Disney Relies on Parks and Streaming to Offset Decaying Cable Cash Flow

迪士尼依靠乐园与流媒体弥补有线电视萎缩的现金流 海量内容的直接面向消费者（DTC）流媒体业务面临稀释迪士尼盛事驱动型品牌影响力的风险，同时也无法匹敌日渐衰退的传统有线网络以往的高利润率。 本篇梳理详述了迪士尼如何在首席执行官迈克尔·艾斯纳（Michael Eisner）和鲍勃·艾格（Bob Iger）的带领下，从1984年陷入停滞、沦为企业掠夺者目标的困境，蜕变为全球媒体巨头。内容回顾了该制片厂的动画复兴、ESPN有线电视转播费带来的巨额收益，以及对皮克斯（Pixar）、漫威（Marvel）、卢卡斯影业（Lucasfilm）和21世纪福克斯（21st Century Fox）等战略性并购。最终，梳理深入探讨了迪士尼如今面临的结构性压力——“掐线潮”不断侵蚀传统有线电视利润，迫使其在依托高利润乐园业务的同时，推进成本高昂且复杂的直接面向消费者流媒体转型。 1984 年，新管理层迈克尔·艾斯纳与弗兰克·威尔斯入主深陷停滞与恶意收购危机的迪士尼，通过大幅调整乐园定价并联合外部资本低成本拍摄真人电影，成功扭转财务困局。 (11:33) 迪士尼引入百老汇音乐剧叙事结构，并与皮克斯合作开发 CAPS 计算机制作系统，开启了接连诞生《小美人鱼》《狮子王》等经典巨作的“动画文艺复兴”，全面重启核心创意飞轮。 (24:30) 家庭录像带（VHS）发售、专卖店扩张及百老汇改编（如累计总收入突破 110 亿美元的《狮子王》音乐剧）等延伸业务，为核心动画 IP 开辟了利润极其丰厚的二次变现渠道。 (37:33) 1995 年迪士尼以 190 亿美元收购 Capital Cities/ABC，意外将 ESPN 揽入麾下，凭借稀缺的体育赛事直播版权与开创性的“广告+按户转播费”双重收益模式，铸就了庞大的现金流引擎。 (65:55) 经历内部权力重组与康卡斯特的恶意收购危机后，鲍勃·艾格接管帅印并通过收购皮克斯、漫威与卢卡斯影业重塑媒体帝国，但在流媒体时代公司亦面临着重资本投入与传统利润渠道萎缩的深层挑战。 (101:58)

Ben Gilbert and David Rosenthal argue that while Disney's multi-decade success was powered by a flywheel of high-margin theatrical releases, home video windows, and cable affiliate fees, the structural shift to direct-to-consumer streaming has replaced automated profits with a capital-intensive, lower-margin business. The Classic Flywheel and Exploitation Windows (37:33) Disney's historical financial power relied on repeatedly monetizing evergreen intellectual property across multiple sequential windows. After Michael Eisner and Frank Wells took leadership in 1984, the studio discovered that selling classic titles on home video created high-margin revenue rather than cannibalizing theatrical re-releases. A 1985 VHS test run of Pinocchio sold 1.7 million units at $29.95 each, generating $50 million in gross sales virtually overnight. By the mid-1990s, Aladdin grossed $900 million on 30 million VHS tapes, and The Lion King sold 32 million units, delivering margins of 50% or higher. This animation engine supported extensive secondary brand extensions. The Lion King musical alone grossed more than $11 billion over a 30-plus-year run, effectively serving as an incremental blockbuster generating roughly $350 million in annual gross revenue. Meanwhile, ticket and parking adjustments—such as raising parking fees from $1 to $5 in 1984—funneled high-margin cash directly into production, illustrating how core IP fed retail, Broadway, and destination resort expansions. The Cable Carriage Subsidy and ESPN Leverage (73:00) The 1995 acquisition of Capital Cities/ABC for $19 billion gave Disney a separate financial engine that insulated its creative operations. Through ESPN, Disney secured unmatched negotiating leverage over pay-TV distributors, bundling carriage demands and higher affiliate fees across secondary channels including the Disney Channel, A&E, and Lifetime. As Bob Iger noted, the predictable cash flow from ESPN cushioned volatile animation cycles and funded capital-heavy theme park investments. Between 2008 and 2011, Disney's cable networks accounted for roughly 60% of total operating income, generating more than $5 billion in profit. When Comcast launched a $54 billion hostile takeover bid in 2004, its primary target was ESPN, which at the time generated $2 billion in operating income—half of Disney's corporate profits. The model produced automated, passive income that did not depend on the creative health of Disney's core character slate. Revitalization Through Pixar and IP Acquisitions (155:00) When Disney's internal animation division stumbled in the early 2000s with box-office disappointments like Treasure Planet and Atlantis: The Lost Empire, third-party intellectual property became essential to maintaining the studio's operating income. Pixar's Finding Nemo grossed $871 million theatrically in 2003 and sold 65 million DVD units, bringing in $2 billion in home video revenue alone and accounting for up to half of Walt Disney Studios' operating profit. Recognizing that Disney had to restore its creative engine, newly appointed CEO Bob Iger orchestrated a $7.4 billion all-stock purchase of Pixar in 2006. The deal integrated Pixar leaders Ed Catmull and John Lasseter, who implemented their collaborative 'Brain Trust' process across Disney Animation, laying the narrative foundation for hits such as Tangled, Frozen, and Moana. Steve Jobs became Disney's largest individual shareholder with a 7.7% stake, concluding that the transaction preserved Pixar's long-term independence while reviving Disney's theatrical core. Cord-Cutting and the Streaming Trap (185:00) The foundation of Disney's distribution model began cracking in August 2015 when an earnings call revealed ESPN had lost 3 million subscribers in a single fiscal year, tumbling from near 100 million households to 92 million. Media stocks tumbled industry-wide as executives confronted structural cord-cutting. To regain direct distribution, Disney acquired a controlling interest in BAMTech and launched Disney+ at $6.99 per month in 2019, choosing to forfeit lucrative licensing fees by withdrawing its catalog from Netflix. While direct-to-consumer streaming achieved rapid scale—expanding to 132 million Disney+, 64 million Hulu, and 24 million ESPN+ subscribers by 2026—the hosts emphasize that the model runs counter to Disney's historical strategy. Streaming demands continuous content production to curb churn, which risks cheapening core brands and sacrifices lucrative theatrical and home-video windows. The direct-to-consumer buildout accumulated $10 billion to $11 billion in losses before generating roughly $1 billion in annual operating income, far below the $13.5 billion streaming profit captured by Netflix or Disney's historical cable margins. The hosts conclude that while Disney's underlying character franchises remain multi-generational and resilient, the structural tailwinds of the late 1990s through 2015—dependable theatrical windows, lucrative physical media re-releases, and automated cable affiliate profits—have permanently receded. Disney must now run an expensive direct-to-consumer distribution platform simply to keep its IP in cultural circulation, relying heavily on its experiences division to generate the bulk of corporate operating income.

Acquired 节目探讨了华特迪士尼公司（The Walt Disney Company）四十余年的演进历程，认为其商业帝国建立在以核心动画带动多渠道变现的IP飞轮之上。然而，随着有线电视高额转播费、院线票房及物理音像制品等历史性红利退潮，流媒体转型又面临高成本与低利润困境，迪士尼昔日的超额盈利模式正面临根本性重塑。 提价策略与家庭录像带激活传统飞轮 (20:00) 1984年迪士尼深陷危机，动画主业停滞且面临拆分收购风险。Michael Eisner与Frank Wells接管后发现，主题乐园门票与停车费自Walt Disney在1966年去世后长期未随通胀调整，遂果断将停车费从1美元上调至5美元，由此产生的纯利润被直接投入真人电影与动画业务。随后，迪士尼于1985年试水发行《木偶奇遇记》VHS录像带，以29.95美元单价迅速售出170万盒，录得5000万美元毛收入。 这一尝试开启了“第二变现窗口”。录像带不仅未侵蚀传统的七年周期院线重映，反而加深了儿童群体的角色黏性。20世纪90年代，《阿拉丁》录像带销量达3000万盒，《狮子王》更售出3200万盒并创造逾10亿美元营收，现金流利润率超50%。结合全美750多家商场专卖店以及百老汇音乐剧《狮子王》累计超110亿美元的票房收入，迪士尼成功将单部经典IP的变现链条延展至历史新高。 Fin-Syn废除与ESPN现金流支柱 (63:00) 1993年美国联邦通信委员会（FCC）废除禁止电视网自持节目产权的Fin-Syn规则，开启了制片厂与电视台大并购时代。1995年，Eisner在Warren Buffett引荐下，以190亿美元收购持有ABC与ESPN多数股权的Capital Cities/ABC。这笔交易不仅让迪士尼掌控了顶级全国广播网络，更获得了往后二十年的财务压舱石。 ESPN凭借不可替代的体育赛事直播权，成为迪士尼对有线电视运营商施加捆绑谈判的强效杠杆，成功拉动Disney Channel等频道的溢价入网。在2008至2011年间，有线网络部门贡献了迪士尼全公司约60%的运营利润，年均盈利超50亿美元。Bob Iger在回忆录中直言，这一“独立于米老鼠之外”的高毛利现金机器，为公司对冲动画创作低谷和承担巨额乐园资本开支提供了关键安全屏障。 治理危机与收购皮克斯重启IP飞轮 (155:00) 进入21世纪初，因高层内耗、人才流失及过度压缩乐园开支，迪士尼动画再度遭遇多部票房惨败。与此同时，合作方皮克斯（Pixar）凭借《玩具总动员》和录像带收入超20亿美元的《海底总动员》迅速崛起。伴随双方续约谈判破裂，Steve Jobs公开宣布停止合作，叠加Comcast发起540亿美元敌意收购及2004年股东大会上43%反对Eisner连任的抗议，迪士尼陷入空前动荡。 2005年出任首席执行官的Bob Iger确立了聚焦顶级品牌内容的核心战略，并于2006年力排众议以7.4亿美元全股票收购皮克斯。Iger承诺保留皮克斯独立的工作室文化，并安排Ed Catmull与John Lasseter接掌迪士尼动画部。这笔收购不仅使Jobs以7.7%持股成为迪士尼最大个人股东，更通过输入皮克斯的“智囊团”（Brain Trust）机制，重振了迪士尼动画团队，拉开了此后漫威、卢卡斯影业收购及《冰雪奇缘》等大作的序幕。 剪线风暴与流媒体的战略陷阱 (180:00) 2015年8月财报会议上，迪士尼披露ESPN单年流失300万订阅用户，成为全美传媒业“剪线潮”（Cord-Cutting）爆发的标志性拐点，迪士尼股价次日下挫10%，此后长达十余年跑输大盘。面对有线电视红利的消退，迪士尼全资控股流媒体技术公司BAMTech，果断斩断每年丰厚的Netflix内容授权费，并于2019年底以6.99美元低价推出Disney+。 然而，流媒体直面消费者（DTC）模式与传统迪士尼飞轮存在本质冲突。Mass-market流媒体要求持续不间断地供应内容以抑制用户流失，而迪士尼飞轮依赖低频、精品的院线大事件树立品牌神话。高频制作流媒体衍生剧严重稀释了《星球大战》与漫威的IP价值，平台建设更带来了100亿至110亿美元的累计亏损。到2026年，尽管DTC业务扭亏录得约10亿美元运营利润，但与Netflix单年135亿美元运营利润差距悬殊，且利润率远逊于昔日的有线电视时代。 现代帝国架构与长期增长的多空博弈 (230:00) 截至2026年，迪士尼形成了娱乐（约420亿美元营收/30亿美元利润）、体验（约360亿美元营收/100亿美元利润）与体育（约160亿美元营收/30亿美元利润）三大业务板块。提供乐园与邮轮服务的“体验”业务已成为全公司事实上的利润支柱，迪士尼更计划在未来十年追加600亿美元资本支出。面对院线票房号召力整体下滑的现实，即使流媒体利润微薄，也是迪士尼维系新一代受众、为下游乐园输送IP的关键输送带。 围绕迪士尼前景的博弈十分激烈：空头认为，自2016年《海洋奇缘》和《疯狂动物城》后公司未能孵化出全新的原生超级IP，长期过度依赖续集正引发观众疲劳；多头则强调迪士尼坐拥代际相传的神话资产，其业务在经历全球疫情停业与流媒体巨亏后，整体利润仍向历史最高点恢复。 主播总结指出，迪士尼在20世纪90年代末及2005至2019年间展现出的惊人盈利能力，本质上是特定历史周期内有线电视高额转播费、高院线票房与物理音像制品等宏观红利共振的产物。在流媒体高流失、低利润的新常态下，旧有的超额利润时代恐难重现；迪士尼的经典角色与跨代神话依旧长青，但其商业模式已被迫进入要求更为严苛的重塑期。

## Detailed walkthrough ### [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01QR2tmxSD4&t=0s) 开场玩笑与迪士尼帝国的真正版图 节目在 Ben Gilbert 和 David Rosenthal 的轻松调侃中拉开序幕。两人打趣说，这一期关于迪士尼的重磅节目上线后，本身也会成为一个经久不衰的超级 IP：是否该顺势改编成音乐剧，台下观众戴着面具在走道里跳舞？或者干脆做成“Acquired 冰上巡演”（Acquired on Ice），甚至是“太空版 Acquired”？在一番欢声笑语后，他们正式切入 2026 年秋季档主题：讲述伟大公司背后的商业逻辑与战略演进。 很多人以为迪士尼仅仅等于米老鼠、唐老鸭、小美人鱼、辛巴、艾莎、皮克斯的胡迪与巴斯光年，或是复仇者联盟、卢克·天行者与达斯·维达，以及世界各地的迪士尼乐园和邮轮。但实际上，这家商业巨擘的触角远不止于此： - 它吞并了 20 世纪福斯（20th Century Fox），将《辛普森一家》、《阿凡达》以及《国家地理》尽收囊中； - 它在佛罗里达州境内曾长期拥有相当于“私营政府”级别的特权管理区（Reedy Creek），在巴哈马拥有一座私人岛屿； - 它运作着工业光魔（ILM）和天行者音效（Skywalker Sound），坐拥 10 部百老汇音乐剧； - 它掌控着美国四大主流广播网之一的 ABC，以及全美体育收视王者 ESPN 和 SEC Network； - 甚至在历史上更激进的探索中，它曾拥有 NHL 冰球队“安纳海姆鸭队”（Mighty Ducks）、MLB 棒球队“加州安纳海姆天使队”，乃至 1936 年退役的英国传奇远洋客轮“玛丽皇后号”（Queen Mary）。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 迪士尼商业帝国的多维资产版图 accDescr: 展示迪士尼从传统经典IP扩张至影视工作室、主题乐园、广播体育网络及衍生实业的完整结构 subgraph CoreIP ["核心IP与工作室"] A1["经典动画 (米老鼠/狮子王/冰雪奇缘)"] A2["皮克斯、漫威、卢卡斯影业"] A3["20世纪福斯、阿凡达、辛普森一家"] end subgraph MediaNetworks ["媒体与广播网络"] B1["广播网 ABC"] B2["体育巨头 ESPN & SEC Network"] B3["流媒体: Disney+, Hulu, ESPN+"] end subgraph Experiences ["线下体验与特有资产"] C1["全球乐园与度假区、迪士尼邮轮"] C2["巴哈马私人岛屿、佛州特权区"] C3["百老汇音乐剧、工业光魔 (ILM)"] end CoreIP --> Experiences CoreIP --> MediaNetworks ``` ### [02:40](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01QR2tmxSD4&t=160s) 创新者的窘境：百年帝国的流媒体巨变与播客公告 尽管迪士尼是美国商业史上最具辨识度、最具韧性的传奇品牌之一，但它此刻正身处前所未有的剧烈震荡之中。为了应对流媒体转型，迪士尼在 Disney+、Hulu 和 ESPN 的技术与内容上砸下巨资，在此前近半个年代里累计亏损数十亿美元。与此同时，曾经躺着赚钱的现金奶牛正在急速萎缩：传统影院票房不再如以往般稳固，消费者早已不再购买 VHS、DVD 或蓝光光盘，越来越多人选择“掐线”（Cord-cutting）放弃有线电视，使得 ESPN 等传统有线网络曾经极其丰厚的高额订阅费利润年年下滑。 站在百年关口，迪士尼直面最经典的“创新者的窘境”（Innovator's Dilemma）：一家老牌媒体巨头能否在颠覆自己的同时生存并取胜？当技术变革和消费趋势变迁时，这个商业模式中真正经久不衰的核心到底是什么？本期节目正是要回溯迪士尼如何从华特·迪士尼最初那个整洁明了的“动画工作室+乐园”飞轮模型，演变为今天依靠持续并购和规模扩张建立起来的庞大跨国媒体帝国。 在切入正题前，主持人宣布了本期的配套物料：观众可在官方网站获取长篇 Companion PDF，里面整理了节目讨论的核心图表与商业模型，并在邮件列表中提供了幕后调研照片与下期预告；此外，他们还感谢了企业级 AI Agent 领域的合作伙伴 Sierra（由前 Salesforce 联席 CEO Bret Taylor 与 Clay Bavor 联合创办）。 ### [05:07](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01QR2tmxSD4&t=307s) 1984 年的至暗时刻：分崩离析的迪士尼与野蛮人叩门 故事正式从 1984 年讲起。当时迪士尼内部处于彻头彻尾的混乱与衰败之中。自华特·迪士尼于 1966 年逝世后的 18 年间，迪士尼这颗巨星的光芒几乎消磨殆尽。华特精心构建的“业务飞轮”核心——迪士尼动画工作室，不仅丧失了曾经代表美国开拓精神的创造力，反而沦为一具“腐烂的躯壳”。而在佛罗里达刚开放不久的 Epcot（未来世界），也背离了华特最初构想的“未来乌托邦城市”宏愿，沦为一个超支严重、平庸乏味的“劣质世博会”，让公司背负了数亿美元的沉重债务。 家族内讧更是将危机推向顶峰：华特的哥哥罗伊·O·迪士尼（Roy O. Disney）的儿子罗伊·E·迪士尼（Roy E. Disney）愤然辞去董事会职务，暗中策划发动代理人战争，试图将华特的女婿、时任 CEO 罗恩·米勒（Ron Miller）赶下台。华尔街的“企业掠夺者”（Corporate Raiders）如群狼般环伺，市场上充斥着将迪士尼拆解变卖的方案——将《白雪公主》、《灰姑娘》、《睡美人》等无价的经典电影版权库作价打包卖给米高梅（MGM），将主题乐园资产剥离卖给连锁酒店集团，以此在 80 年代杠杆收购狂潮中“实现股东价值最大化”。 此时迪士尼的股价一落千丈，以至于拆分出售资产的清算价值竟然远高于公司维持运营的市值。为了抵御恶意收购，管理层不得不引狼入室，向得克萨斯州沃斯堡的石油与地产豪门巴斯家族（Bass Family）及其传奇投资操盘手理查德·雷恩沃特（Richard Rainwater）求助。迪士尼通过发行大量新股引入巴斯家族，致使原有股东股权被严重稀释，巴斯家族一举拿下迪士尼约 25% 的股份，成为持股比例远超迪士尼家族任何分支的第一大控股股东。 - 1983 年至 1984 年间，迪士尼股价剧烈下挫，沦为资产拆分套利的靶子； - 1984 年迪士尼乐园和消费品业务贡献了 2.5 亿美元的利润，而核心的电影与电视内容部门全年仅录得微不足道的 200 万美元利润，飞轮核心实质上已经完全停摆； - 公司的命运最终被迫托付给来自得州的外部资本巴斯家族，由其持有 25% 股权充当“白衣骑士”。 ### [08:45](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01QR2tmxSD4&t=525s) 隐藏的希望微光：A113 与加州艺术学院的黄金一代 就在创意核心引擎全面熄火、内容业务在盈亏平衡线上挣扎的至暗时刻，一线希望的火种已经在暗中积蓄。然而，拯救迪士尼动画未来的并不是后来入主的职业经理人三人组——迈克尔·艾斯纳（Michael Eisner）、弗兰克·威尔斯（Frank Wells）和杰弗瑞·卡森伯格（Jeffrey Katzenberg）。 真正的救赎力量孕育在距伯班克迪士尼制片厂往北仅半小时车程的一间地下教室里。那是华特·迪士尼生前倾注心血创建并在遗嘱中设立基金资助的高等艺术学府——加州艺术学院（CalArts）。在这间后来在动画界名垂青史的“A113”教室里，一群年轻的无名学子正在如饥似渴地研习传统经典动画手艺。 这批年轻学员日后彻底重塑了整个好莱坞与全球动画产业的格局，其中包括： - 约翰·拉塞特（John Lasseter，皮克斯灵魂人物）； - 布拉德·伯德（Brad Bird，《超人总动员》、《料理鼠王》导演）； - 蒂姆·伯顿（Tim Burton，鬼才导演）； - 约翰·马斯克（John Musker，日后执导《小美人鱼》、《阿拉丁》及《海洋奇缘》）； - 紧随其后的安德鲁·斯坦顿（Andrew Stanton，《海底总动员》、《机器人总动员》编剧及导演）、布兰达·查普曼（Brenda Chapman，《狮子王》故事主管）以及如今掌舵皮克斯的首席创意官彼特·道格特（Pete Docter）。他们正是迪士尼日后重燃动画文艺复兴、乃至引爆电脑动画革命的火种所在。 ### [10:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01QR2tmxSD4&t=600s) A113教室的预言：被迪士尼解雇的黄金一代 在皮克斯动画传奇的源头，有一间位于加州艺术学院（CalArts）地下室的著名教室——A113。这里是角色动画项目的授课地。华特·迪士尼当年创立 CalArts 的核心初衷，就是为迪士尼动画源源不断地输送新鲜血液，他甚至在去世后将自己近一半的遗产捐赠给了这所学院。华特的愿景确实实现了：约翰·拉塞特（John Lasseter）、布拉德·伯德（Brad Bird）、蒂姆·伯顿（Tim Burton）、约翰·马斯克（John Musker）以及布兰达·查普曼（Brenda Chapman）等日后名扬天下的顶尖创作者，全都在毕业后被迪士尼动画工作室直接招募录用。然而讽刺的是，进入体制后不久，迪士尼又把他们一个个全开除了——尽管在数十年后，这些天才兜兜转转又全回到了迪士尼的核心舞台。 当年还流传着一个极其戏剧性的真实故事：1970年代末，仍在 CalArts 就读的约翰·拉塞特和这群动画系同窗一起驱车前往迪士尼乐园游玩。路上，拉塞特当时的女友转过头对他们感慨道：“想想看，未来的某一天，整座迪士尼乐园里都会摆满你们这些人创造出来的角色。”这句话在当时听起来像天方夜谭，如今回看却惊人地兼具了预言的准确与命运的坎坷：她完全说中了结果，只是未曾料到这群年轻人需要经历数十年漫长坎坷的漂泊，才最终以救世主的身份兑现这句诺言。 ### [11:15](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01QR2tmxSD4&t=675s) 1984年董事会政变：驱逐罗恩·米勒 黄金一代流失的背后，是迪士尼在1980年代初深陷的经营泥潭。从财报数据看，公司在1982年的利润大幅下滑了19%；正当外界以为这只是短期周期波动时，1983年利润再度下挫7%。伴随着动画主业的停滞不前和财务表现的溃败，华尔街的“企业掠夺者”纷至沓来，试图将迪士尼拆解变卖。 面对生死存亡的危局，华特·迪士尼的侄子罗伊·E·迪士尼（Roy E. Disney）认定必须彻底变革。1984年，罗伊联手持有迪士尼25%股份的得克萨斯贝斯家族（Bass Brothers），并拉上自己的商业合伙人、同为迪士尼董事的斯坦利·戈德（Stanley Gold），向管理层发难。在1984年9月7日那场极具戏剧性的董事会政变中，他们成功罢黜了时任首席执行官罗恩·米勒（Ron Miller）——尽管罗恩·米勒是华特·迪士尼的女婿，也是罗伊的姻亲表兄。迪士尼在瞬间陷入了权力真空与双重危机，董事会必须在极短时间内为这家百年企业找到全新的领航员。 - **财务恶化**：迪士尼净利润在1982年下降19%，1983年再降7%，公司资产面临拆分出售危机。 - **政变节点**：1984年9月7日，罗伊·迪士尼与斯坦利·戈德联合贝斯家族驱逐罗恩·米勒。 - **闪电寻帅**：迪士尼董事会在接下来的短短14天内，完成了寻找、物色、游说并聘用全新最高管理层的全过程。 ### [12:35](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01QR2tmxSD4&t=755s) 好莱坞梦之队：艾斯纳与威尔斯的空降契机 仓促寻帅的迪士尼董事会首先把电话打给了弗兰克·威尔斯（Frank Wells）。威尔斯曾任华纳兄弟（Warner Bros.）总裁，当时刚刚退休，早年在律所工作时正是斯坦利·戈德的导师。董事会对他有着极高的信任，但威尔斯在电话中明确表态：“我很有兴趣，但我一个人搞不定，你们必须打另一个电话——打给迈克尔·艾斯纳（Michael Eisner）。” 彼时的迈克尔·艾斯纳堪称全好莱坞最炙手可热的制片厂掌舵人。他在派拉蒙影业（Paramount）担任传奇领袖巴里·迪勒（Barry Diller）的二把手，两人在短短七年内联手打造了好莱坞历史上最辉煌的商业连胜纪录之一，先后推出了《夺宝奇兵》（Indiana Jones）、《星际迷航》（Star Trek）、《周末夜狂热》（Saturday Night Fever）、《火爆浪子》（Grease）、《浑身是劲》（Footloose）以及《闪电舞》（Flashdance）等一系列大卖影片，将派拉蒙推上行业第一的宝座。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 迪士尼管理层重组与权力架构 accDescr: 展示1984年政变后艾斯纳与威尔斯双核管理体系及卡岑伯格的分工 subgraph Governance["董事会与决策核心"] Board["迪士尼董事会<br/>(罗伊·迪士尼 / 斯坦利·戈德)"] end subgraph DualLeadership["双核领导团队"] Eisner["迈克尔·艾斯纳 (Michael Eisner)<br/>董事长兼 CEO<br/>· 负责创意、电影与战略方向"] Wells["弗兰克·威尔斯 (Frank Wells)<br/>总裁兼 COO<br/>· 负责法务、财务与日常运营"] end subgraph StudioOps["制片厂执行层"] Katzenberg["杰弗瑞·卡岑伯格 (Jeffrey Katzenberg)<br/>华特迪士尼影业主席<br/>· 主抓电影与动画业务变革"] end Board -->|"直接汇报"| Eisner Board -->|"直接汇报"| Wells Eisner <-->|"紧密合伙制"| Wells Eisner -->|"直接领导"| Katzenberg ``` ### [14:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01QR2tmxSD4&t=840s) 派拉蒙战法：“高概念”与“一垒二垒打”哲学 艾斯纳在派拉蒙赖以成名的经营秘诀，被称为“一垒打与二垒打”策略（Singles and Doubles Strategy）。这项策略的核心在于严格控制制作预算，通常不迷信一线大牌明星或顶级大导演，而是将全部重心押注在剧本的原创性和情节本身的吸引力上。对华尔街股东而言，“一垒二垒打”代表着低风险与稳健回报，但好莱坞创意人才并不喜欢这种精打细算的说法；于是，艾斯纳对外将其包装为一个极富吸引力的术语——“高概念”（High Concept），即用一两句简明扼要的话就能说清楚的独特创意。 在好莱坞广为流传的一份艾斯纳备忘录中，他极具现实主义地写道：“我们没有义务创造艺术，没有义务创造历史，也没有义务去表达某种立场。但为了赚钱，创造历史、创造艺术或做出某种重大表态往往至关重要。如果一部电影缺乏强大的底层核心概念，哪怕最伟大的编剧、演员或导演加在一起，也拯救不了它。”后来随艾斯纳前往迪士尼的得力副手杰弗瑞·卡岑伯格（Jeffrey Katzenberg）也在备忘录中留下一句名言：“明星效应可以为电影拉开序幕，但撑不起整部电影。”这种“故事与概念优先”的逻辑，恰好与迪士尼最初的内核产生了奇妙的共鸣。 ### [16:50](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01QR2tmxSD4&t=1010s) 双核治理架构的确立与动画部的流放 尽管艾斯纳履历耀眼，但他完全不是在迪士尼文化里浸泡长大的人。他此前从未完整看过《白雪公主》或《睡美人》，也不懂主题乐园的飞轮效应（虽然后来只要在公开场合露面，他总是系着标志性的米奇领带）。就在此时，派拉蒙内部发生剧变：巴里·迪勒离职跳槽至鲁珀特·默多克旗下联手创立福克斯电视网（Fox Network）。艾斯纳本以为自己能顺理成章接任派拉蒙制片厂主席，却因复杂的内部政治斗争被出局。按照合同，如果他无法升任该职位，将获得一笔可观的补偿金。手握解约金且不愿在没有迪勒的环境下留任的艾斯纳，恰好成了自由身。 由于艾斯纳此前曾与罗伊·迪士尼一同在 CalArts 董事会任职，双方的接洽迅速升温。起初董事会甚至考虑让威尔斯出任最高领导、艾斯纳做副手，或者设立联席 CEO。但艾斯纳直截了当地告诉威尔斯：必须由自己出任董事长兼 CEO，因为必须向全行业传递出“迪士尼如今由创意型主管掌舵”的信号，而法律与运营出身的威尔斯则担任二把手。极其注重务实、毫无虚荣心的威尔斯欣然同意，但他提出了一个维持此后十年稳定的关键前提：“我可以做总裁兼二把手，但我们两人必须分别向董事会汇报工作。”艾斯纳当即应允。 1984年9月21日，艾斯纳与威尔斯正式被任命为华特迪士尼公司的董事长兼 CEO 与总裁兼 COO。为了完成这场艰难的逆转，董事会为他们开出了极其丰厚的激励包，涵盖了巨额股票期权和基于制片厂盈利的提成方案。上任后，艾斯纳迅速招来派拉蒙的心腹杰弗瑞·卡岑伯格接管电影制片业务，全面推行派拉蒙式的狼性改造。作为新官上任的标志性举措之一，管理层迅速腾空了伯班克（Burbank）总部的核心办公区，将积弱已久的迪士尼动画部门直接“流放”到了格伦代尔（Glendale）的简陋仓库中，一场翻天覆地的重组就此拉开序幕。 ### [20:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01QR2tmxSD4&t=1200s) 乐园提价与真人大片：派拉蒙模式的胜利 迈克尔·艾斯纳（Michael Eisner）与弗兰克·威尔斯（Frank Wells）入主迪士尼后，迅速带来了一场文化地震。为了给从好莱坞招徕的真人电影制片人腾出办公室，他们甚至把动画师直接轰出了由沃尔特·迪士尼当年亲自办公的标志性历史动画大楼，勒令他们搬迁到格伦代尔（Glendale）一栋破烂不堪的危旧建筑里。这让视动画为迪士尼飞轮核心的内部老员工感到心寒。 紧接着，艾斯纳和威尔斯将目光投向了主题乐园，灵感的火花在此刻被彻底点燃。自沃尔特·迪士尼去世以来，迪士尼乐园和迪士尼世界的门票价格几乎完全没有涨过。管理层长期抱守着一种教条：“沃尔特定下这个价格是为了让所有家庭都能负担得起，我们绝不能改动。”即便经历了 20 世纪 70 年代肆虐的恶性通货膨胀，迪士尼世界的停车费依然维持在区区 1 美元。 艾斯纳与威尔斯敏锐地意识到这里存在巨大的溢价空间。即便将停车费从 1 美元提到 5 美元，游客的需求也丝毫不会受到影响。乐园作为重资产运营业务，提价带来的每一分增量收入，都能直接不扣分毫地转化为净现金流。他们随即用乐园挤出的真金白银，在外部资方的协助下开启了真人电影工作室的派拉蒙式“安打保送（singles and doubles）”打法。 ```mermaid flowchart LR accTitle: 乐园提价为低风险真人电影注资流程 accDescr: 展示了迪士尼如何将乐园提价获得的增量利润与外部资方联合，转化为高胜率的真人电影商业模式。 subgraph Parks ["主题乐园提价"] P1["停车费与门票大幅提价"] --> P2["零增量成本的纯现金流"] end subgraph Finance ["外部资本协同"] P2 --> F1["Silver Screens 外部联合注资"] end subgraph Studio ["派拉蒙模式电影策略"] F1 --> S1["低成本“安打保送”片单"] S1 --> S2["启用待翻红/新秀演员"] S2 --> S3["高胜率商业回报 (27/33 盈利)"] end ``` - **外部融资杠杆**：在接下来的 8 年里，迪士尼制作的全部 75 部真人电影均由名为 Silver Screens 的外部投资机构共同出资，大大降低了公司的现金流风险。 - **好莱坞的“雪茄蒂”投资策略**：管理层沿用了在派拉蒙屡试不爽的策略，以克制、中等的预算制作真人电影，专门起用刚从康复中心出来寻求复出、或具有高性价比的新生代演员（如罗宾·威廉姆斯、贝特·迈德尔、茱莉娅·罗伯茨），如巴菲特捡便宜雪茄蒂一般锁定确定性回报。 - **爆款与奇迹般的胜率**：接连推出了《乞丐皇帝》（Down and Out in Beverly Hills）、《三个奶爸一个娃》（Three Men and a Baby）、《早安越南》（Good Morning, Vietnam）、《死亡诗社》（Dead Poets Society）和《风月俏佳人》（Pretty Woman）等大爆影片。迪士尼制作的前 33 部电影中，竟有 27 部盈利——在遵循极端幂律分布的好莱坞，这种胜率堪比投出 33 家风投项目仅 6 家亏损。 --- ### [23:45](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01QR2tmxSD4&t=1425s) 濒死的动画部门与好莱坞“西装客”的降临 尽管真人电影大赚特赚，罗伊·E·迪士尼（Roy E. Disney，沃尔特的侄子）却坚信动画才是这家公司的灵魂所在。在罗伊眼中，迪士尼真正的飞轮是：用无与伦比的手绘动画打造具有普世共鸣的角色和经典故事，再将这些 IP 注入衍生品、主题乐园并世代相传；同时定期从“迪士尼片库金库（Disney Vault）”中将老动画重映收割现金流。当初迎立艾斯纳和威尔斯时，罗伊便逼迫他们立下不得废除动画部门的誓言，并让自己出任动画部门的主席，向统管整个制片厂的杰弗里·卡森伯格（Jeffrey Katzenberg）汇报。 彼时的迪士尼动画部门早已是一盘散沙。从 1971 年到 1984 年的整整 13 年里，他们仅上映了三部动画长片；正在制作的《黑神锅传奇》（The Black Cauldron）耗费了近十年心血，部门士气极其低落。加州艺术学院（CalArts）培养的新一代青年才俊不是被解雇就是主动出走，普遍认为这里早已无药可救。 杰弗里·卡森伯格在接受 Acquired 主持人早餐采访时透露了一个经典细节：第一天上班时，艾斯纳把他叫进办公室，指着楼下原来的手绘上色车间大门问他：“你知道那底下是在干嘛的吗？”卡森伯格答：“不知道。”（卡森伯格此前全部背景都是真人电影）。艾斯纳回道：“我也不知道。那是做动画片的地方——现在那是你的烂摊子了。”这群来自好莱坞的商业“西装客（suits）”，就这样一脚踏进了迪士尼这群由天马行空、甚至有些古怪疯癫的艺术家所组成的封闭象牙塔中，两股截然相反的文化瞬间爆发了激烈碰撞。 --- ### [26:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01QR2tmxSD4&t=1560s) 破局者彼得·施耐德与百老汇音乐剧的化学反应 打破僵局的关键人物是皮特·施耐德（Peter Schneider）。施耐德接受这份掌管动画部门的任命时曾打趣道：“反正我不可能做得比《黑神锅传奇》更烂了，你不可能从一楼掉下去摔死。”施耐德到任后毫无历史包袱，大刀阔斧地重塑整个生产流程。他开始质问一切既有传统：“为什么我们要自己研制颜料？这种画钉是最好的吗？为什么我们不用计算机？”自上而下的改革信号彻底打破了沉闷的泥潭，原本闭门造车的老派守旧势力与毫无成功经验的年轻人之间的隔阂被强行拆除，取而代之的是围绕创意质量的高强度激烈辩论。 迪士尼动画开始缓慢走出谷底。1986 年的《妙妙探》（The Great Mouse Detective）反响平平，1988 年的《奥林匹斯历险记》（Oliver & Company）商业上有所起色，证明迪士尼动画仍具盈利能力。但真正引发“迪士尼文艺复兴”的质变飞跃，是他们彻底重构了动画电影的内核底层逻辑——不再做“带有插曲的卡通片”，而是做“以动画形式呈现的百老汇音乐剧”。 这一灵感随着霍华德·阿什曼（Howard Ashman）的加入而化为现实。经大亨大卫·格芬（David Geffen）引荐，卡森伯格找到了百老汇词曲作家阿什曼。听到迪士尼的名字，阿什曼毫不犹豫地提出要去动画部门工作，他坚信动画与音乐剧之间存在着某种天然的灵魂共鸣。阿什曼带来了老搭档作曲家艾伦·曼肯（Alan Menken），两人此前曾合作制作过大获成功的《恐怖小店》（Little Shop of Horrors）。 这对天才搭档主导的第一部作品正是《小美人鱼》（The Little Mermaid）。