。 ### `20:00` 区分“良性”与“劣性”中性利率，以及 AI 驱动的去通胀繁荣幻想 在讨论中性利率（$R^*$）的驱动力时，吉塔·戈皮纳特（Gita Gopinath）指出，若推高 $R^*$ 的并非能够带动足够经济增长的生产性基础设施投资，情况就会变得格外棘手——这意味着经济体仅仅承受了更高的实际中性利率，却没有享受到应有的经济高增长红利。对于决策者而言，首要任务是判断推高 $R^*$ 的究竟是“良性力量”还是“劣性力量”。但无论成因如何，只要 $R^*$ 处于上升通道且通胀目标锚定在 2%，名义利率就注定会长期维持在更高水平。目前美联储对中性利率的预估约为 1%，加上 2% 的通胀目标，基准名义利率的锚点便来到了 3%，这与疫情前的超低利率时代形成了决定性转变。随之而来的关键政策抉择在于：高企的名义利率是否已足以遏制通胀？抑或能源价格传导、移民减少以及供应链断裂等供给侧摩擦仍在持续推高核心通胀，迫使央行必须将利率提升至远高于 $R^*$ 的限制性区间。 面对当前 AI 投资狂潮推高利率的现状，主持人乔·维森塔尔（Joe Weisenthal）提出了科技界津津乐道的“去通胀繁荣”（disinflationary boom）或“通缩性繁荣”愿景：假设在未来的理想状态下，超强人工智能彻底革新了医疗保健、建筑和机器人看护，大幅压低大宗商品与劳动力成本，是否会出现一种全社会生活水准飞跃、物品极度廉价的繁荣图景？戈皮纳特强调，必须严格区分“当下”与“未来”。当下现实是巨大的资本开支正在推高要素价格与利率；而至于十年后是否真能实现兼顾超高生产率且免于内乱与技术失控的完美结局，经济学上固然存在这种可能，但目前没有任何专业人士敢为此打保票。市场分析师预测 AI 每年能为全要素生产率额外带来 2 个百分点的增量（在当前大约 2% 的基础上翻倍），但眼下现实中根本没有出现此类生产率浪潮的确凿证据。戈皮纳特调侃道，虽然自己日常使用这项技术并显著提升了个人工作效率，但它“尚未对我的薪资或类似方面产生任何影响”。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 中性利率与宏观流动性的逻辑分歧 accDescr: 展示政策决策、AI预期与现实资本压力之间的推演路径 subgraph R_Star_Dynamics ["中性利率 (R*) 现实"] A["资本投入激增 / 财政赤字扩张"] --> B["推高实际中性利率 R* (当前预估 ~1%)"] B --> C["叠加 2% 通胀目标<br/>名义利率基准抬升至 3%+"] C --> D["地缘冲突与供应链重构摩擦<br/>要求政策利率维持更高区间"] end subgraph AI_Scenarios ["AI 长期预期与现实错配"] E["市场远期幻想：<br/>'去通胀繁荣' 与边际成本归零"] -.-> F["现实高度不确定：<br/>未见年增 2% 的额外生产率浪潮"] F --> G["股市在历史高位计入'完美定价'<br/>却忽视未来数年过渡期的剧烈摩擦"] end ``` ### `25:00` “全球储蓄过剩”终结与对美股的贪婪饥渴 戈皮纳特进一步剖析了当前金融市场呈现出的奇特脱节：股市不断刷新历史高位，似乎将所有事物都朝着“极致顺境”来定价，但却对未来一到两年内可能爆发的不确定性视若无睹。当特雷西·阿洛威（Tracy Alloway）问及这种对 AI 追捧、大举发债与资本渴求的现象是否意味着本·伯南克（Ben Bernanke）在 2000 年代初提出的“全球储蓄过剩”（global savings glut）已经彻底逆转为“资本稀缺”时，戈皮纳特给出了极其坚决的肯定答复。真实利率和名义利率的全球性暴涨就是最无可辩驳的证据——全球储蓄过剩的时代已经一去不复返。 取而代之的是全球资本对美国资产、尤其是美国股票呈现出一种近乎“暴食般的贪婪需求”（gluttonous demand for US equities）。不论是美国本土投资者还是海外配置盘，都在前所未有地涌入美国股市。全球资本似乎认定在当前的动荡世界中，美股是“全城唯一的游戏”（the only game in town）。 - **全球储蓄格局终结**：全球储蓄过剩不复存在，实际利率中枢实质性上移，资本进入竞争性稀缺阶段。 - **外资持仓美股创纪录**：海外持有的美国股票规模已攀升至约 17 万亿美元的历史绝对高点。 - **占全球经济比重翻倍**：即使以外资持仓占除美国外全球 GDP 的比例来衡量，这一比例也达到了 2000 年互联网泡沫顶峰时期的两倍左右。 - **资产挂钩风险深化**：随着若干估值惊人的巨型科技企业即将进行 IPO，全球投资者与美国 AI 资本周期的捆绑程度将进一步加剧。 ### `26:30` 指数基金的被动宿命与 ETF 时代的制度争议 巨额 IPO 的话题引发了两位主持人的幽默互动与即兴发散。维森塔尔甚至在节目中直接对着制作人录制起“语音备忘录”，提议专门做一期关于指数基金买在顶点的专题节目。他指出，被动投资的历史叙事正在经历关键拐点：在过去，像苹果（Apple）这样的企业是在市值仅有约 200 亿美元时被纳入标普 500 指数，被动指数投资者得以完整享受其一路狂飙至数万亿美元市值的巨大财富红利；然而，如今的大型科技与 AI 独角兽在私募市场已被推至极高估值，当它们最终挂牌上市并被主流指数被迫纳入时，指数基金投资者将完全错过早期的暴利阶段，直接在顶峰“接盘”，这将是被动投资与 ETF 历史上具有里程碑意义的重大时刻。 特雷西·阿洛威对此深表赞同，并重申了她长期以来对大型基准指数编制机构的尖锐批评。指数公司历来标榜自己“不做主观投资判断，只是一面如实映照市场的镜子”，但实际上，将哪些公司在何时纳入或剔除指数，充满了高度主观的自由裁量权，而这些决定会借助被动资金的庞大体量对整体市场产生剧烈的机械性冲击。维森塔尔随后无奈地自嘲，虽然市场上创造的 ETF 数量已经超过了实际挂牌交易的上市公司数量，普通投资者理论上可以通过细分 ETF 进行挑选，但想要调仓换基又不得不面临高昂的资本利得税摩擦，这也道出了当代指数化投资者的现实困境。 ### `28:30` 国家资源囤积、重复资本开支与效率至上模式的终结 话题随后转回推动全球通胀与推高利率的核心结构性矛盾——逆全球化与国家维度的资源囤积（national resource hoarding）。维森塔尔提出，过去的自由贸易分工逻辑在于国际互信与极致的比较优势，例如其他国家可以坦然接受“既然美国能造出顶尖的先进战斗机，本国就无需劳民伤财另起炉灶建立本土战斗机工业”。然而在当前的宏观现实中，各国由于缺乏安全信任感，正在对关键产业、算力基础设施及大宗商品展开全面的本土化备份。 戈皮纳特对此表示高度认同。她强调，全球经济已经“彻底、坚定且果断地告别了纯粹基于效率的旧模式”（moved squarely, firmly, decisively away from a pure efficiency based model）。每一个主要经济体由于不再确信危机时刻外部供应链能够履约，都在同一时刻、同步在本土大举投资、重复建设高度同质化的资本密集型产业。这种全球性的资本过度重复投资不仅大幅推高了对大宗商品和关键原材料的需求，进一步强化了资本的稀缺性，更从供给端构成了长期的通胀阻力，成为全球利率难以下行的最深层结构性原因之一。 ### `30:00` 逆全球化下的资本支出狂潮与人口老龄化的“储蓄缓冲” 全球经济正在经历一场深刻的底层逻辑重构：世界已经彻底告别了过去那种“哪里生产成本最低就在哪里建厂、谁的价格最便宜就向谁采购”的高效全球化分工模式，转而演变为每个国家都在不惜一切代价建立自主产能的割裂局面。吉塔·戈皮纳特（Gita Gopinath）指出，这种自主建产的范围取决于各国的财政空间（fiscal space），但几个核心领域的资本支出几乎是所有国家的核心共识。能源安全首当其冲——没有国家愿意在关键燃料上受制于外部进口，各国都在拼命发展本国能源，无论是押注可再生能源，还是为了短期应急而被迫重回煤炭；国防开支更是如此，各国不仅要增加账面预算，更被迫要在本土建立武器装备的实际生产与制造能力；此外，半导体芯片以及稀土供应链的争夺也已白热化。国际社会在贸易伙伴之间的信任度已经降到了冰点，这倒逼各国开启了一场不计成本的资本支出军备竞赛。 然而，这种无休止的资金需求与资金供给之间存在着极度的失衡。戈皮纳特生动地对比道：如果列出全球对资本的需求清单，那将是一份漫长且看不到尽头的长单；但如果去看全球资本供给的来源，实际上只剩下一大支柱——那就是老龄化人口结构（aging demographics）。在公共舆论中，人们往往习惯于将未来的财政灾难归咎于老年群体，抱怨用于退休养老和医疗健康的福利开支过于庞大；但残酷的现实在于，如果不是因为全球老龄化人群源源不断地向金融系统注入海量储蓄，全球利率水平早就被推升到了无法想象的高度。正是这股来自人口结构的“被动储蓄潮”，在暗中支撑着全球资本市场的流动性，延缓了借贷成本的失控飙升。 - **资本需求膨胀的核心领域**：能源安全（本土燃料替代、可再生能源、煤炭回潮）、国防工业（本土军工武器产能重建）、前沿科技与战略资源（半导体芯片自主化、稀土供应链脱钩）。 - **资本供需的悬殊对比**：需求端是一份几乎无限延展的政府与企业支出清单，而供给端几乎全靠全球老龄化带来的庞大私人储蓄池在苦苦支撑。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 全球资本供需失衡与利率机制 accDescr: 展示地缘政治割裂如何推升资本需求，以及老龄化储蓄如何作为唯一缓冲支撑利率。 subgraph DemandSide ["资本需求端：极度膨胀"] D1["地缘信任坍塌"] --> D2["本土化与产能自主"] D2 --> D3["能源安全 / 军工防务 / 芯片与稀土"] end subgraph SupplySide ["资本供给端：支柱单一"] S1["老龄化人口结构"] --> S2["高额预防性退休储蓄"] end DemandSide --> M["借贷成本面临剧烈上行压力"] SupplySide -. "对冲平抑".-> M ``` --- ### `32:15` 民主体制下的财政紧缩难题与降杠杆的历史路径 面对庞大的主权债务赤字，削减法定福利支出（entitlement spending）在经济学上往往被视为主权政府整固财政的必要手段。但主持人随即抛出一个现实政治中的核心痛点：在成熟的民主体制中，财政紧缩从来就不是一个具有吸引力的竞选纲领。没有哪个政客能凭借“让我们推行长期紧缩，大家短期内都勒紧裤带吃苦”的口号赢得选票，尤其是在每两到四年就要面临一次洗牌连任的选举周期内，政策制定者根本无法调和这种制度性张力。 更深层的问题在于，全球大多数决策者在主观上根本不担心本国的债务占GDP比例（debt-to-GDP）。戈皮纳特直言，除了一些被债券市场以暴跌手段强行逼入绝境的国家之外，即便是在美国国会，也几乎没有人真正为失控的债务轨迹感到焦虑；虽然有极少数议员偶尔会提起债务警报，但相较于当前的绝对负债水平和未来清晰可见的扩张路径，这种担忧显得微不足道。回顾历史，主权国家真正能够成功压低债务占GDP比例的路径极其有限，主要依赖四种机制： 1. **贸易条件的意外红利（外生运气）**：大宗商品出口国因全球价格暴涨经历正向贸易条件冲击，正如戈皮纳特打趣所言，这纯粹是“中了头奖（hit the jackpot）”，完全依靠运气天降横财。 2. **生产率爆发式增长**：经济实现超额繁荣，将内生增速拉升到历史均值之上。发达国家长期依赖这种预期，而当下的全球市场与政府正把全部筹码押注在人工智能（AI）上，幻想着AI能将长期经济增速从2%奇迹般推升至4%，从而一举消化所有的债务隐患。 3. **高通胀稀释**：通过通胀推高名义GDP，从而被动压低债务比例，这在历史上屡试不爽，且在新冠疫情大流行之后的一轮通胀周期中再次展现了这一效果。 4. **主权违约、债务重组与危机爆发**：这是发展中国家降杠杆的经典模式，通过彻底的破产重整与金融危机来强制重置资产负债表。 过去，成熟发达经济体似乎天生享有豁免权，市场从不担心它们会陷入主权债务危机。但戈皮纳特严肃警告，世界正在步入一个全新的危险格局：发达国家的主权借贷成本正在经历前所未有的剧烈波动，对金融市场边际变化的敏感度大幅提升。最刺眼的样本莫过于英国，其债券市场的动荡与溢价反应每天都在上演；与此同时，欧洲核心圈的法国也面临压力，就连利率长期被深度锚定的日本，其10年期国债收益率也在坚决向上突破；德国10年期公债收益率同样居高不下。几乎所有发达国家都在被迫直面骤然升高的借款成本。唯有美国至今仍享受着某种残存的“超级特权”：即便美债10年期收益率已飙升至4.5%，且未来面临着巨量的新债净供给洪峰，全球资本市场依然给予了美债非同寻常的优待，只是这项历史特权的护城河已远不如过去坚固。 --- ### `37:45` 本币发债国的债务危机真相：信贷紧缩与债务积压 在探讨主权债务危机时，主持人提出了一个关键的技术性悖论：对于一个所有债务均以自身主权法币计价的发达国家而言，债务危机究竟以何种形式发生？在政治层面上，国会可能因债务上限纠纷而出现技术性违约，但从纯粹的宏观经济学角度来看，美国理论上永远不会“用光美元”，英国不会“用光英镑”，日本也绝不会“用光日元”。这与依赖外币借债、外汇储备一旦耗尽就会立刻暴毙的新兴市场有着本质不同。既然不会耗尽储备货币，发达国家的债务危机到底意味着什么？ 戈皮纳特给出了清晰的解构：在拥有主权货币的发达国家，所谓的“债务危机”绝非字面意义上的国库空虚或立即违约，而是表现为一场由**信贷紧缩（credit crunch）**引爆的全面金融动荡。其传导机制如下： * **借贷成本的非线性狂飙**：主权债券收益率在市场上发生惩罚性暴涨，并以极快的速度传导至全社会的抵押贷款、企业债和各类信用资产，造成广泛的资产重估与资产价格暴跌。 * **致命的“债务积压”（debt overhang）**：由于政府和私营部门背负着天文数字般的债务存量，且每天都必须在市场上进行再融资（roll over），一旦滚动再融资的利率维持在高位，庞大的利息支出就会瞬间吞噬所有现金流。 * **实体投资与经济活力骤降**：在沉重的债务积压下，全社会的生产性投资陷入冰冻，资本支出停滞，经济增长陷入不可逆的僵化与失速。 戈皮纳特强调，回顾过去数年，尽管全球经济遭遇了地缘冲突、疫情大流行与历史级加息等连环极端冲击，但全球体系中最值得庆幸的一点是：无论是发达经济体，还是任何大型新兴市场国家，都没有演变成系统性的金融危机。正是因为金融体系的底盘没有被彻底击穿，全球经济才得以在每次重创后迅速走出“V型”复苏，展现出令学界惊叹的韧性。然而，随着发达国家纷纷陷入高利率、高波动与日常再融资的债务脆弱期，这种赖以维系复苏的系统性韧性正在遭遇前所未有的极限施压。 ### `40:00` 央行强行压低长端利率的幻想与代价 面对全球债务水平居高不下、借贷成本全面上升的现实，市场中不乏一种猜想：如果某个发达经济体的央行为了防止经济被拖垮或突发金融危机，直接宣布对收益率曲线长端设定上限——通过无限量购债将利率强行压死在 2% 或 3% 以下，究竟会引发怎样的后果？吉塔·戈皮纳特（Gita Gopinath）对此给出了极为严肃且直截了当的警告。她指出，如果一家央行偏离其维持物价稳定与充分就业的核心法定职责，悍然下场兜底买入长期国债以压低利率，结果绝非市场想象的那样岁月静好，而是会瞬间引爆通胀预期。当通胀预期失锚向上漂移，名义利率不仅压不住，反而会报复性反弹；同时，由于投资者要求更高的通胀风险溢价，实际利率同样会被推高。 戈皮纳特强调，这种粗暴干预意味着“过去几十年央行保持独立性并借此将利率维持在低位的黄金时代彻底终结”。这种策略根本不具有可持续性，或许在极短时间内能制造一点风平浪静的假象，但金融市场很快就会将其完全定价。除非经济遭遇了零利率下限（zero lower bound）并且迫切需要非常规手段来刺激经济复苏（如过去的量化宽松），否则在当前利率与通胀高悬的环境下采用此策纯属自欺欺人。她戏谑地指出，历史上尝试过这种操作的国家不在少数，而它们往往最终都沦为了“国际货币基金组织（IMF）的救助对象”，因为短期的喘息过后，接踵而至的必然是更猛烈的利率暴涨与全面的货币及债务危机。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 央行强行压低长端利率的恶性反馈循环 accDescr: 展示央行脱离抗通胀职责强推收益率曲线控制后，如何导致信誉崩溃与利率报复性飙升 subgraph Intervention ["政策干预与信誉崩塌"] A["央行宣布为长端利率设上限<br/>承诺无限量购债兜底"] --> B["偏离物价稳定法定使命<br/>央行独立性与信誉破裂"] end subgraph MarketReaction ["市场惩罚机制"] B --> C["通胀预期失锚大幅走高"] C --> D["投资者要求更高通胀风险溢价"] end subgraph CrisisOutcomes ["终局后果"] D --> E["名义利率与实际利率全面暴涨"] E --> F["财政与货币危机爆发<br/>最终沦入求助 IMF 境地"] end ``` - 实施利率上限干预的初始阶段可能看似有效，但市场迅速定价后，政府不仅捞不到央行接盘国债的任何实质好处，反而要承受融资成本飙升的恶果。 - 当前宏观环境与过去十年的低通胀完全相反，绝非处于需要应对零利率下限的通缩周期，强推收益率控制将直接与抗通胀政策背道而驰。 --- ### `42:43` 支撑经济韧性的两大支柱：天量财政刺激与 AI 浪潮 近几年来，全球经济尤其是美国经济展现出令几乎所有经济学家和市场观察家大跌眼镜的韧性：即使遭遇数十年一遇的连续外部冲击与大幅加息，美国消费者依然在持续支出，整个经济机器仍在运转。针对这一现象是否说明经济学界低估了某种底层力量的疑问，戈皮纳特解释称，这种超强表现并非经济结构发生了不可磨灭的永久转变，而是源于两股极其强大的对冲力量。首先便是债务暴增的真正诱因——各国政府在危机期间提供的史无前例的巨额救助。 在新冠疫情期间，仅发达经济体投入的救助规模就高达其 GDP 的约 25%，这不仅包括直接的救济支票与补贴，还涵盖了海量的贷款担保与股权注资。这种超常规的直接兜底，使得家庭和企业在走出疫情危机时，资产负债表反而比危机爆发前更加强劲与健康。正是这些累积的超额储蓄与缓冲资金，在后疫情时代持续托底了终端消费需求，并反过来支撑了企业的高利润率。第二大支撑力量则是当下正如火如荼的人工智能（AI）热潮。戈皮纳特明确表示，如果剔除 AI 驱动的大规模资本开支与算力基建需求，全球许多地区的经济增长率早已大幅滑坡；不仅如此，全球跨国贸易之所以没有因地缘政治与逆全球化而陷入萎缩，很大程度上也是仰仗围绕 AI 供应链的零部件和中间品往来在苦苦支撑。然而，她发出了关键警示：这两大红利在下一次危机来临时恐难以为继，各国如今已几乎耗尽了财政空间（fiscal space），绝不可能再掏出 25% GDP 的资金救市，届时全球经济的脆弱性或将暴露无遗。 - 疫情期间发达经济体动用了约占 GDP 25% 的综合财政支持（含直接补贴、贷款担保及注资），直接重塑了私人部门资产负债表。 - AI 投资热潮不仅托底了宏观经济增速，更是当前全球货物与中间品贸易流动未出现剧烈下滑的核心支柱之一。 - 绝不能将过去几年的韧性误判为能够抵御任何风浪的长期结构性趋势，下一场危机中政府将缺乏再度大规模救市的财政底气。 --- ### `45:20` “BLISS 极乐交易”：对国家兜底的盲目迷信 戈皮纳特进一步阐释了她在《金融时报》（Financial Times）上撰文提出的“BLISS 交易”（BLISS trade）概念。BLISS 是“庞大且持久的国家支持”（Big, Lasting State Support）的英文缩写，它精准描绘了当前政策制定界与金融市场投资者普遍陷入的一种盲目心态——即坚信无论出什么大乱子，政府总会充当最终的兜底后盾（backstop）。这种思维定式无处不在：即便在通胀压力下能源价格飙升，多国政府的第一反应依然是立刻设定燃油零售限价、下调能源税，竭尽全力保护居民的可支配支出能力，而这又间接维系了上市公司的盈利能力，给金融资产价格注入了强心剂。 市场正沉浸在这种极乐幻想之中，理所当然地认为国家干预是一剂没有止境的万灵药，并据此押注经济将永远具备韧性。