Pabrai Outlines Zero-Risk Wealth Framework built on Cloning and Asymmetry

Pabrai概述基于克隆与非对称性的零风险财富框架 投资者通过克隆成熟的商业模式并进行下行风险有限的非对称下注来建立持久财富，而非追求高风险的风投投机或日内交易。 Mohnish Pabrai概述了一套实现创业成功与财富积累的低风险框架，强调真正的创新极为罕见，而复制经过验证的心智模型要有效得多。他详细阐述了有志创业者如何通过利用业余时间开展副业，并在实现正向现金流之前保留本职工作来降低转型风险。结合Patel汽车旅馆模式和Bill Gates等历史范例，Pabrai倡导“Dhandho”方法——在确保高回报的同时将下行风险降至最低。此外，他还强调了长期复利、指数投资、严谨招聘以及避免过早卖出盈利头寸的重要性。 心智模型会产生一种预言式的网络效应，其中协同效应带来的价值可数倍于各个孤立部分的总和。 (0:00) 成功的创业基于克隆和优化已获验证的商业模式，而非重新发明轮子。 (0:00) 真正的创业者会将风险降至近乎为零；创业应在常规全职工作之余循序渐进地开展。 (7:23) 创立企业应源于真正的热情和价值创造，因为纯粹对金钱的贪婪很少能带来持久的成功。 (11:57) 定期且迭代式的客户反馈以及原型设计，决定了哪些产品构想值得继续推进。 (11:57)

Investor Mohnish Pabrai argues that sustainable wealth and entrepreneurship stem from systematic risk elimination, disciplined cloning of proven models, and uninterrupted long-term compounding rather than speculative gambles or original invention. Cloning Proven Models and Spotting Offering Gaps (0:00) Pabrai challenges the myth that building a business requires novel invention, highlighting 'cloning' as an effective, underutilized strategy. Historically, major enterprises scaled by copying established models: Microsoft adapted Word from WordPerfect and Excel from Lotus 1-2-3; Sam Walton built Walmart by studying Sears and Kmart; and Howard Schultz transplanted Italian espresso culture to America with Starbucks. Emulating proven formats bypasses the failure rates associated with untested ideas. Rather than chasing high-tech concepts, Pabrai advises targeting overlooked 'offering gaps' in ordinary industries. He notes that 99.99% of startups globally are non-venture-backed enterprises like restaurants or service providers. Success relies on listening to direct customer demand and rapid prototyping—such as when Pabrai trimmed a seven-service pitch down to a single offering after an executive bought only slide 10—and identifying localized demand, like a barber opening a shop in an underserved town. De-Risking Transitions via the Dhandho Mindset (7:23) True entrepreneurship, Pabrai asserts, operates on the Gujarati principle of 'Dhandho'—structuring ventures where the upside is vast and the downside is nearly zero ('heads I win, tails I don't lose much'). For instance, the Patel community captured roughly 80% of U.S. motels by living on-site, eliminating outside payroll, and undercutting competitor prices. Similarly, Richard Branson launched Virgin Atlantic by negotiating a leased Boeing 747 with zero money down, using prepaid customer ticket cash to service operating costs. To transition safely without taking career-ending risks, Pabrai recommends that founders maintain their 9-to-5 jobs while building their company. Using a 168-hour weekly framework, an aspiring founder can preserve 56 hours of sleep and 40 hours of work while converting 40 to 44 hours of leisure time into startup operations. When Pabrai launched his IT consulting firm with $100,000 in credit card lines and 401(k) withdrawals, he intentionally performed just above firing level at his day job to conserve energy until cash flow replaced his salary in nine months. Systematic Sales Funnels and Organizational Discipline Pabrai views enterprise sales and recruitment as mathematical conversion funnels rather than speculative efforts. To gain enterprise clients without marketing capital, he mailed 200 mail-merged, personalized letters per week to executives and followed up by phone on a strict progression schedule (1, 2, 4, 8, and 16-week intervals). Pabrai's daughter adopted a similar high-signal strategy by mailing 1,200 physical stock-pitch letters to hedge funds, successfully bypassing digital noise to land a competitive role. When scaling organizations, Pabrai stresses strict hiring standards and cost discipline. Citing Steve Jobs, he cautions that hiring 'B players' causes talent decay, as they inevitably recruit B and C players. He identifies integrity, intelligence, and work ethic as non-negotiable traits, advising founders to hire slowly and fire quickly. Operationally, he points to Sam Walton's micro-optimizations and IKEA's complete avoidance of debt as proof that tight internal cost control safeguards businesses against insolvency. Compounding Mechanics and Uninterrupted Ownership (62:47) While business operations generate seed capital, Pabrai contends that substantial long-term wealth is driven by compounding. Using the Rule of 72, he illustrates how an initial $23 payment for Manhattan in 1623 at a 7% return compounds to over $23 trillion across 400 years. For passive retail investors, investing systematically in broad-market vehicles like the S&P 500 or Berkshire Hathaway captures the roughly 4% of outlier public companies that generate 90% of overall stock returns, whereas day trading consistently enriches brokers rather than participants. Maximizing returns requires extreme discipline and holding winning assets indefinitely. Pabrai adopts Warren Buffett's '20-slot punch card' model to highlight the rarity of exceptional opportunities; Buffett generated the majority of Berkshire Hathaway's wealth from roughly 12 investment decisions. Pabrai notes that premature selling—an 'error of omission'—is far more financially destructive than backing an investment that goes to zero, citing his own premature sale of Ferrari shares that cost him over $1 billion in unrealized gains. Pabrai maintains that wealth accumulation is ultimately ineffective if it detracts from personal happiness, emphasizing that he aligns his daily life with activities he enjoys. He remains cautious regarding complex assets like cryptocurrency, strictly avoiding ventures that fall outside his circle of competence.

投资人莫尼什·帕布莱（Mohnish Pabrai）主张，实现财务自由的最高效路径并非承担极高风险或创造颠覆性创新，而是通过克隆成熟商业模式、识别市场供给缺口，并在保留全职工作安全垫的前提下利用业余时间低风险启动。他强调，结合“单面我赢、双面我也输不了多少”的Dhandho低风险哲学与长期指数复利，创业者与投资者能在彻底控制下行风险的同时获得巨大的非对称回报。 商业克隆与识别市场供给缺口 (0:00) 帕布莱指出，创业必须源于全新发明的观念纯属误区。克隆是商业史上最强大却被严重低估的模式，尽管人类演化出反剽窃的偏见，但商业领袖往往是顶尖的克隆者：微软的核心软件均脱胎于已有产品（Word借鉴WordPerfect，Excel替代Lotus 1-2-3，Bing效仿Google）；沃尔玛通过复刻Sears与Kmart起家，山姆·沃尔顿长年走访对手门店并吸收其陈列优点；星巴克的霍华德·舒尔茨则是将意大利意式咖啡体验直接移植至美国。帕布莱认为，“复制并微调”策略能直接规避未经验证概念的高失败率，使创业者在起步阶段领先竞争对手90%。 此外，全球99.99%的企业属于无需风险投资支持的普通商业（如餐饮店、洗衣店或电商卖家），无需盲目追逐高科技。创业者应当寻找“供给缺口”（offering gaps）：例如在两个已有成熟理发店的城镇之间兴起的新社区设点，即便初期仅租用极小店面且每周仅营业一天，也能凭借解决居民通勤痛点享有更高定价，待需求扩大后再转为全职，以极低资金风险建立稳固业务。 零风险创业与业余时间的积木化管理 (7:23) 帕布莱反对创业必须孤注一掷的传统偏见，强调真正的创业者会竭力将风险降至接近于零，而深陷缺乏激情的全职工作反而是虚掷光阴的更大风险。他将每周168小时拆解为乐高积木模型：睡眠56小时、全职工作40小时、必要通勤与生活28小时，剩余44小时则为可支配的闲暇时间。初创者在初期切勿草率辞职，而应让雇主为房租与生活成本托底，将每周40余小时的闲暇时间完全转化为副业开发时间。帕布莱在创办IT企业时，刻意将主业绩效维持在“刚好高于解雇线”，以此保全心智带宽。 他依靠约12张信用卡提供的7万美元信用额度及401(k)养老账户提现的3万美元（共计10万美元）作为启动资本，在9个月内利用夜晚和周末实现现金流转正才正式递交辞呈。由于此前业绩优良，前雇主甚至承诺若创业失败随时欢迎加薪升职返岗，使其转型成为下行无伤的不对称押注。盖茨退学哈佛（随时可回且家境优渥）以及理查德·布兰森创办维珍航空（致电波音约30次争取到二手客机租赁，利用机票预售达数月、油料与租金滞后30天结算的负运营资本启动）同样印证了这种去风险策略。 敏捷原型迭代与高信噪比获客漏斗 (11:57) 帕布莱强调，赚钱是向市场交付卓越产品或服务的副产品而非初衷。创业者闭门造车的构想鲜少契合实际需求，必须通过快速制作原型直接面向客户测试。在早期IT创业中，他向芝加哥一家大银行高管提案时原本准备了包含7项业务的11页幻灯片，对方打断并执意买下单张聚焦具体痛点的第10页；帕布莱随后舍弃其余6项业务，将该页扩展为20页方案并以此重构整个业务。他指出产品必须契合人体工学与行为习惯，如Google Glass因外形突兀被市场淘汰，而Meta则联合雷朋将技术无缝融入传统眼镜形态。 获客拓展同样是一场数学转化漏斗。帕布莱设计了一套系统化冷触达流程：每周寄出200封利用邮件合并定制的实体商业信函（以亲昵称呼避开助理拦截），并在寄出整整一周后拨打200通跟进电话；对未回复者按1周、2周、4周、8周、16周的双倍间隔持续跟进，直到对方明确拒绝或签单。这一策略推动其IT业务年收入从首年40万美元跃升至数年后超1500万美元。其女儿毕业后也通过向1200家对冲基金寄送附带2页深度股票分析报告的实体信件，成功跨专业斩获高薪录用。 Dhandho低风险哲学与极致成本控制 (75:58) 源自印度古吉拉特语的“Dhandho”指代下行风险几乎不存在的商业运作模式，其核心在于“单面我赢，双面我也输不了多少”。这一哲学的典范是美国帕特尔（Patel）家族：该族群仅占全美人口约0.1%，却掌控了全美约80%的汽车旅馆。他们举家迁入旅馆房间，完全依靠家庭劳力免去雇员工资与工伤险支出，凭借极低成本提供低价房源并维持高入住率，积累现金流后再将模式复制给亲属。 商业亦是一场微观层面的“毫米游戏”。企业无法控制外部宏观环境与营收波动，但对内部成本结构拥有完全控制权。山姆·沃尔顿选用仅有7个字母的“Walmart”名称是为了节省各门市招牌制作维护开支，并亲自趴在过道精确测量货架尺寸；LVMH即便身处高毛利奢侈品行业，董事长阿尔诺在商业地产谈判与运营支出上也推行极严苛管控。企业倒闭的根本诱因是无法偿还的债务杠杆；宜家（IKEA）以超长远视角运营，坚持不借一分钱债务，完全凭借保留盈余和现金储备推进稳健扩张，且规定每家新店都必须包含一项可衡量的渐进创新。 长期指数复利与持有优质资产的克制 (62:47) 帕布莱指出，创业主要用于积累本金，极端财富的创造则来自长期的指数复利。复利由本金、时间跑道与回报率决定；根据“72法则”，7%年回报率意味着资金每10年翻一番。1623年美洲原住民以23美元出售曼哈顿，若以7%年化收益复利400年至2023年将膨胀至超23万亿美元，相当于全美总财富的近六分之一。对普通投资者而言，实现财富积累的关键是践行“先储蓄后消费”（如年薪5万美元强制储蓄10%），定投标普500指数基金或伯克希尔哈撒韦，借助数十年的时间跑道自然滚雪球。 相比之下，频繁日内交易只是为券商贡献佣金的零和博弈，福布斯400富豪榜上从未出现过长期日内交易者。公开市场上仅约4%的股票贡献了90%的财富生成，指数化投资能保证捕获这些极端赢家。在持股心法上，巴菲特50年间仅靠12项关键决策创造了伯克希尔绝大部分财富。帕布莱提出“围绕皇冠上的明珠结营防守”（Circle the Wagons），告诫投资者切勿过早卖出超级牛股；他回顾自己2012年投资菲亚特克莱斯勒，虽然赚取数亿美元，却在法拉利分拆上市后过早清仓所持约1%股权，随着法拉利市值飙升至千亿美元，过早卖出的“错失之错”（error of omission）令他错失了超10亿美元的潜在利润。 帕布莱的论述将实体创业与二级市场投资贯穿于低风险与复利的统一底层逻辑中。然而，该框架也揭示了现实商业中的脆弱性：企业护城河并非坚不可摧，如苹果公司在硬件形态从长方形玻璃砖转向可穿戴设备的范式演进中面临长期替代风险；此外，普通人在投资中极易因情绪诱惑过早卖出赢家资产或误入高频交易陷阱。帕布莱最终指出，财富管理的本质并非无休止地追逐账面回报，其终极价值在于赋予个体从事真正热爱事物（如个人对高尔夫的追求）的时间自由。

## Background 该内容由知名访谈播客《The Diary Of A CEO》（主持人 Steven Bartlett）于 2025 年 8 月 21 日在 YouTube 平台发布。视频围绕著名价值投资人、帕伯莱基金创始人莫尼斯·帕伯莱（Mohnish Pabrai）展开，探讨普通人如何运用巴菲特式的价值投资与“达班度（Dhandho）”思维，在极低甚至零风险的前提下打造副业、积累资产并实现财务自由。 ## TL;DR 莫尼斯·帕伯莱系统阐述了“正面我赢，反面我输不多”的达班度商业与投资心智模型。他主张普通人在创业初期切勿盲目裸辞，而应保留全职工作以保障基础现金流，利用业余的 30 至 40 小时通过克隆成熟商业模式与快速原型验证来启动低风险业务。在投资层面，他用 72 法则和曼哈顿岛的复利推演证明了“跑道长度”对财富积累的决定性作用，告诫大众远离日内交易陷阱，聚焦定投指数基金或伯克希尔·哈撒韦。此外，他还强调了“打孔卡”极度精选与“围成车阵（Circling the Wagons）”长期死守伟大企业的原则，复盘了过早卖出法拉利导致错失 10 亿美元的教训，并分享了不为金钱所困、追求热爱最大化的快乐处世哲学。 ## Atmosphere & style 整场对话洋溢着松弛、睿智而通透的智慧气息。帕伯莱全程面带温和微笑，谈吐幽默风趣，擅长用乐高积木、23 美元买下曼哈顿以及自己早年的地推趣事等生动意象化繁为简，将看似高深的商业与数学逻辑拆解得极其接地气。主持人 Steven Bartlett 则以精准的追问与共鸣推动节奏，二人在思维碰撞中既有对商业残酷现实与大数法则的客观剖析，又有跨越数十年的温情与反思，让观众在收获干货的同时，深切感受到一种超越金钱、从容享受人生的平和力量。 ## Bulletin - [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qgeQ5kMVwRA&t=0s) 莫尼斯·帕伯莱提出“达班度（Dhandho）”商业哲学，即追求“赢则大赢，输则几乎无损”的非对称收益，主张初创者通过克隆成熟商业模式与低成本试错来将风险压缩至接近于零。 - [11:22](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qgeQ5kMVwRA&t=682s) 创业初期切勿贸然辞去朝九晚五的全职工作，应将主业绩效维持在“刚好高过被解雇线”的水平，利用业余每周腾出的 30 至 40 小时推进副业，待现金流转正后再全职投入。 - [01:02:47](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qgeQ5kMVwRA&t=3767s) 美股市场中仅有 4% 的上市公司贡献了超过 90% 的长期净财富增量，普通投资者应放弃寻找黑马与频繁日内交易，依靠定投标普 500 指数或伯克希尔·哈撒韦股票，利用 72 法则享受复利增长。 - [01:40:50](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qgeQ5kMVwRA&t=6050s) 在投资中“错失之错”（过早卖出伟大公司）的代价远超“作为之错”（本金亏损归零）；帕伯莱复盘其曾过早卖出持有法拉利的菲亚特克莱斯勒，错失了高达 10 亿美元的潜在回报。 ## Key takeaways - [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qgeQ5kMVwRA&t=0s) “达班度（Dhandho）”思维的核心在于“赢则大赢，输则几乎无损”（Heads I win, tails I don't lose much），优秀企业家从不主动冒险，而是穷尽手段缩减风险以获取非对称回报。 - [03:09](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qgeQ5kMVwRA&t=189s) 商业克隆（Cloning）是超越 90% 竞争者的捷径，像微软、沃尔玛和星巴克等商业巨头早期均深度借鉴了成熟模式，而非闭门造车凭空重新发明轮子。 - [09:08](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qgeQ5kMVwRA&t=548s) 普通上班族在每周 168 小时中，完全可以在保障 56 小时睡眠和 40 小时本职工作之余，通过压缩无效娱乐与通勤调拨出 30 到 40 小时的安全时间池打造副业。 - [11:22](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qgeQ5kMVwRA&t=682s) 为单纯挣钱而创业往往容易失败；创业的真正驱动力应是向社会交付极致的产品或服务以解决真实痛点，商业利润只是水到渠成的副产品。 - [12:42](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qgeQ5kMVwRA&t=762s) 象牙塔里的理论构想大多脱离现实，初创团队必须通过“快速原型开发”获取活人客户的真实反馈，从海量杂音中剥离出对方真正的核心痛点（信号）。 - [20:41](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qgeQ5kMVwRA&t=1241s) 企业在经营中最具绝对掌控力的环节是“成本”，无论是折扣零售巨头沃尔玛还是顶奢集团 LVMH，其长期竞争优势都建立在极致的成本与细节把控上。 - [34:31](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qgeQ5kMVwRA&t=2071s) 现代商业已逐渐摆脱资本密集型束缚，理查德·布兰森创办维珍航空等案例表明，利用客户预付款与供应链负营运资本周期，可以实现“零资本起步”。 - [43:32](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qgeQ5kMVwRA&t=2612s) 大数法则在商业获客与求职中极其关键，通过高信噪比渠道（如实体纸质信件）与高情感共鸣内容（如原创个股研报）规模化触达决策者，能突破传统筛选壁垒。 - [52:25](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qgeQ5kMVwRA&t=3145s) 在人际与商业交往中，纯粹利他的“付出者（Givers）”长期能建立起不可替代的信任复利，而追求零和博弈的“索取者（Takers）”必须坚决从圈子中剔除。 - [57:12](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qgeQ5kMVwRA&t=3432s) 独立创业者打破增长瓶颈的关键在于将“招聘人才”置于最高优先级，坚持“A 级人才只吸引 A 级人才”及“慢招快辞”原则，不可在“诚信”品质上做任何妥协。 - [01:02:47](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qgeQ5kMVwRA&t=3767s) “72 法则”展示了复利的非线性增长魔力，只要投资跑道足够长、年轻时尽早启动储蓄，初始本金与过高的回报率诉求都会变得次要。 - [01:17:05](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qgeQ5kMVwRA&t=4625s) 帕特尔家族通过买下小型汽车旅馆、全家住店运营消灭用工成本、低价高入住率驱动现金流并滚动复制，仅以 0.1% 的全美人口占比掌控了全美 80% 的汽车旅馆。 - [01:21:54](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qgeQ5kMVwRA&t=4914s) 大众往往过度沉迷高科技幻觉，实际上 99.99% 的创业机会存在于被忽视的传统实体生意中，核心在于敏锐发现未被满足的“供给真空（Offering Gaps）”。 - [01:28:11](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qgeQ5kMVwRA&t=5291s) 会员制模型通过前置费用与即时优惠在心理上锁死消费者，极大地降低比价冲动，这也是 Costco 与亚马逊 Prime 飞轮效应的底层根基。 - [01:34:43](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qgeQ5kMVwRA&t=5683s) 巴菲特的“打孔卡模型”告诫投资者一生只需做极少数、大额度、低频次的优质下注；全球股市中仅有 4% 的头部超级赢家贡献了绝大多数净财富增量。 - [01:37:22](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qgeQ5kMVwRA&t=5842s) 日内交易（Day Trading）是只有券商获利的负和游戏，福布斯富豪榜上从未出现过日内交易员的身影。 - [01:39:25](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qgeQ5kMVwRA&t=5965s) “围成车阵（Circling the Wagons）”战术要求投资者在历经万难抓到真正具备宽广护城河的超级牛股后，必须坚定持有、坚决不卖，以抵御市场诱惑守护核心成果。 - [01:43:35](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qgeQ5kMVwRA&t=6215s) 严守能力圈原则，坚决不碰自己无法理解的领域（如加密货币）；人生的终极目标应是“最大化热爱”，而非盲目追求金钱的最大化。 ## Detailed walkthrough ### [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qgeQ5kMVwRA&t=0s) 导言：低风险高回报的“达班度”智慧 莫尼斯·帕伯莱（Mohnish Pabrai）开篇便解释了何为“达班度投资者”（Dhandho Investor）的核心内涵：这是一种既能经商赚钱、又不必承担巨大风险的思维方式。无论是比尔·盖茨（Bill Gates）、山姆·沃尔顿（Sam Walton），还是理查德·布兰森（Richard Branson），这些传奇商业巨擘在起步阶段都遵循着非常朴素的心智模型——"赢则大赢，输则几乎无损"（If they won, they would win big. And if they lost, they'd lose nothing）。 作为掌管着超过 10 亿美元资产、从零起家的知名价值投资人，帕伯莱致力于向大众普及这套改变人生的财富框架。大多数普通人之所以对创业望而却步，是因为误以为商业充满致命风险；然而一旦理解风险可以被压缩至接近于零，人们的行动意愿便会彻底改变。 - **克隆（Cloning）**：商业并非必须凭空创造新物种，优秀的复制者足以超越人类中 90% 的人，微软的大多数爆款产品皆源于对外部成熟方案的模仿与吸收。 - **时间管理与现金流保护**：初创期切忌贸然辞去朝九晚五的全职工作，让雇主继续为你支付房租和账单，同时利用业余时间推进新业务。 - **经典心智模型组合**：低垂的果实（Low-hanging fruit）、利益攸关（Skin in the game）、给予者与索取者（Givers vs. Takers）、能力圈（Circle of competence）等。 - **投资的核心要素**：涉及 3 个关键维度以及高中理应普及的“72法则”（Rule of 72，用以快速计算资金翻倍所需的时间）。