Bessent Sells Euros in Joint Intervention to Halt Yen Slide

贝森特联合干预中抛售欧元以遏制日元跌势 这场罕见的美方外汇干预在保护美债收益率的同时，利用日本潜在的基础财政收支平衡，将日元汇率锚定在160附近。 在本期节目中，Brad Setser 与主持人 Tracy Alloway 和 Joe Weisenthal 一同探讨了旨在捍卫被严重低估日元的前所未有的美日联合干预。Setser 解释了东亚创纪录的贸易顺差为何会被大规模资本外流、贸易对冲动态以及押注日本央行谨慎加息的投机性空头头寸所抵消。他详细分析了美国通过抛售欧元并利用美联储 FEMA 回购便利工具以避免扰乱美债市场的战术机制，同时通过指出日本平衡的基础财政预算与美国巨额财政赤字的对比，驳斥了关于日本财政不稳定的广泛论调。 美国财政部长 Scott Bessent 携手日本启动 15 年来首次联合汇市干预，目标买入 50 亿至 100 亿美元规模的日元；美方罕见选择抛售储备中的欧元而非美元，并启用了美联储 FEMA 回购便利工具。 (0:00) 尽管全球 AI 硬件需求推动东亚经常账户顺差创下历史新高，东亚货币仍遭遇反常走弱；日本央行在维持约 1% 政策利率的同时保持谨慎，以防加息过快冲击银行庞大的低收益遗留资产并破坏 2% 通胀目标。 (5:00) 美国财政部通过出售欧元购入日元，旨在清晰传达维护盟友汇率平衡的信号而非推行弱势美元政策，同时防范日本为筹集日元资金而大规模抛售美国国债，从而扰动美债市场收益率。 (15:00) Brad Setser 驳斥了日元将因“财政主导”而崩溃的看空观点，强调日本不仅坐拥近 1.2 万亿美元外储及逾 9000 亿美元的 GPIF 海外资产，其基础财政收支也已实现平衡，基础财政状况事实上显著优于美英法德等 G7 成员国。 (40:00)

Following a historic joint currency intervention between the United States and Japan, Brad Setser argues that the Japanese yen's plunge toward 160 per dollar represents a profound disconnect from economic fundamentals rather than a structural fiscal crisis. East Asian Currency Weakness Defies Record Surpluses (5:00) Across East Asia, currencies have experienced severe depreciation despite historic current account surpluses driven by booming US artificial intelligence spending. Taiwan's surplus has moved toward 25–30% of GDP on the back of chip manufacturing, while South Korea's surplus has expanded toward $300 billion to $400 billion. Yet local institutional flows—such as Taiwanese insurers reducing foreign asset hedges and foreign investors selling winning Korean tech equities due to concentration limits—have driven outward capital flows, pulling regional exchange rates well below purchasing power parity and behavioral equilibrium levels. Japan's External Balance Sheet and Hedging Dynamics (10:00) Japan maintains a current account surplus of 5% of GDP, anchored primarily by offshore investment income rather than direct trade. The Japanese state commands immense resources, including approximately $1.2 trillion in foreign exchange reserves alongside more than $900 billion in foreign assets held by the Government Pension Investment Fund (GPIF), together equaling nearly half of Japan's $4 trillion nominal GDP. Strategic Rationale Behind US Intervention Mechanics (15:00) US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent initiated a joint intervention by targeting $5 billion to $10 billion in yen purchases, motivated by concerns over regional currency instability, export competitiveness, and Treasury market spillover risks. Had Japan intervened unilaterally by liquidating US Treasuries from its reserves, the secondary market could have suffered yield spikes. To avert this, authorities deployed the Federal Reserve's FEMA Repo Facility, which enables foreign central banks to pledge Treasuries for liquid dollars directly with the Fed without selling into the open market. In a creative tactical pivot, the US Treasury sold euros rather than dollars from its reserves to purchase yen. Setser notes this signaled that the operation aimed to rebalance an overshot yen rather than institute a weak-dollar policy, creating confusion that squeezed short positions targeting 170 JPY/USD. While the US Exchange Stabilization Fund operates under balance sheet limits—holding roughly $20 billion in foreign exchange, $20 billion in cash, and $160 billion to $170 billion in SDRs—joint action and the threat of forced losses effectively restored two-sided risk around the 160 level. Debunking Fiscal Dominance and Debt-to-GDP Risks (37:45) Setser refutes market narratives that rising Japanese Government Bond yields will inevitably provoke a debt spiral or runaway fiscal dominance. Even as 30-year yields reached roughly 4%, Japan eliminated its primary budget deficit, outperforming IMF forecasts and securing a stronger structural primary balance than the US, the UK, France, or Germany. Because Japan holds foreign reserves acquired when the yen traded between 80 and 100 per dollar, selling foreign assets near 160 yields massive fiscal windfalls that decrease gross debt. Conversely, Setser highlights that the United States runs a primary deficit near 6% of GDP, setting US net debt-to-GDP on a trajectory to rival or exceed Japan's within five years. Investors shorting the yen against the dollar are fundamentally underestimating Japan's primary fiscal equilibrium and external income buffers while absorbing mounting US sovereign fiscal risk. Intervention skeptics argue that currency operations cannot succeed long term without aligned monetary policy. However, Setser contends that narrow rate differentials, potential Bank of Japan rate hikes, and the repatriation of public and corporate overseas earnings provide durable macroeconomic backing to maintain a floor for the yen.

美国外交关系协会（Council on Foreign Relations）高级研究员Brad Setser指出，美日联合干预日元汇率不仅是为了纠正东亚货币被严重低估的失衡，更是为了防止日本被动抛售美债冲击美国金融市场。Setser认为，凭借日本稳健的经常账户、庞大的海外资产以及美日创新的干预工具，政策层已在160日元兑1美元关口周围有效重建了双向风险。 美方干预逻辑与规避美债冲击的操作 (15:00) 美国财政部部长Scott Bessent备忘录中买入50亿至100亿美元日元（JPY）的目标引发轰动。Setser分析指出，除关切汇率对美国制造业竞争力的扭曲外，美方本次协同干预的核心战略考量在于防止溢出效应冲击美国国债市场。若日本财务省（MOF）被迫单方面大举抛售外汇储备中的美债来捍卫日元，将推高美债收益率并扰乱主权债务市场。为此，官方启用了美联储于2020年设立的外国和国际货币当局（FEMA）回购便利工具，允许外国央行抵押美债换取美元现金，避免直接冲击二级国债现货市场。 此外，美国财政部采取了极具战术意味的非常规手段：动用外汇储备出售欧元而非扩大美元供应来买入日元。Setser表示，这一策略既明确向市场传达干预旨在修正日元过度贬值、而非转向弱势美元政策，同时通过欧元兑日元的汇率核查（rate check）引发突袭效应，在财务省主力现汇买盘进场前有效轧平了投机空头。 顺差激增与货币承压的东亚脱节现象 (5:00) Setser指出，东亚外汇市场出现了罕见的宏观背离：受美国在人工智能硬件领域的强劲支出推动，东亚地区迎来了创纪录的经常账户顺差，台湾顺差占GDP比重攀升至25%至30%，韩国顺差亦扩大至3000亿至4000亿美元区间。然而，由于台湾寿险机构获准解除海外资产汇率对冲，以及外资在三星和SK海力士股价大涨触及持仓上限后选择获利了结，叠加韩国散户加杠杆炒作境外资产，资本外流导致韩元兑美元跌至1500的危机级别水平。 相比之下，日本的基本面依然坚挺，其经常账户顺差占GDP的5%，主要由庞大的海外净投资收益贡献。日本政府拥有近1.2万亿美元外汇储备，加之日本政府养老投资基金（GPIF）持有的逾9000亿美元海外资产，公共部门海外资产规模接近其4万亿美元名义GDP的50%。购买力平价（PPP）和行为均衡汇率（BEER）等经典估值模型均显示，日元在160附近的实际有效汇率已跌回20世纪60至70年代水平。除低息诱发的套息交易外，外资投资日股带来的汇率对冲卖盘以及本土寿险调低对冲比例，也是压制日元的主要结构性推手。 联合火力限制与在160构筑威慑机制 (28:30) 针对美方能否单方面在150构筑防线的疑问，Setser强调美国财政部的干预能力受制于外汇稳定基金（ESF）的账面规模。ESF约持有200亿美元外汇、200亿美元现金及1600亿至1700亿美元特别提款权（SDR），单凭财政部无法无限制承接抛压，强设硬性汇率底线亦容易在遭遇通胀或油价冲击时陷入被动。因此，联合行动的核心目标不是誓死保卫固定点位，而是通过协同干预在160水平重塑下行风险与威慑力，击溃投机资金押注日元跌向170的单边交易预期。 面对经济学家Adam Posen对单纯外汇干预效果的质疑，Setser认为本次行动具备中长期奏效的宏观支撑。日本央行约1%的政策利率虽仍滞后于通胀，但市场预期其将在9月继续加息以收窄美日利差。此外，日本跨国企业海外利润丰厚且长期留存离岸，官方外汇储备每年产生350亿至400亿美元利息收入。若日本政府引导公共基金调整对冲要求，或企业开始遣返海外利润，现货市场的供需结构将发生实质性逆转。 财政主导迷思与日本债务基本面的反转 (37:45) Setser驳斥了关于日本高额公共债务将引发恶性“财政主导”和货币崩溃的悲观论调。尽管日本30年期国债收益率从2016年的0.05%攀升至约4%，但日本已消除了不含利息支出的基础财政收支（primary balance）赤字，实现了结构性财政平衡。相比于美国高达GDP约6%的基础财政赤字以及英、法等G7同行的财政恶化轨迹，日本的底层财政状况更为稳健，且实际利率低于或等于实际经济增速，债务动态并未失控。 Setser强调，日本的资产负债表拥有极高的抗风险韧性：日本外汇储备早期的建仓汇率大多在80至100日元兑1美元区间，在160附近抛售变现将兑现巨额收益，可显著冲减国家总债务。结合高收益美元资产与接近于零的日元负债成本，日本政府的历史净利息负担实际接近于零。IMF《财政监测报告》指标显示日本净债务水平呈下降趋势，若不改变现行赤字轨道，美国净债务占GDP的比重将在五年内逼近甚至超越日本，做空日元做多美元的交易无形中承担了美国财政扩张的隐含风险。 Setser的剖析表明，日元此前的深幅贬值并非因为日本陷入主权信用危机，而是受资本单向外流、对冲机制与利差投机共同扭曲的结果。美日联合干预有效瓦解了单边看跌惯性，但干预成效能否持久维持，后续仍取决于日本央行加息进度、利差收窄趋势以及离岸投资收益能否形成实质性回流。

## Background 本期节目由彭博社（Bloomberg）于 2026 年 8 月 6 日在播客及网络平台发布。节目简介指出，美日两国在时隔 15 年后首次联手干预日元汇率以遏制其跌势，美国财长斯科特·贝森特（Scott Bessent）采取了出售欧元而非美元、以及动用美联储冷门回购工具等异乎寻常的手段，对外关系委员会高级研究员布拉德·塞策（Brad Setser）深入拆解了日元暴跌的根源、东亚货币整体走弱的宏观图景以及日本真实的财政基本面。 ## TL;DR 节目围绕美日罕见的联合外汇干预行动展开，深度分析了日元乃至东亚货币在巨额经常账户顺差下依然持续疲软的内在机制。塞策指出，硅谷 AI 硬件热潮推高了东亚顺差，但海外投资未对冲、外资被动减仓以及利差驱动的套息交易共同造成了汇率的严重低估。本次美国财政部动用美联储 FEMA 回购工具抛售欧元买入日元，旨在避免日本大规模抛售美债冲击二级市场，并在 160 关键心理关口向空头施加威慑。塞策进一步驳斥了所谓日本深陷“财政主导”与债务危机的空头叙事，强调日本初级财政已趋近平衡，且海外高息资产与干预汇兑收益显著优化了其资产负债表，日元的长期走势最终取决于日本央行后续的加息步伐。 ## Atmosphere & style 整期对话在轻松幽默与高密度硬核宏观分析之间切换自如，开场以财长贝森特随手写下的百亿美元便签趣闻破冰，迅速调动起听众的好奇心。主持人特蕾西与乔配合默契，频频抛出犀利且具代表性的市场疑问，而受访专家塞策则展现出央行级国际收支专家的深厚功底，抽丝剥茧地拆解复杂的资金流向与资产负债表逻辑。整场讨论充满对传统市场教条的推翻与重新审视，语调机智而严密，带给听众一种俯瞰全球顶级宏观博弈与金融内幕的畅快智力体验。 ## Bulletin - `01:45` 美日罕见联手干预日元汇率，美国财政部动用外汇平准基金出售欧元而非美元，并启用美联储 FEMA 回购工具以避免日本直接抛售美债冲击二级市场借贷成本。 - `06:40` 东亚货币陷入基本面脱钩悖论：硅谷巨额 AI 硬件支出推动韩国、台湾经常账户顺差创历史新高，但寿险不设防对冲与外资触及风控上限被动减持等资本外流力量导致汇率持续被动承压。 - `40:00` 日元深度超跌源于多重资金流错配，但日本基础财政收支已基本实现平衡，整体赤字仅占 GDP 约 1%，且官方坐拥的庞大海外资产带来了丰厚息差，彻底破除了“财政主导与债务崩盘”的流行空头叙事。 - `32:30` 本次外汇干预的核心目标是在 160 关口重塑空头恐惧；短期威慑若要转化为中长期趋势逆转，必须依赖日本央行后续实质性加息及引导离岸巨额利润结汇回流本土。 ## Key takeaways - `01:45` 美国财政部罕见介入日元汇市并选择抛售欧元，展现了新任财长贝森特前对冲基金交易员的战术风格，同时传递出美国无意放弃“强势美元”的政策信号。 - `05:00` 日本央行加息步伐极度审慎，不仅为了巩固脱离数十年通缩泥潭的薪资-物价循环，也是为了避免在收益率曲线变陡前激化商业银行资产负债表的资产负债错配风险。 - `06:40` 硅谷 AI 基础设施的巨额资本开支重塑了东亚贸易格局，但台湾对冲监管放宽及外资因持仓集中度上限被动减持韩股等逆向资金流，对冲了巨额贸易顺差对本币的提振。 - `10:00` 日本官方持有的海外资产净头寸逼近 GDP 的 50%，且坐拥占 GDP 5% 的经常账户顺差，其汇率的极端弱势主要是利差驱动的资本外流所致，而非基本面崩坏。 - `13:40` 真实资金的对冲失衡加剧了日元卖压：外资买入日股时被动卖出日元对冲，而日本养老基金（GPIF）出海投资美股却不进行对冲，导致市场上买入日元的对冲力量极度匮乏。 - `16:00` 美国参与联合干预的深层动机之一是防范美债市场系统性风险，防止日本财务省为筹集干预弹药而在公开市场被迫大规模甩卖美债现券。 - `20:00` 购买力平价（PPP）与行为均衡汇率（BEER）等传统估值框架在利差驱动的资本洪流面前丧失了短期预测能力，但所有量化指标均明确指向亚洲主要货币已被严重低估。 - `22:38` 美联储 FEMA 回购工具允许外国央行抵押美债换取美元现金，不仅阻断了美债抛售踩踏，也让日本在保留高票息国债资产的同时获得了平滑干预操作的时间窗口。 - `27:38` 受制于外汇平准基金（ESF）极度有限的可用流动性，美国财政部在制度上无法单独调动美联储资产负债表来设定“无限弹药”的刚性汇率红线，必须依靠美日多方协同。 - `30:00` 日本财务省的干预意图并非构筑僵死汇率防线，而是在 160 关键心理点位敲山震虎，打破市场认为官方将无底线容忍日元贬值的单边投机惯性。 - `32:30` 外汇干预能否成功取决于宏观拐点是否出现：美日长端利差收敛与外部能源压力可控构成了基础支撑，日本央行后续实质性收紧货币政策是巩固干预成效的关键前提。 - `35:00` 日本跨国企业海外利润与官方储备产生的海量利息收益长期留存离岸再投资，缺乏结汇回流机制，阻断了强劲经常账户盈余向日元即期买盘的转化路径。 - `40:00` 市场对日本“财政主导与债务螺旋”的恐慌被严重夸大：日本初级财政已近平衡，海外高息资产净收益抹平了政府净利息支出，整体赤字状况显著好于美国。 - `40:00` 日本财务省历史上在外汇储备中购入美元的成本仅在 80 至 100 日元区间，当前在 160 附近高位抛售套现锁定了天量汇兑收益，实质上大幅冲减了日本的主权债务压力。 - `44:38` 美国财政部急于压制长端美债收益率与美联储倾向让市场自发定价之间存在微妙张力，反映出美日联合干预背后复杂的跨机构宏观博弈。 ## Detailed walkthrough ### `01:45` 斯科特·贝森特的备忘清单与美日罕见的联合干预 节目开场时，主持人特蕾西·阿洛韦（Tracy Alloway）和乔·维森塔尔（Joe Weisenthal）闲聊起日常工作习惯。乔坦言自己从来不写待办事项清单（To-do list），特蕾西则笑称自己每天顶多半心半意地写上“录播客第一期、录播客第二期、写时事通讯、回邮件”。但前不久，金融圈流传出一张被誉为“史上最霸气”的备忘清单照片——美国财政部长斯科特·贝森特（Scott Bessent）随手写的一张便签被镜头抓拍个正着。上面没有密密麻麻的日常琐事，赫然写着一行大字：“买入日元（JPY），50亿至100亿美元”。特蕾西打趣道，贝森特甚至特意加上了货币代码“JPY”，免得让人产生歧义，而如果一位财长一整天的待办事项只有这一项，那他到底算闲还是算忙？ 这行看似随意的备忘录背后，是美日两国联手阻击日元贬值的重磅行动。日元汇率近期经历了剧烈波动，先是经历了极其漫长而痛苦的贬值，随后在干预预期下拉出惊人反弹。特蕾西指出，外汇市场历来不乏政府干预，但这次美方的操作手法极不寻常：美国财政部动用了一个几乎被市场遗忘的美联储回购工具（Repo Facility），而且美方在干预汇市时抛售的不是美元，而是欧元。对特蕾西而言，看着如今在 155 附近徘徊的日元汇率依然觉得不可思议——因为她儿时在日本生活时，每周的零花钱正好是 1,000 日元，折合大约 10 美元，“1 美元兑 110 日元”是她脑海中根深蒂固的基准锚。 乔则回顾了华尔街过去数十年的经典叙事：在他们职业生涯的前半段，市场永远在交易日元持续走强、日本国债长端收益率不断下探。当年无数试图做空日本国债、押注其收益率终将暴涨的宏观对冲基金纷纷爆仓，这一做空策略甚至被称为惨烈的“寡头交易”（Widowmaker Trade）。然而眼下，日本无论是利率还是汇率都迎来了历史性的反转大戏。为什么日元会疲软到让美国不得不亲自下场？这究竟是迫于日本盟友的压力，还是牵动了美国自身的全球宏观布局？ - **贝森特便签事件**：美国财长斯科特·贝森特被拍到的待办清单上明确写着“购买日元（JPY）50亿至100亿美元”，证实了官方干预行动。 - **干预手法异乎寻常**：美国在此次联合行动中选择出售储备中的欧元而非美元，并启用了极少曝光的美联储外汇/回购机制。 - **历史周期的倒转**：过去数十年间押注日本国债崩盘或日元暴跌的“寡妇交易”在如今的通胀和弱日元环境下彻底重构，汇率从特蕾西记忆中的 110 暴跌至 155 左右。 --- ### `05:00` 日本央行为何对加息按兵不动？ 每当全球宏观流动性与外汇市场出现复杂异动，两位主持人就会在天空打出布拉德·塞策（Brad Setser）的“蝙蝠侠信号灯”。作为美国对外关系委员会（CFR）的高级研究员，塞策是国际收支与主权资本流动领域的顶级专家。节目切入正题后，特蕾西立刻抛出了一个最核心、最直观的疑问：如果一个国家的货币已经贬值到需要政府动用真金白银进行联合干预的地步，为什么日本央行（BOJ）不干脆直接大幅加息来捍卫汇率？ 塞策坦言这是所有人都会问的第一反应。日本央行在收紧货币政策上的动作一直极其迟缓。目前其短期政策利率仅维持在 1% 左右，而日本的通胀指标早已稳固地运行在这一水平之上。日本央行给出的官方理由是：日本苦苦抗争了数十年才终于摆脱通缩、将通胀推升至 2% 的目标，央行行长植田和男（Kazuo Ueda）极其担心过早激进加息会扼杀好不容易形成的薪资-物价正向循环，让经济再次坠入“零利率、零通胀”的泥潭。 从技术与金融稳定的角度来看，日本央行也有其隐秘的考量。首先，植田和男希望在调高短期政策利率之前，先让日本国债收益率曲线显著“陡峭化”（Steepen）。短期利率直接决定了全日本商业银行体系的存款负债成本，而日本商业银行乃至日本央行自身的资产负债表上，都沉淀着过去量化宽松时期积累的海量超低收益长期资产。如果过快推高负债端成本，将对银行的净息差和资本造成严重的短期冲击。市场上还有一种观点认为，央行按兵不动是为了防止日本政府庞大的公债利息支出与财政赤字瞬间失控。塞策认为财政负担的担忧可能被市场部分夸大了，但这无疑也是日本决策层权衡天平时不可忽视的砝码。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 日本央行政策迟缓的传导与制约机制 accDescr: 展示日本央行不愿激进加息的核心原因，包括防范通缩复发、银行资产负债表错配以及政府债务利息压力。 subgraph MacroGoal["宏观政策顾虑"] A["维持 2% 通胀成果"] --> B["担忧过早加息扼杀通胀预期"] B --> C["防止重回零利率/零通胀陷阱"] end subgraph TechnicalFactors["金融体系与技术面制约"] D["收益率曲线偏平"] --> E["需先引导曲线陡峭化"] F["商业银行与央行持有海量低息长债"] --> G["存款端加息导致负债成本飙升"] E & G --> H["避免银行体系爆发资产负债表错配危机"] end subgraph FiscalRisk["财政与债务压力"] I["极高的政府公共债务存量"] --> J["短期利率上升导致国债利息支出剧增"] end MacroGoal --> K["结果：日本央行加息节奏极度迟缓"] TechnicalFactors --> K FiscalRisk --> K K --> L["日美利差高企，日元承受持续贬值压力"] ``` --- ### `06:40` 东亚货币的诡异贬值：AI 硬件顺差与资本外流的脱钩 乔随后提出了一个更广阔的宏观谜题：2026年以来，东亚货币的走弱并非日本独有的孤立现象，韩元、新台币等东亚货币整体都表现得异乎寻常的疲软。这一现象与直觉完全相悖——全球媒体每天铺天盖地报道的，是全球半导体巨头赚得盆满钵满，东亚经济体坐拥令人咋舌的巨额经常账户顺差。在芯片制造产业链全面爆发、现金流源源不断涌入亚洲的背景下，东亚货币为何反而集体走弱？ 塞策从宏观资金流向的全局视角拆解了这一“悖论”。他指出，当前全球的贸易顺差几乎全部集中在东亚地区。其背后的本质驱动力在于：“旧金山（硅谷的科技巨头们）决定将天量资金砸在 AI 硬件基础设施（Kit）上”。这些硬件的核心源头正是台湾地区、韩国和日本的高端半导体与上游核心零部件，同时也惠及了中国大陆的供应链网络。这使得整个东亚（除日本因能源进口受损外）迎来了史诗级的贸易顺差。例如，韩国的经常账户顺差预计将从过去的 1,000 多亿美元直接飙升至 3,000 亿到 4,000 亿美元；台湾地区的经常账户顺差占 GDP 比重预计将从原本就已经很庞大的 15% 翻倍至 25% 到 30%，塞策直呼“这些数据简直高得匪夷所思”。 既然有如此庞大的经常账户顺差支撑，为什么货币还会贬值？塞策指出，不同经济体背后存在着完全不同的汇率管理与资本外流机制： 1. **台湾地区的机制**：台湾地区货币当局（CBC）并不希望新台币升值削弱出口竞争力。他们通过逆转宏观审慎监管规则，允许台湾寿险机构（Lifers）对其庞大的海外投资资产不进行外汇套期保值（Unhedge），从而制造了庞大的向外资本汇出。此外，台湾的出口极度集中于台积电（TSMC）一家巨头，货币当局可以直接对台积电施加行政指导，把控其将美元兑换回新台币的节奏。塞策盛赞彭博社此前的一篇深度报道，精准揭示了台湾货币当局如何在不扩张自身央行资产负债表的前提下精巧地压低新台币。 2. **韩国的机制**：韩国则陷入了一种奇特的反向动态——“对韩国基本面越好的消息，反而越导致韩元走弱”。随着三星电子和 SK 海力士等韩国半导体股票因 AI 浪潮狂飙突进，大量持有韩国股票的海外全球基金触发了投资组合中的“集中度上限”（Concentration Limits）。为了防止单一市场或个股敞口过大，外资机构不得不被动大幅减持韩国股票，锁定收益并将资金撤出韩国。这种顺周期的大规模外资股票平仓，戏剧性地催生了巨额资本外流，将巨额贸易顺差所带来的升值动力对冲殆尽。 - **AI 硬件热潮重塑经常账户**：硅谷对 AI 硬件的巨额资本开支，直接推动韩国经常账户顺差向 3,000-4,000 亿美元挺进，台湾顺差占 GDP 比重攀升至 25%-30% 的极端水平。 - **台湾寿险与台积电调控**：台湾地区通过放宽寿险业外币敞口对冲要求，以及协同台积电的外汇结算节奏，成功在表外阻遏了新台币的升值冲动。 - **韩国股市的被动抛售悖论**：韩国芯片巨头股价大涨反而触碰了外资风控的持仓集中度红线，引发外资被动抛售股票并将资金换回外币撤离，导致强势的基本面直接演变为韩元的汇率下行压力。 ### `10:00` 亚洲货币的反直觉走势与日元强劲的基本面反差 当前东亚货币正处于极其反直觉的宏观环境中。以韩国为例，巨大的外流资金不仅叠加了国民年金等养老金系统的海外配置，散户投资者此前也热衷于加杠杆购买美股单一标的 ETF，随后韩国本土放开杠杆单股 ETF 同样引发了资本波动。这形成了一种极度扭曲的现实：韩国虽然迎来了极其庞大的贸易条件正向冲击，韩元汇率却被砸向了历史性的极弱水平。 日元在很大程度上也处于这种“基本面其实良好却遭遇大幅贬值”的处境。日本不仅拥有占 GDP 5% 的经常账户顺差，其顺差主要来源于海外投资净收益，若剔除能源进口成本，AI 等行业的技术需求同样能改善其贸易账目。在资产负债表层面，日本拥有全球最庞大的海外资产组合之一：日本政府持有接近 1.2 万亿美元的外汇储备，政府养老金投资基金（GPIF）也管理着超过 9000 亿美元的海外资产。在名义 GDP 因汇率折算萎缩至较低体量的情况下，日本官方持有的海外资产净头寸几乎相当于其 GDP 的 50%。亚洲货币普遍走弱各有不同诱因，但对日本而言，极其低迷的利率环境无疑是整个故事的核心。 - **经常账户与投资收益**：日本顺差并非单纯依赖货物贸易出口，而是来自庞大的海外投资存量收益； - **官方资产规模**：约 1.2 万亿美元的官方外汇储备，叠加 GPIF 超过 9000 亿美元的海外资产； - **宏观资产负债表对比**：日本政府坐拥的海外资产总额已逼近其自身 GDP 的 50%。 --- ### `13:40` 投机押注还是真实资金对冲：日元走弱背后的力量 市场往往习惯将汇率干预归咎于“打击投机客”，但日元的实际抛售力量远比单一投机复杂得多。由于日元长期维持极低的借贷成本，它自然成为全球外汇套息交易（Carry Trade）中最普遍的融资货币（funding currency）。虽然套息交易的整体规模可能并未达到历史极端，但大量对冲基金早已认定日本财务省会对日元走贬听之任之；做空日元具备正利差（借日元买美元有更高的收益），只要日元汇率保持稳定就能“躺赚”，一旦贬值更能赚取暴利。 除投机盘外，更隐秘的推手来自真实资金（Real Money）不对称的动态对冲机制： ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 日元外汇对冲与资金流向动态 accDescr: 外国投资者投资日股、日本GPIF投资美股以及日本寿险公司对冲比例调整对日元供需的影响机制 subgraph ForeignFlow["海外资金投资日股 (Nikkei)"] F1["外资买入日经指数"] --> F2["外资被动提高部分汇率对冲"] F2 --> F3["产生卖出日元/做空日元对冲盘"] end subgraph DomesticFlow["日本本土资金出海 (GPIF)"] G1["GPIF 投资美股 Nasdaq"] --> G2["维持不进行汇率对冲策略"] G2 --> G3["无法产生抵消性的买入日元对冲盘"] end subgraph InsurerFlow["日本传统固定收益资金 (Life Insurers)"] I1["日本寿险机构海外债券持仓"] --> I2["主动调降对冲比率 (Life hedge ratio)"] I2 --> I3["减少外汇对冲需求，加剧日元敞口走贬"] end F3 --> AggYen["多重对冲流向共振：日元汇率被动承压"] G3 --> AggYen I3 --> AggYen ``` 当外资涌入日经指数推高股市时，部分外资机构会增加日元对冲，带来日元卖压；而当 GPIF 投资的纳斯达克上涨时，GPIF 并不对冲汇率，因而无法产生反向的买入日元对冲盘来形成抵消。与此同时，日本主要的固收机构（如寿险公司）非但没有加大“对冲美国”的力度，反而降低了对冲比率。这类机构的资本流动在很大程度上放大了日元颓势，也促使许多对冲基金大胆下注“日元将一路跌向 170”，其核心逻辑正是押注日本央行行长植田和男（Kazuo Ueda）的加息步伐严重落后于收益率曲线（Behind the curve）。 --- ### `16:00` 美国财政部的核心考量：贸易竞争与美债市场的潜在冲击 从美国角度来看，日元极度贬值本应引起财政部的高度戒备。传统的经典逻辑是“重商主义竞争优势”：极弱的东亚货币使底特律等美国制造业处于极其不利的竞争地位。从实际购买力平价和巨无霸指数（Big Mac Index）来看，韩元触及 1500 是经济危机的水平，而韩国经济根本没有陷入危机；日元跌至 160 更是“疯狂且被极度低估的水平”，经通胀调整后甚至被砸回到了 20 世纪 60 和 70 年代。 然而，现任美国财长斯科特·贝森特（Scott Bessent）在公开表态中并未打出传统的“保护美国汽车制造业”旗号，而是强调弱日元正波及韩元，导致整个亚洲货币陷入一种“好消息即坏消息”的系统性疲软怪象。更现实的隐忧来自美债市场： - **美债资产升值与干预清仓的矛盾**：单纯的日元贬值虽然会账面推高日本投资者所持美债的日元计价价值，但若日本财务省决定单方面动用天量外汇储备捍卫日元，就不得不大举抛售其储备资产中的美债现券来筹集流动性； - **平抑美债收益率风险**：日本外汇干预引发的美债抛盘将直接冲击美国国债市场。因此，美国财政部介入日美联合干预，核心假说之一就是通过协同机制支持日元，既“帮助了盟友”，又能在源头上遏制日本为干预汇率而被迫在公开市场大量抛售美债的风险。 --- ### `18:50` 为什么动用欧元？贝森特的“另类财技”与政策意图 在此次不同寻常的行动中，美国财政部选择抛售其外汇稳定基金（ESF）持有的欧元而非美元来买入日元。这种极其罕见的“用欧元干预日元”操作，很大程度上反映了贝森特这位前宏观对冲基金交易员的鲜明个人风格——“想秀一把财技，做点不走寻常路的新尝试”。 从技术层面看，美国官方持有的外汇储备绝大部分就是欧元和日元资产，由于不具备凭空创造外国法币的职能，动用原本就有限的储备进行资产置换，在严格意义上甚至只是外汇资产构成的内部调仓，而不会被定义为直接放水抛售美元。贝森特通过这一手法传递了明确的政治信号：“这不代表看空美元，美国仍然坚持强势美元政策，这仅仅是针对日元过度贬值的纠偏态度。” 这一极度生僻的操作还在市场上触发了欧元兑日元（EUR/JPY）的汇率核查（Rate Check），在交易圈引发了不小的错愕与骚乱。虽然目前尚不清楚美国出资的具体规模到底是在 50 亿到 100 亿美元区间的哪一侧，但从市场实操来看，真正的干预主力仍然是日本财务省本身，美国更多是在关键节点提供战术配合与战略背书。 ### `20:00` 汇率估值模型失灵与亚洲货币的深度低估 在分析干预的币种结构时，Brad Setser 首先重申，尽管美国财政部选择出售欧元，但这在本质上仍然是一场美元兑日元（USD/JPY）的干预，而非欧元兑日元的干预。节目主持人随即切入汇率估值理论的现实困境：如果依据“巨无霸指数”（Big Mac Index）等购买力平价（PPP）指标，日元当前正处于历史极度疲软的水平。市场上存在诸如实际有效汇率模型（REER）、利差模型、GDP 增长差模型以及行为均衡汇率模型（BEER）等五花八门的定价框架，但这些古典估值工具是否依然具备预测效力？ Brad Setser 指出，购买力平价的核心逻辑在于：处于相当发展水平的经济体之间，商品与服务的综合价格大致应当趋同。然而近年来，尤其是在亚洲地区，凶猛的金融与资本流动将实际汇率强行拉离了购买力平价水准。因此，作为未来走势的“预测工具”，购买力平价已经彻底失效；但作为评估货币偏离基本面程度的“分析基准”，它仍然具有极高价值。 另一方面，行为均衡汇率模型（BEER）侧重于评估当下的政策设定对汇率产生的直接冲击，并对比历史中枢来衡量货币强弱。而在这一框架下，几乎所有东亚货币都显得极其疲软。例如，中国拥有庞大且仍在持续扩大的巨额贸易顺差，无论按经常账户平衡模型还是行为均衡汇率模型测算，人民币都处于被显著低估的状态；韩国的韩元在经常账户模型下同样严重低估。究其根源，正是由利差和资本外流驱动的全球金融狂潮，导致亚洲货币的价格与购买力平价及外部基本面发生了严重脱节。 - **购买力平价（PPP）与巨无霸指数**：反映可贸易品长期均衡价格，但在利差主导的资本流动冲击下已丧失短期预测能力。 - **行为均衡汇率（BEER）与经常账户模型**：结合政策变动与历史数据评估，显示不仅日元，人民币（基于庞大贸易顺差）和韩元等东亚主要货币全线处于严重被低估状态。