Shkreli Details $100 Billion AI Trade Unwind After SALP Fund Collapse

Shkreli详述SALP基金崩盘引发千亿美元AI交易平仓 Leopold Aschenbrenner创立的Situational Awareness基金在4倍杠杆下崩溃，非流动性私募资产阻碍了快速追加保证金，导致Citadel介入折价收购其公开资产，并引发跟风AI投资组合的更广泛清算。 Martin Shkreli深入剖析了Leopold Aschenbrenner旗下AI对冲基金Situational Awareness LP（SALP）崩盘的内在机制，解释了4倍杠杆如何将投资组合回撤演变为本金全额覆灭。他详细阐述了市场竞争对手如何针对该基金进行“狙击围猎”（shot against）、主经纪商如何接管控制权，以及Citadel最终如何以巨额折扣介入收购其公开股票资产。Shkreli还探讨了历史上的类似市场行情、主经纪商融资模式、媒体舆论动态，以及运用凯利准则（Kelly Criterion）进行仓位管理以避免彻底爆仓在数学上的必要性。 Leopold Aschenbrenner 旗下的 AI 对冲基金 Situational Awareness LP（SALP）因 4 倍杠杆遭遇清算，导致主经纪商强行接管资产，同时引发华尔街对同类持仓进行恶意做空加速其崩溃。 (0:00) SALP 的 4 倍杠杆使其在组合资产下跌 25% 时净值归零，Citadel 最终以大幅折价接手其公开市场股票资产，获得数十亿美元账面利差并平息了市场系统性风险。 (5:00) 该基金的崩溃暴露出将高杠杆公开市场股票与缺乏流动性的私募资产（如 Anthropic）混合的致命缺陷，并波及市场上体量达其 5 至 10 倍的跟单交易对冲基金。 (10:00) 华尔街情绪已从对 AI 的极度狂热转向严格审视超大规模云厂商的资本支出（CapEx）回报率，市场或面临更为漫长的估值修正。 (15:00) 大规模非流动性头寸无法直接在公开挂盘中抛售，强行平仓常带来 20% 至 50% 的折价，而违背凯利判据的过度杠杆与仓位过大终将导致毁灭性清算。 (20:00)

Martin Shkreli attributes the collapse of Leopold Aschenbrenner's hedge fund, Situational Awareness LP, to extreme leverage and illiquid private holdings that left the fund defenseless against predatory market selling and prime broker liquidation. He characterizes the event not as an AI operational failure, but as a classic financial wipeout driven by ideological overconfidence and risk mismanagement. Mathematical Fragility of Leverage and Illiquid Assets (5:00) Reports indicated that Situational Awareness LP operated at roughly 4x leverage, expanding an estimated $30 billion in cash and $10 billion in private assets into a $120 billion gross market value. Under 4x leverage, a 25% decline in gross portfolio value erases 100% of a fund's equity. When a fund's equity approaches zero, prime brokers unilaterally seize the portfolio to prevent losses from hitting their own balance sheets, stripping the manager of control. This structural fragility was magnified by holding an estimated $10 billion illiquid position in private startup Anthropic alongside leveraged public equities. Over the weekend of the collapse, Aschenbrenner reportedly solicited approximately ten parties to sell Anthropic equity at an implied $1.1 trillion valuation, offloading about half the position. Shkreli stresses that mixing illiquid venture assets with public market leverage historically serves as a death knell because illiquid assets cannot be sold rapidly to satisfy intraday margin calls. Predatory Shorting and Citadel's Distressed Liquidation Role (0:00) Once market participants detected fund distress, rival funds initiated what Shkreli terms "shooting against a fund," aggressively shorting shared holdings and bottleneck equities to accelerate the liquidation. Large hedge funds cannot quietly dump multi-million-dollar positions directly into public order books without quantitative algorithms detecting volume-weighted average price flows and driving prices down by 50% or more. Prime brokers seeking to execute block orders via identifiers like Goldman Sachs's GSEO inevitably signal distress to the trading community. To manage the fallout, prime brokers auctioned SALP's public equity book among Jane Street, Millennium Management, and Citadel. Citadel acquired the portfolio at an estimated 20% to 50% discount, generating an immediate $3 billion to $4 billion markup. Shkreli notes that Citadel's diversified operations across market making, commodities, and equities provide the balance-sheet durability required to absorb massive distressed books without succumbing to short-seller pressure. Ideological Over-Betting and Kelly Criterion Failures (40:00) Shkreli connects Aschenbrenner's collapse to historical boom-and-bust figures like Gerald Tsai, Ryan Jacob, and Cathie Wood, observing that speculative cycles routinely produce managers entranced by a narrative who over-leverage at cycle peaks. In this case, belief in artificial general intelligence led to a mindset where traditional financial risk was dismissed on the premise that AGI would render conventional markets obsolete, contrasting sharply with Wall Street trading desks treating the stocks purely as high-risk equities. From a risk modeling standpoint, Shkreli argues that most traders routinely overestimate their edge and over-bet by two to ten times the optimal size dictated by the Kelly Criterion. Mathematical variance ensures that exceeding the Kelly sizing formula eventually causes complete capital wipeout, even with a favorable 55% or 60% win rate. Furthermore, Shkreli warns that copycat funds holding five to ten times SALP's gross exposure face similar margin pressures, threatening broader market contagion. Hyperscaler Capital Expenditure and Shifting Market Sentiment (15:00) Beyond hedge funds, Shkreli asserts that tech hyperscalers experienced similar fear of missing out, aggressively over-allocating capital expenditures to AI infrastructure. Apple's Tim Cook is highlighted as a rare exception for exercising corporate restraint. While leading AI labs continued to hit technical and operational milestones, Wall Street sentiment rotated from celebrating infrastructure bottlenecks to questioning the timeline for return on investment. Shkreli doubts that the market will mount a rapid V-shaped recovery to new highs. He argues that market tops occur when positive forward expectations are fully priced into valuations. When sentiment reaches that threshold, minor supply-chain adjustments can break the narrative, leading to a prolonged market reassessment rather than an immediate rebound. While Shkreli suggests Aschenbrenner may eventually rebuild his career—drawing parallels to Peter Thiel's transition to venture capital after severe early hedge fund drawdowns—the immediate market remains vulnerable to secondary liquidations as copycat funds unwind high-leverage AI positions.

在TBPN访谈中，知名对冲基金前经理Martin Shkreli深度剖析了Leopold Aschenbrenner创办的AI基金Situational Awareness LP（SALP）的爆仓清算事件。Shkreli认为，该基金的崩盘本质上是一场由极端杠杆、混合一二级市场资产的结构性错配，以及华尔街对手盘激进围猎共同触发的流动性清算灾难，而非AI技术或产业基本面的恶化所致。 4倍杠杆与流动性陷阱：净值清零机制 (5:00) 根据相关报告与Shkreli的推演，SALP采取了约4倍的杠杆率运作。4倍杠杆在数学上隐藏着极高的破产脆弱性：投资组合总市场价值（GMV）只需出现25%的回撤，基金的全部净资产就会被彻底蒸发。以总市值450亿美元的基金为例，若其中约100亿美元投资于Anthropic等非上市公司的非流动性股权，其余30亿美元为现金资产，在4倍杠杆下总敞口高达1200亿美元；一旦总市值下跌25%（亏损300亿美元），全部损失将直接由原始权益承担，导致净值瞬间由350亿美元崩跌至50亿美元濒临归零。 面对这种急剧穿仓风险，主经纪商（Prime Broker）会强制收回控制权。Shkreli指出，像高盛或美银等券商风控绝不会允许基金净值跌破零，因为一旦形成负资产，后续损失将完全由券商的资产负债表承担。因此，主经纪商会在数小时内发出巨额追加保证金通知（Margin Call），并在基金无法注资时单方面接管资产组合，以打折强平或拍卖方式迅速切断敞口风险。 华尔街围猎与挂单困境：针对基金的猎杀 (0:00) Shkreli回顾了华尔街被称为“针对基金开火（shooting against a fund）”的残酷博弈法则。一旦市场参与者获悉某家大型基金面临强制清盘，最具暴利的方式是迅速抛售与该基金重叠的多头标的，并全力做空其持有的资产，以此加速抵押品价值崩溃并制造恐慌踩踏。尽管Shkreli声明自己未参与做空且无重叠持仓，但他指出大量对冲基金在上周正是通过这种无情策略触发了底层股票的暴跌。 在公开市场上抛售巨单面临着严峻的微观结构阻碍。陷入困境的基金无法直接向二级市场公开订单簿（into the screens）砸单，否则追踪VWAP（成交量加权平均价）的量化算法会迅速识别出持续卖压，引发股价断崖式下跌。例如，SALP与Shkreli均持仓的日本企业Kyosha在被迫清算抛售潮中，市盈率被生生砸至仅3倍。主经纪商试图通过特定做市商代码（如高盛的GSEO）秘密联络买家撮合大宗交易，但市场对手盘常常违背默契提前抢跑做空，导致受压资产往往需要承受20%至50%的严重折价才能完成易手。 最后的流动性买家：Citadel折价接盘 (25:00) 面对流动性挤兑，Aschenbrenner在周末紧急联络了约10家机构，试图以相当于1.1万亿美元隐含估值的价格变现其持有的Anthropic非流动性股权，据报道成功售出了50亿美元份额（占其100亿美元持仓的一半）。然而，对于庞大的二级市场上市股票组合，主经纪商在周五晚间仅召集了Jane Street、Millennium与Citadel三家做市与多策略巨头进行闭门竞标。 最终，Citadel凭借更高的出价赢得了该资产包。Shkreli分析指出，Ken Griffin旗下的Citadel凭借横跨天气交易、利率、量化做市及上千名股票交易员的多样化平台，是全市场极少数拥有庞大资产负债表与充沛流动性承接数百亿美元问题资产、且能承受空头持续打压而不爆仓的超级买家。这一操作类似于Citadel在2006年接盘Amaranth的天然气头寸或2008年金融危机中私人机构扮演的救市角色，Citadel在此次折价竞购中获得了预估30亿至40亿美元的即时账面折价缓冲，得以在不砸塌市场的前提下有序平仓。 AGI极端信念与数学风控：凯利公式的反思 (40:00) Shkreli分析了促成此次危机的投资文化错位。在部分AGI（通用人工智能）极度信徒的思维中，一旦AGI实现，传统金融学逻辑与估值体系将变得毫无意义，这种“终局思维”成为拉满杠杆孤注一掷的借口；而传统华尔街交易员则务实地将此类交易视作危险的过度狂热。与此同时，对冲基金本质是要求高流动性的二级市场工具，SALP效仿风险投资（VC）模式大比例配置非上市股权资产，这种长短期流动性错配历来是对冲基金的致命毒药。 从数学仓位管理来看，SALP的失败在于背离了科学风险控制。Shkreli引用贝尔实验室的凯利公式（Kelly Criterion）指出，即便交易员享有55%或60%的正向胜率，理论上的全凯利下注比例也仅有10%左右；盲目放大杠杆只会因方差波动在数学上必然走向破产。成熟量化往往采用半凯利（Half-Kelly）甚至四分之一凯利来规避多倍标准差回撤。顶级机构（如前SAC Capital资深交易员）常年在数亿美元组合中保留80%至90%现金以分散试水，而动用高倍杠杆本质上是交易心理失控而非合理风控的产物。 Shkreli警告称，SALP的崩盘恐非孤立事件，由于全市场存在大量以更高杠杆跟风抄单的对冲基金，潜在跟风交易的风险敞口估测达到SALP自身（约1000亿美元GMV）的5至10倍，清算压力可能持续外溢。与此同时，微软、谷歌等超大规模企业（Hyperscalers）在AI基础设施上的非理性军备竞赛正受到华尔街对实际投资回报率（ROI）的严厉审视。在利好预期已被市场充分打满的背景下，任何微小的资本支出缩减信号都可能引发广泛回调，AI资产或将面临漫长的估值重估周期。

