IRGC and Bonyads Convert Iran into Factional Mafia State, Authors Say

作者称IRGC与Bonyads将伊朗转变为派系黑手党国家 军事企业集团和宗教基金会绑架了伊朗1979年后的经济，将意识形态存亡与派系勒索置于经济稳定或市场竞争之上。 本期内容探讨了伊朗政治经济的内部运作机制，以及1979年革命的平等主义承诺如何演变为由IRGC和宗教基金会（bonyads）主导的国家支持型裙带体系。作者Yeganeh Torbati与Bozorgmehr Sharafedin解释了安全部队如何系统性地敲诈成功企业——从重工业到本土科技行业——迫使私营企业出让股权以换取庇护。讨论还强调了西方外交假设与伊朗意识形态韧性之间的错位，指出国家领导人始终将政权生存和意识形态置于普惠性经济繁荣之上。 2026年与伊朗的持续冲突自3月初以来一直在未正式宣战的情况下延续，而普通伊朗家庭日常面临的经济现实在很大程度上仍不为西方观察者所知。 (0:00) 1979年伊斯兰革命最初承诺实现社会正义、财富再分配和公共福利，但其经济结构逐渐演变成了一个国家支持的黑手党式国家。 (4:58) 在伊朗分层的经济体系中，商业机会、国家资本和许可证是根据政治忠诚度而非市场效率来进行分配的。 (6:57) 伊朗国家政权优先为外国准军事代理人和安全派系提供资金，而非保障国内基本的公共服务和民用基础设施。 (6:57) 通过革命后对自给自足的推进，伊朗保持着出人意料的多元化本土工业基础，涵盖汽车制造、钢铁生产以及农业。 (13:30)

Journalists Yeganeh Torbati and Bozorgmehr Sharafedin argue that Iran's economy functions as a fragmented "mafia state," where post-1979 egalitarian promises have been replaced by systemic extortion and crony capitalism dominated by security forces and religious foundations. Revolutionary Ideals and the Layered Mafia State (4:58) Following the 1979 revolution, Grand Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini utilized populist, Marxist-influenced rhetoric with Islamic framing, promising the underprivileged free utilities, housing, and social justice. Over subsequent decades, these commitments were largely abandoned in favor of an explicitly tiered economic structure where state wealth, licensing, and commercial opportunities are allocated according to ideological loyalty rather than market efficiency. Bozorgmehr Sharafedin notes that foreign paramilitary proxies such as Hezbollah and the Houthis receive financial priority over domestic public needs, such as free milk programs in primary schools, while the domestic working class bears the burden of inflation and economic distress. Privatization, Bonyads, and Military Economic Capture (13:30) Although Iran maintains a diversified industrial base spanning steel manufacturing, agriculture, and automotive production, post-war "privatization" shifted state enterprises, mines, and shipping lines to insiders, clerical foundations (bonyads), and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). These entities operate as a "shadow state" beyond parliamentary oversight, taxation, and regulatory audits. Sharafedin highlights historical roots in the 1980s, when charitable foundations secured legal exemptions to bypass import tariffs, establishing precedents that eventually enabled the IRGC to operate unmonitored maritime jetties—termed "invisible ports"—for illicit trade. The IRGC has demonstrated its leverage over civil administration through direct interventions, including a May 2004 incident in which it deployed armored vehicles and scrambled a fighter jet to block Tehran's new Imam Khomeini International Airport because operations were awarded to an Austrian-Turkish consortium rather than Guards-linked entities. Under international sanctions, the IRGC further expanded its footprint by directly selling crude oil on the black market, eventually controlling an estimated 50% of Iranian crude exports. Domestic Tech Growth and Protection Shakedowns (40:00) Western sanctions and the 2010s rollout of 3G and 4G networks under President Hassan Rouhani created a protected domestic digital economy. Iranian entrepreneurs developed domestic equivalents to global platforms, including Digikala (retail) and Snapp (ride-hailing), which attracted returning expatriates and venture capital. However, hardline security factions viewed the sector as an ideological threat, prompting targeted smear campaigns, raids, and arrests against founders. To continue operations, business owners faced extortion from intermediaries tied to defense entities and bonyads demanding equity in exchange for protection. Over time, state-aligned entities acquired major stakes across the tech ecosystem, including Snapp yielding equity to a bonyad, an IRGC-funded ride-hailing competitor entering the market, and Digikala selling a 40% stake to a telecom firm partially owned by a bonyad. Factional Competition and Misaligned Policy Assumptions (50:00) Iran's political economy is characterized by intense factional infighting, where rotating presidential administrations redirect resources to their own networks. Sharafedin contrasts this with unified authoritarian systems, noting that business leaders must navigate conflicting factions—including ministries, religious institutions, and the IRGC—creating deep commercial unpredictability. Ideological directives frequently intersect with self-enrichment, exemplified by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei banning Western COVID-19 vaccines in 2020–2021 while awarding lucrative domestic vaccine contracts to his corporate conglomerate, Setad. Torbati and Sharafedin emphasize that Western policymakers misjudge the regime by assuming economic incentives, sanction relief, or integration into global markets will prompt political moderation. Unblocked funds following the 2015 JCPOA were directed heavily into military operations rather than domestic welfare. Furthermore, Tehran exhibits a significantly higher pain threshold than Western democracies, absorbing severe inflation and economic contraction while subordinating economic prosperity to ideological self-sufficiency and pivoting trade toward China. The hosts and authors conclude that private enterprise in Iran cannot achieve genuine global competitiveness because survival requires surrendering equity to competing, predatory factions. While political leaders have historically floated modernizing ambitions—such as past aspirations to become an 'Islamic Japan'—systemic cronyism, domestic extortion, and prioritizing ideological durability over market growth continue to constrain the country's economic potential.