他们并非最先提出故事概念的人，也不是高高在上的公司高管，却正是赋予迪士尼全新魔力的核心缔造者。阿什曼将百老汇经典的叙事结构移植到动画中，他有一句名言：“在每一部伟大的百老汇音乐剧里，第三首歌必然属于女主角倾诉自己内心终极渴望的‘I Want’之歌……”自此，迪士尼文艺复兴的黄金时代轰然启幕。 ### [30:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01QR2tmxSD4&t=1800s) 霍华德·阿什曼的百老汇魔法与《小美人鱼》的破局 在构思《小美人鱼》（The Little Mermaid）时，作词家霍华德·阿什曼（Howard Ashman）引入了经典的百老汇音乐剧法则：女主角一定要在开场不久坐在某个地方——无论是一块岩石还是一个垃圾桶上——唱出一首心声之歌，向全世界倾诉她到底想要什么（"I Want" song）。整部戏的核心全在于此：女主角真正渴望什么，观众就会全心全意为她加油。《Part of Your World》正是这种设定的产物，爱丽儿坐在海底唱出自己想去人类世界、想看他们跳舞、想踩在“那叫什么来着？哦，脚”上的渴望；细腻动人的歌词不仅立住了角色，更成为贯穿全片的情感支柱。此外，把片中的那只红蟹塞巴斯丁设定为牙买加口音也是阿什曼的主意，这才诞生了轰动一时的传唱名曲《Under the Sea》。 尽管《小美人鱼》在 1989 年上映后成为一代人的童年经典，且动画部门的人数也从跌入谷底时的 150 人重新扩张至 550 人，但它在当年并没有在院线票房上引发彻底的狂轰滥炸。《华尔街日报》的本·科恩（Ben Cohen）曾写道：“很久以前，迪士尼电影在院线票房上甚至会被浪漫喜剧打得落花流水。”1989 年《小美人鱼》的票房甚至不如由梅格·瑞恩主演的《当哈利遇到莎莉》（When Harry Met Sally...）。当时大众对迪士尼动画多年来烂片频出的信任赤字尚未消退，虽然能看出萌芽和希望，但单凭票房并未瞬间给公司带来暴利；直到 1990 年它发行 VHS 家用录像带、孩子们可以在家一遍遍翻看时，这部作品才真正演变成庞大的文化现象。 - 动画部门员工人数从低谷期的 150 人回升至 550 人。 - 1989 年上映时票房表现稳健但未爆棚，票房成绩甚至低于同时期的浪漫喜剧《当哈利遇到莎莉》。 - 1990 年紧接着推出的续作《救难小英雄澳洲历险记》（The Rescuers Down Under）反响平平，未能乘胜追击。 ### [32:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01QR2tmxSD4&t=1920s) 连下三城：迪士尼动画复兴的票房奇迹 真正的票房大引爆从 1991 年的《美女与野兽》（Beauty and the Beast）开始。在互相信任的成熟团队和音乐剧化叙事的推动下，这部同样出自霍华德·阿什曼之手的力作以仅仅 2500 万美元的制作预算，狂揽 3.3 亿美元全球票房，向世人宣告迪士尼动画正式王者归来。紧接着在 1992 年，迪士尼推出了《阿拉丁》（Aladdin），大胆请来凭借《早安越南》大红大紫的罗宾·威廉姆斯（Robin Williams）为神灯精灵（Genie）配音，直接开创了全明星配音阵容的先河。该片以 2800 万美元的预算收割了整整 5 亿美元票房。 到了 1994 年，《狮子王》（The Lion King）将这场复兴推向了巅峰。该片请来詹姆斯·厄尔·琼斯（James Earl Jones）献声，制作预算虽微幅上升至 4500 万美元，却在全球轰下了不可思议的 7.5 亿美元票房，打破了影史纪录，一跃成为有史以来商业上最成功的传统手绘动画电影。鉴于动画部门立下的汗马功劳，首席执行官迈克尔·艾斯纳（Michael Eisner）兴奋地宣布，将在伯班克（Burbank）迪士尼总部片场为动画团队修建一栋全新的专属大楼，把此前被流放外地的画师们风风光光迎回大本营——而这块地皮，恰恰就是当年沃尔特·迪士尼最早构想建立 15 英亩微型迪士尼乐园的原始选址。 | 电影名称 | 上映年份 | 制作预算 | 全球票房 | 标志性亮点 | |:--- |:--- |:--- |:--- |:--- | | **《美女与野兽》** | 1991 | $2,500 万 | $3.30 亿 | 百老汇音乐剧风格成熟，口碑票房双丰收 | | **《阿拉丁》** | 1992 | $2,800 万 | $5.00 亿 | 罗宾·威廉姆斯倾情配音，开创巨星配音模式 | | **《狮子王》** | 1994 | $4,500 万 | $7.50 亿 | 影史最卖座的传统手绘动画长片 | ### [34:30](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01QR2tmxSD4&t=2070s) CAPS 系统：联手皮克斯的技术革命 令人惊叹的是，《小美人鱼》制作成本高达 4000 万美元，随后的《美女与野兽》和《阿拉丁》却将成本压低到 2500 万至 2800 万美元左右。之所以能做到降本增效，核心在于迪士尼自 1990 年起引入的技术革命——电脑动画制作系统（CAPS, Computer Animation Production System）。推动这项技术的正是沃尔特的侄子罗伊·E·迪士尼（Roy E. Disney），他深信拥抱前沿科技、拓宽叙事边界才是继承叔叔遗产的正道。在此之前，手绘动画已从原始的描线涂色进化到静电复印（Xerography），但依然需要人工一张张在赛璐珞胶片上手工上漆填色，且传统的多平面摄像机（Multiplane camera）极其昂贵笨重，导致低谷时期的画师往往只能偷工减料地把单张赛璐珞直接压在背景画上拍摄。 迪士尼投入了 1000 万美元固定成本开发出 CAPS 系统，其革命性体现在两个维度： 1. **数字线稿填色**：相当于 2D 动画专用的高阶“画图软件”，画师只需用鼠标在电脑上选好色号，使用油漆桶工具一点，封闭区域就会自动上色，一举彻底淘汰了人工勾线与人工填色工序； 2. **无限层级的虚拟多平面摄像机**：彻底摆脱了物理多平面摄像机受限于 6 层平面的机械枷锁，不仅操作更迅捷、成本更低廉，还能模拟出无限深度的视觉景深。《小美人鱼》全片仅有 3 个多平面镜头，而到了《狮子王》，借助 CAPS 系统生成的深景深镜头已达数百个。 这项先进软件并非迪士尼独自闭门造车，而是联手了一家当时在电脑图形学前沿崭露头角的小伙伴——皮克斯（Pixar）。不仅如此，《美女与野兽》中极为震撼、运镜如行云流水的标志性舞厅共舞长镜头，其宏伟背景正是由皮克斯软件进行的 3D 数字渲染，再通过 CAPS 将 2D 手绘的贝儿与野兽精妙合成其中。这是迪士尼长片中第一次融入 3D 电脑动画技术。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: CAPS系统制作流程图 accDescr: 展现迪士尼传统动画如何结合CAPS与皮克斯3D渲染技术实现高效生产 subgraph Input["手绘与三维资产"] A["纸上手绘线稿"] B["皮克斯3D场景渲染<br/>(如舞厅背景)"] end subgraph CAPS_Process["CAPS 核心数字化工序"] C["数字扫描与无墨描线"] D["数字油漆桶自动上色<br/>(彻底省去人工填色)"] E["虚拟多平面摄像机合成<br/>(支持无限制图层深度)"] end subgraph Output["最终画面"] F["高景深、低成本的<br/>现代手绘动画电影"] end A --> C C --> D D --> E B --> E E --> F ``` ### [37:33](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01QR2tmxSD4&t=2253s) 飞轮再起：家用录像带与迪士尼库藏解禁 伴随动画复兴的一连串大卖，迪士尼自沃尔特去世后一度停滞的核心 IP 飞轮重新轰鸣运转。迈克尔·艾斯纳与弗兰克·威尔斯（Frank Wells）没有满足于现状，而是沿着这些经典 IP 为迪士尼的商业版图增加了三条此前从未有过的变现支柱，其中打头阵且利润最丰厚的一项就是：家庭录像带（Home Video）。 在 1985 年之前，除了去电影院，观众根本没有任何途径观看迪士尼电影。迪士尼原本沿用了一套被称为“迪士尼库藏”（Disney Vault）的严苛商业模式：将《白雪公主》或《灰姑娘》等经典动画每隔大约七年就重新推上大银幕放映一次，以此收割新一代适龄儿童。进入 1980 年代中期，VHS 录像机已经广泛走入美国家庭，艾斯纳、威尔斯和杰弗瑞·卡森伯格（Jeffrey Katzenberg）主张把经典库藏制作成 VHS 出售。然而，这一主张遭到了公司保守派的强烈阻挠。罗伊·E·迪士尼和迪士尼家族成员视其为离经叛道的大逆不道之举，痛斥这是“异端邪说”，认定会彻底毁掉七年一次的院线重映神话。 最终，艾斯纳不得不亲自召集整个迪士尼家族召开家庭会议，苦口婆心地争取批准。为了降低试水风险，他们挑选了此前已被连续 5 次重映过、市场价值已被充分压榨的老片《木偶奇遇记》（Pinocchio）作为第一块试验田。双方达成妥协：限量发行 170 万盘 VHS 录像带，并定下 29.95 美元的零售高价。结果这批录像带以不可思议的速度瞬间脱销，仅在商品端就卷走 5000 万美元总流水；扣除每盘磁带仅几美元的刻录塑料成本，这笔收益几乎全是纯利。次年，他们如期在院线重映了《灰姑娘》（Cinderella），事实证明影院票房毫发无损，家庭录像带的巨大蓝海被彻底撬开。 - 传统“迪士尼库藏”模式：每隔约 7 年在电影院重新上映一次老动画，让新一代儿童观影。 - 1985 年首发破冰之作《木偶奇遇记》VHS 录像带，首批限量 170 万盒，单价高达 29.95 美元。 - 首批录像带瞬间售罄，创造了约 5000 万美元零售流水，除去极低的灌录成本外几乎全为纯利润。 ### [40:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01QR2tmxSD4&t=2400s) 家庭录像带（VHS）热潮与飞轮效应的威力 《灰姑娘》（Cinderella）重映斩获了 3400 万美元的院线票房，紧接着迪士尼发行了该片的 VHS 家用录像带，销量高达 600 万盒。两项相加，《灰姑娘》单凭这一波就为迪士尼贡献了整整 2 亿美元的毛收入。主持人感叹，这简直就像凭空多捡了一场现象级票房大卖。更奇妙的是，迪士尼意外发现，卖录像带不仅丝毫没有伤害这个 IP 的生命力，也没有压低未来的观影需求。正如迈克尔·艾斯纳（Michael Eisner）后来名言所指出的：人们买了磁带，但磁带会坏、会被弄丢——小孩子们最擅长的就是把 VHS 弄丢。录像带流传在外，绝不是永久性地毁掉了这个资产，反而让人们对《灰姑娘》的渴望更加强烈，六七年后电影再次重映时，观众的狂热不减反增。 这种机制完美印证了华特·迪士尼飞轮商业模式（Flywheel business strategy）的核心哲学。当时迪士尼在零售端拥有极高的议价权，每卖出一盒录像带能斩获丰厚利润，家庭录像带业务迅速发展成规模达数十亿美元的巨型印钞机，跃升为整个迪士尼公司仅次于主题乐园的第二大盈利中心。 这还只是重映经典老动画的威力；当迪士尼开始将最新上映的现象级爆款推向录像带市场时，赚钱效应彻底引爆了。家庭录像带分发渠道的建立，让迪士尼在动画制作上的任何重金投入都变得极其划算： - 1993 年发行的《阿拉丁》（Aladdin）VHS 磁带卖出 3000 万盒，直接带来 9 亿美元销售额。 - 1995 年发行的《狮子王》（The Lion King）创下历史纪录，卖出 3200 万盒，成为人类历史上最畅销的 VHS 录像带，单凭录像带销售额就突破 10 亿美元。 - 录像带业务的现金流利润率高达 50% 甚至更高，意味着仅《狮子王》录像带就为迪士尼账户净打入 5 亿美元现金。 - 结合《狮子王》仅 4500 万美元制作成本换来的 7.5 亿美元全球院线票房（扣除宣发成本后约为迪士尼贡献 2.5 亿至 3 亿美元现金流），该片上映仅一年内就创造了约 7.5 亿美元纯现金。 - 当时的配音演员（即便请来了罗宾·威廉姆斯饰演神灯精灵）并未拿到过高的分成（Back-end），这非常契合艾斯纳控制制作成本、让利润最大程度归于制片厂的经营理念。 紧随家庭录像带之后的是迪士尼零售店（Disney Store）在全美的铺开。那是 1990 年代全美商场（Mall）文化的黄金时期，迪士尼在全美各个购物中心迅速开出了 750 多家零售店。孩子们在家里用录像带一遍又一遍重温电影，周末全家去商场逛迪士尼零售店，沉浸在堆积如山的毛绒玩具和周边商品中。这一整套飞轮让迪士尼再次像华特时代那样席卷全美。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Disney Flywheel Extensions Under Eisner accDescr: 展现迪士尼从院线电影到家庭录像带、零售店、百老汇音乐剧与度假乐园的飞轮价值放大闭环。 subgraph CoreEngine ["核心飞轮引擎：动画 IP"] A["高品质动画电影<br/>（如《阿拉丁》《狮子王》）"] B["院线票房大卖<br/>（低成本、高现金流）"] A --> B end subgraph MediaExtension ["渠道变现放大器"] C["家庭录像带 VHS<br/>（百亿美元级印钞机）"] D["全美 750+ 迪士尼零售店<br/>（日常高频消费与情怀沉浸）"] B --> C C --> D end subgraph BrandExperience ["长青资产与沉浸式体验"] E["百老汇音乐剧<br/>（《狮子王》创造百亿营收）"] F["乐园升级为综合度假区<br/>（酒店、分时度假、高客单价）"] D --> E D --> F end F -.->|"强化 IP 渴望与家庭黏性"| A ``` ### [45:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01QR2tmxSD4&t=2700s) 百老汇奇迹与主题乐园的度假区革命 艾斯纳团队的第三个大师级决策是进军百老汇。原本大家以为这只是类似“迪士尼冰上巡演”之类的普通品牌衍生，带有某种艺术点缀性质，但其实际商业回报却惊骇世人。迪士尼先是以《美女与野兽》在百老汇大获成功，并买下了纽约的新阿姆斯特丹剧院（New Amsterdam Theatre）。随后推出的《狮子王》音乐剧更成为空前绝后的艺术与商业结合体，动物演员沿走道入场的开场巡游、极具原创性的头顶动物面具服饰设计令人震撼。 《狮子王》音乐剧至今仍在演映，成为历史上票房最高的百老汇剧目： - 历经近 30 年的常驻演出与全球巡演，《狮子王》音乐剧全球总票房累计突破 **110 亿美元**。 - 这使其超越了所有单部电影（包括《阿凡达》《复仇者联盟4》）、电视、音乐专辑、视频游戏或其他百老汇剧目，成为人类娱乐史上**单体 IP 作品（Single piece of media）收入最高的产品**。 - 30 年间平均下来，《狮子王》音乐剧每年为迪士尼稳定贡献约 3.5 亿美元毛收入，相当于每年白白多出一部全球大卖的院线大片。 与品牌延伸同步进行的，是艾斯纳对传统市场营销的重启和对主题乐园的彻底重构。他们推出了经典的超级碗 MVP 获胜后高呼“我要去迪士尼世界！”（"I'm going to Disney World!"）广告战役。更深远的变革在于，艾斯纳把华特留下的“主题乐园”彻底变成了“综合度假区”（Resort）： - 在佛罗里达州，迪士尼不再只是让人逛完就走 Magic Kingdom 和 Epcot；他们大举兴建高档酒店，包括迪士尼大佛罗里达人度假村（Grand Floridian）、天鹅饭店（Swan）和海豚饭店（Dolphin）。 - 启动了 Old Key West 度假村等迪士尼度假俱乐部（Disney Vacation Club）分时度假（Timeshare）业务，把原本偶尔来访的游客变成每年必到的终身家庭客群。 - 先后扩建了迪士尼好莱坞影城（Hollywood Studios）以及概念极其激进的动物王国（Animal Kingdom，通过真实散养的狮子、斑马营造真正的非洲野生动物原野体验，而非普通动物园）。 - 通过幻想工程（Imagineering）自主操盘周边地产与豪华酒店，艾斯纳彻底提升了乐园的单客消费水平——迪士尼乐园不再只是与周六看一场棒球赛争夺时间的周边游，而是直接与前往欧洲度过 5 天长假相抗衡的豪华度假方案，将家庭客单价从 300 美元直接拉升至 3000 美元以上，构建起利润惊人的商业巨兽。 ### [50:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01QR2tmxSD4&t=3000s) 欧洲迪士尼的泥潭与“三驾马车”的极盛时代 在上世纪90年代初，虽然迪士尼乐园如今已成为一年能贡献100亿美元营业利润的超级印钞机，但在迈克尔·艾斯纳（Michael Eisner）执政初期，主题公园业务并非一帆风顺。最典型的滑铁卢就是欧洲迪士尼（Euro Disney）。这个耗资高达40亿美元的庞大项目在开业后连续数年巨额亏损。节目中主持人调侃道，迪士尼花了整整十年才搞明白一件事——欧洲的家长带娃在游乐园里跑来跑去时，是需要喝红酒的。不仅如此，欧洲人对“Euro”这个生硬的大一统称谓毫无归属感，巴黎人认为自己是法国人、巴黎人，而不是什么虚无缥缈的“欧洲人”。加上开业恰逢欧洲宏观经济陷入衰退，整个项目一度沦为彻头彻尾的灾难。直到迪士尼后来将其更名为巴黎迪士尼乐园（Disneyland Paris），从运营、餐饮到文化体验做了一系列大刀阔斧的调整，才终于扭转局面。 但在欧洲迪士尼的阵痛之外，艾斯纳、弗兰克·威尔斯（Frank Wells）与杰弗瑞·卡森伯格（Jeffrey Katzenberg）组成的“管理层三驾马车”在商业上取得了令人难以置信的成功。在他们1984年入主前，迪士尼的营业利润在短短两年内狂跌25%，总额远低于3亿美元；而到了十年后的90年代中期，公司营业利润暴涨至近10亿美元，近乎实现了8倍的跃升。可以说，这三人不仅拯救了垂死的迪士尼，更让这家公司繁荣到了连创始人沃尔特·迪士尼都未曾敢想的境地。 到1994年，迪士尼的市值飙升至220亿美元，比艾斯纳团队刚接手时翻了整整10倍。迪士尼一举超越了时代华纳（Time Warner）、维亚康姆（Viacom）以及鲁伯特·默多克的新闻集团与福克斯（Fox and News Corp），加冕为全球市值最高的传统传媒帝国。迪士尼迎来了商业声望的最顶峰，然而，一场席卷整个帝国的巨大震荡也正悄然降临。 - 欧洲迪士尼前期耗资40亿美元，因文化水土不服及宏观经济衰退而多年陷入严重亏损。 - 1984年至1994年的十年间，迪士尼营业利润从不足3亿美元激增至近10亿美元，增长接近8倍。 - 1994年迪士尼市值达到220亿美元，较1984年暴增10倍，登顶全球传统传媒行业之巅。 --- ### [51:30](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01QR2tmxSD4&t=3090s) 中场赞助：Sierra 与企业级 AI Agent 的商业模式革新 在讲述帝国如何走向危机之前，节目切入对本季合作伙伴 Sierra 的介绍。当下几乎所有顶尖企业的创始人与 CEO 都在思考同一个命题：如何利用人工智能推动业务增长，同时又不丢失企业自身的独特性？Sierra 正是为此而生。这家公司由科技界传奇人物布雷特·泰勒（Bret Taylor）与克莱·巴沃尔（Clay Bavor）联手创立，集结了过去二十年硅谷最顶尖的工程技术人才。 与只能处理初级问答的传统客服机器人不同，Sierra 打造的面向客户的 AI Agent 能够深入企业核心价值链中处理高难度任务。例如，全程协助处理房屋抵押贷款直至过户、跟进车祸事故直至保险理赔到账、衔接医生转诊与专科挂号，或是识别有流失风险的高价值客户进行续约挽留、追讨逾期账单，甚至将弃单购物车转化为实际交易。这些交互并非单次割裂的对话，而是跨越电话、短信、邮件与即时聊天等多个渠道，在数天、数周甚至数月内持续推进的长周期旅程。每一次互动都在沉淀独属于客户企业的专有知识，构筑坚固的竞争壁垒。 - Sierra 目前的合作伙伴包括财富500强前50名中的40多家、全球三分之一的大型银行以及全美前十大健康险公司中的5家。 - 商业模式颠覆了传统的 Token 用量计费模式，改为纯粹按业务结果付费（例如成功续约一个订阅用户或完成一笔理赔结案）。 --- ### [54:32](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01QR2tmxSD4&t=3272s) 1994 年的三重重击：空难、心脏病与铁三角的瓦解 1994年对于迪士尼而言是一场极致的“冰与火之歌”。在商业层面上，这一年《狮子王》（The Lion King）横空出世，票房与衍生品卖到脱销；但在公司治理层面，这一年却沦为迪士尼历史上最至暗的时刻，接连遭遇了三记毁灭性的致命重击。 第一记重击发生在1994年的复活节星期日。公司总裁兼首席运营官弗兰克·威尔斯在内华达山脉进行直升机高山滑雪（Heli-skiing）时不幸遭遇坠机事故，当场罹难。这对迪士尼管理层造成了难以估量的心理与运营创伤。在三驾马车中，艾斯纳是极具创意的领袖与面向公众的台前形象，卡森伯格是野心勃勃的制片狂人，而弗兰克·威尔斯则是维系这一切运转的幕后灵魂与“定海神针”。他充当了艾斯纳极度外显性格的“阴阳调和剂”，每当艾斯纳与卡森伯格这两大强硬人格爆发激烈冲突时，唯有弗兰克能够以超凡的情商平息众怒。当年艾斯纳坚持自己必须当“一把手”时，正是弗兰克退后一步大度表态：“没问题，让我们一起去创造奇迹。”如今，这位不可或缺的和事佬与压舱石在瞬间化为乌有。 第二记重击在三个月后接踵而至。艾斯纳在爱达荷州太阳谷参加每年一度的艾伦公司（Allen & Company）媒体峰会时，突发急性严重胸痛。他被紧急空运送回洛杉矶进行抢救，随即被推进手术室接受紧急冠状动脉四重搭桥开心手术（Quadruple bypass open heart surgery）。艾斯纳数周内完全脱离工作状态，甚至在进手术室前，面对生死未卜的绝境，他还向妻子立下了交代后事的临终嘱托：“如果我醒不过来，就按 X、Y、Z 去办。”群龙无首的迪士尼不仅失去了弗兰克，如今连最高统治者也躺在重症监护室中，权力真空引发了前所未有的动荡与猜忌。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 1994年迪士尼三驾马车崩溃链条 accDescr: 展示弗兰克·威尔斯遇难、艾斯纳手术与卡森伯格出走引发梦工厂成立的过程 subgraph Blows["1994年管理层三大致命重击"] A["复活节空难: 弗兰克·威尔斯遇难<br/>失去核心调停者与运营支柱"] --> B["太阳谷突发疾病: 迈克尔·艾斯纳急救<br/>四重心脏搭桥手术致权力真空"] B --> C["高层权力摊牌: 杰弗瑞·卡森伯格逼宫<br/>索求二把手总裁职位遭拒后离职"] end subgraph Fallout["帝国裂变与梦工厂崛起"] C --> D["对簿公堂: 2.8亿美元奖金诉讼"] C --> E["创立竞争对手: DreamWorks SKG<br/>（斯皮尔伯格 + 卡森伯格 + 格芬）"] E --> F["家门口挖角: 在格伦代尔建立动画工作室<br/>挖走布伦达·查普曼等顶尖班底"] F --> G["推出《怪物史莱克》<br/>直接狙击迪士尼传统动画统治"] end ``` --- ### [56:30](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01QR2tmxSD4&t=3390s) 卡森伯格出走、天价官司与梦工厂的正面宣战 第三记重击正是紧随其后的卡森伯格决裂与出走。关于这场震动好莱坞的权力斗争，双方各执一词。卡森伯格坚信，艾斯纳曾亲口向他承诺过，一旦弗兰克·威尔斯离职或退休，迪士尼的第二把交椅（总裁职务）非他莫属。他刚刚凭借《小美人鱼》、《美女与野兽》和《狮子王》一手缔造了迪士尼动画复兴的辉煌战绩，创造了影史最具商业价值的 IP，自认立下汗马功劳，理应接掌大权。 然而，以罗伊·E·迪士尼（Roy E. Disney）为代表的董事会核心力量和刚从病榻上爬起来的艾斯纳却持截然不同的态度。他们认为，卡森伯格虽然擅长掌管真人电影与动画工作室，但他根本没有统领整个迪士尼帝国的综合能力——当时的迪士尼已经是一个涵盖主题乐园、消费品授权和全球衍生网络的庞大商业巨兽，而非单一的制片厂。在艾斯纳冷酷回绝其晋升要求后，备感背叛的卡森伯格果断摊牌，愤然辞职离开迪士尼。 卡森伯格不仅离开了迪士尼，还给前东家引爆了一颗毁灭性的连环炸弹： - **反戈起诉**：他一纸诉状将华特迪士尼公司告上法庭，追索自己合同中约定的影视利润分成奖金。这场漫长难堪的官司最终以迪士尼向卡森伯格支付高达约 2.8 亿美元的和解金告终。 - **联手巨头缔造梦工厂**：卡森伯格迅速联手好莱坞大导演史蒂文·斯皮尔伯格（Steven Spielberg）与音乐巨头大卫·格芬（David Geffen），创立了全方位的娱乐航母——梦工厂（DreamWorks SKG）。梦工厂立志成为迪士尼的“全栈挑战者”，业务覆盖真人电影、动画、音乐、电视和电子游戏，全面复刻迪士尼除乐园外的全套飞轮模式。他们甚至与环球影业（Universal）签订了电影发行协议，将大本营直接设在拥有主题公园的环球影城片场内。 - **家门口挖角与《怪物史莱克》**：卡森伯格将梦工厂动画工作室建在距离迪士尼仅几个街区的格伦代尔（Glendale），大肆开出高薪挖角迪士尼的顶级画师。他招募的第一批核心骨干就包括加州艺术学院（CalArts / A113号教室）出身、刚刚担任《狮子王》故事总监的布伦达·查普曼（Brenda Chapman）。梦工厂动画随后推出的代表作《怪物史莱克》（Shrek）狂揽近5亿美元全球票房，成为迪士尼在好莱坞本土有史以来面对的最强劲敌。 雪上加霜的是，早在此前不久，为迪士尼文艺复兴注入灵魂乐章的天才词作者霍华德·阿什曼（Howard Ashman）已因艾滋病不幸英年早逝。随着核心智囊的逝去、管理层的分崩离析以及超级对手的贴身肉搏，迪士尼刚刚构筑起来的黄金时代，瞬间被撕裂开了一道巨大的鸿沟。 ### [01:00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01QR2tmxSD4&t=3600s) 黄金年代的落幕与艾斯纳的一揽子集权 随着词曲灵魂人物霍华德·阿什曼（Howard Ashman）的英年早逝，迪士尼动画部门不可避免地陷入了一段难以填补的创作真空。此后迪士尼动画工作室推出的片单虽然名作不少——从《风中奇缘》（Pocahontas）、《钟楼怪人》（The Hunchback of Notre Dame）、《大力士》（Hercules）、《花木兰》（Mulan）、《泰山》（Tarzan），到《幻想曲2000》（Fantasia 2000）、迪士尼首部全三维动画电影《恐龙》（Dinosaur），再到《变身国王》（The Emperor's New Groove）、《失落的帝国》（Atlantis）、《星际宝贝》（Lilo & Stitch）和《星银岛》（Treasure Planet）——但平心而论，没有一部能够复制《狮子王》那样的文化海啸与商业奇迹。 屋漏偏逢连夜雨，在弗兰克·威尔斯（Frank Wells）坠机遇难、杰弗里·卡森伯格（Jeffrey Katzenberg）愤而辞职之后，迪士尼的管理核心出现了前所未有的权力断层。面对空缺的二把手职位（总裁兼首席运营官 COO），迈克尔·艾斯纳（Michael Eisner）做出了一个惊人的决定：任命自己兼任该职。至此，迪士尼彻底变成了“迈克尔·艾斯纳一人之公司”。主持人们感叹，虽然艾斯纳在过去十年的战绩无可挑剔、完全有资历担此重任，但这无疑是在一项本已极其繁重的工作之上，又压上了统管电影、电视与主题乐园的全部重担。艾斯纳的潜台词非常明确：既然放眼整个好莱坞都没有人有资格执掌这三大版块，那么在找到合适人选之前，“就由我亲自来扛”。 - **后狮子王时期的动画电影阵容**：涵盖《风中奇缘》、《钟楼怪人》、《大力士》、《花木兰》、《泰山》、《幻想曲2000》、《恐龙》（2000年首部全3D动画）、《变身国王》、《失落的帝国》、《星际宝贝》及《星银岛》。 - **管理层架构骤变**：艾斯纳一人兼任董事长、CEO、总裁及 COO 四大核心职务，实现绝对的个人集权。 --- ### [01:02:18](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01QR2tmxSD4&t=3738s) 监管松绑与太阳谷的百亿豪赌：收购大都会/ABC 集权后的艾斯纳迅速启动了一项酝酿多年的大战略：跨界收购全国性电视广播网络。促成这笔交易的关键转折点发生在1993年，当时美国联邦通信委员会（FCC）正式废除了著名的“财务利益和银幕辛迪加规则”（Financial Interest and Syndication Rules，简称 Fin-Syn）。这项制定于20世纪70年代的法规原本是为了打破三大广播电视巨头对内容的垄断，严禁广播网拥有自己播出的娱乐节目版权或兼并好莱坞电影制片厂。然而到了90年代，有线电视（Cable TV）的迅猛崛起正大肆蚕食传统广播网的收视率和广告份额。Fin-Syn 反而成了捆绑传统电视网手脚的陈旧枷锁。随着该法规寿终正寝，好莱坞制片厂与全美广播电视网之间垂直整合的世纪大门被轰然推开。 早年与巴里·迪勒（Barry Diller）在 ABC 电视网起家的艾斯纳对电视业务了如指掌。他曾在 CBS 门前打转，发现 NBC 是非卖品，随后转向了老东家 ABC。在1995年著名的太阳谷峰会（Sun Valley Conference）上，一段富有传奇色彩的商业佳话诞生了：艾斯纳在停车场里“偶遇”了自己一直试图搭线的沃伦·巴菲特（Warren Buffett）。巴菲特随即把一同参会的大都会/ABC（Capital Cities/ABC）首席执行官汤姆·墨菲（Tom Murphy）叫了过来。三人站在停车场里攀谈，短短几天之内便敲定了全美传媒史上里程碑式的世纪并购——迪士尼以 190 亿美元收购 Capital Cities/ABC。 这笔交易在当时是仅次于雷诺烟草收购纳贝斯克（RJR Nabisco）的历史第二大并购案。许多人不熟悉其背后的复杂结构：十年前，规模仅为 ABC 四分之一的小公司“大都会”（Capital Cities）在巴菲特及伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司的重金支持下，完成了震惊华尔街的“小鱼吞巨鲸”式奇迹收购，因此巴菲特正是 Capital Cities/ABC 的最大股东。艾斯纳在太阳谷停车场真正进行推销的对象，正是巴菲特本人。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Capital Cities ABC and Disney Acquisition Flow accDescr: 展现从巴菲特支持Capital Cities收购ABC，到最终并入迪士尼的资本演进历程 subgraph CapCitiesEra ["1985年：小鱼吞巨鲸"] Buffett["沃伦·巴菲特 / 伯克希尔·哈撒韦"] -->|"资金支持与最大股东"| CapCities["Capital Cities（体量仅 1/4）"] CapCities -->|"逆向收购"| ABC["ABC 广播电视网"] ABC --> MergedCap["Capital Cities / ABC 集团"] end subgraph DisneyDeal ["1995年：太阳谷世纪交易"] Eisner["迈克尔·艾斯纳 (迪士尼)"] -->|"太阳谷停车场会晤"| Buffett Buffett -->|"促成会面"| TomMurphy["汤姆·墨菲 (CEO)"] MergedCap -->|"190 亿美元出售"| Disney["华特迪士尼公司"] end ``` - **收购标的与规模**：迪士尼以 190 亿美元收购 Capital Cities/ABC，为当时仅次于 RJR Nabisco 的史上第二大并购。 - **历史渊源**：艾斯纳与巴里·迪勒均出身 ABC 电视体系，对老东家资产极其熟悉。 - **核心决策圈**：促成交易的关键在于获得 Capital Cities 最大股东沃伦·巴菲特的首肯。 --- ### [01:05:55](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01QR2tmxSD4&t=3955s) 意外的现金奶牛：ESPN 的流转传奇与“加盟费”模式革命 随着有线电视在90年代呈现爆发式增长，原本风光无限的 ABC 广播网已经从极佳的现金牛蜕变为表现平平的普通资产，广告主纷纷将预算移往有线频道。然而，这笔价值 190 亿美元的交易中，却隐藏着人类商业史上最赚钱的有线电视资产——娱乐与体育节目电视网（ESPN）。回顾 ESPN 的早期身世，其曲折程度堪称荒诞：在 ESPN 刚创立几个月还是个初创公司时，石油巨头盖蒂石油（Getty Oil）便将其收购；后来德士古石油（Texaco）收购了盖蒂石油，并在1984年将 ESPN 转手甩给了 ABC。ABC 为了分摊资金压力，拉来了食品巨头纳贝斯克（Nabisco）持有 20% 的少数股权（寄希望于为其快消品带来广告协同效应）。紧接着第二年，KKR 在旷世之战《门口的野蛮人》中杠杆收购了纳贝斯克，顺手将这 20% 的 ESPN 股权转卖给了赫斯特集团（Hearst Corporation）。此后四十年间，赫斯特集团坐享其成，未费吹灰之力便从 ESPN 抽走了数十亿美元纯粹的自由现金流。 ESPN 真正改写商业史的壮举，在于它开创了有线电视除广告之外的第二收入飞轮——“有线网络加盟费/分销费”（Affiliate Fees）。在 ESPN 之前，有线频道为了能挤进运营商的有线电视套餐包（Cable Bundle），完全依赖广告变现，不少新兴频道甚至需要倒贴钱给有线电视运营商以换取播出通道。而 ESPN 由于需要斥巨资竞标各大职业体育联盟的转播权，面临高昂的版权成本，于是破天荒地要求有线电视运营商：“如果想要接入我们的频道，请按每位订户向我们支付几美分的分销费。” 很快，ESPN 与 ABC 意识到，独家体育转播权是有线电视生态中无可匹敌的终极杠杆。每当与有线电视运营商发生转播续约纠纷（Carriage Dispute）时，ESPN 只要威胁“拔线”，告诉成千上万的订户今晚无法观看 NBA、MLB、NFL 或《体育中心》（SportsCenter）集锦，愤怒的美国观众甚至会直接围堵有线运营商的营业网点发起抗议。这种无可替代的刚性需求赋予了 ESPN 无比恐怖的定价权（Pricing Power）。从最初的每户每月几美分，一路飞涨到 1 美元、2 美元、5 美元，ESPN 彻底蜕变成一部永不停歇的超级印钞机。 - **ESPN 股权流转链条**：初创起步 $\to$ 盖蒂石油（Getty Oil）收购 $\to$ 德士古石油（Texaco）合并接盘 $\to$ 1984年出售给 ABC（纳贝斯克持股 20% 作为财务伙伴） $\to$ 1985年 KKR 私有化纳贝斯克后将 20% 股权出售给赫斯特集团（Hearst），赫斯特持股至今。 - **商业模式颠覆**：颠覆了传统有线网络“单靠广告”甚至“倒贴上架费”的规则，开创了向运营商按订户人头强推的“加盟费”（Affiliate Fee）双轮驱动模式。 - **终极定价权**：凭借 NFL、NBA、MLB 等独家核心赛事构筑起抗衡分销渠道的最高壁垒，在转播费谈判中牢牢掌握主动权。 ### [01:10:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01QR2tmxSD4&t=4200s) 意外的印钞机：ESPN 与有线电视帝国的霸权 在迪士尼 1995 年收购 Capital Cities/ABC 时，无论是迈克尔·艾斯纳还是迪士尼管理层，其实都未曾预料到 ESPN 未来会膨胀成何等恐怖的体量。当时 ESPN 拥有 6600 万有线电视订阅用户，但向有线电视运营商收取的月度转播费（affiliate fee）每户还不到 1 美元。罗伊·E·迪士尼（Roy E. Disney）曾对此坦言：“在敲定 ABC 交易时，没有任何人会告诉你 ESPN 将成为这组资产里的‘举重冠军’，当时参与其中的任何一个人都绝不可能料到这一点。”然而在 1996 年交易正式完成后，ESPN 几乎在一夜之间、以一种完全出乎意料的方式，蜕变成了整个迪士尼帝国皇冠上最璀璨的宝石。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: ESPN 的商业飞轮与捆绑提价机制 accDescr: 展示 ESPN 如何通过锁定长期顶级体育版权，在有线电视网络中形成议价权并反哺迪士尼其他频道。 subgraph Rights ["版权护城河"] A["长期顶级体育赛事版权<br/>(NFL, NBA, MLB)"] --> B["黄金档赛事直播<br/>+ 高收视率 SportsCenter"] end subgraph Bundle ["有线电视捆绑溢价"] B --> C["高黏性、必不可少的频道定位"] C --> D["强势提价权<br/>(每年/每两年提价 ~20%)"] D --> E["组团捆绑授权<br/>(Disney Channel, A&E, Lifetime)"] end subgraph CashFlow ["帝国现金流金矿"] E --> F["数十亿美元极高确定性的<br/>每月全美订阅费流入"] end ``` ESPN 跑通后的商业模式简单粗暴得令人咂舌：由于体育直播是维系有线电视套餐的最核心理由，ESPN 凭借对自身价值的清醒认知，把价值捕获（value capture）发挥到了极致。他们会每隔一两年就给有线电视运营商打电话通知要涨价 20%，如果对方拒绝，ESPN 就直接威胁断信号停播。他们大举锁定长达十年的长期体育版权（包括 MLB、NBA，以及 1998 年从 ABC 拿下的 NFL《周日橄榄球之夜》和《周一橄榄球之夜》等转播权，并附带三届超级碗），借此在面对有线电视运营商时筑起不可撼动的议价壁垒。在此基础上，ESPN 还开创了体育集锦节目模式——体育赛事直播在结束哨响的瞬间商业价值便断崖式下跌，但 ESPN 却把这些精彩片段包装成极具感染力的晚间旗舰节目《SportsCenter》，以极低的制作成本反复榨取版权剩余价值。 更绝的是，ESPN 还成为了迪士尼有线电视频道的谈判杠杆。迪士尼早在 1983 年就上线了迪士尼频道（Disney Channel），早期深陷超支与亏损泥潭；而手握 ESPN 这张王牌后，迪士尼得以与运营商进行集团捆绑谈判：“想要 ESPN？那好，迪士尼频道、A&E、Lifetime 的转播费也得一起涨。”随后 ESPN2、ESPN Classic、ESPNews 以及后来的 SEC Network 接踵而至，形成了一个密不透风的“包中包”（bundle within a bundle）。到后来，ESPN 每月从每位订阅用户身上抽取的转播费飙升至 9.42 美元，比第二高频道的收费高出 3 到 4 倍，每月为公司输送数十亿美元具备极强确定性的现金流。 - **订阅费标杆**：ESPN 最终达到约 9.42 美元/月/用户的转播费水平，是全美收费最高的电视频道，甚至超出其他主流频道数倍。 - **低制作成本优势**：除了昂贵的赛事版权采买，ESPN 位于康涅狄格州布里斯托尔（Bristol）的日常节目制作运营成本极具效率。 - **旗舰节目与版权红利**：《SportsCenter》将过期直播内容重构为爆款日播集锦；1998 年重磅 NFL 协议更锁定了包括超级碗在内的顶级收视垄断。 --- ### [01:14:32](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01QR2tmxSD4&t=4472s) 从“飞轮协同”到“现金奶牛”：ESPN 重塑迪士尼财务底盘 这笔收购对于迪士尼而言是一场彻底的“大满贯”，但它也给迈克尔·艾斯纳本已沉重的管理负担又添上了一副重担。艾斯纳最初力推收购 ABC 的出发点，很大程度上是为了重现当年华特·迪士尼通过电视节目宣传迪士尼乐园的协同飞轮——借由 ABC 的公共台和有线网络渠道，全天候推广迪士尼的品牌、动画和消费品。ABC 确实在内容宣发上发挥了闭环作用，但 ESPN 的定位却截然不同：米老鼠与《SportsCenter》根本无法产生有机的品牌共鸣。尽管迪士尼后来尝试过在奥兰多建立“ESPN 体育大世界”（Wide World of Sports）甚至开办 ESPN Zone 主题餐厅，但最终他们发现，最明智的做法就是给 ESPN 设立防火墙让其独立运转，尽情享受它源源不断吐出的滚烫现金。 ESPN 和有线电视网络的现金洪流，在恰到好处的时机彻底重塑了迪士尼的财务结构。正是这些极度稳定的充沛自由现金流，为艾斯纳后续大举扩张主题乐园、建造度假区酒店提供了弹药。日后出任迪士尼 CEO 的鲍勃·艾格（Bob Iger）正是伴随着这笔交易作为 Capital Cities 的 COO 加盟迪士尼的。艾格在自传中曾深刻评价道：“它为迪士尼赋予了在其他制片厂陷入困境时仍能保持独立发展的规模，ESPN 也在动画业务经历起伏动荡时，进一步稳固了公司的底盘。” 这笔业务的盈利能力在后来的数据中体现得淋漓尽致：在 2008 至 2011 年间，包含 ESPN 在内的迪士尼有线网络业务部门，贡献了整整超过 50 亿美元的利润，占全公司营业利润的 60% 之巨；而分析师普遍认为，其中约四分之三的利润直接来自 ESPN。在很长一段时间里，迪士尼本质上已经演变成了一家靠收取有线电视转播费驱动的现金机器。 - **业务协同的悖论**：ABC 融入了经典的迪士尼飞轮，而 ESPN 则是独立防火墙之外的“现金发动机”。 - **利润结构逆转**：2008 至 2011 年期间，有线网络板块占迪士尼全公司营业利润的 60%，利润突破 50 亿美元，其中约 75% 由 ESPN 贡献。 - **鲍勃·艾格登场**：艾格通过 Capital Cities/ABC 交易正式进入迪士尼管理层，担任运营要职。 --- ### [01:17:15](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01QR2tmxSD4&t=4635s) 互联网狂潮与明智抉择：拒绝 AOL 与迈克尔·奥维茨入局 进入 1990 年代末至 2000 年代初，艾斯纳不仅要统筹庞大的乐园、影视与电视台，还一头撞上了互联网泡沫（Dot-com bubble）的疯狂浪潮。迪士尼在这一时期也做了一系列令人眼花缭乱的互联网运作：先是斥资数亿美元收购了保罗·艾伦（Paul Allen）离开微软后在西雅图创办的网络开发公司 Starwave，随后又买下了当时市占率仅排第七的搜索引擎 Infoseek，甚至还效仿当时的泡沫玩法，为迪士尼互联网资产单独拆分发行了一只追踪股票（tracking stock）。 但在所有这些典型的千禧年狂热举动中，艾斯纳最值得称道的决策，反而是他“坚决没有做”的那笔交易——拒绝 AOL（美国在线）。在 AOL 最终与时代华纳达成那场灾难性合并之前，AOL 首席执行官史蒂夫·凯斯（Steve Case）曾率先找上艾斯纳，提议让 AOL 与迪士尼进行换股合并。时代华纳后来被估值泡沫化但毫无实质价值的 AOL 拖入深渊，元气大伤；而艾斯纳在那段狂热时期面对各种超高估值始终保持了清醒与审慎，坚决不肯将迪士尼的实在资产置换给缺乏根基的互联网泡沫。这也成为艾斯纳 CEO 生涯中除买下 ESPN 之外最成功的一记防守。 然而，急速膨胀的商业帝国让艾斯纳分身乏术。1995 年，在弗兰克·威尔斯（Frank Wells）坠机遇难后一直悬空的“二把手”职位终于迎来了新人选——艾斯纳的好友、好莱坞顶级经纪人迈克尔·奥维茨（Michael Ovitz）出任迪士尼总裁。作为好莱坞最大经纪公司 CAA（Creative Artists Agency）的联合创始人，奥维茨在影视创意界的权势一度足以与各大制片厂分庭抗礼。这一任命当时在好莱坞引发了地震般的轰动，不仅体现了迪士尼帝国的庞大规模需要顶尖掌舵者，也为日后迪士尼高层内部爆发的严重动荡埋下了导火索。 - **互联网泡沫动作**：收购西雅图网页开发先驱 Starwave、第七大搜索引擎 Infoseek，并发行动荡的互联网追踪股票。 - **拒绝 AOL 的致命诱惑**：史蒂夫·凯斯先于时代华纳接洽迪士尼，艾斯纳因怀疑其真实内在价值而坚拒合并，避免了时代华纳式的巨额财富蒸发。 - **好莱坞权力地震**：1995 年 CAA 掌门人迈克尔·奥维茨加盟迪士尼出任二把手（总裁），标志着好莱坞超级权力中枢向迪士尼总部的迁移。 ### [01:20:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01QR2tmxSD4&t=4800s) 迈克尔·奥维茨的速败与天价“分手费” 在完成对大都会/ABC（Capital Cities/ABC）的世纪大并购之后，迪士尼毫无疑问成为了全球媒体行业最瞩目的中心。然而，迈克尔·艾斯纳（Michael Eisner）决定引入好莱坞超级经纪人、CAA 掌门人迈克尔·奥维茨（Michael Ovitz）担任迪士尼总裁兼首席运营官（COO），从第一天起就被证明是一场彻底的灾难。两人一位是习惯掌控全局的顶级企业管理者，另一位则是依靠人情与交易立足的好莱坞掮客，底层技能树完全不兼容。 作为一家庞大帝国的二把手，总裁兼首席运营官的日常核心是日复一日的繁琐例会、统领不同利益阵营（“放羊抓猫”）、做出权衡利弊的对齐决策，以及坚决地向下属说“不”，同时维持数万甚至数十万名员工在漫长业务周期里的平稳运转。相比之下，好莱坞顶级经纪人的生存法则则是八面玲珑、四处讨好、逢人说“行”、利用权势快准狠地促成交易，并且随时多线并行处理十几个、甚至是五百个项目。奥维茨在 CAA 磨砺出的那套呼风唤雨的本事，与迪士尼日常运营所需的精细化管理格格不入。 最终，奥维茨在迪士尼仅任职刚过一年，便在 1996 年 12 月黯然离职。由于当初艾斯纳和奥维茨在签约时都盲目自大，认为两人搭档绝不可能失败，因此迪士尼在聘用合同中开出了极其荒谬的违约保护条款。最终，迪士尼不得不向仅工作了一年出头的奥维茨支付高达 1.4 亿美元的天价遣散补偿金，引发了舆论和股东层面的轩然大波。 ### [01:21:40](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01QR2tmxSD4&t=4900s) 动画帝国的真正危机与割裂的商业模式 然而，奥维茨的闹剧与天价遣散费不过是一层遮羞布，真正动摇迪士尼根基的内伤来自其核心灵魂——迪士尼动画工作室（Disney Animation）。在 1994 年之后，虽然迪士尼偶尔还能拿出反响尚可的作品，但整体质量与口碑已不可逆转地走上下坡路。到了《亚特兰蒂斯：失落的帝国》（Atlantis: The Lost Empire）和《星银岛》（Treasure Planet）时期，动画部门已经彻底跌入泥潭。 与此同时，并入 ABC 和 ESPN 后，整个集团在战略与组织架构上陷入了认知混乱。曾经的迪士尼拥有一个精简而优雅的“飞轮模型”：创作出观众热爱的角色与普遍共鸣的故事，随后通过院线票房、家庭录像带（VHS/DVD）、主题乐园游乐设施和消费品衍生授权逐层变现，最后每隔七年把经典 IP 从“迪士尼金库”（Disney Vault）中重新拿出来循环获利。但大都会/ABC 的业务完全是另一回事：它依赖电视台的有线电视订阅费和广告赞助，播放的大多是一次性消耗品，且绝大部分内容并非自己原创。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Disney Dual Operating Models in Late 1990s accDescr: Comparison between Disney's classic animation flywheel and the acquired television broadcast network model. subgraph Flywheel ["经典动画飞轮模型（长效 IP 驱动）"] IP["核心原创 IP 与故事"] --> Cinema["院线首映票房"] Cinema --> HomeVideo["家庭录像带与 DVD 销售"] HomeVideo --> ParksMerch["主题乐园设施与衍生消费品"] ParksMerch --> Vault["'迪士尼金库' 周期性再发行"] Vault -.-> IP end subgraph Broadcast ["ABC / ESPN 广播网络（流量与订阅驱动）"] ThirdPartyContent["外部/一次性内容 (体育、新闻)"] --> TVStations["电视台与有线频道"] TVStations --> CableFee["有线电视网络订阅抽成"] TVStations --> AdRevenue["商业广告投放收入"] end ``` 这两套完全割裂的商业模式被生硬地塞进同一个屋檐下，连管理层自己都搞不清奥维茨到底应该管什么。再加上杰弗瑞·卡森伯格（Jeffrey Katzenberg）出走创立梦工厂（DreamWorks），迪士尼内部的大批核心动画骨干不断被高薪挖角；即便选择留下的员工，迪士尼也必须开出水涨船高的匹配薪资来留人。动画部门的制作成本急剧膨胀，产出品质却一落千丈，彻底陷入了恶性循环。在最初两三年里，这一溃败尚未直接引爆危机，因为主题乐园依然在靠“迪士尼文艺复兴”黄金时期积累的顶级 IP 赚得盆满钵满，掩盖了新片票房不振的滞后效应。 ### [01:24:05](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01QR2tmxSD4&t=5045s) “9·11”黑天鹅、乐园雪崩与巴斯家族强制平仓 由于迪士尼的商业模式并不主要依赖电影首映的院线票房，动画质量滑坡的致命苦果存在极长的反馈延迟——除非作为变现支柱的主题乐园本身遭遇不可抗力。而这正是 2001 年 9 月发生的事情。 “9·11”恐怖袭击不仅是一场举国同悲的灾难，更是对迪士尼乐园业务的毁灭性打击。在袭击发生后的数周乃至数月里，全美领空一度彻底停飞，乐园业务直线下坠，惨烈程度堪比后来的 COVID-19 疫情。对于重资产、高固定成本运营的主题乐园而言，游客对出行的恐惧与消费支出的急冻无疑是致命的毒药。 灾难接踵而至，将艾斯纳推向了悬崖边缘： - **股价暴跌**：在“9·11”袭击发生后的短短数天之内，迪士尼股价暴跌近 25%。 - **零售店大溃败**：由于没有新的爆款动画 IP 来带动玩偶、服装等衍生品销售，消费品部门的营业利润早已在持续萎缩，袭击发生后迪士尼被迫关闭了全美各大购物中心内绝大多数的迪士尼专卖店（Disney Store）。 - **最大股东被迫出清**：长期以来，巴斯家族（Bass Family）不仅是迪士尼最大的外部股东，更是艾斯纳在董事会中最坚定的政治盟友。然而“9·11”引发的连锁反应导致巴斯家族的其他投资遭遇巨额追加保证金通知（Margin Call），被迫成为不计成本的抛售者。他们通过大宗交易一次性甩卖了价值 20 亿美元的迪士尼股票，在股价本已暴跌 25% 的伤口上再度撒盐。 几乎在一夜之间，艾斯纳失去了他在股东层最坚实的靠山。迪士尼的市值被极度打压，整个公司的处境与 1984 年险遭恶意拆解收购的至暗时刻惊人地相似：核心动画业务彻底崩塌，曾经力挽狂澜的乐园业务瘫痪，全靠 ESPN 这根意外买来的顶梁柱在风雨飘摇中勉力维持现金流。 ### [01:26:50](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01QR2tmxSD4&t=5210s) 历史重演：罗伊·E·迪士尼辞职与“Save Disney”运动 就在所有人以为局势已经不可能更加恶化的时候，2003 年 11 月 30 日，罗伊·E·迪士尼（Roy E. Disney，华特·迪士尼的侄子）正式宣布辞去迪士尼董事会职务。他在辞职信中痛斥艾斯纳，直言双方在“公司的管理方向与领导风格上存在无法调和的严重分歧”。 这幕大戏几乎是整整 20 年前（1984 年）罗伊联手清理前管理层场景的历史复刻，但这一次，战火完全烧到了公众视野和刚刚兴起的互联网世界中。罗伊与其长期的商业伙伴斯坦利·戈尔德（Stanley Gold，同样辞去了董事职务）联手打出了一套前所未有的草根股东倡议组合拳：他们上线了极具号召力的网站 `SaveDisney.com`，公开招募普通股东与广大粉丝，正面发起代理权争夺战（Proxy Fight），唯一的诉求就是将迈克尔·艾斯纳彻底赶出华特迪士尼公司。 节目中主持人们调侃道，这种“公司内部元老辞职、建立 `Save[Company].com` 网站发动公众声讨 CEO”的经典商战戏码，在后来的美国商业史上仅出现过一次同样著名的复制版——那就是约翰·施纳特（John Schnatter）发起的 `SavePapaJohns.com` 运动。 ### [01:28:10](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01QR2tmxSD4&t=5290s) 中场赞助与技术伏笔：Sentry 与迪士尼流媒体的基建挑战 在展开罗伊·E·迪士尼如何掀翻艾斯纳、以及鲍勃·艾格（Bob Iger）如何最终接掌帝国的关键转折之前，节目适时插入了对赞助商 Sentry 的介绍。这恰好与迪士尼日后的技术命运形成了奇妙的互文。 作为深得开发者信赖的错误追踪与性能监控平台，Sentry 曾是 2019 年迪士尼筹备 Disney+ 史诗级全球首发时不可或缺的核心基础设施。当时，Disney+ 必须在第一天就同时接入全世界几乎所有的终端设备——从 iOS/Android 手机、PlayStation/Xbox 游戏主机，到各品牌智能电视、流媒体电视棒及平板电脑，迎接千万级涌入的首发订阅用户。在如此宏大的跨平台规模下，代码崩溃几乎无可避免。正是借助 Sentry 的集中化错误日志追踪能力，迪士尼的工程团队才能在用户投诉爆发之前，迅速定位崩溃发生在哪个具体设备的哪个系统版本中。 如今，Sentry 的能力已经从被动监控进化到结合 Claude Code、Cursor 以及其自研智能体 Sear 的“自愈软件”（Self-healing software）阶段，能够在生产环境中捕捉全链路堆栈追踪后，全自动追溯根因并提交修复 PR，为全球数十万开发者守护代码防线。 ### [01:30:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01QR2tmxSD4&t=5400s) 罗伊·E·迪士尼的公开辞职信与“拯救迪士尼”运动 罗伊·E·迪士尼（Roy E. Disney）与斯坦利·戈尔德（Stanley Gold）于 2003 年底双双辞去董事会职务，彻底打响了轰轰烈烈的“拯救迪士尼”（Save Disney）运动。罗伊在写给首席执行官迈克尔·艾斯纳（Michael Eisner）的辞职信中火力全开，并将抄送件直接寄送给迪士尼董事会以及《华尔街日报》、《纽约时报》和《洛杉矶时报》。正如鲍勃·艾格（Bob Iger）在自传《一生的旅程》（*The Ride of a Lifetime*）中所记述，罗伊在这封长达三页的严厉批评审视中承认艾斯纳执掌的前十年取得了辉煌成功，但他直言艾斯纳后期的领导已被“七大罪状”所彻底定义： 1. **未能挽救 ABC 黄金档**：无法将 ABC 的黄金时段节目带回收视率深渊。 2. **严重的微观管理**：对身边的每一个人进行事无巨细的干涉，严重挫伤了全公司的员工士气。 3. **主题乐园投资不足**：为了省钱而粗制滥造，导致乐园游客流失（对此播客主持人们提出了不同意见，指出乐园客流量下滑主要是受到 9/11 事件的冲击，且迈克尔实际上以舍得重金投入乐园著称，仅次于华特·迪士尼本人）。 4. **沦为贪婪短视的资本家**：利益相关者普遍认为迪士尼变得贪婪、缺乏灵魂且只追求快钱而非长期价值，严重透支了公众的信任。 5. **创意人才大量流失**：因管理失当与低迷的士气，导致创意核心人才外流。 6. **伙伴关系彻底恶化**：无法与重要合作伙伴维持良好关系，尤其是与皮克斯（Pixar）之间剑拔弩张的关系。 7. **坚决拒绝制定接班人计划**：始终不愿建立清晰透明的管理层接班机制。 罗伊在信的末尾冷酷而决绝地写道：“迈克尔，我真诚地认为，该离开的人是你，而不是我。因此，我再次要求你辞职并退休。” ### [01:32:45](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01QR2tmxSD4&t=5565s) 动画部的泥潭与灵魂守护者的愤怒 罗伊如此愤怒的根源在于迪士尼动画部门不可逆转的滑坡。在经历 90 年代初的辉煌之后，迪士尼动画陷入了前所未有的谷底：2003 年的《熊的传说》（*Brother Bear*）、2004 年的《放牛大冒险》（*Home on the Range*）、2005 年的《四眼天鸡》（*Chicken Little*），以及后续的《未来小子》（*Meet the Robinsons*）和 2008 年勉强止血的《闪电狗》（*Bolt*）。对于二三十岁的年轻一代观众而言，他们的童年记忆中几乎没有能够匹敌《小美人鱼》、《美女与野兽》、《阿拉丁》或《狮子王》那样的迪士尼自制动画经典。 虽然罗伊本人在行政领导和市场判断上也屡遭质疑（例如《幻想曲 2000》的商业惨败），且他名义上正是动画部门的负责人，但罗伊的真正超能力在于他是“迪士尼精神的终极守护者”。此时的迪士尼不仅失去了创造世代流传故事的创意火花，还在与 ABC 合并后被撕裂在两种完全不同的商业模式之中，战线被拉得过长，彻底失去了原本的灵魂。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Save Disney Campaign Dynamics accDescr: Diagram illustrating the conflict between Michael Eisner's administration and Roy Disney's Save Disney campaign, leading to shareholder dissent and hostile takeover vulnerability. subgraph InternalCrisis["内部管理危机与创意衰退"] A["创意断崖：动画部门连出烂片<br/>《放牛大冒险》《四眼天鸡》"] B["伙伴恶化：与皮克斯/乔布斯关系决裂"] C["管理失当：事无巨细的微观管理<br/>缺乏接班人计划"] end subgraph Protest["罗伊·迪士尼的反击"] D["2003年底公开辞职信<br/>控诉艾斯纳'七大罪状'"] E["发起'拯救迪士尼'运动<br/>联合两大多家代理咨询机构与CalPERS"] end subgraph Consequences["外忧内患爆发"] F["康卡斯特发起 540 亿美元恶意收购"] G["2004年费城股东大会：<br/>43% 股东对艾斯纳投出不信任票"] end InternalCrisis --> D D --> E E --> G InternalCrisis -.引来掠夺者.-> F ``` ### [01:35:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01QR2tmxSD4&t=5700s) 康卡斯特的 540 亿美元恶意收购突袭 罗伊和斯坦利辞职后，将目标锁定在 2004 年 3 月的迪士尼年度股东大会上，试图通过股东投票将迈克尔·艾斯纳赶下台。为挽救股价并稳固艾斯纳的地位，迪士尼管理层在 2004 年 2 月于奥兰多提前召开了投资者日（Analyst Day）。当时他们手中握有绝佳的成绩单：根据迪士尼乐园游乐项目改编的《加勒比海盗》（*Pirates of the Caribbean*）大获成功，单季度营收猛增 19%，约翰尼·德普（Johnny Depp）饰演的杰克船长仿佛正是骑马来拯救艾斯纳职位的英雄。 然而在投资者日当天清晨，艾斯纳与刚升任公司总裁兼首席运营官（COO）的鲍勃·艾格一觉醒来，却迎来了震惊全美的重磅炸弹：来自费城的美国有线电视巨头康卡斯特（Comcast）发起了一笔全股票形式的敌意收购，出价高达 540 亿美元。有线电视运营商当时是全美声名最狼藉的行业类别之一，而很大程度上正是由于迪士尼和 ESPN 多年来煽动公众抗议有线电视费用上涨所致。如今这家“粗暴”的渠道运营商竟然企图用股票吞并美国的文化瑰宝，引发了媒体与业界的巨大震动。 康卡斯特之所以敢于动手，正是嗅到了迪士尼内斗的脆弱裂痕： - **除掉最大谈判对手**：ESPN 是康卡斯特最核心、也是成本最高的内容供应商，双方每年都要为了转播费（Carriage Fees）争吵甚至开战。一旦收购迪士尼，康卡斯特将彻底反客为主直接掌控 ESPN。 - **现实业务的吸金机器**：正如本·汤普森（Ben Thompson）所剖析的那样，华特·迪士尼经典的“飞轮模型”固然极具魅力，但其电视业务——特别是有线电视打包捆绑销售（Cable Bundle）——拥有飞轮无法比拟的规模化印钞能力。无论家庭是否收看迪士尼的节目或体育赛事，全美几乎每个有线电视订阅户每月都在源源不断地支付收视费。 - 当时迪士尼全公司营业利润中，仅有线电视网络就贡献了高达 20 亿美元，几乎占到了全公司总利润的近 50%。 ### [01:38:30](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01QR2tmxSD4&t=5910s) 43% 的不信任票：艾斯纳帝国的裂痕 这场敌意收购客观上成为了“拯救迪士尼”运动的最大助推剂，它在外界眼中坐实了“迪士尼在艾斯纳领导下已经堕落到任人宰割的地步”的叙事。两大主要股东代理咨询机构（Proxy Advisory Services）随即宣布支持罗伊·迪士尼，并建议股东在即将召开的股东大会上对迈克尔·艾斯纳的连任投出保留票（Withhold Vote）。紧接着，美国最大的养老基金加利福尼亚州公共雇员退休系统（CalPERS）也公开宣布将投票反对艾斯纳，要求其立即辞职。 2004 年 3 月 3 日，迪士尼年度股东大会正式召开。具有戏剧性讽刺意味的是，当年的大会偏偏被安排在费城举行——距离康卡斯特的总部大楼仅仅几个街区。表决结果公布时举世震惊：高达 43% 的股东投票反对艾斯纳继续担任 CEO。在商业历史上，没有任何一个首席执行官能在失去 43% 股东支持的情况下继续保全原本的绝对权威。投票结果出炉后，迪士尼董事会立即将管理层排除在外，召开了紧急执行闭门会议。 ### [01:40:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01QR2tmxSD4&t=6000s) 权力真空下的博弈：鲍勃·艾格锁定唯一内部候选人 在董事会召开的紧急会议中，成员们决定剥夺迈克尔·艾斯纳（Michael Eisner）的董事长职务，但暂时保留其首席执行官一职。消息公布后，迪士尼股价应声上涨，而发起敌意收购的康卡斯特（Comcast）股价却持续下跌，数周后康卡斯特正式撤回了收购要约。然而，这并未平息罗伊·E·迪士尼（Roy E. Disney）与斯坦利·戈尔德（Stanley Gold）发起的“拯救迪士尼”（Save Disney）运动——艾斯纳依然盘踞在 CEO 之位上。数月后，艾斯纳终于松口，宣布将在 2006 年底合约到期时彻底离开迪士尼。董事会随即宣布启动一场极具关注度的全球公开选拔，并计划在 2005 年 6 月前敲定继任者。当时外界普遍认为，迪士尼一定会像 20 年前引入威尔斯（Frank Wells）与艾斯纳那样，从外部空降一位强势高管来力挽狂澜。 在起草新闻稿的过程中，原本的表述是“将同时考察外部与多名内部候选人”。时任迪士尼首席运营官（COO）的鲍勃·艾格（Bob Iger）在审阅稿件时敏锐地察觉到了危机。他找到董事会直言不讳：“迈克尔还要在位一年多，除我之外究竟还有没有其他内部候选人？”董事会承认只有他一个。艾格随即坚决要求必须在新闻稿中明确写上自己的名字：“如果不指明，公司内部必将陷入争权夺利的混乱与瘫痪。迈克尔已经是跛脚鸭，员工必须知道该向谁看齐寻求领导力。新闻稿必须明确写成‘寻找外部候选人以及鲍勃·艾格’。”董事会最终被说服并修改了公告。艾格借此抢占了先机，成了唯一合法的内部角逐者。 ### [01:42:47](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01QR2tmxSD4&t=6167s) 竞选神级框架：艾格重塑未来的“三大支柱” 在《一生的旅程》（*The Ride of a Lifetime*）中，艾格详述了自己如何在这场胜算极低的选拔中突围。当时他的处境极为尴尬：作为极不受欢迎的“跛脚鸭总统”的副手，董事会抛给他的前三个问题必然都是：“既然你属于上一届领导班子，而且过去把事情搞得一团糟，我们凭什么选你？”为了破局，艾格聘请了一位专业政治竞选顾问，制定了一套绝妙的话语重塑策略——绝不纠缠并试图辩护过去，将一切对话焦点彻底引向未来。向董事会竞聘时，艾格提出了带领迪士尼走向未来的三大核心支柱： ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 鲍勃·艾格的三大战略支柱 accDescr: 展示鲍勃·艾格竞聘迪士尼 CEO 时提出的三大战略支柱及其实施重点 subgraph Pillars ["鲍勃·艾格的未来三大支柱"] P1["1. 高品质品牌内容"] P2["2. 全面拥抱前沿科技"] P3["3. 拓展全球化版图"] end subgraph Execution ["战略落地重点"] E1["复兴迪士尼动画与飞轮效应<br/>应对社交媒体时代的注意力爆炸"] E2["将技术视为盟友而非敌人<br/>利用全新制作与数字分发渠道"] E3["重点渗透中印两大高人口市场<br/>依托故事和 IP 发挥规模经济效应"] end P1 --> E1 P2 --> E2 P3 --> E3 ``` - **第一支柱：将大部分时间和资本倾注于高品质品牌内容。** 艾格精准预见到社交媒体时代的到来（当时 Facebook 刚刚起步，YouTube 即将诞生），未来消费者面临的内容选择将趋于无限。在注意力极度分散的世界里，唯一的突围方式就是打造最顶级的标杆内容，彻底复兴作为迪士尼“飞轮”核心引擎的动画部门。 - **第二支柱：最大限度地全面拥抱科技。** 当时好莱坞传统传媒集团对硅谷科技充满敌意与恐慌（维亚康姆正准备起诉 YouTube，唱片业刚被 Napster 重创），而艾格却反其道而行之。他主张像华特·迪士尼当年一样，不仅将技术用于开创性内容制作，更要主动将其转化为数字分发手段，绝不让科技成为颠覆传统媒体的掘墓人。 - **第三支柱：扩大全球影响力。** 迪士尼必须深耕中国与印度等新兴人口大国（两国人口当时已占全球近三分之一）。迪士尼的底层逻辑是极具黏性的IP与规模经济，只有让全世界更多人爱上这些角色与故事，飞轮才能发挥最大威力。 ### [01:45:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01QR2tmxSD4&t=6300s) 艾斯纳 21 年时代终结与商业账本 这套高瞻远瞩且完全立足于未来的竞选战略彻底征服了董事会。2005 年 3 月，董事会正式宣布鲍勃·艾格当选迪士尼下一任首席执行官，并将交接时间大幅提前至同年 9 月，比艾斯纳最初预计的离任时间提前了整整一年。至此，长达 21 年的迈克尔·艾斯纳时代正式画上了句号。 纵观艾斯纳执掌迪士尼的 21 年，大致可以清晰地划分为两个截然不同的十年： 1. **黄金复兴期（前十年）：** 艾斯纳与弗兰克·威尔斯、杰弗瑞·卡森伯格（Jeffrey Katzenberg）密切配合，开创了迪士尼动画文艺复兴的黄金时代，使陷入泥潭的迪士尼重获新生。 2. **阵痛与裂变期（后十年）：** 伴随着威尔斯直升机失事遇难与卡森伯格出走，管理层内斗不断，欧洲迪士尼沦为财务黑洞，传统动画陷入泥沼。但艾斯纳在这一时期力主完成了传媒史上最伟大的收购之一——拿下拥有 ESPN 的 Capital Cities/ABC。 收购 Capital Cities 虽然为迪士尼带来了一座近乎无限印钞的现金金矿（ESPN 的订阅附加费与广告收入源源不断地为集团其他业务输血），但它也付出了沉重的代价：迪士尼自此失去了业务上的纯粹性。它不再仅仅是一家围绕动画与乐园飞轮运转的内容公司，同时变成了一家依赖有线电视网络与广告联盟的媒体巨头。从纯财务数字来看，艾斯纳的功绩毋庸置疑： - **公司市值：** 从艾斯纳 1984 年接手时的不到 20 亿美元，飙升至卸任时的约 500 亿美元（剔除股权稀释影响，股票回报接近 20 倍）。 - **年营业收入：** 从 17 亿美元猛增至 310 亿美元，20 年间复合年均增长率（CAGR）高达 15%。 - **净利润：** 从 9700 万美元跨越式增长至 25 亿美元，增幅达惊人的 26 倍。 ### [01:48:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01QR2tmxSD4&t=6480s) 命运的电话：艾格连线史蒂夫·乔布斯 当选迪士尼新任 CEO 的那个周日下午，艾格迅速拨通了一记至关重要的电话——打给当时兼任皮克斯（Pixar）与苹果公司（Apple）CEO 的史蒂夫·乔布斯（Steve Jobs）。由于艾斯纳此前与乔布斯公开决裂，迪士尼与皮克斯的续约谈判早已彻底破裂。 艾格在自传中回忆，他当时与乔布斯素无深交。乔布斯在电话那头展现了他一贯的尖锐与直率，劈头就问：“你在迈克尔手下干了多久了？”艾格回答：“十年。”乔布斯冷淡地回了一句：“哼，那我看不出换你上台会有什么不同。不过好吧，等尘埃落定了，咱们再联系。” 这记看似碰了一鼻子灰的简短通话，最终却成了迪士尼整部百年企业史上最关键的转折点。它不仅叩开了打破僵局的大门，更直接孕育了日后震惊好莱坞与硅谷的皮克斯大收购。在展开皮克斯波澜壮阔的传奇之前，播客插播了对核心赞助商 WorkOS 的探讨，以“酿造啤酒就要专注啤酒风味本身，而非自建发电厂”为喻，阐述在软件开发边际成本趋零的 AI 时代，企业应将底层身份认证等繁琐基础设施托付给专业服务商，全力聚焦于自身差异化产品与业务逻辑。 ### [01:50:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01QR2tmxSD4&t=6600s) 赞助商 WorkOS 与鲍勃·艾格的顿悟 节目首先简短介绍了赞助商 WorkOS。对于做 B2B 和企业级软件的团队来说，客户最在乎的是数据安全与合规，诸如单点登录（SSO）、SCIM 协议、审计日志（Audit Logs）以及基于角色的权限控制（RBAC）等企业功能必不可少。这些功能无法让核心产品产生独特的差异化，却往往成为签单卡脖子的障碍。WorkOS 提供的就是即插即用的 API，把长达数月的工程量压缩到一下午搞定。OpenAI、Cursor、Perplexity 和 Anthropic 等顶尖 AI 初创公司都在使用 WorkOS，免去自建“发电厂”的麻烦，直接插电接入电网，让周末赶出来的原型到周一就能直接卖给大企业。 随后话题回到正轨：在争夺迪士尼 CEO 职位的选拔考核过程中，鲍勃·艾格（Bob Iger）对内部修复迪士尼动画部门已经彻底绝望。他暗自得出结论：唯一能够让迪士尼动画重现往日辉煌的路径，就是用皮克斯（Pixar）的领导层彻底换掉迪士尼动画的管理层。这一顿悟源自 2005 年香港迪士尼乐园开园时的经典一幕：艾格站在巡游路线旁，看着一辆辆花车经过，上面虽然有灰姑娘、米奇和白雪公主这些经典角色，但他猛然意识到，整场巡游竟然没有任何一个属于过去十年的迪士尼原创角色；相反，花车上挤得满满当当的，全都是皮克斯塑造的形象。在那一刻，艾格心中豁然开朗：“必须让皮克斯接管迪士尼动画。”这也是为什么他在得知自己确定当选 CEO 的当天晚上，就立刻拨通了史蒂夫·乔布斯（Steve Jobs）的私人电话。 主播们感叹，皮克斯本质上就是华特·迪士尼动画精神的真正继承者。这一段落也是他们对 Acquired 史上第一期节目（讨论皮克斯）的一次极具诗意的美妙重述。 --- ### [01:52:17](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01QR2tmxSD4&t=6737s) 约翰·拉塞特的迪士尼幻灭与计算机梦想 要讲述皮克斯的故事，时间必须拨回到约翰·拉塞特（John Lasseter）身上。拉塞特从小就梦想成为迪士尼的动画师，早年在加利福尼亚迪士尼乐园的第一份工作是在“丛林巡航”（Jungle Cruise）当船长向导。后来，他如愿考入加州艺术学院（CalArts），师从曾与华特·迪士尼并肩作战、被尊称为“九老”（Nine Old Men）的传奇元老动画大师，堪称美梦成真。 拉塞特顺利进入迪士尼动画部工作，然而当时正值 20 世纪 80 年代初迪士尼最昏暗沉沦的时期。拉塞特对刚刚崭露头角的计算机动画（Computer Animation）技术痴迷不已，但当时的传统动画部门对此毫无兴趣（虽然迪士尼内部当时有真人科幻电影《电子世界争霸战》（Tron）正在探索计算机特效，但这种先锋极客文化并未渗透进固步自封的动画部）。冲突在拉塞特筹备其导演处女作《勇敢的小烤面包机》（The Brave Little Toaster）时彻底爆发。在关键的项目提案会议（Pitch Meeting）上，拉塞特提议全面采用计算机动画制作该片。高管们劈头盖脸地质问他：“这能比传统动画做得更快、更便宜吗？不然我们图什么？”拉塞特回答：“都不能。但这能打破边界，把故事讲述推进到前所未有的境界。” 会议结束后，拉塞特当天就直接被开除了。高层冷酷地表示：“既然项目被砍、不予立项，那你也没有任何理由留在这里了。感谢你的汇报，你被解雇了。” --- ### [01:55:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01QR2tmxSD4&t=6900s) 犹他大学传奇、卢卡斯影业与皮克斯图形电脑 故事的另一条线索回溯到 1963 年的犹他大学（University of Utah），皮克斯的另一位灵魂人物埃德·卡特姆（Ed Catmull）登场。卡特姆同样怀揣一生的动画梦，但他自认缺乏艺术家的绘画天赋，于是转向计算机图形学（Computer Graphics）。在当时犹他大学那个神秘又先锋的图形学摇篮里，卡特姆制作了人类历史上第一批计算机 3D 动画之一——一段以他自己手部为原型的旋转黑白线框模型。卡特姆当时的同窗堪称计算机界的诸神黄昏： - 个人电脑先驱艾伦·凯（Alan Kay） - SGI与网景（Netscape）创始人吉姆·克拉克（Jim Clark） - Adobe 联合创始人约翰·沃诺克（John Warnock） - 雅达利（Atari）兼查克芝士（Chuck E. Cheese）创始人诺兰·布什内尔（Nolan Bushnell） 卡特姆毕业后被招揽至长岛的纽约理工学院（New York Tech）搭建尖端计算机图形实验室。到了 1979 年，加州的乔治·卢卡斯（George Lucas）正在为刚刚拍完《星球大战》、筹备《帝国反击战》的卢卡斯影业寻找顶尖技术人才，旨在探索能够彻底改变电影制作范式的计算机图形工具。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 埃德·卡特姆与约翰·拉塞特汇聚卢卡斯影业图形组 accDescr: 埃德·卡特姆自犹他大学进入卢卡斯影业，后与被迪士尼开除的约翰·拉塞特联手，催生出皮克斯图形电脑。 subgraph TechPath ["技术突破路径"] Catmull["埃德·卡特姆 (Ed Catmull)<br/>犹他大学 / 纽约理工"] Lucasfilm["加入卢卡斯影业 (Lucasfilm)<br/>组建计算机图形组 (1979)"] Catmull --> Lucasfilm end subgraph StoryPath ["故事艺术路径"] Lasseter["约翰·拉塞特 (John Lasseter)<br/>迪士尼被辞退 (80年代初)"] end Meeting{"玛丽皇后号邮轮行业会议相遇"} Lucasfilm --> Meeting Lasseter --> Meeting subgraph PixarBirth ["皮克斯雏形与产品化"] Output["打造兼具技术与情感的动画短片"] Hardware["自主研制<br/>皮克斯图像电脑 (Pixar Image Computer)"] Niche["探索商业变现：MRI 医疗 3D 渲染、卫星遥感建模"] Meeting --> Output Output --> Hardware Hardware --> Niche end ``` 电影产业与其他行业存在一个奇妙的“竞合”差异：电影制作周期长达一到三年，单个导演无法垄断供给；为了培养大众每周或每月定期进影院消费的习惯，导演们往往期盼同行都能拍出好电影以共同繁荣市场。卡特姆携阿尔维·雷·史密斯（Alvy Ray Smith）加入卢卡斯影业成立计算机图形组（Computer Graphics Group），最早的代表作是为《星际迷航2：可汗怒怒》（Star Trek II: The Wrath of Khan）制作的星球地球化（Terraforming）俯冲航拍特效长镜头。 不久，卡特姆在长滩“玛丽皇后号”（Queen Mary）邮轮举办的技术会议上偶遇了刚被迪士尼扫地出门的拉塞特。卡特姆的技术团队擅长写代码和建模，但根本不懂如何编剧、赋予角色生命与情感；他恳求拉塞特北上卢卡斯影业担任动画技术顾问。由于当时市面上的硬件性能过于孱弱，根本无法承载复杂的渲染任务，该团队被迫自主研发专用硬件——“皮克斯图像电脑”（Pixar Image Computer），这也是“皮克斯”这一名称的首次正式亮相。为了补贴昂贵的研发开销并寻找立竿见影的收入，他们将设备卖给医疗机构做第一代 MRI 核磁共振 3D 容积渲染，或者卖给情报部门分析卫星航拍照片。 但好景不长，乔治·卢卡斯本人正身陷昂贵离婚官司的财务泥潭，急需变现资产套现脱困，因此决定整体剥离并变卖这支专注于软硬件研发的图形团队。 ### [02:00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01QR2tmxSD4&t=7200s) 卢卡斯筹资婚变与史蒂夫·乔布斯的入局 这一切的转折点，源于现代电影史上最具戏剧性的一场“蝴蝶效应”。当时乔治·卢卡斯（George Lucas）正在闹离婚，由于他不愿在离婚财产分割中割让卢卡斯影业（Lucasfilm）的任何股权，他急需筹集巨额现金支付给前妻。为了换取现款，卢卡斯不得不卖掉旗下前途未卜的计算机图形部门（Computer Graphics Division）。 传奇计算机科学家艾伦·凯（Alan Kay）——他既是艾德·卡特姆（Ed Catmull）的老同学，也是史蒂夫·乔布斯（Steve Jobs）的密友——牵线搭桥，将乔布斯引荐给了卢卡斯影业团队。乔布斯亲临卢卡斯影业参观技术展示，深感震撼。然而就在双方接触后不久，乔布斯突然“人间蒸发”失联了。卢卡斯团队面面相觑，完全不知道发生了什么——而实际上，当时乔布斯正深陷与约翰·斯卡利（John Sculley）的权力斗争，刚被苹果公司扫地出门。 风波平息后，乔布斯重新联络了这支团队。起初，乔布斯的意图是把这群顶尖技术人才和他们的图像计算机打包买下，作为日后对抗苹果的一枚棋子，打造一家新的消费级计算机公司；他希望这家公司成为 NeXT 的技术雏形。但艾德·卡特姆、约翰·拉塞特（John Lasseter）和阿尔维·雷·史密斯（Alvy Ray Smith）毫无造电脑的兴趣，他们的执念只有做电脑动画电影。乔布斯最终选择独自创立 NeXT，但他始终放不下这帮人，并在长久的接触中被他们颠覆电影工业的愿景打动，决定亲自出资将团队从卢卡斯影业“赎出”。 1986 年，乔布斯大笔一挥写下两张 500 万美元的支票：一张 500 万美元付给乔治·卢卡斯买断业务与技术资产，另一张 500 万美元作为注资打入全新成立的独立实体。这家新公司被正式定名为“皮克斯”（Pixar），股权结构为乔布斯持股 70%，员工团队持股 30%。两位主播感叹，这简直是商业、电影与科技跨界的“复仇者联盟”：一个因主张采用电脑技术而被迪士尼动画扫地出门的画师（拉塞特），遇到了身处《星球大战》与《帝国反击战》黄金时代的科研天才（卡特姆），并在卢卡斯的困局中奇迹般撞上了被苹果放逐的商业巨擘（乔布斯）。更离奇的是，这群人在多年后不仅在自己的地盘上彻底打败了老东家迪士尼，还迫使迪士尼将其全盘收购来拯救自己的命脉，更让乔布斯摇身一变成了迪士尼最大的个人股东——“这情节荒诞得简直就像一部皮克斯电影”。 - **交易架构**：乔布斯共斥资 1,000 万美元，其中 500 万美元用于收购卢卡斯影业资产，500 万美元作为运营资本注入皮克斯。 - **股权分配**：成立之初，史蒂夫·乔布斯持有 70%，创始员工团队持有 30%。 - **关键引路人**：图灵奖得主、施乐帕克实验室传奇科学家艾伦·凯（Alan Kay）。 --- ### [02:03:11](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01QR2tmxSD4&t=7391s) 《小台灯》惊艳业界与艰难的商业求生 独立后的皮克斯面临最现实的生存危机：空有绝顶技术，却没有商用客户。具有历史讽刺意味的是，为皮克斯开出第一张商业订单的不是别人，正是老东家迪士尼。迪士尼聘请皮克斯为其开发定制软件与硬件系统，也就是用于革新传统二维手绘着色流程的计算机动画制作系统（CAPS）。这是迪士尼与皮克斯日后传奇合作的起点，但在当时，皮克斯仅仅是迪士尼体系下一个微不足道的外部供应商。 为了向业界自证三维动画的潜力，皮克斯团队制作了一部开创性的短片《小台灯》（Luxo Jr.），讲述大台灯和小台灯玩皮球的日常。该片在当时的计算机图形顶级会议 SIGGRAPH 上首映，引发了全行业的剧震。主播 Ben 分享道，他的父亲当年曾参加过一场机器人与计算机动画联合大会，回想起在大银幕上看到《小台灯》的震撼体验时，他深信“这门技术将彻底改变世界”。通过短短 90 秒的动画，观众竟能对两盏毫无生命的工业台灯产生共情与情绪起伏，皮克斯赋予无机物以生命的故事讲述天赋自此初露锋芒。 然而理想敌不过冰冷的财务账本。制作一部全电脑动画长片需要至少 3,000 万美元的天文数字，当时的皮克斯根本无力承担。为了维持现金流，拉塞特不得不带着团队给各种消费品牌制作商业广告来补贴家用。在此期间，他们自主研发了底层三维渲染引擎 RenderMan（至今仍是行业工业标准软件，日后广泛应用于《侏罗纪公园》和《终结者2》等里程碑式特效电影）。但在硬件端，皮克斯引以为傲的“皮克斯图像计算机”（Pixar Image Computer）定价高得吓人，整个生命周期里只卖出大约 300 台，公司陷入严重的亏损泥潭，全靠乔布斯不断自掏腰包追加投资输血。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 皮克斯从创立到《玩具总动员》破局历程 accDescr: 展示皮克斯从脱离卢卡斯影业、早期软硬件与短片探索，直至与迪士尼合作长片的演变流程。 subgraph Origin["诞生与独立 (1986)"] LUC["卢卡斯影业技术团队\n(Catmull & Lasseter)"] -->|乔布斯出资 1,000 万美元收购| PIX["皮克斯独立成立\n(Jobs 占 70%)"] end subgraph Survival["早期商业挣扎 (1986-1990)"] PIX --> HARD["硬件：Pixar Image Computer\n(昂贵滞销，仅售约 300 台)"] PIX --> SOFT["软件：RenderMan & CAPS\n(迪士尼成 CAPS 首位客户)"] PIX --> SHORT["短片探索与商业广告\n(《小台灯》确立叙事能力)"] end subgraph Breakthrough["长片契机 (1991)"] SHORT --> PROPOSAL["Lasseter 拒回迪士尼\n提议合作 30 分钟动画特辑"] PROPOSAL --> TOY["迪士尼高管加码批准长片\n《玩具总动员》正式立项"] end ``` --- ### [02:05:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01QR2tmxSD4&t=7500s) 拒绝回归迪士尼与《玩具总动员》的立项 到了 1991 年前后，迪士尼正凭借《小美人鱼》等作品掀起“迪士尼复兴”风潮，求贤若渴的迪士尼高层开始向约翰·拉塞特频抛橄榄枝，开出优渥条件力邀他回归执导长片。重回迪士尼担任正牌动画长片导演是拉塞特从小的毕生梦想，但他顶住了多次邀约诱惑，毅然选择拒绝：“不行，我已经把我的命运押在了加州北部这帮人身上，我们正在做一件很酷的事。” 拉塞特顺势利用迪士尼对他的垂青作为谈判筹码，提出了折中方案：由皮克斯为迪士尼制作一部 30 分钟的电视动画圣诞特辑，改编自皮克斯曾获奥斯卡最佳动画短片的《锡铁小兵》（Tin Toy）。但在迪士尼制片主管杰弗里·卡森伯格（Jeffrey Katzenberg）麾下任职的彼得·施耐德（Peter Schneider）眼光更为激进，他直接打断了拉塞特，拍板决定：“别搞什么 30 分钟电视特辑了，我们直接做一部完整的院线电脑动画长片！”这部长片正是影史首部全电脑动画电影《玩具总动员》（Toy Story）。 大众往往误以为电脑动画比手绘二维动画更廉价、更容易，其实恰恰相反。电脑动画的本质并非单帧插画绘制，而是在虚拟空间中搭建一个三维舞台剧——场景、灯光、物理属性、虚拟摄像机都需要无中生有地编写出来。皮克斯在日后提交的 S-1 招股说明书内页中，首次向公众完整披露了其首创的七步三维动画生产体系： 1. **故事板（Storyboards）**：每部皮克斯长片必须绘制超过 4,000 幅手工故事画稿作为动作与对白的施工蓝图。更关键的是，团队会将这些画稿拼接并配上临时对白与声效，剪辑成被称为“故事卷轴”（Story Reel）的动态分镜样片。制作团队会进行多达 8 次全盘推翻式的推演重写。乔布斯指出，这相当于在重金投入制作前对电影进行“Beta 测试”，极大提高了故事的命中率；拉塞特亦有一句名言：“如果故事在简陋的分镜卷轴里成立，那么上完 3D 动画和色彩后只会更好看；如果故事在分镜阶段就不行，再炫目的三维动画也救不回来。” 2. **建模（Models）**：利用皮克斯自研的专有建模系统 Marionette，在虚拟空间中搭建角色、道具和场景的纯三维骨架模型。 3. **场景布局（Layout）**：将模型放入三维场景，编排场景走位（Blocking），还原故事板上的二维构图与机位。在未进入动画表演阶段前，角色就像一具具僵硬无生气的木偶和火柴人，仅供确认空间关系与镜头叙事。 4. **角色动画制作（Animation）**：通过“骨骼绑定”（Rigging）赋予模型活动关节点与微表情控制点，动画师在此阶段扮演演员，对角色进行逐关键帧的细致动作与情感编排。 - **关键人物与决策**：彼得·施耐德（Peter Schneider）在杰弗里·卡森伯格授意下，将拉塞特的 30 分钟电视特辑提议升级为全长院线长片合约。 - **制作核心哲学**：先做完一部完整的超低成本“二维手绘电影”（Story Reel），确认叙事与情绪弧线完美无瑕，才允许进入高昂的三维渲染管线。 ### [02:10:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01QR2tmxSD4&t=7800s) 从骨骼绑定到原子级计算：皮克斯的 3D 渲染奇迹 在皮克斯的数字制作管线中，给角色注入生命力是一门融合了经典表演与前沿技术的全新艺术。在骨骼绑定（Rigging）阶段，模型各处都被赋予了精细的关节控制选项，比如手腕、手臂、肘部或肩膀的独立旋转。动画师的工作极其严谨，必须一帧一帧地先完成躯干与四肢的动作，最后才去细调面部表情。皮克斯遵循一条铁律：如果仅靠肢体动作在没有面部表情的情况下就能撑起剧情，那么面部微表情和口型同步才称得上是锦上添花；反之，绝不能依赖面部表情来做叙事的“苦力活”。这个过程就像把毫无生气的火柴人真正变成了活生生的生命。 