Ed Yardeni Predicts S&P 500 Will Reach 10,000 by 2029

Ed Yardeni预测标普500指数到2029年将达10,000点 Yardeni认为，随着企业生产率提升、利润率扩大以及AI驱动的增长推动标普500指数升至10,000点，美国经济在本年代末之前都将避免衰退。 Ed Yardeni博士阐述了他的长期看涨宏观经济框架，预计美国经济在2029年前将避免衰退，并将标普500指数推升至10,000点。他为较高的企业利润率和盈利动能（FEMO）进行辩护，认为现代技术、企业重组以及人口结构带来的财富转移正在推动生产力持续提升。与1999年投机性的市盈率（P/E）泡沫不同，Yardeni指出当前的市场上涨背后有广泛的基本面盈利增长以及富有韧性的经济缓冲机制提供支撑。 Ed Yardeni 认为 10 年期美债收益率处于 4% 至 5% 的区间属于健康且正常的经济环境，收益率上升吸引机构买盘介入，展现出市场的自我调节机制而非系统性危机。 (3:16) Yardeni 重申其“咆哮的 2020 年代”（Roaring 2020s）宏观论点，预测美国经济在 2029 年底之前不会陷入衰退，并维持标普 500 指数在本十年末达到 10,000 点的目标。 (15:38) 面对“盈利泡沫”质疑，Yardeni 指出科技与通信服务板块已占标普 500 指数约 45% 的权重，推动整体利润率升至创纪录的约 15%，加之 AI 驱动的企业效率提升，基本面盈利动能依然扎实。 (21:14) 超大规模云服务商（Hyperscalers）在 AI 基础设施上的资本开支逼近 1 万亿美元，这反映了市场对算力变现的旺盛真实需求，与 1999 年缺乏盈利支撑的估值泡沫存在本质区别。 (24:36)

Market strategist Dr. Ed Yardeni argues that the United States is in the midst of a durable, productivity-led 'Roaring 2020s' economic expansion driven by corporate efficiency and demographic wealth. Dismissing persistent recession forecasts, Yardeni projects the economy will avoid a recession through 2029 and targets an S&P 500 level of 10,000 by the end of the decade. The Roaring 2020s and Productivity Growth (10:08) Yardeni formulated his 'Roaring 2020s' thesis in August 2020, drawing parallels to the technological expansion that followed the 1918 influenza pandemic and the 1920–1921 economic depression. Rather than experiencing an economy-wide downturn—which Yardeni termed the widely anticipated 'Godot Recession'—the U.S. economy underwent isolated 'rolling recessions' across individual sectors while aggregate real GDP repeatedly set records. Yardeni identifies data as an expanding, effectively infinite fourth factor of production alongside land, labor, and capital. In this framework, artificial intelligence is an evolutionary milestone of the digital revolution that began with 1960s mainframe computing rather than a sudden structural rupture. Yardeni argues that classical economic models overemphasize resource scarcity while underestimating how technological innovation cures supply bottlenecks, allowing companies to restructure operations, restrain headcount growth, and sustain output despite sequential macro shocks. Earnings Fundamentals Versus Dot-Com Bubble Speculation (21:14) Addressing comparisons to the 1999–2000 dot-com bubble, Yardeni argues that the current bull market is fundamentally supported by operational corporate profits rather than speculative multiple expansion. While the 1999 peak was driven by price-to-earnings inflation without underlying profitability, recent S&P 500 operating earnings surged 28.8% year-over-year, supported by profit margins near record highs of roughly 15%. This structural margin strength reflects the index's composition, where high-margin Information Technology and Communication Services firms account for approximately 45% of total weighting. Market breadth and valuation trends further challenge bubble comparisons. Over a recent six-month span, the S&P 500 rose 11% while its forward P/E multiple contracted by 8%, indicating that operational earnings momentum outpaced equity prices. With the advance-decline line reaching record highs and 85% of S&P 500 constituents recording upward revisions in forward earnings expectations, the rally has broadened into cyclical sectors including financials, industrials, and healthcare. Demographic Wealth and Capital Market Shock Absorbers (50:10) Yardeni rejects the popular 'K-shaped' economy model in favor of a 'G-shaped' (generational) framework. The Baby Boomer and Silent generations hold approximately $100 trillion in net worth, insulating them from unemployment cycles. Because boomers own roughly 60% of money market fund assets and predominantly hold paid-off properties or 3% fixed mortgages, higher interest rates have expanded their cash flow, sustaining consumer spending and enabling intergenerational transfers to assist adult children with living costs. Furthermore, Yardeni contends that modern financial plumbing provides robust buffers against systemic credit crunches, which historically trigger recessions. Private credit pools and dedicated distressed-asset funds step in to absorb dislocations in sectors like commercial real estate without destabilizing the commercial banking core. Localized banking strains are further mitigated by the Federal Reserve's demonstrated willingness to provide rapid liquidity, as shown during the March 2023 regional banking stress. Interest Rate Normalization and Proposed Fed Reforms (66:00) Yardeni frames 10-year Treasury yields between 4% and 5% as a healthy, historically normal environment that restores market discipline after years of zero-interest-rate distortions. Having coined the term 'bond vigilantes' in 1983 during an era of $250 billion budget deficits, he notes the economy continues to function despite federal deficits expanding to between $1.5 trillion and $2.0 trillion. He criticized the Federal Reserve's 100-basis-point rate cuts in 2024 as premature, observing that the cuts perversely prompted 10-year yields to rebound by 100 basis points. To diminish policy uncertainty and central bank commentary noise, Yardeni proposes anchoring the Federal funds rate directly to the market-determined 2-year Treasury yield, which could adjust continuously to reflect market pricing. He also recommends evaluating broad price trends via the GDP deflator rather than narrower consumer indices, and strongly opposes regulatory suggestions to reduce corporate reporting from quarterly to semi-annual filings, arguing that frequent disclosures provide crucial macroeconomic transparency. Based on forward earnings estimates of $413 per share and eventually $500 per share capitalized at a 20-times multiple, Yardeni targets S&P 500 levels of 8,250 and 10,000 by the end of 2029. He notes, however, that monetary policy missteps, geopolitical escalations in the Middle East, or credit strain stemming from massive capital expenditures by artificial intelligence hyperscalers remain critical external risks that could disrupt this trajectory.

资深市场策略师Ed Yardeni在节目中重申其“咆哮的2020年代”宏观论点，预计美国经济在2029年之前不会陷入衰退，标普500指数有望在长周期盈利增长的支撑下于本十年末达到10000点。 咆哮的2020年代与技术驱动型韧性 (10:08) Ed Yardeni指出，他在2020年8月首次提出“咆哮的2020年代”（Roaring 2020s）论点，其历史参照是经历了1918年流感大流行、一战以及1920至1921年严重萧条后，依靠汽车、无线电和装配线推动生产力爆发的1920年代。尽管近年来市场普遍对所谓的“戈多衰退”（Godot Recession）充满预期，但全经济层面的崩溃始终未发生，取而代之的是不同部门间的“滚动式衰退”（rolling recessions）。经济在经历疫情封锁、供应链受阻、美联储加息至5.5%、2023年区域性银行危机以及地缘冲突后，实际GDP仍创出历史新高。 Yardeni强调，在土地、劳动力与资本这三大传统生产要素之外，持续呈指数级扩张的“数据”已成为第四大要素。他认为人工智能并非颠覆性突变，而是始于1960年代中期IBM大型机时代的“数字化革命”的演进延续，核心目的始终是以更低成本、更快速度处理更多数据。虽然传统经济学依赖萨缪尔森模型强调资源稀缺性与配给，但自由市场中的价格高企通常会激励技术创新以解决短缺，进而推动跨行业的长周期生产力扩张。 盈利驱动与1999年泡沫的本质差异 (15:38) 针对当前市场是否形成“盈利泡沫”的争论，Yardeni与主持人分析认为，本轮牛市由真实的营运盈利动能（FEMO，Fabulous Earnings Momentum）主导，而非1999至2000年间缺乏盈利支撑的纯估值倍数扩张。在标普500指数6个月上涨11%的阶段，其6个月远期市盈率反而收缩了8%，体现出盈利增速快于股价增长。目前季度营运利润增长率达到28.8%，指数利润率接近15%的历史高位。以芯片厂商Western Digital为例，其单季利润从去年同期的2.82亿美元暴增至32亿美元，展现出半导体行业在紧缺状态下的定价权。 Yardeni反驳了利润率必须向1985年均值回归的观点，理由是信息技术和通信服务在标普500指数中的权重已达约45%，这些高利润率板块具备自我淘汰与推陈出新的特征。根据分析师对标普500指数每股远期收益约413美元的预期，结合20倍市盈率，Yardeni给出其年内8250点的目标，并推算至本十年末（2029年）市场将对每股500美元的预期进行定价，支撑指数迈向10000点大关。 代际财富、市场广度与金融减震器 在解释消费韧性时，Yardeni提出了基于婴儿潮一代与沉默一代的“G型经济”（Generational Economy），反驳了贫富分化导致消费崩溃的“K型”假说。这两代人拥有约100万亿美元的庞大净资产，持有60%的货币市场基金，锁定了3%的低房贷利率或完全拥有房产，因此并不受失业波动的直接威胁；不仅无需抛售资产，反而通过借贷消费并向年轻子女转移财富。这种代际资金流动有效支撑了日常生活、餐饮和商场的实际消费支出。 与此同时，当前美股腾落线（Advance-Decline Line）创下历史新高，显示出广泛的上涨广度，85%的成分股获得3个月与12个月远期盈利上调，医疗健康、工业和金融板块正迎头赶上。在系统性风险方面，现代资本市场形成了庞大的“减震器”：与大萧条或2008年不同，如今数千亿美元的困境资产基金、二级接续基金以及类似Citadel等机构充当了私营救援者，加之美联储在2023年3月银行危机中迅速全额担保流动性，化解了局部信用紧缩向全系统蔓延的可能。 债券卫士与货币政策框架重构构想 (66:00) Yardeni长期追踪“债券卫士”（Bond Vigilantes）行为，并将10年期美债收益率4%至5%的区间定义为健康和正常的“旧常态”，认为零利率时代反而扭曲了资本分配。他回顾自己在1983年因2500亿美元赤字创造了“债券卫士”一词，而当前财政赤字已膨胀至1.5万亿至2.0万亿美元区间。他曾批评美联储在2024年降息100个基点的做法过于仓促，由此导致10年期美债收益率反弹了100个基点。 在政策机制方面，Yardeni批评了美联储繁琐的会后沟通方式（戏称为“联邦公开大嘴委员会”），并提出一项非传统的操作构想：货币政策应直接挂钩2年期美债收益率这一市场定价中枢，让联邦基金利率根据市场动态甚至按日自动调节。在通胀监控上，他建议美联储更多关注反映整体经济价格的GDP平减指数，而非口径较窄的CPI。此外，Yardeni强烈主张维持美股上市公司的季度财报披露频率，认为更高频的每周远期盈利预期汇总能够有效抑制企业欺诈，同时充当研判实体经济健康状况的关键领先指标。 Ed Yardeni对2020年代的乐观预期建立在科技提高生产力与企业盈利持续扩大的假设之上，但这一路径仍面临超大规模科技企业巨额资本开支带来的信用利差走阔、潜在的地缘冲突升级以及美联储政策失误等不确定性的考验。

## Background 本期内容由 YouTube 频道 The Compound 于 2026 年 8 月 8 日发布，为《The Compound and Friends》播客第 254 期。节目由主持人 Downtown Josh Brown 和 Michael Batnick 邀请传奇经济学家兼市场策略师 Ed Yardeni 共同录制，围绕“咆哮的2020年代”核心论调、本十年末标普 500 指数迈向 10,000 点的路径、AI 盈利驱动力、利润率韧性、美联储政策及债券卫士等热点议题展开深入探讨。 ## TL;DR Ed Yardeni 重申了他对“咆哮的2020年代”的坚定看多立场，预测在生产力跃升与企业强劲盈利动能（FEMO）的驱动下，美国经济在本年代末之前不会陷入全面衰退，标普 500 指数有望在 2029 年底触及 10,000 点。他深入反驳了 1999 年式泡沫论与传统的 K 型经济悲观论调，指出当前美股上涨由实打实的利润而非单纯估值泡沫支撑，且婴儿潮一代坐拥的百万亿级财富与代际转移构成了消费坚实底座。此外，嘉宾与主持人们还系统剖析了超大规模云厂商的资本开支信贷风险、4% 至 5% 美债收益率回归旧常态的健康机制，并探讨了将两年期国债收益率作为美联储调息法定锚的颠覆性构想。 ## Atmosphere & style 整场对谈兼具华尔街老将的从容睿智与长岛老友聚会般的轻松惬意，笑声与深度交锋自然流淌。从开场关于长岛美食、网球与名流八卦的诙谐热络，到面对宏观风浪时对永久看空者的机智拆解，对话既有硬核的量化算术与周期复盘，又充满通透幽默的现实洞察。听众仿佛置身于一家长岛咖啡馆中，聆听历经数十年市场周期考验的智者以反共识的乐观主义娓娓道来，带来一种拨开恐慌迷雾后的踏实感与坚定信念。 ## Bulletin - [16:04](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n4C4DZoz9iw&t=964s) 知名策略师 Ed Yardeni 预测美国经济在本年代末之前不会陷入全面衰退，并重申标普 500 指数到 2029 年底将冲上 10,000 点大关。 - [30:17](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n4C4DZoz9iw&t=1817s) 当前牛市由扎实的盈利增长而非单纯估值泡沫推动；标普 500 远期市盈率在过去六个月收缩 8% 的同时价格上涨 11%，与 1999 年互联网泡沫形成鲜明对比。 - [34:44](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n4C4DZoz9iw&t=2084s) 婴儿潮一代与沉默一代合计坐拥近 100 万亿美元净资产并持有全美 60% 的货币市场基金，形成的“代际（G型）经济”托底了全美消费与资产流动性。 - [01:07:37](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n4C4DZoz9iw&t=4057s) 10 年期美债收益率处在 4% 至 5% 是健康的“旧常态”，打破了零利率时代的资产扭曲，亦标志着资本市场定价机制的正常化回归。 ## Key takeaways - [03:16](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n4C4DZoz9iw&t=196s) 债券收益率突破与股票价格突破具有截然不同的心理机制：高收益率会迅速引发庞大配置盘进场“锁定高收益”，从而自动压制利率狂飙。 - [10:08](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n4C4DZoz9iw&t=608s) “咆哮的 2020 年代”底层逻辑并非偶然，美国经历的是各板块轮流调整的“轮动式衰退”，而非破坏性的全面经济萧条。 - [12:08](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n4C4DZoz9iw&t=728s) AI 在技术史中属于自 1960 年代大型机以来的演进阶段而非孤立革命，其关键在于释放作为“第四大生产要素”的海量数据资产。 - [43:29](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n4C4DZoz9iw&t=2609s) 标普 500 指数 10,000 点目标的测算模型基于 20 倍市盈率乘以此后每股 500 美元的远期每股收益预期（EPS）。 - [21:14](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n4C4DZoz9iw&t=1274s) 标普 500 净利润率攀升至 15% 具备结构性依托，科技与通信板块占比达 45%，且生成式 AI 正在倒逼企业进行组织提效。 - [30:17](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n4C4DZoz9iw&t=1817s) 全市场腾落线创历史新高、85% 成分股远期盈利预期持续上调，表明牛市广度正在扩散至七巨头之外的“令人印象深刻的 493 只成分股”。 - [38:18](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n4C4DZoz9iw&t=2298s) 哈里·登特等悲观派预言的“婴儿潮退休抛售潮”彻底破产，老年群体不仅未大幅降级置业，反而通过质押借贷避税并对子女进行跨代财富支援。 - [39:50](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n4C4DZoz9iw&t=2390s) 现代资本市场拥有庞大的万亿美元级不良资产基金与私募救援资本，能充当高效“减震器”，防止对冲基金局部爆仓演变成系统性银行危机。 - [01:08:57](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n4C4DZoz9iw&t=4137s) 美联储若要提高透明度与调控效率，应直接将两年期美债收益率作为官方锚定指标实行每日调息，并紧盯广义的 GDP 平减指数。 - [01:13:03](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n4C4DZoz9iw&t=4383s) 反对 SEC 将上市公司季度财报改为半年报的设想，每周滚动的“前瞻营收”和“前瞻利润”是宏观定价与研究不可或缺的核心领先数据。 ## Detailed walkthrough ### [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n4C4DZoz9iw&t=0s) 长岛老乡的闲聊：美食地图、网球与 Billy Joel 的豪宅风波 录音伊始，Josh Brown 热情地与嘉宾 Ed Yardeni 攀谈起长岛同乡的日常生活。当被问及不工作时都在做些什么，Ed Yardeni 坦言自己最喜欢与家人共进晚餐。他过去常常打网球，但由于一侧眼睛视力大不如前，网球已不再适合他。谈及心仪的美食，住在长岛北岸的 Ed 表示自己偏爱越南菜和日料。几人随即如数家珍般盘点起长岛的餐厅：罗斯林（Roslyn）的日料店 Kabuki 水平极高，美中不足是无法提前预约；Ed 则强烈推荐了格伦科夫（Glen Cove）电影院对面、紧挨着 Staples 的一家名为 Asian Fusion 的餐厅；此外，华盛顿港（Port Washington）一家餐厅的北京烤鸭更是让 Ed 赞不绝口，他直言其美味程度甚至超过了自己过去在伦敦机场附近吃过的心头好，让人垂涎欲滴。 