Franchise Model Shielded Corporations From Labor Laws, Shaping Gig Economy

特许经营模式助企业规避劳动法，塑造零工经济 快餐特许经营商重塑了20世纪中叶的反垄断规则，在施加严格运营控制的同时摆脱雇主责任，为现代零工平台将劳动者归类为独立承包商奠定了法律蓝图。 本期节目分析了特许经营模式的悖论：该模式虽然描绘了独立开店创业的美好蓝图，却剥夺了加盟商的运营自主权，使压缩劳动力成本成为其获利的主要途径。嘉宾 Brian Callaci 阐述了快餐连锁企业如何在20世纪中叶发起策略性的法律与反垄断诉讼以获得“双重豁免”——即在反垄断诉讼中主张“单一实体”以证明控制权的合法性，在面对劳工监管机构时又坚称彼此为“独立实体”以规避用工与工会责任。这种企业架构为 Uber 和 Amazon DSP 等现代零工经济平台奠定了法律、经济与技术基础，使其得以借助算法实施控制，同时让母公司彻底免除雇主责任。 特许经营常以“做自己的老板”为宣传卖点，但实际上母公司对菜单、定价、设备乃至服务话术实行严密微观控制，加盟商需支付总营业额6%至20%的特许权使用费并承担个人资产风险，其盈利空间与上限均被严格限制。 (0:00) 历史上的快餐连锁巨头构建了“双重豁免”法律策略：在反垄断法院前自称是“单一实体”以证明垂直控制的合法性，但在面对劳工监管机构时又声称是“独立实体”，以此免除最低工资、加班费及工会组织等雇主法律责任。 (10:00) 由于特许人严格控制原料供应链和价格体系，加盟商提升利润的主要手段是压低当地员工时薪并极限提高单兵产出，特许人因而更倾向招募听话执行操作手册的管理者，而非具有创新思维的企业家。 (22:00) 特许监管已从早期的神秘顾客抽检演进为基于POS机和AI软件的实时数字化员工监控；快餐品牌在20世纪60至70年代通过反垄断诉讼确立的“垂直限制免责”架构，直接为现代Uber和亚马逊等零工经济平台的算法控制奠定了法律范式。 (24:30) 实证经济学研究表明，直营店工人的薪资水平与安全合规度明显高于同品牌的特许加盟店，取消特许经营网络内的“互不挖角”协议可直接推动工人薪酬上涨。 (35:00)

Economist Brian Callaci and the program hosts argue that business-format franchising established the legal and operational architecture for the modern gig economy by allowing corporate brands to exert centralized operational control while disclaiming employer liabilities. By successfully reinterpreting antitrust law and structuring contracts to treat subordinate operators as independent businesses, corporate parents externalized labor costs, operational risks, and regulatory responsibilities. The Entrepreneurial Paradox of Business Franchising (5:00) Franchising is widely marketed as an accessible path to independent business ownership, yet economist Brian Callaci observes that franchisees function essentially as risk-bearing middle managers. Under typical agreements, operators invest their own savings and pay 6% to 20% of gross sales in royalties for access to established trademarks. In exchange, corporate franchisors impose rigid operating manuals dictating store hours, pricing, greeting scripts, drive-thru limits, and approved equipment vendors. This framework creates an asymmetric risk profile: franchisees face tightly bounded financial upside while absorbing severe downside losses from corporate missteps, national promotions, or local store failures. Because corporate headquarters strictly controls menu pricing and supply inputs, local operators lack conventional managerial levers to improve profit margins, leaving them with few options other than squeezing store-level labor. Double-Barrel Immunity and Antitrust Reinterpretation (10:00) The modern franchise structure emerged from strategic legislative and legal battles waged during the 1960s to dismantle mid-century antitrust protections. Early postwar courts viewed vertical restraints—contractual conditions imposed down a supply chain—as illegal infringements on independent business autonomy. Aided by Chicago School legal scholars who prioritized economic efficiency over small-proprietor protections, franchisors successfully lobbied courts to evaluate vertical restrictions under a permissive 'rule of reason.' This shift established what Callaci terms a 'double-barrel immunity.' In antitrust litigation, franchisors defend internal restraints and no-poaching clauses by arguing that the franchise network functions as a single integrated entity. Conversely, in labor and tort disputes—such as wage violations, unionization efforts, or traffic accidents tied to delivery guarantees—franchisors insist they are entirely separate corporate entities, insulating brand owners from direct employer liability. Labor Compression and the Rise of Digital Oversight Because input costs and customer pricing are fixed by the brand, local wages represent the primary variable cost franchisees can actively manage. Empirical research by David Weil and Alan Krueger indicates that workers at franchised locations earn lower wages, face slower wage growth, and experience more safety violations than counterparts at corporate-owned chains like Starbucks or Chipotle. A natural experiment following a Washington state consent decree confirmed that eliminating intra-brand no-poaching clauses directly increased fast-food worker wages. To enforce operational uniformity without directly employing local crews, franchisors historically avoided creative entrepreneurs in favor of compliant managers, while progressively upgrading monitoring technologies. Oversight evolved from mid-century mystery shoppers to broadband-connected point-of-sale data streams in the 1990s, culminating in modern AI software that tracks individual crew transaction speeds and drive-thru timing in real time. Franchising as the Architectural Ancestor of Gig Work (30:00) The legal separation perfected by franchise chains directly enabled modern tech platforms like Uber and Amazon's Delivery Service Partner (DSP) program. Rather than inventing a fundamentally new employment model, gig platforms substituted algorithmic dispatching, pricing, and routing for paper franchise manuals. In Amazon's DSP model, small contractor firms operate fleets of branded vans under strict corporate performance standards, echoing the traditional franchise relationship. By operating through disaggregated contractor networks, gig companies maintain centralized managerial control while avoiding direct employment liabilities, minimum wage guarantees, and collective bargaining under the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act. While corporate platforms capture platform rents and efficiency gains, systemic operational expenses—including vehicle wear, delivery accident risks, and local emissions—are shifted onto contractors, drivers, and the public. Callaci argues that modern regulatory architecture—built around a mid-20th-century model of integrated manufacturing firms—must be updated to hold companies legally accountable as employers whenever they exercise direct operational control over labor. However, key policies such as the National Labor Relations Board's joint-employer standard remain subject to sharp partisan reversals across presidential administrations, leaving the legal boundaries of the firm unresolved.

开放市场研究所首席经济学家Brian Callaci与播客主持人指出，现代特许经营模式在法律与经济机制上重塑了企业的边界，通过将运营风险与用工责任转嫁给加盟商，为现代零工经济平台的算法控制与劳工外包铺平了道路。 自主经营假象与双重豁免策略 (5:00) 特许经营常以“做自己的老板”和现成品牌为卖点吸引加盟商，但其实际运作近乎严格的微观管理。总公司通常抽取总销售额6%至20%的特许权使用费，并牢牢掌控菜单、定价、营业时间、话术及指定供应商。这使加盟商在承担门店全部资本风险的同时，丧失了战略决策权与上行利润空间。Callaci指出，该架构在经济学上利用加盟商的个人积蓄解决了“委托-代理问题”，迫使其拼命维持运营。 在法律层面，特许经营体系发展出所谓的“双重豁免”策略。20世纪60年代，国际特许经营协会（IFA）等游说团体与芝加哥学派学者推动司法界重塑反垄断法，主张放弃对小业主的保护以追求经济效率。面对反垄断法审查时，品牌方声称与加盟店是“单一实体”，以合法实施纵向限制；但在面对劳动法、最低工资和工会诉求时，品牌方又坚称双方是完全独立的商业实体，从而彻底免除了自身的雇主责任。 利润杠杆收缩与劳工成本挤压 由于原材料采购、销售价格和运营手册均被总部单方面强制锁定，加盟商提升盈利的手段极其有限，这迫使他们将压缩劳工成本作为主要利润杠杆。这不仅催生了严苛的职场劳动强度，也促使体系青睐绝对服从的管理者，而非具有自主创新意识的企业家。例如Ray Kroc在麦当劳早期便放弃了富裕的被动投资者，转向招募依赖日常实体运营谋生的移民和勤勉经营者。 总部还曾长期通过“禁止互挖员工”（no-poach）条款限制劳动力跨店流动，压低薪酬增长。在反垄断法中，独立业主之间达成的互不挖人协议属于非法的横向卡特尔，但总部自上而下施加的限制却被法院归类为受“合理原则”审视的纵向限制。华盛顿州随后通过同意令强制废除麦当劳等连锁品牌的此类条款，该自然实验在实证上证明了消除限制能直接拉动一线工人的薪资水平。 监控技术迭代与私募股权介入 特许经营最初要求经营者承担个人劳动并以个人资产（如房产和储蓄）提供兜底担保，但该行业目前正在经历大规模的资本重构。私募股权机构不仅收购品牌特许权以攫取稳定的特许权使用费，还开始大量兼并多单元加盟商的资产组合，控制跨品牌的上百家门店，改变了传统的个人小业主结构。 伴随资本重组的是企业监控手段的全面技术化。监督手段已从20世纪60年代的神秘顾客、电话和传真，演进至90年代接入销售终端（POS）的宽带数据流，进而发展为当今基于AI的实时跟踪系统。如今总部能够直接追踪收银速度与穿梭餐厅出餐时长，对一线员工施加超越传统工业巨头的精细控制，同时在法律上维持独立实体的外壳以规避直接雇主责任。 从快餐网络到算法零工平台 (30:00) 特许经营开创的法律防护网直接催生了现代外卖与网约车平台的用工模式。企业通过将配送等业务在运营与经济上“内部化”（严格指定路线与时间），同时在法律责任上将其“外部化”，把一线劳动力界定为独立承包商。Amazon的配送服务伙伴（DSP）项目便是典型代表：Amazon提供初期资金支持并严格掌控日常规范，由拥有约30辆货车的小型承包公司承担车队运营风险及交通事故等连带责任。 经济学研究揭示了这种组织裂变带来的福利代价。正如David Weil在《裂变的工作场所》中所述，全直营连锁品牌（如Chipotle和Starbucks）的薪资水平、职业成长空间与合规记录普遍优于依赖特许加盟的竞品。此外，1947年《塔夫脱-哈特利法》禁止次级抵制，剥夺了加盟店工人直接向品牌母公司施压或抗议的权利。美国全国劳工关系委员会（NLRB）推行的“联合雇主规则”虽试图将控制日常运营的母公司纳入谈判范畴，但该政策在两党执政更替间反复摇摆。 Callaci主张，战后建立的美国监管框架建立在传统工矿企业等明确的雇主边界之上，而特许经营开辟的法律漏洞使企业在行使内部中央计划式控制的同时逃避了法律责任。若企业通过算法调度或运营手册实质控制劳动者的行为与收入，就应当在法律上被认定为雇主并承担相应风险，但如何界定这类联合雇主标准在政策实践中仍存争议。