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 金融流动压制亚洲货币基本面机制 accDescr: 展示巨大的利差与资本流动如何将亚洲货币推离购买力平价及经常账户所决定的基本面估值 subgraph Fund["基本面与估值基准"] PPP["购买力平价 / 巨无霸指数<br/>(偏向公允均衡价格)"] CA["经常账户 / 贸易顺差<br/>(中韩等国顺差强劲)"] end subgraph Flows["金融现实压力"] IR["利差驱动与跨国套利"] Outflows["汹涌的金融资本外流"] end subgraph Result["汇率现实偏离"] Currencies["日元、人民币、韩元等<br/>东亚货币深度承压低估"] end Fund -->|理论牵引力较弱| Result Flows -->|主导实际汇率定价| Result IR --> Outflows Outflows --> Result ``` --- ### `22:38` 美联储 FEMA 回购工具的实操逻辑与利弊博弈 随后，讨论重心转向干预资金的清算机制以及如何避免对美国国债市场造成连锁冲击。美联储的“外国和国际货币当局回购便利”（Foreign and International Monetary Authorities Repo Facility，简称 FEMA Repo）在本次干预中扮演了关键角色。该工具设立于 2020 年新冠疫情爆发、美国国债遭遇流动性踩踏期间，允许外国央行以其持有的美国国债作为抵押品，直接从美联储借出美元现金，而无需在公开市场上抛售国债。 主持人指出外界对该机制的两大主要质疑：其一，FEMA 收取的利率高于市场水平，如果外国央行在私人市场开展回购能拿到更便宜的资金，为何还要承担溢价成本？其二，该机制当时设有大约 600 亿美元的单一主体借款上限，若干预规模扩大，这一额度可能捉襟见肘。 曾在财政部供职的 Brad Setser 坦言自己是该工具的坚定支持者，曾先后在财政部任内与 2020 年公开呼吁建立并推广该机制。他从央行与国债市场的宏观稳定性角度深度剖析了 FEMA 的运作价值： 1. **阻断国债抛售的恶性循环**：在市场剧烈动荡时，若外国央行集中甩卖国债，极易引发私人投资者的跟风踩踏（如 2020 年 3 月长端美债大崩盘的惨剧）。使用 FEMA 回购相当于将抛盘隔离在美联储内部，完全由美联储在后端通过国内公开市场操作对冲流动性，既对美联储自身零风险，也避免了直接冲击美债二级市场。 2. **交易隐蔽性与灵活性**：虽然美联储最终会公布数据，但有一周的滞后期，交易过程比直接在现货市场砸盘更为隐秘；而且若上限得以调整，其潜在规模理论上能够扩大。 3. **持有高息票据的财务账**：对于日本财务省而言，其外汇储备中持有许多过去购入的高票息（High-coupon）5年期等中长期国债。如果直接在现货市场抛售，一旦卖出就再也无法以当年的高收益率买回；而采用 FEMA 回购，这些国债自身的丰厚票息完全足以覆盖 FEMA 的惩罚性借贷利息。 4. **平滑干预操作节奏**：日本以往干预汇市时倾向于直接卖出国债，极少动用其持有的美元现金缓冲。FEMA 赋予了日本财务省“先获取流动性干预汇市、再择机滞后处理美债持仓”的时间缓冲，极大拓展了政策回旋空间。 --- ### `27:38` 设定汇率“红线”？财政部外汇平准基金的火力上限 针对美国政策制定者的行动边界，主持人提出一个激进假设：财政部长斯科特·贝森特（Scott Bessent）能否直接划下一道不可逾越的“沙滩红线”（例如将 150 日元兑 1 美元设定为上限），并凭借“印钞国拥有无限弹药”的威慑力直接宣称绝不允许日元跌破此线，从而实现不费一兵一卒逼退做空投机客？ Brad Setser 明确排除了这种可能性，其制度瓶颈在于**美国财政部根本无法调动美联储的资产负债表**。财政部进行外汇干预所能动用的唯一正规法定资金池是“外汇平准基金”（Exchange Stabilization Fund，简称 ESF），而 ESF 的实际干预资源非常有限： - **流动性美元现金**：仅有约 200 亿美元； - **其他外汇资产**：约 200 亿美元（主要是欧元和日元）； - **特别提款权（SDR）**：账面拥有约 1600 亿至 1700 亿美元。 Setser 分析强调，尽管 1600 多亿美元的 SDR 规模看似可观，但在实际操作中将 SDR 转化为干预外汇在技术和法律上面临极高门槛，“比动用 FEMA 回购更加异想天开（even more out there）”。单凭美国财政部自身微薄的可用弹药，根本不具备在汇市划定绝对防线并提供“无限流动性”的资本。不过，如果将美国财政部、日本财务省（拥有极其庞大的官方储备）以及两国央行的协同力量捆绑在一起，这套联合阵线的实际阻击能量又将另当别论。 ### `30:00` 重新确立160关口的威慑力：日本财务省的市场心理战 日本政府若通过调整监管指引，让规模达9500亿美元的政府养老投资金（GPIF）对其庞大的海外投资组合进行汇率对冲，其释放的弹药量足以设定一个类似收益率曲线控制（YCC）的目标位——比如将美元兑日元强行锁定在150甚至160下方。然而，这种硬性锚定汇率的做法面临极高风险：一旦外部世界突发石油危机、通胀冲击或美联储超预期加息，被动死守某一特定点位就极易遭受反噬。 正因如此，日本财务省（MOF）当下的核心诉求并非设定僵死不可破的红线，而是要在160关口附近重新向市场注入恐惧感。过去几年中，日元的走弱底线实质上一直由财务省划定。鉴于美日巨大利差天然利好美元，且日本央行行长植田和男此前在加息步伐上相对审慎，投机资金往往押注日本官方会容忍日元继续贬值。当汇价突破160而官方按兵不动、甚至直到跌至162才出手时，做空情绪便迅速蔓延。如今的联手干预就像是在黑手党敲山震虎一般，直接告诫市场：在160附近单向做空日元绝非毫无风险的单边下注。 - **养老基金对冲潜力**：GPIF拥有约9500亿美元的海外资产组合，若实施部分汇率对冲，能释放巨额资金支撑日元。 - **做空心理阈值重塑**：通过在160关键点位施加重击，打破空头认为“日本财务省将彻底躺平任由日元贬值”的单边预期。 - **利差与干预底线**：过去三年来日元的极限弱势区间始终由财务省的干预行动定义，本次联合干预旨在将市场拉回双向博弈轨道。 --- ### `32:30` 亚当·波森的讽刺与干预成败的关键：日本央行加息与基本面配合 关于这次干预究竟能否扭转局势，彼得森国际经济研究所所长亚当·波森（Adam Posen）在《金融时报》上发表了一句极具嘲讽意味的评论。他指出，如今主导美国财政部的斯科特·贝森特（Scott Bessent）当年曾在索罗斯与德鲁肯米勒麾下效力，亲历了1992年狙击英格兰银行的著名战役；如今这位打破过央行神话的人，居然寄希望于仅靠外汇干预就能长期捍卫一种货币，这简直具有莫大的讽刺意味。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 联合外汇干预成败机制 accDescr: 展示短期情绪威慑与长期基本面配合如何决定干预日元的最终效果 subgraph Trigger["政策与短期干预"] A["美日联合外汇干预\n（贝森特与日本财务省）"] --> B["打破160单边看空预期\n重塑空头恐惧"] end subgraph Coordination["宏观条件验证"] B --> C{"日本央行是否跟进？"} C -- "9月不加息/态度犹豫" --> D["市场再度测试底线\n干预宣告失败"] C -- "连续加息\n利差实质收窄" --> E["扭转汇率预期"] end subgraph Fundamentals["基本面底盘支撑"] F["长期美日利差深度收敛"] --> G["日元超跌修复"] H["经常账户顺差占GDP 5%"] --> G I["国际油价相对平稳"] --> G E --> G end ``` 然而，布拉德·塞策对此持有更为积极的看法。虽然波森一贯秉持“单纯外汇干预徒劳无功”的传统学术教条，但短期内关键技术点位的干预完全能打乱投机节奏；若要实现中长期逆转，核心前提在于**干预必须与基本面的拐点协同**： 1. **日本央行行动在即**：如果日本央行在随后的9月会议上果断加息并开启紧缩周期，且紧缩节奏快于可能转向的美联储（尤其在凯文·沃什若主政美联储的背景下），干预便有了坚实的货币政策后盾；反之，若央行犹疑不决，市场必将再次大肆考验干预防线。 2. **长端利差早已倒挂背离**：日美长端国债收益率近期已明显收敛，仅从长期利差逻辑来看，日元目前的估值已经出现严重超跌。 3. **外部宏观压力可控**：国际油价未处历史高位，减轻了日本作为能源净进口国的贸易逆差压力。 4. **经常账户底盘稳固**：日本经常账户顺差高达GDP的5%，随着过去购买的海外高息资产持续产生充沛现金流，基本面正朝着极度有利于日元的方向演化。 --- ### `35:00` 日本海外巨额资产的“不回流”怪圈与政府主导的资金流逆转 传统国际宏观经济学模型在解释日元时经常失灵，根本原因在于日本特殊的离岸资本留存结构。日本企业虽然通过庞大的海外投资斩获了惊人的跨国利润，并在弱势日元下折算为亮眼的日元账面盈利，但这些美元、欧元或人民币利润往往被直接用于离岸再投资，根本没有换回日元汇入本土，因而无法在外汇市场上形成支撑日元的即时买盘。 更耐人寻味的是日本官方持有的非对外直接投资（FDI）资产。日本财务省手握的外汇储备每年产生350亿至400亿美元的利息收入，GPIF等国家级养老金同样坐拥庞大的海外股息与利息。这些高达日本GDP 1%至2%的巨额海外收益，在正常时期全都在离岸市场自动进行利息滚存或资产再平衡，完全不触碰外汇现货市场。在过去日元贬值的过程中，最大的财务赢家实际上是日本政府自身，其外币资产斩获了惊人的账面浮盈。要真正平衡外汇供需，就必须让这个最大的赢家将其在海外的“战果”部分结汇带回本土。这种流动性回流与央行加息的组合，正是为日元汇率构筑坚实底部的真正命门。 - **短期政策利差现状**：美联储联邦基金利率处于3.25%至3.50%区间，而日本央行政策利率仅为1%，短端利差依然可观，唯有日本央行实质收窄该利差才能夯实汇价。 - **跨国企业留存机制**：企业海外高盈利转化为离岸留存与扩张资本，阻断了向日元现汇的转化渠道。 - **官方离岸利息滚存**：日本政府外汇储备每年数百亿美元的利息在离岸复合增长，此前并未进入外汇市场形成买入日元的实体资金流。 --- ### `37:30` 破除“财政主导”迷思：被严重误解的日本财政基本面 市场长期流传一种做空日元的经典叙事：日本的30年期国债收益率已从2016年接近0.05%的历史冰点飙升至4%左右；在债务占GDP比重极高的背景下，全曲线利率上行将导致庞大的政府利息支出吞噬财政预算，最终触发不可收拾的“财政主导”（Fiscal Dominance）恶性通胀循环，令日元沦为毫无价值的“碎纸屑”。部分空头据此坚信，日元贬值不过是日本为多年过度宽松财政政策“付出代价（paying the piper）”的必然结局。 塞策针锋相对地驳斥了这一流行观点。关键差异在于，人们常将“历史上累积的债务存量”与“当下的财政收支增量”混为一谈： | 评估维度 | 日本实际现状 | 欧美主要经济体对比 | |:--- |:--- |:--- | | **基础财政收支（Primary Balance）** | **已基本实现平衡（零赤字）**<br>扣除债务利息后，政府经常性税收已能完全覆盖日常财政支出 | 远逊于日本。美国财政赤字居高不下，英、法甚至德国（若计入特别防务支出）均存在显著基础赤字 | | **财政政策实质属性** | 相比2014年与2016年，现行财政立场呈现明显的中性与自律特征 | 美国财政政策扩张程度与顺周期赤字规模显著恶化 | | **对汇率的核心驱动** | 驱动日元走势的核心是**双边利率差**，而非市场臆想中的主权信用危机或恶性通胀失控 | 美元近年的相对强势源于绝对利差优势，而非所谓更健康的美国财政基本面 | 日本当下的财政纪律在G7集团中名列前茅，所谓日本陷入无解的财政螺旋、迫使央行永远无法加息并注定埋葬日元的“财政崩溃论”，在当下的基础收支平衡数据面前根本站不住脚。 ### `40:00` 日本真实的财政轨迹：走出初级赤字与独特的资产负债表优势 很多人对日本庞大的政府债务抱有根深蒂固的恐慌，但布拉德·塞瑟（Brad Setser）指出，现实与市场陈旧的印象大相径庭。当前日本早已不再深陷巨额的初级财政赤字（primary deficit），反而正朝着初级财政盈余的方向迈进。日本财务省（MOF）向来精于预算博弈：他们在编制机械基准预算时往往预先设定了紧缩倾向，从而倒逼政府必须出面推动经济刺激方案，以对冲这种被动收紧。正因如此，日本今年的财政表现实际上优于国际货币基金组织（IMF）的预测，基本实现了初级财政平衡，而非原本预估的 1% 小幅赤字，根本不存在所谓的“债务走向失控边缘”。即便日本央行（BOJ）加息——甚至就算不加息，那些早期以极低利率发行的国债到期置换也会推高名义利息负担，但在更高的通胀和名义增长率带动下，名义利率与名义增长并未脱节，实际利率依然低于或持平于实际增速，只要初级赤字受控，整体债务动态就不会恶化。 更常被市场忽视的是日本政府资产负债表的独特性。财务省掌控的巨额官方外汇储备主要配置于高收益的美债资产，在极低的日元短期融资成本映衬下，这笔美元储备带来了丰厚的净息差收益；与此同时，政府养老金投资基金（GPIF）也持有规模可观的高收益海外资产。这导致日本政府在扣除海外利息收入后的净利息支出极低，有时甚至接近于零。塞瑟直言，真正需要担忧的情形是“名义利率大幅攀升而通胀停滞”，但只要利率与通胀率同步收敛，且维持当前的初级财政状态，日本的债务健康度其实相当稳健。事实上，日本的净债务占 GDP 比重一直在下降；按此趋势发展，短短五年之内，美国的净债务水平就将逼近甚至反超日本。塞瑟提醒道：“当你做空日元、做多美元时，本质上你是在做多美国的财政风险。”美国的财政赤字已从去年的 5% 左右膨胀至 6%，且在国防开支追加前还在进一步上升；而日本去年的整体财政赤字仅占 GDP 的 1% 左右。尽管日本政客（如高市早苗）对财务省的盈余计划公开反弹、主张维持温和的初级赤字，并引发了金融市场的焦虑，但翻开 IMF 的《财政监测报告》（Fiscal Monitor），客观指标与市场流传的唱衰修辞之间存在着巨大的鸿沟。 在告别播客之前，塞瑟还补充了一记极具杀伤力的细节：千万别忘了日本卖出美元的成本价。日本财务省早年干预累积的外汇储备，买入成本大约在 1 美元兑 80 至 100 日元之间，而如今在 160 附近高位抛售套现，这笔交易带来了极其庞大的汇兑浮盈，“在最坏的情况下，你也可以说这种干预操作以极其显著的幅度削减了日本的总债务规模”。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 日本国债与资产负债表良性循环 accDescr: 展示日本通胀回升、外储高息收入与净债务改善的宏观关联 subgraph MacroEnvironment["名义增长与预算表现"] A["再通胀与名义GDP提速"] --> B["初级财政走向平衡 / 盈余"] B --> C["债务可持续性受控"] end subgraph BalanceSheet["海外资产负债表红利"] D["外储资产（美元高息）"] --> F["巨额利息收入 / 净利息支出近乎为零"] E["GPIF 海外投资收益"] --> F G["在 160 高位抛售历史低价储备（80-100）"] --> H["巨额汇兑收益 / 冲减总债务"] end C --- F ``` - **初级赤字逆转**：实际表现超出 IMF 预期，从此前 1% 的预估赤字转为基本实现收支平衡。 - **美日财政赤字反差**：日本整体财政赤字占 GDP 仅约 1%，而美国赤字已达 6% 且仍在扩张。 - **高抛低吸的外汇储备**：日本持有的美元多在 80 至 100 日元区间购入，在 160 附近实施外汇干预实质上锁定了巨额获利，有力减轻了政府总负债压力。 ### `44:38` 节目复盘：失落数十年的心理阴影与美财政部/美联储的潜在张力 塞瑟连线结束后，主持人乔·威森塔尔（Joe Weisenthal）与特雷西·阿洛威（Tracy Alloway）就核心观点展开了讨论。威森塔尔感叹，“失落的数十年”对市场心理的束缚令人震惊，经济学界和商界总是不由自主地被过去的周期记忆所支配，并以此推演当下的决策。阿洛威随即呼应道，当塞瑟提及“日本央行花了如此大力气把通胀拉回 2%”时，欧美投资者的第一直觉往往误以为央行是在“压低通胀”，却忘了日本在过去数十年里一直在拼命走出无通胀和通缩的泥潭；对于日本而言，决策层完全有理由允许通胀在一段时间内适度“跑热”（run hot），从而彻底与几十年来的通缩阴影告别。 另一大让两位主持人深思的焦点，是美国财政部与美联储之间的微妙博弈。财政部长斯科特·贝森特（Scott Bessent）采取前所未有的创意手段介入汇市，核心目标之一无疑是缓解长端美债收益率的上行压力；然而美联储方面的态度（以及凯文·沃什等鹰派声音的表态）却倾向于让自由市场在决定国债收益率上扮演更积极的角色，不应万事依赖央行托底。这便催生了一种荒诞的错位：财政部千方百计希望压低收益率，而央行端却放任市场推高长端美债收益率。纵观全局，不论是用何种经典汇率估值模型测算，日元显然都处于严重低估状态，同时日本的初级财政改善轨迹也显著好于美国。节目在轻松的幽默中收尾，阿洛威打趣想用“Keep calm and carry yen”（保持冷静，做多日元套息）来总结本期，却遗憾发现这个谐音梗早已被金融网友抢注。 - **估值指标共识**：尽管经济学家常用的经典汇率估值指标各有缺陷，但所有传统量化模型均一致表明日元汇率被深度低估。 - **政策目标分歧**：财政部亟需压制美债长端借贷成本，而货币当局倾向于让市场自发定价，促成收益率走高与政策预期脱节。 ## Notable quotes > `01:45` 买入日元（JPY），50亿至100亿美元 — 斯科特·贝森特 > `06:40` 旧金山（硅谷的科技巨头们）决定将天量资金砸在 AI 硬件基础设施（Kit）上 — 布拉德·塞策 > `06:40` 对韩国基本面越好的消息，反而越导致韩元走弱 — 布拉德·塞策 > `18:50` 这不代表看空美元，美国仍然坚持强势美元政策，这仅仅是针对日元过度贬值的纠偏态度。 — 斯科特·贝森特 > `27:38` 比动用 FEMA 回购更加异想天开（even more out there） — 布拉德·塞策 > `40:00` 当你做空日元、做多美元时，本质上你是在做多美国的财政风险。 — 布拉德·塞策 > `40:00` 在最坏的情况下，你也可以说这种干预操作以极其显著的幅度削减了日本的总债务规模 — 布拉德·塞策 > `44:38` Keep calm and carry yen — 特蕾西·阿洛韦 ## Mentioned 特蕾西·阿洛韦（Tracy Alloway）, 乔·维森塔尔（Joe Weisenthal）, 斯科特·贝森特（Scott Bessent）, 布拉德·塞策（Brad Setser）, 植田和男（Kazuo Ueda）, 亚当·波森（Adam Posen）, 凯文·沃什（Kevin Warsh）, 高市早苗, 乔治·索罗斯（George Soros）, 斯坦利·德鲁肯米勒（Stanley Druckenmiller）, 美国财政部（US Treasury）, 美联储（Federal Reserve）, 日本央行（BOJ）, 日本财务省（MOF）, 台湾货币当局（CBC）, 英格兰银行（Bank of England）, 对外关系委员会（CFR）, 彼得森国际经济研究所（PIIE）, 国际货币基金组织（IMF）, 政府养老投资金（GPIF）, 外汇稳定基金（ESF）, 外国和国际货币当局回购便利（FEMA Repo）, 台积电（TSMC）, 三星电子（Samsung Electronics）, SK 海力士（SK Hynix）, 彭博社（Bloomberg）, 金融时报（Financial Times） ## Video description <p>Last week, the US joined forces with Japan to try to stop the yen&rsquo;s slide. It&rsquo;s the first time the two sides have intervened in the Japanese currency in 15 years, and in many ways it was an unprecedented and unusual move, with Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent choosing to sell euros (as opposed to dollars) and the use of a little-known Federal Reserve repo facility. So why did the yen&rsquo;s value drop so precipitously in the first place? And will this intervention be enough to stop it? Brad Setser, senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, explains why the Bank of Japan initially refrained from raising rates, why East Asian currencies (not just the yen) have been so weak lately, the improving fiscal outlook for Japan, and what to look out for next.</p><p>See <a href="https://omnystudio.com/listener">omnystudio.com/listener</a> for privacy information.</p> [Source](https://podtrac.com/pts/redirect.mp3/tracking.swap.fm/track/UVBrz8bN8aM2Xe47PEPu/traffic.omny.fm/d/clips/e73c998e-6e60-432f-8610-ae210140c5b1/8a94442e-5a74-4fa2-8b8d-ae27003a8d6b/09ad45b2-ee9c-4482-8700-b49d0161d97f/audio.mp3?in_playlist=982f5071-765c-403d-969d-ae27003a8d83)

[1:45] 斯科特·贝森特: 买入日元（JPY），50亿至100亿美元 [6:40] 布拉德·塞策: 旧金山（硅谷的科技巨头们）决定将天量资金砸在 AI 硬件基础设施（Kit）上 [6:40] 布拉德·塞策: 对韩国基本面越好的消息，反而越导致韩元走弱 [18:50] 斯科特·贝森特: 这不代表看空美元，美国仍然坚持强势美元政策，这仅仅是针对日元过度贬值的纠偏态度。 [27:38] 布拉德·塞策: 比动用 FEMA 回购更加异想天开（even more out there） [40:00] 布拉德·塞策: 当你做空日元、做多美元时，本质上你是在做多美国的财政风险。 [40:00] 布拉德·塞策: 在最坏的情况下，你也可以说这种干预操作以极其显著的幅度削减了日本的总债务规模 [44:38] 特蕾西·阿洛韦: Keep calm and carry yen

[5:00] Brad Setser: Basically San Francisco decided to spend a lot of money on kit that basically comes from... Japan, Korea, and Taiwan... We have really record trade surpluses throughout East Asia, except for Japan. [15:00] Brad Setser: By helping the Japanese, we're helping a friend... And we can jointly intervene in a way that reduces the possible pressure on the treasury market. [32:15] Adam Posen: the irony of the guy working for Soros and Stanley Druckenmiller who broke the Bank of England back in '92, pretending that you can do FX intervention alone and lastingly defend a currency is just amazing. [43:18] Keep calm and carry yen

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And when losses do happen, that work is paired with insurance coverage shaped by years of underwriting, risk engineering, and claims experience. Learn more at thehartford.com slash risk mitigation. Policies provided by Hartford Fire Insurance Company and its property and casualty affiliates Hartford Connecticut Whatever your goal trade show giveaways client gifts or team gear 4imprint has the promo products to match With thousands of options from apparel and drinkware to tech and totes it easy to find the right fit for your brand and budget with standout choices at every price point And with their 360-degree guarantee, you can be 4imprint certain your order will show up just right, right on time. Explore more at 4imprint.com. 4imprint. 4certain. Bloomberg Audio Studios. Podcasts. Radio. News. Hello and welcome to another episode of the Odd Lots Podcast. I'm Tracy Alloway. And I'm Joe Weisenthal. Joe, I think I know the answer to this question, but do you ever write to-do lists? No. Yeah. I figure. No, I'm not. No. Well, I make a half-hearted attempt every day where it's like podcast recording one, podcast recording two, do the newsletter, reply to the following emails. Yeah. But as of last week I have seen the most epic to list ever Oh yes yes Presumably you saw this Yeah yeah yeah I saw the scott besant to list and it was basically like by the end right right so u treasury uh secretary awesome to list scott besant uh there was a photo taken of him presumably he did this on purpose one would hope but he had a to-do list uh and it basically just said buy japanese yen and he put in the jpy Why? So there's no ambiguity. Five to 10 billion. Yeah. So it's pretty clear that he was not referring to personal purchases in some vacation. If that's the only thing on the Treasury Secretary's to-do list, he's not that busy, right? He's not. But he presumably is fairly busy. We know that the yen had been weakening dramatically. We know that there has been a recent sharp strengthening. There's always talk of a yen intervention here and there. I don't really understand fully why the yen is so weak. why the U.S. feels compelled, that it's important to get involved in that market, etc. I have many questions. Yeah. So the U.S. did intervene together with Japan in the yen to stop it from weakening. And what's really interesting about all of this, I mean, we love big foreign currency stories anyway but what interesting is this was kind of a new type of intervention So the U actually sold euros which was very interesting And they also used a Fed repo facility that I had completely forgotten about as well. So there are all these interesting questions about this particular incident, let's say, including the big one, which is, will this be enough to stop the yen weakening? And it's still very surreal to me whenever I look at a chart of the dollar exchange rate. the yen will always be 110 to the dollar for me because that was my allowance when i was there i got a thousand yen every week and it was like roughly ten dollars and so i have that stuck in my head and whenever i look at the chart it's now at like 155 it's kind of crazy yeah no it's pretty wild i mean for so long for like the first half of our careers the story was like strengthening and strengthening yen lower and lower rates at the long end of the japanese yield curve People used to talk about the widowmaker trade because many people had gone short various forms of Japanese paper on the expectation that it all blow up in some way. But it has really blown up, but it's been quite a reversal on both the rates in the end. And again, the question I have, in addition to the tools, is why is this an important thing now for the U.S. to get involved? And why do we feel so? I have many questions. [5:00] All right. So whenever we have big questions about capital flows or FX moves, we shine our Brad Setzer bat signal into the sky and he magically appears on the podcast. So we do, in fact, have the perfect guest. We are speaking once again with Brad Setzer, Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. So, Brad, thank you so much for coming back on AllBots. It's always fun. Maybe just to begin with, let me ask the obvious question. If your currency is weakening to the degree that you think an intervention is necessary, why doesn't the BOJ, the central bank, just raise rates? That is a very obvious question. For whatever reason, the Bank of Japan has been very slow to raise rates. So the short term policy rates about one, it is 1%. Inflation is clearly above that. There are different measures. Inflation has been above that for a long time. The stated reasons for the hesitation is the Bank of Japan has worked for so long to get inflation back to two. They don't want to prematurely cut off this shift in behavior They don want to fall back into the zero rate zero inflation economy I think there also probably a few technical reasons I sure that Ueda wanted the yield curve to steepen, and it has a lot, before short-term rates went up. Short-term rates affect the cost of all the yen deposits, so they impact the liability side of the banking system. The banks have a lot of low-yielding assets on their balance sheet, so does the Bank of Japan. So there may be some concern about pushing up the cost of funding on the banking side too fast. The theory of some in the market, not me, is that this is out of concern about how it impacts the government's overall funding cost. And if you pushed up short-term rates, that would push up the fiscal deficit and interest cost too much. I think that's a little overstated, but that is certainly one of the considerations. I want to ask about why the yen has been so weak in the first place. But actually, before that, maybe we zoom out bigger, because weakness in East Asian currencies in general has been a story of 2026. And it not obvious to me why East Asian currencies at all would be particularly weak these days because all I ever read about in headlines is extraordinary you know current account surpluses not in Japan