Jacobsen Warns Presidential Nuclear Authority Triggers Total Global Freeze

雅各布森警告：总统核权限或引发全球彻底冰封 美国的单方面核打击指令将触发自动化报复协议，在72分钟内摧毁现代文明并导致50亿人丧生。 调查记者 Annie Jacobsen 深入剖析了一场假想核战争如何在短短72分钟内升级为全球彻底毁灭。她探讨了美国总统的绝对核权力、核探测系统的重大缺陷与险兆，以及根本不存在有效民防或导弹拦截系统来阻止这一灾难的严酷现实。讨论审视了核辐射尘和核冬天的可怕后果，同时也涉及了 CIA 的历史行动、军事 AI 整合，以及为防止彻底毁灭而迫切需要搭建全球外交桥梁。 调查记者安妮·雅各布森（Annie Jacobsen）指出，无论核战争如何爆发，整个毁灭过程仅需 72 分钟，预计将造成全球约 50 亿人丧生。 (0:00) 美国总统拥有发起核打击的“唯一个人权力”（Sole Authority），无需获得国会、国防部长或参谋长联席会议的批准，指挥系统设计为即时执行命令。 (6:30) 军事助手随身携带的“核足球”包含被戏称为“丹尼餐厅菜单”的简化反击方案，面对来袭导弹，总统仅有约 6 分钟时间做出决定。 (19:03) 美军天基红外系统（SBIRS）能在数秒内捕捉导弹发射的热信号，但潜射弹道导弹（SLBM）隐蔽性极高且飞行时间不足 10 分钟，极易导致致命误判。 (40:32) 为防止指挥中枢被“斩首”瘫痪，若总统在袭击中丧生或失能，“通用解锁代码”（Universal Unlock Code）将授权战略司令部（STRATCOM）司令直接释放全部核武库实施报复。 (51:46)

Investigative journalist Annie Jacobsen argues that modern missile speeds and automated launch protocols have compressed nuclear response times to mere minutes, meaning any systemic breakdown or miscalculation would culminate in global catastrophe within 72 minutes. Sole Authority and Compressed Decision Timelines (6:30) Jacobsen emphasizes that modern intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) travel between continents in roughly 30 minutes, while coastal submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) reduce flight windows to under 10 minutes. Because of these constraints, the U.S. system bypasses congressional consultation or military consensus, granting sole presidential authority to the Commander-in-Chief. Guided by a military aide carrying "the football," a president possesses an estimated six-minute window to review pre-planned options in the "Black Book" and order a nuclear strike. If the president is killed, the Universal Unlock Code pre-delegates launch authority to the Commander of U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) to guarantee retaliation. While space-based assets like the Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS) detect thermal plumes within seconds and map flight paths in roughly 100 seconds, detection systems remain vulnerable to human and technical error. Jacobsen recounts an incident shared by former Defense Secretary William Perry, where a training tape simulating an all-out Soviet launch was mistakenly loaded into live warning terminals, bringing command centers to the brink of counterstrike before the error was realized. Escalation Traps and Ineffective Missile Interception (59:03) The expansion from a bilateral Cold War posture to nine nuclear-armed nations has severely destabilized strategic deterrence. In Jacobsen's modeled scenario, an unannounced strike by North Korea—which regularly conducts unannounced tests outside standard protocol—forces an American counterstrike of 82 missiles. Because U.S. ground-based ICBM trajectories must overfly Russia to reach North Korea, Russian early-warning systems cannot verify whether the missiles are passing over or targeting them. Under Russian doctrine, military command would launch an all-out barrage rather than risk silo destruction. Jacobsen dismisses the belief that missile defense shields can stop an incoming barrage as a dangerous fantasy. The U.S. inventory contains just 44 long-range ground-based interceptors—40 located at Fort Greely, Alaska, and 4 at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California—against more than 1,600 ready-to-launch Russian warheads. Interceptors must strike a warhead traveling at 14,000 mph in space, achieving only a 40% to 55% success rate in pre-scheduled tests, an operational threshold easily overwhelmed by Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs) and decoys. Immediate Blast Destruction and Climatic Collapse (62:00) Drawing on defense data, Jacobsen outlines the immediate effects of a one-megaton thermonuclear detonation over a major target like the Pentagon. The initial flash reaches 180 million degrees Fahrenheit, igniting flammable materials across a 9-mile diameter before a supersonic blast wave flattens surrounding infrastructure. The resulting localized blazes merge into massive megafires that consume 100 square miles or more, creating fatal conditions across targeted metropolitan areas. The long-term environmental aftermath poses a far wider existential threat. Citing climate modeling by atmospheric scientist Brian Toon, Jacobsen explains that thousands of simultaneous urban fires would inject massive amounts of soot into the stratosphere, blocking sunlight and ushering in a decade-long nuclear winter. Severe agricultural collapse across global breadbaskets and widespread ozone layer destruction would lead to unprecedented famine. Research published by Toon's team in Nature projects that approximately 5 billion of the planet's 8 billion inhabitants would die. Analog Safeguards, Technological Risks, and Public Action (70:07) To counter digital tampering or hypothetical rogue AI scenarios, Jacobsen notes that American nuclear command and control deliberately retains analog architecture. For instance, Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles rely on space-based star-sighting navigation systems rather than vulnerable networked positioning software. However, the host and Jacobsen note that less sophisticated nuclear states may lack these analog safeguards, increasing the danger of cyber vulnerabilities or automated miscalculations as global arsenals total roughly 12,500 warheads. Because nuclear war is an engineered crisis, Jacobsen argues it remains solvable through executive leadership and public engagement. She cites how the 1983 broadcast of The Day After emotionally shifted President Ronald Reagan away from hawkish orbital defense strategies toward direct diplomacy with Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev. Their subsequent 1986 Reykjavik Summit established that a nuclear war cannot be won, catalyzing sweeping arms control agreements that reduced global stockpiles from a Cold War peak of 70,000 down to current levels. Jacobsen maintains that transparent, evidence-based journalism must demystify classified defense systems so the public understands the razor-thin margin of nuclear deterrence. The enduring question is whether modern political leaders can re-engage in bilateral disarmament before escalating regional standoffs or command-and-control miscalculations initiate an irreversible 72-minute collapse.

调查记者安妮·雅各布森（Annie Jacobsen）指出，现代核战争一旦爆发，全过程将在短短72分钟内结束并造成全球约50亿人死亡；现存核威慑体系建立在决策时间极度压缩、指挥权过度集中和脆弱的理性假设之上，人类随时处于因误判而走向毁灭的边缘。 决策时间压缩与单一总统发射权机制 (6:30) 现代弹道导弹极高的飞行速度彻底重塑了核指挥结构。洲际弹道导弹（ICBM）跨洋打击仅需约30分钟，而巡航在近海数百英里处的潜射弹道导弹（SLBM）打击飞行时间不足10分钟。为了应对这种毁灭性的时间窗口，美国体制确立了“单一总统权力”（sole presidential authority）。作为三军统帅，美国总统在下达核反击命令时无需征得国防部长、参谋长联席会议主席或国会的批准，整个战略评估和决策窗口通常被压缩在极限的6分钟之内。 在危机发生时，总统由随身携带“核足球”（emergency satchel / "the football"）的军事助理陪同，通过其中的“黑皮书”（Black Book）选择预设的报复方案。前五角大楼和战略司令部官员向雅各布森透露，指挥体系对执行命令有极高的纪律要求，基层几乎不可能发生违抗命令的情况。此外，为防止国家指挥中枢遭斩首瘫痪，体制内还设有“通用解锁密码”（Universal Unlock Code）；一旦总统身亡或丧失行动能力，该密码可将全套核武库的发射释放权直接授予美国战略司令部（STRATCOM）指挥官，确保报复打击不可逆地全面展开。 预警系统的技术极限与不可逆的升级链条 (28:44) 虽然美国依托部署在距地面22,000英里地球同步轨道上的天基红外系统（SBIRS）卫星，能在数秒内捕捉到火箭尾焰并在约100秒内完成初步弹道解算，但预警机制远非万无一失。历史上曾多次出现虚假警报，例如前国防部长威廉·佩里（William Perry）亲历的将演习模拟磁带误载入实战预警终端事件。更为严峻的是，潜射弹道导弹无法在发射瞬间确定发射国身份，使指挥官面临缺乏绝对证据却必须立即报复的危险博弈。 雅各布森指出，核战略推演中最致命的环节在于地缘几何与大国交战规则的冲突。在她构建的模拟推演中，如果美方针对朝鲜的核袭击发起82枚陆基洲际导弹的反击，这些导弹必须飞越俄罗斯领空。根据俄罗斯的军事学说，其防空体系无法预先赌博飞越领空的导弹不是瞄准自身，其交战逻辑并非发射一两枚导弹进行对等反击，而是立刻倾泻全部核武库（the "mother lode"）实施全面报复。冷战时期如1983年最高机密的“傲慢先知”（Proud Prophet）兵棋推演均证明，任何试图进行有限核反击的尝试，最终都会迅速升级为全球彻底毁灭。 导弹防御的物理神话与绝对毁灭效应 (59:03) 针对公众普遍认为反导系统能够化解核威胁的观点，雅各布森引述防务专家评估指出，拦截远程弹道导弹被军方形容为“用子弹去击中子弹”。目前全美仅部署了44枚长程陆基拦截弹（40枚位于阿拉斯加格里利堡，4枚位于加州范登堡），在面对俄罗斯等大国拥有的1,674枚处于随时待发状态的核弹头（美方部署约1,770枚）时，防御能力在数量级上微不足道。加之现代导弹配备分导式多弹头（MIRV）和大量诱饵，即使在预先获知时间与弹道的预设测试中，拦截成功率也仅在40%到55%之间。 一旦防御失效，现代热核武器的杀伤效能将带来灭顶之灾。不同于二战时期的裂变原子弹，现代氢弹以原子弹作为内部引爆核，破坏力呈指数级上升。以单枚100万吨当量的热核弹头打击五角大楼为例，爆炸瞬间光辐射核心温度高达1.8亿华氏度，引燃方圆9英里内所有易燃物，随之而来的超压冲击波将摧毁所有建筑物，多处火场迅速合并为覆盖百平方英里以上的超大火风暴（megafire），使地表避难与医疗救援彻底失效。 核冬天、全球大饥荒与文明崩溃 (64:18) 雅各布森强调，核战争的毁灭性影响远超即时的爆炸杀伤。正如赫鲁晓夫名言所预警，“核战爆发后，幸存者将嫉妒死者”。所有依托电网、供水和柴油发电机的地下掩体，在燃料耗尽后都将失去维持生命的条件。幸存的人类将面对完全崩塌的社会秩序与法治，退化至原始且残暴的生存资源争夺状态。 长期环境后果更为致命。气候学家布莱恩·图恩（Brian Toon）与卡尔·萨根团队开创并在近年持续更新的现代气候模型表明，核爆引发的大规模城市火灾将向平流层注入数以百万吨计的黑碳和浓烟，阻断阳光直射。爱荷华州和乌克兰等全球主要粮食产区将面临长达十年的冰雪覆盖与严寒，伴随严重的臭氧层损毁和致命紫外线辐射。图恩团队2022年发表于《自然》（Nature）的研究估计，全球约80亿人口中将有50亿人死于农作物绝收导致的大饥荒，其对生物圈的冲击堪比6600万年前造成恐龙灭绝的陨石撞击。 技术演进、认知觉醒与裁军的历史出路 (70:07) 雅各布森强调，核战争是人造的危机，也必须依靠人类的主动干预来解决。历史表明，大众认知和文化叙事能够对最高决策层产生关键转向。1983年展现核战浩劫的电视电影《浩劫后》（The Day After）吸引了一亿美国观众，极大触动了里根总统，促使其与苏联领导人戈尔巴乔夫在1986年雷克雅未克峰会上达成共识，最终使全球核弹头储备从冷战高峰期的约70,000枚削减至目前的约12,500枚。 然而，当今世界正迈入包含人工智能、无人自主系统与更多有核国家的新风险周期。尽管美军弹道导弹系统部分保留了星光定位（star-sighting）导航等非联网的模拟防御机制以防止黑客入侵，但并非所有核武国家都拥有等同的安全冗余。面对算法误判、地缘摩擦加剧以及核扩散带来的极端不确定性，雅各布森与防务专家一致呼吁，唯有摒弃妖魔化对抗的思维、主动建立跨国沟通桥梁并进一步大幅削减全球核武器储备，才能从概率上真正消除全人类覆灭的终极威胁。 雅各布森的研究表明，现存核战略将全人类的安危寄托于零容错的预警技术和各方领导人的绝对理性之上，在技术与地缘摩擦加剧的当下极其脆弱。虽然裁军与外交被视为根本出路，但如何在多极对抗加剧、互信机制匮乏且人工智能快速介入军事指挥的现实环境中切实推动核武库削减，仍是国际社会尚未解决的重大现实困境。

## Background 该视频由 YouTube 频道“The Diary Of A CEO”于 2024 年 5 月 13 日发布。节目邀请了普利策奖入围调查记者兼畅销书作家安妮·雅各布森（Annie Jacobsen），围绕其著作《核战争：情景推演》展开深度对谈，剖析核战争爆发后分秒递进的毁灭过程、最高决策机制以及人类面临的存亡危机。 ## TL;DR 安妮·雅各布森在访谈中揭示了一个令人不寒而栗的推论：核战争一旦爆发，全球文明将在短短 72 分钟内走向崩塌，随后的核冬天与饥荒将夺走全球约 50 亿人的生命。她深入剖析了美国“单一总统权力”和极端紧迫的 6 分钟决策时限，指出拦截系统在庞大核武库面前形同虚设，而地理限制与预警机制又极易引发美俄倾巢反击的连锁灾难。通过串联冷战误报历史、AI 与战争机器的演化，以及长崎原子弹装配者与幸存者跨越时空的宿命相遇，她强调核战争打不赢也打不得，唯有直面真相、消除零和敌意并开启沟通，才能避免文明毁灭。 ## Atmosphere & style 整场访谈笼罩在令人屏息的紧迫感与末日压迫感中，呈现出冷峻客观与深切人文关怀交织的独特质感。雅各布森以极度克制、精确的调查记者口吻拆解冰冷残酷的军事逻辑与毁灭细节，主持人巴特利特则在步步逼近的绝境推演中展露出由衷的震撼与窒息感。随着对谈从冷硬的技术条令逐步深入到幸存者的伤痛与当事人的伦理折磨，全片的氛围经历了从绝望惊骇到渴望搭建沟通桥梁、重拾和平希望的情感升华。 ## Bulletin - [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=asmaLnhaFiY&t=0s) 核战争推演显示，从第一枚洲际弹道导弹点火到全球文明彻底崩溃仅需72分钟，随后的核冬天将在短时间内导致全球约50亿人死于大饥荒。 - [08:05](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=asmaLnhaFiY&t=485s) 美国现行体制赋予总统“单一总统权力”（Sole Presidential Authority），在面临来袭导弹时，最高统帅仅有约6分钟做出决断，且下达核反击命令无需经过内阁、国会或军方的批准。 - [59:03](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=asmaLnhaFiY&t=3543s) 美国本土针对远程洲际导弹的陆基中段防御系统（GMD）仅部署了44枚拦截弹，面对俄罗斯等大国超过1,600枚战备核弹头及分导式多弹头诱饵，系统在实战中几乎不具备实质性防御能力。 - [01:40:22](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=asmaLnhaFiY&t=6022s) 面对现代化网络劫持与高空核爆产生的强电磁脉冲（EMP），弹道导弹核潜艇和潜射导弹在关键通信制导上刻意保留了“观星定位”（Star-sighting）等抗干扰的物理模拟技术。 ## Key takeaways - [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=asmaLnhaFiY&t=0s) 全球核末日可在72分钟内降临：洲际弹道导弹飞行仅需约30分钟，一旦战略威慑机制失效，连锁报复链条将无法逆转，导致文明崩溃与数十亿人死亡。 - [22:48](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=asmaLnhaFiY&t=1368s) “单一总统权力”排除了任何官僚制衡，总统在极端压力下必须借助军事随从的“核足球”与“黑皮书”，在短短6分钟内从预设套餐中勾选足以毁灭数亿人的反击方案。 - [24:30](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=asmaLnhaFiY&t=1470s) 前线执行链条的高度机械化：核发射井操作员与战略核潜艇官兵经过极端心理脱敏与服从训练，在收到核发射授权时几乎不可能发生基于良知的人性抗命。 - [28:44](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=asmaLnhaFiY&t=1724s) 早期预警系统存在极高误判风险：冷战期间曾因误插演习用VHS录像带，导致五角大楼将模拟突袭数据误读为全面核打击警报，险些触发毁灭性反击。 - [32:16](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=asmaLnhaFiY&t=1936s) 历史绝密核战兵推“傲慢先知”（Proud Prophet）彻底证实：无论开局时采取多么谨慎克制的有限战术核打击，冲突最终都会迅速失控升级为全人类的核浩劫，核战争绝不存在赢家。 - [34:52](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=asmaLnhaFiY&t=2092s) 民防体系在核交火面前形同虚设：前FEMA局长直言在真正的核大战中根本不存在大众保护计划，机构所有资源仅用于掩体内的“政府连续性”运转幻想。 - [40:30](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=asmaLnhaFiY&t=2430s) 天基红外系统（SBIRS）虽能在1秒内捕捉尾焰并在100秒内算出陆基弹道，但完全无法对大洋中发射的潜射弹道导弹进行水下国别溯源，极易导致对假想敌发起毁灭性误击。 - [44:44](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=asmaLnhaFiY&t=2684s) 沿海潜射导弹将预警时间极限压缩至10分钟以内；白宫内部特勤局特工将以武力接管现场强行疏散总统，甚至准备了应对直升机EMP瘫痪的盲跳跳伞预案。 - [51:46](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=asmaLnhaFiY&t=3106s) 五角大楼核指挥链路中设有“通用解锁代码”机制：一旦最高统帅在首轮打击中身亡或失联，战略司令部司令拥有越过常规程序自主下令齐射全部核武库的终极权限。 - [55:21](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=asmaLnhaFiY&t=3321s) 地理必经弹道构成的升级死锁：美国向朝鲜等国发射的陆基反击导弹因地球曲率必须飞越俄罗斯领空，俄方雷达在“预警即发射”作战条例下势必立即触发全面核反击。 - [59:03](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=asmaLnhaFiY&t=3543s) 防空反导拦截纯属心理幻觉：以44枚实测拦截率仅约50%的拦截弹迎战上千枚超高音速分导多弹头，其难度堪比在太空“用一颗子弹击落另一颗子弹”。 - [01:06:23](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=asmaLnhaFiY&t=3983s) 核冬天将摧毁全球农业系统：大火将数百万吨烟尘送入平流层封冻中纬度粮仓十余年，全球80亿人中将有约50亿人死于饥荒，幸存者将被迫在地下废墟争夺残余物资。 - [01:10:07](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=asmaLnhaFiY&t=4207s) 人为制造的危机必有人为的解药：1983年影视作品《浩劫后》深刻触动了里根总统，促成美苏雷克雅未克峰会，使全球核弹头从7万枚峰值锐减至目前的约1.25万枚。 - [01:23:07](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=asmaLnhaFiY&t=4987s) 情报机构与国家安全机器高度擅长运用“掩护”与“虚假信息”等战略欺骗手法操控公众叙事，许多被贴上“阴谋论”标签的事件背后往往隐藏着真实的军工黑幕与历史教训。 - [01:39:35](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=asmaLnhaFiY&t=5975s) 将强人工智能（AGI）引入核决策系统存在不可承受的单点故障风险：自动化算法可能被虚假演习数据误导或遭系统击穿，彻底削弱本就极度紧绷的战略威慑防线。 - [02:10:07](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=asmaLnhaFiY&t=7807s) 避免文明走向核毁灭的根基在于打破你死我活的零和偏见：唯有正视72分钟末日剧本的残酷真相，搭建对话桥梁，推动全球核武归零，才能消解大数定律下必然爆发的终局灾难。 ## Detailed walkthrough ### [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=asmaLnhaFiY&t=0s) 序幕：72分钟毁灭世界与幸存者的绝境 开篇抛出了一个令人不寒而栗的残酷推论：无论核战争以何种形式爆发，整个过程将在短短 72 分钟内走向终局，届时将有 50 亿人丧生。普利策奖入围调查记者兼畅销书作家 Annie Jacobsen 直言，当她深入采访了前美国国防部长、前核潜艇指挥官以及特勤局等核心安全决策者后，得到的真相只有一个词——“我的天哪（Oh my god）”。当今世界与彻底毁灭的核浩劫之间，往往只隔着一次致命的误解，而公众却时常看到各国领导人公然发出核战争威胁。 更令人震惊的现实在于，美国总统发动核导弹打击并不需要获得任何人的许可。Annie Jacobsen 强调，一旦核战争爆发，地球上幸存下来的人将被迫躲入暗无天日的地下废墟，过着生不如死的生活，甚至会去“羡慕那些已经死去的人”。她还透露，在采访过程中有极为触动甚至令她落泪的经历——她结识了一位当年长崎原子弹爆炸的幸存者，而讽刺且沉重的是，她所采访的另一位对她影响深远的关键人物，正是当年亲手为投向长崎的那枚原子弹接通线路的人。 - 核战争推演的终局时限：约 72 分钟 - 预估全球死亡人数：高达 50 亿人 - 发动权真相：美国总统无需征求内阁或国会同意即可单方面下令发射 --- ### [01:59](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=asmaLnhaFiY&t=119s) 写作初衷与地缘政治危机的重叠 主持人 Steven Bartlett 提到，Annie 于 2024 年 3 月出版的新书《核战争：情景推演》（*Nuclear War: A Scenario*），其出版时间点与当前高度动荡的世界局势巧合得令人不安。谈及为何撰写该书，Annie 解释称，自己在过去出版过六本关于五角大楼、中央情报局（CIA）、国防高级研究计划局（DARPA）和 51 区的调查巨作，采访过上百位经历自二战以来历次冲突的高级军政信源。在过往的交流中，几乎每一位国防部和 CIA 的核心人士都会带着自豪感对她说：“我毕生的使命就是阻止第三次核世界大战。” 然而，在特朗普执政期间，美朝领导人之间针锋相对的“怒与火”（fire and fury）核言论让 Annie 深刻意识到：万一原本用于维持和平的“核威慑”（Deterrence，即核预防机制）失效了怎么办？正是基于这一核心叩问，她在 2020 至 2021 年疫情期间正式动笔撰写本书。她的目标不是停留在抽象理论上，而是用严谨、细致到令人心碎的可怕细节，让公众看清核冲突到底意味着什么。许多人已经遗忘了核交火的本质——一旦战略弹道导弹点火升空，世界的毁灭不是以月或周计算，而是以分秒计数的不可逆连锁反应。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 核威慑机制到核浩劫演变逻辑 accDescr: 展示核威慑防线一旦失效，战略弹道导弹发射如何在数十分钟内演变为全球毁灭。 subgraph 威慑逻辑 A["军事情报系统核心宗旨<br/>'防止第三次世界大战爆发'"] --> B{"核威慑 (Deterrence)<br/>是否生效？"} end subgraph 崩溃升级 B -- "失效 / 误判 / 政治挑衅" --> C["洲际弹道导弹 (ICBM) 点火"] C --> D["倒计时启动：以分秒计数的发射序列"] end subgraph 全球终局 D --> E["无法中断的战略报复链"] E --> F["72分钟内全球文明崩塌<br/>约50亿人丧生"] end ``` - 采访背景：涵盖国防部、中央情报局、DARPA 等数百位军政高层消息源 - 写作动机：对“威慑失败”情景的系统性复盘 - 现实对照：新书出版当月正值俄罗斯向白俄罗斯部署战术核武器并发出核威胁 --- ### [08:05](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=asmaLnhaFiY&t=485s) “单一总统权力”：一个人毁灭地球的决策机制 谈及核战争中最让大众难以置信的机制，Annie 揭示了一个制度性冷酷现实：在美国，发动核打击并不需要成百上千位专家与官员举手表决，而是完全取决于唯一的个人——“单一总统权力”（Sole Presidential Authority）。这意味着作为三军统帅，美国总统在决定按下核按钮时，完全不需要向国防部长（SECDEF）、参谋长联席会议主席（Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff），乃至美国国会请示或寻求批准。 Annie 回忆道，人们在网上（例如 Reddit）看到这个概念时，往往第一反应是质疑甚至争论其真实性，认为不可能存在如此绝对的独裁式权力。然而事实恰恰相反。在特朗普任期内，这一问题引发了国会内部的严重焦虑与问询，国会甚至为此专门发布过一份权威调查报告，白纸黑字明确证实：总统确实拥有无可阻辩的单一核打击发射权。Annie 解释，这一机制并不是为了制造独裁，而是冷战时期技术环境逼出来的极端产物——由于敌方洲际弹道导弹（ICBM）跨洲飞行打击本土只需极短的时间，整个防御与报复体系本质上就是一个紧迫的“倒计时时钟”，官僚机构层层讨论的机制在分秒必争的核闪电战面前被彻底剥离。 - 制度术语：**单一总统权力**（Sole Presidential Authority） - 权限范围：总统下达核攻击命令无需经由国防部长、参谋长联席会议主席或国会授权 - 制度成因：受制于洲际弹道导弹跨洲打击仅需数十分钟的极限反应时间窗口 ### [11:39](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=asmaLnhaFiY&t=699s) 洲际弹道导弹与30分钟决断：总统唯一授权的残酷现实 洲际弹道导弹（ICBM）的机制正如其名所揭示的那样冷酷而直接：它能在短短大约30分钟内跨越整个大洲，携带核弹头精确打击目标。安妮·雅各布森指出，正是这个“30分钟”的物理极限，彻底改写了现代战争的决策逻辑。和平时期的政治程序在这里完全失效——这绝不像当年商讨是否出兵伊拉克那样，各方可以从容召集幕僚闭门磋商、展开公开辩论，或者交由国会进行旷日持久的投票表决。 在核突袭的剧本里，所有的繁文缛节都被压缩成了一句直接递到三军统帅耳边的紧急通报：“长官，有一枚弹道导弹正朝美国飞来，您必须立刻采取行动。”没有任何缓冲余地，也没有任何制度制衡来分担这份重担。雅各布森用最通俗易懂的语言解释道，这就是为什么美国宪法和军事机制中会演变出“总统唯一授权”（Sole Presidential Authority）这项不可思议的绝对权力——面对即刻到来的毁灭，留给人类最高决策者的思考窗口只有短短几分钟。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 洲际弹道导弹预警与总统单一决断流程 accDescr: 展示从雷达侦测到导弹升空至总统在极短时限内启用核足球下达反击指令的压缩决策链。 subgraph Crisis["危机触发阶段"] A["监测到洲际弹道导弹来袭"] --> B["横跨大洲仅需约30分钟"] end subgraph Authority["最高指挥决断"] B --> C["打破常规：无法交由国会辩论"] C --> D["总统唯一授权生效<br/>独揽反击决断权"] end subgraph Tool["反击响应工具"] D --> E["军事随从寸步不离<br/>启用'核足球'紧急手提包"] E --> F["五角大楼地下NMCC身份核验"] E --> G["翻阅'黑皮书'核打击方案"] end ``` ### [12:21](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=asmaLnhaFiY&t=741s) 从大象体型到弹头：热核武器的演变与“炸弹中的炸弹” 当主持人提到电影《奥本海默》中物理学家们在新墨西哥州沙漠研制并最终投掷在日本的那颗原子弹时，雅各布森明确指出：今天人类面临的核武库与1940年代的产品早已不可同日而语。虽然在裂变物理学的基本原理上一脉相承，但现代核武器在爆炸体量与破坏力上经历了天翻地覆的裂变。现代核武绝非单纯的原子弹，而是热核武器（氢弹）——当年的整颗原子弹，在今天的热核弹头里仅仅被用作引爆第二级聚变的“撞针”或“扳机”。 雅各布森将其生动地形容为“炸弹内部的炸弹”（a bomb inside a bomb）。其释放的毁灭能量呈几何级数跃升。雅各布森曾专访过理查德·加文（Richard Garwin）——这位泰勒-乌拉姆构型的核心设计者，在24岁时便为爱德华·泰勒设计了人类历史上第一枚热核装置。如今90多岁高龄的加文在采访中向雅各布森拆解了这种超乎人类想象的爆破机制。 除了毁伤威力的跃进，另一个革命性转折在于武器物理尺寸的缩减。1945年投掷在广岛的“小男孩”原子弹爆炸当量约为15千吨，其外形庞大笨重，体积堪比一头小象，必须由重型轰炸机从提尼安岛（Tinian Island）长途跋涉运抵目标上空投掷。二战结束后，随着“回形针行动”中纳粹德国火箭专家的加盟，军事工业复合体确立了极为明确的升级方向：制造威力成百上千倍递增、体积却大幅缩小的热核弹头，从而使其能够精准塞进洲际弹道导弹的狭窄鼻锥内。 - **广岛原子弹（小男孩）**：约15千吨TNT当量，体积如同一头小象，依赖重型轰炸机空运空投。 - **现代热核武器（氢弹）**：采用“分级爆缩”原理，原子弹在其中仅充当第一级起爆引发核聚变的触发器。 - **小型化飞跃**：纳粹弹道工程学与冷战核物理相结合，使巨型核装置微型化为可搭载在弹道导弹前端的高效毁伤弹头。 ### [14:42](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=asmaLnhaFiY&t=882s) 核三位一体与“天启侍女”：深海中无法追踪的幽灵 几十年来冷战军备竞赛的产物，最终固化为支撑大国战略威慑的“核三位一体”（Nuclear Triad）。雅各布森指出，美国的三位一体结构由三根坚固的支柱构成： 1. **陆基洲际弹道导弹**：目前全美分布着400枚随时处于待命状态的洲际导弹，深埋于横跨中西部和大西部荒原的地下发射井中（相关坐标甚至可以在公开地图上查到）； 2. **海基弹道导弹核潜艇**：水下巡航的战略核潜艇搭载着相同的弹道导弹与热核弹头； 3. **空基战略轰炸机**：具备远程核常兼备打击能力的空中梯队。 在这些威慑力量中，海基力量的技术成熟度与隐匿性最令军事专家敬畏。潜伏于大洋深处的核动力弹道导弹潜艇被称为“天启的侍女”（the handmaidens of the apocalypse），它们一年365天、一天24小时无休止地在全球深海游弋。当主持人询问这些庞然大物是否“几乎不可能被发现”时，雅各布森纠正道：在现役反潜技术面前，它们是“真正意义上的无法追踪”。 雅各布森援引美国前核潜艇部队指挥官康纳海军上将（Admiral Connor）的话来形容深海潜艇的隐蔽极限：“安妮，在广袤的太空中搜寻一颗柚子大小的物体，都要比在幽深的海洋里找出一艘战略核潜艇容易得多。” ### [16:16](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=asmaLnhaFiY&t=976s) 九个核大国与地缘火药桶：一念之间的世界末日 雅各布森提醒听众，核威慑早已不是美苏争霸的二人转。冷战初期确立的“相互保证毁灭”（MAD）学说建立在美苏双雄对峙的简单博弈模型上——双方都握有彻底毁灭对手的武器，因此谁也不敢轻启战端。然而，当今世界已经演变出九个公认或事实上的拥核国家：美国、俄罗斯、中国、英国、法国、印度、 Pakistan（巴基斯坦）、以色列、以及朝鲜。更严峻的是，伊朗正在向成为第十个拥核国家的危险边缘试探。 这九个核国家之间的地缘关系远非冷战时期的相对平衡，许多国家正卷入激烈的直接对抗或代理人战争： - 美俄两大核武库巨头通过乌克兰战场深陷代理人冲突，北约成员国英、法同样深卷其中； - 印度与巴基斯坦作为邻国长期处于高度军事摩擦状态； - 以色列与潜在拥核国伊朗在近期直接互射导弹与无人机攻击，中东局势濒临彻底失控； - 冲突各方陷入了缺乏妥协出路的“胜负死局”：乌克兰与背后的美国无法承担战败的战略代价，普京政权也承受不起败选引起的颠覆性后果。 当这些复杂的火药桶与单一元首的发射权限叠加在一起时，战争升级的偶然性呈指数级增加。联合国秘书长近期发出严厉警告：“人类距离核末日浩劫，仅仅隔着一次误解或一次误判。”从“核末日”（Nuclear Armageddon）到“天启”（Apocalypse）再到“核大屠杀”（Nuclear Holocaust），这些极度惊悚的词汇频频出自现任大国领袖之口。朝鲜最高领导人甚至公开指责美国抱有“挑起核战争的险恶企图”。 面对这种令人窒息的末日阴影，雅各布森反问听众：恐惧的意义究竟何在？她认为，沉溺于恐慌毫无助益，但更危险的是随波逐流的冷漠与被动（passivity）。人类文明的演变史证明，唯有公众清醒地认识到真实的危险边界，知识与觉醒才能转化为遏制毁灭的实质性变革力量。 ### [21:32](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=asmaLnhaFiY&t=1292s) 总统身后的黑箱：“核足球”与充斥死亡的“黑皮书” 在白宫或任何美国总统公开亮相的影像中，只要镜头拉得稍开一些，总能看到一名身着戎装的军官如影随形。雅各布森揭秘，这名军官被称为军事随从（Military Aide），他们全天候24小时、每年365天与总统保持近身距离。该军官手中提着的沉重皮包，就是举世闻名的“核足球”（Nuclear Football），官方正式名称为“紧急皮包”（Emergency Satchel）。 “核足球”内部并非外界传闻中的红色物理起爆按钮，而是包含了两样至关重要的国家机密物件： 1. **身份认证与通讯仪器**：包含高等级的呼叫-应答验证系统，确保总统在危急时刻能够向五角大楼地下的“国家军事指挥中心”（NMCC）核战掩体自证其最高指挥官身份，下达具有不可撤销效力的军事指令。 2. **“黑皮书”（The Black Book）**：一本装订成册的机密作战预案。军方知情人士向雅各布森透露，这本打击目录之所以在内部被称为“黑皮书”，是因为其每一页的内容都关乎亿万生灵的死亡。里面详细列出了经过预先计算和推演的各等级核打击选项（Nuclear Strike Options），供处于极度精神高压下的总统在短短几分钟内勾选决定人类命运的剧本。 ### [22:48](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=asmaLnhaFiY&t=1368s) 六分钟生死抉择与“丹尼斯餐厅菜单”般的核打击选项 一旦侦测到弹道导弹正射向美国本土，总统接到通知后，必须在转瞬之间决定是否发动核反击。安妮·杰克森指出，根据历任总统经历和解密机制，国家最高指挥官面临的决策窗口期仅仅只有短短的 6 分钟。在这样命悬一线的极端紧迫状态下，根本不可能召集幕僚展开圆桌会议进行审慎研讨。总统面前摆着的，是一份预先编订好的核打击应对方案清单，他只能在极度有限的选择中迅速拍板。 安妮在撰写《核战：一种推演》（*Nuclear War: A Scenario*）期间，采访了一位曾于 20 世纪 80 年代在五角大楼参与起草这些选项的军方高官。该官员极其骇人地描述了当年的编制过程：军方推演人员在五角大楼内部精确计算出各项打击目标的数值与坐标，详细列明在针对特定国家的“XYZ”或“Q”打击计划中，为什么某处设施必须被摧毁。然而，当这些繁琐严谨的战略数据被汇编进那本随行黑色皮包（核手提箱内附的打击方案手册）后，其形态发生了令人脊背发凉的畸变——正如唯一一名公开受访的白宫前军事助理所形容的，整套战略最终被极度精简为一份“犹如丹尼斯（Denny's）快餐厅点餐单”式的打击套餐列表。 由于预设选项被高度“注水”和抽象化，加之留给决策的时间只有区区几分钟，总统在按下按钮的那一刻，本质上根本无法确切知晓自己摧毁的究竟是什么目标，更不可能清醒预估将会有几千万平民因此丧命。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 总统六分钟核反击决策流程 accDescr: 展示从导弹发射检测到极短决策时间内依赖预设选项的单向核反击链条。 subgraph Detect ["预警系统检测"] A["天基红外系统 (SBIRS) 捕捉发射"] --> B["五角大楼 NMCC 与战略司令部核实"] end subgraph Decision ["极限制约决策窗口"] B --> C["通报总统：启动 6 分钟决策时限"] C --> D["翻阅核手提箱内的预设应对方案"] end subgraph Execute ["指令下达"] D --> E["选定类似'丹尼斯菜单'的抽象打击代号"] E --> F["下达绝密核打击认证码至发射端"] end ``` ### [24:30](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=asmaLnhaFiY&t=1470s) 威慑悖论与失控的领导人：尼克松醉酒逸闻与服从铁律 史蒂文·巴特利特深感震撼地指出，这一现实说明选择国家领导人的决定比以往任何认知都要重大得多，因为全人类的存亡竟系于一念之间。安妮进一步披露，她从前国防部长以及多位总统核心圈幕僚处获悉，多数总统在就任期间对自己作为核战争总司令的角色往往极为无知，甚至可以说是“故意蒙在鼓里”——因为绝大多数领导人潜意识里根本“不想去直面核地狱的真相”。这就将所有人拽回了核威慑的核心悖论：为了防止大战，双方必须部署成千上万枚瞄准彼此的核弹头，寄希望于“谁也不敢率先发疯”；这种“拥有的核弹越多就越安全”的威慑逻辑，充斥着彻头彻尾的奥威尔式荒诞。 史蒂文提出，既然人脑极其脆弱，随时可能因各种诱因出现精神妄想、突发性精神分裂或偏执发作，那么是否应当每隔三个月对领导人进行一次严格的精神鉴定？否则一旦最高领袖出现精神失常，现存机制几乎无法阻止其下令毁灭世界。安妮由此引出理查德·尼克松（Richard Nixon）在水门事件濒临垮台时期的著名历史秘闻：在自知总统生涯即将告终的绝望夜晚，醉醺醺的尼克松情绪极不稳定，借着酒劲大放厥词，滔滔不绝地吹嘘自己只需动动手指按下一个按钮，就能在瞬间抹平整个世界、杀死千百万人。据说亨利·基辛格（Henry Kissinger）为此极为恐惧，私下致电军方最高层并秘密下令：“如果总统发布任何核打击指令，必须先向我汇报。” 对于这类逸闻，安妮客观表示，除非当事人亲口印证，否则历史传言总带着几分模糊性，但它反映出的制度风险是绝对真实的。公众普遍存在一种好莱坞式的天真幻想，以为深处发射井地堡的导弹操作员或战略核潜艇上的艇员，在接到毁灭世界的死命令时，会在良知觉醒的人性时刻选择违抗军令以拯救地球。然而，洛斯阿拉莫斯国家实验室（Los Alamos）机密历史博物馆馆长格伦·麦克道夫博士（Dr. Glenn McDuff）对此给出了极为冷酷的断言： > “安妮，你指望核指挥控制链条上有人抗命，那概率比你买彩票中超级大奖（Powerball）还要低得多。因为他们被彻底训练成只做一件事——绝对服从命令。” 前中央情报局（CIA）官员安迪·布斯塔曼特（Andy Bustamante）在交流中亦证实了这一冷酷机制：军方在选拔核指挥与发射人员时，考核的核心指标就是在此类时刻能够机械式盲从指令，并通过反反复复的模拟演习完成心理脱敏，确保指令一旦下达便被不折不扣地执行。 ### [28:44](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=asmaLnhaFiY&t=1724s) 早期预警系统的致命误报：一盘几乎引发三战的录像带 当史蒂文追问如果总统在首轮突袭中当场阵亡会发生何种连锁反应时，安妮表示书中对此进行了抽丝剥茧的呈现。现代核冲突以秒和分钟为单位推进，美国部署的“天基红外系统”（SBIRS，由洛克希德·马丁公司研制）技术极度先进，可在导弹升空后不足一秒内捕获热羽流并触发警报。然而史蒂文指出，历史上的预警系统曾多次发生惊险误判——甚至雷达会将一群迁徙的天鹅误读为来袭的核弹，人类距离灭顶之灾往往只隔着一次技术误判。 为了揭示预警误报的致命风险，安妮讲述了一位亲历者直接向她倾诉的真实噩梦：吉米·卡特（Jimmy Carter）执政时期，日后成为国防部长的威廉·佩里（William Perry）当时正担任国防部负责研究与工程的副部长。在佩里值守“夜班核威胁通报”职责的一个深夜，位于五角大楼地下的国家军事指挥中心（NMCC）突然拉响最高警报，监测屏幕上显示大批苏联弹道导弹正狂暴地飞向美国本土。内布拉斯加州奥弗特空军基地（Offutt Air Force Base）地下的战略司令部（STRATCOM）地堡随即确认了这一情报，警报不仅显示苏联发射了洲际弹道导弹（ICBM），更有潜射弹道导弹（SLBM）从近海呼啸扑来，那是一场倾巢而出的毁灭性弹头洪流。 佩里回忆道，在那短短几分钟里，他大脑一片空白，极力消化着这个令人窒息的事实：“我的上帝啊，我必须立即通知总统，而总统必须在几分钟内下达全力核反击的命令。”然而在千钧一发之际，危机突然解除——这一切竟是一场极其离奇的技术失误： - 技术人员不慎将一盒用于实战演练的 VHS 模拟录像带插入了五角大楼地下指挥中心的推演主机中。 - 由于该系统与战略司令部直接数据联网，演习数据瞬间被当作真实突袭信号广播至全美战略防御中枢。 - 佩里坦言，那一刻的雷达与遥测读数逼真到让人绝望，“它之所以看起来如此真实，是因为它在设计时就是为了百分之百模拟真实的全面核突袭”。 ### [32:16](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=asmaLnhaFiY&t=1936s) “傲慢先知”核战兵推：无人能赢的终极推演 史蒂文提及，曾有一位美国总统在主导参与核战争推演后，得出了一个令人心碎的结论：核战争中根本不存在赢家。安妮确认了这一点，并提到了代号为“傲慢先知”（Proud Prophet）的绝密核战兵推。 在美国政府高度戒备的绝密体系中，战略核战模拟推演的保密等级极高，与总统核手提箱内的真实方案不相上下。“傲慢先知”是冷战历史上极罕见被部分解密的演习项目。该演习于 1983 年由罗纳德·里根（Ronald Reagan）总统亲自下令举行，持续了整整两周时间。包括国防部长在内的全美核指挥与控制系统高级将领及文官全部进驻岗位实战参演。 安妮在书中收录了部分解密档案。虽然向公众公开的文本被大量涂黑、抹去了核心细节，只留下零星的代号和页码，但这次解密使当时参与推演的非军方战略学者——耶鲁大学教授保罗·布拉肯（Paul Bracken）得以打破沉默，在宏观层面向世人揭示其恐怖真相：无论开局时采取何种审慎的有限核打击方案，冲突都会在极短时间内迅速失控并升级为全面的核浩劫，“核战争打不赢，也打不得”在此次推演中被无可辩驳地彻底证实。 ### [33:44](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=asmaLnhaFiY&t=2024s) 兵棋推演的终局与 72 分钟毁灭世界 安妮·杰克森引用了保罗·布拉肯（Paul Bracken）在其著作中的观察：在军方所进行的所有核战争兵棋推演中，保密细则虽然无法对外透露，但宏观结论却惊人一致——无论核战争以何种方式引爆，无论北约是否卷入、中国是否卷入，“无论它如何开局，最终都会以核决战（Nuclear Armageddon）告终”，而推演结束后，所有参演人员的心情都极其沉重沮丧。所谓核决战，本质上就是整个世界的毁灭。在她的新书《核战争：一种推演》（*Nuclear War: A Scenario*）中，全球文明的全面崩塌仅仅用了 72 分钟。这个具体的时间框架并非凭空想象，而是来自前美国战略司令部（STRATCOM）司令罗伯特·凯勒上将（General C. Robert Kehler）的原话：当被问及美俄若爆发核交火会怎样时，凯勒直言不讳地指出，整个世界将在接下来的几个小时内化为乌有。 这意味着，如果在这场谈话刚刚开始的瞬间核战争爆发，那么在对谈结束前，整个人类文明便已不复存在；而普通大众甚至在第一枚核弹落地前对此一无所知。 ### [34:52](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=asmaLnhaFiY&t=2092s) 联邦应急管理局的幻觉：没有民众保护方案 更令人不寒而栗的事实来自奥巴马时期的联邦应急管理局（FEMA）局长克雷格·富盖特（Craig Fugate）。作为统领该机构长达 8 年的最高长官，富盖特不仅处理了无数飓风、洪水与地震等自然灾害，同时也负责核战争和“小概率、高后果”天体撞击（低概率高危害事件）的民防应急规划。然而，富盖特向安妮披露了一个震撼人心的事实： > 在真正的核战争中，根本没有任何所谓的大众保护计划（population protection planning），“因为所有人都已经死了”。 作为 FEMA 局长，一旦发生核危机，他的职责不是救助平民，而是必须立刻进驻名为气象山（Mount Weather）的地下核避难掩体，将所有精力投入到所谓的“政府连续性”（Continuity of Government，即保障国家最基本核心行政职能运转）工作中。然而，面对彻底毁灭的世界，试图维持政府运转本身就是一种脱离现实的虚妄幻想。富盖特对于这种无能为力的局面坦白得令人难以置信，安妮甚至特意回过头去向他反复核对引语，而富盖特不仅全盘认可，还在该书于美国上市后第一时间在亚马逊上留下了公开书评。 安妮解释道，核指挥与控制系统内的官员在任时往往忠于职守、恪尽职守，信奉国家安全并机械地执行命令；但当他们卸任回归平民身份，尤其是步入八九十岁的高龄后，往往开始用良知反思自己的历史遗产，并在地缘政治和技术剧烈变迁的当下，重新审视这套冷战遗产是否真如他们当年以为的那样严密可靠。 ### [38:08](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=asmaLnhaFiY&t=2288s) 军工复合体与醒悟的五角大楼领袖：威廉·佩里 当主持人询问在安妮接触的所有受访者中，谁对核武器的威胁最为焦虑和痛苦时，安妮毫不犹豫地提到了前国防部长威廉·佩里（William Perry）。这位年过九旬的前五角大楼掌舵人如今已不再接受公开采访，但他将人生最后的二三十年全部奉献给了核不扩散与公众警示。佩里曾撰写《核按钮》（*The Button*）一书，并主持了播客节目《在悬崖边》（*At the Brink*）。 佩里一生的讽刺与沉重之处在于，他曾是美国“军工复合体”（Military-Industrial Complex）的核心设计者之一，长年深度参与先进武器系统的研发（安妮在其关于 DARPA 的专著中曾详细记录过这套庞大网络）。这套军工研发产业深深嵌合在资本、就业与经济繁荣之中，如永动机般不断向前推进。安妮引用了艾森豪威尔总统在告别演说中的警示——世人往往只记住了他对军工复合体的警告，却忽略了演说后半段的核心药方：“唯有见识广博且警惕的公民群体”，才能在国防与真正的和平之间维系平衡。而当前把“持续的战争状态”误当做国防与和平的现实，正是最令人担忧的盲区。 ### [40:30](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=asmaLnhaFiY&t=2430s) 卫星如何判定核打击源头：SBIRS 预警与 100 秒窗口 面对全盘毁灭的 72 分钟倒计时，主持人提出了一个关键技术疑问：在核弹升空的最初几分钟内，决策者究竟如何确定导弹发射自哪里？总统身旁军事助手携带的“核足球”（Nuclear Football）中那份印有打击目标的黑色清单，又该如何选择报复对象？ 安妮指出，这与“9·11”恐怖袭击后情报部门手足无措地追查基地组织的混乱局面完全不同。在过去 79 年里，美国不仅建立了核武库，更构建了极其先进的全球监测天网： ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 陆基导弹天基红外预警与弹道计算流程 accDescr: 展示从SBIRS卫星捕获火箭尾焰到计算落点与判定打击源的100秒时间线 subgraph Detection["天基红外探测（1秒内）"] A["陆基洲际弹道导弹点火升空"] --> B["SBIRS 卫星<br/>（位于 22,000 英里地球静止轨道）"] B --> C["红外传感器精确捕获<br/>火箭发动机高温尾焰"] end subgraph Processing["指挥与弹道解析（100秒内）"] C --> D["航天数据中心 / 太空军司令部"] D --> E["精确计算弹道轨迹<br/>（排除莫斯科或关岛方向）"] E --> F["判定落点与受击目标<br/>（如旧金山或美东沿海）"] end ``` - **SBIRS 卫星系统**：部署在距地表 22,000 英里的地球静止轨道上，利用高灵敏度红外传感器，在导弹发射出筒、火箭发动机喷射出剧烈尾焰的 **1 秒钟之内**，即可锁定发射坐标。 - **弹道推演窗口**：数据迅速下传至美国航空航天数据中心和太空军，电脑与分析人员在约 **100 秒** 内就能完全测算出导弹轨迹，确知其并非飞往关岛或莫斯科，而是扑向美国旧金山或是东海岸。 ### [43:04](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=asmaLnhaFiY&t=2584s) 水下幽灵：潜射弹道导弹引发的猜忌死局 然而，天基红外侦测系统存在一个致命的盲区：**水下潜艇发射的弹道导弹**。当核导弹从浩瀚大洋（例如太平洋深处）破水而出时，红外卫星只能捕捉到出水后的热源，却根本无法在水下溯源该潜艇归属于哪个国家。 主持人提出了一种极具现实毁灭性的假设：如果监测系统发现太平洋中升起一枚核弹，它理论上可能属于英国，也可能属于其他任何拥核国。面对只有十几分钟反应时间的绝境，美国领导人极有可能凭主观地缘政治预判将责任归咎于已知的最大敌对阵营，进而对假想敌发起全面核报复，引发多方连锁打击。安妮坦言，这正是冷战威慑理论中“相互保证毁灭”（MAD）走向纯粹“疯狂”（Madness）的死胡同。事实上，俄罗斯与中国的弹道导弹核潜艇常年在距美国东西两岸仅数百英里的深海海域游弋巡航，一旦来自海洋的潜射核导弹升空，整套本就极为脆弱的威慑逻辑将瞬间滑向全面失控。 ### [44:44](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=asmaLnhaFiY&t=2684s) 潜艇逼近海岸与不到十分钟的预警时间 核潜艇在水下的隐蔽性极高，虽然无法做到绝对的实时监测，但军方依靠一套极其复杂的全球水下声波与监视传感系统，能够掌握敌方潜艇的事后航迹动态。安妮·杰克森提到，美国国防部近期向国会提交的一份预算申请文件中包含一张机密降级地图，她在书中对该图进行了还原。该地图清晰地展示了敌方弹道导弹核潜艇（无论是逼近美国还是英国海岸）距海岸线究竟有多近。 潜艇的极度贴近，直接将潜射弹道导弹从点火升空到击中本土目标的飞行时间压缩到了惊人的 10 分钟以内。这彻底打破了冷战时期“洲际导弹飞行需半小时以上”的心理缓冲空间。安妮强调，所谓人类“生活在末日毁灭的边缘”绝非文学夸张，而是客观存在且时刻紧绷的战备事实。现代社会的大多数人对此浑然不知，公众甚至并未意识到，一场彻底终结人类文明的核战争可能仅仅因为一卷演习测试磁带误播、系统算法误判，或是某种微小的意外而爆发。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 极短预警时间下的核冲突升级链路 subgraph S1["潜艇逼近与发射"] A["敌方核潜艇抵近沿海"] --> B["潜射弹道导弹发射<br/>（飞行时间小于10分钟）"] end subgraph S2["双重雷达确认机制"] B --> C["红外天基卫星预警<br/>（约第3分钟通报总统）"] C --> D["地面铺路爪雷达二次确认<br/>（约第8至9分钟）"] end subgraph S3["指挥中枢路线撕裂"] D --> E["特勤局特种突击队<br/>武装强行撤离总统"] D --> F["五角大楼/战略司令部<br/>紧急催促反击代码授权"] end ``` --- ### [46:02](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=asmaLnhaFiY&t=2762s) 双重确认机制与绝无回头的弹道导弹 当被问及在核危机最初展开的几十秒到几十分钟内到底会发生什么时，安妮阐述了那套极度冰冷、快速运转的军事程序。红外预警卫星在几秒钟内捕捉到导弹点火尾焰后，地面超级计算机便开始以极高速度测算弹道轨迹。军方高层此时会争分夺秒地联络国家指挥中枢，行内将这个催促总统做决定的紧张程序称作“让蓝色时钟运转起来”（Get the blue clock running），因为军官们唯一要对最高统帅说的话就是：“长官，您必须立刻选择一种反击方案。” 弹道导弹一旦离架点火升空，在物理和程序设计上没有任何自毁机制，也绝不可能被召回或重定航向，其杀伤路径是绝对不可逆的。然而，五角大楼为了防止发生系统虚警或仪器误判，严格遵循“双重确认原则”（Dual Phenomenology）：天基卫星看到闪光还不够，必须等待地面大型预警雷达建立雷达波反射锁定。在安妮推演的情景中，位于阿拉斯加的预警雷达基地将在导弹升空后的第 8 到第 9 分钟左右完成二次物理探测确认。在此之前，大约在导弹升空的第 3 分钟，总统就会被紧急接入简报专线，面临一生中最恐怖的数分钟决策期。 - **不可逆物理特性**：现役弹道导弹不具备飞行途中自毁或召回能力，一旦发射即全速飞向预设靶点。 - **蓝色时钟（Blue Clock）**：军方在检测到核打击迹象时启动的不可逆倒计时程序，专用于催促总统选定报复打击打击包。 - **双重现象验证**：美国预警系统强制要求由红外天基光学传感器与陆基超视距雷达提供互为佐证的独立探测数据。 --- ### [47:36](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=asmaLnhaFiY&t=2856s) 白宫角力：特勤局与军方指挥链的武装冲突 当弹道导弹逼近华盛顿特区或美国东海岸时，白宫内部立刻陷入了一场职责冲突导致的死锁。安妮采访了前特勤局局长，揭示了鲜为人知的内幕机制。特勤局内部有一支受过全套特种作战训练的重装准军事部队——反恐突击队（Counter Assault Team, CAT）。他们的宪法誓词和职业本能只有一条：在任何毁灭性威胁下无条件保全总统的肉体生命。 军方指挥高层和参谋长联席会议极其渴望让总统保持在安全通信指挥线路上，以便从他的“黑色核公文包”（Black Book）中获取反击代号和核授权密码，因为按照法律，除了合众国总统，没有任何人能合法下达发动核反击的命令。然而，特勤局的逻辑截然相反：绝不能让总统留在核爆零点附近哪怕多一秒钟。安妮指出，在真实场景中特勤局将彻底打破军方的政治盘算，因为“他们是当时那个房间里唯一全副武装的人”。特勤局特工会强行接管现场，架起总统冲出西翼草坪，直接登上总统专用直升机“海军陆战队一号”（Marine One）逃离华盛顿。 --- ### [49:08](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=asmaLnhaFiY&t=2948s) 电磁脉冲、空中坠机与白宫的应急跳伞方案 “海军陆战队一号”并非安全的避风港。一旦核弹头在目标上空或附近引爆，核裂变与聚变反应释放的瞬发高能射线将引发剧烈的电磁脉冲（EMP）。安妮向主持人打了个比方：“想象一下你家住宅遭遇雷暴的直接雷击，而且室内完全没有任何防浪涌保护器——整栋房子的所有电路板和微芯片瞬间全部报废、彻底归零。”核爆自带的三相电磁脉冲波会在方圆数英里至数十英里内瞬时摧毁一切未受强防护的半导体电路与飞行控制计算机。 即便“海军陆战队一号”在改装时加装了防 EMP 的机壳屏蔽与冗余加固，但也仅仅在地面模拟舱中受测过，没有任何人敢保证它在真实的多波段核爆 EMP 轰击下还能平稳悬停。如果直升机在飞出华盛顿 7 到 10 英里的低空突遭飞控瘫痪，势必发生灾难性坠毁。特勤局老练特工向安妮透露了一套令人倒吸凉气的绝密底线方案： - **双人携行伞降（Tandem Jump）**：特勤局特工会将总统用高强度安全索死死绑在自己胸前，在直升机失去升力坠毁前破门盲跳。 - **关键陪同人员撤离**：手提黑色核足球、掌管全部打击代码的总统军事助理（Military Aide）以及总统警卫特勤处主管必须同时配备伞具一同跳出。 - **致命的荒谬细节**：“海军陆战队一号”机舱内日常并不存放战术降落伞。当空袭警报拉响、留给特工只有短短两三分钟的当口，特勤局特工必须一路狂奔穿过白宫走廊，前往白宫行政办公室临时搜寻并带出伞具。 这种极致的荒诞与忙乱将官方所谓“一切尽在掌握、核威慑确保永不爆发核战”的宣传神话撕得粉碎，展现在真实危机面前的完全是纯粹的混乱与失序。 --- ### [51:46](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=asmaLnhaFiY&t=3106s) 绝对官僚主义下的死手按键：通用解锁代码 核指挥与控制系统（NC3）的设计充斥着严苛的官僚逻辑与技术偏执。安妮指出，如果总统在战备状态下选定了预设反击方案，假如下达的指令是发射 82 枚核弹头，由于发射控制系统内部逻辑的高度刚性，前线发射井和弹道导弹核潜艇绝对发射不了第 83 枚。多发一枚导弹都需要层层上报重新输入动态密码，但在全面核打击留给决策者仅仅几分钟的窗口期内，这种程序化冗余是致命的。 此时便牵扯出核战指挥链路中最令人不寒而栗的机密节点——“通用解锁代码”（Universal Unlock Code）。如果总统来不及下达全面反击指令，或者在下达部分打击指令后飞机坠毁、肉体死亡，美国核力量是否会陷入群龙无首的瘫痪？ - **战略司令部授权**：美国战略司令部（STRATCOM）司令可以预先获得总统发放的通用解锁代码。 - **越过总统权力的终极发射**：该代码实质上是对国家最高军事将领的彻底放权。它意味着只要最高统帅死亡或失联，战略司令部司令便拥有了越过官僚系统核对流程的权限，可以自主下令发射“第 83 枚、甚至一直发射到第 5000 枚核弹头”。 - 这一制度设置在防止敌方“斩首行动”的同时，也事实上将人类终极毁灭的生杀大权移交到了一名职业军官手中。 --- ### [53:23](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=asmaLnhaFiY&t=3203s) 疯王与大洪水：为何首发假想敌定为朝鲜？ 在探讨核战 72 分钟的灾难性连锁反应时，主持人追问为什么在书中的推演脚本里，第一枚打向美国本土的导弹来自朝鲜。安妮表示，这套设定来自她对物理学泰斗理查德·加温（Richard Garwin）长达数小时的深入访谈。加温是人类历史上第一枚热核武器（氢弹）的实际物理构造设计者，曾协助爱德华·泰勒（Edward Teller）完成了划时代的武器研制，他是美国国家侦察局（NRO）的联合创始人，并且自艾森豪威尔总统时代起，为历任美国总统就核武器与绝密国家安全事务提供咨询，其权威地位无可替代。 当已逾九旬高龄的加温被问及当下最让他夜不能寐的核噩梦是什么时，加温并没有点名具体地缘摩擦，而是抛出了一个充满末日隐喻的意象：“疯王”（The Mad King）。加温在交谈中引用了一句著名的法语名言： > “在我死后，哪怕洪水滔天。”（*Après moi, le déluge.*） 加温深刻地指出，最可怕的不是大国之间依靠理性计算和相互保证毁灭（MAD）维系的脆弱均势，而是手握真正洲际核武库的专制暴君。当独裁统治者在政权崩塌或面临生命终局时，完全可能产生“既然我要毁灭，拉上整个世界陪葬又何妨”的病态狂热。安妮正是根据这名热核武器先驱的洞察，在推演中将行事风格极难捉摸、频繁公开试射远程弹道导弹的有核国家朝鲜，设定为推倒人类文明多米诺骨牌的第一张致命推手。 ### [55:21](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=asmaLnhaFiY&t=3321s) 朝鲜试射的惊弓之鸟与反击的致命地理缺陷 在常规的大国核博弈中存在一种不成文的默契：任何国家在试射装有模拟弹头的洲际弹道导弹（ICBM）时，都会提前通报周边国家，以避免战略误判。然而，朝鲜完全无视这一规则。Annie Jacobsen 指出，从2022年起的18个月内，朝鲜密集试射了100多枚弹道导弹。对于驻守在深层地下指挥与控制地堡里的美军军官而言，每一次监测到发射信号，最初的100秒都是难以忍受的极度焦虑——军方完全无法预判这枚导弹是要攻击本土、发射太空卫星，还是仅仅落入日本海。这种完全不受规则约束的特立独行，使朝鲜成为了不可预测的极度危险源。 在她构建的核战争推演场景中，危机正是由此类误判引爆。在遭到朝鲜的突袭后，美国总统下达了核反击命令，向朝鲜境内发射82枚核导弹。然而，真正的全球灾难并不止于朝美之间，而是源于极其致命的“沟通失败”与“技术地理死局”。这一推演情节均有五角大楼解密档案与军方专家的严谨背书：受限于地球曲率与弹道射程，从美国本土陆基发射井打向朝鲜的洲际弹道导弹，最短路径必须从俄罗斯领空上空飞越。 在美俄敌对情绪处于历史最高点的紧张时刻，俄罗斯的导弹预警雷达屏幕上骤然出现数十枚扑面而来的美国核导弹。俄罗斯总统根本不可能赌这些导弹只是借道飞往朝鲜。按照既定的核威慑条约与“预警即发射”的既定作战条例，当雷达显示有核打击逼近时，唯一的应对机制就是发起毁灭性的核反击。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 朝鲜导弹危机引发的误判连锁反应 accDescr: 展示美国反击朝鲜的导弹因必须飞越俄罗斯领空而引发美俄全面核战的逻辑链条 subgraph Phase1 ["第一阶段：突袭与反击"] A["朝鲜突击发射核弹<br/>(无预警试射常态化)"] --> B["美国总统下令全面反击<br/>(发射82枚洲际导弹)"] end subgraph Phase2 ["第二阶段：地理限制与预警误判"] B --> C["美军ICBM射程受限<br/>弹道必须飞越俄罗斯领空"] C --> D["俄罗斯早期预警雷达报警<br/>无法分辨目标是朝鲜还是俄本土"] end subgraph Phase3 ["第三阶段：连锁毁灭"] D --> E["俄方启动核威慑预警发射机制"] E --> F["俄罗斯倾巢发动核反击<br/>核末日于第72分钟降临"] end ``` --- ### [57:42](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=asmaLnhaFiY&t=3462s) “疯王逻辑”与大国核威慑的倾巢而出 面对扑面而来的导弹，任何大国都不会选择只回敬一两枚核弹。Annie 解释称，只发射一两枚导弹去冒险挑衅的行为属于“疯王逻辑”（mad king logic）。在她的推演中，正是朝鲜那位隐去姓名的最高领导人凭着不可理喻的“疯王逻辑”下达了首发攻击命令；而大国永远无法探究他究竟为何要这么做，因为在导弹发射后的短短72分钟内，整个人类文明与书写历史的能力就彻底终结了。 与不可捉摸的“疯王逻辑”完全相反，美国国防部与俄罗斯核指挥体系所奉行的是高度理性但极端冷酷的军事逻辑。这种逻辑历经79年冷战与后冷战的严密推演：核威慑的核心就是确保相互毁灭。一旦确认本土遭受核攻击，战略条令要求指挥官必须立即“倾巢而出”（launch the mother lode），将所有可用的战略核打击力量悉数释放，在己方核设施被彻底抹平前彻底摧毁对方全部工业与军事中枢。在书中的第二幕，推演以每24分钟为一个阶段层层递进，直至俄罗斯将整套核武库倾泻至美国本土。 - **历史书写能力的终结**：自首枚核弹升空起，全球毁灭推演仅持续72分钟，整个人类文明与历史记录在此刻画上句号。 - **威慑逻辑的悖论**：维持了79年和平的“相互保证毁灭”（MAD）机制，一旦触发就没有任何降级或挽回的余地，必须全弹齐发。 --- ### [59:03](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=asmaLnhaFiY&t=3543s) 击落核弹的幻想：44枚拦截弹对抗1600枚核弹头 大众普遍存有一种天真的心理安慰：“难道我们不能直接在天上把它打下来吗？”Annie 明确指出，这纯粹是一种致命的幻想与认知谬误。从双方部署的核武库规模来看： - **美国战备核弹头**：拥有约1,770枚处于随时可发射状态（deployed / ready for launch）的核武器，可在数秒、数分钟内升空（轰炸机部队需要一到两小时）。 - **俄罗斯战备核弹头**：大致处于对等态势，拥有约1,674枚处于待发状态的战略核武器。 - **战略储备**：双方各自还有数千枚核弹头存放在后备军械库中。 而面对可能从俄罗斯或朝鲜飞来的远程洲际弹道导弹，美国唯一的本土防御防线是陆基中段防御系统（GMD），全国仅有屈指可数的 **44枚拦截导弹**： - **加利福尼亚州范登堡空军基地（Vandenberg Space Force Base）**：部署4枚。 - **阿拉斯加州格里利堡（Fort Greely）**：部署40枚。 用44枚拦截弹去迎战1,674枚战备核弹，在数量上就如同螳臂当车。雪上加霜的是分导式多弹头（MIRV）技术的存在：一枚洲际导弹在太空中会释放出多个独立核弹头以及大量难以辨识的金属气球、诱饵假目标，使防御雷达与拦截弹彻底失去焦点。 五角大楼发言人曾向 Annie 形象地形容这种拦截行动：“这相当于用一颗子弹去击落另一颗子弹。”洲际弹道导弹在弹道中段的时速高达 14,000 英里（约 22,500 公里/小时），而拦截导弹内置的动能杀伤飞行器（EKV）以 20,000 英里（约 32,000 公里/小时）的时速迎头对撞，整个碰撞发生在距离地表 500 英里的外太空。即便在预先知情、参数完全校准、毫无实战压力的“精心编排测试”（curated test）中，这套系统的成功率也仅仅在 40% 到 55% 之间。在真正的核突袭狂乱时刻，根本不可能指望它拯救国家。 --- ### [01:01:58](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=asmaLnhaFiY&t=3718s) 毁灭的地狱图景、核冬天与“幸存者羡慕死者” 如果有人站在幸存的角落目睹核弹落下的瞬间，眼前将是一片纯粹的人间炼狱。推演中击中五角大楼的首枚核弹当量为 100 万吨（1 megaton），其破坏参数全部来自于国防部科学家数十年的测试解密档案： 1. **热辐射闪光**：起爆瞬间的火球核心温度高达 1.8 亿华氏度（约 1 亿摄氏度），在直径 9 英里的范围内，所有暴露的易燃物与人体瞬间自燃。 2. **超音速冲击波与气压墙**：如同巨型推土机推平半径数英里内的所有钢筋混凝土建筑。 3. **超级大火风暴（Megafire）**：崩塌引爆管道与化学品，每处爆点都会形成覆盖 100 到 200 平方英里的超级大火。 到了第72分钟，当上千枚俄罗斯核弹在全美各城市与发射井相继爆炸，整片大陆连成一片火海。随之而来的便是漫长致命的“核冬天”。Annie 专门采访了1983年与卡尔·萨根（Carl Sagan）共同发表核冬天开创性论文的布莱恩·图恩教授（Professor Brian Toon）。图恩教授数十年来利用当今最顶尖的超级计算机气候模型证实：数百万吨浓烟与黑碳被火风暴送入平流层，遮蔽全球阳光，导致全球农业绝收与极寒降临。 面对主持人“如果身在纽约被瞬间汽化，是不是反而死得毫无痛苦”的提问，Annie 引用了前苏联领导人赫鲁晓夫的名言：“核战爆发后，幸存者将羡慕死者。”前联邦紧急事务管理局（FEMA）局长 Craig Fugate 也直言，所有社会契约、法律体系和政府组织将在瞬间荡然无存。即便有军方高官躲入绝密地下地堡，那些掩体也只能依靠柴油发电机维持运转；当燃油耗尽，幸存者被迫走出地表时，面对的将是退化到原始暴力状态、为仅存物资残忍厮杀的人群，每个人都在遭受严重辐射病、营养不良以及失去所有亲友的巨大绝望中痛苦挣扎。 主持人随后念出了书中第277页那段令人窒息的终局白描： > “一千道强光将每个爆芯投影点的空气加热至 1.8 亿华氏度；一千个直径超过一英里的巨大火球；一千道陡峭突进的冲击波与压缩空气之墙；一千座美国城镇在五到七英里半径内所有的工程建筑扭曲变形、粉碎坍塌并陷入烈火；一千座城镇的沥青街道化为滚烫熔岩；一千座城镇里幸存者被高速横飞的建筑残骸活活贯穿；一千座城镇堆满了数以千万计的死者，以及承受致命三度烧伤、衣不蔽体、皮肉撕裂、流血窒息的绝望幸存者。” ### [01:06:23](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=asmaLnhaFiY&t=3983s) 72分钟后的灭顶之灾：全球50亿人将死于饥荒 在核战争爆发的短短72分钟之内，跨越美洲与欧洲大陆，数以亿计的人将在核爆的火球中瞬间丧生或奄奄一息。空中，数百架幸存的军用飞机在失去地面指令和基地的绝望中盘旋，直至燃油耗尽坠毁。面对如此令人战栗的画面，主持人询问在最初的这短短72分钟过后，究竟会有多少人死亡。安妮·雅各布森指出，毫无疑问，数亿人会在第一波核爆火球与直接冲击中灰飞烟灭，但更具毁灭性的数字来自环境与气候科学家的最新模型。 科罗拉多大学博尔德分校的大气科学家布莱恩·图恩教授（Brian Toon）及其团队在2022年于《自然》（Nature）期刊上发表了一项权威研究，从粮食系统崩溃的维度更新了核冬天的灾难推演。图恩教授的研究表明，在一场全面的核战争爆发后，全球预计将有50亿人死于随之而来的大饥荒。目前全球人口约为80亿，这意味着在最初的狂轰滥炸和漫长严寒之后，最终将只有大约30亿人能够在废墟中残存。 - **直接伤亡**：数亿人在核爆炸产生的火球和冲击波中即刻丧生。 - **核冬天模型（2022年《Nature》论文）**：全球约50亿人将因农业崩溃和食物短缺而活活饿死。 - **幸存者规模**：全球80亿现存人口中，仅剩约30亿人存活。 --- ### [01:07:32](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=asmaLnhaFiY&t=4052s) 地球上的避难角落：新西兰、澳大利亚与地下求生 面对这残存的30亿人生还概率，主持人好奇地询问如果真爆发核战，逃往哪里才能活命，并提到自己十天前正身处新西兰和澳大利亚，当时恰逢伊朗对以色列发动报复性袭击，推特上甚至冲上了“第三次世界大战”的热搜趋势，他当时还特地调出地图查看自己与冲突核心区的地理距离。安妮证实，图恩教授的研究清楚地指出，新西兰和澳大利亚正是全球极少数能够在核冬天中继续维持基本农业生产的地方。图恩教授曾慷慨地向安妮分享了用于授课的幻灯片资料，直观揭示了战后地球的凄惨景象。 在核爆将数百万吨烟尘送入平流层后，全球大部分中纬度地区将被厚厚的冰层覆盖。像美国爱荷华州以及乌克兰这样著名的粮仓，整整十年时间都将被冰雪彻底封冻，农作物无法生长，农业体系彻底瓦解，饥荒随之吞噬人口。雪上加霜的是，臭氧层遭到极其剧烈的破坏，阳光中的致命紫外线与辐射将让人类无法在白天的户外暴露，幸存者被迫退入暗无天日的地下地穴中互相抢夺残存的口粮。图恩教授将此场景比作6600万年前一颗小行星撞击地球灭绝恐龙及70%已知物种的灾难。前联邦紧急事务管理局（FEMA）局长克雷格·富盖特（Craig Fugate）也表达过类似的看法。但安妮强调，小行星撞击是天灾，人类如今无能为力；而核战争纯粹是“人造的威胁”，因此也必须依靠“人造的解决方案”。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 核战争导致全球农业崩溃与地下求生机制 accDescr: 展示核爆炸如何通过平流层烟尘破坏气候与臭氧层，进而导致中纬度冰封和地下生存争夺。 subgraph Atmosphere["大气与气候层毁伤"] A["核爆大火引发全球烟尘"] --> B["阻隔阳光进入中纬度冰封"] A --> C["臭氧层遭受毁灭性破坏"] end subgraph Impact["地表生存危机"] B --> D["乌克兰与爱荷华等粮仓冰冻10年"] D --> E["全球农业全面瘫痪"] C --> F["致命紫外线阻断地表活动"] end subgraph Consequence["人类社会后果"] E --> G["全球50亿人死于饥荒"] F --> H["幸存者转入地下求生争夺食物"] G -. 极少数例外.-> I["新西兰与澳大利亚维持有限农业"] end ``` --- ### [01:10:07](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=asmaLnhaFiY&t=4207s) 人造危机的解药：里根总统与《浩劫后》的启示 既然核战争是人为设定的毁灭机制，那么解决方案也掌握在人类手中。安妮坚信人能够激发并改变其他人，而美国总统拥有极大的权力——正如总统享有“总统单一权力”可以在数分钟内发起核战争一样，他也拥有一支能签署行政命令（Executive Order）的强力签字笔。安妮讲述了一个极具历史启发性且充满希望的真实故事：1983年，当她还在上高中时，ABC电视台播出了一部名为《浩劫后》（The Day After）的电视电影，以极为直观和恐怖的手法展现了美苏爆发核战争后的毁灭惨象。 当时全美有近1亿观众收看了这部影片，几乎占到了当时美国人口的一半。罗纳德·里根总统不顾幕僚的劝阻，在戴维营独自观看了这部影片。此前，里根是一个不折不扣的核鹰派，坚定主张“核武器越多越好”，并力推包括“星球大战计划”（战略防御倡议 SDI）在内的太空军事化与绝对核威慑。然而，看完《浩劫后》后，里根在白宫日记中坦言自己陷入了“极度沮丧”。深受震撼的他主动接触苏联领导人戈尔巴乔夫，随后促成了著名的冰岛雷克雅未克峰会。两位大国领袖达成了历史性共识并发表联合声明：“核战争打不赢，也绝不能打。”（A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.） 正是在这种基于恐慌与清醒认知的对话推动下，全球核弹头库存从1986年历史巅峰的约70,000枚，逐步削减到如今的大约12,500枚。当被主持人问及“人类是否真的能将核武削减到零”时，安妮谦逊地表示，这需要交给专业的军备控制与裁军专家来回答。她刚受邀参加布鲁塞尔的一个核博览会，与欧洲议会议员及深耕核裁军数十年的专家们进行了深入交流。安妮认为自己的职责是充当一名调查记者和故事讲述者，用极具画面感与紧迫感的方式呈现真相，然后将接力棒传递给那些终身为防核扩散而奋斗的专业人士。 - **1983年电视电影《浩劫后》**：全美1亿人观看，彻底扭转了里根总统的核战略立场。 - **雷克雅未克峰会成果**：全球核武库从1986年的峰值70,000枚锐减至目前的约12,500枚。 - **历史性联合声明**：“核战争打不赢，也绝不能打。” --- ### [01:14:02](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=asmaLnhaFiY&t=4442s) 从写下首字到完稿：冷峻纪实与“阴谋论”的迷思 谈到《核战情景》这本书的写作心境演变，安妮坦言，作为专业记者，她将主要精力集中在严谨核实事实并将其转化为极具可读性的叙事上。她的丈夫凯文常对她说：“你写出来的书必须是让人能在海滩或飞机上读得下去的。”对于充斥着死亡与冷血毁灭逻辑的核武器题材而言，这尤为艰难。安妮选择将全书结构定为从“发射核弹到核冬天降临”的极速倒计时，用紧凑的情节牢牢抓住读者。身为一位母亲，她骨子里怀揣着希望，坚信人类不必永远生活在这柄悬顶之剑的阴影下。在写作过程中，她刻意收敛个人的感伤，将恐惧与危机感压入字里行间的潜台词中，只专注于用客观冷峻的笔触推演下一页的进程。 主持人指出，安妮迄今已经出版了七本书，涵盖了51区、回形针行动、五角大楼、中情局以及核武器等，而这些主题恰好是民间诸多“阴谋论”的核心土壤。能够亲自采访接触这些机密项目的内幕核心人物，赋予了安妮极其独特的视角。当被问及有哪些事情是她曾经以为只是荒诞的阴谋论、后来却证实是真实存在的时，安妮指出，“阴谋论”（conspiracy theory）是一个被过度滥用且饱含偏见的词汇，往往被当成一种粗暴打压大众好奇心的工具。她认为好奇心是无比宝贵的，它能驱动人们去阅读书籍、收听播客，主动探索未知以武装自己的心智。 ### [01:17:08](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=asmaLnhaFiY&t=4628s) 从“阴谋论”标签到解密真相：51区的秘密过往 将难以解释或耸人听闻的事情一概斥为“阴谋论”（conspiracy theory），在安妮·雅各布森（Annie Jacobsen）看来是一种思想上的惰性与自以为是（"intellectually thin"、"very self-righteous"）。她坦言自己在调研中总会遇到形形色色自命不凡的“万事通”（know-it-alls）——那些在特定领域深耕多年却觉得自己未受足够重视的专家，极易产生某种道德优越感。而真正驱动雅各布森本人的，始终是对核心问题的探究欲：为什么有些事情被严密封锁？为什么当年大众对“51区”（Area 51）一无所知？ 雅各布森透露了一个惊人的细节：当年她开始着手撰写《51区》一书时，“51区”这个词本身依然属于最高机密。当她前往中央情报局（CIA）采访时，陪同官员曾严厉警告她，如果敢说出“某个特定的词和数字”，就会立刻被逐出大楼。直到后来奥巴马总统在公开演讲中随口提到了这个代号，美国政府才正式解密了该地点的存在。雅各布森的工作正是切入大众文化与时代思潮中那些扑朔迷离的焦点，拨开谣言与神秘主义的迷雾，还原其中的真伪。 主持人在对话中深有感触地承认，自己过去很长一段时间也对“51区”、CIA特工暗中行动等传闻抱有成见，觉得这些不过是网上那群“头戴锡纸帽”（tin foil hat）的偏执狂编造出来的离奇故事。然而，随着他在播客中接触到越来越多的真实当事人与权威爆料，帷幕被层层拉开，现实甚至比虚构更令人震惊，让他彻底颠覆了既往认知。 --- ### [01:20:04](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=asmaLnhaFiY&t=4804s) 51区与U-2侦察机：一场空难引出的“战略欺骗” 面对主持人的追问，雅各布森明确表示，现实中确实有太多看似荒诞却确凿无疑的黑幕，而理解这些黑幕的关键在于掌握CIA的核心操作法则——“战略欺骗”（strategic deception）。20世纪50年代冷战初期，CIA为了侦察苏联是否正在暗中准备打核战争，急需一种能突破防空网的高空侦察手段，于是在极度保密的51区研制出了U-2高空侦察机。 这种侦察机能在70,000英尺的高空巡航，完全超出当时地对空导弹的拦截范围。雅各布森曾亲自采访过第一位驾驶U-2飞越苏联领空的飞行员赫维·斯托克曼（Hervey Stockman）。斯托克曼携带CIA特制的巨型湿板胶卷相机，飞临苏联军事基地上空秘密拍摄，为美国情报界带回了关于苏联地面军力的真实一手画面。在当时，这项绝密工程仅有总统等极少数核心层知情，而与51区仅有一界之隔的23区（Area 23），正不断进行着震耳欲聋的地下核武器试验。 在采访负责制造U-2的技术团队时，首席工程师之一鲍勃·墨菲（Bob Murphy）向雅各布森讲述了一段险死还生的真实经历： - 工程师们平时驻扎在被称为“牧场”（The Ranch）的51区基地，每到周末便搭乘专线穿梭机飞回加州伯班克（Burbank）与家人团聚。 - 一次周末前夕，一向滴酒不沾的墨菲在聚会上罕见地喝得酩酊大醉，次日清晨竟然睡过头错过了班机。 - 墨菲惊恐万分，以为自己要因为纪律问题被解雇，不料刚打开房门准备去认错，门外赫然站着一位正准备敲门的FBI特工。 - 那位特工见到墨菲后“脸色煞白如鬼”——因为墨菲的名字白纸黑字写在机组名单上，而那架搭载着U-2全部顶尖核心工程师、设计师与飞行员的穿梭机，已在途中惨烈撞毁在查尔斯顿山（Mount Charleston），机上人员全军覆没。 --- ### [01:23:07](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=asmaLnhaFiY&t=4987s) 掩护与虚假信息：情报机构如何操控叙事 这场空难瞬间将CIA推入万劫不复的危机深渊。一个汇聚了国家最绝密侦察机核心人才的班底突然全体遇难，各大电视台与媒体记者像闻到血腥味的鲨鱼一样，疯狂向查尔斯顿山坠机现场涌去。一旦U-2项目的蛛丝马迹泄露给苏联，整个数十亿美元的间谍项目就将彻底付诸东流。 雅各布森查阅了这起事件的全部解密档案，记录显示中情局高层当时陷入了极度恐慌，紧急拉设警戒线进行灾后控制。然而，奇迹般的转机却不期而至：媒体为了抢先报道，自行脑补编造了一套说辞，声称这架坠毁飞机上坐的是“一批正在为绝密新武器工作的原子能科学家”。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 战略欺骗的两大分支 accDescr: 展示CIA战略欺骗策略中掩护与虚假信息的运作方式 subgraph SD["战略欺骗 Strategic Deception"] direction TB C["掩护 (Cover)<br/>主动建立假身份掩盖真相"] D["虚假信息 (Disinformation)<br/>顺水推舟散布或利用假消息转移视线"] end subgraph Case["查尔斯顿山坠机实例"] direction TB C1["鲍勃·墨菲向家人谎称：<br/>在偏远基地维修电视系统"] D1["媒体自发脑补假新闻：<br/>遇难者是一群'原子能科学家'"] end C --> C1 D --> D1 ``` 中情局见状大喜过望，索性顺水推舟，任由媒体大肆渲染原子弹科学家的假故事。雅各布森借此拆解了“战略欺骗”的两条核心路径： - **掩护（Cover）**：个体或机构为隐藏秘密而编造的常规日常借口。例如鲍勃·墨菲对妻子隐瞒自己在造间谍飞机，只说自己是去基地“鼓捣一些电视系统工程”。 - **虚假信息（Disinformation）**：向公众与媒体投放或利用错误的叙事，使外部注意力偏离真正的核心秘密。 雅各布森提醒道，许多进入公众视野的热门信息背后往往带着精心的意图，CIA非常擅长借力打力。面对疑云时，调查者绝不能凭空臆想阴谋，而必须保持理性，用严密的事实和解密证据去还原被遮掩的真正历史。 --- ### [01:25:01](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=asmaLnhaFiY&t=5101s) CIA、媒体操控与MKUltra精神控制计划 当被问及英国军情六处（MI6）或美国CIA这类情报机关是否会系统性地与媒体合作时，雅各布森直言“这完全可以单开一整期播客”。她指出，虽然自己主要聚焦美国情报体系，但翻开历史，CIA长期招募、渗透并联手各大媒体记者、专栏作家与出版人散播定向信息的行为是板上钉钉的事实，“在我看来，中情局几乎没有什么手段是没有用过的”。 雅各布森提到了她在《五角大楼的大脑》（*The Pentagon's Brain*）一书中详尽披露的冷战黑幕——“洗脑”（brainwashing）与著名的“MKUltra计划”（Project MKUltra）： - 20世纪50年代，冷战对抗白热化，精神控制与洗脑实验应运而生，其真实残忍程度令人发指。 - 尽管某些极端阴谋论者给MKUltra蒙上了过于离奇的神话色彩，但其核心的邪恶人体实验、致幻剂利用与心理摧残都是被档案证实的客观事实。 - 这段暗黑历史还交织着令人唏嘘的人性悲剧：当时执掌中情局的局长艾伦·杜勒斯（Allen Dulles），其亲生儿子在朝鲜战争中头部遭受重创导致脑损伤。雅各布森曾历尽周折找到了杜勒斯的儿子并进行了当面采访，挖掘出冷战高层在国家秘密实验与家庭创伤之间纠缠一生的惊人内幕。 ### [01:27:02](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=asmaLnhaFiY&t=5222s) 中情局（CIA）的双重面貌：情报分析与准军事行动 主持人谈到最近曾邀请前情报官员安德鲁（Andrew Bustamante）做客节目，探讨了中央情报局（CIA）内部的运作机制。安德鲁当时提到，CIA 的角色随着时代发生了显著变化：曾经的 CIA 能力更强、行动权限更广，而如今似乎权力和行事范围受到了更多约束，不再像外界过去所指控的那样能为所欲为——历史上甚至有人指控 CIA 参与过暗杀美国总统的阴谋。主持人随即向安妮·雅各布森提问：CIA 是否直接向总统汇报？它的真实能力究竟如何？ 安妮·雅各布森指出，CIA 几乎贯穿了她撰写的每一本书。对于该机构最透彻、全面的剖析见于她的著作《突袭、斩杀、消失》（*Surprise, Kill, Vanish*），该书聚焦于 CIA 的准军事部队（Paramilitary）。安妮解释称，在完成该书的深入调查后，她意识到外界口中的“CIA”实际上包含两个性质截然不同的核心分支： 1. **传统中央情报局**：以人力情报（HUMINT）、情报分析员（Analysts）和间谍活动（Espionage）为主体。 2. **准军事组织（Paramilitary）**：成立于 1947 年，其初衷是为了对抗苏联克格勃（KGB）同类型的暗中破坏机构。这支力量负责执行最黑暗、最肮脏、最下作的绝密任务，在当时冷战的逻辑下，“因为苏联人在做，所以我们必须也有能力做”。 安妮强调，CIA 是一个触角遍布各处的庞大巨兽。在《51区》（*Area 51*）中，她记录了 CIA 在空中侦察、科学与技术研发方面的深厚积淀——例如主导了人类历史上第一颗侦察卫星“日冕计划”（Corona program），她为此采访了该项目的关键科学家巴德·惠伦博士（Dr. Bud Wheelon）；而在准军事端，则活跃着被戏称为“吃蛇者”（snake eaters）的精锐行动人员。这些特工负责执行军方所谓的“发现、锁定、消灭”（Find, Fix, and Finish）行动——安妮直接点破这只是军方暗杀任务的委婉说法。正因该机构跨度极大、分支繁复，安妮表示自己在讨论时一向坚持就事论事、针对具体的行动项目进行拆解，因为这是还原真相、避免落入阴谋论的最佳方式。 --- ### [01:30:36](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=asmaLnhaFiY&t=5436s) 人工智能与战争机器的起源：从冯·诺依曼到五角大楼的算力革命 主持人将话题转向人工智能（AI）与核战争交织的风险。主持人指出，在安妮撰写关于核战争的书籍期间，通用人工智能（AGI）的讨论呈爆发式增长。如果未来人类走向自主决策系统，甚至有 DeepMind 和 Google 的专家提到未来决策者可能会与 AI 深度绑定、协同决策，这引发了极大的隐忧：在决定是否发射核武器的生死时刻，是由像乔·拜登这样的民选人类总统来做决断更好，还是交给某种超越人类理解极限的先进人工智能更合理？ 安妮表示，她在专门探讨美国国防高等研究计划署（DARPA）的著作《五角大楼的大脑》（*The Pentagon's Brain*）中对 AI 进行了详尽研究。她借用莎士比亚的名言“凡是过往，皆为序章”（What is past is prologue），指出若想脚踏实地、不受浮夸科幻概念误导地理解“AI 与核武的未来”，就必须回顾其最初的诞生史： ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: AI 与军事计算技术演进史 accDescr: 展示从二战时期的人工计算到早期计算机、人机交互，再到自主战场决策的技术发展脉络。 subgraph Phase1["1940年代：从人工到机器"] A["二战时期：人工计算员<br/>(拿着铅笔算弹道与爆炸当量)"] B["埃尼阿克 (ENIAC) 与<br/>约翰·冯·诺依曼提出软件构想"] A --> B end subgraph Phase2["冷战突破：超越人脑与微型化"] C["普林斯顿高等研究院地下室测试<br/>(真空管计算机首次击败冯·诺依曼)"] D["国防部与利克莱德 (J.C.R. Licklider)<br/>(人机交互：计算机体积从整座房屋缩至房间大小)"] B --> C C --> D end subgraph Phase3["1980年代：战场自主化构想"] E["1983年 DARPA 战略计算计划<br/>('战场不属于人类'，机器人与AI雏形立项)"] D --> E end ``` - **二战时期的“计算机”（Computers）曾是活生生的人**：在计算机变成机器之前，这个词指的是坐在桌前用纸笔计算炸弹弹道、核爆当量的人工计算员。 - **约翰·冯·诺依曼（John von Neumann）的软件构想**：战后，被称为五角大楼“大脑”的冯·诺依曼向当时全球权柄最盛的原子能委员会（AEC）提议，制造一台能够自主思考的机器。当时主流的计算方式如同巨大的德州仪器计算器（纯硬件计算），而冯·诺依曼开创性地提出“将大脑装入计算器”——即现代软件与存储程序的概念。 - **人类智力被击败的历史时刻**：在普林斯顿高等研究院富尔德楼（Fuld Hall）的地下室里，冯·诺依曼搭建了装满发热真空管和电线的巨型计算机器，甚至要防范老鼠啃咬线缆。起初，助手给出复杂的数学算式，冯·诺依曼凭心算就能跑得比机器还快；直到约在 1946 或 1947 年的某一天，这台真空管计算机在运算速度上第一次击败了他本人。那一刻，冯·诺依曼意识到：机器从此比人类更聪明了。 - **国防部驱动的微型化与人机交互**：随后五角大楼投入海量军费，招募了利克莱德（J.C.R. Licklider）等人推动“人机交互”（Man-Computer Interface），将计算机体积从整座房屋压缩到一间办公室，最终促成了纳米技术与现代微型计算机的诞生。 - **1983年的转折性宣言**：到了 1983 年，DARPA 在启动其第一代自主机器人和 AI 研发计划时，明确打出了这句口号——“战场绝非人类容身之所”（The battlefield is no place for humans）。 --- ### [01:36:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=asmaLnhaFiY&t=5760s) ChatGPT 的核末日推演：现实危险还是流行文化的镜像？ 主持人分享了自己的一段真实经历：几个月前他在 ChatGPT 中输入提示词，让其推演一个“人工智能逃脱人类控制并导致世界毁灭”的场景。令主持人不寒而栗的是，ChatGPT 给出的方案仅进行到第三或第四步，就写明 AI 必须夺取部分核弹头的控制权，并将其向其他核大国发射，从而引发连锁毁灭。主持人坦言，亲眼看着 AI 自己把“动用核武器”列为灭绝人类的最优解，感觉这种威胁极其逼真。 面对主持人的担忧，安妮给出了冷静的反驳。她明确表示，这并不代表谁对谁错，而是一场基于技术本质的理性探讨。安妮指出，像 ChatGPT 这样的大语言模型（LLM），其底层逻辑是抓取并聚合人类现有的文本与数据信息。它之所以在短短几步内就选择“AI 控制核武器毁灭人类”，根本原因在于它在训练数据中吸收了大量类似电影《终结者》（*The Terminator*）里的“天网”（Skynet）流行文化叙事。在很大程度上，它展现的不是机器自主产生的可怕动机，而是人类半个世纪以来在流行文化与科幻作品中反复投射的自我恐惧。 ### [01:37:02](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=asmaLnhaFiY&t=5822s) 古老观星术与最先进核武：防范数字劫持的“模拟时代”遗产 在谈及数字时代与人工智能对核系统的潜在威胁时，安妮·雅各布森指出，美国核指挥、控制与通信（NC3）系统中武器终端与指挥链的通信机制属于最高机密，但其核心防御哲学却呈现出一种极为反直觉的“模拟（Analog）”特质。军方之所以在关键系统上刻意保留模拟技术，正是为了防范外界通过网络手段篡改数据或接管控制权。这种看似落后的技术路径，反而是最坚固的防线。 雅各布森以潜射弹道导弹（SLBM）为例，生动勾勒了这一令人震撼的技术反差：一枚足以终结人类文明的核导弹从深海潜艇中发射，破水而出冲入高空，经过助推段、中段飞行与末段弹道直扑目标。然而，在最先进的火箭推进技术背后，导弹的核心制导方式竟然是“观星定位”（Star-sighting）。在飞行中途，导弹弹体上的小型舷窗会向外打开，直接依靠星光测量天体位置来进行航向校准。 这种将几千年前原始猎人仰望星空导航的古老智慧，与现代最具毁灭性的终极杀戮机器结合在一起的现实，带给现场一种荒诞而深邃的震撼。观星无法被黑客入侵，也无法被无线电信号干扰，这正是美国军工系统在数字化浪潮中刻意保留古老手段的真正原因。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 潜射弹道导弹飞行阶段与观星制导 accDescr: 展示潜射弹道导弹从水下发射到末端打击的各阶段，以及中途观星导航的抗干扰特性。 subgraph Launch["发射与突防阶段"] A["水下潜艇点火发射"] --> B["突破海面进入助推段"] B --> C["高空巡航中段飞行"] end subgraph Navigation["无懈可击的天文制导"] C --> D["弹体侧板开启"] D --> E["光学传感器仰望星空观星定位"] E --> F["完全物理隔离：免疫网络劫持与电子干扰"] end subgraph Target["再入与打击阶段"] F --> G["末段弹道精准修正"] G --> H["核弹头命中既定目标"] end ``` - 潜射弹道导弹的标准飞行轨迹包括三大阶段：助推段（Boost phase）、中段飞行（Midcourse phase）与末段再入（Terminal phase）。 - “观星定位”（Star-sighting）是潜射弹道导弹最主要的导航校准手段，通过物理观测天然恒星坐标，杜绝了依赖卫星信号（如 GPS）易被干扰或欺骗的致命漏洞。 --- ### [01:39:35](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=asmaLnhaFiY&t=5975s) AGI 威胁与核武库规模：从 12,500 枚到“归零”的紧迫性 斯蒂芬·巴特利特顺着这个逻辑推演指出，美国或许能靠模拟系统抵御黑客，但全世界共有九到十个拥核国家，各国的控制系统水准参差不齐。如果未来人类迎来通用人工智能（AGI）乃至技术奇点（Singularity），诞生出一个思维速度与广度远超人类的新智慧生命体，它眼中的人类控制系统可能宛如儿戏。比如面对朝鲜等技术防护相对薄弱的核国家，AGI 完全有可能轻而易举地注入一段“虚拟演练数据”（如同冷战时期 NORAD 误播训练磁带的事故），欺骗对方最高层误以为遭到突袭，从而诱发核弹发射。 