Rory Johnston Explains Why Oil Missed $200 Target During Hormuz War

Rory Johnston解析霍尔木兹冲突期间油价为何未触及200美元 尽管面临重大供应中断，但中国原油日进口量意外减少500万桶，加之交易员风险限额遭到严重下调，共同将布伦特原油价格压制在120美元以下。 尽管人们长期担忧的霍尔木兹海峡封锁发生，且海湾地区原油净损失达每日1300万桶，但全球油价最高仅触及每桶120美元以下，而非如预测般飙升至200美元高位。最主要的缓冲垫来自中国前所未有地将原油日进口量削减了500万桶，这主要得益于大量动用未受监测的地下战略石油储备（SPR）、降低炼厂开工率以及转换原料。此外，极端的下行波动促使交易部门将风险限额削减90%，尽管基本面模型看涨，投机性买盘仍受到抑制。随着此前受困油轮驶离海峡进入疲弱的全球进口市场，即期布伦特原油跨期价差已转为正向市场（contango），显示出暂时的供应过剩，而中国何时恢复正常采购仍存疑问。 尽管涉及伊朗的战事导致霍尔木兹海峡遭到长期封锁，布伦特原油在两次触及略低于120美元的高点后迅速回落至74美元以下，此前市场预期的200美元极端行情并未兑现。 (0:00) 海峡关闭期间中东原油日供应损失约1300万桶（占全球供给逾13%），传统供需模型曾认为需要将油价推升至150到200美元引发严重的需求破坏才能实现再平衡。 (4:30) 中国成为吸收供应冲击的核心力量，其原油日进口量削减了500万至600万桶，并通过大幅降低炼油开工率及动用地下战略石油储备，为日韩等周边国家腾出了现货货源。 (6:30) 中国累计4亿至5亿桶的隐形去库规模与IEA全体成员国4亿桶的SPR释放相当；随着海峡重新开放，逾1亿桶浮仓原油迅速涌向市场，推动即期合约转入期货升水（Contango）格局。 (20:00) 极端的价格下行波动叠加特朗普政府的口头打压，迫使多家大宗商品交易台将风险限额削减高达90%，抑制了投机多头持续推高油价的动力。 (25:00)

Commodity analyst Rory Johnston explains that crude oil failed to reach his $200-a-barrel forecast during the closure of the Strait of Hormuz because an unprecedented pullback in Chinese demand, massive inventory drawdowns, and severe financial risk limits blunted the shock. The Theoretical Deficit and Price Failure (4:30) Before the conflict, roughly 20 million barrels per day (bpd) of crude and refined products flowed through the Strait of Hormuz. Although Saudi Arabia and the UAE mitigated flows via alternative pipelines, approximately 13 million bpd of Gulf crude—excluding Iran—was shut in, representing over 13% of global supply and culminating in roughly 1 billion barrels lost. Under orthodox quantitative energy models, a disruption of this scale without equivalent supply offsets dictated that Brent crude would need to reach $150 to $200 a barrel to induce necessary demand destruction. Instead of spiking into catastrophic territory, Brent peaked twice just below $120 a barrel in late March and late April, before retreating under $74 by late June. Johnston observes that relying strictly on theoretical barrel balances failed to capture structural offsets and shifts in consumer and trader behavior that prevented run-away pricing. China’s Unprecedented Import and Refining Pullback (6:30) The single most significant buffer was China, where crude imports dropped by 5 to 6 million bpd relative to pre-war baselines—absorbing roughly half of the net spot market deficit across Asia. By stepping away from bidding on floating spot cargoes, China allowed import-dependent neighbors like South Korea, Japan, and Australia to secure critical supplies. Domestic fuel prices in Beijing rose only around 30% compared to a doubling of global crude, while Chinese refinery runs dropped by 3 to 3.5 million bpd. Because Chinese urban mobility remained steady and electric vehicles still account for only a fraction of the total fleet (internal combustion engines outnumber EVs roughly 10-to-1), Johnston concludes Beijing relied heavily on unmonitored commercial stocks and its underground Strategic Petroleum Reserve, which holds approximately 131 million barrels across six caverns. Johnston notes that whether this retreat stemmed from regional economic stabilization motives or speculative backroom diplomacy with Washington, China's total silence leaves its re-entry timeline uncertain. Inventory Draws and the Trapped Tanker Surge (20:00) Global resilience was further supported by strategic and commercial stockpiles, which were well buffered following a year of pre-war surplus. As analyst Jeff Currie observed, inventory responded to price rather than fresh production. The International Energy Agency coordinated an SPR release of roughly 400 million barrels, an intervention matched or exceeded by China's cumulative 400 to 500 million barrel import contraction. This drawdown was compounded when the Strait reopened, releasing over 100 million barrels of crude previously trapped aboard idle tankers. Because this floating inventory hit global trade routes far faster than new production could replenish it, prompt Brent time spreads flipped into contango, signalling near-term oversupply as stranded Gulf barrels collided with depressed Asian import demand. Risk Limits and Dismantled Financial Sentiment (25:00) Market psychology and trading mechanics diverged sharply from physical barrel math. Although proprietary trading models consistently flagged crude as an aggressive buy throughout the supply crisis, severe downside volatility—partially driven by political jawboning from Donald Trump—repeatedly triggered trading stop-outs. In response to these volatile swings, internal risk management desks slashed proprietary trader position limits by up to 90%. This created a dynamic where institutional market participants remained fundamentally bullish but lacked the balance-sheet clearance to bid prices up. Moreover, because the market entered the war in surplus and was forecast to return to surplus post-crisis, buyers treated inventory liquidations as a temporary adjustment rather than a permanent structural deficit. While long-term structural demand may eventually emerge as nations like the United States, Japan, and India seek to rebuild depleted strategic petroleum reserves—such as ADNOC's planned 50 million barrel storage initiative in India—the primary unresolved questions remain when China will resume normal crude import volumes and whether institutional risk capital will return to trade oil on fundamental supply metrics.