《纽约时报》记者 Yeganeh Torbati 与 Iran International 数字业务主管 Bozorgmehr Sharafedin 指出，伊朗经济并非由纯粹的市场机制或单一集权主导，而是演化为一个由伊斯兰革命卫队（IRGC）和宗教基金会（Bonyads）深度控制的分层“黑手党国家”，其经济决策始终服从于意识形态生存而非经济繁荣。 革命承诺落空与分层国家形成 (4:58) 1979 年伊斯兰革命初期，大阿亚图拉霍梅尼通过吸收带有马克思主义色彩的民粹语言，向工人阶级和弱势群体（mostazafan）承诺提供免费电力、交通和住房。然而，受访学者指出，这些再分配承诺在随后的数十年中逐渐被废弃，尤其自 2017 年以来，民众抗议已从城市中产阶级的公民权利诉求彻底转向基层劳工的广泛经济生计不满。伊朗由此形成明确的分层社会结构：顶层为伊斯兰革命卫队、宗教基金会及其代理人网络，享有最高的国家资产与贸易特权；中层为顺从的民营企业，其经营规模被设定了无形上限；底层则是承受严重通胀与盘剥的普通民众。不仅如此，国家优先将数十亿美元财政资源输送给黎巴嫩真主党或也门胡塞武装等海外准军事组织以维持地缘威慑，却长期以预算短缺为由削减小学免费牛奶等基础国内民生福利。 影子国家崛起与私有化异化 (13:30) 尽管伊朗拥有可观的钢铁制造、农业及汽车等非石油工业基础，但其战后所谓的“私有化”进程彻底沦为内幕交易。两伊战争结束后，国有资产、航运船队、矿山和工厂被以极低估值转让给与军方和宗教机构有密切联系的权贵；部分企业甚至被拆解机器、清算资产并改建为利润丰厚的房地产项目。宗教基金会（Bonyads）最初以救济伤残军人和烈属等崇高名义设立，但早期议员（如后来的议长卡鲁比）推动立法豁免其政府审计和关税，导致此类特权逐步膨胀为逃避监管的法外特权。伊斯兰革命卫队更是在伊朗南部沿海建立了不受海关管辖的“隐形码头”开展走私，并在 2004 年德黑兰霍梅尼国际机场开幕当天出动装甲车封锁跑道、派战斗机拦截商业客机，强行逼退中标外资财团以夺取运营合同。此外，国际制裁导致石油部无法清偿军费欠款，最终促使政府允许革命卫队直接在黑市转售原油，据学者估计其已掌控该国多达 50% 的原油出口业务。 本土科技生态与政权敲诈接管 (40:00) 在 2010 年代初温和派鲁哈尼政府扩展移动互联网及西方长期制裁的背景下，伊朗国内孕育了本土互联网生态，催生了本土电商巨头 Digikala 和网约车平台 Snapp 等成熟企业，并吸引了海归及欧洲、俄罗斯风险资本入局。然而，这一繁荣随后遭遇了安全机构的系统性打压与清洗。强硬派及革命卫队将科技初创企业视作西方意识形态渗透的渠道，安全部门通过匿名社交频道发起抹黑宣传、突击搜查公司总部并传讯逮捕创业者。随后，具有军方或宗教基金会背景的说客与中间人出面提供“安全保护”，强行索取股权以平息打压；最终，Snapp 的大笔股权被出让给宗教基金会，Digikala 亦向具有宗教基金会背景的电信企业出让了 40% 的股权，民营科技创新的成果最终被安全国家机构所吞噬。 多派系倾轧与被误读的战略痛阈 (50:00) 分析指出，西方决策层长期抱有一种交易性假设，误以为解除制裁和经济融入能促使伊朗实现政治自由化，但这种预设屡遭挫败。在伊朗体系内部，最高领袖哈梅内伊更像是在互相冲突的“众神”之间居中调停，不同政府部委、革命卫队与宗教机构彼此利益割裂，使得企业无法遵循可预期的营商规则，向某一派系妥协往往招致另一派系的报复。同时，政权高层的决策始终将意识形态目标置于经济发展之上，例如哈梅内伊在疫情期间严禁进口英美疫苗，同时将暴利的国产疫苗合同直接授予其个人控制的巨型企业 Setad（Eiko）。在耐受力方面，华盛顿往往对微小的油价震荡或利率上升极度敏感，而德黑兰展现出了承受三位数恶性通胀、严峻失业和重大伤亡而绝不放弃核心地缘战略的极高“痛阈”，且其战略重心正加速向对华经贸与投资靠拢。 伊朗的经济机制由意识形态生存与多派系分肥深度绑定，其多头割据的黑手党治理模式从根本上扼杀了健康的市场竞争与外向型发展潜力。这留给国际观察家与政策制定者的核心未解问题是：当国内底层劳工群体的被剥夺感与经济不满持续累积，这种以牺牲全民福祉为代价来维系海外扩张与寡头特权的经济体系，其社会承压的绝对极限究竟在何处。

## Background 本期内容由彭博社（Bloomberg）旗下的播客节目《Odd Lots》于2026年7月30日发布。节目围绕两位嘉宾撰写的新书《被窃取的革命：现代伊朗的背叛与希望》（Stolen Revolution: Betrayal and Hope in Modern Iran），探讨了1979年伊斯兰革命后伊朗如何从许诺财富再分配蜕变为空前割裂的“黑手党国家”，并深入剖析了普通伊朗人的日常经济处境、科技初创企业的遭遇以及当前地缘局势对经济运转的深层影响。 ## TL;DR 节目全面拆解了伊朗伊斯兰共和国的真实经济运作机制，指出其本质是一个基于意识形态忠诚来分配国家资源的“黑手党国家”。革命初期承诺的社会公平与再分配，在数十年的演变中异化为由伊斯兰革命卫队（IRGC）和免税宗教基金会（Bonyad）等影子权力对工业、石油及科技初创生态的巧取豪夺。与常规威权体制不同，伊朗呈现出多派系割据、缺乏统一寻租秩序的“希腊诸神式”混乱，导致企业随时面临敌对派系的洗牌风险；同时，西方关于“经济利益能够诱使政权自由化”的假设在此彻底失效，因为统治阶层始终将意识形态纯洁性与政权生存置于国民经济福祉之上。 ## Atmosphere & style 整期节目兼具财经深度与政治讽刺，两位主持人与长期追踪伊朗现实的驻外记者展开了机敏且富有穿透力的对话。叙事基调既冷静克制又充满荒诞感——从装甲车横拦新建民航机场跑道，到将多头勒索比作“向希腊诸神献祭”以及东京极道占座的奇闻轶事，生动勾勒出封闭政权内部既残酷又令人啼笑皆非的现实。听感上犹如剥洋葱般层层击碎西方自由市场的惯性思维，让听众在沉重的地缘冲突阴云下，切实触摸到普通伊朗人在动荡撕裂的体制夹缝中挣扎求生的真实体温。 ## Bulletin - `06:55` 伊朗经济已深度蜕变为“黑手党国家”，国家资源与特权分配完全与对体制的意识形态效忠挂钩，伊斯兰革命卫队与宗教基金会逐步侵吞了核心经济命脉。 - `30:00` 长期的外部制裁与主权债务危机迫使伊朗政府交出原油直销权作为抵债筹码，目前伊斯兰革命卫队已实际掌控全国约50%的原油出口。 - `45:00` 曾因制裁壁垒而繁荣的本土科技初创生态遭到安全机关系统性收编，网约车平台Snapp与电商巨头Digikala等企业在威胁下被迫向宗教基金会与特权资本割让核心股权。 - `50:00` 西方关于“经济利益必然驱动政治妥协”的自由市场假设在伊朗失效，经济在该国仅被视为服务于政权生存与意识形态“自力更生”的工具而非终极目标。 ## Key takeaways - `01:50` 外界对伊朗经济存在严重的信息真空，在石油出口与制裁宏大叙事遮蔽下，本土庞大的中产就业与民营产业生态极少为人所知。 - `04:45` 1979年伊斯兰革命的核心合法性始于财富再分配与社会公正承诺，但历经数十年演变，如今已退化为少数派系垄断的特权体系。 - `06:55` 伊朗“黑手党国家”将忠诚置于公民权利之上，宁可削减国内基础民生福利，也要斥巨资补贴真主党、胡塞武装等海外代理人以维系效忠。 - `10:00` 2017年以来的抗议浪潮标志着政权基本盘动摇，抗议主体从知识分子与中产阶级蔓延至深感承诺落空、陷入生存困境的底层工农阶层。 - `12:35` 自给自足理念催生了多元工业与中东领先的钢铁产能，但产业命脉逐步从正规文官政府流失，由不受监督的“影子国家”实际接管。 - `15:00` 所谓的私有化改革沦为特权阶层的分肥盛宴，与安全部队勾结的内部人士低价鲸吞国企、变卖资产并从事房地产土地投机。 - `20:53` 以崇高道德与战时抚恤名义赋予宗教基金会（Bonyads）的免税与免监管特权，最终演化为革命卫队掌控“隐形码头”大肆走私的制度漏洞。 - `25:21` 2004年霍梅尼国际机场事件中革命卫队出动装甲车与战机阻挠民航降落，展现了军工复合体借助神权庇护强行夺取商业合同的霸道行径。 - `32:15` 统治阶层巧妙将反西方意识形态与个人私利结合，例如借安全名义下达美英新冠疫苗禁令，同时将国产疫苗暴利订单输送给自身商业帝国。 - `34:25` 前总统拉夫桑贾尼将伊朗打造成“伊斯兰日本”的外向型构想破灭，特权寻租与逆向淘汰机制扼杀了企业在全球高端产业链的竞争力。 - `40:00` 西方制裁与年轻受良好教育的人口红利一度形成贸易保护温室，催生了Digikala和Snapp等早期蓬勃发展的科技初创巨头。 - `47:15` 伊朗营商环境的核心风险在于不可预测的撕裂式混乱，开明派部委与安全情报机关公开内讧，多头黑帮格局导致企业无法建立稳定预期。 - `50:00` 西方决策层坚信“万事皆有其价码”，误以为千亿美元解封即可换取伊朗政治开放，忽视了该政权优先将红利投入地缘博弈的意识形态现实。 - `55:00` 美伊博弈存在极不对称的“痛苦耐受度”，美国受制于油价与伤亡民意，而伊朗为政权生存而战，能够承受近三位数通胀与巨大人员损耗。 - `01:01:45` “向希腊诸神献祭”的比喻揭示了伊朗的体制死结：缺乏单一终极秩序担保人，向某一派系寻求庇护往往会招致敌对派系的致命报复。 ## Detailed walkthrough ### `01:50` 伊朗战事背景与被忽视的日常经济现实 在节目开场，主持人 Joe Weisenthal 与 Tracy Alloway 谈到了录制时间（7月28日）以及自同年3月初爆发且持续数月之久的伊朗军事冲突。Joe 指出，冲突刚爆发时，外界普遍担忧其可能对全球经济尤其是国际油价造成毁灭性打击；然而随着时间推移，这场甚至未被正式宣战、仅被称为“军事行动”的持久冲突，已经逐渐淡出大众日常头条，人们对战争的持续早已见怪不怪。Tracy 也补充道，这更引发了一个根本性问题：当这一切冲突与制裁最终结束时，伊朗这片土地上究竟会发生什么？ 两位主持人坦言，外界对伊朗经济的认知存在巨大的信息真空。虽然财经舆论经常讨论石油出口，偶尔提及庞大的伊朗股市（规模曾被比作土耳其经济体量），或者谈论伊朗独具特色的本土汽车工业与开心果出口，但几乎没人真正了解一个普通伊朗中产家庭的日常生活到底是什么样。人们在类似 LinkedIn 或 Indeed 的求职平台上找什么工作？普通人追求怎样的职业发展？创业公司如何生存并走向公开上市？此前国际社会曾数次出现过对伊朗经济开放和制裁解除的乐观预期，但往往随之而来的是重新闭关锁国。 - 持续中的中东军事行动自当年3月初开始，已持续数月，外界普遍对其走向与善后阶段的经济重建充满疑问。 - 伊朗本土拥有极为庞大的经济体量和成熟的股市，但在石油与制裁的叙事遮蔽下，普通中产阶级的就业市场与企业生态极少为外界所知。 --- ### `04:45` 探索伊朗政治经济学与《被窃取的革命》的诞生 为了探寻伊朗日常经济与政治治理的真实面貌，Joe 分享了一段有趣的经历：几小时前他在维基百科上随意浏览，偶然查阅了前总统内贾德（Mahmoud Ahmadinejad）首次竞选时的经济纲领，发现其口号异常空泛，大致类似于“只要我们敢于想象，我们就能做到”（"if we imagine it, we could do it"），完全找不到关于税收或微观民生的具体主张。这种体制内政客的空洞纲领，恰恰引出了一个核心课题：伊朗的政治经济学到底是如何运转的？ 为此，节目邀请了两位深耕该领域的专家：《纽约时报》伊朗报道记者叶加内·托尔巴蒂（Yeganeh Torbati）与 Iran International 数字部门主管博佐尔格梅尔·沙拉费丁（Bozorgmehr Sharafedin）。两位嘉宾合著了新书《被窃取的革命：现代伊朗的背叛与希望》（*Stolen Revolution: Betrayal and Hope in Modern Iran*）。托尔巴蒂介绍，这项研究项目始于约五年半前的2020年底。起初，他们的初衷是厘清伊朗政治经济体制中腐败滋生与国家严厉管制的根源；随着过去几年伊朗局势的剧烈演变，书的主题进一步拓展与深化，聚焦于一条贯穿始终的主线：1979年伊斯兰革命掌权者曾许诺实现“社会公正”并重新分配国家巨额资源，但如今的现实却与当年的承诺彻底背道而驰。 - 新书项目启动于2020年底，系统复盘了过去40至50年间伊朗国家对经济的全面渗透、控制与腐败机制。 - 1979年伊斯兰共和国建立的核心合法性基于社会公正与财富再分配，如今却演化成由少数派系深度垄断的经济体系。 --- ### `06:55` “黑手党国家”的运作机制：效忠体系与资源分配 对于伊朗现行政权的定性，沙拉费丁将其明确定义为一种“黑手党国家”（mafia state）。他深入剖析了威权/极权政府与黑手党国家的本质区别：在一个常规社会甚至一般的极权社会中，理论上公民在财富享用和国家资源面前享有基本的平等性；但在一个黑手党国家中，整个社会被切割为严密的分层结构，资源与财富的分配完全取决于个体或群体对统治体制的“效忠程度”（loyalty）。 这种基于意识形态效忠的分配机制贯穿了伊朗伊斯兰共和国的历史。政权系统性地排斥批评者与异见人士，将财富与特权源源不断地输送给忠诚者。随着时间推移，这种逻辑彻底主导了国家经济，伊斯兰革命卫队（IRGC）和各类宗教基金会（Bonyads）借此侵吞了国民经济的核心版图。沙拉费丁进一步指出，这种黑手党式的效忠逻辑甚至延伸至伊朗的外交政策之中：在统治者眼中，黎巴嫩真主党（Hezbollah）成员或也门胡塞武装（Houthi）民兵对政权的忠诚度，远高于德黑兰大学的一名普通教授。这就解释了为何伊朗国内长期存在巨大的民怨与荒谬现象——政府声称财政拮据、甚至无力为本国公立学校的学生提供免费牛奶，却能够毫不吝啬地斥巨资供养千里之外的地区代理人武装，以此奖赏和维持对方的效忠。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 伊朗黑手党国家的资源分配机制 accDescr: 展示了国家财富如何根据效忠程度优先流向核心统治机构与外部代理人，而边缘化的普通公民则资源匮乏。 subgraph Core ["政权核心与效忠层级"] direction TB A["最高领导层与教士集团"] B["伊斯兰革命卫队 (IRGC) 与宗教基金会"] C["地区代理人武装 (如真主党、胡塞武装)"] end subgraph Marginalized ["被边缘化的国内社会"] direction TB D["本土专业群体 (如大学教授、技术官僚)"] E["普通民众与公共福利 (如学校免费牛奶)"] end A -->|"垄断核心特权与决策"| B B -->|"巨额资金奖赏绝对忠诚"| C A -.->|"资源大幅削减与排斥"| D B -.->|"基本公共服务匮乏"| E ``` - **分层社会的核心逻辑**：公民无法平等享受国家财富，资源的获取完全与对体制的政治与意识形态效忠挂钩。 - **经济命脉的全面渗透**：伊斯兰革命卫队与宗教基金会以效忠为纽带，逐步接管并控制了国家最赚钱的产业部门。 - **内外分配的鲜明反差**：体制甘愿削减国内最基础的民生开支（如中小学免费牛奶计划），也要将巨额硬通货拨付给海外代理人网络，用以兑现对“效忠者”的奖赏。 ### `10:00` 革命联盟的演变与未兑现的民生承诺 1979 年伊朗伊斯兰革命的爆发并非单一阶层的运动，其初期的革命联盟极为庞杂且充满张力。在革命初期，真正走在抗议前沿的主要是中产阶级和知识分子阶层，驱动他们的诉求各不相同：一部分人渴望建立伊斯兰政权；共产主义者等左翼力量则高举反美与反帝国主义旗帜；此外还有许多单纯追求世俗自由民主的群体，抗议国王（巴列维王朝）对基本人权的践踏。相比之下，处于社会底层的工人和较低经济阶层介入得相对较晚，直到国王统治末期的一系列经济政策恶化了民生，这部分群体才在大规模动员下加入抗议洪流。 面对多元派系，革命领袖鲁霍拉·霍梅尼（Ruhollah Khomeini）展现了极强的政治手腕，他巧妙地吸纳并挪用了左翼势力最具号召力的阶级叙事。霍梅尼将“资产阶级”（Bourgeoisie）与“无产阶级”（Proletariat）等经典马克思主义词汇披上伊斯兰色彩的包装，借此赢得了大量年轻支持者与基层民众的拥护。在掌权最初的几个月里，新政权做出了极为诱人的经济承诺，宣称国家将全力帮扶贫困人口，提供免费的电力、免费的公交交通，并大兴土木为无房者建造住房，从而确立了自身代表底层穷人根本利益的政治合法性。 然而随着岁月变迁，特别是近十至十五年间，伊朗政权逐渐背离了当年的承诺，如今甚至已经不再在口头上对此类再分配进行修饰。这种转变导致底层的基本盘发生动摇。自 2017 年以来，伊朗爆发的社会抗议不再仅限于受压迫的中产阶级，大量深陷生存泥潭、对革命红利彻底绝望的底层贫困民众也走上了街头，社会内部对政权的合法性危机日益加深。 - **革命初期的多元力量**：包含了宗教伊斯兰派、反帝反美左翼共产分子以及追求世俗宪政的自由派知识分子。 - **阶级话语的宗教化借用**：霍梅尼通过吸收左翼意识形态并将其伊斯兰化，迅速完成了对青年群体和工人的动员。 - **早期的再分配承诺**：向社会底层许诺免费水电、免费交通和全民住房保障。 - **2017 年以后的抗议转折**：民怨从知识阶层向生活陷入困境的低收入阶层深度蔓延。 --- ### `12:35` 伊朗经济的基本盘：从自给自足到多元工业体系 在探讨伊朗政府如何调配资源支撑其住房、电力及对外军火扩张时，不可否认石油是国家财政的核心支柱，但伊朗经济绝非单纯依赖油气开采的单一天赋型经济体。伊朗拥有相当多元化的工业基础，这一格局既部分源自巴列维王朝时期的工业化政策，也深深扎根于 1979 年革命后盛行的“自力更生”（Self-sufficiency）理念。在上世纪六七十年代，第三世界国家普遍抵制外部大国干涉内政，这种思潮在伊朗左翼和部分宗教阶层中演化成极力构建本土产业、斩断对外依赖的坚定信念。 两伊战争结束后，伊朗相继启动并投产了一系列现代化重工业项目。如今伊朗拥有自己的汽车制造体系以及庞大的钢铁工厂，其钢铁产能一度领跑整个中东地区。尽管这些重工企业在生产效率上常饱受诟病，且受限于孤立环境缺乏大规模外国直接投资，但它们承担了维系国家运转和吸收巨额就业的关键任务。与此同时，规模庞大的农业部门也是伊朗经济应对长期国际制裁的生命线与就业蓄水池。然而，这种不计代价追求农业自给的政策也带来了灾难性的生态后果，特别是全国范围内极其严峻的地下水过度开采与水资源危机。 在制度架构的演变上，这些重大产业最初均处于西方式“常规国家机构”的掌控之下，隶属于需要向议会负责的正规部委管辖。但随着时间推移，对工业体系、矿产与关键经济命脉的实际掌控权，开始大规模从公开合法的文官官僚系统流失，全面转移至缺乏监督的“影子国家”（Shadow State）手中。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 经济控制权向影子国家转移结构图 accDescr: 展示伊朗工业命脉从正规政府管辖逐渐流向不受约束的宗教基金会与安全部队的变迁流程。 subgraph FormalState ["正规文官政府 (革命初期掌控)"] A["中央部委 / 议会监管"] --> B["国有重工 / 矿产 / 农业"] end subgraph IdeologicalDriver ["意识形态驱动"] C["反帝国主义思潮 & 自力更生理念"] --> B end subgraph ShadowState ["影子国家与特权阶层 (后期垄断)"] B -->|控制权流失 / 权钱结合| D["伊斯兰革命卫队 / 安全部队"] B -->|非公开网络接管| E["神职人员控制的各类免税基金会 (Bonyads)"] end ``` --- ### `15:00` 影子国家的崛起：伪私有化与“黑手党式”经济掠夺 回顾伊朗伊斯兰共和国的经济演进历程，其发展大致经历了从“激进国有化”到“掠夺性私有化”的畸变。革命爆发之初，新政权推行了大规模的资产国有化浪潮，将全国主要的航运、采矿、银行业和大型工业设施尽数收归国家。但在掌权一二十年后，国家开始高调推行所谓主要工业部门的“私有化”改革。 这场改革非但没有催生健康的自由市场，反而沦为权贵阶层的分肥盛宴： 1. **暗箱低价鲸吞**：与权力核心和安全部队（包括革命卫队）关系密切的内部人士，以难以置信的象征性低价收购了大量原属国家的优质工矿企业。 2. **掏空资产与土地投机**：接盘这些企业的权贵往往根本无心经营生产。工厂的生产设备与机械被迅速变卖套现，而宝贵的工业厂房用地则被直接变更规划，改建为高档住宅公寓牟取暴利，导致大量实体产业遭到系统性破坏。 3. **“黑手党式”敲诈民营经济**：即便仍有部分由普通人创办的民营企业侥幸脱颖而出，一旦其业务规模或盈利能力跨过了某个临界值，安全部队的人员就会直接“上门敲门”，强行索要干股或控制权。这种巧取豪夺的运作模式与好莱坞黑帮电影中向成功餐馆强收保护费如出一辙。 4. **科技初创生态的窒息**：许多抱着建设国家热情从海外归国的伊朗青年才俊曾创办了蓬勃发展的科技初创公司（Startup Sector），但当这些科技平台发展壮大后，安全情报系统便通过威胁与司法恐吓，逼迫创始团队交出股权和管理权，最终将整个新兴产业纳入权贵资本主义的掌控之下。 ### `20:53` 宗教基金会与“隐形码头”：特权体系如何孕育黑手党国家 在探讨伊朗国家权力如何全面渗透并吞噬私营经济时，有两个至关重要的核心概念：“博尼亚德”（Bonyads，即宗教慈善基金会）和“隐形码头”（invisible ports / invisible jetties）。伊斯兰革命之初，最高领袖阿亚图拉·霍梅尼下令设立了一系列规模庞大的宗教基金会。表面上看，这些组织的初衷极其崇高——负责将巴列维时期的被没收财富重新分配给贫民，或者照料两伊战争中阵亡“烈士”的遗属和伤残退伍老兵。正因头顶崇高的革命与宗教光环，这些基金会的掌舵人获得了凌驾于常规体制之上的巨大权力。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Bonyads and Invisible Ports Evolution accDescr: 宗教基金会与革命卫队如何从崇高初衷演化为逃避监管的经济特权实体 subgraph Phase1 ["1980年代：崇高初衷与特批特权"] A["革命基金会 (Bonyads)"] -->|"为伤残老兵进口轮椅"| B["规避官僚红线与产业部禁令"] B -->|"议会立法豁免"| C["免检疫、免关税、免审计特权"] end subgraph Phase2 ["2000年代：特权固化与黑手党化"] C -->|"特权泛滥至伊斯兰革命卫队 (IRGC)"| D["南部沿海设立专用隐形码头"] D -->|"不受政府海关任何监管"| E["巨额走私与商业垄断（黑手党国家）"] end ``` 这种制度性溃败在一个极具讽刺意味的案例中体现得淋漓尽致：两伊战争期间，一位掌管伤残军人基金会的高级神职人员兼国会议员迈赫迪·卡鲁比（Mehdi Karroubi），希望能从德国进口一批高品质轮椅发放给受伤老兵。当时的伊朗工业部部长坚决反对，理由是进口外国轮椅将沉重打击本土制造业。为了绕过政府部门的繁文缛节、保持基金会的“革命纯洁性”，卡鲁比直接在议会推动通过法案，赋予该基金会不受任何政府行政监督、自由进口任何物资的特殊豁免权。当时这一举措看似出于“进口更好轮椅以照顾卫国英雄”的善意，但其实质却开创了极其危险的先例——将宗教基金会置于法律和监管之上。 几十年后，当卡鲁比在改革派运动时期当选为议长并巡视伊朗南部港口时，惊愕地发现了大量专属于伊斯兰革命卫队（IRGC）的“隐形码头”。革命卫队借助当年基金会所享有的那种免税、免审计特权，在这些不受任何海关与政府监管的独立码头中肆无忌惮地走私和调配物资。最初出于战时便利和道德优越感而给予的特权，历经岁月发酵后彻底脱缰，最终将整个国家体制异化为了一个结构性的“黑手党国家”。 - **博尼亚德（Bonyads）的特权根源**：由霍梅尼直接下令设立，享有免税、免审计以及豁免于民选政府行政规章的超级特权，私营企业和普通商业机构根本无法望其项背。 - **“隐形码头”的运作**：由伊斯兰革命卫队独家掌控的专属出入境港口，完全避开国家海关体系，大肆走私消费品与关键物资，彻底破坏了公开透明的市场竞争机制。 --- ### `25:21` 跑道上的装甲车：2004年霍梅尼国际机场事件与不可撼动的神权庇护 面对这些背离公共利益、依靠特权自肥的庞然大物，伊朗体制内并非完全没有出现过试图拨乱反正的声音。然而，这些努力往往来得太晚，甚至连当年亲手参与缔造这套特权机制的当事人也已无能为力。转型为改革派领袖的卡鲁比在担任议长期间，曾试图建立机制让直接效忠于最高领袖的博尼亚德及相关军政实体接受透明度审计与议会监督，但此时最高领袖与这批既得利益者的权势早已膨胀到不可撼动的地步，民选议会的监管尝试彻底沦为泡影。 最为荒诞且直观的一幕发生在2004年伊朗新落成的伊玛目霍梅尼国际机场（IKIA）。这座现代化机场承载了伊朗自革命前就有的夙愿，原本被寄予厚望，旨在建成一个能与迪拜和伊斯坦布尔相媲美的中东航空枢纽。然而在盛大开航当天，革命卫队竟直接派出数辆装甲巡洋舰横亘在跑道中央，物理阻止第一架民航班机着陆；交通部长苦苦哀求后，该航班才被勉强放行。紧接着当第二架进港客机准备降落时，革命卫队甚至紧急升空了一架战斗机进行空中拦截与威吓，迫使民航客机不得不掉头紧急备降伊斯法罕。 这起震惊外界的闹剧背后，完全是赤裸裸的利益争夺：交通部长事后在多次访谈中透露，革命卫队此前曾极力争取该机场的商业运营特许权，但因其开价过高且毫无竞争力，改革派主导的政府最终将合同授予了一家土耳其与奥地利的合资企业。革命卫队随即以“国家安全”为由武力锁死机场，使其沦为空置数月的禁飞区；直到外资合同被强行废除、运营权全盘转交给革命卫队关联的国有实体后，机场才得以重新开放。尽管卡鲁比领导的议会为此出具了详尽的调查报告，但最终没有任何一名涉事军方人员受到问责。这种经济掠夺并非单纯的意识形态防御或国家安全考量，而是体制内派系借国家机器进行垄断敛财的真实写照；由于这些实体直属于被视为“真主在世代表”的最高领袖，任何来自民选政府与公众的质疑，在神权护甲面前都会被瞬间击得粉碎。 ### `30:00` 派系轮替、制裁暗箱与革命卫队的石油掌控 在伊朗的政治经济生态中，政权领导层的更迭往往伴随着资源掌控权的重新洗牌。每一任新政府上台，首要任务都是提携和赋能与自身派系亲近的核心人物。无论是在马哈茂德·艾哈迈迪内贾德（Mahmoud Ahmadinejad）执政时期，还是在相对温和派的哈桑·鲁哈尼（Hassan Rouhani）任期内，这一权力再分配的逻辑始终未变——各派系无不竭尽所能确保自家人能分食国家经济命脉的蛋糕。这种持续的内斗极为复杂，当博弈陷入僵局时，伊斯兰革命卫队（IRGC）往往会直接调动军事和情报机器来强行干预，有时其他文官派系也能短暂夺取控制权。 长达数十年的外部制裁则成了加剧这场内耗的催化剂。制裁不仅没有削弱特权阶层，反而为国家机器披上了一层厚重的黑幕，导致经济透明度荡然无存。各个派系争相将触角伸向关键产业，试图通过掌控日常民生与外贸命脉来证明自身不可替代。一个典型的演变发生在石油产业：在过去数十年里，伊朗石油部（Ministry of Petroleum）一直独家执掌石油外销业务；然而随着制裁持续收紧，政府债台高筑，无力向警方和武装部队偿还债务，最终只能将原油直销权作为抵债筹码拱手让出。如今，伊朗大半的原油出口已经落入革命卫队之手，据估算其控制的份额已达到全国原油出口量的一半左右，使他们成为了实际上的外汇与贸易操盘手。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 国际制裁下的伊朗石油控制权转移机制 accDescr: 展示制裁压力如何导致国家财政吃紧，进而促使原油直销权向革命卫队转移的过程。 subgraph SanctionImpact["制裁与财政危机"] A["长期外部严苛制裁"] --> B["国家外汇受阻与透明度丧失"] B --> C["政府陷入严重主权债务危机"] end subgraph PowerShift["控制权再分配"] C --> D["无力偿还警方与军方债务"] D --> E["出让原油直销权作为抵偿"] E --> F["伊斯兰革命卫队 (IRGC) 掌控约50%原油出口"] end ``` ### `32:15` 意识形态与自肥结盟：以新冠疫苗禁令与商业帝国为例 对于伊朗统治精英是否真正信奉反西方意识形态、还是仅仅借此牟取暴利的问题，答案往往是二者兼备。20世纪的伊朗历史在很大程度上就是一部被英国、俄国等西方列强经济掠夺的屈辱史——英国石油公司（BP）的前身正是英伊石油公司（Anglo-Iranian Oil Company）。这种被外部干涉与剥削的历史记忆，使得统治阶层对西方势力的怀疑根深蒂固且具有相当的真实性；但同时，他们也精妙地将这种意识形态武器化，用于掩护自身的商业利益。 2020至2021年新冠疫情肆虐期间的疫苗事件，堪称这种“意识形态与私利天衣无缝融合”的绝佳例证。当时伊朗是全球疫情最严重的国家之一，然而最高领袖阿里·哈梅内伊（Ali Khamenei）却公开发布禁令，严禁进口美国和英国生产的新冠疫苗。从真实心态来看，他大概率确实对英美的疫苗研发动机抱有强烈的政治戒心；但在政策出台的同时，伊朗政府火速启动了国产疫苗研发项目，而最终承接这项巨额政府订单的，正是哈梅内伊名下掌控的庞大商业集团。最高领袖的一纸禁令既在政治上坚守了反西方立场，又在市场上人为制造出供给短缺，让自己的商业综合体以“拯救者”的姿态拿下垄断大单并赚得盆满钵满。 - **西方剥削的历史渊源**：伊朗石油现代工业史直接肇始于外国资本掠夺，英国石油公司（BP）的前身为英伊石油公司（Anglo-Iranian Oil Company）。 - **新冠疫苗双重套利案例**：哈梅内伊在2020至2021年疫情高峰期以安全为由禁止引进美英西方疫苗，随即将国产疫苗开发采购合同直接批给自己名下的商业托拉斯。 ### `34:25` 寻租特权与外向型经济的破灭：伊朗能成为“伊斯兰日本”吗？ 从纯粹的发展经济学角度看，发展中国家常通过进口替代（Import Substitution）政策保护本土幼稚产业，但东亚经济体的崛起路径表明，真正具备竞争力的产业往往需要经历残酷国际出口市场的检验。在被问及现代伊朗历史上是否曾有人尝试推动这种以出口为导向的发展模式时，嘉宾指出，前总统阿克巴尔·哈什米·拉夫桑贾尼（Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani）曾是最接近这一构想的人物。拉夫桑贾尼曾极度痴迷于西方社会的地铁等现代基础设施，甚至公开提出过将伊朗打造成“伊斯兰日本”（Islamic Japan）的宏伟蓝图，试图借此全面实现工业现代化，但该构想最终以彻底失败告终。 在当前体制下，伊朗本土企业根本无法建立起真正的全球竞争力。经济命脉已被系统性地引向与权力层存在利益勾结的特权实体，这对自由市场竞争构成了致命毒素： 1. **逆向淘汰机制**：在伊朗国内，能够胜出的往往不是技术最卓越、最具创新才能的企业，而是那些懂得主动向权贵转让股份的“聪明玩家”。企业唯有交出所有权寻求权力庇护，才能避免被突击搜查、查封或剥夺经营许可，并换取政府的特殊牌照。 2. **缺乏国际硬实力**：这些依靠特权和裙带关系苟延残喘的受保护企业，即便在假设没有严酷国际制裁的前提下，也完全不具备与西门子（Siemens）或通用电气（GE）等跨国工业巨头同台竞技的实力。虽然伊朗在钢铁等基础大宗领域依然拥有一定的出口创汇能力，但整体制造业早已丧失了在国际供应链高端争夺一席之地的可能。 ### `40:00` 制裁温室与互联网普及：伊朗科技初创生态的早期繁荣 谈及伊朗经济中出人意料的一面，很多人并不知道伊朗曾拥有过极为活跃的科技初创生态。从历史维度来看，伊朗其实在中东地区极具前瞻性——它是中东地区继以色列之后第二个接入互联网的国家。伊朗拥有庞大的年轻、受过良好教育的工程师群体。