## Background 本期视频由 YouTube 频道 TBPN 于 2026 年 8 月 3 日发布。视频内容为对 Martin Shkreli 的独家深度访谈，重点复盘了前 OpenAI 研究员 Leopold Aschenbrenner 执掌的 AI 对冲基金 Situational Awareness LP（SALP）因过度杠杆引发的崩盘清算内幕、华尔街做空狙击机制以及 AI 基础设施交易的后市走向。 ## TL;DR Martin Shkreli 深入剖析了 Leopold Aschenbrenner 旗下 AI 对冲基金的爆仓全过程：该基金在 4 倍杠杆驱动下管理着高达千亿美元的名义敞口，同时重仓了缺乏流动性的小盘云厂商股票与 Anthropic 等一级市场股权。在底层标的仅回调约 25% 的情况下，基金自有权益瞬间被击穿，引来华尔街对手盘残酷的做空“打靶”与主经纪商的强行接管清盘，最终以巨额折价被 Citadel 等巨头低价接盘。Shkreli 还结合 LTCM、Amaranth 等历史危机与凯利公式指出，在宏大 AGI 叙事裹挟下的过度下注与风控缺失，最终让看对长期方向的激进交易者惨遭短期流动性粉碎。 ## Atmosphere & style 访谈氛围充斥着华尔街交易室特有的冷酷、刺激与黑色幽默。Shkreli 以极其内行、毫不避讳的达尔文式语调，将华尔街“闻血而动”围猎爆仓同行的嗜血生态描摹得淋漓尽致，主客之间的对谈节奏紧凑而直白。聆听本期节目既像在目睹一场刚刚发生的千亿级金融车祸现场复盘，又带有一种资深赌客冷眼旁观狂热信徒走向数学必然归零的荒诞与唏嘘。 ## Bulletin - [02:18](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RJdgh9eEZvw&t=138s) Leopold Aschenbrenner 操盘的明星 AI 对冲基金 Situational Awareness LP（SALP）因动用 4 倍杠杆及配置非流动性的一级股权，在标的回撤 25% 时遭遇主经纪商强制平仓，引发全市场狙击。 - [03:44](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RJdgh9eEZvw&t=224s) Citadel 在周五深夜的闭门竞标中胜出，以据传高达 20% 至 50% 的极深折价接管了被清盘的投资组合，锁定了潜在数十亿美元的账面利润。 - [12:30](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RJdgh9eEZvw&t=750s) 华尔街对科技巨头资本支出（CapEx）回报率的分歧加剧：资本支出克制的微软受到市场追捧，而开支激进的 Meta 和谷歌等则遭遇严厉抛售。 - [40:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RJdgh9eEZvw&t=2400s) 过大仓位与过度杠杆是交易者的普遍致命伤，依据凯利公式，哪怕拥有 55% 胜率，合理下注比例仅为 10% 左右，过度押注在数学上必然走向归零。 ## Key takeaways - [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RJdgh9eEZvw&t=0s) 华尔街存在残酷的达尔文“打靶”机制：一旦获悉大型基金即将爆仓，对手盘会火速出清重叠持仓并全力做空其重仓资产，人为催化流动性踩踏。 - [02:18](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RJdgh9eEZvw&t=138s) 短期资产定价由边际买家与卖家决定而非基本面，在 4 倍杠杆下，标的仅需下跌 25% 就会导致基金核心净值彻底归零并触发穿仓风险。 - [03:44](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RJdgh9eEZvw&t=224s) 在主经纪商强平前夕，Jane Street、Millennium 和 Citadel 获邀进行闭门资产竞价，Citadel 最终折价接管了相关账簿。 - [05:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RJdgh9eEZvw&t=300s) 在 Archegos 爆仓事件后，主经纪商对客户风险敞口的容忍度极低，一旦自有权益逼近危险线，便会直接接管资产处置权以断臂止血。 - [06:50](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RJdgh9eEZvw&t=410s) 盲目跟风的抄单基金往往入场时间最晚、成本最高且杠杆激进，在去杠杆踩踏中沦为最惨烈的牺牲品，重现了历史上周期信徒的覆辙。 - [10:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RJdgh9eEZvw&t=600s) 部分对冲基金深陷 AGI 即将颠覆一切金融体系的宏大叙事信仰，拉满杠杆狂欢，忽视了最基本的金融周期和风控常识。 - [10:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RJdgh9eEZvw&t=600s) 现代对冲基金协议中普遍引入了严苛的业绩提成追索条款（Clawback），灾难性回撤不仅抹平收益，还可能迫使经理退还此前拿到的管理费。 - [12:30](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RJdgh9eEZvw&t=750s) 二级市场对冲基金跨界重仓配置非流动性的一级市场私募股权（如 Anthropic）是投资大忌，在面临挤兑与追加保证金时无法变现自救。 - [15:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RJdgh9eEZvw&t=900s) 华尔街的权力格局已由传统投行转向掌控流动性与做市大权的顶级多策略“影子银行”（如 Citadel、Jane Street、Millennium）。 - [17:30](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RJdgh9eEZvw&t=1050s) AI 基础设施的大繁荣已被市场充分定价，当无法提供更具冲击力的增长“二阶导数”时，关于巨头可能削减开支的细微风声便足以引爆回调。 - [20:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RJdgh9eEZvw&t=1200s) 清算巨额头寸极为复杂，小盘 AI 概念股（如 Sharon AI、Nebius）极度缺乏流动性，投行挂单询价的信号泄漏会迅速引发全市场的做空狙击。 - [25:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RJdgh9eEZvw&t=1500s) 接盘爆仓资产包需要能承受数年纹丝不动的雄厚资本与流动性，因为空头会持续压价测试接盘方的承受底线。 - [28:30](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RJdgh9eEZvw&t=1710s) 初创小型对冲基金往往在后台运营与合规内控上极不成熟，频繁延期月报甚至 13F 报告多因人手不足与运营混乱，而非神秘保密策略。 - [30:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RJdgh9eEZvw&t=1800s) 风投（VC）具有长期锁定期和单向做多的结构优势，而对冲基金每天面临盯市与杠杆压力，是极度痛苦残酷的职业赌局。 - [36:30](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RJdgh9eEZvw&t=2190s) 主经纪商的核心盈利模式依赖客户借贷产生的融资利差，这种商业激励促使其在牛市推高杠杆，但在流动性反转时又会化身为风控屠刀。 - [40:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RJdgh9eEZvw&t=2400s) 绝大多数交易者无论散户还是机构都存在仓位过大的致命通病，过度下注在方差累积下必然导致账户归零，极度克制资金管理才是长期生存的核心。 ## Detailed walkthrough ### [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RJdgh9eEZvw&t=0s) 华尔街残酷的达尔文游戏：“打靶”爆仓基金 Martin Shkreli 加入对话，直言过去 24 小时乃至这整个月，堪称华尔街历史上最疯狂的时期之一。昨晚他还与朋友复盘了长期资本管理公司（LTCM）、Amaranth 等历史上著名的流动性危机引发的基金自爆案，而这次 Leopold Aschenbrenner 执掌的 AI 对冲基金（Situational Awareness LP，简称 SALP）的坍塌，绝对可以与这些历史事件并列。早在上周中，业内就开始流传基金出现问题的传闻，随后在昨夜与今晨迅速演变成既成事实（fait accompli）。不过 Shkreli 认为，管理层在事态保密上其实已经做得很出色，但市场上一些敏锐的玩家在周一、周二就已经察觉异样并提前建仓。 这引发了华尔街最残酷的经典操作——Shkreli 的前老板吉姆·克莱默（Jim Cramer）曾将其形容为“对着基金打靶”（shooting against a fund）。在纯粹的达尔文式市场丛林法则下，一旦对手盘得知某家大型基金即将被强制平仓清算，最有利可图的操作就是火速抛售自己所有与该基金重叠的持仓，并反手全力做空该基金持有的一切资产。这种踩踏会以最快速度加速爆仓者的灭顶之灾。Shkreli 坦言，虽然自己并未持有重合仓位、也没有参与其中，但市场上大量基金当时都在疯狂做空这些标的，极力促成恐慌崩盘。 - **华尔街清算“打靶”机制**：一旦获悉某基金面临清盘，机构会清仓重合多头仓位并集中做空其重仓资产，人为催化踩踏以放大跌幅。 - **历史危机对标**：本次 AI 基金踩踏与 1998 年长期资本管理公司（LTCM）崩塌、2006 年 Amaranth 巨额天然气期货爆仓具有同等量级的流动性杀伤力。 ### [02:18](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RJdgh9eEZvw&t=138s) 宏观叙事的幻象与 4 倍杠杆的致命陷阱 针对市场上关于本次 AI 基础设施与“瓶颈交易”（bottleneck trade）回调由何引起的争论——究竟是因为战争、油价上涨、开源模型威胁，还是超大规模云厂商（Hyperscalers）资本支出的缩水——Shkreli 直截了当地指出，这些所谓的基本面叙事“全都不重要”。尽管前沿 AI 实验室正处于商业史上最辉煌的增长月度，模型进展也完全符合预期，但决定短期资产价格的从来不是基本面，而是边际买家与卖家的交易意愿。 泡沫周期的剧本往往如出一辙：最早进场的一批聪明钱推高了价格；随后跟风者看到有人年内收益高达 400%，便蜂拥而至；像 Shkreli 这样的投资人也在接近顶部的位置涌入，热衷于高带宽内存（HBM）和算力瓶颈等概念。然而，在牛市顶峰进场的往往是市场上“最脆弱的筹码”（weakest hands），他们同时也是在风吹草动时最先恐慌抛售的群体。资产 80% 到 90% 的长线持有者并不会轻易倒手，恰恰是这 5% 的边际交易者决定了市场定价。更为致命的是，SALP 动用了高达 4 倍的杠杆（4x leverage）。在 4 倍杠杆的放大效应下，标的资产仅仅出现 25% 的回撤，就足以将整家基金直接打入绝境彻底出局。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 杠杆踩踏与流动性耗尽机制 accDescr: 展现从跟风上杠杆到触及预警线被主经纪商清算的传导链路 subgraph Phase1 ["泡沫积累期"] A["聪明钱建仓推高估值"] --> B["跟风资金进场并在顶部接盘"] B --> C["叠加4倍杠杆放大头寸 (GMV膨胀)"] end subgraph Phase2 ["边际反转与踩踏"] C --> D["边际买盘枯竭，资产价格微调"] D --> E["最弱筹码恐慌抛售，跌幅达 15%-25%"] E --> F["对冲基金净值遭受毁灭性穿透"] end subgraph Phase3 ["强平与接盘"] F --> G["主经纪商 (PB) 强行收缴资产处置权"] G --> H["闭门竞标：Citadel/千禧年折价接管"] end ``` ### [03:44](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RJdgh9eEZvw&t=224s) 闭门竞价与暗盘兜售 Anthropic 股权 当基金滑向深渊，周五晚间一场极为隐秘的闭门竞标紧急展开。据获悉，只有简街资本（Jane Street）、千禧年基金（Millennium）和城堡投资（Citadel）三家顶级做市与对冲机构受邀进入核心圈子，争夺该基金留下的遗骸资产。与此同时，暗盘交易圈开始出现反常异动：有人向 Shkreli 团队兜售数亿美元的 Anthropic 私募股权。Shkreli 当时便心生怀疑这是否正是 Leopold 的抛盘。因为在私募股权交易的潜规则中，当你急需甩卖 40 亿美元的资产时，绝不能直接对外开价 40 亿，而往往会先试探性地放出 1 亿美元；一旦发现买方吞吐量足够吃下 5 亿美元甚至更多，才会逐步亮出底牌。 最终竞标中，千禧年基金递交了报价，但 Citadel 凭借更具吸引力的条件拔得头筹。Shkreli 分析，肯·格里芬（Ken Griffin）一直希望成为危难时刻所有人唯一的求助中介。沃伦·巴菲特（Warren Buffett）年事已高，对这种高危交易向来不感兴趣，而 Citadel 早在当年 Amaranth 天然气爆仓时就展现过极强的吞并胃口，接管了其整个破产投资组合。Citadel 极其擅长在高盛、美银等华尔街大行深陷危机敞口时充当拯救者，顺势低价全盘吞下对方的头寸账簿。 - **三方竞标名单**：Jane Street、Millennium、Citadel 获邀参与周五深夜的极密清算资产竞标。 - **大宗私募试探技巧**：大额抛售通常先以 1 亿美元规模伪装测试市场流动性深度，避免过早引发市场对数十亿巨额抛盘的恐慌。 ### [05:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RJdgh9eEZvw&t=300s) 4 倍杠杆的算术题：主经纪商为何毫不留情 Shkreli 拆解了这笔高达千亿美元级别的清盘算术题。假设该基金总资产规模为 450 亿美元，其中约 100 亿美元是 Anthropic 等流动性较差的私募股权，银行账户尚存约 300 亿至 350 亿美元可用作保证金的现金。在 4 倍杠杆运作下，其总市值（Gross Market Value，GMV）将瞬间膨胀至 1,200 亿美元的惊人规模。在此体量下，哪怕公开市场的投资组合仅下跌 25%——看似只是 300 亿美元的账面回撤——但这 300 亿扣减的全部是基金原本只有 350 亿美元的核心净值（Equity）。基金净值瞬间暴跌至仅剩 50 亿美元。 ``` 【杠杆穿仓推演示例】 - 原始保证金/自有权益：约 350 亿美元 (另有 ~100 亿美元 Anthropic 股权) - 4倍杠杆总市值 (GMV)：1,200 亿美元 - 组合资产下跌 25%：GMV 缩水 300 亿美元（跌至 900 亿美元） - 剩余自有权益：350 亿 - 300 亿 = 50 亿美元 - 主经纪商反应：为防权益跌破零产生坏账，PB 立刻收缴全部头寸强制处置 ``` 在经历过 Archegos 等世纪大爆仓的惨痛教训后，没有任何一家主经纪商（Prime Broker）会容忍客户在净值只剩 50 亿美元的情况下继续维持 900 亿美元的巨额风险敞口。一旦权益跌破负值，超额亏损将全额转嫁给银行自己承担。经纪商会毫不留情地行使清算特权，直接致电并通知操盘手：“这些资产现在归我们接管，如何处置由我们说了算。” 为了自救，传闻 Leopold 在周末紧急联系了大约 10 家机构，试图以相当于 1.1 万亿美元估值的水平紧急抛售 Anthropic 股权以补充流动性。尽管这一估值与市场此前传闻相近，但目前仍不清楚这笔股权究竟是全部成交还是按传闻卖出了一半。而在公开市场股票账簿方面，接盘方（据传为 Citadel）据称获得了极为丰厚的折价保护——如果在不剧烈扰动市场的情况下顺利平仓，接盘方将当场锁定 30 亿至 40 亿美元的账面暴利。 ### [06:50](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RJdgh9eEZvw&t=410s) 倒在伊卡洛斯之翼下的跟风者与历史轮回 针对此前爆料，三家核心当事方之一在昨晚主动联系了 Shkreli。对方含蓄地证实了核心实质：“是的，Leopold 确实飞得太高太靠近太阳了（flew a little too close to the sun）”，但声称爆料中的具体财务数字略有偏差，不过拒绝透露偏差的方向。尽管私下和公开场合都有反驳声音坚称 SALP 仅仅亏损了 30% 左右、情况没有那么糟糕，但 Shkreli 一针见血地指出：如果未上市的 Anthropic 股权估值按原样锁定未动，而基金在 4 倍杠杆下整体仅回撤 30%，那倒推意味着其公开市场股票资产仅下跌了 15% 左右，这在每天相关 AI 基础设施标的动辄暴跌 15% 的极端市况下，简直是“好到不可思议”的谎言。 更惨烈的其实是那些盲目跟风的抄单基金（copy trading funds）。SALP 的坍塌反倒给这批资金提供了一层掩护。这类抄单者由于跟风滞后，往往入场时间最晚、买入成本最高，为了赶上暴利甚至加了更疯狂的杠杆，导致在去杠杆踩踏中沦为最凄惨的牺牲品。 Shkreli 回顾了长达数十年的投机周期： - **2000 年互联网泡沫**：Ryan Jacob 操盘的 Jacob Internet Fund，在顶部极度激进后遭遇灾难性崩盘； - **1960 年代曼哈顿基金**：蔡至勇（Gerald Tsai）创立的 Manhattan Fund，曾被巴菲特痛批为短视投机的激进代表； - **当下的女股神现象**：正如社交网络上调侃 Cathie Wood 的表情包一样，华尔街每一代人都会诞生属于他们自己的“周期信徒”，他们笃信某个宏大叙事，随后毫不保留地孤注一掷（balls to the walls），最终在杠杆的逆向碾压中轰然坠落。 ### [10:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RJdgh9eEZvw&t=600s) 叙事蛊惑、FTX 幽灵与业绩提成的残酷追索 在谈到这种极端单边行情时，马丁·施克莱里（Martin Shkreli）回忆起自己一位极早布局该交易的朋友。那位朋友斩获了堪比利奥波德·阿申布伦纳（Leopold Aschenbrenner）的惊人回报，却近乎奇迹般地在顶部附近完成了对冲，堪称他认识的最顶尖交易员。施克莱里曾开玩笑说，如果利奥波德也能在最高点精准抛售并反手做空，自己绝对会尊称他为“史上最佳”（GOAT）。然而，现实中深陷宏大叙事的人几乎不可能做到这一点。当时市场上弥漫着一种近乎宗教狂热的 AGI 信仰——信徒们坚信“通用人工智能即将降临，届时整个金融体系都将彻底失效，不如拉满杠杆狂欢到世界末日”。而在高盛交易柜台的专业交易员眼中，这群人简直是不可理喻的疯子，毕竟归根结底“这只是一场股票交易”。 令对冲基金界感到费解的是利奥波德过往的经历。他曾身处 FTX，直到平台崩盘当天才辞职。尽管他并未卷入任何违法犯罪活动，但亲身经历了那样一场流动性粉碎的灾难，人们本以为他会心有余悸，退一步在传统行业稳扎稳打干上十年，而不是立刻重返金融赌场大加杠杆。施克莱里进一步揭示了对冲基金行业鲜为人知的深水区规则：除了常见的高水位线（High Water Mark）机制外，如今越来越多的机构协议中包含了严苛的业绩提成追索条款（Clawback Provisions）。这意味着一旦基金遭遇灾难性回撤，基金经理不仅拿不到利润，甚至可能需要退还此前已装进口袋的“二八原则”（2 and 20）管理费与提成。与此同时，利奥波德恰好定于本周末完婚，施克莱里感叹这真是“悲剧与人生巅峰交织的荒诞时刻”。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 宏大叙事驱动下的基金流动性崩塌机制 accDescr: 展示从 AGI 狂热加杠杆到华尔街做空狙击并触发清算与追索条款的完整演变过程。 subgraph Narrative ["狂热期：叙事催生极端杠杆"] A["AGI 信仰与极度做多<br/>（颠覆金融体系预期）"] --> B["超额收益引发狂热募资<br/>（高名义敞口叠加非流动性资产）"] end subgraph WallStreet ["反噬期：华尔街对手盘猎杀"] B --> C["边际利空出现<br/>（二阶导数放缓/CapEx 遭质疑）"] C --> D["市场嗅到血腥味<br/>（对手盘压价逼仓，逼迫经理出清）"] end subgraph Collapse ["清算期：全面踩踏与追索"] D --> E["被迫无底线平仓<br/>（千亿级抛压引发流动性枯竭）"] E --> F["触发严苛追索条款<br/>（返还 2 and 20 提成，惨淡出局）"] end ``` --- ### [12:30](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RJdgh9eEZvw&t=750s) 缺乏经验的操盘手、一级市场的死亡之吻与百亿抛压 施克莱里直言利奥波德在管理大型对冲基金方面完全没有实战经验。他透露，纽约一家规模极大的知名母基金（Fund of Funds）曾彻底回绝过利奥波德的募资，并嘲讽其逻辑根本站不住脚。尽管利奥波德随后凭借激进做多跑出了近 20 倍的夸张收益，一度让那些拒绝他的资深机构感到尴尬，但如今的崩盘最终证明了传统风控的预判。施克莱里指出，该基金犯了对冲基金历史上的大忌：长期处于极端偏向多头（Long-biased）状态，并在后期大举涉足一级市场私募股权（Privates）。在对冲基金长达半个世纪的演变中，二级市场基金一旦戴上风投（VC）的帽子去买入缺乏流动性的非上市资产，往往就是敲响了“死亡丧钟”，极少有人能全身而退。 更可怕的风险在于全市场的同质化踩踏。施克莱里预计，即将公布的 7 月基金业绩将揭示大量对冲基金都拥挤在同一笔交易里。利奥波德手握近千亿美元的名义总敞口（Gross Exposure），而整个华尔街类似头寸的规模可能是他的五到十倍。与当年历经三四年才缓慢爬升、耐性见顶并逐步阴跌出清的互联网泡沫不同，本轮由巨额流动性和高杠杆驱动的行情在短短一个月内完成了极度压缩的剧烈崩盘。即便 Anthropic、OpenAI、微软、谷歌和 Meta 均交出了创纪录的业务答卷，市场对科技巨头巨额资本支出（CapEx）回报率的质疑依然引爆了抛售。华尔街奖励了克制谨慎的微软，却无情惩罚了资本支出激进的 Meta 和谷歌，其疯狂与戏剧性远超 2021 年 Tiger Global 引领的风投繁荣。 - **母基金的态度逆转**：纽约大型 Fund of Funds 最初拒绝投资并报以嘲讽，在利奥波德狂揽 20 倍收益时感到难堪，最终在清算中得到自我印证。 - **一级市场投资陷阱**：对冲基金跨界进行高估值非流动性资产（Privates）配置，在面临赎回挤兑时无法变现，成为压垮流动性的致命诱因。 - **市场总敞口估算**：利奥波德拥有的约 1000 亿美元名义敞口仅是冰山一角，全市场同向头寸规模预计达到该数字的 5 至 10 倍。 - **科技巨头资本支出分化**：财报季对 CapEx 采取两极化裁决，微软因资本克制获得市场青睐，Meta 与谷歌则因资本开支过激遭受严厉惩罚。 --- ### [15:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RJdgh9eEZvw&t=900s) 影子银行的冷酷算计与“闻血而动”的清算风暴 如今华尔街的权力结构发生了深刻转变，简街（Jane Street）、堡垒（Citadel）、千禧年（Millennium）等顶级多策略机构已演变为真正的“影子银行”。以往遇到大规模爆仓通常由传统投资银行吞下苦果，如今这批影子银行掌控着做市和流动性大权。传闻简街本身就是利奥波德的外部投资人（LP），但在流动性告急时据称根本没有出面接盘竞价的意思，仅传闻其可能低价收割了部分 Anthropic 的一级股权。针对主持人提出的设想——“该基金本金可能只有 50 亿美元，鼎盛时期做到 450 亿，如果平仓后账面还能留下 100 亿现金，LP 是否会放他一马让他继续操盘？”，施克莱里给出了极为残酷的否定。 在施克莱里看来，一旦市场上出现了公开的强制平仓盘，流动性掠食者绝不会手下留情。