但戈皮纳特直言，随着主权债务攀升到危险的高度，国家持续提供这种大规模兜底的能力正受到根本性的质疑。当政府的钱袋子见底、常规财政手段无力为继时，为了维系体系运转，政客们极有可能滑向更加激进且非正统的管制手段。她预测，未来各国政府可能会频繁动用“价格管制”（price controls）以及“金融抑制”（financial repression，例如强行限制资金流出、强制金融机构低息认购国债等手段）——这些曾经在主流经济学界被摒弃、多年未被鼓励的政策工具，恐怕将重新回到政策制定的前台。 - “BLISS”代表“Big, Lasting State Support”（庞大且持久的国家支持），揭示了市场将政府兜底视为理所当然的过度乐观交易逻辑。 - 面对民生冲击，各国政府习惯性出台补贴与限价，实质上是用主权信用为私人消费与企业利润买单。 - 财政空间耗尽后，主权国家维稳的手段或被迫转向物价管制和金融抑制等高破坏性的非正统政策工具。 --- ### `47:19` 驳“中国制造通吃论”：消费抑制与经常账户失衡的真相 对话转向了全球经贸结构中的一大核心焦虑：有一种广泛流传的观点认为，在绝大部分实体制造品领域，除了极先进制程芯片或空客、波音客机等极少数尖端工业品外，中国几乎总能比其他任何国家制造得更便宜、更优质；这种“中国制造业通吃”的预期被许多人视为压在其他经济体头上的长期阴霾。对此，戈皮纳特从宏观经济学的底层逻辑进行了坚决的反驳，指出那种认为“中国将因全方位自给自足并向全球倾销而永远维持贸易顺差”的观点在经济学上根本立不住脚。 戈皮纳特从三个维度拆解了这一迷思： 1. **经常账户的结构性平衡**：中国虽然在货物贸易上维系着庞大的顺差，但在服务贸易领域却常年处于巨额逆差状态。中国游客在境外的旅游与消费活动为世界各国带来了巨大的服务业收入。正因如此，中国整体的经常账户顺差占 GDP 的比例目前稳定在 3% 左右，与全球金融危机前高达 10% 左右的历史峰值相比已有大幅回落，所谓“全方位通吃外汇”并不符合事实。 2. **高投资与贸易逆差的经济学定律**：从宏观总量平衡来看，如果一个国家各行各业的生产力真的冠绝全球且投资回报极佳，这种极高生产率驱动的强劲投资繁荣，在给定的本国储蓄水平下，通常会导致资本大规模净流入并演变为贸易逆差，而非源源不断的巨额贸易顺差。因此，顺差的存在并不能被单纯套用为“投资极其成功且生产率极度爆发”的叙事。 3. **顺差的症结在于消费抑制与地产危机**：中国当前巨额货物贸易顺差的真正根源，是国内私人消费长期受到结构性压抑（consumption suppression）。由于居民消费占比过低，过剩的储蓄不得不转化为超高强度的投资；而这种高强度投资模式正在面临严峻的苦果——尤其是房地产市场的历史性崩盘。戈皮纳特强调，尽管过去四年间出台了接二连三的政府干预与扶持政策，房地产部门的去杠杆与调整阵痛至今依然远未解决，这深刻暴露出依赖过度投资与产能外溢模式的脆弱性。 ### `50:00` 中国投资下滑、贸易顺差与不可持续的出口模式 吉塔·戈皮纳特（Gita Gopinath）深入剖析了中国经济政策下的现状与困境。她指出，中国当前的消费与房地产市场持续疲软，而之所以能维持巨额贸易顺差，本质上是因为国内整体投资大幅下降。这一投资下滑既源于房地产泡沫破裂的直接冲击，也源于此前盲目投资所造成的严重产能过剩与供给过剩。2025 年甚至成为中国整体投资首次出现负增长的年份，正是内需与投资的断崖式萎缩促成了其庞大的外贸顺差。 中国制造业向海外倾销大量商品的做法，已经成为全球制造业面临的核心竞争压力。但戈皮纳特坚决认为这种模式不可持续：欧洲以及东亚等其他亚洲经济体绝不会坐视不理、被动接受中国倾销，必然会祭出严厉的关税壁垒进行反击。中国自身也意识到了这层地缘经济风险，正试图在一定程度上管控出口节奏。她直言，自己绝不相信“中国能独揽全产业链自给自足、而外部世界还会无限期照单全收”的论调。 - **投资下滑转折点**：2025 年标志着中国国内投资首次出现绝对下滑，主因是房地产崩盘与多领域严重产能过剩。 - **顺差的本质**：高额贸易顺差并非源于强劲内生竞争力带来的良性扩张，而是国内消费和投资双双走弱后被动形成的供给外溢。 - **外部反制不可避免**：欧洲及东亚邻国对商品倾销的容忍度已达极限，针对中国产品的关税与贸易限制正在加速成型。 --- ### `51:30` 债务危机的隐形导火索：AI 生产力兑现与否 节目主持团队提到，金融市场每隔一段时间就会上演债券抛售潮，有关“爆发主权债务危机”的预警更是财经播客上经久不衰的话题，听起来让人颇有“似曾相识（déjà vu）”之感。针对引发一场真正、全面引爆的现实债务危机的催化剂，戈皮纳特给出了出人意料却切中要害的视角：关键变量在于人工智能（AI）以及市场所寄予厚望的生产力大爆发能否真正落地。 当前全球经济的增长动力高度仰赖 AI 领域的巨额资本开支，以及由此带来的未来全要素生产率跃升的预期。戈皮纳特警告称，如果最终证明 AI 对实际生产率的拉动微乎其微，或者因为模型严重且难以消除的幻觉（hallucination）问题而无法胜任核心关键任务，整个增长叙事就会轰然坍塌。一旦这根支柱倒塌，国债资产将遭遇更剧烈的重估抛售，市场会对主权政府偿还现有及未来巨额债务的能力产生彻底怀疑。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: AI 生产力兑现与债务可持续性逻辑 accDescr: 展示 AI 繁荣与破灭两种路径对主权债务市场与财政信心的深层影响 subgraph GrowthEngine ["当前增长驱动机制"] A["巨额 AI 资本开支投入"] --> B["寄托未来高生产率预期"] B --> C["支撑当前财政债务扩张承载力"] end subgraph DisruptionScenario ["叙事破灭路径 (潜在导火索)"] D{"AI 生产力能否兑现？"} D -- "否：模型幻觉严重/应用受阻" --> E["实际生产率增长缺位"] E --> F["经济基本面增长引擎熄火"] F --> G["主权债务偿付能力遭严重质疑"] G --> H["债券价格暴跌 / 收益率飙升"] H --> I["引爆全面主权债务危机"] end C --> D ``` --- ### `53:05` “我们全都在参与 AI 交易”：两位主持人的复盘与反思 在结束对戈皮纳特的专访后，主持人特蕾西·艾洛威（Tracy Alloway）与乔·维森塔尔（Joe Weisenthal）对谈话进行了梳理。特蕾西感叹，整场讨论最震撼的结论莫过于——“西方经济模式以及整个社会与政府的契约，现在居然完全押注在 AI 能否真正兑现吹出来的承诺上”。这一赌注的规模之庞大前所未有，已经彻底渗透到金融资产定价乃至实体经济中，成为推高长期利率与通胀黏性的中坚力量。 两位主持人打趣道，现在所有人都成了“端着爆米花围观的被动参与者”，无论你主观上是否愿意，大家的命运已被捆绑在同一条船上。戈皮纳特的那句话一针见血：“无论你想不想，我们所有人实际上都在这笔 AI 交易当中。”乔调侃称，自己看着那些全盘被动配置的养老金账户，偶尔会觉得自己像个投资天才；而为了不让股市估值崩塌，大家甚至感到一种荒诞的心理压力——必须多刷几轮 Token、多测试几次 AI，以实际行动去支撑科技巨头们的算力消耗和估值逻辑。 - **系统性绑定**：AI 不再仅仅是科技股的炒作板块，它已成为承载全球公共债务可持续性与经济增长期望的终极底座。 - **被动持仓的无奈**：普通散户即使只购买被动指数基金或持有养老金，其财富状况也已深度挂钩于算力泡沫与模型商业化进展。 --- ### `55:00` 财政空间伪命题与资源硬约束下的通胀陷阱 乔和特蕾西回顾了过去六年的剧烈动荡，感叹世界经历了无数次“百年一遇”的冲击，以至于市场形成了一种病态的自满心理：既然熬过了过去十几次危机，下一次也一定能安然过关。然而，当前的现实是财政空间与政治意愿已发生本质逆转。乔强调，财政能力绝不是一个教条的静态指标（例如“债务占 GDP 80% 即健康、达到 120% 就会破产”，没人知道临界红线到底在哪）。 真正决定财政承载力的是实体资源的硬性约束。在当前高通胀环境下，全球供应链紧绷，且各国政府早已提前背负了不可推卸的刚性承诺——例如对老年群体退休生活水平的保障、对国防开支绝不削减的死命令。此时如果再次遭遇类似于新冠疫情级别的突发灾难，政府如果继续沿用 2020 年的传统脚本（印钱直接发放现金弥补居民收入缺口），其经济后果将完全不同： - **2019–2020 年基准**：当时全球经济并未逼近实体资源的供给极限，闲置产能充足，因此大规模放水后的通胀滞后显现。 - **当前瓶颈环境**：在资源与劳动力已处于极度受限的状态下，任何盲目沿用印钞兜底救助旧模式的做法，都会瞬间击穿供给端，转化为毫无缓冲期的恶性通胀飙升。 ## Notable quotes > `05:22` 我认为在当前这个节点，我们正在见证长期停滞的终结。长期停滞的核心特征曾经是缺乏足够的投资，尤其是私人部门投资不足。而那如今已不再是一个问题了。 — 吉塔·戈皮纳特 > `12:15` 实际利率上升是更核心的驱动因素 — 吉塔·戈皮纳特 > `20:00` 尚未对我的薪资或类似方面产生任何影响 — 吉塔·戈皮纳特 > `28:30` 彻底、坚定且果断地告别了纯粹基于效率的旧模式 — 吉塔·戈皮纳特 > `32:15` 中了头奖（hit the jackpot） — 吉塔·戈皮纳特 > `40:00` 过去几十年央行保持独立性并借此将利率维持在低位的黄金时代彻底终结 — 吉塔·戈皮纳特 > `40:00` 国际货币基金组织（IMF）的救助对象 — 吉塔·戈皮纳特 > `50:00` 中国能独揽全产业链自给自足、而外部世界还会无限期照单全收 — 吉塔·戈皮纳特 > `53:05` 西方经济模式以及整个社会与政府的契约，现在居然完全押注在 AI 能否真正兑现吹出来的承诺上 — 特蕾西·艾洛威 > `53:05` 无论你想不想，我们所有人实际上都在这笔 AI 交易当中。 — 吉塔·戈皮纳特 ## Mentioned 吉塔·戈皮纳特 (Gita Gopinath), 特蕾西·阿洛威 (Tracy Alloway), 乔·维森塔尔 (Joe Weisenthal), 哈佛大学 (Harvard University), 国际货币基金组织 (IMF), 阿波罗全球管理公司 (Apollo Global Management), 托斯滕·斯洛克 (Torsten Sløk), 美联储 (Federal Reserve), 本·伯南克 (Ben Bernanke), 金融时报 (Financial Times), 标普 500 指数 (S&P 500), 苹果 (Apple), 波音 (Boeing), 空客 (Airbus) ## Video description <p data-prosemirror-content-type="node" data-prosemirror-node-name="paragraph" data-prosemirror-node-block="true" data-pm-slice="1 1 []">There's been a massive selloff in the bond market and rates are rising all around the world. Japan, Korea, the UK... You name it. Gita Gopinath, Harvard economics professor and the former first deputy managing director of the IMF, has long warned that bond markets are "in a fragile place." She sees a confluence of demographics, high levels of public debt, and the intense capital needs of the AI boom creating inflationary pressure all around the world. Today we speak with Gopinath about the seeming disconnect between stocks and bonds and why investors may be wrong to assume that governments will have their back the next time there's a major shock.</p> <p data-prosemirror-content-type="node" data-prosemirror-node-name="paragraph" data-prosemirror-node-block="true">Read more:<br data-prosemirror-content-type="node" data-prosemirror-node-name="hardBreak" data-prosemirror-node-inline="true"><a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-05-27/us-bonds-return-to-pre-war-calm-fuels-bets-it-ll-be-short-lived?utm_medium=referral&utm_source=podcast&utm_campaign=odd_lots&utm_content=article" data-prosemirror-content-type="mark" data-prosemirror-mark-name="link">US Bonds&rsquo; Return to Pre-War Calm Fuels Bets It&rsquo;ll Be Short-Lived</a><br data-prosemirror-content-type="node" data-prosemirror-node-name="hardBreak" data-prosemirror-node-inline="true"><a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-05-28/china-markets-885-million-green-sovereign-bond-in-hong-kong?utm_medium=referral&utm_source=podcast&utm_campaign=odd_lots&utm_content=article" data-prosemirror-content-type="mark" data-prosemirror-mark-name="link">China Sells $885 Million of Green Bonds in Hong Kong Debut</a></p> <p data-prosemirror-content-type="node" data-prosemirror-node-name="paragraph" data-prosemirror-node-block="true">Only <a href="http://Bloomberg.com" data-inline-card="" data-card-data="">http://Bloomberg.com</a> subscribers can get the Odd Lots newsletter in their inbox each week, plus unlimited access to the site and app. Subscribe at&nbsp; <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/subscriptions/oddlots?in_source=oddlotspodcast" data-prosemirror-content-type="mark" data-prosemirror-mark-name="link">bloomberg.com/subscriptions/oddlots</a></p> <p data-prosemirror-content-type="node" data-prosemirror-node-name="paragraph" data-prosemirror-node-block="true"><a href="http://bloomberg.com/subscriptions/oddlots" data-prosemirror-content-type="mark" data-prosemirror-mark-name="link">Subscribe to the Odd Lots Newsletter</a><br data-prosemirror-content-type="node" data-prosemirror-node-name="hardBreak" data-prosemirror-node-inline="true"><strong data-prosemirror-content-type="mark" data-prosemirror-mark-name="strong">Join the conversation:</strong> <a href="https://discord.gg/oddlots" data-prosemirror-content-type="mark" data-prosemirror-mark-name="link">discord.gg/oddlots</a></p><p>See <a href="https://omnystudio.com/listener">omnystudio.com/listener</a> for privacy information.</p> [Source](https://podtrac.com/pts/redirect.mp3/tracking.swap.fm/track/UVBrz8bN8aM2Xe47PEPu/traffic.omny.fm/d/clips/e73c998e-6e60-432f-8610-ae210140c5b1/8a94442e-5a74-4fa2-8b8d-ae27003a8d6b/4fea018c-8268-43c3-bdb9-b45801086d9d/audio.mp3?in_playlist=982f5071-765c-403d-969d-ae27003a8d83)

[5:22] 吉塔·戈皮纳特: 我认为在当前这个节点，我们正在见证长期停滞的终结。长期停滞的核心特征曾经是缺乏足够的投资，尤其是私人部门投资不足。而那如今已不再是一个问题了。 [12:15] 吉塔·戈皮纳特: 实际利率上升是更核心的驱动因素 [20:00] 吉塔·戈皮纳特: 尚未对我的薪资或类似方面产生任何影响 [28:30] 吉塔·戈皮纳特: 彻底、坚定且果断地告别了纯粹基于效率的旧模式 [32:15] 吉塔·戈皮纳特: 中了头奖（hit the jackpot） [40:00] 吉塔·戈皮纳特: 过去几十年央行保持独立性并借此将利率维持在低位的黄金时代彻底终结 [40:00] 吉塔·戈皮纳特: 国际货币基金组织（IMF）的救助对象 [50:00] 吉塔·戈皮纳特: 中国能独揽全产业链自给自足、而外部世界还会无限期照单全收 [53:05] 特蕾西·艾洛威: 西方经济模式以及整个社会与政府的契约，现在居然完全押注在 AI 能否真正兑现吹出来的承诺上 [53:05] 吉塔·戈皮纳特: 无论你想不想，我们所有人实际上都在这笔 AI 交易当中。