## Background 本期节目由彭博（Bloomberg）旗下的播客栏目《Odd Lots》于 2026 年 7 月 24 日在网络与 RSS 平台发布。页面简介显示，节目邀请了开放市场研究所（Open Markets Institute）首席经济学家、《指挥链：加盟经济的兴起与残酷统治》作者布莱恩·卡拉奇（Brian Callaci），深入探讨了自 20 世纪 50 年代兴起的快餐特许加盟模式如何通过合同约束实现微观控制，以及该体系在法律层面的长期博弈如何为现代优步（Uber）与亚马逊等平台的零工经济铺平了道路。 ## TL;DR 节目深入剖析了特许加盟体系在“自主创业”光鲜外衣下的制度真相：品牌总部借助商标法和精密合同牢牢锁死定价、供应链与微观流程，剥夺了加盟商除压低工人工资外的几乎所有经营杠杆。在法律演进中，特许巨头巧妙利用反垄断法（主张单一实体的高效控制）与劳动法（主张加盟商为独立第三方）之间的制度套利，实现了“独享垂直一体化控制红利、却彻底免除用工与雇主法律责任”的闭环。随着 POS 数据流与 AI 监控技术的升级，这种将风险和劳资矛盾下沉、由算法实行无孔不入支配的商业架构，直接成为当代网约车与外包物流等零工经济的底层制度蓝本。 ## Atmosphere & style 对话在两位主持人 Tracy Alloway 与 Joe Weisenthal 敏锐而略带调侃的互动中拉开帷幕，从快餐文化的浪漫化滤镜迅速切入到底层商业逻辑的残酷现实。经济学家嘉宾布莱恩·卡拉奇的叙述沉稳详实、条理清晰，凭借扎实的历史法案与实证合同编码研究，层层戳破“做自己的老板”这一美国梦叙事泡沫。整期节目的讨论兼具学术思辨的严密与商业八卦的趣味，在冷静拆解资本免责防火墙的过程中，流露出对一线劳工被系统性剥削与监控的深切关切，带给听众一种豁然开朗却又略感冷峻的深度收听体验。 ## Bulletin - `06:05` 特许经营本质上并非组织创新，而是利用商标许可制度建立的“纵向一体化”替代方案：品牌方抽取 6%-20% 的营收抽成并施加微观控制，同时借由法律防火墙将劳工福利与经营风险完全转嫁给加盟商。 - `30:00` 快餐连锁在 20 世纪 60 至 70 年代成功打通反垄断与劳动法之间的制度套利，开创了“既享有绝对控制权、又免除雇主连带责任”的模式，直接为优步（Uber）与亚马逊配送网络（DSP）等现代零工经济奠定了法律基础。 - `36:35` 实证研究显示，加盟体系下的用工违法率显著高于直营店，且加盟商在原料、设备与定价均被总公司锁死的情况下，压低基层工资与延长工时成为其维持利润的唯一杠杆。 - `27:00` 现代收银机实时数据流与 AI 监控技术的普及，使得特许品牌即便不直接雇佣一线工人，其对门店运营与个体员工行为的微观干预程度也已远超 1950 年代完全垂直一体化的传统工业巨头。 ## Key takeaways - `01:40` 特许加盟模式颠覆了传统创业神话，加盟商承担了重资产投入与经营亏损风险，但业务定价、营业时间及选品均受总部全盘控制，上升收益空间被锁死。 - `07:15` 特许经营解决了经济学上的委托-代理问题，促使加盟商基于全副身家投入高强度管理，同时在法律上隔断了劳资冲突向真正经济收益占有者（总部）的传导。 - `10:00` 战后快餐业借鉴了石油公司控制品牌加油站的避税与规避劳动法规手段，并在反垄断法传统防线前通过行业游说推动了特许控制模式的合法化。 - `13:30` 特许品牌在司法实践中运用“双管齐下的豁免权”：在反垄断诉讼中自称与加盟商属于不可分割的“单一实体”，在劳工法庭上则坚称双方是完全独立的第三方商业实体。 - `17:35` 加盟商常面临母公司的同业蚕食与灰色并购竞争，自掏腰包购买生产资料却失去对其支配权，成为母公司规避风险与转嫁成本的管道。 - `21:30` 快餐体系广泛推行的“禁止互挖协议”利用了反垄断法对横向垄断与纵向限制的二元划分，在“合理原则”掩护下将压低工人工资辩护为系统效率。 - `23:00` 在产品定价与采购成本完全受控的夹缝中，加盟商唯一的盈利杠杆是挤压劳动力成本并提高员工劳动强度，促使总部偏好缺乏退路的苦干型加盟商而非独立思考者。 - `25:00` 传统特许合同普遍要求加盟商承担“亲自劳动义务”且缺乏有限责任保护，但近年来私人股本开始大举下场扮演拥有数百家门店的大型法人特许运营商。 - `27:00` 数字技术与 AI 监视颠覆了传统商业史对外包的理解，使特许企业在不建立法律雇佣关系的前提下实现了超越传统重工业企业的微观劳动控制。 - `28:30` 特许经营重构了科斯与钱德勒的企业理论，将企业内部的权威命令延伸至组织边界之外，这一逻辑被硅谷科技平台照搬以构建网约车与外包即时配送体系。 - `35:00` 亚马逊 DSP 模式与优步模式是特许经营逻辑在数字时代的延续，以“成为自己的老板”为宣传话术，实则将工伤、超时与劳动合规风险外包给小型承运商。 - `36:35` 实证计量经济学研究表明，废除加盟体系内的无挖角协议能直接推动基层工人工资上涨，证明特许条款对劳动力市场存在系统性的买方垄断压制。 - `40:00` 1947年《塔夫脱-哈特莱法案》对二次罢工的禁止为特许模式提供了避开工会的强制度诱因，而“共同雇主规则”的拉锯战反映出司法在追究品牌实际控制责任上的制度困境。 - `43:00` 现代平台与快餐企业本质上扮演着高度集权的“微型中央计划者”，公共政策的核心诉求在于强制其控制权与雇主连带责任、侵权责任对等归位。 ## Detailed walkthrough ### `01:40` 快餐加盟的神话与现实：被剥夺自由的“创业者” 节目伊始，主持人 Tracy Alloway 和 Joe Weisenthal 探讨了大众对快餐连锁文化的认知。Tracy 坦言自己对快餐连锁店一直带有一种“浪漫化的滤镜”，这很大程度上源于经典喜剧电影《来到美国》（*Coming to America*，片中主角试图仿冒麦当劳开了一家 McDowell's），以及自己在海外长大的经历——这让美式快餐在童年记忆中显得格外新奇迷人。然而，一旦深入剖析加盟模式（Franchise Model）的底层逻辑，就会发现其内在结构极其怪诞：许多心怀抱负的小企业主抱着自主创业的梦想加入连锁体系，以为能够凭借知名品牌和现成客流在市场上站稳脚跟；然而现实却是，从商品选品、定价策略到日常运营规程，一切细节都被公司总部全盘掌控，加盟商几乎没有任何自由裁量权。 Joe Weisenthal 进一步指出，现代商业文化极其推崇所谓“当自己的老板”和创业神话，但这与加盟模式所施加的严苛限制完全背道而驰。在真正的创业场景中，创业者承担风险往往是为了追求巨大的“右尾收益”（即规模化扩张与高额利润空间）。但在典型的加盟关系中，这种上升空间早已被总部锁死；近年来 Uber 司机或亚马逊外包货运物流（DSP）司机被宣传为“独立小企业主”，也是同一种套路——法律层面上看似成立了独立实体，实质上却只是被剥离了福利保障的外包劳力，既无独立决策的自主权，也不可能获得传统创业带来的丰厚回报。 ### `04:45` 加盟商的困境：承担一切品牌风险，却没有话语权 加盟商在面对品牌总部时常常处于被动脆弱的地位。Tracy 和 Joe 讨论道，如果总部推行了灾难性的新产品策略——比如推出一款消费者根本不买账的失败三明治，或者投放了一则严重损害品牌声誉的争议广告，抑或是高管在公关场合表现失误——加盟商在法律合同约束下根本无法拒绝配合或自行调价，只能在最前线承担顾客流失和库存亏损的全部代价。Joe 特别提到，此前节目曾探讨过麦当劳加盟店冰淇淋机频频故障的案例，背后正是设备供应商泰勒公司（Taylor）与总部的排他性维修垄断：机器频繁出故障，却严禁加盟商自行寻找外部技术人员维修，只能支付高昂费用等待指定维修团队上门。 面对加盟商日渐收窄的利润空间，Tracy 提出疑问：在20世纪八九十年代，市场上经常能听到通过打造大型加盟帝国而跻身富豪行列的创富故事，如今这种商业路径是否依然走得通？在总部的全方位管控下，加盟店老板究竟还剩下哪些杠杆可以改善自身的经营状况？为了厘清加盟经济的演化路径与法律实质，节目邀请到了开放市场研究所（Open Markets Institute）首席经济学家、新书《指挥链：加盟经济的兴起与残酷统治》（*Chains of Command: The Rise and Cruel Reign of the Franchise Economy*）的作者布莱恩·卡拉奇（Brian Callaci）展开深度剖析。 ### `06:05` 加盟制的法律本质：商标许可与高度控制的中层管理 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 加盟模式的权力与资金流转结构 accDescr: 展示品牌总公司、加盟商与底层员工之间的控制、资金与法律防火墙关系 subgraph HQ["品牌总公司 (Franchisor)"] direction TB Brand["持有商标所有权与核心技术"] Rules["制定微观操作细则、定价与设备垄断"] end subgraph Store["加盟店经营者 (Franchisee)"] direction TB Capital["承担店铺资产投入与经营风险"] Manager["名义上的独立雇主 / 实际上的中层经理"] end subgraph Labor["一线门店员工 (Workers)"] direction TB Staff["执行高压标准化服务流程"] Wage["薪酬与福利被严重压缩"] end Brand -->|"授权商标与运营准则"| Store Store -->|"上缴 6%-20% 营业额抽成"| Brand Rules -.->|"法律防火墙隔离用工责任"| Labor Store -->|"转嫁成本压力与微观控制"| Labor ``` Brian Callaci 阐明，从法律本质来看，加盟制并不是什么复杂的组织创新，而是“商标法（Trademark Law）运作的一个历史副产物”。其核心架构非常直接：品牌方（如麦当劳总部）将商标使用权许可给表面上“独立”的本地小企业主；作为交换，加盟商必须将营业额的 6% 至 20% 作为特许权使用费（Royalties）持续上缴给总公司。对于品牌方而言，这是一种极其稳定、近乎无风险的现金流抽取模式。 但交易的核心痛点在于合同后半部分的管辖条款。为了维持所谓商标一致性与商誉标准，加盟商必须签署协议，无条件服从总部下达的极其细碎、严酷的操作指令。加盟商的自主权几乎被压缩为零： - 销售价格、营业时间与产品组合完全由总部统一钦定； - 门店被设定极其严格的定量考核，例如汽车穿梭餐厅（Drive-thru）服务每个顾客的时间上限必须精确到秒； - 员工接待顾客时必须说哪一套特定的欢迎词、使用何种标准话术，都有强制规定； - 甚至连维修厨房冰淇淋机能选用的维修配件与服务商都被彻底锁死。 因此，加盟商在实质地位上不过是大型跨国集团安排在基层的“中层管理人员”，只是他们不得不自己承担全部资产投入、承担房租与亏损风险，在整个体系中充当了承担资本损失的缓冲垫。 ### `07:15` 激励机制与法律防火墙：为什么大公司钟情于加盟制？ 针对快餐巨头为何在上世纪后半叶全面转向加盟制，Callaci 从经济学与劳工法两个维度给出了深度解释。在经济学层面，这完美解决了所谓的“委托-代理问题”（Principal-Agent Problem）：普通受薪店长由于拿着固定薪水，缺乏动力没日没夜地拼命干活与监督员工；而加盟商把全家的身家积蓄都砸进了这家餐厅，生计全系于此，具有极强的“切身利益”（skin in the game），自然会竭尽所能地投入精力。 然而，更深层且长远的原因在于利用该模式构建起牢不可破的“法律防火墙”。由于加盟店被界定为独立的商业实体，店员在法律关系上并非跨国品牌的正式员工： - 跨国品牌无需为门店员工承担加班费、最低工资保障以及各类法定用工福利责任； - 当一线员工试图组建工会争取权益时，他们的谈判诉求和维权行动只能针对毫无定价权和深层资金实力的本地加盟商，而根本无法触及利润大头的总部； - 这种制度设计在法律上切断了一线劳动者向真正的经济剩余占有者（总部）索赔的可能，将劳资冲突彻底转移到加盟商这一层级。 Callaci 还分享了他在调研新英格兰地区唐恩都乐（Dunkin' Donuts）时记录下的生动案例：一名唐恩都乐员工透露，他们的加盟店老板对“香蕉”有一种近乎疯魔的执念。之所以如此，是因为店里几乎所有的烘焙原料、咖啡豆和包装耗材都必须按照总部规定的高昂价格统购，唯独香蕉不在总部供应链管制名单内。为了在微薄的毛利中省出一点钱，这位加盟商经常打发员工在上班时间跑遍当地各大 Stop & Shop 超市去比价淘最便宜的香蕉。Callaci 直言，除了四处抠搜便宜香蕉，加盟商能够自主调整的杠杆微乎其微——为了维系利润，他们唯一真正能做的就是不断压低工人工资、延长排班工时，并最大程度压榨基层员工的劳动强度，直接造就了加盟连锁行业普遍存在的高压工作氛围。 ### `10:00` 战后现代特许经营的诞生与反垄断法的最初防线 现代特许经营模式并非凭空产生，其法律雏形最早可追溯至 19 世纪末及 20 世纪初的汽车经销商和制造业设备分销。但真正将“一整套成熟商业方案打包许可给小创业者”的现代快餐特许经营体系，则完全是二战后 1950 至 1960 年代的产物。这一时期的开创者个性极为鲜明：哈兰·山德士上校（Colonel Sanders）是个真实存在的传奇人物，雷·克罗克（Ray Kroc）不仅有传记电影，其自传更是语出惊人、坦率得令人咂舌。布莱恩·卡拉奇（Brian Callaci）提到，自己作为经济学家，原本只是想查阅历史背景跑几组回归模型，却意外发现这群商业先驱在历史上留下了极其坦白的记录。他们毫不避讳地公开承认：“我们正在做的事情在当时并不合法，所以我们必须联合起来改变法律，让它变得合法。”为此，他们成立了行业游说组织——国际特许经营协会（International Franchise Association, IFA）。 当时横亘在特许经营模式面前的最大法律障碍，如今听起来可能令人难以置信：那就是反垄断法（Antitrust Law）。在当时的司法体系中，反垄断法的核心职责之一正是保护小企业主免受大型垄断资本的过度控制。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 特许经营与反垄断法的最初冲突 accDescr: 展示二战后特许经营试图控制独立小商户时遭遇的反垄断法律壁垒 subgraph FranchiseConcept["特许经营商的核心诉求"] A["母公司 (特许人)"] B["打包商业方案与品牌许可"] C["全方位经营控制<br/>(统一定价、锁定进货渠道、限定运营区域)"] A --> B --> C end subgraph AntitrustWall["反垄断法的历史防线 (至1970年代中期)"] D["保护小企业主独立地位"] E["禁止转售价格维持 (禁止统一巨无霸售价)"] F["禁止限定市场区域分配"] end C -- "遭遇司法抵触" --> AntitrustWall ``` - **早期借鉴来源**：快餐业的模式主要借鉴了大型石油炼化企业（如壳牌 Shell、雪佛龙 Chevron 等品牌加油站）的运作手法。石油巨头当年为了规避各州的“连锁店税”（chain store taxes）以及 1938 年通过的《公平劳动标准法》（Fair Labor Standards Act, FLSA），设计出控制独立加油站经销商的合约，强迫其只能销售指定品牌的汽油、机油、轮胎与蓄电池，同时免除自身的直接雇主法律责任。克罗克与山德士上校等人敏锐地意识到，这种机制同样可以从商品分销复制到餐饮等服务行业。 - **19 世纪反垄断哲学的延续**：当时的司法观念依然根植于 19 世纪的独立生产者理念——社会的基本单元应该是拥有独立农场或工坊的自主商人；如果一个社会中所有人都在机械地听从外部指令，民主社会的经济基石便会瓦解。因此，直到 1970 年代中期，反垄断法院仍在判定：如果麦当劳直接指定加盟店巨无霸汉堡的终端售价，或强制划分排他性经营区域，均属于违法行为。 --- ### `11:15` 国会听证交锋与“以其他手段实现的纵向一体化” 在 1963 年以及 1965 年参议院反垄断委员会的一系列听证会上，现代特许经营的底层逻辑迎来了最激烈的一次思想交锋。参议院反垄断委员会主席杰里·S·科恩（Jerry S. Cohen）质询了国际特许经营协会（IFA）当时的掌门人蒙蒂·彭德尔顿（Monty Pendleton）。科恩直截了当地戳穿了特许经营行业精心编织的叙事泡沫：“你们向国会兜售这种模式时，坚称它是在为普通人创造独立创业的机遇，让‘独立的男子汉’实现自主经营；但如果这个人必须卖你们指定的商品、定你们指定的价格、在你们圈定的地盘里照本宣科，他哪里还算得上什么独立商人？他分明就是大型托拉斯纵向一体化链条上的一个齿轮。” 面对指控，特许人的回应不仅没有退缩，反而赤裸裸地承认了自己的意图：他们追求的正是“以其他手段实现的纵向一体化（Vertical Integration by Other Means）”。 > “特许人一再公开宣称：我们想获得纵向一体化带来的绝对控制，但我们不想持有重资产，更不想雇佣工人。持有资产和承担雇主责任是必须规避的商业风险。我们要的是绝对控制权带来的收益，但绝不能为此承担任何法律连带责任。” --- ### `13:30` “双管齐下的豁免”：反垄断与劳工法之间的套利把戏 卡车司机工会（Teamsters Union）早在 1960 年代初试图组织加油站服务员加入工会时，其代表在国会作证时就创造了一个极为精准的词汇来形容这种不对称地位——“双管齐下的豁免权（Double Barrel Immunity）”。特许经营巨头在法庭与监管机构面前娴熟地利用两套法律体系打起时间差，创造了制度套利的典型标本： | 面对的法律体系 | 特许人的法律主张 | 诉讼/合规目的 | 实际获益 | |:--- |:--- |:--- |:--- | | **反垄断法庭 (Antitrust Courts)** | “我们所有门店与母公司是一个**单一实体（Single Entity）**，密不可分。” | 规避垄断或串谋指控（法律上单个实体无法自己与自己“共谋”）。 | 合法行使对价格、供应链、运营手册的自上而下的绝对控制。 | | **劳工法庭与工会 (Labor Laws & Unions)** | “加盟商与我们没有任何隶属关系，是**完全独立的第三方商业实体**。” | 拒绝作为“联合雇主（Joint Employer）”承担劳工谈判与最低工资义务。 | 免除为一线员工提供医疗、工伤补偿及应对工会罢工的一切雇主责任。 | 这种让“两个世界长期彻底割裂”的巧妙设计，从 1960 年代对抗加油站员工工会开始，一直稳固运行了数十年，甚至在近年来全美快餐业发起的“争取15美元最低时薪（Fight for $15）”劳工运动中，依然作为特许人的核心防火墙发挥着决定性作用。 --- ### `17:35` 加盟商的自愿陷阱：品牌溢价与被侵蚀的生产资料 讨论转向特许经营对小加盟商而言究竟是蜜糖还是毒药。表面上看，母公司虽然转嫁了资本支出（Capex）和劳工风险，但加盟商入局完全出于自愿。相较于独立开一家披萨店面临的残酷竞争与被价格战拖垮的风险，加盟麦当劳似乎拥有天然的安全护城河：强大的品牌忠诚度能带来稳定的客流，且母公司通常会承诺区域保护，不会在同街区开第二家店相互蚕食。在麦当劳发展早期，雷·克罗克甚至曾公开夸耀“让加盟商先于我自己富起来”，这也确实让一大批第一代加盟商积累了惊人的财富。 但这种保护并非行业常态，现实中充斥着严酷的内部倾轧： - **同业蚕食（Cannibalization）**：如赛百味（Subway）等连锁品牌，在合同中极度弱化区域保护条款，甚至会在现有加盟店的正对面批准开设另一家赛百味门店，让加盟商自相残杀以榨取更多流水抽成。 - **并购重组中的灰色地带**：当教会炸鸡（Church's Chicken）与大力水手炸鸡（Popeyes）合并为一个母公司时，合同虽然禁止在教会炸鸡旁开另一家教会炸鸡，但母公司却合法地在马路对面直接建起一家大力水手炸鸡，彻底击碎了加盟商的经营防御。 从更深层的阶级与经济结构来看，如果用经典的马克思主义视角剖析：工人是因为被剥夺了生产资料，才不得不向资本家出卖劳动力；而特许经营模式则发明了一个极其扭曲的中间阶层——加盟商自掏腰包购买了生产资料（店面设备、地租、流动资金），却在严密的合同控制下失去了对这些生产资料的支配权，反过来成为母公司规避风险、转嫁剥削压力的精密管道。 ### `20:00` 品牌碾压与雷·克罗克的残酷铁腕：特许加盟的权力起点 特许加盟商通常是那些有能力拿出一笔资金开设餐厅的人——他们既出钱又出力，既是投资人也是一线劳动者。然而，他们缺乏进行大规模全国性营销的手段，更没有属于自己的强大品牌。纵观特许经营的发展史，随处可见这种无奈的妥协：许多人原本拥有一家独立经营的甜甜圈店，抱有当企业家的梦想，但一旦唐恩都乐（Dunkin' Donuts）或当年的竞争对手“甜甜圈先生”（Mr. Donut）进驻同一个城镇，独立小店根本无法在品牌声量上抗衡，只能被迫卖掉店铺并加入连锁品牌。品牌赋予了特许总部（Franchisor）极大的号召力，也让他们对加盟商拥有了予取予求的掌控权。 这种残酷的品牌挤压在商业史上屡见不鲜，甚至被拍成了好莱坞电影。最著名的例子莫过于雷·克罗克（Ray Kroc）与麦当劳创始兄弟的故事。麦当劳兄弟最终同意将整个企业、品牌和商标转让给克罗克，他们原本以为自己还能保留原址店铺继续营业；然而克罗克直接在他们原店的正对面开了一家全新的麦当劳，凭借强大的品牌控制权迅速将创始兄弟挤兑倒闭。播客主持人们在此忍不住调侃克罗克的行事作风：在克罗克的自传中，他在谈及个人生活时曾毫无避讳地用短短一两句话轻描淡写道：“当时她已经结婚了，我直接把她从她丈夫身边夺了过来。”这种毫不掩饰、极度专注目标的强人性格，让他在商业战场上做出在原店对门开店这种赶尽杀绝的举动，也就显得毫不令人意外了。 --- ### `21:30` “反垄断的荒谬性”：纵向协议掩护下的禁止互挖墙脚条款 特许经营模式在法律层面钻出了一个令人瞠目结舌的避风港。书中披露了一个令人震惊的内部规则：长期以来，麦当劳等多家快餐连锁店广泛推行“禁止互挖协议”（No-Poaching Agreements）。如果一名在某家麦当劳特许店打工的普通员工想要跳槽到同一城市里的另一家麦当劳，必须先征得当前加盟商老板的明确许可。这种限制劳动者自由流动的条款，恰恰暴露出美国反垄断法在界定“纵向协议”与“横向协议”时近乎荒诞的二元对立。 如果同城两家麦当劳的加盟商私下通电话约定：“你别招我的人，我也不招你的人”，这在反垄断法中属于教科书级别的“横向垄断协议”，属于绝对违法（per se illegal），相关责任人甚至面临刑事入狱的风险。然而，如果是麦当劳企业总部自上而下对所有加盟商单方面下达指令：“你们之间不准互相挖墙脚”，这一行为就神奇地被归类为“纵向限制”。它不再被自动视为违法，而是适用“合理原则”（Rule of Reason）。在合理原则下，诉讼双方需要聘请经济学家出具冗长复杂的计量经济学对抗报告；麦当劳总部可以公然向法庭抗辩称：该条款即便在局部压低了员工工资，但它保障了单一体系统一运作的高效性，帮助品牌卖出了更多汉堡。在这种法律逻辑下，压低工资居然成了一种可以被辩护的“商业效率”。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 反垄断法中横向垄断与纵向限制的法律差异 accDescr: 展示特许体系如何利用纵向限制逃避反垄断法的严厉制裁 subgraph Horizontal["横向垄断协议（非法）"] H1["加盟商 A"] <-->|"私下达成互不挖角协议"| H2["加盟商 B"] H1 & H2 --> H3["绝对违法 (Per Se Illegal)<br/>面临刑事指控与牢狱之灾"] end subgraph Vertical["纵向管理限制（受保护）"] V_HQ["麦当劳总部"] -->|"自上而下单方强制规定"| V_Ops["运营手册与加盟合同"] V_Ops --> V1["加盟商 A"] V_Ops --> V2["加盟商 B"] V_Ops --> V3["适用'合理原则' (Rule of Reason)<br/>辩称压低工资有助于提高系统效率"] end ``` --- ### `23:00` 加盟商唯一的盈利杠杆：压榨劳动力与“最不受欢迎的独立思考者” 既然特许经营体系严苛至极，那么一名加盟商究竟在哪些方面拥有自主权来改变自己的盈亏命运？答案非常冰冷：除了拼命延长自己的劳动时间之外，加盟商能够自主调整的唯一主要杠杆，就是“挤压人工成本”。麦当劳总部几乎管控了一切上游采购和运营标准，唯独将用工成本隔绝在自身法律责任之外。更夸张的是，甚至连店里安排多少名员工的“排班配额”（Staffing Levels），加盟商都没有真正的决定权——总部将配额强制写入《运营手册》，这份手册作为加盟合同不可分割的一部分，总部有权随时单方面修改。 这就带来了一个残酷的商业现实：加盟商若想提高利润，唯一的手段就是极限压缩员工工资，并在既定的人手规模下逼迫员工拼命干活。正如社会学著作《特许经营的梦想》（*Franchise Dreams*）所指出的，在总部眼里，“最具创业家精神的人，往往是最差劲的加盟商”。总部绝对不希望加盟商是一个拥有独立商业想法的思考者。雷·克罗克曾直言不讳地表示：“要在我们这里取得成功，不需要什么特别的天赋或过人的智力，只需要坚韧不拔的毅力和拼命苦干。”克罗克在创业之初曾让乡村俱乐部的富人朋友们加盟，结果彻底失败，因为这些有钱人只想投点钱并在闲暇时偶尔管管店；克罗克随后迅速意识到，他需要寻找的是那些缺乏退路、为了生计拼尽全力的底层拼搏者和移民群体。 --- ### `25:00` 必须亲自上阵与无限责任：私人股本入场前后的合同铁律 针对加盟体系的准入规则，布赖恩·卡拉奇与学者马歇尔·斯坦鲍姆（Marshall Steinbaum）和塞尔吉奥·平托（Sergio Pinto）共同开展了深入研究。他们阅读并系统编码了数百份真实的特许经营合同，其后续团队更是将样本扩大至数千份。他们发现，绝大多数传统特许经营合同中都赫然写有一项核心条款：“亲自劳动义务”（Personal Obligation to Work）。这意味着在传统模式下，加盟商绝不允许只是一个甩手掌柜式的被动投资者（Passive Investor）。不仅如此，合同中通常没有任何有限责任的公司防火墙保护——一旦门店运营失败或违约，特许总部可以直接查封并清算加盟商个人的住宅、汽车以及个人银行储蓄。 然而，近年来这一生态正在悄然分化。除了传统的个体拼搏型加盟商外，市场上涌现出了一批截然不同的“新型加盟巨头”：它们本身就是公司化运作的企业，名下拥有数十家乃至数百家加盟门店，甚至横跨多个不同连锁品牌。与此同时，私人股本（PE）的渗透路线也发生了转变： - **传统的 PE 玩法**：过去私人股本只热衷于收购特许品牌本身（例如汉堡王曾几度转手于不同的 PE 机构），因为特许品牌无需承担一线实体资产运营风险，品牌早已建立完毕，只要坐收持续不断的加盟特许权使用费即可，是一门纯粹的现金流暴利生意。 - **当下的 PE 新动态**：近年来，私人股本开始大举下场扮演“大型特许加盟运营商”的角色。这种法人实体的介入彻底打破了过去强调加盟商个人肉身拼搏的传统伦理，重塑了快餐连锁的劳资动力学。 --- ### `27:00` 监控技术的跃迁：从神秘顾客到收银机实时数据流与 AI 监视 技术的发展使得总部对加盟店的控制力发生了代际跃迁。在 20 世纪 60 年代，总部虽然也想掌控门店的一切，但在物理上受到严重制约，只能依赖传真、电话和偶尔派出的“神秘顾客”（Secret Shoppers）进行暗访，控制力度相当有限。然而自 20 世纪 90 年代起，宽带互联网与连接到 POS 收银系统的收银机彻底改变了一切，持续不断的实时数据流开始源源不断地回传到总部。 这种技术强化颠覆了传统的商业史认知。传统观点往往认为“技术进步推动了外包架构”，但特许经营是在缺乏信息技术的年代就先行确立了这种法律隔离。而如今数字监控与人工智能的结合，让总部的控制欲达到了空前的高度： - **历史对比的强烈反差**：像 1950 年代真正实现垂直一体化（Vertically Integrated）的美国钢铁公司（U.S. Steel）或通用汽车（General Motors），即便直接雇用了数十万名产业工人，其总部对全国各厂房车间一线作业的实际监控力，也远远弱于今天的麦当劳总部。今天的麦当劳在法律上几乎不直接雇用底层餐厅员工，但依靠收银机数据流和 AI，对门店的控制程度却远超当年的工业巨擘。 - **算法监控深入个体**：AI 技术如今可以直接监视收银员或一线员工的动作快慢。总部甚至能够精准掌握每个员工的姓名。如果某个收银员在收银机前的操作延误了几秒，总部并不需要亲自开除他，而是直接向加盟商发送系统警告信息：“某某员工动作太慢了，请立即处理。” --- ### `28:30` 重构企业理论：从科斯、钱德勒到为零工经济打开的制度大门 讨论特许经营的本质，必然会触及经典的企业理论（Theory of the Firm）： - **卡尔·马克思**：将企业定义为“生产的隐秘之所”（The hidden abode of production），是资本拥有者与劳动者相结合的封闭实体。 - **罗纳德·科斯（Ronald Coase）**：在芝加哥学派的经典企业理论中指出，企业的本质特征是**“命令”**（Command）——一个工人在不同车间部门之间的流动，并非源于市场相对价格的调整，而是因为管理者的权威指令。这正是传统经济学解释企业为何替代市场而存在的基石。 - **阿尔弗雷德·钱德勒（Alfred Chandler）**：在商业史名著《看得见的手》（*The Visible Hand*）中提出，现代大型综合企业的崛起是为了追求“高吞吐量经济效益”（High Throughput），企业无法承受市场不确定性的摩擦，因此选择将上下游全部纳入管理者的科层控制之下。 特许经营模式的精明之处在于，它企图获取钱德勒和科斯所描述的那种近乎严苛的一体化命令与控制权，但同时通过合同拟制，在法律上将自身的雇主责任与商业风险完全剥离。特许连锁巨头在 20 世纪 60 年代和 70 年代通过诉讼在反垄断与劳动法中凿开的这条法律漏洞，起初看似只是一条不起眼的小缝隙，如今却已经被彻底拓宽为一座宽敞的“通航闸门”，使得像 Uber 和亚马逊（Amazon）这样的现代零工平台与新型巨头得以毫无阻碍地通行。亚马逊正如同当年的美国钢铁公司，彻底重组了全美的现代物流与配送网络，但支撑其体系运转的底层用工逻辑，正是当年快餐连锁精心搭建起来的避风港。 ### `30:00` 特许经营法律战与零工经济的制度血脉 亚马逊在构建其庞大的物流配送网络时，并没有完全依赖美国邮政（USPS）、联合包裹（UPS）或联邦快递（FedEx）。在经济层面上，亚马逊通过严密的数字追踪与路线规定将配送体系收归“内部”掌控；但在法律层面上，那些穿梭在社区街道上的送货卡车和司机却被界定为独立承包商，亚马逊借此彻底规避了用人单位的法定连带责任。布莱恩·卡拉奇（Brian Callaci）指出，这种“既要全面控制、又要免除法律责任”的商业架构并非凭空产生，它的制度根源正是快餐特许经营品牌在20世纪60至70年代通过诉讼和立法游说打下的一场漫长法律战役。 在反垄断法的传统法理中，法律严格禁止一家企业对名义上独立的另一家商业实体施加过度的“纵向限制”（Vertical Restraints）。当时的特许经营品牌方极力想要打破这种束缚，于是展开了精心策划的战略诉讼，试图从根本上改写判例法。在此期间，他们获得了一个极其强大的理论盟友——芝加哥大学的经济学院与法学院（芝加哥学派）。芝加哥学派学者对传统法律中那种“独立创业者不受干预”的陈旧观念不屑一顾，主张司法应当摒弃这种“陈腐过时的独立企业家幻想”，转而把“经济效率”作为唯一的评判标尺。凭借效率优先的抗辩，特许品牌在法院赢得了关键胜利。 这一突破为资本控制开启了巨大的免责特权空间。随后，美国劳工部（DOL）、全国劳资关系委员会（NLRB）以及民事诉讼原告纷纷发难，提出最朴素的质疑：既然品牌总部对加盟店的运营细节施加了无孔不入的微观控制，就理应为一线工人的低薪欠薪甚至事故承担连带责任。最典型的例子便是达美乐比萨（Domino's Pizza）当年推行的“30分钟必达”规则——由于总部设立了极度严苛的时限考核，导致外卖司机为了抢时间严重超速撞伤行人，这种事故的根源显然在总部政策，而非单独归咎于加盟商或司机个人。然而，特许品牌最终在各级裁决中成功脱身，达成了“既独吞控制红利、又摆脱用工责任”的完美闭环。这一法律成果为后来的硅谷科技平台扫清了道路。到了优步（Uber）和各类派送软件兴起时，当年的纸面纵向合同限制直接升级为算法控制——由算法派发路线、算法统一定价。卡拉奇直言，如果优步试图在1960年代推行这种高压控制却不认劳动关系的模式，“绝对会立刻引来法官的严厉审视与叫停”；正是特许经营先驱几十年前打下的法律漏洞，才让当今的零工经济成为合法现实。