“只要水里泛起一丝血腥味，整个华尔街就会联手把这些仓位砸到零；为了逼你在 3 块钱清算，大家甚至不惜先把美光（Micron）砸到 5 块钱。”当一个交易员背负着千亿美元规模的被动抛盘时，他面前会聚集着一万亿美元虎视眈眈的对手盘，所有人唯一的目的就是坐视他“求饶认输（cry uncle）”。这展现了华尔街最冷血、最马基雅维利式的一面，利奥波德的高杠杆仓位注定了除了粉身碎骨外别无可能。 --- ### [17:30](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RJdgh9eEZvw&t=1050s) 消失的二阶导数、集体 FOMO 与苹果的无为而治 施克莱里回忆起自己曾经的老板——一位资深的“老虎系”投资经理。在 2000 年互联网泡沫顶峰，某家光学元件供应商在财报交流中仅仅出现了一丝极其微妙的口吻转变，这位前老板与索罗斯基金的合伙人便立刻决定将空头头寸拉满，因为他们敏锐地察觉到泡沫最轻松的上涨阶段已经过去，市场上充斥着最脆弱的多头筹码。施克莱里强调，当前市场已经彻底将“AI 处于大繁荣、芯片需求爆表”这一已知前提完全定价；若想再次让市场感到超预期惊艳，就必须出现像德瓦克什·帕特尔（Dwarkesh Patel）在推特上所描绘的那种疯狂加速场景。当无法提供更具冲击力的“二阶导数”时，任何关于“巨头可能削减开支”的细微风声都会引发全盘崩塌。 这一轮狂热绝非利奥波德一人的失控，而是整个科技与资本阶层的集体 FOMO。各大超大规模云服务商（Hyperscalers）和科技巨头都在不顾一切地全力押注 AI，唯独苹果的蒂姆·库克（Tim Cook）在后方稳坐钓鱼台，以“无为而治”的姿态成为全场赢家。主持人也回顾道，在代码智能体（Coding Agents）爆发前夕，OpenAI 的收入增速曾出现放缓，MAU 和 DAU 触底平台期，引发了跨界投资者长达八周的恐慌修正。当时许多人还天真地开玩笑庆祝“AI 泡沫终于挤出去了，接下来可以稳健建设了”。施克莱里对此深表赞同，并指出华尔街当下几乎没人相信美股能够在此刻重新刷新历史新高，而根据逆向思维，当整个华尔街都对此抱持怀疑时，这种极致反弹反而才具备发生的微弱契机。 ### [20:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RJdgh9eEZvw&t=1200s) 华尔街如何清算巨额头寸：从屏幕挂单到投行“断臂止血” 普通散户往往有一种误解，以为对冲基金管理着几十亿美元资产，想卖出持仓时只需要像在 Robinhood 或 E-Trade 上那样“按一下红色按钮”就能全部抛给散户。Martin Shkreli 解释道，在机构投资层面清算巨额头寸要复杂凶险得多。最基础的做法是“向屏幕卖出”（selling into the screens），也就是直接在公开市场上挂单挂牌。虽然可以通过设置成交量加权平均价（VWAP）算法慢慢蚕食出货，但华尔街始终笼罩着一种近乎阴谋论的担忧：市场上那些高频量化机构拥有极其敏锐的嗅觉，他们能通过各种算法和反常的订单流，瞬间嗅出有机构正试图抛售 1000 万股的大单，并抢先做空实施狙击。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 巨额头寸清盘传导链条 accDescr: 展示对冲基金巨额头寸清算时的市场博弈流程 subgraph FundAndBroker["对冲基金与主经纪商"] A["基金遭遇追加保证金通知<br/>（Margin Call）"] --> B{"抛售方式选择"} B -->|"公开屏幕直接出货"| C["算法缓慢挂单<br/>（暴露于量化嗅探与抢跑风险）"] B -->|"致电主经纪商<br/>（如高盛 GSEO）"| D["做市商代号寻找大宗买家<br/>（广告推介暴露抛盘体量）"] end subgraph StreetReactions["华尔街链式反应"] D --> E["市场做市与对冲基金嗅出风声"] E --> F["排查股东名册排除指数与被动ETF"] F --> G["锁定抛售源头<br/>（Situational Awareness）"] G --> H["空头蜂拥做空压价<br/>（迫使目标基金认输爆仓）"] end subgraph PrimeTakeover["主经纪商接管与强平"] H --> I["主经纪商强行接管清算权力"] I --> J["宁可折价断臂亏损 10 亿<br/>也不承担潜在数百亿敞口"] J --> K["一揽子折价打包兜售给 Citadel 等巨头"] end ``` 因此，主流基金经理在需要清仓时，通常会直接拿起电话致电高盛（Goldman Sachs）等主经纪商（Prime Broker）。如果抛售的是微软这类流动性极佳的超级蓝筹股，投行很容易寻找买家或自行吃下；但 Leopold Aschenbrenner 旗下的基金持有着大量像 Sharon AI（澳大利亚的小型新兴云基础设施公司）或 Nebius 这类极度缺乏流动性的股票。这些标的有些相当于该股 10 到 60 天的全市场总交易量，如果直接在公开市场上砸盘，不仅 10 天内要吃掉全部成交量，还可能直接把股价砸跌 50% 以上。投行只能通过做市商代号（例如高盛的代码 GSEO）在市场上公开挂出卖单广告，向其他大机构探询意向。 这种广告询盘本身就是致命的信号泄漏。当高盛告诉大客户“我们这里有个相当大的卖家”时，即便不公开具体数量，精明的交易员也会立刻意识到这是一笔巨量抛盘。市场上的“小鱼”甚至会违规抢先建立空头仓位；与此同时，各家机构会迅速翻查该股的股东名册进行排除法排查：致电富达（Fidelity），对方表示没卖；剔除先锋等被动 ETF 和指数基金后，市场上唯一能抛出几千万股的就只剩下这家 AI 基金。一旦全市场确认该基金陷入流动性危机，其所有重仓股都会遭到猛烈做空。到了这一阶段，主经纪商根本不会在乎基金经理的意愿，高盛绝不想承担持有 AI 概念股的市场风险，他们的董事会宁愿立刻“揭掉创可贴”，确认损失 10 亿美元，也绝不冒可能损失 500 亿美元的系统性风险，最终果断选择直接强行砍仓，将整套投资组合一揽子以极大幅度折价抛售。 - 机构清仓的常规渠道包括公开屏幕成交量加权（VWAP）、主经纪商做市代号撮合，以及场外一揽子大宗转让（Block Trade）。 - 缺乏流动性的小盘 AI 云计算公司（如 Sharon AI、Nebius）持仓量甚至相当于数周乃至两个月的全市场成交量，公开抛售会引发毁灭性崩盘。 - 华尔街交易员通过股东穿透与逐一排除，极易在几个小时内锁定正在遭受爆仓清盘的具体机构。 ### [25:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RJdgh9eEZvw&t=1500s) 嗜血的华尔街折价拍卖与能够买下一切的 Citadel 在这场主经纪商主导的“火警大甩卖”中，据传整个资产包的折价幅度可能高达 20% 到 50%，对于有能力的买家来说，这完全是“令人垂涎欲滴的抄底折扣”。然而，Martin Shkreli 指出，并非谁都有资格接下这笔飞刀。接盘方必须拥有能够将这些股票在账上死守五年而纹丝不动的雄厚资本与流动性。因为一旦你接盘，市场上的空头——包括 Shkreli 这样的小型游资以及规模大得多的机构大鳄——都会虎视眈眈地围猎，疯狂做空来测试你的承受底线，直到把你逼到“跪地求饶”为止。Shkreli 举例称，Leopold 和自己都持有的日本半导体存储相关标的铠侠（Kioxia），在抛盘砸压下估值已经跌到令人难以置信的 3 倍市盈率，但空头仍会继续做空，逼着持有者抗住它跌到 2 倍甚至 1 倍市盈率的极端压力。 放眼全市场，唯一拥有上千亿美元资金体量、面对这种市场海啸连眼皮都不眨一下的超级巨头，只有 Ken Griffin 掌舵的 Citadel。虽然市场上偶尔也有流言声称有人想去阻击 Citadel，但 Shkreli 直言“我绝对不建议任何人这么干”。针对主持人提问 Ken Griffin 是否可能在接盘前提前通过反向对冲建立宏观头寸打出“四维围棋”，Shkreli 认为并不存在这种阴谋对冲。Citadel 本月整体业绩依然微弱飘红，本身就得益于其极为严密的平台型多策略对冲体系——平台旗下拥有专门交易天气、利率以及上千名交易各类股票的独立单元，加上做市机构 Citadel Securities 处理着全球几乎所有金融品种的海量订单流，天生就处于极高水平的市场中性状态。 高盛和美国银行（Bank of America）等主经纪商在面临危机时，第一时间想到的接盘人必然是 Ken Griffin。这就像 2008 年金融危机期间美国政府求助于沃伦·巴菲特（Warren Buffett）入股高盛一样，Griffin 正在全力将自己打造成主经纪商陷入流动性灾难时“全行业唯一必须致电的拯救者”。即便这种极端清盘机会十年才出现一次，但一旦发生，就能稳稳赚取 50 亿至 100 亿美元的无风险暴利。与此同时，这也让 Citadel 成为投行最不敢得罪的核心盟友。如果没有 Citadel 出手接盘，主经纪商面临的可能不仅是亏损，甚至可能导致穿仓——外界有传言称 Leopold 在券商的净资产在最后阶段已经转为负值。虽然高盛通常会提前平仓，但面对 Sharon AI 这类需要 60 天成交量才能出尽的极度缺乏流动性的股票，优质的 Micron（美光）早已被快速卖光，剩下的全是一兜子难以变现的垃圾资产。 - 被清算的投资组合包括大量被错杀的优质资产，在流动性枯竭时给出了 20% 至 50% 的罕见折价。 - 铠侠（Kioxia）等持仓在强制平仓期间一度被砸至仅 3 倍市盈率。 - 极少数平台型对冲基金（如 Citadel）凭借极度分散的底层策略与做市商业务，在全行业重挫的环境下依然保持了正收益。 ### [28:30](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RJdgh9eEZvw&t=1710s) Situational Awareness 的溃败真相：杠杆、内控缺失与致命的推迟信件 回顾 Situational Awareness 崩塌的时间线，危机爆发的速度远超管理团队的应对能力。大概在清盘当周的周一或周二，主经纪商的代表就拍了拍 Leopold 的肩膀发出预警：“你们的保证金看起来有点薄了，能不能再补交几十亿美元的保证金？”然而，在高度杠杆与持仓流动性锁死的双重挤压下，短短两三天之内局面就彻底失控，根本没有留给他们筹集巨资的时间窗口。Martin Shkreli 透露，Citadel 也是在最后关头（第十一小时）才收到投行的接盘邀请，这完全符合危机处理的保密流程。 更深层的原因在于，这家年轻的对冲基金在组织运营和合规内控上表现得极度不成熟。作为一个仅由少数几个年轻学者和前 OpenAI 研究人员组成的小团队，Situational Awareness 在对外沟通、净值披露和行政事务上漏洞百出。他们没有健全的每日净值跟踪与披露机制，甚至连按月和按季度的投资者信件都频繁延期。仅仅一个月前，业界还在热烈讨论该基金为何没有按时提交 13F 季度持仓报告，许多人还神化地推测 Leopold 是否与监管机构达成了某种保密协议以隐藏其天才般的 AI 交易策略。但根据 Shkreli 的说法，残酷的真相远没有那么高深玄妙：他们只是人手不足、陷入混乱，由于优先事项焦头烂额，压根“没顾得上按时去提交”而已。 - 爆仓导火索源于周初主经纪商发出的数十亿美元追加保证金通知（Margin Call），流动性陷阱导致基金毫无回旋余地。 - Situational Awareness 作为初创基金严重缺乏后台运营经验，缺乏及时的月报、季报披露机制。 - 此前被市场热议的“13F 延迟提交之谜”并非出于神秘的保密策略，纯粹是由于小型团队在风控和行政运营管理上的失职与混乱。 ### [30:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RJdgh9eEZvw&t=1800s) 对冲基金的残酷现实与利奥波德的重挫 马丁·施克莱里（Martin Shkreli）直言不讳地指出，做风险投资（VC）可以建立稳定的职业生涯，因为风投本质上是“永远超级做多”（gigalong always），这是极少数几乎不可能被直接洗出局的投资形式。相反，对冲基金经理则是全天下最痛苦、最折磨人的职业。他曾劝告一位跃跃欲试想开对冲基金的朋友：如果做一份年收入五千万甚至一亿美元的付费通讯（Newsletter）业务，表现就已经能吊打地球上绝大多数对冲基金了。人们之所以飞蛾扑火般涌入这个行业，只是因为它是世界上“最性感的东西”，能带来成为“宇宙之主”（master of the universe）的无上荣耀。但这种光鲜背后的日常代价，是凌晨三点爬起来盯盘看韩国股市行情、早晨六点惊醒焦虑世界上又发生了什么，本质上就是一场极度高风险、毫无实际生产力却又刺激血腥的疯狂扑克局。 谈到利奥波德·阿申布伦纳（Leopold Aschenbrenner）的遭遇，施克莱里认为这并不意味着职业生涯的终结。他以彼得·蒂尔（Peter Thiel）为例，蒂尔当年的宏观对冲基金虽未遭遇同等级别的平仓清算，但也经历过数年惨淡期，随后蒂尔不仅打造了风投史上最成功的基金之一，其个人投资与后来的宏观交易（Thiel Macro）同样风生水起。利奥波德拥有毋庸置疑的天赋与天才头脑，只要能保持平稳心态，经历几年沉淀复盘后完全可以东山再起。然而，推特等社交网络上的冷嘲热讽不可避免：就在短短两个月前，他掌管的还是全地球规模最大、最耀眼成功的明星 AI 基金，如今却惨遭强制平仓，这种“市场教你做人”的极度羞辱感极其残酷。人们还在传阅他此前在德瓦尔克什·帕特尔（Dwarkesh Patel）播客上的切片——利奥波德曾笃定地宣称“在实现 AGI 之前显然还有 100 倍的空间”，当时他手握 20 倍的浮盈，以为前方是一马平川的超级牛市，最终却因为高杠杆无法留在牌桌上。 - **风投 vs 对冲基金的生态差异**：风投锁定期长、单向做多，几乎不会被迫清算离场；而对冲基金承受每日盯市与杠杆压力，一旦波动过大随时面临灭顶之灾。 - **神坛跌落的落差**：两个月前还是硅谷与华尔街交口称赞的顶级 AI 操盘手，转瞬间因流动性挤压被迫全面清仓。 - **未能活到终局的悲剧**：利奥波德深信 AGI 前夜仍有百倍涨幅，但在金融市场中，“看对远期方向”无法拯救“死于短期流动性危机”的脆弱仓位。 --- ### [33:15](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RJdgh9eEZvw&t=1995s) 独家爆料的幕后：新锐金融力量与传统媒体的交锋 主持人高度赞扬了施克莱里在此次事件中的信息敏锐度，认为这标志着金融舆论格局的“权力交接”（changing of the guard）。当时施克莱里在自己的终端和社交平台上率先披露了清盘内幕，引发全网围观；尽管初期遭遇了质疑，但两小时后《金融时报》（Financial Times）、彭博社（Bloomberg）和《华尔街日报》（Wall Street Journal）才匆忙跟进核实报道。施克莱里解释说，传统主流媒体的记者虽然极其专业，但他们不是一线操盘手，在华尔街圈内永远不可能比真正的市场参与者更早拿到核心情报。 不过，施克莱里也强调，知情与公开之间存在巨大的职业伦理与利益冲突考量。与传统媒体为了抢头条不惜“烧毁消息源桥梁”（burning bridges）的做法截然相反，业内人士往往压着海量内幕不发。他坦言自己早就听闻了风声，但必须在“公众知情权”与“保护朋友和行业人脉”之间谨慎权衡，因为一旦出卖信任泄露融资或危机隐秘，未来就再也不会有人分享核心情报了。直到一位业内好友明确告知“现在整个圈子都在传这件事了”，施克莱里才判断秘密已守不住，决定公开消息。相比之下，传统调查媒体如 The Information 在 OpenAI 等领域的爆料能力极强，但其商业模式决定了他们必须纯粹服务于读者，而业内自媒体和专业操盘手必须维护长期的信任网络。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 对冲基金危机消息传播路径 accDescr: 展示内幕消息从核心圈子萌芽到自媒体爆料，最终流向主流媒体并引发公开市场反应的传导流程。 subgraph Core["核心圈层 (实时掌握)"] A["基金内部危机与券商逼仓"] --> B["少数业内核心操盘手/密友知情"] end subgraph Spill["消息外溢 (扩散临界点)"] B --> C["华尔街小圈子广泛流传<br/>'大家都在讨论这件事'"] C --> D["业内关键人士<br/>(施克莱里率先发推爆料)"] end subgraph Media["公开传播 (滞后确认)"] D --> E["传统财经大媒核实跟进<br/>(彭博社 / FT / 华尔街日报)"] E --> F["大众市场全面消化恐慌情绪"] end ``` --- ### [36:30](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RJdgh9eEZvw&t=2190s) 主经纪商的杠杆算盘与私有资产的流动性陷阱 对话随后转向对冲基金百亿美元级别杠杆的实际运作机制。主持人调侃道，就在一个月前，西海岸科技圈还在狂妄宣称“全面通吃金融与科技、最大对冲基金已不再属于东海岸”，结果短短三十天就被残酷的市场狠狠上了一课。施克莱里拆解了主经纪商（Prime Broker, PB）的底层商业逻辑：PB 的核心利润来源就是“融资利差”（financing spread）。如果一家基金宣称自己从不加杠杆、也很少高频交易，PB 虽会接纳其资产用于再质押（rehypothecation）转借给他人，但绝不会视其为优质客户。 相反，杠杆才是 PB 最大的摇钱树。若 PB 赚取 1%（100 个基点）的利差，基金借入 4 倍杠杆，相当于每年白白给券商奉送 400 个基点的纯利润；考虑到大型投行的实际资金拆借成本甚至远低于担保隔夜融资利率（SOFR），PB 在巨额资本上榨取的利差可能高达 600 到 800 个基点。然而，PB 的风控部门（risk department）时刻处于警惕状态：他们极度恐惧高集中度持仓和做空头寸——因为做空亏损理论上无上限（如 GameStop 轧空惨案），而普通做多最多亏光 100%；但若加了 4 倍杠杆做多，底层标的仅需下跌 25%，本金就会彻底归零。 最后，施克莱里特别指出了二级市场基金涉足一级非上市股权（privates）的致命隐患。尽管像 Altimeter 或 Coatue 这类老牌跨界基金能够审慎驾驭两栖投资，但多数对冲基金一旦跨界往往是灾难的开端。对于利奥波德而言，诱惑是显而易见的：他与 Anthropic 关系亲密无间，而 Anthropic 在过去半年中市场需求超额认购百倍、份额极度稀缺。面对这种看似稳赚不赔的稀缺资产，基金经理极易打破纪律强行配置，却忽视了一级市场资产毫无流动性，在公募组合遭遇回撤时非但无法变现救急，反而会成为锁死流动性、加速杠杆断裂的夺命绞索。 - **4 倍杠杆的清算数学**：无杠杆多头最多承受 100% 跌幅，但在 4 倍杠杆下，标的资产跌幅达 25% 即触发股权清零，强制平仓不可逆转。 - **主经纪商的暴利激励**：PB 天生鼓励客户借贷以赚取数百基点的融资利差，但繁荣期放出的巨额杠杆在流动性收紧时会迅速转变为残酷的风控屠刀。 - **非流动性私有资产的反噬**：在流动性危机爆发时，Anthropic 等热门一级股权因无法迅速抛售变现，会急剧加剧整个投资组合的抵押品短缺，最终引爆全盘清算。 ### [40:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RJdgh9eEZvw&t=2400s) 散户心态与凯利公式：为什么 99% 的交易者都会走向归零 在节目的最后，主持人请马丁·施克莱利（Martin Shkreli）聊聊对韩国市场的看法。很多人指出，莱奥波尔德·阿申布伦纳（Leopold Aschenbrenner）的投资风格与韩国散户极为相似，如今市场大跌，那边必然是一片惨状。马丁对此深表赞同，并以此引出了交易世界中最普遍、最致命的通病：仓位管理。马丁提到，传奇宏观对冲基金经理保罗·都铎·琼斯（Paul Tudor Jones）曾指出，市场上几乎每一个交易者都在重复犯同一个错误——其实际仓位规模往往是合理水平的 2 到 10 倍。为了验证这一点，马丁自己开发了一个凯利公式（Kelly Criterion）计算器兼投资组合模拟工具。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 凯利公式与下注规模对资本结果的影响 accDescr: 对比合理下注与过度下注在拥有胜率优势下的不同终局 subgraph Optimal["理性配置：凯利 / 半凯利法则"] A["交易胜率优势 Edge (如 55%)"] --> B["计算最佳下注仓位 (如 10%)"] B --> C["采用 Half Kelly 控制波动"] C --> D["资本长期稳健复利增长"] end subgraph Overbetting["致命陷阱：过度杠杆与过大仓位"] E["过度自信 / 散户心理"] --> F["下注 4x 至 5x 凯利仓位"] F --> G["数学方差放大，遭遇连续回撤"] G --> H["账户不可逆归零 (Go to Zero)"] end ``` 马丁详细解释了凯利公式的渊源与数学原理：该公式由原贝尔实验室（Bell Labs）的技术骨干（MTS）J. L. 凯利（J. L. Kelly Jr.）提出，最初主要被赌徒用于确定最优下注比例，后来才被引入金融领域。其核心在于通过胜率优势（Edge）计算最佳资金配比。举例来说，如果你拥有 55% 的胜率优势，在等额赔率下，理论上的最佳下注比例是 10%。即便如此，10% 的仓位对大多数人而言净值波动依然极为剧烈，因此专业机构通常会采用“半凯利”（Half Kelly）甚至“四分之一凯利”（Quarter Kelly）。 现实的荒谬之处在于，绝大多数交易者在市场上根本没有任何真正的优势（Edge）；然而即便假设他们有优势，他们的交易仓位却大得仿佛自己拥有 4 到 5 倍的凯利优势。