per se Or the Korean lawn. The Korean specifically would be the big one. It's not intuitive to me at all that at a time when like the big chip makers are making money hand over fist, that they would be particularly weak currencies. Why do you give us this sort of view from the Asia-Pacific view generally and then the Japan-specific view on this year's currency moves? Well, look, you're right. The global trade surplus is now all in East Asia. Yeah. The chip, you know, basically San Francisco decided to spend a lot of money on kit that basically comes from, you know, in the first instance, Japan, Korea and Taiwan, but feeds into a lot of parts from Japan. It's pushing, you know, it's helping China, too. So, you know, we have really record trade surpluses throughout Asia, East Asia, except for Japan. We get to Japan later And like you know Korea current account surplus is going to go from 100 billion and change to somewhere between three and 400 billion Massive You know Taiwan is probably going to double And you know it was big to begin with So we doubling means going from like 15 to 25 to 30 percent of GDP These are insane numbers. With Taiwan, it's a bit different. The central bank doesn't want its currency to strengthen. It has engineered a weakening of the Taiwan dollar compared to last year by reversing prudential regulations, basically letting the lifers unhedge their foreign assets. And then with Taiwan in particular, it's almost one company, TSMC. And you can kind of lean on that company to tell it when it converts and when it doesn't. Bloomberg actually did one of the best stories I've ever seen about the Central Bank of China, Taipei, and how it is managing Taiwan's dollar without actually using its balance sheet. korea is different korea has been strange it's been this story where the better the news is for korea the more the korean stock market goes up the more foreign holders of korean stocks have to sell because they're hitting concentration limits and that has created a weird situation where good news for the equities for korea's equity so you know hynix and samsung was leading to an outward [10:00] flow and producing record weakness in the Korean won. That is layered on to outflows from the pension system. That is layered on to this whole story about, you know, Korean day traders used to buy levered U.S. ETFs, single stock ETFs, and then Korea let them buy levered single stock Korean ETFs. And that didn't turn out to be a great idea. But, you know, it's sort of we end up with a world where you have this enormous positive terms of trade shock, enormous, that is producing record weakness. And it's in that context where we can think about the yen as being another of these currencies that is kind of fundamentally OK. Japan has a current account surplus of 5% of GDP. It's investment income. It's not trade. Its trade accounts would be improving but for oil, thanks to the AI stuff. It's got one of the biggest foreign asset portfolios in the world. The government of Japan has still probably close to $1.2 trillion in reserves. That's a big number. It has $900 billion plus in the government pension fund, foreign assets. That a big number GDP is now down to trillion The government is sitting on a foreign asset position of close to 50 of its GDP The weakness has been throughout Asia a bit counterintuitive but for slightly different reasons And with Japan, you obviously have the very low rate story as a central part of it. 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But like, you know, look, the yen was the one of the lowest yielding currencies. So you it was a typical funding currency. I don't think the carry trade was on an enormous scale, but there were certainly hedge funds, others who more or less thought that the Ministry of Finance was going to allow the yen to weaken beyond what it had weakened before. And since, you know, the yen, shorting the yen is positive carry. There's a higher yield on dollars than on yen. As long as it's stable, you make a little bit of money. And if the yen depreciates, you make a lot more money. So there was a bit of speculative betting on it. Not a ton, I would say. [15:00] And then you have weird hedging dynamics. So there's a little bit of a dynamic where when the Nikkei goes up, foreigners holding the Nikkei need to hedge a bit more because some do partially hedge. When the Nasdaq goes up, the GPIF doesn't hedge, so it doesn't generate an offsetting hedging flow. And then despite all the hedge America stories from last year, in Japan, the key fixed income hedged investors seem to have gone a little bit less hedged. The life or hedge ratio has come down. So a lot of it is not quite your classic speculative flows, although there's a bit of that. A lot of this is hedging flows amongst real money investors. So that does add a little bit of a different dynamic. But I don't discount the fact that a bunch of investors, including a bunch of hedge funds, were basically making a bet that the yen would go to 170 because Ueda was behind the curve. So let's talk about it from the U.S. perspective. What is the reason that the weakening of the yen is something that would or should concern the Treasury Department? Well I think the classic concern which hasn been the concern that Secretary Besant has articulated is that extreme weakness in East Asian currencies gives East Asia a trade edge over American producers I mean, classically, a weak yen is bad for Detroit. A weak Korean won is bad for Detroit. It's really, you know, the traded goods pressure, most classically through the automotive sector, that has been the traditional driver of this. And to be clear, we are like, you know, the wands come back a bit, but 1500 is a crisis level of the wand and Korea is not in a crisis. 160 is an insanely weak yen on any Big Mac index. It pushes the yen below in inflation adjusted terms where it was in the 1970s. We're back to the 1960s. These are extreme undervaluations, in my view. And so in that sense, the classic concern would be that this gives all these guys a huge edge over American manufacturers. That hasn't been what Besson has emphasized. He emphasized well the weak yen is putting pressure on the wand is adding to this generalized malaise bizarreness where good news is bad news for a lot of Asian currencies And then there a sense that this could create pressure on the treasury market Now, to be clear, if the yen just falls, that makes the value of Japanese investments in treasuries higher. So the impact on the treasury market would come if the Japanese resisted that, use their reserves and the excessive use of their reserves or the use of their reserves started to put pressure on the treasury market because they have to fund, they would fund it by selling treasuries. So I think part of Besant's theory of the case is that by joining with the Japanese, first of all, we're supporting the yen from an incredibly weak level. It's arguably overshot. It has decoupled from five-year, 10-year rate differentials for the past several months past year even. And by helping the Japanese, we're helping a friend. That's what the president says. And we can jointly intervene in a way that reduces the possible pressure on the treasury market. That would be, I think, the explanation I would give. But I, you know Besant hasn been he more I mean the president said it was to help a friend Besant has said it to avoid destabilization throughout the Asia currency complex Why did they do it in euros Or why did the U do it in euros They sold euros I mean, you know, some of it is just Secretary Besant being a former currency trader wanting to have presumably a bit of fun. Just getting creative. We have euros. We can't use euros. We have a few more dollars, but only a few more dollars. I mean, you can debate. I mean, this was clearly an intervention. But, you know, when you shift your the composition of your reserves around, sometimes that's not even viewed as intervention because you're not selling your currency to buy another guy's currency. I think he presumably did it because he wanted to be a bit cute and say, well, this is not a view about the dollar. We still want a strong dollar. This is just a view about the yen. And we're just expressing this in a way that makes it clear that this is a view about the yen. It also let him do like kind of surprising things like