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 特许经营向零工经济的法律与控制演进 accDescr: 展示从20世纪传统反垄断法对纵向限制的禁止，到特许品牌联合芝加哥学派合法化微观控制，再到算法零工经济规避责任的演进路径。 subgraph Era1["传统反垄断框架 (1960s前)"] A["保护独立创业者地位"] --> B["禁止核心'纵向限制'<br/>(严防大企业微观控制独立主体)"] end subgraph Era2["特许经营突围 (1960s-1970s)"] C["特许品牌发起战略诉讼"] --> D["芝加哥学派倡导'效率至上'<br/>击溃传统法理保护"] D --> E["确立控制权但不承担共同雇主责任<br/>(如规避达美乐配送事故/欠薪责任)"] end subgraph Era3["现代零工经济 (2010s至今)"] F["算法取代纸面合同<br/>(路线指定、动态定价、超时惩罚)"] E --> G["亚马逊 DSP / Uber 模式落地<br/>享有绝对控制，免除劳动责任"] F --> G end B -.->|"法律防线瓦解"| C ``` --- ### `35:00` “做自己的老板”：Uber 与亚马逊 DSP 模式的制度包装 主持人提及，当今的网约车与即时物流平台在招募司机与小型承运商时，是否依然在沿用当年特许经营招募加盟商时那套“做自己的老板，开创自己的事业”的话术？卡拉奇给予了完全肯定的回答。他分析道，这种话术之所以数十年经久不衰，是因为它精准击中了极为核心的“美国梦”文化心理——普通人渴望摆脱受制于人的打工生活，成为自己的主宰，通过打拼积累起属于自己和家庭的经济养老金（nest egg）。 然而在具体组织形式上，亚马逊的配送服务伙伴（DSP, Delivery Service Partner）模式相较于优步，与传统特许经营的血缘更为亲近： - **优步/Lyft 模式**：平台将每一个具体开车的自然人司机都虚拟包装为“自负盈亏的独立微型企业”。 - **亚马逊 DSP 模式**：亚马逊并不直接将单个司机签约为个体户，而是扶持承包商成立中小型公司。每个 DSP 承包商通常管理约30辆货车与相应的司机班底。 - **名实分离的权属结构**：亚马逊甚至会为承包商垫付或提供初始资本支持，所有卡车外观全部喷涂着极其显眼的亚马逊官方 Logo。但在法律形式上，它是一家独立的法人实体；一旦发生劳动纠纷、工伤保险赔偿或超时罚款，所有的法律风险与监管成本都被硬性阻隔在这家外围小公司内部，亚马逊母体安如泰山。 --- ### `36:35` 实证经济学证据：裂缝工作场所、无挖角协议与工资压制 当谈到特许经营模式在宏观上如何压低美国整体薪资水平时，卡拉奇指出，对于一家加盟店所有者而言，在总部的特许使用费、原料采购价、店面设备和商品定价都被合同锁死的情况下，“劳动力成本是加盟商手中唯一能用来削减开支以榨取利润的调节杠杆”。 实证经济学界对这一现象进行了深入研究，卡拉奇梳理了几个关键的研究脉络与实证结论： - **直营店与加盟店的薪资鸿沟**：已故著名经济学家艾伦·克鲁格（Alan Krueger）早在1990年代就进行了开创性研究，其后大卫·韦尔（David Weil）在其代表作《裂缝工作场所》（*The Fissured Workplace*）中进一步系统论证。实证数据表明，即便是在同一快餐品牌旗下，直营店工人的时薪显著高于加盟店工人；同时，直营店拥有更陡峭的“资历-工资曲线”（Tenure-Wage Profile），意味着随着工龄增长，工人升职加薪的通道明显更为顺畅。 - **劳动违规率的剧增**：数据还证实，加盟店违反职业安全健康标准、发生工资盗窃（Wage Theft）以及侵犯劳工权益的频率，远远高于品牌自营门店。加盟商背负沉重的财务特许提成压力，往往将成本转嫁给店员。 - **华盛顿州“无挖角协议”自然实验**：卡拉奇与合作者利用了一个绝佳的政策外生冲击自然实验——华盛顿州司法部门此前针对麦当劳等一众大型快餐连锁品牌发起反垄断执法，最终签署了废除“禁止跨店挖角协议”（No-Poach Agreements）的和解协议（Consent Decree）。卡拉奇的研究证实，消除加盟店之间互不挖角、互不加薪的恶性串通，对底层工人的薪资提升具有直接的因果效应（Causal Effect），这有力佐证了特许条款对劳动力市场的系统性卡特尔化压制。 - **不断收紧的合同枷锁**：卡拉奇与经济学者马歇尔·斯坦鲍姆（Marshall Steinbaum）及塞尔吉奥（Sergio）的后续研究显示，特许经营合同条款与低工资之间存在着高度正相关的负面羁绊；更值得注意的是，跨期追踪数据显示，过去20年间特许经营合同中的各项限制性条款不但没有放松，反而变得愈发严苛和专制。 --- ### `38:20` 从手工编码到 AI 抓取：特许经营披露文件（FDD）与合同限制性研究 面对主持人关于“研究人员如何量化衡量特许合同中具体的限制程度”这一技术性问题，卡拉奇分享了他早年在学术探索阶段极具代入感的实证经历。他解释道，特许经营合同之所以能够被学术界进行大规模量化，要归功于美国联邦贸易委员会（FTC）在1979年出台的一项行政规章。这项规章诞生的初衷，是因为当时大量加盟商被快餐品牌极其不平等的霸王条款欺骗洗劫，政府为了保障买方的知情权，强制要求品牌方在签约前向潜在加盟商出示一份名为“特许经营披露文件”（Franchise Disclosure Document，简称 FDD）的标准化文书。 FDD 用通俗易懂的语言详细载明了特许权使用费提成比例、强制采购目录、竞业限制等核心条款，并且在很多情况下，品牌方会把长达数十页的完整格式合同作为附件一同归档。尽管 FTC 本身不强制在联邦层面公开建档，但加利福尼亚州和威斯康星州等州法律要求其必须向州政府登记并对公众公开。这使得任何人都能合法调取这些庞大的合同档案。 卡拉奇回忆道，大约10年前他开展这项开创性研究时，自然语言处理技术尚未普及，他不得不采用最原始的“笨功夫”——连续耗费长达18个月的时间，人工通读并逐条手工编码了530份特许经营合同中包含的上百个细分条款，从而构建起宝贵的截面数据集。而在今天，这项繁重的案头工作被现代文本抓取工具和 AI/大语言模型彻底颠覆：“在今天，你只要花一个下午编写一段爬虫程序，配合文本识别与 AI 技术，几千份合同瞬间就能完成清洗与横截面跨期对比。” 在谈话尾声，主持人抛出了一个小企业神话的悖论：社会舆论通常习惯于神圣化街角的小微企业（Small Businesses），将大公司塑造成贪婪冷酷的象征；但在劳工权益领域，各种恶劣的“病态行为”——例如工资盗窃、克扣工时、无视安全隐患——在小型独立企业或加盟商中其实比在大型直营跨国企业中更为猖獗。卡拉奇对此坦言，自己尚未直接对比过纯独立单体餐厅与加盟连锁餐厅在违规率上的具体差异，但他完全认同主持人的这一现实观察，并指出这种现象背后折射的恰恰是特许经营模式试图掩盖的深层矛盾。 ### `40:00` 特许经营与直营之辨：租金分配、控制权与工会法律壁垒 对话首先聚焦于快餐企业的利润分配与所有权模式。主持人指出，特许经营模式的精髓在于捕捉小企业的低劳动成本模式，并将其嫁接到大型企业之上，但关键在于将所有经济租金（rents）全部上缴给顶层公司的股东，而不与一线工人分享。相比之下，完全采用直营模式的星巴克（Starbucks）或奇波雷（Chipotle），虽然未必代表拥有极佳的工作环境，但确实体现出更多的租金共享——Chipotle 的薪酬明显高于塔可钟（Taco Bell），星巴克的薪资也高于唐恩都乐（Dunkin' Donuts）；甚至星巴克员工还能组织工会投票，这在传统特许经营快餐店中是不可想象的。 针对“为什么并非所有连锁品牌都采用特许经营”的疑问，Brian Callaci 解释了直营与特许模式的内在权衡： 1. **资产控制权与准入门槛**：完全拥有资产并直接雇佣店长能赋予品牌方更直接、更全面的控制力。麦当劳之所以能对加盟商保持绝对压制，正如雷·克罗克（Ray Kroc）在自传中所言，是因为麦当劳持有底层地产，一旦加盟商失去商标授权，麦当劳可以直接将他们驱逐出店面；而如今初创的连锁品牌往往没有足够的资本像麦当劳那样买下所有黄金地段的房地产。 2. **客单价与品质定位差异**：星巴克和 Chipotle 定位相对高端，产品单价高出一些，对食材品质要求更严苛，这与追求极致周转率（churn out high throughput）、极力压低劳动力成本的快餐特许模式存在天然差异。 随后，探讨延伸至特许经营架构对工人权益与集体谈判的法律限制。Brian Callaci 指出，加盟模式设立之初的一大明确动机就是规避工会。根据 1947 年出台的反劳工法律《塔夫脱-哈特莱法案》（Taft-Hartley Act），法律禁止工人进行针对第三方雇主的二次罢工或纠察，员工只能针对直接雇主发起行动，而不能直接针对麦当劳公司（McDonald's Corporation）。这为品牌方剥离雇佣责任提供了巨大的制度激励，因此特许经营正是在该法案通过后迅速爆发。直到“争取 15 美元时薪”（Fight for $15）运动之前，工人都无法将麦当劳推上谈判桌。奥巴马政府时期曾推行“共同雇主规则”（Joint Employer Rule），允许工人基于“经济现实”认定麦当劳掌控了人员配置、原材料配给及营业时间，从而强制其参与谈判；然而该规则在特朗普时期被推翻，拜登时期恢复，随后再度陷入拉锯，导致现阶段工人的法律权利处于极度模糊的动荡状态。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 特许经营与直营模式的控制与权责对比 accDescr: 对比麦当劳式特许经营与星巴克式直营在控制力、地租、工会谈判壁垒及法律责任上的差异。 subgraph FRANCHISE["特许经营模式（以麦当劳为例）"] F_HQ["品牌总部 / 特许人"] F_LAND["麦当劳持有地产（核心控制杠杆）"] F_OP["独立加盟商（直接雇主）"] F_WORK["加盟店劳工"] F_HQ -->|"租赁地产 & 授权商标"| F_OP F_LAND -->|"驱逐权制约"| F_OP F_OP -->|"微薄工资 / 承担用工风险"| F_WORK F_WORK -.->|"《塔夫脱-哈特莱法案》阻隔无法直接谈判"| F_HQ end subgraph DIRECT["全直营模式（以 Chipotle / 星巴克为例）"] D_HQ["企业总部"] D_STORE["直营门店 & 资产"] D_WORK["直营雇员"] D_HQ -->|"完全控制门店运营"| D_STORE D_STORE -->|"直接雇佣 / 共享部分租金（相对高薪）"| D_WORK D_WORK <-->|"合法组建工会并直接谈判"| D_HQ end ``` ### `43:00` 算法时代的配送物流：便利背后的负外部性与“共同雇主”责任归位 话题随后转向现代平台经济与物流系统。主持人提到，诸如亚马逊（Amazon）等平台建立的现代配送物流网络，在速度上超过美国邮政（USPS），在灵活性上胜过联合包裹（UPS），让消费者能在一小时内收到各类杂货，公众确实享受到了极大便利，该如何权衡其公共效益与隐性代价？ Brian Callaci 强调，评估这一模式时必须将真实的社会成本纳入核算： - **社区与环境成本**：物流设施集中地周边承受着严重的重型卡车拥堵与尾气污染。 - **劳工尊严与健康代价**：高压的算法指标迫使配送司机为了完成指标不得不“在塑料瓶里小便”。 Callaci 特别厘清了亚马逊庞大物流体系中的权责隔离设计：亚马逊全资拥有干线配送中心（Distribution Centers），但末端分拣与配送点（Delivery Centers）却演变为复杂的承包外包链条。司机虽然前往亚马逊设立的设施打卡、穿戴印有亚马逊 Logo 的制服、驾驶漆着亚马逊标识的货运面包车，并受亚马逊算法的严格监控与调度，但其名义上的直接雇主却是一家家名不见经传的第三方承包运输公司（Delivery Service Partners）。 对于公共政策的改良，Callaci 提出了直截了当的治理主张：政策的目标不应是扼杀创新或否定统筹协调的价值——企业本质上就像是一个内部运转的“微型中央计划者”（mini central planner），通过集中指挥提升生产效率是正常且有益的。但核心问题在于，企业**绝不能在享受集中控制带来的全部好处的同时，单方面免除持有资产和雇佣劳动力应承担的法律义务、责任与风险**。 美国现行的劳动监管法律体系主要成型于 1935 年至 1960 年代中期，那时的企业定义非常清晰：工厂耸立着大烟囱，拥有固定厂房，直接雇佣大批员工。然而特许经营和零工经济撕开的法律漏洞打破了这一切。Callaci 主张回归常识性原则： - 如果企业通过算法对司机的行驶路线、配送节奏实施事实上的指导与监控，那么企业就是司机的法律雇主； - 企业必须依法支付法定最低工资，保障集体谈判权； - 如果司机为了追赶算法设定的极限时效而闯红灯撞伤路人，平台不能将责任完全推给外包公司或个体，而必须为自身控制行为造成的后果承担侵权责任。 ### `45:00` 幕后复盘：“既要又要”的特许幻象与无处不在的“企业中央计划” 在访谈结束后，主持人 Joe Weisenthal 与 Tracy Alloway 展开了对谈复盘。Tracy 感慨，特许经营模式最令人震惊之处在于品牌方那种“既要蛋糕又要吃掉蛋糕”（have your cake and eat it too）的精明算计。Joe 则认为，整个模式的核心支撑完全建立在知识产权之上——就像电影《来到美国》（*Coming to America*）里的经典情节，主角开了一家山寨麦当劳，本质就是知识产权盗窃；普通人根本无法凭空制造出麦当劳的品牌心智，只能通过受控的形式接入其体系。 两人随后聊到了快餐先驱的自传与文化符号： - **创始人自传的坦率**：Joe 极力推荐雷·克罗克的自传《麦当劳之父》（*Grinding It Out*），赞叹克罗克在书中极其直率、毫无伪饰地记录了自己的一切商业手腕，阅读体验极其奇特且有趣。Tracy 则表示也想去读肯德基创始人哈兰德·桑德斯上校（Colonel Sanders）的故事。 - **肯德基在日本的文化奇观**：两人谈到桑德斯上校常常给人一种“虚构角色”的荒诞感，并提到了日本著名的“圣诞节吃肯德基”传统。Tracy 回忆在日本时，很多 KFC 店门口都立着巨大的桑德斯塑像，因为他长得颇像圣诞老人，肯德基便成功将自己包装成了美国文化与商业传统的终极图腾。 在讨论零工经济与特许加盟的本质时，主持人深刻批判了当代平台的招募话术。无论是 Uber 招募司机还是亚马逊招募车队加盟商，广告里充斥着“成为自己的老板”（be your own boss）或“开创属于自己的事业”等光鲜词汇。然而从收益分布来看，这种模式大幅压缩了上行收益（right tail），同时也锁定了下行底线（left tail），其运作机制完全背离了传统意义上的企业家精神（entrepreneurship）或真正的企业所有权——加盟商名义上是“独立创业者”，但从菜单、原料到操作流程，每一项业务细节都被特许人牢牢锁死，“除了劳动力工资成本以外，一切都被品牌方全盘包办”。 最后，主持人特别赞同 Brian Callaci 引申出的制度反思：即便最推崇自由市场的芝加哥学派经济学家，也无法否认在庞大企业的中央集权保护伞下进行资源统筹能带来巨大的效率红利。现实中极少有人愿意公开讨论的是——**现代经济中有极其庞大的份额实际上是在“中央计划”（central planning）的机制下运转的，只是因为执行者是跨国大企业，人们便不再称其为中央计划**。而在享受着 Amazon Prime 一小时送达与麦当劳汉堡的现代消费者生活中，这种高度集权的商业控制系统早已无孔不入。 ### `50:00` 播客结语：特许经营模式与知识产权的深层纽带 在节目的尾声，主持人对本期关于特许经营经济学及劳工制度的探讨进行了收束，并提醒听众获取更多《Odd Lots》内容的渠道。听众可以访问彭博官网专属页面（Bloomberg.com/oddlots），查阅每日推送的简讯并收听往期全部播客节目。此外，节目还设有一个全天候 24 小时开放的 Discord 讨论社区（discord.gg/oddlots），供全球听众随时交流与探讨播客中涉及的各类前沿议题。 主持人呼吁，如果听众喜欢本期节目中关于“知识产权（IP）如何构成了快餐特许经营商业模式底层支柱”的深度剖析，欢迎在各大播客平台留下好评。同时，节目也为彭博的付费订阅用户提供了专属收听福利：只需在 Apple Podcasts 上找到 Bloomberg 官方频道并按照指引操作，即可全程无广告畅听所有剧集。 - **官方资源与社群**：可通过 Bloomberg.com/oddlots 获取每日简讯与完整往期节目，或加入 Discord 官方社群（discord.gg/oddlots）参与实时讨论。 - **订阅用户权益**：彭博订阅者可在 Apple Podcasts 的 Bloomberg 频道内享受全剧集无广告收听体验。 --- ### `50:35` 赞助致谢与《Bloomberg Daybreak》晨间新闻推介 在播客最后插播了品牌赞助与彭博旗下其他资讯栏目的推荐。