话题随后延伸到长岛各地的美食与居住地。Josh 提到了伍德伯里（Woodbury）的大型购物中心 Woodbury Commons 附近的日料店，以及公认的长岛第一寿司店——位于长滩（Long Beach）的 Nagahama。由于 Ed 住在北岸，驱车前往南岸的长滩被戏称为一段漫长折腾的“苦旅”（schlep）。Josh 和 Michael Batnick 都定居在长岛南岸的梅里克（Merrick），而制作人 Nicole 则来自长滩。聊到同为长岛标志性人物的传奇歌手 Billy Joel，大家谈及他已迁居佛罗里达，并在此前夏天出售了位于长岛海峡（Long Island Sound）的主豪宅。Josh 分享了去年夏天 HBO 纪录片里的动人细节：年轻时的 Billy Joel 还在长岛海峡的船上打工当水手时，一眼望见那片地皮便立誓“有朝一日我一定要买下它”，并在成名后实现了这一梦想。但 Billy Joel 早年的财富之路极度坎坷，曾遭遇前妻的兄弟兼商业经理人背叛，被卷走高达 1800 万美元的巨款。大家感慨道，一旦让律师兼任商业经纪人且全权掌握委托代理权（Power of Attorney），往往会引发灾难性的财务危机。 - 休闲爱好：Ed 因单眼视力退化放弃网球，闲暇时间主要陪伴家人聚餐。 - 长岛美食坐标：涵盖罗斯林的 Kabuki、格伦科夫的 Asian Fusion、华盛顿港的北京烤鸭名店，以及长滩排名第一的寿司店 Nagahama。 - Billy Joel 轶事：早年在船上打工时立志买下长岛豪宅；早年因将财务代理权授予身为律师兼经理人的前妻兄弟，被侵吞约 1800 万美元资产。 --- ### [03:16](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n4C4DZoz9iw&t=196s) 债券卫士与利率技术分析的内在悖论 话题顺畅过渡到金融市场，Josh 抛出了由 Ed Yardeni 本人在 20 世纪 80 年代创造的著名概念——“债券卫士”（Bond Vigilantes）。Ed 指出，当前的债券卫士们确实显得有些焦躁不安，正在推高债券收益率，但这尚未达到令人恐慌的地步。在他看来，10 年期美债收益率处在 4% 到 5% 的区间是完全合理的，市场甚至可能会重演 2023 年的一幕：当时 10 年期美债收益率在三个月内从 4% 飙升至 5%，但在 5% 的高位，大批买家迅速入场扫货，这就是市场机制自我调节的奇妙之处。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 股市突破与美债收益率突破的心理机制差异 accDescr: 对比股票突破引发追涨FOMO与利率上升吸引买家锁定高收益从而压制收益率的不同反馈回路 subgraph StockBreakout["股票市场突破逻辑"] S1["股价突破区间 / 创出新高"] --> S2["散户与机构产生 FOMO 情绪"] S2 --> S3["'明天还会更高' 追涨买入"] S3 --> S4["买盘推升价格进一步走高"] end subgraph YieldBreakout["债券收益率突破逻辑"] Y1["美债收益率向上突破区间"] --> Y2["借款人减少借贷而非抢先借款"] Y1 --> Y3["高票息吸引庞大配置盘入场"] Y3 --> Y4["投资者进场'锁定高收益' (Lock-in)"] Y4 --> Y5["大量买盘购入债券，压制收益率继续冲高"] end ``` 针对美债走势，Josh 提出了一个独特的观察：他虽然信奉技术分析，但坚决不认同将形态突破理论直接照搬到利率分析上。在股票市场中，股票盘整突破后，投资者因担心错失行情往往会蜂拥追涨；但在利率市场中，逻辑恰恰相反。没有人会因为利率突破而产生“我明天借钱成本更高，所以今天必须赶紧去借钱”的恐慌。相反，当收益率突破上升到较高水平时，庞大的债券买家会出于“锁定高收益”（lock it in）的强烈冲动蜂拥而入，从而瞬间形成强烈的吸筹阻力，遏制收益率进一步狂飙。Michael 辩解称，多数技术分析师分析的是债券价格或债券 ETF（如价格与收益率反向变动），但 Josh 反驳称像 JC Parets 这类图表派确实直接给收益率画图，不过收益率本身无法直接买卖，其实际运行机制在底层心理学上与股市突破有着本质不同。Ed 对 Josh 的这番精妙逻辑表示由衷赞同，认可其指出的核心差异。 --- ### [05:19](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n4C4DZoz9iw&t=319s) 录音室花絮与节目第 254 期的里程碑 进入节目录制倒计时，录音室内出现了一段幽默的耳机插曲。Josh 提醒 Ed 戴上耳机，Ed 一开始笑着拒绝，打趣道“我戴耳机不好看”，Josh 则奉承道“你戴耳机看起来棒极了”，并解释戴耳机是为了能清晰听到自己的声音，最终说服了 Ed。节目随之插入了赞助商 Nuveen 的播报，强调私募市场投资不再是大机构的专利，涵盖房地产、信贷、基础设施和自然资本等另类资产配置，旨在帮助前瞻性投资者在波动环境中抵御风险并获取多元化回报。 广告归来，Josh 正式宣布《The Compound and Friends》迎来了第 254 期节目。他感慨这档自 2021 年夏天开播的播客不知不觉已走到了第五个年头，迎来了五周年纪念。回顾制作这档节目的历程，Josh 对能够保持如此长期的稳定产出并持续吸引忠实听众感到不可思议与自豪。 --- ### [07:05](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n4C4DZoz9iw&t=425s) “铜博士”与活化石：传奇策略师 Ed Yardeni 的职业生涯 在正式介绍嘉宾时，Josh 毫不吝啬溢美之词，将 Ed Yardeni 誉为“行走的传奇”（living legend）。Josh 坦言，在自己的整个职业生涯中，Ed 是他获益最多的导师之一，自己长年累月研读 Ed 的研究报告和市场洞察。现场响起了热烈的掌声，Josh 调侃道：“你是市场的博士？还是什么领域的博士？”Ed 风趣地回应道：“我是铜博士（Doctor of copper）……我和铜博士是竞争对手。” Josh 随后正式宣读了 Ed Yardeni 极为辉煌的职业资历： - 他是 Yardeni Research 的创始人兼总裁，该独立投资策略和资产配置研究机构成立于 2007 年。 - 曾先后担任保德信股票集团（Prudential Equity Group）、德意志银行美国股票部（Deutsche Bank's US Equities Division）以及 Oak Associates 的首席投资策略师。 - 曾出任 C.J. Lawrence、保德信贝奇证券（Prudential-Bache Securities）和 E.F. Hutton 的首席经济学家。 - 早年间，他曾担任纽约联邦储备银行（Federal Reserve Bank of New York）经济学家，并在美联储理事会（Fed Board of Governors）和美国财政部（US Treasury）任职，同时还在哥伦比亚大学商学院任教。 听完这串长长的履历，Ed 自嘲地打趣道：“我真希望你别念这么长，听起来就像是我根本保不住一份稳定工作似的。”Josh 紧接着提到，自己在疫情期间研读了 Ed 的著作《为乐趣与利润跟踪美联储》（*Fed Watching for Fun and Profit*），该书系统梳理了美联储的历史，以及华尔街如何从曾经对美联储漠不关心逐渐演变为如今紧盯其一举一动的全过程。当被问及未来是否还有冲动重返财政部或美联储等政府机构任职时，Ed 毫不犹豫、斩钉截铁地回答：“绝对没有。”他透露自己甚至从未接到过这类邀请电话。 ### [09:04](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n4C4DZoz9iw&t=544s) 调侃美联储主席提名：特朗普的“真人秀”与内定人选 对谈在轻松幽默的气氛中开场。埃德·亚德尼（Ed Yardeni）打趣说，自己曾提出愿意以“半价薪酬”承担美联储主席的工作，却根本无人理睬。他笑称自己甚至没有进入下任主席候选人的决选短名单，这让他略感不快；不过他也心知肚明，自己在公开场合一直直言不讳地批评美联储降息是个错误，因为经济依然韧性十足，而通胀根本没有真正回到 2% 的目标——有了这种观点，自然不可能拿到这份工作。 乔什·布朗（Josh Brown）随即拆穿了政坛所谓“选拔”的表象。乔什指出，特朗普骨子里极度热爱真人秀效应，热衷于把贝莱德（BlackRock）的高管里克·里德（Rick Rieder）等一众华尔街大佬拉出来轮番面试走过场。但实际上根本不存在真正的海选短名单，最终胜出的人选几乎早已注定——因为特朗普最要好的挚友是雅诗兰黛家族的亿万富翁罗纳德·劳德（Ronald Lauder），而当时大热的候选人正是劳德的女婿（指凯文·沃什，Kevin Warsh）。在特朗普眼中，此人就像自家人一样，无论亚德尼还是其他人，从始至终都只是陪跑的背景板。 ### [10:08](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n4C4DZoz9iw&t=608s) “咆哮的2020年代”：历史镜像与“等待戈多式衰退” 乔什将话题引向亚德尼职业生涯中最精彩、最具远见的预判之一——“咆哮的2020年代”（Roaring 2020s）。亚德尼澄清，这个观点并非疫情前提出，而是在 2020 年 8 月全美刚经历首轮疫情封锁、市场弥漫着巨大焦虑时正式确立的。当时悲观情绪笼罩市场，但他回溯了一百年前的历史：在“咆哮的1920年代”到来前，世界同样在短时间内接连承受了第一次世界大战和西班牙大流感的重创，甚至在 1920 至 1921 年间还经历了一场严重的通缩萧条；如果在 1920 年预言接下来会是黄金十年，所有人都会觉得那是痴人说梦。 亚德尼指出，2020 年的疫情从经济本质上看并非一场典型的内生性衰退，而是一次仅持续两个月的行政性停摆。从那时起，他就坚定押注美国经济的内在韧性。在整个 2020 年代初期，华尔街不断敲响经济衰退的警钟，但亚德尼将其讥讽为“等待戈多式衰退”（Godot Recession）——一场所有人都在苦苦等待、却始终没有真正降临的衰退。在他看来，经济各领域呈现的是此起彼伏的“轮动式衰退”（rolling recessions），而非全行业同步崩塌的全面危机。百年前的飞跃依靠的是收音机普及、汽车流水线作业等新技术带动生产力，而今天的繁荣底层同样有着强大的技术脉络支撑。 ### [12:08](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n4C4DZoz9iw&t=728s) AI是演进而非革命：数据成为“第四生产要素” 乔什提到，站在当下的视角，任何人都可以轻描淡写地说“咆哮的2020年代是理所当然的，因为我们有生成式 AI”，但在 2020 年 8 月，没有人预知到 ChatGPT 的诞生。亚德尼承认，自己当年列出的技术清单涵盖了机器人与自动化、人形机器人、纳米技术、云计算以及早期 AI，确实未曾料到 2022 年底 ChatGPT 会以爆发之势点燃全球狂热。然而，他对 AI 的定性却十分冷静：在科技长河中，AI 属于“演进”（evolutionary）而非“孤立的革命”（revolutionary）。 亚德尼认为，真正的大革命是始于 1960 年代中叶以 IBM 大型机（mainframe）为起点的“数字化革命”。其核心目标历经六十年始终未变：以最快速度、最低成本处理海量信息，AI 只是这场漫长长征中的一个最新阶段。他从古典经济学理论出发做出生动对比： - **传统三大生产要素**：土地（Land）、劳动力（Labor）和资本（Capital），这三者在物理世界中皆具有天然的“稀缺性”，经济学家的核心职责便是研究如何在稀缺约束下实现效用最大化。 - **第四大生产要素：数据（Data）**：与前三者截然相反，人类社会生产的数据永远不会出现短缺，每月产生的数据量都在刷新人类历史总和。AI 的真正功绩，是让企业终于有能力挖掘并利用自身长年沉睡的庞大数据资产。 - **区块链与金融创新**：关于加密货币与区块链，亚德尼认为其作为底层账本技术，在稳定币（stablecoins）等支付领域有着重塑传统金融体系的潜力，同样属于助推这十年生产力扩张的技术拼图之一。 ### [14:36](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n4C4DZoz9iw&t=876s) 2022年悬崖边缘：ChatGPT的救场与美国例外主义 乔什与迈克尔·巴特尼克（Michael Batnick）回顾了 2022 年末的惊险时刻：当时科技巨头市值暴跌、美联储急速加息，全市场都认定经济正径直冲向悬崖；然而 2022 年 11 月 30 日 ChatGPT 的横空出世，在短短两周内席卷社交网络，随后以不可思议的速度拉动了以科技巨头与创业新星为主导的新一轮超级牛市。乔什感叹，许多人认为经济原本必死无疑，全靠 AI 像守门员在球门线上演了“飞身扑救”，这种技术浪潮的不可预测性，正是投资者必须始终保持做多倾向（stay bullish）的根本原因。 亚德尼对此深表赞同。他直言，投资者根本不需要精准预测每一次创新的具体形态，真正需要信任的是“美式资本主义”对创新的培育机制，这正是“美国例外主义”（American Exceptionalism）的底色所在。美国的资本市场具备无可比拟的规模与弹性，数以万亿美元计的资金在不知疲倦地追逐各种好想法与坏想法；即便在这个过程中会产生大量泡沫与平庸尝试，但只要脱颖而出的好想法最终转化为能够商业化的优质商品与服务，整个社会的生产力便会实现跃升，企业家与投资者也将共同分享红利。 ### [16:04](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n4C4DZoz9iw&t=964s) 标普终极目标看至10,000点：到2020年代末零衰退 当被问及“咆哮的2020年代”能否贯穿整个十年时，亚德尼提醒大家，按年头计算如今已经步入这十年的第七个年头。他给出了一个极其坚定且极具穿透力的长期预测：**直到 2029 年底这一个十年结束，美国经济都不会出现真正的全面衰退，而标普 500 指数将在本年代末触及 10,000 点大关。** ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 美国经济抗压路径图 accDescr: 展现美国经济如何连续吸收重重宏观冲击，在没有全面衰退的情况下将实际GDP推向历史新高 subgraph Shocks["一系列严峻宏观冲击 (2020-2024)"] A["疫情与全局行政停摆"] --> B["商品抢购潮撞上供应链中断"] B --> C["通胀高企 & 美联储暴力加息 (0% -> 5.5%)"] C --> D["2023年周末地区性银行危机"] D --> E["地缘战争爆发与关税摩擦再起"] end subgraph Outcome["经济韧性与市场结局"] E --> F["各领域经历'轮动式衰退'而非全面危机"] F --> G["实际GDP攀升至历史绝对新高"] G --> H["标普500长线目标：2029年底看至 10,000 点"] end ``` 亚德尼强调，这一看似激进的预言实际上是对过往几年市场韧性的客观总结。回顾这几年，美国经济连续承受了数轮“毁灭级”测试： - 突发疫情与全社会封锁； - 消费爆发撞上全球供应链严重瘫痪，通胀飙升至数十年高位； - 美联储以史无前例的速度将基准利率从 0% 拉升至 5.5%； - 2023 年春季以硅谷银行为代表的“周末级”地区性银行业微型危机； - 乌克兰等地的地缘战争，以及接连不断的新一轮关税扰动。 在承受了上述所有冲击后，美国实际 GDP 依然刷新了历史新高。亚德尼指出，美国上一次真正意义上的系统性大衰退还是 2008 至 2009 年的全球金融海啸（2020 年的两个月停摆并不能算作典型经济周期衰退）。现代经济中衰退的频率本身就在大幅下降，熊市也随之变得罕见。2022 年的市场暴跌正是历史上极少数“没有伴随经济衰退的熊市”之一。当年 6 月到 11 月筑底期间，正是由于前瞻盈利预期（Forward Earnings）始终保持坚韧、企业持续反馈订单稳定，才支撑着他坚定看多，并准确捕捉到了那一轮周期的底部。 ### [18:25](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n4C4DZoz9iw&t=1105s) 公开战绩的自豪：从研报档案到定制回顾图表 在切入下一步关于当下市场热点的深度剖析之前，乔什向观众揭秘了一件趣事。在亚德尼的研究机构官网（yardeni.com/market-calls）上，常年公开挂着一份透明且详尽的“公开观点记录簿”。这份档案长年累月地收录了亚德尼在 CNBC、彭博（Bloomberg）、《巴伦周刊》（Barron's）等主流财经媒体受访时由各大编辑所拟定的原始新闻标题。 乔什由衷赞叹亚德尼敢于把自己所有公开言论毫无保留地公之于众的坦诚态度。虽然新闻媒体的标题党风格不由受访者控制，但那些白纸黑字的预判记录真实地折射出他多年来傲人的胜率。节目组为此特意将这些历史呼吁与标普 500 的走势拟合成了一张精致的大图表，并在现场展示给亚德尼，引出接下来关于市场估值与宏观逻辑的交锋。 ### [18:58](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n4C4DZoz9iw&t=1138s) 坚守牛市信仰：宏观经济才是终极北极星 Josh Brown 与 Michael Batnick 回顾了 Ed Yardeni 自 2009 年代际大底以来的多空预测图谱。图表上虽有零星标注审慎的红点，但整体上几乎全被坚定看多的蓝色预测填满。在过去十几年中，无论是贸易摩擦还是 Omicron 等疫情黑天鹅，Yardeni 都未曾被震荡出局。面对主持人的称赞以及“企业盈利（Earnings）是否是投资者不盲目择时、坚定持仓的最好北极星”这一提问，Yardeni 给出了更深一层的见解。 Yardeni 认为，决定市场信心的终极锚点不是纯粹的财务报表，而是对底层宏观经济韧性的准确感知。分析师团队擅长捕捉当期与下一年的远期盈利（Forward Earnings），但他们存在一个致命的系统性盲区——“永远看不见经济衰退的到来”。因此，作为宏观策略师的核心职责正是填补这一盲点。只要判断本年代末之前不会发生实质性衰退，分析师共识所展现出的极强盈利动能——Yardeni 戏称之为“FEMO”（Fabulous Earnings Momentum）——就是完全靠谱的。 - 分析师一致预期计算公式：基于当年与下一年盈利预测的时间加权平均值（Forward Earnings）。 - 分析师的局限：微观盈利测算精准，但在预测宏观经济拐点与衰退时屡屡失灵。 - Yardeni 核心宏观假说：当前至 2020 年代末，美国经济不会陷入长期性衰退。 ### [21:14](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n4C4DZoz9iw&t=1274s) 盈利增长是否在透支未来？利润率结构性抬升的底层逻辑 主持人提到了空头论点的演变：2024 年初空头抨击美股上涨全靠以“七巨头”（Magnificent Seven）为代表的市盈率估值扩张（PE Expansion）；而当下当季标普 500 营运利润（Operating Earnings）同比增长高达 28.8%（排除 Anthropic 股权升值等一次性投资收益），空头又转而宣扬“盈利泡沫论”（Earnings Bubble），坚称企业正在透支未来两年的需求。针对这种质疑，Yardeni 用极简的盈利算术拆解了反驳逻辑： ```mermaid flowchart LR accTitle: S and P 500 Earnings Growth Drivers accDescr: 拆解推动美股整体盈利创下历史新高的两大核心引擎——远期营收与利润率。 subgraph REVENUE["营收端 (Top Line)"] A["地缘动荡与通胀挑战"] --> B["企业远期营收创历史新高"] end subgraph MARGIN["利润率端 (Profit Margin)"] C["科技与通信服务板块占比达 45%"] --> D["以产品创新获得高溢价"] E["AI 倒逼组织精简与效率提升"] --> D D --> F["利润率突破 15% 历史极值"] end B --> G["盈利爆发增长 (FEMO)"] F --> G ``` 面对市场目前高达 15% 的高额净利润率，许多空头坚信利润率最终必须均值回归到 1985 年的历史水平，但 Yardeni 指出这种刻舟求剑的视角完全忽略了指数构成的质变。信息技术与通信服务板块目前已占据标普 500 指数 45% 的权重。这些企业擅长熊彼特式的“创造性破坏”（Creative Destruction），依靠源源不断的新技术产品获取暴利溢价。更重要的是，生成式 AI 的爆发倒逼所有企业高管进行全面的组织审查——暂停盲目招聘，排查能被 AI 深度赋能或应被整体优化的边缘部门。AI 带来的去芜存菁直接拉动了企业生产率，从而让居高不下的利润率具备了扎实的现实依托。 ### [25:09](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n4C4DZoz9iw&t=1509s) 算力军备竞赛与经济学家的“稀缺思维”陷阱 针对市场上关于科技巨头囤积 GPU、内存芯片造成算力假性繁荣的担忧，Yardeni 纠正了这种认知。就他与超大规模云厂商（Hyperscalers）高管接触的实情来看，巨头们非但没有过度囤积，反而普遍抱怨“当前可用的算力远远不够”，只要有现成算力就能立刻变现赚取真金白银。哪怕是偶有富余算力的企业（如 Elon Musk 旗下的公司），也能在高度流动的租借市场上迅速将算力转租。即便 Alphabet 发行 250 亿美元债券引来上千亿美元超额认购、巨头资本开支（CapEx）明年可能向万亿美元迈进，这类资本开支最终仍会实打实地流向硬件供应链与相关企业的资产负债表。 Josh Brown 感慨，这种天量资本开支让 70、80 年代科幻作品里的无人机作战、人形机器人、太空探索与卫星互联纷纷变成现实商业产品，给人带来一种强烈的眩晕感。Yardeni 随即借此批判了学院派经济学教育的固有缺陷：从萨缪尔森的《经济学原理》开始，经济学就被定义为“如何在资源匮乏的前提下进行优化分配”，这种思维天生带有马尔萨斯式的悲观色彩。 > "主流经济学根本不懂得如何前瞻科技创新的力量。真正的自由市场不是在贫困中分配匮乏，而是用价格上涨标识出‘短缺’，随即便会有企业家带着更颠覆、更低廉的技术创新彻底打碎这种瓶颈。" Yardeni 强调，面对席卷而来的科技革命，投资者绝不能用狭隘的存量思维画地为牢。虽然目前尚难准确断言哪些巨头最终胜出、谁又会被淘汰出局，但技术突破持续推动实体经济效率跃迁的大趋势毋庸置疑。 ### [28:35](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n4C4DZoz9iw&t=1715s) 芯片定价权与科技行业的“创造性破坏” 关于半导体巨头（如英伟达）巨大的指数权重和高企的利润率，主持人和嘉宾展开了深入讨论。当前科技巨头处于能够以任意高价售出产品的绝佳地位，甚至不需要大举扩张晶圆厂即可实现超额增长。英伟达几乎售罄了所有供给，渠道中毫无库存积压，盈利的爆发式增长直接源自对每一个出货单元的大幅提价。面对“其他厂商难道不会寻找替代方案以压榨更多算力”的质疑，埃德·亚德尼（Ed Yardeni）指出，这种优化研究早已在发生；价格机制本身就在释放信号——60%到70%的高利润率终将推动算力成本下降，这些昂贵的芯片在三到四年后未必是理所当然的持有选择。 但正如约瑟夫·熊彼特所说的“创造性破坏”，技术的短缺最终会由创新来解决。亚德尼强调，刚刚推出震撼创新并斩获巨额利润的公司，本身就在夜以继日地研发让自家上一代产品被淘汰的技术；因为一旦自己不革自己的命，竞争对手就会抢先一步。这就是“科技吞噬自身幼崽”的残酷残酷法则。随后迈克尔·巴特尼克（Michael Batnick）提到西部数据（Western Digital）的财报：其单季度利润从去年同期的 2.82 亿美元飙升至 32 亿美元，但股价在财报发布后却重挫约 15%。这正是典型的“买预期、卖事实”，也反映出当前市场内部依然充斥着大量怀疑情绪。 - **西部数据业绩异动**：季度利润同比从 2.82 亿美元激增至 32 亿美元，但在大幅上涨后遭遇获利回吐（Sell on the news），股价下跌约 15%。 - **算力与利润率机制**：芯片厂商 60%~70% 的超高净利率正在倒逼算力提效与替代创新的诞生。 --- ### [30:17](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n4C4DZoz9iw&t=1817s) 估值反常收缩与全面繁荣：粉碎 1999 年泡沫类比 巴特尼克展示了一张过去六个月的标普 500 估值图表，揭示了一个极为罕见的现象：在过去六个月中，市场的未来 6 个月远期市盈率（Forward P/E）下降了 8%，而指数价格本身却上涨了 11%。通常情况下，当市盈率发生 8% 到 10% 的多倍数收缩（Multiple Contraction）时，股票价格往往同步下跌约 9%。然而当下市场却在强劲的盈利势头推动下变得“越来越便宜”。这种背离的核心原因在于投资者普遍缺乏信念，怀疑这轮循环融资模式能否持续，甚至担忧重演 2000 年的互联网泡沫。 亚德尼果断驳斥了将当前与 1999 年相提并论的观点。他指出，1999 年的行情纯粹是由“错失恐惧”（FOMO）主导的估值扩张狂欢，最终被证伪没有坚实的盈利支撑；而当下的牛市完全建立在扎实的盈利飙升之上。乔什·布朗（Josh Brown）补充提出腾落线（Advance-Decline Line）已创下历史新高：全市场几乎所有行业板块的股票都在突破新高，包括石油、生物科技、金融等各个领域。这与 1999 年“只有买科技股才能赚钱、买其他任何资产都像傻子”的狭窄投机截然不同。