雅各布森深表赞同，并指出这正是人类必须严肃讨论“核武器归零”（Global Zero）的根本理由。当今世界仍有约 12,500 枚核弹头，虽然相较于冷战巅峰时期的 70,000 枚已有大幅削减，但在日益逼近的强人工智能与自动化战争背景下，这一存量依然庞大到难以承受任何单点故障。雅各布森强调，自己撰写《核战争：场景预案》的初衷，正是希望年轻一代的思想领袖和公众能够带着对新技术的敬畏，重新推动核裁军政策的讨论。 - 冷战高峰时期全球核弹头储备曾超过 70,000 枚，目前全球保有量约为 12,500 枚。 - 自动化与人工智能技术的下沉，使得核反击误判的风险呈指数级上升，任何非对称的技术漏洞都可能被超人类智能（AGI）瞬间击穿。 --- ### [01:40:55](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=asmaLnhaFiY&t=6055s) 乐观主义与“疯王”悖论：核战争的数学概率 当被问及骨子里是否是一个乐观主义者、人类未来是否注定会爆发核战争时，雅各布森坦言自己天性积极乐观。她写这本书并非为了宣扬末日宿命，而是坚信“人为制造的问题，必有人为的解决之道”（A man-made problem has a man-made solution）。然而，巴特利特从数学概率的角度提出了尖锐的反驳：核战争或许属于“高代价、低概率”事件，但随着时间推移，在未来五百年甚至上千年的尺度下，大数定律决定了灾难发生的累积概率必然无限趋近于百分之百。 巴特利特描绘了一个极具现实张力的“疯王”（Mad King）推演：在历史长河中，某个拥核独裁者迟早会面临病入膏肓的境地——他可能身患绝症、精神分裂、饱受偏执与妄想折磨，且不愿让子嗣继承权力。在风烛残年的濒死时刻，这样一个精神崩溃的独裁者极有可能按下发射键，拉着整个世界为自己陪葬。 雅各布森对年轻一代展现出的这种终局思维感到欣慰。她分析道，当今年轻人拥有前所未有的信息获取渠道，深切体会到新兴威胁的叠加效应。面对这种概率上的必然性，人类必须发生根本性的认知转变：不能再把身边的每一个人、每一个国家都视为你死我活的“死敌”（Enemy）。拥有竞争对手或反对者（Adversaries / Opponents）是正常的，就像体育比赛中的对手，但若将所有人都定义为必须从肉体上消灭的敌人，世界便永远处于升级为世界大战的悬崖边。 --- ### [01:43:37](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=asmaLnhaFiY&t=6217s) 战争的起源：从亚马逊猎人的人类学研究看信任与敌意 针对巴特利特提出的“战争是人类基因硬编码，因争夺地位、资源与繁衍而无法避免”的悲观论调，雅各布森分享了她对战争起源的人类学观察。学术界长期争论战争究竟是伴随文明与定居农业出现的副产物，还是在原始狩猎采集时期就已经存在。 上世纪 60 年代，人类学家曾深入亚马逊雨林，考察那些从未受过现代文明侵蚀的原住民狩猎采集部落，观察他们如何看待陌生人。研究发现了一个奇特的现象：当一名原始猎人在雨林中偶然撞见另一个外人时，他面临着两种截然不同的本能反应——要么认为对方是致命威胁并立刻拔矛相向，要么认为对方是可以联合起来对抗猛兽等更大危险的盟友。 人类学家至今无法解释为何某些人天生充满猜疑与杀戮冲动，而另一些人则倾向于信任与结盟。雅各布森指出，不论这背后是遗传学机制还是偶然因素，现代神经科学与心理学已经证实，人类的心智是可以被后天训练的。作为一名长期报道残酷现实的调查记者，她每天都在刻意训练自己的心智：在逆境中寻找转机，学会把迎面而来的人看作潜在的队友或纯粹的竞争对手，而不是一个必须被彻底歼灭的敌人。 - 20 世纪 60 年代针对亚马逊原始部落的研究表明，人类在遭遇未知的“局外人”时，存在“预设敌意以自保”与“寻求合作以抗击更大威胁”两种分歧性的心理本能。 - 改变文明命运的关键在于打破零和博弈思维，通过后天的心智训练，用“体育竞技式的对手关系”替代“你死我活的敌对关系”。 --- ### [01:46:24](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=asmaLnhaFiY&t=6384s) 跨越所有调查报道：哪一本书是她的“心头肉”？ 随着访谈进入更加个人化的维度，巴特利特转移了话题。他提到雅各布森过往关于美国国防高级研究计划局（DARPA）的著作《五角大楼的大脑》（The Pentagon's Brain），并感叹在欧洲和英国，普通大众对这类深层军事科研机构几乎一无所知。巴特利特询问，在她撰写的所有畅销书中（涵盖 51 区、回形针行动以及冷战秘史），哪一项发现最令她感到震撼，哪一本书在读者中引发了最深的回响？ 雅各布森深情地回应称，每一部作品对她而言都具有不可替代的分量。这不仅是因为书中挖掘出的绝密档案和史实，更是因为在数年采访调查中结识的那些形形色色、经历非凡的当事人。对她而言，要在这些耗费多年心血的书籍中挑选出一本最爱，就像在自己的亲生骨肉中偏心某一个孩子一样不可想象。甚至在每次准备接受深度播客访谈前，她都会重新翻阅自己早年的著作，在重读文字的过程中重新审视那些跨越数十年的调查历程。 ### [01:47:08](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=asmaLnhaFiY&t=6428s) 命运的交汇：长崎原子弹装配者与幸存者 在回顾多年的调查报道生涯时，安妮·雅各布森（Annie Jacobsen）坦言，最触动她的并非某个具体惊人的内幕，而是她有幸采访过的那些极具传奇色彩的人物，以及命运与机缘在每个人生中所扮演的奇妙角色。由于她采访的对象大多是战士、一线作战人员或情报官员，许多人早在多年前就失去了身边的战友。当被问及是否有哪次采访让她当场落泪时，她承认确实有，并分享了一段此前从未公开写进书里的震撼经历。 就在前不久，安妮前往布鲁塞尔参加一场核能大会。在那里，她结识了一位日本女性，这名女性在 1945 年长崎原子弹爆炸时仅有 1 岁零 10 个月大，是长崎核爆的亲历幸存者（被爆者）。安妮带着一本亲笔签名的著作赠予她。安妮感慨道，广岛与长崎的核爆幸存者在战后背负着常人难以想象的沉重污名——人们将他们视为“受到辐射污染的人”，对辐射的代际遗传与后遗症怀有深深的恐惧，幸存者因此长期遭受排斥与偏见。 在与老妇人交谈时，原本自以为能保持冷静克制的安妮再也忍不住泪水。令她彻底破防的深层原因在于一种宿命般的强烈冲击：多年来，安妮深入采访过一位对她意义非凡、且多次出现在她报道中的核心信源，而那位男子当年亲手参与了投放在长崎的那枚原子弹的线路组装（wiring）。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 历史与命运的交汇 accDescr: 展示安妮·雅各布森如何作为调查记者连接长崎原子弹的装配者与长崎原子弹的幸存者 subgraph Source["历史的两端"] A["长崎原子弹装配者<br/>（曼哈顿计划核心成员，安妮长期核心信源）"] B["长崎原子弹幸存者<br/>（爆炸时仅1岁10个月，背负辐射污名）"] end subgraph Bridge["调查记者的历史角色"] C["安妮·雅各布森 Annie Jacobsen<br/>（布鲁塞尔核能大会与多维采访调查）"] end A -->|"口述历史与终生秘密"| C B -->|"生存创伤与历史记忆"| C ``` 此时此刻，命运让安妮这个记者站在这段历史的两极之间：一只手牵着那个在曼哈顿计划中亲手接驳长崎原子弹雷管引线的核心信源，另一只手则握着在原子弹轰炸下侥幸生还的受害者。这种横跨近八十年的历史交汇与人性震撼，让她深深体会到人类境遇（the human condition）的无常与沉重。 --- ### [01:50:25](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=asmaLnhaFiY&t=6625s) 走过漫长岁月的人：科学家的执念与特工的晚年 谈到那位参与接线组装原子弹的曼哈顿计划成员，安妮表示该男子现已离世。这枚原子弹影响了他的一生，让他此生都与核武器工业紧密绑定。安妮谈到，随着自己年龄渐长，比起单纯挖掘某个特定的绝密军事行动，她越来越被一个人波澜壮阔的“一生轨迹”所吸引。尤其是采访那些八九十岁、耳垂下垂、满脸皱纹的退役老兵与情报人员时，她能从老人们的眼神中读出一种强烈的历史托付感——他们深知自己来日无多，正将一生参与绝密计划的真相交付给眼前这位记者，希望由她记录在公共历史中。 针对这位组装原子弹的男子在晚年是否有悔意或心理折磨，安妮给出了一个令人意外的答案：比起长崎原子弹，反而有其他绝密项目更让他耿耿于怀。这也是安妮至今迟迟未将其生平著书立说探讨的原因，因为其中交织着太多难以轻易定性的复杂秘密与伦理困境。 为了说明这种人性的复杂，安妮提到了另一位核心信源——比利·沃（Billy Waugh，安妮在《Surprise, Kill, Vanish》一书中的主角）。Billy Waugh 是美国中情局（CIA）服役时间最长的单兵准军事特工之一，业内甚至流传着“Billy Waugh 杀的人比癌症还多”的说法。安妮曾陪同这位年逾八十的老特工一同前往河内、哈瓦那等地重访历史现场。当被问及他们晚年是否快乐时，安妮直言人性无法被简单归类为“快乐与否”：他们确实拥有真诚快乐的时刻，也背负着深沉的遗憾；Billy Waugh 并非尖酸刻薄之徒，但他经历了太多战友在身边惨死的情境，内心始终交织着复杂的愤怒。 - **广阔视角的平衡**：安妮提到自己工作方式的一个生动对照——她前一周还在欧洲议会与反核和平抗议者交流，后一周就可以在家中招待两位来自洛杉矶美国太空军（Space Force）的军工复合体现役军人，与她的家人包括年轻儿子共进晚餐。她认为自己作为调查记者的使命，就是在势不两立的群体之间充当忠实的记录者与沟通通道。 - **幸存者的身世秘密**：布鲁塞尔遇到的那位长崎女幸存者本身也是公众人物，但她直到成年后才得知自己的幸存身世，因为家人为了保护她远离社会歧视，多年来一直对她隐瞒真相。 --- ### [01:57:04](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=asmaLnhaFiY&t=7024s) 调查记者的秘密容器与跨代历史 安妮由幸存者被隐瞒身世的经历，引申出关于自我认知与评判他人的哲学思考。她认为每个人都在经历一场认识自我的旅程，就像播客主持人在访谈中不断审视自我一样，她在调查采访中也通过聆听他人来反观自身。作为调查记者，很多时候手中只有一纸一笔，而采访对象往往会坦白：“有些事情我不希望公开见报，但我必须告诉你，因为只有了解这些，你才能真正理解我。” 安妮强调，做调查记者最重要的品格是赢得信任并坚守承诺，成为守护他人隐秘真相的容器。许多曾为国家最高机密效力的人，甚至连他们的孙辈、重孙辈在几十年内都不知道自己的祖父当年究竟从事过什么惊天动地的工作。 安妮举了一个近期的生动例子：就在上周日的《洛杉矶时报》图书节（LA Times Festival of Books）签售会上，一名男子手捧着一个厚厚的文件夹排在队尾，一直等到所有书迷签完，才走上前轻声询问安妮，是否能占用她一点时间看看文件夹里祖辈留下的历史档案。这些被深埋在尘封历史中的未解之谜与家族记忆，正是推动她持续深挖历史真相的力量源泉。 ### [01:58:32](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=asmaLnhaFiY&t=7112s) 遗忘的档案与历史见证者 安妮·杰克森（Annie Jacobsen）讲述了自己作为调查记者的日常工作场景：有人曾拿着一整本厚厚的活页夹找到她，请她协助解读其中的机密文件。当事人的祖父曾是早期“北极星实验”（Polaris experiment，潜射弹道导弹项目）的高级负责人，家中留下了大批与总统的合影、工作证件、往来信件和历史档案，但在整个家族里，除了这位孙子，几乎没人关心这些尘封的纸页。杰克森当时便为对方逐一梳理背景脉络，告诉他这些材料在历史上的重大意义。她感慨道，人类天生渴望追寻自我的根源与家族的传承，而当老一辈离世后，记者的职责就是将这些珍贵记忆抢救性地记录进历史档案中。 主持人随后谈及杰克森在新书出版后于布鲁塞尔遇到的一位核爆幸存者，询问这次相遇是否重塑了她对自己著作和研究工作的看法。杰克森坦承，这次会面对她的情感冲击极大，回家后立刻与丈夫进行了彻夜长谈。在此之前，她为了写书查阅了海量幸存者口述史与外围文献，并在书中引用了广岛原子弹爆炸幸存者瑟罗节子（Setsuko Thurlow）向联合国等机构发表的公开发言。但杰克森指出，非虚构叙事作家即便再努力在脑海中重构灾难场景，“当面见到活生生的人时，这一切才彻底变得真实，不再只是纸面上的文字”。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 历史记忆的代际传递与认知转化 accDescr: 展现从解密档案、亲历者口述到作者非虚构叙事与情感共鸣的转化过程。 subgraph Phase1["历史记录与口述档案"] A["潜射弹道导弹机密文件与家属遗物"] --> B["档案解读与历史拼图还原"] C["广岛/长崎幸存者（被爆者）口述证言"] --> D["非虚构调查报道写作"] end subgraph Phase2["现实会面与情感升华"] B & D --> E["布鲁塞尔现场面对面交流"] E --> F["文字重构升华为真实共情"] F --> G["深刻反思'因'（决策研发）与'果'（灾难承受）"] end ``` ### [02:00:46](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=asmaLnhaFiY&t=7246s) 幸存者“被爆者”与废核运动 谈及如何定义核爆幸存者时，杰克森提到了日语中的专门称谓“被爆者”（Hibakusha）。该词专门指代在1945年8月广岛和长崎原子弹爆炸中幸免于难的人。随着距离核爆过去79年，仍在世的幸存者均已年逾古稀甚至耄耋之年，例如书中写到的瑟罗节子如今已90多岁高龄。2017年，国际废除核武器运动（ICAN）获得诺贝尔和平奖，瑟罗节子与卡洛斯·乌马尼亚医生（Dr. Carlos Umaña）等杰克森在布鲁塞尔结识的专家正是该阵营的中坚力量。这些组织始终在联合国等国际地缘政治舞台上奔走呼吁，致力于将全球核武器彻底削减归零。 - **被爆者（Hibakusha）**：特指1945年美军核袭击广岛和长崎后的在世幸存者，承载着核战争残酷后果的人类活化石。 - **诺贝尔和平奖关联**：瑟罗节子曾代表反核组织在2017年诺贝尔和平奖颁奖典礼上发表演讲，呼吁国际社会直面核武反人道本质。 - **废核游说**：相关医学界与反核组织长期致力于向联合国及各国政府提供不可逆的核战医学与生态后果报告。 ### [02:02:28](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=asmaLnhaFiY&t=7348s) 与丈夫的对话：记者职责与人性的拉扯 杰克森回忆起回到家与相伴多年的丈夫复盘布鲁塞尔之行的场景。她开玩笑说夫妻之间享有法律上的“配偶特权”（spouse privilege），丈夫是她最信任的传声筒与反思镜子。正是这类深入的对话，让她看清了下一本书的核心命题——不再局限于单向的技术或战争机器运转，而是深入探索“前因”（研制核武的决策者与军人）与“后果”（承受核爆摧残的无辜受害者）之间的深刻羁绊，揭示出双方在本质上往往同时兼具受害者与无辜者的悲剧宿命。 主持人指出，深入这类极度残酷的题材时，调查记者往往面临身份分裂：一方面必须戴上理智、客观的专业记者面具，另一方面又无法剥离内心的情感触动。杰克森对此深表认同，她提到中情局特工或军人（如传奇准军事特工比利·沃 Billy Waugh）执行追捕、定点清除任务时，绝对不允许把个人情感带入任务，甚至无法对伴侣吐露半句机密。杰克森直言自己绝不可能加入军方或情报界，因为那些工作要求人“戴上一顶必须摘除心脏的帽子”。她将能够自由感受悲伤、与伴侣开诚布公沟通视为一种奢侈和生存必需品，并强调民主社会的健康恰恰依赖于各行各业形形色色的人——包括那些立场相左的人，正是与不同阵营人士的交流促使她对世界展开更透彻的思考。 ### [02:06:18](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=asmaLnhaFiY&t=7578s) 播客传统提问：最近改变看法的一件事 在回答上一位播客嘉宾留下的保留问题——“你最近改变想法的一件事是什么？”时，杰克森分享了一段关于自身报道偏见的真实教训。在撰写《五角大楼的大脑》（The Pentagon's Brain）期间，她试图采访一位负责研发“单兵外骨骼/超级作战服”（soldier super suit）的美军将领。军方设立该项目的理论基础是消除战场上人类士兵的恐惧、疲劳等所谓“软弱缺陷”。杰克森联系了该将领，但对方完全没有回复。杰克森当时感到被轻视，在主观成见和自尊心作祟下，她在初稿中顺理成章地将这位将军塑造成冷酷、傲慢的“反派角色”。 然而，就在全书进入后期编辑排版阶段时，杰克森意外收到了将军发来的简短邮件。将军在信中致歉，解释自己未能及时回复是因为妻子身患癌症，他一直在床前悉心照料。这一记事实让杰克森深感愧疚与震动，意识到自己犯下了危险的预设偏见。她随后与将军进行了两次极为深入的访谈，并立刻通知责任编辑：“我必须推倒重写那一整个章节。”主持人感叹，这个故事恰恰呼应了当天的讨论核心：当人们轻易将某个人打上“外人”、“对手”或“敌人”的标签时，往往会彻底屏蔽对其人性的体察，并以敌对的方式对待他们。 ### [02:08:57](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=asmaLnhaFiY&t=7737s) 搭起沟通的桥梁：从敌对本能到人性共识 安妮·雅各布森（Annie Jacobsen）在反思中谈到，现实生活中人们往往惊人地相似：每个人都在与同样的焦虑、担忧、恐惧和不安作斗争。有时，仅仅因为一封坦诚的邮件所搭建起的沟通桥梁，大家就会猛然意识到彼此根本不是敌人。她感慨道，无论是在日常生活中用言辞相向，还是在国际地缘政治中挥舞核武器，人类其实完全没有必要陷入战争；就像远古时期在狭窄小径上相遇的两位猎人一样，迎面而来的人不一定是非死即伤的死敌，对方完全可以成为携手同行的合作伙伴。 主持人史蒂芬·巴特利特（Steven Bartlett）对此深表共鸣，称赞安妮能够坦白这种心态正展现了真实的人性。将陌生人或对手本能地预设为敌对阵营，似乎是深植于人类基因中的一种演化设定，但人类同样拥有主动寻找并搭建桥梁的能力。史蒂芬指出，在当下充斥着社交媒体割裂与两极分化的时代，跨越鸿沟变得极其罕见和艰难；如果美国能与那些所谓的外国对手建立起真正的沟通桥梁，或许大家今天就不必坐在这里探讨核战争的毁灭性剧本了。 ### [02:10:07](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=asmaLnhaFiY&t=7807s) 直面72分钟的末日真相：对话与去核化的希望 史蒂芬对安妮撰写《核战争：一种设想》（Nuclear War: A Scenario）表达了诚挚的感谢。他坦言自己一向主张无论现实多么残酷和令人不适，都必须坦率、公开地去直面它；因为如果选择逃避或闭目塞听，反而会推高人类走向毁灭的概率。在谈话间，史蒂芬发生了一个耐人寻味的口误，把书中的推演说成了“72小时的情景”，安妮随即轻声纠正道：“是72分钟。”史蒂芬不由得苦笑惊呼，感叹这是一个弗洛伊德式的潜意识口误，心底里甚至希望那真的能有72小时，但随即又改口道：“其实真要发生的话，我倒宁愿它在一眨眼之间彻底结束。” ```mermaid flowchart LR accTitle: 直面核威胁的破局路径 accDescr: 展现从回避恐惧到坦诚对话，再到推动决策者去核化的逻辑闭环。 subgraph Mindset["认知转变"] A["打破恐惧与回避心理"] --> B["直面72分钟毁灭现实"] end subgraph Action["沟通与影响"] B --> C["开启公众讨论与搭建桥梁"] C --> D["触达核心决策层"] end subgraph Goal["终极诉求"] D --> E["推动去核化政策落地"] end ``` 史蒂芬进一步谈到，面对如此沉重压抑的核毁灭话题，许多人出于本能的恐惧甚至不敢点击收听这期节目，但唯有敢于“迎难而上”（leaning in），人类才能展开真正的对话并寻求解决之道。正如节目此前探讨过的历史先例（影视作品曾深刻触动并改变过里根总统等最高决策者的冷战思维），没人能预料到会有哪些手握重权的高层正在收听这场对话，也没人知道他们是否会因此下定决心去搭建外交桥梁、推动世界走向去核化。史蒂芬高度评价了安妮为此付出的心血与智慧，安妮也向节目组的邀请致以诚挚谢意。 - **时间跨度的致命差距**：史蒂芬口误中的“72小时”被安妮立即更正为“72分钟”，核战争从第一枚洲际弹道导弹发射到全球文明陷入核冬天，全过程仅有短短的72分钟。 - **对话的深远潜力**：文艺与纪实作品对拥有决策权的人具有不可估量的心理震慑力，直面核恐惧正是打破全球核僵局、促成军控与去核化谈判的关键第一步。 ## Notable quotes > [11:39](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=asmaLnhaFiY&t=699s) 长官，有一枚弹道导弹正朝美国飞来，您必须立刻采取行动。 — 安妮·雅各布森 > [14:42](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=asmaLnhaFiY&t=882s) 安妮，在广袤的太空中搜寻一颗柚子大小的物体，都要比在幽深的海洋里找出一艘战略核潜艇容易得多。 — 康纳海军上将 > [24:30](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=asmaLnhaFiY&t=1470s) 安妮，你指望核指挥控制链条上有人抗命，那概率比你买彩票中超级大奖（Powerball）还要低得多。因为他们被彻底训练成只做一件事——绝对服从命令。 — 格伦·麦克道夫博士 > [34:52](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=asmaLnhaFiY&t=2092s) 在真正的核战争中，根本没有任何所谓的大众保护计划，因为所有人都已经死了。 — 克雷格·富盖特 > [53:23](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=asmaLnhaFiY&t=3203s) 在我死后，哪怕洪水滔天。 — 理查德·加温 > [59:03](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=asmaLnhaFiY&t=3543s) 这相当于用一颗子弹去击落另一颗子弹。 — 五角大楼发言人 > [01:01:58](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=asmaLnhaFiY&t=3718s) 核战爆发后，幸存者将羡慕死者。 — 赫鲁晓夫 > [01:10:07](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=asmaLnhaFiY&t=4207s) 核战争打不赢，也绝不能打。 — 罗纳德·里根与戈尔巴乔夫 > [01:30:36](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=asmaLnhaFiY&t=5436s) 战场绝非人类容身之所 — DARPA > [01:40:55](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=asmaLnhaFiY&t=6055s) 人为制造的问题，必有人为的解决之道 — 安妮·雅各布森 > [01:57:04](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=asmaLnhaFiY&t=7024s) 有些事情我不希望公开见报，但我必须告诉你，因为只有了解这些，你才能真正理解我。 — 受访核心信源 > [02:02:28](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=asmaLnhaFiY&t=7348s) 戴上一顶必须摘除心脏的帽子 — 安妮·雅各布森 ## Mentioned Annie Jacobsen, Steven Bartlett, Nuclear War: A Scenario, The Pentagon's Brain, Surprise, Kill, Vanish, Area 51, Operation Paperclip, The Day After, 五角大楼 (Pentagon), 中央情报局 (CIA), 国防高等研究计划署 (DARPA), 国家军事指挥中心 (NMCC), 战略司令部 (STRATCOM), 联邦应急管理局 (FEMA), 天基红外系统 (SBIRS), 陆基中段防御系统 (GMD), 核足球 (Nuclear Football), 黑皮书 (The Black Book), 理查德·加温 (Richard Garwin), 威廉·佩里 (William Perry), 罗伯特·凯勒上将 (General C. Robert Kehler), 克雷格·富盖特 (Craig Fugate), 布莱恩·图恩教授 (Professor Brian Toon), 格伦·麦克道夫博士 (Dr. Glenn McDuff), 比利·沃 (Billy Waugh), 瑟罗节子 (Setsuko Thurlow), 国际废除核武器运动 (ICAN), 约翰·冯·诺依曼 (John von Neumann), U-2侦察机, MKUltra计划, 气象山 (Mount Weather), 海底声波监视系统 (SOSUS) ## Video description Annie Jacobsen is an investigative journalist, New York Times bestselling author, and a 2016 Pulitzer Prize finalist. Her books include, ‘Area 51’, ‘Operation Paperclip’, and ‘The Pentagon’s Brain’. 00:00 Intro 01:59 Why Write This Book Now? 06:30 Are We Getting Closer to Nuclear War? 08:05 Who Is in Charge of the Nuclear Button? 12:23 The Evolution of Nuclear Weapons 16:16 Who Has Nuclear Weapons? 21:32 What Is the Football and Why Is Near the President 24/7? 24:30 How Important Is Picking the Right Leader? 28:17 What If the President Is Dead? 29:28 The Biggest Mistakes in Nuclear Detection 32:16 Nuclear War Games and Strategies 38:09 How Do the Decision Makers Cope? 40:32 How Would We Know Where the Nuclear Bomb Got Launched From? 46:02 What Happens After the First Minutes? 51:46 What Happens if the President Dies 53:23 The Aftermath 01:01:59 What Would Happen to a Country After It's Struck by Nuclear Bomb 01:06:51 How Many People Will Die? 01:07:35 Where Is Safe? 01:10:07 What Is the Solution? 01:14:02 How Did Annie's Feelings Change? 01:15:53 Conspiracy or Real? 01:26:55 The Role of the CIA 01:30:36 AI and the War Machine 01:40:55 Is Annie Optimistic? 01:43:37 The Origin of War 01:46:24 The Most Important Takeaway from Annie's Books 01:50:25 The People on Both Sides of Nuclear 01:59:18 The Impact of Your Books on You 02:00:46 Survivors of Nuclear Bomb 02:02:28 Conversations with Her Husband 02:06:18 What Have You Changed Your Mind About? You purchase Annie’s most recent book, ‘Nuclear War: A Scenario’, here: https://amzn.to/3UFHfn4 Follow Annie: Twitter - https://bit.ly/3UNNZQO Instagram - https://bit.ly/3UPDgp5 Follow me: https://beacons.ai/diaryofaceo Join this channel to get access to perks: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCGq-a57w-aPwyi3pW7XLiHw/join Follow our Shorts channel for more content: https://www.youtube.com/@TheDiaryofaCEOShorts [Source](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=asmaLnhaFiY)

[11:39] 安妮·雅各布森: 长官，有一枚弹道导弹正朝美国飞来，您必须立刻采取行动。 [14:42] 康纳海军上将: 安妮，在广袤的太空中搜寻一颗柚子大小的物体，都要比在幽深的海洋里找出一艘战略核潜艇容易得多。 [24:30] 格伦·麦克道夫博士: 安妮，你指望核指挥控制链条上有人抗命，那概率比你买彩票中超级大奖（Powerball）还要低得多。因为他们被彻底训练成只做一件事——绝对服从命令。 [34:52] 克雷格·富盖特: 在真正的核战争中，根本没有任何所谓的大众保护计划，因为所有人都已经死了。 [53:23] 理查德·加温: 在我死后，哪怕洪水滔天。 [59:03] 五角大楼发言人: 这相当于用一颗子弹去击落另一颗子弹。 [61:58] 赫鲁晓夫: 核战爆发后，幸存者将羡慕死者。 [70:07] 罗纳德·里根与戈尔巴乔夫: 核战争打不赢，也绝不能打。 [90:36] DARPA: 战场绝非人类容身之所 [100:55] 安妮·雅各布森: 人为制造的问题，必有人为的解决之道 [117:04] 受访核心信源: 有些事情我不希望公开见报，但我必须告诉你，因为只有了解这些，你才能真正理解我。 [122:28] 安妮·雅各布森: 戴上一顶必须摘除心脏的帽子

[24:30] Annie, you have a better chance at winning Powerball than betting on someone in the nuclear chain of command and control to defy orders. [51:46] Annie Jacobsen: The president can release to the Stratcom commander the universal unlock code, which basically says... if I die, you have permission to launch nuclear weapon number 83 or nuclear weapon number 5,000... and that is a pretty shocking concept. [56:52] A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. [62:00] Nikita Khrushchev: After nuclear war, the survivors would envy the dead. [73:48] Kevin: You got to write something that someone can read on the beach or an airplane. [110:25] Annie Jacobsen: I can sense them looking at me with this sense of their own legacy... 'I'm telling her my story, and then I'm going to be gone.' That's really powerful. [116:34] Annie Jacobsen: When they say survivor... there's a word in Japanese... Hibakusha. That is an actual term that is used by anyone who lived through the atomic bombings in August of 1945 of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. [205:37] Annie Jacobsen: wear a hat that removes your heart [206:18] What is the last thing you changed your mind about? [206:18] General: I'm so sorry I didn't get back to you. My wife had cancer.