首先是赞助商 4imprint 的宣传信息，引导听众访问 4imprint.com 了解更多定制商品服务。 随后，彭博推出了晨间旗舰新闻播客《Bloomberg Daybreak》的宣传片。主持人内森·黑格（Nathan Hager）与凯伦·莫斯科（Karen Moscow）向听众推介了这一“15分钟速览全球资讯”的早间播客节目。《Bloomberg Daybreak》主打以敏锐且深度的全球视角，精选涵盖时事政治、商业动态及国际关系的核心要闻，并在每期就当天最重要的热点事件展开深度访谈与剖析。听众可在 Apple Podcasts、Spotify 或任意主流播客平台订阅收听。 ## Notable quotes > `10:00` 我们正在做的事情在当时并不合法，所以我们必须联合起来改变法律，让它变得合法。 — 商业先驱（引自 Brian Callaci） > `11:15` 特许人一再公开宣称：我们想获得纵向一体化带来的绝对控制，但我们不想持有重资产，更不想雇佣工人。持有资产和承担雇主责任是必须规避的商业风险。我们要的是绝对控制权带来的收益，但绝不能为此承担任何法律连带责任。 — Brian Callaci > `11:15` 你们向国会兜售这种模式时，坚称它是在为普通人创造独立创业的机遇，让‘独立的男子汉’实现自主经营；但如果这个人必须卖你们指定的商品、定你们指定的价格、在你们圈定的地盘里照本宣科，他哪里还算得上什么独立商人？他分明就是大型托拉斯纵向一体化链条上的一个齿轮。 — Jerry S. Cohen > `20:00` 当时她已经结婚了，我直接把她从她丈夫身边夺了过来。 — Ray Kroc > `23:00` 要在我们这里取得成功，不需要什么特别的天赋或过人的智力，只需要坚韧不拔的毅力和拼命苦干。 — Ray Kroc > `27:00` 某某员工动作太慢了，请立即处理。 — AI 监视系统（模拟信息） > `36:35` 劳动力成本是加盟商手中唯一能用来削减开支以榨取利润的调节杠杆。 — Brian Callaci > `38:20` 在今天，你只要花一个下午编写一段爬虫程序，配合文本识别与 AI 技术，几千份合同瞬间就能完成清洗与横截面跨期对比。 — Brian Callaci > `43:00` 绝不能在享受集中控制带来的全部好处的同时，单方面免除持有资产和雇佣劳动力应承担的法律义务、责任与风险。 — Brian Callaci > `45:00` 现代经济中有极其庞大的份额实际上是在“中央计划”（central planning）的机制下运转的，只是因为执行者是跨国大企业，人们便不再称其为中央计划。 — Joe Weisenthal / Brian Callaci ## Mentioned Tracy Alloway, Joe Weisenthal, Brian Callaci, Open Markets Institute, Chains of Command: The Rise and Cruel Reign of the Franchise Economy, McDonald's, Dunkin' Donuts, Taylor Company, Colonel Harland Sanders, Ray Kroc, International Franchise Association (IFA), Jerry S. Cohen, Teamsters Union, Subway, Church's Chicken, Popeyes, Marshall Steinbaum, Sergio Pinto, U.S. Steel, General Motors, Ronald Coase, Alfred Chandler, Uber, Amazon, Delivery Service Partner (DSP), Lyft, Alan Krueger, David Weil, The Fissured Workplace, Federal Trade Commission (FTC), Franchise Disclosure Document (FDD), Starbucks, Chipotle, Taco Bell, Taft-Hartley Act, National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), Coming to America, Grinding It Out, Bloomberg Daybreak, Nathan Hager, Karen Moscow ## Video description <p data-prosemirror-content-type="node" data-prosemirror-node-name="paragraph" data-prosemirror-node-block="true" data-pm-slice="1 1 []">When the fast food industry began booming in the 1950s, it did so via a new business model known as the franchise. This model allowed independent operators to license trademarks from a business like McDonald's or Dunkin Donuts, and it soon spread across the country, with huge consequences for how Americans are employed. Legal battles fought by franchises eventually opened the door to what's now known as the gig economy, allowing Uber drivers to be treated in much the same way as the operator of a local Chick-fil-A. To better understand the history of the franchise model, we speak with Brian Callaci, chief economist of the Open Markets Institute, and author of the book <em data-prosemirror-content-type="mark" data-prosemirror-mark-name="em">Chains of Command: The Rise and Cruel Reign of the Franchise Economy</em>. Callaci helps break down how the franchise model works, how franchise contracts are structured to precisely dictate how franchisees are supposed to run their businesses, the relationship between the franchise model and gig work, as well as how franchises pioneered worker surveillance.</p> <p data-prosemirror-content-type="node" data-prosemirror-node-name="paragraph" data-prosemirror-node-block="true">Read more:<br data-prosemirror-content-type="node" data-prosemirror-node-name="hardBreak" data-prosemirror-node-inline="true"><a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-07-20/taco-bell-traffic-sinks-after-lettuce-tied-to-parasite-outbreak?srnd=homepage-americas?utm_medium=referral&utm_source=podcast&utm_campaign=odd_lots&utm_content=article" data-prosemirror-content-type="mark" data-prosemirror-mark-name="link">Taco Bell Traffic Sinks After Lettuce Tied to Parasite Cases</a><br data-prosemirror-content-type="node" data-prosemirror-node-name="hardBreak" data-prosemirror-node-inline="true"><a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-07-22/chicken-back-on-menu-as-cyber-hit-nichirei-restores-operations?utm_medium=referral&utm_source=podcast&utm_campaign=odd_lots&utm_content=article" data-prosemirror-content-type="mark" data-prosemirror-mark-name="link">Chicken Back on Menu as Cyber-Hit Nichirei Restores Operations</a></p> <p data-prosemirror-content-type="node" data-prosemirror-node-name="paragraph" data-prosemirror-node-block="true">Only <a href="http://Bloomberg.com" data-inline-card="" data-card-data="">http://Bloomberg.com</a> subscribers can get the Odd Lots newsletter in their inbox each week, plus unlimited access to the site and app. Subscribe at&nbsp; <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/subscriptions/oddlots?in_source=oddlotspodcast" data-prosemirror-content-type="mark" data-prosemirror-mark-name="link">bloomberg.com/subscriptions/oddlots</a></p> <p data-prosemirror-content-type="node" data-prosemirror-node-name="paragraph" data-prosemirror-node-block="true"><a href="http://bloomberg.com/subscriptions/oddlots" data-prosemirror-content-type="mark" data-prosemirror-mark-name="link">Subscribe to the Odd Lots Newsletter</a><br data-prosemirror-content-type="node" data-prosemirror-node-name="hardBreak" data-prosemirror-node-inline="true"><strong data-prosemirror-content-type="mark" data-prosemirror-mark-name="strong">Join the conversation:</strong> <a href="https://discord.gg/oddlots" data-prosemirror-content-type="mark" data-prosemirror-mark-name="link">discord.gg/oddlots</a></p><p>See <a href="https://omnystudio.com/listener">omnystudio.com/listener</a> for privacy information.</p> [Source](https://podtrac.com/pts/redirect.mp3/tracking.swap.fm/track/UVBrz8bN8aM2Xe47PEPu/traffic.omny.fm/d/clips/e73c998e-6e60-432f-8610-ae210140c5b1/8a94442e-5a74-4fa2-8b8d-ae27003a8d6b/2050514a-2131-40e9-bc90-b48f0113d17c/audio.mp3?in_playlist=982f5071-765c-403d-969d-ae27003a8d83)

[10:00] 商业先驱（引自 Brian Callaci）: 我们正在做的事情在当时并不合法，所以我们必须联合起来改变法律，让它变得合法。 [11:15] Brian Callaci: 特许人一再公开宣称：我们想获得纵向一体化带来的绝对控制，但我们不想持有重资产，更不想雇佣工人。持有资产和承担雇主责任是必须规避的商业风险。我们要的是绝对控制权带来的收益，但绝不能为此承担任何法律连带责任。 [11:15] Jerry S. Cohen: 你们向国会兜售这种模式时，坚称它是在为普通人创造独立创业的机遇，让‘独立的男子汉’实现自主经营；但如果这个人必须卖你们指定的商品、定你们指定的价格、在你们圈定的地盘里照本宣科，他哪里还算得上什么独立商人？他分明就是大型托拉斯纵向一体化链条上的一个齿轮。 [20:00] Ray Kroc: 当时她已经结婚了，我直接把她从她丈夫身边夺了过来。 [23:00] Ray Kroc: 要在我们这里取得成功，不需要什么特别的天赋或过人的智力，只需要坚韧不拔的毅力和拼命苦干。 [27:00] AI 监视系统（模拟信息）: 某某员工动作太慢了，请立即处理。 [36:35] Brian Callaci: 劳动力成本是加盟商手中唯一能用来削减开支以榨取利润的调节杠杆。 [38:20] Brian Callaci: 在今天，你只要花一个下午编写一段爬虫程序，配合文本识别与 AI 技术，几千份合同瞬间就能完成清洗与横截面跨期对比。 [43:00] Brian Callaci: 绝不能在享受集中控制带来的全部好处的同时，单方面免除持有资产和雇佣劳动力应承担的法律义务、责任与风险。 [45:00] Joe Weisenthal / Brian Callaci: 现代经济中有极其庞大的份额实际上是在“中央计划”（central planning）的机制下运转的，只是因为执行者是跨国大企业，人们便不再称其为中央计划。

[5:00] Brian Callaci: They're basically a middle manager for a large corporation, but with a little bit more risk and a little more skin in the game... [5:00] If you can lean, you can clean. [15:00] Ray Kroc allowed his franchisees to get rich before he did [18:00] Brian Callaci: If two McDonald's across town pick up the phone and say, 'Hey, don't hire any of my workers,' that is a horizontal agreement. That is so illegal—you might go to jail. But if McDonald's from above tells them unilaterally, 'Don't hire each other's workers,' it's put under the 'rule of reason'—which just keeps people in my profession employed with competing econometric reports.