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 商业与投资的核心心智模型体系 accDescr: 帕伯莱提出的组合思维模型，包含克隆、零风险创业、时间分配与72法则。 subgraph Mindsets["心智模型叠加 (1 + 1 = 11)"] direction TB M1["克隆成熟模式<br/>(降低模式不确定性)"] M2["非对称风险控制<br/>(赢则大赢，输则无损)"] M3["全职工作保底现金流<br/>(业余时间开发副业)"] end subgraph Outcomes["结果呈现"] direction TB R1["规避毁灭性风险"] R2["业务成功率提升90%+"] R3["实现非线性财务自由"] end Mindsets --> Outcomes ``` --- ### [02:14](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qgeQ5kMVwRA&t=134s) 心智模型叠加效应：1 + 1 = 11 帕伯莱指出，自己在过去数十年中梳理出多项关键心智模型。当这些模型单独存在时已有价值，但真正产生核聚变效应的，是将它们相互“叠加（overlaying）”的时刻——此时系统的威力不是线性的相加，而是呈现出“1 + 1 = 11”的指数级爆发。 心智模型本质上是用来做决策与思考的底层认知脚手架。对于渴望建立财富或开启副业的人而言，单一技巧往往脆弱，唯有将认知框架交叉运用，才能在复杂的现实市场中找到阻力最小、胜率最高的通道。 --- ### [03:09](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qgeQ5kMVwRA&t=189s) 心智模型一：克隆（Cloning）不是抄袭，而是顶级智慧 人类主流教育往往向人们灌输一种偏见：创业必须开天辟地，做出前所未有的创新产品。帕伯莱直言这种认知与真实商业世界背道而驰。现实生活中的市场容量巨大，往往轻而易举就能容纳三个甚至五个同类型的竞争者。最聪明的做法绝不是重新发明轮子，而是审视现存的成功实体并思考："市场上能否再容纳一个同样的产品？我能否在现存产品的基础上做一点细微的微调（tweak it a little bit）？" 人类天性里有一种深层的心理偏执，往往从道德或智识上鄙视“模仿”。然而商业史上最伟大的两位企业家——微软的创始人比尔·盖茨与沃尔玛的创始人山姆·沃尔顿，本质上都是登峰造极的“克隆者”： - **微软（Microsoft）的克隆史**：微软早期的重大成功均非原创。Microsoft Word 模仿自当时统领文字处理市场的 WordPerfect；Excel 模仿自 Lotus 1-2-3；甚至 Bing 也是直接锚定 Google。微软的核心优势在于将市场上已验证的模式拿过来，依靠生态与执行力做深做透。 - **沃尔玛与山姆·沃尔顿**：沃尔顿家族坐拥超越埃隆·马斯克及任何单一富豪的全球最富家族资产。山姆·沃尔顿本人公开坦承自己毫无原创构想（"had no original ideas"）。沃尔玛起步完全是在克隆当年的零售巨头西尔斯（Sears）与凯马特（Kmart），最终却后发制人将这两家先驱彻底埋葬。 - **沃尔顿巡店的狂热执念**：沃尔顿一生中去过的零售店数量无人能及。即便带全家自驾度假，途经任何零售小店，他都会让家人坐在车内等候，自己钻进店里研究。零售行业极具透明度，走进去观察 10 分钟便能看透其运转逻辑。一次，随行经理向沃尔顿抱怨某家竞品店铺杂乱无章、管理极差，沃尔顿却反问："难道你没看到他们惊艳绝伦的蜡烛陈列架吗？"在他眼中，无论是平庸之辈还是卓越同行，皆有值得学习与提取的闪光点。 - **星巴克（Starbucks）**：霍华德·舒尔茨（Howard Schultz）并未凭空发明咖啡文化，他只是去了一趟意大利，被当地的意式浓缩咖啡吧氛围震撼，随后将整个意大利咖啡体验原封不动地搬回了美国市场。 帕伯莱总结：一个善于在商业中成熟克隆他人成熟路径的人，起步就已经甩开 90% 到 95% 的竞争者。 --- ### [07:23](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qgeQ5kMVwRA&t=443s) 心智模型二：零风险创业与“高风险”朝九晚五 大众潜意识里总觉得创业是九死一生的巨大赌博。帕伯莱犀利地扭转了这一偏见：真正的优秀企业家从不主动冒险，他们会穷尽一切可能去抹杀、缩减风险，使商业起步时的风险无限趋近于零。 相反，在帕伯莱看来，**按部就班的朝九晚五全职工作才是人世间最极端的冒险**。人的生命只有短短数十年，转瞬即逝；每天在公司消耗精力，最终可能至死都未能释放出自己内心深处的潜能与才华（"You may not get your music out"）。 当把“克隆既有模式”与“零风险创业方式”两大模型结合在一起时，1 + 1 就会瞬间变成 11。模式本身已经被别人在市场上真金白银验证过（无市场未知风险），而在操作层面上，创业者亦不需要孤注一掷去裸辞押上一切。 --- ### [09:08](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qgeQ5kMVwRA&t=548s) 积木拆解：如何每周腾出 30-40 小时打造副业 为了具象化展示如何实现零风险起步，帕伯莱使用乐高积木详细拆解了人类一周时间的具体分配： 每周总共有 **168 小时**。帕伯莱以每块代表 2 小时的乐高积木展示了一名普通上班族典型的每周时间分布： | 分类 | 每日时间分配 | 每周总时长 | 说明 | |:--- |:--- |:--- |:--- | | **睡眠时间** | 每天 8 小时 | 56 小时 | 每周 7 天，确保基础生理恢复 | | **全职工作** | 每天 8 小时（工作日） | 40 小时 | 周一至周五的固定 9-5 上班工时 | | **基础生活与通勤** | 工作日约 4 小时 / 周末约 8 小时 | 36 小时 | 洗漱打理、烹饪进餐、上下班通勤与日常杂务 | | **闲暇与社交** | 工作日约 4 小时 / 周末约 8 小时 | 36 小时 | 刷社交媒体、刷 Netflix、聚餐与朋友闲聊 | ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 一周168小时时间拆解 accDescr: 上班族每周168小时的四个40小时左右的模块分布。 Total["每周总计 168 小时"] Total --> Sleep["充足睡眠: 56 小时<br/>(8小时 × 7天)"] Total --> Work["全职工作: 40 小时<br/>(8小时 × 5天)"] Total --> Life["基础琐事与通勤: 36 小时<br/>(周中4h / 周末8h)"] Total --> Free["自由闲暇时间: 36 小时<br/>(周中4h / 周末8h)"] Free -.-> SideHustle["可调拨至副业创办<br/>(30 - 40 小时安全时间池)"] ``` 帕伯莱指出，在开启副业的最关键前提是：**绝不要切断原本的现金流**。正是因为有雇主这个“冤大头（some other yo-yo）”在替你按月付房租、买食品杂货，你才拥有了不被生存压力击垮的底气。创业者绝不要轻易掀翻这条船，但必须对这 40 小时的工作状态与闲暇时间做出战略层面的重新定义。在全职创业之前，每个人手中其实都自然沉睡着 30 到 40 个小时可供调动的自由时间。 ### [11:22](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qgeQ5kMVwRA&t=682s) 创业前的职场策略：做个“勉强及格”的打工人 莫尼什·帕伯莱（Mohnish Pabrai）回顾了自己当年决心创业时的心理转变。一旦认准了要创办自己的公司，他对全职工作的策略立即调整为：“表现刚好高过被解雇的标准就行”（just above firing level）。他的业绩只要好到公司不会把自己扫地出门即可，绝不再多浪费一点精力。因为真正的重头戏是自己的初创项目，所有的额外能量都必须毫无保留地灌注到创业当中。主持人斯蒂芬·巴特利特（Steven Bartlett）补充说明，图表中代表本职工作的“蓝色块”依然保留，但再也不会像以前那样无休止地自愿加班。 帕伯莱随即抛出了一个颠覆常人认知的论断：绝对不要为了“赚钱”去创业。为了赚钱而做公司，是创业最糟糕的理由。商业的本质并非赚钱，而是向人类社会提供某种不可思议的极致产品或服务；只要切实做到了这一点，财富不过是随之而来的“副产品”（side effect）。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 创业认知与业务闭环 accDescr: 展示从提供社会价值出发，通过客户反馈打造好产品，最终自然产生收益的因果模型。 subgraph Mindset["核心心智模型"] A["错误目标：为了赚钱而创业"] -.->|容易走偏| Fail["失败概率高"] B["正确目标：向社会交付极致产品/服务"] --> C["解决用户真实痛点"] end subgraph Outcome["业务结果"] C --> D["产品获得市场认可"] D --> E["商业利润与财富自由<br/>（自然而然的副产品）"] end ``` --- ### [12:42](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qgeQ5kMVwRA&t=762s) 象牙塔里的构想行不通：芝加哥银行会议与“第 10 页幻灯片” 当被问及“如何判断自己的点子是否优秀”时，帕伯莱直截了当地回答：“无论你想出什么点子，它大概率都行不通。”原因在于，那只是你在两耳之间的象牙塔里闭门造车构思出来的，根本无法反映现实世界的复杂需求。唯一的出路是“快速原型开发”（rapid prototyping）——把想法做成雏形，拿去给真正的活人看，收集第一手反馈。 他分享了自己创办第一家 IT 服务公司时的亲身经历。当时他的目标客户是年收益或现金流在 10 亿美元以上的超大型企业。在芝加哥一家巨头银行的高管会议上，帕伯莱对着一位资深 IT 主管展示精心准备的 PowerPoint 演示文稿。他讲完第 10 页幻灯片，顺手切换到第 11 页。 - 那位主管当场打断他：“退回第 10 页。” - 帕伯莱退回后把第 10 页的措辞又念了一遍，正准备再翻到第 11 页，主管直接喝止：“回到第 10 页，不要再动了！我对其他任何一页幻灯片都没兴趣。” 整份演示文稿罗列了他们能做的 7 项业务，而第 10 页仅仅是其中之一。但对那位银行高管而言，那一项恰恰是他当时痛彻骨髓的极端痛点（extreme pain point），其余 6 项全部是毫无意义的琐碎杂音。会议结束时，对方当场开出了采购订单（Purchase Order）。帕伯莱回去后当机立断：将原本的第 10 页内容直接拆解扩展为 20 页的新幻灯片，其余内容全部扔进垃圾桶，这成了公司后续的标准演讲稿。帕伯莱自嘲说：“仅凭我有限的脑容量，根本不可能在办公室里想明白这一点，全靠客户亲自告诉我痛点在哪。” --- ### [16:13](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qgeQ5kMVwRA&t=973s) 倾听的威力：从招聘对话到心智模型 听完第 10 页幻灯片的故事，主持人斯蒂芬深有共鸣，分享了当天早上自己主持的一场关键岗位面试。应聘者在一家全球顶尖企业工作了 20 年，面试中花了整整 55 分钟巨细靡遗地讲述这 20 年间的各种辉煌履历。然而，斯蒂芬整场面试唯一关心的核心问题其实只有一件事：“你能不能独立操办大型活动？”如果该候选人一开场能主动发问：“斯蒂芬，能先告诉我你最看重这个岗位的什么能力吗？”整个对话就能完全聚焦在如何证明自己具备大型活动操盘能力上，而不是让 55 分钟的时间在无关话题中白白流逝。 帕伯莱指出，如果让他重新回到当年的销售会议，他会把自己的“倾听雷达放大 10 倍”： - **核心法则**：“我们说话时学不到东西，唯有倾听时才能学到新知”（We don't learn when we speak. We learn when we listen）。 - **创始团队与客户的博弈**：几乎没有任何成功的企业最终执行的是最初构想的商业模式；商业化就像塑造一块湿黏土，是由创始团队与早期客户反复切磋互动捏出来的。 - **软硬件的人体工学与心理距离**：以 Google Glass 为例，由于眼镜直接戴在人脸上，属于极度私密的个人领域（就像人们绝不会把不知名的廉价口香糖放进嘴里一样，只会选择熟悉的 Wrigley 箭牌口香糖），极轻微的不适或怪异外观都会导致灾难性失败。相比之下，Meta 选择与传统眼镜巨头 Ray-Ban 合作，打造外观与普通眼镜无异的智能眼镜，成功率就高得多。 - **第三个心智模型**：承认自己不够聪明。客户虽然往往说不清自己要什么，但只要你把原型摆在面前，他们就能立刻指出哪里不对。创业者的核心能力就是倾听，并精准分离“信号”（Signal）与“噪声”（Noise）。 --- ### [20:41](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qgeQ5kMVwRA&t=1241s) 成本控制的极致：沃尔玛与 LVMH 的细节管理 斯蒂芬将话题引向商业中的另一项关键能力：对细节的极致关注（Attention to detail）。帕伯莱赞同这是一场“毫厘之间的博弈”（a game of inches），并以零售帝国沃尔玛（Walmart）创始人山姆·沃尔顿（Sam Walton）为例展开说明。 沃尔顿当年为公司敲定名字时，选择“Walmart”的一大关键考量竟是它只有 7 个英文字母。由于每家门店都需要制作发光招牌，字母数量直接决定了招牌的制作与维护成本，沃尔顿为了省下这笔细微的开支，特意挑选了最短的名字。沃尔玛将这种“从石头里榨出血来”（squeeze blood out of a rock）的成本敏感度融入了骨髓。 帕伯莱总结了掌控成本的心智模型： - 在日常商业经营中，毛利率、最终售价以及宏观经济走势往往超出掌控范围。 - 唯有一件事是企业能够 100% 绝对掌控的，那就是自己的**成本**（You can always control costs）。 - 这种成本控制的自律不仅适用于平价零售业，同样适用于高端奢侈品帝国。例如执掌 LVMH（旗下拥有 Louis Vuitton、Tiffany & Co. 等顶奢品牌）的伯纳德·阿诺特（Bernard Arnault），虽然为了品牌调性不惜重金抢占全球最优质的核心商圈地段，但在地产租约的实际谈判与内部运营把控上，其精打细算与严苛程度丝毫不亚于任何折扣零售商。 ### [22:37](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qgeQ5kMVwRA&t=1357s) 严格运营与时间方块重新分配 对话从对欧洲首富（阿尔诺/阿曼西奥·奥尔特加式的极端执行力）商业逻辑的讨论无缝切入。这种在一个看似不需要极端精细化运作的品类里建立起极度严密的运营体系，正是其积累巨额财富的核心原因——一旦这种思维模型被贯彻到成百上千个微小决策中，其累积效应是极其惊人的。 随后，主持人拿出代表一天各项生活构成的彩色积木块，探讨如何从一个打工人的日常作息中抽离时间投入到自己的副业或初创公司中。莫尼什·帕伯莱（Mohnish Pabrai）清晰地拆解了这套时间管理架构： - 睡眠时间（Sleep Cycles）绝不能牺牲，必须保持充足与稳定。 - 代表日常朝九晚五全职工作的蓝色方块（每周40小时）必须予以保留，因为当前依然依赖这份薪资维持生计。 - 第一个立竿见影的动作是缩短通勤时间——尽量搬到离公司更近的地方住，因为在时间极为匮乏的阶段，每一小时都至关重要。 - 真正要动刀的是代表娱乐休闲的“空闲时间”（Orange blocks，橙色方块）。 帕伯莱指出，剥夺空闲时间并不会让人感到痛苦，因为创业不是为了单纯的“挣钱”，而是为了“释放内心的音乐”（getting our music out）——每个人内心深处都有某种确信世界需要的东西，将这种热情带给世界的过程，本身就超越了所谓的“工作感”。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 打工人向创业者的时间重组模型 accDescr: 展示如何在保持睡眠和全职工作不变的前提下，通过压缩通勤和牺牲空闲时间为创业腾出每周40小时。 subgraph Fixed["不可撼动的基石"] S["睡眠时间（严格保障）"] W["本职工作（40小时/周 全职）"] end subgraph Optimization["优化与收割"] C["缩短通勤时间（搬到公司附近）"] F["娱乐空闲时间（追剧/刷社交媒体）"] end subgraph Startup["初创项目时间池（每周40小时）"] WD["工作日：4小时/天 × 5天 = 20小时"] WE["周末：10小时/天 × 2天 = 20小时"] end C --> Startup F -->|直接替换| Startup ``` --- ### [24:11](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qgeQ5kMVwRA&t=1451s) 职场倦怠真相与寻找人生天命 当主持人提出，部分听众可能由衷热爱自己的工作（比如每天与小狗打交道的工作），帕伯莱对此表示由衷赞同。他明确指出，创业绝非适合所有人：如果你对朝九晚五的工作满怀热情，每天清晨都充满干劲，甚至“一路踢踏舞去上班”（tap dancing to work），那完全不需要去搞什么创业公司。在别人的平台上释放自己的才华，同样是非常值得尊重的选择。 然而残酷的现实数据反映了大多数人的真实处境： - 全球有 12% 的人明确痛恨自己的工作。 - 85% 的全球职场人士处于“工作不敬业”（disengaged）的状态，即并未全身心投入或在工作中感受不到快乐。 - 即使超过半数的美国员工表示“在某种程度上感到满意”，但整体敬业度依然极其低下。 帕伯莱剖析道，这种普遍存在的不快乐往往只是一种表象症状，其深层根源在于人们没有顺从自己真正的“人生天命”（calling）。像比尔·盖茨（Bill Gates）与保罗·艾伦（Paul Allen）那样早早确立使命的人是极少数的特例——当年保罗·艾伦将刊登着早期个人电脑 Altair 8800 的杂志拿给在哈佛念书的盖茨看，两人立刻意识到时代范式发生了剧变，盖茨退学创业甚至不需要任何思想斗争。尽管盖茨的父母当时陷入巨大的震惊，盖茨安慰父母“我以后会回来的”，几十年后哈佛授予他荣誉博士学位，父母坐在台下，他幽默地向父母兑现了诺言。 对于绝大多数普通人而言，发现天命并不是一蹴而就的，而是需要像“试穿不同的鞋子”一样不断尝试。通过做思维实验、与朋友交流，逐步摸索自己心之所向。帕伯莱强调，我们都是独一无二的个体，内心都有一段等待演奏的旋律；创业绝不能仅仅出于对现状的不满，也不能纯粹为了发财，而必须是因为你手中拥有世界真正需要的事物。 --- ### [28:59](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qgeQ5kMVwRA&t=1739s) 工业心理学与无死角邮件漏斗战术 谈及自己的创业历程，帕伯莱分享了早年接受工业心理学家测试的趣事。心理学家得出的结论是：“莫尼什，你骨子里是一个游戏玩家（game player）。”事实确实如此，由于是数学系背景、对数字极度敏感，他在创业初期没钱打广告的情况下，把B2B销售做成了一套极其精密的数学游戏： 1. **突破秘书防线（Gatekeeper）**：他每周向200家不同公司的高级IT主管寄出200封信函。主管往往有秘书负责拦截一切垃圾推销，莫尼什利用邮件合并（Mail Merge）功能进行巧妙的个性化定制——如果对方全名叫 David Smith，信封与正文开头一律写作“Dear Dave”（亲爱的戴夫），并在信件全文中自然提及“戴夫”三到四次。秘书拿到信件时无法判断写信人是否是戴夫的老朋友，不敢擅自扔掉，信件因此得以顺利呈递。 2. **滚雪球式电话跟进漏斗**：信件寄出1周后，他针对这200人逐一拨打电话。无论直接接听还是留言，这些潜在客户正式进入销售漏斗。若对方未予回应，1周后再打；此后跟进间隔按几何倍数拉长（2周、4周、8周、16周……）。 3. **“戴夫”永不出池**：只要对方没有明确说出“请别再烦我了，我完全没兴趣”，这个客户就永远留在追踪漏斗中。随着第二周、第三周每周新增200封信与200通电话，后续每天需要拨打的电话量呈现出指数级增长。 由于莫尼什销售的IT企业服务单笔客单价高达数十万美元，这套依靠数学概率（信件数、回应率、会议邀约转化率、最终关单率）建立起来的销售流水线在9个月内彻底改变了他的商业轨迹。 --- ### [32:08](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qgeQ5kMVwRA&t=1928s) 创业的试金石：黄色方块必须碾压橙色方块 回到时间积木的讨论，莫尼什展示了打工人向创业者转型的核心时间排期： | 时间段 | 投入时长 | 具体安排 | |:--- |:--- |:--- | | **工作日（周一至周五）** | 每天 4 小时 | 下班后投入自身业务（共计 20 小时） | | **周末（周六至周日）** | 每天 10 小时 | 全天候深度推进自身业务（共计 20 小时） | | **每周总计** | **40 小时** | 相当于在全职工作之外再打一份全职创业工 | 在莫尼什看来，这种高强度的切换之所以能够成立，是因为“黄色方块（创业）的兴奋感必须彻底压倒橙色方块（休闲娱乐）”。他直言不讳地调侃道，日复一日地“死磕戴夫”（pounding Dave），直到戴夫要么咆哮着让他滚开、要么乖乖签下采购订单（PO），这种过程所带来的多巴胺刺激，远远超过刷社交媒体或躺在沙发上看 Netflix。 衡量一个人是否真正适合走上创业之路的“终极试金石”只有一条：**你的初创项目必须让你觉得比无所事事的空闲时间好玩百倍**。如果在你眼里，刷 Facebook、Instagram 变得索然无味，唯有打造自己的商业版图能让你肾上腺素飙升，甚至让你产生像平克·弗洛伊德（Pink Floyd）在经典歌曲《Another Brick in the Wall》中所唱的那种反叛劲头——“We don't need no education, we don't need no thought control”——你才真正做好了告别朝九晚五的准备。 ### [34:31](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qgeQ5kMVwRA&t=2071s) 从零到一：资本不再是创业的门槛 对于许多困在朝九晚五全职工作中、脑海中有想法却迟迟无法落地的人而言，现实的财务压力往往是最大的阻碍。他们渴望财务自由、渴望拥有休假与自主选择的自由度。针对这种困境，莫尼什·帕伯莱（Mohnish Pabrai）指出，当今商业世界的一个核心底层逻辑是：**绝大多数初创业务根本不再属于资本密集型**。随着时代的发展，创业对资金的需求越来越少，对脑力的依赖反而越来越高，因此“缺乏启动资金”绝不应该成为创业的绊脚石。 帕伯莱分享了自己当年起步的亲身经历。为了筹集启动资金，他申请了所有寄到信箱里的信用卡，在十几张 Visa 和 MasterCard 上积累了大约 7 万美元未使用的信用额度；同时，他从自己 401(k) 退休金账户中提前取出了约 3 万美元——当时他才 25 岁左右，心想这笔钱未来完全可以补回来。手握这 10 万美元的初始资本作为营运周转，他在保持日常工作的同时悄悄推进副业。仅仅过了 9 个月，新公司的现金流就转正了，产生出足以支撑生活的稳定收益，他当即向公司递交了辞呈。 当帕伯莱向直属上司和上级主管递交两周离职通知并说明自己创办了一家非竞争业务时，两位管理层把他叫进办公室，坦白了一件困扰他们长达 9 个月的事。他们说：“莫尼什，过去 9 个月我们开过好几次会，对你困惑极了。你的绩效明显出现严重下滑，但怪异的是，它从没有低到能让我们合理开除你的地步。”帕伯莱笑着回应道：“这正是我精密计算的结果。我一直努力将表现维持在‘刚好高于被解雇线’的水平。”管理层听后不仅没有发怒，反而赞许他把这种平衡术拿捏得极其精准，并真诚地表示：“等你创业失败的时候——不是‘如果’，而是‘当’它失败的时候——请立刻回来，我们会给你加薪升职，随时欢迎你归队。” - **初始资本组合**：10 万美元（约 7 万美元信用卡未动用额度 + 3 万美元 401(k) 提前支取）。 - **现金流转正周期**：仅用 9 个月兼职运营即实现现金流转正，随后正式辞职。 - **职场防守策略**：精准掌控产出，让主业产出始终处于刚好不被辞退的临界点之上，腾出精力给副业。 --- ### [37:39](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qgeQ5kMVwRA&t=2259s) 创业的真正风险：零风险决策与可逆路径 管理层的承诺让帕伯莱意识到，自己实际上拥有了一次“免费试错”的机会：即便创业完全失败，他随时可以返回原来的职位，甚至待遇更好。这正是经典的“单向门与双向门决策”（Type 1 vs. Type 2 Decisions）——如果失败的后果完全可逆，那么实际风险无限接近于零。深入研究众多顶尖企业家的发家史会发现，世人眼中的“孤注一掷”往往只是错觉，优秀的创业者本质上都是规避风险的高手。 比尔·盖茨（Bill Gates）从哈佛大学退学创业时，他在就业市场上作为大一新生的身价几乎为零；即使在新墨西哥州的尝试失败，出身于西雅图富裕家庭的他也可以随时回哈佛把学位读完，最多只是晚一年毕业，毫无实质风险可言。理查·布兰森爵士（Sir Richard Branson）创办维珍航空（Virgin Atlantic）的案例更是将“用创造性思维替代资本”发挥到了极致。当时购买一架波音 747 巨型客机需要大约 1.5 亿美元的天文数字，但布兰森几乎在零资本、零风险的前提下让航空公司顺利起航。 布兰森首先拨打西雅图的长途查号台电话（206-555-1212）要到了波音公司总机的号码。他致电波音总机直截了当地表示想租一架巨型喷气客机，前台接连挂了他大约 30 次电话。直到接线员被他的毅力折服，将电话转给了一位租赁业务主管。对方起初态度冰冷，称波音在每个国家只对口一家客户，在英国唯一的客户就是英国航空（British Airways）。布兰森不依不饶地请对方假设：“如果英航打电话给你们，想要租用一架闲置的二手波音 747，你们库房里有吗？”主管承认确实有一架闲置飞机。布兰森随即切入谈判，最终成功说服波音将这架飞机租给了他。对波音而言，飞机闲置也是亏损，一旦布兰森断供租金，他们随时可以收回飞机；而对布兰森而言，航空业的现金流模式极为特殊——乘客提前四个月预付全款购票，燃油款和飞机租金却都在航班落地 30 天后才结算。维珍航空借此实现了纯粹依靠客户预付款驱动的“零资本启动”。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 维珍航空零资本启动现金流模型 accDescr: 展示理查·布兰森如何利用创造性思维与负营运资本周期启动维珍航空 subgraph Acquisition["飞机获取（创造性思维）"] A["拨打波音总机约30次"] --> B["转接至租赁负责人"] B --> C["探寻闲置二手波音 747"] C --> D["达成租赁协议<br/>(无前期巨额购机款)"] end subgraph CashFlow["负营运资本循环"] E["提前4个月预售机票<br/>(现金全款流入)"] --> F["执行航班飞行任务"] F --> G["落地后30天支付燃油费"] F --> H["落地后周期性支付租金"] end D --> E ``` --- ### [41:38](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qgeQ5kMVwRA&t=2498s) 全力投入业务增长与大数法则 一旦摆脱朝九晚五全职工作的枷锁，创业者便能将全部心力倾注于核心业务的爆发式扩张。在兼职创业阶段，帕伯莱每天早上 7:00 到 9:00 工作两小时，下午 6:00 下班后再干到夜里 10:00 甚至 12:00，周末更是全天无休。那种对全职投身创业的极度饥渴感，让他在辞职后迎来了爆发式增长。因为彻底解除了束缚，他完全清楚营销邮件的转化率、电话呼叫量与成单之间的数学关系。 - **初创公司营收复合增长轨迹**： - **第 1 年**：40 万美元 - **第 2 年**：140 万美元 - **第 3 年**：300 万美元 - **第 6 至 7 年**：达到 1,500 万至 1,700 万美元 面对年轻求职者或初创者“寄出 6 封邮件毫无音讯便心灰意冷”的普遍心态，主持人史蒂文·巴特利特（Steven Bartlett）与帕伯莱指出了认知上的巨大偏差。很多人仅仅尝试了 6 次就得出“找工作太难、完全不可能”的结论，而成熟的商业操盘手信奉的是“大数法则”（Law of Averages）与高频出击。如同板球或棒球比赛，要想击中球，前提是必须挥动足够多次球棒；商业开发绝不是发几封邮件就能坐收渔利，它要求成百上千次高密度的触达。 --- ### [43:32](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qgeQ5kMVwRA&t=2612s) 实战范例：1200 封实体信打通对冲基金求职之路 为了证明“大数法则”结合“高价值触达”的威力，帕伯莱分享了女儿从加州大学伯克利分校（UC Berkeley）毕业时的求职故事。当时女儿提出想去对冲基金工作，但她的本科学位根本不是商科，在传统招聘渠道中连被简历筛选通过的资格都没有。面对这一劣势，帕伯莱为她制定了一套纯粹依靠概率与价值输出的破局方案。 帕伯莱让女儿打开 Excel，地毯式收集纽约和洛杉矶所有对冲基金的管理合伙人姓名与公司实体通信地址。普通人常常困扰于找不到决策者的私人电子邮箱，但机构的实体邮寄地址是完全公开的法定信息。女儿最终整理出了一份包含约 1,200 家基金的详尽名单。 求职信的结构设计打破了常规：除了首页简明扼要地表达求职意向外，后面紧附了两页由她独立撰写的**个股深度研报（Stock Pitch）**，清晰列出了一家具备高确定性赚钱潜力的投资标的逻辑。他们没有通过网络海投任何电子邮件，而是实打实地印制并寄出了整整 1,200 封物理平信。在这场规模化的触达中，纽约一位已经退休、旗下基金早已停运的 85 岁老投资人也意外收到了这封信，由此拉开了一段戏剧性的求职转折。 - **名单规模**：精选纽约与洛杉矶对冲基金合伙人，共计 1,200 个实体通信地址。 - **触达媒介**：放弃低打开率的冷邮件，全部采用 1,200 封纸质实体信件邮寄。 - **内容策略**：求职信 + 2 页原创个股研报，直接用实打实的投研价值证明专业能力。 ### [44:55](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qgeQ5kMVwRA&t=2695s) 触达的高效法则：信噪比、情感共鸣与概率游戏 在探讨如何通过主动触达脱颖而出时，对话由上一段关于一名背景优秀、最终薪资超过加州大学伯克利分校商学院高绩点毕业生的分析师案例自然引申开来。