到了 2010 年代初，温和派的哈桑·鲁哈尼（Hassan Rouhani）政府上台后，大力推进基础设施建设，开通了 3G 和 4G 移动互联网，使得移动数据网络、手机 App 和流媒体视频能够迅速普及。 伊朗年轻人对数字内容与原生应用的需求呈现爆炸式增长。而在客观环境上，由于西方长期的制裁政策，即便在 2015 年签署、2016 年初正式生效的《伊朗核协议》（JCPOA）框架下，美国公司依然被禁止直接进入伊朗市场。这意味着亚马逊（Amazon）、优步（Uber）、Lyft 等全球科技巨头根本无法涉足。制裁反而形成了一个天然的“贸易保护温室”——在一个拥有 8000 万至 8500 万庞大人口的封闭市场中，伊朗本土创业公司迅速填补了这一空白。 从 2010 年代初开始，海外的伊朗裔精英纷纷回流，组建本土风险投资（VC）基金。核协议生效后，外部资本更是兴奋不已，许多来自欧洲、俄罗斯的外国投资人认为伊朗是全球“最后的绿地投资市场”，甚至幻想着这里会成为“下一个俄罗斯”或“下一个中国”，渴望尽早入场掘金。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 早期伊朗科技生态的繁荣催化剂 accDescr: 描绘了推动伊朗早期科技生态爆发的基础设施、市场隔离与资本三方因素 subgraph Infra["基础设施与人口"] A["高素质年轻工程师红利"] B["鲁哈尼政府普及 3G/4G 网络"] end subgraph Protection["市场保护壁垒"] C["美欧制裁阻断国际巨头<br/>(无 Amazon / Uber / Lyft)"] D["8500 万人口庞大本土数字需求"] end subgraph Capital["资本驱动"] E["海外伊朗裔精英回流设立 VC"] F["2016 伊核协议生效引入欧俄外资"] end Infra --> G["本土初创企业爆发式增长"] Protection --> G Capital --> G ``` - 核心商业模式多以成熟模型本土化为主：如被誉为“伊朗版亚马逊”的电商巨头 Digikala、被称为“伊朗版 Uber”的网约车平台 Snapp，以及各类外卖订餐 App 等。 - 创业团队早期凭借把西方经过验证的商业逻辑直接移植并本地化，获得了惊人的用户增速与规模效益。 --- ### `45:00` 安全机构的反扑与强行入股：初创巨头的被动“收编” 起初，伊朗官方与保守派建制派势力并未预料到科技初创公司会发展得如此迅猛，甚至在初期完全轻视了这一赛道。然而，随着本土风投资本不仅吸纳国内资金，还引入了大量来自欧洲和俄罗斯的境外投资，保守派与安全机构的警惕与敌意迅速被点燃。 这股反扑首先以舆论抹黑的形式展开：Telegram 上出现神秘频道，针对创业公司创始人及其生态圈发起涉嫌勾结外部势力的严重指控。在政治上，这批创业企业往往在客观上与温和派的鲁哈尼政府捆绑在一起，而当时伊斯兰革命卫队（IRGC）等强硬派安全势力正与鲁哈尼政府处于激烈角力状态，认为鲁哈尼及其外交团队对美过于妥协求和。于是，安全机构展开了实打实的强力干预：创始人遭到传讯审问、办公室被无端搜查，甚至有人被正式拘捕。 紧接着，一批兼具军工安全背景与商界人脉的“掮客”（包括前国防部官员或宗教基金会 Bonyad 的董事会成员）开始浮出水面，向被逼到墙角的创始人开出“保护费”式的交易条件：**“转让大约 5% 的股份给我们，我们就能出面替你摆平这些指控，为你提供安全庇护。”** 面对极大的身心压力，许多创始人为了保住心血、维持企业正常运转并继续为中产阶级提供就业岗位，不得不低头妥协。 - **Snapp（伊朗版 Uber）的股权妥协：** 被迫向大型宗教基金会（Bonyad）出售了相当大比例的股权；与此同时，伊斯兰革命卫队（IRGC）还自行出资孵化了另一家与之竞争的网约车企业。 - **Digikala（伊朗版亚马逊）的屈服：** 尽管创始人团队进行了数年的顽强抗争，但最终在近年来仍被迫将约 40% 的股权出售给一家由 Bonyad 参股的电信巨头。 - **绕过封锁的草根智慧：** 播客中提到媒体《Rest of World》报道的一个趣闻：Snapp 为了绕过苹果应用商店（Apple App Store）的制裁封锁，曾巧妙地伪装成一款音乐流媒体 App 上架，只有当用户通过伊朗本土 IP 地址登录时，应用才会解锁完整的网约车打车功能（虽然该应用最终仍被苹果发现并下架）。 --- ### `47:15` 混乱型威权与黑手党分舵：无法预测的系统性风险 伊朗商业环境面临的最大难题并非单纯的“腐败”或“威权统治”，而是体制内部极度撕裂导致的**不可预测的混乱**。这种混乱对商业生态的毒害，远甚于任何明面上的规则。 播客对比指出，在其他一些威权国家体制下，企业只要理顺了与核心执政党的关系，往往就能获得稳定的经营预期并专注于业务推进。但在伊朗，政权组织呈现出一种多头并立、缺乏统一协调的“黑手党体系”： - 一方面，部分开明派的政府部长（例如当时通信和信息技术部的年轻官员）竭力公开宣导、扶持科技创新与数字经济发展； - 另一方面，更为强势的情报与安全机关（如革命卫队的情报部门）却在暗处开展虚假信息抹黑，肆意传唤、逮捕企业家，并与政府行政分支公开内讧。 对于许多放弃海外优渥生活回国创业的年轻海归来说，这种权力的日夜摇摆与各派系之间的明争暗斗让他们陷入极度困惑。“商业最核心的前提是确定性”（business requires certainty），而在伊朗，你根本无法预知今天向某个派系割让股权所换来的庇护，明天会不会在另一个敌对派系的打击下瞬间化为乌有。这种深层的制度动荡与无休止的内耗，最终彻底扼杀了初创生态原本蓬勃的生机。 ### `50:00` 奥德赛式的博弈与西方自由市场假设的盲区 伊朗的权力结构往往被误解为最高领袖一言堂式的绝对专制，但现实更像是一场希腊神话中的诸神博弈。正如宙斯虽然是众神之王却无法为所欲为一样，伊朗最高领袖同样需要在一众明争暗斗的政治派系、神职人员和强力机构之间平衡斡旋。这就像《奥德赛》中的英雄奥德修斯，他在归途上得到某些神祇庇护的同时，又不断遭到另一些愤怒神灵的围追堵截；在伊朗做生意的企业家，每一天都在经历这样一场危机四伏的“奥德赛之旅”。虽然分析人士常常将伊朗与苏联解体前夕、后苏联时期的寡头掠夺、委内瑞拉式黑手党国家，甚至是中共体制进行类比，但伊朗存在一个最关键的特殊维度——意识形态与宗教的统摄力。 西方决策者在与伊朗打交道时，反复陷入一种基于自由市场与资本主义信条的认知盲区：西方普遍假设，当任何国家面临“孤立受制裁”与“融入全球经济换取繁荣”的抉择时，理所当然会选择后者，并相信经济一体化必然催生政治自由化和民主化。奥巴马政府签署2015年《联合全面行动计划》（JCPOA）是基于此逻辑；甚至到了2025年特朗普公开发表讲话，依然声称“希望让伊朗成为一个伟大国家、看到光明未来”。然而，伊朗伊斯兰共和国并未按这套剧本出牌。2016年制裁解除后涌入伊朗的巨额资金与经济红利，并未被用于解决国内严峻的失业和通货膨胀，而是直接流向了军事扩张与地缘武器研发。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 西方经济理性与伊朗意识形态逻辑的冲突 accDescr: 展示西方国家以经济繁荣换取政治妥协的假设，在伊朗优先保障军事与政权存续的意识形态面前失效。 subgraph WEST["西方核心假设 (自由市场逻辑)"] W1["制裁施压与经济孤立"] --> W2["提供数百亿/千亿美元利益"] W2 --> W3["预期选择: 经济繁荣与市场开放"] W3 --> W4["衍生预期: 政治自由化与民主转型"] end subgraph IRAN["伊朗实际行动 (意识形态逻辑)"] I1["获得解除制裁资金红利"] --> I2["优先投入军事扩张与地缘博弈"] I2 --> I3["忽视民生通胀与失业问题"] I3 --> I4["强硬派阻挠协议, 确保政权意识形态纯洁性"] end W2 -.->|"假设落空 / 无法买通"| I1 ``` - **西方的认知脱节**：西方社会潜意识里深信“凡事皆有其价码”（Everyone has a price），认为所有人嘴上宣称崇高理想，底色都是对物质财富与舒适生活的追求；但面对真正不以财富积累为首要动机的政权时，这种认知便彻底失效。 - **利益诱惑的碰壁**：在特朗普政府与伊朗方面商讨谅解备忘录（MOU）时，虽然涉及数百亿甚至上千亿美元的潜在经济利益，但伊朗内部的强硬派系依然极力排斥与阻挠，不愿以牺牲意识形态为代价妥协。 --- ### `55:00` 极不对称的“痛苦耐受度”与未曾改变的政权逻辑 面对复杂混乱的派系内斗，美伊冲突的未来充满了极大的不确定性。目前伊朗政坛内部撕裂严重，强硬派正猛烈抨击总统与外长谈判谅解备忘录的行为，指责其胆怯软弱，甚至有派系渴望冲突继续，坚信伊朗已将美国逼入被动境地。即便伊朗体制内存在放眼未来的目光，他们的方向也绝非西方，而是全面倒向中国；正如代表伊朗方面与美国副总统 JD·万斯（J.D. Vance）周旋的伊朗议会议长穆罕默德·巴盖尔·卡利巴夫（Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf）明确表示的那样：伊朗欢迎投资，但必须是来自中国的投资。 更为根本的失衡在于两国政治体制截然不同的“痛苦阈值”（Pain Threshold）。美国政府至多是在为总统的个人政治遗产而战，核心关切是美联储是否会加息25个基点、房贷利率走势、油价是否突破100美元大关，以及汽油价格每加仑上涨1美元引发的民意反弹；在军事人员伤亡上，18名美军阵亡就足以引发国内巨大的政治风暴。反观伊朗伊斯兰共和国，它是在为自身的政权生存而战：即便面临接近三位数的恶性通货膨胀和高企的失业率，政权根基依然稳固，甚至可以轻易吸收数百上千名士兵的伤亡。这种悬殊的承受力决定了在持久战中，美国很难长期维系军事高压，油价触及百元关口时往往只能诉诸谈判和社交媒体发帖安抚。 - **经济只是手段而非目的**：回顾自霍梅尼革命至哈梅内伊统治37年以来的历史，经济从来不是伊斯兰共和国追求的终极目标，它仅被视作实现“自力更生”和巩固意识形态力量的工具。 - **体制内的落空呼吁**：尽管伊朗历来有前官员呼吁搁置僵化的意识形态与对外对抗、全力吸引外资以挽救经济，但这一主张从未被最高决策层接纳；只要未发生根本性剧变，伊朗绝不会为了单纯的经济增长而放弃其核心意识形态路线。 ### `01:00:00` 意识形态的真实性与威权体制下的“投资稳定性” 在访谈结束后的复盘中，主持人深入探讨了西方学者与谈判代表在理解伊朗等国家时常陷入的思维误区。西方政策制定者往往在思维定式中很难相信世界上许多地方的人是真正出于意识形态信仰而行动，而非单纯追求利益交换。这也是此前提出“伊朗伊斯兰革命究竟是由经济诉求还是纯粹意识形态驱动”的核心原因。 讨论随后延伸到新兴市场的投资逻辑。在很多威权国家，跨国资本依然大量涌入，其关键前提在于“稳定性与可预期性”——“如果你知道该向哪个正确的人行贿，且不必担心两周后资产会被某个竞争派系直接没收，那么即便是在威权体制下，你完全可以进行投资”。然而，伊朗的根本死结在于缺乏这种单一秩序。相比于中国政府与执政党之间虽然存在职能划分但高度协同绑定的治理模式，伊朗呈现出一种彻底的“多方博弈”（Multiplayer）格局：国家本身有一套官僚体制与国家利益，伊斯兰革命卫队（IRGC）拥有庞大的独立经济帝国，各类宗教慈善基金会（Bonyad）与教士阶层又各怀诉求。这种严重的利益割裂直接导致了制度性的混乱与极高的违约风险。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 单一威权秩序与多派系黑帮国家对比 accDescr: 对比单一权威下的可预期寻租环境与伊朗多派系利益冲突下的企业困境 subgraph SingleAuth ["单一威权秩序（如常规新兴市场）"] A["中央权威 / 独占政权"] --> B["确定的规则与单一寻租对象"] B --> C["企业可形成稳定经营预期并存续"] end subgraph MultiFaction ["伊朗多派系黑帮生态（希腊诸神模式）"] D["国家官僚机构"] -. 利益冲突.- E["伊斯兰革命卫队 (IRGC)"] E -. 利益冲突.- F["宗教基金会与教士阶层"] D --> G["企业向某一方妥协或献金"] E --> H["招致其他敌对派系严厉报复与敲诈"] F --> H H --> I["无法建立商业预期，资产随时面临查抄"] end ``` ### `01:01:45` “希腊诸神”式勒索困境与东京极道的占座逸事 针对这种碎片化的权力结构，主持人形象地引用了“向希腊诸神献祭”的比喻：在一个多神崇拜的世界里，如果你向宙斯献祭了一只山羊，波塞冬就会因此震怒；当你转头去讨好波塞冬时，阿佛洛狄忒又会找上门来兴风作怒。这精准刻画了在伊朗经商的荒诞现实——如果社会上只有一个黑帮，“黑帮国家”（Gangster State）未必是最糟糕的商业环境，因为企业即便不情愿，也能将敲诈勒索的“保护费”计入经营成本，从而维持运转；但一旦街区同时存在三个互为死敌的黑帮，任何一家都会要求抽成，并且会因为你向对手交了钱而严厉惩罚你，企业便根本无法建立合理的预期。 为了说明单一黑社会势力与商业博弈的区别，主持人分享了一个关于东京的真实趣闻： - 一位外国朋友在东京开了一家只有10个吧台席位的微型酒吧，随后遭遇了日本极道（Yakuza）上门索要保护费。 - 该店主一开始坚决拒绝，宣称自己是外国人、不必遵从当地黑帮规矩。 - 极道并未动用暴力打砸，而是采取了极其高效的“软性封锁”：第二天晚上派出一名身穿西装的日本上班族，点了一瓶啤酒后通宵霸占一个座位。 - 第三晚来了两人同样各点一瓶啤酒坐到打烊；到了第十天，整间酒吧的10个座位全部被黑帮派来的单人顾客整夜占满。 - 店主无法接待任何正常客人，只得心领神会地妥协达成协议，风波随即平息。 这个故事生动印证了：即便面对黑恶势力的盘剥，只要寻租主体单一、规则明确，商业主体尚有周旋与妥协的空间；而伊朗经济体系的悲剧恰恰在于其多头政治下的无序内耗，没有任何一个派系能够提供最终的秩序担保。 ### `01:04:10` 播客尾声与收听渠道信息 在全篇讨论告一段落之际，两位主持人总结了本期节目对深入拆解伊朗深层政经结构的重要收获，并向制作团队及听众致谢，同时给出了官方互动渠道与下期预告： - 节目主创：主持人 Tracy Alloway 与 Joe Weisenthal；制作人 Carmen Rodriguez、Dashiell Bennett、Kael Brooks 以及 Kevin Lozano。 - 订阅与社群：听众可通过彭博官网（bloomberg.com/odd_lots）查阅每日通讯及往期节目，亦可加入 Discord 社区参与全天候讨论。 - 会员权益：彭博订阅用户可在 Apple Podcasts 的 Bloomberg 专属频道内收听无广告版本。 - 节目尾声同时播发了 15 分钟早间全球资讯播客《Bloomberg Daybreak》（由 Nathan Hager 与 Karen Moscow 主持）的推荐信息。 ## Notable quotes > `04:45` 只要我们敢于想象，我们就能做到 — Joe Weisenthal > `45:00` 转让大约 5% 的股份给我们，我们就能出面替你摆平这些指控，为你提供安全庇护。 — 博佐尔格梅尔·沙拉费丁 > `47:15` business requires certainty — 博佐尔格梅尔·沙拉费丁 > `50:00` Everyone has a price — Joe Weisenthal > `50:00` 希望让伊朗成为一个伟大国家、看到光明未来 — 特朗普 > `55:00` 伊朗欢迎投资，但必须是来自中国的投资。 — 穆罕默德·巴盖尔·卡利巴夫 > `01:00:00` 如果你知道该向哪个正确的人行贿，且不必担心两周后资产会被某个竞争派系直接没收，那么即便是在威权体制下，你完全可以进行投资 — Joe Weisenthal > `01:01:45` 在一个多神崇拜的世界里，如果你向宙斯献祭了一只山羊，波塞冬就会因此震怒；当你转头去讨好波塞冬时，阿佛洛狄忒又会找上门来兴风作怒。 — Tracy Alloway ## Mentioned Joe Weisenthal, Tracy Alloway, 叶加内·托尔巴蒂 (Yeganeh Torbati), 博佐尔格梅尔·沙拉费丁 (Bozorgmehr Sharafedin), 《被窃取的革命：现代伊朗的背叛与希望》(Stolen Revolution: Betrayal and Hope in Modern Iran), 纽约时报 (The New York Times), Iran International, 彭博 (Bloomberg), Odd Lots, 马哈茂德·艾哈迈迪内贾德 (Mahmoud Ahmadinejad), 鲁霍拉·霍梅尼 (Ruhollah Khomeini), 阿里·哈梅内伊 (Ali Khamenei), 迈赫迪·卡鲁比 (Mehdi Karroubi), 阿克巴尔·哈什米·拉夫桑贾尼 (Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani), 哈桑·鲁哈尼 (Hassan Rouhani), 穆罕默德·巴盖尔·卡利巴夫 (Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf), 唐纳德·特朗普 (Donald Trump), 巴拉克·奥巴马 (Barack Obama), JD·万斯 (J.D. Vance), 伊斯兰革命卫队 (IRGC), 博尼亚德 (Bonyads), 真主党 (Hezbollah), 胡塞武装 (Houthi), 英国石油公司 (BP), 英伊石油公司 (Anglo-Iranian Oil Company), 西门子 (Siemens), 通用电气 (GE), Digikala, Snapp, Uber, Amazon, Lyft, Apple App Store, Telegram, Rest of World, 伊玛目霍梅尼国际机场 (IKIA), 联合全面行动计划 (JCPOA), 《奥德赛》, 奥德修斯, 宙斯, 波塞冬, 阿佛洛狄忒, 日本极道 (Yakuza), Carmen Rodriguez, Dashiell Bennett, Kael Brooks, Kevin Lozano, Nathan Hager, Karen Moscow, Bloomberg Daybreak ## Video description <p data-prosemirror-content-type="node" data-prosemirror-node-name="paragraph" data-prosemirror-node-block="true" data-pm-slice="1 1 []">After the Iranian Revolution of 1979, the country's new leaders &mdash; religious and political &mdash; promised to redistribute the country's wealth and made moves to make Iran independent from western influence and business interests. In the decades since, Iran's economy completely transformed, and it is closer to what Yeganeh Torbati and Bozorgmehr Sharafedin describe as a "mafia state," where fealty to various factions is baked into the country's political economy. In their new book <em data-prosemirror-content-type="mark" data-prosemirror-mark-name="em">Stolen Revolution: Betrayal and Hope in Modern Iran</em> they trace the massive changes Iran's political economy has undergone since the revolution, and they speak to us today about this history, how average Iranians navigate everyday cronyism, how Iranian leaders treated the country's burgeoning tech sector, and why the recent peace talks might not change all that much about how the country's economy currently operates.</p> <p data-prosemirror-content-type="node" data-prosemirror-node-name="paragraph" data-prosemirror-node-block="true">Read more:<br data-prosemirror-content-type="node" data-prosemirror-node-name="hardBreak" data-prosemirror-node-inline="true"><a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-07-29/a-new-dawn-of-missiles-shapes-battlefields-from-ukraine-to-iran?utm_medium=referral&utm_source=podcast&utm_campaign=odd_lots&utm_content=article" data-prosemirror-content-type="mark" data-prosemirror-mark-name="link">A New Age of Missiles Reshapes Battlefields Around The World</a><br data-prosemirror-content-type="node" data-prosemirror-node-name="hardBreak" data-prosemirror-node-inline="true"><a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-07-29/us-war-with-iran-looks-set-to-drag-on-for-months-over-hormuz-deadlock?utm_medium=referral&utm_source=podcast&utm_campaign=odd_lots&utm_content=article" data-prosemirror-content-type="mark" data-prosemirror-mark-name="link">US War With Iran Set to Drag On for Months Over Hormuz Deadlock</a></p> <p data-prosemirror-content-type="node" data-prosemirror-node-name="paragraph" data-prosemirror-node-block="true">Only <a href="http://Bloomberg.com" data-inline-card="" data-card-data="">http://Bloomberg.com</a> subscribers can get the Odd Lots newsletter in their inbox each week, plus unlimited access to the site and app. Subscribe at&nbsp; <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/subscriptions/oddlots?in_source=oddlotspodcast" data-prosemirror-content-type="mark" data-prosemirror-mark-name="link">bloomberg.com/subscriptions/oddlots</a></p> <p data-prosemirror-content-type="node" data-prosemirror-node-name="paragraph" data-prosemirror-node-block="true"><a href="http://bloomberg.com/subscriptions/oddlots" data-prosemirror-content-type="mark" data-prosemirror-mark-name="link">Subscribe to the Odd Lots Newsletter</a><br data-prosemirror-content-type="node" data-prosemirror-node-name="hardBreak" data-prosemirror-node-inline="true"><strong data-prosemirror-content-type="mark" data-prosemirror-mark-name="strong">Join the conversation:</strong> <a href="https://discord.gg/oddlots" data-prosemirror-content-type="mark" data-prosemirror-mark-name="link">discord.gg/oddlots</a></p><p>See <a href="https://omnystudio.com/listener">omnystudio.com/listener</a> for privacy information.</p> [Source](https://podtrac.com/pts/redirect.mp3/tracking.swap.fm/track/UVBrz8bN8aM2Xe47PEPu/traffic.omny.fm/d/clips/e73c998e-6e60-432f-8610-ae210140c5b1/8a94442e-5a74-4fa2-8b8d-ae27003a8d6b/519b7338-f6ec-4d99-a8a2-b496012a0db1/audio.mp3?in_playlist=982f5071-765c-403d-969d-ae27003a8d83)

[4:45] Joe Weisenthal: 只要我们敢于想象，我们就能做到 [45:00] 博佐尔格梅尔·沙拉费丁: 转让大约 5% 的股份给我们，我们就能出面替你摆平这些指控，为你提供安全庇护。 [47:15] 博佐尔格梅尔·沙拉费丁: business requires certainty [50:00] Joe Weisenthal: Everyone has a price [50:00] 特朗普: 希望让伊朗成为一个伟大国家、看到光明未来 [55:00] 穆罕默德·巴盖尔·卡利巴夫: 伊朗欢迎投资，但必须是来自中国的投资。 [60:00] Joe Weisenthal: 如果你知道该向哪个正确的人行贿，且不必担心两周后资产会被某个竞争派系直接没收，那么即便是在威权体制下，你完全可以进行投资 [61:45] Tracy Alloway: 在一个多神崇拜的世界里，如果你向宙斯献祭了一只山羊，波塞冬就会因此震怒；当你转头去讨好波塞冬时，阿佛洛狄忒又会找上门来兴风作怒。

[9:50] Yeganeh Torbati: These arguments of kind of the bourgeoisie versus the proletariat, you know Khomeini kind of adopted some of those terms with an Islamic tinge. And therefore, sort of, he promised... 'we are going to provide for the poor, we're going to provide free electricity, free buses for the poor, we're going to build housing.' [13:30] Bozorgmehr Sharafedin: The problem with the private sector is that if a business becomes successful and it passes a certain threshold, you will see the security forces coming and knocking on your door and they want their share. [50:00] Yeganeh Torbati: For the Islamic Republic, the economy has never been an end goal in and of itself... In terms of actually focusing on the economy at the expense of its ideological goals, that has never been in its pattern of behavior.