亚德尼赞同道，今年不仅是“科技七巨头”（Magnificent Seven），他所称的“令人印象深刻的 493 只成分股”（Impressive 493）同样表现强劲。特鲁斯特财富（Truist Wealth）的数据显示，互联网泡沫顶峰前的三年估值扩张幅度高达 250%，而过去三年市场的估值增幅仅为 18%，两者根本无法相提并论。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 1999年与当前市场牛市特征对比 accDescr: 对比1999年互联网泡沫与当前牛市在驱动核心、估值倍数变化和市场广度上的根本区别。 subgraph Y1999["1999年 互联网泡沫"] A1["驱动机制: 狂热FOMO情绪"] --> B1["估值倍数3年暴涨 250%"] B1 --> C1["极度狭窄: 仅限科技概念股，其余板块边缘化"] end subgraph Y2020s["当今牛市环境"] A2["驱动机制: 实打实的利润与生产力暴增"] --> B2["估值倍数3年近乎持平 (仅涨 18%)"] B2 --> C2["全面开花: 腾落线(A/D)创新高，能源/金融/生科共振"] end ``` --- ### [32:35](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n4C4DZoz9iw&t=1955s) 经济是否真的具有“防弹”属性？ 面对市场的屡屡预测失误，业内顶尖人士开始重新审视宏观经济的抗冲击力。布朗提到，包括富达投资（Fidelity）的尤里安·蒂默（Jurrien Timmer）以及贝莱德（BlackRock）的里克·里德（Rick Rieder）在内的多位投资大师近期都公开发出沉思：当下的经济体制是否已经彻底免疫了过去那种“传统香草式衰退”（Vanilla Recession）——即传统的“制造商过度积压库存、消费者停止买单、企业承受亏损并开启大规模裁员”的传导链条。 亚德尼戏称自己能洞察这些是因为拥有“来自未来的内部情报”，而这种情报源自他对人口结构的深刻理解。早在 2020 年代初，他就预判美国不会陷入传统衰退。尽管 2022 年市场经历了标普 500 指数下跌约 25% 的常规深度回调，但实质性经济衰退从未降临。如今，全市场正在逐渐接受他的这一前瞻性论调：即使美国经济尚未达到“刀枪不入”（Bulletproof）的程度，其弹性与结构也已经与过去的经济周期发生了本质变化。 --- ### [34:44](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n4C4DZoz9iw&t=2084s) 颠覆“K型经济”偏见：婴儿潮一代引发的“G型（代际）经济” 亚德尼随后对市场上流行的“K型经济”（K-shaped economy）悲观叙事提出了强烈质疑。外界普遍认为“富者愈富、贫者愈穷”的模式终将因不可持续而把经济拖入衰退，甚至有人宣称占比 5% 的极富人群贡献了全美 50% 到 60% 的消费支出。亚德尼直言这种观点荒谬可笑：“富人并不会比普通人吃更多的饭，你最近去过开市客（Costco）、大商场或普通餐馆吗？”真正支撑消费中流砥柱的，是亚德尼定义的“G型经济”（Generational，代际经济）。 所谓“G型经济”，核心在于婴儿潮一代（Baby Boomers）与仍在世的“沉默的一代”（Silent Generation）。这两个年龄群体合计坐拥惊人的 **100 万亿美元净资产**，构成了人类历史上最富有的退休阶层。无论加息降息还是失业率波动，他们根本不受负面影响；他们手握 3% 的超低利率房贷甚至全额还清了房产，持有全美 60% 的货币市场基金并持续享受高息利差，过着四处邮轮旅行的优渥生活。 这笔巨额的财富正在以代际转移的形式下沉，资助年轻一代应对住房负担危机。布朗对此补充指出，社交媒体上频繁出现 27 岁年轻人抱怨即便白天从事白领、晚上兼职调酒依然无法在纽约立足，追问身边同龄人如何能买房潇洒；而残酷的现实在于，那些过得轻松的年轻人背后，都有父母在股市、房产或家族企业中积累的数十年财富在托底。 - **代际财富规模**：婴儿潮一代与沉默一代的净资产总和高达约 100 万亿美元。 - **高息利好退休群体**：婴儿潮一代持有全美超过 60% 的货币市场基金份额，高利率环境反而大幅增厚了其利息收入。 - **代际转移与负担分层**：上一代锁定超低借贷成本与充沛现金，正通过直接资金援助为承受高房价高生活成本的下一代注入流动性。 ### [38:18](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n4C4DZoz9iw&t=2298s) 婴儿潮一代的财富神话与哈里·登特的“大误判” 关于代际财富与支出的讨论仍在继续。许多步入退休年龄的老人虽然积蓄并不算极其丰厚，却仍然在源源不断地资助成年子女；年轻一代即便父母并不大富大贵，也能在购房首付或育儿方面获得实质支持。因为托儿费用高昂，许多年轻家庭选择搬到离父母更近的地方寻求照料帮助。 主持人提到了著名经济预测家哈里·登特（Harry Dent）从1990年代起便大肆宣扬的人口学悲观论调——他曾断言婴儿潮一代退休时会集体抛售房产套现，并清仓其股票投资组合，引发资产价格暴跌。然而现实走向了完全相反的极端：没有婴儿潮一代愿意降级居住（downsize），他们不仅保留甚至同时持有两套大房子，其居住面积远超以往任何一代人；在资金需求上，他们选择以股票质押借贷而非卖出变现，以此享受税收优惠；同时，他们还在替二十多岁、大学毕业后薪资不足以支撑城市生活成本的孩子支付房租。事实证明，当年基于人口老龄化断言2010与2020年代将陷入灾难的理论彻底破产。现场甚至戏谑道，如今那些整天全职参加抗议活动的激进年轻群体，很多恰恰来自优渥家庭，因为有衣食无忧的父母买单，他们才能负担得起“整天抗议”的生活方式。 - **代际支持现实**：退休群体没有抛售资产，反而通过资产质押借贷避税，继续持有高价值房产并为子女提供租金与育儿兜底。 - **人口论破产**：哈里·登特预言的“婴儿潮退休抛售潮”完全落空，老龄人口财富留存与代际转移反倒成了消费与资产价格的缓冲垫。 --- ### [39:50](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n4C4DZoz9iw&t=2390s) 对冲基金爆仓与资本市场的“减震器机制” 对话切入近期对冲基金行业发生的震荡（例如对人工智能深度研判但高杠杆操作的机构爆仓）。主持人发问：这是否类似于1998年长期资本管理公司（LTCM）崩塌的前震？当年LTCM以不到2亿美元的资本撬动了高达上万亿美元的杠杆套利头寸，其倒闭直接促成了美联储施救，不仅没有拖垮1998年的实体经济，反而为1999年科技狂热的超级泡沫铺平了道路。当前的局部爆仓事件是否也是两三年后更大危机爆发的先兆？ ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 现代资本市场吸收局部风险的减震机制 accDescr: 展示局部机构高杠杆爆仓后，高风险承受力的私人资本与不良资产基金如何迅速接盘清算，阻断系统性蔓延。 subgraph RiskOrigin["风险起源：局部高杠杆爆仓"] A["科技洞察极强但风控缺失的基金经理"] --> B["高杠杆单向押注遭遇清盘"] end subgraph Absorption["资本市场减震层"] B --> C["高风险承受力资本承担损失（VC与超高净值人群）"] B --> D["数十万亿规模的不良资产基金（如高盛困境基金）"] B --> E["流动性巨头迅速入场接盘（如 Citadel 接手重组）"] end subgraph MarketResult["市场结果"] C --> F["资产以折扣价有序出清（如25美分清算）"] D --> F E --> F F --> G["无系统性银行风险，大盘次日继续上涨"] end ``` 埃德·亚德尼（Ed Yardeni）与主持人均认为，这次所谓的爆仓对整个宏观体系几乎微不足道，甚至可以说是“极其健康的资产出清”。一位极具远见但完全不懂组合风险管理的年轻操盘手被市场“抬着担架抬走”，而大盘隔天若无其事地继续上涨，蒙受损失的也仅仅是那些风险承受能力极强的顶级风险投资人与亿万富翁。 亚德尼指出，现代资本市场拥有大萧条时期或2008年所不具备的巨大“减震器”： - **万亿美元级的不良资产基金（Distressed Asset Funds）**：在经济平稳时这类基金无所事事，一旦出现局部暴雷，它们便迅速蜂拥而入，以极其低廉的价格（如25美分买1美元面值资产）完成市场清算，将风险完全吸收在非银体系内。 - **私募信贷与二级接盘机制**：在商业地产或私募信贷发生违约时，高盛等华尔街投行迅速成立商业地产困境救援基金，各机构亦大举发行二级基金与延续基金，为急于套现退出的投资人提供流动性。 - **顶级做市商与救援资本介入**：不同于2008年沃伦·巴菲特充当独家白衣骑士，如今诸如 Citadel 等巨头能在极短时间内接手清理优质违约资产，迅速锁定暴利并稳定流动性，避免了类似雷曼兄弟倒闭时波及整个商业银行体系的系统性灾难。 --- ### [43:29](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n4C4DZoz9iw&t=2609s) 标普500目标点位：年末8250与2030年10000点 谈及对美股大盘的具体测算，埃德·亚德尼给出了极为大胆但逻辑清晰的量化模型：标普500指数年末目标看至 **8,250点**，并在本年代末（2030年前）冲上 **10,000点**。 亚德尼解释，这一计算过程非常简单透明（“各位在家里拿计算器就能算出来”）： - **估值逻辑**：采用经典的市盈率（P/E）乘以远期每股收益（Forward EPS）模型，基准估值倍数设定在20倍P/E。 - **未来盈利预期**：目前华尔街分析师对标普500未来一年的每股收益预期约为413美元。将其乘以20倍市盈率，所得点位即突破8,200点（约为8,260点）。且这一盈利预测不包含任何按市值计价的账面资本利得，属于非常扎实的企业经营业绩。 - **万点大关推导**：随着生产力提升与利润率扩张，到本十年末，市场将开始对标普500每股500美元的盈利进行贴现。500美元盈利乘以20倍市盈率，便精确对应了10,000点大关。 面对主持人关于“实现该目标的最大阻碍是什么”的提问，亚德尼罗列了空头最常担忧的三大老问题：所有人都在恐惧却始终未降临的经济衰退、美联储出现严重的货币政策失误，以及中东地缘政治冲突失控升级。 - **远期估值公式**： $$\text{指数目标} = \text{远期 EPS} \times 20\text{ 倍市盈率}$$ - **2027年盈利测算**：分析师对2027年盈利预期的持续上调，正在夯实8,000点以上的估值地基。 - **2030年目标**：每股500美元盈利 $\times 20 = 10,000$ 点。 --- ### [45:04](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n4C4DZoz9iw&t=2704s) 80次“恐慌发作”日记与彼得·林奇式的现实常识 回顾历史，亚德尼谈到他在2009年全球金融危机到2020年新冠危机期间，专门为客户维护了一份名为“恐慌发作日记”（Diary of Panic Attacks）的跟踪记录。经历过2008年创伤的投资者如惊弓之鸟，极其容易被永久看空者（Perma-bears）吓退。然而在那十余年间，市场记录下的整整80次恐慌警报，事后证明全都是虚惊一场的“非事件”（non-events）。 主持人也对此深表共鸣，提到已故投资泰斗拉斯洛·比里尼（Laszlo Birinyi）过去每季度都会向客户寄送厚厚的汇总图册，罗列过去几个月各大媒体引发市场巨震的耸动新闻头条。每次翻看这些旧闻都会让人彻底清醒——那些当时看似世界末日的事件，在长周期走势中根本无足轻重。 亚德尼指出，从近期的多次宏观压力测试来看，美国实际GDP均轻松过关。尽管唱衰者不断拿消费者信用卡违约率攀升或就业增长放缓说事，但零售销售数据表明居民消费依然旺盛。他不赞成用悲观的“K型经济”视角盲目下结论，而是主张重拾彼得·林奇（Peter Lynch）最朴素的投资常识：环顾四周，商店挤满了人，航班全部爆满，演唱会与球赛一票难求，甚至有人愿意掏8万美元买票去看一场尼克斯队的比赛。这种火爆的线下消费景象正是经济基本面强劲的真实缩影。 --- ### [47:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n4C4DZoz9iw&t=2820s) 1966年以来的牛市周期对比与技术起点之辩 节目的最后，讨论转向了亚德尼团队制作的一张关键图表——**1966年以来的标普500历次牛市复盘**。图表中那条用醒目红线勾勒出的当前牛市走势，呈现出全周期中最具韧性的进攻形态之一。 关于本轮牛市的起点界定，亚德尼将其确立在 **2022年10月12日** 的周期绝对低点。面对主持人关于“牛市究竟应从崩跌20%后的绝对低点起算，还是突破历史前高起算”的技术与哲学争论，讨论回顾了历史惯例： - 市场常将1982年至2000年的大繁荣称为长期结构性牛市（Secular Bull Market），这是因为标普500在1982年才实质性突破了长期盘整平台创出历史新高； - 但如果从熊市实际触底回升的周期性视角来看，该轮周期的底部早在1974年就已经形成。在这张横跨半个多世纪的牛市轨迹对比图中，每一轮周期的时钟均从官方熊市底部的最低点精准起算，而当前红线所处的位置表明，本轮由生产力驱动的牛市依然具备极为宽广的向上空间。 ### [48:04](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n4C4DZoz9iw&t=2884s) 重新定义牛市起点与“咆哮的年代” 三人就技术上如何界定“牛市的起点”展开了辩论。Michael Batnick 指出，传统观点习惯在熊市跌去 20%、25% 甚至 50% 探底后，以后视镜视角将那个明确的低点作为新牛市的开端，计算自那之后的全部涨幅。但 Josh Brown 提出了另一套虽然许多人不认同、却深具逻辑的视角：牛市真正的起点，应当是指数突破前一个牛市的历史峰值之时。比如在 2013 年，标普 500 指数才刚刚把金融危机亏掉的本金追平，只有翻越那座旧高山，才算真正拉开新一轮扩张的序幕——如同 1982 年以及 1940-1950 年代走出大萧条阴影时的情形一样。 Ed Yardeni 赞同这种界定方式颇具启示，但指出更核心的宏观现实在于：经济扩张与“咆哮的年代”远非 1920 年代或 2020 年代所独有。事实上，在美股历史上，“咆哮的十年”才是常态：1950 年代、1980 年代与 1990 年代均是轰轰烈烈的大牛市，真正原地踏步的只有 1970 年代等少数时期。Josh 强调 2010 年代被严重低估，年均复合回报率高达 14%，却鲜有人像怀念黄金岁月那样称颂它。屏幕上切出历史牛市对比图表，Ed 总结道，这再次印证了沃伦·巴菲特（Warren Buffett）式的法则——“在市场中的时长”（Time in the market）远比择时更重要；如果当前这轮牛市遵循历史轨迹演进，如今不过才走了三分之一的旅程而已。 --- ### [50:10](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n4C4DZoz9iw&t=3010s) 信贷紧缩机制、美联储“打地鼠”与做空的代价 衰退的真正起因并非大众某天突发奇想“不想花钱”，而是源自流动性窒息。Ed 剖析了衰退的经典传导链条：当美联储不断加息直至某一临界点，债券市场意识到若短端利率持续飙升，信贷系统必将爆雷，于是资金涌入买入债券压低长端；随后金融体系发生断裂，受严格监管的商业银行因资本金耗尽而引爆全行业范围的信贷紧缩（Credit Crunch）。然而当下的市场格局已截然不同：私人资本市场构建了极其充沛的“减震器”（Shock Absorbers），资金不单单押注在杠杆银行体系内，系统不再轻易全盘坍塌。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 经典信贷紧缩与现代减震机制对比 accDescr: 展示美联储加息导致银行信贷紧缩的传统路径，与现代拥有私人市场减震器及美联储流动性兜底的路径差异。 subgraph Classic["经典衰退传导链"] A["美联储激进加息"] --> B["债券市场预期破裂"] B --> C["银行体系资本金耗尽"] C --> D["全系统信贷紧缩爆发衰退"] end subgraph Modern["现代市场韧性格局"] E["局部金融裂缝"] --> F["私人市场吸收冲击"] E --> G["美联储闪电打地鼠注入流动性"] F --> H["经济保持韧性，衰退预期落空"] G --> H end ``` 此外，美联储早已从 2008 年大金融危机和 2020 年疫情危机中积累了丰富的“打地鼠”（Whack-a-mole）经验。2023 年 3 月的硅谷银行等区域性银行危机仅仅持续了几天，美联储便火速入场提供无限流动性兜底，宣布所有存款均受保护。Josh 调侃空头们又一次被剥夺了一场“大萧条”的狂欢。Ed 戏谑道，自己由衷喜爱那些“永久看空者”（Perma-bears），因为空头做了极度详尽的研究去挖掘一切可能暴雷的隐患，帮他省去了大量繁琐的工作；他只需要问一句“他们忽略了什么”。遗憾的是，听信永久看空者的代价惨重： - 空头会在市场顶部吓你离场； - 空头会在市场半山腰劝你割肉； - 空头甚至会在真正的市场底部阻止你建仓； - 最终的结果是，你将永远踏空、永远活在对市场的恐惧之中。 --- ### [52:11](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n4C4DZoz9iw&t=3131s) 头部集中度 41%：见顶崩盘还是健康轮动？ 节目切到第四张图表——美股历次头部集中度峰值对比，包括 1970 年代的 Nifty 50、世纪之交的科技与电信泡沫，以及昔日的日本股市泡沫。当下的“AI 十巨头”（AI Big 10）在标普 500 指数中的市值集中度已经达到 41%，几乎全部押注于同一个宏观叙事。面对这是否会推高至 45% 或 50% 继而演变成整体崩塌（Blowoff Top）的担忧，Ed 回顾了自己在投资组合策略上的精准调仓： 去年 12 月 7 日，当标普 500 信息技术与通信服务两大板块合计权重触及 45% 时，Yardeni Research 明确宣布不再超配这两大行业，下调至“标配”（Market Weight），同时重申超配金融、工业，并新增超配医疗保健。事实证明，市场随后迎来了显著的广度扩展，剔除七巨头之外的“令人印象深刻的 493 只股票”（Impressive 493）在今年表现极其优异。 ```mermaid flowchart LR accTitle: Yardeni Research 行业配置转向 accDescr: 展示从过度拥挤的信息技术与通信板块调降至标配，并转向超配金融、工业与医疗板块的资金轮动。 subgraph Overcrowded["降低拥挤度 (2023年12月)"] IT["信息技术板块"] CS["通信服务板块"] end subgraph Broadening["广度扩散超配组合"] FIN["金融板块"] IND["工业板块"] HC["医疗保健板块"] end Overcrowded -->|"权重达45%时下调至标配"| Broadening ``` 罗素 2000 小盘股一直被所谓的衰退预期所压制。Josh 指出，在前两年的牛市里，小盘股因为高利率环境以及未能直接受惠于 AI 浪潮而完全被晾在一边，整体经济不温不火，小盘股盈利增速无法匹敌大盘巨头。然而每当电视上的空头分析师高呼这是“大盘股终将向下补跌（Catch-down）的负向背离”时，现实往往走向截然相反的“向上补涨”（Catch-up）——今年小盘股、银行股和工业股全线爆发，资金加速向滞涨板块扩散。人们总逃不开骨子里的悲观情绪，但正如 Ed 所言，悲观主义永远更有卖点，而他的职责是在恐慌时拉住投资者的手，告诉他们为什么世界不会毁灭。 --- ### [56:59](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n4C4DZoz9iw&t=3419s) 狂欢周：金发女孩行情重现？ 谈话转向录制当周的市场情绪剧变。在经历了前一周对追加保证金通知（Margin Calls）的恐慌焦虑后，周一与周二市场骤然爆发了一轮极度亢奋的无差别买盘狂潮。投资者不仅疯抢科技股，连同高盛（Goldman Sachs）、摩根士丹利（Morgan Stanley）等华尔街大行也被资金猛烈扫货，仿佛所有宏观阴霾在一夜之间被亮眼的财报季一扫而空。 Ed 笑着提到，自己恰好在刚过去的周日撰写了一篇即时市场简评（Quick Take），标题就直呼“信息技术板块正在大打折”。他基于市盈率（PE）估值计算，只要企业盈利预期站得住脚，当时的科技股实际上便宜得惊人。眼下这种狂飙突进的势头，让整个市场弥漫着一种“金发女孩”（Goldilocks，温和适度、不冷不热）般的极致舒适感，甚至让人不禁怀疑这是否已经是“好到不能再好”的周期高点。 ### [57:57](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n4C4DZoz9iw&t=3477s) 市场是否处于“加速赶顶”与盈利广度的扩张 Ed Yardeni 提到，当天早上有人问他美股目前是否正处于“加速赶顶”（meltup）的行情中。为了解答，他给对方发了一张将当前标普 500 指数和纳斯达克指数走势与 1999 年至 2000 年互联网泡沫时期进行对比的图表。从走势形态来看，确实可以说当前市场依然沿着类似的轨道前进；但两者之间存在一个核心区别：当前的估值是由扎实的盈利驱动的，而当年的市盈率（P/E）要极端得多，因此这是一轮“盈利主导”（earnings-led）的行情。 三人随后讨论了来自团队分析师 Matt（Chart Kid Matt）整理的市场广度数据。Josh Brown 和 Michael Batnick 开玩笑说真庆幸自己抢先雇佣了 Matt。数据显示，就在一周前，标普 500 成分股中有 59% 的股票跑赢了指数本身，显示出涨势正在向更多股票扩散；尽管随着科技股新一轮反弹，这一比例有所回落（降至约 45%），但仍处于相对健康的区间。Ed Yardeni 指出，他们团队每周都会监测标普 500 成分股未来 3 个月和 12 个月的远期盈利预期广度（breadth of forward earnings），目前有高达 85% 的成分股远期盈利预期处于上调状态。虽然悲观主义者会警告“预期见顶后往往就会断崖式下跌”，但历史经验表明，这种盈利预期高位完全可能长时间维持在 85% 左右。 - 标普 500 成分股跑赢指数的比例此前曾高达 59%，随着科技股重新领跑回落至 45% 左右。 - 标普 500 指数中 85% 的成分股 3 个月及 12 个月远期盈利预期持续上升。 --- ### [59:20](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n4C4DZoz9iw&t=3560s) 超大规模云厂商资本开支与信用债风险 Josh Brown 将话题转向科技巨头（Hyperscalers，超大规模云计算厂商）的资本支出热潮，联想到历史上运河、铁路开凿以及 1999 年暗光纤（dark fiber）等一系列资本开支繁荣与泡沫破裂的教训。制作人调出图表展示固定收益市场的异动：超大规模云厂商发行企业债相对美国国债的信用利差（credit spread）正在扩大，其借贷成本正像股价一样飙升。Josh 询问这是否意味着市场正在失控，如果债券市场拒绝继续为这些庞大的开支计划买单，是否会引爆系统性风险。 Ed Yardeni 坦承他不会忽视这些令人不安的信号，并认为债券市场的动向至关重要，因为“债权人往往先于股市察觉到危机”——债券投资者不追求无限的上涨空间，他们只在乎本金能否安全收回。例如甲骨文（Oracle）的信用违约互换（CDS）利差已攀升至多年高位，原因是市场发现甲骨文深度依赖 OpenAI 与英伟达（NVIDIA），隐约浮现出 2000 年代那种循环融资（circular financing）的影子。不过，Ed 也强调如今的经济体量更大、更多元化；即便科技与通信板块在标普中的市值占比显得过度拥挤（合计占比远超其在 GDP 中约 45% 的实际经济比重），但 AI、区块链等技术正在向金融、医疗保健和生物科技等传统低生产率部门渗透，通过重塑各行各业的生产效率来支撑整个经济的基本面。 - 超大规模云厂商发债融资的信用利差持续走高，市场对巨额资本开支的偿债风险保持警惕。 - 甲骨文（Oracle）的 CDS（信用违约互换）成本触及多年高点，引发市场对依赖英伟达与 OpenAI 之“循环融资”模式的担忧。 - 金融领域（淘汰纸质支票、转向即时电子支付）与医疗/生物制药领域（电子病历、AI 加速新药研发）正迎来长期的生产率补课机会。 --- ### [01:02:07](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n4C4DZoz9iw&t=3727s) 技术面与基本面的博弈：原油、黄金与均值回归 当被问及“当技术面与基本面发生冲突时该如何处理”时，Ed Yardeni 自嘲自己只是一个拿着尺子和铅笔在图表上画线的“业余技术分析师”。他举了原油的例子：自 2022 年俄乌冲突爆发导致油价飙升后，原油实际上一直处于漫长的技术下行通道中。尽管今年早些时候由于中东地缘局势升级、美军调动频繁，新闻头条充斥着看多情绪，但技术图表却清晰显示油价逼近下行趋势线后向下突破，技术面早就发出了精准的预警，让他事后深感懊悔没有严格按照趋势线操作。 谈到黄金时，Ed 认为黄金纯粹由资产本身的供需关系驱动，几乎没有公司业绩等杂音，因而极其适合用技术分析工具来审视。此前金价处于清晰的上升通道中，他曾预测金价会达到 5,000 美元甚至提至 5,500 美元，但近期黄金经历了一次健康的回调，稳定在 4,000 美元左右。Ed 总结道，自己骨子里依然是基本面分析师，但非常敬畏技术分析，因为走势图犹如罗夏墨迹测验（Rorschach test），反映的是“乌合之众的疯狂”与市场心理学。大宗商品、韩国股市或半导体板块在暴涨后往往会发生均值回归（mean revert），而判断一次回调是健康调整还是行情终结，最终仍需回归到市盈率等基本面指标。