有趣的是，皮克斯依然继承了迪士尼早在 1938 年制作《白雪公主》时的传统——动画师在动笔前会亲自把场景表演一遍，录下录像带作为动作参考。在 YouTube 上至今还能看到 1992 年制作《玩具总动员》时的珍贵幕后：负责胡迪（Woody）的动画师在镜头前反复模拟肢体细节；而为了研究片中绿色塑料兵（Army Men）的动作，动画师们甚至用大力胶带将滑雪靴牢牢绑在一块长木板上，然后在办公室里绑着脚跳来跳去，借此切身体会双脚被固定在一块底座上时人类到底会如何移动。 一旦动作确立，接下来的步骤是材质着色（Shading）与数字灯光（Lighting）。着色程序赋予物体表面的质感、反射与色彩，无论是木材、金属、布料、玻璃，还是毛发和皮肤，都在此定型；而数字打光就像舞台剧布光一样，能瞬间化腐朽为神奇，将原本死气沉沉的模型场景点染得情绪饱满、美轮美奂。最后的关键瓶颈是渲染（Rendering）——皮克斯自主开发的 RenderMan 软件必须综合考虑模型几何结构、骨骼运动、材质光泽、光源数量乃至运动模糊（Motion Blur），逐一计算每一个像素点。 这种计算量在 20 世纪 90 年代初期堪称天文数字。渲染单单一帧画面就需要一到两个小时，整个工作室每周只能渲染出大约 3.5 分钟的最终成片。皮克斯集中了 117 台在当时最顶尖的 Sun Microsystems 工作站，组建成了影史上早期的“渲染农场”（Render Farm）。正如节目中所感叹的，传统 2D 手绘动画是纯粹的平面绘画艺术，而皮克斯所做的，是在计算机中凭空创造一个完整的三维宇宙，并从物理层面上精确计算这个宇宙中的每一个原子。更重要的是，技术的每一个步骤都与故事构思紧密交织，而非技术人员与编剧之间的简单交接。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 皮克斯 3D 动画制作管线 accDescr: 展示从表演参考与骨骼绑定到最终像素渲染的完整 3D 制作流程 subgraph Performance ["第一阶段：表演与动作"] A["真人实拍参考<br/>(滑雪靴捆绑试验/真人表演)"] --> B["骨骼绑定与躯干动画<br/>(Rigging & Body Motions)"] B --> C["面部与口型细化<br/>(Facial Expressions)"] end subgraph Aesthetics ["第二阶段：外观与光影"] C --> D["材质与表面着色<br/>(Shading: 木纹/金属/皮肤)"] D --> E["数字舞台打光<br/>(Digital Lighting)"] end subgraph Computation ["第三阶段：算力输出"] E --> F["RenderMan 像素计算<br/>(运动模糊/物理光照反射)"] F --> G["117 台 Sun 工作站集群<br/>(每帧耗时 1-2 小时)"] end ``` - **制作周期极限**：每周仅能产出约 3.5 分钟的渲染成片，硬件算力受到当时芯片技术的严苛限制。 - **经典表演技法复用**：绿色塑料兵跳跃动作源于动画师脚踩胶带固定木板的真实物理体验。 --- ### [02:14:05](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01QR2tmxSD4&t=8045s) 迪士尼的严苛条款与“黑色星期五”危机 1993 年 1 月 19 日，迪士尼正式向《玩具总动员》亮起绿灯。双方签署了一份由迪士尼占据绝对统治地位的“三部片约”合同：迪士尼先投拍一部，并拥有独家追加两部续作的期权。迪士尼出资全部的制作费用（预算起初定为 1700 万美元，最终攀升至约 3000 万美元）并承担发行与市场宣发成本；皮克斯则必须独家为迪士尼制作动画。然而，在利益分配上，皮克斯只能分得扣除宣发成本后不足 10% 的微薄净利润，更致命的是，迪士尼牢牢掌控着《玩具总动员》的所有知识产权（包括所有角色版权、衍生品周边收益），并拥有任意开发续集的绝对权利。即使皮克斯拒绝制作续集，迪士尼也可以另起炉灶自行拍摄，且续集根本不算在约定的三部电影额度之内。尽管这是一份极其严苛的“不平等条约”，但彼时好莱坞没有任何其他片厂愿意冒险投资一部全电脑生成的长篇动画，皮克斯别无选择。 雄心勃勃的皮克斯团队决心打破迪士尼经典范式：他们不想制作歌舞片（当时迪士尼连续四部爆款都是歌舞片），也不想翻拍传统的古典童话故事。然而由于缺乏长片讲故事的经验，加之合同规定必须接受迪士尼管理层的修改意见（Notes），制作迅速偏离了轨道。时任迪士尼制片厂负责人的杰弗里·卡森伯格（Jeffrey Katzenberg）不断施压，要求把故事改得更前卫、更尖锐（edgier）。 在缺乏经验和高层施压的双重夹击下，主角胡迪变成了一个刻薄、阴险、满嘴冷嘲热讽的角色。胡迪被巴斯光年带来的失宠威胁冲昏了头脑，甚至演变成了蓄意将巴斯光年推下窗户和塞进梳妆台背后的反派形象。1993 年 12 月，皮克斯带着根据迪士尼反馈制作的故事板动态预览（Story Reel）来到伯班克总部进行内部放映，结果遭遇了灾难性的“黑色星期五”。放映室内一片死寂，卡森伯格和罗伊·E·迪士尼（Roy E. Disney）痛恨这部片子，角色完全立不住。迪士尼当场下达停工令，拒绝再掏一分钱。 面对灭顶之灾，皮克斯团队恳求迪士尼给予两到三周时间进行彻底推倒重写。团队火速撤回北加州，日夜兼程按照自己心目中真正认可的方式重新塑造角色，赋予胡迪和巴斯光年更复杂、更多维的情感张力与脆弱感。奇迹般地，重写后的故事打动了迪士尼高层，项目得以死里逃生重获注资。 - **苛刻的分成机制**：皮克斯获得的利润分成不足 10%，几乎无法支撑独立制片公司的长期资本积累。 - **IP 归属权丧失**：所有角色形象、玩具周边衍生权全部被迪士尼据为己有。 - **“黑色星期五”事件**：1993 年 12 月因胡迪性格过于恶毒险遭迪士尼腰斩，靠团队两三周闭门绝地反击才拯救了项目。 --- ### [02:16:30](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01QR2tmxSD4&t=8190s) 乔布斯的世纪阳谋：卡位上映周的 IPO 豪赌 进入 1994 年，随着故事被彻底扶正，制作管线输出的早期渲染测试镜头惊艳了所有人。整个皮克斯内部士气大振，而幕后大老板史蒂夫·乔布斯（Steve Jobs）也彻底被眼前的成果折服，坚信他们手上正在诞生一部旷世爆款。但作为顶尖战略家的乔布斯，脑海中盘算的远不止一部电影的票房成败。 乔布斯看清了一盘残酷的商业死局：一旦《玩具总动员》大获成功，迈克尔·艾斯纳（Michael Eisner）执掌的迪士尼就会惊觉自己亲手扶植起了一个最可怕的噩梦——一个掌握了自身完全不具备的数字核心技术、且能打造顶级动画内容的超级对手。届时，迪士尼势必会携强大的发行霸权逼迫皮克斯重新签约，把皮克斯锁死在更长期的廉价代工合同里。要想在未来的谈判桌上拥有真正平起平坐的筹码，皮克斯必须摆脱单纯出卖劳动力的代工厂地位，能够自主拿出 50% 的电影制作资金，与迪士尼平起平坐地进行五五对账分账。 但这笔巨额资金从何而来？当时皮克斯连续四年都在亏损，连一部正式院线长片都未曾发行，根本不具备常规上市的基本面。然而乔布斯展现出了标志性的胆魄与狂妄：他决定把皮克斯的首次公开募股（IPO）定在《玩具总动员》上映后的一周内。他的逻辑极为凶悍：只要电影一炮而红，皮克斯就会瞬间成为全球媒体与大众追捧的宠儿，必须在这一热度达到顶峰的瞬间直接撬动华尔街的资本大门。对于任何按部就班的传统管理层来说，在成败未卜之际押上整个公司的身家性命去赌 IPO 简直是疯了，但这就是乔布斯的行事逻辑。1995 年 11 月 22 日，《玩具总动员》正式登陆全美各大院线，一场彻底重塑好莱坞与硅谷权力格局的大风暴蓄势待发。 - **乔布斯对弈艾斯纳的战略构想**：必须拥有与迪士尼对等出资 50% 的资本能力，才能打破不足 10% 的微薄代工分成结构。 - **极致的上市时间窗口**：卡位在电影公映后仅一周挂牌，将好莱坞的票房声浪瞬间转化为华尔街的资本估值溢价。 ### [02:20:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01QR2tmxSD4&t=8400s) 《玩具总动员》爆火与皮克斯 IPO：乔布斯晋升亿万富翁 1995 年感恩节档期，皮克斯首部长篇 3D 动画电影《玩具总动员》（Toy Story）横空出世，首周末便在北美斩获 2900 万美元票房，最终全球总票房狂揽近 4 亿美元。它不仅成为全美当年的票房冠军，更成为影史第一部非迪士尼制作却取得爆炸性商业成功的动画巨制，登顶 1995 年全球所有电影票房榜首。 仅仅一周后的 1995 年 11 月 29 日，皮克斯正式在美股上市挂牌。当时史蒂夫·乔布斯（Steve Jobs）作为公司唯一的商业核心，在电影紧张制作和宣发的节骨眼上满世界飞，向华尔街投行与投资者路演。皮克斯挂牌首日收盘市值突破 15 亿美元，一举融资 1.4 亿美元，超越当年的网景（Netscape），成为 1995 年规模最大的 IPO。乔布斯早前以 500 万美元从卢卡斯影业手中买下这支团队，此后 9 年间不断自掏腰包倒贴 5400 万美元救急发薪水；上市当天乔布斯持股比例高达 78%，单凭这笔股份就坐拥 12 亿美元身价——让乔布斯真正成为亿万富豪的不是苹果公司，而是皮克斯。 这是一连串惊险的“押注公司（Bet-the-company）”豪赌：如果《玩具总动员》扑街，IPO 必将崩盘；而若 IPO 无法成行，皮克斯在下一轮谈判中就只能被巨无霸迪士尼彻底捏死。随着皮克斯资金充足并成为市场上唯一的潜在动画威胁，迪士尼 CEO 迈克尔·艾斯纳（Michael Eisner）坐不住了，急于重签协议。乔布斯借势提出“双方按 50/50 比例共担成本、共享收益”。艾斯纳最终同意，但前提是将原协议剩余的 2 部片约扩展为全新的 5 部长片大单（续集另计）。虽然名义上是 50/50 分成，但迪士尼扣除高额的分销成本与营销发包费后，实际吞下了约 65% 的收益。据传后来乔布斯从乔治·卢卡斯处得知二十世纪福斯给卢卡斯的发行条件远优于迪士尼，心中由此埋下极大的不满。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Pixar and Disney renegotiation after Toy Story IPO accDescr: Diagram illustrating Pixar's hit movie and IPO leading to a new 5-picture deal with Disney. subgraph IPO ["1995 爆发式转折"] A["《玩具总动员》票房近4亿美元"] --> B["皮克斯美股上市 (IPO)"] B --> C["融资1.4亿美元 / 市值15亿美元"] C --> D["乔布斯持股78%成为亿万富翁"] end subgraph Deal ["迪士尼重新谈判"] D --> E["皮克斯账面资金充裕，摆脱被动地位"] E --> F["新签 5 部长篇合作大单"] F --> G["名义利润 50/50 分成"] G --> H["迪士尼扣留发行费，实占约 65%"] end ``` - 《玩具总动员》首周末北美票房 2900 万美元，全球累计近 4 亿美元，为 1995 年全美及全球年度票房冠军。 - 皮克斯 1995 年 11 月 29 日上市首日市值达到 15 亿美元，募资 1.4 亿美元。 - 乔布斯 9 年间累计向皮克斯注资 5400 万美元，IPO 当天所持 78% 股权价值约 12 亿美元。 - 双方签署新 5 部电影发行合约，迪士尼实际拿走约 65% 经济利益。 --- ### [02:25:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01QR2tmxSD4&t=8700s) 艾斯纳与乔布斯交恶：《虫虫危机》、《玩具总动员2》与音乐反盗版冲突 皮克斯的第二部作品《虫虫危机》（A Bug's Life）再传捷报，狂揽 3.6 亿美元全球票房，彻底坐实了皮克斯“爆款制造机”的地位。然而，在筹备《玩具总动员2》时，两家公司的裂痕开始剧烈放大。在此之前，迪士尼对于续集有一套固执的商业逻辑：续集只做低成本的录影带直发（Direct-to-Video），认为影院上映不能过度榨取 IP 价值，且续集天生品质低下。然而皮克斯管理层断然拒绝，他们不愿在内部制造“A队做院线级大片，B队做缩减预算的录影带垃圾”的二等公民文化。 皮克斯据理力争，终于在 1998 年 2 月说服迪士尼批准《玩具总动员2》登陆院线。然而致命的利益冲突随之爆发：这部院线续集算不算新协议 5 部影片之一？乔布斯认为既然是院线大制作，就应计入 5 部合约；而艾斯纳坚称白纸黑字写得清清楚楚，续集绝不计入片约。最终《玩具总动员2》以近 5 亿美元票房刷新皮克斯纪录，迪士尼在数钱数到手抽筋的同时，也学会了“院线续集不仅叫好更极其暴利”的商业模式，但乔布斯与艾斯纳的私交已降至冰点。 外部火药桶接踵而至。乔布斯重回苹果担任 CEO，推出 iPod 和 iTunes，打出了轰动一时的“Rip, Mix, Burn（抓轨、混音、刻录）”营销广告。坐拥庞大原声带唱片帝国的艾斯纳对此震怒，认为这无异于煽动盗版盗窃版权。2002 年艾斯纳亲赴美国国会作证，直接点名炮轰苹果公司的广告助长数字盗版。鲍勃·艾格（Bob Iger）在回忆录《一生的旅程》（The Ride of a Lifetime）中写道：“很明显，在迪士尼失去光彩的同时，皮克斯正变得越来越耀眼，这两个强势人物注定要为争夺霸权而正面交锋。” - 《虫虫危机》全球票房取得 3.6 亿美元。 - 迪士尼原坚持《玩具总动员2》走直发录影带模式，被皮克斯团队抗议后于 1998 年 2 月获批院线发行。 - 《玩具总动员2》全球票房近 5 亿美元，不计入 5 部片约协议。 - 2002 年迈克尔·艾斯纳在国会作证，直斥苹果的“Rip, Mix, Burn”广告是在鼓励侵权。 --- ### [02:27:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01QR2tmxSD4&t=8820s) 《海底总动员》备忘录丑闻与 DVD 时代的巅峰之作 两巨头之间的矛盾在《海底总动员》（Finding Nemo）制作期间演变成一场毫无掩饰的权力暗战。在早期制作阶段，艾斯纳受邀观看了其中一卷粗剪的故事白模带（Story Reel）。皮克斯的创作习惯是通过反复迭代粗糙的白模镜头来打磨剧情，初版往往惨不忍睹。艾斯纳看完后草率地认定这是一部无可救药的烂片。 回到迪士尼后，艾斯纳向董事会提交了一份密级备忘录，断言《海底总动员》必定彻底扑街。艾斯纳在备忘录中写道，这场惨败正好给皮克斯那帮自大狂一个“现实清醒针”（Reality check），并声称皮克斯的失败将极大增加迪士尼在后续续约谈判中的筹码。匪夷所思的是，迪士尼自身在《海底总动员》中享有超过 50% 的巨额分成，理应全力支持其成功，艾斯纳却巴不得它沦为烂片。这份备忘录随后被董事会内部人士泄露给了媒体。乔布斯见报后出离愤怒，在他看来，艾斯纳不仅在商业上处心积虑压制合作伙伴，甚至在主观上积极期盼皮克斯的创作流产。 ```mermaid flowchart LR accTitle: Finding Nemo Memo Conflict accDescr: Flow showing Eisner's memo leak and the surprising box office triumph of Finding Nemo. A["艾斯纳观看《海底总动员》初剪母带"] --> B["向董事会发备忘录：预测电影必定大暴跌"] B --> C["备忘录泄露给媒体：意图借失败打压皮克斯谈判筹码"] C --> D["乔布斯极度震怒，双方伙伴关系彻底破裂"] D --> E["2003年电影上映，全球票房狂斩 8.71 亿美元"] E --> F["DVD 发行登顶影史巅峰，狂揽数亿美元纯利"] ``` 现实无情地击碎了艾斯纳的幻想。《海底总动员》于 2003 年上映后引发全球轰动，院线票房狂飙至 8.71 亿美元，仅次于《指环王：王者归来》（The Lord of the Rings: The Return of the King），位列 2003 年全球票房第二位。仅扣除影院终端分成后，迪士尼与皮克斯光是院线端就落袋约 4.7 亿美元净收益。随后推出的《海底总动员》DVD 更是创造了神话——正如当年《狮子王》VHS 录像带统治了录像带时代一样，《海底总动员》DVD 成为全行业进入流媒体前夕、实体光盘黄金时代当之无愧的绝对巅峰。 - 迈克尔·艾斯纳在泄露的董事会备忘录中称《海底总动员》将遭遇滑铁卢，可给皮克斯一个“现实清醒针”。 - 2003 年《海底总动员》全球票房达到 8.71 亿美元，位列全年度全球票房亚军。 - 扣除影院院线分成（约 4 亿美元），制片与发行方在实体 DVD 发售前已入账约 4.7 亿美元。 - 《海底总动员》DVD 销量打破行业历史纪录，成为家庭录像光盘（Home Video）历史上的最高峰。 ### [02:30:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01QR2tmxSD4&t=9000s) 《海底总动员》的巅峰印钞机与乔布斯的决裂通牒 2004年的家庭录影带市场正处于流媒体诞生前的最后狂欢与最巅峰时代。在两人的调研中，迪士尼与皮克斯联合发行的《海底总动员》（Finding Nemo）DVD在全生命周期内疯狂卖出了创纪录的 6500 万张。按照当时每张约 30 美元的零售价计算，仅家庭音像制品一项就录得了高达 20 亿美元的毛收入。如果再加上全球院线票房，《海底总动员》仅凭影院和 DVD 的毛收入就达到了约 30 亿美元——这甚至还没算上衍生品周边销售、主题乐园游乐设施授权以及随后的电视转播权。面对这台前所未有的超级印钞机，史蒂夫·乔布斯和皮克斯管理层迎来了一次彻底的现实觉醒：皮克斯在羽翼丰满后，根本不再需要依靠迪士尼。 《洛杉矶时报》（Los Angeles Times）在当时的一篇报道中一针见血地指出，在近年间，皮克斯的影片为华特迪士尼影业贡献了多达一半的营业利润，而这其中绝大部分由《海底总动员》所拉动。与此同时，迪士尼自家的传统手绘动画部门却陷入了绝境，接连推出了《星银岛》（Treasure Planet）和《亚特兰蒂斯：失落的帝国》（Atlantis: The Lost Empire）等票房巨亏之作。眼看着自家工作室撑起了整个迪士尼影业的半壁江山，乔布斯被彻底激怒了。自认皮克斯早已是能稳定制造超级爆款的独立成熟制片厂，他将迪士尼的角色贬低为纯粹的“出资与发行管道”。 即便原先的合同里还剩下两部电影的合作义务，乔布斯依然向迈克尔·艾斯纳（Michael Eisner）抛出了一份极具羞辱性的强硬反向要约： - **利润分成逆转**：皮克斯将全额自行承担未来的制作预算，相应地要拿走 100% 的全部利润，彻底废除原本对半开的五五分成协议。 - **纯通道发行费**：迪士尼只能像当年二十世纪福斯（20th Century Fox）发行卢卡斯影业（Lucasfilm）的《星球大战》那样，收取区区 10% 的固定发行服务费。 - **放弃过往版权**：乔布斯甚至开出了最苛刻的条件，要求迪士尼彻底放弃对以往所有合作电影的共同所有权。 很显然，乔布斯深知迪士尼当下极度饥渴、极度依赖皮克斯。艾斯纳选择坚守阵地断然拒绝，因为从财务角度来看，乔布斯搭出的这副利益框架几乎让迪士尼无利可图，在商业逻辑上根本说不通。但对当时的迪士尼而言，除了一枝独秀的 ESPN 体育台，皮克斯几乎是全公司唯一还在良好运转的引擎，失去皮克斯的代价无异于被斩断命脉。 ### [02:32:45](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01QR2tmxSD4&t=9165s) 终止谈判、Circle 7 与 Eisner 时代的黯然落幕 僵局最终在 2004 年 1 月彻底爆发。皮克斯主动拔掉了谈判的插头，并在其官方网站上发布了一篇行文极具乔布斯个人烙印的决裂声明：“在经历了长达 10 个月的努力尝试之后，我们决定向前迈进。我们曾共同走过好莱坞历史上最辉煌的合作历程之一，迪士尼未来无法分享皮克斯的成功，这确实令人遗憾。” 声明宣告双方的合作将在履行完合同中剩余的《超人总动员》（The Incredibles，2004）和《赛车总动员》（Cars，2005）后正式终止。皮克斯随即马不停蹄地奔走于好莱坞其他各大传统巨头之间，自认为只要找个普通的全球发行商便能海阔天空。 被逼入绝境的迪士尼在公司内部仓促设立了一个全新的动画部门——“第七圈动画”（Circle 7 Animation）。该工作室被赋予了非常明确且带着报复色彩的使命：利用迪士尼合同中享有的续集开发权，绕开皮克斯，火速自主立项制作《玩具总动员3》（Toy Story 3）、《怪兽电力公司2》（Monsters, Inc. 2）和《海底总动员2》（Finding Nemo 2）。Circle 7 当时甚至已经针对《玩具总动员3》展开了大量实际的前期开发工作，而这些当年仓皇上马的废案如今早已被严密封存在迪士尼深不可测的绝密档案库里。 这一幕决裂大戏恰恰上演在迈克尔·艾斯纳治下的最后黄昏。彼时迪士尼正处于内外交困的风暴中心：罗伊·E·迪士尼（Roy E. Disney）掀起的“拯救迪士尼”（Save Disney）倒戈运动甚嚣尘上，康卡斯特（Comcast）趁虚发起残酷的敌意收购，股东代理权投票危机一触即发，董事会秘密启动 CEO 遴选程序。即便在那个季度迪士尼交出了爆表的财报，但功劳簿上真正救命的并非自制作品，而是加勒比海盗与《海底总动员》在同一个季度双双引爆的奇迹。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 皮克斯与迪士尼合作决裂及转机 accDescr: 展示2004年皮克斯提出苛刻条件、双方谈判破裂，到迪士尼筹建Circle 7以及艾格上台破局的过程。 subgraph Conflict["2004 决裂危机"] A["《海底总动员》爆火<br/>DVD 狂卖 6500 万张 / 20 亿美元"] --> B["乔布斯提出苛刻续约条件<br/>(100% 利润 + 10% 发行费 + 索要旧版权)"] B --> C["艾斯纳坚决拒绝<br/>谈判彻底崩塌 (2004.01)"] C --> D["皮克斯物色新发行商"] C --> E["迪士尼成立 Circle 7 Animation<br/>强推《玩具总动员3》等续集开发"] end subgraph Transition["权力更迭与破冰"] E --> F["艾斯纳黯然下台<br/>拯救迪士尼运动 & 康卡斯特收购危机"] F --> G["鲍勃·艾格 (Bob Iger) 出任 CEO"] G --> H["艾格破冰致电乔布斯<br/>提议全资收购并让皮克斯接管动画部门"] end ``` ### [02:34:30](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01QR2tmxSD4&t=9270s) 鲍勃·艾格的大胆设想：不仅收购皮克斯，更让其接管迪士尼动画 当鲍勃·艾格（Bob Iger）接过首席执行官权杖时，他清醒地意识到皮克斯对迪士尼未来的不可替代性。艾格做出了一个在好莱坞看来近乎疯狂的决断：他不仅要出巨资把皮克斯买下来，更要让这家曾经的对手直接君临天下，全面接管迪士尼的灵魂核心——华特迪士尼动画工作室。站在乔布斯的视角，这通电话的震撼程度不可思议：前任 CEO 刚刚烧毁了所有桥梁，继任者打来电话不仅愿意全盘配合开价，甚至还挥舞着白旗坦承“我们彻底输了，请你们过来接管并拯救我们最引以为傲的动画帝国”。 在与乔布斯正式挑明之前，艾格先前往迪士尼董事会请求授权，探讨收购皮克斯的可能性。据艾格本人向节目主播回忆，董事会当时的反应是彻底懵掉的，“他们震惊到甚至忘了说‘不’”。董事们普遍认为乔布斯答应被收购的几率基本为零，既然是个绝不可能达成的幻想，便索性随手放行让他去碰壁。 然而艾格迅速向乔布斯端出了一套极其诱人且尊重对方的整合蓝图： - **保持皮克斯独立自治**：皮克斯仍将完整保留在旧金山湾区的埃默里维尔（Emeryville）园区，保留自己专属的企业邮箱域名、不受干涉的创作文化以及独特的人员体系，一切运行机制丝毫不变。 - **双线掌舵与文化输出**：约翰·拉塞特（John Lasseter）与埃德·卡特姆尔（Ed Catmull）不仅继续领导皮克斯，还将每周抽出两天飞往洛杉矶，亲自挂帅统领迪士尼动画工作室。 - **赋予“生杀大权”**：艾格甚至对拉塞特和卡特姆尔直言，如果他们考察后认为迪士尼动画部门积重难返、无可救药，或者两地奔波会毁掉皮克斯本身的专注度，他们拥有直接关停迪士尼动画工作室的权力，届时皮克斯将成为迪士尼旗下唯一的动画厂牌。 拉塞特和卡特姆尔没有选择“斩下宿敌的首级”。对于这两位从传统动画走出来的匠人而言，华特·迪士尼是他们精神与技术萌芽的圣殿，亲手杀死迪士尼动画是情感上绝对无法接受的事。当他们低调飞往洛杉矶考察后发现，迪士尼动画内部并不缺乏才华横溢的天才画师与动画人，其真正的病根出在官僚僵化和极其糟糕的领导管理。他们坚信只要引入皮克斯引以为傲的“智囊团”（Brain Trust）机制、打破原有的物理办公隔阂、导入皮克斯的协作文化，迪士尼动画就能浴火重生——而历史也证明他们后来确实做到了。 ### [02:36:45](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01QR2tmxSD4&t=9405s) 74亿美元世纪并购、园区长椅上的绝密告白与皮克斯的归宿 双方的并购谈判以惊人的速度推进并达成共识。迪士尼同意以总计 74 亿美元的全股票交易收购皮克斯。这笔交易通过新发行的大量迪士尼股票完成，使得史蒂夫·乔布斯瞬间成为迪士尼最大的个人股东，一举持有约 7.7% 的股权，并顺利进驻迪士尼董事会——此时乔布斯手握的迪士尼股份份额，已经远远超过了整个迪士尼家族后代资产的总和。 2006 年 1 月的一个清晨，所有法律文件与董事会审批全部就绪，艾格专程飞抵旧金山湾区埃默里维尔的皮克斯总部，准备在全员大会上正式向全世界揭晓这一重磅喜讯。但在官宣前夕，乔布斯突然走向艾格，提议道：“我们单独在园区里走走吧。” 两人漫步到园区的一处长椅前坐下，乔布斯神情严肃地对艾格吐露了一个天大的秘密：“我必须告诉你一件事，你必须向我保证绝对保密。我的癌症复发了，我不知道自己还能在这个世界上活多久。” 当时距离正式发布会只有短短 30 分钟。乔布斯坦言，自己反复思量后认为在官宣前对艾格负有不可推卸的道义责任：鉴于自己马上就要成为迪士尼的第一大股东，而一旦自己离世，这笔巨额股权将去向何方、会给迪士尼带来怎样的动荡皆是未知数。乔布斯主动对艾格表态：如果你现在想反悔退出交易，我给你权利立刻取消。 面对这起好莱坞世纪并购案中最残酷也最戏剧性的谈判考验，艾格只有 30 分钟做出抉择，而且受限于保密义务，他连身边的法务、财务高管或董事会成员都无法商榷。最终，艾格顶住了难以想象的心理重压，做出了交易照旧推进的决定。此后乔布斯与病魔抗争，又在这个世界上生活了五年半的时间。但自长椅对话的那一刻起，乔布斯、艾格、苹果公司乃至不久后整个世界都知道，他所剩的每一分每一秒都已是向死神借来的倒计时——这也正是乔布斯决意将皮克斯托付给迪士尼的最底层原因。 主播深入探讨了调研本期节目时长期困扰的一个核心商业问题：如果皮克斯始终保持独立，它是否有可能凭借自身的超级 IP，一步步拓展至衍生品、自建主题乐园，最终打造出一个全栈式飞轮、成为正面击溃迪士尼的新时代媒体帝国？在广泛访谈了迪士尼高管、皮克斯元老以及各方内幕人士之后，主播得出的结论是：这种假设在现实中毫无发生的可能。皮克斯自始至终是一群艺术家与技术纯粹主义者的聚合体，他们骨子里永远不会愿意去承担蜕变成为另一个庞大、世俗、重资产的迪士尼商业帝国所必须付出的复杂妥协。 ### [02:40:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01QR2tmxSD4&t=9600s) 皮克斯的乌托邦与“拯救两家公司” 皮克斯位于埃默里维尔（Emeryville）的园区，恰恰是华特·迪士尼在 1940 年建造伯班克（Burbank）动画园区时梦寐以求的样子——一个属于创意艺术家的纯粹乌托邦天堂。在皮克斯，你看不到西装革履的商业管理人员（“no suits”），这里的一切核心都围绕着故事、艺术和电影。而最令人惊叹的是，在被迪士尼收购之后，皮克斯依然完整保留了这一特质：所有负责商业和行政的“西装官僚”都留在了伯班克的迪士尼总部，而埃默里维尔得以继续作为创意的净土存在。历史上迪士尼伯班克园区未能长期保持这种乌托邦状态，是因为它必须同时承担整个商业帝国的重负；而皮克斯在被收购前之所以能做到这一点，完全仰仗史蒂夫·乔布斯（Steve Jobs）的庇护与魄力。 主播们分析道，如果乔布斯身体健康且精力充沛，他完全有能力在兼顾苹果的同时将皮克斯打造成与迪士尼并驾齐驱的竞争对手，甚至未来将苹果与皮克斯合并。然而乔布斯深知自己身患重病、时日无多。如果没有乔布斯，皮克斯内部由艺术家与技术专家组成的团队根本无人愿意去经营一家商业娱乐巨头，他们唯一的执念就是做出极致动人的故事、取悦观众并制作最顶级的长篇电影。因此，皮克斯必须寻找一个坚实的归宿，而迪士尼正是最完美的家。动画的历史由此形成了闭环：华特·迪士尼时期的黄金时代，其精神继承者是 1990 年代的迪士尼文艺复兴（Disney Renaissance），而文艺复兴的精神继承者正是皮克斯。 这项收购不仅让皮克斯延续了辉煌（接连推出《赛车总动员》、《料理鼠王》、《机器人总动员》、《飞屋环游记》、《玩具总动员 3》、《勇敢传说》、《头脑特工队》等传世之作，其中《料理鼠王》在上映前曾因“老鼠在厨房做饭”的概念被外界质疑为糟糕的点子），更彻底激活了迪士尼动画工作室的复兴。在埃德·卡特姆（Ed Catmull）和约翰·拉塞特（John Lasseter）入主后，迪士尼动画接连打造了《公主与青蛙》、《魔发奇缘》、《冰雪奇缘》、《超能陆战队》、《疯狂动物城》以及《海洋奇缘》。在乔布斯去世前的几个月，他和妻子劳伦（Laurene Powell Jobs）与鲍勃·艾格（Bob Iger）夫妇共进最后的晚餐。席间，乔布斯举杯向艾格致敬，说了一句意味深长的话：“看看我们做成的事，我们拯救了两家公司（Look what we did. We saved two companies）。”乔布斯清楚皮克斯失去他后无法独立存续，而艾格明白迪士尼不能没有皮克斯的创意引擎，二人合力成就了商业史上的奇迹。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Disney and Pixar Creative Lineage accDescr: Diagram tracing the creative evolution from Walt Disney to the modern revival. subgraph Heritage["动画创意传承脉络"] A["华特·迪士尼黄金时代 (1930s-1940s)"] --> B["迪士尼文艺复兴时期 (1989-1990s)"] B --> C["皮克斯工作室崛起 (Pixar)"] end subgraph Synergy["2006 收购后的双向赋能"] C --> D["输入皮克斯创意流程与领导力"] D --> E["迪士尼动画第二轮复兴<br/>(《冰雪奇缘》《疯狂动物城》等)"] D --> F["皮克斯持续推出经典<br/>(《飞屋》《头脑特工队》等)"] end ``` ### [02:43:20](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01QR2tmxSD4&t=9800s) 验证皮克斯模式与收购的商业回报 为了探究迪士尼动画工作室是如何被改造成爆款工厂的，节目组在录制前特意与在《冰雪奇缘》中为安娜公主配音的克里斯汀·贝尔（Kristen Bell）进行了交流。贝尔向他们证实，如今迪士尼动画的运作模式完全移植了 1990 年代初皮克斯的蓝图：这是一个高度迭代的创作过程，核心在于通过早期故事画稿（reels）和剧本反复感受故事是否打动人心；所有创作者抛开个人自负（ego）进行坦诚互评，一旦发现剧情走偏，随时有勇气彻底推倒重来。在贝尔看来，这种极致的叙事与协作文化，正是如今迪士尼整体运转顺畅的底层原因。 从财务投资的角度复盘，这项收购无疑取得了巨大成功： - **收购成本对冲**：迪士尼当时的收购对价为 74 亿美元，扣除皮克斯账上的 10 亿美元现金后，净收购成本约为 64 亿美元。 - **单项 IP 的吸金能力**：仅《玩具总动员》一个系列，全球累计票房就突破 40 亿美元（归属迪士尼约 15 亿至 20 亿美元）；其衍生消费品全生命周期零售额达 300 亿美元，按迪士尼通常收取的 5% 授权分成计算，便带来了 20 亿美元的高利润收入。 - **庞大的飞轮乘数**：单是《玩具总动员》的基础收益就收回了收购对价的一半到三分之二，这尚未计入迪士尼乐园（4 个主题园区、19 个游乐设施及 2 家配套酒店）、Disney+ 订阅价值、Netflix 历史流媒体授权费，以及早期录像带与 DVD 的巨额销售。 - **流媒体时代的护城河**：在迪士尼近十年来押上全部筹码的核心战略 Disney+ 上，每周播放量前 15 名的影片中，绝大多数既非真人电影，也非《星球大战》或《复仇者联盟》，而是皮克斯与卡特姆/拉塞特入主后的迪士尼新动画。现代孩子们很少反复重温 1937 年的《白雪公主》，而是在无限循环观看《冰雪奇缘》、《魔法满屋》、《海洋奇缘》和《疯狂动物城》。 ### [02:46:37](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01QR2tmxSD4&t=9997s) 赞助商插播与 2009 年收购漫威的前奏 在皮克斯取得耀眼成功后，鲍勃·艾格与迪士尼董事会坚定了这一路径，继续践行艾格“三点战略”中的第一条——制作最优质的内容。在深入探讨艾格接下来的两大重磅收购（漫威与卢卡斯影业）之前，节目插入了对赞助商 Anthropic 旗下 AI 模型 Claude 的致谢。 两位主播分享了一段幕后趣事：在录制《迪士尼（上集）》的当天，时间极度紧迫，他们在核对《白雪公主与七个小矮人》原始上映票房时遇到了严重的矛盾。大量权威文献记载《白雪公主》当年的票房收入为 800 万美元，然而他们手头持有的迪士尼 1940 年原始财务报表却白纸黑字写着 450 万美元。由于无法调和这两个数据，节目录制被迫中断。当时适逢 Claude 3.5 Sonnet（节目中口误称为 Fable 5）发布，他们便将报表照片与相关的年度财务分解说明上传至 Claude。Claude 在几分钟内厘清了困惑：800 万美元是院线“总票房”（Gross box office），而 450 万美元是影院分账后迪士尼与发行方实际拿到的“制片厂租金收入”（Film rentals）。这不仅解决了数据矛盾，更帮他们推导出一个独家洞察：仅靠《白雪公主》的利润根本不足以全额支付伯班克园区的建设成本，迫使华特·迪士尼举债借贷，从而引发了一系列连锁财务危机。在 Claude 的帮助下，录制在 20 分钟内恢复并顺利完成。 随后话题切回正题：2009 年，迪士尼宣布以 40 亿美元收购漫威娱乐（Marvel Entertainment）。在当时，这是一笔极具争议、被外界视为“极度反共识”的交易。华尔街和媒体普遍感到费解，纷纷质疑迪士尼为何要斥资 40 亿美元去买一家看似日薄西山的漫画书公司。尽管当时漫威影业已经推出了《钢铁侠》等电影并取得了不错的票房，但在好莱坞大众眼里，漫威宇宙宏大的统治版图在当时还远未清晰可见。 ### [02:50:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01QR2tmxSD4&t=10200s) 漫威宇宙的封神与卢卡斯影业收购 在迪士尼收购漫威之初，外界根本无法预见漫威最终会演变成何等庞大的商业怪兽。彼时超级英雄电影在好莱坞并非稳赚不赔的通用公式；尽管历史上出现过多部《蝙蝠侠》和《超人》，索尼也拍出了大火的《蜘蛛侠》，但这恰恰暴露了漫威当年的窘境——在被迪士尼收购前，漫威为了自救早已把最值钱的核心角色授权给了其他电影制片厂。X战警在二十世纪福斯手里，蜘蛛侠在索尼手里，钢铁侠已被拍成独立电影，而超级英雄界最顶级的招牌“超人”和“蝙蝠侠”全都在对手 DC 麾下。迪士尼接盘时，外界质疑这无异于花巨资买下一堆“别人挑剩下的次级角色”。然而漫威影业团队与迪士尼却交出了一份惊天答卷：他们精心构建出电影史上前所未有的“漫威电影宇宙”（MCU），让多部彼此互联的独立角色电影最终交汇于《复仇者联盟》，成为所有试图打造宇宙级 IP 的好莱坞片厂的终极范本。前三个阶段的漫威宇宙堪称 IP 运营的大师级教材。 截至 2025 年，漫威电影宇宙已成为影史票房最高的系列IP，全球院线总票房累计接近 320 亿美元，彻底超越了《星球大战》与《007》等老牌神作。虽然这建立在多达 37 部电影的体量之上，但其中《复仇者联盟4：终局之战》更是荣登全球影史票房第二名（仅次于《阿凡达》）。尽管很难精确分摊内部成本，但光是漫威电影的院线票房净利润就达到了数十亿美元级别；更不用说随之而来的衍生消费品、迪士尼乐园主题展区、实体蓝光光盘销售，以及日后支撑 Disney+ 流媒体订阅的庞大号召力。漫威的收购逻辑本质上与皮克斯如出一辙：找到这群拥有顶级故事与世界观的创作者，为他们提供一个尺度前所未有的超级画布。 紧接着在 2012 年，鲍勃·艾格再次出手，以 40 亿美元现金加股票收购了卢卡斯影业（Lucasfilm）。《星球大战》正传是过去一百年人类神话叙事的巅峰之作，艾格同样希望将其纳入迪士尼体系并赋予更大的舞台。回看艾格当年的疯狂扫货清单，他在好莱坞几乎以一己之力垄断了所有的“超 A 级”（Tier A+）头部 IP——除了《哈利·波特》和任天堂宇宙等极少数资产，全球最具商业延展性的顶级 IP 几乎尽收迪士尼囊中。当时许多人觉得艾格掏支票的胆量大得吓人，且多次增发股票稀释股权，但后来的事实证明其前瞻性惊人。相比于当年收购皮克斯付出的 74 亿美元高价，漫威与卢卡斯影业的 40 亿美元估值显得格外划算，特别是卢卡斯影业在被收购时甚至没有正在制作中的电影储备；尽管《星球大战》后续的开发现实证明其后劲与口碑并未达到漫威的高度（虽然也有《安多》和《侠盗一号》这样的惊艳之作），但这一系列收购彻底重塑了迪士尼的资产版图。 - 漫威电影宇宙截至 2025 年上映 37 部电影，全球累计票房接近 320 亿美元，超越《星球大战》和《007》。 - 《复仇者联盟4：终局之战》全球票房位列影史第二，仅次于卡梅隆的《阿凡达》。 - 核心 IP 版权初始状态：漫威此前已将蜘蛛侠授权给索尼，X战警授权给福斯，收购漫威时外界一度视其为“残羹冷炙”。 - 2012 年迪士尼以 40 亿美元收购卢卡斯影业，将《星球大战》与《印第安纳·琼斯》收入麾下。 --- ### [02:54:32](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01QR2tmxSD4&t=10472s) 飞轮全速轰鸣与十年的帝国狂飙（2005–2015） 在皮克斯、漫威与卢卡斯影业三大超级收购的加持下，迪士尼传奇的商业飞轮迎来了历史上最辉煌的轰鸣期。公司的故事创作与角色库达到了前所未有的繁荣与多元，不仅漫威与皮克斯连战连捷，迪士尼本部动画工作室也推出了现象级爆款《冰雪奇缘》（Frozen）。电影上映后的第一年，迪士尼在全球卖出了整整 300 万条艾莎和安娜的公主裙。到 2015 年，迪士尼在全球零售渠道的授权衍生品年销售总额突破了惊人的 500 亿美元，在短短五年内直接翻了一倍，生动展现了其角色资产的统治级变现能力。 音乐业务同样重返黄金时代。电影主题曲《Let It Go》不仅斩获奥斯卡最佳原创歌曲，其所属的《冰雪奇缘》电影原声大碟更以 1000 万张（含流媒体折算）的销量，击败了泰勒·斯威夫特现象级的专辑《1989》，荣登 2014 年全球最畅销专辑宝座。线下乐园方面，迪士尼于 2012 年在加州冒险乐园推出了轰动一时的“汽车总动员天地”（Cars Land）。有趣的是，在收购皮克斯之前，幻想工程师（Imagineers）原本独立立项的是一个与 IP 完全无关的“汽车天地”（Car Land）；收购完成后，管理层迅速将其无缝嫁接为皮克斯顶级 IP。在鲍勃·艾格执掌公司的前十年间（2005 至 2015 年），乐园业务的整体营收几乎翻番，营业利润暴涨近三倍。 从 2005 年艾格接手到 2015 年的十年间，迪士尼的整体财务指标完成了惊人的跨越： - **公司总市值**：从艾格上任初期的 500 亿美元暴涨至 2000 亿美元，整整翻了 4 倍。 - **年度总营收**：从 320 亿美元跃升至 520 亿美元。 - **营业利润**：从 47 亿美元飙升至 147 亿美元以上。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Disney Flywheel Expansion 2005-2015 accDescr: Diagram illustrating how ESPN cash flow funded acquisitions that fed into Disney's global franchise flywheel. subgraph CashSource["现金奶牛 (资金引擎)"] ESPN["ESPN & 有线电视网络<br/>每年数以十亿美元计的保底现金流"] end subgraph Acquisitions["顶级 IP 收购"] PIX["皮克斯 Pixar (2006)<br/>74 亿美元"] MAR["漫威 Marvel (2009)<br/>40 亿美元"] LUC["卢卡斯影业 Lucasfilm (2012)<br/>40 亿美元"] end subgraph Flywheel["全面放大的迪士尼飞轮"] FILM["核心电影与叙事<br/>MCU / 冰雪奇缘 / 玩具总动员"] MERCH["消费品零售<br/>2015年规模达 500 亿美元"] MUSIC["音乐唱片<br/>《Let It Go》力压 Taylor Swift"] PARKS["主题乐园与度假区<br/>Cars Land / 利润增长近 3 倍"] end ESPN -->|"资金反哺并购"| PIX ESPN -->|"资金反哺并购"| MAR ESPN -->|"资金反哺并购"| LUC PIX --> FILM MAR --> FILM LUC --> FILM FILM --> MERCH FILM --> MUSIC FILM --> PARKS ``` --- ### [02:56:45](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01QR2tmxSD4&t=10605s) ESPN 的印钞机法则与剪线风暴的初现（2015） 这种飞轮奇迹的背后，隐藏着一个常被公众忽视的核心功臣：ESPN 与有线电视业务那口永不干涸的“现金喷泉”。外界在看皮克斯（74 亿美元）、漫威（40 亿美元）和卢卡斯影业（40 亿美元）的收购时，往往觉得金额高得不可思议；但如果对照迪士尼有线电视部门当时的净利润，账目逻辑便一目了然：收购皮克斯相当于有线电视部门两年半的利润；收购漫威只用掉了 2009 年有线电视部门不到一年的利润；而收购卢卡斯影业同样耗资不足有线网络一年的盈利。换言之，**ESPN 在四年内产出的纯现金利润，就轻轻松松买下了皮克斯、漫威和卢卡斯影业全部资产**。这堪比沃伦·巴菲特式的超级资本配置艺术：把那些具备强大垄断特许权、但无法高效进行资本再投资的业务（ESPN）所产生的源源不断的现金，抽调注入到那些拥有巨大再投资空间与长期复利潜力的顶级资产（IP 飞轮）中。 到了 2015 年夏天，迪士尼在华尔街和消费者眼中都完美无缺。艾格成功将 ESPN 的现金奶牛与好莱坞的内容创造力天衣无缝地结合在一起，股价在 2015 年 8 月初创下历史最高纪录。然而，盛极必衰的转折点恰恰毫无征兆地降临在公司创下历史最高股价的同一天。 2015 年 8 月 4 日，迪士尼召开了 2015 财年第三季度财报电话会议。