《Commodity Context》创始人Rory Johnston在节目中反思其此前关于霍尔木兹海峡封锁将导致原油飙升至每桶200美元的预测，指出中国前所未有的进口缩减与多国释储等缓冲机制，成功吸收了每天约1300万桶的供应冲击。 供应缺口与传统模型的预测失效 (4:30) 在霍尔木兹海峡因涉及伊朗的冲突而关闭前，每天约有2000万桶原油及成品油经该通道运输。尽管沙特东西管道和阿联酋通往富查伊拉的管道提供了旁路分流，但中东地区（除伊朗外）最终仍有约1300万桶/日的供应被迫关停，占全球总供应量13%以上，累计造成的原油损失达约10亿桶。按照传统能源市场模型的计算，在缺乏其他供应端对冲的情况下，唯有通过150至200美元/桶的破坏性高价才能强制压缩全球消费以匹配供给。 中国大幅削减进口充当超级缓冲器 (6:30) 国际油价并未如预期般突破新高，布伦特原油在3月下旬和4月下旬仅两次触及略低于120美元/桶的峰值，至6月24日已跌破74美元/桶。全球市场免于崩溃的核心原因，在于中国原油日均进口量较战前三个月平均水平骤降500万至600万桶，累计缩减量达4亿至5亿桶，规模匹敌甚至超过了国际能源署（IEA）约4亿桶的战略石油储备（SPR）协调释放。中国主动退出现货采购竞争，为韩国、日本、台湾地区和澳大利亚等高度依赖进口的邻近经济体腾出了急需的现货资源，避免了恐慌性抢购。 地下储备与国内调控的运作机制 (15:00) 中国在进口暴跌的情况下并未出现经济停摆，其应对手段主要依托未被公开监控的库存与灵活替代。尽管中国机动车保有量中燃油车对电动汽车的比例仍维持在10比1左右，但国内炼厂开工率主动下调了300万至350万桶/日，石化原料也部分转向天然气与煤炭。同时，官方通过价格监管将北京等地的成品油涨幅压制在约30%左右，并推测深度动用了分布于六个已知基地、总容量约1.31亿桶的地下战略储备洞库和商业成品油库存。然而，关于中国究竟出于地缘政治考量、抑或同美方转移亚太军事资产存在某种默契的猜测，至今未获官方证实。 金融风控限制与过剩预期扭转定价 (25:00) 金融衍生品市场的反应与实物短缺发生脱节，布伦特原油近月跨期价差已转为现货贴水（Contango），显示短期供应正迅速转向宽松。在冲突爆发前，市场原本处于长期过剩格局，且交易员普遍预计海峡重新开放后供应仍将充裕，因而将库存急剧消耗视为暂时性扰动而非永久性短缺。此外，特朗普的口头干预引发了剧烈的下行波动，直接导致各大自营原油与成品油交易台的风险限额被风控部门削减高达90%，形成了“人人看多却无人敢买”的局面。随着霍尔木兹海峡内此前滞留的逾1亿桶浮仓原油加速外流，短期抛压进一步抑制了油价。 商业与战略库存重建的长期分化 (30:00) 随着危机趋缓，全球面临庞大的库存回补需求，但商业库存与战略储备的重建逻辑截然不同。商业库存目前处于深度耗尽状态，其恢复必须依赖现货市场出现明确的供过于求周期；而政府主导的战略储备回补（如美日两国的计划以及阿布扎比国家石油公司在印度规划的5000万桶战略库存）则属于长效结构性需求，只会在现货紧张情绪彻底消退后分步实施。诸如尼日利亚耗资200亿美元新建的丹格特炼油厂等下游基础设施，也正在重构全球能源流向，使未来的市场平衡更加多元化。 本期节目的核心结论表明，原油市场在应对前所未有的供应链中断时展现出超出模型预期的韧性，但中国在战略上大幅缩减进口的真实动因及其重返全球采购市场的确切时机，依然是国际能源贸易中最核心且未解的变量。

## Background 本期节目由彭博社（Bloomberg）旗下的《Odd Lots》播客于2026年6月26日发布在RSS及网络平台。节目页面介绍显示，随着霍尔木兹海峡大体恢复通航，特邀嘉宾、《Commodity Context》时事通讯创始人兼原油分析师 Rory Johnston 重返播客，复盘为何他在伊朗冲突爆发初期所作出的“布伦特原油将飙升至200美元/桶”的预测未能应验，并深入解析了包括管网转运、特朗普口头喊话以及中国意外大幅缩减原油进口等遏制油价上涨的关键机制。 ## TL;DR 在霍尔木兹海峡遭遇史上最大规模供应中断（净断供约1300万桶/日）的背景下，全球原油价格并未如预期般失控暴涨至200美元，而是止步于略低于120美元并最终回落至74美元下方。Rory Johnston 复盘指出，最核心的平抑力量来自全球第一大买家中国——其日均进口量反常骤降约500万桶，相当于自行承担了亚洲现货市场近半数的断供冲击，并可能借由未公开的地下战略储备和巨额成品油库存填补了国内缺口。与此同时，危机前全球长达一年的严重过剩预期、IEA成员国协调释放SPR、以及特朗普政府高频“口头干预”打穿纸货交易员风控限额导致多头买盘枯竭，多重因素形成了合力。这一系列组合拳打破了传统的“需求破坏定价”模型，展现出全球原油系统及实物与金融市场脱节时出人意料的韧性与复杂性。 ## Atmosphere & style 对谈整体洋溢着一种既坦诚自省又极具极客精神的专业学术氛围。面对此前广受关注但最终落空的200美元预测，嘉宾毫无包袱且幽默自嘲，主持人也以包容和欣赏的态度将其视为解剖现代能源体系运作规律的绝佳样本。整期节目在严密硬核的“数桶”基本面算术与充满悬疑色彩的地缘博弈猜想之间自如切换，既有拆解中国隐秘地下储油洞库时的探索兴奋，也有探讨金融衍生品与物理断供严重脱节时的现实冷峻，听感扎实、透彻且兼具智识趣味。 ## Bulletin - `00:00` 霍尔木兹海峡大部分恢复通航，布伦特原油已回落至74美元/桶下方，此前市场关于封锁将推高油价至200美元的预期彻底落空，峰值收盘价止步于120美元左右。 - `05:40` 中东地区因海峡封锁累计断供约10亿桶原油（峰值达1300万桶/日），但中国同期每日进口骤降500万桶，累计缩减4亿至5亿桶采购，以一己之力抵消了亚洲现货市场近半缺口。 - `10:00` 中国炼厂开工率骤降300万至350万桶/日，其需求缺口主要通过消化推测超10亿桶的隐形地下成品油与原油战略储备、以及切换石化替代原料填补，而非源于电动汽车短期爆发。 - `28:38` 特朗普政府的高频口头干预重创原油期货交易员持仓信心，风控部门砍掉自营多头90%的风险敞口，与中国的实物进口收缩共同掐断了油价轧空暴拉的机制。 ## Key takeaways - `04:30` 霍尔木兹海峡受阻导致波斯湾除伊朗外日均关停1300万桶产能（超全球供应13%），虽然沙特与阿联酋陆上管道全力分流，仍造成了史上最大规模的供应中断。 - `04:30` 传统供需定价模型失效：原先分析界认为唯有冲上200美元高位才能倒逼需求破坏以弥补1300万桶的缺口，但系统展现出未曾预料的弹性机制。 - `05:40` 中国原油日进口量反常削减约500万桶，主动放弃公开现货竞价，为韩国、日本、中国台湾等极度恐慌的亚洲经济体腾出了急需的实物货源空间。 - `07:30` 中国各项人员流动与高频出行数据并未显著下滑，国内成品油限价机制阻断了国际高油价传导，证实500万桶进口缺口并非来自真实的终端需求崩溃。 - `07:30` 卫星监测显示中国地表浮顶储罐未明显抛售，分析推测其主要动用了至少6处已知、容量约1.31亿桶的地下地下储油洞穴以及规模超10亿桶的成品油隐形储备。 - `10:00` 电动汽车短期替代神话被证伪：尽管中国新能源车新车销售渗透率超60%，但机动车全社会大盘中燃油车与电车比例仍为10:1，无法在数月内抹去数百万桶日需求。 - `13:00` 中国此前在2023年宏观疲软时积累的异常石油表观需求，本质上是防备马六甲海峡等潜在军事封锁的备战囤积，却在霍尔木兹危机中意外充当了平抑全球价格的压舱石。 - `15:00` 布伦特原油近月跨期价差一度反常转为现货贴水/期货溢价（Contango），释放出因中国缺席现货采购、即期市场实际原油过剩的强烈信号。 - `21:05` 中国进口削减总量（4亿至5亿桶）超过了IEA成员国协调释放的战略石油储备上限（约4亿桶），配合封锁解除后海峡内滞留的逾1亿桶浮舱原油快速外流，彻底压制了紧缺预期。 - `25:36` 市场对库存见底的恐慌感被战前供应过剩及冲突必将结束的共识大幅稀释，所有人深知一旦通航恢复，中长期供给将再度泛滥。 - `28:38` 金融纸货市场买盘枯竭：“所有人都看多，但没人敢买”，特朗普的密集口头喊话打乱了做多节奏，自营机构风控削减90%额度，致使盘面无法追涨逼空。 - `30:00` 全球原油库存重构存在前置条件：战略石油储备回填（如美日及ADNOC印度5000万桶项目）和深度透支的商业库存修复，必须建立在市场重新进入供过于求周期的前提下。 - `31:47` 实体物理断供与金融纸货严重脱节：尽管金融价格被死死按在120美元以下，但亚洲部分进口国实体供应链一度极度紧张甚至出台严苛燃油配额管制。 - `33:38` 后市原油交易的最大核心变量在于中国何时重返现货市场，其反常压减进口的终极战略意图仍是全球大宗商品领域未解的达摩克利斯之剑。 ## Detailed walkthrough ### `00:00` 霍尔木兹危机重压下，油价为何未触及200美元大关 在经历了一场令全球能源市场屏息的重大危机后，霍尔木兹海峡如今大部分已恢复通航。彭博社《Odd Lots》节目录制于6月24日中午，此时布伦特原油价格已回落至每桶74美元下方。主持人 Joe Weisenthal 与 Tracy Allaway 回顾了伊朗战争爆发初期的恐慌氛围：当时整个原油分析界多年来一直将其视为典型的“尾部风险事件”（tail risk event），普遍预期霍尔木兹海峡哪怕只被切断数周，原油价格也将轻易飙升至每桶150美元甚至200美元。然而现实中，布伦特原油在3月下旬和4月下旬经历了两次高点，但两次收盘价都止步于接近120美元的水平，并未失控。 社交平台（X/Twitter）上甚至出现了大量嘲讽“数桶工人”（barrel counters，指基于供需基本面硬核计算桶数的分析师）的声音。