Microsoft Restructures Xbox Unit as Game Pass Subscriptions Stall

Game Pass订阅停滞，微软重组Xbox部门 微软在Xbox Game Pass及低规格硬件上的发力蚕食了全价游戏销售，且未能达成订阅目标，迫使管理层离职并引发大规模裁员。 Ben Thompson深入剖析了微软Xbox部门的历史演进与战略失误，从最初的“客厅屏幕”构想到当前订阅模式所面临的困境。他阐述了跨平台开发经济模型如何有利于索尼的独占工作室模式，以及为何Xbox Game Pass最终蚕食了全价游戏的销售而非拓展市场。对话还探讨了《GTA 6》等3A大作的真实价值、近期Xbox管理层的变动，以及针对Getty与Shutterstock等并购案的监管阻力如何未能考虑到生成式AI带来的快速颠覆。 Ben Thompson 认为 Rockstar Games 对《Grand Theft Auto VI》（GTA 6）定价 80 美元严重过低，并指出该作是 AI 时代前人类手工制作的巅峰之作，完全具备支撑 200 美元定价的价值。 (2:54) 微软早年依靠 DirectX 奠定了 PC 游戏优势，并试图借 Xbox 推进“三屏一云”战略来占领客厅电视入口，但该策略最终失败，因为消费者购买主机是为了玩游戏而非作为通用互联网门户。 (4:43) 索尼在 PS4 时代吸取教训，放弃特异硬件转用对开发者友好的通用架构，并聚焦第一方独占大作锁定市场主导地位，进而赚取第三方发行商 30% 的平台授权分成，使微软在硬件市场陷入严重劣势。 (11:51) 微软 Series S/X 的双硬件策略拖累了开发优化，同时将 Bethesda 与动视旗下的 3A 大作直接加入 Xbox Game Pass 严重蚕食了全价游戏收入，订阅人数在达到 3000 万后停滞不前，未能实现 7500 万目标并导致了换帅与裁员。 (15:33)

According to tech analyst Ben Thompson, Microsoft's long-term Xbox strategy has repeatedly foundered by subordinating core gaming realities to corporate ambitions—first through a failed attempt to control the living room, and later through a Game Pass subscription model that cannibalized retail sales. The Flawed Living Room Portal Strategy (4:43) Microsoft entered the gaming console market rooted in its proprietary DirectX and Direct3D technologies, pursuing a pre-iPhone corporate strategy centered on 'three screens and the cloud.' Having secured the PC desktop and targeted mobile via Windows CE in 1999, Microsoft viewed the living room television as its third critical screen. The company reasoned that placing an Xbox under the television would secure permission to operate the primary household internet portal. Thompson argues that this thesis ultimately proved to be an 'ouroboros of self-mutilation.' While consumer demand for living room service portals materialized, non-gamers refused to buy multi-hundred-dollar gaming hardware for internet access. Instead, dedicated, lower-cost streaming devices—such as the Amazon Fire Stick, Google Chromecast, Roku TV, and Apple TV—captured the portal market. Meanwhile, Microsoft’s insistence on using the console as a general entertainment and media hub alienated its core gaming demographic, culminating in severe backlash during the Xbox One launch due to forced Kinect integration and digital rights management restrictions. Game Engine Shifts and Sony's Software Advantage (11:51) The transition to high-definition (HD) gaming during the seventh console generation permanently altered development economics. Studios shifted away from writing proprietary, low-level engine code for custom architectures—such as the complex Cell processor that handicapped Sony's expensive PlayStation 3—toward standardized third-party engines like Epic Games' Unreal Engine. Because the skyrocketing cost of producing HD assets required cross-platform distribution across the PlayStation 3, Xbox 360, and PC, single-platform exclusivity became prohibitively expensive for independent publishers. Although the Xbox 360 succeeded due to its accessible, PC-like architecture, Sony capitalized on Microsoft's subsequent missteps by adopting standardized hardware for the PlayStation 4 and PlayStation 5 while differentiating strictly through software. Rather than pursuing massive multi-billion-dollar publisher acquisitions, Sony acquired agile studios like Naughty Dog to build high-profile exclusives, such as The Last of Us and Spider-Man. With roughly 80% of the console base opting for PlayStation, Sony accepted the capped audience of its first-party titles because it captured highly lucrative 30% platform licensing fees on industry-wide blockbusters like Call of Duty and Madden. Game Pass Stagnation and Retail Cannibalization (15:33) Faced with a widening hardware deficit, Microsoft pivoted toward Xbox Game Pass, attempting to expand its ecosystem by offering high-end Series X consoles ($500–$600) alongside a lower-powered Series S ($300). This split compromised development efficiency, as studios routinely built games to the lowest common denominator of the Series S. To supply Game Pass, Microsoft acquired major publishers including ZeniMax/Bethesda and Activision Blizzard, shifting traditional $70 retail titles directly into a $20 monthly subscription. This strategy failed to generate the anticipated volume growth. While Microsoft targeted 75 million Game Pass subscribers, the service stalled at approximately 30 million. Instead of onboarding millions of new subscribers, the service allowed existing customers who previously paid full price to consume expensive AAA releases at a fraction of their historical cost. The resulting revenue cannibalization prompted a leadership reset, the departure of Xbox head Phil Spencer, the appointment of Matthew Ball as Chief Strategy Officer, and thousands of layoffs, including a phased reduction of 1,600 roles followed by an additional 1,600 cuts. Exclusivity Tests and Antitrust Inconsistencies (20:24) To counter mounting subscription losses, Thompson posits that Microsoft may be forced to consider radical operational measures, such as writing off acquisition costs and making premier franchises like Call of Duty exclusive to Xbox. Such a move would serve as an ultimate pricing test to see if consumers will purchase a $500 console solely to access a single intellectual property franchise. Thompson notes the irony that antitrust regulators originally opposed the Activision acquisition over market concentration, yet Microsoft may now require exclusivity simply to salvage its division. The discussion highlights broader regulatory friction through the recent termination of the Getty Images and Shutterstock merger under pressure from UK regulators. Thompson notes that regulators routinely block defensive consolidation in declining sectors—such as stock photography disrupted by generative AI, where combined valuations plunged from an initial $3.7 billion in January 2025 toward $300 million each—because mature industries are easily evaluated via discounted cash flow models, even while emerging monopolistic platforms often evade scrutiny. Microsoft faces unresolved strategic dilemmas over whether to spin out Xbox, absorb severe acquisition write-downs, or enforce platform exclusivity to justify its hardware investments, all while navigating an antitrust environment that Thompson observes is structurally hostile to defensive consolidation.