[0:00] Joe Weisenthal: After a decade where we just assumed that rates were going to head lower, there's been a regime change as economists sometimes like to say. [0:00] Joe Weisenthal: If the alternative is being consigned to the permanent underclass when the other company builds the most advanced model, you're going to do it nonetheless. [5:00] Gita Gopinath: I actually do think the one that's most worrisome is what we see with public debt levels everywhere in the world. [5:00] Gita Gopinath: We've suddenly moved away from the pre-pandemic period of low for long interest rates... I think we have the end of secular stagnation at this point. [10:00] Tracy Alloway: It's now 50% of all investment grade issuance year-to-date. And in even junk rated debt, it's creeping up to almost 40%. [10:00] Gita Gopinath: The first channel... which is just the fact that there is so much demand from the private markets... for capital, is going to raise real rates, even if there is no effect on inflation. [35:10] Gita Gopinath: A crisis in a developed economy would look more like a credit crunch that then leads into a financial crisis. So we would see a sharp increase in borrowing costs. That will affect many other asset classes. You would see a slump in investment... that debt overhang which slows growth, slows dynamism, that is what a typical crisis looks like. [50:00] Joe Weisenthal: Gita said it really well, which is like we're all basically in the AI trade together, whether you want to be or not.

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When you're running a business, the best days are the ones where priorities stay on track. For midsize and large companies, risk can affect multiple parts of the organization at once, from property and liability to cyber and regulatory challenges. At that level managing risk becomes an ongoing discipline At the Hartford the focus is on helping businesses manage risk before it turns into something more disruptive And when losses do happen, that work is paired with insurance coverage shaped by years of underwriting, risk engineering, and claims experience. Learn more at thehartford.com slash risk mitigation. Policies provided by Hartford Fire Insurance Company and its property and casualty affiliates, Hartford, Connecticut. Bloomberg Audio Studios, podcasts, radio, news. Hello and welcome to another episode of the All Thoughts podcast. I'm Tracy Allaway. And I'm Joe Wasenthal. Joe, the big story of markets right now has to be one of the big stories. The bond market sell off. By the way, as I say that, I just got this massive feeling of deja vu because I'm pretty sure we've done a few episodes where I've started out saying the exact same line. Well, I mean, one, obviously, this is sort of one of the trends of our time, which is that after a decade pre where we just sort of assumed the rates were going to head lower there been a regime change as economists sometimes like to say And so now we have rates pushing higher again They come back a little bit in the last couple of days but that not really the point The point is it is this global phenomenon around the world, rates going up. I would still say probably the big story in markets is AI and memory and chips. But if it weren't for that, everyone would be talking about interest rates higher in almost every country in the world. So here's the thing. I actually think AI and the rate sell-off is kind of connected. So, you know, we're talking about yields going up generally in developed markets. And we've seen that recently. I know we saw, for instance, the long end of the UK gilt market hit like the highest since 1998. The 10-year US Treasury yield was kind of inching up towards 5%, but it's come down. Mostly a lot of those yields have been moving in line with the oil price, right? So a lot of people will say that this is just because oil is going up, that's inflationary, maybe we'll get higher rates. And so this is why yields have been backing up. However, there is an argument, I'm seeing more and more people make this one, that what going on is actually a repricing of something you know less transitory Am I allowed to say that word anymore Less transitory and something more secular in what happening with the rates market Something that more about the massive amounts of capital that AI is actually consuming and having a crowding out effect on sovereign bonds or maybe something that more about you know the ability of the developed world to actually finance itself in the longer term And so you're starting to see some of those bigger themes creep into the discussion about the bond market sell off. This idea that it's something else is happening here, something more than the oil price. Totally. Actually, just speaking of the nexus between interest rates and AI, Torsten Slok has a good chart out, came out this morning, pointing out essentially that one thing with AI is the sort of FOMO aspect, not among investors per se, but about companies and not wanting to let their models be six months behind. And so they'll pay whatever the cost is to catch up. And therefore, he argues that perhaps higher rates do not have the slowing effect that they might have had in another cycle because it's like, well, yeah, it's no fun to finance this data center at higher rates. But if the alternative is being consigned to the permanent underclass when the other company builds the most advanced model, you're going to do it nonetheless. And so, yes, between oil, between the [5:00] AI boom, between demographics and the challenges of sort of resourcing for care of the elderly, of the infirm, between all of these things that we are in this real secular shift and we have to understand it better. Yes. So I am very happy to say we do, in fact, have the perfect guest to talk about all of this. We're going to be speaking with Gita Gopinath. She is, of course, a professor of economics at Harvard University, but also famously the first deputy managing director of the IMF. So truly a perfect guest to speak to, someone who's been talking about, you know, a secular change in the bond market for quite some time. Gita, thank you so much for coming on All Thoughts. A pleasure, Tracy and Joe. Great to be on your show. So what's your take when you're staring, presumably, you know, on a minute by minute basis at a chart of the U.S. 10 year yield? What are you thinking? I mean, firstly, I think it's absolutely right to start with the conversation about what's happening in bond markets, because frankly, despite all the many different shocks going around in the world, I actually do think the one that's most worrisome is what we see with public debt levels everywhere in the world. In the US we seen yields go up It a combination of things You just talked about all of them which is one is the fact that inflation is now expected to be higher And there is a sense that the real rate at which the economy will stay, you know, at a somewhat stable level of inflation is higher. So the kind of the real interest rate has drifted up. The R star has drifted up from pre-pandemic when it was like half a percentage point. Now it's a one percentage point. But on top of that, you have the premier that's coming from the risk of inflation, from very importantly, the last fiscal deficits that the US is running and is projected to continue to run into the foreseeable future. And of course, the third element, which is the AI boom and the expenditure, the capital expenditure that's being undertaken for that is also shifting the R-star up to maybe even higher than one percentage point. So because of all these reasons, we've suddenly moved away from the pre-pandemic period of low for long interest rates and what we were talking about, you know the end of I think we are have the end of secular stagnation at this point secular stagnation was about the fact that there was not enough investment happening especially in the private sector That is no longer an issue anymore So because of the combination of inflation, AI boom, fiscal deficits all over the world, high public debt everywhere, we are seeing yields go up, and that's true in the US too. I want to drill into all of these specific things, but let's start with the high level of public debt. That was a thing that people were talking about quite a bit prior to the pandemic as well, and rates just kept going lower and lower, including famously in Japan, where debt to GDP levels are even much higher than they are in the Western world, and that was sort of famously known as the widowmaker trade because rates kept going lower. What changed between pre-2020 and post-2020 such that this suddenly, in your view and perhaps the market's view, this became an important thing that was not perceived by the market as being important pre-COVID? A few things changed One the AI boom was unexpected