[0:00] No matter how nuclear war begins, it [0:03] ends in 72 minutes and 5 billion people [0:08] would be dead. Do you think there will [0:10] be a nuclear war? So, I've interviewed [0:12] former secretaries of defense, the [0:14] former nuclear sub commander, the Secret [0:17] Service, and what I learned was [0:20] oh my god. Annie Jacobsen, investigative [0:23] researcher and writer who specializes in [0:25] uncovering the world's biggest secrets. [0:28] We are one misunderstanding away from [0:30] nuclear apocalypse. And yet you have [0:33] presidents threatening nuclear war. In [0:35] fact, the president of the United States [0:37] doesn't need to ask anyone to launch a [0:39] nuclear missile. [0:40] It makes me realize how important the [0:41] decision to pick our leaders is. Nothing [0:43] could be more important. Could you play [0:45] out a scenario where nuclear war broke [0:47] out? [0:47] Yes, and I can describe in painstaking [0:51] horrific detail precisely what happens. [0:53] So, [0:57] but after nuclear war, the survivors [1:00] would be forced to live underground and [1:02] envy the dead. [1:04] Annie, [1:05] is there anyone you interviewed that [1:06] brought you to tears? Yes, I met a woman [1:09] who was a survivor of the Nagasaki bomb, [1:11] and I haven't written about this yet. [1:14] But someone I interviewed and someone [1:16] that meant a lot to me wired that [1:19] nuclear weapon that was dropped on [1:21] Nagasaki. [1:23] Can you speak about the impact that it [1:25] had on both those individuals? Mhm, and [1:27] it's horrifying. [1:30] Congratulations, Diary of a CEO gang. [1:32] We've made some progress. 63% of you [1:34] that listen to this podcast regularly [1:36] don't subscribe, which is down from 69%. [1:40] Our goal is 50%. So, if you've ever [1:44] liked any of the videos we've posted, if [1:45] you like this channel, can you do me a [1:47] quick favor and hit the subscribe [1:48] button? It helps this channel more than [1:50] you know, and the bigger the channel [1:51] gets, as you've seen, the bigger the [1:53] guests get. Thank you, and enjoy this [1:54] episode. [1:59] Annie, [2:00] you wrote this book about nuclear war [2:02] and published it in March 2024. [2:06] The timing [2:08] of this book seems to be a little bit [2:12] coincidental when I [2:14] or not, when I look at what's going on [2:15] in the world at the moment. [2:17] Why did you write a book about nuclear [2:19] war? Mhm. And why did you write it now? [2:23] As an investigative journalist, [2:26] before nuclear war a scenario, I had [2:29] written six [2:30] previous books, all of which are about [2:33] the military and intelligence [2:36] organizations in the United States, [2:37] DARPA, Area 51, always the Pentagon, the [2:40] CIA. That's my That's my beat. [2:43] And think about how many sources I have [2:46] in each book, 100 or more. How many [2:49] covering all the wars, by the way, since [2:52] World War II. [2:53] All these intelligence and military [2:55] programs [2:57] uh intensely kinetic, [2:59] and think of how many people said to me [3:02] with a kind of [3:04] pride, I dedicated my life to preventing [3:08] nuclear World War III. That's always the [3:11] idea in the Defense Department and in [3:13] the CIA. We are there to prevent nuclear [3:16] war. And so, during the previous [3:19] administration, [3:20] former President Trump, [3:22] there was this presidential rhetoric [3:24] going on. [3:26] You may recall fire and fury. [3:29] Trump and the president of North Korea, [3:32] the leader of North Korea, threatening [3:34] this kind of thing, and I, like many, [3:37] I'm sure, began to wonder, my god, what [3:40] if deterrence, another word for [3:43] prevention, fails? [3:46] And that is the question that I put to [3:49] all of those sources in the book, and [3:51] that result is nuclear war a scenario. [3:55] What was your intention? [3:58] I wanted to show in horrific detail [4:03] just how [4:06] horrible, just how apocalyptic nuclear [4:10] war will be. [4:12] Because I think many people have [4:15] forgotten [4:17] or don't know to begin with [4:20] the consequences [4:22] of a nuclear exchange. As I show in the [4:24] book, almost certainly, [4:27] if a nuclear exchange happens, and we're [4:29] talking strategic ballistic missiles, it [4:31] will not stop until the world ends. [4:34] And we are talking about in seconds and [4:36] minutes, not in days and weeks and [4:41] months. [4:42] That is astonishing. [4:45] When did you start writing the book? [4:47] When was the first word written? [4:49] So, probably during COVID was the first [4:52] word written, but keep in mind, my [4:54] reporting on nuclear weapons goes back [4:57] my entire career. My first [5:00] book, Area 51, [5:02] is about a a joint CIA Air Force base [5:06] out there in the Nevada desert inside [5:09] a secret test and training range where [5:12] the United States government used to [5:14] explode nuclear weapons. [5:16] Atmospheric nuclear weapons in the '50s. [5:19] And so, my when I was reporting Area 51, [5:23] I I wound up quite literally, I did not [5:26] intend to, but I wound up interviewing [5:29] the people who armed, wired, and fired [5:34] those nuclear weapons, early Manhattan [5:36] Project members. [5:37] And they That was kind of my B story of [5:40] Area 51. [5:42] And what I learned was like, [5:44] oh my god. And I was also surprised to [5:47] learn that most people didn't even know [5:49] we, the American government, set off 100 [5:52] some odd atmospheric nuclear weapons in [5:55] the desert in Nevada testing them. [5:58] So, my reporting, to answer That's a [5:59] long-winded answer of I've been on this [6:02] issue [6:04] peripherally, [6:05] you know, for years, for more than a [6:07] decade, but the idea in this book, the [6:10] word one, as you asked, was like, once I [6:13] understood that nuclear war is a [6:15] sequence, [6:17] it begins the first fraction of a second [6:20] after detection, [6:21] then I could see clearly, oh my god, [6:24] it's a ticking clock scenario. [6:26] Because it just all happens so fast. [6:29] I'll ask that again because So, if you [6:31] started writing the first word of the [6:33] book on nuclear war in COVID, sort of [6:36] 2020, [6:37] Mhm. [6:37] 2020, roughly? 2021? [6:40] Around there. [6:40] Yeah. 2020, 2021, yeah. Since then, [6:43] things have escalated around the world [6:45] in terms of conflict in a way that I [6:46] imagine you couldn't have forecasted. [6:48] And even it's almost ironic that in the [6:50] month that your book was published, [6:51] Putin moved I think he moved nuclear [6:53] weapons into Belarus, and the rhetoric [6:56] and he started saying that he would use [6:57] them. And if you look at the terminology [6:59] him and his commanders are using towards [7:01] the world, it seems like we're at a [7:03] moment that I haven't seen in my [7:05] lifetime where the subject of nuclear [7:07] war seems to be more real than ever [7:09] before. [7:10] You're absolutely right, and that is [7:12] astonishing because in 2021, when I [7:15] began the interviews, [7:18] people were forthcoming with me, you [7:21] know, as you know from the list of [7:22] sources I've interviewed, former [7:24] secretaries of defense, former nuclear [7:27] sub commander, you know, former STRATCOM [7:30] commander, former FEMA director, former [7:33] cyber chief. [7:35] And a lot of these individuals shared [7:37] with me in 2021 this idea that wow, the [7:41] world has kind of forgotten that the [7:43] nuclear [7:45] threat is always there. [7:47] And so, over the course of reporting and [7:50] writing, you're absolutely right that [7:53] the geopolitical [7:55] temperature of the world has escalated [7:58] to a point that you have not seen in [8:01] your lifetime and I haven't seen in my [8:03] lifetime. [8:05] Setting the stage even more, we talked [8:07] about how possible nuclear war is, but [8:11] one thing I learned from reading your [8:12] book, which actually surprised me, [8:15] was that it doesn't take thousands of [8:17] people to agree on a nuclear war for it [8:19] to begin. [8:20] In the case of the United States, it [8:22] only takes one person to make that [8:23] decision, [8:25] which I find quite unnerving that [8:27] there's one individual [8:29] that can theoretically make the decision [8:32] that would destroy the earth. [8:34] Uh you're absolutely right, and this [8:37] kind of thing is surprising to almost [8:39] everyone. One of the things that I [8:42] strive to do in my reporting is take [8:45] very complex [8:47] science and technology, military issues, [8:51] and simplify them down for the layman, [8:54] just for the average Joe or the average [8:56] Jane. And I do that by interviewing [9:00] the really smart, really knowledgeable [9:03] people on those subjects. I have two [9:07] things going for me, perhaps, as an [9:09] investigative journalist that help in [9:11] conveying a story, is that I'm not a [9:13] scientist, and so, I can ask questions [9:17] that the average person would ask, like, [9:19] really try and help me understand this, [9:22] whatever this is. And then also that I [9:25] have a real interest in [9:27] making what is conveyed to me [9:31] make sense [9:33] to other people in their lives, right? [9:35] So, and also, perhaps, make them [9:38] realize, [9:39] I never even stopped to think about the [9:41] fact, how strange is it that the United [9:43] States president, this is what you learn [9:45] in the book and you're talking about, [9:46] the United States president has sole [9:48] presidential authority to launch a [9:50] nuclear war. What does that mean? It's [9:53] exactly like it sounds. What's so [9:55] interesting is a lot of this stuff, this [9:56] nomenclature that gets thrown at you, [9:58] if you just break it down, it's sole, [10:01] solo, [10:02] presidential, he's the POTUS, [10:05] authority. He doesn't have to ask anyone [10:08] for permission. [10:09] Not the SECDEF, not the Chairman of the [10:11] Joint Chiefs of Staff, not the Congress. [10:14] I love the worried look on your face in [10:15] this moment because it is Once you know [10:19] that, [10:21] you say Well, first you might Google, is [10:23] it really true? And you will get, for [10:26] example, on Reddit, like, that's not [10:28] really true. You'll get like hundreds of [10:30] thousands of people, [10:32] you know, coming in with their opinions [10:34] about how that's not really true. [10:36] Well, it is really true. [10:38] It's absolutely true. And in fact, [10:40] during the former President Trump [10:42] administration, [10:44] Congress became so sort of [10:47] And I want to say motivated or alarmed [10:49] by this issue, meaning they were being [10:50] asked questions by the powers that be, [10:54] is this actually true? That they [10:55] released a report stating specifically, [10:59] and I quote in the book, yes, it is [11:00] true. As Commander in Chief, the [11:03] President has this sole authority. He [11:06] doesn't need to ask anyone. [11:08] And hopefully, [11:10] sort of my bringing sort of concepts [11:13] like that to the fore right away, the [11:15] reader can then become engaged and they [11:17] say, well, that's weird. Why? And then I [11:20] can give you a very simple answer [11:22] without [11:24] necessarily taking you through the whole [11:25] history of presidential authority, but [11:27] it has to do with the ticking clock of [11:29] it. [11:31] And I explain to you right away that a [11:33] ballistic missile [11:35] travels from one continent in It's [11:37] called an ICBM. People have heard of [11:39] that. Intercontinental ballistic [11:42] missile. Again, [11:43] exactly like it sounds. It can travel [11:45] from one continent to the next in [11:48] roughly 30 minutes carrying a nuclear [11:51] warhead to strike a target. [11:53] Once you realize, wait a minute, there [11:55] are only 30 minutes, [11:57] this isn't like, hey guys, should we go [11:59] have a war in Iraq? Let's discuss this. [12:01] Let's debate this. Let's take it to the [12:03] Congress. [12:05] This is There is a ballistic missile, [12:07] sir, coming at the United States, and [12:10] you must act. [12:13] And that's why, in the simplest layman's [12:16] terms, sole presidential authority [12:19] exists. [12:21] So, let's define then [12:23] what these weapons are. We Many of us [12:25] have seen that film Oppenheimer. We saw [12:26] them out in the desert, I think, in New [12:28] Mexico playing playing with all these [12:29] weapons and eventually making this one [12:31] bomb that they would then drop drop in [12:33] Japan. [12:35] The weapon we see in that film, which [12:36] was in the 1940 made in the 1940s that [12:38] ultimately led to the end of the war, is [12:40] that the same weapon that we're talking [12:42] about today? [12:43] No. [12:44] Well, in in in sort of principle, in [12:47] yes, meaning it's an atomic bomb, but [12:50] there's two things that separate where [12:52] we are now. [12:53] One has to do with the size and the [12:55] power of the bomb. [12:57] So, the the In 1945, there were atomic [13:00] bombs. Now, there are thermonuclear [13:02] bombs. So, an atomic bomb is used inside [13:06] a thermonuclear weapon as the trigger. [13:10] Okay. [13:11] It is a bomb inside a bomb. And the [13:13] power of the thermonuclear bomb is so [13:16] astonishingly, [13:18] you know, destructive, you can read the [13:20] details. I interviewed Richard Garwin, [13:22] who designed the first thermonuclear [13:25] bomb for Edward Teller when he was 24 [13:28] years old. I interviewed him, he's in [13:29] his 90s. He explains to me, and I [13:32] explain to you, [13:33] what the power is behind that. But this [13:36] So, the atomic bomb and and it has to do [13:38] with size. Like, the old atomic bomb, [13:39] the one that was dropped on Hiroshima [13:41] was the size of a small elephant. [13:44] Okay, 15 kilotons in a big giant [13:48] elephant-sized bomb inside of an [13:50] aircraft having to fly from Tinian [13:53] Island to over Hiroshima where it drops [13:57] in an aircraft. [13:59] That all changed [14:01] when we brought the Nazi scientists to [14:04] us. Ooh, let's have Let's figure out how [14:07] to do two things. Let's figure out how [14:08] to [14:09] create more powerful bombs. That's the [14:11] result The result is the thermonuclear [14:13] bomb. And let's make them smaller. [14:16] We can't load an elephant-sized weapon [14:18] into the top of a ballistic missile. It [14:20] needs to be smaller. And so, so much of [14:22] this buildup was about creating more [14:25] powerful weapons to be smaller in size. [14:29] And then you see the military-industrial [14:30] complex. You see You can imagine, and I [14:33] do this as a history lesson in just a [14:35] few short pages to try to bring readers [14:37] up to speed without losing the drama of [14:40] the narrative. [14:42] And [14:43] the result, so if you flash forward to [14:45] where we are now, which is where we've [14:47] been for a very long time, is a nuclear [14:49] triad, just like it sounds, three parts. [14:53] We have ICBMs, silos under the ground. [14:57] So, those are weapons hidden in the [14:58] ground? In the United States, there are [15:00] 400 of them. There were more. Now, there [15:03] 400. You can find out where they are on [15:05] a map. [15:06] They're in silos, underground silos [15:08] across the Midwest and the West. [15:12] Then we have our nuclear-armed, [15:14] nuclear-powered submarines that carry [15:18] that same kind of concept of a ballistic [15:21] missile [15:22] with a warhead in its nose cone. [15:25] We have those same systems on [15:27] submarines. [15:28] And the technology behind it is [15:30] astonishing. I take the reader through [15:31] it fast from the experts who explain it [15:34] to me in a digestible way. [15:36] And those systems lurk around in the [15:40] oceans [15:41] all 24 hours a day, [15:44] 7 days a week, 365 [15:46] days a year. They're called the [15:47] handmaidens of the apocalypse. They're [15:50] almost impossible to find, right? They [15:52] are impossible to find. The nuclear The [15:54] former nuclear force sub commander, [15:57] um [15:58] Admiral Connor, [16:01] had this great way of describing it to [16:02] me. When I said, like, how hard is it to [16:04] find a sub? He said, Annie, it's easier [16:07] to find a grapefruit-sized [16:10] object in space [16:14] than a nuclear sub under the sea. [16:16] And it's not just the United States that [16:18] have these weapons, which I think is [16:20] important to say. There's many people [16:22] listening all around the world now who [16:24] have these weapons in their country, [16:25] too. You list um several of those [16:27] countries. I think it's nine countries [16:28] in total that have nuclear weapons, [16:30] right? What are those countries? I know [16:32] we have them back in the UK. [16:33] Yeah, there are nine nuclear-armed [16:35] nations. Also really interesting to [16:37] think about that the whole sort of [16:39] let's have a triad. Let's have all these [16:41] weapons that we will use We will have a [16:42] concept of mutually assured destruction, [16:44] so we will have these weapons, but we [16:46] will never use them because everyone [16:48] would be destroyed. Those concepts go [16:50] back to the '50s when there were only [16:53] two nuclear-armed nations, the United [16:56] States and Soviet Russia. So, [16:59] you know, really making all of this more [17:01] precarious, talk [17:03] looping back to your, [17:05] you know, notion that, like, my God, we [17:07] are at this precipice [17:09] of [17:10] danger, which we are, is because there [17:12] are nine nuclear-armed nations, many of [17:14] which are in direct conflict with others [17:18] or their neighbors. And they are the US, [17:21] Russia, China, [17:24] the UK, France, India and Pakistan, [17:28] Israel, [17:30] North Korea. [17:32] And there's some threat that Iran [17:36] are trying to Absolutely. I mean, that [17:39] is a very, very, very significant [17:42] threat. And you really have to look I [17:45] think the book [17:46] I stay away from the sort of [17:48] geopolitical [17:49] posturing or analysis or even, [17:52] um [17:53] you know, opinion about the political [17:56] aspect of all of this. But I think [17:59] readers get to take their away there and [18:02] have, because I have read a lot of the [18:04] responses and had a lot of really [18:06] interesting conversations since the book [18:09] published a month ago. [18:11] But yes, you can take away what you [18:13] think about the fact, what, my God, you [18:15] put a 10th nuclear-armed nation in here. [18:19] That is Iran. [18:21] How [18:23] more destabilizing is that going to be [18:26] to safety and security? [18:30] And when I look at the list of countries [18:32] um you've written about that have these [18:33] nuclear weapons, [18:35] the US, Russia, they're both basically [18:37] in proxy wars at the moment with [18:39] obviously the the war going on in [18:40] Ukraine. [18:41] Think about Pakistan and India, um [18:44] Israel and Iran, you know, they're both [18:47] at conflicts flat throwing different [18:49] missiles at each other and drones at [18:50] each other at the moment. [18:52] Um the UK and and France are obviously [18:54] part of NATO, so they're kind of [18:56] sucked into the whole Russia-Ukraine-US [18:58] conflict that's going on, that proxy war [19:00] there. These countries right now, many [19:03] of them, I think the majority of them, [19:04] are involved in a direct war or some [19:06] form of proxy war as it is. [19:08] And with many of these wars, it's hard [19:10] to find the way that it ends, the way [19:12] out, the kind of golden bridge, because [19:14] Ukraine aren't going to relent, so [19:16] Russia aren't going to necessarily [19:19] decide one day that they're going to [19:21] lose the war. That would cause [19:22] significant ramifications for Putin, his [19:24] reputation, and Russia as a whole. The [19:26] US can't let Ukraine lose for a variety [19:29] of geopolitical reasons. And then at the [19:31] same time, all this conflict started in [19:32] Israel following the the attack in [19:34] Israel, which has sucked Iran in and [19:36] much of that region. It's all seems [19:38] like, [19:39] you know, these are the countries right [19:41] now that are involved in [19:43] the conflict that is scaring many much [19:45] many of us [19:47] um in a significant way. And if all [19:48] these countries operate in a similar way [19:50] where there's one individual that can [19:51] make the decision [19:53] to release those weapons. [19:57] It is quite scary. [19:58] The UN Secretary General said recently [20:01] that we are one [20:03] misunderstanding, one miscalculation [20:07] away from nuclear Armageddon. [20:10] And so the scary part of it is that when [20:14] you look at that sort of verbage, right? [20:16] When I talk about you know, nuclear [20:19] Armageddon, nuclear apocalypse, nuclear [20:22] holocaust. [20:24] Those are words out of the mouths of [20:27] some of these leaders. So there is a [20:30] very clear notion that if nuclear war [20:34] starts, it ends [20:36] civilization. That is almost certainly [20:40] known among the leaders. And yet [20:43] you have people like the president of [20:46] Russia and the president of the United [20:48] States [20:49] and the leader of North Korea [20:52] throwing around threats and terms. You [20:56] know, the leader of North Korea recently [20:59] accused the United States of having a [21:01] sinister intention of provoking nuclear [21:05] war. [21:06] I mean, that is a provocation on top of [21:08] a provocation in you know, embedded in [21:10] but to your point [21:12] what's the point of being scared? [21:14] Well, the point is [21:17] to realize that passivity [21:20] is not necessarily the answer. That your [21:23] knowledge of the situation leads to [21:28] change. That's just the that's just the [21:29] history of of civilization. One of the [21:32] things that did make me think when I [21:33] realized that there's one individual in [21:36] in the United States, where we are now, [21:37] who can make that decision and that [21:39] there's basically like someone following [21:41] the president with a briefcase called [21:43] the it's like the football or something. [21:45] Yes. What is that football for people [21:46] that don't know? Yeah. And so so now [21:49] that people know about the football or [21:50] when they read it, you'll you'll see you [21:53] can see in photographs of the president, [21:55] you will almost if he's in frame, you'll [21:57] see the mill aid. That's the military [21:59] aid. An individual who is assigned to be [22:03] with the president 24/7 365. And inside [22:07] the football, it's called the emergency [22:09] satchel [22:10] are two important things. There's [22:13] instrumentation that allows the [22:15] president to be identified as the [22:18] president to the National Military [22:21] Command Center, which is the nuclear [22:22] bunker beneath the Pentagon. [22:25] Okay? So it's a it's a call and response [22:28] authentic authentication. [22:31] And then there is something called [22:34] colloquially the black book. [22:37] And it was told to me the reason it's [22:39] called the black book is cuz it involves [22:40] so much death. [22:42] And what the black book is is a list of [22:45] nuclear strike options for the president [22:48] to choose from. And so once the [22:51] president is notified that a ballistic [22:53] missile is coming at the United States [22:56] and he has to make a decision about a [22:58] counterattack [23:00] he must look quickly because as you [23:02] learn in the book and as I learned from [23:04] presidents [23:05] uh there is a 6-minute window of [23:08] decision-making. [23:10] And so there's no time for a round table [23:13] discussion. [23:15] There is a list of options that has been [23:18] pre-prepared [23:20] for the president to choose from. [23:23] And I interviewed for the book someone [23:25] who actually [23:27] was responsible for some of those [23:28] decisions in the '80s. [23:30] And he [23:33] described to me in appalling detail [23:36] what it was like to have worked on this [23:39] in the Pentagon, like worked out [23:43] numerically different targets and why [23:46] they would be targets in said strike XYZ [23:49] or Q against said nation. [23:51] And then later seeing the black book and [23:55] realizing the like sort of transmutation [23:57] of that information to what was [23:59] described by the only mill aid who's [24:02] ever gone on the record speaking about [24:04] this as essentially like a Denny's menu [24:07] list of options. [24:09] And [24:11] so you understand that this list is so [24:14] watered down [24:16] into strike options and there is so [24:20] little time that the president in [24:22] essence has really no idea [24:25] what he's striking and how many millions [24:28] of people will be killed. [24:30] When I [24:31] hear that, it makes me realize how [24:33] important the decision to pick our [24:34] leaders is. [24:35] Something I didn't realize before. [24:37] Nothing could be more important. And yet [24:39] I learned in the book and I'm talking [24:41] about from former secretaries of [24:43] defense, people very close to the [24:45] president, that most presidents are [24:48] ill-informed about their role as [24:52] commander in chief in a nuclear war [24:54] because and it was said to me, most [24:56] don't want to know. [24:57] And again, so this brings us back to [24:59] that paradox of deterrence. The original [25:03] question I asked in writing and [25:04] reporting this book, what if deterrence [25:06] fails? Deterrence is this idea, we will [25:09] have so many nuclear weapons pointed at [25:12] the other side, they will have so many [25:14] nuclear weapons pointed at us, no one [25:16] would be insane enough to let any of [25:18] them loose. [25:20] That's how we all stay safe. [25:23] Another way of saying deterrence is more [25:25] nuclear weapons make us more safe. You [25:28] can decide if you think that's a little [25:30] Orwellian, but that is what exists. [25:33] Okay, so with that in mind, we should [25:35] really be doing [25:37] mental [25:39] checks on our leaders every 3 months [25:42] because we've all probably [25:44] had an experience with someone who's had [25:46] a [25:49] episode. [25:50] You know, and I'll I'll leave it at at [25:52] episode because there's a variety of [25:53] different types of episodes one can [25:54] have. And I was thinking, well, if the [25:56] president just has a bit of an episode [25:58] and gets a little bit paranoid or you [26:00] know, sort of has a little bit of a [26:01] schizophrenic paranoia [26:04] which can happen to people for a variety [26:06] of different unpredictable reasons then [26:09] that president could potentially make a [26:10] decision to end the planet and there [26:12] doesn't seem to be a [26:14] defense mechanism to stop him doing that [26:16] or her doing that. You're reminding me [26:18] of a famous story when Nixon was [26:20] president and it was during the [26:21] Watergate scandal. He probably knew the [26:24] end of his presidency was near. And he [26:27] was very drunk one night and he began to [26:31] threaten or rather he just began to [26:33] talk, you know, [26:34] in in a sort of extremely verbose [26:36] drunken manner about how he could end [26:38] the world or kill tens of millions of [26:40] people with a push of a button. And his [26:43] it is said that that Kissinger called up [26:46] the military and said, if the president [26:48] orders any kind of a nuclear strike, [26:50] talk to me first. [26:52] Really? [26:54] And you'd say that you think that would [26:55] have happened? [26:57] I mean, we you know It's hard to know, [26:59] isn't it? [27:00] All of these stories, unless they come [27:03] out of the mouth of the individual who [27:05] actually said that, are in essence [27:08] stories. So there's an element of truth [27:10] to them for sure. Um you know, the [27:13] actual command and control, who's going [27:16] to follow the rules, people ask me that [27:18] question often. And I took that exact [27:21] question like [27:23] you know, I think people have a naivete [27:24] that if you're in the nuclear command [27:27] and control, whether you're a missileer [27:28] in a underground silo or a submariner on [27:31] a sub that you might when you get this [27:34] command, suddenly have this heart, you [27:37] know, like in a Hollywood movie, have [27:38] this moment where you say, my goodness, [27:41] I'm going to save the planet rather than [27:42] destroy it. [27:44] I put that question to Dr. Glenn McDuff, [27:47] the [27:48] historian at the classified [27:51] museum at Los Alamos, the one you and I [27:53] can't go see. [27:55] Um and I said, do you think that could [27:57] happen? And he said [27:58] Annie, you have a better chance at [28:00] winning Powerball [28:02] than betting on someone in the nuclear [28:06] chain of command and control [28:08] to defy orders. And I said, why? And he [28:11] said, well [28:12] you are trained to follow orders. [28:16] I spoke to a CIA agent or should I say [28:18] former CIA agent called Andy Bustamante. [28:21] Might have seen him, he did does some [28:22] podcasts. And [28:24] after speaking to him, I I completely [28:25] agree because as he said, he was trained [28:27] to [28:28] basically he was selected and trained on [28:31] the basis that he would [28:33] follow orders in that moment and they [28:34] even do drills to make sure dummy drills [28:36] to make sure that they're prepared, I [28:38] guess psychologically to follow through [28:40] on those instructions. It made me think [28:42] as well that if if um [28:44] what if the president's dead? What if [28:46] the president is hit by a nuclear weapon [28:49] from another country and now they can no [28:51] longer make the decision. Is the [28:53] decision deferred on to somebody else? [28:56] Well, I take the reader through that [28:57] precisely because those are the kind of [28:59] questions that I had to ask of my [29:01] sources as I was reporting this. [29:03] On the one hand as I was learning what [29:05] happens in the seconds and minutes you [29:07] know, after a launch is detected because [29:10] we have a satellite system that detects [29:12] the launch of a nuclear weapon in under [29:14] a fraction of a second. But it's not [29:16] always very trustworthy. This is why I'm [29:17] concerned. [29:18] The ours is very trustworthy as far as I [29:20] understand. It's called SIBERS. It's [29:22] built by Lockheed and it's astonishingly [29:24] powerful. Other nations do not have that [29:27] same kind of technology. [29:28] Cuz I was reading about the sort of [29:29] historic [29:30] mistakes that were made. Sometimes [29:31] people thought there was a a nuclear [29:33] bomb or a strike coming and it was [29:34] actually just a bunch of swans. [29:36] Absolutely. So I was a little bit like [29:39] you know. [29:39] these are these are you know, this is [29:40] the one miscalculation, one [29:42] misunderstanding away from nuclear [29:43] Armageddon. [29:45] What what are those instances from [29:46] history where the nuclear detection [29:48] system was triggered and someone in some [29:50] country decided um [29:53] not to follow through on a notification? [29:56] I think the most interesting stories [29:58] that I report come from the person who [30:01] is an actual first-hand witness to it [30:04] because what often happens is the [30:06] telephone game, you know, whereby one [30:08] person tells the story and then you [30:10] imagine you add a detail. So, I write [30:12] about a couple of them in the book, but [30:14] one of them came to me first-hand and [30:16] I'll share that with you, which was [30:18] former Secretary of Defense Bill Perry. [30:21] And he was on the night watch during the [30:23] Carter administration. He wasn't the [30:25] Secretary of Defense yet. He had like [30:26] the job before that, the Director of [30:28] Research and Engineering at the [30:30] Pentagon. But it was his his night watch [30:32] inform the president job. [30:35] And he was told by the National Military [30:38] Command Center, which is the bunker [30:39] beneath the Pentagon, [30:42] that [30:43] there were ballistic missiles on the way [30:46] from Soviet Russia. [30:48] This was confirmed [30:50] by the nuclear bunker beneath Offutt Air [30:53] Force Base in Nebraska, the STRATCOM [30:55] bunker. [30:57] And not only were they intercontinental [30:59] ballistic missiles flying at the United [31:01] States, but they were sub-launched [31:04] ballistic missiles coming at the United [31:05] States. And it was a massive mother lode [31:09] of warheads. [31:11] And Perry described to me as I recount [31:13] in the book what that was like [31:17] to try and process [31:19] in your mind oh my god, I'm going to [31:22] have to tell the president [31:25] and going to have to and he is going to [31:27] have to make a counterattack. [31:30] And [31:31] within a matter of minutes [31:34] he got word that it was a mistake. [31:37] And a mistake, you might ask like a [31:39] mistake? How does a mistake happen? What [31:42] he told me was that it was a VHS tape, [31:46] a simulated war game, [31:48] a simulated attack by the Soviet Union [31:52] against the United States. [31:54] And the VHS tape [31:56] had mistakenly been inserted into a [31:59] machine in the nuclear bunker beneath [32:01] the Pentagon and because it is linked to [32:03] STRATCOM, [32:05] it was seen in both places. [32:08] And Perry said to me, it looked real [32:10] because it was meant to look real. [32:13] Hm. [32:16] There was a president you talk about [32:19] that played a nuclear war game [32:23] and discovered that [32:24] there could be no winners. [32:26] So, [32:28] Proud Prophet Proud Prophet, yeah. is [32:30] one of the few [32:32] a very rare declassified nuclear war [32:35] game. People talk about, you know, [32:38] jealously guarded secrets in the United [32:40] States government. You can be sure that [32:42] anything having to do with nuclear war [32:44] gaming is way up there [32:47] in the top secrets along with what is [32:50] actually in that black book. [32:53] But the Proud Prophet war game was [32:54] declassified. Reagan had ordered it. I [32:57] don't believe he participated in it. His [32:59] sec desk everybody in the commit nuclear [33:01] command and control participated in for [33:03] two weeks in 1983. [33:06] And this is declassified. I reprint some [33:09] of it in the book. And if you have a [33:11] look at it, you might say to yourself, [33:13] well, what's the point of declassifying [33:15] something that looks like this? It's [33:16] just black. It's like there's a number [33:19] here and a word there and a page number, [33:22] but mostly it's entirely redacted. [33:25] And so, what's the point of [33:27] declassifying it? Well, for the public, [33:29] something very valuable came out of [33:32] that, which is it allowed a