艾格在会上轻描淡写地提到了一句话：受消费者“剪线潮”（Cord-cutting，即退订有线电视）的影响，ESPN 遭遇了“适度的订阅用户流失”（modest subscriber losses）。随后的年报披露，ESPN 在那一年直接流失了 300 万订阅户，总户数滑落至 9200 万。在此之前，ESPN 的订户数曾一度达到约 1 亿户——在当时几乎相当于覆盖了全美所有的有线电视家庭。在所有投资人的认知里，ESPN 是一部营收与利润只增不减的完美印钞机。虽然行业内早就有人警告流媒体对有线电视的冲击，年轻一代成家立业后也不再安装有线电视线缆，但当这一数据真切地在财报中被管理层承认时，瞬间对华尔街造成了剧烈的信仰地震。 - 资本配置对照：ESPN 等有线电视网络 4 年左右的净利润，即可全额覆盖皮克斯、漫威和卢卡斯影业三笔交易的对价总和。 - 拐点时刻：2015 年 8 月 4 日财报电话会，迪士尼股价触及历史极值（除 2021 年疫情期间的异常暴涨外）。 - 订户下滑：ESPN 在 2015 财年损失约 300 万订户，从峰值时约 1 亿全美家庭渗透率回落至 9200 万户，敲响了传统有线电视帝国的黄昏丧钟。 ### [03:00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01QR2tmxSD4&t=10800s) 财报黑天鹅与传统媒体的十年大溃败 2015 年 8 月的那场财报电话会议成为了整个传媒帝国的“零号震源”。此前，传统媒体行业一直心存侥幸，即便知道年轻一代更喜欢在网上获取内容，但只要财报上的数字依然向上增长，大家就继续装作一切正常。然而，当迪士尼正式坦承 ESPN 遭遇用户流失后，一场波及整个行业的恐慌瞬间爆发。尽管奈飞（Netflix）彼时市值已达 500 亿美元，行业转型本不该令人意外，但市场的反应依旧血腥：财报发布次日，迪士尼股价暴跌 10%；紧接着的几天内，福克斯（Fox）、时代华纳（Time Warner）和探索传播（Discovery）也遭遇了同等幅度的下挫；而业务严重依赖有线电视网络的维亚康姆（Viacom）更是直接被砍掉超过 20%。 拉长时间维度来看，这一天成了传统媒体分水岭的注脚。自那场财报电话会以来的十一年间，迪士尼的股价经历了剧烈震荡，但最终却几乎原地踏步，与十一年前持平；与此同时，标普 500 指数（S&P 500）在同一时期内暴涨了 3.5 倍。市值虽然无法概括一切，但它反映了资本市场对一家公司极度长期的未来现金流折现预期——投资界认为迪士尼今天的长期现金流创造能力，与十一年前相比并没有发生根本性的飞跃。 更为惨烈的是其他传统媒体公司的宿命。在这场有线电视退订潮（Cord-cutting）和流媒体崛起的惊涛骇浪中，整个影视制作领域陷入了现代商业史上罕见的狂躁与重组周期： - **时代华纳（Time Warner）**：先是将自己出售给电信巨头 AT&T；随后 AT&T 尝尽苦头反悔，剥离时代华纳并将其与探索频道合并为华纳兄弟探索（Warner Bros. Discovery）；之后又经历几番震荡，甚至险些被奈飞收购，一度深陷与派拉蒙的合并传闻。 - **维亚康姆与 CBS**：二者重新合并，因原有品牌失去号召力而改用旗下制片厂的名字更名为派拉蒙（Paramount）；随后派拉蒙在沉重的债务压力下濒临崩溃，最终由大卫·埃里森（David Ellison）及其父亲拉里·埃里森（Larry Ellison，甲骨文创始人）出手收购，与天空之舞传媒（Skydance Media）合并为 Skydance Paramount。 - **科技巨头的农奴制**：几乎所有好莱坞传统巨头最终都沦为了科技平台领地上的“农奴”。放眼当今好莱坞的影视版图，真正能够产生巨额且稳定利润的核心玩家只剩下了三个：奈飞（Netflix）、YouTube 以及唯一维持独立运作的迪士尼。 --- ### [03:03:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01QR2tmxSD4&t=10980s) 告别 Netflix 幻觉：自建流媒体与直面消费者的野心 面对汹涌的流媒体浪潮，鲍勃·艾格（Bob Iger）和迪士尼董事会画下了一条不容退让的底线：绝不能坐以待毙被奈飞“干掉”，必须正面迎战，建立属于迪士尼自己的直接面向消费者（DTC）流媒体平台。这恰好呼应了艾格最初接任 CEO 时向董事会提出的第二大核心战略支柱——拥抱前沿科技。 在当时，业内曾存在一种看似诱人的商业模式假设：迪士尼何不舒舒服服地每年躺赚奈飞支付的数亿美元版权采购费？只要把内容分发到奈飞等平台，全世界都能看到迪士尼的作品，不仅坐收纯利，还能顺理成章地带动下游的消费品授权和主题乐园业务。然而，艾格敏锐地意识到了这一模式背后致命的灰犀牛：**分发与算法的控制权**。一旦家庭观众能否看到迪士尼影片的决定权落入奈飞算法的黑箱中，迪士尼就彻底丧失了对其 IP 曝光度与生命周期的主导权。如果缺乏自主控制的可发现性（Discoverability），没有观众对角色产生深厚的情感共鸣，乐园与周边销售的飞轮便无从谈起。 自建 Disney+ 虽伴随着难以估量的业务阵痛，却为迪士尼带来了一项百年未有的战略资产——**与消费者的直接连接**。在此之前的整整一百年里，除非游客亲自踏进迪士尼乐园，否则迪士尼对自己的用户一无所知： - 观众买录像带（Home Video）走的是百思买（Best Buy）或沃尔玛等零售商； - 观众去电影院买票，钱和数据留在影院院线； - 观众收看有线电视频道，订阅费由有线电视运营商收取。 过去一个世纪，迪士尼从未掌握过终端消费者的邮箱地址、家庭住址或用户画像，它只是坐在渠道背后收取分销支票，盲目相信另一端存在着最终客户。打造自建流媒体，让迪士尼第一次能够直接触达亿万家庭，不仅能围绕经典角色构建更加深入的剧集宇宙、为主题乐园源源不断地输送新 IP，更从底层重塑了整个商业帝国的用户数据根基。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Disney Distribution Shift accDescr: Comparison between Disney's legacy indirect distribution model and its direct-to-consumer streaming model. subgraph Legacy["传统百年分销模式（数据与渠道受制于人）"] L1["迪士尼内容库"] --> L2["中间渠道（院线 / 有线网络 / 零售商 / Netflix）"] L2 --> L3["最终消费者（无用户画像、无直接触点）"] end subgraph Modern["DTC 流媒体模式（闭环飞轮）"] M1["迪士尼 / 皮克斯 / 漫威 / 星球大战"] --> M2["自主流媒体（Disney+ / ESPN+）"] M2 --> M3["直接消费者关系（数据掌控、算法自主）"] M3 --> M4["主题乐园互动 & 衍生消费品"] M4 --> M1 end ``` --- ### [03:05:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01QR2tmxSD4&t=11100s) 放弃推特，押注棒球：收购 BAMTech 铺平 Disney+ 之路 下定自建流媒体的决心后，艾格与管理层迅速意识到一个残酷的现实：作为一家传统内容与娱乐公司，迪士尼内部根本不具备从零搭建并高并发运维现代互联网流媒体平台的技术基因。要打赢这场仗，唯一的出路就是通过外部收购来买齐底层拼图。 迪士尼首先将目光投向了市面上具备规模化互联网服务能力的公司。由于硅谷巨头市值庞大难以吞并，当时唯二进入射程的潜在标的只有 Twitter 和 Snapchat。巧合的是，Twitter 联合创始人杰克·多西（Jack Dorsey）当时恰好身兼迪士尼董事会成员。迪士尼与 Twitter 的谈判一路狂飙推进，甚至所有法律协议和交割文件都已经完全准备就绪，计划在周一清晨正式签署并对外官宣。然而，就在周日深夜的最后一刻，艾格突然踩下了刹车。他实在无法想象由迪士尼来拥有并运营充满争议言论的 Twitter 会带来何种文化灾难。这个在最后一秒流产的插曲，成为了传媒并购史上最惊险的未竟篇章之一。 告别 Twitter 后，迪士尼转向了一个低调却技术纯正得多的标的——**BAMTech**。BAMTech 的前身是美国职业棒球大联盟（MLB）旗下的数字媒体部门 MLB Advanced Media。早在 2002 年，为了让日本球迷能够实时收看转会至西雅图水手队（Seattle Mariners）的日本棒球巨星铃木一朗（Ichiro Suzuki）的比赛，大联盟团队（当时西雅图水手队由任天堂北美控股）便启动了超前的棒球赛事线上流媒体直播业务。该团队从为大联盟各球队制作官方网站起步，历经十余年淬炼，不仅打磨出能够抗住海量并发的顶级体育流媒体底层架构，还在独立拆分后承接了北美职业冰球联赛（NHL）以及 HBO 早期流媒体试水产品“HBO Now”的流媒体技术后台。 对于既要布局 ESPN 体育直播、又要承载高品质影视点播的迪士尼而言，BAMTech 堪称天作之合： - **2016 年 8 月**：迪士尼出资收购 BAMTech 33% 的股份，并附带在未来数年内增持至控股地位的期权； - **2017 年**：迪士尼决定大幅提前行使期权，全资掌控 BAMTech 的控制权； - **重磅战略官宣**：迪士尼正式向外界宣布，将于 2018 年推出面向 ESPN 的 OTT 体育流媒体服务（即后来的 ESPN+），并于 2019 年正式上线迪士尼独立流媒体服务（即 Disney+）； - **与奈飞决裂**：作为这项激进战略的配套动作，迪士尼宣布将在 2019 年前彻底终止与奈飞的内容许可协议，全面下架并召回迪士尼、皮克斯（Pixar）、漫威（Marvel）以及卢卡斯影业（Lucasfilm）的所有影视版权。 这一决定意味着迪士尼主动放弃了奈飞每年支付的数亿美元纯利润分红。对于当时年运营利润约为 150 亿美元的迪士尼而言，这无异于亲手割肉断粮，但也正是这份断腕的决心，正式拉开了全球流媒体大战的世纪序幕。 ### [03:10:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01QR2tmxSD4&t=11400s) 告别 Netflix、全员备战与 ESPN 的流媒体两难 为了筹备自家的流媒体服务，迪士尼做出了一个极其大胆的决定：撕毁与 Netflix 之间利润极其丰厚的内容分销协议。当时迪士尼很大一部分利润直接来自 Netflix 的支票，但管理层毅然决定放弃这笔唾手可得的现金流，宁愿从零开始建立独立的用户群，实现与消费者的直接连接。之所以敢于冒这种巨大的财务风险，很大程度上是因为背后有 ESPN 这座稳固的资金“堡垒”提供现金流支撑——尽管此时传统有线电视已显露颓势，但 ESPN 依然是一台不折不扣的印钞机。 然而，这也导致了一个尴尬的局面：为了保护利润丰厚的有线电视基本盘，迪士尼必须对流媒体上的 ESPN 做出妥协与削弱。2018 年上线的 ESPN+ 几乎成了一个“无关痛痒的空壳产品（nothing burger）”，因为所有最精彩、最具价值的独家顶级赛事依然留在有线电视频道里。对于 ESPN 而言，转向直接面向消费者（DTC）极其困难。传统有线电视模式的精妙之处在于“按人头抽成的渠道费（affiliate fee）”以及捆绑包的威力：不论用户平时看不看体育频道，每个月都会通过 80 到 100 美元的电视账单为 ESPN 贡献一笔固定收入；而一旦转为单独按需订阅，愿意单月支付 30 美元高价专门看 ESPN 的核心球迷群体，远远少于过去那些被动付费的轻度观众与泛人群。 面对流媒体转型的硬仗，鲍勃·艾格（Bob Iger）向迪士尼内部发出了“全员备战”的最高指令。他要求旗下所有的创意工作室——迪士尼动画工作室（Disney Animation）、迪士尼真人电影部门（Disney Live Action）、皮克斯（Pixar）、卢卡斯影业（Lucasfilm）以及漫威影业（Marvel）——不仅要维持原有的院线排片计划，更要开足马力为计划于 2019 年上线的迪士尼第一方流媒体平台专门定制优质独家内容。 --- ### [03:12:45](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01QR2tmxSD4&t=11565s) 默多克的来电：福克斯的战略抉择与 520 亿美元协议 就在迪士尼内部全速运转之际，鲍勃·艾格接到了传媒大亨鲁伯特·默多克（Rupert Murdoch）打来的电话。此时默多克和二十一世纪福克斯（21st Century Fox）也经历了深刻的战略复盘。福克斯得出的结论与迪士尼截然相反：流媒体的核心命脉在于具有“长尾重温价值（rewatchability）”的深厚片库，例如许多人在睡前反复刷《办公室》（The Office）、《发展受阻》（Arrested Development）或《宋飞正传》（Seinfeld）。然而，福克斯自认其内容资产并不足以独立撑起一个具有全球竞争力的流媒体服务——虽然拥有《阿凡达》（Avatar），但观众很少反复重温；而《辛普森一家》（The Simpsons）、《恶搞之家》（Family Guy）以及 FX 电视台的内容虽好，却难以与科技巨头抗衡。 因此，福克斯决定放弃流媒体竞赛，选择在片库估值最高的时候将其高位变现，转而全力坚守具有即时收视价值的有线电视业务（新闻与体育直播）。更关键的是，福克斯手中的许多资产对迪士尼来说具有无可比拟的协同价值：漫威宇宙遗落在外的拼图——《X战警》（X-Men）、《死侍》（Deadpool）、《金刚狼》（Wolverine）和《神奇四侠》（Fantastic Four）的版权，在迪士尼手中的价值远大于在福克斯手里。 2017 年 12 月，双方正式宣布重磅交易：迪士尼将以 520 亿美元全股票交易的方式收购二十一世纪福克斯的娱乐资产与国际资产。该交易剥离了福克斯新闻（Fox News）、福克斯体育（Fox Sports）以及福克斯广播网，只打包了电影电视片库及综合娱乐业务。520 亿美元是双方在数轮激烈博弈后达成的“最具诚意且最终报价”，迪士尼内部进行了极为详尽的财务测算，确保能在承受范围内榨取这些资产的最大协同收益。 --- ### [03:15:15](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01QR2tmxSD4&t=11715s) 康卡斯特竞标搅局与 713 亿美元的“天价福克斯”账本 就在该笔收购等待监管部门批准期间，AT&T 收购时代华纳的案件获得了司法判决放行。这让迪士尼的老对手康卡斯特（Comcast）嗅到了机会。此前康卡斯特因担心无法通过反垄断审查而作罢，此时眼见判例落地，便毫不犹豫地横插一杠，向福克斯抛出高额敌意竞价。 康卡斯特的搅局引发了残酷的竞价战，逼得迪士尼不得不大幅提价应对。最终，迪士尼以 713 亿美元的惊人总价敲定收购——相比最初达成的 520 亿美元，整整凭空多出了 190 亿美元，直接给福克斯股东送上了一份巨额大礼。当时迪士尼的市值约为 1500 亿至 1800 亿美元，这意味着仅福克斯这一笔收购就占了当时整个迪士尼市值的 40% 左右，金额远超皮克斯、漫威和卢卡斯影业三者收购成本的总和。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 迪士尼收购福克斯资产财务与战略拆解 accDescr: 展示福克斯收购案从713亿美元总价通过资产剥离降至440亿美元净成本，以及其战略资产布局 subgraph AcquisitionCost ["交易总代价与剥离回款"] A["最终竞购总价<br/>713 亿美元"] --> B["剥离福克斯区域体育网络 (RSN)<br/>收回约 140 亿美元"] A --> C["出售英国 Sky 电视台股权<br/>收回约 150 亿美元"] B & C --> D["迪士尼实际净承担成本<br/>约 440 亿美元"] end subgraph StrategicAssets ["主要保留资产与战略表现"] D --> E["超级英雄 IP 归队<br/>X战警 / 死侍 / 神奇四侠"] D --> F["Hulu 控股权 (增持至约 67%)<br/>构建双平台协同"] D --> G["印度资产 (Star India/Hotstar)<br/>表现不及预期 (2024并入Reliance)"] end ``` 为了缓解沉重的财务负担，迪士尼在交易达成后迅速剥离了福克斯原有的区域体育网络（以约 140 亿美元出售），并出让了福克斯持有的英国天空电视台（Sky）股权（收回约 150 亿美元）。剔除这 290 亿美元资产处置后，迪士尼实际为保留下来的业务支付了约 440 亿美元的净成本。 回顾来看，这笔资产很难说给迪士尼创造了与 440 亿美元相称的回报： - **片库拉动力有限**：庞大的电影电视长尾片库固然扩充了流媒体储备，但在直接驱动流媒体拉新和留存上的作用并未达到预期； - **核心 IP 的部分闪光**：《死侍与金刚狼》在票房上斩获巨大成功，《阿凡达》也成功落地迪士尼主题乐园，漫威核心 IP 的回归意义重大； - **Hulu 的战略定位**：迪士尼借此获得了福克斯持有的 30% 左右 Hulu 股权，加上自身原先持有的份额，一举拥有了控制权（约 67%）。这确立了双轨战略：Disney+ 保持纯粹的家庭与 IP 宇宙调性，Hulu 则充当海纳百川的成人向综合娱乐平台； - **印度市场的滑铁卢**：福克斯在印度的庞大内容与分发网络原本契合艾格“全球化扩张”的战略支柱，但实际表现远逊预期，最终在 2024 年以大幅缩水的估值与信实工业（Reliance）合并。 总体而言，在迪士尼近代史上的几宗标志性大收购中（皮克斯、漫威、卢卡斯影业、BAMTech 以及福克斯），福克斯无疑是溢价最高、回报率垫底的一笔交易。 --- ### [03:18:35](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01QR2tmxSD4&t=11915s) 2019 投资者日：Disney+ 震撼亮相与 6.99 美元王炸定价 收购案于 2019 年 3 月正式完成交割，为随后的决战时刻扫清了障碍。仅仅一个月后的 2019 年 4 月，迪士尼举办了万众瞩目的投资者日活动，正式向全球揭开了旗下第一方流媒体服务——Disney+ 的神秘面纱。 这一刻被极具象征意义地宣布为：“迪士尼的宝库正式打开（The vault is now open）。” 最初版 Disney+ 展现出了无与伦比的产品清晰度与品牌感召力：界面被清晰地划分为五大旗舰核心品牌专区——迪士尼（Disney）、皮克斯（Pixar）、漫威（Marvel）、星球大战（Star Wars）和国家地理（National Geographic），同时吸纳了福克斯带来的丰富资产。 更让全场及整个好莱坞震惊的是其公布的初始定价：**每月仅需 6.99 美元**。这个极具破坏性的价格不仅引爆了社交媒体，彻底点燃了消费者的订阅热情，更粉碎了此前华尔街的所有保守预测。资本市场对此反响狂热，在宣布该消息的次日，迪士尼股价直接应声暴涨 11%。 ### [03:20:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01QR2tmxSD4&t=12000s) 表面辉煌与暗藏危机：迪士尼四大 IP 支柱的隐患 2019 年 4 月末投资者日公布流媒体战略后，迪士尼股价单日暴涨约 20%。当 Disney+ 在同年 11 月正式上线时，市场表现堪称狂暴：前 24 小时内即斩获 1000 万付费订阅用户，第一个季度就冲破了 2600 万大关。从表面来看，2019 年中期的迪士尼几乎处于好莱坞有史以来的最巅峰状态——皮克斯与迪士尼动画部如日中天；卢卡斯影业的新《星球大战》后传三部曲已上映两部，外传《侠盗一号》（Rogue One）口碑炸裂、被奉为影史高水平的商业艺术杰作；漫威影业更是在缔造电影史前所未有的神话，《复仇者联盟4：终局之战》（Avengers: Endgame）即将横扫全球院线，最终豪取 28 亿美元票房。然而，主持人指出，在繁华表象的深层，迪士尼的几大核心 IP 支柱实际上已陷入过度透支与隐秘危机之中。 首先是动画领域，两大王牌工作室正经历动荡的领导层断层：约翰·拉塞特（John Lasseter）因丑闻黯然离职，埃德·卡特姆（Ed Catmull）宣告退休，皮克斯与迪士尼动画部同时失去了掌舵人。卢卡斯影业更是暗潮汹涌：《游侠索罗》（Solo: A Star Wars Story）在院线惨遭票房滑铁卢，而彼时尚未公映的《星球大战9：天行者崛起》早已陷入巨大的创作危机。第 8 部与第 9 部缺乏统一的统筹规划与愿景，第 8 部走向了反传统且不太具有“星战味”的解构路线，导致第 9 部只能手忙脚乱地“抹上一层厚厚的星战凡士林”来强行圆场——粗暴地让帕尔帕廷皇帝死而复生，凭空变出上万艘歼星舰，叙事支离破碎。 漫威的困境则更为隐蔽且深刻：《复仇者联盟4》在艺术与商业上是一个极度完美的“终局”（Endgame），全片穿针引线理清了 15 条叙事线索，对灭霸的塑造以及终局响指后的余波处理堪称典范。然而，对于一个即将被要求“为全新流媒体平台疯狂输送内容”的体系而言，一个完美落幕的故事反而成了沉重的枷锁。迪士尼管理层不仅没有让宇宙休养生息，反而在短期内将影视剧产量提升了 50% 以上。随后的多重宇宙设定与剧集（如《洛基》、《旺达幻视》）虽然在单点上有过亮眼尝试，却从根本上消解了原有主宇宙的厚重感——当灭霸屠杀半数生命的史诗壮举在无限多元宇宙中不过是微不足道的一根分支时，观众过去十年对漫威宇宙的情感投入瞬间被贬值。随之而来的《惊奇队长2》（The Marvels）、《蚁人与黄蜂女：量子狂潮》（Ant-Man and the Wasp: Quantumania）与《永恒族》（Eternals）等院线作品的接连失利，宣告了漫威在缺乏节奏控制下的急剧透支。 - **流媒体首发战绩**：Disney+ 上线首日订阅达 1000 万，首季度突破 2600 万。 - **《复仇者联盟4》全球票房**：以 27.98 亿美元刷新影史记录，但同时也标志着旧周期的闭环。 - **星战系列叙事脱节**：第 8 部与第 9 部更替导演且缺乏长远规划，导致世界观自相矛盾。 - **后 2021 年漫威阵痛**：除《黑豹2》维持了高口碑与回报外，多部后续院线与剧集内容回报率大幅下滑。 --- ### [03:25:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01QR2tmxSD4&t=12300s) 流媒体与经典飞轮的冲突：“喂饱巨兽”对品牌价值的稀释 为了全面迎战 Netflix，迪士尼跨入了一场商业逻辑彻底逆转的赌局。正如本·吉尔伯特（Ben Gilbert）在 2019 年 Disney+ 发布特辑中所预言的那样：“人们可能低估了流媒体用户需要多少内容才能维持满足感……仅仅拥有传奇 IP 的完整历史片库是不够的，如果我只想重温《星球大战》，只要特定月份开通一个月即可，他们必须像打开消防水龙带一样源源不断地倾倒新内容。” ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 迪士尼传统飞轮模式与流媒体模式对比 accDescr: 对比传统精品飞轮以稀缺度打造爆款，与流媒体需要持续产出以防止用户流失的逻辑冲突。 subgraph Flywheel["经典迪士尼飞轮 (稀缺与蓄水)"] direction TB F1["精雕细琢精品 IP"] --> F2["院线大事件 / 文化现象"] F2 --> F3["衍生品 / 乐园长尾变现"] F3 --> F4["长时间封存沉淀品牌价值"] end subgraph Streaming["直面消费者流媒体 (喂饱巨兽)"] direction TB S1["不间断海量生产"] --> S2["高频发布防止流失 (Churn)"] S2 --> S3["设定膨胀 / 稀释原有传奇形象"] S3 --> S4["侵蚀母品牌声誉与核心护城河"] end ``` 流媒体的商业模式本质是“喂饱巨兽”（feed the beast），防止付费用户退订（churn）成了第一法则，这与迪士尼历史沉淀下来的“飞轮战略”在哲学层面上完全对立。迪士尼几十年来赖以生存的核心能力，是“极低频次但极高质量”的产出节奏：花数年时间打磨一部神作，通过院线引爆成为全民文化大事件，随后在较长时间里保持克制与沉寂，通过主题乐园、衍生品和家庭录像带收割长尾红利。而流媒体则要求用户每次打开应用时，都必须看到全新的剧集。 这种冲入流媒体战场的举动让迪士尼承担了巨大的非对称风险： 1. **优质资产的贬值风险**：迪士尼拥有全世界最具差异化的内容库，但硬生生在经典神作后嫁接粗制滥造的衍生剧（如剧版《欧比旺》），会瞬间打破传奇角色的光环与神秘感，反噬资产价值。皮克斯历史上平均七年才推出一部续集，正是为了维持严苛的品质基准，而流媒体的工业流水线摧毁了这种节奏。 2. **品牌光环的损耗**：Netflix 的品牌对大众而言只是遥控器上的一个播放按钮，烂片掠过即忘，没人会责怪平台本身；但“迪士尼”三个字代表着近百年的品味保证。接连不断的平庸之作和商业惨败，会迅速透支迪士尼品牌的无形溢价，摧毁其几十年来依靠“复利”建立起来的顶级信任。 与此同时，传统的有线电视与 ESPN 业务版图在 2018 至 2019 年间也迎来了更剧烈的掐线潮（cord-cutting）。尽管 ESPN 凭借极高的议价能力，仍能通过单价上涨暂时跑赢订阅户流失带来的减收，但这种提价掩盖下的结构性衰退已无法逆转，双重压力正悄然逼近迪士尼帝国。 ### [03:30:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01QR2tmxSD4&t=12600s) 有线电视与 ESPN 的“终局之战”：版权通胀与科技巨头的降维打击 进入 2023 年至 2024 年，有线电视退订潮（Cord-cutting）终于迎来了不可逆转的爆发点。长期以来，ESPN 依靠不断提高有线电视转播附加费（Affiliate Fees）来抵消订阅用户流失的把戏彻底失灵——用户流失速度实在太快，涨价已无法填补窟窿，ESPN 的收入大盘开始实质性下滑。用《复仇者联盟》的话来说，有线电视和 ESPN 正式迎来了“终局之战”（Endgame）。如果说收入端的萎缩已足够棘手，那么成本端的恶化则直接扼住了 ESPN 的咽喉。在过去，体育赛事的整个价值链中，很大一部分超额利润被卡在中间渠道的网络电视台截留，而 NFL、NBA 等体育联盟并未将商业价值榨取殆尽；ESPN 凭借庞大的有线附加费现金流构建起规模经济壁垒，成为绝大多数赛事的唯一或最大买家，将其他竞标者阻挡在外。 然而，游戏规则被财大气粗的科技巨头彻底重塑。亚马逊、苹果等科技巨头带着深不可测的资金池涌入体育版权竞标市场。更致命的是，科技公司的商业变现维度远比传统电视台丰富：亚马逊可以通过高价购买 NFL 转播权将观众转化为 Prime 会员，再通过电商、云服务等全生态变现，这使得科技公司对单个用户的商业变现上限远高于 ESPN。按照经济学常识，资产的价格由出价最高者决定，当竞标对手的商业模式在结构上能实现更高的用户变现效率时，传统媒体便注定在出价竞争中落败。 与此同时，互联网内容的泛滥反而推高了“现场共同文化体验”的稀缺性，体育直播的战略地位被推到了前所未有的高度。这种溢价不仅体现在泰勒·斯威夫特演唱会、超级碗或世界杯门票的天价炒作上，也直接传导到了赛事版权的续约合同中： - **NFL《周一橄榄球之夜》（Monday Night Football）转播权暴涨**：ESPN 在 2006 年支付的版权费为每年 11 亿美元，2011 年涨至每年 19 亿美元，到了 2021 年续约时更是飙升至惊人的每年 27 亿美元。 - **内容护城河的侵蚀**：过去观众必须守在 ESPN 前观看集锦和重播（如《SportsCenter》），如今社交媒体让高光镜头随处可见。一旦附加内容的差异化价值被抹平，赛事的超额利润便全额被 NFL、NBA 等版权所有方抽走。 - **体育内容缺乏“飞轮效应”**：尽管 ESPN 制作出了极高水准的衍生内容（如佩顿·曼宁兄弟的《ManningCast》或《The Pat McAfee Show》），但体育内容具有极短的保质期——没人会在次年回头重温去年的比赛解说。它无法像迪士尼的动画经典那样沉淀为具有长久复利价值的 IP 飞轮。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: ESPN与科技巨头体育版权竞争演变 accDescr: 展示ESPN从凭借有线附加费垄断版权，到科技巨头凭借多维度生态变现降维打击的过程。 subgraph OLD["过去：传统有线电视闭环"] A["高额有线附加费<br/>(Affiliate Fees)"] --> B["充沛现金流构建壁垒"] B --> C["垄断核心体育版权<br/>(排除其他竞标者)"] C --> A end subgraph NEW["现在：科技巨头降维打击"] D["科技巨头入场<br/>(Amazon / Apple)"] --> E["多维度生态变现<br/>(Prime会员 / 电商 / 硬件)"] E --> F["承受更高版权溢价<br/>(如天价NFL转播权)"] F --> G["ESPN成本失控<br/>且失去垄断地位"] end ``` ### [03:35:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01QR2tmxSD4&t=12900s) Disney+ 闪电破亿、疫情黑天鹅与流媒体的残酷现实 历史的吊诡之处在于，ESPN 随时间衰减的内容属性恰恰反衬出迪士尼核心 IP 飞轮的伟大；而鲍勃·艾格（Bob Iger）在任期内最精彩的手笔之一，正是将 ESPN 极度稳定可预测的现金流抽调出来，反哺迪士尼的内容帝国并购。然而，流媒体转型的暗礁尚未完全暴露，一场席卷全球的危机便突然降临。2019 年 11 月，Disney+ 正式上线；紧接着在 2020 年 2 月，艾格宣布卸任 CEO，由主题乐园业务负责人鲍勃·查佩克（Bob Chapek）接任，艾格则转任执行董事长以协助过渡。当时谁也没有料到，随后爆发的全球新冠疫情不仅不是“几周之内就能结束的插曲”，反而引发了巨震。 2020 年 3 月，疫情全面暴发导致迪士尼全球主题乐园全线关闭，乐园业务收入瞬间归零，公司单月市值蒸发 40%，当年的净利润直接坠入负值区间。但与此同时，Disney+ 却迎来了难以置信的野蛮生长：全人类被困在家中，对高品质流媒体内容的需求集中爆发。迪士尼最初设定的目标是“上线 5 年内获得 6,000 万至 9,000 万订阅用户”，但在短短 16 个月后的 2021 年 3 月，Disney+ 的订阅用户数便突破了 1 亿大关，彻底粉碎了最乐观的预期。在零利率流动性狂欢的推波助澜下，迪士尼的市值在 2021 年初创下了 3,600 亿美元的历史新高，管理层一时间被视作商业天才。 然而，这轮由疫情催化的虚火并未掩盖流媒体生意的结构性缺陷。2021 年底艾格彻底退休后，Disney+ 的商业模式裂痕迅速浮现： - **流媒体在商业模式上天然逊于传统有线捆绑包**：传统有线电视每月躺着收支票，且由有线网络运营商负责拉新与客服；而流媒体的取消门槛极低，用户在看完特定剧集后随时可能退订，导致极高的用户流失率（Churn）。 - **获客与留存成本居高不下**：迪士尼不得不像踩在永不停歇的跑步机上一样，不仅要为留住用户持续投入巨额营销费用，还必须不断生产具有院线级品质的高成本剧集。 - **重资产与产品技术挑战**：流媒体不再只是卖版权，平台必须自建底层流媒体技术架构、持续优化跨设备 UI 与交互体验，而消费者对于在手机和电视上管理无数个订阅 App 也正迅速失去耐心。 ### [03:40:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01QR2tmxSD4&t=13200s) 流媒体的残酷现实与 Bob Chapek 的仓促退场 进入直接面向消费者（DTC）的流媒体战场后，迪士尼才痛苦地意识到这绝非传统好莱坞的玩法。搭建流媒体平台不仅需要巨额资本开销，还得组建极高成本的技术团队：高薪聘请优秀的软件工程师、设计师和产品经理；必须由自己亲自去直接获取客户，获客成本（CAC）极其高昂；更致命的是客户流失（Churn），一旦用户退订，平台又得花大价钱把他们重新买回来。最让传统制片厂难受的是，流媒体彻底摧毁了过去赖以生存的“二次开发窗口期”（Theatrical re-releases 与限量版家庭录像带/DVD 发行窗口）。在 2023 至 2024 年间，迪士尼终于迎面撞上了这个残酷现实：流媒体根本不是“砸一次钱搭好基础设施就能坐享其成”的摇钱树，而是一个需要无休无止持续烧钱维护的昂贵怪兽。 在这一背景下，接替 Bob Iger 出任 CEO 的 Bob Chapek 在 2022 年初推动了激进的大重组，将整个公司的架构全面倒向流媒体战略，把旗下所有制片厂的内容制作与发行统筹合并为一个业务报告部门——迪士尼媒体与娱乐发行部门（DMED）。然而，Disney+ 的亏损却像滚雪球一样不断失控，庞大的内容制作费、获客成本、防流失运营支出和技术研发开销彻底压垮了报表。这场危机在 2022 年 11 月迪士尼第四财季的财报电话会上全面引爆，华尔街分析师和投资者对 Disney+ 令人咋舌的亏损额及其应对策略发起轮番逼问，Chapek 的现场应对堪称灾难。 与此同时，Chapek 治下的迪士尼还在各个层面遭遇了密集的“自残式”公关与管理溃败。公司一度大张旗鼓宣布要将加州的几千名幻想工程（Imagineers）核心团队强制搬迁至佛罗里达州，甚至在许多员工已经去当地买了房之后，又突然宣布取消整个搬迁计划；随后，Chapek 又卷入了与佛罗里达州州长关于争议法案的激烈政治纷争；而在华特迪士尼世界耗费巨资精心打造、面向核心粉丝的《星球大战》沉浸式主题酒店（Star Wars: Galactic Starcruiser），虽然单价极为昂贵且粉丝满怀期待，却在开业没多久后就因为运营惨淡被仓促关停。就在财报电话会几天后，迪士尼董事会闪电解雇了仅执政两年出头的 Bob Chapek，并紧急将已经退休的 Bob Iger 重新请出山，重掌 CEO 帅印以稳定军心。主持人回顾这场风波时认为，Iger 当年钦点 Chapek 最大的失误，在于误以为公司经历了一系列大收购与 Disney+ 推出后即将迈入“和平守成期”，只需一位严谨的“看守型管家”即可；但现实恰恰相反，流媒体带来的商业模式剧变和下游连锁反应完全脱离了既有剧本，这不仅不是一个按部就班巡航的时期，反而需要那个最初制定战略的人亲自在战火中摸索破局。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 流媒体运营困境对迪士尼传统商业模式的冲击 accDescr: 展示从传统多轮窗口期向流媒体订阅模式转变所带来的技术成本、获客成本与留存挑战。 subgraph TRAD["传统好莱坞飞轮"] A["院线首映窗口"] --> B["家庭录像带 / DVD 轮次"] B --> C["高利润、可重复开发窗口"] end subgraph STRM["流媒体 DTC 困局"] D["自建平台与技术基建"] --> E["昂贵工程师 / 设计师团队"] E --> F["直接获客 (CAC) 居高不下"] F --> G["用户流失 (Churn) 与高额召回成本"] end TRAD -. "颠覆与取代".-> STRM ``` ### [03:43:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01QR2tmxSD4&t=13380s) 动荡的 2023 年：大罢工、佩尔茨代理人战争与 ESPN 棋局 Bob Iger 回归后的 2023 年并未迎来喘息之机，整个好莱坞陷入了长达数月的编剧与演员双重大罢工，行业制作全面停摆。与此同时，迪士尼遭遇了来势汹汹的外部控制权挑战：前漫威董事长 Ike Perlmutter 联手知名维权投资人 Nelson Peltz，向迪士尼董事会发起了极具火药味的公开代理人争夺战（Proxy fight）。尽管这场旷日持久的缠斗最终未能成功撼动管理层，但它迫使 Iger 与高管层耗费了极其巨大的时间、金钱与精力去拆解防守。 在资本市场的逼问下，华尔街讨论的焦点迅速落在了 ESPN 这项所谓的“衰退资产”上。主持人笑着调侃华尔街的偏见——这项被投行斥为“夕阳资产”的传统体育网络，每年实际上仍能为迪士尼喷涌出高达 30 亿美元的营业利润，依然是不折不扣的“现金喷泉”。虽然有线电视基础确实在不断流失，但其利润规模仍令人垂涎，华尔街之所以极力鼓噪要求迪士尼将其拆分上市，正是想把这块优质现金流从母公司分离出来变现。为了回应这种情绪并保留未来的资本运作弹性，迪士尼在 2023 年 10 月正式做出财务调整，史上首次在财报中将 ESPN 独立划分为单独的“体育业务部门”（Sports segment），为未来可能的股权引入或拆分剥离留足了空间与期权价值。 随后在 2025 年，ESPN 敲定了一笔极具战略眼光的重磅交易：NFL 将旗下的 NFL Network 有线电视频道等资产注入 ESPN，以此换取 ESPN 自身 10% 的股权。主持人对这笔交易大加赞赏，认为这达成了罕见的各方多赢： - 对 ESPN 而言，直接将北美最大的体育联盟深度绑定为股东，让其拥有切身利益共同做大平台。 - 对 NFL 而言，联盟本身根本不擅长内容制作与日常渠道分发，将 NFL Network 和 RedZone 交付给业内最顶尖的 ESPN 打理才是最优解，同时保留 ESPN 的雄厚财力也能确保未来 NFL 赛事版权竞标时始终有一个强劲且不可或缺的出价方。 ### [03:45:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01QR2tmxSD4&t=13500s) 捆绑防线、乐园利润逆袭与 2026 年新老交接 在整合了核心体育版权后，迪士尼在年底推出了筹备已久的完整直面消费者服务——“ESPN Unlimited”，每月定价 30 美元，提供对 ESPN 旗下所有电视频道和独家体育赛事的完整访问权限。为了最大限度扩大战果，迪士尼祭出了极具进攻性的捆绑包策略：凡是订阅 ESPN+ 的用户，每月只需额外加付 6 美元，即可同时打包获得 Disney+ 与 Hulu。这一举措背后暗藏着两大精妙的商业算盘：一是传统的大捆绑心理学，能以低边际成本把原本不是核心影迷的泛受众顺带拉进生态；二是极为关键的“防流失机制（Churn mitigation）”——多平台捆绑订阅者的流失率远低于单项独立订阅者，因为用户不会每个月都锱铢必较地去算计自己在这一个 App 里到底看了多少小时。 然而，在近几年流媒体处于巨额亏损与艰难调整期、ESPN 面对传统有线网络萎缩的逆风时，真正充当定海神针扛起迪士尼整个大盘的，是其主题乐园业务（Disney Parks and Experiences）。尽管公众和媒体经常指责乐园“定价过高”、“处处盘剥游客钱包（nickel and diming）”，但财务数据证明乐园的表现堪称统治级： - 全球乐园年入园总人数约为 1.45 亿人次，相比疫情前最高峰的 1.57 亿人次实际上仍有小幅下降。 - 但凭借强大的定价权，每位游客的平均客单消费额（Per-visit spending）大幅飙升，并以每年约 5% 的增幅持续攀升了数十年。 - 虽然游客一直在抱怨涨价，但全球乐园依然天天人满为患，高溢价不仅没有吓跑消费者，反而直接对冲了影视与流媒体业务的周期性低迷。 - 公司的利润结构发生历史性逆转：如今乐园部门贡献了迪士尼全公司近 60% 的营业利润，而曾经辉煌的 ESPN 及体育部门占比则压缩到了 16%，与十年前的格局彻底颠倒。 这场漫长转型的终章在 2026 年 2 月尘埃落定。迪士尼董事会正式对外宣布了重大人事任命：长期执掌乐园及体验部门立下汗马功劳的 Josh D'Amaro 被选为下一任迪士尼 CEO，并定于六周后的 3 月正式履新；从 Fox 阵营加入并战功卓著的 Dana Walden 则升任总裁兼首席创意官（CCO，公司新设立的二号核心职位）；而二度出山稳定江山的 Bob Iger 则转任高级顾问兼董事会成员，直至 2026 年底彻底功成身退。迪士尼在历经流媒体战役的血洗与多轮动荡之后，终于完成了新老帝国的权力交接。 ### [03:50:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01QR2tmxSD4&t=13800s) 艾格时代的财务复盘与流媒体业务现状 从 2005 年 9 月 30 日鲍勃·艾格（Bob Iger）正式接任迪士尼 CEO 算起，当时公司的市值约为 500 亿美元；在他卸任时，迪士尼的股价实现了 5 倍的暴涨。尽管第二个十年整体走平，但第一个十年带来了惊人的 5 倍增长。这 20 年间，迪士尼的年营收从 2005 年的 310 亿美元翻了三倍，增长到 940 亿美元；而净利润更是从 25 亿美元飙升到 124 亿美元。净利润的增速显著超越了营收增速——在营收扩大三倍的同时，利润率实现了五倍的提升。有趣的是，迈克尔·艾斯纳（Michael Eisner）当年执掌时期也出现了完全相同的规律：两任任期极长的明星 CEO，其主要功绩都是把公司变得极其赚钱。这或许更能说明 1984 年迪士尼原本的商业效率有多低，而不是过去 40 年里发生了什么凭空捏造的奇迹。 如今审视迪士尼的业务全貌，战略核心显然压在了流媒体上。迪士尼目前拥有三大流媒体平台：Disney+ 拥有 1.32 亿订阅用户（其中略低于半数来自美国和加拿大本土），Hulu 拥有 6400 万订阅用户，ESPN+ 拥有 2400 万订阅用户。在 2017 年迪士尼刚准备下场做流媒体时，这项业务的收入几乎为零，而到了 2024 财年披露时，其订阅收入已超过 190 亿美元，如今推算更已达到约 220 亿美元的规模。虽然外界常常抱怨 Disney+ 利润率低下、烧钱极狠，但这笔收入已占迪士尼全公司总营收的近四分之一，成为单一最大的收入支柱。迪士尼成功将过去来自其他渠道的传统媒体收入，置换成了流媒体订阅收入。 但与行业霸主 Netflix 相比，迪士尼的流媒体规模依然显得局促。Netflix 拥有 3.25 亿全球订阅用户，几乎是 Disney+ 的近三倍；Netflix 年营收达到 450 亿美元，接近迪士尼全部流媒体收入（Disney+ 与 Hulu 合计约 250 亿美元）的两倍。更震撼的是营业利润的悬殊：Netflix 仅凭流媒体单项业务，一年就能创造高达 135 亿美元的营业利润，这几乎等于迪士尼全公司所有业务相加的总营业利润。回望 2017 年，Netflix 的营业利润还不足 10 亿美元，而当时的迪士尼拥有 140 亿美元的营业利润。在随后的八年里，迪士尼遭遇了疫情重创、乐园关停，并在构建 Disney+ 的过程中累计吞下了百亿美元级的巨额亏损；与此同时，Netflix 却凭借流媒体强大的规模经济效应，实现了十余倍的经营杠杆跃升。不过，迪士尼的直接面向消费者（DTC）板块终于走出亏损泥潭，去年实现了约 10 亿美元的盈利，这也正是鲍勃·艾格复出后全力整顿的核心成果。 - **Disney+ 订阅体量**：全球 1.32 亿订阅用户，北美用户占比略低于 50%。 - **其他平台规模**：Hulu 达 6400 万订阅用户，ESPN+ 达 2400 万订阅用户。 - **流媒体收入规模**：从 2017 年的近乎为零激增至 2024 年的 190 亿至 220 亿美元左右，占迪士尼总营收约 25%。 - **Netflix 对比数据**：全球 3.25 亿订阅用户，年营收 450 亿美元，营业利润达 135 亿美元（相当于迪士尼全集团水平）。 - **流媒体扭亏历程**：DTC 业务前期累计亏损超 100 亿美元，艾格重返后强力降本增效，上财年斩获约 10 亿美元营业利润。 --- ### [03:55:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01QR2tmxSD4&t=14100s) 线下乐园扛起利润大旗与业务分部解构 在流媒体激战的同时，主题乐园与体验板块构成了迪士尼当下最强力的现金支柱。全球迪士尼乐园每年接待游客量高达 1.45 亿人次，旗下 6 大度假区共分布着 12 座主题乐园，此外还在筹备阿布扎比的新乐园。