That was not something that was being priced in markets pre for sure That big increase in demand for capital coming from the private sector is one big change The other big change is the fact that fiscal deficits are now projected to stay at levels that nobody was expecting the U.S. to run close to 7% fiscal deficits for the foreseeable future. That is another important factor. And the third is a composition of who's the marginal buyer of this debt. So we had a period when central banks everywhere were buying government debt. And that also helped keep interest rates low. In fact, that was part of the strategy of how to strengthen the economy. Quantitative easing was part of the toolkit. And so that helped keep interest rates low. But that's changed. and now we have the central banks everywhere who have either stopped buying or they're running it down like it's happening in Japan. And the marginal buyer are the more volatile investors. Hedge funds in the US are the market makers over here. And so whenever there are any shifts in global market conditions, you see a lot more rate sensitivity than you would have seen if it was mainly a free market. [10:00] credit flows. And by the way, that's also true about capital flows coming into the U.S. Previously, the buyers of U.S. treasuries used to be foreign central banks. They're not doing as much anymore. It's mainly coming from non-bank financial institutions from the rest of the world. And so they're also much more volatile and fleeting. So you're going to see just generally higher volatility in the ill curve. Can you talk a little bit more about the AI boom? Because we hear people talk about a crowding out effect. And I think this is actually like something that is just starting to get a lot of attention. But the proportion of issuance in the corporate bond market that's coming from AI companies or AI related, you know, investment right now is just insane. And you mentioned Torsten's slough chart. Torsten is going to be at our upcoming. That's right. We're recording this on May 27th, our upcoming live show in New York. And so I've previewed some of the charts he's going to be sharing there. There's a chart there that shows basically the proportion of AI in the corporate bond market. It's now 50% of all investment grade issuance year to date. And in even junk rated debt it creeping up to like almost 40 So this is a significant amount of debt that being issued into the market Is it reasonable to think that investors are maybe going to think like well, I'll buy some big tech mega cap IG debt versus a US Treasury? At least when we look at the pricing in markets, that seems to be the case, especially when it comes to equities. Everybody wants to have a piece of the AI boom. And yes, I think there is that sense that, well, this is a sector where we could really see real gains, especially in terms of productivity increases and profitability. And that's going to help. That's going to be something that they want to be a part of. So there is that demand for corporate bonds and for US equity, which is coming again, both from domestic investors, but also from international investors where AI is the trade. I mean, that's where all the dynamism is and that's where people want to park their money. Now, we pointed at all the reasons why rates are likely to stay high. But I just want to point out that we, since we still have the ongoing Iran conflict and we still have the Strait of Hormuz closed if that is not resolved in any time soon like you know the next month or so and you see an even steeper increase in oil prices and crude prices going up to, say, $160 a barrel, which is what some of the projections would be in that case, then we could see much more demand destruction than we are seeing today. And we could be back in that space where, at least at the short end, interest rates are being cut pretty rapidly. On this question, going back to the effect that the AI build out is having across rates and bonds and so forth, I want to sort of get some clarification here of what either you or economists mean when they talk about, say, like crowding out. Because there's one version of it that is like there's a lot of debt being issued right now by very highly rated companies. It probably yields a little bit more than U.S. government bonds. that is attractive for investors, perhaps. And maybe that has some sort of crowding out in the financial markets. The other way that I tend to think of crowding out is that the AI build out, it's like they're taking up all of the wind turbines, they're taking up all of the trucking capacity to get the goods to the data centers they taking up all the skilled contractors and laborers within the regions that these data centers are being built and that creates inflationary pressure that adds to the strain and therefore all things being equal that says higher inflation, therefore higher rates for longer to maintain that. Which of those two models, whether it's the sort of financial markets version or the sort of real economy version, is a more useful way of thinking about that linkage between private and public sector spending slash debt? So both of those are in play right now. So that's the difference between what's happening to real rates versus what's happening to nominal rates and what's happening to the pricing of the Fed rate path. So the first channel that you mentioned, which is just the fact that there is so much of demand from the private markets, from AI investors, AI companies for capital, is going to raise real rates, even if there is no effect on inflation or inflation expectations are not moving, we should expect to see real rates rise. And that's certainly we're seeing some of that. And then the other is the effect that's working through the demand for the different inputs that go into AI, and that's creating an inflation. [15:00] pressure, which would then need higher nominal rates. And that is also playing out. I think right now, I suspect that the real rate piece is more important. The inflationary path has been driven a lot by what's happening with energy prices and the pass-through from energy prices into also core inflation. So I think that's the more of the higher inflation, higher rate path story is coming from other forces on inflation as opposed to what's coming from AI itself. And then you have the real rate path, which is going up also because of the general risk environment that we're in, but also because of what's coming from this increase in capital demand coming from the AI sector. Thank you 4imprint offers thousands of options from on apparel and premium drinkware to tech totes and giveaways so you can find the right fit for any audience purpose or budget You can customize it all, your logo, your message, your look, and many items come with no setup charge to help you save. And if you're really watching the bottom line, you'll find standout choices at every price point so you can make a real impact while staying on budget. Plus, you'll get expert help, fast turnaround times, and their 360-degree guarantee. So you can be 4imprint certain your order will arrive on time and look exactly right. Whatever your goal, 4imprint makes it easy to find your perfect promo match. Explore the possibilities today at 4imprint.com. 4imprint. 4certain. Support for this show comes from public.com. If you're actively involved in your portfolio, you probably catch yourself repeating the same actions. Buying the dip, manually sweeping idle cash, putting on a hedge. On public, you can now create AI agents that handle all these tasks on your behalf. Just describe what you want to do in plain English. Like, if the VIX hits 25, buy a put option on the S&P 500. Or, if my cash balance goes above $20,000, move the excess into my direct index. You approve of the workflow and your agent handles the rest Monitoring the market watching for your conditions and executing your strategies exactly as defined An investing platform driven by your intent not just your clicks You can also get full read and write access to your account via the public API. 