分析师Ben Thompson指出，微软Xbox业务陷入困境的根源在于其长期将游戏机作为占领客厅入口的战略错位，以及后续试图通过Game Pass订阅制与双硬件配置颠覆行业商业模式的尝试失败，导致高昂的内容投资严重自噬传统销售收入。 客厅门户战略的错位与硬件自噬 (4:43) Thompson回顾指出，微软在智能手机兴起前曾确立“三屏一云”的战略核心，意图全面占领PC桌面、移动口袋以及电视客厅。微软开发初代Xbox的动机并非单纯深耕游戏市场，而是认为消费者既然已在电视旁连接游戏设备，微软便可借此获得掌控客厅在线服务门户的商业许可。然而，这一逻辑最终彻底落空：消费者购买游戏机只是为了运行游戏，绝不会为获得客厅网络入口而购置昂贵的专用主机；真正的客厅门户最终被Amazon Fire Stick、Google Chromecast和Roku等低成本流媒体硬件占据。 微软对客厅中枢的执念在此后演变为伤害主机的循环。尽管Xbox 360凭借接近PC的友好架构取得了商业成功，但微软在Xbox One时代执意捆绑Kinect体感设备并推行严苛的数字版权管理（DRM），试图强行兑现家庭娱乐中心构想，结果引发核心玩家的强烈抵触。这种将企业级平台扩张目标凌驾于游戏核心体验之上的做法，严重动摇了Xbox世代更迭的立足根基。 引擎标准化与索尼的软件壁垒 (10:31) 在标准画质（SD）时代，游戏通常依赖针对特定硬件（如超级任天堂）的专用底层优化；而迈入高清（HD）时代后，游戏资产的制作开销呈指数级攀升，促使行业普遍转向以Unreal Engine为代表的标准化第三方商用引擎。这一技术转向抹平了底层硬件壁垒，也意味着高昂的开发成本迫使第三方顶级大作必须全平台发行以回收资本。 索尼吸取了PlayStation 3因复杂Cell芯片及强推Blu-ray格式导致成本失控的教训，在PlayStation 4时代采用易于开发的标准PC架构，并转向重点收购Naughty Dog等敏捷型工作室，打造出《最后生还者》和《蜘蛛侠》等独占杀手级软件。Thompson分析表示，当《使命召唤》等全平台大作可以在所有设备运行时，索尼凭借独占软件吸引了约80%的主机用户基本盘，进而从第三方全平台销售中坐享30%的高额分成收益，彻底压制了微软传统硬件周期的反扑空间。 订阅制自噬与硬件分层困境 (15:33) 面对硬件层面的巨大赤字，微软选择绕开传统主机周期，全力转向Xbox Game Pass订阅生态并推出双轨硬件策略——定价500美元的高端Series X与300美元的低配Series S。然而，这一策略引发了多重内部矛盾：第三方开发者受限于机能木桶效应，被迫按照最低标准的Series S进行游戏规格适配，从而削弱了旗舰机型的吸引力；更关键的是，微软斥巨资收购Bethesda与动视暴雪以补充内容，却将原本单套全价70美元发行的顶级作品直接放入每月20美元的Game Pass中首发。 这种做法未能按预期带来海量新增用户，反而让原本愿意全价购入游戏的核心玩家得以低成本游玩，形成了严重的收入自噬。报道数据显示，微软曾定下同期达到7500万订阅用户的预期目标，但实际用户增长在3000万左右停滞甚至下滑。商业模式的受挫导致了高管人事震荡，原Xbox负责人Phil Spencer离职，微软引入Matthew Ball出任首席战略官，并启动了包括分批削减1600个岗位在内的数千人规模大裁员。 3A独占性博弈与反垄断监管偏差 (20:24) 在探讨Xbox的潜在自救路径时，Thompson提出了一项激进设想：微软或许应计提对Bethesda与动视暴雪的巨额收购减值损失，并将《使命召唤》等支柱IP转为Xbox平台完全独占。他认为，此举将是对3A级游戏独立价值的终极定价测试，用以检验玩家是否真的愿意为单一顶级IP而购买500美元的主机。尽管反垄断机构此前对平台独占保持警惕，但在订阅制造成数百亿美元亏损的压力下，微软可能出于生存考量被迫采取这一手段。 对话同时结合Getty Images因英国监管机构要求剥离编辑业务而叫停对Shutterstock合并的现实案例，反思了反垄断审查的系统性偏差。两家图片平台的合并案最初估值达3.7亿美元，但受生成式AI冲击，双方市值在18个月内各自缩水至约3亿美元。Thompson指出，反垄断机构往往因为成熟或衰退行业易于建立折现现金流模型而倾向于阻挠此类防御性整合，却往往在具备垄断萌芽的高速成长期企业并购面前无所适从，暴露出监管评估机制与技术变革周期的脱节。 本期节目认为，微软Xbox从最初脱离游戏核心的客厅占领意图，到后期依靠Game Pass低价模式解构传统发行体系，均反映出企业宏观平台诉求与高预算3A游戏底层经济规律的冲突。当前留待观察的核心问题在于，经历换帅与深度裁员后的Xbox，是否会彻底放弃跨平台订阅的幻想重回独占竞争，以及整个游戏与数字资产行业在生成式AI冲击和开发成本膨胀的双重挤压下将如何重估内容资产的真实价值。

## Background 该视频由 YouTube 频道 TBPN 于 2026 年 8 月 3 日发布。根据页面简介，本期节目邀请到知名科技战略分析博客 Stratechery 创始人 Ben Thompson，深度探讨微软 Xbox 战略失败的原因、为什么《GTA 6》应该定价 200 美元、主机大战如何重塑现代游戏业、Xbox Game Pass 遭遇的困境，以及反垄断监管在错误时机阻碍企业并购等核心议题。 ## TL;DR 对话从 3D 图形技术史与《GTA 6》手工制作价值的激进定价切入，系统复盘了微软试图将 Xbox 打造为“客厅第三屏”的特洛伊木马战略偏差。随着高清开发时代通用引擎普及与成本激增，索尼凭借高品质自研独占大作与平台抽成模式确立了绝对优势，而微软试图复制 SaaS 模式力推 Xbox Game Pass 订阅制并推出阉割硬件 Series S，反而严重自我蚕食全价买断收入、陷入订阅停滞与大规模裁员的僵局。节目尾声还探讨了微软巨额收购后的潜在资产减记与独占豪赌，并以 Getty 与 Shutterstock 交易告吹为例，辛辣反思了反垄断监管在传统行业衰退期机械阻挠自救整合的荒谬悖论。 ## Atmosphere & style 整场对谈兼具轻松诙谐的极客闲聊与极其锋利的商业战略解剖，Ben Thompson 与主持人在看似随意的夏日闲扯中，不断抛出令人耳目一新的硬核观点。对话节奏明快自然，充斥着硅谷内行特有的辛辣反讽与自嘲比喻（如高价柠檬水摊、翻找垃圾桶烟头等），既有对老牌科技巨头战略误判的冷峻剖析，也带着对昔日硬件拓荒时代的怀旧与同理心。聆听体验就像是置身于一场没有公关话术修饰的闭门智囊茶叙，兼具推演推导的智力快感与洞察现实商业残酷的通透感。 ## Bulletin - [16:44](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0s6UAstE2Ms&t=1004s) Xbox Game Pass 订阅用户停滞在约 3,000 万，远未达到 7,500 万的预期目标，高溢价并购后强推首发入库对原有的 70 美元全价买断基本盘造成了严重的自我蚕食。 - [04:42](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0s6UAstE2Ms&t=282s) 微软早年以主机作为特洛伊木马占领客厅第三屏的构想彻底破产，该生态位最终被廉价流媒体棒占据，而后续推行的低配版 Xbox Series S 反而拉低了整个世代游戏的开发基线。 - [18:45](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0s6UAstE2Ms&t=1125s) 伴随掌舵人菲尔·斯宾塞（Phil Spencer）退场与千人级裁员，新任首席战略官 Matthew Ball 上任，微软正面临是否对动视暴雪等巨额收购进行资产减记乃至彻底拆分 Xbox 业务的抉择。 - [24:06](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0s6UAstE2Ms&t=1446s) Getty 与 Shutterstock 合并因监管阻挠告吹揭示了反垄断的“逆向悖论”：监管者往往在新兴垄断萌芽时袖手旁观，却在成熟企业遭遇生成式 AI 降维打击、被迫整合自救的衰退期施加干预。 ## Key takeaways - [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0s6UAstE2Ms&t=0s) 微软凭借 DirectX 图形抽象层抹平了显卡硬件差异，在 Direct3D 与 OpenGL 的较量及 PC 3D 图形技术爆发期奠定了涉足游戏领域的基础。 - [02:54](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0s6UAstE2Ms&t=174s) 《GTA 6》被视作生成式 AI 浪潮前纯人工十年心血打磨的顶级工业杰作，相较其开发投入与艺术沉淀，80 美元的常规发售定价被严重低估。 - [04:42](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0s6UAstE2Ms&t=282s) 微软早期的“三屏一云”战略企图以游戏主机作为切入客厅中央的特洛伊木马，但消费者不会为多媒体入口支付昂贵主机溢价，客厅入口最终被 Fire TV 等廉价流媒体设备攻占。 - [06:42](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0s6UAstE2Ms&t=402s) Xbox One 执迷于客厅娱乐终端并强制捆绑 Kinect 与 DRM，失去核心玩家支持；而在微软股价长期低迷的鲍尔默时期，Xbox 部门曾是维系内部自豪感的情感图腾，延迟了战略纠偏。 - [09:33](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0s6UAstE2Ms&t=573s) PS3 复杂的 Cell 硬件架构拖累开发，叠加 3D 高清时代通用引擎普及与资产制作成本暴涨，促使第三方大厂全面转向跨平台发行，成就了 Xbox 360 的黄金时代。 - [11:46](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0s6UAstE2Ms&t=706s) 索尼在 PS4 时代依靠精品第一方独占游戏吸纳超过 80% 的核心玩家，进而通过从全平台第三方的巨额销售中抽取平台分成，形成了极高壁垒的商业正向飞轮。 - [14:20](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0s6UAstE2Ms&t=860s) 微软试图用企业级 SaaS 订阅制改造 3A 游戏市场推出 Game Pass，而配套的低价阉割版 Series S 沦为开发者的最低公共分母，反向限制了旗舰主机 Series X 的性能发挥。 - [16:44](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0s6UAstE2Ms&t=1004s) 微软以全价单卖估值天价收购 Bethesda 与动视暴雪，随后将新大作首发塞入 Game Pass，未能有效撬动 PlayStation 玩家跳槽，反而使自身高价值付费玩家低价化，陷入严重反噬。 - [18:45](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0s6UAstE2Ms&t=1125s) 长期负责人菲尔·斯宾塞（Phil Spencer）退场且部门开启 1,600 人分阶段裁员，团队士气遭遇重创，推动 Xbox 彻底独立拆分重新成为行业推演的现实选项。 - [20:24](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0s6UAstE2Ms&t=1224s) 知名分析师 Matthew Ball 加盟出任 CSO，引发了微软是否会资产减记数百亿美元收购并将《使命召唤》彻底转为独占的讨论，这本质上是一场对 3A IP 撬动硬件销量的终极定价权测试。 - [21:58](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0s6UAstE2Ms&t=1318s) 从 2014 年苹果 30 亿美元收购 Beats 引发热议到如今 AI 赛道后排企业估值动辄数十亿，科技行业的数字通胀与资本泡沫已严重脱离传统商业常理。 - [24:06](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0s6UAstE2Ms&t=1446s) 监管机构在新兴技术上升期往往因不可测而袖手旁观，却在商业模式已知、企业因外部冲击（如 Gen AI）抱团取暖的行业暮年强行叫停并购，呈现荒谬的逆向监管错位。 ## Detailed walkthrough ### [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0s6UAstE2Ms&t=0s) 播客开场与追溯 Xbox 的技术前史 节目在一阵轻松的寒暄中开场。主持人提到，科技战略分析博客 Stratechery 创始人 Ben Thompson 在通常被视作新闻淡季的夏季里依然高产输出。主持人打趣称，即便没有《华尔街日报》或彭博社（Bloomberg）的重大独家爆料推动，Ben Thompson 甚至能以 Mark Zuckerberg 的口吻沉浸式展开长达二十分钟的宏大推演，重塑了外界对 Meta 的叙事框架。不过，本期对话的核心议题迅速转向了微软的 Xbox 困境。 主持人抛出了自己对微软游戏业务由来的理解假说：微软能够涉足主机领域并阻止类似“Chrome Box”或亚马逊、谷歌主机的出现，核心源头在于其独占的图形抽象层 DirectX，正是它让游戏开发者能够跨不同显卡运行程序。Ben Thompson 对此表示赞同，并将时间线进一步拉回 1990 年代 3D 图形的洪荒时期。当时业界的主流技术是 OpenGL，随后微软推出了紧密贴合自身操作系统的 Direct3D 作为替代方案。这一时期不仅见证了 Nvidia 凭借 Riva 128、RNT 和 GeForce 系列显卡的崛起，也记录了 PC 游戏的黄金拓荒期。 - 早期 PC 3D 图形技术主要围绕 OpenGL 与微软的 Direct3D 展开竞争。 - Nvidia 在该时期相继发布 Riva 128、TNT 及 GeForce 显卡，奠定了现代 GPU 市场格局。 - id Software 推出划时代作品《雷神之锤》（Quake），当时开发者在极高强度的加班（crunch）下几乎拖垮了整个工作室，成为早期游戏工业史上的著名轶事。 ### [02:54](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0s6UAstE2Ms&t=174s) 插曲讨论：为什么《GTA 6》应该卖 200 美元 当主持人顺势询问 Ben Thompson 是否能给即将推出的《GTA 6》（侠盗猎车手 6）写一篇游戏评测时，Ben Thompson 坦承自己并不是狂热的游戏玩家，甚至常因为“只关注商业战略和企业架构、而非游戏本身好不好玩”而招致硬核玩家的抨击。但他随即抛出一个足以让互联网炸锅的“核弹级”观点：Rockstar 针对《GTA 6》收取的 80 美元定价实在太低了，这款游戏完全应该定价 200 美元。 主持人完全赞同这一视角，指出《GTA 6》几乎是整个行业在生成式 AI 浪潮爆发之前、纯粹由人工精雕细琢完成的“最后一部超级巨作”。那是数千名开发者耗费十年光阴、倾注无数血汗泪水打造的工艺巅峰。在网络上，狂热的玩家甚至通过放大卫星航拍图、清点 Rockstar 办公室外垃圾桶里的烟头数量来推算开发团队的加班赶工程度。Ben Thompson 调侃道，哪怕现在的孩子在路边摆柠檬水摊都能随随便便赚到 100 美元，那些抱怨 80 美元昂贵的人在过去十年里难道存不下这点钱？为了向这种极致的工业杰作致敬，哪怕自己买来并不一定有时间通关，也绝对会毫不犹豫地掏出 200 美元买单。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 游戏定价争议与工业价值对比 accDescr: 对比传统游戏工业的极致人工沉淀与现代消费环境中的价格错位 subgraph Craftsmanship["工业巅峰价值沉淀"] A["研发周期：长达10年之久"] B["生产方式：Pre-AI 时代纯手工顶级雕琢"] C["人力投入：极致加班与心血凝聚"] end subgraph MarketReality["现实消费与定价错位"] D["官方预期定价：约 $80"] E["玩家舆论：抱怨价格上涨"] F["Ben Thompson 论点：实际价值达 $200+，80美元被严重低估"] end Craftsmanship --> F MarketReality -. 认知脱节.-> F ``` ### [04:42](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0s6UAstE2Ms&t=282s) 微软的宏大构想：折戟客厅的“三屏一云”战略 回到 Xbox 的发展脉络，Ben Thompson 拆解了微软在 iPhone 诞生之前制定的核心企业战略——“三屏一云”（Three screens and the cloud）。微软当时的野心极为清晰：通过 Windows PC 牢牢统治办公桌的第一块屏幕；通过 Windows CE（早在 1999 年就已布局）渗透进用户的口袋掌控移动第二屏；而第三块屏幕，就是家庭客厅中央的电视机。微软认为，只要占据电视机旁的连接设备，就能掌握进入数字客厅的独家网关。 为了获得进驻家庭客厅的正当许可，微软选择将特洛伊木马伪装成一台游戏主机，也就是初代 Xbox。然而，Ben Thompson 指出这一战略在逻辑上从一开始就注定失败：消费者购买主机纯粹是为了玩游戏，没有任何人会为了获得一个客厅网络门户而花费数百美元去买游戏机。最终真正抢占客厅入口的，并非昂贵的专业游戏硬件，而是售价低廉、功能聚焦的流媒体设备，例如亚马逊的 Fire TV Stick、Roku、谷歌的 Chromecast 以及价格偏高的 Apple TV。微软敏锐且正确地预测到了流媒体服务与客厅入口的崛起，却给出了完全错误的硬件产品解答。 ```mermaid flowchart LR accTitle: 微软客厅特洛伊木马战略的错位 accDescr: 展示微软将主机作为客厅入口的失败逻辑与流媒体棒的成功替代路径 subgraph MSStrategy["微软最初设想：特洛伊木马"] A["三屏一云宏图"] --> B["目标：占领客厅第三屏"] B --> C["手段：Xbox 游戏主机"] C -- "昂贵硬件（数千元）" --> D["结果：仅核心玩家购买，无法下沉普通家庭"] end subgraph MarketOutcome["市场实际演变：专注轻量"] E["流媒体需求爆发"] --> F["轻量廉价方案：Fire Stick / Roku / Chromecast"] F --> G["结果：低成本彻底统治客厅电视入口"] end ``` ### [06:42](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0s6UAstE2Ms&t=402s) 战略反噬：Xbox One 的“衔尾蛇之困”与内部情结 更加荒谬的是，这个从未达成的战略野心演变成了一条自我吞噬的“衔尾蛇”（ouroboros）。Xbox 360 时代原本是微软与索尼竞争最焦灼、甚至一度占据上风的黄金时期。然而到了下一代硬件时，微软高层执念于当年“统治客厅”的旧梦，推出了强行捆绑 Kinect 体感摄像头、强制网络连接和施加苛刻数字版权管理（DRM）的 Xbox One。这台主机在设计之初就偏离了游戏本身，试图强行将自己打造成家庭多媒体娱乐终端。结果不仅未能吸引普通电视观众，反而彻底激怒并失去了最核心的主机玩家群体，直接在当世代的竞争中被宣判死刑。 Ben Thompson 回忆起自己在 2011 至 2013 年间供职于微软的经历。当时正值鲍尔默执掌后期的迷茫低谷，微软股价在 40 美元左右徘徊了整整十年，企业形象死气沉沉。在那种灰暗的氛围下，Xbox 是全公司员工唯一的心灵寄托——大家总会互相安慰说：“至少我们还有 Xbox，全公司最酷的人都在那个部门。”这种组织文化上的情感依赖，让微软迟迟不愿面对残酷的商业现实。早在十多年前，Ben Thompson 就曾撰文呼吁微软必须拆分或彻底关停 Xbox 业务，因为这项业务既没有达成占领客厅的既定公司战略，反而为了追逐一个不切实际的幻影而在市场上自断经脉。 - 微软早期的宏伟愿景是“三屏一云”（PC 桌面、手机口袋、客厅电视）。 - Xbox One 因强推 Kinect 体感外设与数字化限制，导致发售成本过高并失去硬核玩家支持。 - 在 2011 至 2013 年微软股价长期停滞在 40 美元区间的低迷期，Xbox 曾是维系内部极客自豪感的核心精神图腾。 ### [08:39](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0s6UAstE2Ms&t=519s) 混乱的命名怪圈与 PS3 的历史转折点 对话随后转向了 Xbox 系列硬件令人匪夷所思的命名逻辑。主持人梳理道，微软的命名序列堪称硬件工业史上的谜团：初代叫 Xbox，第二代却跳跃成 Xbox 360（听起来像第三代），第三代反其道行之命名为 Xbox One（听起来像第一代），到了第四代又变成了 Xbox Series X，中间还穿插着各种繁复的子型号。微软似乎始终无法大大方方地按照 Xbox 2、Xbox 3、Xbox 4 的顺序迭代。 Ben Thompson 调侃说，向一个曾经在微软工作过的人询问命名逻辑完全是“找错了人”，微软内部向来有着混乱命名的传统。不过当年的 Xbox 360 确有其特定动机：该设备发售时正好正面迎战索尼的 PlayStation 3，微软管理层极力避免让消费者产生“Xbox 2 对抗 PlayStation 3”的代际落后感，因此必须在名字中强行植入一个“3”。而具有讽刺意味的是，正是那个看似势不可挡的 PlayStation 3 世代，由于架构设计复杂和定价高昂，反而成为了索尼主机历史上最大的一次战略失误，为 Xbox 360 的早期突围创造了千载难逢的历史窗口。 ### [09:33](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0s6UAstE2Ms&t=573s) PS3 时代的硬件陷阱与高清多平台浪潮 在游戏主机历史的早期，硬件本身是平台实现差异化的绝对核心。索尼当初能击败任天堂，关键原因之一就在于 PlayStation 采用了光盘载体，相比任天堂顽固坚守的卡带能够容纳海量内容，再加上对第三方开发者极为友好，索尼凭借初代 PlayStation 和 PS2 彻底称霸。然而到了 PlayStation 3 时代，索尼却跌入了一场典型的由公司多元诉求导致的泥潭——为了强行扶植自家的 Blu-ray（蓝光光碟）标准对抗东芝阵营的 HD DVD，索尼为 PS3 配备了架构极其奇葩且复杂的 Cell 处理器。这场蓝光格式大战索尼虽然赢了，但代价惨痛：PS3 发售定价高得令人咋舌，机器发热严重，更为致命的是其宣称的超强硬件性能在开发中极难被利用。 这一时期恰逢游戏行业全面迈入高清（HD）与 3D 时代，开发逻辑发生了颠覆性的范式转移。以往游戏的好坏取决于开发团队如何针对特定主机底层硬件写代码、挖掘极限性能；而高清时代之后，游戏逻辑与渲染大量被交给了通用商业引擎（如 Epic 异军突起的 Unreal Engine）。游戏公司不再单打独斗造轮子，精力全面转向玩法设计与巨额的高清资产制作（Asset Creation）。由于高清资产制作的研发成本相比标清时代呈现指数级暴增，第三方发行商面临着严苛的商业现实：他们承担不起只押注单一 PlayStation 平台的风险，必须让游戏在所有平台上铺开以摊薄成本。这使得几乎所有主流大作都转向跨平台，必须同时能在 PS3、Xbox 360 和 PC 上运行。