面对这种基本面预测与实际走势的巨大脱节，两位主持人再次请回了《Commodity Context》时事通讯创始人、原油分析师 Rory Johnston。在冲突爆发伊始，Rory 也曾认为长时间封锁必然带来200美元油价，如今他重新复盘了过去几个月的市场演变，剖析整个体系是如何在极端供需震荡中通过重定向、地缘博弈以及最为关键的——中国意外大幅削减进口——完成了自我缓冲与再平衡。 - **录制时点与价格表现**：截至6月24日中午，布伦特原油已跌回74美元/桶以下；冲突期间仅在3月下旬和4月下旬触及高点，均略低于120美元/桶。 - **市场心理与调侃**：社交媒体上对死板计算供需缺口的“数桶师”充满冷嘲热讽，但真实市场展现出了意料之外的弹性和机制变动。 --- ### `04:30` 1300万桶日产能缺口：史上最大供应中断与需求破坏假设 Rory Johnston 带领听众回顾了3月初市场的主流共识。从历史上看，这依然是全球原油市场有史以来面临的最大规模供应中断。在危机发生前，通过霍尔木兹海峡的原油日流量约为2000万桶。虽然市场知道存在部分陆上绕道方案——例如沙特阿拉伯横贯东西的管道（East-West Pipeline）以及阿联酋通往阿曼湾富查伊拉（Fujairah）的管线——但此前这些设施从经受过满负荷极限测试。 实际运行中，这些绕道设施确实发挥了作用，但即使在全面利用所有备用管网后，波斯湾地区（除伊朗外）仍有高达每天1300万桶的原油被迫关停（shut in）。这个缺口占到了全球原油总供应量的13%以上。按照以往的供需模型，当遭遇如此巨大的供给黑洞且缺乏替代增量时，油价唯一的平衡机制就是进入极度剧烈的“需求破坏定价”（demand-destructive pricing）。分析师们之所以预判200美元，是因为在历史先例中，只有达到该级别的天价，才能倒逼全球消费者迅速砍掉1300万桶的日消费量。然而，全球原油系统通过未曾预料的弹性化解了这一末日剧本。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 霍尔木兹海峡断航后的原油流向与缺口分流 accDescr: 展示了危机前2000万桶日流量在扣除沙特与阿联酋陆上管道分流后，仍留存1300万桶的实际断供缺口 subgraph PreWar["危机前基准流量"] A["霍尔木兹海峡通行量: ~2000万桶/日"] end subgraph Mitigation["应急管线绕道分流"] B["沙特东西管线 (East-West)"] C["阿联酋富查伊拉管线 (Fujairah)"] end subgraph Disruption["净断供与市场缺口"] D["受限关停产能: ~1300万桶/日<br/>(超全球供应量13%)"] E["传统定价模型预期: 激进需求破坏<br/>(预估价格: $150 - $200/桶)"] end A --> B A --> C A --> D D --> E ``` --- ### `05:40` 中国进口锐减500万桶：亚洲现货市场的“定海神针” 油价之所以未冲破200美元，最重要的基本面因素出在全球最大的原油进口国——中国身上。战前市场皆知中国拥有庞大的战略与商业库存，但无人料到其反应模式。从危机前三个月的平均水平到6月份，中国的原油进口量出现了断崖式下滑，日进口量暴跌了整整500万桶（若计入成品油，缺口达500万至600万桶/日）。这500万桶的降幅，相当于抹平了亚洲现货市场因断航遭受的近一半供给冲击。 中国选择不再入场竞价抢油，直接为其他严重依赖海峡运输的亚洲邻国腾出了宝贵的货源空间。在危机爆发初期，韩国、日本、中国台湾地区以及澳大利亚等政府一度陷入极度恐慌，“那种氛围非常像 COVID 初期，澳大利亚总理甚至每天都要公开通报政府又成功抢购到了一船柴油”。日韩等国的进口在3月和4月一度崩盘，但到了5月和6月，由于中国彻底放弃争夺现货市场多余的桶数，这些国家的进口量迅速恢复至战前水平。中国在实质上以一己之力承担了绝大部分供应冲击。 - **中国进口削减幅度**：战前3个月均值至6月期间，中国原油日进口骤降约500万桶，占亚洲现货市场总损失的一半左右。 - **邻国采购出现喘息**：日韩澳台等经济体从最初日日抢货的恐慌状态，逐步在5、6月份将原油进口恢复至战前常态水平。 --- ### `07:30` 需求破坏还是动用暗库？解构中国表观消费的谜团 这一庞大进口缺口的性质引发了主持人与 Rory 的深度讨论：这究竟是真实的需求破坏（demand destruction）、国内能源替代，还是动用了鲜为人知的地下战略储备？Rory 强调，中国官方从不公布官方原油需求数据，也不公开详细的库存变动，市场只能在“阴影中摸索”。 从需求侧来看，各项高频数据并不支持严重的需求破坏。无论是近期实地考察的出行指标，还是各类人员流动数据，均未见显著下滑。如果这500万桶/日的缺口属于真实的需求破坏，其规模将堪比2022年严格疫情管控时期的冲击，但眼下中国各城市显然没有发生大范围的停摆封控。此外，中国国内完善的成品油零售限价机制切断了国际油价的输入通道：危机期间全球油价翻倍，但北京等地的汽油零售价仅温和上涨了约30%左右。这表明终端消费者并未遭遇导致消费雪崩的高油价惩罚。 从库存侧来看，卫星监测到的地面浮顶储罐（floating roof tanks）库存依然处于极高水平，与危机前几乎持平，表明中国并未大规模抛售可见的商业地表库存。Rory 指出，排查这一矛盾的关键在于卫星看不见的盲区——中国至少拥有6处已知的地下战略石油储备洞库（underground storage caverns），容量约为1.31亿桶。由于中国炼油厂的加工开工率下滑幅度远不及原油进口跌幅，两者的差额必然来自某种形式的国内供给填补，因此大概率是通过动用这批深埋地底的隐形战略储备来平抑冲击。 ### `10:00` 需求锐减之谜：隐秘成品油库存、原料替代与“电车替代神话” 面对原油市场并未因霍尔木兹海峡危机而飙升至 200 美元的现实，分析师们发现中国不仅悄无声息地向市场投放了额外的原油战略储备，其炼厂的原油加工开工率（refinery runs）更是在短时间内断崖式下跌了 300 万至 350 万桶/日。这引发了一个根本性的行业谜题：如果原油进口与加工量同步骤降，那些消失的油品需求到底是如何被满足的？Rory Johnston 指出，市场面临两种可能的解释。第一种解释是成品油库存的超大规模释放。中国拥有极其庞大的成品油储备（包括汽油、柴油、航空煤油等），规模可能在 10 亿桶以上，但与拥有浮动储罐顶（floating roofs）的原油罐不同，成品油储罐无法通过卫星阴影准确测算日度或周度的液位变化，外界只能推测中国正在以极为惊人的速度急剧消化这些隐形库存。第二种解释则是化工原料的极限替代，彭博能源专栏作家哈维尔·布拉斯（Javier Blas）此前便敏锐指出，中国在边际上有能力将石脑油（naphtha）和液化石油气（LPG）等石油基石化原料，快速转向以天然气、甚至极端情况下的煤制化学品作为替代路径。 主持人随即抛出了市场上流传的第三种流行论调——中国飞速攀升的电动汽车（NEV）渗透率是否在一夜之间抹去了石油需求？Rory 对此给出了清醒的反驳。他强调，决定实际燃料消耗规模的从来不是“新车销售结构”（sales penetration），而是“整个社会的汽车保有量结构”（fleet composition）。尽管新能源汽车在中国的新车销售中占比已超过 60%，但纵观全国庞大的机动车大盘，燃油车（ICE）与电动车的比例仍然高达 10 比 1。除非北京手中掌握着一支凭空造出、随时能开下生产线替换全社会燃油车的天量隐形 EV 车队，否则电车替代根本无法在短短数月内解释数百万桶/日的剧烈需求萎缩。 这个技术细节引发了主持人们的轻松打趣。Joe Weisenthal 笑称：“难道你觉得他们没有秘密的电动车战略储备？中国既然有‘战略猪肉储备’，说不定就能一夜之间给每个人免费置换一辆电动汽车，‘你领一辆百度 Apollo，他也领一辆 Apollo！’”Tracy Alloway 顺势聊起中国自动驾驶汽车的技术细节：无论官方的无人出租车（Robotaxi）还是车主开启智驾模式，车身外部都会亮起一盏醒目的蓝灯，让路上的行人和车辆一眼就能辨认出当前是由算法还是人类在驾驶。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 中国炼厂降负荷后的油品供给填补机制 accDescr: 展示原油加工量骤降300-350万桶每日后，通过库存、化工替代与长期电动化承接的三种假设路径 A["中国原油加工量暴跌<br>（-300万至350万桶/日）"] --> B{"表观需求缺口如何填补？"} subgraph Stockpile ["核心承压来源：隐形库存"] B --> C["巨额成品油库存剧烈去化"] C --> C1["汽柴煤储备推测超10亿桶"] C --> C2["储罐无浮动顶，卫星难以侦测"] end subgraph Petrochemical ["边际原料替代"] B --> D["石化原料路线切换"] D --> D1["压减石油脑 (Naphtha) 与 LPG"] D --> D2["转向天然气化工或煤制化学品"] end subgraph EVMyth ["长期变量（短期无法解释缺口）"] B -.-> E["电动汽车（NEV）替代"] E --> E1["新车销售占比超 60%"] E --> E2["全社会保有量燃油车:电车仍为 10:1"] end ``` ### `13:00` 战略备战还是软实力外交？天量储备的初始动因与地缘假设 在梳理完供需算术后，Joe 表达了对 Rory “脚踏实地的数桶人”（humble barrel counter）特质的欣赏。在充满宏大叙事、充斥着不可证伪地缘玄学的石油市场，踏踏实实追踪每一桶原油的流向显得尤为珍贵。基于中国当前不惜消耗本国缓冲储备来削减进口的现实，主持人提出了两个层层递进的问题：第一，这是否是中国为了拉拢亚洲邻国而展示的“地缘软实力善意”？毕竟新加坡、韩国、日本乃至中国台湾严重依赖中东进口，中国主动退避现货采购，等同于为脆弱的邻国腾出救命的现货原油；第二，原油圈内是否有共识，中国此前积累的庞大油品库存，最初根本就是为了防备一场高强度的消耗性战争（例如台海冲突）而未雨绸缪？ Rory 回忆起自己在 2023 年发表的一篇名为《中国石油需求激增之谜》（Chinese Oil Demand Adds）的分析报告。当时中国刚刚走出疫情防控，经济复苏势头疲弱，但纸面上的“表观石油需求”却出现了极其反常的井喷增长，这在经济基本面上完全解释不通。Rory 当时便推断，中国正在暗中疯狂积累外界无法直接监测的成品油储备。在那个时间节点，外界高度担忧台海紧张局势升温，频繁的海空战备巡航与实弹演练让军演与战备难以剥离。 回过头来看，当初为了防备马六甲海峡潜在军事封锁而未雨绸缪积累的战略缓冲，如今在霍尔木兹海峡突然受阻时意外发挥了决定性的平抑作用。中国长期以来对能源运输咽喉有着强烈的“战略脆弱性”担忧，这批在和平时期被秘密塞满的油库，客观上成了如今遏制全球油价突破 200 美元的最强刹车片。 - 2023 年中国表观石油需求在宏观经济疲软的背景下暴涨，实际暗含了巨量未向国际公开的战略油品囤积。 - 中国原有的战略库存预期主要防御马六甲海峡的战时切断风险，但在霍尔木兹海峡爆发危机时起到了同样立竿见影的缓冲效果。 ### `15:00` 现货正价差警报：“锡纸帽”地缘交易猜想与 500 万桶的市场巨震 中国持续抽离进口市场所引发的连锁反应正在彻底重塑全球油价结构。最令 Rory 痴迷且警惕的信号在于，不仅原油期货单边价格正在大幅下挫，布伦特原油近月跨期价差（prompt Brent time spreads，即首行与次行合约之差）甚至在对话当天直接翻转为了现货贴水/期货溢价（contango）。这种跨期曲线的崩塌发出了极其明确的信号：相对于当前的即期需求而言，市场上正在“被原油淹没”（swimming in oil）。这很大程度上正是因为原油第一大买家中国迟迟没有重返公开市场进行竞争性采购。 为何北京选择做这个“沉默的压舱石”？Rory 梳理了两种截然不同的地缘政治解释： 1. **邻里睦邻与外需自救论**：北京希望在亚洲树立一个负责任的大国形象，向日韩等邻国暗示“当华盛顿将你们置于能源危机而不顾时，中国在替你们减压”。同时，中国若想降低对美国市场的依赖，其主要出口目的地只能是亚洲和欧洲。如果中东断供导致欧亚经济彻底陷入能源崩溃，而拥有庞大本土油气自给能力的北美却毫发无损，这绝不符合中国的经贸利益。但这个理论的硬伤在于——如果是为了赚取外交资本，北京理应大张旗鼓地宣传自己的克制与贡献，但现实中官方监管机构和政策制定者对此一言不发。 2. **“戴上锡纸帽”的地缘大交易论**：另一种更加晦暗的可能是中美高层接触达成了某种私下默契。数月前特朗普政府团队访问北京时，外界普遍认为谈判毫无实质性突破。然而在中东战局中，伊朗的袭击摧毁了大量雷达系统、防空防舰导弹等先进装备，导致华盛顿不得不将原先部署在亚太战区的核心军事资产大举回撤至中东填补战力空白。这与特朗普长期倡导的“抽离亚洲前沿介入、推行离岸平衡”的战略意图不谋而合。美方是否可能在闭门磋商中向北京传递了某种利益交换，促成中国在能源端协助压制油价？ 尽管地缘阴谋论缺乏实锤，但残酷的算术摆在眼前：中国原油进口端目前存在高达 500 万桶/日的反常缺口。当下，随着霍尔木兹海峡的商业油轮通航逐步恢复，大量中东积压原油正奔涌出海，然而它们迎头撞上的却是以中国为首、依然极度羸弱的现货接盘意愿。在无法完全解构中国意图的前提下，市场几乎不可能预判这头巨兽究竟会在何日重新进场扫货，而这正是当前油市最深层的达摩克利斯之剑。 ### `21:05` 库存应对与战略储备：中国与IEA的万亿桶缓冲 在危机爆发前，全球原油市场已经连续一年多处于供应过剩状态，商业库存与战略储备都积累得相当充裕。知名大宗商品策略师杰夫·柯里（Jeff Currie）曾提出过一个经典论断：“当前发生的不是供应对价格做出反应，而是库存在对价格做出反应；但与产量不同，库存是有底线的。”如果霍尔木兹海峡持续封锁或再度关闭，这种依托库存缓冲的机制极可能彻底见底，从而引发油价狂飙。 在这场危机中，中东每天有约1300万桶的产能被迫中断，截至录制时累计损失的原油规模高达约10亿桶。面对这巨大的供应缺口，国际能源署（IEA）成员国协调释放的战略石油储备（SPR）上限约为4亿桶；而中国在同期相较于战前三个月的进口削减总量，达到了4亿至5亿桶之间。这意味着，仅中国一国在需求侧和隐性库存调整上的摆动幅度，就相当于甚至超过了整个IEA成员国战略储备释放的总和。 在罗里·约翰斯顿（Rory Johnston）的分析框架中，战略储备不应被简单视为普通库存，而应被视为“相机抉择的供需调节工具”（discretionary supply and demand）。通常驱动边际定价与稀缺感的是商业贸易库存，而SPR释放本质上相当于在市场上凭空注入了此前不可用的“新增供应”。类似的情况此刻也发生在霍尔木兹海峡内部：封锁期间海峡内一度滞留了超过1亿桶无法运出的原油，如今这些被困油轮正以极快的速度集中驶出海峡。这种浮顶游资的集中离港同样构成了某种形式的非自愿库存释放，其流出速度远快于新装船速度，属于不可持续的短期脉冲，而它恰恰迎头撞上了中国进口需求的断崖式回落。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 霍尔木兹海峡危机中的原油供需缺口与弥补机制 accDescr: 展现中东减产10亿桶的缺口如何被IEA储备释放、中国减少进口及海峡滞留浮仓释放所对冲 subgraph Deficit["供应缺口"] A["中东原油断供<br/>约1300万桶/日<br/>(累计约10亿桶)"] end subgraph Buffers["对冲缓冲池"] B["IEA成员国战略储备释放<br/>(上限约4亿桶)"] C["中国进口削减量<br/>(累计4亿至5亿桶)"] D["霍尔木兹滞留浮仓集中流出<br/>(超1亿桶原油入市)"] end subgraph Impact["市场结果"] E["商业库存未触及极限干涸<br/>油价未发生200美元极端脉冲"] end A --> B A --> C A --> D B --> E C --> E D --> E ``` ### `24:30` 战前溢价与现货溢价的假象：远期贴水与供应过剩 年初布伦特原油价格在60美元/桶左右，到战争爆发前夕已攀升至70美元/桶。针对这10美元的涨幅，约翰斯顿确认其中有相当大一部分来自于市场提前预期的地缘政治风险溢价。然而在战争正式打响的前最后一周，即期布伦特原油却反常地跌入了期货升水（Contango）结构，这正是现货市场实体供应依然严重过剩的确凿信号。 截至录制时，原油价格回落至74美元/桶下方，仅略高于战前夕的70美元/桶水平。约翰斯顿指出，鉴于战前全球原油本身就处于供应严重泛滥的宏观背景中，当前的70美元绝非坚不可摧的铁底，随着海峡逐步恢复通行以及潜在产能的复苏，油价完全有可能进一步下探。 - 年初布伦特油价：约60美元/桶。 - 战前夕布伦特油价：约70美元/桶（包含地缘防范溢价，但末期曲线出现Contango）。 - 录制时油价：低于74美元/桶，并不存在坚固的价格下限支撑。 ### `25:36` 思想实验与反思：中国每日削减500万桶进口的“不可思议” 节目主持人提出了一场“反思与自我批评”式的思想实验：如果在2026年3月初危机刚爆发时，有人提出“中国拥有庞大的电动车替代规模和巨额库存，可以直接把进口量每日削减500万桶来化解危机”，当时的分析界会如何看待？约翰斯顿坦言，如果在3月10日面对这个问题，他依然会认为这完全是天方夜谭。当时市场的理性预期是IEA会释储，中国可能放缓或暂停囤积商业及战略储备，但直接削减500万桶/日的实际进口量，无论在当时还是事后复盘来看，其规模都令人瞠目结舌。 更为深刻的盲区在于对“库存触底与远期过剩”之间关系的理解。在传统的定价模型中，库存见底往往伴随着对未来供应持续匮乏的极端焦虑，从而导致价格垂直拉升以强制破坏需求。但这次危机截然不同：危机前市场极度过剩，且所有人都心知肚明这场冲突和海峡封闭注定是暂时的，一旦封锁解除，明年的全球供给又将重新泛滥。因此，即便库存不断向罐底逼近，市场参与者对低库存的恐慌感也被“未来注定再度过剩”的共识大幅稀释。约翰斯顿反思称，自己最初虽然持有长线看空观点，但在封锁发生后迅速倒向极度看多，正是因为低估了这种预期差，坚信300万桶/日的过剩绝不可能对冲1300万桶/日的供给断崖。 ### `28:38` “所有人都在看多，但没人敢买”：特朗普口头干预与交易员止损 除了基本面上的供需调整，交易层面的微观结构崩溃是抑制油价冲向200美元的另一关键推手。约翰斯顿在与原油及成品油自营交易员（prop traders）交流时，频繁听到一个不可思议的现象：交易员们内部构建的所有基本面模型都显示原油是一个“必须疯狂买入”（raging buy）的极品标的，然而在3月至4月的剧烈波动中，多头仓位被反复来回扫荡止损。 各大机构的风控部门随即介入，将自营交易员的风险限额（risk limits）直接砍掉了90%。市场上因此弥漫着一种荒诞的氛围，正如当时交易圈流传的绝妙名言：“所有人都在看多，但根本没人敢买”（everyone's bullish, but no one's buying）。 这种资金层面的买盘枯竭，很大程度上由特朗普政府极高频的“口头干预”（jawboning）所引爆。特朗普团队在极度敏感的节点不断注入极大的下行波动性，彻底阻断了原油价格惯常的追涨逼空暴拉（melt-up）机制。约翰斯顿总结认为，如果仅有口头干预，它绝不可能压制住实体短缺；如果仅有中国缩减进口，或许也无法完全阻遏市场投机资金的疯狂上冲。但这两者构成了致命的连环组合拳：特朗普的口头敲打不断重启并打乱投机做多的时间窗口，而与此同时，中国实质性的大规模削减进口则在暗中不断稀释紧缩的基本面，二者合力最终彻底熄灭了200美元油价的烈焰。 ### `30:00` 战略与商业库存：补库需求能否成为未来油价的长期支撑？ 在反思了市场抵御冲击的表现后，Rory Johnston 坦言，这套平抑价格的组合拳所发挥的威力“远超我最初的预期”。这也彻底刷新了他的认知：至少在当前这种特殊情境下，全球石油市场面对巨大地缘政治冲击时的韧性，远远高于他过去的评估。针对市场上仍有一部分多头持有的看涨逻辑——即全球库存已被大幅消耗，未来各国必须重新补库，从而在未来两三年内形成结构性的强劲需求——Rory 提出了兼具“肯定与否定”的辩证看法，并强调必须将“战略石油储备”（SPR）与“商业库存”明确区分开来。 在战略储备层面，补充库存的迫切冲动确实存在。美国和日本需要回填本国的 SPR，而那些在此次危机前缺乏战略储备的国家更是深感被动。例如印度便痛定思痛，阿联酋阿布扎比国家石油公司（ADNOC）已制定计划，将在危机过后于印度建立规模达 5000 万桶的商业战略储备库。Rory 认为，这类建设确实会在未来一到三年内为需求提供结构性底部支撑；但关键在于，只要当前市场依然紧平衡，这种补库需求就绝不可能大规模兑现——因为在供应吃紧时强行补充 SPR，只会让本已脆弱的市场“再度收紧”。而在商业库存方面，回填的前提是全球市场重现供应过剩（surplus）。目前全球绝大多数可追踪的商业库存都已处于“深度透支”（deeply underwater）的状态，市场确实需要一段过剩期来恢复至正常基准，但大概率不需要完全倒退回危机爆发前那种异常臃肿的过剩库存水平。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 战略储备与商业库存补库逻辑流程 accDescr: 展示全球原油库存被消耗后，战略储备与商业库存重构的前提条件与对市场的反馈。 subgraph Deficit["库存现状"] A["危机冲击：全球库存深度消耗"] end subgraph Conditions["补库启动前提"] B["市场必须先转入过剩/宽松状态"] end subgraph Stocks["两类库存回填路径"] C["战略石油储备 (SPR)<br/>美日回填、印度/ADNOC 5000万桶项目"] D["商业库存 (Commercial Stocks)<br/>自深度透支回升至正常水平"] end A --> B B --> C B --> D C -.->|"若在紧平衡下强行补库"| E["导致市场再度过紧 (Retightening)"] ``` - **ADNOC 印度战略储备**：阿布扎比国家石油公司已规划在危机后为印度建设一座 5000 万桶级别的商业与战略混合储备库。 - **补库的前置条件**：无论是政府的 SPR 还是炼厂的商业库存，都无法在供应短缺的紧平衡阶段发力，唯有等待市场出现宽松过剩才具备补库窗口。 - **库存中枢预测**：商业库存需要脱离当前的透支状态回归常态，但预计不会追求恢复到危机爆发前那种“异常偏高”的历史极值。 --- ### `31:47` 坦诚复盘错误预测：实体短缺与纸货市场的脱节 讨论到各国对储备设施的重视，主持人 Joe Weisenthal 联想到有听众曾极力推荐录制一期关于尼日利亚拉各斯新建成的丹格特炼油厂（Dangote Petroleum Refinery）的节目。这座耗资 200 亿美元的超级工程不仅是近年来全球工程界的奇迹，更是当今世界最重要的炼油中枢之一。随后，主持人对 Rory Johnston 能够毫无包袱地重返节目、公开复盘自己此前看涨至 200 美元的“错误预判”表达了由衷的敬意与感谢。Rory 幽默地回应道，面对这样复杂的市场反转，“我们所有人都学到了一些新东西，而我学到的显然最多”。 在 Rory 离开后，Joe 和 Tracy Alloway 对这场危机的深层机制进行了对谈复盘。Joe 承认，此前自己并没有对特朗普的“口头喊话干预”（jawboning）给予太大权重，因为原油市场的直觉逻辑往往是“桶数的数学账就是硬道理”（the barrel math is the barrel math）。但 Rory 的解释极具启发性——政治施压精准切中了纸货交易员的风险限额（risk limits），改变了资金的持仓行为。Tracy 亦指出，回顾 3 月至 4 月的市场，最令人费解的正是物理现货与金融衍生品市场的剧烈脱节：一方面，纸货盘面价格并未像预期的那样出现狂飙；另一方面，物理供应链却承受着极度紧张的真实重压，当时甚至传出菲律宾由于燃油极度匮乏而不得不限制民众“每周只能驾车通勤两天”等严苛管控。尽管布伦特原油最终并未触碰 150 乃至 200 美元的极端关口，但实体经济所经历的阵痛是绝对真实的。 - **丹格特炼油厂（Dangote Refinery）**：位于尼日利亚拉各斯，投资规模达 200 亿美元，是全球炼油版图中的新兴巨无霸项目。 - **物理现货与金融纸货的脱节**：危机高峰期现货市场曾出现“有钱买不到桶”的现实窘境，部分国家实施极端配额限行，但金融投机价格却因监管施压与进口减量而被牢牢压制。 - **交易员心理与风险控制**：白宫对投机行为的喊话有效锁死了对冲基金与大宗交易机构的风险暴露敞口，阻止了多头资金通过盘面疯狂加杠杆。 --- ### `33:38` 中国谜题与后市展望：隐秘的地下储油洞穴与节目结语 贯穿整场危机的另一个核心谜题是中国超预期的反向操作。Tracy 和 Joe 均认为，留给交易员与观察人士最大的未解之谜在于“中国究竟在打什么算盘”（what's China thinking?）。在原油断供恐慌最严重之时，中国不仅没有恐慌性抢购，反而大幅削减了原油进口，这一举动直接拆解了全球油价飙升的导火索。对于短中期内的交易员而言，目前最核心的观察指标，莫过于中国何时、以及是否会将其采购量恢复到战前的常态规模。谈及中国庞大而神秘的战略仓储，Tracy 甚至半开玩笑地提议，应该组织一场“公路旅行”，亲自去看一看中国深藏地下的巨型人工储油洞穴（oil caverns）。 在节目的最后，两位主持人向听众致谢并照例介绍了播客的制作团队及社群互动渠道： - **主持人社交平台**：关注 Tracy Alloway（@TracyAlloway）与 Joe Weisenthal（@TheStalwart）。 - **特邀嘉宾追踪**：关注独立宏观与原油研究分析师、《Commodity Context》创始人 Rory Johnston（@Rory_Johnston）。 - **幕后制作团队**：感谢制作人 Carmen Rodriguez（@CarmenArman）、Dashiell Bennett（@Dashbot）、Kale Brooks（@KaleBrooks）以及 Kevin Lozano（@KevinLloydLozano）的共同协作。 - **资讯获取与全天候交流**：更多往期节目与每日新闻简报可访问彭博官网专属频道，听众亦可加入官方 Discord 社区展开 24 小时实时讨论。 ## Notable quotes > `05:40` 那种氛围非常像 COVID 初期，澳大利亚总理甚至每天都要公开通报政府又成功抢购到了一船柴油 — Rory Johnston > `10:00` 难道你觉得他们没有秘密的电动车战略储备？中国既然有‘战略猪肉储备’，说不定就能一夜之间给每个人免费置换一辆电动汽车，‘你领一辆百度 Apollo，他也领一辆 Apollo！’ — Joe Weisenthal > `21:05` 当前发生的不是供应对价格做出反应，而是库存在对价格做出反应；但与产量不同，库存是有底线的。 — Jeff Currie > `28:38` 所有人都在看多，但根本没人敢买 — Rory Johnston > `30:00` 远超我最初的预期 — Rory Johnston > `31:47` 我们所有人都学到了一些新东西，而我学到的显然最多 — Rory Johnston > `31:47` the barrel math is the barrel math — Joe Weisenthal > `33:38` what's China thinking? — Tracy Alloway ## Mentioned Rory Johnston, Joe Weisenthal, Tracy Alloway, Jeff Currie, Javier Blas, Donald Trump, Carmen Rodriguez, Dashiell Bennett, Kale Brooks, Kevin Lozano, Bloomberg, Odd Lots, Commodity Context, IEA (国际能源署), ADNOC (阿布扎比国家石油公司), 百度 Apollo, 布伦特原油 (Brent), 霍尔木兹海峡, 沙特东西管道 (East-West Pipeline), 富查伊拉管线 (Fujairah Pipeline), 丹格特炼油厂 (Dangote Petroleum Refinery), 《中国石油需求激增之谜》(Chinese Oil Demand Adds) ## Video description <p>The Strait of Hormuz has (mostly) re-opened! Crude prices are still up since the start of the war with Iran, but popular predictions earlier this year of $200-a-barrel Brent didn&rsquo;t pan out. Why is that? We last talked to Rory Johnston, the founder of the Commodity Context newsletter, at the start of the conflict. And in that conversation he said that the Strait&rsquo;s closure would lead to $200 oil if it persisted for any length of time. Today, he returns to tell us what he&rsquo;s learned about the oil market since then. He explains the various factors that kept a lid on prices, including some re-routing, Trump jawboning, and (crucially) surprise import reductions from China.</p> <p>Previous: <a href="https://bit.ly/44sr0if">Rory Johnston on How Oil Could Surge to Over $200 a Barrel</a></p> <p>Only Bloomberg.com subscribers can get the Odd Lots newsletter in their inbox, plus unlimited access to the site and app. <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/subscriptions/oddlots?in_source=oddlotspodcast" data-link-cookie="1" data-destination="https://www.bloomberg.com/subscriptions/oddlots?in_source=oddlotspodcast">bloomberg.com/subscriptions/oddlots</a></p><p>See <a href="https://omnystudio.com/listener">omnystudio.com/listener</a> for privacy information.</p> [Source](https://podtrac.com/pts/redirect.mp3/tracking.swap.fm/track/UVBrz8bN8aM2Xe47PEPu/traffic.omny.fm/d/clips/e73c998e-6e60-432f-8610-ae210140c5b1/8a94442e-5a74-4fa2-8b8d-ae27003a8d6b/774dd005-8b31-4ba1-9549-b474011e8753/audio.mp3?in_playlist=982f5071-765c-403d-969d-ae27003a8d83)

[5:40] Rory Johnston: 那种氛围非常像 COVID 初期，澳大利亚总理甚至每天都要公开通报政府又成功抢购到了一船柴油 [10:00] Joe Weisenthal: 难道你觉得他们没有秘密的电动车战略储备？中国既然有‘战略猪肉储备’，说不定就能一夜之间给每个人免费置换一辆电动汽车，‘你领一辆百度 Apollo，他也领一辆 Apollo！’ [21:05] Jeff Currie: 当前发生的不是供应对价格做出反应，而是库存在对价格做出反应；但与产量不同，库存是有底线的。 [28:38] Rory Johnston: 所有人都在看多，但根本没人敢买 [30:00] Rory Johnston: 远超我最初的预期 [31:47] Rory Johnston: 我们所有人都学到了一些新东西，而我学到的显然最多 [31:47] Joe Weisenthal: the barrel math is the barrel math [33:38] Tracy Alloway: what's China thinking?