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Wise is the smart way to manage the currencies you need around the globe. When you send money abroad using your bank, you could get hit with hidden fees and exchange rate markups. There's a better way. Try Wise. Wise uses the exchange rate you usually find on Google with no unwelcome surprises Plus most transfers happen in under 20 seconds which means your money arrives in less time than you been listening to me It simple and free to sign up when you download the WISE app. Be smart, get wise. T's and C's apply. Bloomberg Audio Studios. Podcasts, radio, news. Hello and welcome to another episode of the Odd Thoughts Podcast. I'm Tracy Allaway. And I'm Joe Wasenthal. Joe, I will fully admit, I think I have a romanticized view of fast food chains. Yeah, you're the only one. Yeah, I know. No, I mean, literally. I know. I like fast food chains. I don't have a romanticized view of them. I blame Coming to America and the restaurant that was in there and also my overseas upbringing that probably made American fast food seem a lot more exotic and interesting than it perhaps actually is. But I was thinking the other day about the franchise model. It is really weird once you start digging down to it because it like this in Coming to America is you have the small business owner They want to be all entrepreneurial So they get this franchise But then everything is basically dictated to them about how to do the business by the actual corporate franchise owner Well, in coming to America, he didn't open a McDonald's. No, he opened. No, but it was. Yeah. Right. But no, but that was the whole thing. There was like a legal fight against, you know, because they claimed that like he won't. But he won't. But he wanted to do it. I mean, he really just wanted to commit intellectual property theft. I mean, that's really what was going on. I suppose you could tell an optimistic version he wanted to go his own way and do his own thing. But he was really just committing. I love, you know, I'm on his side. It's a perfect summary of why people are interested in the franchise model, which is like, OK, you're ostensibly supposed to be your own business person, I guess, independent. But you get a leg up because you get that like built in customer base and the existing brand and all of that. But to your point, like the pitch in many franchise-esque relationships, it's like, this is your chance to be an entrepreneur, et cetera. Except when you think about entrepreneurship, you don't think about like so many constraints, like here's the thing and here's the price and here the thing you know And also in a typical entrepreneurial environment there is quite a bit of like you know people often go into entrepreneurship for like big like right tail outcomes you know So for example the big payoff Yeah. And so like, for example, I remember, you know, in the I guess you still hear it, but like the glory days of like Uber and stuff like that, or being like an Amazon van driver or something like that, they talk about start your own business. And on some level, it was like on paper, it's like there was legally a business. It's not going to be like a high scale, high margin business the way many people hope for when they do, quote, entrepreneurship, unquote, the sort of like parameters of the outcome. It's like, OK, maybe they've taken off some of like the really bad outcomes. Yeah. But it's not the sort of like really good right tail outcomes that many people associate with like the aspirations of the entrepreneur. Well, this is the other thing I'm interested in, because certainly in the 80s and 90s, you would hear stories about people who became relatively wealthy by running like franchise empires. So I'm curious if that still exists. But the other thing that's really interesting to me is like, okay, you're an independent owner of a franchise. What levers do you actually have to pull to improve the business? I know. I always think like sometimes you see those stories, again, not to keep picking on McDonald's, which we both love, but like you'll see these stories from time to time about like, [5:00] bad product rollout, right? They introduce a new sandwich and nobody likes it or something like that. And I always think, man, that would be so annoying to be a franchisee and to be at the whims of some, like, how much do they have to carry the sandwich? Can they change the price? Like, you know, you're really putting a lot of faith and money on people who like make big decisions that are, or you're like, let's say you run a bad ad, right? Let's say you run an ad that McDonald's corporate runs an ad that tarnishes the whole brand, which could could theoretically happen. And it's like you've just like totally outsourced some of your future outcomes. A CEO seems reluctant to eat their own meal product. Oh, yeah. OK, well, we should talk about, I guess, the franchise model and the franchise economy, because it is really interesting. We've never done a franchise episode. So I am happy to say we have the perfect guest. We're going to be speaking with Brian Kalachi. He is the chief economist at the Open Markets Institute and author of the book, Chains of Command, The Rise and Cruel Reign of the Franchise Economy. So, Brian, thank you so much for coming on Oddbox. Yeah, thanks for having me. Can you maybe just give us an overview like the actual legal and corporate structure of a franchise What does it look like and how does it differ from I guess either like McDowell Yeah there we go Yeah So legally it a very simple structure It really an artifact of trademark law. So you've got a brand owner, a McDonald's, let's say, and they license ostensibly, we can get into how independent they really are, but an independent business owner to run a McDonald's restaurant and use a McDonald's trademark. And in exchange, the franchisee, both the one, the operator called the franchisee, kicks a percentage of their sales and royalties, usually between six or 20%. And so McDonald's takes that revenue stream. And in return, also, the franchisee, this is the key sticking point, agrees to follow all of their instructions. And it is quite minute. I mean, everything from, in many cases, even the prices, hours of operation, product mix, and even things like, how long does your employee have to serve as a customer in a drive through what words do they use to greet the customer. There's very little left to discretion of the franchisee. They're basically a middle manager for a large corporation, but with a little bit more risk and a little more skin in the game because of that, the way that the structure of it works. They even like constrained equipment you can use to repair ice cream machines. That is a famous example of yeah franchisees as I an avid consumer of fast food I love it As a consumer I love it but yeah that that a joke among us mcdonald fans is their ice cream machines are always broken do you remember we did that episode a couple of years ago and the guy who we're talking to was bullish on that company that makes the ice cream gear but he was very straightforward which i respected it was like they have the monopoly their equipment breaks a lot and only they can repair it and so that's a A popular business model, especially in the tech world where we see companies create problems that only they can solve. Anyway, OK, so you mentioned skin in the game there. Give us the sort of origin story of the franchise model, because my understanding is part of this was about incentives. Right. So you tell people, well, you're not just going to be like a person working for us. you're actually going to have ownership in this particular restaurant and the revenue that it's throwing off. You want to incentivize people to, I guess, work harder for you. Yeah. So it solves, you know, what, you know, we economists call the principal agent problem, you know, where you have the local manager more incentivized to exert effort to put in, you know, put in work than a salaried employee would be because you know their life savings depend on it You know they invested their family money in that restaurant or that other whatever kind of business it is But the other reason why franchising was so appealing to these franchisors is that the fact that they were a separate business they were not employees of the chain meant that they were covered by overtime or minimum wage. Or if the McDonald's workers wanted to join a union or something like that, they weren't able to do so. They had no rights against McDonald's. All of their rights are only against a franchisee who really doesn't have the money. The money is all sort of coming to the top. So that acts as a legal barrier to exclude workers from those rents. And the other aspect I would say, again, back to those incentives, is that what are these franchisees incentivized to do? As I was researching the book, I met someone, I'm from New England, so Dunkin' Donuts is our big chain. And someone who had worked at Dunkin' Donuts said, yeah, my franchisee was obsessed with bananas. Why bananas? And so, well, because all the The other ingredients were controlled by Dunkin' Donuts, but bananas, you can send us around to look at the stop and shop for the cheapest banana. So there was that aspect of it. So they're highly incentivized because nothing else is under their control. Pretty much what they do outside of bananas is they extract effort and push down wages for their franchised employees. So it's a high stress, if you've ever been to one, a very high motivated workforce. The phrase that workers at these restaurants use is [10:00] You're always telling them, if you can lean, you can clean. You always got to be doing something. Yeah. All right. So that explains the sort of corporate logic. What is like the history of it? Who are the real like innovators? We've just mentioned Dunkin and McDonald's, but who were like the early players? What did they realize? What were the conditions, et cetera? Tell us about that period. Yeah. So, you know, the initial legal structure comes out of like auto dealers and like these manufacturing companies in the 19th and early 20th century. But the fast food and modern franchising as we know it, where you have that you're licensing like an entire business package to a small entrepreneur. That really dates to the post-war period, 1950s, 1960s. And the innovators who invented this business model, they are fascinating. It was a joy to research the book. Very colorful people. Colonel Sanders was a real guy. Ray Kroc does a movie about him. It's fantastic. His autobiography is very good. Yes, that's also excellent. Yeah. A lot of quotes from there in my book because, yeah, he's such a verbose guy. But I'm an economist. And so I just started looking. I just want to know a a little bit of the background so I can run my regressions. But as I got deep into the history, I decided I really wanted to write a book about how it was founded. It very fascinating because these guys had a great idea but they also said this openly There was no secret to unearth They said pretty clearly what we doing isn really legal We need to change the laws to make it legal Let form an association a trade association international franchise association to make this business model legal And the body of law that actually they've been up against, it's kind of hard to believe now, but it was antitrust. Antitrust law protected these small business owners from that kind of control. So would the issue be that under a prior regime, a McDonald's or a franchise or would be the monopoly seller of mcdonald's ip and so forth to all their like what what how did this run up against franchise or uh antitrust law yeah so a lot of the um a lot of the case law actually comes from the petroleum industry petroleum refiners who had branded stations you know like a shell station or a chevron and they came up with a way to get around chain store taxes and and also antitrust to control the independent dealers make sure they're only selling shell oil and also only selling approved brands of batteries and tires and other accessories. But they also did this to avoid when the Fair Labor Standards was packed in 1938. And Ray Kroc and Colonel Sanders and all these founders of the franchise, we should do that in service industries, not just product distribution. But the antitrust body of law was sort of like 19th century anti idea of there meaning to business you know owning your own farm or you know employment is like you can have a democratic society where people are taking commands from someone else So the antitrust courts through the mid 1970s are still enforcing that, not in every case. But, for example, if McDonald's wanted to set the price of a Big Mac, that was against the law. If they wanted to, you know, tell franchisees, you know, what territories they could operate, that was against the law. And so, for example, there's a great moment that I've now talked about so many times that I've basically memorized the quote, is there's a series of hearings in front of the Senate Antitrust Committee. There's a bunch of them in 1963 and then a more robust set in 1965, where you have the chair of the Senate Antimonopoly Committee, a guy named Jerry S. Cohen. He's interviewing or questioning the president of the International Franchise Association, a guy named Monty Pendleton. And he can't really believe his ears that franchises are trying to get away with this. You know, he tells him, wait a minute, you know, the argument that you're giving us for why we should allow this business model under antitrust is that, you know, it creates all these opportunities for independent business owners. It allows an independent man. And so it's a very gendered thing here, but an independent man to be independent. But if he told what products he has to sell what price he has to charge what operation he has to operate in well he not really independent is he He part of an integrated franchisers operation And franchisers themselves say repeatedly throughout this period we trying to get vertical integration by other means We don't want to own the assets. We don't want to employ the workers. Those are risks we'd rather do without. We want the benefits of that control, but we really don't want to be held liable for it. So somehow the franchisers are able to successfully argue that they should be, I guess, treated like single entities when it comes to antitrust law. But at the same time, they should be exempt from, I guess, the obligations and liabilities that would normally come with that. Yeah, absolutely. So there's another a few years before the hearing I just mentioned. The Teamsters Union was trying to organize gas station attendance and they sent their guy to testify and he complained about this. He called it double barrel immunity. You know, so, you know, when you're going to antitrust courts, you tell them that you are a single entity. You know, you're all just one company. So it's like logically impossible for you to violate the antitrust laws because that requires a conspiracy. You know, two people have to agree. But at the same time, when we try to organize your workers, you say, no, you know, the labor laws don't apply. They are totally separate company. They have nothing to do with this. And, you know, that was the 60s. The same thing happened in franchising is happening in franchising. You know, people remember the fight for 15 whole thing a few years ago, but they've been able to win this so far. [15:00] and just sort of have those two worlds stay separate. And it's, yeah, it's interesting they've been able to do that for so long. Whether you're planning a big tech event, launching a new campaign, or just stocking up on team gear, finding the right promotional products makes all the difference. 