对于微软而言，这成了 Xbox 360 历史上最辉煌的黄金一代——360 采用了与 PC 极其近似、易于开发的架构，第三方开发者乐于适配，两家在软件生态上第一次平起平坐。 - **存储介质演进**：卡带（任天堂）过渡至 CD/DVD/Blu-ray（索尼），硬件规格一度是平台胜负手。 - **开发引擎化与成本膨胀**：Unreal Engine 等引擎接管底层，资产制作开销暴涨，逼迫第三方跨平台自救。 - **Xbox 360 的技术优势**：得益于类 PC 架构的易用性与全平台开发红利，成为微软最具竞争力的一代主机。 --- ### [11:46](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0s6UAstE2Ms&t=706s) PS4 独占翻盘：索尼的精品策略与微软 Kinect 惨败 然而，微软在随后的世代交替中犯下了傲慢的战略失误。在推出 Xbox One 时，微软试图将体感外设 Kinect 强加给所有用户，叫嚣着“要统治家庭客厅电视”，引发玩家群体强烈反弹。相反，索尼从 PS3 的挫折中汲取了深刻教训：硬件不再搞复杂特异化，而是采用对开发者友好、低门槛的通用硬件架构；至于差异化，索尼选择全力押注在“第一方独占游戏（Exclusives）”上。与微软后来挥舞支票簿吞并动视暴雪这种庞然大物不同，索尼当时系统性收购并扶持了一批中小型精英工作室（如 Naughty Dog、Insomniac Games），督促他们为 PS4 量身打造杀手级大作，相继拿出了《蜘蛛侠》（Spider-Man）、《最后生还者》（The Last of Us）等顶级招牌。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 索尼的主机生态盈利闭环 accDescr: 展示索尼如何利用独占游戏吸引海量玩家，再通过第三方跨平台大作的平台授权费实现盈利。 subgraph SonyEcosystem["索尼 PlayStation 闭环战略"] A["通用友好硬件<br/>降低开发门槛"] --> B["精选第一方独占<br/>《最后生还者》《蜘蛛侠》"] B --> C["虹吸 80% 核心主机玩家<br/>确立绝对装机量优势"] C --> D["全平台发行商进驻<br/>《使命召唤》《麦登橄榄球》等"] D --> E["收取巨额第三方授权抽成<br/>反哺硬件与自研投入"] end ``` 这种策略在商业逻辑上形成了无懈可击的正向飞轮。对于像《使命召唤》（Call of Duty）或《麦登橄榄球》（Madden NFL）这类全平台大作，无论哪家主机都能玩到；第一方工作室虽然因为局限在自有硬件而牺牲了潜在的跨平台游戏销量，但索尼凭借无与伦比的独占阵容吸附了市场上 80% 的核心玩家。当绝大多数玩家都在 PlayStation 上时，索尼便能从 EA、动视等发行商的每一份游戏销售中抽取高额的平台授权分成。凭借这套打法，索尼在 PS4 时代将微软彻底击溃，并且这种碾压态势一路延续到了 PS5 世代。 - **微软战略偏航**：Xbox One 捆绑 Kinect 强推客厅娱乐中心概念，错判了玩家对纯粹游戏主机的需求。 - **第一方自研闭环**：索尼放弃硬件特异化，通过收购中小团队孵化王牌 IP，用精品独占筑高生态壁垒。 - **抽成盈利机制**：虽然自研游戏放弃了多平台销售收入，但通过垄断绝对多数的玩家入口，从第三方跨平台销售中赚取了远超自研收益的平台税。 --- ### [14:20](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0s6UAstE2Ms&t=860s) 转向服务化：Xbox Game Pass 订阅制与硬件妥协 在面对主机市场连番失利的困局时，科技分析圈曾多次直言“微软该彻底放弃 Xbox 业务了”。但伴随着萨提亚·纳德拉时代微软股价因 Azure 云计算业务的腾飞而屡创新高，微软内部生出了新的战略执念：既然在传统卖主机、卖授权的战场上赢不了索尼，那就把微软最擅长的企业服务与订阅模式（SaaS）复制到游戏领域，采取与索尼完全相反的打法，强推“Xbox Game Pass”（XGP）。微软的美好愿景是终结每款 AAA 游戏单买 60、70 乃至 80 美元的传统模式，让玩家只需每月支付一笔固定月费，便能畅玩库内所有游戏。 但这套逻辑在根本上违背了传统独立游戏发行商的商业利益。与好莱坞电影院线模式如出一辙，游戏大厂绝大部分利润来自首发期核心死忠粉的全价买单，没有任何理智的大型发行商愿意将刚出炉的重头戏拱手送进低价订阅池。为了强推订阅制，微软设想了一套靠“走量（Volume）”弥补单价的宏大叙事，并为此配套推出了两款主机：高性能高单价的 Xbox Series X（售价约 500 美元），以及性能阉割、不带光驱但价格极其低廉的 Xbox Series S（首发仅 300 美元）。微软甚至将 Series S 硬件与一年期 Game Pass 打包大甩卖。然而，这一策略带来了严重的后遗症——游戏开发者往往只能根据机能最差的“最低公共分母”来开发适配，性能缩水的 Series S 反过来严重限制了顶配 Series X 的画质与游戏表现潜力。 - **业务逻辑转型**：微软借助云计算和 SaaS 的成功经验，企图用 Netflix / Spotify 模式改造高风险的 3A 游戏市场。 - **硬件分化与掣肘**：Series S 低价拉新但拖累了整个世代的开发基线；Series X 的旗舰性能未能转化为胜势。 - **发行商的抵触**：3A 游戏极其依赖首发“窗口期”全价收割核心受众，第三方厂商普遍拒绝首发入库。 --- ### [16:44](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0s6UAstE2Ms&t=1004s) 商业逻辑的自我吞噬与 Xbox 的全面溃败 由于缺乏外部大作支持，微软只能硬着头皮自掏腰包扫货，先后掷重金收购了拥有庞大 IP 库的 ZeniMax/Bethesda，后续更以天价吞并动视暴雪。然而，这笔商业账目从底层开始就无法自洽：微软收购这些公司时，支付的是建立在其全平台高额全价单买基础上的估值溢价；但在收购完成后，微软却为了强推 Game Pass，强行要求旗下第一方工作室将新游戏全部在发售首日塞进订阅库。虽然微软不敢断绝 PlayStation 上的单份发售——因为彻底切断这笔巨额收入在经济上无异于自杀——但微软原本幻想通过“PlayStation 玩家每款要花 70 美元，转投 Xbox 每月只需 20 美元”的悬殊差距，倒逼大量主机用户跳槽，并吸引海量增量新玩家入局。 ```mermaid flowchart LR accTitle: Game Pass 经济模型反噬闭环 accDescr: 展示微软高溢价收购开发商后，强推 Game Pass 首发导致严重自我蚕食与用户增长失速的恶性循环。 subgraph FailureLoop["Game Pass 的商业反噬机制"] A["高溢价并购<br/>Bethesda / Activision"] --> B["强推首发入库<br/>破坏传统全价销售"] B --> C["严重自我蚕食<br/>原本全价付费的核心玩家转白嫖"] C --> D["未能破圈拓展新受众<br/>主机总盘子并未扩大"] D --> E["订阅用户严重不及预期<br/>3000万滞长甚至萎缩"] E --> A end ``` 然而，残酷的现实击碎了微软的算盘。“这一切压根就没有发生。”微软不仅未能借此扩大主机玩家的基本盘，反而严重蚕食了自身原有的盈利根基——那些原本甘愿掏 70 美元买断的大批核心忠实玩家，现在心安理得地按月低价消费，这中间巨大的收入落差全由微软自己打碎牙齿往肚里咽。原本被寄予厚望的订阅规模陷入停滞：内部原本规划到今年达成 7500 万 Game Pass 订阅用户，实际上徘徊在 3000 万左右，甚至还出现了下滑趋势。这套战略宣告全面破产，直接引发了高层人事地震，掌舵 Xbox 多年的菲尔·斯宾塞（Phil Spencer）宣布“退休”——对这种级别的高管而言，所谓退休不过是体面的“被解雇”。伴随新管理层走马上任，微软展开了数千人规模的大裁员与业务急刹车。Xbox 最终陷在“高不成低不就（stuck in the middle）”的尴尬境地，进退失据，全盘陷入僵局。 - **核心矛盾**：高溢价收购的成熟工作室被迫为 Game Pass 牺牲单品销售利润，导致工作室深陷巨额亏损风险。 - **自我蚕食效应**：不仅没有抢夺到索尼的主机用户，反而将自己原本最具购买力的高价值核心玩家转化成了廉价订阅户。 - **订阅规模失速**：预期目标 7500 万，实际仅维持在 3000 万且呈萎缩态势。 - **败局收场**：长期负责人 Phil Spencer 黯然出局，数千人遭裁撤，整个 Xbox 部门面临全面战略重组与路线清算。 ### [18:45](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0s6UAstE2Ms&t=1125s) 微软 Xbox 裁员阵痛与拆分传闻 主持人向 Ben Thompson 提问，如何看待 Xbox 当前裁掉 1,600 人并保留后续裁员计划（RIF）的处理方式。在风投领域，典型的铁律往往是“长痛不如短痛，一刀切到底”（cut hard, cut deep），裁撤到位后与留下的人同舟共济；然而 Ben 认为 Xbox 当下的做法十分糟糕，这意味着所有在职员工接下来一整年都将人心惶惶、等待靴子落地，士气必遭毁灭性打击。不过，Ben 也表达了某种程度的同理心：微软坦白承认了自身深陷泥潭的现实，没有进行任何粉饰。如果他们直言问题严重却只裁掉 1,600 人，大家自然心知肚明后续还会有更多动作。当前科技业整体就业环境低迷，员工不会轻易主动离职跳槽，管理层选择将危机公开化，反而能光明正大地逐个部门审视员工产出与留任价值。尽管 Ben 极其不同情也绝不羡慕 Xbox 管理层当下的艰难处境，但他完全理解事情为何一步步滑落至此。 至于 Xbox 业务被微软分拆独立（Spinout）的可能性，Ben 坦言这其实是他多年来始终坚持的观点。他一度对 Xbox Game Pass 的商业模式抱有期待，甚至动摇了自己的看法，觉得“或许值得一试”，但回过头看，他后悔自己没有坚持最初的直觉——这个模式正在走向灾难。Ben 承认自己此前没有看清，而如今 Game Pass 的尝试未能奏效，拆分已经成为极具必要性的选项。 - 裁员规模：当期宣布裁员 1,600 人，同时保留后续人员优化计划。 - 战略态度：Ben 坦承曾短暂看好 Game Pass 的订阅制转型，但如今认为微软应重新考虑彻底拆分 Xbox。 ### [20:24](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0s6UAstE2Ms&t=1224s) 独占策略豪赌与收购资产减记 微软任命 Matthew Ball 出任首席战略官（Chief Strategy Officer），这一举动让 Ben 陷入深思。Matthew Ball 曾多次做客 Ben 的播客节目 *Stratechery*，Ben 对其行业洞察极为推崇。这引发了一个尖锐的战略设想：微软是否会干脆将耗资巨额的动视暴雪等收购直接进行资产减记（write off），承认损失了数百亿美元，然后彻底将《使命召唤》（Call of Duty）等王牌游戏变为 Xbox 独占平台作品？ ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Xbox独占策略的逻辑传导 accDescr: 展示巨额收购减记到全平台独占、再到测试3A游戏硬件拉动能力的逻辑闭环 A["巨额收购代价与增长停滞"] --> B["巨额资产减记 (Write-off)"] B --> C["完全独占策略 (如《使命召唤》独占)"] C --> D["印证 FTC 垄断担忧"] C --> E["终极定价测试"] E --> F["验证 3A 大作能否带动数百美元主机硬件销售"] ``` 如果微软真的推行完全独占，就等于坐实了当初联邦贸易委员会（FTC）在反垄断诉讼中最担心的噩梦。但讽刺的是，当初 FTC 的担忧脱离了实际商业语境，因为微软如今只有在公开承认亏损、减记数十亿上百亿美元的前提下，才有破釜沉舟搞独占的合理性。主持人指出，这本质上将成为一次针对 3A 游戏终极定价权（Pricing Power）的压力测试：如果玩家必须花几百美元买一台 Xbox 才能玩到《使命召唤》，就能真正测出这款大作在玩家心目中究竟值多少溢价，以及它究竟能从竞争对手 PlayStation 那里撬动多少新增硬件销量。 - 人事变动：行业知名分析师 Matthew Ball 加盟微软担任 Xbox 首席战略官。 - 监管讽刺：若走向全独占，恰恰符合了 FTC 当初极力阻拦收购时的预测，但其触发逻辑却是源于收购后的巨额亏损与绝望减记。 ### [21:58](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0s6UAstE2Ms&t=1318s) 科技估值通胀与 AI 赛道的异常狂热 对话随后转向整个人工智能领域的狂热现象。