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Analysis Framework accDescr: Technical analysis reflects market sentiment while fundamentals decide long term trend. subgraph MarketDynamics["市场观察维度"] A["技术分析 (Technicals)"] --> B["衡量群体心理与短期供需<br/>(例如原油下行趋势线、黄金通道)"] C["基本面分析 (Fundamentals)"] --> D["评估远期盈利与市盈率 (P/E)<br/>(判断均值回归后行情是否延续)"] end B --> E["市场出现剧烈波动 / 极端走势"] D --> E E --> F{"最终定调：宏观与策略结合"} ``` - 原油市场从 2022 年俄乌冲突高点后便进入技术性熊市，地缘政治看多叙事未能打破其下行通道。 - 黄金价格具备纯粹的供需属性，极适合技术通道分析；近期在健康回调后于 4,000 美元关口企稳。 --- ### [01:05:12](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n4C4DZoz9iw&t=3912s) 反向指标“永久看空者”与“债券义勇兵”的启示 在研究方法上，Josh 询问 Ed 是否会阅读其他策略师的报告或美联储观察家的评论。Ed 直言，除了看美联储评论图个乐子之外，他最喜欢看“永久看空者”（perma-bears）的研究。因为他自己在看多方向上的研究已经做得很充分，每当看到永久看空者的观点开始成为大众主流共识时，就会激发出他的逆向投资本能，促使他去思考“这些人究竟遗漏了什么”。 谈及美联储政策与他在 1983 年创造的著名术语“债券义勇兵”（Bond Vigilantes），Ed 回忆道，2024 年美联储降息 100 个基点时他是明确反对的，并警告债券义勇兵不会买账；事实证明美联储降息后，长端美债收益率反而飙升了 100 个基点。回顾历史，1983 年他提出该词时，债券义勇兵还在为 2,500 亿美元的财政赤字焦虑，而如今美国赤字高达 1.5 万亿至 2 万亿美元，收益率水平虽然上升，但经济依然表现出惊人的承受力。Josh 调侃称过去 45 年里人们天天把债券义勇兵挂在嘴边，似乎美国无论发多少债都不会真正出事。Ed 则展示了他居家办公书架顶层的历史书籍（如 1980 年代的《入不敷出》和《债务炸弹》），表示债务末日论已经讲了几十年，只有当债券义勇兵真正出手发难时（正如 2023 年将美债收益率从 4% 一路推高至 5%）他才会严肃对待。 - Ed Yardeni 于 1983 年创造了“债券义勇兵”（Bond Vigilantes）一词，当时美国财政赤字仅为 2,500 亿美元，现已高达 1.5 万亿至 2 万亿美元。 - 2024 年美联储降息 100 个基点后，长端美债收益率反而反弹了 100 个基点，印证了债券义勇兵对通胀和财政赤字的警惕。 - Ed 将看空阵营的流行观点作为逆向思维的磨刀石，对长期的政府债务末日叙事保持务实的怀疑态度。 ### [01:07:37](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n4C4DZoz9iw&t=4057s) 4% 至 5% 的美债收益率：回归健康与“旧常态” 嘉宾与主持人们回顾了 2023 年秋季美债市场的动荡走势。当时 10 年期美债收益率一度冲破 5%，Ed Yardeni 指出，市场终究需要通过价格来寻找到买盘平衡点，而 5% 的收益率确实起到了稳定市场的作用。不过，所谓的“债券卫士”（Bond Vigilantes）并非债市中唯一的博弈力量，财政部、美联储以及全球范围内的多元投资者都在深刻影响着利率走势。例如在 2023 年 11 月 1 日，美国财政部长珍妮特·耶伦（Janet Yellen）发布了季度再融资公告（QRA），当时财政部明确表示虽然需要筹集更多资金，但并没有如市场担忧的那样盲目增加长久期国债的发行规模，而是选择偏向通过国库券（T-bills）等短期工具融资。与此同时，对冲基金大佬比尔·阿克曼（Bill Ackman）也公开表示自己在 4% 左右做空国债，并在收益率触及 5% 时平仓止盈。种种力量在这一关口交汇，共同推动了债市的企稳。 在 Ed Yardeni 看来，4% 到 5% 的长端收益率区间其实正是全球金融危机（GFC）爆发之前、乃至 1970 年代大通胀之前的“旧常态”（Old Normal）。Josh Brown 和 Michael Batnick 赞同这一观点，并提到在 1990 年代，美债收益率同样稳定在 5% 上下，但那却是美股历史上表现最辉煌的十年之一。Ed 强调，4% 到 5% 的利率不仅非常健康，甚至是一个看涨信号（Bullish level），它代表着资本市场重新拥有了自由定价和优化资源配置的能力；相反，从金融危机到新冠疫情期间实施的人为极低利率政策彻底扭曲了市场，是一场本不该发生的“愚蠢政策”。 - **2023年11月1日再融资转向**：耶伦通过增加短期国库券供应、抑制长债发行冲击，有效化解了当时长端利率的急剧飙升。 - **阿克曼交易案例**：对冲基金在 4% 做空美债、5% 止盈平仓，反映了 5% 是极具吸引力的配置分水岭。 - **健康常态回归**：4% 至 5% 宣告了零利率时代的扭曲终结，资本市场重回正常机制。 --- ### [01:08:57](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n4C4DZoz9iw&t=4137s) 执掌美联储的构想：锚定两年期国债与每日调息 当被问及如果接到白宫征召是否有意愿出任美联储主席时，Ed 幽默地表示自己绝对愿意接受，但他开出的首要硬性条件是必须“居家办公”（Work from home）。当被调侃“如果不住在华盛顿特区是否会被一票否决”后，Ed 深入阐述了他颠覆现行货币政策操作的全新构想，并宣称这是一项独家“大爆料”。 Ed 批评了以凯文·沃什（Kevin Warsh）为代表的一些改革思路。沃什虽然主张美联储减少喋喋不休的言论干扰、让市场自行表达对利率的看法并以此作为指引，但在具体执行层面却常常前后矛盾。对此，Ed 提出了一个激进且直接的框架：何不直接将两年期美债收益率（2-Year Treasury Yield）作为货币政策的法定锚定指标？ ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Two-Year Treasury Anchored Monetary Policy Flow accDescr: Ed Yardeni proposed monetary policy mechanism tracking 2-year yields with daily rate adjustments and GDP deflator. subgraph MarketIndicator["市场信号与指标"] TY["2年期美债收益率"] Deflator["GDP平减指数 (整体经济通胀)"] end subgraph FedAction["美联储动态调控"] CheckMarket{"市场预期评估 (加息/降息)"} DailyAdjust["每日小幅调整联邦基金利率 (如 25bps)"] ObserveReact["观察加息后2年期收益率走势"] end TY --> CheckMarket Deflator --> CheckMarket CheckMarket --> DailyAdjust DailyAdjust --> ObserveReact ObserveReact -->|持续指向加息| DailyAdjust ObserveReact -->|收益率趋稳| Balance["达到市场均衡利率"] ``` Ed 解释说，很多市场参与者本就认为美联储一直在暗中跟随两年期收益率的走势，那不如直接将其官方化。例如，若当前两年期收益率定价了 3 次加息，美联储就先加息 25 个基点，然后继续观察两年期收益率接下来的反应；若收益率依然暗示需要加息两次，那就再加一次。在这样一套机制下，联邦基金利率完全可以像市场利率一样每日动态变动，根本不需要等到 FOMC 闭门开会才做出调整。此外，如果沃什想要减少会议次数甚至改成季度开会，并寻找最关键的通胀指标，Ed 建议应该紧盯 **GDP 平减指数（GDP Deflator）**——因为它是涵盖全经济体系的广义通胀率，而非仅局限于个人消费者的 CPI 或 PCE（目前剔除与包含能源食品的 GDP 平减指数大约处于 3.5% 至 4% 区间）。 --- ### [01:11:12](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n4C4DZoz9iw&t=4272s) 美联储的传统迷思与“大嘴巴委员会” Josh Brown 对美联储固化的官僚流程提出了质疑。他提到美联储至今还在坚持收集诸如《褐皮书》（Beige Book）里的道听途说，比如官员坐在卡车休息站、路边餐馆去和卡车司机或农民聊天，这种形式主义几乎没有任何决策增量。Ed 对此深表赞同，直言自己从来没有从《褐皮书》中获得过任何有价值的分析。 大家讨论到，现代人往往忘记了美联储在金融危机前的真正“传统”——在格林斯潘早期甚至更早之前，美联储极其沉默，从不召开新闻发布会，有时即便调整了利率，外界也往往在数天甚至一周之后才后知后觉。然而，后金融危机时代却演变成了激进的“沟通时代”，每一个理事、地方联储主席都在四处巡回发表演讲。Ed 打趣说，自己或许是第一个把联邦公开市场委员会（FOMC）戏称为“联邦大嘴巴委员会”（Federal Open Mouth Committee）的人；但他又笑着承认，作为一名以此为生的“美联储观察家”（Fed watcher），如果美联储真的闭嘴不言，自己反而会“失业”。 谈及美联储当下的内部政治与动向，Ed 直言局面十分扑朔迷离。近期会议上已经出现了三名希望加息的反对票（dissenters），市场甚至怀疑主席鲍威尔本人其实也想加息，只是苦于无法拉拢到足够票数，同时担心成为第四个投下反对票的主席会引发巨大公众难堪；另一方面，面对来自行政层面的政治干预与来自前总统的公开斥责（源于在选前加息），美联储高层在做决策时也面临极大的外部政治压力。 --- ### [01:13:03](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n4C4DZoz9iw&t=4383s) 财报披露频率之争与尾声 话题随后延伸到监管政策与信息透明度。主持人提到，随着减少沟通的论调兴起，美国证监会（SEC）也曾流传出一项设想：是否允许上市企业将季度财报（Quarterly reports）改为半年报告一次（Semi-annual reports）。Josh 提到，伯克希尔·哈撒韦（Berkshire Hathaway）常常选择在周六发布财报，而且从不举办投资者电话会议，但其股价依然稳步创下历史新高，这似乎表明精简报告并不会毁掉优质公司。 但 Ed Yardeni 坚决反对这一提议，连呼“这太糟糕了”（Terrible）。他认为减少披露绝非好事，甚至可能滋生更多的财务违规行为。Ed 从投资研究的实际操作角度分析指出： - **前瞻营收与前瞻利润**：他每周都会跟踪华尔街分析师的一致预期，利用当前年度与下一年度的预期计算出时间加权平均数。其中，每周滚动计算的“前瞻营收”（Forward revenues）是极佳的宏观经济领先指标，而“前瞻利润”（Forward earnings）更是预测实际企业盈利的顶级风向标。 - **信息越多越好**：如果财报间隔拉长到半年，分析师与宏观研究员将面临巨大的数据真空期，而资本市场对资产的定价效率也会大打折扣。对于投资者而言，永远是“信息越充分越好”。 节目最后，主持人盛赞了 Ed Yardeni 几十年来对华尔街和投资群体的深远贡献。Ed 幽默地回应，自己从不打高尔夫球，如果不做宏观研究、不写书，自己都不知道退休后该干什么，因此会把这一事业一直“坚定地推进下去”。听众可以通过其官方网站 `yardeni.com` 获取其前沿研究、投资书籍与宏观洞察。 ## Notable quotes > [07:05](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n4C4DZoz9iw&t=425s) 我是铜博士（Doctor of copper）……我和铜博士是竞争对手。 — Ed Yardeni > [25:09](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n4C4DZoz9iw&t=1509s) 主流经济学根本不懂得如何前瞻科技创新的力量。真正的自由市场不是在贫困中分配匮乏，而是用价格上涨标识出‘短缺’，随即便会有企业家带着更颠覆、更低廉的技术创新彻底打碎这种瓶颈。 — Ed Yardeni > [34:44](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n4C4DZoz9iw&t=2084s) 富人并不会比普通人吃更多的饭，你最近去过开市客（Costco）、大商场或普通餐馆吗？ — Ed Yardeni > [48:04](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n4C4DZoz9iw&t=2884s) 在市场中的时长（Time in the market）远比择时更重要。 — Ed Yardeni > [59:20](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n4C4DZoz9iw&t=3560s) 债权人往往先于股市察觉到危机——债券投资者不追求无限的上涨空间，他们只在乎本金能否安全收回。 — Ed Yardeni > [01:02:07](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n4C4DZoz9iw&t=3727s) 走势图犹如罗夏墨迹测验（Rorschach test），反映的是‘乌合之众的疯狂’与市场心理学。 — Ed Yardeni > [01:13:03](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n4C4DZoz9iw&t=4383s) 这太糟糕了（Terrible）。 — Ed Yardeni > [01:13:03](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n4C4DZoz9iw&t=4383s) 信息越多越好。 — Ed Yardeni ## Mentioned Ed Yardeni, Josh Brown, Michael Batnick, Billy Joel, JC Parets, Nuveen, Yardeni Research, 保德信股票集团 (Prudential Equity Group), 德意志银行 (Deutsche Bank), Oak Associates, C.J. Lawrence, 保德信贝奇证券 (Prudential-Bache Securities), E.F. Hutton, 纽约联邦储备银行 (Federal Reserve Bank of New York), 美联储 (Federal Reserve), 美国财政部 (US Treasury), 哥伦比亚大学商学院 (Columbia Business School), 《为乐趣与利润跟踪美联储》(Fed Watching for Fun and Profit), 唐纳德·特朗普 (Donald Trump), 里克·里德 (Rick Rieder), 贝莱德 (BlackRock), 罗纳德·劳德 (Ronald Lauder), 凯文·沃什 (Kevin Warsh), IBM, ChatGPT, OpenAI, 标普 500 (S&P 500), 硅谷银行 (Silicon Valley Bank), CNBC, 彭博 (Bloomberg), 《巴伦周刊》(Barron's), Anthropic, 埃隆·马斯克 (Elon Musk), Alphabet, 萨缪尔森 (Paul Samuelson), 约瑟夫·熊彼特 (Joseph Schumpeter), 英伟达 (NVIDIA), 西部数据 (Western Digital), 特鲁斯特财富 (Truist Wealth), 尤里安·蒂默 (Jurrien Timmer), 富达投资 (Fidelity), 开市客 (Costco), 哈里·登特 (Harry Dent), 长期资本管理公司 (LTCM), 高盛 (Goldman Sachs), Citadel, 沃伦·巴菲特 (Warren Buffett), 雷曼兄弟 (Lehman Brothers), 拉斯洛·比里尼 (Laszlo Birinyi), 彼得·林奇 (Peter Lynch), 罗素 2000 (Russell 2000), 摩根士丹利 (Morgan Stanley), 甲骨文 (Oracle), 珍妮特·耶伦 (Janet Yellen), 比尔·阿克曼 (Bill Ackman), 杰罗姆·鲍威尔 (Jerome Powell), 伯克希尔·哈撒韦 (Berkshire Hathaway), 美国证券交易委员会 (SEC) ## Video description On episode 254 of The Compound and Friends, ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Downtown Josh Brown⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ and Michael Batnick are joined by legendary economist and market strategist ⁠Ed Yardeni⁠ to discuss: the case for the Roaring 2020s, why Ed sees no recession through the end of the decade, his S&P 500 target of 10,000, whether AI is fueling an earnings bubble, rising profit margins and productivity, why this market is different from 1999, the broadening bull market, hyperscaler spending and credit risk, bond vigilantes, the Fed, and what the bears keep getting wrong. This episode is sponsored by Nuveen. To learn more, visit ⁠https://www.nuveen.com/alternatives 👕 Check out The Compound shop: https://www.idontshop.com 🎙️Listen to our podcasts: TCAF: https://podcasts.thecompoundnews.com/show/TCAF/ Animal Spirits: https://podcasts.thecompoundnews.com/show/animalspirits/ Ask The Compound: https://podcasts.thecompoundnews.com/show/ATC/ The Compound Newsletter: https://www.thecompoundnews.com/subscribe Linkedin: https://www.linkedin.com/company/the-compound-media/ Instagram: https://instagram.com/thecompoundnews Twitter: https://twitter.com/thecompoundnews Tik Tok: https://www.tiktok.com/@thecompoundnews Investing involves the risk of loss. This podcast is for informational purposes only and should not be or regarded as personalized investment advice or relied upon for investment decisions. Josh Brown and Michael Batnick are employees of Ritholtz Wealth Management and may maintain positions in the securities discussed in this video. All opinions expressed by them are solely their own opinion and do not reflect the opinion of Ritholtz Wealth Management. See our disclosures here: https://ritholtzwealth.com/podcast-youtube-disclosures/ The Compound Media, Incorporated, an affiliate of Ritholtz Wealth Management, receives payment from various entities for advertisements in affiliated podcasts, blogs and emails. Inclusion of such advertisements does not constitute or imply endorsement, sponsorship or recommendation thereof, or any affiliation therewith, by the Content Creator or by Ritholtz Wealth Management or any of its employees. For additional advertisement disclaimers see here https://ritholtzwealth.com/advertising-disclaimers. #thecompound #investing #stockmarket #stocks [Source](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n4C4DZoz9iw)

[7:05] Ed Yardeni: 我是铜博士（Doctor of copper）……我和铜博士是竞争对手。 [25:09] Ed Yardeni: 主流经济学根本不懂得如何前瞻科技创新的力量。真正的自由市场不是在贫困中分配匮乏，而是用价格上涨标识出‘短缺’，随即便会有企业家带着更颠覆、更低廉的技术创新彻底打碎这种瓶颈。 [34:44] Ed Yardeni: 富人并不会比普通人吃更多的饭，你最近去过开市客（Costco）、大商场或普通餐馆吗？ [48:04] Ed Yardeni: 在市场中的时长（Time in the market）远比择时更重要。 [59:20] Ed Yardeni: 债权人往往先于股市察觉到危机——债券投资者不追求无限的上涨空间，他们只在乎本金能否安全收回。 [62:07] Ed Yardeni: 走势图犹如罗夏墨迹测验（Rorschach test），反映的是‘乌合之众的疯狂’与市场心理学。 [73:03] Ed Yardeni: 这太糟糕了（Terrible）。 [73:03] Ed Yardeni: 信息越多越好。

[10:08] Ed Yardeni: I kept saying that, you know what, I think we're experiencing the most widely anticipated recession of all time that just ain't going to happen. It's I call it the Godot recession. [18:25] Ed Yardeni: FEMO [32:48] Ed Yardeni: 1999 is so yesterday. [32:48] Ed Yardeni: I'm not—I mean clearly we can learn from the past, but let's not ignore the pace at which the future's coming at us. [36:25] Ed Yardeni: Have you been to a Costco recently? Have you been to a mall? Have you been to a restaurant? The rich don't eat more than the rest of us. [56:59] Ed Yardeni: The difference, though, is the P/E is not as high now as it was back then... It's earnings-led. That's a big difference. [68:57] Ed Yardeni: Why not take the 2-year Treasury and use that to run monetary policy?... In that scenario, the Fed funds rate could move daily. Why does it have to move when this committee gets together?