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So one of the reasons we wanted to speak with you is because you do have that very significant policy experience And so when faced with you know potentially rising real rates because of an AI boom what should policymakers be doing here Because you know certainly in the US, we've already seen some Fed officials or outgoing Fed officials start to argue that they can look through the AI boom and its impact on inflation. But if real rates are, you know, structurally rising, if our star is structurally higher than it was before, is that the right move? So, I mean, what matters crucially is what we believe are the main drivers of our star at this moment. Is it coming because of higher productivity growth, which is then leading to higher investment and therefore demand for capital? You know, all of that is good as a kind of good kind of increase in our star because that's an economy that is going to is projected to grow at a faster rate. And that helps. That helps on many fronts, including in terms of bringing debt to GDP down. The other reason our star is going up is because of the increase in fiscal deficits and just general high levels of government borrowing in the US. That is less appealing because that tends to be not necessarily growth enhancing. The money that's being raised is not for productive, necessarily. [20:00] productive infrastructure investment that's going to generate enough growth. So that's more problematic because it's just generating higher R-star without generating the higher growth that should come with it. And that can be a problem. From a policymaker's perspective, of course, you have to firstly be able to tell what is driving the R-star. Is it a good kind or is it a bad kind? But regardless, if R-star is drifting up and you have an inflation target of 2%, you are looking at higher nominal interest rates, right? So right now, the Fed has an R-star forecast of about 1%. If you put 2% inflation on top of that as their target, we're looking at 3% nominal rates, which is a clear shift away from what it used to be pre-pandemic. Then you have to check to see whether the R-star increase is actually slowing the economy down or the increase in your nominal the rates are slowing the economy down and how much higher than that R-star do you have to be to be able to bring inflation down? Because there is obviously above target inflation in the US at this moment. That is now the big question, whether the air productivity boom is going to mean that you don need that much of a above R interest rate or do we have too many other forces coming from energy prices passing through into core inflation the lesser lower levels of immigration in the country, just general trade disruptions, supply chain disruptions? And those are the main drivers in which case maybe you need to keep interest rates even higher. So being able to tease that apart is, you know, I think that's where the tough decisions are. But what is clearly the case is that we are looking at higher nominal interest rates, I mean, regardless of whether our star is coming from the good kind or the bad kind. You know, there is this fantasy, and hopefully it comes true, but there is certainly this fantasy of a lot of people who are into AI, which they would call like the disinflationary boom, right? So let's just imagine we have extremely powerful artificial intelligence that is capable of delivering incredible material gains for people. It makes healthcare really easy and quick. It can power robots that care for us. It can build things, etc. Meanwhile, the cost of commodities collapses, maybe the cost of labor collapses. Is that a scenario in which it worth contemplating and thinking about So everything gets really cheap because it all gets super automated but also our standards of living rise dramatically because the AI takes care of it for us Is that conceivable Like from an economist perspective is there such thing as the disinflationary boom or the deflationary boom even So this is about, you know, making a distinction between now and what comes next. Yeah. Now, clearly, it is about the high levels of investment. Right. Right. Clearly, right now, it's pushing everything up. But let's imagine 10 years from now and we've done it. We have this incredible and somehow we've solved all the sci-fi scenarios so that the AI doesn't want to kill us all, et cetera. Let's just imagine the rosy scenario in which we have this like there's some under discussed risk factors. No, but right, like, let's just say the robots don't kill us. Assuming we solve that and the AI works on our behalf and it does what we want it to do and it can create incredible material gains while also delivering it cheaply because it's just one AI, etc. Is that a contemplatable scenario from an economist perspective? There is absolutely a scenario where we could be in that wonderful place with high productivity growth At the same time we don have civil unrest or rogue forces using AI for ill That is a scenario, but I do not know a single person who will put a probability on that scenario and say that that's going to happen with a significant amount of certainty. There is a very high degree of uncertainty, And there are several who also believe that it's yet to be seen whether there is going to be any major productivity gain of the kind that, you know, there are analysts who believe that productivity could go up by two percentage points a year over and above where it is right now, which is around two percentage points a year. I mean, that is huge. There is no evidence right now of that kind of productivity wave coming through. So it's early. But, you know, I use the technology and I find it terrific. I mean, it is it's been really great for my own productivity. It's not affecting my wages or anything so far, but it's there. It is it is a very valuable technology, but there is a lot of uncertainty and which is what is very curious about the markets. Right. Because on the one hand, it is impressive where the stock markets are again. [25:00] close to a record high. And maybe one can explain that by saying that, well, there is a scenario where everything goes perfectly well. But there are so many other scenarios that could play out between now and next year or even two years from now. And you barely see that price being priced in markets. So I think that's frankly more surprising than just looking at what's happening with just the level of the stock market. So, okay, we keep talking about the stock market and, you know, debt issuance in the corporate bond market and how everyone wants a piece of AI. Does that basically mean that we're seeing, I guess, maybe scarcity of capital versus the global, we used to call it a global savings glut in the early 2000s, right, which ended up, per Bernanke, pushing yields lower. Does anyone still talk about a savings glut or should we all we talking about you know like capital scarcity no we don't have a global savings glut anymore and proof of that is real rates going up interest rates going up so that's so that's that what we certainly seem to have in the u is i don know what to call it but gluttonous demand for u equity yeah coming both from domestic investors but also from foreign investors I mean we at trillion in terms of foreign holdings of U equities That is at a historic high, even if you look at it as a share of the rest of the world's GDP. It's about twice as high as what it was just before the 2000 dot-com bust, I guess, at the peak of the dot-com. The world has never been that invested in U.S. equity markets. It's like it's the only game in town. So if there's a gluttony, I would say it is for U.S. equities. We're all in this together. And as we know, in terms of what's coming into the markets right now, we have some very big IPOs. And that will make us even more all tied at the hip when it comes to AI and stock markets. Speaking of big IPOs, Tracy, this reminds me, and I'm saying this to a message to our producers, we should really do an episode soon about... Are you including voice memos to producers in episodes now? Yeah I now including voice memos to producers No I really want to do an episode soon about the fact that all the big index funds are going to have to include companies at basically their peak where you think like historically okay like a company like Apple like it enters the S&P 500 at, I don't know, maybe a $20 billion market cap, and then it's a multi-trillion dollar market cap. This will be the first time that the index fund owners are going to eventually have to buy these really big companies without having ever experienced any of the gains from the run-up. And I think that's going to be a historic moment for both markets indexing and ETFs. This has been one of my long-running criticisms of the big benchmark index providers, which is they always say that they're not making investment judgments. They're just holding up a mirror to the market. But actually, a lot of these decisions are incredibly embedded with judgment calls, and they do end up having an impact on the entire market. Yeah, this is, I think, going to be a historic time for sort of index investing. Anyway, I know that this is a divergence. I