4imprint offers thousands of options, from on-trend apparel and premium drinkware to tech, totes, and giveaways, so you can find the right fit for any audience, purpose, or budget. You can customize it all, your logo, your message, your look, and many items come with no setup charge to help you save. And if you're really watching the bottom line, you'll find standout choices at every price point so you can make a real impact while staying on budget. Plus, you'll get expert help, fast turnaround times, and their 360-degree guarantee. So you can be 4imprint certain your order will arrive on time and look exactly right. Whatever your goal, 4imprint makes it easy to find your perfect promo match. Explore the possibilities today at 4imprint 4imprint 4certain Support for this show comes from public If you actively involved in your portfolio you probably catch yourself repeating the same actions Buying the dip. Manually sweeping idle cash. Putting on a hedge. On public, you can now create AI agents that handle all these tasks on your behalf. Just describe what you want to do in plain English. Like, if the VIX hits 25, buy a put option on the S&P 500. or if my cash balance goes above $20,000, move the excess into my direct index. You approve the workflow and your agent handles the rest. Monitoring the market, watching for your conditions, and executing your strategies exactly as defined. An investing platform driven by your intent, not just your clicks. You can also get full read and write access to your account via the public API. Go to public.com slash market and fund your account in five minutes or less. That's public.com slash market. Paid for by Public Investing. Brokered services by Open to the Public Investing, Inc., member FINRA and SIPC. Advisory services by Public Advisors, LLC, SEC Registered Advisor. Complete disclosures available at public.com slash disclosures. As industries evolve faster than ever, companies need an environment that accelerates strategic growth and Michigan delivers on that promise From emerging startups to global enterprises Michigan offers what executives value most a resilient, innovative ecosystem, diverse communities that attract top talent, and a quality of life that supports work-life balance. With our unified Team Michigan approach, businesses scale faster and compete at the highest level. Michigan, pure opportunity. Seize your opportunity at michiganbusiness.org. So, OK, I see in one version of it, the parent company or the franchisor has taken a lot of risk off the table. They don't have to make as many capital investments. They don't have to worry about their employees going on strike. On the other hand, any franchisee enters into this voluntarily, right? Like no one has to like open a McDonald's until they're like can see the risk rewards. the mcdonald's will ensure i believe or the franchisor will ensure that say like another one isn't going to open up on the same block which is a risk if an independent business right i open up like my own independent pizza shop someone opens one the next door suddenly like they undercut me etc so it like i don have like the risk of like another mcdonald undercutting mcdowell You could have a McDonald but you know like since we talking about brands like there is a McDonald brand affinity in a way that many independent burger shops have like you know either have yet to or never achieve. So, like, at least some of these sort of, like, classical business risks are taken off the table for the franchisee. And also, it's my understanding, like, generally, McDonald's franchisees have done very well, and they're consistently quite profitable. yeah is this all is this an all fair characterization yeah well a lot of that is fair yeah i particularly if you got in with mcdonald's like at the beginning if you're on the ground floor with these i think it's fair to say yeah ray crock he allowed his franchisees to get rich before he did uh you know that's a brag that the company does it's kind of true um so there definitely was that there was that dynamic on the other hand there are some chains that don't give that protection for example okay a subway is an example of one where they will open one up up across the street from you or if there's some litigation in the past with, let's say, Church's Chicken merges with Popeyes. Well, the contract might protect the Church's, but they could put a Popeyes across the street from you. So there is still some of that risk. But if you have any more Marxist-inclined listeners, who's a worker? It's someone who doesn't have access to the means of production, so they have to sell their labor to a capitalist. But franchising has this whole other layer [20:00] of these are people who can afford to open a restaurant. They have some capital. They supply capital as well as labor. They're investors, but they don't have the means of marketing at the scale. They don't have a brand. And so another thing you see in the whole history of franchising is franchisees saying, yeah, I kind of wanted to be an entrepreneur or I used to own my own donut shop. But once Dunkin' Donuts or at that time, there was another chain called Mr. Donut came to town. I really couldn't compete. I had to sell out and join their chain. And that brand is very powerful. So this is even in the film. Ray Kroc famously, You know, he stole all the they agreed to sell their whole business, basically the McDonald brothers, the guys who created McDonald's to him. And he but after he controlled the McDonald's name and the trademark, they thought they could keep operating and doing. And he just opened a McDonald's right across the street from their original place and put them out of business. And so that's something that you see that that brand is very powerful, but it also gives the franchisor power for the franchisee to do what they say. You know, I'm not surprised that McDonald's did this. Probably the only fact that really sticks out at me from Ray Kroc's autobiography, where he's like talking about his personal life. And he was like in love with some woman. And in like one sentence is like oh she was married at the time and I took her away from her husband Or it like one paragraph So I was like oh he very forthright about that So I can say I surprised that he opened up a McDonald across the street from a normal aside but actually a goal pursuing individual Yes Related to this. One thing I was very surprised to learn from your book is that there are no poaching agreements between McDonald's. So if I'm a worker at a particular McDonald's franchise and I want to go work for another one. I have to get the permission of my current franchise owner in order to do that. Yeah. And they may have since dropped those, but they had them in a lot of chains did for a very long time. And that sort of gets at this weird niche that they've been able to occupy in antitrust and labor law. So this is the I think I would characterize it fairly as the absurdity of antitrust law, where there is this what is called the vertical horizontal distinction. And what that means is that, you know, for two McDonald's, you know, across town to pick up the phone and say, hey, don't hire any of my workers. I won't hire any of yours. That's a horizontal agreement. That is so, so illegal. You're going to face you might go to jail for doing that. But if McDonald's from above tells them unilaterally, don't hire each other's workers. It not per se illegal It gets put under what called the rule of reason which just means that now you have it keeps people in my profession employed but you have competing econometric reports You know it very difficult for a plaintiff or a worker to challenge these kinds of no agreements though they have tried because it very difficult to win because once it vertical now McDonald's can enter evidence that says, yeah, maybe, you know, it has a bad effect on wages, but, you know, it helps us sell more hamburgers, because, again, we're a single entity. You know, we should have, this just makes it more efficient. And in that sense, low wages can be more efficient. I think I'm just going to accept that we're just going to use McDonald's is like a standard for franchising. Let's say we're talking about McDonald's. Some do very well. Some maybe less so. Is there anything that the franchisee actually has discretion on that could either improve or lessen their odds of success? Other than bananas at Dunkin' Donuts. How hard they work. And I think the key to that is looking at what are they then incentivized to exert that effort towards. And it is because the one thing that McDonald's doesn't directly touch is, besides bananas, is their labor cost. So how big is your crew? Actually, the staffing requirements are even required. So how hard are they working? How low are their wages? And making sure everyone's- The owner doesn't have any discretion about the staffing levels? No, staffing levels are mandated in the operations manual, which is incorporated into the contract and can be unilaterally changed at any time by McDonald So it a very one contract To be fair the pro argument for that is that again willing consenting buyers and sellers and it incentivizes those franchisees to follow the system and to work as hard as they possibly can. Sorry, just to make this very clear, the major lever that franchisees have to be a better business, to produce more money, is to basically squeeze wage costs. Yeah. Wow. And you can see, you know, in the and this is something, again, franchises are very open about. I think there's a quote in the book that's from another book called Franchise Dreams. But, you know, a franchisor just look at entrepreneur makes the worst franchisee. You don't want someone who's an independent thinker who has their own business ideas. Similarly, you know, Ray Kroc said, you know, it doesn't take any particular aptitude or intellect to make it one of our restaurants. You know, it just takes grit and hard work. He wanted workers. As a matter of fact, he sought out people who really needed this. you know, his first investors in McDonald's were his friends from like the country club. Oh, yeah, it's a nice investment opportunity. You know, I'll put in some money and sure, I'll manage the restaurant in my spare time. I didn't work out. They didn't put in the work. And so he found people who were a little bit more scrappy, you know, yeah, immigrants, you know. Yeah, there are constraints or are there not? Like, let's say I wanted to open a McDonald's, but I didn't want to work hard. I just wanted [25:00] investment. Am I allowed to front someone else's capital to do that? How does that work? You never hear very much about, say, I don't know, PE or finance backing 1,000 new franchisees. Is that allowed? Yes. A lot of the franchise contracts, my other work outside the book, a lot of this work joint with Marshall Steinbaum and Sergio Pinto, we actually coded, we read hundreds of franchise contracts. Those guys have since digitized and they have thousands of contracts. And one key contract clause in across most chains is a personal obligation to work. So you are not allowed to be a passive investor. And you also have to also there's no corporate shield. If you mess up, they can come for your house and your car and your savings and all that stuff. That said, there has you know, I wouldn't I wouldn't want to hide this. There has been a move in recent years to more of a different kind of franchise operator. Some of them are incorporated now. Some of them own multiple, even hundreds of locations. Some of them even own locations across multiple chains. And since then also there been a migration Private equity used to only own the franchise brands And that a great business Like Burger King famously has flipped you know for private equity owners All you got to do is get those royalties Someone else already built the brand You know just all it is is cash But since then there been private equity franchise operators So it a very different dynamic It no longer obviously a private equity firm is a legal entity not a person They can't exert effort. They can hire people that do that. But there is a new breed of franchisee that in some chains, that's a little bit different than the old model. Again, I hate to bring up AI in every single conversation that we do nowadays, but I think it's kind of unavoidable. Well, we have all this new technology and Joe and I have done plenty of trucking episodes where we talk about, you know, tech that monitors whether people's eyes are open and things like that. Does that new technology play a role in, I guess, exerting more control over some of these franchises? It absolutely does. And it started in the 1990s with broadband Internet and is accelerating now with with AI for sure. So think about the 1960s, right? You want to have this legal structure where this independent operator is operating the restaurant. They kick me back a royalty. I try to control everything they do. But how can you really control it? You can, there's fax machines, there's telephones, you can send secret shoppers, but there's only so much you can really do. By the 1990s, particularly with broadband internet connected to the cash registers through, you know point of sale systems there a steady data stream now going back to headquarters where they have an intense amount of control And I think one of the interesting things about that technological change is first of all in terms of the motivation for these kinds of outsourced industrial structures it's usually technology is a story. But they started doing this way before the technology. But now that technology exists, it allows, just think about like a truly vertically integrated corporation like U.S. Steel or General Motors in 1950, the control they have over all of their plants is less than McDonald's that they own. And they employ, you know, those hundreds of thousands of industrial workers. McDonald's now hardly employs anybody, but they have way more control because they're able to get that stream of data. And now the AI has made that surveillance of workers themselves. And by the way, you don't have to fire them if they're too slow with the register. You just send a note to the franchisee, hey, so-and-so, they even know the names of the employees, you know, is a little too slow. Do something about that. You know, so. Wait, can you say just talking more about like, I guess this is theory of the firm type stuff. Explain this notion that like a U.S. deal is not intuitive to most people is like would be a more distributed type of entity than a McDonald's. Why is that? What do you talk when you say that? What do you mean? Yeah So I think you know so theory of the firm I think you know no matter your political proclivities I like for you know Marx called it the firm the hidden boat of production What happens there is that there an entity that owns assets and there someone who works and you put them together and it happens inside a firm Coase the great Chicago conservative economist had a similar notion where what the nature of the firm is is command. A workman doesn't go from department Y to department X because of a change in relative prices, but because it's ordered to do so. That's the classical economic reason why firms exist. Then there's, of course, you know, Chandler with his, you know, visible hand book, which is the foundation for most business history of this is why do we have these big corporations? And his answer was the economics of high throughput and the efficiencies of, you know, if you want to make steel, you can't really rely on the uncertainties of those of those prices. You kind of want to have everything under control and have managers, you know, sort of running it. What they're trying to do with franchising is get sort of that same type of control, but without having the legal risks and liabilities. And I would say just one more thing is that that the legal door that franchisors opened in the 1960s and 1970s has since been started as a little loophole. Now it's just a huge bay door that an Uber or Amazon can walk through. So Amazon's fascinated because they are very much like a US steel in that they found a need to totally reorganize distribution in the United States. [30:00] rely on USPS, they didn't rely on UPS or FedEx. They brought it all back in-house in economic terms and the fact that they controlled it. But they did not bring it in-house in terms of legal liabilities because those trucks driving around your neighborhood are independent contractors. And they are able to control them because of this litigation and legislation battles that franchises fought in the 60s and 70s to legalize those kinds of controls. What exactly is, I guess, the concrete lineage between the franchise model and the gig economy and the independent contractors? Yeah. So franchisors on the 1960s and 1970s, you know, don't like the antitrust jurisprudence that says you can't control independent businesses through, I don't know if I've used this term yet, but vertical restraints is like the term of art and antitrust for that. So they go about filing cases to, you know, very concerted, very smart strategic effort to change the law. They ended up having a huge, very important ally in the University of Chicago economics department and law school who are, have the same ideas that, that we shouldn't be judging. What is this hoary old idea of the independent entrepreneur? It's efficiency. That's all we care about. So they won those battles in the courts. And then after that, they also were able to head off any ... After they win those, getting this control you start seeing the Department of Labor the National Labor Relations Board and litigants say wait a minute all that control you probably should be responsible you know for the underpayment of wages Or let say you know for example Domino you got this 30 minute delivery rule, your driver's speeding to make that delivery, you hit somebody, that's kind of your fault. You know, that's not the franchisee's fault, or even the driver's. So they win all these. So they're able to say, well, no, that doesn't really apply to us. You know, we, they're still so they're able to have their cake in India, too. And so that's just that there's not only there's any explicit coordination. But once you start getting companies to try to do this with, you know, rather than explicit contractual vertical restraints, it's algorithmic. You know, here's the route you're going to drive. Here's the price you're going to charge. They're able to do it that way. And that would not have been or that would have raised some judicial eyebrows if they had tried to do Uber in the 1960s. So, you know, obviously, the technology is highly important. But there's the other story I think is important, too, is that the fact that these things are legally permissible is the result of this of a franchise's efforts. Thank you launching a new campaign or just stocking up on team gear finding the right promotional products makes all the difference 4imprint offers thousands of options from on apparel and premium drinkware to tech totes and giveaways so you can find the right fit for any audience, purpose, or budget. You can customize it all, your logo, your message, your look, and many items come with no setup charge to help you save. And if you're really watching the bottom line, you'll find standout choices at every price point, so you can make a real impact while staying on budget. Plus, you'll get expert help, fast turnaround times, and their 360-degree guarantee, so you can be 4imprint certain your order will arrive on time and look exactly right. Whatever your goal, 4imprint makes it easy to find your perfect promo match. Explore the possibilities today at 4imprint.com. 4imprint. 