史蒂芬·巴特利特分享了他总结的一套信息触达坐标模型：横轴代表渠道的“信噪比”（Signal vs. Noise），纵轴代表信息的“情感共鸣度”（Emotional Impact）。低信噪比渠道如同投递到企业的通用公关邮箱（如 `press@yourcompany.com`），信息被海量杂音淹没，甚至无法越过助理或门卫；而高信噪比渠道则能直接穿透防线触达核心决策者。同样，低情感共鸣的信息充斥着 AI 生成的套话或千篇一律的模板，高情感共鸣的信息则通过真诚的个性化细节（例如给出具体股票见解或自然地缩写对方称谓）引发兴趣。绝大多数人总是通过低信噪比渠道发送毫无个性的模板信息，遭遇沉默后便陷入沮丧，放弃尝试。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 触达信息的信噪比与情感共鸣四象限模型 accDescr: 展示高低信噪比渠道与高低情感共鸣组合后的四种触达效果 subgraph Matrix["信息触达转化象限"] Q1["高情感共鸣 + 高信噪比渠道<br/><b>【高转化区】</b>：穿透前台阻隔，建立真正信任"] Q2["高情感共鸣 + 低信噪比渠道<br/><b>【埋没区】</b>：内容优质但被海量杂件淹没"] Q3["低情感共鸣 + 高信噪比渠道<br/><b>【浪费区】</b>：直达决策者却因套话被秒拒"] Q4["低情感共鸣 + 低信噪比渠道<br/><b>【无效区】</b>：AI 垃圾套话投向公开邮箱"] end Q4 -->|优化渠道| Q3 Q4 -->|优化内容| Q2 Q2 -->|双重升级| Q1 Q3 -->|双重升级| Q1 ``` 莫尼斯·帕伯莱对此高度认同，并引用迈克尔·乔丹的名言强调：“只要不出手，命中率就是零。”作为一名注重数学概率的投资者和创业者，帕伯莱看待陌拜与销售的本质就是纯粹的数理统计与抗挫韧性： - **大数法则的转化链路**：如果在 25 周（约 6 个月）内寄出 5,000 封信件，只要最终能促成 10 到 20 场会面，基数模型便已成立。 - **确定非零期望值**：对于数学思维者而言，最重要的第一步是验证转化率“不为零”；在最初两到三个月内看到非零的反馈，就足以证明机制有效。 - **高客单价对冲低响应率**：即使整体回复率极低，单笔交易若能带来 20 万至 30 万美元的收入，极小的转化百分比就能产生巨大的商业收益。 --- ### [47:33](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qgeQ5kMVwRA&t=2853s) 少年时代的冷电话磨砺与地推残酷法则 在商业竞争中，卓越的人才构筑了企业的长期护城河，无论全职骨干还是专业外包皆是如此。随后，话题转向青年时期的抗挫力培养。史蒂芬回忆起自己在 16 岁至 19 岁期间从事电话陌拜销售（Cold Tele-sales）的经历，他认为这是父母能给孩子最宝贵的人生体验之一。 当时史蒂芬的工作是在晚上 9 点给完全不认识的陌生人打电话推销门窗。这种高压销售直面人性的真实反馈：大约 80% 的人会直接爆粗口挂断，15% 的人会礼貌拒绝，仅有 5% 的人愿意倾听，最终能够成交的可能只有 1%。但一旦在少年时期理解了这一漏斗结构，往后整个人生看待挫折与机遇的视角都会被彻底重塑——拒绝不再具有个人针对性，而只是通往成功必然经历的统计成本。 --- ### [49:11](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qgeQ5kMVwRA&t=2951s) 帕伯莱家族的商业起落：从濒临破产到迪拜金饰地推 莫尼斯·帕伯莱深有共鸣地回顾了自己早年的成长轨迹。他的父亲是一位极具天赋但极度激进的企业家，擅长敏锐洞察“供给空白”（Offering Gaps）——即那些本该存在却尚未出现的商业机会，并且屡屡在分文没有的情况下空手起家。然而，由于极度偏好杠杆、忽视沉淀资本与抗风险冗余，父亲的企业缺乏持续性，一生中先后破产倒闭过八九次之多。 帕伯莱 11、12 岁时，他和弟弟就不得不充当父亲的“董事会”。每到深夜，三人围坐在一起，面对债务人的步步紧逼和随时崩塌的生意，唯一的议题就是：“今晚该如何想办法让公司再撑过最后一天？”第二天晚上，这个痛苦的流程再度循环。 到了 16 岁，父亲在迪拜开办了一家黄金首饰加工厂，并带着帕伯莱开展线下陌生拜访。这段经历深刻雕刻了帕伯莱的商业世界观： - **跨城扫街**：父子俩从迪拜搭乘计程车前往阿布扎比，在满街素不相识的黄金店铺间一家接着一家上门推销。 - **破冰与渐进**：在连续遭受冷遇后，走到第五家店时终于破局成交，哪怕第一笔单子因缺乏信任而金额微薄。 - **信任复利**：三个月后回访该店，店主热情奉上热茶，彼此建立起默契与好感，订单规模成倍攀升；这一模式随后在卡塔尔多哈等地被反复复制。 - **漠视闭门羹**：父亲对紧闭的大门和冷酷的拒绝彻底免疫，内心毫无波澜；只要拿到一个“确定”的订单，一粒能够长成参天大树的种子就已埋下。 帕伯莱指出，当时建立的许多商业关系甚至延续到了数十年后的今天，初期看似微小的会面，其客户终身价值（LTV）与复利效应超乎想象。 --- ### [52:25](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qgeQ5kMVwRA&t=3145s) 播种人生、意外际遇与三类人性模型 史蒂芬借此引申出一种贯穿人生的处世哲学：日常中看似微不足道的一场对话，往往会在多年后演化为关键的转折点。14 岁时，史蒂芬参加英国广播公司（BBC）面向全英 35,000 名青少年的《飞黄腾达》青年版（Junior Apprentice）海选。在漫长的排队等候中，他身旁的一个男孩闲聊提到自己的父亲管理着一家 5 亿美元的公司。史蒂芬当时未加在意，但他对那个男孩十分友善，两人互加了 Facebook 好友。 最终史蒂芬并未入选节目录制，但在 5 年后，当史蒂芬正在艰苦创业、穷困潦倒到甚至要在超市偷食物糊口时，那个在队伍中结识的男孩突然发来私信。原来，那个男孩的父亲——印度阿卢瓦利亚（Ahluwalia）家族的企业家、欧洲汽车零部件公司（Euro Car Parts）的创始人苏克帕尔·辛格·阿卢瓦利亚（Sukhpal Singh Ahluwalia）——刚以 10 亿美元出售了企业，并一直在社交媒体上关注着史蒂芬的创业动向。随后，阿卢瓦利亚家族将史蒂芬接去伦敦，为他的初创企业投资了相当于当年节目冠军奖金两倍的资金。这次经历让史蒂芬笃信，每一次真诚的交谈都是在时间长河中播下一颗种子。 帕伯莱随即引入了沃顿商学院教授亚当·格兰特（Adam Grant）在《沃顿商学院最受欢迎的成功课》（*Give and Take*）一书中的核心分类学，指出世界上所有人类都可以被划分为三类角色： | 人性分类 | 行为特征与底层心理机制 | 人际与商业走向 | |:--- |:--- |:--- | | **付出者 (Givers)** | 行事不以索取即时回报为目的，关注能够为他人创造什么价值。 | 虽然短期易被利用，但在长期往往能建立无可替代的信任网络，收获巨大的复利回报。 | | **匹配者 (Matchers)** | 秉持对等与互惠原则（“你敬我一尺，我敬你一丈”），在大脑中精确计算人情账。 | 构成社会大多数，人际关系遵循清晰公平的交易逻辑。 | | **索取者 (Takers)** | 企图利用、欺骗并榨干他人，永远索取却从不回报。 | 最终走向孤立与溃败；帕伯莱严正告诫在人际交往中必须果断剔除此类人。 | ### [55:06](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qgeQ5kMVwRA&t=3306s) 利他者的善意复利与独立创业者的规模化困境 Mohnish Pabrai 进一步阐释了利他思维（Giver）的巨大威力。纯粹的付出者不求回报，只想真诚地帮助他人、推动人类社会进步，其结果往往是“全宇宙都会合力去帮助他们”。大家都会主动给予他们回报，即便他们从未主动开口索取。Pabrai 提及了亚当·格兰特（Adam Grant）的著作《付出与索取》（*Give and Take*），强调做一个给予者是最顶级的商业心智模型之一。在现实交易中，千万不要斤斤计较、玩数字心眼，而是“永远尽量让对方占到更多便宜”。带着这种原则生活，积累的商誉就会不断复利，时间越长威力越大，且无需焦躁于短期的回报周期。Steven Bartlett 赞同道，核心在于不要带着“为了换取什么”的算盘去行事，放下精打细算的功利心，纯粹去给予。 随后，Steven 聊起前一天晚上与女友的交谈。他的女友经营着一项呼吸疗愈业务，本质上是一名独立创业者（Solopreneur），目前正面临业务规模化的瓶颈。Steven 发现，这是绝大多数中小企业（SME）和早期创始人普遍遭遇的痛点：创始人起初单打独斗，市场需求旺盛，但个人精力很快变成了公司发展的最大瓶颈；自由职业者不知道如何转型成团队化机构。更关键的是，许多初创老板抱有极强的不信任感，总觉得“客户只认我”、“我自己干得最好”、“别人来做我不放心”。 ```mermaid flowchart LR accTitle: 从个体户到企业的跃迁瓶颈 accDescr: 展示独立创业者因时间瓶颈和不信任他人导致无法规模化，需通过招聘顶级人才破局的路径。 subgraph Bottleneck["个体瓶颈期"] A["高需求涌入"] --> B["创始人成为唯一瓶颈"] B --> C["缺乏信任：'只有我能做好'"] end subgraph Breakthrough["破局关键"] D["顶级招聘优先级"] --> E["引入 A 级人才与专业工具"] E --> F["实现机构化与规模化扩展"] end C -.->|"观念转变"| D ``` --- ### [57:12](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qgeQ5kMVwRA&t=3432s) 顶级创业者的头号任务：招聘与人才筛选体系 面对创始人的瓶颈，Pabrai 指出，像埃隆·马斯克（Elon Musk）和史蒂夫·乔布斯（Steve Jobs）这样的商业领袖，无一例外都将“招聘人才”视为自己最核心的首要职责。以 SpaceX 为例，前 3,000 名员工全部由马斯克亲自面试；为了挑选出这 3,000 人，背后所花费的面谈工作量难以估量，但马斯克深信舍此别无他法。乔布斯也曾提出著名的人才理论：**A 级人才只渴望与 A 级人才共事**；一旦团队引入了 B 级员工，B 级员工就会开始招揽 B 级甚至 C 级人才，绝不敢招募比自己强的 A 级选手，企业由此便迅速滑向平庸。因此，创业者无论有多忙，都必须将招聘置于最高优先级，并不惜投入海量时间。 谈及如何选拔人才，Pabrai 透露他使用的是 Caliper 等工具进行入职前测评。他解释道，人的性格与底层特质在基因和生命前 5 年的经历中就已经基本固化，“从 5 岁到 95 岁几乎不会改变”，试图后天彻底改造一个人的本性是不切实际的，而专业的人才测评能挖掘出面试中根本看不到的关键数据。Steven 借此介绍了自己正在打造的平台 culturetest.com，其核心理念在于：企业文化绝非团建时写在纸上的口号，而是“平安夜突然收到客户紧急消息时团队成员会作何反应”。该工具通过模拟真实业务场景与团队最优表现者对齐，从而在招聘早期筛出潜在的“红旗”风险，避免一次糟糕的雇佣摧毁整家公司。 - **A 级人才法则**：A 级人才吸引 A 级人才，B 级人才招募 B 级与 C 级人才，引入次等人才将引发团队质素的不可逆滑坡。 - **选拔优于改变**：人的底层心理特质早年即已定型，招聘必须借助科学测评在源头识别，而非指望后期重塑。 - **超越创始人的下属**：优秀的创始人乐于寻找在特定领域远比自己卓越的团队成员，从而释放出超额的生产力红利。 --- ### [01:01:16](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qgeQ5kMVwRA&t=3676s) 慢招快辞与三项核心品质 关于团队淘汰机制，两人深入探讨了“慢招快辞”（Hire slow, fire fast）的准则。Pabrai 强调，尽管创始人常常在辞退员工上犹疑不决，但“快辞比慢招更加重要”。及时辞退不合适的人不仅是对现有团队负责，本质上也是对该员工的善意，因为对方在当前岗位受挫，但完全有可能在另一家公司的另一角色中大放异彩，果断放手是在帮他们尽早找到真正适合的舞台。 当被问及如果有人想为他工作，哪一项品质是绝对不可妥协的一票否决项时，Pabrai 毫不犹豫地回答：“**诚信（Integrity）**”。他将人才的非妥协要素精炼为三点： 1. **聪明才智（Intelligence）** 2. **绝对诚信（Integrity）**：非黑即白的高道德标准与坦荡诚实，无论对内还是对客都恪守顶级伦理底线。 3. **刻苦努力的意愿（Willingness to work hard）** --- ### [01:02:47](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qgeQ5kMVwRA&t=3767s) 财富积累的本质：复利魔法与曼哈顿岛的 72 法则 回顾自己的财富来源，Pabrai 坦承，尽管创办企业奠定了基础，但如今绝大部分财富均来自长期的投资回报。面对工作领薪、仅有几千美元存款的普通人如何起步投资的疑问，Pabrai 提炼出决定投资最终成果的三大关键要素： - **初始本金（Starting Capital）** - **投资跑道长度 / 存续时间（Length of the Runway）** - **年化复合回报率（Rate of Return）** 为了形象地揭示复利的惊人威力，Pabrai 讲述了一个著名的历史故事：1623 年左右，荷兰定居者看中了纽约曼哈顿岛优良的天然港口，最终与美洲印第安原住民达成协议，以仅仅 23 美元买下了整座曼哈顿岛。世人常嘲讽印第安人被严重坑骗，但 Pabrai 提出了一个思想实验：假设当年印第安人聘请了一位信托管理人，将这笔 23 美元的本金妥善投资，结果会怎样？ Pabrai 随之介绍了基础却常被大众忽略的“**72 法则**”（Rule of 72）——用于快速估算资产翻倍所需年限的数学法则（即用 72 除以年复合收益率）： | 年复合回报率 (Rate of Return) | 翻倍所需年限估算 (72 / 回报率) | 复合翻倍效果 | |:--- |:--- |:--- | | **7%** | 约 10 年 ($72 \div 7 \approx 10$) | 每 10 年本金翻一番 | | **10%** | 约 7 年 ($72 \div 10 \approx 7$) | 每 7 年本金翻一番 | | **15%** | 约 5 年 ($72 \div 15 \approx 5$) | 每 5 年本金翻一番 | 通过这个极具穿透力的复利计算框架，Pabrai 为进一步阐述超长周期与收益率对微小初始本金的几何级放大效应做足了铺垫。 ### [01:06:03](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qgeQ5kMVwRA&t=3963s) 72法则与复利的非线性魔力 莫尼什·帕伯莱（Mohnish Pabrai）深入剖析了“72法则”（Rule of 72）的运作机制：如果年化回报率为 20%，资产仅需 3.5 年就能翻倍（72 ÷ 20 ≈ 3.6）。他强调这是一个极其实用且关键的心算工具，一旦掌握了资金翻倍所需的时间，就能在脑海中迅速推演长期财富的轨迹。接着，他以印第安人以 23 美元出售曼哈顿岛的著名历史典故为例：假设这笔 23 美元以 7% 的适度年化回报率进行投资，在 72 法则下，大约每 10 年翻一倍（72 ÷ 7 ≈ 10）。10 年后变成 46 美元，20 年后变成 92 美元，30 年后达到 184 美元。 ```mermaid flowchart LR accTitle: 复利增长模型 accDescr: 展示印第安人23美元在7%年化收益率下400年的复利增长轨迹 subgraph S1["前期积累 (1623-1823)"] A["1623年: $23"] --> B["1723年: $23,000"] B --> C["1823年: $23,000,000"] end subgraph S2["后期爆炸 (1923-2023)"] C --> D["1923年: $23,000,000,000"] D --> E["2023年: $23,000,000,000,000"] end ``` 如果将时间拉长到 100 年，就经历了 10 个翻倍周期，即 $2^{10} = 1024$。帕伯莱表示，为了简化心算，可以直接忽略零头 24，这意味着在 7% 的回报率下，每过 100 年资产就会膨胀 1000 倍。这种非线性的增长曲线就像一根“曲棍球棒”（hockey stick），初期平缓但后期近乎垂直暴增，这也是普通人难以在直觉上理解复利的原因。顺着这个数学逻辑推算： - 1723 年：2.3 万美元 - 1823 年：2300 万美元 - 1923 年：230 亿美元 - 2023 年：23 万亿美元 帕伯莱指出，目前全美所有男女老少的总财富大约为 150 万亿美元，而曼哈顿未开发的土地价值绝不可能占到全美总财富的六分之一（23 万亿）。因此，当年的印第安人根本没有被占便宜，这是一笔非常划算的交易；他们唯一的遗憾只是“缺少一个能帮他们把投资落地的优秀信托管理人”。 ### [01:08:39](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qgeQ5kMVwRA&t=4119s) 坡道长度胜过一切：年轻人的投资起点 为了进一步说明时间在复利中的决定性作用，帕伯莱将时间轴向前倒推 100 年至 1523 年。1623 年的 23 美元相当于 2300 美分；若倒推一个世纪，只需投入其中的千分之一，即 2.3 美分（甚至只需 2 美分），100 年后就能增值为 23 美元，并最终演变为 400 年后的 23 万亿美元。帕伯莱据此得出了一个核心结论：“只要跑道足够长，初始资本根本无关紧要，甚至连回报率的高低都不那么重要。” 基于这个底层逻辑，他给年轻人的财务规划提出了极具操作性的建议： - **量入为出，储蓄第一块钱**：永远不要等花完后再存“最后一块钱”，而是在收入进账时先扣除储蓄。例如年收入 50,000 美元，应先将 5,000 美元存入投资账户，其余款项再用于日常开销。 - **尽早开始，拉长雪道**：22 或 23 岁刚步入职场时就要启动储蓄，因为这笔钱拥有长达 50 年的完整复利周期。 - **拒绝英雄主义**：普通人不需要承担巨大风险去寻找“下一只英伟达”（the next Nvidia），只需持续将每年结余的 5,000、7,000 或 10,000 美元投入指数中，而不是拿去夏威夷度假挥霍。 ### [01:10:57](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qgeQ5kMVwRA&t=4257s) 指数基金与伯克希尔·哈撒韦的极简投资法 针对从未接触过投资的大众，主持人追问该如何把“买入指数”落地为极其简单的具体操作。帕伯莱解释，任何人只要在 Fidelity（富达）、Interactive Brokers（盈透证券）或 Robinhood 等券商开设一个低成本的在线账户，直接买入标普 500 指数（S&P 500）即可。标普 500 汇集了美国最顶尖的 500 家主导企业（如英伟达、微软、苹果等）。虽然指数目前略显过热，且历史上也经历过长期横盘的阶段，但只要投资视界足够长，通过定期定额（Dollar Cost Averaging）的方式持续买入，就能分享过去一个世纪以来年化约 10% 的历史回报。 除了指数基金，帕伯莱给出的另一个极佳替代方案是直接购买伯克希尔·哈撒韦的 B 类股（BRK.B）。他指出，伯克希尔本身就宛如一只优质指数基金，投资者完全可以采取“买入后置之不理”（set it and forget it）的态度。这样既不用天天操心投资，又能专注于自己的主业和生活（yellow），让财富在后台默默滚雪球： - 假设在 18 岁时存下 5,000 美元，按照 10% 的年化回报率，资金约每 7 年翻一倍（72 ÷ 10 ≈ 7）。 - 跨越 50 年至 68 岁时，共经历了 7 个翻倍周期（$7 \times 7 = 49$ 年）。 - $2^7 = 128$，保守舍弃零头按 100 倍计算，这笔最初的 5,000 美元到退休时将膨胀为 500,000 美元。 - 如果 19 岁再存一笔，又能带来另外的 50 万美元；到了 20 岁收入增加存下 10,000 美元，未来的财富效应还将翻倍。日积月累，一个人一生中积累的财富将完全超出想象。 ### [01:13:48](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qgeQ5kMVwRA&t=4428s) 播客赞助：Netflix 与 Ketone-IQ 在访谈间歇，主持人史蒂芬·巴特利特（Steven Bartlett）插播了两则赞助内容。首先，作为曼联前主帅弗格森爵士（Sir Alex Ferguson）的忠实拥趸，巴特利特分享了自己对高绩效体育团队心理学的痴迷。他推荐了 Netflix 独家纪录片《America's Team: The Gambler and His Cowboys》，该片讲述了 1980 年代末毫无美式橄榄球背景的石油商人杰里·琼斯（Jerry Jones）收购达拉斯牛仔队（Dallas Cowboys），通过大胆果敢的组队决策，带领球队在 1990 年代豪取三座超级碗，将其打造成全球最具价值体育商业帝国的传奇历程。 随后，巴特利特介绍了自己重度投资并成为联合创始人的生酮能量补剂品牌 Ketone-IQ。他讲述了自己践行极低碳水、极低糖饮食以促进身体产生内源酮的经历。在播客中提及这一生活方式后，该品牌的便携饮剂被寄到了他的伦敦总部办公室。体验后，他发现该产品在提升认知专注度、语言表达流畅度、体能训练耐力及防止日间精力骤降方面效果显著，促使他最终决定出资入股。 ### [01:15:58](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qgeQ5kMVwRA&t=4558s) 什么是真正的“达投资本”（Dhandho）？ 话题重新回到帕伯莱的经典著作《达投资本家》（*The Dhandho Investor*）上。主持人询问“Dhandho”一词的确切含义，以及为什么帕伯莱会被外界冠以这一称号。帕伯莱解释说，“Dhandho”（达投）源自印度西海岸古吉拉特邦（Gujarat）的古吉拉特语——那里正是圣雄甘地的故乡，当地人以精明过人的商业头脑闻名于世。 在古吉拉特语中，“Dhandho”表面上的直译只是“生意”（business），但其深层的哲学内涵却是一种极其独特的商业运作模式：**下行风险几乎为零的生意**。他指出，许多顶尖的企业家本质上都是“达投式投资者”： - 理查德·布兰森（Richard Branson）创立维珍航空时锁定了下行风险，进退自如。 - 比尔·盖茨（Bill Gates）在微软初创期同样没有承受灾难性下行。 - 萨姆·沃尔顿（Sam Walton）创立沃尔玛时也是步步为营，规避下行敞口。 这些商界巨擘之所以能白手起家构筑庞大的财富帝国，核心就在于他们从一开始就践行了这种风险不对称的商业打法。 ### [01:17:05](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qgeQ5kMVwRA&t=4625s) 帕特尔家族的逆袭：从身无分文到掌控全美 80% 汽车旅馆 莫尼什·帕布莱（Mohnish Pabrai）阐述了他所著《丹多投资人》（*The Dhandho Investor*）的核心哲学：如何在承担极低风险甚至“零风险”的前提下，最大化投资回报并确保收益完好无损。为了具象化这种“丹多”（Dhandho）模式，他分享了印度帕特尔家族（Patels）跨越百年的传奇商业史。帕特尔并非单指某个家庭，而是印度的一个特定族群。大约 130 年前，这群天生具备敏锐商业嗅觉的帕特尔人前往乌干达修建铁路，并在随后的近百年间，凭借丹多商业智慧成为当地极其成功的企业家，一度掌控了乌干达经济的大壁江山。 然而到了 20 世纪 70 年代，伊迪·阿明（Idi Amin）在乌干达掌权并推行排外政策，高呼“非洲是非洲人的”，将所有帕特尔人驱逐出境，并直接将其巨额资产收归国有。一夜之间沦为无国籍难民的帕特尔人流落至美国、英国和加拿大等地。初到美国时，他们几乎没有任何能胜任白领高薪工作的技能。 面对困境，少数帕特尔人发现了一条独特的生存与商业路径： - **低资本与住行合一**：通过极低首付及银行贷款收购一家只有 10 至 20 间客房的小型汽车旅馆（Motel）。全家人直接住在其中一两间客房里，一举解决了高昂的居住生活成本。 - **消灭人力成本**：汽车旅馆本是重度依赖劳动力的行业。帕特尔人接手旅馆后的第一件事就是辞退所有雇员，由家庭成员全包清洁、前台及日常维护等一切脏活累活。由于全家亲力亲为且是生活极其节俭的素食主义者，旅馆无需支付员工工资、工伤赔偿保险（Workers' Comp）和薪酬税。 - **极致的降价与高入住率**：零劳动力成本使他们具备了绝对的成本优势。如果周边其他旅馆每晚收费 25 美元，帕特尔旅馆就能轻松降到 19 美元。超低价格带来了远高于同行的入住率和丰沛的现金流。 - **滚雪球式家族扩张**：将积累的利润作为本金再买下第二家汽车旅馆，派侄子前去打理；随后再买下第三家，派另一位亲戚接管。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 帕特尔家族汽车旅馆扩张模型 accDescr: 展示帕特尔家族如何通过极低成本收购、自家人运营、超低价格驱动现金流并滚动复制到全美的商业闭环。 subgraph Operation ["单店极低成本模型"] A["低首付 + 贷款买下小型汽车旅馆"] --> B["全家入驻客房并解雇所有雇员"] B --> C["零薪资 / 零工伤险成本支出"] C --> D["定价低于竞对 (例如 $19 vs $25)"] D --> E["超高入住率与稳定净现金流"] end subgraph Expansion ["家族网络化扩张"] E --> F["积累利润用于下一次首付"] F --> G["购置新旅馆并派家族亲属接管"] G --> F end ``` 这种模式自 70 年代初萌芽，经过数十年发展，成果令人震惊：如今，帕特尔人仅占美国总人口的 0.1%（全美印度裔约占 1.2% 至 1.3%，帕特尔人仅占其中的十分之一），却掌控着全美整整 **80%** 的汽车旅馆。这种庞大商业帝国的建立，正是源于这种纯粹而极致的“丹多方式”。 --- ### [01:20:57](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qgeQ5kMVwRA&t=4857s) 丹多核心法则：“正面我赢，反面我输不多” 当主持人斯蒂芬·巴特利特（Steven Bartlett）问及如何借鉴这种被验证的“抄袭”策略，以及《丹多投资人》一书总结的九大原则中哪一条最核心时，帕布莱斩钉截铁地给出了答案：“**正面我大赢，反面我输不多**”（Heads I win, tails I don’t lose much）。 帕布莱指出，这一原则贯穿了所有真正伟大的商业传奇： - 无论是他自己早年创业，还是比尔·盖茨（Bill Gates）创立微软、萨姆·沃尔顿（Sam Walton）创办沃尔玛，抑或是理查德·布兰森（Richard Branson）创立维珍集团，无一例外都在遵循这种不对称公式。 - “正面赢了，他们就赢得盆满钵满；哪怕输了，他们也几乎毫发无损。” - 商业的终极真谛是**风险削减**（Risk Reduction）与寻找“**免费午餐**”（Free Lunches）——时刻思考如何在不投入巨额资本、不冒毁灭性风险的情况下，撬动巨大的潜在回报。 --- ### [01:21:54](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qgeQ5kMVwRA&t=4914s) 告别科技幻觉：在被忽视的“无聊”生意中寻找“供给真空” 斯蒂芬提出，当今大众的目光全被 AI、前沿科技与颠覆性创新所吸引，这是否反而在洗衣店、汽车旅馆等看似“枯燥乏味”的传统生意中孕育了巨大的机会？ 帕布莱对此极为赞同，并剖析了当下的创业认知偏差： - **99.99% 的创业非风投支持**：商学院从不深入研究真正的草根创业，因为没人会为此类研究买单。实际上，全美乃至全球 99.99% 的初创企业都不是靠风险投资（VC）创立的，而是由洗衣店、中餐馆、eBay/亚马逊小卖家等实体微型商业构成的。风投支持的科技公司连全部企业的千分之一都不到，媒体的过度曝光制造了“创业必须搞高科技”的虚假共识。 - **发现供给真空（Offering Gaps）**：莫尼什援引父亲提出的商业概念——“供给真空”（Offering Gap）。真正的创业者应当是敏锐的观察者，捕捉市场尚未被满足的需求空白。 为了讲透供给真空，帕布莱举了一个通俗的理发师案例： - A 镇与相距 30 英里的 B 镇各自拥有多家运转良好的理发店，单次理发均价为 30 美元。 - 在两镇之间崛起了一个快速扩张的新兴社区 C 镇。由于是新建城镇，镇上尚无任何理发店。 - A 镇的一位聪明理发师捕捉到了这个商机。为了将风险降至绝对的零，他没有冒失地全职搬迁或投入重金建店，而是转租了一个极小的店面并添置二手设备，贴出告示称“仅每周三来店营业”。 - C 镇居民为了免去驱车半小时前往其他城镇的时间成本，纷纷涌向该店。理发师索性将每次理发费用提高到 45 美元。 - 随着周三全部排满，他顺势将营业时间扩大到周二和周三，最终发展为全职高收益店铺。 - 尽管随着资本的自由竞争，第二、第三家理发店未来必定进驻，价格终会回落到 30 美元，但这位理发师在毫无资本风险的前提下，已经提前将业务体量翻了一倍。 这正如霍华德·舒尔茨（Howard Schultz）创立星巴克时一样，他在美国看到了咖啡馆文化的“供给真空”——把意大利人深爱的意式浓缩与社交氛围引入了当时根本不存在这一业态的美国市场。 --- ### [01:26:21](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qgeQ5kMVwRA&t=5181s) 护城河的构建：从行为习惯到会员忠诚度 围绕先发优势与竞争壁垒，斯蒂芬谈及丹多九大原则中的第四条：“**打造持久的护城河**”（Creating a durable moat）。 帕布莱解释道，任何商业启动之初都是没有护城河的： - **护城河的本质隐喻**：如同中世纪的城堡需要环绕一圈宽阔的深水护城河来阻挡骑士与入侵者一样，商业中的护城河就是一道让竞争对手极难夺走你客户的结构性屏障。 - **习惯的力量即壁垒**：即使后续有新理发师进入 C 镇，先发理发师只要手艺过硬、服务到位，客户往往不会轻易流失。因为“人类是习惯的生物”，消费者并不愿意频繁更换理发师，这种心理惯性本身就是最天然的初始护城河。 随后斯蒂芬补充了关于用户黏性与口碑营销的亲身体验： - **口碑推荐的十倍威力**：斯蒂芬最近在洛杉矶出差，因在飞机上提及自己在实行生酮饮食（Keto Diet），一名空姐便极力向他推荐了当地的高端有机超市 Erewhon。这种纯粹自发的真实推荐，其转化信任度“比品牌投放的任何广告都要强大 10 倍”。 - **会员制模式初探**：当斯蒂芬第二次到店结账时，收银员非常坦诚地询问他是否要付费加入 Erewhon 会员计划，展示了品牌如何通过会员机制进一步强化客户黏性与打造竞争壁垒。 ### [01:28:11](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qgeQ5kMVwRA&t=5291s) 会员锁客模型与比尔·盖茨的“违法”论断 主持人 Steven Bartlett 分享了自己的一次消费经历：当他在高端有机超市 Erewhon 结账时，收银员告诉他，只要购买会员，当笔昂贵的订单立刻就能享受 90% 的折后价（节省 10%），并且每个月还能免费领取一杯饮品。听完一连串权益后，Steven Bartlett 当场办了会员并下载了 App，自那之后便成了忠实拥趸，“我再也不去其他地方消费了，一旦成为会员并装了 App，整个人就被彻底锁定了。” Mohnish Pabrai 对此表示高度赞同，指出这正是亚马逊凭借 Prime 会员所实现的商业神技，而这项策略最早其实脱胎于 Costco。随后，Pabrai 幽默地打趣称自己的中间名简直是“阿甘（Forrest Gump）”，总能莫名其妙地置身于历史性的大场面中。他回忆起两三年前与比尔·盖茨（Bill Gates）共进晚餐时的奇特经历：当时盖茨坐在他旁边，十分认真地向他论证为什么 Costco 和亚马逊的商业模式在法理上“应当属于违法”。盖茨的逻辑在于：企业收取会员费的本质是在对消费者实施行为锁定（lock-in），一旦缴纳了预付会员费，消费者在心理上就会产生行为扭曲，不再主动货比三家去寻找市场上的最低价。虽然美国联邦贸易委员会（FTC）并不认为这种模式违法，但盖茨坚信其破坏了纯粹的市场机制。Pabrai 当时心里暗想：“比尔，你之所以这么觉得，很大程度上是因为微软正与亚马逊在各个领域激烈竞争吧。”无论法律如何界定，商业现实证明会员制带来的客户锁定效应威力极其巨大。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 会员制锁定客户的飞轮效应 accDescr: 消费者支付前期会员费后产生沉没成本心理，进而持续在单一平台复购。 subgraph Acquisition["获客阶段"] A["即时优惠刺激<br/>（如首单立减10%、月度赠品）"] --> B["支付前期会员费<br/>（形成沉没成本）"] end subgraph LockIn["锁定阶段"] B --> C["安装独立 App / 建立使用习惯"] C --> D["认知扭曲与路径依赖<br/>（不再比价，停止流向竞品）"] end subgraph Compounding["终身价值爆发"] D --> E["极高留存率与排他性复购"] E --> A end ``` --- ### [01:29:41](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qgeQ5kMVwRA&t=5381s) 苹果的潜在风险与宜家的“500年长期思维” 话题随后转向苹果公司（Apple）。Steven 提出，苹果既是一个创新者，又常常像一个后来居上的模仿者，但在后乔布斯时代，它的定位似乎愈发模糊。Pabrai 直言，作为一项投资标的，当前的苹果实际上“潜藏着相当大的风险”。他分析道，苹果是一家极度不寻常的企业，其最初的灵魂和所有突破性产品几乎完全源自史蒂夫·乔布斯（Steve Jobs）这一个人；然而乔布斯离世已久，此后苹果并未再出现真正意义上颠覆性的新品。这与当年的迪士尼如出一辙——当沃尔特·迪士尼去世后，迪士尼丧失了核心创造力，最终不得不通过收购皮克斯（Pixar）来注入新鲜血液。 Pabrai 强调，目前全人类出门时都在口袋或手里拿着一块被称为智能手机的“板砖”，但这种硬件形态（form factor）迟早会发生彻底改变。未来的交互载体可能会演变为可穿戴设备或某种更符合人体工程学的新形态，而主导这场范式转移的极大概率不会是苹果，更可能是某间车库里的年轻极客。除非苹果能极具远见地在早期买下这家车库公司并将天才创始人迎入管理层，否则其庞大的帝国也将面临动摇。 由此，两人探讨起创始人与企业护城河的关系。Pabrai 指出，所有伟大创始人都极擅长寻找“供给缺口（offering gaps）”，并在填补需求的过程中建立起护城河（如 Visa、运通以及苹果的封闭生态）。然而，商业历史上“100% 的企业最终都会走向归零”，能够穿越周期跨越百年的企业凤毛麟角，这类公司必须依靠深刻的底层价值观。对此，Pabrai 列举了宜家（IKEA）创始人英格瓦·坎普拉德（Ingvar Kamprad）的经典经营哲学： * **500年长期视角**：坎普拉德在做出每一项重大战略决策时，都秉持着审视未来 500 年的宏大视角，这在追求季度财报的商业世界中绝无仅有。 * **零负债准则（Zero Debt）**：Pabrai 在研究大量破产案例后发现，商业失败的首要死因就是“杠杆（Leverage）”——企业因背负债务无力偿还而崩塌。宜家在全球开设的每一家门店，完全由留存收益和自由现金流进行再投资建设，一生从未举债。虽然零负债在零售业意味着扩张步伐相对缓慢，但它构筑了固若金汤的资产负债表。 * **店店皆有微创新**：宜家严格贯彻“绝不在世上开两家完全相同的门店”原则。每一间新店开业，都必须植入以往老店所不具备的某种改良或实验。坎普拉德深信，一旦停止微创新，商业生命便告终结。 --- ### [01:34:43](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qgeQ5kMVwRA&t=5683s) 20次打孔卡法则与 4% 的超级赢家 在谈到战略专注时，Steven 询问了 Pabrai 经常提倡的“做极少数、大额度、低频次的下注”到底适合何种场景。Pabrai 搬出了沃伦·巴菲特（Warren Buffett）著名的“打孔卡（Punch Card）模型”：假设人生发给你一张只有 20 个孔的打孔卡，你这一辈子最多只能买 20 只股票，每做一次投资决定就敲掉一孔。一旦面临这样的稀缺性限制，投资者就不会在平庸的机会上频繁折腾，而是会极度审慎、全方位推演，从而大幅提高决策胜率。 随后，Pabrai 用冷酷的统计学事实揭示了为何散户选股常常以亏损告终： | 投资维度 | 核心数据分布 | 投资启示 | |:--- |:--- |:--- | | **风险投资（VC）** | 极小比例的头部初创项目贡献绝大部分收益，项目阵亡率极高。 | 早期投资呈现极端幂律分布，依赖少数独角兽弥补所有失败亏损。 | | **二级股票市场** | 全球股市中仅有 **4% 的上市公司贡献了市场 90% 以上的净财富增量**。 | 剩余 96% 的公司从长期看几乎不创造超额价值，普通人随意选股踩中平庸标的的概率高达 96%。 | | **指数基金定投** | 买入标普500等宽基指数，等于自动无脑囊括了那关键的 4% 核心赢家。 | 避免单只个股 24/25 的淘汰轮盘赌，以极低摩擦成本被动享受顶层红利。 | 当 Steven 追问 Pabrai，如果他手里现在只有三到五个打孔机会，他会买入哪几家具体巨头时，Pabrai 审慎地拒绝给出具体的个股代码。他坦言直接报代码往往会误导公众盲目跟风，对大众而言最有价值的事情是管好另外两个由自己掌控的变量：**极致提高储蓄率**，以及**尽可能拉长复利跑道的时间跨度**，并踏老实实定投大盘指数。 --- ### [01:37:22](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qgeQ5kMVwRA&t=5842s) 日内交易（Day Trading）是给券商打工的陷阱 针对当下大量社交媒体广告向年轻群体（尤其是年轻男性）灌输“靠日内交易（Day Trading）实现财务自由”的风潮，Pabrai 予以了极其严厉的驳斥。他一针见血地指出：“日内交易的唯一赢家是券商经纪人，Robinhood 赚得盆满钵满，而散户必定颗粒无收。” 当 Steven 问及“世界上到底有没有人能依靠长期的日内交易赚得巨额财富”时，Pabrai 给出了一个无可辩驳的观察标准：翻开福布斯（Forbes）全球 400 强富豪榜，这里面汇聚了创业者、长期价值投资者、工业巨头与房地产大亨，但从始至终，榜单上“连一个日内交易员的影子都没有”。高频买卖只是纯粹的负和博弈与资本内耗。 --- ### [01:38:03](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qgeQ5kMVwRA&t=5883s) 围成车阵（Circling the Wagons）：坚守决定命运的 12 次重大胜利 在对话进入尾声时，Steven 向 Pabrai 探寻了一个投资术语——“围成车阵（Circling the Wagons）”的深层含义。Pabrai 再次引用了巴菲特的坦白：在巴菲特掌舵伯克希尔·哈撒韦（Berkshire Hathaway）长达半个世纪的生涯中，他累计做出过数百次投资决策（若算上各类小型头寸，远超 300 次），但真正从根本上改变伯克希尔命运、贡献绝大部分惊人回报的，“仅仅只有区区 12 次”。 这再次精准印证了“3% 到 4% 的超级机会决定大局”的铁律。Pabrai 特别点出，在这 12 次神来之笔中，最关键的核心力量甚至不是当初做出的“买入决策”，而是巴菲特在漫长的数十年中**“坚定持有、坚决不卖”**的超人定力。 Pabrai 解释道，“围成车阵（Circle the Wagons）”这一典故源自 19 世纪美国西部拓荒先驱的历史生活：当拓荒车队在向西迁徙途中遭遇原住民印第安人的突袭或猛烈外部危机时，所有车辆会迅速在荒原上头尾相接围成一个坚固的环形防御堡垒。在商业与投资的世界中，当投资者历经千辛万苦抓住了那极少数能改变人生轨迹的王牌资产时，唯一要做的就是“调集车阵重重防护”，抵御市场波动与卖出的诱惑，誓死守护自己的核心阵地。 ### [01:39:25](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qgeQ5kMVwRA&t=5965s) 围成车阵保护核心资产：为什么绝不要卖掉超级牛股 莫尼什·帕伯莱（Mohnish Pabrai）用美国西部拓荒历史中的经典战术——“大篷车结阵防御”（Circling the Wagons）来比喻投资策略。在旧西部时代，当土匪袭击跋涉的大篷车队时，拓荒者会迅速将车辆围成一个闭环，全员依附车阵用枪支拼死抵御攻击；这种阵型能最有效地抵御外敌，核心目的就是誓死捍卫车阵中心最宝贵的财产。莫尼什指出，在一个人一生的投资生涯中，能够真正捕获数十倍乃至上百倍涨幅的“超级牛股”（Multibagger）的机会屈指可数。当投资者幸运地拥有这类资产时，必须像拓荒者那样“把车阵围起来”，用最严密的防御机制保护它，坚决阻止自己将其卖掉。 莫尼什强调，没有任何人能在买入之前就百分之百预知某家公司会成为翻倍数十倍的巨额赢家。投资的真实情况往往是：你只有在真正买入并长期持有之后，伴随着对企业运营的深入观察，才可能彻底理解这到底是一家多么非凡的伟大企业。而一旦你真正看懂并确认了它的卓越品质与宽广护城河，唯一正确的行动就是彻底管住自己的手，“绝不要卖掉它”。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 识别与保护超级牛股的决策模型 accDescr: 展示从买入研究到识别出顶级企业后进行车阵式防御不卖出的投资闭环 subgraph Phase1["买入与持有阶段"] A["买入低估标的"] --> B["在持有中深度理解业务"] end subgraph Phase2["定性与认知升华"] B --> C{"是否具备顶级护城河？"} C -- "否（普通价值回归）" --> D["达到公允价值后获利了结"] C -- "是（罕见 Multibagger）" --> E["识别为皇冠上的明珠"] end subgraph Phase3["车阵防御阶段"] E --> F["实施车阵式保护<br>（Circle the Wagons）"] F --> G["坚决拒绝卖出，享受长期复利"] end ``` ### [01:40:50](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qgeQ5kMVwRA&t=6050s) 投资生涯最大的错误：错失之错与菲亚特克莱斯勒的法拉利遗憾 在被问及职业生涯中最糟糕的财务决策时，莫尼什坦承，自己经历过不少血本无归、资产归零的案例，但那根本不是最痛的教训。在投资领域中，“作为之错”（Mistakes of commission，即踩雷导致投资归零）的损失永远存在上限——最多也就是赔光本金；而“不作为之错”或“错失之错”（Mistakes of omission），尤其是本该把车阵围起来却过早卖掉伟大企业的错误，其代价要残酷和高昂得多。 他以大约 13 年前（2012 年左右）对菲亚特克莱斯勒汽车（Fiat Chrysler Automobiles, FCA）的投资为例详细复盘。当时该公司刚从金融危机后的破产重组中走出，甩掉了巨额沉重债务，整家公司的市值仅有大约 50 亿至 60 亿美元，估值极其便宜。当时莫尼什并未过度看重的是，菲亚特克莱斯勒内部实际上持有法拉利（Ferrari）80% 的股权；即便完全忽略法拉利的存在，单看其旗下的 RAM 皮卡、Jeep、玛莎拉蒂（Maserati）等品牌资产，价值就已经远超五六十亿美元。莫尼什的判断完全正确，并从中斩获了数倍的投资收益。 然而，致命的失误发生在 2017 至 2018 年前后： - 当时菲亚特克莱斯勒推动法拉利独立拆分上市，莫尼什误以为该交易已经完全释放并兑现了全部潜在价值，于是选择清仓离场。 - 在那次交易中，莫尼什通过持股一度间接拥有法拉利约 1% 的股份。 - 随后数年间，法拉利的市值一路飙升至近 1000 亿美元。 - 莫尼什感慨，虽然他在整笔投资上赚到了两三亿美元，但如果当初没有犯下那个“愚蠢的过早卖出错误”，仅仅是把车阵围起来一股不卖，他现在的财富就能凭空再多出整整 10 亿美元。 ### [01:43:35](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qgeQ5kMVwRA&t=6215s) 能力圈原则：对加密货币的态度 当被主持人问及是否会涉足或投资加密货币（Crypto）时，莫尼什给出了极其干脆且克制的回答。他直言不讳地表示，加密货币完全处于自己的“能力圈之外”（Outside my competence），因为自己从根本上无法理解它，所以坚决不碰。这一回答充分展现了他长期恪守的格雷厄姆-巴菲特式严谨投资纪律——无论外界多么喧嚣，坚决不投资自己看不懂的东西。 ### [01:43:41](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qgeQ5kMVwRA&t=6221s) 快乐哲学：不追求金钱最大化，而是追求热爱最大化 史蒂文指出，莫尼什身上有一种在执掌数十亿美元的超级富豪圈子中极其罕见的气质：脸上永远洋溢着由衷的微笑，是一个发自内心快乐通透的人。莫尼什听后反问：“如果赚了几十亿却不快乐，那赚这些财富又有什么意义呢？”他直言，许多富豪在追逐财富的过程中不知不觉迷失了自我。 莫尼什分享了他保持快乐的日常法则： - 每天清晨，他都会非常具象地自问：“我今天到底想怎么度过？” - 他的日程规划从来不是为了追求“金钱最大化”，而是高度聚焦于“最大化莫尼什所热爱的事物”（Maximizing what Mohnish loves）。 - 他笑谈自己目前最痴迷的热爱就是打高尔夫球（Golf）。事实上，在录制本期节目的当天早晨，他还在内心做过一番激烈的拉锯：“今天是去打高尔夫，还是去见史蒂文？”最终他安慰自己“让手臂休息一天”，这才欣然赴约。 - 在回答上一位受访嘉宾留下的盲盒问题——“如果你此刻能瞬间去往世界上任何一个地方，你会去哪？”时，莫尼什不假思索地脱口而出：“去高尔夫球场。” 节目尾声，主持人史蒂文对莫尼什非凡的叙事魅力和倾囊相授的真知灼见表达了由衷敬佩，并呼吁观众订阅支持节目，共同践行长期主义的持续成长。 ## Notable quotes > [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qgeQ5kMVwRA&t=0s) If they won, they would win big. And if they lost, they'd lose nothing — 莫尼斯·帕伯莱 > [16:13](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qgeQ5kMVwRA&t=973s) We don't learn when we speak. We learn when we listen — 莫尼斯·帕伯莱 > [20:41](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qgeQ5kMVwRA&t=1241s) You can always control costs — 莫尼斯·帕伯莱 > [24:11](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qgeQ5kMVwRA&t=1451s) tap dancing to work — 莫尼斯·帕伯莱 > [32:08](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qgeQ5kMVwRA&t=1928s) We don't need no education, we don't need no thought control — 莫尼斯·帕伯莱 > [44:55](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qgeQ5kMVwRA&t=2695s) 只要不出手，命中率就是零。 — 史蒂芬·巴特利特 > [01:08:39](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qgeQ5kMVwRA&t=4119s) 只要跑道足够长，初始资本根本无关紧要，甚至连回报率的高低都不那么重要。 — 莫尼什·帕伯莱 > [01:20:57](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qgeQ5kMVwRA&t=4857s) Heads I win, tails I don’t lose much — 莫尼什·帕伯莱 > [01:37:22](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qgeQ5kMVwRA&t=5842s) 日内交易的唯一赢家是券商经纪人，Robinhood 赚得盆满钵满，而散户必定颗粒无收。 — 莫尼什·帕伯莱 > [01:43:41](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qgeQ5kMVwRA&t=6221s) 如果赚了几十亿却不快乐，那赚这些财富又有什么意义呢？ — 莫尼什·帕伯莱 ## Mentioned 莫尼斯·帕伯莱 (Mohnish Pabrai), 史蒂芬·巴特利特 (Steven Bartlett), 沃伦·巴菲特 (Warren Buffett), 比尔·盖茨 (Bill Gates), 山姆·沃尔顿 (Sam Walton), 理查德·布兰森 (Sir Richard Branson), 保罗·艾伦 (Paul Allen), 史蒂夫·乔布斯 (Steve Jobs), 埃隆·马斯克 (Elon Musk), 伯纳德·阿尔诺 (Bernard Arnault), 英格瓦·坎普拉德 (Ingvar Kamprad), 霍华德·舒尔茨 (Howard Schultz), 亚当·格兰特 (Adam Grant), 苏克帕尔·辛格·阿卢瓦利亚 (Sukhpal Singh Ahluwalia), 《达投资本家》 (The Dhandho Investor), 《付出与索取》 (Give and Take), 微软 (Microsoft), 沃尔玛 (Walmart), 维珍航空 (Virgin Atlantic), 苹果 (Apple), 亚马逊 (Amazon), 好市多 (Costco), 宜家 (IKEA), 伯克希尔·哈撒韦 (Berkshire Hathaway), 标普 500 指数 (S&P 500), 菲亚特克莱斯勒 (Fiat Chrysler Automobiles), 法拉利 (Ferrari), Erewhon, Robinhood, Ketone-IQ ## Video description Is copying Warren Buffett the fastest way to get rich? Mohnish Pabrai reveals the strategy to turn 1K into 10K in 30 days, quit your job safely, build passive income, and master the step-by-step formula millionaires actually use! Mohnish Pabrai is a renowned value investor and founder of Pabrai Funds, who is best known for his successful implementation of Warren Buffett's value investing principles. He is also the bestselling author of books such as, ‘The Dhandho Investor’, which guides people on low-risk, high-return investing. He explains: ⬛Why building passive income is simpler than you think ⬛How to build a business or portfolio with no risk ⬛Why copying ideas made Mohnish a millionaire ⬛How to find low-risk, high-reward investment opportunities ⬛Why 99% of people follow the wrong advice about money 00:00 Intro 02:14 Mental Models for Business and Investing 13:55 Never Start a Company for This Reason—It'll Fail 16:13 How to Focus Your Sales and Pitches 20:41 The Importance of Attention to Detail 26:27 Why the Low Engagement in 9–5 Jobs 34:31 How to Reach Financial Freedom 42:57 You Have to Reach Out to Thousands of Places 45:15 Signal vs. Noise Ratio 47:35 Ads 52:25 The 3 Categories All Humans Fall Into 56:22 How to Scale Your Company as a Solopreneur 59:12 Mastering the Art of Hiring 01:01:16 Hire Slow, Fire Fast 01:02:47 Do People Build More Wealth from Business or Investing? 01:05:59 The Magic of Compounding 01:10:57 How to Invest in Indexes 01:13:48 Ads 01:15:58 Why Do They Call You the Dhandho Investor? 01:17:33 The Patels' Framework to Take Over the U.S. Motel Industry 01:20:57 Heads I Win, Tails I Don’t Lose Much 01:21:54 What Is the New Opportunity in the AI Era? 01:26:21 Business Moats 01:27:33 Loyalty Points Models 01:29:41 Is Apple a Good Investment? 01:34:43 The Importance of Making Fewer Big and Infrequent Bets 01:37:22 Is Day Trading Worth It? Can You Make Money from It? 01:38:03 Circling the Wagons 01:40:50 Your Worst Ever Financial Decision Follow Mohnish: Instagram - https://bit.ly/4lCFFO6 YouTube - https://bit.ly/4fKRroh You can purchase Mohnish’s book, ‘The Dhandho Investor: The Low-Risk Value Method to High Returns’, here: https://amzn.to/4qAwn8l The Diary Of A CEO: ⬛Join DOAC circle here - https://doaccircle.com/ ⬛Buy The Diary Of A CEO book here - https://smarturl.it/DOACbook ⬛The 1% Diary is back - limited time only: https://bit.ly/3YFbJbt ⬛The Diary Of A CEO Conversation Cards (Second Edition): https://g2ul0.app.link/f31dsUttKKb ⬛Get email updates - https://bit.ly/diary-of-a-ceo-yt ⬛Follow Steven - https://g2ul0.app.link/gnGqL4IsKKb Sponsors: Fiverr - https://www.fiverr.com/diary with code DIARY for 10% off your first order Netflix - http://netflix.com/title/81725526 KetoneIQ - Visit https://ketone.com/STEVEN for 30% off your subscription order [Source](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qgeQ5kMVwRA)

[0:00] 莫尼斯·帕伯莱: If they won, they would win big. And if they lost, they'd lose nothing [16:13] 莫尼斯·帕伯莱: We don't learn when we speak. We learn when we listen [20:41] 莫尼斯·帕伯莱: You can always control costs [24:11] 莫尼斯·帕伯莱: tap dancing to work [32:08] 莫尼斯·帕伯莱: We don't need no education, we don't need no thought control [44:55] 史蒂芬·巴特利特: 只要不出手，命中率就是零。 [68:39] 莫尼什·帕伯莱: 只要跑道足够长，初始资本根本无关紧要，甚至连回报率的高低都不那么重要。 [80:57] 莫尼什·帕伯莱: Heads I win, tails I don’t lose much [97:22] 莫尼什·帕伯莱: 日内交易的唯一赢家是券商经纪人，Robinhood 赚得盆满钵满，而散户必定颗粒无收。 [103:41] 莫尼什·帕伯莱: 如果赚了几十亿却不快乐，那赚这些财富又有什么意义呢？

[7:23] Mohnish Pabrai: some other yo-yo is paying your rent and groceries [23:00] Mohnish Pabrai: We have something in us that we know the world needs, and we want to bring it to the world. And because we want to bring it to the world, it's not work. [26:27] Bill Gates: I told you I'd come back and finish it off. [34:31] Mohnish Pabrai: When your business fails—not if your business fails, when your business fails—please come back. We'll give you more money, you'll get a promotion, and we'd love to have you back. [45:15] Michael Jordan: You miss 100% of the shots you don't take. [55:10] Mohnish Pabrai: Don't play math games... always try to make sure the other guy gets the better end of the deal. [62:47] Mohnish Pabrai: If the runway is long enough, the starting capital doesn't matter. Even the rate of return doesn't matter. [75:58] Mohnish Pabrai: Dhandho... means business. But it doesn't really mean business. What it means is it's a way of doing business where the downside is non-existent. [80:57] Mohnish Pabrai: Heads I win, tails I don't lose much... Everything has to be in business about risk reduction. Everything has to be about free lunches.