[0:00] So, what do you do? What do you do when [0:01] you're not I know you're a Long Island [0:02] like us. What do you do when you're not [0:03] working? [0:04] >> Uh, it's a good question. Uh, go out go [0:07] out to dinner with with my family and uh [0:10] I used to play tennis, but uh my my [0:12] eyesight on this side isn't what it used [0:14] to be. So, [0:15] >> okay. [0:16] >> Tennis is not my thing anymore. [0:17] >> What's your What are your go-to [0:19] restaurants? [0:20] >> Um, we like Vietnamese. We like [0:23] Japanese. We're at the north shore of [0:25] Long Island. There's quite a few good [0:27] >> kabuki for Japanese in Rosland. Yeah, [0:29] that's really good. [0:30] >> Great spot, right? [0:30] >> That's a great spot. [0:31] >> No reservations though. [0:33] >> I know. That's Yeah. [0:34] >> Uh but we got our own Japanese place in [0:37] Glen Cove. Okay. [0:38] >> Called Asian Fusion. And that's really [0:39] good. [0:39] >> I think I know it. [0:40] >> It's called Asian Fusion. That's [0:42] >> Asian Fusion. It's across from the movie [0:44] theater. [0:44] >> Yeah. [0:45] >> Is it in that old Chinese restaurant? [0:48] >> Remember that with the lanterns? [0:49] >> It's across from Laafigia if it across [0:53] from um Staples or [0:55] >> Yeah. [0:56] >> You know what's great by you? Ja. Is it [0:58] G or Gaia? [0:59] >> In Port Washington, the uh [1:01] >> Port Washington. I haven't gone there. [1:03] >> It's uh [1:04] >> Don't tell me it's Gaia. [1:05] >> No, [1:06] >> it's neither. [1:07] >> No, [1:08] >> they have the best place. Amazing. [1:09] >> The best uh what's the duck called? The [1:13] Peeking Duck. [1:13] >> Oh, yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. We've been [1:15] going there recently. It's like the best [1:17] duck place I've ever [1:18] >> I've never had anything like it. [1:19] >> Yeah, I know. Unbelievable. [1:20] >> Yeah. I used to My favorite place used [1:22] to be in near the London airport, but [1:25] this this tops it. It's fantastic. [1:27] >> You had the duck? [1:28] >> No. [1:29] >> Yeah, it's the best. [1:30] >> And now I feel like I'm going to go [1:31] there tonight. It's the best. [1:32] >> I got another Japanese place for you. [1:34] Uh, doz. [1:36] >> Have you been there? [1:37] >> I think it's in Woodbury. [1:39] >> Very good. It's in a It's in It's in the [1:41] big what? Whatever that big shopping [1:42] center is called. [1:43] >> Yeah. Yeah. [1:44] >> Um, [1:44] >> Woodbury Commons. [1:46] >> Yes. And then the best sushi restaurant [1:48] on all of Long Island. Do you know what [1:49] it is? [1:50] >> Nagama. Paul knows what it is. Is that [1:52] Nagama? [1:52] >> Nagama. Number one rated. [1:54] >> Where is it at? It's in Long Beach, so [1:56] it's a schlle for you. But [1:57] >> yeah. [1:58] >> Uh, [1:58] >> are you are you in the South Shore? Did [2:00] you move? [2:01] >> We're I live in I live in Merrick. Yeah. [2:03] >> So does Michael. [2:04] >> Nicole's from uh Long Beach. [2:06] >> And uh [2:07] >> Long Islanders here. [2:08] >> Yeah, we all are. [2:09] >> Yeah. [2:09] >> And um [2:10] >> too bad Billy Joel uh [2:12] >> he's in Florida. Well, that's where [2:14] that's where I'm going as soon as I can. [2:15] So [2:16] >> do we know who bought his house? [2:17] >> No. [2:18] >> They just sold it right this summer. [2:20] >> They sold the main house. I don't know [2:21] if they sold this the other house. What [2:24] was cool about the h that house [2:28] >> in the HBO documentary about Billy Joel [2:30] from I guess it was last summer. [2:32] >> So good. [2:32] >> It opens with him telling the story of [2:34] working on a boat in the Long Island [2:36] Sound [2:37] >> and seeing that piece of property and [2:39] saying one day I'm going to own that [2:42] >> way before he was a musician and he [2:44] actually did it. [2:46] >> Early on his career he had a terrible [2:47] manager that just lost him tons of [2:49] money. [2:50] >> Yeah. It was his wife's husband [2:52] >> stole from him. His wife's husband. [2:53] >> His wife's hus [2:54] >> You mean him? [2:55] >> His wife's brother. [2:57] >> Yeah. [2:57] >> His wife's brother. [2:59] >> Yeah. [2:59] >> Cleaned them out. [3:00] >> Yeah. Cleaned them out. [3:01] >> It's a [3:01] >> like $18 million or something. [3:03] >> Yeah. Crazy story. [3:03] >> Back then it was a real real money. [3:05] >> Yeah. Um the problem there is when your [3:08] lawyer is also your business manager [3:11] and has power and has power of uh power [3:14] of attorney. That tends not to go well. [3:16] >> So Ed, how about those bond vigilantes? [3:18] >> Well, um they're they're kind of [3:20] restless. you know, they're pushing bond [3:22] yields up a bit. I don't think it's a to [3:24] the point where I'm concerned about it. [3:27] I think four to 5% is kind of the range [3:29] that they should be at, but um you know, [3:32] we could have a repeat of 2023. Remember [3:35] when the bond deal went up from four to [3:37] five% in 3 months uh and at 5% there [3:40] were buyers. I mean, that's the [3:41] wonderful thing about markets. [3:42] >> I'm so glad you said that. I want your [3:43] take on this. I I think you might agree [3:45] with me. Um I am technically inclined. I [3:48] believe in technical analysis. [3:49] >> I agree. Okay. But I don't believe in it [3:51] with interest rates. And here's why. [3:53] >> When that's an interesting point. [3:54] >> I'll tell you why. I'd like to hear your [3:56] take. [3:57] >> When a stock is consolidating or it's in [3:59] an uptrend, eventually it breaks out and [4:02] it continues to go higher, right? At [4:03] some point [4:04] >> with interest rates. So if you look at [4:05] the 10-year, you would say it's an [4:07] uptrend and you would say it's been [4:08] consolidating for a long time and it's [4:10] probably going to break out of this [4:11] range. If you're just looking at a [4:11] chart, you don't know what it is. You [4:12] would say, "Yeah, buyers in control." [4:15] But I don't think that with with the [4:17] stock market when a stock breaks out, [4:19] people chase it. [4:20] >> Holy it's going to go higher. I [4:21] better buy today. It doesn't work with [4:23] interest rates. Holy I need to [4:25] take I need to borrow money today. No, [4:27] no, no. Stop. Stop. Stop. Let me finish. [4:29] You don't say I need to borrow. You [4:31] don't say I need to borrow today because [4:32] this be more expensive to borrow [4:33] tomorrow. Number one. Number two, it [4:34] might even be the opposite because at [4:37] higher yields, a ton of buyers come in. [4:39] Holy I I actually [4:41] >> lock it in. [4:42] >> I want to lock it in. [4:43] >> Yeah. pushing a whole different [4:45] mentality. [4:45] >> So, it's the opposite of a stock market [4:46] breakout. [4:47] >> A very good point. [4:48] >> Well, I don't think any technicians [4:50] chart yields themselves. They chart the [4:53] price of [4:54] >> they chart an a bond ETF. [4:56] >> JC would fight you. He charts interest [4:57] rates, [4:58] >> does he? [4:58] >> Yeah. [4:59] >> Or he can't chart anything, right? [5:02] >> What's the difference? [5:02] >> But I think it's a good point. Thank [5:04] you. [5:05] >> The difference is that you can't buy or [5:06] sell the yield. You buy or sell the bond [5:08] itself. It's [5:08] >> the inverse of it's the same thing. [5:10] Yeah, [5:11] >> I guess it makes sense. [5:13] I rest my case. [5:16] >> Good case. [5:17] >> Thank you, Ed. All right, let's go. [5:21] Oh, [5:21] >> headphones, please, if you don't mind. [5:24] >> No headphones. [5:26] >> I don't look good in headphones. [5:28] >> You look great in headphones. [5:29] >> You look great. [5:30] >> So that you could hear yourself. [5:31] >> You're going to let us sit here with [5:32] these on our head and pretend we [5:33] weren't. All right. [5:36] All right. [5:48] This message is brought to you by New. [5:51] Private market investing is no longer [5:52] just for large institutions and [5:55] forwardthinking investors are taking [5:56] notice. New combines decades of private [5:59] market expertise with innovative [6:01] solutions across real estate, credit, [6:04] infrastructure, and natural capital, [6:07] giving investors access to new sources [6:09] of return and diversification beyond [6:12] what traditional markets offer. From [6:15] navigating volatility to managing risk [6:17] in an uncertain environment, new [6:19] strategies are engineered to complement [6:22] traditional portfolios and unlock [6:24] lasting growth potential. Grounded in [6:27] experience and focused on the future, [6:29] New sees today's markets as tomorrow's [6:32] opportunities. New unlocking opportunity [6:35] in private markets. Visit [6:37] newven.com/alternatives [6:41] to learn more. Investing involves risk. [6:43] Loss of principle is possible. [6:49] All right, ladies and gentlemen, welcome [6:50] to the compound in front. What episode? [6:52] 254. [6:54] How did that happen? [6:56] believe this. We've done 254 of these. [6:58] Congression started in um 2021. So, our [7:01] fifth anniversary this summer of doing [7:03] the show. [7:03] >> That's great. [7:04] >> All right, you guys. We have a living [7:05] legend with us today. One of my uh one [7:08] of the people that I probably have [7:09] learned more from than almost anyone I [7:12] can really think of. I've been consuming [7:15] his research and his commentary for as [7:17] long as I can remember, for as long as [7:19] I'm doing this. Uh and we're we're super [7:22] lucky to have him in the house today. [7:24] His name is Ed Yord Denny. Dr. Ed Denny. [7:27] Round of applause. [7:29] >> Thank you. Thank you. Pleasure to be [7:31] here. Just the ladies. [7:33] >> All right. Are you a doctor of markets? [7:35] What are you a doctor of? [7:37] >> Doctor of copper. [7:38] >> Doctor of economics. Doctor of copper. [7:41] >> I compete with Dr. Copper. [7:43] >> Doctor at Yordenni is president of [7:44] Yordenni Research, an independent [7:46] investment strategy and asset allocation [7:49] research firm he founded in 2007. He [7:52] previously served as chief investment [7:54] strategist at Credential Equity Group, [7:56] Deutsche Bank's US Equities Division, [7:58] and Oak Associates, as well as chief [8:02] economist at CJ Lawrence, Credential, [8:05] how do I say it? Bash [8:07] >> B. I wasn't in the business back then. [8:10] >> Yeah, [8:10] >> EF Hutton. I know cuz I remember the [8:12] commercial. Um earlier in his career he [8:14] was an economist the Federal Reserve [8:16] Bank of New York held positions at the [8:18] Fed Board of Governors and the US [8:21] Treasury as well as teaching at Colombia [8:24] Business School. Ed, thank you so much [8:25] for coming. [8:26] >> I I wish you wouldn't have had done all [8:28] that because now it sounds like I can't [8:30] keep a job. [8:31] >> No, no, you long and distinguished [8:33] career. Hey, uh I read your book during [8:35] the pandemic. [8:36] >> Okay. [8:37] >> Uh Following the Fed for Fun and Profit. [8:39] Is that what it was called? Yeah. [8:40] >> Okay. I loved it and I learned so much [8:42] about the history of the institution [8:44] >> and why the investment markets at one [8:47] time ignored it and then started paying [8:49] really close attention to it. [8:51] >> Did you ever get the urge to go back [8:53] into government work or doing something [8:56] for Treasury or Fed? [8:57] >> Absolutely not. [8:58] >> Did you ever get the phone call? [8:59] >> Uh, no I did not get the phone call. As [9:01] a matter of fact, in writing a few times [9:04] I've offered to do what the Fed does for [9:06] half the price. [9:08] >> No takers on No, no takers. And I I I [9:11] was kind of annoyed that I wasn't on [9:12] that short list of possible Fed uh uh [9:16] chairs. But uh then again, I I've been [9:19] saying that the Fed was wrong to lower [9:20] interest rates because the economy is [9:22] resilient and inflation is not at 2%. [9:24] >> Well, you were definitely not getting [9:25] the job then. [9:26] >> Then I definitely Yeah, I wasn't I was [9:28] >> feel I don't actually think it was a [9:30] short list. I think the Trumps love a [9:32] reality show. [9:33] >> Yeah. [9:33] >> And they loved parading Rick Reer and [9:35] all these people, [9:36] >> but it was always gonna be this kid [9:38] because this kid is like family to him. [9:40] >> Yeah. [9:41] >> And what he [9:42] >> fine, but it's a kid to Donald Trump. [9:45] >> Uh Donald Trump's best friend is Ron [9:47] Lauder. [9:48] >> Mhm. [9:48] >> He's Ron Lauder's uh son-in-law. This [9:52] was It was never going to be you or [9:53] anyone else. It was always going to be [9:55] this. Okay. Um we're going to talk Fed [9:58] stuff in a little while. I want to get [9:59] to I think one of the best calls you've [10:02] ever made and I listened to it. I heeded [10:04] it and I think I'm benefiting as a [10:06] result of it. [10:08] >> You you were talking about the roaring [10:10] 2020s [10:12] I think before the pandemic. [10:14] >> Uh actually August 2020. So right right [10:17] at the beginning. Yeah. Right after the [10:19] lockdowns and uh there was a lot of [10:22] angst obviously about uh what was going [10:25] to happen. Uh but uh I try to point out [10:27] that uh if you look back at the 1920s uh [10:31] a few years before that [10:33] Spanish flu and a couple years before [10:36] that we had world war the great war they [10:38] call it back then. And as a matter of [10:40] fact in 1920 they had what they called [10:42] the depression back then. And so if if [10:45] you were uh forecasting the 1920s in [10:48] 1920 and said it's going to be the [10:51] roaring uh 1920s, you would have been [10:54] looked as delusional. [10:55] >> They had a they had a recession in 20 [10:57] and 21 or a depression. [10:58] >> Yeah. Right. [11:00] >> 1920. [11:01] >> Okay. [11:01] >> Yeah. And and this time around um we had [11:03] a we didn't really have a recession. It [11:05] was a two two-month lockdown. And I kept [11:08] betting on the resilience of the [11:09] economy. As a matter of fact, early on [11:11] in the decade, I kept saying that, you [11:13] know what, I think we're experiencing [11:14] the most widely anticipated recession of [11:16] all times that just ain't going to [11:18] happen. It's I call it the GDAU [11:19] recession. And so, I was a big fan of [11:22] the economy. I had lots of reasons for [11:24] believing that the economy would, if [11:27] anything, experience rolling recessions, [11:28] but not an economywide recession. So, [11:32] uh, it worked. In the 2020s, the analog [11:34] is in the 2020s you had radio and you [11:37] had [11:37] >> 1920s [11:38] >> 1920s you had radio and you had um the [11:41] assembly lines, manufacturing, [11:43] automobiles, obviously driving [11:44] >> a lot of technology, [11:45] >> right? So that in that time that was the [11:48] technology of the day [11:50] >> um [11:50] >> and it increased standards of living and [11:52] people were feeling good and it was the [11:54] roaring 1920s. [11:55] >> So right now from the safety of 2026 we [11:58] could all say, "Oh yeah, of course the [12:00] roaring 2020s. We have AI." Mhm. [12:02] >> But you said that in August of 2020, you [12:04] could not have known about the existence [12:06] of chat GPT or any [12:08] >> I made I made a list of some of the [12:10] technologies that were already existing. [12:13] Uh so obviously robotics and automation, [12:15] humanoid robotics, nanotechnology, cloud [12:18] computing, all that stuff. uh and I said [12:21] an AI but I no I didn't anticipate that [12:24] uh in uh November of 2022 uh chat GPT [12:29] would kind of get everybody excited [12:30] about this uh this new technology. Uh [12:33] let let me just say something about that [12:35] and that is um in my mind uh AI is [12:40] evolutionary evolutionary not [12:42] revolutionary. The revolution is what I [12:44] call the digital revolution and it [12:46] started in the mid 1960s with the IBM [12:48] mainframe and the whole point of that [12:51] digital revolution is to process more [12:54] and more information as quickly as [12:56] possible as cheaply as possible. We've [12:58] come a long way since the mid1 1960s and [13:00] a AI is part part of that. uh uh [13:03] revolution part of it. [13:05] >> Okay. So you don't see this as [13:08] being I mean I think you see it as being [13:10] transformational but you see it as more [13:12] iterative on top of internet 1.0 2.0 [13:16] >> and main all the way back to mainframe [13:18] computers. I mean that was revolutionary [13:20] at the time. I I think what AI has done [13:22] is it got us to the point where we [13:24] realize we're sitting on a lot of data [13:25] that we're not taking advantage of and [13:27] really understanding what we could learn [13:30] from that. So, you know, as an [13:32] economist, I was taught that uh there's [13:34] three factors of production: land, [13:35] labor, and capital, and that they're all [13:37] kind of scarce, and that it's an [13:39] economist's job to figure out how to [13:41] optimize everybody's happiness with the [13:43] scarce resources. There's no there'll [13:45] never be a shortage of data. Uh so, and [13:48] data is the fourth factor of production [13:50] is the way I look at it. [13:51] >> We're creating more data every month [13:53] than has ever existed in the world [13:55] before. That's correct. Something crazy [13:56] like that. Okay. What's what's ironic is [13:59] if somebody would have in August 2020 [14:02] taken what you said we could be setting [14:04] up for a roaring 2020s. [14:07] You think about like what's the [14:08] revolutionary technology? They probably [14:09] would have been talking about [14:10] blockchains. [14:11] >> No, I mean blockchain [14:13] >> maybe space a little bit. [14:14] >> Yeah, I think you know blockchain [14:15] obviously has a role in things like [14:17] stable coin and that's uh probably going [14:20] to revolutionize uh finance in in many [14:24] ways. So blockchain is just another [14:26] technology that uh you can kind of throw [14:29] in and say here you make a list of all [14:31] the technologies that could make this [14:33] the roaring 2020s and you could add that [14:35] to to that list for sure. [14:36] >> Michael and I were debating somebody [14:38] good naturatured debate. Um, in 2022 it [14:43] really felt like the economy was headed [14:45] off a cliff and the stock market was [14:47] front running that tech was down huge. [14:49] >> Correct. [14:50] >> All the biggest companies [14:51] >> and then all of a sudden on November [14:54] 30th chat GBT is released by December [14:57] 15th. It's all anyone is talking about [14:59] on Twitter. And it sort of just [15:02] kickstarts this brand new bull market [15:04] for the most established tech companies [15:07] and then a whole slate of brand new sure [15:09] startups. Okay. [15:11] >> And and we're somebody was like saying [15:13] well we were supposed to have a [15:14] recession but then this like almost like [15:18] the kicksave of AI isn't what happens [15:20] all the time. These innovation waves are [15:23] unpredictable which is why you stay [15:25] bullish. [15:26] >> Absolutely. [15:26] >> You don't have to anticipate what it is. [15:29] You just have to recognize that [15:30] Americanstyle capitalism facilitates [15:33] these types of things. [15:34] >> Absolutely. [15:35] >> springing out of nowhere [15:36] >> and it's absolutely flourishing. Yeah. [15:38] In in all sorts of ways. I think one of [15:40] the things that uh if I may say so makes [15:43] America exceptionalism is in fact our [15:45] capital markets. There is so much money [15:48] uh chasing good ideas and bad ideas. And [15:51] uh the good ideas turn out to be very [15:53] beneficial for all of us because they're [15:56] creating goods and services that uh can [15:59] be sold and then the entrepreneurs gets [16:02] uh get benefited from that. [16:04] >> Does the roaring does the roaring 2020s [16:06] run through the end of the decade? [16:08] >> Uh well, we're in the seventh year of [16:10] it. You know, everybody thinks it's six, [16:12] but you know, put it count it on your [16:14] fingers and we're actually in the [16:15] seventh year. So of 2020. [16:17] >> Yeah. Let's get through this and then I [16:19] think by the end of 2029, which will be [16:22] the end of the decade, I think we will [16:24] not have a recession. I have the S&P 500 [16:26] at 10,000 by by the end of the decade. [16:29] >> No recession before the end of the [16:30] decade, you say? [16:31] >> No recession before the end of the [16:32] decade. And and all I'm doing is uh [16:37] taking pointing out that look how [16:39] resilient the economy has been so far. [16:41] We hit it with a pandemic lockdowns. Uh [16:44] then we had a buying boom that ran smack [16:47] dab into supply disruptions. Inflation [16:50] surged. The Fed went from zero to 5.5%. [16:54] That's why everybody thought there was [16:55] going to be a recession. So, how could [16:56] you not have a recession with the Fed [16:58] tightening like that? And then we had a [17:00] mini many basically a weekend financial [17:04] crisis in 2023 and then Trump comes [17:07] along with tariffs and then there's the [17:08] war and there's tariffs again and here [17:10] real GDP is an all-time record high. [17:12] >> We've thrown a lot at this stock market. [17:14] >> Yeah. Yeah. I mean, it's it's it's been [17:16] extraordinary. And the last serious the [17:18] last recession we had was in 2008 2009. [17:22] it it wasn't that uh two-month uh lock [17:24] lockdown recession and uh bare you know [17:27] recessions don't happen that much and [17:29] they seem to be happening less uh and u [17:32] bare markets don't as a result bare [17:34] markets don't happen that much you're [17:36] you're right 2022 uh was one of the rare [17:39] bare markets that had that did not have [17:42] a recession [17:42] >> I think if not for uh the AI explosion [17:47] it's possible that 22 led to something [17:51] worse [17:52] Not my that was my opinion. As a matter [17:54] of fact, I don't remember if it was late [17:56] October, early November. I said I [17:58] actually thought the bottom was made in [17:59] June and we kind of retested it, made it [18:02] a little came down below it. And I said [18:05] I I think it was early November. I said [18:07] I think that's the low. And the reason [18:09] is because I, you know, I look at uh [18:12] forward earnings and forward earnings, [18:14] which is analyst expectations for [18:15] earnings, dipped a little bit in uh [18:19] 2022, but they certainly weren't falling [18:22] falling off. Companies were still saying [18:24] business is okay. [18:25] >> So, we're going to get to modern markets [18:26] in a second, but before we do, I [18:28] mentioned that we had made a