4certain. Support for this show comes from public.com. If you're actively involved in your portfolio, you probably catch yourself repeating the same actions buying the dip manually sweeping idle cash putting on a hedge on public you can now create ai agents that handle all these tasks on your behalf just describe what you want to do in plain english like if the vix hits 25 buy a put option on the s 500 or if my cash balance goes above twenty thousand dollars move the excess into my direct index You approve the workflow and your agent handles the rest Monitoring the market watching for your conditions and executing your strategies exactly as defined An investing platform driven by your intent, not just your clicks. You can also get full read and write access to your account via the public API. Go to public.com slash market and fund your account in five minutes or less. That's public.com slash market. Paid for by Public Investing. Brokered services by Open to the Public Investing, Inc., member FINRA, and SIPC. Advisory services by Public Advisors, LLC, SEC Registered Advisor. Complete disclosures available at public.com slash disclosures. As industries evolve faster than ever, companies need an environment that accelerates strategic growth, and Michigan delivers on that promise. From emerging startups to global enterprises, Michigan offers what executives value most, a resilient, innovative ecosystem, diverse communities that attract top talent, and a quality of life that supports work-life balance. With our unified Team Michigan approach, businesses scale faster and compete at the highest level. Michigan, pure opportunity. Seize your opportunity at michiganbusiness.org. Amazon, Uber, do they still use that, like, [35:00] Be your own boss and start your own business rhetoric when they're trying to look for new drivers or little local carriers. Yeah, they do. But with the Amazon models, even closer to franchising Uber, because, you know, Uber and Lyft, it's each driver is treated as sort of like an independent entrepreneur. They own their own business. Yeah, yeah. Whereas, yeah, be your own boss. And that's a powerful thing. You know, I want to be my own boss. I mean, no, no, it is, I guess, an American, like a very American. That's how you, you know, get your nest egg and take care of yourself and your family. But Amazon, it's called their delivery service partner, or GSB model, is much closer to a franchise in that every driver is not an independent entrepreneur. It's the contractor company. Right. So they might have like 30 or whatever. Yeah, 30 trucks or whatever. Yeah. So it's a relatively small business. Amazon, I think, even fronts some of the capital. But it's a legally distinct entity, even though it's painted with the Amazon logo and tightly controlled. Since you're an economist and you mentioned regressions before, do you have any empirical research about the relationship between the growth of the franchise model and wages in the U.S.? Because again like if we talking about the primary lever that an independent franchise owner can actually pull to improve the business it all wages Yeah so I don have that time series of the growth of franchising and the growth of wages But there are you know my work and other work We do know a couple of things about franchising One is that if you a wage worker now there work from Kruger back in the 1990s There David Weil, who's I should have mentioned him before. He's like the economist on this stuff. He wrote a book called The Fisher Workplace, where we do know that even within the same chain, you want to be at the company owned one, not at the franchised one, because your wages will be higher. You'll have a higher tenure wage profile, meaning you're going to get promoted and your wage is going to go up more over time. And also franchised establishments violate their workers' safety and other rights at a much higher rate than ones that are company owned. So we do know that stuff. And then we have my work. We have one. We were able to take advantage of a really nice natural experiment where Washington state entered a consent decree with McDonald's and a bunch of other chains to get rid of those no poach agreements I mentioned earlier. And we found, I mean, maybe not surprising, but there's a causal effect. Once they got rid of those no post agreements, wages went up. And then, you know, again, because it's very hard, you don't want to be careful as an economist, you know, it's hard to get those natural experiments. So we don't have that for like specific contract terms. But in work, again, with Marshall Steinbaum and Sergio, we found you know correlations with lower wages And then they have a new paper where they look at franchise contracts over time and find that they have gotten more restrictive even over the past 20 years Wait how do they actually measure that Now I really interested because if we talking about what I guess I interested in how the actual like franchisor communicates a lot of the restrictions to the actual business Like how did they do that? And then how do you tally that up in an empirical way? Yeah. So studying franchising, I was very fortunate because these contracts are sort of public records. So there's a requirement from a 1979 Federal Trade Commission rule that requires franchisors to furnish to a franchisee what's called a franchise disclosure document, which in sort of plain English lays out key contract terms, what the royalty is going to be. And basically, it's meant to inform the franchisee, the idea being franchisees are getting swindled into entering these incredibly one-sided contracts. They should know what they're getting into. Let's make a law to disclose that. So there's this franchise disclosure document, and then usually the franchisor will file as an attachment the entire franchise contract. So we have the contracts, and they're not filed with the FTC, but some states require them to be filed. So you just go to Wisconsin or California. Anyone who wants to do a study on this, you can get the contracts. Back in when I was doing this 10 years ago I had to read the contracts and hand code them It took me like 18 months But I got through 530 contracts hundreds of contract terms So we got a pretty good but it only a cross section But what my colleagues have been able to do since then is I mean just you know text recognition software and, you know, text scraping abilities and, you know, AI. In an afternoon, you know, you could program a computer to just scrape thousands of these contracts and you can get them over time, which I wasn't able to do. But yes, these are public records. So anyone could do this. You mentioned treatment of workers and wages at McDonald's franchise locations versus the McDonald's owned and operated locations. What about franchise locations versus just pure independent restaurants? Because it seems like one of these things that people don't want to talk about that much, that when we talk about wages, when we talk about wage theft, and some of these other things, we all like to glorify small businesses, but there's a lot of like these pathologies seem to be fairly prevalent or more prevalent, I think, at small businesses than say like large corporations. Is that accurate? You know, I haven't looked at that comparison between independent restaurants and between fast food restaurants. Yeah, not, yeah. But yeah, but I think that's a fair case. And I think what franchises are trying to [40:00] is capture that small business labor model and then graft it to a large corporation, but make sure that all the rents go up to the shareholders and the top corporation and not be shared with the workers, where if you're at a Starbucks or a Chipotle, which is totally corporate owned, not saying they have great working conditions, but some of those rents do appear to be shared because wages are higher at Chipotle than Taco Bell and they're higher at Starbucks than at Dunkin' Donuts. And also Starbucks workers, even they don't have a contract yet, but they were able to at least vote for a union in a way that has never happened in fast food. Can you explain the logic either like why companies aren't all franchises? So first of all, why would a Chipotle, why did they not go down the franchise road? But why does McDonald's actually have a pretty significant number of owned and operated restaurants? Yeah. So I think there could be a few reasons for that. One is owning the assets and employing the managers, there is a little bit more control that you get there than if it's franchised. And particularly if you don't have the McDonald's model. When McDonald's, and Ray Kroc talks about this in his book, he really has a hammer over those franchisees in that if they lose that trademark, he can evict them from their own business because McDonald owns the land But if you starting a chain now you probably don have the money to actually own all that real estate So there are those elements of it But yeah, I think there's also there the Chipotle's or the Starbucks are a little bit more high end, like a few cents more. It's not quite the same quality ingredients. It's just a little bit of a different model than the churn out high throughput, as low wages as possible model of a franchised fast food restaurant. You mentioned unions just then. And one of the interesting things in your book, I think it's maybe in the preface or something like that, but you talk about the legal structure of a franchise, even if you wanted to unionize or negotiate with the franchisor, it's not entirely legally clear that you can do that because of the corporate structure. Is that right? Yeah, that's absolutely correct. Yeah. And this is something, again, that the franchisors where they were clear this is what they wanted to achieve with their business model. They didn't want to deal with unions. Up until the 20 teens and the fight for 15, no one really thought that there was a way for workers who wanted to form a union to negotiate with McDonald's. Probably McDonald's could willingly do this at any point, but they choose not to. There's something called the Taft-Hartley Act, which is an anti law from 1947 that makes it illegal for workers You can go on strike you can pick it You can target McDonald Corporation You can only target your immediate employer So that creates enormous incentives Franchising not coincidentally takes off after the Taft Act But during the Obama administration, they enacted something called a joint employer rule, which did make it possible for or made it easier for workers to say, you know, I really can't, you know, look at the realities of the situation, the economic realities. If I'm to get a raise or I'm going to get better working conditions, we need to bargain with McDonald's because they control the staffing levels, they control the supplies, they control how what hours we operate and all that stuff. So that have under Obama, of course, it was overturned during Trump. It flipped back during Biden. Now it's flipped back. So it's just no one really knows their rights are. It's not. It's a whole other issue that we could get into. But yeah, so there has been have been attempts to sort of fix that problem. But we have not fixed it yet. From a sort of like broader public policy standpoint, I mean, my doorbell rings a lot or too much because it's like random like grocery deliveries and stuff like that but like clearly the amazon distribution logistic system that they built out it's clearly more like rapid than the u postal service more flexible i think than ups how should we think about the sort of like the public benefit of this model that like has made it you can order all kinds of stuff and frequently have it delivered in an hour which seems pretty nice. Plus, we do have McDonald's, which we also love. Yeah. Yeah. So first of all, there are benefits to the Amazon distribution model. And I think, yeah, we should acknowledge those for what they are. There are also costs. And, you know, we should we should make sure those are counted to, you know, whether it's pollution neighborhoods where those distribution centers are, or delivery centers, I should call them. There's the cost of workers, you know, famously peeing in bottle stores. Can you just quickly say you distinguish between distribution centers and delivery centers? So the distribution centers are owned. Those are owned by Amazon. Yeah. So Amazon. But then they go to a delivery center before they go to your house. They don't. OK. Right. And that's where the other. Yeah. And the delivery center is not owned by Amazon. The center is, but the trucking companies, they all go. So if you're a driver for these companies, you show up at an Amazon facility, you put on an Amazon uniform, you drive an Amazon truck, but your employer is one of these contractors. So yeah, I think we should, first of all, we have to account for the cost on workers and other communities and all that kind of stuff. But also, my proposition for policy here is pretty simple, is that the problem is not that, [45:00] There's innovation that there's control. That's what a firm is. That's what a corporation is, is, you know, market shouldn't do everything. Sometimes having a little central planner, you know, a mini central planner, you know, coordinating activity is a great thing for, you know, getting more efficient and innovating. So we should have that. The problem is then you can't avoid the obligations and liabilities and risks that go with owning assets and employing workers. And we used to have, you know, our whole legal architecture for regulating and holding these companies accountable was based on that, like, archetype. You know, we pretty much only our wave of regulation. It was like 1935, you know, to the mid 1960s. And we know what a company is. It has a smokestack. It employs a bunch of workers. It owns a factory. Like that's what that's what a company is now with all of these, you know, and partly due to franchises creating this loophole, it's no longer so clear what an employer is. And all I would propose we do is, well, if you want to direct to control the work of these drivers, well, look, you're their employer. And if you're not paying them the legal wages or if they want to bargain with you for a union or if, you know, because of you, because of your algorithm, they ran a red light and hit someone. Those are all those things you caused. You should be held responsible for those. All right Brian Kalachi we going to have to leave it there Thank you so much for coming on All on Thank you I had a great time So, Joe, that was a fascinating conversation. And I'm really glad we ended up doing a franchise model because Brian truly was the perfect guest. But it's so interesting to hear. I mean, it just kind of blows my mind. The have your cake and you get to aspect of all of this. Right. No, totally. I mean, look, again, no one has to enter that. To me, that's one of the main things. I did think it was interesting that it really is literally about the intellectual property. That is literally what Coming to America is about, is about a guy who commits intellectual property theft by making something that looks like a McDonald's. But that is the core thing. You know, most people aren't going to be able to manufacture that, etc. So being able to plug into that. No, I thought it was like really interesting, the history. I am not surprised at all. The Ray Kroc book is so good. He's so forthright. He so unselfconscious about everything that he did in life It just like a very like weird and fun read for that purpose alone I going to to read it yeah i kind of want to read the colonel sanders one it so funny to hear colonel sanders and it's like ray kroc and colonel sanders like wait that's it it still feels like that's just like a made-up character really yeah to me it does i mean i knew who was real but it still feels like that's like a real person do you know about the whole um kfc christmas thing in japan oh they're really into it but other than that I think it's because Colonel Sanders kind of looked a little bit like Santa so a lot of the Japanese KFCs at least when I was there they used to have big statues of Colonel Sanders out and it was kind of like very American, very Western that's a great avatar of American both cultural and business traditions as Colonel Sanders I do think like, you know, I always found it weird when the marketing for being an Uber driver or like starting a van line was like either like be your own boss or like start your own business. It's like maybe like the math. Look, the left tail is reduced and the right tail is reduced. So there maybe you know and clearly people have done well entering franchise but they do not look anything like what we typically think of as like quote entrepreneurship business ownership it like a very uh it clearly a very different thing no that tension is also remarkable the idea that like you're an entrepreneur you're independent but also the franchisor is going to dictate basically everything to you i also just think i like except wage costs except wage costs i like that brian uh brought up like you know even the most like you Chicago schooled economists is like, no, it's really good. And there are a lot of efficiency gains when you do a lot of activity under a centrally planned umbrella, such as a large corporation and the sort of like thing that hardly anyone talks about, which is like how much of the economy is literally under central planning. We just don't call it central planning because it's corporate. Yeah. I mean, yes, there are clearly some benefits to it. Both you and I, it's I think you use Amazon Prime, do you? I do, yes. Yeah, so do I. And McDonald's, of course. Okay, shall we leave it there? Let's leave it there. This has been another episode of the All Thoughts Podcast. I'm Tracy Alloway. You can follow me at Tracy Alloway. And I'm Joe Weisenthal. You can follow me at The Stalwart. Follow our guest, Brian Kalachi. He's at Brian underscore Kalachi. Follow our producers, Carmen Rodriguez at Carmen Armand Dashiell Bennett at Dashbot, Kale Brooks at Kale Brooks, and Kevin Lozano at Kevin Lloyd Lozano. And we'll see you next time. [50:00] Odlots content, go to Bloomberg.com slash Odlots. We have a daily newsletter and all of our episodes. You can chat about all these topics 24-7 in our Discord, discord.gg slash Odlots. 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