[0:00] Why do they call you the Dhandho [0:01] Investor? It's a way of doing business [0:03] and making money without taking risk. [0:06] Like for example, Mr. Gates, Mr. Walton, [0:08] Mr. Branson, all of these people [0:10] followed these simple mental models. So, [0:12] if they won, they would win big. And if [0:15] they lost, they'd lose nothing. So, I [0:17] want to know everything. Okay, let's [0:19] start with this. Mohnish Pabrai is the [0:21] self-made millionaire who built one of [0:23] the most respected investment firms in [0:25] the world, managing over a billion [0:27] dollars. And now, he's giving us the [0:29] simple tools and frameworks to create [0:31] life-changing wealth. If humans [0:33] understood that if I embark on a [0:35] business in a format where the risk is [0:37] close to zero, more people would do it. [0:40] And that's what these mental models do. [0:41] For example, cloning. We are taught, if [0:44] you want to start a business, you need [0:46] to come up with something new. But [0:47] actually, if you are a great cloner, you [0:50] will be 90% ahead of the rest of [0:53] humanity. And in fact, everything that [0:55] Microsoft has done well at has come from [0:58] copying someone on the outside. And [1:00] then, there's time. When you're starting [1:02] a business, don't quit the day job [1:04] because some other yo-yo is paying your [1:06] rent. But it does mean that you need to [1:09] find time to work on your business. But [1:11] I will show you the perfect way to [1:13] allocate your time. And that's not all. [1:15] There's models like low-hanging fruit, [1:17] skin in the game, givers versus takers, [1:19] and the circle of competence. And I'll [1:21] I'll explain all of them. What about [1:23] investing? Cuz you're very well known [1:25] for being an excellent investor. There [1:27] are three things that matter with [1:29] investing. And there's also something [1:31] known as the rule of 72, but I wish they [1:33] would teach it more in high school. And [1:35] it tells us how long it takes money to [1:38] double. Now, this is exciting. [1:43] I see messages all the time in the [1:45] comment section that some of you didn't [1:46] realize you didn't subscribe. So, if you [1:48] could do me a favor and double-check if [1:50] you're a subscriber to this channel, [1:51] that would be tremendously appreciated. [1:52] It's the simple, it's the free thing [1:55] that anybody that watches this show [1:56] frequently can do to help us here to [1:58] keep everything going in this show in [1:59] the trajectory it's on. So, please do [2:01] double check if you subscribed and thank [2:03] you so much because in a strange way you [2:05] are you're part of our history and [2:07] you're on this journey with us and I [2:08] appreciate you for that. So, yeah, thank [2:10] you. [2:14] Mohnish Pabrai, [2:16] with the work that you do and the sort [2:18] of public educating that you've done [2:20] more recently in your career, [2:23] what is the message you're trying to [2:25] convey? If you had to summarize that [2:26] message and exactly who you're trying to [2:28] convey it to? [2:30] It really depends on [2:32] uh [2:33] what message. [2:35] There are uh a few different mental [2:39] models that I've figured out [2:42] over the last few decades. When you have [2:45] uh you know, clarity on these mental [2:47] models and especially [2:49] when you can start overlaying them, [2:52] that's when you get 1 + 1 becomes 11. [2:55] And uh so, these mental models are not [2:58] all in the same direction or in the same [3:01] genre. So, just to pause there for a [3:03] second. So, the the word mental models [3:05] Yeah. [3:06] >> means it's basically a framework for [3:08] thinking. [3:09] >> Yes. [3:09] >> So, one framework for thinking is this [3:11] idea of cloning [3:12] >> Yes. [3:12] >> um as one such example. Yes. Let's take [3:15] the mental model of cloning. Cloning. [3:18] >> Cloning, right? So, [3:20] um [3:22] what we are taught is that if you want [3:25] to start a business, [3:27] you need to come up with something new. [3:29] Something that hasn't been done before. [3:31] But, the reality is that the world will [3:35] very easily accept three of the same [3:37] thing [3:38] or five of the same thing. And usually [3:41] it is an advantage [3:43] to look at something that already exists [3:46] and say, [3:48] "Can [3:49] another one of those exist?" For [3:51] example, or can I take what's there and [3:54] tweak it a little bit? So, there's [3:57] something peculiar in the human psyche, [3:59] maybe going back into our history and [4:01] our ancestral evolution, [4:04] where humans look down upon cloning. [4:07] But, if you look at it, so for example, [4:09] two of the greatest cloners, I think, in [4:11] human history, [4:13] were Bill Gates and Sam Walton. [4:16] Now, we think of Bill Gates as an [4:19] innovator. [4:20] And we think Sam Walton created Walmart, [4:22] which was also new. But, actually, [4:25] they're both me-too models. [4:28] And [4:29] Microsoft would not have existed [4:32] without being a great cloner. [4:34] So, when we look at um Microsoft Word, [4:39] it came from WordPerfect. Which was a [4:41] company [4:42] >> Which a competitor that he took out. [4:45] Uh we look at Excel, it came from Lotus. [4:48] Uh we look at Bing, came from Google. [4:51] And you know what Bing is, but it's not [4:53] Google. [4:54] Everything that Microsoft has done well [4:56] at [4:56] has come from copying someone on the [4:59] outside. [5:00] And when we look at Sam Walton, who's, [5:04] you know, the Walton family, if you [5:06] pull them all together, [5:08] it's the richest family in the world. [5:10] It's richer than [5:12] uh Elon and everyone. [5:13] And Sam Walton, by his own admission, [5:16] would tell you that he has no original [5:18] ideas. [5:19] So, originally, Walmart [5:22] cloned Sears and Kmart. For my [5:25] international listeners, these are two [5:26] big supermarket chains. [5:28] >> Yeah, and they're both gone. They're [5:30] They're And in fact, Walmart buried [5:32] them. [5:33] And um [5:34] and Sam Walton [5:37] was one of the most intense cloners [5:39] ever. [5:40] So, if he was driving on vacation with [5:43] his family, [5:45] and he's passing some retail store, he [5:47] would tell his family to stay in the car [5:49] and he would go in the store just to [5:51] check it out. And he said that there is [5:54] there is no human who has lived in [5:56] history or will live in the future [6:00] who has visited more retail stores than [6:03] he has. [6:04] One time there was a manager of his and [6:07] he would go in with his managers to [6:08] these stores. Retail is one of the most [6:11] transparent businesses. You can go into [6:13] your competitor's store and you'll [6:16] figure out the entire business model in [6:17] 10 minutes. You don't need to talk to [6:18] them. Okay, it's beautiful. So, he went [6:21] into this retail store and the manager [6:22] says to him, "Oh, what a terrible [6:24] operation. The the whole store was [6:26] topsy-turvy. It's really bad." And Sam [6:28] says to him, "Yeah, but did you see the [6:30] candle display?" [6:32] The candle display was fantastic. So, [6:34] Sam felt that he could learn from [6:36] anyone. [6:38] It didn't matter if you were a useless [6:39] operator or a great operator or [6:41] whatever, anyone in the middle. Walmart [6:43] is just an amalgamation [6:46] of ideas from other places. If we look [6:49] at If you look at a company like [6:51] Starbucks, [6:53] we think of Starbucks as innovative, but [6:56] actually what Howard Schultz did is [6:58] he saw a concept in Italy [7:01] and his idea was that I think this is [7:03] work in the US, right? And so, he cloned [7:07] he cloned that idea from Italy and [7:09] brought that coffee shop experience to [7:12] the US. If you are a great cloner, [7:16] you will be [7:18] 90% ahead or 95% of the rest of [7:22] humanity. [7:23] Now, [7:25] another mental model, [7:27] humans have this [7:28] perspective [7:30] that starting a business [7:34] is risky. In reality, entrepreneurs do [7:38] not take risk. [7:40] They do everything in their power to [7:43] minimize risk. And in many cases, when [7:46] they embark on a business, [7:49] the risk approaches zero. [7:51] What is extremely risky [7:54] is a 9:00 to 5:00 job. [7:57] Because we have one life. [8:00] Right? And it goes away. And you may not [8:02] get to do what's in your heart. You may [8:04] not get your music out. Right? And so, [8:07] getting our music out is really [8:08] important. So, [8:11] so this notion, which is drilled into [8:13] us, that [8:15] if you're an entrepreneur, you're taking [8:17] risk, really kind of does a big [8:20] disservice [8:21] to [8:22] most humans. And if if humans understood [8:26] that if I embark on a business, I can do [8:28] it in a format where the risk is zero or [8:31] close to zero. [8:33] And I can clone an existing business. [8:37] Right? Now you've [8:39] combined two mental models. [8:41] And we can start adding more to them. [8:44] But two has become 11. 1 + 1 has already [8:47] become 11. It's non-linear. And [8:52] why is it [8:54] that why is why am I saying [8:57] that entrepreneurs do not take risk? So, [9:01] if I take my own case as an example, and [9:04] I can give you 100 cases like that, but [9:06] if I take my own case as an example, [9:08] I was working [9:10] 9:00 to 5:00 at a company. [9:12] And I had a business idea. [9:15] My employer expected me to work 40 hours [9:19] a week, right? [9:21] There's 168 hours in the week. So, I [9:25] felt like there must be at least another [9:28] 30 40 hours that I could work [9:31] on my startup. Could you show me this in [9:35] context? [9:35] >> Right. So, if you look at our whole [9:37] week, for example, these beautifully [9:40] arranged LEGOs. If I take one of these [9:43] blocks of LEGOs, so each one of those [9:46] blocks in there is 2 hours. So, 8 hours [9:49] a day, we're sleeping 8 hours a day, [9:51] right? And uh and we're doing that 7 [9:54] days a week, right? So, basically we've [9:56] got 7 days a week, 8 hours a day, we're [9:59] sleeping. [10:00] The blue LEGOs are showing our 40 hours [10:04] a week. [10:05] Uh 8 hours a day, 5 days a week, we're [10:07] working, right? Then we get to [10:12] other, you know, [10:14] uh preparing dinner and showering, [10:17] shaving, getting ready, whatever else. [10:20] So, that's about 4 hours a day on the [10:23] weekdays, which is including commute [10:26] time. [10:27] And about 8 hours a day on the weekend. [10:29] Then we get to free time, you know, [10:31] social media and watching Netflix and [10:33] hanging out with friends, going for [10:34] dinner. [10:35] And we've got [10:37] quite a bit. We've got about 4 hours a [10:38] day of doing that. And about 8 hours a [10:41] day on the weekend. So, this is kind of [10:42] typical what a typical week for most [10:45] people would look like, right? Mhm. Now, [10:49] when you're starting a business, the [10:51] important thing [10:53] is don't shut off the cash flow. [10:56] Some other yo-yo is paying your rent. [10:59] And some other yo-yo is paying your [11:01] groceries. So, we don't want to rock the [11:02] boat. [11:03] But we're going to make one change to [11:05] blue. Which is the amount of hours I'm [11:07] working for my 9-5. [11:08] >> Now, before I started my startup, um I [11:12] used to [11:14] get top reviews as an employee. [11:17] Uh you know, [11:18] I was very focused on doing a great job [11:20] for my employer, all in, right? [11:22] The day I decided I'm going to run do my [11:24] startup, I decided I need to be just [11:27] above firing level. [11:29] My performance needs to be just good [11:32] enough [11:33] so they don't can me. [11:35] But nothing beyond that because I need [11:38] all my energy to go into my startup. So [11:40] that's the only tweak I'm making is the [11:43] blue stays, but we're not doing extra [11:45] blues like we were doing before, right? [11:48] And blue for anybody that doesn't can't [11:49] see cuz you're listening on audio is [11:51] work. Exactly. Yeah. Blue is work, [11:54] exactly. [11:55] Now [11:57] when we embark on a startup, [12:00] we should never do a startup to make [12:02] money. [12:04] It's the worst reason [12:06] to start a company. [12:08] The purpose of business is not to make [12:10] money. [12:12] The purpose of business is to deliver [12:15] an incredible product or service to [12:17] humanity. [12:19] If you do that, the money is a side [12:22] effect. [12:23] It'll happen. We don't need to focus on [12:25] it. So what we are looking for is [12:30] do we have a product or a service that [12:33] we're thinking about that we could bring [12:35] into this world [12:36] that is going to improve the world in [12:39] some way. How do I know if it's a good [12:41] idea? [12:42] Whatever idea you have come up with [12:46] is not going to work. [12:48] Okay? [12:51] Because you came up with it in an ivory [12:53] tower between your ears. [12:56] Okay? And that's not really a great [12:58] place to find great ideas. [13:02] What's going to happen is we're going to [13:04] be doing what I call rapid prototyping, [13:07] which is we take this idea [13:10] and show humans what it is. And when you [13:14] show it to humans, you will get [13:17] feedback. So I'll I'll I'll [13:19] um maybe I'll just give it in more [13:21] practical terms. [13:22] Uh [13:23] when I was um [13:25] uh when I was starting my first [13:26] business, uh it was going to be a IT [13:29] services business. Okay, information [13:31] technology services. And I was going to [13:33] be providing these services to very [13:35] large businesses. [13:36] Companies that are, you know, billion [13:38] dollars or more in in earnings or cash [13:40] flows. [13:41] Um, [13:43] I was in a meeting with a, uh, senior IT [13:46] guy at a very large bank in Chicago. [13:50] And I was going through my PowerPoint [13:52] deck with them. [13:54] I came to the 10th slide, [13:57] said my spiel, went to slide 11. [14:01] So, the boss who was sitting in the [14:03] meeting said, "Go back to slide 10." [14:06] So, I went back to slide 10, again gave [14:08] my speech that I had for slide 10, and [14:10] took it to 11. [14:12] He said, [14:13] "Go back to slide 10, and do not change [14:17] the slide. [14:19] I don't have an interest in any other [14:21] slide. [14:22] Okay? So, I took it back to slide 10. [14:26] And all he wanted to talk about was what [14:29] was on slide 10. [14:31] My deck was talking about [14:34] seven things we could do. [14:37] Slide 10 was one of those seven. [14:40] It was an extreme pain point for him. [14:44] He needed help on that one thing. [14:48] He didn't need help on all the other [14:50] riffraff stuff I was talking about. [14:52] So, [14:54] when you're doing a startup, [14:56] you have to be [14:58] listening very carefully. [15:01] Your customers or potential customers [15:05] will tell you exactly what you need to [15:08] do. [15:09] Whatever you came up with maybe 80% [15:12] right or 70% right or 40% right, but [15:16] your customer will tell you what is 100% [15:18] right. Okay, because that's a real pain [15:21] point. So, I went back and thought about [15:22] it [15:23] and I realized that his pain point [15:27] and I could see it was a severe pain [15:29] point because he gave me a purchase [15:31] order at the end of that meeting. [15:32] Um was going to be a pain point for a [15:35] lot of people. [15:37] So, I went back. [15:39] I took slide 10, [15:41] blew it up into 20 slides, and that [15:44] became the deck. [15:46] Okay, everything else got thrown out. [15:49] Right now, I couldn't have done that [15:51] without him. [15:53] My brain is too small to have figured [15:56] that out. So, anytime you're doing a [15:59] startup of any kind [16:01] and you have a prototype or a early [16:04] product or something going on, [16:07] your users are going to tell you exactly [16:10] what [16:12] tweak they want. You've just reminded me [16:14] of a conversation I had this morning. [16:16] Okay. Where I interviewed someone [16:17] because much of what you're saying is [16:18] orientated towards startups, but it's [16:20] actually every single day of everyone's [16:22] life because I interviewed someone this [16:23] morning for a really critical role in [16:25] the company. And this person has spent [16:27] 20 years at one of the biggest companies [16:29] in the world. And [16:31] when I was doing the interview, she was [16:32] telling me about lots of things she's [16:34] done during those 20 years. And I was [16:35] just trying to get to this one thing, [16:37] can you put on events? And she was [16:38] telling me about this and that and the [16:40] other thing and this and this and the [16:41] other thing. And I was just actually I'd [16:42] only come to this interview to figure [16:44] out if she could do put on big scale [16:45] events. So, we spent over an hour [16:48] conversation. We spent 55 minutes [16:50] talking about a bunch of things I wasn't [16:51] interested in. And actually as she was [16:53] speaking, I was going, "Do you know what [16:54] she could have done at the start of that [16:55] conversation? She could have gone, [16:56] 'Steven, can I ask you one question? [16:58] What is the What are you looking for [17:00] from from this person?'" And if And then [17:02] I would have gone, "I just want someone [17:03] that can put on events." And then the [17:05] next 55 minutes could have been [17:06] persuading me that she can do that. [17:08] Sure. And it just applies to what you [17:10] just said there. How could you of this [17:12] as the sales person that day in that [17:14] meeting, [17:15] with what you know now, how could you [17:17] have done a better job without going [17:19] through all of those slides? [17:21] Well, I think what what I would do now [17:24] if I were doing something like that is [17:26] that my my radar [17:29] on listening would be 10x. [17:33] You know, we don't learn when we speak. [17:37] We learn when we listen. So, I would [17:40] really be trying to talk less and [17:43] extract more. Mhm. And I wouldn't even [17:47] rely so much on slides. I'd like to [17:50] really try to bring them in into into [17:52] what they are trying to say. And uh [17:55] And and so, basically in uh if if you [17:59] study if you study businesses, you know, [18:02] venture back, non-venture back, [18:04] whatever, this is a very [18:06] common thing. There are almost no [18:08] businesses [18:10] who end up with the business model that [18:13] was originally conceived. I mean, that [18:15] just is would be such an anomaly. [18:18] It's really the interplay between the [18:20] founding team and the early customers, [18:24] which really leads to taking this wet [18:26] clay [18:27] and making into something that people [18:30] want. [18:30] >> Mhm. [18:31] You know, and so, you know, if you think [18:33] of something like Google Glass, you [18:35] know, when they came up with those [18:37] glasses that they thought the whole [18:39] world was going to wear. Yeah. So, [18:42] it didn't work. [18:43] Well, why didn't it work? [18:45] Well, the reason it didn't work is [18:47] you're talking about something extremely [18:49] personal. Okay? Like, for example, [18:52] Wrigley's chewing gum. Okay? [18:55] My mouth is a very personal space. [18:58] I'm not going to put Glotz chewing gum [19:00] in there. What's Glotz chewing gum? [19:03] Exactly. [19:04] >> Okay. Okay? Yeah. You're not going to [19:06] put some brand that's half the price of [19:08] Wrigley's in there. [19:11] Because you don't want to go there. [19:12] That's not of interest to you. So, when [19:14] we wear glasses or sunglasses or [19:17] anything we wear, [19:18] that's very personal. [19:20] So, the the ergonomics and the human [19:23] factors are very important. If it's [19:26] slightly off, now [19:28] Meta [19:29] is trying to do the same thing. But, [19:31] they went to Ray-Ban. [19:33] Right? They did a JV with Ray-Ban. [19:36] Those glasses look like normal glasses. [19:39] Mhm. I think there's a higher chance. [19:41] Well, I've got some. [19:43] I used them, yeah. You don't have any [19:44] Google Glass. No, no, no, no. [19:46] I think they they cut the project, [19:48] didn't they? Yeah. So, so what I'm [19:49] trying to say is that we we have to pay [19:52] very close attention to the customer. Uh [19:55] I mean, Steve Jobs was right. The [19:57] customer doesn't know what he wants. [19:58] Okay? But, if you put it in front of [20:00] them, [20:01] then they can now tweak and tell you [20:03] exactly what they want. Right? So, so [20:06] that and that's another mental model, [20:08] which is uh now we get to the third [20:10] model, which is that you're not smart [20:13] enough. If whatever founding team you [20:14] have is not smart enough to figure out [20:16] what people want. Period. So, you have [20:19] to have very good listening skills. [20:21] And you have to be have the flexibility [20:25] to and again, when you're listening, [20:27] separate the signal from the noise. [20:29] Right? Take in what is real signal [20:32] and [20:33] leave out what is the noise. And then [20:36] you're starting to get down a path which [20:38] is going to make more sense. [20:40] The other kind of a model maybe woven [20:43] into there was this idea of just like [20:45] attention to detail. I'm not even sure [20:46] if that's a model, but when you told me [20:48] about the Walmart founders laying [20:50] between the aisles to measure the exact [20:52] centimeter of length. The model there [20:54] for me was just like precision and [20:56] detail. [20:57] It's a game of inches. I mean, what I'm [21:00] saying is that [21:02] uh when [21:04] when Sam Walton was [21:07] trying to figure out the name of the [21:08] company. [21:09] One of the reasons he went with Walmart [21:11] was it was seven letters. [21:14] And he was looking at the cost of [21:16] putting up signage [21:19] in stores, and he was trying to come up [21:22] with a name with the fewest letters [21:24] because it cost less. [21:26] Okay? And so, I mean [21:30] cost [21:31] cost sensitivity is all over the place [21:34] in Walmart. Right? I mean, that's just [21:36] front and center with what they do, [21:37] right? I mean, they just really squeeze [21:39] blood out of a rock, you know? So, [21:41] basically, I mean, I think that was and [21:43] that's the reason why they became so [21:45] successful. One of the things you can [21:47] always control in business is your [21:50] costs. You You may not be able to [21:52] control your margins and selling prices [21:55] and a lot of other things, but you can [21:56] always control costs. So, that's another [21:59] model where you have to have discipline. [22:02] You have to have very strong discipline [22:04] on the cost side. If you look at [22:05] something like LVMH, you know, [22:08] the guy who runs it, [22:10] I mean, [22:11] he's in luxury goods. He's in high-end. [22:15] LVMH make Louis Vuitton and [22:16] >> Yeah, yeah, yeah. I mean, everything, [22:18] you know? It's you know, they've taken [22:21] over Tiffany's and everyone. Um [22:23] but when you look at how the company is [22:25] run, it's very tight. [22:28] He spends money on the best real estate [22:32] because that's important. But the deals [22:35] he negotiates on those real estate is [22:37] mind-blowing. You know? So, it's it's a [22:40] very tightly run operation [22:42] on a product category that doesn't [22:46] necessarily need it. Hm. But that's why [22:48] they That's why he's become the [22:50] wealthiest guy in Europe. Because that [22:51] mentality will then apply to every [22:53] decision. [22:54] >> Absolutely. [22:55] >> And if you apply it to 100 things, it [22:56] does matter. [22:57] >> Oh, it does matter big time. Yes. So, I [22:59] have these [23:00] yellow blocks here which represent [23:02] working hours working on your own [23:04] business. So show me how you would take [23:06] some of these blocks away Yes. and [23:09] introduce hours working on your own [23:11] business. Yeah, so basically it's it's [23:13] really quite simple. We're not really [23:15] not going to mess with our sleep cycles. [23:17] We're going to leave that alone. Sleep [23:19] staying the same. And we we need our [23:21] blue, which is our work work space 40 [23:24] hours. We need that to continue. [23:27] One of the changes we're going to make [23:28] is we're going to live close to work. So [23:30] we're going to cut down commute time as [23:32] much as we can. Okay. Because every hour [23:35] matters. Okay, so the area that we're [23:38] going to focus on [23:39] is the free time. Okay. And the reason [23:41] why taking out the free time [23:45] is not a problem is because what we are [23:47] embarking on, like we just discussed, is [23:49] not about making money [23:51] is getting our music out. Getting our [23:53] music out. What do you mean by that? [23:54] Which means that we [23:57] have something in us that we know the [24:00] world needs. [24:01] And we want to bring it to that world. [24:04] We want to bring it to the world. And [24:06] because we want to bring it to the world [24:08] it's not work. I think the audience [24:11] might be challenging themselves in the [24:12] head and saying but I love my the thing [24:14] I do for work. [24:16] I'm I'm one of maybe the rarer group of [24:17] people that I get to work with puppies [24:20] every day. [24:21] And I love that. Yeah, so I think that I [24:23] think this is not for everyone. [24:26] So I think you have to ask yourself who [24:27] you are. [24:29] If you are truly excited about [24:32] your 9-to-5 job and what you're spending [24:34] your main working main waking hours on [24:38] awesome. [24:39] That's great. I mean, everyone's not [24:41] going to be an entrepreneur. Everyone's [24:43] not going to have a startup. Everyone [24:45] they they may be getting their music out [24:47] in a different way on someone else's [24:49] platform, which is perfectly fine. And [24:52] but but if if that is not you, where [24:55] when you go to work, you're not super [24:57] excited to get up in the in the morning [24:58] and you're not tap dancing to work every [25:01] day. If that's not happening, then [25:03] there's something wrong. And you have to [25:05] ask yourself, well, [25:08] is there something else that is that [25:11] you're passionate about, that you want [25:13] to do? [25:14] And this is not something that should [25:16] take a lot of [25:19] effort. So, if we go back [25:22] and look at, for example, Bill Gates and [25:25] Paul Allen, right? I mean, Bill Gates is [25:28] at Harvard [25:30] and he sees [25:32] a magazine which shows a very early [25:36] personal computer [25:37] and he realizes that there's a paradigm [25:40] shift. [25:41] And he realizes that he needs to be part [25:44] of it. [25:45] And Paul Allen is the one who sent him [25:48] that magazine and he told Bill, [25:51] "We got to go do this. Now, this is our [25:54] time." Now, and for Bill, [25:57] it was a very easy decision. [25:59] Very easy decision, very [26:02] difficult for his parents. His parents [26:05] were in shock that he's going to abandon [26:08] his degree. And, you know, he he told [26:11] his parents, "Don't worry about it. [26:13] I'm going to come back and I'll finish [26:15] the degree." [26:16] And several decades later, Harvard gave [26:19] him an honorary degree. [26:20] And his parents were in the audience and [26:22] he told them, "I told you I'd come back [26:25] and finish