there was the rate check in euro yen, which caused a lot of confusion in the market. But at the end of the day, we don't know the volume. We don't know if he actually did the five to 10. Maybe we'll see in a week or so. But the vast bulk of the intervention was from Japan's Ministry of Finance. [20:00] It was in dollar yen. So fundamentally, this was a dollar yen intervention, not a euro yen intervention. Brad, you mentioned that if you were to go by something like the Big Mac index, the dollar yen or the yen is at historically weak levels. And of course, there's all kinds of attempts to measure like what like fair value of a currency is. Right. So you mentioned the Big Mac index. And then there's like, I don't know, beer models and rear models and exchange rate differential models. and GDP differential models, do any of them work anymore? Are any of them consistently either predictive or useful? What is the state of all of these sort of classical approaches to determining fair value of any given currency? The Big Mac Index is a version of purchasing power parity that sort of prices, broadly speaking, should be the same if you're at comparable levels of development. Recently particularly vis Asia the market pressure the financial pressures have pulled currencies further away from their purchasing power parity levels So that hasn as a predictive variable that hasn worked As an analytical tool I still think it valuable A behavioral equilibrium exchange rate model fundamentally looks at policy settings today and says, what's the impact of the policy settings? And then it says, we don't know what the equilibrium value of the currency is, but we know what it is, where it has been in the past. So given the policies and given the past, Is the currency strong or weak? All the Asian currencies kind of score as weak on this because they are fundamentally incredibly weak. I mean, we haven't talked about China, but China has a big and growing trade surplus. Use a current account based model. You'll find that China's currency is undervalued. Certainly, Korea's currency is undervalued on a current account based model. All these show is undervalued on behavioral exchange rate based models. So basically, what we know is that financial flows have pulled currencies quite far away from any of the more fundamental or purchasing power-based measures. So I want to go back to the idea of avoiding additional pressure on the U.S. Treasury market. And a big component of this seems to be use of this Fed facility that I mentioned earlier It called the Foreign and International Monetary Authorities Repo Facility very catchy or FEMA And it basically allows foreign central banks to use their treasuries as collateral to get dollars. But from what I understand, and I should say this facility, I think, came about during 2020, during the pandemic with the big treasury market route. From what I understand, it charges above market rates for central banks. And so one of the criticisms I've seen lately or maybe concerns is that the FEMA repo facility is ultimately going to be uneconomical for central banks. Like, why would they want to use it if they could just repo treasuries at cheaper market rates? And then secondly, the facility is also capped at something like 60 billion. So if you need to intervene again, someone's going to have to raise that limit. What are the sort of pros and cons of using this particular facility in this way? You're a fan, right? I'm a fan. I publicly, I privately pushed for it back when I was at the Treasury. I publicly pushed for it in 2020. I think it is a useful tool So the basic idea is that central banks have a lot of really good collateral And if they need cash they don actually have to go and sell the treasuries into the cash bond market They can just repo them at the Fed, get dollars, and then intervene that way. And it's zero risk to the Fed. And the Fed can always offset any monetary impact with its domestic operations. So there's no necessary monetary impact. It's just a way to allow in times of stress or times of pressure, a central bank to avoid having to immediately sell treasuries. And remember that in 2020, we kind of got into a downward spiral in the treasury market where central bank sales were sort of begetting private sales and the long bonds was really selling off and the Fed had to come in and do a lot of direct bond purchases. So, you know, it sort of makes sense to have this additional tool in the toolkit. You know, why do it with the Fed rather than with it? Well, first of all, I guess, you know, the Fed is not in this case is a little quieter as a counterparty. I mean, it is disclosed, but with a weak lag is in theory. You know, if you get rid of the cap, it's unlimited in the quantities. [25:00] And then the premium is there. It's not huge, but you can debate where it is. It was not meant to be used as a substitute for repo in ordinary conditions. So it does have a premium. I think you can argue that right now, if you're the Ministry of Finance and you got a legacy five year bond with a pretty high coupon, bond, you're better off using FEMA repo than dumping it in the market. You're going to be able to cover the cost of FEMA repo out of the coupon on the bond. And obviously, if you sell the bond, you're never going to get that bond at that yield back. It gives the Ministry of Finance a bit of flexibility. At a minimum, it means it can intervene and then sell treasuries with a lag. It doesn't have to sort of immediately sell. Now, Japan does have a cash buffer. When they've intervened in the past, for whatever reason, they haven't used their cash buffer. They've pretty directly sold treasuries. So I think you know it just gives another tool to the Ministry of Finance and gives the Ministry of Finance more options about how it generates the dollars that it selling The thing about AI for business, it may not automatically fit the way your business works. At IBM, we've seen this firsthand. But by embedding AI across HR, IT, and procurement processes, we've reduced costs by millions, slash repetitive tasks, and freed thousands of hours for strategic work. Now we're helping companies get smarter by putting AI where it actually pays off, deep in the work that moves the business. Let's create smarter business, IBM. 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Optum is working to bring costs down save patients money and make it easier to get refills Little by little Optum is helping make healthcare work as one for everyone Head to business to see how Is there anything stopping Secretary Besant from saying, you know what, $150, $150 end of the dollar, that is our line in the sand. We're not going to let it weaken beyond that. And then you might not even have to spend a penny because, you know, no one's going to people might not want to test it. And you just say we have unlimited unlimited firepower because we're spending our own currency. We're just going to cap it there. Yeah, there's something that limits Secretary Besson from doing that, which is that he doesn't control the Fed's balance sheet. OK, Secretary Besson just has the ESF. Now, the ESF has ballpark 20 billion in FX, ballpark 20 billion in like liquid dollar cash. and then the special drawing rights which it has like 160 170 billion of a lot but not unlimited and using the special drawing rights is kind of even more out there than using fema repo you know it's sort of so you know the treasury on its own probably doesn't have the firepower now you can argue that between the treasury the moth if japan [30:00] could, through some magic, change some of the pension funds operating guidance so that it started hedging its $950 billion portfolio. There's more than enough firepower there collectively to set a target, sort of a yield curve control type target, 150, probably be more like 160 now, and thereby implement that. So, you know, whatever it takes, this is going to stay below 150 or 160. The world does change. Oil shocks happen. Inflation shocks. The Fed may be raising rates. People think the Bank of Japan is likely now to raise rates. So I think the risk on that is that you get locked into defending a level and then the world changes. But, you know, conceptually, you could try to do that. I think what the Ministry of Finance is trying to do is reestablish fear in the market around 160. I