马丁直言，很多人以为重仓只是“行事勇猛、敢于冒险”（swashbuckling），但只要你在模拟器里跑一下模型就会发现，过度下注的最终数学结果只有一个：“每一次都会走向彻底归零”（you will go to zero each time）。哪怕你在每一笔交易中都握有 60/40 的巨大胜率，只要仓位过重，也必然破产爆仓。更何况在真实的股市里，“根本没有人能拥有 60/40 的胜率优势”。马丁坦言，这也是他多年来付出惨痛代价才领悟的教训——自己过去几乎总是在过度下注，而几乎所有的对冲基金和散户也都在玩这场充满方差的数学死局。 - **凯利公式算例**：55% 胜率对应的理论最佳下注比例仅为 10%，过度下注会因负向方差累积导致几何平均增长率变为负数。 - **市场现实**：绝大多数散户与激进基金非但没有胜率优势，反而以相当于凯利最优值 2 到 10 倍的仓位过度暴露于市场。 --- ### [41:45](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RJdgh9eEZvw&t=2505s) SAC Capital 隐世老将的启示：超额现金、轻仓试探与人性弱点 马丁分享了一段令他印象极深的个人往事。在他离开最初任职的老虎门徒（Tiger Cub）基金后，曾在一间办公室里与一位从 SAC Capital（现 Point72）退隐的老牌投资经理共事了几个月。这位经理行事极为低调，外界鲜有人知，当时主要管理着约 3 亿到 4 亿美元的自有资金。在自己自立门户创立对冲基金之前，马丁近距离观察了这位顶尖高手的操盘方式，其投资风格让马丁感到不可思议。 这位老将在实际运作中几乎从来不重仓使用资金，账面上长期保留高达 80% 至 90% 的纯现金。面对市场机会，他从不激进出击，每次只投入极微小的仓位进行轻度试探（"just did these little nibbles"）。凭借这种极度克制与保守的仓位管理，他在长达二十多年的交易生涯中几乎从未出现过单个季度亏损，年化复合回报率稳定保持在 20% 到 30% 之间，实现了一种近乎不败的资金曲线。 然而，马丁幽默而又自嘲地反思道，这种顶级交易员的智慧并没能阻挡人性弱点。在他自己拿到资本去独立管理基金的第一瞬间，他立刻把那位老将的生存法则抛到了九霄云外，做出了完全相反的举动——直接打满 8 倍杠杆（"8x large"）重仓出击。马丁感慨道：“这是全世界最愚蠢的事情。但人总是在经历中成长，这就是投资心理学（You live and you learn. Psychology）。” 在轻松愉快的笑声中，主持人们向马丁致谢，感谢他深入拆解了阿申布伦纳基金爆仓背后的杠杆机制与市场教训。马丁表示与大家交流非常尽兴，双方互道周末愉快并期待下一次节目录制，访谈在融洽的气氛中正式收尾。 - **顶尖交易员的仓位哲学**：管理 3 亿至 4 亿美元自有资金，日常持有 80% 至 90% 现金储备，以微小仓位博取不对称回报。 - **传奇战绩**：20 多年交易生涯几乎无单季回撤，年化收益率稳定维持在 20% 至 30%。 - **人性的贪婪与反思**：明知稳健之道，年轻管理者在掌控资金时仍极易被“满仓加杠杆”的冲动所吞噬，风险控制的关键最终落脚于克制本能的心理修炼。 ## Notable quotes > [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RJdgh9eEZvw&t=0s) 对着基金打靶 — Martin Shkreli > [02:18](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RJdgh9eEZvw&t=138s) 全都不重要 — Martin Shkreli > [05:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RJdgh9eEZvw&t=300s) 这些资产现在归我们接管，如何处置由我们说了算。 — Martin Shkreli > [06:50](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RJdgh9eEZvw&t=410s) 是的，Leopold 确实飞得太高太靠近太阳了 — Martin Shkreli > [10:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RJdgh9eEZvw&t=600s) 通用人工智能即将降临，届时整个金融体系都将彻底失效，不如拉满杠杆狂欢到世界末日 — Martin Shkreli > [15:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RJdgh9eEZvw&t=900s) 只要水里泛起一丝血腥味，整个华尔街就会联手把这些仓位砸到零；为了逼你在 3 块钱清算，大家甚至不惜先把美光砸到 5 块钱。 — Martin Shkreli > [20:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RJdgh9eEZvw&t=1200s) 向屏幕卖出 — Martin Shkreli > [20:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RJdgh9eEZvw&t=1200s) 我们这里有个相当大的卖家 — Martin Shkreli > [25:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RJdgh9eEZvw&t=1500s) 我绝对不建议任何人这么干 — Martin Shkreli > [30:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RJdgh9eEZvw&t=1800s) 在实现 AGI 之前显然还有 100 倍的空间 — Leopold Aschenbrenner > [40:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RJdgh9eEZvw&t=2400s) 每一次都会走向彻底归零 — Martin Shkreli > [40:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RJdgh9eEZvw&t=2400s) 根本没有人能拥有 60/40 的胜率优势 — Martin Shkreli > [41:45](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RJdgh9eEZvw&t=2505s) 这是全世界最愚蠢的事情。但人总是在经历中成长，这就是投资心理学 — Martin Shkreli ## Mentioned Martin Shkreli, Leopold Aschenbrenner, Situational Awareness LP, Jim Cramer, 长期资本管理公司 (LTCM), Amaranth Advisors, Citadel, Millennium Management, Jane Street, Anthropic, Warren Buffett, Ken Griffin, Goldman Sachs, Bank of America, Archegos Capital Management, Ryan Jacob, Jacob Internet Fund, 蔡至勇 (Gerald Tsai), Manhattan Fund, Cathie Wood, FTX, OpenAI, Microsoft, Google, Meta, Tiger Global, Dwarkesh Patel, George Soros, Tim Cook, Apple, Sharon AI, Nebius, Fidelity, Micron Technology, 铠侠 (Kioxia), Peter Thiel, Thiel Macro, Financial Times, Bloomberg, The Wall Street Journal, The Information, Altimeter Capital, Coatue, Paul Tudor Jones, J. L. Kelly Jr., 贝尔实验室 (Bell Labs), Point72 (SAC Capital) ## Video description This is our full interview with Martin Shkreli. We discussed the collapse of Leopold Aschenbrenner's AI-focused hedge fund, why leverage turns market corrections into disasters, how Wall Street unwinds massive positions, why AI infrastructure stocks sold off despite record AI demand, whether the AI trade has further to fall, and much more. 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[0:00] Martin Shkreli: 对着基金打靶 [2:18] Martin Shkreli: 全都不重要 [5:00] Martin Shkreli: 这些资产现在归我们接管，如何处置由我们说了算。 [6:50] Martin Shkreli: 是的，Leopold 确实飞得太高太靠近太阳了 [10:00] Martin Shkreli: 通用人工智能即将降临，届时整个金融体系都将彻底失效，不如拉满杠杆狂欢到世界末日 [15:00] Martin Shkreli: 只要水里泛起一丝血腥味，整个华尔街就会联手把这些仓位砸到零；为了逼你在 3 块钱清算，大家甚至不惜先把美光砸到 5 块钱。 [20:00] Martin Shkreli: 向屏幕卖出 [20:00] Martin Shkreli: 我们这里有个相当大的卖家 [25:00] Martin Shkreli: 我绝对不建议任何人这么干 [30:00] Leopold Aschenbrenner: 在实现 AGI 之前显然还有 100 倍的空间 [40:00] Martin Shkreli: 每一次都会走向彻底归零 [40:00] Martin Shkreli: 根本没有人能拥有 60/40 的胜率优势 [41:45] Martin Shkreli: 这是全世界最愚蠢的事情。但人总是在经历中成长，这就是投资心理学

[5:00] Martin Shkreli: No prime broker is going to let you keep $90 billion of gross market value because once you dip your equity below zero, it's their loss, not yours... They basically call you in and say, 'Listen, these are our assets now. So we're going to decide what their disposition is going to be.' [15:00] Martin Shkreli: The hyperscalers and the big companies, they FOMO'd too. They FOMO'd just as hard as Leopold did, if not harder... Who had the guts other than one man, Tim Cook, in the back saying, 'Not me. Do nothing, win'? [10:00] Wall Street Traders: These people are fucking nuts. It's just the stock market.

[0:00] Let's bring in Martin Scrawley to break it down for us. I believe he's here. How are you doing, Martin? Good to see you again. Hey, guys. I'm doing great. How are you? Oh, perfect. Perfect. How's your last? Take us through it. 24 hours. What's the last 24 hours been like for you? It's been interesting. I do invest myself. So it's been probably one of the craziest months in Wall Street history. I was talking to some friends last night about long-term capital management, Amaranth, other famous liquidity-driven blowups. And this is up there. And yeah, it's just a really crazy thing. We had heard rumors sort of mid-last week, and then they really started crystallizing last night and this morning, obviously, sort of a fait accompli. And I actually think they did a wonderful job of keeping it relatively quiet. I think some players were already positioning, say, early in the week, Monday, Tuesday, looking to do what my old boss Kramer used to call shooting against a fund. So if you know somebody has to liquidate the best thing for you to do unfortunately sadly Darwinian is to go sell all the positions you have in common and go start shorting everything they have And it accelerates the sort of downfall as quickly as you can And this is a very common practice when these things happen. Certainly not something I had overlapped positions with him, so certainly not something I would do. But no wide number of funds that were shorting all of these stocks, hoping to cause a panic and a crash. How do you trace back the start of this correction? Is it the war? Is it oil? Is it jitters around open source or just hyperscaler capbacks? There's so many different narratives around why the AI infrastructure trade, the bottleneck trade might be weakening. At the same time, it feels like there's some really solid progress and the models are progressing along like pretty like as expected. Yeah, you have the labs having some of the best months in business history of any companies ever, but then all the infrastructure correcting. Yeah, none of that stuff matters. The only thing that matters is the propensity of the buyer and seller to buy yourself. and what you had happen was the smart guys get in early, start buying see the prices go up buy some more and then less smart guys take note and say I want to do that I want to be up 400 this year too Guys like me started buying right near the top It's just like, hey, this is great. I love memory. I love bottlenecks. And then, but the weakest hands are buying at the top, so they're also the first to sell, Sure. First to panic. Yeah. And it just creates this like, you know, every bubble is sort of the same. You have this euphoria, this peak, and then, you know, everyone sort of panics at once. And, you know, the fundamentals basically don't make a difference. You know, I think they, you know, they sort of drive the marginal buyer and seller. But, you know, the 80 or 90 percent of the assets shareholders don't change hands. It's that 5 percent of the margin that's deciding the price. And if that 5% is in the state where they're levered up 3x, or 4x, as we heard, SALP was a 4x levered fund, which is a lot of leverage. A 25% drawdown takes you out of business. Interestingly, we heard that three firms were bidding on the assets. so uh jane street millennium and citadel were sort of brought in in a closed closed circle sort of late friday to to bid on the remains of the firm And we got offered a look at million of Anthropik stock which we were puzzled by You know, sometimes you see these SPVs, sort of interest comes across, you know, here and there. And we thought that was interesting. I sort of raised my eyebrow and I was like, is that Leopold? is because sometimes when you want to sell $4 billion or something, you don't come out and say you want to sell $4 billion. You come out and you say you want to sell $100 million of it. And usually a guy who wants to buy $100 is enough to buy $500 or more. And you sort of fill him out and say, here's $100. Okay, do you want $500 by any chance? And then your eyebrow starts to raise a little bit that maybe he's got even more. Now, of course, this is a really odd situation. So