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When you're running a business, the best days are the ones where priorities stay on track. For midsize and large companies, risk can affect multiple parts of the organization at once, from property and liability to cyber and regulatory challenges. At that level managing risk becomes an ongoing discipline At the Hartford the focus is on helping businesses manage risk before it turns into something more disruptive And when losses do happen, that work is paired with insurance coverage shaped by years of underwriting, risk engineering, and claims experience. Learn more at thehartford.com slash risk mitigation. Policies provided by Hartford Fire Insurance Company and its property and casualty affiliates, Hartford, Connecticut. Bloomberg Audio Studios, podcasts, radio, news. Hello and welcome to another episode of the Odd Lots podcast. I'm Joe Weisenthal. And I'm Tracy Alloway. Tracy, it's now July 28th and the Iran war continues to go on. And it's sort of extraordinary the fact that, you know, in the beginning, here was this thing that was going to be, if it persisted, sort of cataclysmic, perhaps, for the global economy and particularly with related to oil prices. And yet on a sort of day to day basis it not even necessarily the biggest headline news that most people are talking about People get used to a lot of things very quickly I mean it still has the potential to be catastrophic at some point in time But you absolutely right We gone months now since when did this start in March Yeah the very beginning of March. Yeah. Months now with a war, which technically hasn't even been declared a war. It's an operation. Is that what they're calling it? I believe so. Military operation. I think it's been a long. People talk about, you know, the forever war. Yeah, I think the last it's been a long time since America actually ever acknowledged that it was in a capital W war. Very true. But it does kind of beg the question about what happens when all of this is over, right? Yeah, right. I mean, hopefully it ends one day. And I have to say, so obviously we talk about oil a lot when we talk in terms of economics. I have to admit, you know, it's funny, we've done multiple episodes about the Iranian stock market, which is a fascinating topic. But other than the fact that obviously Iran produces a lot of oil. I actually like basically know nothing about the Iranian economy. Like the day to day. What a typical middle class family. There's some things I know. So there's oil. Yes. There's Iranian cars. Yes. Famously, which I would be interested in experiencing one day Not necessarily buying but experiencing pistachios I was going to say so like pistachios like nuts I imagine But like what this sort of job market is what a day what out there and you know whatever the Iranian equivalent of LinkedIn or Indeed is like what people do what people want career all of these things because there's an Iranian stock market, obviously, you know, presumably there are like startups and companies that one day want to list, but I don't know what any of them do. I have so many questions, I guess, about like what a, quote, normal Iranian. Let's imagine the war ends and also there aren't sanctions, right? What would an Iranian? Well, this is my point, because at various points in time previously, you have had these bursts of optimism about the opening up of the Iranian economy, the lifting of sanctions. It's one other thing I know, again, not much, but one thing I know is it's a huge economy, right? With our previous Iranian stock market guest, the size of Turkey, right? Something like that. It's a really big economy. It's a big economy. And so what happens if that starts to open up? Can it open up? Are we going to see what happened previously where it kind of starts to open up and then it shuts down again? I don't know. Several months ago, there was some random night where I was clicking on random Wikipedia links. And I was like, [5:00] I wonder what Ahmadinejad's economic policy platform was when he ran for president for the first time. I started clicking on his campaign. I was like, I wonder. And it seemed kind of vague. And he had some, I wish I could remember the slogan. It was really good. It was something like, if we imagine it, we could do it. It was like the most inoffensive sort of like domestic policy agenda slogan. And I couldn't really find that more specifics. But you have elections, et cetera. What do they run on? Where do they stand on taxes? All these questions about sort of like, quote, normal, unquote, economic life in Iran. Is that your way of saying that you want to talk about the political economy of Iran? I want to talk about the political economy and the even regular economy of Iran. Anyway, I'm very excited to say we do, in fact, have two perfect guests on who teach us much more about this. We're going to be speaking with Yegana Torbati, Iran correspondent for The New York Times, as well as Buzorghmer Sharafadim. He's the head of digital at Iran International. So both of you, thank you so much for coming on OddLots. Thank you so much for having me. Thanks for having us. Oh, and I should, of course, have mentioned that they are the co-authors of a brand new book, Stolen Revolution, Betrayal and Hope in Modern Iran. So again thank you both so much for coming out Why don we just start What is the premise of this book Why was this an important book to write or what endeavored you to go on this project Yeah well thank you so much for having us I mean we started on this project around five and a half years ago so late 2020 And I think our vision was at first we were very focused on kind of trying to explain, as you sort of mentioned, Iran's political economy and in particular sort of the roots of corruption and sort of state control and influence over the economy over the past 40, you know, 50 years. And then, of course, as time went on and since 2020, a lot of things have happened in Iran and our focus both broadened and I think deepened. But sort of throughout our book is sort of this continuous thread of the promises that the current government, the Islamic government came to power on in 1979, particularly around social justice and how it might redistribute Iran's really immense resources and sort of what that has actually led to in practice today, which is far from those promises. Yeah. So you describe the Islamic Republic as evolving into this sort of mafia-like state. And I guess there a difference between an authoritarian government and a corrupt one although they often go hand in hand How did Iran kind of evolve from the authoritarian Islamic Republic to a place that in terms of its economy was actually extracting value from its people? Yeah, I think maybe it's good to define what do we mean by a mafia state? What's the difference between a mafia state and a normal totalitarian government? I think in a normal society, all citizens are equal and they benefit the same from the government and the wealth of a nation. But in a mafia state, you should imagine a layered society and citizens are rewarded based on their loyalty to the system. So the more loyal you are to the government and the state, the more you will benefit from the resources. So that's how the Islamic Republic was from the beginning. And it excluded its critics and it rewarded people who were loyal. And it was an ideological government. So people who believe in the values of the Islamic Republic were rewarded But as we move forward we see that this trend was reflected more and more in the economy You see that how revolutionary guards and other religious foundations they come and take over a big chunk of the economy. And I can say that this mafia state and the layered society is even reflected in Iran's foreign policy. So in the eyes of Iranian states, maybe a Hezbollah member in Lebanon or a Houthi militia in Yemen, they are more loyal to the Islamic Republic than, let's say, a professor at Tehran University. So they should benefit more from the wealth of the nation. So that's why we have had all these discussions within the Islamic Republic that while the Iranian government can't afford to provide free milk at schools, it has the money to give to its proxies in the region to kind of reward their loyalty. Right. Maybe I should back up even further at this point and ask the Iranian revolution. How much of that was about economic grievances on the part of the people, the idea that as so many revolutions are, you know, things need to get better versus just [10:00] the clergy basically seizing power? I think it was sort of a mix of a few different things. The working classes and sort of the lower socioeconomic classes did not really jump in to be part of the revolutionary coalition until quite late in the game, when they really started to suffer from some of the Shah's economic policies kind of towards the very end. Really, at the beginning, it was more kind of like the middle classes and the intellectuals who were sort of forming this kind of revolutionary coalition from a bunch of different impulses. There were some who wanted kind of an Islamic government. There were others who were communists and were kind of more anti-U.S., anti-imperialist. And there were others who just wanted kind of a secular liberal democracy and felt that the Shah was trampling on people's rights. All of those people kind of joined in. But what we see, especially kind of towards the end of of the revolution as we're getting to 1979, is that the leader of the revolution, Ruhollah Khomeini, who then became the leader of the new government, he wanted to kind of co-op some of the most effective sort of leftist arguments, because he wanted kind of their young people, their supporters to sort of also support him And so you know these arguments of kind of the bourgeoisie versus the proletariat you know Khomeini kind of adopted some of those terms with an Islamic tinge. And therefore, sort of, he promised, and then in the first few months, especially the revolution, he also promised that, you know, we are going to provide for the poor, we're going to provide free electricity, free buses for the poor, we're going to build housing. And I think the government sort of wanted to present itself as being on behalf of some of those, the kind of lower classes of society and presented them kind of as its base. As time goes on, what we see, especially kind of in the last 10 to 15 years, it sort of turned its back on a lot of those promises to where it's not even really even pretending anymore that that is kind of what it's aimed at. And we can kind of talk about some of the turning points there. But it really was kind of a gradual shift over time. And then, especially since 2017, you really see this growing dissatisfaction amongst not just middle class Iranians, but also people who are poor and struggling against what this revolution has brought to them. Okay everyone ability to derive wealth or income is somehow linked to where they stand in this hierarchy of supporting the government or supporting the state in some way or another Let talk about where the government gets its resources to make these allocations, whether it's housing, whether it's electricity, whether it's obviously munitions for various groups, etc. Obviously, we know oil is a big part of it. But What are the main, how would you big picture decompose what the Iranian economy sort of basically looks like? So I think, of course, yeah, oil is a big one. It has kind of this huge resource that's very valuable and that it can kind of use to fund itself. But also Iran has a pretty diversified economy in terms of its industrial base. And that is partially as a result of kind of the Shah's own policies. But then also sort of this idea that took root after the revolution that we need to provide for ourselves. We need to be self-sufficient. This was a very important kind of part of both the ideology of kind of present in that moment in general, the sort of like 20th century, 60s, 70s backlash against interference by world powers in the internal affairs of Iran and of other countries So there was kind of this very strong idea especially among Iranian leftists and including some of the clerical class that we need to kind of establish our own industries and be independent. So Iran has a car industry. Iran has steel plants that were built after the Iran-Iraq War and it became operational sort of after the Iran-Iraq War that produce, you know, huge amounts of steel, you know, kind of leading the Middle East in that industry. And these industries are maybe not necessarily the most efficient, and they don't have a ton of foreign investment, but they provide employment. Iran has a huge agricultural sector, which is an enormous source of jobs in Iran, which has been very important as it's been under sanction. Of course, the agricultural sector has a lot of other costs, including overuse of water, which Iran has been facing, but it's an important, at least, source of jobs in the economy. So these are all these major industries that kind of first start out after the revolution, being very much under the purview of the formal states, kind of what we in the West would recognize as a government, including a ministry that is answerable to parliaments that oversees, for instance, the steel industry or the mines in Iran. [15:00] Over time, and we should kind of talk about this more, the control over those industries moves away from sort of the recognized parts of the state into kind of this shadow state, you know, which is sort of much more linked to the security forces and to these entities that are kind of controlled by the clerics, but aren't really accountable to the rest of the government. If I add a bit to that, because if you look at the history of the Islamic Republic, of course, the revolution started with this massive wave of nationalization. The state took control of the major industries, shipping, mining, banking, and many more. But gradually, as we come forward, after a decade or two, the Iranian state decided the privatization of these major industries. But I think the main problem was the corruption, but we didn't see real privatization. So usually people who were close to centers of power, they came and took over these industries and they took them over with a very low price. Imagine factories that were owned by the government They were taken over by elements very close to the security forces And so after that many of these factories they didn come back to production The machinery was sold and the land was turned into maybe a residential place to build apartments in. So we saw that level. But still, as Yegona mentioned, we have private sector in Iran. The problem with private sector is that if a business becomes successful and it passes a certain threshold, you will see the security forces coming and knocking on your door and they want their share. And that's, again, it's like a mafia state, which you can imagine if you have a restaurant in, I don't know, in mafia movies, if you have a successful restaurant, they would come and they want their share from these businesses. And as we showed in the book, one of the major new sectors was the startup sector. Of course, this sector was started by many Iranians who came back from abroad to launch this sector. But they saw that how the security forces came and forced them to give up these firms From on-trend apparel and premium drinkware to tech, totes, and giveaways, so you can find the right fit for any audience, purpose, or budget. You can customize it all. Your logo, your message, your look. And many items come with no setup charge to help you save. And if you're really watching the bottom line, you'll find standout choices at every price point so you can make a real impact while staying on budget. Plus, you'll get expert help, fast turnaround times, and their 360-degree guarantee. So you can be 4imprint certain your order will arrive on time and look exactly right. Whatever your goal, 4imprint makes it easy to find your perfect promo match. Explore the possibilities today at 4imprint.com. 4imprint. 4certain. Today I joined by Dr Cynthia Dickerson Vascular Neurologist and Stroke Director at HCA Health 1 Swedish Doctor what are the most important warning signs The easiest way to remember is with an acronym BFAST B is balance E for eye or vision changes F is for facial droop and numbness, A is for arm weakness and numbness, S is for speech difficulty, and T is time, which means call 911 right away. Stroke symptoms can come on suddenly for anyone of any age, and they're always an emergency. And time really is everything. Absolutely. Every minute that passes, you can lose millions of brain cells. That's why getting to a well-equipped ER quickly is critical. At HCA Health One Swedish, when a stroke is suspected, our team is activated immediately. We're getting labs, imaging, neurologic evaluation within minutes so that we can treat as quickly as possible. And choosing the right ER makes a real difference. It absolutely does. A specialized stroke center has the expertise in rapid response systems to save lives and improve outcomes. Learn more about stroke care at HCA Health One dot com. Support for the show comes from public.com. If you're actively involved in your portfolio, you probably catch yourself repeating the same actions, buying the dip, manually sweeping idle cash, putting on a hedge. On public, you can now create AI agents that handle all these tasks on your behalf. Just describe what you want to do in plain English. Like if the VIX hits 25, buy a put option on [20:00] S&P 500. Or if my cash balance goes above $20,000, move the excess into my direct index. You approve the workflow and your agent handles the rest. Monitoring the market, watching for your conditions, and executing your strategies exactly as defined. An investing platform driven by your intent, not just your clicks. You can also get full read and write access to your account via the public API. Go to public.com slash market and fund your account in five minutes or less. That's public.com slash market. Paid for by Public Investing. Brokered services by Open to the Public Investing, Inc., member FINRA and SIPC. Advisory services by Public Advisors, LLC, SEC Registered Advisor. Complete disclosures available at public.com slash disclosures. Just in terms of the state, like becoming more intertwined with the private sector, I learned two new words, or I guess terms, from your book, and I'm going to mispronounce the first one because I've only ever read it. I've never said it aloud. But bonnads? Is that right? Bonnads, yeah. Bonnads Okay bonnads and then invisible ports Can you talk a little bit more about those two things as sort of examples of how the state becomes intertwined with the private sector or the general economy OK, so these religious foundations, they were launched at the beginning of the revolution and they're very interesting. So like one of them was this massive foundation that was established to distribute the wealth among the poor. And it seemed quite a noble cause. And of course, we had other foundations to look after families of martyrs of Iran-Iraq war and the veterans of the war. So these massive foundations, they were established by the order of the founder of the revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini. And the heads of those foundations, they had massive power. So we show in the book, for example, that how the head of one of these foundations, he wanted to import some wheelchairs into the country to give it to the veterans of war. But at that time