mean, that used to be kind of a level where, you know, if you were going to go short the yen, you'd be a little nervous that the moth might come in and whack you. But then when they didn't defend one thing, yeah. It's like the mafia whacking you, right? I mean look the weak side of the yen has been defined by the Ministry of Finance for the past several years I mean that a conventional view in the market given that the interest rate differential favors the dollar. By the way, we should discuss fiscal policy because U.S. fiscal policy is way worse than Japanese fiscal policy. So I don't buy this fiscal fears or whatever. It is rate differentials. But the rate differential has favored the dollar. And the limit for the past, I would say, three years on how weak the yen gets is has been set by the moth. And when the moth didn't intervene at 160 and then the last time it intervened at 162, you know, people thought, well, maybe they're going to allow further moves and we'll make a bet that the moth is going to tolerate a weaker yen, given that Ueda has been slow to raise rates. And so I think this is fundamentally about saying we're going to defend 160. There's a lot of risk around 160. Be careful if you want to just go short yen when you're close to that level, which is a softer version of the we're just going to defend 150 to kingdom come. All right. Well, on that note, perhaps the biggest question other than, you know, why did all of this happen is is it going to work And I mentioned earlier the yen is trading at like 155 156 to the dollar That better than where it was before this intervention but it is starting to weaken ever so slightly again And on that note, Adam Posen had a pretty funny quote in the Financial Times. Did you see this joke? Oh, I didn't see it, no. So basically saying, verbatim quote, The irony of the guy working for Soros and Stanley Druckenmiller who broke the Bank of England back in 92, pretending that you can do FX intervention alone and lastingly defend a currency is just amazing. So, again, this idea of like how much firepower does the U.S. actually have? Does this need to be more coordinated? Do you think this is enough? I think it will be enough if the Bank of Japan is going to raise rates and maybe raise rates several times. I think the only reason why it wouldn't be enough if the Bank of Japan is going to raise rates, and look, I think if the Bank of Japan doesn't raise rates in September, this will be tested clearly. I mean, that would signal there's not full commitment inside Japan to defending the currency even in the classic sense the monetary and fiscal authorities have different views But if the Bank of Japan does raise rates the other side of the currency pair is the dollar And so it depends a little bit on what Warsh does. But if the Bank of Japan is raising rates faster than the Fed from this point on, I actually do think this will work. You know, Adam never believes currency intervention works, by the way. So it's not at all a surprise that he has this view. And I think he should reflect a little bit on why the yen and why currency traders are nervous around key levels, because in the short run, most market people I talk to say intervention can work in a over a reasonably short period of time. And it can work over a longer period of time. If the currency is overshot, I would say the yen has overshot. if the fundamentals are evolving in a way that is going to be eventually favorable to that currency, you can make that argument with Japan. You know, oil prices, you know, that depends on what happens in the Straits and with Iran. But oil prices are not at their highs. That helps Japan. The BOJ seems likely to raise rates in September. Certainly, the BOJ could be on a path that brings short-term rates up. [35:00] to closer to inflation, so on a path that leads it to two over time. That should support the yen if the Fed's stable. Long-term Japanese rates have converged with long-term U.S. rates. So the long-run interest rate differential is now actually at odds with the yen. Given this rate differential, the yen should be stronger. The current account is actually quite solid, 5% of GDP. Japan's getting ever more money on the same level of its U.S. portfolio because U.S. rates are now higher than they were when Japan bought its original bonds. So that's not really at risk. And, you know, the key thing is that you got to change expectations. And the expectations have been that the yen is going to stay weak and maybe get weaker. So in that context, this huge foreign portfolio of Japanese institutional investors is generally becoming less hedged over time. you change that and I think you change the dynamics. And where I probably differ a bit from people like Adam or more like the conventional international macroeconomics school is that I do think Japan is unique in a couple of ways One way it has been unique is that the companies that have this massive foreign presence make enormous profits abroad Those profits translate into enormous yen profits, but they don't actually bring the dollars, euros, yuan that they earn abroad back home. They tend to reinvest it, so that doesn't generate a flow. And then the irony is a lot of the non-FDI foreign assets are held by the government. You know, the bulk of the unhedged portfolio is actually in the hands of the MOF and the GPIF, the pension fund. And they typically don't repatriate. So, you know, they're generating, you know, the reserves were generating 35 to 40 billion in interest a year. But in normal times, that just was compounding abroad. The GPIF gets dividends, it gets interest. It doesn't repatriate that. Now, there's some portfolio rebalancing. there's some additional complexities. I won't go into that. But in the normal course of action, all this interest income that goes to the government, which is well above a percentage point of GDP, is heading towards two percentage points of GDP, doesn't hit the FX market. So in a sense I think in order to equilibrate flows you going to need to see a way to have the winner of a weekend which in a financial sense has been the government of Japan take some of its winnings and bring them back home And so in that sense, I tend to view this a little more favorably. I think this is part of the conditions needed to set a floor under the yen over time together with the Bank of Japan. So to me, you've got to have the Bank of Japan, and then you have to have the flow dynamics. And the interesting thing about Japan is that the government is by far the biggest actor on the flow dynamics. It has the biggest foreign asset position, and it has the biggest capital gains from yen weakness. By the way, for those who don't know the numbers, as you mentioned, the long end of the curves in the U.S. and Japan converge somewhat. But, you know, the Fed's current rate is between three and a half and three and a quarter. Bank of Japan is still 1%. So that's really where this gap persists. We'll see, as you mentioned, if the BOJ closes it. Before we wrap, let's talk about fiscal policy for a moment. Because, you know, going back in 2016, the yield on the Japanese 30-year was like 0.05, like something like truly nothing. And now it like around 4 percent There are these because the debt to GDP is so high there are these fears that if rates rise across the curve a significant share of government expenditures are in the form of interest payments That furthers the inflation problem. Then you have what people call fiscal dominance. It spirals out of control. The central bank can't fix it. That is sort of like the classical version of why some people think that you should short the yen because it will one day be worth confetti or something like that. What is wrong with the theory that this is the the piper being paid? Is that a phrase? The piper being paid from years of overly loose fiscal policy? Well, I like I like the way you phrase it as years of overly loose fiscal policy, because you didn't say today's fiscal policy is overly loose. Right. Right. What has changed, certainly compared to 2014, even compared to 2016, is that the primary balance, so excluding interest, government revenues relative to expenditure, is now in balance. It's now flat. There's no primary deficit. That makes Japan one of the better G7 economies, certainly better than the United States, certainly better than