[4:30] Rory Johnston: demand-destructive pricing [6:30] Rory Johnston: felt very COVID-y [15:00] swimming in oil [15:00] Rory Johnston: tinfoil hat [15:00] Rory Johnston: Trump doctrine [20:00] Jeff Currie: This is not supply responding to price. It's inventory responding to price—and inventory, unlike production, has a floor. [20:00] Rory Johnston: discretionary supply [25:00] raging buy [25:00] Rory Johnston: everyone was bullish, but no one was buying [25:00] Rory Johnston: jawboning [32:15] Joe Weisenthal: The barrel math is the barrel math. But if it did... change the behavior of traders who might have—that point about their risk limits, that's interesting.

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As industries evolve faster than ever, companies need an environment that accelerates strategic growth, and Michigan delivers on that promise. From emerging startups to global enterprises, Michigan offers what executives value most a resilient innovative ecosystem diverse communities that attract top talent and a quality of life that supports work balance With our unified Team Michigan approach businesses scale faster and compete at the highest level Michigan, pure opportunity. Seize your opportunity at michiganbusiness.org. Bloomberg Audio Studios, podcasts, radio, news. Hello and welcome to another episode of the Odd Lots podcast. I'm Joe Weisenthal. And I'm Tracy Allaway. Tracy, recording this June 24th at noon, Brent crude is below $74 a barrel. I know. It's crazy to look back when the Iran war started. I don't think we ever got above like $120 per barrel on Brent. despite this scenario, the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, the thing that oil analysts had talked about as a tail risk event for years and years and years actually happening. No, it is really remarkable. We had two peaks. There was one right at the end of March and then one right at the end of April basically and the closing price right around just a little bit shy of 120 both of those days But no absolutely not like some of the doomsday scenarios at least for now, you know, their crossings are picking up, I guess, negotiations are ongoing of some sort. But no, they clearly the doomsday scenarios about how this couldn't even stay closed for a few weeks, let alone two or three months did not pan out. I see a lot of people on Twitter slash X making fun of the barrel counters right now. Yes. Which I have a lot of sympathy for barrel counters, because I like my analysis to be grounded in facts and numbers, but there is clearly a disconnect here between what happened with the price and some of those predictions. Well, maybe we learned something. Maybe we learned something about the oil market in the last few months. We've gotten a lot of requests for this episode, and so we are going to talk to someone that we talked to right at the very beginning of the war, someone we've talked to a lot, someone whose oil analysis would greatly respect, even if this particular incident did not perhaps pan out the way he and many others, almost all the others expected. We're going to be speaking with Rory Johnston. He is the founder of the Commodity Context Newsletter. And maybe he learned something about the oil market in the last few months So Rory thank you so much by fan request and a request because we want to learn something too By fan request welcome back to the podcast thanks for having me guys let just start with like what was let before let start with like okay early march remind listeners what this sort of your take and the sort of general wisdom was you know first couple weeks of march about how long this could persist and why this remind people why the Strait of Hormuz was seen as sort of the choke point among choke points when it comes to oil. Yeah. So let's transport ourselves back to our last conversation. I think it was the first time travel machine music, right? They can add that. So yeah, the reason that it was such a massive deal and still remains, I would say, I mean, while we have avoided the doomsday prophecies, it is still by far the largest supply disruption in the market's history and for the numbers for the barrel counting for Tracy the total flow through Hormuz prior to the war was roughly 20 million barrels a day now we knew we weren't going to lose all of that because we knew that we had some offsets you know the Saudi east-west pipeline the Emirati pipeline to Fujairah on the Gulf of Beaumont but overall net netting for all of those known rerouting options which again at the time we didn't know if they would fully work because they'd never been fully tested but [5:00] It did work, thankfully, but even netting of those, we were still down roughly 13 million barrels a day of Gulf oil production, excluding Iran, that had been forcibly shut in through the duration of this crisis and is only now beginning to pick back up again. That's a lot of oil. That's 13 plus percent of the global supply. And the reason we thought that prices were going to hit $150 or even $200 a barrel was that when you have a supply shock that large without any more offsets, you end up at demand-destructive pricing really, really fast. And to destroy that level, the depth of that demand, we had never seen that before, but $200 a barrel seemed like the reasonable price at which that would happen. Now, thankfully, we did not have to destroy that demand. And what we will talk about shortly, I'm sure, is all the ways in which the system adapted and flexed. And I think we saw this most notably above all in China. Yeah. OK, well, why don't we just dive into it? Give us your overview on what happened and why we didn't actually hit $200 a barrel. Yeah. So I'd say the two biggest things, one on the fundamentals on the barrel counting side was China. We always knew that China had huge stockpiles of oil but we didn know how they were going to react to this crisis And what we seen through this crisis is that Chinese oil imports crude oil imports into China the world's largest crude oil importer, fell by upwards of 5 million barrels a day between the three-month average prior to the war through to June. Now, we're not quite done this month, but that's roughly where we're trending for June so far. That 5 million barrels a day was upwards of half of the total spot market supply hit to Asia. And that allowed a lot of those other Asian importers to basically not have the competition that they would have had for the barrels they were importing. So the countries that were hit hardest by this crisis and the governments that were most panicked, governments in South Korea, Australia, Japan, Taiwan, etc. There was a period where like the prime minister of Australia was coming out daily and announcing the Australian government's successful acquisition of a cargo of diesel. Like it felt very COVID-y. Now, those importers saw imports collapse through March and April, but through May and into June, they actually recovered basically to pre-war levels. And the largest facilitator of that was the fact that China was not competing for any of the other barrels and it absorbed so much of the shock itself Just on China specifically I have so many questions already but do you have any sense of how much of this was genuine demand destruction or substitution in China versus just releasing from stockpiles? It's a good question. And the firm answers, we do not have 100% certainty as to what the exact composition of that swing was. We know the oil going in fell by five to six million barrels a day given products as well. But in terms of the actual demand destruction, the thing that we have seen across China is that all of the mobility indicators, and you guys were actually in China very recently, all the mobility indicators showed no notable decline. The level of implied demand destruction that we see, and importantly here, China does not publish official demand data. It also doesn't, very importantly, publish official inventory data. So we're left kind of feeling around the shadows. The implied demand destruction we saw through this crisis was on par, was the steepest demand destruction implied in history, and on par on the volume with the COVID zero demand shock in 2022. But you guys were in China. I have not seen any reporting that indicates that level of lockdown. So we start asking questions, okay, what going on in the middle Also when you look at typically you assume that that level of demand destruction without COVID zero lockdowns would have had to be driven by massive price increases But part of what also happened to this crisis is that China had basically throttled the ability of domestic retail prices through their normal regulatory procedures. Prices of petrol in Beijing only rose maybe 30 percent versus the doubling we saw globally. So again, it just doesn't track for me that all of that or even most of that was demand destruction. So then we go to this point about substitution or outright releases of strategic petroleum reserves. Now, the one thing we can say is that the inventories we can see, these are the floating roof storage tanks for crude oil, those are still very, very high and roughly where they stood at the beginning of this crisis. So as far as we can tell, they're not drawing down aggressively on those stocks, at least not yet. The caveat there is that we can't see through those satellite analyses, we can't see underground storage tanks, underground storage caverns and their proper SPR. They have six storage caverns, at least that we know of about 131 million barrels. The likelihood is that they have been drawing down those because the following crude oil imports fell far faster than the decline in refining run rates. So again, had to be made up somewhere. So we're just kind of feeling around the shadows for the Occam's razor here is [10:00] They have been releasing silently additional crude inventories. But above and beyond that, we know that crude refining run rates also fell dramatically by three to three and a half million barrels a day. So where's the implied demand destruction? Now, this is where we either get one of two things. We either get a very large release of refined product stocks. Now, we know that China has large stocks of refined products like gasoline, diesel, jet fuel, etc. We have virtually no firm information on those stock levels or can track them very closely day to day or week to week because unlike crude, they don't have they don't have floating roofs. So we have to kind of, again, infer those stockpiles upwards of a billion barrels. But the implication is that they're drawing them down very, very, very rapidly. The other thing we could have seen is and your your colleague, Javier Blas, was on this very early, was on the potential to switch some of the petrochemical feedstocks from oil derived products like NAFTA and LPG towards more gas based products, natural gas or even the extreme coal based chemical products that could, again, have a switch on the margin. And then the other thing that you hear is that like well China has massive penetration of electric vehicles So maybe that was making part of it as well The challenge is that it not the sales penetration the sales