just needed to get that voice memo into our producers. Yes. I mean, as you know, hey, there are now more ETFs than there are actually companies being created on the market. So if you want to spend a lot of time picking and choosing you could be selective too Yeah I want to switch ETFs but then I have to take a capital gains hit So I can you know this is the anyway we getting pretty sidetracked here I want to talk more. I mean, there are many phenomenons or many things going on at once. But when we think about these pressures, one of and it relates to AI, but it also relates to commodities itself, is this idea of essentially national resource hoarding. and the decline of sort of free trade. And so the fact is, it's like, you know, maybe at one point, we could say, you know what, a country could say, you know, it's great that America is building a bunch of fighter jets, so we don't have to have our own indigenous fighter jet industry, etc. How much when you look at what's going on with the rates picture and pushing up inflation and so forth, is this phenomenon in which no country fully trusts other countries to deliver goods for them, And therefore, there's a lot of replication or duplication of capital investment happening in every country all at once simultaneously. We're seeing a lot of that. I mean, we moved squarely, firmly, decisively away from a pure efficiency based model of I'm going to buy from the. [30:00] cheapest place, and I'm going to sell if I'm the cheapest source, to one where everybody is building up their own capacity as much as they can. And of course, depending on the country and depending on how much of fiscal space you have, that can be a small group of things or a big group of things. For sure, energy security is everybody's paying attention to it. How do we make sure that we don't have to import fuel from the rest of the world? And how can we have our own fuel at home, either three renewables whatever we need to do or maybe just returning to coal for now that is we're going to see we're seeing that defense expenditure we need to be able to not just spend more on defense but make sure that we can actually produce more of the weapons that we need semiconductor chips rare earths yes there are you know i think there's so little trust in the world right now in terms of relying on your trading partners, that countries are just going to be spending a lot more on this. It's just that it depends on whether you're a country that can afford to raise the finances for it or not. But everybody is heading in that direction So if you look at the list of all the sources of demand for capital that is a very very long list And if you look at the sources of supply of capital there's just one category, which is aging demographics. We often tend to blame old people for the fact that we need to spend so much on retirement and on health for the future. But the truth is, the reason interest rates are not much more high than they would have been is because of the supply of savings coming from aging demographics around the world. Well, you mentioned fiscal space, and I know you've talked previously about the need to, you know, reduce some entitlement spending if governments are going to be serious about reducing deficits. And yet we've seen numerous attempts in the developed world to actually cut back on government spending. And it seems very, very hard to do in elected democracies, right? Like it is not a popular platform to be elected and say what we really need is austerity for the longer term. And all of you are going to have to suffer in the near term. How are policymakers like realistically supposed to navigate that tension, assuming that they're up for election every two to four years? I mean we have the additional problem that I think policymakers actually are not really keen or particularly worried about where their debt to GDP is If you look around the world again except for places where the bond markets are simply just not letting you do more spending even in the U.S., I don't believe there's anybody in Congress who's truly worried. There are a couple in Congress who are worried about the U.S. debt level, but not enough, given where debt levels are and given the foreseeable path of spending that's happening. But again, to step back and see, it's helpful to look at what has happened historically and when have countries been able and how have they been able to bring their debt to GDP levels down. It's a couple of things. One is just a spurt of growth that has come about either because you are some sort of a commodity exporter and you just had positive terms of trade shock. And because of that, your debt to GDP comes down. You hit the jackpot, basically. Yes, exactly. You got lucky. Or productivity growth, a boom, above average growth. And I believe that's what we're betting on this time with AI. The hope is that with AI, we will get growth from 2 up to 4 And then that will certainly solve all of our problems if we have that on a persistent basis Countries especially developed countries have tended to rely on that And then you have inflation If you go back even further and also obviously during right after the pandemic, inflation helped bring the GDP levels down. And then, of course, the third is what we see with developing countries is you end up with default and restructuring and crises. And then again, you bring debt to GDP down that way. So those have been the typical path. We've never had to worry about debt crises in developed economies. But now more and more, and I think this is also a new feature of the world we live in, is the developed world is moving into that space where their debt costs and their borrowing costs are far more volatile, far more sensitive to market conditions. I mean, the stock case is the UK, where you see that on a day-to-day basis. But, You see that in other countries too, in Europe, and some of it in France, and more generally, even Japan, where for the longest time, we didn't have to worry about borrowing costs. Those have squarely moved up. The tenure rates have moved up. Germany's tenure rates have moved up. So everywhere we are seeing developed economies also now having to face higher borrowing costs. The US, I think, is still the [35:00] Exception in the sense that even though tenured yields are at 4.5% right now, just given the level of supply of debt and what's expected to come out in the future, markets are still treating it as giving it some privilege, even if it was not as big as it used to be in the past. Whether you're planning a big tech event, launching a new campaign, or just stocking up on team gear, finding the right promotional products makes all the difference. 4imprint offers thousands of options, from on-trend apparel and premium drinkware to tech, totes, and giveaways, so you can find the right fit for any audience, purpose, or budget. You can customize it all, your logo, your message, your look, and many items come with no setup charge to help you save. And if you're really watching the bottom line, you'll find standout choices at every price point so you can make a real impact while staying on budget. 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Okta secures AI. What does, in your view, a debt crisis look like in a country that borrows in its own currency? Because obviously, like politically, you know, maybe the debt ceiling doesn't get raised. there were certainly political ways to default. But economically, the US never theoretically has to run out of dollars per se. In fact, I would say it's the same thing with the UK. You say it the same thing with Japan They can run out of yen the same way in the same way that say an emerging market that borrows in a foreign currency could theoretically run out of dollar reserves which is why we watch reserve levels when we talk about sort of on the edge emerging markets To you, what does a debt crisis look like in an advanced economy in which all of its debt is denominated in its own currency? A crisis in a developed economy would look more like a credit crunch that then leads into a financial crisis. So we would see a shop increase in borrowing costs. That will affect many other asset classes. You would see a slump in investment. So it's this debt overhang, high levels of debt that you have to roll over on a daily basis. that overhang which slows growth, slows dynamism, that is what a typical crisis looks like. And yes, you can have financial crisis. One of the wonderful things about the last several years, despite all the shocks, we haven't had a financial crisis in the developed order in an emerging market, any big emerging market. And that has been