certain [33:35] civilian who was participating, Yale [33:37] professor named Paul Bracken, [33:40] to actually speak about it in a general [33:42] way. He couldn't, you know, [33:44] couldn't tell OPSEC, but he could [33:47] generally talk about it. And what he [33:49] said in his own book was that no matter [33:53] how nuclear war begins, [33:55] NATO's involved, NATO's not involved, [33:57] China's involved, China's no matter how [33:59] it begins, it ends in nuclear [34:02] Armageddon. And Bracken's words was that [34:04] everyone left really depressed. [34:09] Nuclear Armageddon essentially means the [34:10] world is destroyed. Nuclear Armageddon [34:13] is the world is destroyed. And when you [34:14] get to the end of the book, which [34:15] happens in 72 minutes, and that comes [34:19] from something that [34:21] former STRATCOM director General Keeler [34:23] said to me when we were discussing and [34:25] interviewing and I said we I asked him [34:28] about what could happen if there was a [34:30] nuclear exchange between Russia and the [34:32] United States and he said, the world [34:35] could end in the next couple of hours. [34:38] So, from where we are now in this [34:40] conversation to the end of this [34:41] conversation, if a nuclear war broke out [34:43] when we were sat here, [34:45] by the end of this conversation, [34:47] basically the entire world would be [34:49] destroyed. And we you and I wouldn't [34:50] even know before the first missile hit. [34:52] That was shocking to me to have that [34:54] confirmed in essence by [34:56] uh Obama's [34:58] FEMA director. So, FEMA, the Federal [35:00] Emergency Management Agency, is the is [35:03] the agency in the United States that's [35:04] in charge of disasters, right? So, if [35:06] there's a hurricane or a flood or an [35:08] earthquake, FEMA steps in to help the [35:11] people. They have something called [35:13] population planning. [35:15] Craig Fugate was Obama's FEMA director [35:17] for 8 years and he just covered an [35:20] extraordinary amount of catastrophes in [35:22] the United States. He was also [35:24] responsible for planning for a nuclear [35:26] war. He told me that they did that. He [35:28] also said, we plan for asteroid strikes. [35:31] These are called low probability, high [35:34] consequence events. [35:36] But what Fugate told me that was [35:37] shocking is that [35:39] there is no population protection [35:41] planning in a nuclear war because [35:43] everyone will be dead. [35:45] And he explained to me that there's [35:47] nothing [35:48] that that that that he could do as FEMA [35:51] director. He would really be putting his [35:53] efforts from this nuclear bunker where [35:55] he would be, which is called Mount [35:56] Weather, he would be putting his efforts [35:58] on [36:00] the continuity of government issues, the [36:02] continuity of like the government has [36:05] what are called essential functions. So, [36:08] and you know, as a nuclear war is [36:10] happening, the government is trying to [36:13] prepare to keep the government running, [36:16] which is a form of fantasy in itself. [36:19] And when you read Fugate's interviews [36:21] with me, he's just so candid about how [36:25] there is nothing anyone can do. And you [36:29] know, what he told me was so shocking, I [36:31] went back to him [36:33] and said like, I just want to really [36:35] make sure these are your actual quotes [36:37] that you that that [36:39] And he absolutely, you know, he was one [36:42] of the first people [36:44] to write an Amazon review of the book [36:46] after it published here in the United [36:47] States. [36:48] And I find that [36:51] both terrifying, but also heartening for [36:54] this reason is that a lot of these [36:57] people who leave office because my [37:00] sources are all former [37:02] and then the title. [37:04] They when they are in the command and [37:06] control, they are very focused on doing [37:09] their job. Hence what we spoke about [37:11] earlier about like following orders. [37:13] They are civil servants. They are [37:15] dedicated civil servants. They believe [37:17] in national security. They believe in, [37:20] you know, the perseverance of [37:22] government. And then they leave office [37:24] and they are just regular people again. [37:27] And that's when the heart [37:30] I think begins to lead and particularly [37:34] as people get older [37:35] because I interview a lot of people in [37:37] their 80s and 90s. [37:39] And then they begin to think about [37:42] what this means in terms of legacy. [37:46] What is nuclear command and control [37:50] really as buttoned up [37:52] as this is might be them talking, you [37:54] know, [37:55] as I thought. [37:57] And is it a good idea [38:00] in a world that is so rapidly changing [38:03] both geopolitically and also in terms of [38:07] technology? [38:08] Was there one individual you met that [38:10] comes to mind when I ask who the most [38:13] troubled person was in terms of the work [38:16] they participated in or troubled in the [38:18] context of [38:21] what they know and what it means for [38:22] humanity and how they're grappling with [38:24] that? The most concerned and sort of the [38:27] most activated by all means would be [38:29] former Secretary of Defense Bill Perry. [38:31] And he's now in his 90s and I I don't [38:34] believe he's doing interviews anymore. [38:36] But it it's not surprising that Perry [38:39] shared with me his intense worry about [38:43] all of this because he has been actively [38:46] working on this and [38:48] you know, for at least 15, 20 years. And [38:52] when I say this, I mean bringing the [38:56] information to the public so that the [38:58] public is aware. He wrote his own book [39:00] with a colleague called The Button. And [39:03] he has, you know, really [39:05] he did a podcast called At the Brink. [39:08] And what's fascinating is Perry spent [39:10] most of his life dedicated to what you [39:14] might call the military-industrial [39:15] complex, right? To the research and [39:18] development of weapon systems that I [39:21] write about in my other books, [39:24] the DARPA book in particular because [39:26] this is all part and parcel to what [39:27] we're talking about here that you have [39:30] this sort of [39:31] industry, [39:33] military weapon system industry that is [39:35] in a constant state of [39:38] forward movement. It's deeply tied to [39:41] economics, to jobs, to prosperity. And [39:44] so, where does that take us? And and at [39:48] what point does it end? It was [39:50] Eisenhower who said in his famous speech [39:52] where the public really learned about [39:54] this so-called military-industrial [39:56] complex because Eisenhower spoke of it [39:59] in his farewell speech. But he also said [40:01] an important thing in the second half of [40:03] that speech which doesn't get nearly as [40:05] much airtime, which is that a [40:07] knowledgeable and alert citizenry [40:11] is how you balance sort of an idea of [40:14] peace with an idea of defense. [40:18] And I think what frightens both of us [40:19] that we talked about in the beginning [40:20] here was that peace and defense are very [40:25] different than constant states of war. [40:30] 72 minutes. [40:32] You you go through this in the book [40:34] minute almost minute by minute showing [40:36] exactly what will happen. We know in [40:37] this first [40:39] couple of minutes there's the [40:40] notification that there's a you know, a [40:42] nuclear bomb coming in from somewhere. [40:44] My question on that was and I was [40:45] thinking about this earlier as we were [40:46] talking about it, how does the president [40:48] know? How does the world leader of that [40:49] country know? The prime minister of the [40:50] UK, whoever it might be, or Netanyahu, [40:53] or Putin know where that nuclear bomb [40:57] has come from because we talked about [40:58] this sort of black black book of places, [41:00] this menu that the president has in that [41:03] football that his aide is carrying [41:05] around. [41:06] How does he know which place to pick on [41:09] the menu to send the nuclear bomb back? [41:11] Powerful distinction, right? This is not [41:13] 9/11 where suddenly there are planes in [41:16] the Trade Center towers and [41:19] you know, everyone is scrambling to say [41:21] who did this and the CIA is saying this [41:23] is Al-Qaeda, it has the mark of Al but [41:25] no one knows for sure. This is not that. [41:29] This is the fact that for 79 years the [41:32] United States has been building nuclear [41:34] weapons, nuclear weapon systems, and [41:36] also systems to detect other people's [41:40] nuclear weapons should they have them. [41:42] What are these submarines? Okay, so [41:45] good point on the submarines, which is [41:47] but [41:48] we have a set of satellites called [41:51] Sibers, which are parked. Now, I'm only [41:54] talk when you said what how would [41:56] Netanyahu know, how would the president [41:57] of [41:58] that is a different scenario. [42:02] What I am talking about is the US [42:04] president because I have interviewed [42:07] people in the US Defense Department and [42:10] the intelligence community. And the [42:11] Defense Department knows precisely where [42:16] a weapon comes from within a second of [42:17] launch because the Siber satellites can [42:20] measure the hot rocket exhaust. So, you [42:22] imagine a rocket taking off, lots of [42:25] fire beneath it. That is measured [42:28] from 22,000 miles up in geosync. I mean, [42:31] that is just a technological [42:33] astonishment. [42:34] And then there begins the data sent down [42:39] to these various commands in the United [42:41] States, the Aerospace Data Center, the [42:43] Space Force, and they begin measuring [42:45] the trajectory of the missile and [42:48] figuring out where it's going to go. [42:49] Like, it's not going to Moscow and it's [42:51] not going to Guam, those would be [42:53] opposite directions. Is it going to San [42:55] Francisco or is it going to the East [42:57] Coast? That is learned in 100 seconds [43:01] approximately. Okay? Now, you are right, [43:04] you cannot you if some if a submarine [43:07] launches a ballistic missile, there's no [43:10] way of knowing where that came from, [43:11] which is why in the scenario I have that [43:13] happen and it creates a whole other set [43:17] of problems. [43:18] What are these I mean I mean I mean what [43:20] is the answer to that? Cuz I was [43:21] imagining [43:22] if the Siber system sees a nuclear bomb [43:25] coming out of the Pacific Ocean, [43:27] I mean, that could be Rishi Sunak, that [43:29] could be [43:30] that could be the UK firing one at [43:33] America. It could be, you know, could be [43:35] anybody. You are absolutely right that [43:37] there is no way of knowing. And in the [43:38] scenario that I chose because I wanted [43:40] to try to take the reader through a [43:43] logical sequence, if you could even call [43:46] any of this logical because it's all you [43:48] know, they call it MAD, Mutual Assured [43:49] Destruction. It's really madness. [43:52] But you cannot know who launched that. [43:56] So does we just go for our enemy in that [43:58] situation? [44:00] I mean, [44:01] Do you know what I mean? [44:02] now you [44:03] have a new task. You are going to write [44:06] nuclear war an even worse scenario. [44:09] Well, cuz that's what you would do, [44:10] right? If you're President Biden, your [44:12] aide turns to you and goes, "Hi [44:13] President, there's a nuclear bomb [44:14] heading our way." I go, "I know exactly [44:16] who that who did that." [44:20] And you might start firing a couple of [44:21] back back at just the people that you [44:23] assume would do it. [44:24] And then they do the same. [44:27] Um [44:29] The nuclear-armed submarines [44:32] that [44:34] are owned by Russia and China [44:37] regularly come within a couple hundred [44:40] miles of East of each coast of the [44:42] United States and you can assume the [44:44] same about England. [44:46] And how do we know this? [44:48] Well, you can't see a submarine moving [44:50] in real time, but you can track the [44:53] submarine's movements after the fact [44:56] owing to a very [44:58] complex system of underwater [45:01] surveillance [45:02] systems that we have in place. [45:05] And there's a map that appeared in a [45:08] recent Defense Department budget request [45:11] to Congress, which I reproduce in the [45:13] book, that shows just how close those [45:17] submarines, those enemy submarines get [45:19] to the coast. And that reduces the [45:22] travel time of a ballistic missile down [45:25] to under 10 minutes. And so this idea [45:28] that we really are living at the edge of [45:31] apocalypse is not an exaggeration. The [45:34] question is, how would this start? Why [45:36] would this start? Again, read the [45:39] scenario and you begin to realize [45:43] this could start in or have a discussion [45:46] with you and you this could start in so [45:48] many [45:50] the training test tape. I mean, [45:52] and the real takeaway is asking [45:55] ourselves is [45:56] why do none of us know about this? Or [45:58] most of us rather. [46:02] There's so many ways this could start [46:03] and one of them one of them obviously [46:05] again has emerged [46:06] front of mind for society since you [46:08] started writing the book, which is [46:09] artificial intelligence. Before I get to [46:11] that though, I really want to I really [46:12] want to close off on this 72 minutes. I [46:15] understand the first couple of minutes [46:16] there. [46:17] Um [46:19] what does the person listening to this [46:20] need to know about what happens in the [46:22] subsequent what are 60 minutes? [46:25] There's a very fast process where the [46:28] trajectory of the ballistic missile is [46:31] being determined and we're talking in [46:33] the first minutes of the sequence [46:35] because everyone is getting ready to [46:37] tell the president because what they're [46:38] going to tell the president is, "Sir, [46:40] you need to choose a counterattack." [46:42] That is called get the blue clock [46:44] running. Does the president not like [46:46] getting some plane super quick? [46:48] So, we'll get there in a second because [46:49] that's where the that's a decision tree [46:51] problem. [46:51] Okay. So, everyone is working on [46:54] figuring out the trajectory of the [46:55] ballistic missile. [46:57] And there is the first confirmation when [47:00] you see it and by the way, a ballistic [47:01] missile cannot be redirected or [47:04] recalled. Cannot be. [47:06] Now, [47:07] ultimately the Defense Department will [47:10] wait for second confirmation of that [47:12] missile from a ground radar system. We [47:15] have them around the world. The one in [47:17] the scenario that would see it is in [47:18] Alaska. [47:19] It has to be able to see and confirm [47:23] that missile is definitely coming this [47:25] way. [47:26] And that happens at around 8 or 9 [47:28] minutes. And so the process in between [47:31] that everyone's getting ready to brief [47:33] the president about a counterattack. And [47:36] so [47:37] in the scenario the president learns [47:38] around 3 minutes and then they're [47:41] waiting on the secondary confirmation. [47:43] And in my interviews with the Secret [47:44] Service, [47:46] as I was reporting the book, interesting [47:48] things would happen exactly like your [47:50] question, like, "Wait a minute. [47:52] What would [47:54] would the president be staying at the [47:55] White House?" So, I as the reporter put [47:57] that question to the former director of [47:59] the Secret Service, who explains to me [48:02] how there is a team called the Counter [48:04] Assault Team. [48:06] Um and that is that is the sort of [48:08] paramilitary organization of the of the [48:11] Secret Service that's going to always be [48:13] there to move the president really fast [48:16] if need be. And in this situation, they [48:20] make a decision, "We're moving him." If [48:23] the target is Washington, D.C. or [48:25] anywhere on the East Coast for that [48:26] matter, we cannot have the president [48:29] anywhere near ground zero. [48:31] And their job that they are sworn to do [48:34] is to protect the president. And so that [48:36] then you're going to have a bit of a [48:38] stalemate because the military command [48:41] wants the president on on coms to be [48:44] able to give him counterstrike orders. [48:47] That is what they want. [48:48] And they can only get those orders from [48:51] the president, but the Secret Service [48:53] has a totally different agenda. And in [48:55] my scenario, the Secret Service, [48:57] considering they're the only ones in the [48:59] room that are armed, win. [49:01] They take the president out and he flies [49:04] out of Washington, D.C. in Marine One. [49:08] Marine One being the helicopter? The [49:10] helicopter that is that Yeah. You know, [49:12] and then I learned even more interesting [49:13] details like, "Okay, so in the scenario, [49:16] the likely situation is that the [49:18] electromagnetic pulse will really [49:21] threaten the the electronic system in [49:23] Marine One and it will be in deep danger [49:25] of crashing." What is that for people [49:27] that don't know? For people that don't [49:28] know, an an electromagnetic pulse is [49:30] like a three-pulsed [49:32] sort of shock wave that essentially just [49:35] zeros out electronics. Imagine your [49:38] house getting struck by lightning, a [49:40] direct hit, [49:42] and no surge suppressor. I mean, just [49:44] just it's all all the electronics go [49:46] out, and that will almost certainly [49:48] happen. Marine One is outfitted [49:51] retrofitted against EMP attack cuz they [49:54] think about these things, but no one [49:57] knows if it's going to really work. It's [49:58] been tested in a chamber. They're [50:01] So So, what you're saying, sorry, just [50:01] to be clear, is that whoever's attacking [50:04] the United States or another country [50:06] would send an electronic pulse first? [50:09] No, the pulse is part of the of the bomb [50:11] going off. [50:11] Ah, okay. [50:11] It's It's a It's inherent in the nuclear [50:14] explosion. Okay. And so, even if you [50:16] even if you're getting the president [50:17] out, if he's 7 8 9 miles 10 miles out of [50:21] ground zero, as they rush because [50:23] remember this is all happening in 30 [50:24] minutes, under 30 minutes, as they rush [50:27] to get him out of the White House, [50:29] the EMP could seriously damage the [50:31] Marine One. So, the Secret Service [50:33] people I interviewed explained to me [50:35] that they would have a backup plan, [50:38] which would be to tandem jump the [50:40] president out of the aircraft [50:43] in a with with a parachute. They would [50:44] strap the president onto them and jump [50:46] out of the aircraft cuz at least there [50:47] would be the the aircraft is going to [50:49] crash if it gets hit by the [50:50] electromagnetic pulse. [50:52] So, at least there's a better chance. [50:54] Well, then you have to have the mill aid [50:56] has to have a parachute cuz he's got the [50:58] black book. And the direct the the [51:01] special agent in charge of the president [51:03] is definitely going to go. So, then I [51:04] learned that this incredible detail that [51:07] there aren't parachutes in Marine One. [51:10] So, they have to go to the White House [51:12] office to get the parachutes. You know, [51:14] these kind of details [51:16] I believe provide the reader with a [51:18] number of things like the the [51:21] astonishing understanding of how many [51:24] different scenarios are in play all the [51:27] time, you know, being rehearsed so that [51:30] we because we might have a nuclear war. [51:33] At the same time that the messaging is [51:35] we will never have a nuclear war. [51:37] And then when you begin to look at all [51:39] the competing agendas that will happen, [51:42] you you realize it's just chaos upon [51:44] mayhem. [51:46] What if the president dies [51:49] in the strike [51:51] and before we've made a counter attack? [51:53] Which is something that Stratcom thinks [51:55] about and it's certainly why I have that [51:57] in the scenario because if the president [51:59] is the only one that can order a [52:01] a counter attack, that can launch [52:02] nuclear weapons, what if he dies? [52:05] And so, I learned in the reporting that [52:07] if you're the president, let's say he [52:09] even gives the order, okay, here's my [52:11] counter strike. I'm choosing this from [52:13] the black book. [52:15] The situ- the command and control is set [52:18] up that if the president orders 82 [52:19] nuclear weapons is in response, [52:22] you can't launch 83 nuclear weapons. [52:25] It's 82 and 82 only. And then to do [52:28] another launch requires passwords I [52:32] mean, it requires so much bureaucracy. [52:35] There's not time for that. And so, [52:36] there's this almost unknown little [52:40] detail inside of the nuclear command and [52:42] control apparatus called a universal [52:45] unlock code, which I learned about in [52:47] the book, and the eyebrow goes up for [52:49] exactly that reason, as did mine when I [52:52] Wait, what? And then you find out that [52:54] the president can release to the [52:57] Stratcom commander [52:59] the universal unlock code, which [53:01] basically says, okay, you if I die, you [53:05] have permission to launch [53:08] nuclear weapon number 83 [53:11] or nuclear weapon number 5,000, you [53:13] know, all the way up. And that [53:16] is a pretty [53:18] shocking concept. [53:23] The president responds to the nuclear [53:24] attack, [53:26] hits I don't know, let's say they they [53:28] hit Russia. [53:29] They send the submarines out to [53:32] send the [53:33] ICBMs or whatever it's called to hit [53:36] strike Russia. [53:37] Russia have these submarines as well, [53:39] they send more back. [53:42] What does What's the aftermath [53:44] of [53:45] nuclear you know, that 72 that 72nd [53:48] minute? Cuz I imagine from the minute [53:50] the president hears that um [53:52] gets the notification that there are [53:54] it's been confirmed, it's had the second [53:55] confirmation, [53:56] he's going to make the decision to fire [53:58] nuclear weapons back, I assume. [54:00] And then from I mean, from there it's [54:02] just all fire as far as I'm concerned. [54:04] There's a concept called jamming the [54:05] president, which is So, the president [54:08] learns in the scenario I write that [54:10] North Korea has fired [54:12] a ballistic missile and then a second [54:13] one comes in from a sub and hits a [54:15] nuclear power plant in California. [54:17] Why did you pick North Korea? [54:19] I picked North Korea because of my [54:21] interviews with Richard Garwin, the [54:23] designer of the nuclear thermonuclear [54:25] bomb, the first one, which he designed [54:27] for Teller, [54:29] because in our interviews I asked him [54:31] what scared me most. Garwin, also in his [54:33] 90s, has advised every president of the [54:35] United States since Eisenhower. [54:38] He was an early founder of NRO. I mean, [54:40] our one of our most classified agencies. [54:43] His [54:44] opinion matters. And while he didn't [54:47] want to be specific, he gave me sort of [54:50] a very interesting, almost poetic [54:52] metaphor when he spoke of the mad king. [54:56] And the mad king with a nuclear arsenal, [54:59] and he even used us that French phrase [55:02] après moi le déluge. [55:05] This idea of like after me the flood. If [55:07] I die, who cares? And I [55:10] interpreted that that Garwin was talking [55:13] about North Korea because North Korea is [55:15] the rogue nuclear-armed nation that [55:18] regularly sets off ballistic missiles [55:21] and doesn't tell anyone. There is an [55:23] unspoken reality among the other nations [55:26] that you inform people when you're going [55:28] to test an ICBM with a dummy warhead, of [55:31] course. [55:32] North Korea doesn't adhere to that. So, [55:34] you know, [55:35] when I interviewed people who are in [55:37] those command and control bunkers, those [55:39] first 100 seconds we spoke of where the [55:41] ballistic missile is on its way, and and [55:44] and all of that command and control is [55:46] focused on is this coming at us or is it [55:49] as launching a space satellite or is it [55:51] going into the Sea of Japan? That's what [55:53] North Korea does. [55:55] They don't announce those tests, and so [55:57] imagine the anxiety [55:59] in those command bunkers [56:02] every time they launch [56:04] a ballistic missile. They have launched [56:06] uh more than 100 ballistic missiles in [56:08] an 18-month period from like 2022 [56:11] forward. [56:12] Testing. [56:13] Okay. Testing. [56:14] So, this is so dangerous and so rogue. [56:18] If they're, you know, on the one hand I [56:20] say there are no rules to nuclear war, [56:22] but there are a few nuclear rules to [56:24] nuclear deterrence like you tell your [56:26] neighbors. And that's why I chose North [56:28] Korea. But just to finish that, the [56:30] sequence [56:33] the president launches 82 missiles at [56:37] North Korea in a counter attack. [56:39] And that is And in the scenario that I [56:42] write, the failure [56:44] now becomes about miscommunication, a [56:47] very important concept, and also about [56:50] technology not working. [56:52] And I source in the book precisely where [56:55] this information comes from. So, [56:57] Russia [56:59] misinterprets [57:01] our launching nuclear weapons at North [57:04] Korea [57:05] as being launched at Russia. Why? [57:09] Because actual fact, our ICBMs do not [57:13] have enough range [57:16] to travel [57:17] to North Korea without overflying [57:20] Russia. [57:22] And so, imagine in a climate like now [57:26] with hostilities as an all-time high, [57:29] the Russian president just saying, okay, [57:32] well, maybe they're not coming for us. [57:34] And nuclear policy, the policy of [57:36] deterrence is you launch if someone's [57:38] launching at you. And so, that is where, [57:42] you know, in the second act of the book, [57:45] it's 24 minutes 24 minutes 24 minutes [57:47] end game, Russia launches. And Russia [57:50] launch You don't launch If someone's [57:52] attacking you with nuclear missiles, [57:55] you don't launch [57:57] one or two back. That's mad king logic. [58:01] You launch the mother lode, and that's [58:04] what I have Russia launch in the [58:05] scenario. What do you mean mad king [58:07] logic? Well, mad king logic is [58:11] why would you do that? Yeah, yeah. [58:13] Okay. So, in the book [58:15] in the mad king logic of the book, the [58:17] leader of North Korea, who is nameless, [58:20] um [58:21] launches a nuclear weapon at the United [58:23] States for reasons we don't know, and we [58:24] will never know because history will [58:26] end. The ability to write history ends [58:29] in 72 minutes of the book. [58:32] So, we will never know why. [58:35] And that is the sort of, [58:38] you know, question. [58:40] Mad king logic is very different than [58:42] Defense Department logic or in many [58:45] regards [58:46] Russian nuclear command and control [58:48] logic, which I interviewed sort of the [58:50] world's expert on those subjects to be [58:52] able to, you know, give readers quickly [58:55] an idea of what that logic is and why [58:59] it has held for 79 years. [59:03] Can't we just shoot it out the sky? [59:06] That is the great fantasy that is a [59:08] fallacy, right? So, [59:11] let's talk numbers for a second. [59:14] America has 1,770 [59:16] nuclear weapons on ready for launch [59:20] status. They're deployed. [59:22] Okay? They can launch in seconds, [59:24] minutes, maybe some of the bombers take [59:26] an hour or two. [59:28] Russia has roughly the same, 1,674. [59:32] That's the parity of the nuclear [59:34] treaties. That says nothing of the [59:36] thousands more that we each have in [59:38] reserve. But those are actual nuclear [59:40] weapons that are pointed at one another [59:42] ready to go. [59:43] Ready to go. Okay? So those numbers [59:48] The US has an interceptor program [59:52] to allegedly intercept a long-range [59:56] ballistic missile. I'm not talking about [59:57] short-range or even medium-range, [59:59] long-range like that would come from [60:02] Russia or North Korea. We have 44 [60:07] interceptor missiles. Four of them are [60:09] at Vandenberg Air Force Base in Santa [60:11] Barbara. 40 of them are at Fort Greely [60:14] in Alaska. [60:15] 44. So if Russia has 1,607 [60:19] nuclear weapons how are our 44 [60:23] interceptors going to go up against [60:25] those? [60:26] And that and that says nothing by the [60:28] way, and I get into this in sort of the [60:30] little bit of the wonkiness inside a [60:33] nuclear warhead [60:35] many of them are what are called MIRV's, [60:37] which means they have multiple warheads [60:39] inside of it. And so when the warhead [60:41] unleashes the multiple warheads go out [60:43] along with decoys so that if an [60:46] interceptor missile is coming at it [60:48] it it greatly reduces the chance that [60:51] the interceptor will be able to shoot it [60:52] out of the sky. The way that it was said [60:54] to me was like this. [60:55] An interceptor missile, which is [60:57] basically just like a small ICBM, right? [60:59] It's a small rocket. [61:01] It [61:03] is like trying to shoot a bullet with a [61:05] bullet. That's a quote from the [61:08] spokesperson of at the Pentagon. [61:11] One of them is traveling at 14,000 miles [61:14] an hour, the ballistic missile. 14,000 [61:17] miles an hour. [61:19] The interceptor, the little kinetic [61:21] vehicle inside of it that's going to hit [61:23] the warhead, hopefully, is traveling at [61:26] 20,000 miles an hour. That's where you [61:29] get the trying to hit a bullet with a [61:32] bullet. And by the way, this is all [61:33] happening 500 miles up in space. [61:37] Good luck. [61:38] The success rate of our interceptor [61:40] program is between 40 and 55%. That's on [61:44] a good day where they're testing these [61:46] things and they go, "Hey, we're doing an [61:48] interceptor test. It might be around [61:52] there, right?" That's called a curated [61:54] test. That's not in the madness of the [61:56] moment. [61:58] The bombs land. [62:00] If I was a [62:03] fly on the wall, not that there would be [62:05] a wall left. [62:06] What would I what would I and I was [62:07] looking at America or the UK after it [62:09] had been strike struck by these nuclear [62:12] bombs by thousands of, you know, Russian [62:14] or North Korean nuclear weapons, what [62:16] would I see? What would the visuals be [62:18] in those minutes after the strike? [62:20] I describe the first bomb in the [62:23] scenario that strikes the Pentagon. It's [62:25] a one megaton thermonuclear bomb in [62:27] painstaking horrific detail all sourced [62:30] from Defense Department documents, [62:32] defense scientists who have worked for [62:33] decades to describe precisely what [62:35] happens to things and to humans. And [62:38] it's horrifying. But on top of the [62:41] initial flash of thermonuclear light, [62:44] which is 180 million degrees, which [62:46] catches everything on fire in a 9-mile [62:49] diameter radius. On top of the [62:51] bulldozing effect of the wind and the [62:53] all the buildings coming down and more [62:56] fires igniting more fires. On top of the [62:58] radiation poisoning people to death in [63:01] minutes and hours and days and weeks if [63:04] they happen to have survived. On top of [63:05] all of that, each one of these fires [63:08] creates a megafire that is 100 or more [63:12] square miles. And so essentially in [63:15] essence, what do you see? Well, in the [63:17] scenario at minute 72, a thousand [63:20] Russian nuclear weapons land on the [63:22] United States. And so it just becomes a [63:25] conflagration of fire. It's just fire [63:29] fires burning. Fires 100, 200 square [63:34] mile fires burning. And then we move [63:37] into nuclear winter. And that's sort of [63:40] the denouement of the book where I tell [63:43] you about nuclear winter from the point [63:46] of view of one of the original [63:49] scientists who wrote that original [63:51] nuclear winter paper with Carl Sagan [63:54] back in 1983. And his name is Professor [63:56] Brian Toon, and he's spent the decades [63:58] since working with the state-of-the-art [64:01] climate modeling systems that can now [64:03] precisely tell us what nuclear winter [64:06] will look like. Cuz I've always thought, [64:07] you know what, nuclear war wouldn't be [64:09] that bad if, you know, Russia launched a [64:10] thousand of their nuclear bombs at the [64:12] United States and I was here in New York [64:14] where I am now [64:15] I would die instantly so I wouldn't [64:17] really know it happened. [64:18] Is that true? I think you would want to [64:21] die instantly. I mean, there's a quote [64:22] from Nikita Khrushchev, the former [64:25] um premier of the Soviet Union, and he [64:27] said, "After nuclear war, the survivors [64:30] would envy the dead." [64:33] Because there is right? There is this [64:36] sense of if you survived, I mean, there [64:40] is no more law and order. There is no [64:43] more rule of law. There is no [64:46] government. Craig Fugate made that very [64:48] clear. The bunkers that the people in [64:51] the military command and control centers [64:53] would be in, let's say the secret [64:55] bunkers, not the ones that are targets [64:56] that Russia's going to take out that I [64:58] write about in the book, but the smaller [64:59] ones those are going to only function [65:03] for as long as there's gasoline to run [65:05] the diesel in the diesel generators. And [65:08] then those people are going to have to [65:09] come out. And who's left? It's man [65:13] returning to the most primal, most [65:16] violent state as people fight over the [65:20] tiny resources that remain. And by the [65:23] way, they're all malnourished. [65:25] Everybody's sick. And most people have [65:29] lost everything and everyone they know. [65:31] How's that going to feel? [65:35] It's going to feel as you describe here [65:36] on page 277 [65:39] there are a thousand flashes of light [65:41] superheating the air in each ground zero [65:43] to 180 million degrees Fahrenheit. A [65:46] thousand fireballs each more than a mile [65:48] in diameter. [65:50] A thousand steeply fronted blast waves. [65:53] A thousand walls of compressed air. A [65:56] thousand American cities and towns where [65:59] all where all engineered structures in [66:01] 5, 6, or 7-mile radius change physical [66:04] shapes, collapse, and burn. A thousand [66:06] cities and towns with molten asphalt [66:08] streets. A thousand cities and towns [66:10] with survivors impaled to death by [66:11] flying debris. A thousand cities and [66:13] towns filled with tens of millions of [66:15] dead people. With tens of millions of [66:17] unfortunate survivors suffering