chart for [18:30] you. You have on your website at [18:32] yordenni.com. [18:34] It's yordenni.com/market-calls. [18:37] And this is a running record going back [18:40] years of all of the things that you've [18:42] said either CNBC, Bloomberg, Baronss, [18:46] anytime that you're interviewed, [18:48] >> just like the headline, [18:49] >> which and you don't get to pick these [18:51] headlines. The editors pick how they're [18:53] going to but it's close enough, right? [18:55] >> Um, look what we made for you. Tell me [18:57] if you think that's cool. [18:58] >> Wow, that is cool. [18:59] >> These are all of your calls. The red [19:01] ones are where you're a little bit [19:02] cautious. The blue ones are um just I [19:06] guess your your your commentary that [19:08] they turn into headlines. And this goes [19:10] back to 2009. And to your credit, you've [19:13] basically been overall bullish almost [19:15] the entire time since the market had its [19:18] generational low. [19:19] >> You really didn't get shaken out by [19:21] tariffs. You didn't get you didn't get [19:23] shaken out by [19:25] >> um oh no, now it's omacron or like the [19:28] virus is going to like you you kind of [19:30] were steady through that. Yep. Um I I [19:33] just I think it's I think it's [19:35] commendable. I think it's remarkable and [19:37] uh [19:38] >> it's been really helpful obviously to [19:40] people that are listening to you and [19:42] tuning out a lot of other voices [19:44] >> and you focus on earnings growth so [19:46] much. [19:47] >> Yeah. [19:47] >> So here's my [19:48] >> So when you look at this and you look [19:51] you're talking about all all types of [19:53] scenarios things that could happen. Um, [19:56] but in the big picture, [19:59] are earnings the best northstar for [20:01] investors, not to time the market, but [20:04] to just feel confident that there's a [20:06] reason to stay stay put? [20:09] >> Well, I think at the end of the day, [20:10] it's uh the perception of what what the [20:12] economy is doing because the economy [20:14] >> more than earnings. [20:15] >> Well, the economy is is is the the [20:18] fundamentals behind the earnings. Um uh [20:21] and so if if you do your homework on the [20:24] economy and the economy looks like it's [20:26] uh hanging in there pretty well through [20:27] thick thick and thin then you can pretty [20:29] much conclude that earnings are doing [20:31] so. Uh I do I do look at analyst [20:34] consensus expectations uh something [20:36] called forward earnings which is time [20:38] weighted average of this year and next [20:40] year's expectations and analysts [20:42] actually do a very good job of [20:43] predicting earnings with one rather [20:46] important exception. They don't see [20:47] recessions coming. So that's my job. Uh [20:50] and you know if if you agree with me [20:53] that there's no recession through the [20:55] end of the decade then analyst consensus [20:57] forecasts which are I call them FEMO [21:00] fabulous earnings momentum that's what [21:02] they're seeing and that's what they're [21:03] expecting. Uh then I think we're uh in [21:06] in in pretty good shape. But uh yeah I I [21:08] I think earnings is is a key. Uh and I [21:11] do have my opinion on valuation [21:13] multiples. [21:14] >> So is is there too much earnings? Are we [21:16] pulling forward? Is this as good as it [21:18] gets? [21:19] >> Yeah. Earning. Can you answer the ear? [21:21] Is there an earnings bubble? [21:23] >> Well, that's a very good Yeah. [21:24] Irrational exuberance and earnings those [21:26] times. That's that's why I came up with [21:28] FIMO fabulous earnings momentum. And [21:30] that's the not the estimates. [21:31] >> The alternative is [21:32] >> the result. No, no, I'm ask you the [21:34] results. The the Bears pivoted in 2024. [21:38] They said it's all PE multiple [21:40] expansion. And they were right cuz the [21:42] the Mag 7 were getting rerated higher. [21:44] Okay. Um, that's not this year. This [21:48] year it's 28.8% earnings growth this [21:51] quarter, which is absurd. Are are we [21:54] pulling forward [21:55] >> not including the other income that [21:57] forgetting about the real forgetting [22:00] about the anthropic writeups and all [22:02] that? [22:02] >> Operating earnings, operating earnings. [22:04] >> Okay. So, are we over earning this year? [22:07] Are we pulling forward earnings from two [22:08] years from now into this quarter? [22:11] >> Um, is it an earnings bubble? So they're [22:13] not saying stock bubble because you [22:14] can't with earnings growth like this. So [22:16] they're saying earnings bubble. What do [22:17] you think about that? [22:18] >> Well, you know, uh earnings, uh the [22:21] arithmetic of earnings is real simple, [22:22] and that's revenues times the profit [22:25] margin. And uh revenues are doing fine. [22:28] Uh even with the war in the Middle East, [22:31] uh and all the other crazy stuff around [22:34] the world, uh forward revenues are an [22:36] all-time record high. Analysts keep [22:39] seeing that companies are reporting [22:41] better and better revenues and at the [22:43] same time the profit margin keeps going [22:45] up. It's going up into record high [22:46] territories. [22:47] >> We have 15% profit margins now. [22:49] >> Yeah. Yeah. It's it's it's huge. [22:51] >> Is this the thing the bears missed the [22:53] most that um profit margins would not in [22:58] fact have to mean revert back to 1985 [23:00] levels? [23:01] >> Well, they actually have an upward trend [23:03] now. you know uh they they kind of [23:05] looked at the history be be before the [23:07] past several years in the past several [23:09] years we actually have seen an upward [23:12] trend in the profit margin now part of [23:14] that is because um S&P 500 information [23:17] technology and communication services [23:19] now account for 45% of the S&P 500 and [23:22] those companies tend to high have high [23:24] profit margins because they they do uh [23:28] uh creative destruction better than [23:29] anybody else. They're always creating [23:31] new product and when you bring in a new [23:33] product to the market, you can have a [23:35] high margin on that, but they know it's [23:36] going to collapse and they know that [23:38] they've got to come up with the next [23:39] innovation. So, uh yeah, the short [23:41] answer is I I I I don't think that we're [23:44] taking earnings away from from from the [23:47] future. I I think u uh we're kind of [23:49] building on the uh the the productivity [23:52] of these companies. Look, I I think what [23:55] AI forced a lot of companies to do is [23:57] say, "Okay, stop the music. We're not [23:59] hiring anymore. we're not firing [24:00] anymore. I want an up and down [24:02] investigation of our company. Where can [24:04] we use AI most effectively? What [24:06] departments can we shut down? And that [24:08] was a hugely [24:10] uh important exercise because in some [24:13] departments it's like well we really AI [24:15] is irrelevant here. They're doing a good [24:17] job. Let's keep them or AI is irrelevant [24:19] here and they're irrelevant so why do we [24:21] even bother keeping them? So I think [24:23] there's been a lot of cleaning house as [24:26] a result of AI but I think AI is is also [24:29] uh already and will continue to uh [24:32] increase um productivity of companies [24:34] and that and we're seeing that in profit [24:36] margins. [24:36] >> So when you hear people say things like [24:39] everybody the reason it's an earnings [24:41] bubble is because everybody is getting [24:43] ahead of their future demand stockpiling [24:46] GPUs because they think the prices will [24:49] be higher in a year. stockpiling [24:51] compute, stockpiling memory chips, [24:54] they're buying out the whole supply. [24:56] Therefore, they're pulling forward, [24:58] >> and there's just no way two years from [25:00] now there will be the same level of [25:03] demand for these components that are [25:04] driving the S&P's earnings higher based [25:07] on how big tech is. [25:09] >> Well, the the vibes I get out of the [25:11] hyperscalers, the managements uh wish [25:14] they had more compute today because they [25:16] could make a lot more money today if [25:18] they had it. And then we've had a couple [25:20] of episodes, I think, where uh uh Elon [25:23] had more compute than he he needed and [25:26] he just uh rented it. So, you know, it's [25:30] it's it's a very liquid market. It's a [25:32] very it's it's it's a very competitive [25:35] market. [25:36] >> I think the point is though that the [25:37] hyperscalers are going to spend an [25:38] estimated trillion dollars next year on [25:40] capex, whatever it is. [25:41] >> And that's going to somebody's bottom [25:42] line. Correct. [25:43] >> They're not going to be doing that in [25:44] 2029, 2030. Now, [25:46] >> who knows? [25:47] >> Who knows? Google uh I think Google just [25:49] raised $25 billion worth of of debt and [25:51] there was like a hundred something [25:52] billion dollars worth of demand, [25:54] >> right? [25:54] >> They're still spending obviously, but at [25:56] some point that spending you would think [25:58] is going to come down. [25:59] >> I I I can't say that it that it won't. I [26:02] mean it's it's conceivable. Uh but u I I [26:06] think I think we in the digital [26:09] revolution in turn is part of the [26:11] technology revolution and the future's [26:13] kind of here. I mean, uh, we're already [26:15] talking about 2030 and 2040 and what the [26:19] world's going to look like. And, uh, I I [26:21] think it's it's making everybody's head [26:23] spin. We really don't know. We we we [26:26] have a good idea that AI is a very [26:28] profitable business on balance, but we [26:30] don't know who's actually going to make [26:31] the money and who's going to go out of [26:33] business. [26:34] >> Somebody somebody said it's all the [26:36] sci-fi movies from the 70s and 80s that [26:39] we grew up with [26:40] >> are now being productized. So, drone [26:44] warfare, [26:45] >> robots, humanoid robots, [26:48] >> space, [26:49] >> satellites, [26:50] >> sure. [26:51] >> Um, I don't know. Are they working on [26:52] teleportation? Somebody probably is. [26:55] >> So, but it's be me up. [26:56] >> But that's why it's so You said [26:58] dizzying. That's what it's so [27:00] disorienting because these are the [27:02] sci-fi tropes that we all grew up with [27:04] from Star Trek, Star Wars. Like, [27:07] >> now we're actually seeing these things [27:09] in the wild. Let me just take a slight [27:12] diversion here and that is I mentioned [27:13] before um how economists are trained to [27:17] think about the economy three scarce [27:19] resources or scarce resources and it's [27:21] their job to optimize these things so [27:23] that increases prosperity that is in [27:26] Samuelson it's in in economics 101 [27:29] that's the way they teach it and it's [27:30] very pessimistic it's very depressing [27:32] because it's like what there's only so [27:34] much and we all have to figure out the [27:36] market figures out some people want the [27:38] market to figure out other people want [27:39] the socialists to figure out. [27:41] >> Who was the guy that said everyone was [27:42] going to starve? Mouthus. [27:44] >> Uh yeah, it almost sounds like that. [27:45] Yeah, they've been there lots of [27:46] >> these are the constraints these [27:48] >> technology what what econ economists [27:51] aren't taught as the impact of [27:53] technology. To my mind, what I've [27:55] learned over the years is that actually [27:57] economics is very positive. It's all [27:59] about letting the free market tell you [28:02] where quote unquote scarcities exist by [28:04] raising prices. And then some [28:06] entrepreneur says, "Wait a second. I got [28:08] a better idea and I can and this idea is [28:11] gonna, you know, be far better than [28:14] what's what this is and we're we're [28:16] gonna sell it at a lower price. So, [28:18] economists just aren't really good at uh [28:20] anticipating technology. I'm I'm not [28:22] saying I am, but at least I'm [28:24] open-minded about it and uh recognize [28:26] that technology is uh hugely important. [28:29] >> All right. So to that end, a great deal [28:30] of the earnings growth that we're [28:32] getting is thanks to companies like [28:33] SanDisk and Micron, which are now [28:35] gigantic index weights and they're in a [28:38] position where they can sell their [28:39] product for whatever they want and they [28:41] are [28:41] >> right. [28:41] >> And it's not like they've thrown up all [28:44] these new fabs and they're selling more [28:46] chips. They're selling out of their [28:47] supply. There is no inventory and the [28:50] earnings growth is coming as a [28:51] consequence of them raising the prices [28:54] on every unit they sell. [28:56] >> Yeah. So to your to to what you just [28:59] said, [29:00] >> I guess my argument has been, well, [29:02] won't people come along and say [29:04] >> exactly why don't we figure out how to [29:06] get more juice out of this chip? [29:08] >> It's already happening. I mean that [29:10] research is already going on and it's [29:12] the price mechanism. The price mechanism [29:14] says, wait a second, these guys are [29:16] making a ton. The profit margin is 60 [29:18] 70%. So compute should come down and [29:21] those chips may not be obvious holds [29:24] >> going into year three or four. Well, [29:27] >> shortages get cured by innovation. [29:29] >> Well, it's it goes back to what I said [29:30] about creative destruction. The same [29:32] company that just put out an amazing new [29:35] innovation and and has a huge margin on [29:38] it is already working on making it [29:41] obsolete because if they don't do it, [29:44] somebody else is going to do it. [29:45] >> So, you know, technology literally eats [29:47] its young. I mean, it's it's it's it's a [29:49] crazy kind of business, but it, you [29:52] know, all you got to do is sit back and [29:54] watch what they're doing. [29:55] >> Sandis just reported uh not Sandis, [29:57] Western Dig just reported a $3.2 billion [30:00] quarterly profit. It was up from $282 [30:03] million a year ago. The stock is down [30:06] 15% or whatever. Now, in fairness, it's [30:08] up a ton. All right, so whatever. [30:10] It's just [30:10] >> sell on the news, [30:11] >> right? So, there is there's still a lot [30:15] of doubt in this market. Daniel chart, [30:17] please. For the last six months, I think [30:19] you'll like this one. The six-month [30:21] forward PE is down 8%. [30:25] And yet, the price of the index is up [30:28] 11%. This is very unusual. Normally, [30:32] >> when you have multiple contraction [30:34] between 8 and 10%. That's because the [30:36] price is coming down. Correct. [30:37] >> So, normally when that happens, the [30:39] market is down 9% over the same time. [30:40] >> The market's gotten cheaper on fabulous [30:43] earnings momentum [30:44] >> because people don't believe it. because [30:45] the people don't believe [30:46] >> they don't believe it will continue. [30:48] >> Yeah. And they, you know, and they they [30:50] have some legitimate concerns about [30:52] circular financing and, you know, this [30:54] is the dot bubble all over again. But, [30:57] uh, [30:57] >> do you worry at all about the just while [31:00] you mention mentioned it? [31:01] >> No, I I you know, I've been pointing out [31:03] recently that the the whole case for uh [31:07] 1999 2000 all over again has just been [31:09] blown apart by this amazing earnings uh [31:12] surge. Back then we had FOMO, fear of [31:15] missing out. So we had a a PE rally and [31:17] the earnings really turned out not to [31:19] really be there. This time around it's [31:21] grounded on on earnings. [31:23] >> You think we'd all be better if we [31:24] didn't live through 1999. [31:26] >> I think I would be I think I would be [31:29] making more money and taking more risk [31:31] if I hadn't been through that. [31:33] >> Yeah. But on the other hand, uh the [31:35] market, you know, climbs a wall of [31:37] worry. And it's it's good to have uh [31:40] people worrying. I mean, that creates [31:41] the opportunity. Michael showed me a [31:43] chart of the advanced decline line uh [31:45] two nights ago on our on our YouTube [31:47] show as another way to blow up the 1999 [31:50] analogy. We have an all-time record high [31:53] in the AD meaning stocks in every sector [31:57] almost every industry group are breaking [32:00] out to new highs. [32:01] >> Yeah. [32:02] >> In 99 it was only it was tech if you [32:05] were investing in anything else you look [32:07] like an idiot. You felt like an idiot [32:09] every day. [32:09] >> Yeah. Yeah. I mean look at this year [32:11] we've uh had I call them the impressive [32:13] 493 have significantly outperformed the [32:17] magnificent sub [32:17] >> got oil stocks biotech stocks [32:20] >> biotech yeah [32:21] >> finance uh it's everywhere [32:22] >> and biotech's using AI to [32:26] go where none of us have ever gone [32:27] before. [32:28] >> So that's not 1999 at all in 99 [32:32] >> 1999 is so yesterday. [32:34] >> Yeah, [32:34] >> you know. Okay. [32:35] >> Yeah. I mean I'm looking at the future. [32:37] I'm not I mean clearly we can learn from [32:39] the past but let's not ignore the pace [32:42] at which the future's coming at us. [32:44] >> I I think you make a great point about [32:46] um the dot bubble is acting like a [32:49] governor on this stock market rally a [32:51] little bit. I think people are so [32:52] freaked out about blowing another [32:53] bubble. Um so I actually think it's a [32:55] good thing. I hear I I totally hear what [32:57] you're saying. This is a great point, a [32:59] great chart from Truest Wealth showing [33:01] the multiple expansion in the do leading [33:05] up to the do peak. It was 250%. Multiple [33:08] expansion. [33:08] >> Yeah. Wild. [33:09] >> Here it's b I mean it's basically flat [33:11] over the last 3 years. [33:12] >> Mhm. [33:13] >> It's 18% versus 250%. [33:16] >> Hope was doing all of the heavy lifting. [33:18] >> And well people could come back and say [33:20] well the multiples come down but it's [33:22] still high at at 20 and mean reversion [33:24] we should be going down uh to to 15. But [33:27] you know all these te technical rules of [33:29] thumb. Uh you have to give the [33:32] fundamentals some weight too in all of [33:34] this. And u [33:37] again I I I was early on in the decade [33:41] saying I don't think we're going to have [33:42] a recession and uh the markets come [33:45] around to that view. It didn't believe [33:47] it in 2022. It took had as you said it [33:50] was pretty garden variety correction [33:52] selloff 25% uh over nine months but no [33:56] no recession. And I think the market's [33:58] come around to my view that this e [34:00] economy is I don't know that it's [34:02] bulletproof but it's [34:03] >> we've had we've had some very smart [34:05] people sitting in your chair that I [34:08] don't think they emphatically stated [34:09] this but they're pondering now out loud [34:12] bulletproof [34:13] >> without embarrassment saying thing I uh [34:15] Yuri Timmer at Fidelity who's great [34:18] >> uh Rick Reer who's great [34:20] >> yeah great [34:20] >> they're asking questions out loud um [34:23] without the answer but just like daring [34:25] to ask the [34:26] Is it possible that this economy is not [34:30] subject or prone to the types of what we [34:34] used to refer to as vanilla recessions [34:36] where a manufacturer uh takes on too [34:39] much inventory, customers stop buying [34:41] it, [34:42] >> take losses, lay people off? [34:44] >> I've thought about that and I figured it [34:45] out. Uh and that's because I have inside [34:48] information from the future. [34:50] >> I'm a baby boomer. [34:51] >> I'm a baby boomer. And uh uh so in in [34:54] the uh beginning of the decade, I I knew [34:57] I knew where the baby boomers were [34:59] going. They're going to get older and [35:01] they were going to start to retiring. [35:02] And I figured that that could create a a [35:05] skills mismatch in the labor market. It [35:08] create shortages in the labor market. [35:10] And I figured, well, technology solves [35:12] problems. The problem is the baby [35:14] boomers, huge a huge cohort is going to [35:18] retire. And what are we going to do [35:20] without them? And the answer is [35:21] technology comes to the rescue. We have [35:23] to augment the uh skills of younger [35:27] workers with technology and that's [35:29] exactly what's happening. So you know [35:31] people have been talking about the [35:32] Kshaped economy. I I have I'm I am a [35:36] little bit of a contrarian when I hear [35:37] that everybody has bought into it. I [35:39] said what's the matter with that thesis? [35:41] And the Kshaped economy is that the rich [35:43] are getting richer and the poor are [35:44] getting poorer and it's not sustainable. [35:46] >> The first part is true. [35:47] >> The rich are getting Yeah. [35:49] >> Yeah. It is. and a lot and a lot of the [35:51] poor that were poor are are also doing [35:53] well but or doing better. But look, I'm [35:56] not saying there isn't [35:56] >> is that why we have all these communists [35:58] running around? [35:59] >> Well, this is no bottom. [36:01] >> They uh they they just want to get [36:03] everything for free, right? [36:05] >> Um but uh the point I want to make is [36:08] I'm not denying that there are people [36:10] that are struggling out there. I'm just [36:12] saying that the K economy doesn't isn't [36:14] an explanation. It's it's a pessimistic [36:17] theory that it's not sustainable and [36:18] therefore we have to get into recession. [36:20] There's even a kakami notion that 5% of [36:24] the population, the rich are accounting [36:26] for 50 to 60% of consumption. Really? I [36:30] mean, have you been to a Costco [36:31] recently? Have you been to a mall? Have [36:33] you been to a restaurant? Uh, the rich [36:35] don't eat more than the rest of us. They [36:36] don't Let me get right down to the point [36:38] here. And the G-shaped economy, which [36:40] stands for generational, is the baby [36:42] boomers. the baby boomers and the silent [36:45] generation which are actually older than [36:47] the baby boomers. They're still some [36:48] still kicking around. They have a [36:50] hundred trillion dollars of net worth. [36:54] It is the richest retiring generation [36:57] ever and everybody's ignoring it. [36:59] >> That's a good thing. [37:00] >> It's a great thing. [37:01] >> They're in comfort. They're not [37:02] starving. [37:03] >> Well, think about it. Interest rates go [37:05] up, they love it because they own they [37:08] own 60% of money market funds, so