主持人指出，当前市场出现了一种反常动态：某些 AI 应用层初创团队或实验室在风光一时后往往沉寂数月，甚至让人以为濒临出局，却突然宣布新增数亿美元营收并完成不可思议的估值暴涨轮次。在传统幂律分布下，行业第 10 名通常生存艰难，但如今 AI 细分领域排在第 10 位的公司，其财务表现竟能匹敌 5 年前行业龙头的水平。 Ben 认为这种数字脱节是科技行业的常态。他回忆起 2014 年苹果公司斥资 30 亿美元收购 Beats 时，整个科技媒体界陷入疯狂争论，而他当时撰文直言：“苹果是一家市值 5,000 亿美元的巨头，30 亿美元不过是沙发垫下的硬币零钱，根本无足轻重。”回看当时的论断，Ben 感叹不仅收购金额无足轻重，连“5,000 亿美元市值”在如今苹果数万亿估值的时代都显得不可思议。科技行业内部的数字通胀极其夸张，如今各种融资估值已经脱离了实际意义。Ben 打趣地借用之前吐槽过的柠檬水摊贩作比喻，调侃道：“硅谷柠檬水摊的通货膨胀，绝对是全世界最离谱的。” - 历史参照：2014 年苹果收购 Beats 耗资 30 亿美元，当时苹果市值仅约 5,000 亿美元。 - 市场反常：AI 赛道排位靠后的梯队展现出过去只有头部独角兽才具备的创收数字，加剧了硅谷的纸面估值泡沫。 ### [24:06](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0s6UAstE2Ms&t=1446s) 监管机构的逆向悖论：Getty 与 Shutterstock 交易告吹 话题延伸到反垄断与并购审查机制的固有缺陷。当天传出消息，由于英国竞争与市场管理局（CMA）等监管机构要求剥离编辑图片业务，图片库巨头 Getty Images 终止了收购 Shutterstock 的交易。主持人困惑地表示，在生成式 AI 对传统图库行业展开毁灭性降维打击的当下，两家公司通过合并抱团取暖是唯一合理的防御动作，监管机构的出手令人费解。 Ben 指出，这正是反垄断监管一再上演的荒谬规律： ```mermaid flowchart LR accTitle: 监管介入时机的逆向悖论 accDescr: 行业上升期与衰退期监管行为与实际需求的错配 subgraph Growth["行业成长期（真正需要监管介入）"] G1["新兴巨头通过并购垄断未来"] --> G2["监管者因未来不可测而袖手旁观"] end subgraph Decline["行业衰退期（企业迫切需要整合）"] D1["外部颠覆（如 Gen AI 打击图库）"] --> D2["成熟业务容易估值计算"] D2 --> D3["监管者因模式成熟轻易出手叫停"] end ``` 当一个行业整体遭遇外部灭顶之灾时，整合是削减成本、追求协同效应的必然自救手段。由于 Getty 和 Shutterstock 都是成熟且处于衰退期的企业，现金流折现（DCF）模型一目了然，极易定价与谈判；但正因为其商业模式完全已知、清晰可测，反而给监管机构提供了现成的靶子和借口进行阻拦。相反，在新兴技术处于上升期、未来巨头正在通过并购扼杀潜在竞争的黄金时刻，监管者往往因为未来的不确定性而不敢妄动。监管机构总在企业最需要合并自保的暮年强加干预，却在真正关乎未来垄断的关键节点毫无作为。 主持人补充道，这笔交易早在 2025 年 1 月最初定价时高达 37 亿美元，而历经 18 个月的漫长监管折磨后，两家公司的市值双双暴跌至各自仅剩 3 亿美元左右。Ben 幽默地总结，这种困局甚至比当年奈飞（Netflix）传出竞购华纳兄弟（Warner Bros.）还要惨烈——资本市场认定你是因为穷途末路才去并购，即使被迫放弃交易，公司也早已被打上绝望标签、承受了毁灭性打击。 节目最后在轻松的夏日寒暄中结束。主持人和 Ben 互相调侃着昂贵的“柠檬水摊”和过敏药开销，为整场深度对谈画上了句号。 - 交易终止：Getty Images 因英国监管机构要求出售其编辑业务而放弃合并 Shutterstock 的交易。 - 市值蒸发：该交易于 2025 年 1 月作价约 37 亿美元，但经过 18 个月的拖延与生成式 AI 冲击，双方市值均大幅萎缩至 3 亿美元上下。 ## Notable quotes > [02:54](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0s6UAstE2Ms&t=174s) Rockstar 针对《GTA 6》收取的 80 美元定价实在太低了，这款游戏完全应该定价 200 美元。 — Ben Thompson > [04:42](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0s6UAstE2Ms&t=282s) 消费者购买主机纯粹是为了玩游戏，没有任何人会为了获得一个客厅网络门户而花费数百美元去买游戏机。 — Ben Thompson > [06:42](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0s6UAstE2Ms&t=402s) 至少我们还有 Xbox，全公司最酷的人都在那个部门。 — Ben Thompson > [08:39](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0s6UAstE2Ms&t=519s) 向一个曾经在微软工作过的人询问命名逻辑完全是“找错了人”，微软内部向来有着混乱命名的传统。 — Ben Thompson > [16:44](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0s6UAstE2Ms&t=1004s) 这一切压根就没有发生。 — Ben Thompson > [18:45](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0s6UAstE2Ms&t=1125s) 长痛不如短痛，一刀切到底 — 主持人 > [21:58](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0s6UAstE2Ms&t=1318s) 苹果是一家市值 5,000 亿美元的巨头，30 亿美元不过是沙发垫下的硬币零钱，根本无足轻重。 — Ben Thompson > [21:58](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0s6UAstE2Ms&t=1318s) 硅谷柠檬水摊的通货膨胀，绝对是全世界最离谱的。 — Ben Thompson > [24:06](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0s6UAstE2Ms&t=1446s) 监管机构总在企业最需要合并自保的暮年强加干预，却在真正关乎未来垄断的关键节点毫无作为。 — Ben Thompson ## Mentioned Ben Thompson, Mark Zuckerberg, Meta, 微软 (Microsoft), Xbox, Xbox 360, Xbox One, Xbox Series X, Xbox Series S, Xbox Game Pass, DirectX, Direct3D, OpenGL, Nvidia, id Software, 《雷神之锤》(Quake), Rockstar Games, 《GTA 6》(侠盗猎车手 6), 索尼 (Sony), PlayStation 3 (PS3), PlayStation 4 (PS4), PlayStation 5 (PS5), 任天堂 (Nintendo), Epic Games, Unreal Engine, Naughty Dog, Insomniac Games, 《蜘蛛侠》(Spider-Man), 《最后生还者》(The Last of Us), 《使命召唤》(Call of Duty), 《麦登橄榄球》(Madden NFL), 动视暴雪 (Activision Blizzard), Bethesda, ZeniMax, 史蒂夫·鲍尔默 (Steve Ballmer), 萨提亚·纳德拉 (Satya Nadella), 菲尔·斯宾塞 (Phil Spencer), Matthew Ball, 苹果 (Apple), Beats, 美国联邦贸易委员会 (FTC), 英国竞争与市场管理局 (CMA), Getty Images, Shutterstock, 奈飞 (Netflix), 华纳兄弟 (Warner Bros.) ## Video description This is our full conversation with Ben Thompson. We discuss why Microsoft's Xbox strategy failed, why he thinks GTA 6 should cost $200, how console wars shaped the modern gaming industry, what went wrong with Xbox Game Pass, why AI is reshaping competition across tech, the future of Microsoft's gaming business, and why regulators often block mergers at exactly the wrong time. TBPN is made possible by: Ramp - https://ramp.com Public - https://public.com Cisco - https://www.cisco.com Console - https://www.console.com CrowdStrike - https://www.crowdstrike.com Figma - https://www.figma.com MongoDB - https://www.mongodb.com NYSE - https://www.nyse.com Railway - https://railway.com Shopify - https://www.shopify.com/ Codex - http://openAI.com/codex Sign up for TBPN’s daily newsletter at TBPN.com Follow TBPN: https://TBPN.com https://x.com/tbpn https://open.spotify.com/show/2L6WMqY3GUPCGBD0dX6p00?si=674252d53acf4231 https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/technology-brothers/id1772360235 https://www.youtube.com/@TBPNLive [Source](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0s6UAstE2Ms)

[2:54] Ben Thompson: Rockstar 针对《GTA 6》收取的 80 美元定价实在太低了，这款游戏完全应该定价 200 美元。 [4:42] Ben Thompson: 消费者购买主机纯粹是为了玩游戏，没有任何人会为了获得一个客厅网络门户而花费数百美元去买游戏机。 [6:42] Ben Thompson: 至少我们还有 Xbox，全公司最酷的人都在那个部门。 [8:39] Ben Thompson: 向一个曾经在微软工作过的人询问命名逻辑完全是“找错了人”，微软内部向来有着混乱命名的传统。 [16:44] Ben Thompson: 这一切压根就没有发生。 [18:45] 主持人: 长痛不如短痛，一刀切到底 [21:58] Ben Thompson: 苹果是一家市值 5,000 亿美元的巨头，30 亿美元不过是沙发垫下的硬币零钱，根本无足轻重。 [21:58] Ben Thompson: 硅谷柠檬水摊的通货膨胀，绝对是全世界最离谱的。 [24:06] Ben Thompson: 监管机构总在企业最需要合并自保的暮年强加干预，却在真正关乎未来垄断的关键节点毫无作为。

[4:43] Ben Thompson: People buy consoles to play games, not to have a portal to the internet in their living room. [15:33] cutting hard and fast to go to Valhalla together [26:56] Silicon Valley lemonade stand inflation is absolutely the worst in the world.