we heard Millennium did put in a bid. Citadel's bid was better. I think Ken wants to be the guy that everyone goes to when they're in trouble. Buffett is getting older. This is not the kind of stuff Buffett wants to do anyway. But Citadel did this in the Amaranth deal. When Amaranth blew up natural gas futures, I think Citadel took that portfolio and first [5:00] Every blow up in finance. Well, you have Enron where they just raided all the talent. Yeah, they wanted to do an Enron as well. I think they just sort of can is very smart guy sort of shows up and says, you know, how can I, you know, how can I, you know, be a partner to the Goldman's and the Bank of America's when they need to get out, you know, of a really risky position. They basically take it, take over the book. Right. So if you I'll give you sort of an example and you're asking the question. So let's say, you know, you're at $45 billion, you know, sort of try to trace this back. And you're, you know, $10 billion of that is in Anthropik from what we understood. So you have $30 billion of cash in your bank account. And running Forex Labyrinth means you have $120 billion gross market value. oh um so if your gmv drops i don't know 25 percent that doesn't sound so bad at 120 billion uh maybe that's you know i don't know uh 30 billion so you're down to 90 billion but that's not your equity so your equity drops from 35 billion to 5 billion yeah no no prime broker is going to let you keep 90 billion of gross market value because once you dip your equity below zero it their loss not yours And they not going to lose a penny after Archegos and after these other kind of blow ups That's not their job. And they kind of have the right to take over your portfolio, which is sort of, you know, something I hope nobody ever has to experience. But they basically call you in and say, listen, you know, these are our assets now. So we're going to decide what their disposition is going to be. And the rumor is over the weekend, he contacted about 10 parties to place Anthropic in an effort to shore up liquidity, selling the Anthropic stake for allegedly the offer was at $1.1 trillion equivalent market cap, which I think is roughly where it's trading. And it's unclear whether that was sold or half of it was sold, is what we reported. that half of it was sold. It's still a little unclear who bought that, what's happening exactly, but that's the best we've got. And then when it came to the public book, it does sound like the buyer of that book basically got a from what we were told a three to four billion dollar Insta markup So they basically now have to work out of to billion more than to billion quite a lot more. But in essence, if they work out of these positions without disrupting the market, they'll have printed $3 to $4 billion on the trade, which is unusual and interesting trade, but really exciting. One of the parties reached out to me last night, one of these three parties, interestingly, after my reporting, and they said that, in essence, it's on the substance, yes, Leopold flew a little too close to the sun, and your numbers are a little off. And I asked what direction, and they wouldn't confirm or deny. I received a lot of pushback on the reporting, to your point, privately and publicly, that it's not so bad, and that he's only down 30%. 30% you can kind of live with. But also, if Anthropic hasn't changed its mark, that means you were down 60% in the public book. And if you're Forex levered, that means you're sort of down 15% on the public book, which sounds too good to be true. If you're trading these stocks, they were down like 15% a day. So we also heard the other AI funds are hurting maybe not as much as in trouble but certainly hurting as well Where does the fund go from He gives some good cover to all the funds that were effectively copy trading him Oh, sure. Maybe even being more risk on and later to these positions because they're naturally just late if you're trying to copy trade someone. Trying to catch up. Yeah, you're trying to catch up. More leverage. You're coming into these trades way later. Do you recall, like, how did you process Ryan Jacob around the year 2000? Because you were at Kramer's firm, I believe. You joined maybe right before the Ryan Internet Fund started collapsing. Yeah, there was also the Amaranth Fund. fund, there was a fund in the 60s called the Manhattan Fund that Warren Buffett criticized for being the go-go kind of lazy fund, run by a guy named Gerald Tsai. And so like every generation, you've seen the memes about Kathy, you know, every generation has it, you know, the guy that believes in that cycle and it goes balls to the walls on that cycle. And look, I have a lot of respect for somebody who's [10:00] who's willing to do that i i used to tell a friend who who kind of did the same thing he followed this trade but he was very early so he had sort of leopold like numbers um and he sort of did hedge at at what sounds like close to the top so sort of a miracle um trader best trader i know and i joked with him i said you know if leopold sells at the top and turns short like i i will absolutely adulate him as the greatest of all time it's just that you know usually when you're so spellbound by that narrative of whatever is happening, in this case AGI. There are people out there that say, look, AGI is here slash coming. When it comes, the entirety of finance is not relevant anymore. We might as well just run it up and kind of see the end of days this way. And of course, there's some guy sitting on a trading desk at Goldman Sachs. These people are fucking nuts. It's just the stock market. I think it's a deal. Given that Leopold had been at FTX right up until the fall, did you think that maybe as risk-on as he was, maybe he was like, you know what, I can't go through that again. He wasn necessarily directly tied to any of the nefarious activity at FTX but he did have to viscerally experience it and I believe resign the day of the collapse And I just would have expected to run it back so quickly. You would expect even go and have a normal great career for a decade, whatever, then maybe come back to leverage and be like, I'm ready to dance again. There's a lot of questions. One question is, what's his carry? A lot of firms in the hedge fund industry, believe it or not, they have clawback provisions for carry. Like high watermark provisions, right? So you have to clear something? Sure. Everyone has a high watermark, but what's increasingly happened is a carry provision where you have to return the two and 20 you earned if you have a severe drawdown, which could actually end up being a tough situation. Now, as you guys know, the fellow is getting married this weekend as well, which is, you know, a little bit of tragedy with a little bit of triumph mixed in. But obviously, you know, when this kind of thing happens. How common are those clawback clauses? Because you have to imagine in this fundraiser you had like massive massive leverage you know Demand was very high Demand was very high That feels like a term The numbers were so good Yeah it a more institutional thing And you know speaking of which you know obviously the guy basically had no experience And again, in times like this, nobody wants to gravedance. And I'm not doing that. But I had some institutional friends, one of the biggest fund of funds in New York, for example, who passed on Leopold, basically laughed at him and said, you know, there's no way I could invest in this. And of course, you know, he goes on this tear, you know, makes like 20 X or whatever it was since inception and does fantastic. And he feels sort of sheepish, but ultimately, you know, somewhat vindicated after all of this. So you did have a manager that had no experience, kind of a long only or extremely long biased, starts through privates, which for many hedge funds is kind of the death knell. you know when hedge funds put on their VC cap and try to do what those guys do it often doesn't end well and that goes back like you know 50 years basically of hedge fund history and very few people have been able to do both and the other thing I'd point out is we're going to see July numbers very soon here from quite a lot of hedge funds that I think we in the same trade Sure And so this this is not just Leopold hundred billion gross It like that times maybe five or ten And while the market liquid that a lot of downward pressure in a few weeks And, you know, it's amazing to see this all compressed in a month, whereas like the dotcom bubble took three or four years to like patiently go up and patiently go down. You know, seeing that compress instantly is interesting. What's going to happen next is really going to be fascinating. There's some theory out there that, you know, that we see all-time highs again now that all this liquidity is out. And there's other theories there that we actually were just having this nice big downtrend and that this liquidity pop will fade and we'll be back down further and further. You know, nobody knows what will happen, but it's certainly, while you're right that, you know, the Anthropics and OpenAI are having record business results, so is Microsoft and Google, and Meta for that matter, there's still, I think, some more discerning questions about is this CapEx investment worth it? Sure. They rewarded Microsoft for being prudent. They punished Meta and Google for not being prudent. So one wonders what the future will bring there. But yeah, it's