迪士尼的邮轮业务也是一匹低调的黑马，现有 8 艘巨型邮轮，未来几年计划以每年一艘的速度扩充至 13 艘。邮轮原本是艾斯纳时代的构想，最初假设游客在佛罗里达迪士尼世界玩三四天后，正好登船去巴哈马群岛度假几天再返航；虽然对于拖家带口的父母来说这种连轴转的行程并不现实，但邮轮本身的体验极其出色，赢得了极高的口碑。2023 年，迪士尼宣布将在未来十年内向乐园和邮轮业务投入高达 600 亿美元的资本支出（CapEx），其中 300 亿美元将直接用于佛罗里达和安纳海姆的本土乐园，打造大量全新的园区和游乐设施。 这一系列激进资本配置背后，是一套清晰的宏观商业逻辑：迪士尼过去最赚钱的“现金喷泉”正在消退——有线电视转播分成（Affiliate Fees）急剧萎缩，院线黄金时代一去不复返（过去花两三亿美元制作宣发《复仇者联盟》，轻松席卷 15 亿美元全球票房，如今影院人流锐减且顶级 IP 成本飙升，传闻《复仇者联盟：毁灭日》的制作与宣发预算已高达 5 亿美元），而转向流媒体后的利润率远不如从前。迪士尼唯一能够赚取丰厚利润的阵地只剩下了线下乐园。然而乐园受制于物理空间与客房数量，无法像有线网络那样无限扩张接待规模；既然无法塞进更多游客，迪士尼唯一的选择就是“提高单客消费”。而要让家庭为一趟动辄数千美元的度假行程心甘情愿买单，就必须砸下 600 亿美元不断翻新体验，以此支撑门票与服务的连续涨价。 拆解迪士尼 940 亿美元的总营收与 130 亿美元的净利润，各大分部的业绩反差令人咋舌。娱乐板块（涵盖影视、流媒体与内容制作）贡献了 420 亿美元营收，营业利润仅为 50 亿美元；而体验板块（乐园、邮轮与周边）虽产生相近的 360 亿美元营收，营业利润却高达 100 亿美元，是娱乐业务的两倍整。体育板块（ESPN 为主）实现 160 亿美元营收与 30 亿美元营业利润。全公司近 60% 的营业利润完全由乐园和邮轮部门驱动，这也合理解释了掌管乐园业务的乔什·达马罗（Josh D'Amaro）为何成为呼声最高的下任 CEO 人选。更颠覆传统认知的是院线发行数据：作为外界心中迪士尼王国的象征，影院院线发行年收入仅为 26 亿美元，仅占全公司总营收的 3%。“外人总以为迪士尼就是靠大银幕电影立足，然而电影票房只占其营收的区区百分之三。这已经是流媒体的天下，迪士尼不过是身处其中的租客而已。” ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 迪士尼 2024 财年业务板块与营业利润结构 accDescr: 展示娱乐板块、体验板块和体育板块在营收与营业利润上的鲜明对比，凸显体验板块贡献了近60%的利润。 subgraph ENT["娱乐板块 (Entertainment)"] E1["营收: 420 亿美元<br/>(流媒体、电视网、院线)"] --> E2["营业利润: 50 亿美元"] subgraph BOX["其中：院线发行"] B1["院线票房收入: 26 亿美元<br/>仅占集团总营收 3%"] end end subgraph EXP["体验板块 (Experiences)"] X1["营收: 360 亿美元<br/>(12座乐园、8艘邮轮、周边零售)"] --> X2["营业利润: 100 亿美元<br/>★ 占集团总利润近 60%"] end subgraph SPT["体育板块 (Sports)"] S1["营收: 160 亿美元<br/>(ESPN 等相关业务)"] --> S2["营业利润: 30 亿美元"] end E2 & X2 & S2 --> TOT["全集团总营业利润: 约 180 亿美元<br/>净利润: 约 130 亿美元 / 总营收: 940 亿美元"] ``` - **资本支出规划**：未来十年向乐园与邮轮砸下 600 亿美元 CapEx，其中 300 亿美元专项投资于美国本土乐园（加州迪士尼与奥兰多迪士尼世界）。 - **利润结构倒挂**：理论上轻资产、高边际的内容媒介（娱乐板块）因重金投入流媒体，营业利润（50 亿美元）反而只有重资产线下体验板块（100 亿美元）的一半。 - **院线发行占比**：大银幕院线票房收入仅 26 亿美元，在 940 亿美元大盘中仅占微不足道的 3%。 - **战略推演转型**：告别黄金时代的有线电视分成红利与暴利院线大片，公司战略全面转向由乐园“高客单价现金流”为“流媒体规模战争”输血托底。 --- ### [03:59:22](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01QR2tmxSD4&t=14362s) 战略深度复盘：当年力推 Disney+ 是否为唯一解？ 这一系列商业现状为后续的战略大讨论做足了铺垫，也引出了整场讨论最核心的拷问：当年大举押注 Disney+ 究竟是不是正确的战略选择？在 2015、2017 和 2019 年的关键节点上，迪士尼到底有没有其他切实可行的替代路径？ 回顾历史，评估这一决策的前提是必须提出一个具有现实操作性的备选方案，因为“无所作为”（Do Nothing）根本不是一个合格的商业选项。“舒舒服服地躺在过去的丰厚利润里坐享其成”在当时的市场环境下纯属幻想。如果迪士尼当年选择按兵不动，其命运必然会步其他传统好莱坞老牌巨头的后尘——要么被吞并收购，要么被迫走向大规模行业整合，或者整体业务被严重肢解缩水。对于心系迪士尼经典文化的人来说，或许在情感上宁愿看到一家精干瘦身、坚守传统动画与影视创作的纯粹制片厂，但在商业残酷竞争的擂台上，迪士尼别无退路。 ### [04:00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01QR2tmxSD4&t=14400s) 精品流媒体的幻想与院线习惯的终结 两位主持人坦言，在过去的几个月筹备期里，他们内心一直渴望一种更理想化的商业愿景：希望 Disney+ 能成为一家精致小巧的“精品流媒体”（boutique streaming service），只专注于迪士尼的核心顶级 IP，彻底剥离 Hulu 等杂乱内容，摆脱流媒体无休止消耗资金的“内容跑步机”陷阱。对于有孩子的家庭来说，纯粹的 Disney+ 堪称“人类有史以来发明的最佳育儿神器”，周末瘫在沙发上看一部漫威电影更是极致享受。但从商业逻辑来看，这种乌托邦式的构想根本无法维系。其核心症结在于：观众的观影习惯已经发生了根本性转变——大众基本不再走进传统电影院了。 在迪士尼原有的飞轮模型中，院线是点燃公共意识、注入新角色与唤醒老 IP 的总源头。而现在，普通人一年顶多进一两次影院，只为了看真正的“超级事件大片”，例如《玩具总动员 5》或现象级史诗巨制。像《料理鼠王》、《魔法满屋》（Encanto）或《长发公主》（Tangled）这种全新原创动画电影，观众已经极少愿意买票进影院尝鲜了。数据也印证了这一残酷现实：皮克斯在过去十几年开发的原创新作，哪怕口碑依然极佳，票房也只能维持在两三亿美元徘徊，唯有续集才能屡创纪录。皮克斯并未丧失创作才华，而是“市场的及格线变了，产品与市场的契合度（PMF）随之改变”。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Disney IP Distribution Dilemma accDescr: Comparison between legacy theatrical flywheel and new streaming algorithmic distribution. subgraph Legacy ["传统院线飞轮"] T1["院线排片与宣发"] --> T2["轰动级大众认知"] T2 --> T3["衍生品与主题乐园变现"] end subgraph StreamingEra ["流媒体新常态"] S1["影院观众锐减<br/>(仅流向超级续集大作)"] S2["算法超级市场<br/>(Netflix / Disney+)"] S3["自建 Disney+ 强行曝光<br/>(支撑 100 亿美元乐园业务)"] S1 --> S2 S2 --> S3 end ``` - **观影频率锐减**：大众如今只为极少数超级头部续集走进影院，原创中成本电影在院线端几乎失去了原有的启动飞轮功能。 - **乐园经济的倒逼**：迪士尼乐园每年能产生上百亿美元的高额利润，但乐园极度依赖全新 IP 的持续灌溉；哪怕流媒体自身盈利困难，迪士尼也必须拥有一个能强行把《心灵奇旅》（Soul）、《青春变形记》（Turning Red）推到消费者眼前的分发阵地。 --- ### [04:03:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01QR2tmxSD4&t=14580s) 授权 Netflix 还是自建飞轮：流媒体的规模与覆盖难题 这引出了另一个两难假说：迪士尼是否应该只做一个仅服务三五千万核心铁粉的“高价小圈子”服务，而将重磅大作以数亿美元的授权费卖给 Netflix 等拥有 3.5 亿庞大用户的超级平台？这种策略虽然诱人，却直接暴露了 Disney+ 面临的“规模受限”瓶颈。迪士尼试图在 Netflix 领先十年之后入局并追赶其体量，却因为迪士尼品牌天然的高端与调性壁垒，无法像 Netflix 那样肆无忌惮地塞入海量低成本“填充内容”（filler content）。结果导致 Disney+ 止步于约 1.3 亿用户——1.3 亿虽然可观，但相比 Netflix 的 3.5 亿，迪士尼内容的潜在触达面直接被腰斩了近 60%。 然而，若退回到全面授权给 Netflix 的旧模式，也同样存在致命缺陷。院线时代是一部迪士尼电影上映便铺满全球每一块银幕，天然具有“全员强制曝光”的中心化属性；而 Netflix 本质上是一个被算法主导的“超级大卖场”。即便迪士尼新片能登上 Netflix 月度前十或前三热搜，在算法分流与无限选择下，真正观看它的用户比例可能连 10% 都不到——你的大片不仅要和院线新片抢注意力，还要在同一个界面里和《宋飞正传》（Seinfeld）以及海量的背景真人秀竞争。 - **规模劣势与触达损耗**：Disney+ 约 1.3 亿订阅用户与行业最大平台的 3.5 亿相比存在天然天花板，导致优质 IP 驱动乐园和衍生品消费的覆盖面受限。 - **算法货架与院线排片的本质差异**：院线是排他且并行的实体展映，而流媒体算法不会将任何单部优质内容推到 70% 的全局用户眼前，无法复制传统影院引发的“社会级集体讨论”。 --- ### [04:06:45](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01QR2tmxSD4&t=14805s) 流媒体的“大杂烩”宿命与消费者的黄金时代 在复盘 Disney+ 的实际表现时，两人指出外界常宣称的“直接触达消费者（D2C）带来深度用户关系与乐园协同”在现实中大多是伪命题。除了终于打通了同一个登录账号（Unified Login），用户的流媒体观看习惯几乎没有对其实际入园游玩产生任何体验上的增量赋能。自建流媒体最大的现实价值，仅仅在于迪士尼拥有了将新内容“强行塞进观众眼眶”的自主权。然而，流媒体高昂的固定基础设施成本注定其必须依赖庞大规模；而要维持极大规模，就必须囊括形形色色的泛大众内容，最终走向类似有线电视捆绑包的“大杂烩”（the kitchen sink）模式，如同 Netflix 和 Hulu 所做的那样。 这种商业逻辑上的必然性，对传统媒体巨头尤其是迪士尼而言，是一场痛苦的降维打击。迪士尼立足的核心承诺是“稀缺而高质量”的内容，但流媒体为了留存率却要求永不停歇地增产与填充，这从根本上侵蚀了其原有的商业基石。但极具讽刺意味的是，虽然这对影视制作公司是一场更残酷的商业折磨，对当代消费者而言，这却是“有史以来最好的黄金时代”。消费者只需支付几乎等于或低于当年有线电视捆绑包的费用，就能享受免费的 YouTube、海量且低价的流媒体库，甚至院线上映仅 45 天后就能在家里看 IMAX 级画质的顶级院线电影。唯一的副作用，或许只是整个好莱坞因不敢冒险而导致的“续集泛滥综合征”（sequel-itis）与对成熟 IP 的过度开发。 - **D2C 协同效应的落空**：流媒体并未真正重塑乐园游玩体验，其核心价值仍停留在内容分发展台，而非全链路个性化消费。 - **大杂烩定律（Kitchen Sink）**：流媒体由于高额固定成本，必须追求极致规模；要获取大众规模，就必然沦为涵盖各类内容的大杂烩，这与传统高门槛精品厂牌的稀缺性发生冲突。 - **内容消费者的黄金时代**：从手机上的社交短视频到院线窗口期仅 45 天的高清视听内容，消费者以极低的边际成本获得了空前的选择自由。 ### [04:10:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01QR2tmxSD4&t=15000s) 悲观视角：飞轮失速与超级 IP 的开采殆尽 讨论进入了对迪士尼未来前景的看空（Bear Case）与看多（Bull Case）分析。在看空的一方看来，迪士尼飞轮最核心的心脏以及 ESPN 曾经极其完美的有线电视转播附加费（Affiliate Fee）商业模式，如今双双受损，甚至可能遭遇了不可逆的永久性破坏。 最尖锐的问题莫过于：**过去十年里，迪士尼是否创造出哪怕一个在商业层面上取得巨大成功的新原创 IP？** 自 2016 年《疯狂动物城》（Zootopia）与《海洋奇缘》（Moana）上映后，迪士尼在院线狂揽票房的所有大作，几乎无一例外都是在收割过去积累的既有 IP 资产。这一节点恰恰与流媒体全面崛起的周期完全重合。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Disney IP Dilemma accDescr: Chart illustrating the transition from original mega-hits to IP harvesting and franchise fatigue. subgraph PastHits["黄金原创期（2016年前）"] A["超级原创爆炸<br/>《冰雪奇缘》《疯狂动物城》"] --> B["建立全新文化现象<br/>全产业链疯狂变现"] end subgraph PresentState["流媒体时代困境"] C["新片依赖流媒体反哺<br/>《寻梦环游记》《魔法满屋》"] D["老 IP 竭泽而渔<br/>续集不断 / 边际效应递减"] end subgraph BearCase["看空隐忧"] E["漫威/星战 20年燃料耗尽？"] F["乐园扩展绑定枯竭 IP"] end B --> C B --> D D --> E E --> F ``` 即使像《寻梦环游记》（Coco）、《魔法满屋》（Encanto）或《疯狂元素城》（Elemental）这样的作品赢得了口碑，并在主题乐园中逐渐拥有一席之地，但它们在上映时的传统院线票房并未达到昔日的狂热量级，必须依赖 Disney+ 等流媒体渠道去证明并承载其长尾价值。而它们无论多优秀，都无法企及《冰雪奇缘》（Frozen）那种现象级超级大单品的统治力。 更令人担忧的是外购的三大支柱——漫威（Marvel）、皮克斯（Pixar）和卢卡斯影业（Lucasfilm）。当年这些收购堪称神来之笔，但回过头看，它们像是为迪士尼注入了长达 20 年的强劲燃料，而非 50 年的取之不尽之矿： - 《星球大战》的未来叙事方向陷入迷茫； - 漫威的宇宙是否已经被过度透支和索取一空？面对预告中的《复仇者联盟：末日降临》（Avengers: Doomsday），曾经那种令全球观众热血沸腾的期待感已大不如前，甚至很多人根本意识不到它的到来； - 当乐园里的每个全新设施、院线里的每部重磅排片都高度捆绑在既有 IP 续集上时，一旦续集动力枯竭，整个飞轮将面临失去牵引力的危险。 --- ### [04:12:15](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01QR2tmxSD4&t=15135s) 乐观视角：不可摧毁的现代神话与历史新高的盈利能力 面对悲观论点，乐观派（Bull Case）则给出了针锋相对的反驳：从更长远的历史维度来看，无论是迪士尼核心动画、皮克斯、卢卡斯影业还是漫威，它们的本质都如同“顶级奢侈品品牌”——**根本无法被真正杀死**。它们构成了现代人类社会的核心神话，在一代又一代人之间口口相传： > “当它们跌入谷底的那一刻，往往正是它们触底反弹、以意想不到的方式重新惊艳世人的节点。” 这种文化韧性已被历史反复验证。正如一位主播所言，在接下来的几年里，他迫不及待要带自己的儿子第一次看《星球大战》，而孩子们长大后绝不会因为迪士尼拍过一部糟糕的《欧比旺》衍生剧就动摇对星战宇宙的向往；这正如 1980 年代乔治·卢卡斯曾推出过一部粗制滥造的《星球大战假日特辑》（Star Wars Holiday Special），但如今根本没人看它，它也丝毫未削弱星战在文化层面的神话地位。 在财务表现上，迪士尼同样展现出惊人的生命力： - 尽管迪士尼主动选择“断臂”，加速让自身原本极具暴利属性的有线电视与旧分销模式走向衰亡，并在转型流媒体的过程中经历了 5 至 6 年的艰难重建期，还遭遇了新冠疫情导致全球乐园关闭、净利润转负的重创； - 但到 2026 年，伴随流媒体业务止血扭亏与乐园客流强劲复苏，迪士尼的净利润正重回历史最高水平，即将创下公司有史以来的全新利润纪录； - 尽管 3% 到 5% 的低单位数年化增速无法支撑高倍数估值，但对于一个已经达成文化统治级规模的巨无霸来说，作为面向家庭的文化常青树，稳健的成长步调或许反而是其坚实壁垒的写照； - 迪士尼乐园早已成为现代家庭亲子仪式感的一部分，代际相传的特质构筑了全球范围内无人可比的品牌黏性与飞轮基础设施。 --- ### [04:15:30](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01QR2tmxSD4&t=15330s) 潜在猎物：谁该成为迪士尼帝国的新版图？ 顺着乐观逻辑，如果迪士尼如今依然是全球顶级故事、角色与 IP 寻找避风港时的“最佳归宿”，那么市场上有两个显而易见的标的正呼之欲出： 1. **《布鲁伊》（Bluey）**：被誉为有史以来最优秀的儿童动画剧集，但其受众与影响力早已超越了普通儿童节目的范畴。它目前已经与迪士尼高度绑定，入驻了 Disney+，并在乐园中亮相。虽然主创乔·布鲁姆（Joe Brumm）无法靠一己之力将其打造成下一个迪士尼，但《布鲁伊》身上到处闪烁着早期皮克斯的光芒，迪士尼正是护航其未来几十年全产业链变现的最完美管家。 2. **任天堂（Nintendo）**：任天堂如今市值约 500 亿美元，较一年前的高点回落了近 50%，甚至低于迪士尼当年收购福克斯（Fox）的代价。尽管出于日本政策保护与民族品牌原因，全资收购几乎不可能发生，但双方在实景娱乐上的错失令人扼腕： - 迪士尼竟然任由任天堂与环球影城（Universal Studios）达成战略合作； - 任天堂的 IP 矩阵完全不输于“皮克斯 + 漫威 + 卢卡斯影业”的集合体，手握马力欧（Mario）、塞尔达传说（Zelda）和宝可梦（Pokémon）三大世界级台柱，更有大金刚（Donkey Kong）、银河战士（Metroid）、星之卡比（Kirby）等深厚储备； - 环球影城里的任天堂超级乐园（Super Nintendo World）面积或许只有迪士尼乐园的五十分之一，如果将其置于迪士尼无与伦比的实景娱乐画卷之上，所能爆发的影视与乐园协同效应本该是难以想象的。 --- ### [04:18:25](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01QR2tmxSD4&t=15505s) 七大战略权力分析：流媒体时代的规模经济法则 在节目例行的汉密尔顿·赫尔默（Hamilton Helmer）《7种战略权力》（7 Powers）框架评估中，讨论聚焦于流媒体时代下的迪士尼： ```mermaid flowchart LR accTitle: 7 Powers in Streaming Landscape accDescr: Comparison between Disney's Cornered Resource and Netflix's Scale Economies. subgraph DisneyAdvantage["对抗垂直流媒体（Peacock/Paramount+）"] CR["独特资源 Cornered Resource"] CR --> IP["坐拥漫威/星战/迪士尼百年独家超级IP<br/>质量、跨代际影响力远超竞品"] end subgraph NetflixAdvantage["对抗流媒体霸主（Netflix）"] SE["规模经济 Scale Economies"] SE --> RevDiff["Netflix：450亿营收 / 135亿营业利润<br/>Disney+：体量仅其一半，刚在盈亏线挣扎"] end ``` - **针对垂直流媒体对手（如 Peacock、Paramount+）的权力——独特资源（Cornered Resource）**： 与对手各自锁死自有 IP（如 Peacock 独占《办公室》、Paramount+ 独占《星际迷航》）类似，迪士尼拥有跨越百年的庞大顶级独家 IP 资产库，且在数量、知名度和耐用性上形成了降维打击。 - **面对行业终极赢家（Netflix）时的短板——规模经济（Scale Economies）**： 在流媒体这个以内容摊销为核心的纯数字分销生意里，商业实力的分水岭最终归结为纯粹的规模效应。 - **Netflix**：坐拥约 450 亿美元的年收入，并产生高达 135 亿美元的营业利润； - **Disney+ 流媒体业务**：营收规模仅有 Netflix 的一半，且在经历数年百亿美元级别的亏损后，目前仅仅挣扎在盈亏平衡点附近。 这种数字差距成为商业教科书中最残酷而清晰的“规模经济”图景，也引发了关于全球流媒体最终是否会走向“Netflix 赢家通吃、其他厂商沦为附庸”的深层追问。 ### [04:20:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01QR2tmxSD4&t=15600s) 流媒体格局与迪士尼的“第二名”定位 在付费流媒体的战场上，Netflix 凭借庞大的规模效应稳居第一；而在免费、广告驱动、创作者主导的视频领域，YouTube 则是赢家通吃的一方霸主。与这两者不同，迪士尼并不完全依赖流媒体本身的独立盈利能力，它凭借主题公园等其他高利润业务的交叉补贴，完全可以保持相对适中的规模，而不必在同等维度上与 Netflix 进行刺刀见红式的正面对决。在流媒体的角逐中，迪士尼明智的策略是确立稳固的“第二名”，而非盲目争夺第一；一旦试图登顶，公司就不得不把所有内容倾囊抛出（“kitchen sink”），陷入无限扩充制作成本的泥潭。 眼下迪士尼所拥有的内容储备，已经足以压制 Peacock 等一众竞争对手。他们大可以缩减内容制作规模，让自家的飞轮自我修复并健康运转。至于 Hulu，随着它与 Disney+ 的捆绑销售越来越紧密，内容相互渗透，两位主持人也调侃起要不要搞一场“让 Hulu 再次伟大”（Make Hulu Great Again）或者“剥离 Hulu 与 Fox 资产”的运动，戏称除了把《阿凡达》（Avatar）留在 Disney+ 之外，其他非核心资产甚至都可以考虑分拆。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 流媒体与视频生态格局 accDescr: 展示 Netflix、YouTube 与迪士尼在流媒体生态中的不同定位与优势来源 subgraph Leaders["行业领头羊"] A["Netflix<br/>付费流媒体规模之王"] B["YouTube<br/>UGC与创作者生态霸主"] end subgraph DisneyStrat["迪士尼策略定位"] C["稳居行业第二名<br/>无需强争第一"] D["削减过度制作<br/>修复核心IP飞轮"] E["跨业务利润补贴<br/>主题乐园/周边衍生"] end Leaders -.->|差异化竞争| DisneyStrat E -->|反哺支撑| C D -->|保护内容品质| C ``` --- ### [04:21:20](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01QR2tmxSD4&t=15680s) 终局洞察：大环境的剧变与不灭的世代神话 在节目的终局洞察（Quintessence）环节，两位主持人提炼了复盘整个迪士尼帝国历史留下的核心感悟。首先是大环境的彻底颠覆。曾经的传统媒体时代是一个对迪士尼极度宽容且赚钱容易的“黄金时代”：有线电视网络套餐让 ESPN 如同一台自动印钞机源源不断地输送巨额利润；借助 ESPN 的统治地位，迪士尼旗下的所有电视频道也都能坐享高额回报；影院观影是当时大众的生活方式，迪士尼的头部大片横扫票房；随后，家庭录像带（VHS）和 DVD 的发售更像给利润装上了增压器。从有线网、院线到家庭影音，传统媒体全方位的结构性红利推动着当年的迪士尼登上神坛。 然而现代传媒环境却走到了完全相反的一面：有线电视“剪线潮”（Cord-cutting）彻底瓦解了曾经的摇钱树；影院观影人次持续萎缩，票房红利逐渐枯竭；流媒体则被证明是一个极其昂贵且残酷的生意——开发成本高昂、维护开销庞大、获客成本高、用户留存艰难，而且它极难像传统院线那样凝聚全民级别的“文化大事件”共识。整个行业曾经充沛的利润剩余（surplus）已荡然无存，若想维持原有的利润体量，管理层必须做出极为精明和苛刻的商业决断。迪士尼在 20 世纪 90 年代末以及 2005 年至 2019 年间的空前繁荣，本质上是外部结构性红利与卓越管理创新叠加的历史特例。正因如此，迪士尼在今天永远被拿去与那段黄金期对比，显得格外残酷。 从另一个乐观的视角来看，迪士尼是一家无可替代的“世代神话造梦工厂”（Home of generational myths），具有真正的“不可消灭性”（Unkillable）。尽管媒体商业模式可能需要演变，甚至可能永远无法重现 90 年代或 2010 年代初的暴利盛况，但迪士尼的兴衰始终遵循着约 20 年一轮的周期规律。纵使前路波折，在未来十年内看到它重返世界之巅，也绝非不可能。 --- ### [04:24:39](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01QR2tmxSD4&t=15879s) 节目好物分享（Carve-Outs） 在好物分享环节，两位主持人带来了各自近期喜爱的事物： - **Warby Parker 变色镜片（Transitions Extra Active）**：针对夏季外出需要频繁在普通眼镜与太阳镜之间切换的痛点，传统灰色的变色镜片容易显得呆板老气（“derpy”）。Warby Parker 推出的棕色 Transitions Extra Active 镜片不仅在户外变色足够深，甚至在车内也能感光变色，搭配得当的镜框后兼顾室内外佩戴，彻底解决了佩戴变色镜片显得不自然的尴尬。 - **Michael Arndt 的《玩具总动员 3》（Toy Story 3）编剧讲座**：该公开课是本期节目筹备期间的重要参考资料，由电影编剧 Michael Arndt 在 YouTube 上分享。视频长约 1 小时 20 分钟，深入拆解了皮克斯的故事创作机制，甚至获得了公开皮克斯早期故事卷轴（Story reels）的授权，直观展现了剧本在被皮克斯智囊团（Braintrust）打磨之前原始粗糙的初稿状态，对于想理解皮克斯魔法与叙事艺术的观众极具价值。 - **缺失的碧姬公主（Princess Peach）周边与收购任天堂的畅想**：主持人近期带家人在纽约参加 Sierra 活动期间，带女儿前往洛克菲勒中心的任天堂旗舰店寻找碧姬公主的服装，却发现任天堂官方竟然完全不生产第一方的碧姬公主角色扮演服装。这一细节引发了趣味吐槽——任天堂在衍生周边开发上留下了巨大的空白，“挂在树上的低垂果实”无人采摘，迪士尼真该把任天堂买下来，甚至开玩笑建议主管战略规划的高管 Josh D'Amaro 介入推动，圆小朋友的公主服梦想。 - **金州女武神队（Golden State Valkyries）**：旧金山新成立的 WNBA 球队。该球队与金州勇士队同属一个所有权集团，由总裁 Jess Smith 掌舵。作为成立仅第二年的特许经营球队，其估值已突破 10 亿美元，成为全球商业上最成功的女子体育队伍之一。现场球票场场售罄，全场观众从头到尾起立呐喊助威，展现出了前所未有的主场氛围与极具感染力的现场体验。 --- ### [04:28:40](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01QR2tmxSD4&t=16120s) 致谢与尾声 在长达四个半小时的巨制尾声，主持人向为本期节目的研究、访谈与制作提供关键支持的各界人士表达了致谢： - **内容赞助商**：企业级对话式 AI 平台 Sierra（sierra.ai/acquired）、企业级身份认证与登录基础设施 WorkOS（workos.com）、应用性能监控与错误追踪平台 Sentry（sentry.io/acquired，亦为 9 月 17 日 Acquired 年度聚会合作伙伴），以及大语言模型 Claude 的研发公司 Anthropic（claude.ai/acquired）。 - **专业研究与行业顾问**：Worldly Partners 的 Arvind Navaratnam（撰写了深度的迪士尼多年代研究报告）；华特迪士尼现任 CEO Bob Iger 与体验部门主席 Josh D'Amaro；皮克斯核心团队 Pete Docter、Jim Morris、Danielle Feinberg、Katherine Sarafian 以及皮克斯档案室团队的热情接待；在《冰雪奇缘》（Frozen）中为安娜配音的 Kristen Bell；A24 的 Ravi Nandan；自由媒体（Liberty Media）及前福克斯高管 Chase Carey；Benchmark 的 Mitch Lasky；《华尔街日报》的 Robbie Whelan、Ben Fritz 与 Emily Nelson；皮克斯联合创始人 Ed Catmull；传奇动画掌门人 Jeffrey Katzenberg；前米拉麦克斯负责人 Bill Block；持续输出深度科技与媒体评论的 Stratechery 创始人 Ben Thompson；以及迪士尼前高管 Sean Bailey 等。 回顾整个内容矩阵，听众若想深入了解迪士尼商业脉络，还可以回听 Acquired 过往节目库中关于华特·迪士尼生平（Part 1）、皮克斯、漫威、卢卡斯影业、ESPN、BAMTech 以及 2019 年 Disney+ 上线的专题剧集。节目伴读 PDF 与历史图表资料已在官网同步放出。伴随着经典的片尾标志性唱段，本期横跨迪士尼文艺复兴与现代帝国的商业史诗正式拉下帷幕。 ## Video description In 1984, the Walt Disney Company was worth more dead than alive. Disney Animation — the heart of Walt's famous flywheel — had stagnated for years, bleeding away talent while corporate raiders circled, salivating over offers to sell off the film library to MGM and offload the parks to hotel operators. But what followed instead was the greatest turnaround in media history under Michael Eisner and Frank Wells. Beauty and the Beast. The Lion King. Broadway. Bringing the Disney Vault home on VHS and DVD. And the greatest media acquisition of all time — ESPN. And then... it all almost fell apart. Again. Euro Disney turned into a money pit. Boardroom and executive infighting ran rampant. Animation descended into a dumpster fire. (Remember Chicken Little? Us neither.) Comcast — Comcast!! — tried to steal the company via a hostile takeover. Out of the chaos, a new generation of Disney management emerged under Bob Iger to stage yet another epic comeback with Pixar, Marvel and Lucasfilm, creating the defining media empire of the 21st century…until the tech companies came along. Tune in for the ultimate Acquired thrill ride: Disney, Part II. *Sponsors:* Many thanks to our fantastic Fall '26 Season partners: - Sierra: https://link.acquired.fm/sierra - Sentry: https://link.acquired.fm/sentry - WorkOS: https://link.acquired.fm/workos - Anthropic: https://link.acquired.fm/claude *Links:* - Sign up for email updates, get our takeaways and research photos from each episode, and vote on future topics: https://www.acquired.fm/email - The Official Acquired Meetup on Sept 17th with our friends at Sentry. Join us!: https://acquired.fm/meetup - The Acquired Disney Part II Companion PDF: https://www.acquired.fm/episodes/disney-the-renaissance-and-the-empire#companion - Worldly Partners' Multi-Decade Disney Study: https://worldlypartners.com/businesshistory - All episode sources: https://www.acquired.fm/episodes/disney-the-renaissance-and-the-empire#sources *Carve Outs:* - Warby Parker Transitions Extra Active: https://www.warbyparker.com/eyeglasses/light-responsive - Michael Arndt's https://youtu.be/FBcwt3QlY_8?si=fp92rR-B46Sz74GG - The Golden State Valkyries: https://valkyries.wnba.com/ *More Acquired:* - Get email updates and vote on future episodes! https://www.acquired.fm/email - Join the Slack http://acquired.fm/slack - Check out the latest swag in the ACQ Merch Store! https://www.acquired.fm/store 00:00:00 Start 00:00:50 Intro 00:05:07 Disney in Chaos (1984) 00:11:33 Eisner, Wells, Katzenberg Arrive (1984) 00:24:30 Animation Renaissance & CAPS Tech (1989) 00:37:33 Flywheel Extensions: Home Video, Retail & Broadway 00:54:32 Challenges & ABC/ESPN Acquisition (1994-1995) 01:05:55 ESPN: Disney's Accidental Goldmine 01:21:26 Eisner's Decline & Save Disney Campaign (2001-2004) 01:34:53 Comcast Hostile Takeover Bid (2004) 01:41:58 Bob Iger's Vision & Pixar Acquisition (2005-2006) 01:52:17 Pixar: From Lucasfilm to Steve Jobs (1979-1995) 02:03:11 Toy Story, IPO & Eisner Conflict (1995) 02:34:30 Disney Acquires Pixar (2006) 02:46:37 Marvel & Lucasfilm Acquisitions (2009-2012) 02:58:01 Streaming Pivot: Cord Cutting & BAMTech (2015) 03:06:30 The Disney+ Strategy & FOX Acquisition (2017-2019) 03:19:01 The Disney+ Launch, COVID, & Chapek's Tenure (2019-2022) 03:42:15 Iger's Return, Challenges & Parks Revival (2022-2026) 03:50:54 The Business Today: Parks & Streaming Focus 03:59:22 Analysis: Disney+ Strategy & The New Media Landscape 04:10:01 Analysis: Bull/Bear Cases 04:21:20 Quintessence 04:24:39 Carve-Outs + Outro _Note: Acquired hosts and guests may hold assets discussed in this episode. This podcast is not investment advice, and is intended for informational and entertainment purposes only. You should do your own research and make your own independent decisions when considering any financial transactions._ [Source](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01QR2tmxSD4)

[8:49] John Lasseter's girlfriend: Just think, someday this park is gonna be filled with the characters that you guys are gonna create. [11:33] Michael Eisner: We have no obligation to make art. We have no obligation to make history. We have no obligation to make a statement. But to make money, it is often important to make history, to make art or to make some significant statement. [24:30] Peter Schneider: I knew I could do no worse than The Black Cauldron. You can't fall off the first floor. [73:00] Roy E. Disney: Nobody would have told you when that deal, the ABC deal, was being made that ESPN was going to turn out to be the weightlifter of the group. [76:00] Mickey Mouse and SportsCenter do not meet. [90:00] Roy E. Disney: Michael, it is my sincere belief that it is you who should be leaving and not me. Accordingly, I once again call for your resignation and retirement. [108:00] Steve Jobs: How long have you worked for Michael? [108:00] Steve Jobs: Well, I don't see how things will be any different, but sure, when the dust settles, be in touch. [125:00] John Lasseter: If it's working in our story reels, when we animate it and put color to it, it's going to work even better. If it's not working in story reels, the animation won't save it. [210:00] The structural force working against ESPN here is that ESPN used to be the only place that you could go to watch highlights and replays... if the main reason to subscribe to any given channel ends up being actually about the game content itself... the excess profits in the long term will just be captured by the rights holders like the NFL and the NBA. [226:00] If you could get the same amount of revenue from 200 million visitors a year or 100 million visitors a year, you want it more dispersed because you want all 200 of those people imbuing Disney fandom into their core childhood memories.