[0:00] Ben Thompson, the founder of [0:01] Stratechery. He's been on an absolute [0:03] tear during a slow news cycle. Does it [0:06] feel like a slow news cycle to you? [0:10] >> I don't know. It It And the summer's [0:12] always slow. Um I, you know, I take a [0:14] couple days or I slow down a little bit [0:16] myself. [0:17] >> I feel like you've done a good job of [0:19] like providing really insightful and [0:21] interesting pieces during a slow time [0:24] where I didn't know that I wanted to [0:26] >> I'm doing you a favor? Is that what [0:27] you're saying? [0:29] >> I didn't know I wanted you to adopt the [0:31] voice of Mark Zuckerberg for 20 minutes [0:34] [laughter] and [0:35] go on a tear. But it's not like that was [0:36] driven by like a specific Okay, there's [0:38] a Wall Street Journal article where like [0:40] Bloomberg has a scoop and like we need [0:42] to know this. It's more just like [0:43] resetting on the meta narrative. I want [0:46] to talk about the meta narrative, but [0:47] can we start with Xbox? [0:49] >> Sure. [0:50] >> I want to know First, [0:53] let's go back in time a little bit and I [0:55] want you to reality check me on the the [0:58] the story I tell myself about how [1:01] Microsoft wound up in the situation it [1:03] wound up in with Xbox. And I think it [1:06] stems with DirectX. [1:09] The It's the graphics layer that allowed [1:12] games to be run on multiple graphics [1:14] cards. So that was a Microsoft licensed [1:17] piece of property. So you This is why we [1:19] don't have the Chrome box. [1:20] >> You want to go You want to go really far [1:22] far back. [1:23] >> Like Like because we did we didn't get [1:25] an Amazon gaming console. We didn't get [1:27] a [1:28] a Google gaming console. Ready? [1:30] >> Right. Yeah, DirectX is interesting. So [1:32] you We go back way back I mean [1:34] we can go really far back here. [1:35] >> Please. [1:35] >> Um [1:36] I mean back in the day the [1:39] main technology for doing 3D when it was [1:41] coming along was OpenGL. And OpenGL had [1:45] various pluses and minuses. [1:47] It was, you know, [1:48] we're way back in history, but there [1:50] This is the origin of the Nvidia story, [1:52] making cards to do 3D graphics. [1:55] You had like the Riva, the 128, then you [1:58] had the TNT, then you had the GeForce, [2:00] and like we're talking back in the '90s [2:02] when I was, you know, you guys' age or [2:04] whatever it was [2:05] >> [laughter] [2:05] >> in college. And you know, making [2:09] the first you know, Quake comes out like [2:10] the real first 3D game, you know, there [2:12] was actually a really interesting [2:13] Twitter back and forth with the old ID [2:15] people talking about Quake and how [2:17] basically they obliterated the company [2:19] by burning everyone out by watching it. [2:21] But [2:22] super fun super fun back and forth. But [2:26] Microsoft comes out with Direct 3D as an [2:28] alternative to OpenGL that was I think [2:31] and this is a little out of my area of [2:33] expertise, but I think it was a little [2:34] easier to use, had more niceties, was [2:36] more tied into the platform. But this is [2:38] all sort of PC gaming. [2:41] The Xbox, the way I think about it and a [2:45] lot of gamers kind of get annoyed and [2:46] riled up about the gaming stuff cuz I [2:47] don't really care about the game [2:48] [laughter] part of it. I'm more [2:49] interested in like this the strategy [2:52] and how that fits in the overall [2:53] company. [2:54] >> your review? [2:55] >> Can we get a GTA 6 review? [2:57] >> No. [laughter] Well, [2:58] I feel I feel compelled number one, I [3:01] feel Rockstar I think is charging way [3:03] too little for this game. They're [3:04] charging what, $80? [3:05] >> Yes. Oh, you're this is you're going to [3:07] get canceled for this. This is a nuclear [3:09] take. [3:10] >> No, they should be charging like $200 [3:12] for this game. [3:12] >> should. [3:13] >> I know. [3:13] >> GTA 6 is like the last great game. Like [3:17] you think about every it was built [3:19] mostly all made pre-AI. Like it is the [3:22] pinnacle of this [3:24] >> craftsmanship [3:25] >> Yeah. [3:26] >> craftsmanship, years and years and years [3:29] of blood and sweat and tears to the [3:31] extent where you have like the Twitter [3:33] analysts like counting cigarette butts [3:35] outside of the offices [laughter] to see [3:38] like how much crunch are they in right [3:39] now. [3:39] >> I don't even think he's trading the [3:40] stock. I don't even think he's trading [3:42] the stock. I think he just wants to know [3:43] what GTA [3:44] >> the love of the game. Literally the [3:45] game. The GTA [3:47] >> Gamers are insane. So I always tread in [3:49] this water like very very carefully. But [3:51] uh no, so I feel compelled to buy GTA 6 [3:55] just in honor of it existing even if I'm [3:58] don't know if I'm ever going to play it. [4:00] So I'm definitely going to do that and [4:01] I'd be happy to pay Yes, I $200. Like [4:03] $80 is ridiculous. They should charge [4:04] more. Anyhow, [4:06] >> Yeah, we had what the youngest person on [4:08] our team was commenting on people online [4:11] complaining about the price and said [4:13] something like you didn't have [4:15] you 10 years you couldn't save up 80 [4:17] bucks. [4:18] >> I [laughter] know, seriously. [4:20] >> It's like whoever whoever you are like [4:22] like I know kids that do lemonade stands [4:25] and they clear like a 100 bucks. [4:26] >> Yeah. [4:27] >> Oh, absolutely. I want you know the old [4:29] $20 I'll keep the change. Nothing will [4:31] make a kid's day better than that. [4:32] Although unfortunately with inflation I [4:34] think now it's sort of like expected. [4:35] It's unbelievable how expensive things [4:37] are these days. But it's bad. Um so [4:39] anyways, I don't know how I got to GTA [4:41] 6. But we're we're back Oh, so the the [4:43] console the console era. So the way I [4:46] think about Xbox is you go back to [4:49] Microsoft and Microsoft had this whole [4:50] thing This is pre-iPhone. This is idea [4:53] of their corporate strategy was three [4:56] screens in the cloud. And the idea that [4:59] we're going to we already own the desk [5:02] via the PC. We're going to own the [5:04] pocket via the phone. And people always [5:07] used to say that Microsoft missed [5:08] mobile. Microsoft did not miss mobile. [5:10] They like they came out with a Windows [5:11] CE in like 1999. Like they were in [5:13] mobile. They just had the totally wrong [5:15] conceptual model because they were [5:17] basing it around, you know, as an [5:18] extension of the PC. But then the third [5:20] screen was the living room. How do we [5:23] get in the living room? [5:24] Well, people have consoles plugged in [5:26] their TVs. If we can get in and own the [5:28] console, we can own sort of the gateway [5:30] to the living room and we need to earn [5:33] permission to be in the living room. We [5:35] will do that by creating [5:37] a game the Xbox the game console. [5:40] And what's interesting about this is uh [5:43] this is a strategy that totally failed. [5:45] And [laughter] it failed for a a kind of [5:48] an obvious reason in retrospect, which [5:51] is first and foremost [5:53] people buy consoles to play games, not [5:56] to have a portal to the internet in [5:57] their living room. And so you're selling [5:59] a multi-hundred-dollar sort of console [6:02] to people who want to play games, but [6:04] people who don't want to play games [6:06] aren't going to randomly start buying [6:07] consoles. What actually ended up taking [6:09] it over was things like the Fire Stick [6:11] or, you know, Apple TV beta play this. I [6:13] still think it's like probably [6:15] the best solution, but it's way too [6:16] expensive. Now, the Apple TV's poor [6:18] price got jacked to the moon with this [6:20] recent memory increase. Uh but the Fire [6:22] Stick is probably a big one. You had the [6:24] Chromecast. You had Roku TV. Uh you had [6:27] all you know, these [6:28] which ended up being It's not that It's [6:30] a classic Microsoft thing. They were [6:32] actually right. There was this new front [6:36] page to online services to be built. [6:39] They just took totally the wrong [6:40] approach with Xbox. And what's funny is [6:42] that this approach actually became the [6:45] ouroboros of self-mutilation [6:48] because the Xbox didn't succeed in [6:51] achieving this because the games console [6:53] was way too expensive to achieve this, [6:55] but then also they killed the Xbox where [6:57] Xbox 360 was pretty competitive. And [7:00] it's that generation is actually the [7:01] most interesting console generation. I'm [7:03] happy to expand on that if you want to. [7:05] But they come out after with the Xbox [7:07] One, I think, which was super expensive [7:10] because it had the Kinect built in, that [7:12] sort of like wave your hands around sort [7:14] of thing. And it had all much more like [7:16] restrictive DRM things. It's going to be [7:18] more digital. It was basically that [7:20] console was designed around we're going [7:22] to realize our vision and own the living [7:24] room. And gamers hated it. So they [7:27] rejected it. So their vision, which they [7:30] didn't achieve, [7:32] also killed their console. And so and [7:36] the So my I wrote over a decade ago. [7:40] And the whole Xbox saga is filled with [7:42] regrets, I think. First and foremost for [7:44] Microsoft, but also for me because I [7:48] from the beginning is like [7:50] they need to kill this program. They [7:51] need to spin it out or get rid of it. [7:54] The stated goals which made sense from a [7:57] corporate perspective were not achieved [8:00] and it is continuing to exist because it [8:03] exists. And I was actually sympathetic [8:06] to that. I worked at Microsoft from from [8:09] 2011 to 2013 when when Microsoft was in [8:11] the dumps and you know, they were still [8:14] had a great business, but their stock [8:15] had been like $40 for like a decade. And [8:19] and [8:20] the one thing the employees has like [8:21] well, at least you have Xbox. All the [8:23] cool kids over there. Like that it was [8:24] such a important thing to corporate [8:26] culture to have Xbox [8:28] even though this was a totally failed [8:30] division in terms of achieving corporate [8:32] goals and also was sort of [8:34] self-immolating because it was trying to [8:36] achieve corporate goals that it was not [8:37] going to achieve. [8:39] >> What do you think the naming scheme says [8:42] about that project? I always found it [8:44] very odd that they went from Xbox to [8:46] Xbox 360. That sounds like the third. [8:50] It's actually the second. Then Xbox One [8:52] is the third, but it's one and then now [8:54] they're on Series X, which feels like [8:57] the 10th, but it's the fourth and then [8:59] they have a bunch of sub names. It feels [9:00] like they just didn't they never leaned [9:02] into just like Xbox 2, Xbox 3, Xbox 4. [9:06] >> Yeah, well, you're asked I mean maybe it [9:07] shows that I work at Microsoft. You're [9:09] asking the wrong guy about naming [9:10] things, I think. [9:11] But yeah, total mess. They called it the [9:13] 360 because it was coming out the same [9:15] generation as the PlayStation 3. And so [9:17] they wanted to Well, they wanted to be [9:19] on the same level. Like you both have [9:20] sort of a three or name. [9:22] So what's interesting about the [9:24] PlayStation 3 is the PlayStation 3 was [9:27] Sony's [9:28] big misstep in terms of the whole [9:30] PlayStation era. What they had this [9:33] crazy