the minister of industries he was against the import because he believed that the imports of German wheelchairs will be undermining the domestic production But the head of foundation he was an MP at that time member of the parliament So he went to the parliament and passed the bill to allow the foundation to import anything they want without any government supervision. And he wanted to do that to maintain the revolutionary nature of the foundation. and he didn't want to be constrained by bureaucracy and red tape. It's interesting that the same person, decades later, he becomes the Speaker of the Parliament during the reform movement, and he founds these invisible ports or invisible jetties. How is that? So we see that these foundations and the Revolutionary Guards, they had massive power to import anything they wanted without audit and without taxation. And this character of the book, decades later, he goes to southern ports of Iran and he saw a dedicated port that belonged to the Revolutionary Guards. And they could import anything they wanted without any supervision of the government So in a way you see how this mafia state was formed gradually how the revolutionary nature of the foundation forced them into creating a system which was not transparent from the start. And later on, the same system turned into a mafia state. And you sort of see how there are some good intentions, right? Like the idea of importing higher quality wheelchairs from abroad to help veterans of the war who had been injured. You know, that that is a laudable intention. But, you know, this character, this person that we're talking about, Mehdi Kaurubi, he sort of in that decision in the 1980s establishes this idea that these foundations and it wasn't just him, but this was just one example. These foundations are above the law and they get special dispensations and special privileges because they're kind of associated with the revolutionary state. private companies don't get those rights. Entities that are disconnected from the government don't get those rights. But he establishes that. And that same thinking, as it continues and is not challenged over the years, sort of grows into eventually these invisible ports and many other abuses. It's so striking, like listening to this, because you I mean, on the one hand, obviously, Iran, very distinct story about. [25:00] But on the other hand, you know, so many of these themes we've already discussed, you see like echoes of them or versions of them in all sorts of developing states or whatever. You know, obviously, when you talk about, oh, here is a still factory, some industrial facility, and then it's been reproposed in some way for some non-vital thing, you sort of think about late era Soviet Union, for example. It's like, here's the company that wants to make bread, but they just sell all their parts abroad for hard cash and then don't actually serve their purpose. Were there ever any forces in government that tried to keep some of these entities in line? I assume there must be like some conflict or effort to sort of maintain this thing where you have something that resembles industry has some perverse incentives to maybe like take some shortcut for the personal gain of whoever is the controlling entity. Were there ever attempts to build in mechanisms such that these perhaps public resources couldn't be expropriated in some way? For sure I mean there were definitely people who maybe too late sort of saw the errors of some of the ways that the government had acted including people who had been part of the problem you know earlier on in their career So like for example Mehdi Karubi who we mentioned who was a cleric an MP he led one of these bonnads but then later on becomes part of the reform movement and rises to great power and tries when he's in parliament to establish some standards of transparency for these entities, these bonnads and other institutions that answer directly to Iran's supreme leader. And he's unsuccessful. By that point, which was the late 90s, early 2000s, these entities and the supreme leader himself were just far too powerful for the elected government to really put a check on. There's another anecdote that we talk about at length in the book, which was in 2004 when Iran was opening a new airport. And this is a big moment for Iran. They had been planning this airport actually since before the revolution. Of course, it was delayed because of that and because of the war. But this was going to be kind of this big moment when Iran was going to have an airport to kind of rival Dubai and Istanbul. On the day that it being opened the Revolutionary Guards drive armored land cruisers onto the runway and prevent the first plane from landing They have to be begged by the transport minister before they allow it to land When the second plane wants to come in they scramble a fighter jet and threaten it, and it has to divert south to Esfahan. And why did this happen? The transport minister later revealed in a series of interviews, because the guards had wanted the contract to operate that airport, but they hadn't provided the best price. And so the government had given it to a Turkish-Austrian firm. And the airport was shut down. It was basically a no-fly zone for months. And it was reopened with state firms running the airport rather than this foreign contract. And so, you know, our character Mehdi Karubi, he's a Speaker of Parliament. His MPs write a report about what happened. But ultimately, there's no accountability for that action. And as we go on in time, there's, we get to a point where the guards don't even really have to take such a dramatic step. Their dominance in contracting and in different parts of Iran's economy sort of goes unquestioned. And I think the element of Iran's government that is somewhat unique, at least in its specifics from a place like the Soviet Union or other places is that because all of these institutions answer to someone who sort of seen as a holy figure and whose power comes from God effectively it's much more difficult to question both his authority and to establish any accountability over institutions that only report to him, which is how Iran's government is structured. Both the military and these big bonnards only report to him? And how can you question someone who's, you know, effectively God's representative? I mean, the extraction from the private sector, how much of that is about consolidating political power? And how much of it is about being worried about, I guess, foreign threats that might come in through additional capital in the country. Can you kind of decompose or try to maybe psychoanalyze the motivations for, for instance, the Iranian guards wanting to stop a new airport from operating? I think the way I see it is the competition of different factions within the same system. It's not that one faction wants to have all the money and the other faction is promoting transparency and is fighting corruption. [30:00] Usually you see with a change of government, you see that how the new government tries to empower people and elements close to that. And we explain that in the book and how, for example, Ahmadinejad, when he came to power, he tried to empower people close to him. But when next presidents, when they come, including Hassan Rouhani, we see that he also tried to somehow make sure that people close to him can benefit from such resources. So I think there is this infighting that you see that sometimes the Revolutionary Guards, they need to use their military and intelligence power. And sometimes the other faction can take control. But overall, I think there are many elements that have added to this competition. Of course, the sanctions are one of those. Like decades of sanctions, they have created this lack of transparency within the state. And each faction they come and they try to take a part of the business trying to show themselves essential for the everyday affairs of the country to be handled For example before that Iranian oil ministry has been in charge of selling ores That been the case for decades. But when the sanctions increased in recent decades and the government couldn't pay its debts to, let's say, Iran's police and their military forces, it gave them access to oil. So So a big part of Iranian oil export has been done by the Revolutionary Guards at this stage. Some estimate that half of the Iranian oil is sold by the Revolutionary Guards. So I think the way I see it is just these different factions that are constantly fighting with one another, trying to have a bigger share of the economy. And Tracy, I think your question, like there's one anecdote that sort of exactly answers it. So I think it's both. I think they came by their suspicion of foreign intervention in Iran's economy. Honestly, I mean, if you look at the 20th century history of Iran, it is one of economic exploitation of the country by world powers, U the British the Russians etc And also they have used that ideology in a way that has benefited themselves So the one anecdote that kind of gets at this is in 2020 2021 when COVID is hitting Iran is one of the worst affected countries by COVID, the supreme leader decides to bar the import of many Western doses of the COVID vaccine. And kind of almost simultaneously, the Iranian government decides to launch on a project to make its own COVID vaccine. But what's the entity that's given that contract? It's the conglomerate controlled by the Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei. So he's both deciding a policy that, and I think, you know, if we, he's no longer with us, but if we had given him truth serum, I think he actually was suspicious of the motivations of the U.S. and the British in, you know, making these COVID vaccines. I think, you know, that was probably genuine. But also with that decision, he creates a shortage and then his conglomerate that would profit from a government contract like this is able to step in and kind of save the day and also make these vaccine doses. So you kind of see in that one example, both the ideology and the self kind of really melding seamlessly in a way that it just kind of remarkable to me So I think Boswick answer stands but I also think that it sort of both of those those factors that you identified acting at once. Yeah. And Joe, I should just say the one other thing I know about Iran's economy is that it has been the subject of interest, to put it mildly, to many foreign governments over time. And of course, famously, BP, you know this, right? BP has its origins as the Iranian, Anglo-Iranian oil company. So here's one question I have, just again, from a sort of pure economic developmentalist question. Many of the things that you describe, they would call like import substitution in developing economies, etc. It's like, okay, like, we don't want to import too much of X because then our sort of nascent company can't compete, et cetera. And in many cases, there could be logic. Has there ever been a figure in modern Iranian history who is sort of like the sort of the export oriented development? Let's build an industry that can compete. Here's what we always talk about with the East Asian countries. Let's build an industry, set aside oil that competes and that we want to thrive, et cetera. And the export market will be the test of whether this is a [35:00] successful company or not. Has anyone like tried this sort of popular idea? I think the closest that comes to my mind was Hashemir Afsanjani, President Hashemir Afsanjani, who was saying that he wants to turn Iran into an Islamic Japan. So he was very fascinated by metro system in Western societies, and he wanted to create the same system. But at the end, I think he failed to do that. What do you think, Edgar? Yeah, I mean, I think, you know, I don't know that I would if anyone should cite me on this, but, you know, when I'm kind of looking at sort of how Iranian companies compete, I mean, given the fact that the way the way the direction the direction the economy has gone in is favoring these entities, these companies that are linked to powerful people in the state. And that's sort of poisonous to competition. And so the idea that even within Iran domestic economy the truly most talented and meritorious companies are not the ones that rise to the top or are the most successful or get the most market share It the ones that are smart enough or able enough to sell enough of their shares to some powerful entity that at least they then protected from being perhaps raided or shut down or maybe they get some sort of like special dispensation from the government. And then the idea that those companies that are themselves maybe not the best are then going to compete externally with like the Siemens of the world or GE just seems a bit, even if we set aside sanctions being a huge barrier, which they are, it seems a bit unrealistic to me that Iran would succeed in that kind of market. Although, you know, Iranian steel has, you know, they used to get a lot of foreign revenue, foreign currency from exporting steel to various countries. So they are, there is a market for some Iranian goods, but it's, you know, I don't know that they would kind of be at the top of any sort of board list. Whether you're planning a big tech event, launching a new campaign, or just stocking up on team gear finding the right promotional products makes all the difference 4imprint offers thousands of options from on apparel and premium drinkware to tech totes and giveaways so you can find the right fit for any audience purpose or budget You can customize it all, your logo, your message, your look, and many items come with no setup charge to help you save. And if you're really watching the bottom line, you'll find standout choices at every price point so you can make a real impact while staying on budget. Plus, you'll get expert help, fast turnaround times, and their 360-degree guarantee. So you can be 4imprint certain your order will arrive on time and look exactly right. 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And choosing the right ER makes a real difference. It absolutely does. A specialized stroke center has the expertise in rapid response systems to save lives and improve outcomes. Learn more about stroke care at hcahealth1.com. Support for the show comes from public.com. If you're actively involved in your portfolio, you probably catch yourself repeating the same actions. Buying the dip, manually sweeping idle cash, putting on a hedge. On public, you can now create AI agents that handle all these tasks on your behalf. Just describe what you want to do in plain English. Like, if the VIX hits 25, buy a put option on the S&P 500. or if my cash balance goes above $20,000, move the excess into my direct index. You approve the workflow and your agent handles the rest. Monitoring the market, watching for your conditions and executing your strategies exactly as defined. An investing platform driven by your intent, not just your clicks. You can also get full read and write access to your account via the public API. [40:00] Go to public.com slash market and fund your account in five minutes or less. That's public.com slash market. Paid for by Public Investing. Brokered services by Open to the Public Investing, Inc., member FINRA and SIPC. Advisory services by Public Advisors, LLC, SEC Registered Advisor. Complete disclosures available at public.com slash disclosures. Can we talk about the tech sector specifically? Because, again, this was surprising to learn that at one point Iran had a vibrant startup scene. But on the other hand, it kind of makes sense. If you think about a place where because of sanctions, you don't have a lot of Amazons or Ubers around, then maybe that's the perfect, you know. I also just associate Iran with having a lot of young, bright, young, educated, young, young, young, young. Yeah, absolutely. So what did Iran's tech startup scene actually look like? Yeah, I mean, this is a fascinating chapter and one that we really dug into. So, Iran was the second country in the Middle East after Israel to get access to the Internet. So it's a very kind of like tech forward, pioneering country in that way. And towards the end the early 2010s more and more young people are starting to get online The Rouhani government kind of this more moderate government coming in they enabled access to 3G and 4G internet So there's suddenly this access to mobile data and to the ability to kind of have apps and stream video, all that sort of thing. So it really took off and Iranian users wanted content. They wanted apps. And as you mentioned, sanctions meant that even with a nuclear deal, because the nuclear deal, if you remember, did not allow American companies to go into Iran. So the leading tech companies in the world, Amazon, Uber, Lyft, they could not operate. So there's this sort of protected ecosystem of 80 million at that time, 85 million or so population that needed apps and Iranian businesses could suddenly launch and serve those people. And so that's really what happen. So you kind of start to see the first inklings of this sort of tech industry forming in the early 2010s. You get some very early foreign investment, even before the nuclear deal happening, and some Iranian expats moving back and sort of seeing what's happening and starting venture capital funds And this really then takes off after the nuclear deal is signed in 2015 and goes into effect in early 2016 And foreign investors are just really intrigued by this idea that we finally have like the last sort of green field opportunity is in Iran, and maybe it could be the next Russia, maybe it could be the next China, and we could really get in early on this. And so that, you know, we kind of trace what happens after that. You know, it's great if you go to the website of the University of Tehran, where I am right now. It's all the cliches of every university. They have a picture of a bunch of happy grads. They have the required photo of a multiracial classroom, which every university has on their website, all these people learning. But let's talk a little bit more about, okay, you mentioned like the Ubers and Lyfts, et cetera. What else were people trying to build? How far did this ecosystem push? And then you mentioned, okay, eventually a company gets to a point it reached some threshold in which like it is no longer really able to like operate as like a private entity that pursues shareholder value is its mission. What's the second after all this excitement, like where does it go? Yeah. So, I mean, I will say a lot of the, the startups were kind of familiar There were sort of like versions of things that we be familiar with in the West So there the Amazon of Iran called Digicolor There the Uber of Iran called Snap There food delivery apps There all sorts of things There also things that are kind of more unique. But those the most successful companies, the ones like kind of right out the gate are the ones that are sort of taking business models that have been tried and true in the rest of the world and localizing them for Iran. So, you know, they start to really grow. And this kind of takes everyone by surprise, including the government. I think, you know, from interviews I've done, it seemed like the government really sort of thought this stuff was sort of whatever, you know, like, okay, I think they didn't quite realize how quickly this field would grow. And our character that we kind of follow in the book starts his own venture capital fund, first with domestic funding, and then brings in a lot of external funding as well from Europe and and Russian investors. This