they [37:10] love it. the unemployment goes up or [37:12] down, they're on a they're on a cruise, [37:14] right? They're on a cruise. Mortgage [37:16] rates, they locked them in at 3% or they [37:18] paid off their mortgage. So, what are [37:20] they doing? They're helping their [37:22] younger kids. The younger kids are the [37:23] ones that have the affordability [37:25] problem. And and I see just so much [37:28] intergenerational even personally, uh [37:31] I'm helping my kids out and you have to [37:33] when when I graduated from when I came [37:35] out of graduate school, I didn't even [37:37] think about asking my parents to move [37:39] in. Uh I mean you know back then things [37:42] were really affordable. [37:43] >> But this is the pro this is the problem. [37:45] Not everyone's parents can help them. [37:47] >> Not everybody can correct. So you have a [37:49] lot of stuff going on in social media [37:51] where a person who's 27 years old will [37:54] go direct to camera and say [37:56] >> I don't understand. I live in New York [37:58] City. How are all these people doing [38:01] this cuz I can't do it. I'm bartending [38:03] at night. I'm working a white collar job [38:05] during the day. And the answer is, well, [38:09] their parents had money in the stock [38:10] market in real estate, maybe small [38:12] business ownership, [38:14] >> and you didn't, and yours didn't, and [38:16] it's horrible, but it's the reality. [38:18] >> Yeah. I I think there's stories about uh [38:21] older people that saved for retirement [38:24] and and they're not they didn't save a [38:27] ton of money, but all of a sudden, they [38:29] have to help their kids. So even people [38:32] younger people who don't have very [38:34] wealthy parents uh they're still helping [38:36] them out. [38:37] >> Yeah. [38:37] >> Um and u maybe uh you know with child [38:41] care for example you're going to live [38:42] closer to your parents so they can help [38:44] with childare and because it's [38:45] unaffordable to actually [38:47] >> remember uh remember Harry Dent. [38:49] >> Sure. [38:49] >> So his stick from I guess the 90s on [38:53] maybe it predated me was the boomers [38:56] would retire. They would all sell their [38:59] houses at once. they would liquidate [39:00] their stock portfolios. [39:02] >> The opposite happened. Nobody downsized. [39:04] Now they're maintaining two homes. [39:06] >> They're borrowing against their stocks [39:08] rather than selling them. [39:09] >> Yeah. [39:10] >> It's more tax advantageous to live that [39:12] way. [39:13] >> And they're in bigger homes than pri [39:15] every prior generation. [39:17] >> In many cases, two homes and they're [39:19] also paying rent for their 20some [39:22] children. Sure. who are out of college [39:25] with a degree [39:26] >> and not earning enough to live in the [39:28] places they want to live. So [39:30] >> that that demography argument for why [39:34] the 201s in 2020 I mean we know that [39:37] disastrous did not work. [39:38] >> Yeah. We know that some of the [39:39] socialists have very welloff uh parents [39:42] and and actually don't have a a life [39:45] that they're struggling that really [39:46] >> well that's how they can afford to [39:48] protest all day. [39:48] >> Yeah. All day. Exactly. Ed, getting back [39:50] to uh where we are today, I want to [39:53] throw a theory at at you. [39:55] >> Sure. [39:56] >> What we just saw with situational [39:58] awareness and the blow up [39:59] >> and awareness and and the blowup [40:02] >> any any resemblance to the tremors of [40:06] long-term capital management? Now, [40:08] >> I looked at that [40:08] >> what they were doing was obviously very [40:10] different, right? Like that was levered [40:11] fixed income arbitrage and it's it's [40:13] different thing, but some of the [40:15] ingredients need to be in place for that [40:16] amount of leverage and access to happen. [40:19] any uh any thing in there that we've got [40:23] another two to three years left and then [40:24] we will look back on the blow up and [40:26] say, "Yeah, those are the seeds of [40:28] destruction." Not that per se, but that [40:30] environment. [40:30] >> Yeah. I mean, it's it's possible that uh [40:33] this was sort of a a warm-up act for uh [40:36] big bigger blowups. Uh long-term capital [40:39] management, I think, took like uh [40:41] something like under $200 million and [40:43] leveraged it into a trillion dollars. [40:45] So, back then that was serious money. Uh [40:48] and then of course they were rescued. Um [40:51] and nothing terrible happened in the [40:52] economy in 1998. As a matter of fact, [40:55] that set the stage for the 1999 [40:59] uh bubble in technology, the euphoria. [41:02] Um I I mean clearly this the blow up of [41:05] situational awareness uh has been almost [41:08] irrelevant, has had really no impact on [41:10] the [41:11] >> I agree. I would take it further. I [41:12] would say actually it's the healthiest [41:14] possible thing that could happen. [41:16] >> Absolutely. Yeah. You have somebody that [41:19] has really brilliant ideas about [41:21] technology but no idea how to risk [41:23] manage a portfolio. [41:24] >> Correct. [41:24] >> Having that person [41:27] carried out uh feed first and the market [41:29] is up the next day. [41:30] >> And by the way, the people that got hurt [41:32] are very rich people. [41:34] >> Yeah. Oh, I made this argument like [41:36] they're the most risk tolerant people [41:39] there are. They're venture capitalists [41:41] with billions of dollars. [41:42] >> Just Okay. So So one blew up. Who cares? [41:44] Look, that goes back to the shock [41:45] absorbers in in in the capital markets. [41:48] During the Great Depression, uh there [41:50] was no such thing as distressed asset [41:52] funds. Now, we've got distressed asset [41:54] funds with hundreds of billions, maybe a [41:56] couple of trillion dollars, and they're [41:57] always depressed when things are going [42:00] well, and they're just waiting around [42:02] until something blows up and they clear [42:04] the market. They clear the market maybe [42:05] at 25 cents on the dollar, somebody gets [42:08] hurt. Uh but basically it's uh like if [42:11] if private credit blows up, we haven't [42:13] talked about private credit in a while. [42:14] It's a portfolio of private credit and [42:16] some of them are going to blow up and it [42:18] reduces the rate of return. It's not [42:20] like the banking system blowing up the [42:23] way it did in 2008. So that's a pretty [42:25] significant [42:26] >> Goldman Sachs has a rescue fund [42:29] immediately as soon as commercial real [42:31] estate starts to wobble in the pandemic. [42:33] Like nobody will ever go to the office [42:35] again. These buildings are zeros. Blah [42:37] blah blah. the next day there are [42:39] newspaper articles Goldman is launching [42:42] a commercial real estate focused [42:44] distressed asset fund like you're [42:46] exactly right and then in the case of uh [42:48] credit they all launch secondary funds [42:52] >> uh for private equity because or [42:54] continuence funds because they know [42:56] >> there's a there's an opportunity if [42:58] somebody has to get out [42:59] >> there that's an opportunity [43:00] >> then that's an opportunity for somebody [43:02] that doesn't have to get out [43:03] >> look in 2008 I think Buffett came in and [43:05] he was sort of the rescue fund [43:07] uh and uh I think in the current [43:10] situation, Citadel turned out to be the [43:12] the rescue fund and they bought it and [43:14] the next day I think they had already [43:16] made a lot of money on on that that nice [43:18] clean deal. [43:19] >> Yeah. [43:19] >> Um but yeah, Leo, the the first name of [43:22] the guy who ran that fund uh was a [43:24] newbie. He had no no business playing uh [43:27] with with that kind of fire. [43:29] >> Uh your S&P 500 [43:33] year end target [43:35] >> 8,250. All right. 8250. Where does that [43:38] come from? [43:38] >> You're on the high side versus the [43:40] street, but there are some people at [43:41] 8,000 now. [43:43] >> Um, yeah. Yeah, there there are. Uh, [43:46] look, um, I I do uh PE time Z and I use [43:50] u my assessment of what analyst what [43:53] what the market's expectations is going [43:55] to be at the end of the year. Uh, right [43:58] now, and I look at forward earnings, but [44:00] let's not get into that. Right now, the [44:03] analysts are looking for $43 a share for [44:08] next year. Okay. [44:10] >> For S&P 500 earnings. [44:11] >> Yeah. Multiply that by 20 and you've got [44:13] yourself over 8,000. [44:15] >> And and and it's still the year isn't [44:18] over. And all they've been doing is [44:19] raising 2027 all along here. Um and and [44:24] by the way, the 2027 number is a clean [44:26] number. it doesn't include uh any [44:28] mark-tomarket cap capital gains. Uh so [44:32] it's it's really that simple. And same [44:33] thing with 10,000. By the end of the [44:35] decade, I think by the end of the [44:36] decade, the market's going to be [44:38] discounting $500 a share times 20 is [44:42] 10,000. I mean, it's, you know, you can [44:44] do this at home, folks. I mean, it's [44:47] >> So why doesn't everyone What's the [44:48] biggest obstacle to that to that coming [44:51] true? [44:51] >> A recession, which everybody fears is [44:53] inevitable. [44:54] >> The Fed makes a mistake. Fed makes a [44:56] mistake. Uh the war the war in the [44:59] Middle East uh gets worse. I mean [45:01] >> so the usual that we always worry [45:03] about [45:03] >> over and over again. [45:04] >> But something has to start the [45:06] >> I just want to say that between 2009 and [45:09] the between the great financial crisis [45:11] and the great virus crisis. I actually [45:14] for my accounts kept a diary of what I [45:18] call panic attacks and I said look we [45:21] all got panicked. We all got totally in [45:24] uh burnt in 2008 2009. So it's going to [45:28] be pretty easy to scare people and [45:29] there's always a perma bears the [45:31] pessimists out there to do the job. So I [45:33] kept adding to the list. I made like 80 [45:36] panic attacks that turn out to be [45:38] non-events. [45:39] >> We have we have a reason to sell chart. [45:41] We do the same thing. We compile who who [45:43] used to send the books out with the [45:44] newspaper. Was that lloin? You're right. [45:47] Yeah. [45:48] >> Remember the book? [45:48] >> Yeah. Yeah. [45:49] >> Okay. RIP Llo Bini. But he he used to [45:52] send out like I get I was quarterly [45:55] >> here are all the news stories that moved [45:56] the market. [45:58] >> That was a great affirmation to flip [45:59] through that and just say, "Wow, none of [46:01] that mattered." [46:01] >> Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. [46:02] >> What's that? What's next? [46:03] >> Well, that's that's it. [46:04] >> So, you have to you have to kind of [46:05] learn. It's like learning by doing. I [46:08] mean, learn from recent experience. [46:10] Recent experience shows I made a list of [46:12] all the things that you know were stress [46:14] tests and the and the GDP passed it [46:18] passed it just fine. and you know all [46:20] these things about the consumer their [46:21] high delinquencies and uh the the rate [46:24] of employment is is is low. I mean, at [46:28] the end of the day day, look at what the [46:29] consumers are doing with retail sales [46:31] and they're they're still spending and [46:33] so you know the again um why come up [46:38] with a K economy pessimistic uh [46:40] conclusion and why not really just look [46:43] look around you remember Peter Lynch [46:45] >> the stores are full, the planes are [46:46] full, the concerts are full, the ball [46:48] games are full they're paying8 $80,000 [46:52] to watch a Knicks game. [46:53] >> Yeah. Uh, now I understand that's not [46:56] everyone, but I think it's it's [46:58] emblematic of everyone. [46:59] >> Absolutely. [46:59] >> Okay. Yeah, [47:00] >> I'm with I'm I'm with you 100%. Can we [47:02] do some of your charts? [47:03] >> Yeah, sure. [47:03] >> All right. S&P 500 bull market since [47:06] 1966. [47:08] >> Yeah. [47:08] >> And then you've got this red line, [47:10] >> which is where where we are now. [47:13] >> This is one of the most bullish ways to [47:15] look at the current environment. What's [47:17] your starting point for the current bull [47:19] market? [47:20] >> Uh, [47:21] >> you did October 22. Yeah. October 12th, [47:23] 2022. [47:25] >> Okay. Are all of these others dated from [47:28] a similar low or? [47:29] >> Yeah. Yeah. Official lows. [47:30] >> Okay. All right. So, once we're down [47:32] 20%, that starts the clock for and then [47:35] we recover. That's the new bull market. [47:37] >> Once we actually make the low, that's [47:38] all all of all of these is from the low. [47:41] >> So, can I ask a philosophical question? [47:43] >> People say the 1982 to 2000 bull market, [47:46] but if we were starting from the low, it [47:48] would have been the 1974 to 2000 bull [47:51] market. M. [47:52] >> So why do we start the secular bull [47:54] market count at the new high which was [47:57] 1982 in that case? [47:58] >> Yeah. [47:59] >> But then when we look at the chart like [48:00] this, we're starting from the lows. Why [48:02] do we [48:03] >> I mean [48:04] >> is it not inconsistent or [48:05] >> No, I I think uh I I I mean I never even [48:09] thought about it that way. To me, it's [48:11] like, you know, the bare market takes it [48:13] down 20 25 50%. And then you there's [48:18] clearly a bottom with the benefit of [48:20] hindsight. Uh and then just you take [48:23] that bottom and say how much are we up [48:25] today, the next day, and so until until [48:28] the next bare market. [48:29] >> So a lot most people don't agree with [48:31] this, but I've always thought of it like [48:33] the bull market starts when it eclipses [48:35] the prior bull market's peak. So 2013 [48:39] >> Oh, I see what you're saying. [48:40] >> 2013 is the first time you got a bunch [48:41] of [48:42] >> You just got your money back and now [48:44] Yeah. [48:44] >> So that So that's the way [48:45] >> that's another way to look at it. [48:46] >> Well, that's that's what they do with 82 [48:48] >> and that's what they do with the uh [48:50] >> Yeah, [48:51] >> I guess they do that with uh the uh the [48:54] 40s and 50s is when you get back to the [48:56] starting point before the depression [48:57] >> where you were. [48:58] >> But I guess it's probably semantic. [49:00] >> That's a that's a good point. Um but uh [49:03] look uh we were talking about uh the [49:05] roaring 2020s or the roaring 1920s. Uh [49:08] those are not the only roaring decades [49:10] we've had. [49:11] >> Oh 50s, 80s. [49:12] >> Yeah, we've had 90s. [49:13] >> Yeah, roar roaring decades are actually [49:15] the norm. Uh we we had a couple of uh uh [49:20] decades where nothing happened. Uh and [49:23] that was the 70s. [49:24] >> 201s were underrated. [49:26] >> Yes. [49:26] >> Right. I think that was 14% average [49:29] annual returns. Yeah. [49:31] >> Nobody talks about the 201s like it was [49:33] the good old days, [49:34] >> but they definitely were. [49:35] >> Yeah. Yeah. [49:36] >> Yeah. It's a good It's a good point. [49:37] What's the takeaway from from this [49:39] chart, though? [49:40] >> Which one? [49:41] >> But uh Daniel, give me that back. [49:45] >> Well, it's uh kind of the Warren Buffett [49:47] approach, right? It's time in the market [49:49] uh is uh is more important than [49:52] >> if we follow these prior bull markets, [49:55] >> we could be a third of the way in only. [49:57] >> Yeah. That's incredible to me that that [49:59] that visualization. [50:00] >> Yeah. Yeah. [50:01] >> Okay. I love it. What do you think? [50:05] >> I love it. [50:06] >> Bye. [50:07] >> Bye. [50:09] >> All right. Uh [50:10] >> I think the point is [50:14] for there to be the recessions don't [50:17] just happen because people just decide [50:18] like, oh like uh I don't want to [50:20] spend money. [50:22] >> They have happened because of credit [50:23] crunches. The Fed raises interest rates. [50:27] it gets up to a level where the bond [50:29] market says, "Man, if they keep raising [50:30] short-term rates, something's going to [50:32] blow up in the credit system." So, the [50:34] the bond guys start actually buying the [50:36] bonds. And then sure enough, something [50:38] blows up in the credit system and that [50:40] becomes an economywide credit crunch. [50:42] But it usually needed to involve the [50:44] banks. The banks were the regulated [50:46] institutions are the ones that their [50:48] capital were depleted. Uh what's [50:50] different this time ever since we we've [50:52] created a lot of shock absorbers in the [50:54] market not necessarily the government [50:57] created but created by the private [50:59] market uh in uh in the capital markets [51:02] there's a lot of shock absorbers and [51:04] things just don't blow up. The other [51:05] thing you have to say is the Fed's not [51:07] exactly irrelevant here. The Fed uh has [51:10] has a lot of experience playing [51:12] whack-a-ole in the credit markets from [51:14] 2000 from the great financials crisis, [51:16] the great divirus crisis. And so in [51:18] March 2023, we had a mini mini many mini [51:22] uh banking crisis lasted a couple of [51:24] days because they came in and provided [51:27] liquidity and basically said all rules [51:31] all deposits are are going to be [51:34] protected. [51:34] >> Yeah. [51:35] >> Uh so um [51:36] >> that's another depression the Bears were [51:38] robbed of. [51:40] >> The the Bears thought that that would be [51:42] the next banking crisis and they said no [51:44] limit on deposits. Don't worry about I I [51:46] love I love the Perba Bears because they [51:48] do a lot of work that I don't have to to [51:50] do. In other words, I I if they wasn't [51:53] for them, I'd have to do all this [51:54] research of what could possibly go [51:56] wrong. And they do it all for me. And [51:58] all I got to do is ask, well, what are [52:00] they missing? And and they rarely miss [52:02] anything. But the perma bears will get [52:04] you out at the top. They'll get you out [52:05] in the middle. And they'll get you out [52:07] at the bottom. You'll never be in the [52:08] market. Yeah. [52:09] >> You'll always be scared of it. [52:11] >> So, good segue, Daniel. Can I have chart [52:13] four? [52:15] Historical concentration peaks. [52:19] This was one of the other big things [52:21] that the bears were talking about. We [52:23] had this highly concentrated tape where [52:28] you know 10 stocks were 50% of the [52:30] market cap or whatever it is and they [52:32] were all in the earnings growth in one [52:34] year and you know etc etc. So this is [52:37] showing uh the Nifty50 concentrated [52:39] peak, [52:40] >> the tech and telecom bubble uh Japan [52:43] because of course always yeah [52:45] >> now show Japan. Okay, here you go. So [52:48] now we're calling this one the AI big 10 [52:50] and [52:52] you know to the Bears credit they're [52:54] sort of right here. We're at 41% [52:57] concentration in the 10 largest stocks [52:59] and they're all the same theme pretty [53:01] much. Um, do you worry about do you [53:04] worry about this going from 41 to 45 or [53:06] 50 and that being a blowoff top moment [53:09] for the overall tape [53:10] >> when uh S&P 500 information technology [53:13] and communication services got to 45% of [53:16] the market cap uh of the S&P 500 uh last [53:20] year on December 7th we said we no [53:23] longer want to overweight information [53:25] technology and communication services [53:27] we're just going to market weight them [53:29] and we're we reiterate our stance on [53:32] overweighting financials, industrials, [53:34] and we added added healthcare. So, in [53:36] other words, we were saying that we [53:38] thought the we thought the market was [53:39] going to broaden and and it has uh 493's [53:43] done great this this year, the [53:44] impressive 493. Uh the small caps, look, [53:47] if a recession was coming, you'd you'd [53:49] probably start to sniff it in the small [53:51] cap index because, you know, those guys [53:54] run out at the first uh signs of of a [53:57] possible recession. [53:58] >> How would you sniff it? You would look [53:59] to the small caps. Yeah, the for Russell [54:02] 2000. I mean, I think they were kind of [54:04] held back all this time because of all [54:06] this recession that, you know, widely [54:08] expected recession that didn't happen. [54:11] >> The last time we got a real broading, [54:12] what was that at the top? You have this [54:13] chart, chart five. Um, where you show a [54:16] ratio of the 100 divided by the 500. [54:20] >> Yep. [54:20] >> And what's with the circles? You think [54:22] we're you think we're gonna start to see [54:23] another broadening like we did then [54:25] without the recession? Well, I I I think [54:27] I'm I'm what I'm trying to point out, [54:28] and I do it when I write this this chart [54:31] up, is that the current situation kind [54:34] of si looks similar, but it's not. We're [54:37] not we're not anywhere near near that [54:38] peak. [54:39] >> The rate of change the rate of change [54:40] looks similar. [54:41] >> Yeah, the rate of change looks similar, [54:42] but uh it it certainly looks as though [54:46] uh we're not going down that count down [54:48] that road. And look, [54:51] there's sometimes there's a coincidence [54:52] between these charts and uh and [54:55] recessions and the the business cycle, [54:58] but at the end of the day, with the [55:00] exception of most recent exception of [55:02] 2022, we typically do not care get bare [55:05] markets uh stock market panics without a [55:08] recession. Earnings have to take a take [55:11] a dive. If that's not going to and not [55:13] only the earnings take a dive in a [55:15] recession, but the PE takes a dive. Um, [55:17] I'm a catchup person versus a catchdown [55:20] person. [55:20] >> Okay, [55:22] >> the small caps did not participate in [55:24] the first two years of this three-year [55:26] bull market, [55:27] >> right? [55:27] >> They were completely on the sideline and [55:29] with good reason. Interest rates were [55:31] too high [55:32] >> and they didn't benefit from any of the [55:34] AI or [55:35] >> very few there were a few component [55:37] suppliers, but [55:39] >> um, so you had a morabund economy. It [55:41] wasn't bad. It wasn't great and they [55:43] just were not growing earnings to the [55:45] extent that large caps were. And so as a [55:47] result they were held back. And if [55:50] you're looking at that you're and you're [55:51] negative and you're predisposed to being [55:53] a bear then the thing that you say