processor called the Cell [9:35] processor that had all these [9:36] capabilities and they had [9:39] up to that point consoles were [9:41] differentiated by hardware. And so Sony [9:43] famously helped one of the reasons they [9:45] beat Nintendo was they had discs so they [9:47] could have much larger like media and [9:50] things on those lines. And whereas [9:52] Nintendo was sticking with cartridges [9:53] and there was like other like they were [9:54] much more favorable to third-party [9:56] developers [9:57] just in general that they they had sort [9:58] of taken over in PlayStation 1 and 2. [10:00] PlayStation [10:02] 3 comes along they produce this Oh, they [10:04] wanted to get [10:05] >> Blu-ray off the ground. [10:06] >> That's another example of consoles [10:08] getting screwed up by a trying to [10:10] attempt to other corporate priorities. [10:12] They It worked Blu-ray did win. [10:14] >> and and didn't Xbox go with HD DVD and [10:17] they lost? [10:18] >> They did but at the end of the day what [10:20] happened was the PlayStation 3 was way [10:22] too expensive. I think it ran super hot [10:24] if I remember and all these extra [10:27] capabilities were not used. [10:29] >> Mhm. [10:29] >> And the reason they weren't used is that [10:31] was the first HD generation and you had [10:34] this shift to 3D games and high [10:35] definition graphics. And what happened [10:37] was it used to be games differentiate [10:39] themselves by how well they wrote the [10:41] game like how did it perform on your [10:43] Super Nintendo on your Nintendo? Now we [10:45] move to a world of actually all the [10:47] actual game was offloaded to engines [10:50] game engines like you know it had one [10:52] obviously where Epic got super big with [10:54] their Unreal Engine. And so you no [10:56] longer did that what a game company did [10:58] was actually design the game and then [11:01] asset creation. And asset creation at HD [11:04] was way more difficult way more [11:05] expensive than it was for for standard [11:09] definition TVs. And so the economic [11:11] imperative for developers came we can't [11:14] just be on PlayStation. We need to be on [11:17] everything. And so that was the ultimate [11:19] generation and almost every game was [11:21] made to run everywhere. Run on PS3 run [11:24] on Xbox 360 and run on the PC. And that [11:27] was [11:29] also the Xbox 360's best best [11:31] generation. That was the one they were [11:33] the most competitive on because they had [11:34] all the games, because all developers [11:35] were making them sort of run everywhere. [11:37] They had a very simple to develop for [11:39] architecture. The 360 was very PC like, [11:41] even more so than the one sort of [11:43] previously. And that was their best [11:44] generation. And then they come back the [11:46] the next generation shoving connect down [11:49] people's throats, we're going to own the [11:50] TV. And meanwhile, Sony learned their [11:53] lesson. They're like, "Okay, we can't [11:56] differentiate on hardware. We need to [11:58] create sort of generic hardware that is [12:00] easy to develop for. And the way we will [12:03] differentiate is through exclusives." [12:05] They bought a bunch of small studios, in [12:07] contrast like buying Activision. So you [12:09] can get to it a little bit. They bought [12:10] a bunch of small studios and pushed all [12:13] those studios to developing killer games [12:15] for the upcoming PS4. And so you got [12:18] things like like the Spider-Man, like uh [12:21] that was a huge game. [12:22] >> Naughty Dog, Last of Us, that type of [12:24] stuff. [12:25] >> Exactly. I mean, and so the PS4 was an [12:27] unbelievable generation. [12:29] >> Yeah. [12:29] >> And in in a lot of the reasons it was [12:30] unbelievable was because it had these [12:32] exclusive games, and they just crushed [12:34] Microsoft. Because for all the [12:36] cross-platform games, the Call of [12:38] Duty's, the Madden's, things like that, [12:40] those are always ran everywhere. And so [12:42] what you do is you limit the economic [12:44] potential of your studios, cuz you're [12:46] only building for your platform, and you [12:49] make it back by all the licensing fees [12:52] you get off the EA's of the world and [12:54] the Activisions of the world, because [12:56] 80% of gamers are on your console, not [12:58] on the other guy's console. [13:00] >> Mhm. [13:00] >> And so they just wiped out Microsoft in [13:02] that generation. Um and [13:05] that really just continued to the PS5. [13:07] Uh and this is where we sort of get to [13:09] the the the Game Pass disaster. [13:11] >> Okay. Yes. So, [13:13] uh yeah, I want to yeah, let's just jump [13:15] forward to that. [13:16] How is it that [13:17] >> I didn't want to ramble too long. I was [13:19] going to give you a chance to jump in, [13:20] but [13:20] >> No, we love it. [13:21] >> Yeah, I have a bunch of other I have a [13:22] bunch of other questions not related to [13:24] gaming, but I love I like I love I love [13:26] this history of [13:27] >> the console [13:28] >> console history is fascinating. It's [13:29] really interesting how sort of cuz it [13:31] tracks technological change to such a [13:33] large extent and it totally shifted sort [13:35] of strategy. So [13:36] >> And yeah, I think you can draw I think [13:38] you can draw a lot of real parallels [13:40] even just model releases over the last [13:41] couple years how you know [13:43] >> The number of models [13:45] >> model sets you back a certain number you [13:47] know, they're they're iterating a lot [13:48] faster. [13:49] >> Yeah. [13:50] >> But I'm I'm seeing parallels. [13:51] >> Yeah, the sort of development of the of [13:53] yeah, it's interesting. You could always [13:54] sort of draw draw draw lessons. So you [13:56] get to Microsoft at this point [14:00] again, I think I wrote at the time, [14:01] okay, time to give up. [14:02] >> [laughter] [14:04] >> I wrote multiple times over the years [14:06] they should give up on Xbox. And at this [14:08] point Microsoft stock is doing much [14:10] >> an option after they bought Activision [14:12] just to make Call of Duty a console [14:14] exclusive or would that have been an [14:16] FTC problem? [14:17] >> well, we can we we'll get to that cuz [14:19] that's part of the story here. So [14:20] Microsoft decides, okay, [14:22] uh [14:23] what we we're going to actually try a [14:25] new business model. It's true Xbox sort [14:27] of selling a console [14:29] >> Mhm. [14:29] >> selling you know, licensing it. [14:32] We kind of do that, but we're actually [14:34] moving to being a services company. The [14:36] stock's doing much better now, you know, [14:38] like we have Azure, all these all these [14:40] things. What we need to do and the way [14:43] we compete with Sony is we need to have [14:45] the exact opposite of the Sony strategy [14:48] and we need to lean into services, lean [14:50] into subscriptions. We're going to do [14:52] Xbox Game Pass. And the idea of Xbox [14:55] Game Pass is instead of buying every [14:57] individual game for $60, $70, $80. [15:00] Gaming pricing by the way really has [15:03] stayed suppressed probably far longer [15:04] than it should have been particularly [15:05] for these AAA games, but we already got [15:07] to that with Rockstar. So they're [15:09] they're they're like [15:10] you pay one price per month and you get [15:12] access to all the games in Game Pass. [15:14] Well, of course no publisher wants to [15:17] partake in this because they make all [15:19] their money up front by selling games to [15:22] their biggest fans. You You know, it's [15:24] kind of like the movie model. You make a [15:25] bunch of money up front and yeah, in the [15:27] long run [15:28] >> were they looking at like at at what [15:29] happened to the music industry as an [15:31] example of saying like yeah, it's cool [15:33] to make your product more accessible. [15:35] You get, you know, more listeners by [15:38] bundling and streaming and like [15:39] >> was the bet. You had to make it up in [15:40] volume, right? And so this old This why [15:43] the Series S came about. There's the [15:45] Series X and the Series S. The Series S [15:47] was a more underpowered, but much [15:50] cheaper model. I think it launched at [15:51] $300 versus the X was I think $600 or [15:54] maybe $500. And that was also a problem [15:57] because you're [15:59] kind of neutering the X because [16:01] developers build to the lowest common [16:03] denominator. Not not sort of the highest [16:04] one. So, that was one problem. But, the [16:06] idea was we're going to expand the [16:07] market. And they had these package deals [16:09] where you get an S and you get Game Pass [16:11] for a year and it's this sort of thing. [16:13] And we will make it up in The problem is [16:16] no no independent developer is going to [16:18] go for that. So, they had some of their [16:20] own games, but they went out and started [16:22] buying a bunch of developers. So, they [16:24] bought Bethesda, which included I think [16:25] it at that point [16:27] and and ZeniMax. I I don't know the uh [16:31] >> Yeah, they they they they they [16:32] they have a bunch of like great IP [16:34] libraries. They have Activision deal. [16:36] Those uh but those developers just [16:38] aren't releasing like incredible titles [16:41] annually except for Activision, which [16:43] does have a lot of releases. [16:44] >> Exactly. And so, the issue So, the issue [16:46] with buying these companies is their [16:49] What you're paying for is you're paying [16:51] for their existing business plus the [16:54] premium. And their existing business was [16:57] selling single copies of games to all [17:00] platforms. And what they were saying is [17:02] we're going to basically force all these [17:05] studios to take a bath, to lose a ton of [17:08] money by putting all their games on Game [17:10] Pass. We'll still sell on PlayStation [17:13] because we have to because that's a lot [17:15] of money. It'd be massively economically [17:17] destructive not to. But, what we think's [17:19] going to happen is gamers are going to [17:21] realize I could be paying $70 a pop on [17:24] PlayStation, or I could go to Xbox and I [17:27] could pay $20 a month and I can get all [17:30] these games and that's it. It would be a [17:32] better deal. And by the way, we'll get [17:33] new gamers. People are going to come in [17:35] and [17:36] rise, "Wow, I can get all these games [17:37] for $20 a month." Uh [17:39] None of that happened. [17:41] All they did was cannibalize their [17:43] existing business. They didn't expand [17:46] the market for console gamers. All they [17:48] did was have gamers who would have paid [17:50] way more to play these games, pay way [17:52] less to pay these games, and Microsoft [17:55] ate it. And they I think they you know, [17:57] the recent reporting was they expected [17:59] to have 75 million Game Pass subscribers [18:01] by this year. They have like 30 million [18:03] and that number is actually decreasing. [18:05] It's not going up. And so, it's just [18:08] been Uh and so, that that that's sort of [18:10] the context of what's happened here. Uh [18:12] Phil Spencer got uh [18:14] retired, which uh if you retire at that [18:17] level of a company, um you're probably [18:19] canned. Uh probably too late. The whole [18:21] strategy was a disaster. They brought in [18:23] new leadership and now there's sort of [18:26] like a reset going on. They're they're [18:27] laying off few thousand people. [18:30] They they say all games production are [18:32] going to