not as crazy as things have gotten on Wall Street in many years, probably at least since FTX, and certainly crazier than the sort of Tiger [15:00] Bank venture boom of 21 and then you know really since then the away insanity so it's it's um it's quite a spectacle and I think you know no matter how much people want to learn the lesson of leverage over and over and over again we all seem to repeat it and you know it is what it is but I think that the Jane the Jane Citadel Millennium kind of like entire hedge fund complex sort of becoming this shadow bank is quite interesting. These guys are sort of there to... Normally, the banks would sort of take this on the chin, but now that there's other folks who are like... Jane was an LP, for example, and reportedly was not interested in bidding, which is fascinating. May have taken the Anthropic, however. Really unclear. We're going to learn more, obviously, as some days go on here, but it's an unprecedented time and really an insane story that may just get more insane as we learn more. Is there a world where the fund continues? Because I'm just hearing the numbers and it's like, you know, up at 45 billion, the actual money into the fund was maybe 5 billion or something if you sell the positions There a world where you wind up with like 10 billion in a bank account and the LPs are like well we gave you five Keep going Get back in the game. I hope that's the case for the LPs who are awesome and for the fund manager who obviously got quite a lot of whiplash. But at the end of the day, there's this concept on the street, is, as you guys know, like, once there's blood in the water, like, these positions would go to zero. Like, we'll send Micron to $5, you know, just to liquidate this guy at three, right? Like, that's, you know, the craziest thing is like, that's the nature of Wall Street. When this happens, and there's a guy that has to sell 100 billion, you'll have a trillion dollars in front of him just like, you know, let's see this guy cry uncle, and it's the saddest kind of most Machiavellian thing. But like, he had, he sort of had to blow up. You know, there's no other ending, sadly. Yeah. Because of the leverage level, it's just like one slight, you know, I remember my old boss who was a Tiger portfolio manager, reminded me of the 2000 era where there's this very slight change in tone from one optical component supplier. And that like him and his partner from Soros just decided to go like as short as they could Because they knew ultimately these vulnerable hands were sort of sitting there After the easy part of the bubble was over, you had this like, okay, what's next? Things have to get a lot crazier. You saw Dworkesh's tweet. Things like that would have to sort of happen for there to be enough second derivative for somebody to be surprised. You know, everyone knows AI's in this boom. Everyone knows chips are in this boom. What could possibly shock you to the upside? Not much. So if you hear any little like, you know, we're not going to spend as much, the whole shit hits the fan. And it's just too heavy. So I actually wonder if we're, you know, if we're not in for a longer, more protracted decline. Things feel great today. You know, we have this huge boom, this relief rally. A lot of the froth is out of the system. But, you know, what next? You know, I don't know that, you know, a patient and calm market is going to emerge. because you had the hyperscalers and the big companies, they FOMO'd too. They FOMO'd just as hard as Leopold did, if not harder. This isn't just him. It's the whole world collectively saying fuck I got to go all in on AI Who had the guts other than one man Tim Cook in the back saying not me Do nothing win Yeah No really it is Tim Cook Yeah Yeah the funny thing you know we had been joking We were joking in, like, Q4 when, you know, prior to, like, coding agents really starting to rip, you know, OpenAI revenue growth had, like, slowed a little bit, and, like, there was some jitters, and a lot of this stuff wasn't, you know, public at the time, but you could tell some of the kind of crossover types were like getting a little nervous, right? They kind of expected something to happen. MAU, DAU numbers. Yeah, yeah. You know, really plateaued. And then there was a correction. Like there was like briefly, you know, for a period, it was probably like eight weeks. It was like, okay, like, and then it started ripping again. And we were taking like a sort of a bit of a joking, like victory lap being like, cool, like AI corrected, you know. Bubble popped. Now we're able to build back sustainably. We're good from here on out. It's smooth sailing. No, I completely agree with you. I think the most unexpected thing would be if we saw brand new all-time highs for the entire thing. I think almost everyone on Wall Street is skeptical this will happen, which means it has a chance of happening, obviously. [20:00] You're saying there's a chance. I love it. Can you give me a little bit more insider baseball on what it takes to unwind a big position as a shareholder? Because a lot of people who are not inside the hedge fund world are sort of maybe confused around, okay, yeah, you own $50 million of a $1 billion chip stock. Can't you just dump that on retail? Can't you just sell that on E-Trade or Robinhood? And in fact, it's much more complicated when you're at this level, even though it's public markets. There's not just a big button. Can you walk us through what it actually takes to sell a big position when you're at that level? Yeah, there's a lot that goes into it, interestingly. So the first is you have this advertisement system. So if you sell into the market, you can try that. and that's called selling it to the screens. The screens are the numbers on your screen. Anybody could buy and sell, Robinhood, whatever. So you don't normally do that if you can help it. Selling on screens is at least somewhat quiet. You can just sort of trickle out There always this conspiracy that as I selling on the screens there some guy who can see my screen and he like this guy got a VWAT market order to sell 10 million shares That like you know I going to tell somebody And that knowledge should be very very powerful And there's even some even crazier conspiracies out there that quants can actually use different all kinds of insane ideas around what they can do to sort of sniff out that this is happening. So there's people that are scared of that. Then you can pick up the phone and this is the way you normally do it. And you call Goldman and you say, listen, I need to sell five, you know, five million shares of Microsoft or something like that. And they say, hmm, you know, should we take it or do we find a guy that wants to take it? And they'll sort of try to decide. Now, Microsoft is easy. If you're trying to sell Sharon AI, a neocloud in Australia that nobody wants, that's a tough one. And you own like 10 days of volume. So if you try to hit the screens, you have 10 days of volume. You have to be the entire volume for 10 days before you'd be out. You'd probably take the stock down 50% or more. And you don't want to do that. So you try to do this advertisement process, you know, and you basically can post in the stock market that you're a seller of a stock. And you can post that your four digit what called MarketMaker ID And so Goldman is GSEO so GSEO would be a seller of say you know Nebius which was one of his positions and so you call up you say okay Goldman I'm a client too of Goldman uh you know what do you got on Nebius and and the guy would say listen we got a pretty big seller here you know and say how big you know half a million shares and he's like, a lot bigger. So you'd say, hmm, okay. Because they have to advertise that they're working your order. So they have to sort of tell people that there's a seller. They kind of are trying to be coy about how big, but they're not going to waste somebody's time either. So the guy who's heard that there's a big seller, well, he might turn around. He's not supposed to do this. He sort of might turn around and say, there's a huge seller of Nebius out there, and I'm just a little baby fish. maybe I could short 50,000 shares and get in front of this guy. If you're an actual interested buyer, you might also still be nervous because you'd say, well, if he's really got a ton of size, I might have to be judicious about how I stepped in. And so if you combine that with the sort of like pressure in the market and you add it all up, and then usually what you do is you'd have to say, oh I know a guy that works there and let see if he returning calls And you know When you hit up the guy and he not on Bloomberg it hard to reach It kind of like well it sounds like it could be them selling So it's not too many people that own that many shares of that security. So you look at the holders list and you're sort of like, who could it be selling 10 million shares? So you call Fidelity and they say, no, we're not selling. You call the next guy. No, we're not selling. Next guy's an ETF. Next guy's an index fund. You know, it's got to be him, you know. And so if it's them and then you start noticing all their positions are down, it gets really hard. So ultimately, the bank decides because you might say, you know, I don't want to sell. The bank says, I don't care what you want. We're selling regardless. And Goldman Sachs is not in the business of holding AI stocks. You know, we're going to sell at any price we can because