[0:00] All right. So, David, the real question is, after this episode, it gets released. It becomes this durable IP that is part of an IP franchise. Will we turn this into a musical? Oh, yes, absolutely. With masks, dancing in the aisles. And I'm thinking, too, we may as well do Acquired on Ice. Oh, yeah. While we're at it. Let's go. Yet another adaptation of it. Can we do Acquired in Space? Oh, we know a few people who could make that happen. Yeah, help make that happen. All right. All right, let's do this. Welcome to the fall 2026 season of Acquired, the podcast about great companies and the stories and playbooks behind them. I'm Ben Gilbert. I'm David Rosenthal. And we are your hosts. Disney is so much more than you think it is. It is Mickey and Minnie and Ariel and Simba and Elsa and Woody and Buzz and Nemo and all the Pixar characters And of course it the Avengers and Luke Skywalker and Darth Vader and Winnie the Pooh and Disneyland and Disney World and Disney Cruises, Disney Hotels. But now it's also The Simpsons and Avatar and National Geographic, plus the entire studio of 20th Century Fox, a privately owned government inside the state of Florida, a private island in the Bahamas, 10 Broadway musicals, the special effects firm Industrial Light and Magic and Skywalker Sound, one of the four major U.S. broadcast networks, ABC. It is, of course, ESPN. I was wondering when you were going to get to the worldwide leader here. Unexpectedly, a giant amount of the profits of the whole company come from. It is the SEC network. And for a period of time, David, they got even more exotic, owning the NHL team, the Mighty Ducks. Oh, yeah. The Anaheim Angels. Angels in the outfield, baby. And the 1936 British ocean liner, the Queen Mary. That's right. Despite being one of America most storied and stable brands the company is going through a time of immense upheaval They in the midst of a transition to streaming with Disney Plus and Hulu and ESPN making giant technology and marketing investments to support that transition that lost billions for half a decade. And they're doing this while their old, fantastically profitable businesses are fading. Consumers don't really go to the movies like they used to. They don't buy movies on VHS or DVD or Blu-ray. And of course, consumers are also cutting the cords to cancel their cable subscription, so those fat profits from cable channels like ESPN are shrinking every year. And Disney, despite being over 100 years old, is at the very center of the most interesting business strategy questions that have ever been posed. Can we fight the innovator's dilemma and win? What exactly is enduring about our business as technology and trends change, and can our future be as bright as our past? Today, listeners, we tell the story of how Disney went from Walt's tidy, neat idea of an animation studio turned theme park operator into the global, sprawling, diversified behemoth that Disney acquired and expanded its way to today. And we answer that question What does their future look like from here Yes All right well big news from Acquired headquarters This episode has a companion PDF with visuals charts tables and illustrations of the key concepts we discuss. You can get access and follow along by clicking the link in the show notes or going to library.acquired.fm. You can join the email list at acquired.fm slash email. That's where we'll send out behind-the-scenes photos of research, past episode corrections, and it's where you can vote on future episode topics. Plus, we'll give away a little hint each time at what the next episode is about. That is acquired.fm slash email. And if you are in the Bay Area on September 17th, you should join us for the official 2026 Acquired Meetup with our friends at Century. Details are at acquired.fm slash meetup. Before we dive in, we want to thank our brand spanking new presenting partner, Sierra. Yes, Sierra is not only the very best partner for agents in the enterprise, but also home to the self-proclaimed co-presidents of the acquired fan club, Clay Bavor and Brett Taylor. Yes, as Brett and Clay shared on stage with us a few weeks ago when we were in New York together. Yes, indeed. Thank you, Sierra. So with that, listeners, this show is. [5:00] Non-investment advice, David and I may have investments in the companies we discuss, and this show is for informational and entertainment purposes only. All right, well, we start. In 1984, the year I was born, all this was happening. I had no idea. Disney is in chaos in the 18 or so years since Walt died. Disney's star has faded so badly that it looks like no wish can save it. So Disney animation, once the shining pillar of the American can-do spirit and the core of Disney's beautiful flywheel business model, has become a rotting carcass of its former self. That's the kindest way I could think to put it. And Epcot has just launched in Florida, not as Walt Disney's utopian dream of a city of the future, but as a massively over budget and underwhelming World's Fair knockoff that the company has sunk hundreds of millions of dollars deep into debt to build. Family drama among the Disneys runs rampant Roy Disney son Roy E Disney has resigned from the company and is scheming to launch a boardroom attack on Walt once beloved son Ron Miller who is currently the CEO running the company The stock is in the dumps. There have been multiple corporate raiders swirling. There are deals on the table to break up Disney, sell off the film library, Snow White, Cinderella, Sleeping Beauty, sell it all off to MGM, sell the theme parks off to hotel operators, maximize shareholder value here in the 1980s. And in the midst of all this, desperate to ward off these corporate raiders, management strikes a series of friendly deals with four oil and gas and real estate brothers in Fort Worth, Texas, the Bass family and their famous investment manager, Richard Rainwater, that results in the Bass family owning about 25 percent of the Walt Disney Company and becoming Disney's largest shareholder. Yeah, how crazy is this? It's quite the introduction that the company was in such bad shape in 1983, their stock dropped from to that the company was worth more if you sold it for parts than actually running it And so the only defense that they have against these corporate raiders is to find a corporate raider of their own Right. Dilute shareholders so much that they're creating all these new shares to give to these new guys. These Texas guys. The Bass family. So they can own 25%, which basically makes them, you know, pseudo controlling shareholders. More than any of the remaining branches of the Disney family. Yes, and that is by far the best option to fend off these corporate raiders. Dark times. And David, things have gotten so bad in the creative core engine that nearly every dollar of profit is coming from the parks and licensing consumer products at this point. Films and TV, you know, the Disney that you know of, the content business is basically break even. In 1984, Disney generated a quarter billion dollars of profit from its parks and consumer products and a mere two million from film and TV. The core of the famous Disney flywheel is completely broken. But, but, there is a spark of hope. A group of young innovators who will ignite a whole revolution in the movie industry come in and save the company i not talking about michael eisner frank wells and jeffrey katzenberg oh i thought that where you were you would think that's where we're going rather the group that i am talking about is a new hope for the core of disney animation the center of the flywheel all right so ben What if I told you that during this very same time as everything that I just said, Disney animation is floundering. All of the following people are being taught the craft of Disney animation in a small basement room just a half hour's drive north of the Disney Burbank lot. In another institution that Walt Disney himself had created, set up and endowed in his will. CalArts, John Lasseter, Brad Bird, Tim Burton, John Musker, who would do The Little Mermaid, Aladdin, and then many years later, Moana. And then later after them, Andrew Stanton, of course, writer and director of Finding Nemo, WALL-E, Toy Story 5, Brenda Chapman, head of story for The Lion King, and of course, Pete Docter, who today is chief creative officer. [10:00] at Pixar. All of these people are in a basement classroom, classroom A113, home of the Character Animation Program at the California Institute of the Arts, or CalArts. Which was basically created as a pipeline for Disney, right? Yes, exactly. That was why Walt created CalArts. He wanted it to be this institution that would keep the pipeline of new animation talent flowing into Disney long after he was gone. And Walt left like half of his estate to fund this institution. And it was that. I mean, so there's people I mentioned, John Lasseter, Brad Bird, Tim Burton, John Musker, Brenda Chapman. All of them were hired directly by Disney and Disney Animation right out of school. And then Disney fired all of them. But they all end up back. But, you know, they all end up back. So there's this amazing story that one day, while John Lasseter is a student there in the late 70s, he and a bunch of these people, they drive down to go spend the day at Disneyland. And John's girlfriend at the time comes along with them and she says to them, just think, someday this park is gonna be filled with the characters that you guys are gonna create. And she had no idea both how right and how wrong she was It would just take a few decades Yes Okay so how does this company turn around Because I was looking at the financials, and it looks like 1982, earnings are down 19%. And you sort of expect, oh, maybe that's a hiccup. It'll come back. Then 1983, earnings are down another 7%. Yep. So in the wake of all that, in 1984, Roy Disney decides enough is enough. Together with the Bass Brothers, the new 25% shareholders, Roy and his business partner, Stanley Gold, who's also on the Disney board with him, they gang up and they finally force out Ron Miller as CEO, who, again, is Roy's cousin by marriage, married to Walt's daughter. And they do this via dramatic boardroom coup that happens on September 7th, 1984. And then over a period of just 14 days, because Disney now is without a leader, is in double crisis here. They go out and they identify, recruit, sell and hire. Arguably the greatest two person management team in media company history Michael Eisner and Frank Wells and then Michael quickly brings in his number two from Paramount Jeffrey Katzenberg to run the film studios Yep All right So who are these guys? So first, the board goes after Frank Wells. Frank had been the president of Warner Brothers and had since retired. But before that, earlier in his career, he was the mentor of Stanley Gold, Roy Disney's business partner and fellow Disney board member now, back at their old law firm. So Frank is their first call. They trust him deeply. He's eminently qualified. He's recently retired, so he's available. Frank says, I'm interested, but I can't do this alone. There's somebody else you got to call. You got to call Michael Eisner. So Michael, until recently, the timing is just crazy on this, had been probably the hottest Hollywood movie studio executive in town. He had been the number two executive at Paramount under Barry Diller and had architected one of the most legendary runs in Hollywood history. The two of them Barry Diller and Michael within a span of seven years they made Indiana Jones Star Trek Saturday Night Fever Grease Footloose Flashdance The list goes on and on This is when Paramount was number one Yep And the way they did it was this famous strategy that they called the singles and doubles strategy The idea was they would keep their production costs low. They would generally not work with a list stars and directors. and instead they would focus on the quality of the scripts and the stories and let that be their guiding judgment as opposed to the typical hollywood thing of who's attached to the project like do we have the stars and the singles and doubles name appealed to shareholders it didn't exactly appeal to talent and so the way they build it the other direction was high concept exactly describing a unique idea whose originality can be conveyed briefly yep so michael writes a famous memo in Hollywood history that gets leaked and spread around the rest of Hollywood, describing the strategy. And he writes, Spoiler alert, no memo actually ever leaks in Hollywood. They're all intentionally leaked. Yes, they're written for publication. Yeah, that's the way this town works. So Michael writes, We have no obligation to make art. We have no obligation to make history. We have no obligation to make a statement. But to make money, it is often important to make history, to make art or to make some [15:00] significant statement. Not even the greatest screenwriter or actor or director can be counted on to save a film that lacks a strong underlying concept. There you go, Ben. High concept. That's right. And there was another memo leaked later by Jeffrey Katzenberg, who, you know, speaking of the lieutenants, you got Barry Diller's lieutenant is Michael Eisner. Michael Eisner's lieutenant is Jeffrey Katzenberg. Jeffrey writes a memo later where he espouses this really great line that celebrity can open a film, but celebrity can't carry a film. So, yes, you can pay up to attach these big names, but ultimately the audience does experience the quality of the story for itself. And you kind of need the story and the characters and the emotion to take it from there. Yep. Yep. Now, on the one hand, this is crazy that these guys are coming in to run Disney. Disney is not a Hollywood company. Right. It's a Warner Brothers retired executive and a hotshot Paramount executive. Michael from Paramount has not seen Disney movies. He was not raised on them. He had never seen Snow White or Sleeping Beauty. He wasn really a Disney guy despite the fact that as soon as he later gets the job he was never without his Mickey Mouse tie Of course of course But yeah I didn know how to run a theme park flywheel anything But when you think about it though Michael philosophy actually is pretty simpatico with the Disney philosophy It's all about story. It's all about concept. And yes, Walt had a very different way of doing this. He would go big and invest tons in technology and animation. And Michael is like, produce things cheap, singles and doubles. But they're both story first. They're both obsessed with, can we create characters that take you on these emotional journeys and tell compelling stories? And then the unthinkable happens. Michael gets forced out of Paramount at the peak of his success. Well, sort of. Barry leaves, as we talked to Barry about on stage at Radio City Music Hall. To team up with Rupert Murdoch and launch Fox. Yes, Fox the TV network, because Fox the film studio already existed. So Barry leaves. Michael is supposed to get the job that Barry had as chairman of the movie studio over at Paramount. And he doesn't get that job, largely because of internal politics and who's making how much money, those sort of games. And Michael basically his contract says that he owed a check if he does not get the job when Barry leaves So Michael decides you know what I don really want to stay here without Barry anyway I'm going to start poking around for other things. He had been having these kind of background conversations. I'll take the check and get out of here. So all of a sudden, Michael's available right as all this drama is going on at Disney. He was on the board of CalArts with Roy E. Disney. So they've been talking for a while, but now it all comes together. So Frank is offered the top job and Michael's offered number two. Then there's a second iteration where they're sort of offered co-CEOs. And Michael basically tells Frank, hey, look, if I'm going to do this, I'm CEO or I'm chairman, I think is even what he says. And you're number two, because we need to send a signal to the world that Disney is run by a creative executive of which he was at Paramount. And Frank had always sort of been more the numbers and legal and operations. Operational. He was a legal background. Right. So if this is going to work, I have to be the top guy. And Frank, this tells you everything about who Frank is and sort of how the company would work for the next decade Frank says okay that makes sense to me I perfectly happy to do it I be your number two as long as we both just report to the board I be president You can be the chairman but we both have our own relationship with the board. Michael says, works for me. Yep. So on September 21st, 1984, Michael Eisner and Frank Wells are introduced as the new CEO and president of the Walt Disney Company. Can we just talk about what dire straits this company was in that they had to go and in a matter of weeks find two people who had zero relationship with the company, had never worked there, and bring them in and make one of them chairman of the board? Also, we should say there was a giant comp package if the studio did well. There was massive profit sharing. There was big stock options issued. It was like we need a complete reboot, and we're bringing in these Hollywood guys from other studios to make it happen. Yep, yep, yep. they turn around quickly and bring in Jeffrey Katzenberg from Paramount as well to come in and run the studios under Michael at Disney. And the plan is Disney's going to become Paramount. Actually, one of the first items on their agenda is they move the animation department out of the Burbank lot and basically exile Disney animation over to Glendale. They're like, hey, [20:00] You got to make room for all the, you know, movie producers that we're going to bring in here and make live action films. If you're one of these animators who is looking at it from the perspective of what makes this place special, and the very first thing, let's say you were optimistic about change, that happens is they kick the animators out of the building that Walt's office was in. This is like the historic animation building. They clear them out and they say, go to Glendale in this like really rickety rundown building instead. Not looking good for the core of the Disney flywheel here. And then Eisner and Wells turn their attention to the parks. And this is where some light bulbs start to go off. One of the first things they do that ends up, I think, really setting up all the following success that Eisner and Wells and Katzenberg have is they raise the ticket prices at Disneyland and Disney World. Ticket prices at the Disney parks have basically been flat since Walt died. Like the spirit around the company and the ethos of management is like, well, Walt wanted this to be accessible to everybody and he set these prices. So like we shouldn't change them. Never mind that inflation was rampant during the 1970s So parking at Disney World and Disneyland when Eisner and Wells come in to run the company is still only a buck so they start raising ticket and parking prices at the parks not enormously but like they had so much headroom here i mean you can criticize them all you want today for raising prices but they had i don't know five to ten x of you can raise the price and it wouldn't impact demand for a second back then. I mean, you can raise the price of parking from $1 to $5 said nobody will care. But when you do that in an operational business like parks, all of that incremental profit falls right to the bottom line. This is pure incremental cash flow into the Walt Disney company because they're not changing the operations at all. They're just making more money. So Eisner and Wells turn around and they take all these quick profits from the parks and they start investing them into building the live action studios and running the Paramount playbook. Sort of. That still didn't generate as much cash as they'd actually need to finance the full film slate. So for each of the films, all 75 films they would make over the next eight years those were financed by a partner called Silver Screens Ah interesting So Michael singles and doubles strategy worked at Paramount It works even better at Disney They make Down and Out in Beverly Hills, Three Men and a Baby, Good Morning Vietnam, Dead Poets Society, Pretty Woman. These are all huge hits with, you know, singles and doubles size budgets. And they would get actors that would go on to be big, big names. I mean, you name in Robin Williams and Bette Midler, Julia Roberts, and they were basically looking for ways to get deals on talent. Yes. So a lot of times it was like actors that had been in rehab and were looking to make a comeback or it was these up and comers. But it was in many ways like a young Warren Buffett strategy of looking for cigar butts. Yes. That they they knew they could get a guaranteed return on. But it works, man. All told, 27 of their first 33 movies that they make are profitable, which in Hollywood to have a hit rate like that, that's like making 33 venture capital investments and only losing money in six of them. Right. Films are like books or like startups power law distributed normally. But of course along the way as we all know they do quickly realize that hey there some potential in this animation thing here too Well this is a Roy E Disney special Roy views his job as the keeper of Walt vision and the keeper of the thing that made the company special And the thing that made the company special was this ridiculous flywheel, for lack of a better term, that they had where you make amazing, compelling characters on universally relatable stories, told through animation, drawn in a spectacular way that no other studio can do. And then you get to pump that into consumer products and parks and kids pass down to their kids. And it's this like beautiful special business. You re-release the classics in theaters from the Disney vault and you make cash flow on that. And Roy's sitting here looking at the current business of singles and doubles and live action and being like, hey, we got to do the Disney thing. Yeah. So as part of the deal, when they brought Eisner and Wells in, Roy had made them promise not to fully kill animation, and then he had made them make him, Roy, chairman of the animation division under Katzenberg, who's running all the studios. Okay, so flashback to the day that Michael and Frank take over. What had happened the 13 years up to that point? Disney Animation had only released three movies from 1971 to 1984, and they had a film called [25:00] the Black Cauldron, in development for nearly a decade. Yeah, brutal. And morale is low. There's even a sense by the current animators on staff that they weren't making anything as good as what the company used to make. And this is when all that young talent that's coming in from CalArts, Disney's either firing or they're leaving, because they're just like, hey, this place is cooked. Yes. Okay, so we brought up Jeffrey Katzenberg. I was having breakfast with Jeffrey to prep for this episode, and he told me this story where Michael calls Jeffrey into his office on his first day. and this is before animation had been moved out to Glendale so he's still pointing down at the original animation building and he points to the ink and paint door and Michael says to Jeffrey do you know what they do down there and Jeffrey goes no because you know Jeffrey's background is live action paramount stuff with Michael and Michael says neither do I he goes that's where they made the animated movies and that's your problem and so Jeffrey like Michael doesn't know anything about animation, the animators, when he sort of gets in there and he says, okay, I'm, uh, I'm the boss now start looking at this invasion from Hollywood. I mean Disney always existed outside the realm of Hollywood doing their own thing And now you got effectively the suits coming into a culture that is like a bunch of wackadoos I mean, it is like the most fun, crazy place in animation. And this was quite the clash at first. Yep. But at some point, and I don't know, was it Katzenberg or was it Eisner and Wells who realized like, hey, there actually is an opportunity here? Well, it was both of them. and it would take a third guy, and that guy is Peter Schneider. Yes. So his quote when accepting the job is, I knew I could do no worse than the Black Cauldron. You can't fall off the first floor. That's great. So Peter and Jeffrey come in, and they start making changes. And Peter had this license to examine everything. He's not afraid to break any process. So he starts saying, why do we use this type of paint? Why do we make our own paint? Why do we use this style of animation pegs? Is there a better style? Why aren't we using computers? It seems like that could really help us. It sends a cultural message here in 84, 85, 86, that things are really changing. And all the way from the top, we are trying to get better. We want to make something great. We want to make great films. And we want to debate each other over how good of an idea things are We want to iterate all in service of making a great film But this is exactly what they needed New blood a complete shakeup There was good talent there, but they were just sort of like wasting around not being led at all. And there was this sort of dichotomy where the old guard was stuck in their ways. And the young people who came in with all these fresh ideas were falling on deaf ears. And they'd never been part of anything successful. So they sort of didn't know what success looked like or felt like. So they slowly start to turn it around in animation. You know, at first with films like The Great Mouse Detective in 1986, nothing to write home about. They did Oliver and Company in 1988. That gets a little bit more press. There's people sort of saying, hey, look, Disney animation can make good things that are commercially successful. But then the big idea, the crazy one that really worked, was to refine the formula of the Disney animated movie and make them musicals. Yes. These are going to be Broadway musicals, but animated. Yes. We're going to turn these things from cartoons with music to musicals that are cartoons. And it makes all the difference in the world. From story arc to the type of music I mean Snow White had some really catchy tunes Whistle While You Work Hi blah yeah yeah But they weren musicals No And they didn follow the sort of musical stage performance story structure. So, Jeffrey Katzenberg recruits a guy named Howard Ashman. Yes. Interestingly, introduced by David Geffen. I was going to say, yeah, David Geffen connects them, right? Yes. Howard, when he hears the word Disney, instantly says, I want to work in animation. I feel there is a connection between animation and musical theater. And I don't think this was obvious to anyone else. This is like a unique Howard insight. So Howard brings along Alan Menken. Composer Alan Menken. The two of them had done Little Shop of Horrors together, and they hit the ground running. They come into Disney Animation, and the first film that they work on together is The Little Mermaid. Yeah. These guys are geniuses. when we really started to dig into the question of like the Disney Renaissance, who was responsible? Who created these incredible movies and totally turned around Disney? It's these guys. Yeah, they weren't the original story pitch. No, and they weren't the executives, but they brought the magic. So Howard has this great quote where he says, Well, in every great Broadway musical, the third song, the leading lady, [30:00] Goes and she sits on something, might be a rock, might be a trash can, and she sings a song to the world, telling the audience what she wants. If she could only have this thing in life, and then the whole rest of the film, we root for them. That is the entire crux of the play, is what does the leading lady want, and we hope that she gets there. And he's like, I just realized we could do that in Little Mermaid. So Part of Your World is just the setup song for Ariel sitting there, explaining to everyone, I just want to go where the people are. I want to see them dancing. walking around on what do you call them? Oh, feet. And this amazing sort of like lyrical explanation of what she feels as a character that ends up kind of carrying the whole movie. Howard is also the one who says, hey, that little crab, should we make him Jamaican? Yep. And that leads to the whole song Under the Sea. I mean, these are like formative songs that are in at least, David, you and my, our generation's head forever, and why we watch the films, I'm sure a million times when we were kids. Yep, and why they survive. I mean, my girls are watching these movies today. So, Little Mermaid comes out in 1989. It's a classic. But it not like it blew the doors off at the box office And it had a pretty big budget Animation grew its headcount from that low when it was Left 4 Dead of 150 people to 550 people And here a great quote from our friend Ben Cohen at the Wall Street Journal in a piece that he wrote Once upon a time, Disney movies got beat at the box office by rom-coms. The Little Mermaid made less money than when Harry met Sally in 1989. Only when it came out on home video in 1990 and kids could watch VHS tapes of The Little Mermaid. anytime they wanted did the iconic children's movie become truly massive so if you're just looking at box office you're kind of like okay i see green shoots here we're really on to something people love this but it's not like it magically made the company it's not like we just generated a bunch of profits which you don't look trust in disney animation had eroded right like people were used to crap coming out of the studio so they do rescuers down under in 1990 it's fine but it's not like one of the great Disney Renaissance films, the way that Little Mermaid and the one we're about to talk about. And then Beauty and the Beast. I know Lion King's bigger, but like, Beauty and the Beast is my favorite of these movies. It was my first movie in theaters. Oh, wow. And this is another Howard Ashman special Yep yep It so good Yes So Beauty and the Beast builds on the momentum of the team that trusts each other the new style of musicals as animation This one actually lights up the box office. 330 million gross at the box office on a $25 million production budget. Man, Disney animation is back. They do it again the next year. I'm telling you, year after year after year, 1992 with Aladdin. Box office. 500 million is what I saw, right? That's right. Half a billion. On a 28 million dollar production budget. And they're pulling out the stops on sort of the Disney stars at this point. They're bringing in Robin Williams to be the genie. From Good Morning Vietnam to the genie. That's right. And then they do it again two years later with The Lion King, 1994. This time a little bit bigger production budget. It's 45 million dollars. It's very sophisticated animation. We've got James Earl Jones. How much money did this thing make? This brings in $750 million. Yeah. Unprecedented at the time. The most successful, traditionally animated, hand-drawn film in history. In history. Michael Eisner actually announces then they are going to build a new animation building and bring all of the animators back onto the Disney lot Yes back to Burbank Which as a fun little aside Disneyland when it was originally supposed to be like a little 15-acre park or something right next to the Disney lot before it became a much bigger project, this is actually the plot of land. Where the new animation building is today. So great. So great. So that's the Disney Renaissance. So it's interesting, right? Little Mermaid cost $40 million to make, and then Beauty and the Beast and Aladdin were cheaper. And you said like, oh, production budgets balloon back up with Lion King, but only to $45 million. How are they making these so cheap? Yes. So the process of actually doing the hand-drawn animation, and it all was still hand-drawn in this era, had progressed from the actual inking and painting to kind of skipping the inking step, because they use xerography so you could directly transfer the paper sketches onto the transparent celluloid for each frame so that you can photograph it. But the thing that Disney does here during the Renaissance films is something called CAPS. Starting in 1990, the computer animated production system. This was really pushed by Roy E. Disney, who felt this was [35:00] a big part of his Uncle Walt's legacy, kind of pushing the frontier of technology and how investing in new technology can push the state of the art in storytelling. Computers had advanced a lot by 1990, and so they got to thinking, why are we still using physical paint to color in the lines on every single one of these hand-drawn frames? Also, multi-plane cameras were really, really expensive to operate, so they started cheaping out in the dark times, where rather than photographing really complicated, you know, six-plane animation, they would just kind of slap one animation cell down, put a background underneath it, photograph it, and move on to the next one. And so they invested $10 million in fixed costs into software that could do two things. One was effectively Microsoft Paint for 2D animation, where you could look at all the lines on a computer, you could select a color, you could bring over your little paint tool and dump your bucket of into an enclosed area. It sounds like I'm describing something that you're like, yes, we've all used MS Paint, but this was rocket science at the time. This was really cool and meant that not only do you not have to do inking anymore, you don't do painting either. And on top of that what CAPS was was a super duper multi camera that could do an unlimited number of planes not just limited to whatever you could actually do in Walt era So you could do it faster and cheaper without actually operating the multi-plane camera. So the Little Mermaid, which only had three multi-plane shots because it was before Caps, by the time you get to the Lion King, it had hundreds. So it's better, it's faster, and it keeps the budget down. Yeah, seems odd that Disney, a media company, would develop this computer software technology in-house. Yes, they relied on a partner for that who was getting really, really good at early computer graphics, Pixar. Yeah, well, put a pin in that. Yes, and one other just fun, just because this is cool nerdy stuff, the scene in Beauty and the Beast that is the ballroom dancing scene that has this crazy cool camera pan It's a quick shot, but it's one of the most memorable shots of the whole film. The background of that was actually 3D rendered using Pixar software. Oh, cool. And then they composited, using caps, a 2D hand-drawn bell and the beast dancing, and that is the first time they used any 3D animation in any Disney films Oh that so cool Yeah And if you go back and watch it you like whoa yeah the background is computer generated Yeah Oh that awesome Okay So in the back of all these Disney Renaissance animated hits the flywheel is soaring again at Disney. I mean, really for the first time since Walt died, the core animated IP at the center of the company is back. It's inspiring new generations of children. their parents. And Eisner and Wells not only embrace all of it, they extend the flywheel even further. So they add three new incredible extensions to the Disney business model, all based on these characters and stories and this timeless IP that Disney Animation is once again creating. So the first, home video. Man, this is a banger. So the Disney vault already Disney would take their classic movies like Snow White or Cinderella and re-release them in theaters every seven years or so to get a new generation of children exposed. Which was the only way to watch movies. My brain sort of can't understand this since home video has existed my entire life. No Disney Plus back then, baby. Nope And until 1985 there was no way to watch a Disney film outside of a theater Yep yep So Eisner and Wells and Katzberg were like well we can do the same thing with home video You know, VHS exists now. It's a big thing. You know, it's high penetration in U.S. households. None of the old people at Disney want to do it. Roy is opposed. The family's opposed. It's heresy. It's heresy. Michael has to convene the whole Disney family and get their approval to release Pinocchio as the first of the classics that they're going to put on VHS here in 1985. And they're starting low stakes. I mean, Pinocchio has already been re-released in theaters five times, seven years apart. You would think you're not cannibalizing much at this point on the sixth re-release. Yes, of Pinocchio. So they agree to a very limited 1.7 million unit run of VHS of Pinocchio. I'm glad you found this too. At the very high $29.95 at retail per copy. It sells out like instantaneously. So that's $50 million in gross merchandise sales. Basically zero incremental production costs except for the couple bucks of printing the cassette tapes. And then they do it the next year with Cinderella, which proves the exact same thing. So they do a theatrical re-release on schedule of Cinderella and [40:00] Does $34 million in box office revenue. And then they put out the VHS home video. Six million units. So between the two of them, that is $200 million in gross revenue from Cinderella. Oh, man. I mean, it's basically another box office smash, like, for free that they're getting here. So it's this crazy thing they discovered where it seems to not hurt anything, not dampen any demand, because Michael Eisner would sort of later famously point out, people buy these tapes, but they break, they lose them. Right, right. It doesn't make people any less excited to go to the theater six, seven years later. You know what kids are really good at? Losing VHS tapes. Right. It's not like, oh, you're permanently destroying an asset now that those tapes exist in the world. No. It only increases the demand for more Cinderella now that the tapes are out. This is the core philosophy behind how Walt Disney's flywheel business strategy works. I had read that Disney was keeping like between to a pop in profits per VHS tape that they were selling because I think they had so much leverage over the retailers So home video quickly becomes a billion dollar business for the Walt Disney Company It the second biggest profit center for the whole company after the theme parks And then that's just re-releasing the classics. Then they start doing home video of the new hits that are coming out. And like, man, does that blow the doors off. Having a home video release channel instantly makes whatever you want to spend on animation worth it. Yes. It is this sudden renewed focus on animation because they realize, oh my God, there's a way to get value out of this. Yes. So the numbers on this, Aladdin sells 30 million VHS tapes in 1993. So that's $900 million in sales. Yeah, in sales. Sales of tapes. Yeah, yeah. And then The Lion King eclipses it in 1995 when it comes out on VHS with 32 million units, the best-selling VHS of all time, period, in history, ever. That's a billion dollars of tapes of The Lion King sold. Yes, Disney is getting roughly 50% or greater cash flow margin out of that. You should think each of those is half a billion dollars in Disney bank account Because these films are already quite profitable from the box office because the budgets are low and the box office is super high I mean Lion King is just ridiculous right Like $750 million at box office on a $45 million production. So let's say, what does Disney make? $300 million in cash flow out of that theatrical? Minus distribution and marketing expenses. I don't know, $250? Yeah, okay. Sure. 250 out of half a billion from home video. You're at three quarters of a billion in cash out of The Lion King within a year of release. And then, well, we'll get to what else comes out of The Lion King in a second. And I don't think there was much back end at that point for any of the actors. So I think this is literally just going to. No, this is also why it fits so great with Eisner's philosophy, because even though they were signing stars to be voice actors like Robin Williams is the genie, et cetera, et cetera. They weren't getting paid much. So like these are very different deals, especially back then for those actors, then for the live action films that were starting to get expensive and actors were making real money out of. Yep. So that's home video. Next they launched Disney retail stores across the country That right Do you remember these I spent so many weekends at the mall when I was a kid in Disney retail stores Plastered with Disney stuff giant piles of stuffed animals. It was a hallucinogenic experience to go in there. It was peak 1990s. Yes. So they build more than 750 Disney stores, retail stores in basically every mall in America, which now between home video, where for the first time you've got kids and families watching these movies over and over and over again at home. And on the weekends, these American families, they go to the mall, they go to the Disney store, they buy the merch, they revel in all this Disney. It is back to the peak of Disney under Walt, where it just takes over America, basically. Yep. I bet people of our generation have a unique relationship with Disney because of this period, because we were there in such a heyday. I bet people that are 10, 15 years older than us don't have the same Disney relationship. Yeah. Since they were sort of grownups by the time the Eisner era hit. Yeah. I mean, it was the dark period when they were children. Yes. And you got to get children to make this work. Yep. And then they pass it on to their children and et cetera, et cetera. So, okay. Home video, Disney retail. [45:00] And then three, Broadway. This is an absolute masterstroke. When we first started the research, we were like, oh, yeah, yeah, we'll put a thing about the Lion King, the musical in there. And Broadway, they do that. You know, great. It's a thing that Eisner and team do in the 90s. Oh, it must be like Disney on Ice, some random extension that I'm not really sure how much it contributed. But cool that they did that and very artistic of them. Okay. So first they do Beauty and the Beast. That's a big success on Broadway. They end up buying the new Amsterdam Theater. Disney owns that in New York now. So then they put on the Lion King musical, which is spectacular. Oh, amazing. I haven't been in 15 years or something, but I have a visceral memory of the parade of animals walking down the aisle and just how uniquely they did the costume designs with the faces of the animals that sort of hover above their heads. It's art. It's back to Walt Disney. It's art and commerce. Like, right. It's absolute art. And it becomes the highest grossing Broadway show in history. It's still running today. And if you add up gross on Broadway over the past 30 years plus the touring company the Lion King musical has grossed over billion in total revenue in its run which I think makes it the single highest grossing entertainment product in history in any medium film music TV video games other Broadway shows What? Lion King the musical is the highest grossing piece of entertainment ever created in history. Of any medium, the highest grossing is a Broadway musical? Yep, of a single, like non-episodic, but like a single piece of media, a single story concept. Lion King the musical. How is it $11 billion? Because even the biggest box office films do $2.8, $2.9 billion. I mean, that's Avatar, that's Avengers Endgame. And then if you were to add like an entire home video on top of that, we already said the Lion King home video was a billion. Yeah, you double it, maybe more, yeah. How do they get to $11 for a Broadway musical? It's been running for 30 years. 30 years. And they're packing the house around the world. Traveling show, pretty high ticket price to go to a musical. It's in London, it's in New York, it's got the traveling company. Wow. Yeah, so even spread out over 30 years, Lion King the Musical, on average, that means it has generated million in gross revenue for Disney every single year That is an extra hit movie every year And they own it outright Yeah I mean they have to share theater revenue with you know especially the touring company when they go to theaters around the world. But that's the same as any movie. It's another movie every year. Wow, $11 billion. Yeah. Fascinating. Absolutely incredible. So Eisner in this era really did crack the extensions of the brand thing. And he also kind of dipped his foot back into traditional marketing more. Didn't they start running a whole bunch of like come to Disneyland commercials? Yes. And like explaining the rides. And I think this is also when they started the campaign where the winning Super Bowl MVP would always say, I'm going to Disney World right after they won the Super Bowl. So this is the other big, big thing that Michael Eisner does is he transforms the parks. the parks were obviously walt's genius and part of the original walt vision and business model for what disney would become but they're just theme parks when michael takes over yeah they're not really resorts he makes the parks and especially florida a resort it goes from ah yeah we got disney world and we got epcot and sure come to florida they build the grand floridian hotel they build the Swan They build the Dolphin They start the Vacation Club timeshare program with Old Key West Resort which my family was a member of And so what did we do every year? We went to Walt Disney World every single year. It was a resort. It was a vacation. They add Hollywood Studios. Then they add the Animal Kingdom. They completely transform what a theme park resort is. And the Animal Kingdom in particular is a wild pitch. What if we build an actual animal kingdom with lions and zebras? And it won't feel like a zoo. It'll feel like you're on the African safari when you're out doing it. They changed the park from something that could compete with going to a baseball game on a Saturday to something that could compete with your European five-day vacation. Yes. Yes. And they get into all the real estate all around it. All those hotels that they're developing, having Imagineering develop. It's not just Marriott's that they're throwing in there. Right. And with him raising prices, plowing cash into building out the next 10, 15, 20 years of parks and attracting, oh, I'm not going to spend $300 here. I'm going to drop $3,000 here on a family vacation. This starts to become kind of a behemoth business of its own. I mean, it sets the stage. [50:00] Today, last year, Disney Parks and Experiences contributed $10 billion in operating profit to Disney. And it starts with this. Nuts. Now, it's not all sunshine and rainbows on the parkside during the Eisner era. Euro Disney? There is Euro Disney, which costs $4 billion to develop and just loses money for years. The sort of glib line that I like about this is it took Disney a decade to figure out that European parents want to drink wine while their kids run around. There's more to it than that. And also, I'm not sure that Europeans love being called Euro. If you live in Paris, you consider yourself French or Parisian. You don't consider yourself Euro. So they rename it Disneyland Paris. They make a whole bunch of changes. They eventually write the ship. And there's a global macro thing that changes, too. They sort of opened into a recession. But yeah, that was a disaster for a while. Yeah. Yeah. But that aside, I mean, man, by the time we're in the mid 90s here, Disney and the Eisner, Wells, Katzenberg dream team is just crushing it. Operating profit at the company goes from well under 300 million when they take over in 1984 to just under billion a decade later So almost what that 8x operating profit in a decade Wow. And it had been declining. I mean, it fell 25% in two years before they joined. Yeah, those three guys didn't just save Disney. Like, they made Disney flourish in a way that Walt only could have dreamed of. It is quite reasonable to say that Disney has never been as successful as they were in this period from the early to mid 90s. Well, I've got the stats to prove it. So by 1994, Disney's market cap, it's $22 billion, up 10x from when the Eisner crew took over. And it becomes the highest valued of all the traditional media companies, more valuable than Time Warner, more valuable than Viacom, more valuable than Fox and News Corp. Disney is on top of the world and it's all about to fall apart. But before we tell that story, now is a great time to thank our new presenting partner, a company that we are very excited about, Sierra. Yes we study founders and CEOs of some of the greatest businesses in history And those folks today are all wrestling with the same question How do I use AI to grow my business without losing what makes us unique And that's exactly where Sierra comes in. And part of why we're so excited to be partnering with them. Well, that and the fact that it's built by basically the super group of tech from the last two decades with Brett Taylor and Clay before. Previously ACQ2 guests. Yes. And the ridiculous group of talent that they have assembled there. Yes, Sierra has built customer-facing AI agents that can do a huge range of things, not just basic support stuff like answering questions, but the kind of hard things that are closer to a company's core value creation. 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Instead of paying for usage or tokens, you pay for outcomes, a subscriber renewed or a claim got paid. so you can focus on growing your business, not choosing models or managing tokens. And in fact, we think so highly of Sierra that we invested in the company. So to find out how you can build standout customer experiences that grow your business with AI, visit sierra.ai slash acquired and just tell them that Ben and David sent you. Okay, so David, they're flying high. What could possibly go wrong? Oh, man. Well, 1994 is a great year for Disney as a business because Lion King comes out. It's a terrible year for Disney as a company. And there's three huge blows that hit the company in quick succession. First, on Easter Sunday, 1994, Frank Wells is shockingly and tragically killed in a helicopter crash. [55:00] while hella skiing this is terrible um on every level for the company and the management team for all that michael eisner was ben as you said like the creative executive and had to be the public face of the walt disney company and the disney renaissance frank was like the guy behind the scenes holding it all together he absolutely was the ying to michael's yang and all of a sudden he's gone like one day's here one day's gone and there's big personalities at the table michael's big personality jeffrey's a big personality and frank was kind of the the peacekeeper the the one who could always relate to everyone be the intermediary calm people down when they were hot about something i mean he was the guy who when michael said i need to be number one he said Okay, no problem. Let's all go make magic together. Yep. And that force is just not at the company anymore. So then three months later, while Michael is at the annual Allen and Company conference in Sun Valley Idaho he starts experiencing chest pains and has to be rushed back to LA into emergency quadruple bypass open heart surgery Yeah, and he's out of commission. I mean, he is recovering from open heart surgery in the hospital while they're feeling the loss of Frank Wells. There's a lot of decisions that need to get made, and there's a lot of personnel clashes that needed to get sorted through. But what can Michael do? He's like literally on the operating table. He even thought there was some chance he might not make it. He gave his wife instructions. Hey, if I don't wake up, do X, Y and Z. Harrowing times. Yeah. Yeah. So then. In the middle of this, Katzenberg quits. Well, there's a lot of different sides to this story. One version of it is that Jeffrey was promised the number two job at the company if Frank ever moved on or retired or anything. That was certainly Jeffrey's understanding that Michael had promised him that. Yes. There were other perspectives including from Roy E Disney that hey Jeffrey is great in the job that he has running the studios animation and the other film studios But he by no means ready to be the president of the Walt Disney Company Which again at this point is much more than just the film studios It all of those other businesses that we talked about Right. And so we need to sit tight for a little while. So Jeffrey's interpretation of this, which is, again, quite reasonable, is, well, I thought you told me this was mine. I am itching to do something bigger than my current responsibility. I've been a good team player. I just created some of the most successful movies ever. Iconic IP. That's right. With the Disney Renaissance films, Lion King and Beauty and the Beast and all these. If you don't think I have a future here to become president of this company, then I'm out. I'm going to go do something else. Yep. So he elects that option and leaves. Yep. And he doesn't just leave. He leaves and starts a competitor. And starts a lawsuit. Yes. Yes, he also sues the Walt Disney Company for bonuses that he was owed. They end up settling that lawsuit many years later for a reported $280 million. But yeah, he leaves and starts a competitor. Yes. DreamWorks. Yes. With Steven Spielberg and David Geffen. And the intention is DreamWorks is going to be a full stack Disney competitor They going to do live action They going to do animation They going to do music with David Geffen They going to do television They going to do video games Basically, the whole Disney flywheel minus the parks. But then they sign up with Universal as their movie distributor, and they set up their headquarters on Universal's lot, which is also a theme park. So, yeah. suddenly a very very formidable competitor and then they decide to build the dreamworks animation studio just down the street from disney in glendale and they start poaching the disney animators and one of the first people that katzenberg recruits is brenda chapman member from cal arts and room a113 who was head of story for the lion king and dreamworks animation would soon go on to create Shrek. That would do half a billion dollars at the box office. This is the first time Disney has had something like this, a full stack competitor in its backyard. Yep. Adding insult to injury here is you might say, okay, well, animation is roaring and, you know, it wasn't all Jeffrey, so they should be fine. Sadly, Howard Ashman passed away from AIDS just a couple [60:00] years before this. And there's a vacuum of Howard's presence in the animation department and in the films that they would go on to make from here. So kind of from here, what comes out of Disney Animation is... Next one is Pocahontas, right? Yep. Then Hunchback of Notre Dame, Hercules, Mulan, Tarzan, Fantasia 2000, a movie called Dinosaur in 2000, which I actually remember fondly. I think that was Disney's first 3D animated movie. Yeah, exactly. Yeah. Emperor's New Groove, Atlantis, Lilo and Stitch and Treasure Planet. Yeah. You know, you know, some of those films. None of them are The Lion King. Right. So, yeah, in the vacuum left by all of this, Michael decides that the person he's going to promote to number two president and chief operating officer of the Walt Disney Company is himself. Yeah, it's the Michael Eisner company now, through and through. Yeah, hey, he was great. Like, he's eminently qualified. I mean, the last 10 years have been unbelievable, so. Yeah but that a big job on top of an already very big job And really what he saying is look there no one obviously ready to be number two across films and TV and the parks And so until we figure that out I just going to be the guy Yep. Yep. And he's also about to pull the trigger on a pretty fundamental change in what the Walt Disney Company was that he had been planning for a couple of years. He's been sniffing around the TV networks. And wasn't there some regulatory reason why suddenly this was possible? Yes. So back in 1993, the FCC had repealed a law called the Financial Interest and Syndication Rules that prohibited TV networks from owning the programs that they aired. Right, because the thinking behind this, I think in the 70s when it was enacted, is that these TV broadcast networks, the big three networks, are kind of a monopoly on content in the country. There's no cable. So if those companies basically vertically integrate and own a movie studio and then they air those movies on just the three networks then we kind of have a problem because there not enough competition in this marketplace but as two decades go by now you got cable TV and suddenly you hamstrung all these networks and the networks aren allowed to produce their own content while they trying to fight this existential battle of, oh my god, cable's coming in and eating our lunch. So of course, the thing that makes sense, which is great, I love it when laws get repealed, when they don't make sense anymore, that law is repealed, and suddenly you now have open season on movie studios and TV networks trying to combine. Yep. So Michael is sniffing around. He's like interested in CBS first, right? Yeah. Sniffing around CBS, NBC isn't for sale. He talks to ABC, does a typical Michael kind of lowball offer that goes nowhere. But Michael had actually started his career at ABC. So Barry Diller and Michael, they were TV guys at ABC before they went to Paramount. Right. So he knew everybody there. And then at the Sun Valley Conference the next year in 1995, always at Sun Valley, Michael strikes a deal for the Walt Disney Company to acquire ABC Capital Cities for billion which was the second largest acquisition in history to that point Man crazy 19 billion dollars That like quaint today The only bigger one was RJR Nabisco. Yes. Yes. Which is going to come up here in a sec. And I think there's so much great lore around this, but I think this was like a parking lot conversation where Michael had been hoping to run into Warren Buffett. And he finally did. And Warren calls over Tom Murphy, who was there too. CEO of Capital Cities ABC. And they kind of start talking. And I think within days, maybe a week or something, then they've got a deal hammered out. Yep. Yep. Yeah. So Warren Buffett and Berkshire was the largest shareholder in ABC Cap Cities, which had been created a decade earlier in the famous Minnow Swallows Whale transaction. That's right. A lot of listeners probably won't know this, but ABC is actually not the parent company that Disney was going after to acquire. ABC was owned by something called Capital Cities, which had unbelievably managed to acquire ABC even though ABC is much bigger than it was. Yeah, it's like four times bigger. You might say, how is this possible? Well, they had the financial backing of Warren Buffett and Berkshire Hathaway. That's right. That's right. So, it's basically using Berkshire Hathaway's capital and the small company of Capital Cities [65:00] sort of jointly buy and control ABC. Yeah, one of Warren Buffett's many, you know, genius deals. Yeah. So Buffett and Berkshire are the largest shareholders in ABC Cap Cities here. So really, the person that Eisner is pitching is Buffett. Now, Ben, you mentioned something really important, which was that the reason that these laws had been repealed by the FCC was the new competition from cable TV. I mean, the broadcast networks used to have this monopoly on television content in America. Now, all of a sudden here in the 90s, cable and pay TV is just this explosion of content in America and the broadcast networks are under threat. So the broadcast networks like ABC went from like historically these great businesses to it's kind of like OK businesses because so much of American viewing time and thus advertising dollars had transitioned over to cable. But it just so happened that buried within ABC was the single best cable asset in the history of mankind. The Entertainment and Sports Programming Network better known as ESPN Yes Oh man The history of ESPN is like completely crazy on its own It was acquired by the Getty Oil Company just months after it was founded when it was still a startup Texaco then acquired Getty, sold off ESPN to ABC. This happened in 1984. ABC wanted a financial partner for the deal. So they bring in Nabisco, like Nabisco as a 20% minority partner in ESPN. I guess in theory, like Nabisco was going to get some advertising synergies for their CPG products. I don't know. Okay. It doesn't matter because the next year Nabisco gets taken private by KKR in the Barbarians at the Gate. The largest acquisition of all time. Yep. As part of that, they sell off this 20% ESPN minority stake to the Hearst Corporation, which still owns it to this day. And Hearst, over the ensuing four decades, just gets billions and billions of dollars of free cash flow out of ESPN. In a complete free ride Free ride Doesn have to lift a finger That right That right But yeah ESPN became this juggernaut and they actually invented a whole second revenue line for cable networks in addition to advertising, the affiliate fee business model. Because before, cable channels would just let themselves show up in a cable bundle. They'd let the cable bundle distribute and say like, oh, well, we're selling ads. So can you just do the distribution for us so that anybody who's buying your cable bundle will get my channel and thus see my ads? And pre-ESPN, that was the whole business model. Even more than that, I think for a lot of startup cable networks, the dollars went the other way. I think they were even paying. They would pay to be included. The cable operators to carry the channel, right? Yes. And ESPN sort of realizes like they were buying sports rights to broadcast leagues and they needed to cover their costs. So they asked the bundlers, the cable companies like, hey, will you pay us X cents per viewer so that we can actually afford to go buy these rights? the money to buy the sports. That may have been how it started, but pretty quickly though ESPN and then within ABC once ABC owns it they realize that sports rights are the biggest point of leverage that they could possibly have over the cable operators because all ESPN has to do is threaten to pull the plug on any given cable operator and say to their thousands or millions of subscribers out there oh, hey, you know, you wanted to watch those NBA games or those MLB games or those NFL games or see those highlights on SportsCenter. Sorry, we're in a carriage dispute with ESPN. We're not going to be able to show those. A stick that still gets used today. Right. I mean, when that happens, people actually show up at the doorstep of the cable operators and basically riot. Americans love nothing more than their sports. Yep. That is pricing power right there. And so once ESPN figures out this business model, it just becomes this incredible juggernaut. At first, Ben, like you said, they get the cable operators to pay them a few cents per subscriber that gets the ESPN channel. And it goes up to a dollar, then $2 a month, and then $5 a month. Do you know what ESPN's current affiliate fee [70:00] The average deal is per month with pay TV operators. I know it's the single highest paid channel by like 3x. 4x. Yeah, much higher than I'm going to guess, I don't know, $10 per subscriber. $9.42 per month per subscriber that the cable operators pay ESPN. This is billions and billions and billions of highly predictable cash money dollars flowing into ESPN. contractually guaranteed virtually guaranteed every month i mean yeah sports are the reason especially today that people are buying cable right and espn is very aware of that value that they provide to the bundle they are very good at value capture yes yes so back to the disney cap City's ABC deal here in 1995. I don't think if they're really honest that Disney and Michael really knew how how big ESPN was going to become. At this point ESPN had 66 million cable subscribers but they were only just beginning to really ramp their pricing leverage There a Roy E Disney quote on this Nobody would have told you when that deal the ABC deal was being made that ESPN was going to turn out to be the weightlifter of the group. Nobody involved in it in any way ever would have thought that. Yep, yep. At that point, ESPN's average monthly affiliate fee with their cable partners was still less than a buck. So there was so much more room to scale ahead of it. But absolutely quickly after Disney acquires Cap Cities in 1996, ESPN becomes this just crown jewel within the company almost overnight and almost completely by accident. The business model, once they got it going, was so simple, just like call up the cable operators every year or two and say, hey, we're going to raise carriage rates 20%. Oh, you don't like that? Okay, we'll pull the plug. You sure you don't like that? All right. 