very helpful to bring back a fast recovery of the world economy every time after every shock. And we talk about resilience. So in a case, [40:00] to where we end up with just debt levels that are really high. It's just costs going up everywhere. And that will eventually slow down economies, if not just trigger a financial crisis right away, given how sanguine financial conditions have been. You mentioned that one of the things that's changed pre to post pandemic has been the change in marginal position of central bankers with respect to the bond market and the fact that they've gone from being, although even in the US, I mean, quantitative easing ended in the 2010s, et cetera. But what happens if, say, we talk about some central bank and one of these developed markets and they say, you know what, we're going to just going to we're going to cap the long end. We're going to we're going to buy bonds until the rates are, you know, they don't go above two percent or three percent or et cetera. Seems very plausible that something like that could happen in in a developed market before too long. What would be the sort of fallout if a central bank explicitly came out and said we are going to buy government debt and just hold down the rates in a very explicit manner like that? If a central bank comes out and says that we are you know different from our mandate of price stability and full employment regardless of what happening there if we are going to go out and buy long debt then that's what's going to happen is you're going to see inflation expectations drift up, and then the nominal rates are going to go up. And real rates will also go up because of the risk associated with inflation, premium will go up. And that will be the end of the wonderful era that we've had of central bank independence, and that's helping to keep interest rates low. So that strategy just doesn't exist. You can play with it for a little while, but eventually it gets priced into markets. So, I mean, unless, of course, it is a tool for monetary policy because you've hit the zero lower bound and you still need to simulate the economy, then you do that. But right now we are far from the zero lower debt. Right. We currently have the opposite. We have the opposite. So it is, countries have tried it in the past. And these are usually the countries that the IMF works with because they eventually find themselves in crisis. But what typically happens is you get a tiny period when it looks like this is helping. And then you just get much higher interest rates and you just don get any of the benefits of the central bank buying your debt You know you mentioned earlier that we haven really had a major financial crisis in recent years And if we could just broaden that idea out a little bit, I think that the resilience of the global economy and certainly the U.S. economy has been surprising to a lot of people. We've had multiple shocks. But overall, certainly in America, people just keep spending. Everything kind of keeps ticking along. Is there something that economists are maybe like underestimating when it comes to why it seems like, again, the global economy to a lesser extent, but certainly the U.S. economy seems so resilient in the face of all these once in a lifetime shocks that we keep seeing? There have been a combination of things that have helped, and some of it have been surprises. Again, since we're talking about debt, that increase in debt has come about because of the very large amount of support that governments around the world gave during each of these crises. So during the pandemic I mean advanced economies spent about 25 percent of GDP if you look at the combination of not just outright support but all kinds of loan guarantees and equity infusions and so on that was huge Those were much higher levels than anything we'd seen in recent times. And because of that, housals and businesses came out of the pandemic with stronger balance sheets than they did going in. And that has helped hold up demand And also, and also has helped, therefore helps hold up profitability in a lot of businesses because of that strength that came from all that large amount of support. That was one. Second is the AI boom is a big player right now. If we didn't have AI and if we didn't have the increase in demand coming from AI, we would be looking at just much lower growth rates in many parts of the world at this time. And we would also see trade being much weaker. I mean, trade is being held up a lot by AI inputs flowing around. That's also been a big contributor. So we've had these positive offsetting events. Now, the question is, what happens in the next crisis? In the next crisis, countries do not have the fiscal space to provide that kind of support. And we may see much less [45:00] resilience than we've seen the last few years. I mean, I think that's something we should keep in mind. I don't think we should take this resilience as some sort of an absolute structural shift that keeps economies growing at their long-term trends, regardless of how big the shock is that's affecting them. Yeah, you wrote a piece, I think, recently for the Financial Times, which you talked about the bliss trade, I think as you called it. And can you clarify, because it sounds like expand on this idea that there is this assumption of state support. There's an assumption of a backstop. Things go bad, the government will be able to do something. And this seems to be the core of your idea that this is mistaken. We have this mindset right now in the policy world, and therefore people who are investing in markets, that the state is there to fix a lot of the And we see it right away. Even now, what's happening with energy prices going up is that there are many countries that are capping fuel prices, that are cutting energy taxes. The instinctive reaction is to protect households and protect their spending power And when you do that that helps corporate profitability and that is going to be favorable for markets So we've been in this environment. Now, either explicitly or implicitly, there has to be this notion that the economy has been resilient, and it is a reflection of what I call bliss, which is big, lasting state support, which has helped economies all over the world, not just in the U.S., but in many other countries. So the expectation is that that will continue. And going back to where we started with this conversation, just given how high debt levels are, that's just increasingly questionable, which means that I think governments are going to move towards far more unorthodox approaches, including price controls, financial repression, the kinds of things that we haven't encouraged in a long time. You know, we've talked about some of the big structural phenomenons in the global economy, the AI boom, demographics, certain things with trade. There's one thing we haven't really talked about, which is something I think about, which is that if a country makes something physical, there is a very good chance that either right now or in the future China will be able to make it cheaper and better And this is no matter what it is there are still some things that aren't the case. The most advanced semiconductors aren't manufactured in China, Boeing and Airbus jets and stuff. There's a few examples. But by and large, when you think about the stresses that are being placed on economies all around the world, how much is this particular dimension a factor the fact that like any almost any tradable good might at some point be most efficiently originate from china yeah i read a lot of pieces on this that somehow china will continue to run trade supplication because everything it wants it wants it produces for itself and produces for the rest of the world and so that's that i mean that makes little sense to me firstly if you just look at china's spending behavior they you know they run a surplus surplus on their goods trade front but they run a deficit on their services trade front and so one of the reasons why china overall deficit current account deficit or trade deficit is around three percent of gdp as compared to like 10 percent of gdp before the great financial crisis is because they are big consumers of services around the world Chinese tourism has been a big contributor to incomes around the world and the service deficit that they run. So just that, right? So there's nothing, there's no sense in which China ultimately gets to do everything. Secondly, usually if you get to a point where if you're so good at manufacturing, making everything, you ultimately are going to have very high levels of investment. Given the level of savings in your country, that