fatal [66:19] third-degree burns. People naked, [66:21] tattered, bleeding, and suffocating. [66:23] People who don't look or act like people [66:27] anymore. [66:30] Across America and Europe, hundreds of [66:31] millions of people are dead and dying [66:33] while hundreds of military aircraft fly [66:35] circles in the air until they until they [66:37] run out of fuel. [66:39] I mean, that is [66:42] that is some visual. [66:44] How many people would be [66:46] dead or dying, do you think, after those [66:48] 72 minutes? [66:51] Hundreds of millions of people die [66:55] in the fireballs, no question. But the [66:58] number that I think is very interesting [67:00] to think about comes from Professor Toon [67:04] and his team who wrote a paper for [67:07] Nature uh recently, 2022, and sort of [67:11] updated nuclear winter idea based around [67:15] food. And the number that they have is 5 [67:18] billion people [67:20] would be dead. The population of the [67:22] planet currently is about 8 billion? [67:24] Yes. So there'd be 3 billion people [67:26] still alive. [67:29] Where shall I go to be one of the 3 [67:32] billion? I I was just in New Zealand and [67:34] Australia. That's exactly where you'd [67:36] go. Although according to Toon, those [67:38] are the only places that could actually [67:41] sustain agriculture. [67:43] I was there two weeks ago. Not even two [67:46] weeks ago, it was maybe 10 days ago. I [67:47] was in New Zealand and Australia. [67:49] And at that time [67:51] I think Iran attacked Israel. [67:54] Right. Yes. [67:58] I was kind of happy. You're in the right [68:00] place at the right time. Yeah. I was [68:01] kind of happy for where I was located if [68:03] I'm you know, and I was thinking I [68:05] actually remember I was talking to my [68:06] friends and I pulled up a map and I was [68:07] trying to see how far away I was from [68:09] everything. I was thinking if cuz World [68:11] War III started trending on Twitter, I [68:12] was thinking if if it does break out [68:14] now, I think I'm pretty probably pretty [68:16] well placed. Is that the place to be, do [68:18] That is. That is according to Professor [68:20] Toon. I mean, he was so generous with [68:22] me. He shared a lot of his slideshows [68:25] that he has for his students. And that [68:28] is really pretty much what's left. I [68:29] mean, because most of the world is [68:32] certainly the mid-latitudes would be [68:33] covered in these, [68:35] you know, sheets of ice. The the [68:37] freshwater bodies, [68:39] places like Iowa and Ukraine would be [68:42] would be just snow for 10 years. And so [68:44] agriculture would fail. And when [68:47] agriculture fails, people just die. And [68:50] and on on top of that, you have the [68:52] radiation poisoning because the ozone [68:55] layer will be so damaged and destroyed [68:59] that [69:00] you can't be outside in the sunlight. [69:05] And so people will be forced to live [69:07] underground. And so you have to imagine [69:11] people living underground fighting for [69:13] food everywhere except for in New [69:14] Zealand and Australia. Um there was also [69:17] another interesting detail that that he [69:20] shared with me that, you know [69:22] 66 million years ago an asteroid hit [69:27] Earth and wiped out the dinosaurs [69:30] and something like 70% of the known [69:32] species. [69:34] And Professor Toon compared nuclear war [69:38] to that situation. [69:41] And so when you really think about it [69:43] and and again this was also echoed by [69:44] Craig Fugate [69:46] FEMA's director. [69:49] You think about it there's nothing we [69:50] can do about an asteroid. [69:54] At least not right now. [69:56] And yet there is something [69:58] nuclear war is a man-made threat [70:02] and therefore it has to be a man-made [70:05] solution. [70:07] What is the solution? [70:10] I really believe that people motivate [70:12] other people. It's like a fundamental [70:14] truth on the smallest scale and on the [70:16] biggest scale. And so there's one person [70:19] who is incredibly powerful and that is [70:21] the president of the United States. For [70:23] better or for worse, it's just the way [70:25] it is. And so in the same way that the [70:27] president has [70:28] presidential sole authority to start a [70:30] nuclear war, the president also has a [70:32] very powerful pen with which he can [70:34] write executive orders and EO. [70:38] And the story I tell on the hopeful note [70:40] goes like this. When I was in high [70:42] school in 1983 there was an ABC TV movie [70:46] called The Day After [70:48] and it [70:49] showed a fictional war between the [70:52] United States and then Soviet Russia. [70:55] It was horrific and terrifying, okay? [70:58] 100 million Americans watched it. [71:01] 100 million Americans It's like the [71:03] third of the the population. [71:05] And I think it was half the population [71:08] then. [71:08] Um [71:09] President Reagan was one of those [71:12] Americans. He had a private screening at [71:14] Camp David. [71:16] His advisers told him not to watch it. [71:18] He did watch it. Before that President [71:21] Reagan was a hawk. He was pro nuclear [71:25] weapons. His position was the more [71:27] nuclear weapons the better. He was the [71:29] one putting nuclear weapons in space [71:32] with the Star Wars program, the SDI [71:34] program, okay? He couldn't have been [71:36] more pro deterrence [71:39] supremacy. [71:41] He saw The Day After [71:44] and he changed his position. He wrote in [71:47] his White House journal that he became [71:49] greatly depressed, his words. [71:53] And he reached out to Gorbachev. [71:55] And then they had a Reykjavik Summit a [71:57] summit in Iceland [71:59] Reagan and Gorbachev [72:01] and [72:02] through communication, right? Through [72:06] both of them realizing this is madness [72:09] realizing what could happen seeing The [72:11] Day After and realizing my God [72:14] this cannot happen. And they famously [72:16] issued a statement that said a nuke the [72:18] joint statement between the two of them [72:20] that said [72:20] a nuclear war cannot be won [72:24] and must never be fought. [72:26] And the result of the Reykjavik Summit [72:29] was that the world has gone from 70,000 [72:32] nuclear warheads. That was the all-time [72:35] high. [72:36] 70,000. [72:38] Why do you need 70,000 nuclear warheads? [72:42] That's what there were in 1986. And now [72:46] here we are because of the reductions, [72:48] because of the treaties, thanks to those [72:50] two. [72:52] 12,500 [72:54] approximately nuclear warheads. That is [72:57] the movement in the right direction. [73:00] And it came from [73:02] a dramatic story being told and it came [73:05] from the president taking action because [73:08] people would not stand for this anymore. [73:11] There were massive protests. Do you [73:13] believe we could ever get to zero? [73:15] Honestly. [73:15] That is for the disarmament experts. I [73:18] like to stay in my lane as a [73:20] storyteller, as an investigative [73:22] journalist. I like to give you the [73:24] dramatic [73:26] fast read and then pass the baton [73:30] to those who have been working on that [73:34] issue for decades because boy are they [73:35] qualified. I just had the great fortune [73:37] of being invited to Brussels where I was [73:40] part of a nuclear expo and there were [73:43] members of the European Parliament in [73:44] the audience. [73:46] And I and and there were all these [73:48] disarmament people there and I learned a [73:50] lot about all of these groups and they [73:54] have the answer and they are the ones [73:56] that should be asked that question and [73:58] they are doing a lot to get us there. [74:01] From the moment you wrote the first word [74:05] in this new book um nuclear war scenario [74:08] to when you finish the book, how did [74:10] your feelings change about the subject [74:13] matter? [74:18] It's interesting because [74:21] you [74:22] you write the This is just my experience [74:25] as a journalist, but [74:26] you you write the book and you're like [74:28] any [74:29] professional person you want to do a [74:31] really good job at your job, right? So [74:34] so I was very focused on gathering the [74:37] facts and then relaying them in a [74:39] readable way, you know? My husband Kevin [74:42] always says like you got to write [74:43] something that someone can read on the [74:44] beach or an airplane. Right? Which is [74:46] not necessarily conducive to like Nazi [74:49] scientists or the other things I've [74:50] written about. But for this it became [74:52] clear to me nuclear launch to nuclear [74:55] winter fast. Have people read it fast [74:59] because you want to grab their attention [75:00] because [75:01] I'm a mother, you know? I'm a hopeful [75:04] person that believes that we do not have [75:06] to live with this threat overhead. And [75:08] so my focus of the work was really on [75:12] doing the best job I could to narrate [75:15] the story and I think you you take your [75:18] hat off about um maybe any more sort of [75:23] emotional or sentimental feelings. You [75:26] try to [75:27] you try to push that into the prose I [75:30] suppose. So maybe in subtext [75:33] there is [75:34] a sense of urgency and and even fear. [75:39] But for me intellectually, you know as [75:43] an investigative journalist it was it [75:45] was just what's what's the next page [75:47] going to read like. But how do you feel [75:48] about you know the nature that you It's [75:50] interesting as well because you when you [75:52] think about the books you've written I [75:53] don't even think how many have you [75:54] written now six or seven? Seven books in [75:56] total. [75:57] The subject matter of your books are all [76:00] the basis of a lot of conspiracy theory. [76:03] If that makes sense. You know you've [76:04] written about Area 51 and this thing [76:06] called Operation Paperclip and the [76:07] Pentagon and [76:09] and our nuclear bombs and the CIA, all [76:11] these kinds of things which are the [76:12] basis of many of the conspiracy theories [76:14] that I hear hear about. Um so you've [76:18] you've got a very unique perspective on [76:19] the world because you've had the [76:20] privilege and the access of interviewing [76:22] some of the most interesting people that [76:23] are closest to these very interesting [76:25] subjects. [76:26] What are some of the things that you've [76:28] come to learn that you once thought were [76:29] just conspiracy theories? [76:33] I mean conspiracy theory is such a [76:35] loaded word and I think it's too bad [76:39] that um it's used as a catchall to kind [76:42] of dismiss [76:45] uh a lot of curiosity. Mhm. Because [76:48] curiosity is important, right? And [76:50] curiosity leads toward reading. I mean I [76:52] couldn't be a bigger fan of reading or [76:54] listening to pod you know educating [76:56] yourself. I mean things have really [76:57] changed in terms of audio. Like you can [77:00] listen to a podcast [77:02] and learn a lot. You can listen to an [77:04] audio book the same way that you used to [77:06] have to read them. And [77:08] and so [77:10] to just call things conspiracy [77:13] theories I find to be intellectually [77:17] thin, right? It's just too easy. And [77:19] it's also very self-righteous. [77:21] And I think two things I always work to [77:24] avoid um [77:26] is like [77:28] kind of being a know-it-all. And I am [77:30] around a lot of know-it-alls because [77:32] people who become experts in subjects [77:36] um and maybe they don't get as much [77:37] attention as they think they deserve [77:40] tend to become [77:41] a little bit of self-righteous [77:43] know-it-alls. [77:44] And so I have to wind my way [77:47] through that world because I'm always [77:50] What interests me are [77:52] subjects that [77:54] make me ask the question why, right? [77:57] Like [77:58] why does no one know about Area 51? What [78:00] why why is Area 51 so secret? I mean [78:03] when I wrote the book Area 51 the word [78:05] Area 51 was still classified. Really? [78:08] You couldn't say it. I went to the CIA [78:10] and I was told by my minder [78:12] if you say a certain word and number [78:17] you will be asked to leave. [78:19] It was classified. It only became [78:20] unclassified when President Obama spoke [78:23] about it publicly. Oh really? He just [78:25] mentioned it [78:27] and then it was unclassified. Right? And [78:29] so [78:32] to answer your question um [78:35] I find it really interesting tackling [78:37] subjects that are in the zeitgeist that [78:41] people are interested in and then trying [78:43] to unpack [78:45] the truths and the fictions. Is there [78:48] something you heard about you heard a [78:50] you know a whisper about and you thought [78:51] that can't possibly be true? And then [78:53] after doing a little bit of [78:54] investigative researching and journalism [78:57] you discover that it actually was true [78:58] and you were blown away. And I say that [79:00] in part because [79:01] I lived much of my life thinking that a [79:03] lot of these subjects Area 51, the CIA, [79:05] this idea that there's all these spies [79:07] and they're doing all this stuff and I [79:09] thought a lot of it was [79:12] just internet rumors and you know people [79:15] who certain people who have you know [79:18] they have like the silver foil on their [79:19] heads and they're just like whatever. [79:21] And then I had the privilege of speaking [79:24] to [79:25] some people on this podcast and just out [79:28] there in the world [79:29] who confirmed that a lot of the things I [79:32] once thought were [79:34] tin foil hat stuff is actually true. And [79:37] once once you have the curtain pulled [79:40] back, [79:41] it kind of blows your mind open to what [79:43] else could be true. [79:45] And I'm I'm a person that kind of like [79:46] needs evidence and logic and I'm not [79:48] going to believe something cuz I saw it [79:49] on like an Instagram post or a story or [79:51] a Telegram community. [79:53] But my mind's been blown, especially [79:55] over the last couple of years, about [79:56] how um how some of these things that [79:58] people consider to be conspiracy [79:59] theories are actually very true. Have [80:01] you had those moments in your career? [80:04] Oh, absolutely. But I mean, you can [80:06] really drill down on this stuff and [80:07] figure out the thematic element of [80:11] what's going on and then the specifics. [80:12] And I'll give you an example. Like in [80:14] Area 51, I learned about something [80:16] called strategic deception, which is a [80:19] CIA concept, okay? [80:21] And this plays into [80:25] conspiracy theories and when you come [80:28] across something [80:30] maybe having this information I'm about [80:32] to tell you will help you go, [80:34] "Okay, let me look at it in terms of [80:35] these two lanes." So it goes like this. [80:38] The CIA's [80:39] had a was building spy planes out at [80:42] Area 51. [80:43] The U-2 spy plane, which was going to [80:45] spy on the Soviet Union in the '50s [80:48] from above and figure out whether they [80:50] were preparing for nuclear war. [80:53] And the plane was built at Area 51 cuz [80:55] this no one could know about it. It flew [80:57] at 70,000 ft. [80:59] It was out of range of any [81:00] surface-to-air missiles. [81:02] Um I interviewed the first man who flew [81:05] over the Soviet Union in a U-2, Hervey [81:08] Stockman. And he took pictures with [81:10] these massive CIA cameras [81:12] that, you know, came back to the agency. [81:14] It was wet film and allowed the CIA to [81:17] understand what was actually going on on [81:19] the ground in Soviet Russia. It was [81:21] photographing military bases. [81:23] So the spy plane was being built and it [81:24] was so secret, like only the president [81:26] knew about it. At the same time, nuclear [81:29] weapons were being exploded next door, [81:32] right? So Area 51 and then over at Area [81:35] 23 was where the the the bombs were [81:37] going off. [81:39] And [81:40] there was a I was interviewing all the [81:42] engineers who were building the spy [81:43] plane. [81:44] And Bob Murphy was one of the lead [81:46] engineers and he told me this story [81:48] about strategic deception. So, [81:50] he and others would go to the ranch, [81:53] that's what they called Area 51, then [81:54] they'd fly back to Burbank, California [81:55] where they all lived for the weekends to [81:57] be with their families. And they would [81:58] take the shuttle back and forth. [82:01] And one day, um they went to a big party [82:04] the night before and Bob Murphy got [82:05] drunk. He was not a guy who gets drunk, [82:07] but he got drunk. [82:09] He missed the shuttle. [82:11] And he was like, "Oh my god, I'm going [82:13] to lose my job. I'm in trouble." And he [82:14] opens the door, is how he described it [82:16] to me, to like, [82:17] you know, go out and deal with this. And [82:20] there's an FBI agent like about to knock [82:22] on the door. [82:24] And they tell and the guy turns white as [82:26] a ghost because Bob Murphy was supposed [82:27] to be on that flight, so he was on the [82:29] flight manifest and it crashed into [82:31] Mount Charleston on the way there and [82:33] everyone was dead. [82:34] Okay? [82:36] So that is a dramatic thing to begin [82:38] with, but here's how it ties up with [82:39] strategic deception. [82:42] The CIA [82:44] learns that its aircraft full of U-2 [82:48] engineers, pilots, designers, all these [82:51] incredibly important people on this top [82:52] secret project are dead. They just [82:55] crashed into Mount Charleston. [82:57] What are they going to do? How are they [82:59] going to keep this secret? All the news [83:01] stations are racing up to the top of the [83:04] mountain to try to get to the crash [83:06] site. [83:07] Oh my god, this is going to be the [83:09] project's going to be blown open. What [83:11] are we going to do? So they quickly rope [83:13] off the areas. They do the damage [83:15] control to the best that they can. [83:17] But they're spinning and I have all the [83:19] declassified documents from that part of [83:21] it, learning how worried they are. [83:22] There's [83:23] almost no doubt the project's going to [83:24] be revealed. The U-2 program is going to [83:27] be no more because once the Soviets know [83:29] about it, it's off. [83:32] And instead, the press [83:35] comes up with a story. [83:37] The press reports that it's all these [83:39] atomic scientists working on this secret [83:42] new weapon. They just completely make [83:43] this up in essence, right? It's this new [83:45] weapons project. And that's what they're [83:47] all doing. Who knows who put what bug in [83:49] someone's ear. [83:51] And so that's the story that comes out. [83:54] And the CIA is like, [83:57] "Perfect." And what I The story explains [84:00] that there are two kinds of strategic [84:02] deception. There's cover when you say, [84:05] like Bob Murphy said to his wife, "I'm [84:07] just an engineer working out there on [84:09] some television systems." That's cover. [84:11] That was his cover. He didn't say I'm [84:13] working on the U-2 spy plane. And then [84:16] there's disinformation. [84:18] When the press reports that the crash [84:22] was full of a bunch of atomic engineers [84:24] working on a secret weapons program. [84:26] And those are both kinds of strategic [84:27] deception. And so you begin to realize [84:31] that [84:32] there is a purpose behind a lot of [84:35] information coming out into the public. [84:37] And the CIA often uses that to its [84:41] advantage. And so whenever a situation [84:43] happens, you have to say to yourself, [84:45] "Is this really what happened? Or is it [84:47] covering up something else?" And then of [84:50] course you have to put your rational [84:51] person [84:52] hat on and you can't just imagine [84:56] what the true story might be. You have [84:59] to actually find it and report it. Does [85:01] the CIA [85:03] um or the I think in the UK it's called [85:05] MI5 or MI6. MI6, I think it's the [85:07] equivalent. Does MI6, all of these sort [85:09] of special secret service agencies [85:11] around the world, do they work with the [85:13] media? [85:15] That's a much That's a totally separate [85:17] podcast. We could talk forever because [85:19] there's history of the CIA. I and I'm [85:21] not an expert on foreign intelligence [85:24] agencies as much as I am on the United [85:25] States. But by all means, there's a long [85:27] history of the CIA working with uh [85:31] journalists, reporters, authors, [85:34] um [85:34] to [85:36] put information there. I mean, there's [85:38] almost nothing that the CIA hasn't done [85:41] to my eye. The question is, you know, [85:44] reporting it in the context of [85:48] how that's happening. I wrote about in [85:50] The Pentagon's Brain, if you want a [85:52] little homework, you know, and you go [85:53] into the back and in the index and look [85:57] up brainwashing. [86:00] And there's a long story [86:03] uh where I talked to where I explain [86:06] exactly how this happened in the '50s [86:10] with [86:11] what ultimately an element that became [86:13] known as the MKUltra program, okay? So [86:15] like MKUltra was a real program and it [86:18] had a lot of sinister components to it. [86:21] Is it everything that, you know, [86:24] certain [86:25] groups of people that sometimes get [86:27] called conspiracy theorists say that it [86:30] was? No. But there are threads of truth [86:32] in it. And if you reverse engineer the [86:35] brainwashing concept from the back, you [86:37] will see what I'm talking about. And [86:39] it's I think it's a very interesting [86:40] story cuz it actually involves [86:41] the head of the CIA, a guy called Allen [86:43] Dulles, and his son who got brain [86:46] damaged in Korea, whom I tracked down [86:49] and interviewed for that book. Spoiler [86:52] alert. [86:54] What what happens? [86:57] Which part? I mean, [86:58] which part of I'm so I'm so compelled by [87:00] the the whole idea of the CIA because we [87:02] we had somebody here recently talking We [87:03] had Andrew here recently talking about [87:05] what goes on in the CIA and [87:07] I think um one of the things he said to [87:09] me is that the role of the CIA has [87:10] changed over time and once upon a time [87:13] it was [87:14] more capable of doing more things. And [87:17] by the way he described it, it sounded [87:18] like the CIA has less powers and can do [87:20] less of the things that it's been [87:22] accused of in the past. I think it's [87:24] been accused of killing the president [87:25] here [87:26] by some people or being involved in the [87:28] assassination of one of the presidents [87:30] here. [87:31] Um and [87:33] does the CIA report directly into the [87:34] president? [87:35] The CIA features in almost every one of [87:37] my books. [87:39] Um [87:40] the most sort of comprehensive look I [87:43] did at the CIA was a book called [87:45] Surprise, Kill, Vanish, which is about [87:47] the CIA's paramilitary. [87:49] And once I reported that, I understood [87:52] that there are actually two very [87:53] distinct components of the CIA. There's [87:56] the sort of Central Intelligence Agency, [87:59] the primary [88:01] um human [88:02] It's called human intelligence. And [88:04] there's analysts and there's espionage. [88:06] And And then there is the [88:08] paramilitary organization, which was set [88:13] up in 1947 [88:15] specifically to go against the Russian [88:19] version of itself. [88:22] Sort of to do the darkest, [88:24] dirtiest, [88:26] nastiest [88:27] operations that we had to because the [88:30] Russians were. And so, [88:32] you know, the CIA is a is a is a giant [88:36] organization with a lot of tentacles. [88:39] And I think it's important to [88:41] speak, at least for me, having reported [88:44] on many of these different programs. You [88:46] know, Area 51 covers the aerial [88:48] espionage element of the CI, the science [88:50] and technology. The CIA was responsible [88:53] for putting the first satellite in [88:56] space, the Corona program. [88:58] Dr. Bud Wheelon, who I interviewed for [89:00] Area 51, remarkable [89:03] intelligence, surveillance, and [89:04] reconnaissance programs. And then you [89:06] have the paramilitary operators, the [89:08] trigger pullers, [89:10] uh the snake eaters, the individuals [89:13] who, you know, find, fix, and finish [89:16] people. That's a euphemism. [89:19] Um [89:20] the teams that do that. [89:22] But I prefer to speak very specifically [89:26] on programs because I find it's [89:29] the most [89:30] it it's the most responsible or the most [89:33] factual way for me to stick to a certain [89:36] lane of the agency because it is so [89:39] vast. [89:40] Once upon a time, if you had a business [89:42] idea, it was exceptionally difficult to [89:45] get going. But now, in the age of [89:47] Shopify, it is exceptionally [89:50] easy. As many of you will know, Shopify [89:53] are a sponsor of this podcast. If you [89:54] don't know Shopify, it's an [89:56] exceptionally simple web platform for [89:58] anybody that's got an idea that wants to [90:00] transact on a global scale. So, things [90:03] like these conversation cards, which we [90:04] sell, we've sold using Shopify, and it [90:07] only took us a couple of clicks to get [90:10] going. So, why did we choose Shopify? [90:11] For a number of reasons, but I think one [90:13] of the big ones which goes unappreciated [90:15] is their checkout system converts 36% [90:17] better compared to other platforms. And [90:20] here's what I'm going to do to remove [90:22] the cost for you. If you go to [90:23] shopify.com/bartlett, [90:26] you'll be able to try Shopify for $1 [90:29] a month. I've seen Shopify completely [90:31] change people's lives. And for many of [90:34] you, I think it could change yours. [90:36] On the the nuclear war subject, we [90:38] talked a little bit about um another [90:40] thing that has what we I kind of alluded [90:42] to it that has emerged since you started [90:43] writing this book, which is the [90:44] conversation around artificial [90:45] intelligence. [90:47] And when I start thinking about how you [90:48] overlay that with this idea of nuclear [90:50] war, it becomes even more [90:52] um concerning because we're heading [90:55] towards a world of what they call [90:56] artificial general intelligence, where a [90:57] lot of these systems will be making [91:00] autonomous decisions. They'll be able to [91:02] and a couple of people that I've spoken [91:04] to from DeepMind or from um Google have [91:07] talked to me about a world where [91:10] this is an extreme case, but our elected [91:11] leaders will be [91:13] either AI themselves or being basically [91:15] working in lockstep with AI. And And [91:18] then when you think about our nuclear [91:19] weapon systems, who is better to make [91:21] that decision? Is it a Joe Biden that's [91:23] better to make a decision to launch a [91:25] nuclear weapon, or is it some kind of [91:27] artificial intelligence that is so [91:29] advanced [91:30] we might not even know what it's [91:31] thinking or doing. Have you thought much [91:33] about artificial intelligence since this [91:34] book came out and since you started [91:36] writing? Absolutely. It's something I [91:38] covered at length in The Pentagon's [91:41] Brain, which is the book about DARPA. [91:43] And I think [91:45] that [91:45] maybe I'll speak to an origin story [91:47] here, right? Because I think of [91:48] Shakespeare, it's like what is past is [91:50] prologue. We can understand better the [91:52] question you raise, especially for [91:54] younger people, like, what is this going [91:56] to look like in the future? Is a [91:57] president really going to be working in [91:59] consort with AI? [92:01] If we know, wait, how did this all [92:03] begin? It somehow, at least to my eye, [92:08] becomes easier to [92:11] think about these things in a grounded [92:13] manner. [92:15] And so [92:16] I'll throw this detail at you. In In [92:19] reporting The Pentagon's Brain, it was [92:21] fascinating to learn that during World [92:23] War II, computers [92:25] were people. [92:28] A computer was someone who computed [92:31] mathematical [92:33] you know, call right [92:35] trajectories, bomb explosions were all [92:39] measured by people and pencils. [92:43] And right? So, then and I love the smile [92:45] because suddenly it all becomes easier. [92:47] Then you have a guy called John von [92:48] Neumann, the the The Pentagon's Brain. [92:51] He was the first brain that the Pentagon [92:54] really was interested in. And he created [92:57] one of the first [92:58] computers. You can't really assign the [93:00] first computer to anyone, but there was [93:02] a computer that was doing calculations [93:04] for [93:05] called ENIAC. And ultimately after the [93:08] war, von Neumann went to the Atomic [93:11] Energy Commission, the most powerful [93:13] organization in the world at the moment, [93:15] and said, I want to build a computer [93:17] that can actually think for itself. That [93:21] can He's kind of the progenitor of this [93:23] idea of software, not just hardware. So, [93:26] for a long time it was kind of Texas [93:27] Instruments type computing, almost just [93:30] like a giant calculator. [93:32] And von Neumann [93:34] wanted to put the brain inside the [93:37] calculator. [93:39] And they gave him a lot of money to do [93:41] it, and he did this in the basement of [93:44] Fooldall over at the Princeton Institute [93:46] for Advanced Study. [93:48] And it was giant vacuum tubes, and he [93:50] would do these tests, and I describe [93:52] this in The Pentagon's Brain, because [93:55] it's really interesting to think this [93:57] was only in 1945. [94:00] There were vacuum tubes and, you know, [94:02] cords, and they had to worry about mice [94:04] eating cords, and John von Neumann was [94:06] so brilliant and smart that his he could [94:10] beat the computer initially. [94:12] The his assistants would give him [94:14] numerical calculations, he would do them [94:16] in his mind, the computer would be [94:17] trying to do them, he would win. [94:20] And then one day, and like I think it [94:22] was 1946 or 1947, the computer beat him. [94:27] That was the moment that von Neumann [94:29] realized computers are going to be [94:32] computers just got smarter than me, [94:34] than man. [94:36] And then he began [94:38] to develop and systems, the Defense [94:41] Department began to put an extraordinary [94:43] amount of money into computer systems. [94:45] And if you really want to know where [94:47] they took off, cuz this has to do with [94:48] AI. [94:49] This is man-computer interface. The [94:53] Defense Department hires a guy called [94:55] Licklider [94:56] to essentially shrink computers down [94:59] from the size of a a house [95:02] to the size of this room. And think of [95:03] what they are now. [95:05] So, the Defense Department has always [95:07] led with artificial intelligence, which [95:09] is computer-based. [95:11] And when you can see that origin story, [95:14] you can begin to understand where we're [95:15] going. And AI had to have these military [95:19] the the benefits of these military [95:21] systems [95:23] to develop, right? Like nanotechnology. [95:26] Things had to start becoming smaller. [95:29] And that all happens in that book. [95:33] You know, not all of it, but in other [95:34] words, you can you can learn in a sort [95:37] of poetic manner the trajectory of [95:40] computers [95:41] and where they began not so long ago and [95:44] where we are now. [95:46] And it was in 1983 that DARPA, that [95:48] organization, decided that the battle [95:52] place the battlefield is no place for [95:56] humans. That was a statement of its [95:58] first robotic AI program. [96:00] I went on ChatGPT um a couple of months [96:02] ago, and I asked it, I said, could you [96:04] play out a scenario where the world ends [96:06] because an artificial intelligence [96:08] basically gets leaked out of its [96:11] out of the [96:12] computer that it was um [96:14] born out of born on. And it the scenario [96:16] that it played out involved nuclear war [96:18] because halfway, I think it was in step [96:20] three or four, it says that the AI [96:22] basically takes control of the nuclear [96:25] warheads [96:27] or at least some of them, [96:28] and then it kind of launches them at [96:30] other countries. [96:31] And [96:33] it hearing ChatGPT [96:37] say that [96:38] and and it and in step three or four use [96:41] nuclear weapons as a way to kind of make [96:43] the world extinct, it felt plausible. [96:46] Okay, so I'm going to push back against [96:48] that, and which is by no means right. [96:50] I'm not right. But we're just having a [96:52] like sort of theoretical conversation [96:53] here. [96:54] ChatGPT is gathering its information, [96:56] right? So, my I would argue that ChatGPT [96:58] has got a lot of information from The [97:00] Terminator movie. Yeah. Okay? There is [97:02] that in the zeitgeist of what happens. [97:05] Then I want you to consider that [97:09] the communication systems in nuclear [97:11] command and control, which is actually [97:13] nuclear command control and [97:14] communication, [97:16] the the ability to for [97:19] NC3 to communicate with the actual [97:21] weapons is so profoundly classified that [97:23] I don't have access to it. But I'm going [97:25] to give this to you as an idea. [97:27] What I do know and learned reporting [97:29] nuclear war scenario is a fascinating [97:31] detail that stands as an analogy, at [97:34] least for me, [97:35] which is how analog [97:38] our ballistic missile systems are [97:40] because of the exact [97:42] fear that you describe or that and that [97:44] ChatGPT [97:46] described back at you. [97:47] And will they stay that way forever? [97:51] Probably not, but are they that way [97:53] right now? From what I understand, yes. [97:56] Our submarine-launched ballistic [97:58] missiles [98:00] that that are just so the technology [98:02] behind them, and I I delineate it for [98:05] the reader, you it's it's astonishing [98:07] that you can launch a missile [98:09] from underwater, it can breach the [98:12] surface, [98:13] it's afterburners take off, and then it [98:15] begins its trajectory, you know, boost [98:18] phase, midcourse phase, [98:21] terminal phase, hits the target. This is [98:24] incredible. [98:25] And how does it get there? [98:28] You might ask. I asked. It gets there by [98:31] starsighting. [98:34] Oh, really? [98:36] So, you realize there's this little [98:37] panel that opens up in the ballistic [98:40] missile. [98:41] And there are other ways that it's [98:43] navigating. But the primary mean of [98:45] navigation is starsighting. [98:48] Right? I mean, you just have to really [98:49] stop and go, oh my first of all, it's [98:52] actually really interesting concept that [98:54] the [98:55] most advanced, potentially [98:57] civilization-ending [98:59] ballistic missile is guiding itself to [99:02] its target by this ancient concept, [99:07] like that our hunter-gatherer ancestors [99:10] used, which is looking at the stars. [99:12] It's looking at the stars and then [99:13] navigating using them. [99:18] And that's meant to be [99:21] a defense against a system an enemy [99:25] taking control of your nuclear weapons. [99:28] The issue we have is that there's [99:30] potentially nine or 10 different nuclear [99:32] powers [99:33] and they don't all have the same system. [99:34] So, if a if we get to the point of AGI, [99:37] which a lot of people almost see as the [99:39] singularity, almost you can't see past [99:41] moment where there is a new being [99:43] amongst us that is capable of [99:46] thinking faster and more expansively and [99:48] more intelligently than humans. It knows [99:49] things we don't. [99:51] I think it might look at our systems as [99:53] child's play. As maybe not our systems, [99:55] but maybe it'll look at North Korea's [99:57] systems as child's play. It might be [99:58] able to put that VCR into the system and [100:00] play out the nuclear simulation that [100:02] tricks those people into believing [100:04] they're being attacked and that Yes. And [100:07] so Which is maybe time for the answer to [100:10] your question of should we be at zero, [100:12] right? [100:13] Yeah. So, what you have presented, which [100:16] would be the whole point of somebody [100:17] like me writing a book that somebody [100:18] like you would read of a younger [100:20] generation and begin having these [100:22] conversations with their colleagues and [100:25] their thought leaders and the people [100:27] that could maybe influence public policy [100:29] and saying [100:30] well, that would be a very good reason [100:32] to have zero nuclear weapons or, you [100:34] know, everybody gets 10. I'm making that [100:37] up, but right? [100:37] Yeah, yeah. Because if you have 12,500 [100:40] nuclear weapons, it's better than [100:43] 70,000, [100:45] but that's way too many for an [100:47] artificially intelligent, you know, [100:50] trigger scenario like you're talking [100:51] about. [100:55] Are you optimistic? [100:57] Optimistic about I I am [101:01] I mean [101:02] I am an optimistic person by nature and [101:05] so Do you think there will be a nuclear [101:07] war [101:08] in the course of humanity? [101:12] I [101:13] wrote this book as the optimistic [101:17] hopeful person that's saying read this [101:23] and realize [101:26] that a man-made problem has a man-made [101:29] solution. [101:30] Earlier you talked about there being [101:32] high consequence and low probability, [101:34] but the more the years tick on, that [101:36] probability increases by nature of there [101:38] being this mad king [101:39] Absolutely. [101:40] point. So, you know, and that's what I [101:42] think. So, I was asking myself, [101:43] eventually, if we if we play this [101:46] forward, I don't know, 1,000 years, [101:48] what what is most likely to cause the [101:51] end of humanity? Is it [101:52] a mad king somewhere who doesn't want [101:54] that, you know, he realizes that he's [101:56] going to either die, he's got cancer, he [101:57] realizes that, you know, he's got some [102:00] sickness and he doesn't really want that [102:02] his son to take power. He starts getting [102:04] a bit agitated, maybe he has some kind [102:05] of psychosis, schizophrenia, I don't [102:07] know, decides to in his [102:10] dying days to let a couple of these [102:11] things fly. Is that [102:14] eventually going to happen? The laws of [102:15] probability, the laws of averages say [102:17] that the longer we're here, the longer [102:19] we have these weapons, [102:20] the higher the probability. [102:23] I mean, I leave that to people like you [102:26] to think about and talk about because I [102:28] do and I am fascinated that I find that [102:30] people of your generation [102:32] ask that question a lot more than [102:35] perhaps people of my generation and [102:36] older. Like that was not a mindset that [102:39] people necessarily [102:41] had and talked about and I think that [102:42] has to do with the confluence of events [102:45] that you talk about. First of all, [102:46] people are [102:47] have access to information in a manner [102:49] they didn't, [102:50] you know, 30, 40 years ago or it took a [102:52] lot more effort. And also that there are [102:56] these incredible new threats that you're [102:57] talking about that are that you cannot [102:59] overlook. And so you would think that [103:02] it's time to kind of and I'm not a [103:03] Pollyanna, but you have to move away [103:06] from seeing everyone and everything as [103:08] an enemy and moving toward it's fine to [103:11] have adversaries. Having opponents is, [103:15] you know, [103:16] Sportsmen have opponents, right? But [103:19] everyone being an enemy and having, you [103:22] know, wars [103:24] escalating around the world, it seems as [103:28] if what you are saying is there has to [103:30] be a fundamental shift in what people [103:35] are considering important. But war has [103:37] always existed and it's existed as long [103:39] as humans have. So, it makes me think [103:41] that war is just part of humans trying [103:44] to coexist. And all of the things that [103:46] are hardwired into us, our search for [103:47] status and ego and reproduction and [103:50] resources and survival result in war. [103:53] Like they result in recessions. [103:55] So, I read a lot about the origin of [103:57] war. Like there it's a debate. No one, [103:59] you know, it but it is discussed and the [104:01] anthropologists, I think, have the most [104:03] interesting [104:04] sort of thoughtful concepts around it, [104:06] which I'll share with you, which is [104:07] this. Because yes, technically men there [104:10] has always been war. And that one of the [104:11] debates is, you know, did war begin with [104:14] civilization or were hunter-gatherers [104:15] warring? [104:17] But more interesting to that, I think, [104:18] is about the anthropologists who studied [104:22] in the '60s the hunter-gatherer tribes [104:24] like in the Amazon when there were still [104:26] access to them and they were sort of, [104:28] you know, they were unaffected by [104:30] civilization at all and they could look [104:33] at how they perceived [104:36] enemies. And an interesting idea came [104:39] out of that, which makes me think about [104:41] optimist versus pessimist, right? Sort [104:43] of or rather those who trust versus [104:46] those who are suspicious. That [104:48] that no matter if a hunter is out [104:50] hunting in a that's part of a [104:52] hunter-gatherer tribal environment and [104:56] he comes across another person, [104:59] obviously, there could be that person is [105:01] either threatening or that person is [105:03] someone to team up with against the [105:05] greater threat. [105:07] And the anthropologists do not know why [105:10] it is that some people [105:13] interpret this person with suspicion and [105:15] then might kill him [105:17] and others would interpret that person [105:20] as a teammate. [105:23] And so, if we don't know [105:26] how human, you know, is it genetics? [105:28] Like how do people [105:30] either fall on one of those two sides, [105:32] but what we do know is that people can [105:36] learn to think differently. You talk [105:39] with half your guests on the podcast [105:40] about this. People can be trained, not, [105:44] you know, propagandized, but people can [105:47] learn to think differently. So, if [105:48] you're me who [105:50] is a hopeful person and wants to see the [105:52] positive side of even my dark reporting [105:57] because that's a better choice for me [106:01] and for my family. [106:02] I train myself to find, if you will, the [106:06] silver lining or rather, if that's too [106:08] Pollyanna-ish, to find the way in which [106:10] how do I look at the person coming at me [106:13] as someone who could be on my team or [106:16] even an [106:17] an opponent, but not an enemy that I [106:20] would have to kill. [106:21] What's the most interesting thing that [106:22] you've written about that we haven't [106:23] discussed? [106:25] Of all the and I don't just mean in the [106:26] nuclear war, I mean in all these books. [106:28] I mean, I'm particularly fascinated by [106:29] DARPA because I think in a lot of the [106:31] world, especially in Europe, in the UK, [106:32] we we don't even know what DARPA means. [106:35] So, you know, it was interesting reading [106:36] about the existence of that. But in all [106:38] these books, what is the most [106:40] interesting thing, the most resonant [106:42] thing when you talk about your work to [106:43] people? Maybe that surprised you. [106:47] I mean, [106:48] every single one of my books is [106:50] powerfully important to me, not just [106:51] because of the information there, but [106:53] because the people I met along the way. [106:55] And I really could not sit, you know, [106:58] put one over the other because that [106:59] would be like favoring a child. And I [107:01] mean that literally, you know, [107:04] sometimes when I prepare to do a [107:05] podcast, I read my own books. And I and [107:08] I'm really [107:09] it for me, it's the it's the [107:12] it's the sum total of these incredibly [107:15] fascinating people I have had the [107:18] incredible fortune of interviewing and [107:21] also how [107:23] fate and circumstance always seems to [107:25] play a role in all of their lives and [107:28] that's maybe the theme that I take away [107:30] from all of this as opposed to the [107:31] specific shocking thing. Because [107:33] remember that many of the people that I [107:35] interview, [107:36] because they're war fighters or [107:38] intelligence agency people, [107:41] many of their friends have died. [107:43] Is there anyone you interviewed that [107:44] brought you to tears when you were [107:45] interviewing them? Oh, absolutely. I [107:48] can't I can't even I can't even say it [107:50] now cuz I might [107:51] Yeah. [107:52] Yeah. [107:53] going to ask you for the example. You [107:55] want the example? I'll tell you right [107:56] now. [107:58] It's a hard one. Um [108:02] So, I was just in [108:08] I was just in uh Brussels, I told you, [108:10] at the nuclear convention and [108:14] and I met a woman who was 1 year and 10 [108:17] months when [108:20] the bomb was dropped on Nagasaki. [108:22] So, she's a survivor of the Nagasaki [108:24] bomb. [108:26] Right? [108:28] And [108:30] I met her, I brought her a signed copy [108:31] of my book, right? I mean, you just [108:33] think about being [108:34] a victim of that. And also, I learned so [108:38] much about the stigma that followed [108:42] the survivors of the atomic bombs [108:45] of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The stigma [108:47] because they were perceived as sort of [108:51] tainted people, tainted humans and there [108:54] was this deep fear of the legacy of [108:56] radiation. [108:59] And [109:01] I met her and I expected to just be so [109:03] composed, but in talking to her, [109:06] I got very emotional kind of, you know, [109:09] because you can't avoid that. And part [109:11] of the reason why I got so emotional was [109:14] that, and I haven't written about this [109:16] yet, but I will, is that [109:19] someone I interviewed and someone that [109:20] meant a lot to me and that I have [109:21] written about a lot wired [109:24] that nuclear weapon [109:27] that was dropped on Nagasaki. [109:33] And so, when you think about it, [109:37] and there's little old me, the reporter, [109:39] who fate and circumstance put in [109:41] Brussels last week at a Nuke Expo. You [109:44] couldn't make that up [109:46] if you were me, you know, [109:48] even a year ago, let alone 10 years ago, [109:50] let alone when I was a child. [109:53] And here I am, and one hand of my [109:57] reporting goes to that source that [109:58] worked with me for a very long time, [110:01] whose story I haven't written yet, who [110:03] wired the bomb that was dropped on [110:06] Nagasaki. And my other hand goes to [110:09] someone [110:10] who was there. [110:15] That [110:16] that wells you up. [110:18] Because it's the human condition. [110:25] Can you speak to this impact that [110:29] that had on both those individuals? [110:32] So, [110:33] starting with if we start with the [110:37] individual who was involved in wiring [110:38] that bomb. [110:40] Mhm. [110:44] So, and I know less about her than I [110:48] know about him, right? [110:50] And I've reached out to her and we will [110:52] do interviews now, okay? So, but for [110:55] him, [110:57] it impacted his whole life. And he [111:00] became a member of the Manhattan [111:01] Project, and he became uniquely tied [111:04] into the nuclear weapons industry. [111:07] So, these kind of long arcs of history [111:12] are so deeply interesting to me, [111:14] especially as I get older. [111:16] You move from [111:18] um [111:20] the intensity of specific missions that [111:24] people were on, of specific operations [111:26] they ran, and you begin to look [111:30] at a human [111:33] over the course of their life, and what [111:35] that means, because ultimately that's [111:37] the most interesting storytelling of [111:39] all. It's the most interesting [111:41] conversation you and I can have. And And [111:43] you have to get a little bit older to [111:46] know that, you know? But sometimes when [111:48] I'm interviewing people who are in their [111:50] 80s and 90s, and I see them looking at [111:53] me, [111:54] and I like especially going back 15 [111:56] years ago when I started reporting all [111:58] this, and I could see I can you know, [112:00] they're old and they're like earlobes [112:02] sag, and they have you know, incredible [112:04] wrinkles and [112:06] the course of their lives, what they [112:08] have done, and they're all involved in [112:10] these top formerly top secret programs, [112:12] and I can [112:14] I can [112:15] I sense them looking at me with this [112:18] sense of their own legacy, that they are [112:22] like, I'm telling her my story, and then [112:25] I'm going to be gone. And that's really [112:27] that's powerful. [112:30] It's a lot of trust as well, isn't it? [112:33] It It is. That's the role of the [112:36] reporter. You You work, at least my job [112:40] as an investigative journalist is like, [112:43] you know, I want people to trust me that [112:46] I am getting the in their information [112:48] down on the public record. And that has [112:50] a lot to do with why, you know, people [112:52] say, "How did you get so many people to [112:54] talk to you about nuclear weapons, [112:56] right?" So, to loop this back to [112:59] nuclear war scenario, I know I'm doing [113:02] my job, at least it feels like I'm doing [113:04] my job properly or earnestly, that I can [113:08] in the same week last week have two [113:12] people that are 100% part of the [113:14] military industrial complex, working for [113:16] the Space Force in Los Angeles, [113:19] you know, at a Space Force convention, [113:21] come to my house for dinner, [113:24] have a conversation with my family, [113:25] including my young son who's closer to [113:28] your age, [113:29] and then the week before have been with [113:31] peace activists [113:33] addressing members of the European [113:35] Parliament. I have my lane, [113:38] but yet all of these people are around [113:42] me. [113:43] They might not think they can get along, [113:46] but they probably can. And if I'm the [113:50] middle of the road of all of that, that [113:53] is important to me as an investigative [113:55] journalist, and but also like as an [113:58] American citizen as and as I said [114:00] earlier, as a as a mother. [114:03] That individual that wired that that [114:05] bomb, took took part in the Manhattan [114:07] Project, was involved in dropping the [114:09] bomb on the lady that you met recently. [114:13] How do they feel about that now in [114:14] hindsight with with their age and as [114:16] they look back? [114:16] He has died. Oh, okay. [114:18] He has died. Um and [114:19] How How did he feel about it? [114:22] There were other things that bothered [114:24] him more, which is [114:27] the great conundrum [114:29] of [114:31] using your own eyes to [114:36] perceive another person. And it's why I [114:39] have not written that book yet, because [114:41] it is still very confusing, and there is [114:43] a lot of mysterious elements of it. And [114:46] sometimes when people are involved in [114:47] really classified programs, [114:50] you have to spend a lot of time to [114:53] uh [114:55] dig and uncover and discover. It's a [114:59] long process. [115:01] Um and he was involved in some other [115:03] programs that [115:04] he had more intense thoughts about. And [115:08] that alone is enough to [115:10] I mean, the look on your face is the [115:12] look on my face [115:14] interviewing him. A happy man? [115:16] Absolutely. [115:18] Absolutely. Regret? [115:21] Yes, most definitely. Almost everyone [115:23] that I end up spending hours and hours [115:25] and hours with, that I would travel [115:27] with, and you know, another person that [115:28] comes to mind was Billy Waugh in the [115:30] Surprise Kill Vanish book, sort of the [115:31] longest serving singleton for the US [115:35] government as a paramilitary operator. [115:37] The saying goes, Billy Waugh killed more [115:39] people than cancer. [115:41] Okay? We traveled to Hanoi together. We [115:44] traveled to Havana together. [115:46] Um I spent a lot of time with him. [115:49] Uh they were you know, both of these men [115:51] were probably the two most powerful [115:53] sources I worked with in my life, in [115:55] their 80s and 90s. Both happy men? [116:01] Billy was more complex than happy, you [116:04] know? Um [116:06] you work hard to kind of get at the [116:11] to get at the character of someone, and [116:13] you you you you try the best to [116:15] represent them. But I mean, [116:17] you know, Billy had so many people um he [116:20] was involved in so many missions with so [116:22] many people that died that [116:24] I don't know if happiness is He [116:26] certainly wasn't ang- He certainly [116:27] wasn't sour, [116:29] but uh he had a lot of anger about a lot [116:32] of things. And then the lady, she was 1 [116:34] and 1/2 years old when the bomb was [116:36] dropped. She survived as a baby. Mhm. [116:38] Her family, did they survive? Yes, and [116:40] it was it's fascinating. Um [116:43] uh I'm not saying her name because I [116:45] don't I I don't have quite her [116:46] permission yet, right? So, but um [116:48] although she is a public figure, but she [116:52] didn't know [116:54] about her story until she got older, [116:56] because it was kept hidden from her, [116:57] which is [116:58] So, these layers upon layers about what [117:01] we know about our own selves, you've [117:04] made me think of, which is you balance [117:06] that out with [117:09] ques- what you know about your own self [117:11] versus what how easy it is to to judge [117:14] someone else or perceive someone else. [117:17] And I think those two journeys in life [117:19] are interwoven always. Like, our own [117:22] journey for self-discovery, [117:24] right? In a way, you're on that with [117:26] your podcast, I'm guessing. You probably [117:28] learn as much about yourself [117:31] um as you do about others. I know I do. [117:33] I'm usually in your seat. Um and there's [117:35] no camera running. It's just a pen. And [117:38] so, I can learn so much from people [117:41] about how they speak, why they speak, [117:44] what they say to me, "I don't want this [117:46] on the record. I want you to know this [117:48] about me because it's important, but I [117:50] don't want it publicly known." And I [117:52] honor that, because in a way, being a [117:55] journalist is [117:57] being [117:58] a a trusted source that someone can [118:02] share information with within a context [118:04] that the person I I mean, knows the [118:06] groundwork about. Many people's [118:09] grandchildren's [118:10] grandchildren don't [118:12] they don't know what grandpa did. [118:15] And they might not know [118:17] for decades. I had a guy show up at one [118:20] of my book signings at the LA Times [118:22] Festival of Books just last Sunday. And [118:25] he had, [118:27] you know, a binder, and he said, "After [118:29] you're done signing, would you mind [118:32] looking at this binder and interpreting [118:34] it for me?" And of course I did, you [118:36] know? And his grandfather was a [118:38] seriously high-ranking person working on [118:41] nuclear sub launched ballistic missiles [118:45] in the early days of what was called the [118:46] Polaris experiment. And he had all these [118:49] documents, and no one in his family [118:50] cared about it. He had ID badges and [118:53] letters and pictures with the president [118:55] and picture and I could say to him, "Oh, [118:57] yes, this is the you know, I could give [118:59] him some context." And his wife was [119:01] there, and you know, it was just like [119:03] it's a great example of how [119:06] we sometimes have a desire to know about [119:09] our own selves and our own legacy. Where [119:11] did we come from? And then grandpa has [119:13] passed. And so my job is like getting [119:15] grandpa's story on the record. [119:18] That conversation you had um [119:20] since the book had come out with the [119:22] lady you met in Brussels. [119:24] Did it change how you viewed your your [119:26] book and the work you've done here [119:29] in writing this? Did it add an element? [119:31] Oh, it most certainly enhanced and added [119:34] and particularly that emotional one that [119:35] you saw for me when I think about that, [119:37] you know, [119:38] um [119:40] and I immediately had a long [119:41] conversation with my husband about it [119:43] when when I got home, right? Because I [119:45] use sounding boards to understand how I [119:48] even really feel about things, but [119:50] I already had a context to know about [119:52] survivors having read a lot of accounts [119:57] from survivors [119:59] to report the book and I mention [120:03] some of them. Setsuko Thurlow was a [120:06] survivor of Hiroshima and has given a [120:08] lot of incredible public statements on [120:12] the record to the United Nations and [120:13] elsewhere and I quote her in my book to [120:16] narrate the part of the story where we [120:18] learn about the bomb dropping on [120:19] Hiroshima and then I read a lot of the [120:22] ancillary material about that so I can [120:25] understand more [120:27] and try and a lot of work as a [120:29] journalist you're just at least if you [120:31] write narrative non-fiction as I do, [120:33] you're really trying to imagine [120:37] the situation. But then you meet someone [120:39] and it all becomes real. And that's [120:41] where the this comes in cuz it's not [120:43] just words on the paper. It hasn't been [120:46] When they say survivor [120:49] what what [120:50] how do you categorize or define a [120:52] survivor of a nuclear bomb? [120:57] Um there's a word in Japanese and I [120:59] don't want to get it wrong and it's [121:01] something like Hibakusha, right? So [121:03] forgive me for not having that word. [121:05] But um [121:07] that is an actual term [121:09] that is used by [121:12] anyone who [121:14] lived through [121:16] the atomic bombings in August of 1945 [121:20] of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. [121:23] So if you lived through it, you are [121:27] in that category of people. If you lived [121:29] through that Yeah, yeah, yeah. And so in [121:32] other words now [121:34] uh this was, you know, [121:36] 79 years ago. [121:38] So most of the survivors you can just [121:42] think about the ages of the people [121:44] involved. Setsuko Thurlow is 90. [121:47] You know, she's she's [121:48] one she was a recipient of the who I who [121:51] I write about. Um [121:53] she was a recipient of the Nobel Peace [121:56] Prize in 2017 with a group of physicians [122:01] Dr. Carlos Omana and others whom I met [122:03] in Brussels that are all part of these [122:06] organizations working to reduce nuclear [122:09] weapons down to zero. [122:12] Right? They are against [122:14] nuclear war. [122:16] And their organizations work diligently [122:19] to bring the information to the fore and [122:22] to affect change at a geopolitical level [122:25] like the United Nations. [122:27] That conversation you have with your [122:28] husband when you got home that day after [122:30] meeting her. [122:33] What can you tell me about that [122:34] conversation? [122:36] It's probably like you have with your I [122:38] mean my husband and I've been married a [122:39] very long time. So he knows everything. [122:43] Um [122:44] there's also a joke that he has what's [122:46] called spouse privilege which he does, [122:48] right? You can tell your spouse anything [122:50] legally [122:53] But no, those conversations are [122:55] priceless. Those are the conversations [122:56] that allow me to try and peel back one [123:01] layer [123:02] of what the next book is going to be and [123:06] what the next book aims to do because I [123:09] am always working on the next book. I am [123:11] one of those people who loves writing. [123:14] And so and I also love evolving as a [123:18] writer. So you want to get better in [123:19] terms of the small mistakes you make and [123:22] you want to get better in terms of the [123:25] the intentions that you might have [123:27] thematically about conveying it. And so [123:29] thank you for pointing out to me [123:31] and I mean this sincerely is that what [123:33] you helped me realize is that [123:34] the next book is trying will try to move [123:37] more toward those themes of cause [123:41] that was him and effect that was her. [123:45] This idea that there are always [123:47] consequences. [123:49] And very real people on both sides that [123:53] you know [123:54] one could class as both victims and [123:57] innocent at the same time, I guess. [124:00] I've just a horrific situation. [124:02] Absolutely. I'm really intrigued now by [124:04] this idea that you almost have to embody [124:06] two roles. You're a human being but at [124:08] the same time you've got a job to do [124:11] here [124:12] and you've got a mission. [124:14] And when you meet that person who's who [124:16] is a survivor of a nuclear attack [124:19] those lines can understandably become at [124:22] at least in your head [124:23] the wall can drop between the two. And [124:25] as you you touched your heart, you [124:27] referred to your head which I think is [124:28] typically when you're talking about your [124:30] journalistic hat, but then we all have [124:31] hearts as well, thank God. [124:33] Um you come home and I don't know the [124:35] conversations I have with my partner. [124:37] I guess I I'm assuming, you know, the [124:39] conversation you have with your husband [124:40] there is about [124:43] the complexity of the emotions you feel [124:44] upon meeting that person. [124:46] Absolutely and what you do with that and [124:48] what that means and you want to be able [124:49] to have those conversations so that you [124:51] can I think [124:55] have both of those bring both of those [124:58] components into your [125:00] into your work. I mean [125:02] maybe with the exception being the [125:03] military or the CIA, the two [125:05] organizations I write about. You know, [125:07] Billy Waugh can't bring his heart into [125:10] the mission when he is assigned to go X [125:12] Y Z. [125:14] You know, find, fix and finish someone. [125:16] They're not allowed to tell that that [125:17] partner are they in the CIA? No. [125:19] I was told to you. And and so so what we [125:21] that aren't in the military or the [125:23] intelligence community have that luxury. [125:26] Is it a luxury? [125:27] I don't know, but it's a necessity for [125:29] me. [125:31] What if you couldn't? [125:32] I wouldn't be myself. I wouldn't I [125:35] wouldn't choose that. I could never be [125:37] in the military. I could never be in the [125:39] agency. [125:40] Because I I think you are asked to wear [125:44] a hat that removes your heart. [125:47] And that's not possible for somebody [125:50] like me. I mean we just figure out our [125:52] strengths and our weaknesses. Um and [125:55] society needs all of those people by the [125:56] way. That is what a democracy is. It is [125:59] made up of all kinds of people. I'm all [126:02] for that. It's why I have so many [126:05] friends and colleagues from different [126:07] worlds on different sides of the aisle. [126:09] They just make me think [126:12] more interesting things about the world [126:15] in which we all live. [126:18] We have a closing tradition on this [126:19] podcast where the last guest leaves a [126:20] question for the next guest not knowing [126:22] who they're leaving it for. [126:23] And the question that's been left for [126:25] you [126:26] was written in Europe when we were in [126:27] our studio then. [126:30] It is what is the last thing you changed [126:33] your mind about? [126:38] Well, I'll just [126:39] it comes this comes to mind only because [126:42] it's apropos to what we've been talking [126:43] about and it has to do with reporting [126:45] not my personal life which is maybe more [126:47] interesting to people. Um [126:52] I always strive to interview people [126:55] and ask them questions even if they are [126:57] hard, even if I have a preconception [126:59] that maybe they are the sort of bad guy, [127:01] shall we say, or the you know [127:04] perpetrator the what? [127:05] the perpetrator some something not [127:07] necessarily the bad but just that like I [127:09] might not my brain might not think I [127:11] agree with what they did or the project [127:13] they were on. [127:14] And there was a general that I was [127:16] trying to interview for the Pentagon's [127:18] brain and he had he was kind of the [127:21] creator behind what's called the soldier [127:23] super suit, okay? And that's a totally [127:25] different subject but that these idea to [127:26] make super soldiers, okay? Off of this [127:29] idea of the this concept called the [127:31] weakling on the battlefield that humans [127:34] feel fear and get fatigued and those are [127:36] not good things for soldiers and so [127:38] there are all these programs to try and [127:40] enhance our top tier military fighters [127:44] to become super soldiers. This is a [127:46] fact. And this one general was part of [127:48] that program and I had reached out to [127:51] him and asked him to interview with me [127:54] and I get it. Lots of people say you [127:56] know, I'm going to pass. I don't want to [127:57] interview. That's fine. But he ignored [127:59] me. And I felt slighted. And so I'm [128:02] telling on myself here from your view. [128:05] And so when I was writing my narrative [128:07] of the super soldier, he essentially was [128:10] kind of cast as the bad guy. [128:12] And then [128:15] I was in the editorial phase of the book [128:18] and I got an email from him and he said, [128:20] "I'm so sorry I didn't get back to you. [128:22] My wife had cancer." [128:27] And I what a valuable lesson. What a [128:30] valuable lesson. [128:32] And we did two interviews. And I told my [128:35] editor, "I have to rewrite that [128:36] chapter." And I did. [128:42] I mean that story speaks to a lot of the [128:45] subjects we spoken about today which is [128:46] when we [128:48] see someone as different, when we see [128:49] them as aliens, adversaries, enemies, [128:51] opponents [128:52] we are much more likely to treat them [128:55] as such, but [128:57] in reality it often turns out that we're [129:00] all very much the same, struggling with [129:02] the same things, with the same worries, [129:04] anxieties, concerns, [129:06] apprehensions, and it's just sometimes [129:08] when there's a bridge built, in the case [129:10] of that email, that we realize that [129:13] we're not enemies after all. [129:15] And that we don't need to be at war, [129:16] whether that's with words or whether [129:17] it's with [129:19] nuclear weapons. [129:21] And when you see that fellow [129:23] hunter on the path, [129:26] they might not be [129:28] the enemy. They might be someone to work [129:31] with. [129:32] It's very good of you to admit that, [129:33] Annie, because [129:35] what you're actually admitting is that [129:36] you're a human being. [129:38] Because we all do that kind of thing. [129:40] When we see someone as an adversary, I [129:41] think, as you say, it's feels like it's [129:42] hardwired into us in some way, but also [129:44] within that story we learn to [129:46] try and find or make the bridge [129:47] ourselves. [129:49] Which in the world we live in now, with [129:50] social media and stuff, is [129:52] doesn't seem to be um [129:54] easy or obvious for people, with all of [129:56] this polarization and such. And maybe if [129:58] the you know, if the US could make a [130:00] bridge with some of these foreign [130:02] adversaries, we wouldn't be talking [130:04] about nuclear war in your book, nuclear [130:06] war scenario. [130:07] Thank you so much for writing this book, [130:09] because [130:10] I'm a big believer and a big [130:12] um advocate of confronting the realities [130:15] honestly and openly, regardless of how [130:17] uncomfortable it is, because [130:19] if we don't, I think it actually [130:20] increases the probability of us [130:23] finding ourselves in a 72-hour [130:26] scenario, as you write about in the [130:27] book. And I The same thing [130:28] 72 minutes. [130:29] 72 [130:29] Christ, only two hours. Did I say 72 [130:31] hours? [130:31] Yes. [130:32] We all make Freudian slips. Okay. I wish [130:34] it was 72. [130:36] Well, no, I actually don't. I [130:37] Well, if it was going to happen, I'd [130:38] rather it just [130:40] happened in the blink of an eye. But um [130:42] but no, I think it's it's so, so [130:43] important to write. A lot of people [130:45] would be scared. A lot of people would [130:46] choose not to even click on this [130:47] conversation, because they're scared of [130:48] the subject matter. But I I think it's [130:50] leaning in that helps us to resolve and [130:53] find solutions and start the [130:54] conversation. And I know lots of people [130:56] listen to this. You never know, like [130:58] that [130:59] like that documentary or movie you [131:00] talked about earlier, who's listening [131:02] and the powers that they have, and the [131:04] decisions that they can make to change [131:06] things or to create one of those bridges [131:07] to to sort of denuclearize the world. [131:10] And that's the work you're doing. So, I [131:11] think it's very, very important work, [131:13] and I'm glad that you've committed your [131:14] brilliance to doing it. So, thank you. [131:16] Thank you so much for having me.