when [55:56] the TV camera goes on is this is a [55:58] negative divergence and ultimately this [56:02] will end with the large caps catching [56:05] down [56:06] >> to what the small caps are already [56:07] signaling. [56:08] >> It almost never goes that way in my [56:10] experience. Everything's a catch up. So [56:12] this year small caps explode higher. [56:15] bank stocks work, industrials work. It [56:18] it's the catchup trade and it happens [56:19] all the time that way from my [56:22] experience. Why don't people understand [56:24] that? That's how it goes. [56:26] >> I I think uh there is a pessimistic [56:28] streak in in a lot of investors. They [56:31] they do get nervous. It's it's it's [56:33] pretty hard to kind of stay the course [56:36] uh when uh there's so much negative news [56:39] uh and and analysis out there. Um, but [56:43] that's kind of where I I try to help [56:46] people out is kind of try to hold hold [56:48] their hand during the bad times and say, [56:50] "Well, you know, here's here's why this [56:53] is not going toii continue." Uh, but um [56:56] I don't know. I mean, pessimism just [56:58] seems to sell better. [56:59] >> Do you worry about this week? It felt [57:01] like Goldilocks, [57:03] so I don't even know what triggered it. [57:05] Maybe it was an earnings report, but [57:07] there was just this explosive euphoric [57:10] run. Was that on Monday or Tuesday? [57:12] >> Monday and Tuesday. Really? [57:13] >> Monday and Tuesday. [57:14] >> Yeah. [57:15] >> And [57:17] uh all of a sudden it just felt like [57:20] whatever we were worried about last week [57:22] with margin calls and don't worry about [57:25] that. Look at these fabulous earnings [57:27] reports. And people just wanted to buy. [57:29] >> Yeah. [57:30] >> And it's not just tech. They're buying [57:31] Goldman Sachs. They're buying Morgan [57:33] Stanley. It's [57:33] >> Well, do you worry it's as good as it [57:35] gets? [57:35] >> And on Sunday, I wrote one of my quick [57:37] takes. [57:38] >> Yeah. and uh I said uh information [57:42] technology is on sale and I looked at [57:44] the PE so maybe some people read my [57:46] piece and said you know what the stock [57:48] really is dirt cheap [57:50] >> if if you believe the earnings [57:51] >> but does it feel Goldilocksesque right [57:54] now [57:54] >> I had a call for one of my accounts uh [57:57] this morning said uh Ed are we in a [57:59] meltup and so I I sent them I sent him a [58:03] chart that compares the current uh S&P [58:07] 500 and I did the same for the NASDAQ to [58:09] what happened in 99 and 2000. And you [58:12] could argue that we're still on on on [58:14] course like that. The difference though [58:16] is um the PE is as much as is is higher [58:21] now than it was back then. Uh so it's [58:23] earningsled. Uh that that's that's a big [58:26] difference. [58:27] >> Um let's look at this. Let's this is [58:29] from Chart Kid Matt. 45% of S&P 500 [58:32] stocks. [58:32] >> I should have hired Matt, you know. I [58:35] >> Yeah, we got him. We got [58:37] >> so we are start to see a broadening just [58:39] a just a week ago 59% of the index was [58:41] outperforming the index itself which is [58:44] >> pretty high it's been way lower than [58:46] that now now with the with the tech [58:48] rally it's [58:49] >> that that's brought it down to [58:51] >> we we actually do a weekly chart on uh [58:54] the um uh breadth of uh forward earnings [59:00] uh on a three-month basis and a 12-month [59:01] basis for the 500 stocks. [59:03] >> How we looking? 85% [59:06] >> 85% what [59:07] >> uh are up [59:08] >> rising [59:09] >> are rising you know [59:10] >> unbelievable [59:11] >> yeah now you can you can look at that [59:13] chart and if you're a pessimist says [59:14] yeah but the next thing they do they [59:16] take a dive well yeah but there have [59:17] been times when they just stayed at 85% [59:20] >> uh do you worry about the rate of [59:23] spending at the hyperscalers [59:26] uh just thinking about prior capex [59:29] bubbles throughout history we'll skip [59:31] 1999 [59:32] >> think about the canals the rail [59:35] the whole the whole litany of uh booms [59:38] and busts. [59:39] >> Yeah. The dark fiber. [59:40] >> So uh Daniel chart nine just to set the [59:43] table. [59:45] >> So these are this is fixed income but [59:48] we're talking about debt. [59:49] >> Yeah. [59:49] >> So this is the hyperscalers what they're [59:51] able to sell bonds for above a treasury. [59:54] And as you can see it's it's rising like [59:57] one of their share prices. [59:58] >> Yeah. [59:58] >> Um do do you think that it's getting [60:02] carried away? Is it a a systemic risk to [60:05] the market if the bond market decides [60:07] they no longer want to go along with [60:09] these spending plans? [60:10] >> I'm not going to uh close my eyes to [60:12] things that uh I'm not that thrilled [60:15] with and this is not a very thrilling [60:18] development uh on on the debt side and [60:21] uh I I think it's it is very important [60:23] to bring this up because uh it's usually [60:26] the debt markets get see the problems [60:29] before the the stock market does. I [60:31] credit default swaps on Oracle, I think, [60:33] are at like a multi-year high. [60:34] >> Yeah. Yeah. I mean, [60:35] >> debt investors are not focused on [60:37] upside. They're focused on getting their [60:38] money back. [60:39] >> Yeah. I mean, they're basically looking [60:40] at Open AI and saying, you know, Oracle [60:43] depends on Open AI and Nvidia. And so, [60:45] it reminds them of the kind of circular [60:48] financing we had. So, there I'm not [60:49] telling you there aren't similarities. [60:51] Uh but it's it's a much bigger economy [60:54] today. It's a much more diversified [60:56] economy today. Um and um I think the [61:00] market has overdone it in terms of the [61:02] giving the market cap share to [61:05] technology and communication services. I [61:07] mean uh they they don't really account [61:09] for 45% of the economy. Uh and um I [61:13] think you're going to see technology [61:15] used blockchain and AI and other [61:18] technology used by financials to [61:20] dramatically increase their their [61:22] productivity. I I still don't understand [61:24] why I get clients send me checks. I [61:26] mean, I I wish we could just make that [61:28] all Venmo, you know. Um, and u [61:32] healthcare, you go to a doctor or a [61:34] hospital and it's like the productivity [61:36] is like non-existent. [61:38] >> Yeah. [61:38] >> Uh, but they're catching up now. You [61:40] know, they're starting to, you know, [61:41] doctors are actually now being forced to [61:44] uh type in your your your information [61:47] instead of just kind of taking random [61:49] notes. and AI is uh is being used in [61:52] biotech to dramatically increase the [61:55] efficiency of uh researching for for new [61:58] drugs. So again, I I think I'm just [62:01] betting on the future. I'm just betting [62:03] that it's that it's here and um you [62:06] know, hold on. [62:07] >> Can I ask you some research questions? [62:09] >> Sure. [62:09] >> Okay. Um [62:11] >> what do you do when the technicals and [62:12] the fundamentals disagree? [62:15] Do you say price must be right, [62:17] therefore my research must be missing [62:19] something? [62:20] >> Yeah. Well, um, [62:23] over the past couple of years, I wish I' [62:25] I'd followed I'm an very amateur [62:29] technician. I take a a ruler and a [62:31] pencil and I draw a line. And uh, I I [62:34] saw that in in oil. I mean, I'm kicking [62:36] myself cuz we've been in a bare market [62:39] in oil from 2022 when Russia invaded [62:42] Ukraine and it spiked up uh right until [62:44] before the war. And so I I have I I have [62:48] charts on on the website where I I drew [62:51] the line and said, "Look at that. It's [62:52] we're we're in a bare market." And then [62:55] in early this year, it started coming [62:58] closer to the downtrend, then went [63:00] through the downtrend. And meanwhile, [63:02] and the news is saying that America's [63:04] sending all these military I mean I'm [63:06] kicking myself. It was so obvious the [63:08] market the the technicals the market was [63:10] just screaming at you that something [63:11] like that was going to happen. Um on [63:14] gold I uh noted that we're in a channel [63:18] that started a few years ago. Um and um [63:23] I got I I I got a little bit uh excited [63:27] in the situation because we were uh [63:29] predicting 5,000. We'll raise it to 550 [63:31] 5500 by the end end of the year, but it [63:34] it had a pretty reasonable correction. [63:37] Um and now it's been holding at 4,000. I [63:40] think gold particularly lends itself [63:42] well to being technically analyzed [63:43] rather than [63:44] >> I do too because it's pure supply and [63:46] demand for the asset itself. There's [63:48] nothing else. [63:49] >> Yeah. But uh to to your point uh at the [63:51] end of the day, I guess I have to stay [63:53] true to my school, I'm I'm a fundamental [63:55] analyst. Uh you know uh maybe what's [63:58] relatively unique about the way we do [64:00] things is we do economics and strategy [64:02] together. You know, we don't I don't [64:05] have to go talk to a strategist to to [64:08] kind of get the story uh lined up. [64:12] >> You have a technician in house. [64:14] >> Me? [64:14] >> It's you. Okay. [64:16] >> But but I mean it's amateur. I'm not [64:18] even claiming that that there's [64:20] >> an amateur can look at it and say the [64:21] trend is up, the trend is down. [64:22] >> Yeah. I mean, I have a lot of respect [64:23] for technicals. Let me put it put let me [64:25] put it to you that way. And I I think [64:27] the charts do tell you about the madness [64:29] of crowds, the the psychology. It's a [64:31] psychological indicator. It's like, you [64:33] know, aar shark. And if you can say, [64:35] well, what what what's the market [64:37] telling me that that can be very very [64:39] important. I mean, we we we do this over [64:42] and over again. you see some of these uh [64:45] stock charts or other charts like [64:47] commodity prices going straight up. I [64:49] think we all know by now that the next [64:51] thing they do is they go straight down. [64:53] The only question is how far down [64:55] >> commodities mean revert? [64:57] >> They mean revert. [64:58] >> Yeah. [64:58] >> But but we just saw that in the Korean [65:01] stock market. We've seen it the [65:02] semiconductors. But is that the end? You [65:05] know, is that the end of the the rally? [65:08] Not if you look at PE which gets you [65:09] back to the fundamentals. Do you read [65:12] the research of other strategists or do [65:14] you find that that would cloud your own [65:17] ability to come up with [65:18] >> No, I I I you know, I mean, [65:20] >> who do you who do you who do you like to [65:21] read or who do you pay attention to? [65:23] >> I pay attention to all the perma bears. [65:25] >> Okay. Me, too. [65:26] >> Because I because I I think I do [65:28] relatively good work on the on the [65:30] bullish side. [65:31] >> Yeah. Uh, and so the the perma bears are [65:34] great because uh to when when I see that [65:37] what they're saying is kind of becoming [65:39] the popular view, it does bring out my [65:41] contrary instincts of like what what [65:43] could they possibly be missing? [65:45] >> Do you pay a lot of attention to the [65:47] people that write about the Fed? Um, or [65:50] do you just kind of digest what the [65:52] statement is and move on? [65:53] >> Just for amusement, you know, I mean, [65:55] I've I've got my own amusing views on [65:57] what what the Fed Fed's doing. Uh, I I I [66:00] been wrong on the Fed, but but right. [66:02] And what I mean by that is I was against [66:05] the Fed lowering rates. And again, this [66:07] is why I I wasn't I'm not Fed chair, but [66:10] I was against the Fed lowering rates in [66:12] 2024. They lowered it by 100 basis [66:15] points. The Fed funds rate. I said, I [66:17] don't think the bond vigilantes are [66:18] going to be happy with what you're [66:19] doing. And sure enough, the bond yield [66:21] went up 100 basis points. [66:22] >> You invented that term [66:23] >> back in 1983. And back then, I went back [66:26] and read it recently. I said the Bob and [66:28] Gilanes are worried about $250 billion [66:30] deficits and now we got one and a half [66:33] to2 trillion dollars and it's like we're [66:36] at levels of the bond yield that the [66:38] economy can deal with. It's not really a [66:41] problem. [66:41] >> People have been saying bond vigilantes [66:43] for 45 years. Apparently there's no [66:46] level of debt that the US can take on [66:47] where they will actually do anything. [66:49] Well, I I I tend to be pretty pragmatic [66:52] about the the these issues, especially [66:54] the ones that people get all uh huffy [66:57] and puffy about and deficits and debt. [67:00] Uh you know, I'm I I I do occasionally [67:04] appear uh from my home office on these [67:06] Zoom calls and things like that. I tell [67:08] them, "Look at in the back all these [67:10] books at the top at the top two shelves. [67:13] So, we got books uh from the 1980s [67:15] called Living Beyond Our Means and the [67:18] Debt Bomb and all these kind of old doom [67:21] and gloom scenarios. And uh I've I've [67:24] concluded that I'll worry about uh all [67:27] this government debt uh when the the [67:30] bond digital worry worry about it. And [67:32] they did worry about it in 2023. We went [67:34] from four to 5%. But what I learned from [67:37] that is kind of like what that [67:39] experience reminded me of is like [67:41] >> it's a market and at some point you're [67:43] going to have a price and 5% did the [67:46] trick. Also the bond vigilant [67:47] >> on the tenure [67:48] >> on the tenure and also the bond [67:50] vigilantes are not the only players in [67:52] the bond market. There's also the [67:54] Treasury and the Fed and a whole bunch [67:56] of other people around the world. And at [67:59] November 1st, 2023, Janet Yalen came in [68:03] uh with her quarterly refunding [68:04] announcement said, "I need more money, [68:06] but I'm not going to increase what I [68:09] usually get from the bond market. I'm [68:10] going to do it in the bull market." And [68:12] the, you know, that also Aman uh [68:15] announced that he shorted the bonds at [68:17] 4% covered at 5%. So, a lot of things [68:19] kind of came together. I think four to [68:21] 5% is kind of the the the the old [68:24] normal. This is where we were before the [68:26] great financial crisis. This is where we [68:28] were before the the inflationary binge [68:31] of the 1970s. [68:32] >> A 5% bond yield in the 90s, one of the [68:35] greatest decades for stocks ever. [68:36] >> Abs. Well, four to 5% is healthy. It's a [68:40] bullish level. It means that the capital [68:42] markets are actually free to allocate. [68:45] Uh the the bond market was rigged uh [68:48] between the great financial crisis and [68:49] great vice crisis. And it was just a [68:52] dumb policy. was should shouldn't have [68:55] uh happened, but it did. [68:57] >> If so, if you ever got the call, your [69:00] government needs you, would you do you [69:02] wouldn't consider it? [69:03] >> Oh, abs. Absolutely. [69:04] >> I know you love your life the way it is, [69:06] but if they if they need [69:07] >> if if they needed me to to to run the [69:09] Fed, but I have conditions. One is uh [69:13] I'll do it from home. [69:17] >> Do you live in DC? [69:20] >> All right. That might be a knockout [69:21] factor. What what what are the other [69:23] conditions? [69:24] >> Well, you know, I I would actually [69:26] experiment with a differently than than [69:29] Worsh. I would say, okay, I would I [69:31] would kind of up the ante on Worsh's [69:34] idea that Worsh wants to have the market [69:37] express an opinion that's not about [69:40] about where they where REIT should be [69:42] without being polluted by what Fed [69:44] officials are chattering about. Yeah. [69:46] Right. And then he says, "And we will [69:48] take our guidance." basically saying [69:50] we'll take our guidance from from the [69:52] market and then uh the next sentence he [69:55] says is but we're not going to [69:56] necessarily do that. So he's all over [69:58] the map on that. Why not and this this [70:01] is uh uh this is a first this is a scoop [70:05] for if you will why not take the 2-year [70:09] Treasury and use that to run monetary [70:12] policy. So [70:14] >> many people think they do that anyway. [70:15] >> Well why follow the make it official? [70:18] Why make it official? Why not? Right [70:21] now, the two-year is saying that the Fed [70:22] should raise rates uh three times. Okay, [70:26] here's what I would do. I would say, [70:27] "Okay, let's raise it a quarter and see [70:30] what the two-year tells me after that." [70:32] If the two-year tells me I still need [70:34] two, then I'll give them one more. Uh [70:38] and in that scenario, uh the Fed funds [70:41] rate could move daily. [70:43] >> Right. [70:43] >> Right. I mean, why does it have to move [70:45] when this committee gets together? Now [70:48] Wars wants to have fewer meetings. If he [70:50] wants to do it quarterly and and he [70:53] wants to know what uh inflation number [70:55] to watch, I' i'd watch the GDP deflator. [70:58] It's the it's the inflation rate for the [71:00] entire e economy, not just consumers. [71:04] And right now that ex with and without [71:07] uh food and energy, it's like three and [71:09] a half to 4%. Uh, so do [71:12] >> you think they just they're doing things [71:13] because they've always done them and [71:15] they like it? Like collecting anecdotes [71:17] for the Beige Book? Like sitting in a [71:20] truck stop and like sitting in a diner [71:22] and talking to a farmer. [71:24] >> I never got anything from the Beige [71:26] book. [71:26] >> Of course not. [71:27] >> Yeah. [71:27] >> But they just have always done it. [71:28] >> Yeah. [71:29] >> There's a lot of that. And so when [71:30] somebody like Walsh comes along, the [71:33] traditionalists, they don't know the [71:35] previous tradition, which is the Fed [71:37] never speaks, right? No press [71:39] conference. If they change weights, [71:42] maybe you find out about it a week [71:43] later, maybe you don't. [71:44] >> Sure. [71:44] >> That's the real tradition. [71:46] >> Yeah. [71:46] >> And then we had this very aggressive [71:49] kind of communication era post financial [71:52] crisis, which I understand. [71:54] >> Maybe the time for that is gone. [71:56] >> Maybe [71:56] >> and we don't need to hear from every [71:58] every month. [71:59] >> But I'm biased. You'd make me very [72:00] unhappy. I'm one of my jobs is to be a [72:03] Fred watcher. What am I going to do? You [72:05] know, I need [72:06] >> You watch the two-year like they will. I [72:07] need Yeah. I mean, I I I think I have [72:11] the one who first called them the [72:13] Federal Open Mouth Committee, but I've [72:15] heard others use that expression. Yeah. [72:17] >> But, uh, I don't think they're going to [72:19] stop talking. I mean, Worsh might might [72:21] have nothing to say, [72:22] >> right? [72:23] >> But, uh, and what's going on right now [72:25] at the Fed is very confusing. Did he's [72:27] got three dissenters at the last meeting [72:29] who wanted to raise rates. Is it [72:31] possible that he wanted to raise rates [72:33] but couldn't get the votes and it would [72:34] be too embarrassing for him to be the [72:36] fourth denter or is he kind of thinking [72:39] about his boss fellow who hired him and [72:42] saying yeah and and saying do I really [72:45] want the president to start beating up [72:47] on me the way he did on pal I mean the [72:49] reason the president hated Pal is simply [72:51] because Pal raised interest rates before [72:53] the elections so the revenge was all [72:56] what is all about um I don't know where [72:59] Walsh's head is I you know he's keeping [73:01] it pretty pretty pretty quiet. [73:03] >> So they want to talk less on a parallel [73:06] track. The SEC is floating a proposal [73:09] whereby corporations only report twice a [73:11] year. [73:12] >> Terrible. [73:12] >> Instead of quarterly [73:13] >> terrible. [73:14] >> I So tomorrow Bergkshire Hathaway is [73:15] going to report they'll report on [73:17] Saturday. There will be no conference [73:18] call. [73:19] >> Mhm. [73:20] >> The stock is fine. It's at an all-time [73:21] record high right now. [73:23] >> I I feel like it'll be okay. You think [73:25] it'll be terrible? [73:26] >> Yeah. Will it lead to more uh financial [73:29] crimes? [73:30] >> Again, I'm I'm biased, right? Uh I want [73:32] the the Fed to meet often and to chatter [73:34] a lot so I can comment on it. Uh I I I I [73:37] I want quarterly earning seasons uh [73:41] because there isn't that much time for [73:43] one to the another. Um I I think that's [73:46] very useful information. Uh I mean I um [73:49] again I I follow weekly analyst [73:52] consensus expectations and I look at [73:54] this year next year and do a time [73:55] weighted average and the revenues [73:58] forward revenues great economic [74:01] indicator weekly uh and forward earnings [74:05] is a great leading indicator of of [74:07] actual earnings. So I I would I I would [74:10] kind of miss it but I think for [74:11] investors investors should have more not [74:14] less information. [74:14] >> More more information is better. Yeah. [74:16] >> Okay. Uh, Ed Danny, ladies and [74:18] gentlemen, thank you so much for being [74:20] here. Did you have fun on the show? [74:21] >> Absolutely. I had fun with you. [74:22] >> All right. So, that was the first half. [74:23] We're gonna take an intermission. We'll [74:25] do a dinner break. [74:28] >> I got you almost. [74:30] >> All right. I want to tell people where [74:31] they they can subscribe to your research [74:33] and and learn more about what you do and [74:35] your books. So, what is the website URL? [74:37] >> Yeah, you just go to yard.com, yi.com, [74:41] and everything's there. [74:43] >> Okay. And uh you going to keep going? [74:45] You going to keep it rolling? you know, [74:46] I don't I don't play golf, so I don't [74:48] know what else I do believe for myself. [74:50] So, [74:51] >> I'm rolling. [74:51] >> I get so much out of it personally, and [74:53] I know uh thousands of other [74:55] professionals on Wall Street do as well. [74:57] So, thank you on behalf of everybody for [74:59] everything that you do. [75:00] >> I appreciate it. [75:01] >> Of course. All right, guys. That's it [75:02] for us this week. Please go to [75:04] yordanny.com. [75:05] Uh thanks so much to everybody for [75:07] watching and listening. We'll talk to [75:08] you soon.