our board would rather know for sure that we're down a billion and just take the rip the bandaid off than to wonder if we could lose 50. And so it's Goldman's position that we're just going to just cut the arm off right now before it metastasizes. And so they'll do a fire sale. And of course, Goldman's smart. They're going to reach out to a guy like Citadel or somebody else to place it carefully. But selling the whole portfolio in one shot was a very smart move. Now, again, we've heard the discount could have been as big as, you know, 20 to 50 percent, which is, you know, [25:00] mouth-watering discount to buy some quality companies at. But to end it and have finality, what was really to answer the question finally, what you really needed to do is the buyer of these stocks has to have the liquidity to hold them for five years and do nothing. Because the market, guys like me, to a very small extent, and guys too much bigger will sit there and say, I don't think you can hold this. And they'll start shorting it and shorting it and shorting it and trying to make you cry uncle. Kyosha in Japan, one of Leopold's holdings, also one of mine, is trading at three times earnings. You're forcing the guy to sell. If you're going to hold this stock, you have to make sure that you can hold it until it's two times earnings or one times earnings. The only player big enough and more powerful enough to hold $100 billion and not blink is somebody like a Citadel. Even still, some keep the rumors out there that there are people who are going to try to crush your Citadel, which I wouldn't advise, you know, but something like that where, you know, maybe they'll have now have to suffer the same contagion. So it's a very crazy time in the markets. And I don't think we've seen everything yet, because I do think there are some large tech funds that have had the same trade on I do think liquidation is over thankfully But I do think that there are some funds that are about to be found out to be down 30 or down 40 or something like that Take me through the mind of Ken Griffin like a couple weeks ago There this rumor that he was sort of like pushing or signaling that there might be a rate hike. But what I'm interested in is if you suspect that there's going to be a fire sale on X, Y, and Z companies, is there a world where you build the hedges before you acquire those assets? Or is that too 4D chess? Because if they wind up acquiring these for 50%, 20% off, but they already have offsets, then they sort of come in market neutral. Is that possible? I don't think so. So I'm familiar with Citadel's performance for this month, which is surprisingly up. So I think they're probably one of the only hedge funds in the world. It's up very small. They were actually hedged is what you're saying? Yes. They have a diverse platform of different businesses, a guy trading weather, a guy trading rates, a guy trading stocks, about 1,000 guys trading stocks. They have a computer fund called Citadel Securities that is a market maker that trades a good chunk of the volume of every instrument in the world And ultimately I think that the prime brokers the Goldman and Bank of America they do so much business with Citadel, and they've done this before where they know who to go to just the same way the US government went to Warren Buffett when they wanted to shore up Goldman. They know that the right person to call is Ken, and he is really going out of his way to make himself the guy to call. I think that is a great brand because you may not need to be that guy more than once a decade, but look, once a decade to make a free $5 billion or $10 billion is a great guy to be. It's sort of like he becomes a dependable, trusted partner to these banks. If he wants something from the banks, he's helped them because without him, they might have had to sell that at a negative number. In fact, some people think I don't think this is what happened, but some people actually think the equity in Leopold's prime brokerage accounts went negative, which I think is something that, again, the Goldman's and Bank of America's try to stop you before you get there. But they also don't want to sell, like I said, share in AI, which is an illiquid, tough-to-sell security. They sell out your Micron very fast or you sell it out before then But if you left holding this bag of liquid crap that you have 60 days of volume to get out of it pretty tough to sit there and tell your prime broker don worry Which is why again I think he needed cash Probably somebody on Monday or Tuesday tapped them on the shoulder and said, your margin's looking a little thin, you know, can you add, you know, a couple billion here or more? And things happened so quickly that there was just no time. I think Citadel learned about this at the 11th hour, as you're supposed to. The firm didn't leak out that they were hurting. They didn't have, to my knowledge, daily performance. In fact, from what I'm told, situational awareness as a young hedge fund was not so great with communication, not surprising, especially with monthly and quarterly letters, could have been more timely on some of those. So it's a small group of a couple of guys. So I don't think that this was the same where... You rewind, what was it, only a month ago that the... 13F was late. 13F was like late and everyone was questioning like, did he work out some kind of deal to get it confidential? But it sounded like you just like didn't get around to it. They had other priorities maybe. Do you think you can... Yeah, I mentioned... [30:00] build a career as a venture investor because in venture you're just gigalong always. It's one of the few forms of investing where it's just so hard to get out of position. That's the thing. Why become a hedge fund manager? I have a friend who wants to start a hedge fund. I told him, this is the most painful, horrible business in the world. Why do this? If you start a newsletter business that makes $100 million a year, even $50 million a year of revenue, you've done better than almost every hedge fund on the planet. You do not want to do this job. The reason people do it, and I did it too, and I would never do it again, is it's the sexiest thing in the world. The glory is incredible. The glory is the master of the universe. I had friends wanting to quit really high-profile jobs to be a hedge fund. I was just like, you're out of your mind. You don't know what this job is. waking up at 3 a.m., checking Korean stock prices and, you know, waking up back up at 6, you know, wondering what's happening in the world, stuff like this. And there's absolutely no productive thing you're doing. You know, you're providing capital. You know but other than that you know you really playing this high stakes crazy poker game And you know it certainly fun and interesting But when it painful and raw you know I hope he do something You know he a brilliant person brilliant people like that I mean, look, Peter Thiel had a hedge fund that didn't quite have this level of liquidation or anything like that. But it had a rough last few years. And, you know, Teal was able to obviously not only continue his venture investing efforts, creating one of the biggest funds of all time, one of the most successful funds of all time, investing personally doing amazing, also getting back into macro trading with Teal Macro, which supposedly has done well. So I do think there is this like period of a few years that, you know, he can reset and take the learnings, take whatever talent and skill and certainly genius that nobody denies that he's a brilliant guy and rebuild. I don't think it's the end at all. And I hope he's keeping that even temperament about this because I think a lot of people respect him quite a lot. No matter how this turned out, he'll be back and successful. But it is a little bit of a humiliation thing that I think most people on Twitter and other places are sort of saying, well, the market tends to humble you. And this is like an extremely humbling moment from being you know just two months separated from the biggest hedge fund on planet Earth and most successful to being forced to sort of liquidate that is quite a rapid sort of reversal Also, just imagining what the fund looks like in two or three years if you just survive, right? There was a clip that was circulating yesterday from his appearance on Dwarf Cash where he's like, oh, there's obviously like 100x, you know, left before AGI, right? So like he was like up, you know, 20x or whatever, thinking like I got so much room to run, but I just couldn't stay in the game. I got to say, I got to say, it felt like a huge moment for you and your business, just because everyone, the whole finance world was learning about the situation. from your posts. I'm sure a lot of people were glued to your terminal. And it felt like a changing of the guard because, again, you were getting pushback. You were getting some pushback. But then two hours later, it was like Financial Times and Bloomberg and Wall Street Journal. They all kind of clearly they needed a couple hours to like run it down But you got to it first and yeah I was quite impressed Thank you Yeah I mean I think that you know we talked about this in the past I mean, there is a change of the guard. You guys helped change the guard in your space. And I think that, you know, the folks at the Journal, the folks at Bloomberg, the folks at these other companies, they're fantastic reporters, but they're not active or former players. And, you know, we will hear we will always hear things before them, because especially on the street, because that's just. Well, the crazy the craziest thing is you you actually waited until it was like over effectively to share. Right. Like you had been hearing about this. There's a lot to sit on. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. And we, you know, we've been in that position like hundreds of times where it's not appropriate to share anything. And sometimes you're sitting there being like, I'm really surprised that, like, legacy media hasn't picked up on this story. It feels like it's just common knowledge and there's definitely a time and place to just not say anything and let something work its way through the system. Yeah. I mean, to give the devil their due, the information is also quite good at, you know, this type of thing. And they are particularly good at scoops on OpenAI. [35:00] which I still haven't unraveled how, but they're obviously very good reporters. But a reporter in a place like that, in Trad Media, they generally don't care about burning bridges and resources or contacts. So they want that news out yesterday. You know, I do care. And it also is a conflict of interest because I don't want to hurt somebody that's given me good information and betray their confidence because I have to keep the confidence of these folks if I want to keep talking to them. But I also in the case of this situation, as the carnage is unfolding, you know, there's sort of the balancing the need for everyone to know with the need for, you know, protecting friendships and relationships. You have to make that judgment call each time. And I hope that our customers understand that there will be things that we know before others we can't disclose because we want to protect folks and protect our friends. Bloomberg, Wall Street Journal, they'll never do that. They're always going to serve their customer who is the reader. We can't necessarily do that. You probably know things about a litany, like you said, hundreds of times, different fundraisers going on, different things like that. And we have to all keep our lives closed because, you know, that will be the last time we hear about a fundraise And I think that this was a situation where it sort of merited discussion it was going to happen momentarily anyway i in fact to your to your point the thing that got me to publish was my friend saying everyone is hearing this now once that happened i said all right well you know it's time to let i can let the cat out of the bag it's about to be let out anyway so yeah I have two more quick questions if you have a minute. One is just about how leverage works at a hedge fund. I think, again, from the retail perspective, from the much smaller player, you might know that you can go to a brokerage and get a little bit of leverage. But what does the process look like as you're scaling into the tens of billions of leverage? At a certain point, you have to go to all of the banks, certain banks. Who's actually – like what is that process to get leverage at that scale actually look like? And also let's appreciate for a moment that I feel like just a month ago, the West Coast broadly was taking this insane victory lap being like the West Coast is Eaton. The best and biggest hedge fund is no longer on the East Coast. We just have everything now finance and technology and then just deeply humbled within the span of 30 days And it turns out you guys over there, you know a thing or two, and here we are asking you, so how would one go about getting? One of the things that I think is not well understood is the prime broker make a spread on, I think this is somewhat understood, is they make their business to make a spread on financing. So if you go to a prime broker and say, I'm never going to use leverage, never? They say, I'm never going to use leverage and I'm never going to really trade a lot with your firm. They're just going to just sit there and say, we'll still take the assets because we can rehypothecate them and lend them to the guys that are going to take leverage. But in general, that's not a great customer. So if they're making a 1% spread, which is actually a relatively huge amount, and you're borrowing Forex, you're actually giving them 400 basis points of free money, which is fantastic. In fact, their borrowing costs are probably less than so far. So you know they may be getting as much as 600 or 800 bips of free money on huge amounts of capital So leverage is the best friend to a prime broker Now the risk guy is sitting there saying well wait a second You know I love lending, but I don't like lending to concentrated portfolios. I don't like lending to short sellers. You know, short sellers can can get big, big, big, you know, leaps in their portfolio. It's like GameStop, for example. So the most that a long can lose is 100 percent. But if a Forex lever, the most long that loses 25%. So, you know, there's sort of this mix of things you have to think about. I think the getting into the privates is usually, like, for me, a really bad sign for almost every fund because it's as tantalizing as private companies are, there is a whole group of people on the West Coast who are much better at that than the guys on the East Coast. And of course, there are funds now like Altimeter and Co2 and others that are doing both and doing both judiciously. And what made And that what made it so tempting, obviously, for Leopold, is just how close he is to, like, he couldn't be closer to Anthropic. And it's a company that over the last six months has had 100x the demand relative to the allocation, right? So it just felt like, you know, and I don't know, who knows what the structure on those investments look like. But it's like, if you're going to break your rule and do privates, like, then that's the company [40:00] But then you still get into a situation where you're like, wow, I really wish this was more liquid. I can't press the sell button. Give us an update before you leave on on Korea broadly, because, you know, a lot of people are commenting on on on just how similar Leopold's approaches to Korean retail. I don't know how true that is, but I can imagine there's blood in the water over there, and the whole country is probably in shambles. Yeah, I think so. I made a Cali Criterion calculator and a little portfolio simulator tool that basically, and Paul Trader Jones said this a while back, and I had a problem with this. every single trader out there makes makes one seems to make the same mistake over and over again which is their position size is probably 2 to 10 X more than should be and if you actually you know so it sounds nuts right yeah but if you actually run the simulator and we ours up Kelly dot Kelly so Kelly was a guy at Bell Labs he was a member of the technical staff his original oh oh gee The MTS. And so Kelly came up with the proof called famously the Kelly Criterion, which gamblers use. Mostly it was a gambler thing before a financing, and it proves the optimal bet size. And the optimal bet size is your edge. It's attracted by the reciprocal of it. So if you have 55% edge, your optimal bet size is 10%. That's still quite volatile for folks. And so people do half Kelly or quarter Kelly. Most folks actually don't have an edge when they trade. But if they did have an edge, they're trading as if they had 4x or 5x Kelly edge, which is interestingly, like you might sound, okay, well, that just sounds swashbuckling and like that takes a lot of risk. No if you run the simulator you will go to zero each time And the simulator is a really cool tool that shows you even with a 60 edge on every trade you make you go bust if you overbet It an eye You might say, who has a 60-40 edge on the stock market? Nobody has a 60-40 edge. You will absolutely go bust if you don't size correctly. It's something that I've had to learn very painfully over the years that I'm almost always overbetting. I think every fund is sort of the same, and certainly every retailer is the same. And it's just sort of a weird variance math game that very few people actually map out and say, can I simulate portfolio and just to see what is sort of the right thing to do in most cases? And in fact, after I left the Tiger Cup I worked at, I worked briefly in the office of a guy who worked at SAC Capital, now called Point72, for years. And he was one of the best managers. He's a quiet guy nobody's ever heard of, kind of retired. But I got to watch him before I set up my own hedge fund and did the exact opposite, way over metal and everything. I got to sit with this guy for a few months and I was astounded. What I found is that he was managing, I don't know, 300 or 400 million of his own basically. He almost never used the capital. 80, 90% of the capital was just cash and he would just make these tiny trades. The guy had almost never had a down quarter in 20 something years of trading. He had like 20%, 30% returns, which was great. The guy just did these little nibbles. He never lost money. It was an incredible thing. Of course, the second I get the chance to get some capital, I'm 8x large. It's the dumbest thing in the world. You live and you learn. Psychology. Thanks so much for coming on the show and breaking it down. Thank you, guys. This is always a great time. Yeah, looking forward to the rest of your time. Yeah, seeing where we go from here. Have a great week. Have a great weekend. We'll talk to you soon. Cheers, Martin.