composition that drives fuel demand, it's the fleet composition. And while new energy vehicles in China are like 60 plus percent of new vehicle sales, the overall stock of vehicles in China is still 10 to 1 internal combustion engines to EVs. So the implication would have to be that Beijing at this massive fleet of EVs. They're like waiting to roll off the line. And that just doesn't seem plausible on the timeline we're talking about. That is a very important stat to keep in mind. And I didn't know the exact numbers, but I do think that's important because we all, yeah, we talk about the declining like oil intensivity of the Chinese economy due to growing EV sales. You know, it's going to take a while before it really swings and enough to make a difference. You don't think they have a secret stockpile of EVs. They have a strategic pork reserve. They just swap out everyone's cars. Everyone gets a free EV for a few months. And you get an Apollo. And you get an Apollo. You know what's really cool about the Chinese EVs? Yeah. Or sorry, the Chinese automatic driving vehicles. All cars whether they the official robo or when you in a car that you push on self mode they have this blue light that shows up So it not like the typical red light And so you can see every single car on the road in China that is currently operating in an autonomous manner and know if there's a human. Oh, I see. Yeah, it's pretty nice. You know, you mentioned, Tracy, at the beginning of the episode, barrel counting. I think one of the reasons we like talking to Rory is that I do consider you to be a humble barrel counter because it's so easy in oil conversation to get tempted by grand threads about geopolitics, right? Because it's sort of intertwined. So I really do appreciate the humble barrel counter. But when we talk about this sort of like China's willingness to either draw down stocks, et cetera, there's two sort of related questions that I have. It's like, one is, could China just be like, have done its neighbors a solid in the sense that it's like, you know what we really do have quite a big buffer and we know that Singapore and Taiwan and Korea are really going to be Japan are going to really be under strain so from like a sort of soft power goodwill thing like we don't really need to be adding and be given that we know and be given the EV penetration even if it small now it going to grow is the consensus in oil world that the massive stockpiles in China do they exist in the event of like preparation for a theoretical war which would be a very oil intensive process Yeah, so let's work in reverse there. And I think so. Back in 2023, I wrote a piece called Chinese oil demand ads, which was about how in 2023 with this massive growth in Chinese apparent demand. Again, remember, China doesn't publish official demand stats. It was so big, and China was still pretty weak coming out of COVID zero at that point. It didn't seem plausible. And I kind of speculated that maybe they were building refined product stocks, which we can't see because of the way we calculate this stuff. And at the time, the worry was that it was in anticipation of a war or an invasion of Taiwan. At that stage, you had an increased bellicosity of Beijing, a lot of saber rattling, them buzzing airspace, naval drills, etc. So I think that was definitely part of it that was the thought at the time now what we've seen is that obviously came in very very handy now for much the same reason although not getting blockaded through malacca yeah but just the lack of hormuz itself which again was always part of china's kind of strategic or perception of strategic precarity of its uh of its stockpiles and but i think to this point of like why this is [15:00] Question that continues, I continue to obsess about, because it also kind of tells you when they're going to re-enter the market. Because as we will talk right now, not only are crude oil prices collapsing, but we've actually seen prompt Brent time spreads, the difference between the first and the second contract, actually flip into outright contango today. So I think it's a particular suspicious day. So we're swimming in oil. We're swimming in oil, at least relative to demand. And I think part of that is that China just still hasn't stepped back in as a competitive importer. So to your point, Joe, this idea that like maybe Beijing was playing the altruistic neighbor, which I think is I think one of the theories I'm holding as well, which is not only do they want to kind of be seen as the good neighbor, not only do they want to be seen as kind of standing up and defending its neighbors when very clearly in their in their telling Washington has abandoned you and kind of stuck you with this massive energy crisis. Yeah. The challenge, I think, with that, I think also if China is trying to pivot away from the U.S. market. Its only other market options are Asia or Europe, really, in terms of like a sizable sources of demand. So it's not its interest to see those economies kind of collapse while North America remains relatively insulated given domestic supplies I think the only challenge with this theory is that if that was true I would have expected China to say something about it And the fact is is that so far we have seen we heard virtually nothing from Beijing or any of the regulatory authorities that this is happening, why it's happening, or the scale of what we're talking about. The other, I think, more nefarious option, and you were just talking about how I'm a humble barrel counter, I don't like to go grand strategy. But I think there is like the put my tinfoil hat on for a second. Why would China do this and not talk about it? The other option, I still think this is less likely because it seems very nefarious. But we had the Trump administration visiting Beijing a couple months ago. At the time, it seemed like nothing much came out of those meetings. It seemed pretty lukewarm at best. But I think there's a chance that you saw some kind of discussion between the Trump administration and Beijing over like, help us out with this, and we will do something for you in the future. Now, what could that be? One of the things that was happening at the time was with all of the military equipment destroyed in the Middle East from the Iranian attacks, lots of advanced radar systems, anti-ship, anti-aircraft missiles, et cetera et cetera Washington began migrating all of its kit that had been in Asia back over to the Middle East So maybe this is part of this broader kind of Dunro doctrine that Trump sees himself as pulling out of Asia And maybe someone somewhere made that point and said, like, if you help us, we'll keep this going. That said, I again, I don't think any of this perfectly fits. And I think the easy answer is that it remains a mystery as to why China is doing this. The only problem is, is that given that we still don't understand why China did this, or even to that degree, how exactly they managed to pull it off, it makes it difficult to handicap when they're going to enter back into the market, because obviously a 5 million barrel a day swing is massive in this context. And right now, I think part of the reason that crude prices and time spreads are back in the contango today is that we have this rising surge of exiting transits out of Hormuz that are running up against a still relatively weak import market driven first and foremost by China. Thank you Finding the right promotional products makes all the difference 4imprint offers thousands of options from on apparel and premium drinkware to tech totes and giveaways so you can find the right fit for any audience, purpose, or budget. You can customize it all, your logo, your message, your look, and many items come with no setup charge to help you save. 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Not noise, Proof of how we can help companies get smarter by putting AI where it actually pays off. Deep in the work that moves the business. Let's create smarter business. IBM. So China isn the only one that been releasing from stockpiles So the U also has a strategic petroleum reserve And I think we were getting pretty close to the operational minimum on that thing And Jeff Curry who's been on the podcast a number of times, he had a really good line basically saying this is not supply responding to price. It's inventory responding to price and inventory, unlike production, has a floor. So devil's advocate question, but like, if this kept going, if the Hormuz shuts again, or if it hadn't been opened in recent days, and I guess I should mention we're recording this on June 24th, could that inventory response have gone away? And could we see prices shoot up? Absolutely. You know, when we started this crisis, we had been in a surplus in the oil market for upwards of a year. We had built substantial stockpiles, both commercial and strategic, obviously in the case of China strategic. We were as buffered as humanly possible to weather this shock. I still didn't think it was enough at the time, and that proved out to be thankfully incorrect. But now we have drawn down massive volumes of oil. To put in perspective, that 13 million barrels a day of Middle Eastern productions and shut the cumulative volume of that to date is roughly 1 billion barrels Like we talking massive massive gobs of oil The collective IEA SPR release at its upper end is pegged at about 400 million barrels. The cumulative reduction in Chinese imports over this period, again, relative to three months prior to the war, is between four and 500 million. So at least on that basis alone, China swung as much and likely more than the collective IEA member states. And what I will say about SPRs, in my modeling, in my mental model, I think about SPRs not as inventory per se, but as discretionary supply and demand. That when you think about the effect of inventories on prices, and I think they are the primary thing that drives prices and perceptions of scarcity, it's mainly the commercial kind of merchant inventories that catch the residual, the remaining surplus or deficit after all is said and done that drives that kind of marginal pricing influence. But an SPR release, as an example, manifests in the market as new supply, not new production, but new supply that wasn't available before. And we're actually seeing another stock or strategic stock release of that kind in a way right now in Hormuz itself We had for this whole period we had well over 100 million barrels of oil trapped in Hormuz These are the ships that have been trapped unable to escape Those are the ships that we seeing rise very quickly in terms of their exit pace out of Hormuz again. But because that is the stockpile, the floating oil available in Hormuz is drawing down faster than it is being replenished with new loadings. The pace that we're seeing come out of hormones right now also is inherently unsustainable and itself represents some kind of stockpile release from a stockpile that was not accessible to the market in the Gulf to now a stockpile that is accessible to the market in the broader market in the broader world. But that's right now what's running up against the lack of Chinese import demand. First of