usually means that you start running trade deficits. So it cannot be a story of China being very successful in its investment and being very productive. Because any kind of high productivity investment boom story means the country running. deficits. What has happened in China is basically a lot of consumption suppression. Because of that, you're seeing surpluses that the country is running. And we're also now seeing all the problems of very high levels of investment that's come from the crash in the property market, which despite the last four years of interventions and government policies, [50:00] policies is actually looking quite bad. So the weakness in the property market, weakness in consumption. If China is running surpluses at this point, it is because investment has dropped in China. You have, that's come both from the property market crash, but also because of all the, you know, excess supply and the overcapacity that they've created. You've seen a decline in investment. So 2025 was the first year when investment in China actually declined. That explains why it's running a big trade surplus. Now, yes, there are a lot of exports coming out of China. Forget about the surplus deficit part, but just the fact that they are sending a lot of goods out of their country is a source of competition for manufacturers around the world. I believe that this is not sustainable. I don't think Europe or other Asian economies and East Asia are going to just say, well, that's OK. We are OK with China dumping all these goods on us. They're going to put tariffs on China. China is aware of that, which is also partly why they are trying to, you know, see how they can manage their own exports to some extent They will move in that direction But I not a buyer of the whole China produces everything and does everything on its own And somehow we still continue buying from China. That makes a little sense to me. You know, just going back to the beginning of this conversation, I mentioned a bit of a deja vu feeling because we do have these bond sell-offs from time to time, and we often record podcast episodes on them. And the idea of a debt crisis has also been a popular theme on many podcasts, not just ours. Do you have any sense of what a catalyst for, you know, this actually exploding into a real life debt crisis could be? Or are there certain levels or numbers or behaviors that you kind of watch out for from here? I think it's very important what's going to happen with AI and the productivity boom that we are hoping for, that is going to be very important. If it turns out that there is very little showing up in productivity from AI, or we have a setback that comes from just discovering that, oh, there's so much of hallucination that it's just you can't really use it for anything very important. If that the case then I could see a situation where the pricing of debt it drops even more It a lot more concern about what going to happen in terms of government ability to repay all the debt that they have And not just now, but that's expected to come into the future. So for me, that's one thing. I mean, it is important that there is growth in the economy and that that growth is coming from good places. At this point, it seems like the growth is coming from AI investment and the hope that it's going to generate all that productivity growth. If that story goes away, we have a problem in terms of the concerns around fiscal positions around the world. All right. Giza, thank you so much for coming on All Thoughts. Truly the perfect guest for this moment in time. We really appreciate it. Thank you. It was a lot of fun. Joe, here is my overwhelming takeaway from that discussion. Go on. There is so much riding on AI. Yeah. Right? Like honestly the last answer is like whoa it kind of all depends on economic growth and whether we get that productivity boost via AI Yeah Like the idea that the entire sort of Western economic model and I guess social compact with governments is now dependent on whether AI actually does what it says on the label on the tin is nuts Yeah. I mean, the numbers are obviously just extraordinarily big and they're affecting everything. And they're obviously it shows up in financial markets, but it also shows up in the real economy. It is a major force of sustained upward pressure. Yeah, I think there's no dispute of it. It's like we're all watching along sort of like eating popcorn and knowing that our fates will somehow. And I'm serious, you know. Gita said it really well, which is like we're all basically in the AI trade together, whether you want to be or not. No, I know. And it's like, you know, I look at my like very passively diversified retirement money. And I'm like, I'm such a genius these days, you know, because it's like because you don't even have to be an AI star. Conversely, though, do you feel pressure to keep spending on tokens in order to support equity market valuations? Yes, that's right. I keep like thinking of more tests that I could do with AI because like, oh, I need to make sure the tokens are boosted. No, it's really wild. It really is everything. And then you, the whole conversation [55:00] It's like, man, the last six years have been crazy. Crazy. Like, seriously. No, seriously. I have a voice memo for producers, which is we need to clip that quote of Joe going crazy. No, seriously. You just think of all the things that have happened in the last six years. And so I guess I'm not surprised. Well, that also. The regime shift during that time. I mean, that also gets to Gita's response about this idea that, like, there is this assumption in markets that, well, we got through the last, like, 18 once in a lifetime. Yeah. just fine. And so we'll manage to get through the next one. But then the question is fiscal capacity and I guess political will. It's both of those. And it's like, you know, the way I think about it in Japan, I think, is an instructive example here, which is that like when I think of fiscal capacity, I don't think of like a sort of like if you have 80 percent debt to GDP level, you have fiscal capacity. If you have 120 percent, you don't because we don't know If there is that number But what you do know and what we can say is that in a period of high inflation and in a period where resources are already constrained and governments have made a commitment say to seniors that their standard of living will be X and governments have made a commitment to so the defense that it not going to drop below X that once a lot of these certain sort of commitments have been made if you get another shock in which you say, okay, let's just, God forbid, let's just say there were another pandemic in which a bunch of people temperate, and we tried to do the same playbook again, And it's like, OK, we're going to replace your lost income for a few months. Well, at a time in which we're already very like resource constrained, you see how that just becomes, you know, there's a lag period where like instantly inflationary because we're already sort of that's the difference of in 20 in early 2020 and late 2019. We were not pushing against our real resource limits in the way that we appear to be right now. Yeah, I think that's right. Okay, well, on that happy note, shall we leave it there? Yeah, let's leave it there. This has been another episode of the Odd Thoughts podcast. I'm Tracy Alloway. You can follow me at Tracy Alloway. And I'm Jill Weisenthal. You can follow me at The Stalwart. Follow our guest, Gita Gopinath. She's at Gita Gopinath. Follow our producers, Carmen Rodriguez at Carmen Armand. Dashiell Bennett at Dashbot. Kale Brooks at Kale Brooks. And Kevin Lozano at Kevin Lloyd Lozano And for more Odd Thoughts content go to Bloomberg slash Odd Lots We have a daily newsletter on all of our episodes And you can chat about all of these topics 24 in our Discord discord slash Odd Lots And if you enjoy Odd Lots, if you like it when we talk about bouncing bond yields, then please leave us a positive review on your favorite podcast platform. And remember, if you are a Bloomberg subscriber, you can listen to all of our episodes absolutely ad-free. All you need to do is find the Bloomberg channel on Apple Podcasts and follow the instructions there. Thanks for listening. Thank you It easy to find the right fit for your brand and budget with standout choices at every price point And with their 360 guarantee you can be 4imprint certain your order will show up just right right on time Explore more at 4imprint.com. 4imprint. 4certain. When you're running a business, the best days are the ones where priorities stay on track. 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