the UK, certainly better than France. I think better than Germany now, too. I mean, I think if you count the defense... [40:00] spending. So Japan no longer has a big primary deficit. It's actually trending towards a primary surplus. The moth loves to play games where if you don't do a stimulus, you actually tighten because the way they structure the budget, they sort of force the government to go out and argue for a stimulus to offset what they mechanically have baked in as a tightening, which is why we You've ended up, you know, Japan has outperformed the IMF's forecast this year. It's really, you know, at a primary balance rather than in a modest 1% primary deficit. And so, you know, you're not in a position where things are on the edge of spiraling out of control. Now, it is certainly true that the interest burden will go up if the Bank of Japan hikes rates. And it will actually go up even if the Bank of Japan doesn't hike rates. because there's an awful lot of bonds that were issued in the past at very, very low rates. They will mature. They'll have to be refinanced. With higher inflation, higher nominal growth, the debt dynamics don go crazy because you have higher nominal rates but your nominal rates aren wildly out of line with nominal growth Real rates are probably still below or equal to real growth and your primary is in an okay position The other weird thing about Japan is that the government of Japan holds on its balance sheet. So the Ministry of Finance is part of the government. It holds the reserves. The reserves in Japan make money. They are in dollars with this higher interest rate compared to the short-term cost of funding in yen. The GPIF, the government pension fund, makes money. It has higher yielding foreign assets. So the net interest payments on Japan are actually, at times, they've been close to zero. Now, that's a function in part of the backward-looking low rates, but it's also a function of the fact that Japan's government has this massive foreign asset position. Long-winded way of saying you should worry if nominal rates go way up and inflation doesn't go up. But if nominal rates converge to levels that are consistent with inflation and if the primary stays where it is Japan debt dynamics are actually not bad The net debt levels have been falling In five years without much change net debt in the U will surpass or be close to that of Japan And remember, when you're short in the yen and to go long the dollar, you're going long U.S. fiscal. And I would argue if you look at the full range of variables, not gross debt, but the dynamic path of net debt, the primary, absolutely, the fiscal balance, 1% of GDP in last year. And that's not We're at six. We were five-ish last year, but we're now at six. We're heading up. That's before the defense spending. I think what has gotten people nervous is Takeichi doesn't want, at a minimum, to get a bigger surplus. She's pushing back against the MOF's plans. She may want to go back to a modest primary, and she expresses this in a way that generates a lot of angst. But the underlying fiscal performance of Japan, stack up Japan using the IMF fiscal monitor variables against the U.S., and then compare that to the rhetoric that is tossed around. And I would say there's a very big gap. All right. Well, on that note, Brad, thank you so much for coming back on the show. Really appreciate it. Oh thanks Thanks for letting me explain my this is one area where I not the most conventional Yeah that was great That was excellent And just remember this last thing just always remember Japan is selling dollars a bot between 80 and 100 depending on when they bought them and somewhere around 160 At the worst, you can say, this operation, it reduces gross debt in a really big way. Awesome. That was excellent. Thanks, Brad. Hopefully talk to you soon, but not too soon. Joe, always good to catch up with Brad and get his perspective. Yeah. A few things stood out from that conversation. So one, it is kind of crazy how long the memory of the lost decade is lingering here. And we see this time and time again, both in economics and the business world, which is like people just remember the past cycle. Right. And it influences their current behavior. Understandably so in the case of Japan. The other thing that stood out to me is this idea of, OK, the Treasury has done this sort of creative intervention in order to ease people. [45:00] on long-term treasuries. But there seems to be a tension there with what the Fed's doing at the moment, right? So Warsh is like, ah, you know, like markets, you have more of an activist say in where treasury yields are going. It shouldn't all be about the central bank. And so we've seen longer-term treasury yields go up. So now you have this weird situation where like treasury clearly wants them to come down, whereas the Fed is kind of like, ah, do your own thing. Totally. There's lots of in there. One of the first things that Brad said that I thought was interesting and sort of speaks to your point about the lost decade is he's like, oh, the BOJ has done all this work to get inflation back to 2%. And in my mind, I was thinking like, oh, yeah, right. Like they must when he says all this work, they're trying to get inflation back down. But then I remember that in Japan, it's the other direction. And so, like, you know, for years, the story is like no inflation, no inflation. Maybe they just want to let it run hot a little while to fully put the last really multiple decades of like no inflation truly in the past I also think it is interesting and probably no one really talks about it the idea that Japan fiscal position at least by certain objective measures clearly improving clearly looking better than the trajectory of the U these days at least if you looking at a primary deficit And then to his point, there's numerous – the classical metrics that economists use to measure the valuation of a currency. We know none of them are that great as metrics go, but they all point to the yen, in fact, being undervalued. Yeah. All right. I think we should end it there before I make a terrible turning Japanese treasury market cliche. Oh, you know what? I thought of a good pun, but someone had already used it. Oh, what was it? Keep calm and carry in. Yeah, all right. Oh, you know, it's like I'm saying it's usually been used a handful of times. And yeah, I just looked it up. It's just a few random. You need to make those posters. I know. On the wall. If I had been the first, I would do it. But I was not. All right. Shall we leave it there? Let's leave it there. This has been another episode of the All Thoughts podcast. I'm Tracy Alloway. You can follow me at Tracy Alloway. And I Joe Weisenthal You can follow me at The Stalwart Follow our producers Carmen Rodriguez at Armand Dash O at Dashbot Kale Brooks at Kale Brooks and Kevin Lozano at Kevin Lloyd Lozano And for more Odd Lots content, go to Bloomberg.com slash Odd Lots or the daily newsletter and all of our episodes. And you can chat about all of these topics 24-7 in our Discord, discord.gg slash Odd Lots. And if you enjoy Odd Lots, if you like it when we shine the Brad Setzer bat signal, then please leave us a positive review on your favorite podcast platform. And remember, if you are a Bloomberg subscriber, you can listen to all of our episodes absolutely ad-free. All you need to do is find the Bloomberg channel on Apple Podcasts and follow the instructions there. Thanks for listening. When you're running a business, the best days are the ones where priorities stay on track. For midsize and large companies, risk can affect multiple parts of the organization at once, from property and liability to cyber and regulatory challenges. At that level, managing risk becomes an ongoing discipline. At the Hartford, the focus is on helping businesses manage risk before it turns into something more disruptive. And when losses do happen that work is paired with insurance coverage shaped by years of underwriting risk engineering and claims experience Learn more at the Hartford slash risk mitigation Policies provided by Hartford Fire Insurance Company and its property and casualty affiliates, Hartford, Connecticut. Whatever your goal, trade show giveaways, client gifts, or team gear, 4imprint has the promo products to match. 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