all, I have a very short question. The start of the year, Brent was around 60 and on the eve of the war was 70. Just Just real quickly, would you say a non-trivial amount of that $10 a barrel increase was, I mean, people were talking about the risk of war all year. Would you say at least some of that was driven by war premium already rising before the initial strikes? Yes. Okay. And I think part of that too, again, remember that the oil market was exceptionally weak prior to this. Flat prices rising because, as you noted, I think there was this kind of precautionary kind of geopolitical premium being built in. [25:00] But on the eve of the war, the last week before the war, we saw prompt Brent also dipping into Contanga. That was your sign that we had too much supply. So I think that that was exactly what happened. So right now, oil is like, again, just below 74 and like 70 on the eve of the war. Not necessarily a reason to think that that's a floor, given what we know about the world swimming in oil. So maybe it could even go lower. All right. I'm going to try and do something that's like a very like we're all doing like self-criticism here, a theme of the day. So we're going to do like a sort of double counterfactual question. So if I had been a smarter interviewer in March of 2026, which feels like a long time ago, you know, I think I probably asked you, you know, it's like, OK, I was like, well, what about that pipeline that Saudi Arabia has gone on? And I might have said, well, what about the role of SPRs? Or maybe even I might have asked something like, what about lowering sanctions on Russian oil, etc.? I did not ask, Rory, China is importing so much more oil than it needs to operate its economy day to day. So if I had asked you, and so this is going to force you to put yourself in early March mind. So let imagine it early March And I say Rory but can China just massively reduce its imports They don use that much oil It a bunch of EVs What would Rory in March 10th or whatever 2026 how would you have thought then if I had proposed that as a possible way out of this crisis this i like this game so i think that what i would have said at the time is we knew we were going to get i you know ie member state strategic releases we probably were also going to get some kind of or at least at the time the thought would have that we might have get some kind of chinese release or at least they would have stopped stopped stockpiling but i still at the time i would have found it very implausible that they reduced imports by five million barrels a day okay i think it's in terms of the scale, I think that yes, there could have been a little bit of reduction there. But even in hindsight, it's still very, very surprising the scale of reduction we saw. The other thing I think is that the other question that I you know, if I was to go back and kind of challenge my own challenge myself, I'll do the meta meta here. I would say that, okay, we had this big surplus beforehand. Everything looked very, very bearish. This was thought to be a temporary shock at the time. And it's inherently temporary, because we all thought it wasn't going to be sustainable. The challenge is that when we think about fair value in the market we think about the relationship between inventories and prices Part of what we historically seen is that when inventories get really low and prices get really high the outlook for future balances is also pretty precarious But what we see in this crisis is that going in, we were oversupplied. The future was looking even more oversupplied. So when you saw inventories drawing down towards tank bottoms, yes, if we hit tank bottoms and we actually hit that acute reckoning where you had to destroy demand because there's literally nothing left, then, yeah, you could have gotten this massive spike. But in terms of the market's wariness or concern about those lower levels, you could make an argument that, well, it doesn't really matter if they go low because we know they're going to get swollen again next year as soon as this is open. And I think that that's one thing that I may have misappreciated at the time, even if I went into this crisis bearish before flipping bullish during and after Hormuz was closed. I still thought that Hormuz was such a larger kind of shock to the system that even going in with a three million barrel a day surplus, a 13 million barrel a day loss of production was still going to put you in an extraordinarily tight position. But again I think that that part of what I may have misconsider I think the one final thing I say and the one thing I haven mentioned so far and I think we should is the jawbone is the fact that when I talk to traders the one thing I heard time and time and time again is that, and these are like, these are prop kind of oil and products traders. They have their own models that show them fair value. They keep saying like all their models say this is a raging buy, but they got so blown out repeatedly in that kind of March and April period, All their risk management kind of limits have been throttled down by 90 percent. That there was this general the quote was everyone's bullish, but no one's buying. And I think one thing I also deeply misappreciated going into this crisis was the potential power of Trump himself, more broadly, Trump administration to inject so much downside volatility that it kind of arrested the normal melt up process. And I think that if we had just had jawboning, I don't think it would have been enough. If we just had China import contraction, I don't think it would have been enough to arrest that melt up that we saw through March and April. But I think the combination of them proved to be especially potent that you had, you kept resetting the clock and all the while, markets kept loosening because of China's kind of pullback on imports. So I think the combination [30:00] The nation of them proved to be way more powerful than I have ever expected. And I think going forward has really shown the degree to which the market, the oil market is much more resilient, at least in this kind of condition, to a big shock like that in a way that I just hadn't appreciated at the time. Can I just ask on the inventories and strategic reserves? So one of the bullish arguments I've seen, and there are still some oil bulls out there, But they say, well, stockpiles are low now, so people are going to have to fill them up, right? And you're going to get like maybe structurally higher demand for oil for the next couple years or so. Is that a theory that you buy into? People need to refill their oil tanks? yes and no and i think again it goes to that split between how i think about strategic and commercial inventories differently or strategic stocks and commercial inventories differently i think that yes there will be an impetus to let's say refill the spr in the united states refill the spr in japan countries that didn't have sprs going into this that all of a sudden wished they had them like india you seen a lot of examples of countries building adnock the The Emirati natural oil producer has now made plans for a 50 million barrel strategic commercial strategic stock in India coming out of this So I think that will structurally undergird demand for the next year or two or maybe even three. But I don't think that that demand is going to manifest as long as the market is tight. So you need to get back to a stage where the market is looser. Otherwise, you're just kind of retighten the market through SPR rebuilds. I think on the commercial stock, I think that is a situation where you kind of need a surplus in order to rebuild those stockpiles in the first place. So I do think that right now we are deeply underwater on most global kind of trackable commercial stockpiles. And I think we need a period of surplus in order to get us back up to normal levels. But we probably don't need to get back to where we were, say, at the beginning of the crisis where we had abnormally high levels of inventories. That was fantastic. By the way, this reminds me, you know what an episode I really want to do? And it's been requested actually by a listener. We should do an episode about the $20 billion Dengote Petroleum Refinery that opened recently in Lagos, Nigeria. So this incredible engineering feat one of the most important refineries in the world right now hasn been opened very long Anyway I was only reminded by that because of your point about maybe more countries are going to think about having SPRs in the first place Rory Johnson thank you so much for coming on Really appreciate you willing to talk about an incorrect call. Appreciate your candor and coming back on Adler. Thanks for having me, guys. Thanks, Rory. Thanks, Rory. We all learned something. Yeah, we all learned something. Me most of all. Tracy, I thought there were a lot of interesting moving parts. I liked his point about the sort of intersection between the Chinese import reduction and the jawboning, which at the time, I didn't put a ton of weight on it because I was like, the barrel math is the barrel math. But if it did, as he put it, like, changed the behavior of traders who might have, that point about their risk limits, that's interesting. That was really interesting. And also, if you remember back in March, sort of April, there was a lot of discussion of the disconnect between the physical market where like you couldn get barrels versus the actual financial market which like wasn showing that big price increase There were a lot of threads that I didn totally understand But it was a really weird time in the market And it was absolutely true that at least for several weeks, there were all those headlines about like, oh, in the Philippines, you can only drive to work two days a week or whatever. And so it was like a real crisis. It was not the headline crude barrel price never got to 200 or even 150. But it was like deep, deep stress. Yeah, that's the thing, right? It's like the tension between people not being able to get oil and the prices actually not shooting up that much. But also, I think the big question that we're all left with is what's China thinking? Yeah, totally. Like why they do it, right? Right. We don't really know. And then just in terms of, I guess, the short to medium trader question, will and when will they reenter the market in the same levels that they were pre-war is like a really interesting question for people to watch currently. I would love to see one of China's like oil caverns. Oh, that would be good. Well, that would be good. Let's do it. Let's do a road trip. All right. Shall we leave it there? Let's leave it there. This has been another episode of the All Thoughts Podcast. I'm Tracy Allaway. You can follow me at Tracy Alloway. And I'm Joe Weisenthal. [35:00] at the stalwart. Follow our guest, Rory Johnston at Rory underscore Johnston. Follow our producers, Carmen Rodriguez at Carmen Armand, Dashiell Bennett at Dashbot, Kale Brooks at Kale Brooks, and Kevin Lozano at Kevin Lloyd Lozano. And for more Odd Lots content, go to bloomberg.com slash oddlots for the daily newsletter and all of our episodes. 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