continue, but there's a real [18:34] sort of critical decision here. What do [18:37] we do because we ended up [18:40] getting stuck in the middle. Like and [18:42] we're just [18:44] it doesn't work. [18:45] >> Mhm. What uh what did you read into [18:48] their approach of laying off 1,600 [18:51] people now and keeping a 1,600 person [18:54] riff? [18:55] >> it's a terrible idea [18:56] >> [laughter] [18:56] >> because they don't [18:57] like everyone there for the rest of the [18:59] year is [19:00] >> Like a VC like like every VC would tell [19:03] you to like cut hard, cut deep. [19:05] >> And then move forward with the team. If [19:07] you're on the ship, we're going to [19:09] Valhalla together [19:10] >> I think I I do have some sympathy [19:12] because uh the reality is [19:16] I appreciated the note [19:18] because [19:20] they are in big trouble. And if there's [19:22] an there's an aspect of just stating it [19:24] clearly, we're not sugarcoating it. And [19:27] if they laid out how much trouble they [19:29] were in and then only cut 1,600 people, [19:32] then everyone kind of knows they're [19:34] going to be cutting more people, right? [19:36] So, [19:37] I think they're just in a bad spot. So, [19:39] of course it's not great. It's going to [19:40] destroy morale. It's going to destroy [19:42] everything for the next year cuz [19:43] everyone's waiting to get fired. But, [19:45] there's a bit of they did, I think, tear [19:47] the band-aid off to the extent they [19:49] could. And now there's just a Now they [19:51] can be very overt. They can go through [19:53] and actually talk to employees about [19:55] what are you working on? Why should you [19:57] still be here? And [19:58] it's a reflection of the employment [20:00] climate. Like like people in general are [20:02] more They're just not going to bail. [20:04] Microsoft, you know, they're going to [20:06] want to keep their job. And so, they can [20:08] probably, hopefully, fingers crossed, do [20:12] better cuts by virtue of doing them in [20:14] the open. [20:16] But, I don't know. I mean, I don't envy [20:18] I don't envy Xbox's leadership at all. [20:20] It's going to be a very tough thing, but [20:21] I I I I I can totally understand how [20:23] they are where they are. [20:24] >> Probability of a spinout? [20:27] >> I mean, I think it I think it needs to [20:28] happen. Like I I But, you know, this is [20:31] again, the regret is this was my take [20:33] for years and years and years. Like, [20:35] okay, fine. Xbox Game Pass that kind of [20:37] seems kind of interesting. Let's go for [20:38] it. I should have stuck to my guns. [20:39] Like, no, stop. This is going to be a [20:41] disaster. Um [20:43] I think yeah, I don't I I I don't get [20:45] it. Um I just don't I didn't see it [20:48] before. [20:49] The thing that got me to say, "Okay, [20:51] let's give it a chance." didn't work. I [20:53] don't see it now. I mean, I think it [20:56] does give me pause they hired Matthew [20:57] Ball who I've had on Stratechery [20:58] multiple times [21:00] >> as their chief strategy officer. I have [21:02] a lot of respect for, you know, his [21:04] takes. So, I'm curious what he's [21:05] thinking about. This gets to the [21:07] question before [21:09] is there a bit where they just write off [21:11] these acquisitions and say [21:14] actually all this stuff's going to be [21:15] exclusive now. We're like Call of Duty [21:17] buy an Xbox. [21:19] Like basically giving into the FTC's [21:22] worst fears which uh [21:25] but they those fears didn't make sense [21:27] at the time in the context because it's [21:31] by writing off acknowledging we lost [21:34] billions and billions of dollars. [21:35] >> Yeah, and it would it would test it [21:37] would be a good pricing test for the [21:39] power of a triple-A game to say, "Okay, [21:43] you can only get Call of Duty on Xbox [21:45] now." And you would see like how like [21:47] how many incremental Xbox sales do you [21:49] get? Because that means the real value [21:51] of the game is actually in the hundreds [21:52] of dollars because if people have a [21:54] PlayStation and then they'll try [21:55] something new. Switching gears a little [21:58] bit. [21:59] Uh [22:00] We keep having this experience where [22:03] there's a company, you know, an AI [22:05] company, let's say an application layer [22:06] company that is Or Lab that is, you [22:09] know, hot but then you don't hear very [22:11] much for a few months and you write them [22:12] off and then they come out and they've [22:14] like added hundreds of millions of [22:16] dollars of revenue and are doing a crazy [22:18] up round. And it's this weird thing [22:20] where like even, you know, historically, [22:22] you know, there's power laws everywhere [22:24] but [22:26] I feel like in this moment we're seeing [22:27] more and more examples where like the [22:29] 10th best company in the category is [22:32] still having the financial performance [22:35] that a company that would have been the [22:37] leading company in their category 5 [22:39] years ago. What do you make it What do [22:41] you make of that? [22:42] >> This is just a thing in tech in general [22:44] that that has always sort of stuck out [22:47] at me. I mean I think I [22:48] >> Has it been Has it been though but like [22:50] like CRM for example? Like if you go [22:52] back to like 2015 [22:55] was like the 10th best CRM company like [22:58] actually [22:58] >> No, of course not. No, no. The the the [23:00] the example I always go back to is [23:02] I think it was 2014 [23:04] or so when Apple bought Beats. And they [23:06] bought Beats for $3 billion and [23:08] everyone's going the tech press is going [23:09] crazy. Everyone's writing thought pieces [23:11] about it. And I'm like, you know, of [23:13] course writing about it. I'm like [23:15] $3 billion like Apple is a $500 billion [23:18] company. What is $3 billion matter? And [23:21] what's funny about that take is number [23:22] one it was right. Who cares about $3 [23:24] billion? That's under couch cushions. [23:25] Like people were spun up about something [23:27] that didn't really matter. Number two, [23:29] Apple was only a $500 billion company. [23:31] Like the the astronomical increase in [23:34] valuation and numbers around this is [23:37] absolutely crazy. So to your point yeah, [23:38] a 2019 CRM company number one there [23:40] probably wasn't a number 10 even then. [23:42] But yeah, the numbers are not even [23:44] remotely tied to like any I just sort of [23:47] let them go and be like I write down the [23:49] numbers and they don't really mean [23:50] anything to me. [23:52] Um but it's very hard to keep track of. [23:53] Like the inflation in tech numbers [23:55] specifically, [23:57] you know, you think that what was I [23:58] complaining about pricing before? Oh [23:59] yeah, lemonade stands are bad. [24:01] The Silicon Valley lemonade stand [24:03] inflation is absolutely the worst in the [24:04] world. [24:06] >> Um on mergers and acquisitions, [24:10] there's this news today about Getty [24:12] Images calling off Shutterstock deal [24:14] after UK regulators said that they would [24:17] have to sell the editorial business for [24:20] the merger to be approved. And it seemed [24:22] very odd to me that a merger would be [24:26] blocked by a regulator when that [24:29] industry that is consolidating and is [24:31] maybe becoming more monopolistic is [24:34] under such insane attack from generative [24:37] AI. I can't imagine a better defensive [24:40] move than putting Getty Images and [24:41] Shutterstock together. [24:43] >> Yeah. This happens this is this is [24:44] happens every single time. Like the the [24:46] natural response to your overall [24:48] category being threatened by an external [24:50] force is consolidation. Like it's the [24:52] only way to defend yourself to sort of, [24:55] you know, you get synergies. Like and [24:57] like all these companies are pretty [24:59] established. So, it's actually fairly [25:01] easy to price. You know exactly what [25:03] things are. It's a much like we have [25:05] growing companies you want to merge them [25:06] or acquire them. It's really unclear cuz [25:09] how do you sort of price out the future? [25:10] These companies are declining. So, it's [25:12] very easy like you could do a discounted [25:15] cash flow and understand exactly how [25:16] much they're worth. It's a very [25:17] straightforward negotiation. It makes [25:19] total sense for them to consolidate [25:21] date, but precisely because they're [25:24] knowable and understandable, it's very [25:26] easy for regulators to block them. And [25:28] you see this happen again and again. You [25:30] see like pushback on you saw this with [25:32] TV and like [25:33] like different networks getting together [25:35] and the various pushbacks happen to that [25:36] or in telecoms. Like the this happens [25:40] this is a natural pattern. The moment [25:42] that a company an industry wants to [25:46] consolidate, needs to consolidate, is [25:48] the moment regulators are most likely to [25:50] stop them consolidating. And whereas the [25:53] actual time when action would matter, [25:55] like when it when it's growing and a [25:57] company is making the right acquisitions [25:59] to take over an industry, [26:00] regulators don't do anything and also [26:04] rightly don't do anything because you're [26:06] dealing with the future and it's [26:08] unknown. You don't want to screw it up. [26:10] Um it raises the question of what use [26:13] do regulators sort of do anyway in broad [26:16] broad strokes? I used to be [26:18] I've sort of you know, I think that they [26:20] probably do more harm than good as far [26:21] as a lot of these sort of blocking [26:24] mergers and things go. But um I don't [26:26] know. I'm the one that just said maybe [26:28] Microsoft should take Call of Duty [26:29] exclusive. So, so who knows? Uh maybe [26:31] I'll have a different [26:32] >> Well, yeah, we had a funny moment cuz we [26:33] were looking at the $3.7 billion deal, [26:36] but I'm like how is this a $3.7 billion [26:38] deal? Both these are two $300 million [26:40] ish market cap companies. And it was cuz [26:43] they pri- the deal was like priced back [26:45] in January of 2025. And so both [26:48] companies had declined so much over the [26:51] last [26:52] over the last 18 months. [26:56] >> I mean it could be worse. You could be [26:57] Netflix and have the stock market sort [26:59] of like make a bid for Warner Brothers [27:01] that the stock market hates abandoned [27:02] the deal, but they already decided you [27:04] did the deal because you're desperate [27:05] and you're [27:06] >> [laughter] [27:06] >> you're screwed anyway. So yeah, [27:08] you don't even get what you bid for. So [27:11] maybe that's what happened here. I don't [27:12] know. [27:12] >> Oh well. Well, thank you so much for [27:14] taking the time to come chat with us. [27:16] Have a have a great summer. [27:18] Enjoy the break and we'll see you soon. [27:21] >> Yeah, good luck with the lemonade [27:22] stands. [27:23] >> Yes. Try to try to make it through the [27:25] summer. [27:28] >> [laughter] [27:28] >> You're going to run up on a kid that has [27:29] Claritin. [27:29] >> Raise some money. Yeah, I know. [27:31] Claritin and a lemonade stand. [27:33] >> Claritin and a lemonade stand. Five easy [27:35] payments. [27:36] Interest free. It might. Well, thank you [27:38] so much and have a great rest of your [27:39] >> Great to see you. [27:40] >> We'll talk to you soon, [27:40] >> Yeah, talk to you later. [27:41] >> Have a good one.