it off, right?" So, let's put [26:27] some numbers to this. 12% of people, [26:30] according to the stats that are [26:31] listening right now, are explicitly [26:33] unsatisfied with their job, which means [26:34] they hate it. 85% of workers globally [26:38] are disengaged, meaning they're not [26:39] fully invested or happy at work. So, [26:41] it's a huge number of people. More than [26:43] half of the US workers are at least [26:45] somewhat satisfied, but engagement [26:47] remains worryingly low. So, So, we look [26:50] at that 85% number, 85% of workers [26:52] globally are disengaged, [26:55] meaning not fully invested or happy at [26:57] work. So, it's really those Sure. [26:59] people. [27:00] And and the thing is it's not it's not [27:02] just enough to be unhappy at work. [27:06] That's one piece of it. I [27:08] The unhappiness can be a symptom. [27:11] And one of the [27:13] one of the [27:15] causes can be [27:17] that you have a different calling in [27:19] life. [27:20] And you are not following following your [27:23] calling. Now, [27:25] sometimes for someone like Bill Gates, [27:27] for example, and Paul Allen, they [27:29] figured out their calling. [27:31] And they just went, right? [27:33] For many of us, it may not be that easy. [27:36] So, [27:37] what we have to do is we have to [27:41] um [27:42] try a few things. You know, you try on [27:45] different shoes to see what fits. [27:47] And so, [27:50] you know, have some thought experiments, [27:52] talk to your friends, [27:53] you know, say, "Okay, you know, [27:56] I'm a UPS driver. This is what I do. And [28:00] I really like playing the guitar, or I [28:02] like to make these art figurines or [28:05] something at home, whatever else, right? [28:08] So, you have to figure out [28:10] what your calling is. And [28:13] I'm probably not the best person to tell [28:15] you how to figure out what the calling [28:16] is. Maybe another guest of yours can can [28:18] can help them with that. Do you think [28:20] everyone has a calling? [28:23] Yeah, I mean, I think I think we are all [28:27] unique children of God. And I think we [28:31] uh we all have some music we want to get [28:33] out. [28:34] And [28:35] uh [28:36] knowing what that is and getting it out [28:39] may not be the easiest thing, but it's a [28:41] worthwhile journey [28:43] to try to get there. [28:44] Right? So, [28:46] we can't do this just because we're [28:48] dissatisfied, and we can't do this just [28:50] because we want to make money and get [28:51] rich. We've got to have something that [28:54] we think the world would be interested [28:56] in. [28:57] And [28:59] you know, in my case, I I'd gone through [29:01] this uh [29:03] session with a couple of industrial [29:05] psychologists, and they told me, [29:08] "Monish, you like to play games. You're [29:09] a game player." And actually, they [29:11] couldn't be more accurate. So, [29:15] when I was doing my startup, [29:17] um [29:19] I'm I'm a numbers guy and a math guy, so [29:23] I actually like that. So, what I used to [29:26] do is [29:28] because I had no money, [29:30] I used to send 200 letters a week to the [29:33] senior IT people [29:36] at 200 different companies. But what I [29:38] did is, so all these people I was [29:39] sending this letter to, [29:41] they had a gatekeeper, some secretary [29:44] etc., whose job was to not let anything [29:48] through. [29:49] And my whole purpose was I need this [29:51] letter to get through. [29:53] It needs to get through the gatekeeper. [29:55] So, I was using mail merge, which was [29:58] mass producing these letters, but there [30:00] was a [30:01] customization the mail merge where if [30:03] person some person name was David Smith, [30:07] it said, "Dear Dave." Okay? And then [30:09] throughout the letter, it talked Dave [30:11] Dave's name came up like three four [30:13] times. When the assistant got the [30:15] letter, she couldn't tell whether I know [30:18] Dave or not. Because you used his [30:20] shortened name. [30:20] >> His shortened name, and she doesn't want [30:22] to throw a letter that is somebody that [30:24] he knows. [30:26] So, the letter would go through [30:28] Mhm. enough times, right? Now, what I [30:31] also did is uh 1 week after those [30:33] letters were delivered, [30:36] I called I made 200 calls. I called all [30:39] 200 people. [30:41] And basically, if I got voicemail, left [30:43] a message, whatever else, right? Now [30:45] they have entered the sales funnel. [30:48] Okay, so [30:49] Dave Smith is in the sales funnel. [30:52] If I get no response from Dave Smith [30:55] after 1 week there's one more call. [30:58] Then the calls start getting spaced out [31:02] double time, 2 weeks out, then 4 weeks [31:04] out, then 8 weeks out, then 16 weeks [31:07] out, but [31:09] Dave never leaves that funnel. [31:11] Okay, until he tells me [31:15] "Do not bother me anymore [31:17] and I have no interest." They're going [31:20] to stay in that funnel. So the second [31:22] week I send out another 200 letters, [31:24] make another 200 calls, right? And now [31:28] I've got the first week, second week. So [31:31] you can see as time goes on [31:34] I'm calling nonstop, right? Because this [31:36] thing is [31:37] but what I was tracking [31:40] because I'm a math guy, what I was [31:41] tracking is, "Okay, these 200 letters [31:43] went out. How many people did I get any [31:46] kind of positive response from?" Right? [31:48] Because not everyone's telling me to get [31:50] lost. Okay? And how many meetings am I [31:53] having? [31:55] And what is the ratio of calls to [31:57] meetings, meetings to close, etc. And [32:02] my ticket size of the item I was selling [32:05] was very large, hundreds of thousands of [32:06] dollars, right? [32:08] 9 months after doing this, where now [32:12] let's go back here. So we're going to [32:13] take our free time. So what I've tried [32:16] to describe is that what I'm doing [32:19] is actually more exciting than the [32:22] orange. The yellow [32:25] is more exciting [32:27] than the orange. So basically we are [32:30] >> The yellow is our startup. So that's [32:33] working on your startup. [32:34] >> So on on the weekends [32:37] I'm going to do 10 hours a day because [32:38] I'm not working, right? [32:41] And on the weekdays, I'm going to do 4 [32:43] hours a day because I've got other [32:44] things to do. [32:46] Because I have a job and whatever else [32:47] is going on. So, there's my weekdays. [32:52] 5 days there when I'm putting in 4 hours [32:54] a day. [32:55] And then I'm putting in 10 hours on the [32:57] weekend. And the free time, [33:01] this is not as exciting [33:04] as pounding Dave. [33:07] Pounding Dave continuously till he says [33:09] either get off my back or here's your [33:11] purchase order [33:13] is very exciting. [33:15] It's way more exciting than playing some [33:17] social media or watching Netflix or [33:19] whatever else. Which is what people [33:21] currently do with their free time. [33:22] >> Right. So, one of your one of the litmus [33:25] test of whether [33:27] you need to you should be doing a [33:30] startup or not is yellow [33:33] needs to be more exciting than orange. [33:37] Your startup needs to be more exciting [33:39] than your free time. [33:40] >> should be so painfully boring for you. [33:44] And going on Facebook or Instagram or [33:48] whatever should be very boring for you. [33:49] Compared to This is exciting. Compared [33:52] to building your company. Yes. [33:58] So, you know, um the Pink Floyd's song, [34:01] "We don't need no education." Yeah. "We [34:03] don't need no thought control." Yeah. We [34:05] don't need none of this. [34:07] This is so useless. You understand how [34:09] useless this is? Yellow is where it's [34:11] at. [34:13] It's not It's not with the orange stuff. [34:15] You don't need this. Thank you. See you. [34:18] So, we don't need any free time. [34:21] This is better than free time. Building [34:23] your business. You having an orgasm [34:25] every hour. [34:28] So, what can you What can be better than [34:30] this? [34:31] Much of what I do here when I'm having [34:33] these conversations is I'm trying to put [34:35] myself in the shoes of the person who is [34:37] currently sat in a in a 9-5 job and [34:39] they've they've got an idea and their [34:41] idea is isn't really hasn't really gone [34:43] anywhere yet necessarily and the the [34:44] pressure they're feeling in their lives [34:46] is is probably now a financial one. Like [34:48] they want financial freedom. They want [34:49] more optionality in their lives to be [34:51] able to go on holiday, make more choices [34:53] and have more freedom. If you're that [34:55] person, [34:56] um, what are the mental models that we [34:59] haven't discussed yet that you need to [35:01] be thinking about to get from zero to [35:02] one? So one of the things to keep in [35:04] mind is that we live in a world now [35:07] where most things that you would want to [35:09] do in terms of starting a business [35:13] are not capital intensive. What does [35:15] that mean? [35:16] Doesn't take much money. [35:18] In fact, what's been happening over time [35:20] is startups need less and less and less [35:24] money because they need more and more [35:26] and more brainpower. [35:27] Right? So the good news is [35:30] that [35:32] a gating factor [35:34] is not that you need money. [35:36] When when I started my business, I took [35:40] on [35:41] I signed up for every credit card that [35:43] would come to me. So I had 70,000 in [35:46] unused credit lines [35:48] in a probably a dozen Visa and [35:50] MasterCards, right? [35:52] I had about $30,000 in my retirement [35:54] account, my 401k, which I also took out [35:56] at like 25, I can make that up later, [35:58] right? So basically I had $100,000 of [36:01] capital. [36:02] And [36:03] that 100,000 got used because once I got [36:06] going, I needed working capital and so [36:08] on. [36:09] And but then the business was the [36:11] business was actually cash flow positive [36:13] 9 months after I was doing this, [36:17] I was able to get rid of this. [36:21] So after 9 months, my business was [36:23] producing [36:24] enough cash flow [36:26] that I went and resigned. [36:29] Okay? And uh yeah, we can we can put [36:32] that in here as well. So, what happened [36:35] is that [36:37] I went to my boss and his boss and [36:38] basically told them that [36:41] I'm [36:43] started a business. It's not competitive [36:45] with the company and [36:47] I'm going to be leaving in 2 weeks and [36:49] this is my two weeks notice. And [36:51] basically, that was that, right? [36:53] And [36:55] you know, they they sat me down and [36:56] said, "You know, Monish, [36:58] we were so confused for the last 9 [36:59] months [37:01] because [37:02] we met several times because we saw big [37:05] drop-off in your performance. [37:07] But it was never so low that we wanted [37:10] to fire you." I said, "Exactly. [37:13] That was exactly what I was trying to [37:14] do. I was trying to stay just above [37:16] firing level." He said, "Well, you [37:17] mastered it because we we met several [37:20] times, but we couldn't get rid of you." [37:22] So, they what they told me is [37:24] they said, "Look, when your business [37:26] fails, [37:27] not if your business fails, when your [37:30] business fails, [37:31] please come back. [37:33] We'll give you more money. [37:35] You're going to get a promotion. [37:37] And we'd love to have you back." [37:39] I could immediately come back. So, I [37:41] said, "I got one free shot Yeah. where I [37:45] leave my job, I go, [37:47] I do this thing, and if it doesn't work, [37:50] I'm back to almost exactly where I was. [37:52] Almost no change, right? [37:54] >> type one, type two decision making. [37:56] Yeah. Yeah. And so, and this is not just [37:59] me. What risk does Bill Gates take? [38:02] Okay, Bill Gates, what is his value [38:05] as a Harvard freshman in the job market? [38:10] Zero. Okay? He Nobody would pay him [38:13] anything. [38:14] And he could come back anytime and [38:16] finish that degree. So, let's say he [38:18] went to New Mexico. Things didn't work [38:20] out. He's got wealthy parents in [38:22] Seattle, okay? He just comes back, [38:25] graduates a year later, and he goes on. [38:28] So, what was the risk? There was no [38:30] risk. And if you study entrepreneur [38:34] after entrepreneur after entrepreneur, [38:35] what you're going to find So, if we look [38:38] at Sir Richard Branson, [38:41] he wants to start an airline. [38:44] Okay? Now, to start the airline, you [38:46] need a jumbo 747. [38:49] That costs like 150 million. The plane? [38:51] The plane, right? That's some serious [38:54] money. [38:55] Richard Branson got Virgin Atlantic off [38:58] the ground with zero. [39:00] And with zero risk. So, here's what he [39:02] did. [39:03] You replace capital with creative [39:07] thinking. [39:08] So, he calls [39:10] 206-555-1212, [39:13] which is directory assistance in [39:15] Seattle, Washington. [39:16] And he asks for the phone number for [39:18] Boeing. Okay? So, he calls the main [39:21] Boeing switchboard. [39:23] >> Boeing sell the planes, right? Yeah, [39:24] Boeing makes the 747. So, he calls the [39:27] main switchboard of Boeing, giant huge [39:29] company, [39:30] and says, [39:31] "Uh I'd like to lease a jumbo." [39:33] And they hang up on him. Okay? [39:37] He calls about 30 times, and they keep [39:40] hanging up. And finally, they get tired [39:43] of his calls, and the lady says, "Let me [39:46] put you in touch with somebody who's in [39:48] charge of leasing, and they can tell you [39:50] to get lost." Okay? So, she transfers [39:53] him to a person who's [39:56] actually leasing jumbos. [39:58] This person tells Richard, says, "Look, [40:01] Mr. Branson, in every country, we have [40:04] one customer. [40:06] And in the UK, that is the British that [40:08] is British Airways. So, we have nothing [40:10] to talk about." So, he said, "Well, just [40:12] humor me for a second." He said, "If [40:14] British Airways called you and said that [40:16] they wanted to lease [40:18] a old used jumbo. [40:20] Do you have one lying around? So, the [40:22] guy said as a matter of fact we do, but [40:24] that's academic. [40:26] He says, well, what would you lease it [40:28] to British Airways for just since we're [40:30] having a conversation. [40:32] What ended up happening is [40:34] Boeing leased him that jumbo. [40:37] And the reason they leased him that [40:38] jumbo is they had one just sitting [40:39] around. [40:40] So, they didn't really have any risk [40:42] because they said the moment the guy [40:43] doesn't make any payments, we're going [40:45] to pull the plane. Mhm. [40:46] >> Right? So, now when you have an airline, [40:50] you sell all the seats 4 months in [40:51] advance. The cash has already come in. [40:54] You pay for the fuel 30 days after the [40:57] plane lands and you pay for the lease [40:59] after the plane lands. [41:02] You don't need any capital. [41:04] Virgin Atlantic got off the ground with [41:06] zero capital. [41:08] Okay, now if you can start an airline [41:10] which needs a jumbo with zero capital, [41:14] you can start any business with zero [41:15] capital. Okay? So, [41:19] so basically [41:21] when you look at business after business [41:22] after business, [41:24] all of them what they do is they start [41:26] small, they're embryonic, they minimize [41:29] risk, they get a few customers, and then [41:32] after they just roll with the customers, [41:34] right? And then that's how they get [41:35] going. So, [41:38] so the important thing is that when we [41:40] take the blue out, when blue is no [41:42] longer here, Which is what? [41:44] >> with the work is gone, yellow's going to [41:46] almost double or triple because this is [41:49] where all the orgasmic activity is. So, [41:52] we move the work, we quit the 9-5 job [41:54] and we move that time over to work on [41:55] our startup time. [41:56] >> I was working on my startup like from [41:59] 7:00 to 9:00 in the morning, and then I [42:01] would come back 6:00 p.m. and work till [42:03] 10:00 or 12:00 in the evening. When you [42:05] had a job. [42:06] >> When I had my job, and then I'd work on [42:07] the weekends. And I was so desperate [42:10] to just go full-time into it because I [42:12] just said if you just let me go full [42:14] time, [42:15] I can tear it up. And that's exactly [42:18] what happened. I mean, we [42:20] in about five first year we did 400,000 [42:23] revenue, second year 1.4 million, third [42:26] year 3 million, and by the 6th or 7th [42:28] year we were at about 15, 17 million. It [42:31] just grew because basically then I had [42:34] no shackles on me. [42:35] You know, I could just go full out, [42:37] right? And the engine I I knew all the [42:39] statistics of these letters, so many [42:41] calls, so many this, so much this means [42:43] this and all of that. And uh it works. [42:47] So, [42:48] and and if if it doesn't work, you can [42:51] go back to your 9:00 to 5:00 and give it [42:53] another shot, you know? So, you actually [42:55] could do this a few times. I think [42:57] that's a really unappreciated framework, [42:59] as you call it, or mental model, which [43:01] is [43:02] cuz you said you sent 200 letters. I So [43:03] many times kids come up to me in the [43:05] street and they say, "Look, I've been [43:06] looking for a job. I've sent [43:09] six emails." Yeah. And they go, "No [43:11] one's got back to me." Yeah. And you can [43:13] see that it's hit hit their confidence. [43:15] And now they've actually arrived at the [43:16] conclusion that getting a job is like [43:18] harder or impossible cuz they sent six. [43:21] Now, when I interview people like you, [43:22] they all give me much bigger numbers. [43:24] They say 200, 300, five, you know? [43:26] And there's something in this sort of [43:27] law of averages, [43:29] which is just like just take more [43:30] swings. You know, you see it in like [43:32] cricket. [43:32] >> My my daughter, when she was graduating [43:36] from Berkeley, came to me and I was [43:37] really surprised. She said, "I want to [43:39] work at a hedge fund." And so I I said, [43:42] "Okay." And her degree was not in [43:45] business. So, she was not a natural [43:47] candidate to be even considered. I said, [43:50] "Uh can you make a list [43:52] of every hedge fund in New York and LA [43:55] and put it in Excel, [43:58] managing partner's name, address." Now, [44:01] we don't know people's email addresses, [44:04] but we know everyone's mailing address. [44:07] Okay, the mailing address is a public [44:09] piece of data. The address. The address [44:12] is easy, right? [44:13] And I I said that uh so she she got a [44:16] list of about [44:18] 1,200 [44:19] funds in LA and New York. And I said [44:22] what you're going to do is [44:23] uh you're going to ask for the job, but [44:26] you're going to have two pages behind [44:27] that giving them a stock tip. [44:30] You're going to give them a pitch that [44:32] you have written up of a company that if [44:35] they invest in [44:36] they're likely to make money. [44:38] We sent the 1,200 letters, physical [44:41] letters, okay? All physical letters, no [44:43] email, right? [44:45] And um [44:47] there's a 85-year-old guy in New York [44:50] who gets the letter. He's retired, the [44:51] fund doesn't exist, it shouldn't have [44:53] been on the list, whatever. But he has a [44:55] friend in LA. He says, "Hey Jamie, why [44:57] don't aren't you looking for an [44:58] analyst?" [44:59] And this girl, she seems to have the [45:01] perfect kind of background. And she ends [45:05] up with a higher salary [45:08] than anyone who went to Berkeley [45:11] business school [45:12] with a much higher GPA than hers. [45:15] I was thinking about [45:17] what you're saying um and I made a video [45:20] the other day which I think is somewhat [45:22] relevant where I was trying to describe [45:24] to people how to send a message to [45:26] someone [45:27] in a way that creates impact. And the [45:31] framework that I came up with, which [45:32] I'll I'll well animate on the screen, [45:35] but is basically [45:36] so this axis here is the signal versus [45:40] noise of the channel you're using. Mhm. [45:42] So a high signal channel is one where it [45:45] gets past the PA. Mhm. It's less [45:47] saturated, less busy. [45:49] A high noise channel, which is the [45:51] opposite, would be sending a an email to [45:53] the like press@yourcompany.com's [45:56] email. So like everyone goes through [45:58] that path and it doesn't get doesn't get [45:59] to the person. And then the other axis [46:00] is basically the emotional impact of the [46:02] message. [46:03] >> Yeah. So, high emotional impact is doing [46:05] what you said, put a stock tip in there, [46:07] you're going to stand out, they're going [46:09] to think you're a little bit strange, or [46:10] what you said about like shortening the [46:11] name, that creates more emotional [46:13] resonance. And then low would just be [46:14] Yeah. AI slop, copy and paste jargon. [46:18] And really like the most successful [46:19] messages are up here. Absolutely. [46:21] >> High like high signal channel, high [46:22] emotionally resonant. Absolutely. But [46:24] what happens is people send loads of [46:26] messages down here [46:28] and then they get depressed and [46:29] demotivated and say no one's getting [46:30] back to me. [46:30] >> Yeah. [46:31] Like Michael Jordan used to say, you [46:34] miss every shot you don't take. [46:36] Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. [46:39] So, basically, it is [46:41] I mean, I think one of the things about [46:43] entrepreneurs is that you need to have [46:46] resilience. [46:47] Um [46:49] like for me [46:50] for me, what the data I was looking for [46:54] is that [46:55] if I send 5,000 letters, okay, which [46:59] takes 25 weeks, 6 months, [47:03] how many [47:04] meetings does that [47:06] end up in? If that ends up with [47:09] 10 meetings or 20 meetings, [47:12] well, now I have my number, right? And [47:14] then the second part is the meeting to [47:16] close ratio, right? And so, to me as a [47:19] math guy, [47:21] I I was just interested to know that [47:24] it's not zero. Okay, I just want to make [47:26] sure. [47:27] And I could see very quickly it was not [47:29] zero. Literally within the first 2 3 [47:31] months I could see it's not zero. [47:33] Every business needs a competitive edge, [47:35] and if you're great at hiring, that edge [47:38] should probably be your people, the A [47:40] players you bring in. And I don't just [47:41] mean your full-time team, but your [47:43] freelance support, too. If you feel like [47:45] your talent isn't quite cutting it, then [47:47] I want you to take another look at our [47:48] sponsor, Fiverr Pro. Fiverr Pro is [47:51] Fiverr's premium offering, where every [47:53] freelancer is hand-vetted, so you're [47:55] guaranteed top quality every single [47:56] time. What's brilliant about Fiverr Pro [47:58] is that you're picking from a very [48:00] experienced talent in marketing, web, [48:01] app development, AI, and 750 other [48:04] categories. And these are people that [48:06] can swoop in and lead the more complex [48:08] projects that your team might not be [48:10] capable of handling yet. And because [48:11] it's a personalized service, a Fiverr [48:13] Pro hiring expert will find the help [48:15] your business needs for you. They'll [48:17] hire them and manage your outsourced [48:19] projects end-to-end, too. And if you're [48:21] not happy with your freelancer's work, [48:23] then you get your money back. They are [48:25] that confident in their talent. So, to [48:27] give it a shot, head to [48:27] fiverr.com/diary. [48:29] And for 10% off your first order, use [48:31] code diary. [48:33] I think one of the the most formative [48:35] experiences you can give your children, [48:37] which I got at 16, through through 16 to [48:40] 19 years old, which is what I did, was [48:42] working in cold tele sales. [48:44] So, my job at 16 years old was to call [48:46] people at 9:00 p.m. cold and try and get [48:49] them to buy windows and doors. And it [48:50] taught me the exact lesson you're [48:52] describing, which is yes, 80% of people [48:54] tell you to off. 98% say no, but it [48:57] doesn't matter. I always say like 80 80% [48:59] told me to off. 15% said it in a [49:01] nice way, and then 5% were at least [49:03] receptive to what I had to say. Yeah. [49:06] Maybe 1% close, but when you understand [49:08] that, you think of life through that [49:10] lens. [49:11] And actually, Stephen I had the almost [49:13] same experience. So, [49:15] my father was an entrepreneur. He was [49:18] really smart at identifying what I call [49:20] offering gaps, like things that should [49:23] exist in the world, but didn't. [49:25] And he would get these businesses off [49:27] the ground with no money. I saw him do [49:28] it repeatedly. [49:30] His downfall was he was very aggressive [49:32] in growing the businesses. And so, they [49:34] didn't have staying power. There was [49:36] almost no equity, always very leveraged. [49:38] So, I he went bankrupt eight or nine [49:42] times, right? Repeatedly. [49:45] When I was um [49:47] when I was about 11 or 12 years old, my [49:49] brother and I, [49:51] we were like his board of directors, [49:52] okay? Because he had nobody else. [49:54] The three of us would sit down at night [49:57] to figure out how to make the business [49:59] last for one more day. [50:01] Okay, everything's caving in, the [50:03] creditors are craving in, the business [50:04] is collapsing. How do we make it [50:07] work for one more day? [50:09] And then the next night we'd get [50:10] together and how do we get it work for [50:13] one more day again, right? [50:17] At 16, and I don't know why my dad did [50:19] this, but I'm so grateful that he did. [50:22] He was at that time he had a gold [50:23] jewelry factory in Dubai. [50:25] And he was [50:28] going cold calling [50:30] in person to jewelry shops to buy his [50:33] jewelry that he was manufacturing. [50:35] So he took me with him on many of these [50:37] trips. And I was 16 just like you, [50:39] right? So we would [50:41] take the taxi from Dubai to Abu Dhabi. [50:44] And now there's all these [50:46] gold shops. [50:48] He doesn't know any of them, right? And [50:51] he's going one after the other after the [50:53] other after the other. [50:54] And I would be stunned that [50:58] fifth shop he makes a sale. Yeah. And [51:01] it's a very small sale because he has no [51:03] trust and all that, but he's made the [51:05] sale. [51:06] Then I noticed that after 3 months we go [51:08] back to that same shop we made the [51:10] little sale to. [51:12] The guy brings out tea. [51:14] He there's a there's a lot of chemistry, [51:17] bigger order. [51:18] And then I saw the orders increase, [51:20] right? And then he's continuing to do [51:22] that. I I went with him to Doha, Qatar. [51:24] Uh Qatar. And again, the same thing. It [51:27] was like, you know, [51:29] I saw how those doors opened. Mhm. And I [51:32] saw how it didn't matter to him when [51:34] they closed. [51:36] That was irrelevant to him. [51:38] You know? Really interesting new way to [51:41] think about it because what you're [51:42] saying there is actually, when you get [51:44] that one yes, it's actually a seed [51:47] that's being planted that can grow into [51:49] something We just care about the ratio [51:52] and the number. Okay, so what effort did [51:55] it take? Like I was saying, if I send [51:56] 5,000 letters and I get 20 meetings, [52:01] it's awesome. Mhm. I mean, that's a [52:03] fantastic ratio because one sale is [52:06] going to get me about 200,000 or [52:07] 300,000. It's a significant amount, [52:10] right? I mean, so that I don't need [52:11] large numbers. And But the lifetime [52:14] value of that can huge. Yeah, yeah. I [52:16] mean, I mean, [52:17] uh these uh these relationships I got [52:20] then, they're still with me. Mhm. You [52:22] know, so it's uh it's it's like forever. [52:25] Here's a philosophical way to think [52:26] about that for just everybody, which is [52:29] you can remember probably conversations [52:31] you had in your life that you thought [52:32] were totally inconsequential, but then 8 [52:35] years later, that seed became a business [52:38] relationship. The example I always give [52:40] is when I was 14, I applied for The [52:41] Apprentice. They did this like junior [52:43] apprentice on the BBC. And it's a long [52:46] story. 