sort of, I think, takes a lot of the conservative kind of established forces by surprise. And what we very quickly see is a backlash. And first, it kind of takes the form of sort of hidden kind of whispers. There's like a mysterious telegram channel that forms that starts making accusations against some of the startup founders and, you know, sort of people [45:00] around that sector. The startups are very much associated, in some cases, they did not mean to be, but in some cases, they did sort of form an alliance. They're associated with the elected government of Hassan Rouhani. And, you know, there were already these factions kind of developing that were very against Rouhani, particularly in the Revolutionary Guards, and sort of saw him and his diplomats as being too conciliatory towards the U.S. So this backlash from the security state is kind of forming, people are being interrogated, they're being, you know, sometimes arrested, even their offices are being raided. And at the same time, what we document is that people kind of middlemen with a foot in the security state and a foot in the private sector, people who had been, you know, Ministry of Defense officials, or who had served on the boards of some of these bunyads, etc. They start to make an offer to some of the startups. And basically, the offer is, give us like 5% of your shares and we will help protect you from these accusations and from the risks that you're facing. And some of the startup founders take that deal. You know we really try to get into their mindset and we interviewed over 70 people for this section of the book And I think they some of them didn understand really what was happening They felt beleaguered and they felt quite at risk and they wanted to save their companies. They wanted to do what they felt like was good work, employing people, providing middle-class jobs. And so some of them took that deal. And we see, for instance, the Uber over on Snap sold a large portion of shares to one of the bunyads. There's another kind of rideshare company that launches with a revolutionary guard financing. And then ultimately, just a couple of years ago, we sort of trace the specifics of this and how much the company tried to resist. But ultimately, the Amazon of Iran, Digikala, did sell 40 percent of its shares to a telecom that is part owned by one of these bonnads as well. So we really kind of see this this exciting, vibrant, thriving industry that was not deeply connected to the government over time, then kind of is subdued by those government forces. By the way, Tracy, I just found this very interesting article from 2020, that company Snap. In order to get onto the there a story from Rest of World they got on the Apple App Store by disguising the app as a music streaming app And then only upon a user logging in with an Iranian IP address what its full capabilities is a ride hailing app emerge And then I guess Apple has since banned that, but some clever ingenuity there. Yeah, very smart. So one thing I'm wondering is, at the time of this tech boom, such as it was, there were some Iranian officials that seemed to be supportive of it. I can't remember his exact name, but there was someone in the ministry who was like actually actively promoting tech at the same time that you had other actors in the government who are starting like disinformation campaigns to smear these companies and making, you know, not so subtle threats and things like that. Again, I'm fascinated by the coordination problem or lack of coordination here because it really seems like people are like off doing different things. And if you're a business owner, how are you supposed to respond to all these competing interests? Yeah, it's not a question, I guess. It's a statement. I can add a little bit to this. I think that that is the huge challenge that like Iran not just for instance a corrupt state or just an authoritarian state It also sort of chaotic And I think that is what is poisonous to business almost more than any other part of it You know I not a China expert but my sense is that you know, when it comes to China, if you have an understanding with the Communist Party, then you're good to go. In Iran, even if you do end up making a deal with, you know, some bonnets, selling your shares, whatever it might be, it's a mafia structure, but there's also all these underbosses and they all kind of compete with each other and their power sways from day to day. So yes, one entity within the government was really supporting these startups and wanted them to succeed. And his administration was sort of hated by the more powerful security forces. So for the startup guys, a lot of whom were coming, you know, they were expats, they were kind of coming back to Iran, they were bewildered by this. And as you both know, I mean, business requires certainty. And that has been, I think, more detrimental, the uncertainty in Iran, the instability of the actual government structure and figuring out what it was from day to day. That's been more poisonous almost than the actual fact of like, OK, I got to make a deal with like such and such entity and, you know, be able to continue my my work safely. You know, the closest comparison that comes to my mind is like Greek mythology. I'm reading [50:00] And I realized that Zeus doesn't have the absolute power. So Iran's supreme leader didn't have the absolute power. He needs to manage between all different gods and goddesses. And in the case of Odysseus, you see that he is supported by some gods to go back home, but some angry gods are trying to block his return to back home. So, yeah, I think a businessman in Iran is just like, it's a real odyssey. I love this analogy because it's like, what was the breakthrough of monotheism? Was it part to solve this problem of different people petitioning different gods, etc.? So you want to like establish, you know, there's like one set of rules. So I think that's that. But also that sort of actually brings me to another question, which came up a little bit earlier. But you know, when we when we talk about some of these things, we can draw these analogies. So there's maybe comparisons to late Soviet Union. There may be comparisons to the oligarchs extracting the resources after the collapse of the Soviet Union. There may be analogies to a country like Venezuela, which, of course, people have also likened to a mafia state or analogies to China with the difference between the CCP and the government itself The thing that feels a little distinct here is the role of religion which you meant and the idea that there maybe this other higher thing that people are told to strive towards Can you talk a little bit more about like teasing out the effect that that sort of like spiritual element plays in some of this, which I could imagine, A, creates yet another difficult dimension for businesses to operate in. But then also, especially when I think of the tech sector, like tech fries people's brains. And if I wanted to have a more spiritual society, I don't know how much I want the public to be looking at their phones all day. Yeah, I think that's a good point, because I think that's been one of the core problems when Western societies have been trying to tackle the Islamic Republic. Look, Obama tried to have a nuclear deal with Iran and Trump is trying to do that. I think one of the reasons that the U.S. and many Western countries tried to do that was their deep belief in free market economy and capitalism. I think the underlying assumption was that given a choice between isolations and sanctions and prosperity of course every country will choose the latter Like in a way they believe that by integrating the Iranian economy into the world, they will create some political liberalization and some form of democratization. But I think, I mean, Trump also believes that if you look at Trump's speeches in 2025, he says, oh, I want to make Iran a great nation. I see a bright future for the country. But you see, surprisingly, that Iran doesn't take that offer. The Islamic Republic, I think that's when that this ideological component comes in that is somehow difficult to explain for the Western societies that you see that the country is much focused on the ideological aspects of it. And even And after the nuclear deal that Obama managed to sign in 2015 and the lifting of sanctions in 2016, the money that came to Iran, the incentives that the Western societies offered, it was spent on military development. So the Iranian state has different priorities when it comes to development They prefer to put the money on military development rather than on tackling unemployment inflation and things like that So that's been a challenge. And I think a challenge exists at the moment as well. Like now, the deal, the MOU that was signed between Trump and the Islamic Republic, they offered billions of dollars, even hundreds of billions of dollars. But it seems that some elements, some hardline elements within the Islamic Republic, they didn't want that. Tracy, I think from the perspective of the West, most people, if they're being honest, cannot believe that some people aren't just motivated by money. Like they hear like people say, oh, we believe in some higher power or some vision. But I think like deep down, we all believe that everyone has a price and that everyone actually just wants like, no, they're really they're saying this. But what they really want is wealth. And so I do think like there is this disconnect when we encounter when we have relationships with people who actually may believe in something that is not just accumulating wealth and comfort. Some people in the West. I think most people in the West. Well, OK. But on this note, what does Iran's political economy mean? [55:00] The story we just heard about chaos and competing factions and all of that suggests for the future of the Iran-U.S. conflict. I mean, we see this we see this right now. Right. There's multiple factions inside Iran. There's kind of this hard line faction that is really harshly attacking the president and the foreign minister for even having the temerity to sort of negotiate this memorandum of understanding. There are people who kind of still want inside Iran for this war to continue because they really believe that Iran kind of had the U.S. on the back on the back foot. And so I think in terms of like how Iran's political economy looks going forward, I think it's still quite early to say at this point, just because they're still sort of in the midst of this war, really. And I think no one in Iran right now is looking that far ahead to the extent that they are. it's very much towards China as the future. Mohamed Balgar-Ghalibov, the Speaker of Parliament, the guy who's been kind of negotiating with J.D. Vance, he basically said that as well. He said that, you know, we want investment, but they want it from China. Yeah, I agree. I think one thing that I want to add is that again the different nature of these states like Trump is fighting at best for his legacy but the Islamic Republic is fighting for its survival I think that creates different pain tolerance and pain thresholds among these two nations. For the US administration, The main problem is now if the Fed would increase the interest rate by 0.25% and the impacts of that on mortgage rates and other things. And of course, people are unhappy with the rise of gasoline prices by a dollar or so. But when you look at the Islamic Republic, you see that the inflation is almost three figures. And they're not that much affected by that. the unemployment rate is very high. And even when you compare the casualties for the US administration, the death of 18 soldiers is a lot, is significant while for the Islamic Republic, the death of hundreds or thousands of soldiers is something that can easily absorb So I think that is the nature of the conflict at this stage And I think that the reason is that the Islamic Republic has survived the war so far is that its pain threshold is much higher. And I think if it continues like that, I think the U.S. administration, I don't think they will continue the war because of the long term impacts it will have on the economy. Of course, Trump is trying to keep the price of oil under $100 per barrel. Anytime that it touches 100, there is some talks for negotiations and some positive through social posts. But I think they can manage to do that for a bit, but I don't think it can continue for a long time. I think the pattern that we saw kind of throughout reporting this book and that we really see now is that for the Islamic Republic, the economy has never been an end goal in and of itself. It's focused on it to the extent that it's a means to a broader end goal of self-sufficiency or, you know, some kind of like drawing some sort of ideological strength from it. But in terms of actually focusing on the economy at the expense of for instance some of its ideological goals that has never been in its pattern of behavior And there are former officials like don you have to take it from us there are former officials who have said, you know, it's time to set aside our ideology and our foreign policy and focus on the economy, which would mean bringing in foreign investment, which would mean coming to some final accord with the U.S. that would really lift sanctions so that we can actually move on and grow the economy. And whoever's been in power at any point, mostly Ali Khamenei for 37 years, but before that Khomeini, of course, has not taken that bet. For them, the important thing has always been Iran's ideology. And I think unless there's some drastic change, I don't necessarily expect that to change. I would need to see a lot more evidence of that actually shifting before I would kind of change my assessment on that. All right. Yegeneh and Borzog, thank you both so much for coming on the podcast. Absolutely fascinating discussion. Yeah, really appreciate you taking your time. Thank you. I really enjoyed it. Thank you both so much. Tracy, I really enjoyed that conversation. I learned a lot. I really did mean what [60:00] I said in the conversation, which is that I do think a lot of American or Western like negotiators and thinkers just sort of like constitutionally find it hard to believe that people in much of the world actually believe in things and aren't just like going to be transactional at the end of the day. That's why my first question was about how much of the Iranian revolution was driven by economic interests versus actual ideology. But, yeah, I totally take the point. I also thought it was interesting. You know, when we think about emerging markets, there's plenty of investment that goes into emerging markets. Right. But it feels like the stability point definitely stands out. You know, you can invest in an authoritarian regime. Totally. If you know you're bribing the right person and you're not going to have all your assets seized in like two weeks or something by a competing faction. But when it comes to Iran, it does seem that factional element, that chaos, as they described, it has been an issue. Yeah I thought the point about the sort of like you know in China there the Chinese government and then there the party Right And they not the same thing but they closely linked But the idea that like OK what if you have like a more multiplayer element where it like OK you have some entities that are like truly like this is the state and this there are state interests And then you have IRGC interests and then you have religious interests, et cetera. And then you really do get this sort of like potential misalignment. I love the analogy of like the sort of like petitioning the various Greek gods as like a way to think about a sort of like problem of establishing that stability. It's almost like, OK, like a gangster state might not be the worst thing in the world if there were just one gang. Right. But right. If there's just one producers clip that. No. Yeah. Like if there's just one gang. Think about like a mafia story. Right. part of the problem it's like okay i'm gonna pay this this mafia i don't really need the protection for my store this come this guy comes and said i'll protect your store from damages for some insane amount i don't need it but whatever i'm gonna pay it you know but then the moment there's three gangs and each of them wants that cut then it becomes like a seriously no and also they get mad at you for paying one of them yeah so like i prayed at the temple of zeus and because i sacrifice to go to Zeus Poseidon is now upset at me and now I have to appease Poseidon And then I going to appease Poseidon and then I don know Aphrodite or whoever is going to get mad It just goes on and on Right If your only issue was the sacrifice that Zeus demanded you might not like it but you could form a business with those expectations And that would probably be you'd find a way to survive. But then you have this multilevel thing and you can't form that expectation. Did I ever tell you about in Tokyo, a friend of mine had a bar, tiny bar, 10 seats at the bar. And he got extorted by the Yakuza. Really? Yeah. And so what happened is there were only 10 seats at the bar. He noticed, first of all, he got a request for money, for protection money from the Yakuza. And he said, no, I'm not going to pay it. I'm a foreigner. I don't have to blah, blah, blah. Next night, a single Japanese man comes into the bar, orders one beer, sits at the bar all night, taking up that seat. Not a big deal. Plenty of other people around. That's a good story. Next night, two people come in. Two Japanese salary men sit there, order one beer, don't leave the entire night. You can see where this is going. Yeah, wow. Within 10 days, all of his seats were being taken up by single customers ordering single beers. Wow. And it didn happen anymore after that So you know I want to say Infer how the problem was avoided Yeah exactly Exactly That a good story Anyway I really glad we did that episode I learned quite a bit Absolutely. All right. Shall we leave it there? Let's leave it there. This has been another episode of the All Thoughts podcast. I'm Tracy Alloway. You can follow me at Tracy Alloway. And I'm Jill Weisenthal. You can follow me at The Stalwart. Follow our producers, Carmen Rodriguez at Carmen Armand, Dashiell Bennett at Dashbot, Kale Brooks at Kale Brooks, and Kevin Lozano at Kevin Lloyd Lozano. And for more OddLots content, go to Bloomberg.com slash OddLots. We have a daily newsletter and all of our episodes. And you can chat about all of these topics 24-7 in our Discord, discord.gg slash OddLots. And if you enjoy OddLots, if you like it when we talk about the Iranian economy, then please leave us a positive review on your favorite podcast platform. And remember, if you are a Bloomberg subscriber, you can listen to all of our episodes absolutely ad-free. All you need to do is find the Bloomberg channel on Apple Podcasts and follow the instructions there. Thanks for listening. [65:00] Thank you. Show up just right, right on time. Explore more at 4imprint.com. 4imprint. 4certain. Get the news you need in just 15 minutes. Start your day with Bloomberg Daybreak, the podcast with a global view on the stories that matter. I'm Nathan Hager. And I'm Karen Moscow. Join us each morning for curated stories on current events, politics, business, and foreign relations. Plus one conversation on the day's biggest developments, all in just 15 minutes. Subscribe to Bloomberg Daybreak for a precise, thoughtful take on the stories that matter. Listen to Bloomberg Daybreak each morning on Apple, Spotify, or anywhere you listen.