35,000 kids in London and across [52:48] the UK applying. I met a kid in the line [52:51] while I was queuing up for my audition, [52:53] and he said to me, "Oh, my dad runs this [52:55] um [52:56] 500 million-dollar company." And I was [52:58] like, "Yeah, whatever. Like, not [52:59] interested." I went through the [53:00] auditions. I didn't end didn't end up [53:02] getting on in the show for whatever [53:03] reason, [53:04] but then I ended up cuz we were waiting [53:07] in the queue that day, I was really nice [53:08] to this kid and I added him on Facebook. [53:10] 5 years later, I get a message on [53:12] Facebook. Hey, 5 years later, although I [53:15] didn't get on the show, which would have [53:16] got me about $25,000 investment in my [53:18] company if I'd won, [53:20] 5 years later, I'm working on a startup. [53:22] That kid from the line says, "Hey, um my [53:25] dad has sold his business for a billion [53:27] dollars, and I've been watching you on [53:29] Facebook for the last 5 years. My dad [53:31] would love to meet you." It was a an [53:33] Indian family, the Aluwalias. They'd [53:35] sold a business called Euro Car Parts. [53:37] They took me to London when I was [53:38] literally so broke I was like [53:39] shoplifting food to feed myself. And his [53:41] dad invested double what I would have [53:43] won on the show into my business. Um and [53:46] I would and that always reminded me that [53:47] like every conversation [53:49] that I have is like planting a seed that [53:51] at any point in my life Sure. could turn [53:53] into something. [53:55] Well, [53:56] I mean, you know, um I always bring up [53:58] Adam Grant's book uh [54:00] Givers and Takers. I don't know if [54:02] you've seen that. [54:04] All humans on the planet fall into one [54:06] of three categories. [54:08] They are either a giver [54:11] or a taker [54:13] or a matcher. [54:15] Okay? These are There are no other [54:17] categories of humans. There's just these [54:18] are the three categories. [54:20] Now, the matchers [54:23] are relatively simple to understand. [54:25] Their [54:26] mental framework is [54:28] if Stephen does me a favor [54:31] I'm going to try to do something similar [54:32] for him. [54:33] You know, one-to-one. They can do the [54:35] matching in the math in their heads. [54:37] The takers [54:39] who you don't have anything to ever do [54:40] with are trying to scam and screw [54:44] everyone. [54:45] And always take and never give. Okay? [54:50] The takers basically go nowhere. Okay? [54:52] And if you have any takers in your life, [54:54] get rid of them. Okay? [54:56] Now, the givers [54:58] what the givers do is the givers [55:01] um are not focused on what comes back to [55:04] them. [55:06] They just want to help you. [55:08] They want to help humanity. [55:10] And what end up happening is [55:13] the universe conspires to help them. [55:15] Mhm. So, the givers [55:18] become the most successful. [55:21] Everyone is trying to give to them [55:25] even though they're not asking for it. [55:28] So, basically [55:31] when we and that's the book that Adam [55:33] Grant Grant wrote, Givers and Takers, is [55:37] one of the mental models with is a great [55:39] mental model to have, is to be a giver. [55:42] Don't play math games, you know, always [55:45] try to make sure the other guy gets the [55:47] better end of the deal. [55:49] And just keep going through your life [55:51] that way, and that goodwill [55:54] will compound. [55:56] And it will take care of itself. [55:59] And the time horizon, you don't worry [56:01] about the time horizon. [56:01] >> You're not doing it for getting [56:03] something back. That's the key. You're [56:06] not doing any mathematics, like I'm [56:07] going to do you're not calculating. [56:10] I'm going to do this so XYZ happens. [56:14] You're just doing it, end of story. [56:17] I was sat with my girlfriend last night. [56:18] She runs a breath work business, so [56:20] she's essentially a solopreneur. [56:22] Um, and she's at that point where she's [56:23] trying to scale. In fact, I just meet so [56:25] many I think I I actually ran a survey [56:27] before. And the vast majority of [56:30] business owners are in that SME [56:31] category, that small small sort of [56:34] business category. The back startups are [56:35] the backbone of our economy, but they [56:36] they come to me with the same problem, [56:38] which is [56:39] maybe I started as an individual, I've [56:41] got high demand, and now I'm a [56:43] bottleneck. And I don't know how to get [56:45] out of being like a freelancer. How does [56:47] the freelancer become an agency? And the [56:50] the thing I was chatting to my [56:51] girlfriend about last night was um [56:54] the step she hasn't taken yet is to hire [56:57] someone exceptional. [57:00] And so many founders come to me, these [57:01] early stage founders are like [57:03] like I I I my customers like me, I do it [57:06] better, I don't trust anybody. I I [57:08] wondered if you had a like a mental [57:10] model for thinking about [57:12] >> the thing is, so if you look at people [57:13] like Elon Musk and Steve Jobs, [57:18] they believe their number one job is [57:21] recruiting. [57:22] The first 3,000 people who joined SpaceX [57:27] all personally interviewed by Elon. [57:30] Just think about that. Those are 3,000 [57:33] hires. [57:34] Think about the number of interviews to [57:37] get the 3,000 hires, okay? [57:40] He [57:42] did not believe there was any other way. [57:46] And [57:47] what Steve Jobs used to say is that [57:50] A players [57:52] want to work with A players. [57:55] The moment you start introducing B [57:57] players, [57:59] B players will hire B and C players. [58:03] They will never hire an A player. So, [58:05] your downhill the journey's already [58:08] started the moment you get a B player. [58:11] And so, [58:12] as an entrepreneur, [58:14] you know, we have a lot of demands on [58:16] our time, right? [58:18] But, recruiting [58:21] has to be at the top. [58:24] And you've got to be willing to spend [58:26] inordinate amounts of time [58:29] on recruiting. [58:31] Okay? And um [58:34] There's you know, there are tools that [58:36] you can use. We use uh There's a company [58:38] called Caliper we use for pre-employment [58:41] testing. [58:42] And the thing is that [58:44] between the genetics of a human and the [58:47] first five years of the life experience, [58:49] who they are, [58:51] their traits are hard-coded. [58:54] That is not going to change from 5 to [58:57] 95, okay? So, it's not like you're going [59:00] to change a human. Human is the way they [59:02] are, okay? Now, these pre-employment [59:06] testing tests [59:08] can get you data that you're not going [59:10] to get in an interview. [59:12] One of my companies I'm building at the [59:13] moment is called culturetest.com. [59:15] It's exactly this. Okay. Um [59:19] I mean, you're just like preaching [59:21] preaching to the choir here. [59:22] >> But, what I'm saying is that It It was [59:24] the most [59:24] >> we need to get really good at [59:26] recruiting. Yeah, it's my absolute [59:28] absolute obsession. And what I found out [59:31] is that, funnily enough, from doing [59:32] these culture tests. So, I've kind of [59:33] culture tested tens of thousands of [59:35] people in the general population now. [59:37] And the shocking part was, just to give [59:39] you some context on what it does, it [59:41] benchmarks our best-performing people [59:43] and how they make their decisions. The [59:44] assumption here is that culture isn't [59:46] the thing you come up with at the [59:47] offsite. Culture is how you would behave [59:50] on Christmas Eve when you get a text [59:52] message from a client. Like, what you do [59:54] there is your company culture. [59:56] Basically, it creates these questions [59:58] which simulate optimal culture in that [60:02] team. [60:03] And it puts you in that scenario and [60:04] says, "What do you do?" [60:06] This is probably a good point to talk to [60:07] you guys about culturetest.com, which is [60:09] the website we're about to launch for [60:11] anyone who has the responsibility of [60:13] hiring someone, which is probably [60:14] everybody listening. One bad hire can [60:16] destroy your entire company. So, we made [60:18] culturetest.com [60:20] so that you guys at home can spot those [60:22] red flags and avoid those hires that [60:24] might be the end of your business. [60:26] Culture Test will make you your own [60:27] personalized culture test so that you [60:29] can screen every single person that [60:31] wants to be in your team and your [60:32] current team members and people that [60:35] have left to see how they align. Just go [60:37] to culturetest.com [60:39] and put your email address in. And the [60:40] minute we launch, I'm going to send you [60:42] an email so you can try it before [60:43] anybody else. [60:45] So, recruiting is really important. And [60:47] I think the other thing is uh [60:50] we're willing to [60:52] hire people [60:54] who may not do things as well as we do. [60:55] But actually also what I have also found [60:57] is I have so many people on my team who [61:00] are better than me. [61:02] You know, they're better at many of [61:04] these things because it's not my natural [61:06] bent to do those jobs. So, that's really [61:10] when you get a huge bang for the buck [61:13] is you end up with team players that are [61:15] way better than you. [61:17] How do you think about firing people? [61:19] Cuz this is the other thing I've found [61:20] is slow, fire fast. [61:26] Founders really struggle with the fire [61:28] fast thing. And uh [61:31] it is very important [61:34] to fire fast. [61:36] I think fire fast is more important than [61:38] hire slow. [61:41] And you're doing the person a a service [61:44] because they may be exceptional in [61:46] another role [61:48] at another place. [61:49] So, [61:51] you are helping them [61:54] try to find that. [61:56] If [61:57] >> And you're helping your other team [61:58] members. [61:59] If I was trying to work for your [62:01] companies, it what is the one [62:03] non-negotiable? Like what is the trait [62:05] that I would demonstrate where you would [62:06] immediately not even consider me? [62:08] The most important is integrity. [62:11] Mhm. You know, I mean [62:14] we we want three traits, right? We want [62:17] intelligence, [62:19] we want integrity, and we want [62:21] willingness to work hard. [62:23] Right? And none of these three are [62:25] really negotiable. And what does [62:27] integrity mean in your definition? Well, [62:29] it's absolute honesty. It's pretty [62:31] simple. [62:32] You know, it's black and white. [62:34] And you conduct yourself with the [62:35] highest level of ethical standards. [62:39] So, on all fronts, when you're dealing [62:40] with a customer or [62:43] internally or externally, it's the moral [62:46] standards need to be very high. [62:48] When you think about your wealth, how [62:49] much of it has come from building [62:51] businesses versus being a great investor [62:54] of the capital that you managed to make [62:56] from those businesses? [62:57] I think currently most has come from [63:01] the investing side. [63:03] You're very well known for being a [63:04] really excellent investor over many many [63:07] many many many years. [63:09] I'll put a graph on the screen that I [63:11] found which I think shows [63:12] the returns of your investment strategy [63:15] versus the the Dow Jones. This graph, [63:18] Have you seen that one before? [63:19] I haven't seen it this way, but people [63:21] put up all kinds of things. Yeah. I [63:23] mean, all this says is that you're [63:24] extremely good at investing. [63:26] So, I want to know if I if I'm in [63:29] starting my investing career, I'm [63:31] working in a 9-5 job at the moment. I've [63:32] got a couple of thousand dollars in my [63:34] my bank account. How should I be [63:36] thinking about investing? Should I be [63:37] investing? [63:39] So, [63:41] there are um [63:45] there are three things that matter [63:48] in terms of getting a great outcome with [63:51] investing. [63:52] Um [63:54] starting capital, [63:56] how much the amount you start with, [63:59] length of the runway, [64:01] how long [64:02] are you going to invest the money, Mhm. [64:05] and the rate of return. [64:07] Okay, so [64:08] before I answer your question, [64:11] I want to [64:13] tell you a story. [64:15] So, [64:16] and this is a true story. [64:18] Um in 1623, [64:22] in New York, the [64:25] Native American Indians in New York who [64:28] owned the island of Manhattan, [64:30] the Dutch settlers wanted to buy the [64:32] island. [64:33] And so, they went to the Indians and [64:35] said, "We'd like to buy the island of [64:36] Manhattan. Great natural [64:38] harbors. It can be a great place for [64:41] us." [64:43] And the Indians and the Dutch reached an [64:45] agreement to sell the island of [64:48] Manhattan for $23. [64:50] And when people hear that, they think, [64:54] "Oh, the Indians got taken." [64:56] You know, [64:57] island of Manhattan for $23 is [64:59] ridiculous. [65:00] But, let's say [65:03] let's say the Indians had a trust [65:05] officer who they said, "Invest this $23 [65:09] for the benefit of the tribe [65:11] and try to do a decent job, right? [65:14] Now, [65:15] there's something known as the rule of [65:16] 72. [65:18] And the rule of 72 is a is a very [65:20] important rule and I wish they would [65:22] teach it more in high schools and [65:25] elementary school. [65:27] It tells us how long it takes money to [65:30] double and it's a kind of a mathematical [65:32] hack. So, for example, [65:34] if I'm going to get a 7% return [65:37] and I do 72 / 7, [65:40] that's approximately 10. [65:43] And at the 7% return, it's going to take [65:46] 10 years for the money to double. 7% [65:48] compounded will take 10 years. [65:50] If I have a 10% return, [65:53] it will take 7 years. [65:55] 72 / 10 is 7. If I have a 15% return, [66:00] it will take 5 years. 72 / 15 is 5, [66:03] approximately. [66:05] And if I have a 20% return, it'll take 3 [66:08] and 1/2 years. [66:10] So, this rule of 72 is a nice hack and [66:13] it's very important to know how long [66:15] money takes to double because then we [66:17] can start doing a lot of math in our [66:18] heads. [66:19] So, when we look at these Indians with [66:21] the $23, if they were getting a 7 7% [66:25] return, [66:26] it would become $46 in 10 years. [66:30] And then it would become $92 [66:32] in 20 years. [66:33] And [66:35] $184 in 30 years [66:38] and so on. [66:40] Now, if you go 100 years, [66:43] right? It's 10 periods of 10. [66:47] And 10 periods of 10 is 2 to the power [66:50] of 10. [66:52] And 2 to the power of 10 is 1,024. [66:55] So, we throw away the 24 because we [66:57] don't want to complicate the math. [66:59] So, [67:00] at 7% [67:03] for 100 years, [67:05] you would have 1,000 times what you [67:07] started with. [67:08] And this is why because compounding [67:10] becomes non-linear, people have a hard [67:12] time getting their hands around it. So, [67:14] Non-linear meaning? It's not going up in [67:16] a straight curve. It's going up in a [67:19] Hockey stick. [67:20] >> Hockey stick club, yeah. So, [67:23] in 1723, the Indians would have 23,000. [67:27] It had gone up a thousand. [67:29] And then if they continue at the 7% in [67:32] 1823, they would have 23 million. [67:36] And in 1923, they would have 23 billion. [67:41] And in 2023, [67:43] they'd have 23 trillion. [67:45] Okay? Now, [67:47] the entire wealth of every man, woman, [67:49] and child in the United States is 150 [67:52] trillion. [67:54] 1/6 of that is not [67:57] undeveloped land in Manhattan. [68:00] So, if the Indians had invested at 7% a [68:02] year for the last 400 years, [68:06] they would have more money than owning [68:08] the land. [68:10] So, they were not taken. [68:12] They were given a fair deal. [68:15] But they just didn't have a good trust [68:16] officer who could actually make it [68:18] happen for them. [68:19] So, the [68:22] magic of compounding [68:24] is that we started with $23. [68:28] And we end up with 23 trillion. [68:31] Without having a great rate of return. [68:33] It's just an okay 7% is just okay. It's [68:36] not great. It's not bad, but it's okay. [68:39] Now, if you go back a hundred years. So, [68:41] we started at 1623, go back a hundred [68:43] years to 1523. [68:45] We had 2300 cents in 1623. [68:50] 2300 cents? $23 is 2300 cents. [68:54] >> Oh, okay. If If they'd got it Just [68:56] convert it to cents instead of dollars, [68:57] right? Now, if you [68:59] make it 1/1000 of that. So, just so I'm [69:02] clear here. So, if you're saying if you [69:03] went back 100 years from that point and [69:06] you gave them just 23 cents. [69:08] >> If you gave them 2 cents. If you gave [69:10] them 2 cents. 2.3 cents to be exact. [69:13] But, if you just gave them 2 cents Yeah. [69:16] 100 years later, they would be $20. [69:19] If you gave them 2.3 cents, 100 years [69:22] later they'd be $23 and now it would be [69:25] the 23 trillion, right? So, [69:28] what I'm trying to say is that [69:31] if the runway is long enough, [69:34] the starting capital doesn't matter. [69:37] Even the rate of return doesn't matter. [69:40] If the runway is long enough. Now, so [69:42] when people are thinking about [69:43] investing, [69:45] they have to keep a few things in mind. [69:47] The first thing is spend less than you [69:49] earn. [69:51] So, [69:52] always try to [69:54] save the first dollar rather than the [69:57] last dollar. [69:59] So, if you are making $50,000 a year, [70:03] put 5,000 into savings to start with and [70:05] then [70:06] do the rest of your expenses after that. [70:09] Now, [70:10] it's very important when we saw with [70:12] this example, you start young. [70:15] So, when people start working at 22 or [70:17] 23, whenever they start working, [70:20] they have to be saving then. [70:22] Because that early money at 22 [70:26] can compound for 50 years. [70:29] And that's what we want. So, we don't [70:31] need to do heroic things [70:34] with finding the next Nvidea or whatever [70:36] else. [70:37] We can just put it into an index [70:40] and the important thing is spend less [70:42] than you earn and keep putting that 5, [70:44] 7, 10,000 every year [70:47] into the savings. Don't go have a [70:50] vacation on Hawaii with it. [70:52] Let it keep compounding and just put it [70:54] into a broad index [70:57] and we don't really [70:58] So, for someone who has never invested [71:00] before, Yeah. [71:01] >> which would probably be the majority of [71:03] the audience, how do we simplify even [71:05] further in terms of just put it in an [71:07] index? What does that mean? So, [71:09] basically, [71:11] you could open an account at [71:14] Fidelity or Interactive Brokers or [71:16] Robinhood, any of these places. You [71:19] could open a brokerage account for very [71:21] little money. And there's lots of them [71:22] in every country. Yeah, and then you [71:24] could just uh [71:27] ask them to give to buy you the S&P 500 [71:31] index, for example. And they will get [71:34] you invested in that. [71:36] >> And the S&P 500 is basically the top 500 [71:39] companies in [71:40] >> It's the Yeah, the 500 dominant [71:42] businesses in the US. [71:45] Like Nvidia's in there and Microsoft and [71:47] Apple and so on. And you're going to get [71:49] your 10% a year if it if the trend holds [71:52] over the last century. The S&P has [71:55] plenty of periods where it does nothing. [71:58] Uh it's somewhat overheated right now. [72:01] Uh but I think if you have a long enough [72:03] time of time horizon and you're dollar [72:04] cost averaging in, it's perfectly okay. [72:07] Uh [72:08] what you could also do as an alternative [72:11] is buy Berkshire Hathaway. [72:14] So, that's a stock, BRKB. So, you could [72:16] again tell these people that just put it [72:18] into Berkshire Hathaway. It's like an [72:20] index. [72:21] And And again, it's like set it and [72:23] forget it. You don't need to think about [72:25] the investing side. You [72:27] focus on yellow, [72:29] okay? And keep putting this little money [72:31] away on the side, [72:33] and it's going to compound. And so, at [72:35] 18, [72:37] if you put away $5,000, [72:40] and you fast forward to when you're 68, [72:44] 50 years later, [72:46] right? [72:47] Now, [72:48] if if you got a [72:51] 10% return on that money. Every year? [72:54] Let's say. [72:55] Every 7 years it would double. [72:58] Okay, 72 / 10 is 7. [73:02] 50 years [73:04] is seven doubles. 7 * 7 is 49. [73:08] And [73:11] 2 to the power of 7 [73:13] is 128. [73:15] Okay. [73:16] So, we can throw away the 28. Keep it [73:19] simple. [73:21] You're going to have 100 times what you [73:22] started with. [73:24] So, the 5,000 at 18 is going to be [73:26] 500,000. [73:28] Okay. [73:30] At 19, if you put money away, that's [73:32] another 500,000. [73:34] 20, you might have 10,000 you can put [73:37] in. [73:38] So, you can start seeing that over a [73:40] lifetime, [73:41] you know, you're going to be [73:44] having too much money. [73:47] As you might have been able to tell, I'm [73:49] absolutely fascinated by the psychology [73:52] behind high-performing sports teams. I [73:54] think it started with my love for Sir [73:55] Alex Ferguson as a Manchester United [73:57] fan. So, when I was told about a new [73:59] Netflix series that covers the rise of [74:01] the Dallas Cowboys, it immediately [74:03] piqued my interest. And this isn't [74:05] because I'm mad about American football. [74:07] I'm not. I don't even watch it. But I do [74:09] know about the Dallas Cowboys, and for a [74:10] lot of Texans, they're much more than a [74:12] sports team. I watched this series, and [74:15] it is absolutely [74:17] brilliant. It centers on Jerry Jones, an [74:19] oil businessman with no football [74:21] background, who bought the Cowboys in [74:23] the late '80s and transformed them into [74:25] the most valuable sports franchise in [74:27] the world. It's all about how one guy [74:29] assembled a powerhouse team in the 1990s [74:33] made up of legendary players and [74:34] coaches, and through fearless [74:36] decision-making led his team to three [74:38] Super Bowl victories. And I really [74:40] enjoyed it, and I think you might, too. [74:42] Check out America's Team: The Gambler [74:45] and His Cowboys, which is streaming [74:47] right now only on Netflix. And they now [74:49] sponsor this podcast. [74:51] I've just invested millions into this [74:54] and become a co-owner of the company. [74:55] It's a company called KetoneIQ. [74:57] And the story is quite interesting. I [74:59] started talking about ketosis on this [75:01] podcast and the fact that I'm very low [75:02] carb, very very low sugar, and my body [75:05] produces ketones which have made me [75:06] incredibly focused, have improved my [75:08] endurance, have improved my mood, and [75:10] have made me more capable at doing what [75:12] I do here. And because I was talking [75:13] about it on the podcast, a couple of [75:15] weeks later, these showed up on my desk [75:17] in my HQ in London. These little shots. [75:20] And oh my god, the impact this had on my [75:24] ability to articulate myself, on my [75:26] focus, on my workouts, on my mood, on [75:29] stopping me crashing throughout the day [75:31] was so profound that I reached out to [75:33] the founders of the company, and now I'm [75:35] a co-owner of this business. I highly [75:38] highly recommend you look into this. I [75:39] highly recommend you look at the science [75:41] behind the product. If you want to try [75:42] it for yourself, visit ketone.com/steven [75:45] for 30% off your subscription order. And [75:47] you'll also get a free gift with your [75:49] second shipment. That's [75:50] ketone.com/steven. [75:54] And I'm so honored that once again a [75:55] company I own can sponsor my podcast. [75:59] You've been referred to as the the [76:00] Dhandho investor. And uh I've I've got a [76:03] book here which you wrote called [76:06] the Dhandho investor. [76:08] What what [76:10] What does this word Dhandho mean? And [76:12] why do they call you the Dhandho [76:13] investor? [76:14] Dhandho is actually a word from Gujarat, [76:17] which is on the on the western coast of [76:19] India, where Gandhi came from. They're [76:22] extremely astute business people. And [76:25] Dhandho, [76:26] if you translate it directly in [76:28] Gujarati, [76:30] it means business. [76:32] But it doesn't really mean business. [76:34] What it means is it's a way of doing [76:36] business [76:38] where [76:39] the downside is non-existent. [76:43] We already discussed how Mr. Branson [76:49] is a Dhandho investor. [76:51] He had no downside. [76:53] Uh [76:53] Mr. Gates was a Dhandho investor. He had [76:56] no downside. Mr. Walton was a Dhandho [76:58] investor. They had no downside. So, all [77:00] of these people embarked on businesses, [77:03] built huge fortunes [77:05] without taking risk. And so, the Dhandho [77:09] investor was written from the [77:10] perspective of [77:12] how can we minimize risk [77:16] while keeping the returns intact. You [77:18] use this example of the Patels. Mhm. [77:21] What is What is that story? The Patels [77:24] uh [77:25] went to Uganda [77:28] more than 100 years ago, maybe close to [77:30] 130 years ago. It was a family? It's a [77:34] ethnic group in India. [77:36] >> And so, this ethnic group came to Uganda [77:39] to build the railroad. [77:41] And [77:43] but they're very savvy business people. [77:46] And [77:48] over the course of the last 100 odd [77:51] years, uh when they were in Uganda, [77:54] through their Dhandho methods of doing [77:56] business, they became very successful [77:59] entrepreneurs. [78:00] And they controlled large parts of the [78:03] Ugandan economy. And Idi Amin came to [78:07] power in Uganda in the 1970s. [78:10] And he said Africa is for Africans. [78:14] So, what he did is he threw all the [78:16] Patels out. [78:18] And he nationalized all their assets. [78:21] So, now the Patels [78:24] were stateless. [78:26] The US took them in. [78:28] The UK took some in. Canada took some of [78:30] them in. [78:32] And when they landed in the US, they [78:33] basically really didn't have any skills [78:37] that would allow them to get good jobs, [78:39] white-collar jobs in the US. [78:42] And [78:44] what a few of them started to do was [78:47] they realized [78:49] that if they bought a motel [78:52] a small 10 or 20 room motel [78:56] uh the family could live in one or two [78:57] of the rooms and [79:00] they could use the money they got out [79:02] and get a bank loan. [79:05] And run the motel. Now, motels are very [79:08] labor-intensive businesses. So, what [79:10] they did is when a Patel took over a [79:11] motel [79:13] they fired all the staff. [79:15] And the family took over all the jobs, [79:18] you know, the cleaning and front desk [79:20] and everything else, right? [79:22] And the Patels are vegetarians [79:26] and they have very they live they live a [79:28] very simple life. So, [79:31] when a Patel took over a motel in an [79:33] area, what they were able to do is they [79:36] were able to undercut the prices [79:39] of all the other motels in the area [79:40] because they have no labor. [79:43] They have no payroll, they have no [79:44] workers' comp, none of those things. [79:46] And so, they were if everyone else is [79:48] charging $25 a night, they're charging, [79:50] you know, 19 a night. So, their [79:52] occupancy was higher than everyone else. [79:55] And they saved their money and then what [79:58] they would do is buy the next motel. [80:01] Send the nephew to run it. [80:03] And then buy the next motel. [80:05] And this started happening in the early [80:07] '70s and when you fast forward to today [80:11] 80% of all the motels in the US [80:16] are under Patel ownership. [80:18] 80%. So, [80:21] the Patels make up [80:23] .1% [80:26] of the US population. [80:29] Indians make up about [80:31] little over 1%. Maybe 1.2, 1.3%. [80:35] Just 1/10 of that is the Patels. And [80:37] this 0.1% population [80:40] is controlling 80% of the motels in the [80:44] country. [80:45] And um [80:48] it's because of the Dhandho way. [80:51] So, if I want to steal from the Dhandho [80:53] way, you told me it's good to be a [80:54] copier. [80:55] Um what are the principles of the [80:57] Dhandho way that I need to be thinking [80:58] about? Cuz I think there was [81:01] Was there nine? Yeah, there was nine [81:03] principles in total in the book. [81:05] >> Well, the most important one is heads I [81:08] win, [81:09] tails I don't lose much. [81:13] Everything we discussed today, Stephen, [81:16] is heads I win, tails I don't lose much. [81:19] When I started my business, [81:22] when Bill Gates started, when Sam Walton [81:24] started, and when Richard Branson [81:26] started, [81:27] that was the formula. [81:30] If they won, they would win big. And if [81:33] they lost, they'd lose nothing. [81:35] So, everything has to be in business [81:39] about risk reduction. [81:41] Everything has to be about free lunches. [81:43] We love free lunches. Okay, so we always [81:47] have to think about how do we get this [81:49] done [81:51] without capital, without risk, free [81:53] lunches. [81:55] Do you think there's an opportunity for [81:56] people, cuz everybody's at the moment [81:57] thinking about AI and technology and [82:00] these like really advanced um [82:02] new innovations as an opportunity, but [82:05] does that create an opportunity in the [82:06] boring? [82:08] In the motel? In the laundry mat? [82:12] Yeah, so, you know, the reality is so [82:15] entrepreneurship is not studied much in [82:18] business schools because there's nobody [82:20] going to give you a consulting project [82:21] for [82:22] studying entrepreneurs. [82:24] If we really study startups [82:27] in the US or actually anywhere in the [82:29] world, [82:30] 99.99% [82:33] of startups [82:34] are non-venture backed. [82:36] What What does that mean? What I What I [82:38] mean by that is those are your [82:40] laundromat, your Chinese restaurant, [82:43] your [82:45] you know, eBay seller, [82:47] whatever, Amazon seller, so on, right? [82:49] The small businesses. [82:51] None of those companies were [82:54] formed because of venture capital. So, [82:56] the media focuses on all the venture [82:59] capital-led businesses. [83:02] And so, people think that oh, if I have [83:03] to do a startup, I got to do something [83:06] in technology. [83:07] Well, that's like 1/10 of 1% or less. [83:10] You can ignore it. You don't need to [83:12] really worry about it. [83:14] Uh [83:15] the important thing [83:17] is to be an observer [83:20] and to look at uh what what uh my dad [83:24] would call offering gaps. [83:26] So, let me explain an offering gap, [83:28] right? So, [83:30] let's say [83:32] there's a town We Let's call it town A. [83:35] Town A, [83:37] there's a barber shop in town A. [83:39] Okay, and the barber's [83:41] one of many barbers doing well, etc. [83:44] There's another town about 30 miles [83:46] away, town B, which also has barbers. [83:49] They're also doing fine. [83:51] There's a new township coming up in the [83:53] middle of these two towns called town C. [83:57] Town C doesn't have much of a [83:59] population, but it's growing fast. [84:02] So, the barber in town A goes to see [84:05] what the all the hoopla about town C is [84:07] all about. So, he makes a takes a trip [84:10] there, sees that there's some increase [84:12] in population, people are moving in, and [84:13] he notices [84:15] there's no barber shops. [84:17] Why would there be any barber shop? [84:18] Because it's brand new, right? [84:21] So, he's thinking, how do I do this [84:23] without taking risk?" [84:25] And what he does is he rents a [84:29] subleases a small storefront, [84:32] buys some used barber equipment, [84:35] and then decides that one day a week [84:38] he's going to go into that town and cut [84:40] hair every Wednesday. [84:42] He puts up a note board saying, "I'm [84:44] available Wednesdays." [84:46] And [84:47] what happens is [84:49] people start coming in. [84:52] They come in because they have no [84:53] choice. If you don't go to this barber, [84:56] you're going to spend half an hour [84:57] driving to one of the other two towns. [84:59] Now, he normally charges 30 bucks for a [85:01] haircut. [85:03] But here, he doesn't need to charge 30 [85:06] because there's an opportunity cost of [85:07] the time you're saving. So, he can [85:10] charge 45. [85:12] So, [85:13] he's charging 45 over here, and then [85:15] when he's in his own town, he's charging [85:17] 30. Now, what he what he notices is [85:19] Wednesdays are filled up. [85:20] So, he says, "Tuesday and Wednesday." [85:23] Okay, and gradually what ends up [85:26] happening is that that business [85:29] is full-time, [85:31] and he's making 45 bucks an hour per [85:33] haircut. [85:35] But the nature of capitalism is more [85:38] barbers are going to show up. [85:41] So, the second barber comes in, the [85:43] third barber comes in. Eventually, the [85:46] haircut there is going to be 30 bucks. [85:48] It's going to neutralize. But in the [85:49] meanwhile, [85:50] he's doubled his business. [85:52] Right? [85:53] What risk did he take? [85:56] So, [85:57] going into town C was addressing an [86:00] opportunity gap. [86:03] When Howard Schultz started Starbucks, [86:07] he saw an offering gap. [86:09] He thought that what [86:11] Italians love about cafes [86:14] might be what Americans love, too. [86:17] Didn't exist, right? [86:19] And he went and did it. You know that [86:22] barber that moves into town C first and [86:24] they're really having a great time [86:25] because there's no competition. [86:27] One of your points when you're talking [86:28] about the Dandam method is this idea of [86:30] creating a durable moat. It's point four [86:33] of the nine. So So sometimes what [86:35] happens is [86:37] that [86:38] you start a business. Every business [86:40] starts off without a moat. [86:43] What is a moat? [86:46] We have a castle. [86:49] A knight in charge of the castle [86:52] to keep the invaders away. And one of [86:55] the ways to keep the invaders away is [86:57] you put a moat of water around the [86:59] castle. [87:00] So when you put a moat of water around [87:02] the castle, it makes it harder for [87:04] anyone to take the castle. [87:06] And a business with a moat around it is [87:09] a business that competitors [87:12] will have a difficult time take this [87:14] taking business away from. So what can [87:16] happen with our barber in town C? [87:19] Humans are creatures of habits. [87:22] We don't like to change our barber every [87:23] month. [87:25] We like the same barber. [87:26] So if he's competent and good, [87:29] what's going to end up happening is that [87:31] his client base will stay with him. What [87:34] about loyalty points? I was just struck [87:36] the other day when I was shopping in LA [87:37] at Erewhon, which is a supermarket here [87:39] in LA, and I had someone who'd [87:41] recommended to me on the plane, which [87:42] actually goes to your point about [87:43] actually give a great product cuz an [87:45] airline hostess on my flight over here [87:47] went, "Oh, you're you're on keto diet. [87:50] You need to go check out Erewhon." I got [87:51] to So that's the recommendation [87:53] >> 10x more powerful than any ad or [87:55] anything else they could run. [87:56] >> And I went there Yeah. when I landed cuz [87:58] I needed a supermarket and didn't know [87:59] the place. But then interestingly, what [88:01] I was at the checkout yesterday after my [88:02] second visit, the lady at the checkout [88:04] goes, "Hey, are you are you an Erewhon [88:05] member?" And I was like, "Erewhon [88:07] member?" And she was it does cost She [88:09] went She was honest. She went, "It costs [88:11] money, but here's what you get. She goes [88:13] on this order today, you would have got [88:14] 10% off this entire order. It's [88:16] expensive that one. And she goes, and we [88:18] give you a drink every month. She listed [88:19] all the things off. [88:21] I signed up and bought the membership to [88:22] L1. I tell you now, [88:24] I'm not going anywhere else. [88:27] I don't know what it is, but now that [88:29] I'm a member and I have the app, I'm not [88:30] going anywhere else. Well, that's Now, [88:32] that's the hack that Amazon did, right? [88:35] With Prime. [88:37] And um [88:40] two or three years ago, I was uh I was [88:42] seated at dinner next to Bill Gates. You [88:45] know, my middle name is Forrest Gump. [88:47] These things happen once in a while. [88:49] And Bill is Bill is describing to me how [88:54] the business model of Costco [88:56] and the business model of Amazon is [88:58] illegal. Okay? So, I said, "Why is it [89:01] illegal?" He said, [89:03] "When you [89:04] When you put a membership fee, [89:07] what what you're doing to the consumer [89:09] is you're locking them in. [89:11] Mhm. Which means the consumer is no [89:13] longer going after the lowest price [89:17] because there is a distortion in their [89:18] behavior." Yeah. Okay? So, now the FTC [89:23] doesn't believe it's illegal, but Bill [89:24] Gates does. And I was just thinking, [89:26] "Well, that's because you're competitive [89:28] with Amazon." Mhm. You know? Yeah, yeah, [89:30] yeah. [89:31] That Prime thing with Amazon is super [89:33] smart. [89:33] >> Yeah, and and that was taken from [89:34] Costco. [89:36] Oh, okay. I get it. [89:37] >> But basically, yeah, the lock-in [89:39] lock-in is very powerful. [89:42] What one company I wanted to talk to you [89:43] about was Apple. [89:44] Because Apple I find is a really [89:46] interesting company. You You talked [89:48] about being a copycat, kind of arriving [89:50] later to the party with new things. [89:53] They've kind of been a story of both [89:55] sides of the equation. They've been [89:56] innovative, it seems, especially under [89:58] Steve Jobs. And more recently, [90:00] I mean, they were like copying other [90:02] people, but now I'm not even sure what [90:04] they are. Well, so Apple is a very [90:06] unusual company in that [90:09] everything emanated from one guy. Mhm. [90:12] Okay. [90:13] And that one guy has been gone for a [90:15] long time. And if you look at Apple, [90:19] basically nothing new has come out [90:22] since he left. [90:24] We don't have a Steve Jobs at Apple. [90:27] We [90:28] And and the same thing happened at [90:30] Disney. [90:31] You know, they had to buy Pixar [90:33] because there was no Disney anymore. Mr. [90:35] Disney was gone. [90:37] And so, Apple actually I I find [90:43] somewhat risky. [90:45] As an investment? Yes, because [90:48] if the form factor, so currently humans [90:51] walk around with a brick in their [90:53] pockets or in their hands. [90:56] At some point that form factor is going [90:57] to change. It may be integrated into [91:00] something we wear or some other more [91:03] ergonomic [91:05] situation. [91:07] That may or may not be Apple. [91:10] And in fact, more likely not to be [91:12] Apple. It's probably some guy in a [91:13] garage somewhere. [91:15] And so, if they are smart enough to [91:18] find the guy in the garage early enough [91:20] and buy them, they're okay. [91:23] And bring them in as the next Steve [91:24] Jobs, that's okay. [91:26] But [91:27] even there the odds are low. [91:29] What does this say to you about [91:30] founders? [91:33] The specialness of founders. Are they a [91:35] unique animal? [91:37] Or can you swap them out and still be [91:40] tremendously successful? Well, I would I [91:42] would say that [91:45] there's [91:46] there are a lot of elements of luck. [91:49] So, first of all, founders are all great [91:52] at what I call offering gaps, right? [91:53] They find something that the world [91:55] doesn't have, that needs, etc. and they [91:57] go after it. [91:59] Sometimes what happens with these [92:00] offering gaps is a moat gets built. [92:04] Right? Someone starts Visa, it becomes a [92:06] multi company or American Express and so [92:08] on. And and it [92:10] perseveres and scales. Like Apple with [92:13] their ecosystem, the closed ecosystem. [92:15] But [92:17] 100% of businesses [92:20] eventually will go to zero. [92:23] And so [92:25] it very well could be that a business [92:27] could last for 50, 100, 200 years, 150 [92:31] years. [92:32] Uh could last well past the founder's [92:34] lifetime. [92:36] Those are businesses which were built [92:38] with a lot of principles and lot of core [92:40] great core values. You know, the founder [92:43] of IKEA [92:45] every decision he took [92:47] was with a 500-year view. [92:50] How many businesses think with a [92:52] 500-year view? [92:54] And [92:56] IKEA, you know, I was I was uh studying [92:58] IKEA. Some very remarkable things about [93:00] it. First of all [93:02] he never ever took debt. [93:05] Every single store they built, they [93:07] built out of retained earnings and cash. [93:09] He never took debt. [93:11] And I've studied business failure quite [93:12] a bit. The single biggest reason why [93:15] businesses fail is leverage. [93:18] They owe people money and they can't pay [93:20] it back and then they're gone. [93:22] So [93:24] IKEA has never taken debt. [93:26] If you never take debt as a retailer, [93:28] you're going to grow slower. All right? [93:30] You're going to keep [93:32] uh kind of bringing in the cash, but [93:34] it's a very solid foundation. [93:37] Because [93:39] it's it's on a rock solid balance sheet. [93:43] Mhm. And and such. And um [93:46] his second principle was [93:49] no two IKEA stores can be the same. [93:53] So, what he said is that whenever we are [93:55] opening a new IKEA store, [93:58] there has to be some innovation [94:01] that is going into that store [94:04] that does not exist in our previous [94:05] stores. [94:07] Because he says that if I don't keep [94:09] innovating, [94:12] I'm done. [94:13] And so if you don't notice it because we [94:15] think all the IKEA's are the same, [94:17] but actually if you study them and look [94:19] at when they were when they were built, [94:21] etc., you start seeing these [94:24] these incremental changes that they're [94:26] making. That's a really interesting idea [94:28] that I can implement [94:29] into everything that I do, which is just [94:31] make sure that every podcast I do, [94:33] there's one new experiment or innovation [94:35] or every piece of work you do, whatever [94:37] team you're in, is just to run out one [94:39] experiment and every [94:40] >> Absolutely. But you have to make it [94:41] measurable, right? Or else it's not a [94:43] experiment. So [94:45] And you also talk about making fewer big [94:47] infrequent bets. [94:49] Yes. Who who's that relevant for and in [94:51] what context? So [94:54] one of the things that Warren Buffett [94:55] says, he says that you got a punch card [94:59] which you can punch 20 times in your [95:01] lifetime. [95:02] And each time you buy a stock, [95:05] it's one punch that's gone. So what what [95:07] Warren is saying is [95:10] if there was a rule which said [95:12] that you cannot buy more than 20 stocks [95:15] in your whole life, [95:17] what would happen is you'd be very [95:19] thoughtful [95:21] about what you bought. [95:23] Okay, and chances are those decisions [95:26] might be good decisions because [95:28] uh you only have 19 left and then you [95:31] only have 18 left, etc. [95:33] So [95:37] in in venture investing, [95:40] a very small sliver of companies that [95:42] venture capitalists invest in [95:45] do well. [95:46] Right? There's a high [95:48] high burnout rate. [95:50] And if we look at the stock market, [95:53] 4% of listed companies [95:57] generate 90% of the return. [96:00] So, most [96:02] companies that we may think about [96:04] investing in [96:06] are likely not to do well [96:08] for us. It's a 96% odds [96:12] that that's why the index is so [96:14] important. Is when you buy the index, [96:18] you bought that 4%. [96:20] And if you go pick stocks, [96:24] you have one in 25 chance of getting it [96:27] one of those 4%. You said earlier the [96:30] punch card analogy of 20 things in the [96:32] punch card. You got to pick 20 in your [96:33] life. If you only had three of three to [96:35] five things that you you would bet or [96:37] back now, [96:39] which I think is actually kind of what [96:40] you do, what would those things be? [96:43] Well, I mean, uh so [96:46] I'm trying to resist going to specific [96:50] big names. [96:50] >> Yeah. Because I think that would hurt [96:52] people more than help people. Okay, I [96:54] mean, it's fair. What I [96:56] would prefer that people do is focus on [97:00] the other two variables, which is [97:02] the amount you're saving and the length [97:05] of the runway and focus on the index. [97:08] So, I I I think that it's it's kind of [97:11] like saying, I want to be a great AI [97:14] developer because it's the way it will [97:18] to be a great AI developer is going to [97:20] take time. [97:21] It does the nature of the situation. [97:23] What do you think about these people [97:24] that day trade? Cuz so many young [97:26] people, specifically men, are being [97:28] sucked in by these adverts that you can [97:30] day trade your way to wealth. It's not [97:32] good. [97:34] I think I think it's uh [97:37] the broker's going to make all the [97:38] money. [97:39] Robinhood will do well. [97:42] Not you. [97:43] Do you think anyone can make loads of [97:44] money as a long-term day trader? [97:47] I look at it this way, [97:49] if you study the [97:51] Forbes 400, the 400 richest people in [97:54] the in the in the world actually, [97:58] I don't see any day traders in there. [98:03] One of the last things I want to speak [98:04] to you about is this idea of um [98:07] circling the wagons. Yes. What does [98:10] circling the wagons mean? [98:12] Warren Buffett [98:14] um said that over um [98:18] 50-year [98:20] period of running Berkshire Hathaway, [98:23] he's made hundreds of investments. [98:27] And only 12 [98:31] have moved the needle for Berkshire [98:32] Hathaway. [98:34] So, [98:35] it's the same three or four percent rule [98:38] where [98:39] if we say that Warren made [98:43] 300 investments, he probably made more [98:45] than 300, but let's say he made 300 [98:47] decisions. [98:49] Only 12 [98:51] have resulted in [98:54] what we see as Berkshire Hathaway today. [98:56] And the important thing was not [99:00] the buy decision on those 12. [99:04] The important thing was never selling [99:06] them. [99:07] So, [99:09] circle the wagons is a term that comes [99:12] from [99:14] the 19th century when these pioneers [99:17] were moving west, the wagon trails [99:19] moving west, [99:21] and the native Indians would attack or [99:25] bandits would attack these wagon trails. [99:28] So, what they would do is they would put [99:31] themselves in a circle. Mhm. They would [99:33] circle the wagons, then defend that [99:37] circle as best they could with their [99:39] guns and so on. But the wagons being [99:41] circled was the best possible possible [99:44] way of trying to face off that attack. [99:48] So, [99:49] in effect, they circle the wagons around [99:51] the Crown Jewels. So, when I'm talking [99:53] about circle the wagons, what I'm saying [99:54] is that [99:56] in a lifetime of investing, [99:58] there are very few times when you're [100:00] going to actually have [100:02] a huge multibagger. What's that? A big [100:05] big winner. [100:06] You know, something that goes up 10x, [100:08] 50x, 100x. [100:10] And what you want to do is you want to [100:14] effectively circle the wagons around [100:17] that idea, so it doesn't get sold. [100:21] So, [100:22] we are not going to know [100:25] before we invest [100:27] whether something is going to be a [100:28] multibagger or not. [100:30] But, we may figure it out after we own [100:33] it. Mhm. So, [100:35] after we we're only going to know a [100:37] business after we own it. We're not [100:39] going to know it before we own it. After [100:40] we own it, [100:41] we may understand the business well [100:43] enough to know that this is a great [100:44] business. And when we figure out it's a [100:46] great business, [100:48] you don't want to sell that. [100:50] When I meet people like you, I I'm [100:53] always so inspired because we spend a [100:54] lot of time thinking about the wins, the [100:56] great decisions. We've talked about [100:57] that. I've shown you the graph of your [100:58] great decisions. What is the worst ever [101:00] decision you made in terms of financial [101:01] performance? Well, I've had so many [101:04] zeros. [101:06] I mean, uh Or the one that got away. I [101:08] mean, uh [101:09] Yeah. so there are there's mistakes of [101:12] commission, [101:13] which is uh [101:14] things going to zero. [101:16] And there's mistakes of omission. The [101:18] mistakes of omission are [101:21] far [101:23] um far worse. [101:25] Okay? So, the biggest mistakes I have [101:28] made aren't the ones that have gone to [101:29] zero. [101:30] The biggest mistakes I've made are the [101:32] ones that I sold and I shouldn't have. [101:35] Where I should have circled the wagons [101:36] and I didn't. [101:38] And those have been very costly. Give me [101:40] one example. [101:42] Well, so of I think this was in about 13 [101:44] years back, 2012. I invested in uh [101:48] company called Fiat Chrysler [101:49] Automobiles. [101:51] Um [101:52] basically it was uh coming out of [101:54] bankruptcy after [101:56] the financial crisis. They'd gotten rid [101:58] of all that debt and everything and the [102:00] stock was very cheap. It was about 5 or [102:02] 6 billion dollars. Uh [102:04] the you could buy the whole business. [102:06] One of the things I didn't pay too much [102:08] attention to at the time was that 80% of [102:10] Ferrari [102:12] was inside Fiat Chrysler. [102:14] And they owned Ferrari, 80% of it. And [102:19] um [102:20] but they had many other assets which are [102:21] like they had the RAM trucks and Jeep [102:24] and [102:25] Maserati and so on. [102:27] And [102:29] when I looked at the business, I thought [102:31] the business was worth many times the 5 [102:33] or 6 billion. [102:35] Even ignoring Ferrari. [102:37] And I was right. So, in the end, I made [102:42] several times my money. [102:44] And in 2017 or 2018, they took Ferrari [102:47] public. So, they actually then listed [102:50] the company. [102:51] And [102:53] um [102:54] it looked like that they had captured [102:56] all the value and so I sold. I used to [103:00] own approximately [103:02] 1% of Ferrari as part of that purchase [103:06] that I'd made. [103:08] So, 80% of Ferrari was in this 5 [103:11] billion-dollar company. Ferrari now has [103:14] a market cap of almost 100 billion. [103:17] And I [103:20] would have about a billion more [103:23] if I had not done that stupid thing. [103:26] So, I I made a [103:28] couple of hundred million on this whole [103:29] thing, but it would have been a lot [103:32] more. And all I needed to do was just [103:34] not sell it. [103:35] Do you deal in crypto at all? Do you [103:37] invest? [103:38] It's outside my competence. I don't [103:40] understand it. [103:41] >> I was going to say, one of the things I [103:42] notice about you that's quite rare for [103:43] someone that deals in bees, billions, is [103:46] you have a smile on your face. [103:48] You seem like a really genuinely happy [103:49] person. [103:51] Well, what would be the point of the [103:53] bees without being happy? A lot of [103:55] people aren't, as you know. Well, then [103:57] they've lost their way somewhere. [104:00] I mean [104:01] on a daily basis, I specifically ask [104:05] myself, how do I want to spend today? [104:08] And I focus on spending it not with the [104:10] focus on maximizing money. [104:13] I focus it with maximizing what Monish [104:16] loves. [104:18] And that changes all the time, but [104:19] that's the way it is, you know. What is [104:20] that? [104:21] Well, currently it's golf. [104:24] Like one of the things I really [104:25] struggled with today [104:28] was there wasn't going to be any golf. [104:31] So, I said, it's either Steven or golf. [104:34] Should I go to Steven or should I go for [104:35] golf? I said, you know what? Give the [104:37] arms a rest. [104:41] Let's go meet Steven. I'm glad you did. [104:44] We have a Oh, you probably just answered [104:46] this question. We have a tradition where [104:47] the last guest leaves a question for the [104:48] next, not knowing who they're leaving it [104:49] for. And the question left for you is, [104:52] if you could go anywhere right now, [104:55] instantly, where would you go? [104:58] I'd go to the golf course. Thank you so [105:00] much. Oh, it's my pleasure. [105:01] >> everything that you do. It's so [105:03] incredibly important, and I now know why [105:04] you're why people love listening to you [105:06] and learning from you, and it's because [105:08] you have this most remarkable ability to [105:09] tell deeply engaging stories. Thank you [105:12] so much. [105:14] This has always blown my mind a little [105:15] bit. 53% of you that listen to this show [105:18] regularly haven't yet subscribed to this [105:20] show. So, could I ask you for a favor? [105:22] If you like this show and you like what [105:23] we do here and you want to support us, [105:25] the free, simple way that you can do [105:26] just that is by hitting the subscribe [105:28] button. And my commitment to you is if [105:30] you do that, then I'll do everything in [105:31] my power, me and my team, to make sure [105:33] that this show is better for you every [105:35] single week. We'll listen to your [105:36] feedback. We'll find the guests that you [105:38] want me to speak to. And we'll continue [105:40] to do what we do. Thank you so much.