20 percent it is. And they had locked up the sports rights for like a decade for any of the sports they were bidding on. They realized that, oh, we should go get the longest contracts we can. So we have the most leverage over these cable companies. So this is like the heyday of ESPN here in the late 90s into the early 2000s MLB NBA they do a big NFL deal in 1998 to get Sunday night football and Monday night football rights for ABC They get three Super Bowls out of that. Meanwhile, they invented the whole sports highlight category, which is just like, hey, we've got these rights and live sports are worthless the minute after they aired. But what if we show them again a few hours later in a nightly highlight show with a lot of sizzle and some great anchors? And this is SportsCenter. And like, man, was it awesome? Yep. The cost to operate ESPN beyond the sports rights was not that much. They're operating out of Bristol, Connecticut. Yeah. The cherry on top to all this, too. So Disney is already in the cable game before acquiring ABC Cap City's ESPN. they had launched Disney Channel in 1983. Yep, I think that's right. And it was super rocky at first, expensive to get off the ground, way over budget. It was actually part of the problems they were going through in 83 along with Epcot cost overruns. But now that they have ESPN, they're able to collectively bargain with the cable companies So not only could they command premium rates for ESPN they would also say oh yeah you want the Disney Channel and A and Lifetime Yeah those rates are going up too Yep. Exactly. It's almost like a bundle within a bundle. And that's not even getting into ESPN2, ESPN Classic, ESPN News, ESPN Ocho, you know. These days, the SEC network, they go nuts. So this is a grand slam for Disney, an absolute grand slam. But it's yet another huge management item competing for Michael Eisner's attention, among all the other existing management items at the Walt Disney Company. And Eisner's thought going in was, it is important to have the Disney brand and our products and our content distributed on television. Walt did this. That's how they built the Disneyland mania around that TV show. With ABC. Bringing it full circle. And all that did become important. It was kind of amazing to have ABC and these cable stations as an outlet to promote Disney stuff, you know, in this kind of flywheel synergistic aligned way that we've been talking about. But to your point, [75:00] David, what it ended up actually being was just an amazing source of continuous free cash flow that they could do other stuff with. Yeah, it's great that we can promote the Disney brand and it can provide all this alignment. But you know what's even better than that? Just spitting off mountains of cash that we can use in movies, in parks to sort of expand the business. Yeah, I think you can make an argument that ABC fits in with the Walt Disney Company and the Disney Flywheel. ESPN is this wholly separate thing that really doesn't. Mickey Mouse and SportsCenter do not meet. I mean, they try to put ESPN World of Sports in Disney World and stuff like that. Wide World of Sports. Yep. And ESPN Zone. Yeah, that's right. Oh, ESPN Zone. Yeah, yeah, yeah. But the correct move that they figured out eventually was kind of firewall ESPN out on its own. Make the best ESPN you can and just enjoy the dollars. And the timing totally lines up with everything you were talking about, David, expanding the parks, building hotels, leaning into resorts. This is how they funded it all was all the cash that ESPN and the cable networks but mostly ESPN were spitting out There even a quote in Bob Iger book which we haven talked about Bob yet but we will Comes into Disney via the Cap Cities acquisition That right He worked at Capital Cities. Bob is COO of Cap Cities. Yep. The quote is, it gave Disney a scale to remain independent while other studios were falling on hard times. ESPN also further stabilized the business during the ups and downs of animation. And here, David, is an astonishing statistic. So we're flashing forward. But later on in the 2008 to 2011 timeframe, Disney's cable networks segment, of which analysts believe that three quarters of the cable network segment is ESPN. That segment accounted for 60% of the entire company's operating income during that 2008 to 2011 period. Over $5 billion in profit just from the cable channels. I mean, they evolved into the cable TV affiliate fees company. Yep So back here to the late 90s into the early 2000s Michael just overloaded managing all this And one element of the backdrop to all this is it the dot era Disney does all sorts of crazy dot stuff They acquire Starwave, Paul Allen's company after Microsoft. Right here in Seattle. Yep. Starwave was basically like a web developer that they, I think, paid a couple hundred million dollars for. Then they buy Infoseek, which was like the seventh place search engine. They then create a separate Disney internet assets tracking stock that they float publicly. Yeah, you can't make all this stuff up. It's, you know, dot com insanity. And like, hey, OK, great. Give Eisner a pass because everybody's doing dot com insanity during this era. Well, the biggest credit to give is the deal that he didn't do. Exactly. Yeah. AOL approached him. Steve Case approached him before Time Warner about an AOL Disney combination. And to Michael's eternal credit, maybe the best thing he did as CEO of the Walt Disney Company, among many, many great things. Other than buying ESPN. Other than buying ESPN. But yeah, I was going to say thanks, but no thanks to AOL. Yeah. I mean, looking at what AOL did with Time Warner, AOL merged its stock that was highly marked but the intrinsic value of the company was actually worthless with Warner Brothers like a real durable stable company at least at the time And that could have happened to Disney too But amidst all these very high valuations of the dotcom era and I watched a bunch of interviews of Michael at this time he was skeptical and very careful about not giving away Disney in like a foolish transaction like that Yep, yep, yep. While we're on bad decisions during this era, Michael does finally hire a president. Yeah. And a number two. His close friend and Hollywood super agent, Michael Ovitz, comes in as Disney president to be Eisner's number two and help him operate the company in 1995. Michael, famed past acquired guest. That's right. Founder of Creative Artist Agency. This was huge. This was huge news in Hollywood. Earth-shattering stuff. I mean, Michael Ovitz built CAA into such a force in not only Hollywood, but kind of the whole creative community. The only thing that rivaled the power of the studios at the time was CAA. Going to be the number two after being the founder number one at CAA said a lot. And you know what? It also speaks to what Eisner had said. [80:00] built and assembled at Disney, especially after Cap Cities. It was the place to be in media. And it was almost immediately a horrible decision on both sides. Ovitz was an agent. Eisner was an executive. This was a bad idea from the start. You know what the job of a president and COO is? It's to sit in meetings all day, herd cats, make aligned decisions, tell people no, don't people, please, make sure that the thing runs, and manage processes that take a really long time with tens or hundreds of thousands of employees to carry out. The job of being an agent is being liked, saying yes, wielding your power, making things happen quick, being involved in 15 projects at once, or in Michael Lovitz's case, 500 projects at once. The day-to-day operations of being the number two at Disney could not have been more different than the skill set he had perfected at CAA. Yep. So Ovitz lasts just over a year at Disney and leaves in December 1996 with a million severance package Because neither Ovitz nor Eisner thought there was any chance this was going to fall apart and so the walt disney company was willing to put in a contract and say if you don't make it x amount of time then you get 140 million extra dollars yep now all of this frankly is just window dressing on what the real problem is the real problem is disney animation hmm that's interesting. Ben, you talked about what the movies were after 1994, and some of them were good, but it's a downhill slide. And by the time you get to the end of that period, Atlantis, Treasure Planet, these are bad movies. Yeah. And with Capital Cities, ABC, ESPN coming in, it's a little bit confusing how to think about and organize the company. Because before, you had this nice, tidy flywheel business. You make films with characters that people love on these universally relatable journeys. You make money at the box office, home video parks, consumer products, and then you recycle the IP every seven years. It's articulatable in one sense. When they bought Capital Cities, it's totally different. Owning TV stations that generate revenue from advertising from cable subscriptions mostly using one use content that is not most of which you don create yourself in I mean it can be profitable and sometimes fantastically profitable but it's worth acknowledging that that's a totally different business model. And now you have these two completely different sort of business model, operating model things under one roof. And bringing in Michael Ovitz, what was he supposed to run? Because they're actually two very different things. Yep. Yep. So all this and, you know, animations now without Katzenberg, Roy E is still there, but a lot of the talent is bleeding out to DreamWorks. Even the talent that stays, they're getting competitive offers from DreamWorks. So Disney has to pay them more. So all their costs and animation are going up. It's really a downward spiral. And for the first couple of years, it didn't really matter that much because the parks were still doing great. They still had all the great IP from the Disney Renaissance that was driving everything that they could put into the parks. Yeah because they don make most of their money from actual profits at the box office when the movie comes out the first time there a delayed impact to animation sucking that doesn show up in the financials until way later Yes or until something happens to the parks which is exactly what happens in September 2001 with September 11th Obviously, national tragedy. But Disney Parks business basically instantly falls off a cliff. I mean, it's like COVID for Disney Parks for the few weeks and months after September 11th. All of a sudden, this crown jewel asset within the empire just goes to, you know, close to zero. Yeah. Real bad. Yeah. I mean, for a few weeks, zero planes are in the air. and for years after that, people don't feel safe traveling. Not to mention it triggers this consumer spending impact. Not good if you're running a high fixed cost theme park business. Yep, yep. So Disney stock falls nearly 25% in the days after the September 11th attacks. Fairly quickly thereafter, they're forced to close the vast majority of the Disney retail stores that they had opened in malls across America. [85:00] The operating profit from the whole consumer products division had already been slowly ticking down as no new good IP was coming out of Disney animation to sell dolls and costumes. Now it's down to like a trickle. the worst part of all of this for michael eisner at least is that the bass family which to this point are still disney's largest shareholders and michael's strongest supporters among the shareholder base in the days after september 11th they face a margin call on their other investments they have to become forced sellers of two billion dollars worth of disney shares which puts even further downward pressure on the Disney stock, which has already just fallen by 25%. They sell the majority of their Disney holdings in a block transaction. And overnight, Eisner's support in the shareholder base, or at least the biggest bulk of it, is gone. Disney is now trading at depressed levels. I mean, it's almost like 1984 or all over again. Could there be corporate raiders showing up to break up the company It eerily similar Animation in the dumps Before it was Parks holding the company up but now it ESPN holding the company up Exactly And even ESPN for a short period of time is shaky like sporting events stop after 9-11. It's a weird time for the country. Yep. And then just when it seemed that things couldn't get any worse at Disney in the years after 9-11, on November 30th, 2003, Roy E. Disney announces that he is resigning from the Disney board of directors, citing, quote, serious differences of opinion about the direction and style of management. Man, this really is a mirror of 20 years earlier. Is it ever? Except this time, it all plays out in public. Because Roy and Stanley Gold, his business partner, who also resigns from the board, would promptly turn around and launch a first-of-its-kind public grassroots shareholder campaign with the website SaveDisney.com with the stated goal of mounting a proxy vote to oust Michael Eisner as the CEO of the Walt Disney Company Yeah Ben this playbook of starting a website of SaveCompanyX like an insider resigning from the company, starting a website and a public grassroots campaign, would famously be repeated once more in American corporate history. Do you know what company? No. SavePapaJohns.com. No way. Yeah. Save Disney and save Papa John's. Wow. Well, before we tell the story of Save Disney and Disney's ultimate leadership transition to Bob Iger that would come out of it, now is a great time to thank one of our favorite companies, Sentry. That's right. That's S-E-N-T-R-Y, like someone standing guard. Which is what they do for developers. Sentry helps teams debug everything from errors to latency issues, basically any software problem, and fix them before users get mad. It is considered, quote unquote, not bad by millions of developers out there. And David this might be one of the most on theme sponsor moments that we have ever had on Acquired We are about to spend a good chunk of time on the Disney Plus launch later in the episode Yes and think about what that launch actually was One service going live on basically every device on Earth all at once. Phones, video game consoles, smart TVs, streaming sticks, tablets, all ready for tens of millions of subscribers on day one. At that scale, things break in places you've never seen. Disney Plus launched with Sentry as the centralized error logging service behind it. So when something broke, the team knew exactly why it broke on which device and in which release, all before the angry email started. And here's the wild part. That was 2019. What Sentry does now goes a step further. Software is starting to fix itself in production, and the clever thing is how they pull it off. So Sentry is already watching your app in production. So the second it breaks, it has the whole picture. Error logs, the trace, the release that it started in. It hands that context straight to the tools developers already use, whether that's Claude Code or Cursor or Sentry's new agent, Sear. And it automatically finds the root cause and opens the PR for the human to review. That is what makes software self-healing, and it's why 200,000 [90:00] organizations run on Sentry. Yes, thanks to Sentry for making sure everyone's favorite stuff, including Disney+, which let me tell you, is our favorite stuff in this household, actually works. They've got an incredible customer list, including not only Friends of the Show Anthropic and Vercel, but also Cursor, Linear, GitHub, and many more. If you want to learn more, go check out sentry.io slash acquired. And one last thing, Sentry is the host this year of the official Acquired community meetup with David and me in San Francisco, Thursday, September 17th at Fort Mason. David and I are going to have a live conversation going behind the scenes of Acquired. We'll have food and drink and a room full of the Acquired community. Tickets are $20 and 100% of the proceeds will go to the Susan Wojcicki Foundation for early detection of lung cancer. So great. It really is. Space is limited to 500 people only. So grab your spots now at acquired.fm slash meetup, and we look forward to seeing you there. Indeed. All right, David. So the Save Disney campaign. First let me just open with an excerpt from Ride of a Lifetime Bob Iger book This is about the resignation letter that Roy had written Which he sent copies to Eisner the board and then the Wall Street Journal the New York Times and the LA Times He went on a blistering three-page critique of Michael's stewardship of the company. The first 10 years had been a success, he acknowledged, but the latter years had been defined by seven distinct failures, which Roy laid out point by point. One, a failure to bring ABC primetime back from its ratings abyss. Two, the consistent micromanagement of everyone around you with the resulting loss of morale throughout the company. Three, a lack of adequate investment into theme parks, building on the cheap that has depressed park attendance. Which, that is counter to every other thing that I've heard. I mean, yeah, well, park attendance was down because of September 11th. Right. Michael sort of famously had an eye for making the theme parks great. the sort of second only since walt nobody invested in the parks like michael eisner right right for the perception by all of our stakeholders that the company is rapacious soulless and always looking for the quick buck rather than long-term value which is leading to a loss of public trust disney was by this point distributing pixar early films but eisner and pixar had a very contentious relationship we put a pin in that for now Five a creative brain drain from the company due to mismanagement and low morale Six a failure to build good relationships with Disney's partners, particularly Pixar. And seven, your consistent refusal to establish a clear succession plan. This is a brutal letter. Yeah. And then Roy ends the letter with, Michael, it is my sincere belief that it is you who should be leaving and not me. Accordingly, I once again call for your resignation and retirement. Oh, man. So what is Roy so upset about? Amazingly, Disney animation had continued to go downhill. Right. 2003 had Brother Bear. 2004 had Home on the Range. 2005 was chicken little you've never heard of any of these films I'm sure maybe you've heard 2007 they had meet the Robinsons which I guess would have been in development yeah yeah yeah bolt was the end of this misery in 2008 yeah I mean if you are a little bit younger than David and I call it 25 maybe 30 you probably don actually have any Disney movies from your childhood that you remember the way that we remember Aladdin and the Lion King and Little Mermaid and Beauty and the Beast Totally But yeah back to Roy and this Save Disney campaign I mean, look, Roy, as we already talked about earlier, he's a complicated guy. He's so upset about Disney animation. I mean, technically, he's the one in charge of Disney animation. So, like, who's he upset at here? Like, himself? But I think really like what this is really about and Roy's superpower for Disney was that even if he wasn't, you know, the best executive or leader or in touch with the marketplace, as evidenced by the total flop of Fantasia 2000, he absolutely was the steward and protector of the Disney spirit. And it was so clear that the Disney spirit, the creative spirit, the spirit that made these timeless stories that got handed down from generation to generation had left the building. And the company just spread too thin. It's got two completely different business models doing two completely different things from this merger with ABC. Yep. So what happens next? Roy and Stanley had resigned in a huff from the board at the end of 2003. [95:00] right at the holidays. Disney's annual shareholder meeting is coming up in March of 2004, where the vote is going to happen to hopefully in their minds oust Michael Eisner as CEO of Disney. Disney, in response, schedules an analyst day, an investor day for the company in Orlando in February of 2004, ahead of the meeting to sort of shore up support for Michael and shore up support for the stock and they have good news to share pirates of the caribbean is gonna save the company the movie did great based on a disneyland ride i mean you can't write a better story can't write a better story revenue for the quarter is up 19 johnny depth riding in gonna save michael eisner's job they all wake up the morning of the investor day eisner's there bob eiger is there by this point in time he's been promoted to be president and COO of the Walt Disney Company and they read the news that Comcast the Philadelphia cable company is making a hostile takeover bid to acquire Disney for 54 billion billion in Comcast stock I remember when this news hit it was shocking I mean, it was shocking. The idea that a cable company, a cable company could take over the Walt Disney Company was like just offensive. There were practically no more hated, you know, genre of corporations in America than cable operators, largely in part thanks to the Walt Disney Company and ESPN riling everybody up against them, and that they would be taking over with stock this treasure of America. Honestly, for Roy and for Stanley and their Save Disney campaign, it was the best thing that could have happened because to many people, they look at this and they're like, how low has the Walt Disney Company fallen? Yeah. But Disney is doing great. The parks business was down because of September 11th, but it's coming back. Pirates of the Caribbean is a big success. They've got this great partnership with Pixar. They've got freaking ESPN, which is still crushing it. Why does Comcast want to buy Disney? They sense this opening, this weakness. And wouldn it be amazing if Comcast could all of a sudden acquire its most important supplier in ESPN that has all of this leverage over them They constantly going to war with ESPN every year to renegotiate the carriage rates Be nice to own it. We might be able to get ESPN. Holy crap. Let's try it. Yep. Oh, man. Just to underscore this ESPN thing, friend of the show, Ben Thompson, has a great reflection on all this. Walt Disney's chart, the famous flywheel one, may have been a very satisfying business model, but the reality of Disney's TV business is that it was scalable in a way that the Disney chart could never be. The beauty of the cable bundle is that nearly every household in America paid for it every single month, regardless of whether or not Disney had a hit TV show or a must-watch sporting event. Thanks to its suite of channels anchored by ESPN, Disney received a big chunk of that money, and it grew like clockwork. In that world, Walt Disney's model was a nice side business to the real moneymaker. Yep, yep. Man, it's all about ESPN, everything that's happening. Yep. The cable network's operating income, the profit within the Walt Disney Company at this point, was $2 billion. Company they were only making billion So like almost 50 of the company total profits is just these cable networks Which is really ESPN So on the back of this narrative of how low the Disney company has sunk under leadership of Michael Eisner which gets ridiculous but it the narrative out there The two major shareholder advisory services back the Save Disney campaign and Roy. And they advise shareholders to vote to withhold their support of Michael Eisner as CEO at the March shareholder meeting. CalPERS, the big California pension fund, they announced that they're going to vote their Disney shares against Eisner and vote for him to resign. So all of this comes to a head on March 3rd, 2004, at the Disney Annual Shareholder Meeting, which hilariously had been scheduled that year to take place in Philadelphia, headquarters of Comcast. They're like just a few blocks away. At the end of the day, 43% of the shareholder base votes to withhold support for Eisner as CEO, which is a huge number. You don't renew a CEO's contract when 43% of your shareholders don't want that CEO. Yep. So the Disney board meets in an emergency executive session without management. [100:00] present during which they decide to remove michael as chairman but let him remain ceo of disney for the moment they announce this the disney stock jumps in response meanwhile comcast stock has been falling so a few weeks later comcast formally withdraws their bid but this doesn't placate Roy and Stanley in the Save Disney campaign. Eisner is still CEO. A few months after that, Michael announces that he will leave the company when his contract expires at the end of 2006. So he's announced that he's going to resign. But now there's a question. Okay, who's going to take over? The board announces that it's going to initiate a public high stakes CEO search, and they intend to name Michael's successor by June of 2005. Everyone, everyone believes it's gotta be an external candidate that is gonna come in and take over Disney, just like Wells and Eisner came in 20 years ago. Well do you know what the press release says who it names Well it says that there will be external candidates and that there will be one internal candidate Initially it actually said internal and external candidates And Bob Iger was reviewing the press release because he's COO. And he goes to the board and says, wait, Michael's going to be CEO for another year. Bob's like, you can't really do this. Are there other internal candidates or is it just me? And they say, it's just you. And he said, well, then you need to put me in the press release. Because there's going to be a power. Otherwise, it's going to be chaos around here. Right. People will need someone to look to for leadership because no one's going to be looking to Michael. He's a lame duck. And there's going to be all these people vying for power. The company will not function. You have to say external candidates and Bob Iger. And they agree and say, okay, then we'll do it. So Bob is announced as the internal candidate. And the board promises they will run an exhaustive search for external candidates. Bob, and he recounts all of this in Ride of a Lifetime, comes up with, I think, one of the most brilliant campaign framings that I have ever heard. And he actually hires like a political campaign consultant to help him with this. And he realizes that OK I am the number two to an unpopular incumbent I like the vice president of a massively unpopular president right now who has just become a lame duck Right. Every board member's first, second, and third question for me should be, why should we pick you when you were a part of the previous administration? And how did you screw up so badly? Yeah. So he realizes that his only chance is to completely reframe the situation. This isn't about what happened in the past. this is only about the future which both is the right way to look at this and it is bob's only chance to win yes so he proposes to the board in his candidacy three pillars of his vision and strategy for the future of the walt disney company number one we need to devote most of our time and capital to the creation of high quality branded content aka we need to revive disney animation and along with it the disney flywheel spot on especially now because the amount of content in the world is exploding we here entering the social media era there facebook we about to get youtube consumers have infinite choice for content The only way for a company like Disney to hope to try and still be relevant is to go back to making the very best content. And build a brand to be known for that, so people know to look to you for that highest quality tier. And still, nobody is better positioned than Disney to do that. Even despite all the problems and distractions and the downfall of animation over the last 10 years, it's still Disney. Yep. So that's one. Two, we need to embrace technology to the fullest extent. Now, this sounds like, duh, why wouldn't you do that? But this is actually kind of a radical statement at this point in time. We're about to enter an era where the entire traditional media industry is going to be either running scared or actively trying to fight tech in Silicon Valley. Viacom is about to launch a lawsuit against YouTube to try and sue it out of existence. Everybody remembers what just happened to the music industry in Napster. Bob is saying, no, we are going to embrace technology. Both to produce fresh new cutting edge content the way that Walt did, but also embrace technology as a distribution. [105:00] medium and figure out how to use that to our advantage, not let technology be the reason for our downfall. Yep. And then Bob's third pillar of his strategy is expand global reach. We need to better penetrate certain markets, particularly the world's most populous countries like China and India. Unlike Walt's era, at this point, something like a third of the global population lives in those two countries. And Disney is all about scale economies, make the deepest, best, highest quality content and characters and stories possible and get as many people around the world to fall in love with them as possible. And we need to get into those two countries. Yep. So amazingly, Bob wins on this campaign. In March of 2005, the board announces Bob Iger will be the future CEO of the Walt Disney Company. They accelerate his start date and Michael's departure date to that September 2005, a year ahead of when Michael had initially announced. And the Michael Eisner era at Disney comes to an end after 21 years It so interesting Michael Eisner tenure at Disney in my mind is really two chapters There that whole first chapter that sort of ends with Frank Wells passing Katzenberg leaving, the end of the great Disney animation era. And acquiring Capital Cities. But the ownership of Capital Cities is sort of that whole second era. Yes. Yeah. I think that's the way I would frame it, too. So he and Wells and Katzenberg did an incredible job turning around Disney in the first 10 years. That sort of went sideways in the second 10 years. But also, Michael made one of the greatest acquisitions of all time in the second 10 years. And because of all the drama, doesn't get anywhere near enough credit for it. Yeah, it's so interesting when you say the greatest acquisitions of all time. When I look at ABC Capital Cities, it was because it had ESPN. but it also costs the company its strategic clarity. Disney never again would get to be just Disney. It's the flywheel business and the affiliate slash advertising cable business. And it worth it because buying ESPN was this pseudo infinite wellspring of capital to fund everything else But it cost the clarity Yep that exactly right By the numbers Michael tenure was unbelievable He comes in with a market cap a little shy of billion, leaves with it worth, I don't know, $50-ish billion. I think there was some dilution, so it wasn't quite a 25x, closer to a 20x of the stock. He comes in, revenue is $1.7 billion. He leaves at $31 billion. That's a 15% compound annual growth rate over his two decades. And net income goes from $97 million to $2.5 billion. Yeah, 26x net income during his tenure. By the numbers, great. And, you know, ESPN is arguments one, two, and three of why was he a great CEO. Yep, yep, yep. And also Disney's Renaissance, but like I'd put that at four below ESPN, ESPN and ESPN. And then the Disney Renaissance. Yeah. Yes. I don't know. You got to count Lion King the musical for something. That's true. That's very true. So Bob Iger is named CEO. One of his first calls after he gets the news on I think a Sunday afternoon is to Steve Jobs the then CEO of Pixar in addition to being the CEO of Apple And he writes in Ride of a Lifetime I barely knew Steve at that point He was typical Steve. How long have you worked for Michael? He asked. Ten years. Huh, he said. Well, I don't see how things will be any different, but sure, when the dust settles, be in touch. and it turned out that that phone call was probably the most important phone call in the history of the walt disney company but before we tell the story of pixar now is a great time to thank one of our favorite companies work os yes so i want to start with a line that we quote on this show all the time focus on what makes your beer taste better yes one of the great business metaphors from back when breweries ran their own power plants all that electricity did nothing for the taste of the beer. And every era of software has its own version of the power plant. Right now, the cost of building software is collapsing to near zero. And you can build a real working product with AI writing 100% of the code. The stuff that differentiates you is what you build, your ideas, and how to serve customers. And this is where WorkOS comes in, something that you absolutely should not build [110:00] self is enterprise authentication. Nobody needs to roll their own. If you're selling software to B2B or enterprise buyers, they deeply care about their data, and they care about security. They need things like SSO or SCIM, S-C-I-M, audit logs, role-based accounts, the entire checklist. None of that is the sort of thing that you listeners can uniquely do well to make your product better, but all of it sits in between you and closing a deal with a customer. This is the whole reason WorkOS exists. They turn those enterprise requirements into drop-in APIs. Your team adds enterprise SSO in an afternoon instead of a couple months and gets back to the stuff that really differentiates your product. Yes, and that is why OpenAI, Cursor, Perplexity, Friend of the Show, Anthropic, and hundreds of other AI startups build on WorkOS instead of building the power plant themselves. They just plug into the grid so the product that you built over a weekend can be ready for the enterprise on Monday. You can learn more at WorkOS.com and just tell them that Ben and David sent you. So during his CEO audition process Bob Iger had completely lost faith that Disney animation can be fixed from within And secretly he concludes that the only viable path to restore Disney animation to its proper glory is to replace the entire leadership team with Pixar leadership. There's this famous moment that Bob writes about where he's at the opening parade of Hong Kong Disneyland in 2005. He's watching all the floats go by and he sees Cinderella and Mickey and Snow White. And he realizes that there are no Disney characters from the last 10 years or so that are in this parade. And on the contrary, it's stuffed to the gills with Pixar characters. Yep. And that's the moment where he's like, you know what? the path is clear. Pixar needs to take over Disney Animation. And that's why he called Steve Jobs the evening that he knew he was going to become CEO. So listeners, we thought something that would be fun on this episode is to tell the whole Pixar story. We could have done it sort of in line earlier with Disney Animation but we wanted to carve it out give it its own special section and you know a really poetic thing for David and I redo our very first episode on Acquired which was on Pixar, here as a segment of this episode. Yep. Pixar is the spiritual successor of Walt Disney's vision for Disney Animation. Yep. All right. So we're winding the clock back. Let's start with John Lasseter. Yep. So this is a guy who dreamed of becoming a Disney animator his whole life. One of his early jobs is working the Jungle Cruise at Disneyland. That's right. And David, as you mentioned, he ends up getting into CalArts. It's a complete dream come true. Classes are taught by Disney's legendary animators who worked with Walt, the Nine Old Men, as they are affectionately referred to. Now, he does get a job at Disney Animation, but it's unfortunately during those dark times in the early 80s, John gets obsessed with the budding field of computer animation, even though no one else in the department is, although actually Tron was happening elsewhere in Disney. So cool computer stuff was happening, just not in the culture of Disney animation. This all comes to a head when John gets the chance for his directorial debut on the movie Brave Little Toaster And in his big pitch meeting he comes in with the idea that he going to use computer animation to do it Now remember, this is the early 80s, so computer animation was pretty primitive stuff. The time wasn't actually right yet. He gets asked if it's going to be faster and cheaper than traditional animation, because why else are they doing it? And he says, neither. It's just going to push the envelope on what is possible in great storytelling. John is immediately, and I'm not kidding, same day, let go. Wow, I didn't realize it was same day. It was, thank you for your meeting. We are declining to put this project into production. And since your project is over, you really have no reason to be here. Thanks for your meeting. You're fired. Yes. So we'll put a pin in John's story for now while we introduce another co-founder of Pixar. Flashback to 1963. We're at the University of Utah, where we meet Ed Catmull. Ed also wanted to do animation his whole life, but he felt that he didn't have the chops to cut it as an artist. So he got into computers instead. He finds himself in this truly magical program for computer graphics at Utah, though it was sort of just this, like, pocket of an esoteric field that most people didn't [115:00] not really care about or appreciate at the time. Ed ends up creating one of the first films ever with computer graphics, a rotating model of his own hand, just a black and white wireframe. His classmates are famed computer scientist Alan Kay, Jim Clark of Netscape and Silicon Graphics, and John Warnock, who founded Adobe. And also, wasn't Nolan Bushnell knocking around there? Yep, past acquired guest, Nolan Bushnell, the famous founder of not only Atari, but Chuck E. Cheese. That's right. That's right. So Ed ends up getting recruited to build out this pioneering computer graphics program at New York Tech on Long Island. So he's sort of in this academic sphere. Now, meanwhile, in northern California, the year is now 1979, and there's a guy named George Lucas who is looking for someone who can help him. Yeah, heard of him. Push the field of computer graphics forward. George had just released Star Wars, and he was working on Empire Strikes Back, and he had this experience, this amazing first-hand experience, of how computers could unlock brand new filmmaking methods. And not just for Star Wars but George was looking to develop tools to make the whole industry better This is pretty heady stuff at the time No one in Hollywood was looking to invest in building out new computer technology just because. And the reason why George, this is actually pretty interesting from a business analysis perspective. Why did George want to make stuff to push all of filmmaking forward? Well, a filmmaker can only make one film at a time, and that takes one, two, three years. but you want an audience who's used to always going to the movies every week or every month and has a great experience. So if you are a filmmaker, you're rooting for all the other filmmakers to make amazing films to sort of condition your customer set that your product is good and they should have a habit of going to the movies. So unlike other industries, being a filmmaker has this sort of delightful cooperative. Yeah, you're sort of collaborators slash competitors. Right. So George gets put in touch with Ed. Ed accepts a job, moves across the country to join Lucasfilm. He brings Alvy Ray Smith with him from New York Tech, and they create the Computer Graphics Group at Lucasfilm. And really, the goal here is figure out how to do stuff that you couldn do with traditional live action techniques Pretty broad The first big success is actually not with a Star Wars film but a Star Trek film in The Wrath of Khan It was a flyby of a planet as it was being terraformed, and it's shot from all these crazy swooping angles. So this is now where the two paths collide. You've got John Lassiner and Ed Catball, and they see each other at an industry conference, of all places, on the Queen Mary. John has just been fired from Disney. Ed doesn't actually know that. Ed is hitting the limitations within his graphics group where none of them really know how to tell stories or create characters or imbue any emotion into the things that they're making. Ed begs John to see if there's any chance he could take some time and come up north to hang out at Lucasfilm Graphics and improve the storytelling in the short films that they're starting to think about. John's like, oh, let me check my calendar. Yeah, I'm free. Yes. And this is really the first chance that they had to get like a real animator. So the duo is now together, but computer hardware at the time was not capable of doing what they needed. So the group needs to develop hardware. They make the Pixar image computer within Lucasfilm This is the first time they actually used the Pixar name for anything So they making these short films which there no it not a real market It fun to make but it not like anyone buying them The Pixar image computer could do MRIs Basically anything where you needed to turn images into 3D renders, they did the first volumetric renders of an MRI. They also would analyze satellite photos for intelligence agencies and build 3D models there. So they're finding these niche, interesting markets to try to make some money. For their software and hardware? Yeah. So it's interesting. All of this is part of Lucasfilm. Is George interested in MRIs or even making animated films? Not particularly. I mean, he wants them to develop capability for future films, but he doesn't want to actually staff up a big story team and have this be a filmmaking division. And no, I don't think he's particularly interested in the MRIs. He actually has a different piece of news to share with the team. He's going through a divorce. He's short on cash. He needs to free up cash for the divorce. So actually what he wants to do is sell the graphics group. Which this is fascinating, by the way. This all happened because George believes so deeply in Star Wars and the movie. [120:00] movies he was making that he didn't want to give up any equity in Lucasfilm as part of his divorce. So he needed to raise cash to pay his former wife cash instead of giving her any equity in Lucasfilm. Wild. This is like the butterfly flaps its wings that results in Pixar saving Disney. So he finds a buyer. Yes. Enter Steve Jobs. Steve Jobs. Amazingly, they are first introduced by Alan Kay, legendary computer scientist, former classmate of Ed's, and a trusted friend of Steve. Steve visits Lucasfilm to see the technology firsthand, and he's impressed. But then he goes dark, just vanishes for a while. The Lucasfilm guys are wondering, what's going on? And it turns out this is right in the middle of when Steve is getting fired from Apple and ousted from his own company. So then Steve gets back in touch after the dust settles. And at first, what he actually wants is the Pixar team and technology to create a rival consumer computer company to Apple. He wants to get back at Apple using Pixar as the seeds of the company. He wants Pixar to be next. Exactly. Ed and John and Alvy and the team have no interest in doing that Steve eventually does go and start next on his own but he keeps in touch and he likes these guys and he kind of comes around on the vision to create films He does agree to buy the company and kind of rescue it out of Lucasfilm. He goes into business with Ed and John and the team. He writes in 1986 a $5 million check to George Lucas to buy the company. Another $5 million check into a new entity that he just created to fund the company. It's formally named Pixar, and it is owned 70% by Steve Jobs and 30% by employees. And that's Pixar. And that's Pixar. Can we just say how insane this story is? There's a guy who worked at Hallowed Disney Animation. He gets his first directing gig, but he's fired for advocating to use the technology in the future. Then he finds a kindred spirit who happens to be working for George Lucas. George freaking Lucas, right in between Star Wars and Empire. They're inventing all this insane stuff, but George needs to sell it off and somehow manages to find Steve goddamn Jobs. It is like the Avengers of technology, of film, of business. I mean the only way this story could get any more awesome is if they somehow beat Disney at their own game got bought by Disney breathed new life into the core of the company and Steve Jobs became the largest shareholder of Disney itself It sounds like a Pixar movie. Doesn't it? It does. This is like, this is why Acquired exists. It's so great. So they spin off the company. They don't have any customers for the product. is they go out and they recruit someone to come and buy their software as a commercial product. Yes, and that customer is Disney. Yes. The first check to Pixar Inc. is from Disney to work with them and create the CAPS system for improving their 2D animation. Yep. This is the beginning of the Disney-Pixar relationship as a vendor. As a vendor. So Pixar decides they need to show the world who they are. They make this short little film about a lamp and a baby lamp, and they're playing with a ball, and they show it to industry conferences, because that's what you did with computer graphics back then. And people go nuts. You were texting me. Your dad was at the conference where they showed Luxo Jr.? Yeah at one of them It wasn the original SIGGRAPH but it was right there in the late 80s It was a joint robotics and computer animation conference And I remember when I was a kid, he just told me, I think it was when we were seeing Toy Story, and it was the little short before it. I remember him telling me, yeah, I saw this at a conference, and I just, I knew this was going to change the world. Wow. Wow. I just rewatched Luxo Jr. this morning. you go on an emotional journey and develop feelings for lamps over 90 seconds to me this is where the storytelling aptitude and an ability to animate lifeless objects into something you really care about starts to come through yep so full steam ahead right let's let's go make movies well there's a problem you need like 30 million dollars to go do that so first they start making in a bunch of commercials to try to pay the bills. They develop RenderMan as a piece of software. It's actually still an industry standard today for computer animation. They release it externally. It actually gets used on Jurassic Park, on Terminator 2, a bunch of cool films with early computer graphics. But the business is not working. These image computers are insanely expensive. They've only sold like 300 of them ever. If they're gonna do their dream of an animated film, [125:00] They need to go all in on it, and someone needs to fund it. So here's what happens. John rekindles his relationship to Disney. From what I could tell, this is completely outside of the whole Caps relationship. John is being recruited to join Disney as a director. This is 1991 or so. Oh, wow. So right as the Disney Renaissance is happening. That's right. They want him back. That's right. And instead, he says, no, I kind of threw my lot in with these guys in Northern California. We got something cool here. It's a great team. No, I'm turning down multiple offers to be a Disney animation director, his lifelong dream. And he says, but here's what I think we should do. Let's do a 30-minute Christmas special based on our tin toy short. And he's got a little bit of leverage to kind of ask for stuff here, because they just really want him to direct something. And Disney, really it's Peter Schneider, who works with Jeffrey Katzenberg, says, hey, forget the 30-minute TV special. Let's do it. A whole feature film, Toy Story. Yep. And this is how Toy Story happens. So why is this such a crazy idea I mean why is it going to cost million Why did the folks at Disney think this is such a kind of nutty idea to make a computer animated film Yeah, it seems on the surface like this should be easier than 2D animation, right? You're going to just get computers to do all of it. Not quite. So we got to go spend a day at Pixar and learn from the folks there who make Pixar movies how they do it. And wow, it was so cool. Embarrassingly, I did not really understand that the way these things are made is kind of like a stage play. You actually lay out all the objects on a stage in a 3D virtual environment, and you can put cameras and lights anywhere you want all in this virtual environment. It's like a video game. Yeah, they're creating the universe, basically. It's not just that you're illustrating a still frame. Yes. So hilariously, the best explanation of this, the best sort of seven step process, is on the inside cover of their S1 IPO prospectus. We'll put it in the email. It has this little animated guide the Pixar animation steps So here they are Step one storyboards Over 4 storyboard drawings are created as the blueprint for the action and dialogue of a feature Pixar film I think the most interesting part of this is they then take the storyboards and put them together in a story reel where they're able to like watch it like a movie even though they're still frames and they either narrate over it or they do temp dialogue on top. So in a very inexpensive way using 2D sort of sketching, you really can get a true sense of what's going on. This also makes it very iterable and revisable. So we were chatting with folks at Pixar, and they said, yeah, there's usually about eight different iterations where we are revising the plot, the script, the dialogue to really nail it and make sure that the story works. And I was watching old interviews with Lasseter and Jobs, and Lasseter has this quote, if it's working in our story reels, when we animate it and put color to it, it's going to work even better. If it's not working in story reels, the animation won't save it. And then Jobs says, in essence, it lets us beta test and iterate on our films before we actually make it. We believe it's one of the reasons that the hit rate can be substantially different. So they basically make a low 2D movie before they make a 3D movie Yeah And the story and characters all have to work in 2D first Yep All right, so step two, models. Pixar's proprietary animation software, Marionette, is used to create the three-dimensional computer models for characters, props, and sets. Three, layout. Each scene is begun by assembling the models for the required characters, props, and sets, and blocking out the action. This is where they really go into the computer for the first time. They take the models and they lay them out to kind of resemble the 2D paper sketches that they made for the story reels. Now, hilariously, you can watch some of these. Like, you can watch the film when it's only done in the layout stage. The characters don't have any of their limbs that move. Their mouths don't move. They're these, like, lifeless puppets being dragged around. You kind of get the plot, but you get no personality or emotion. Yeah, they're like the 3D equivalent of stick figures. Yeah, the animators haven't really performed the characters yet. Yep. So then step four, animation. Pixar's proprietary animation software allows Pixar's animators to choreograph the motion in each scene by defining key frames or poses. So this is the exciting step. Each character goes through something called rigging by this point, where they provide the animators with a buffoon. [130:00] We have options for each character, like moving the hand at the wrist, or the arm, or the elbow, or the shoulder. And the animator then very carefully, frame by frame, first animates the bodies, and then later the faces. Because if the body motions are working for the story with no facial expressions, then all of the facial expression and mouth moving is just icing on the cake. But you never want to rely on the facial expressions to do the heavy lifting for you. This is such a cool part of the process. You're turning them from stick figures into something that's alive is really the best way to frame it. Yeah, and to your point, they use the same thing here that the animators used in 1938 with Snow White, where they film themselves acting it out first, and then they use that video as sort of reference for how would this character act. And there's all this great footage on YouTube of, in 1992, the guy who was animating Woody sort of going through motions, or for the army men to figure out how the army men were going to move in Toy Story they duct taped ski boots to a giant plank of wood and they sort of jumped around the room in it to really understand how would a person move if their feet were locked together So it this really amazing performance. And then you're teaching the computer through the rigging and through effectively pulling the strings how to make the character move the way that you want it to. Then there's shading, computer programs that describe these surface characteristics like textures, finishes, colors that are added to every object in the scene. This is where you can get things like wood and metal and fabric and glass and hair and skin. Then step six is lighting using digital lights. Each scene is lit much in the same manner as stage lighting. David, you and I saw some really cool examples of scenes that look boring and lifeless, and then they go through lighting, and oh my god, suddenly they're gorgeous and emotional. And then lastly, step seven, rendering. Pixar's RenderMan software draws the finished image by computing every pixel of the image from the model, animation, shading, and lighting information. This is insane. This is the part that, if you think about all the computing involved, for every single frame, it needs to compute and recompute every pixel based on what object something is where all the light sources are each one for each pixel if they in motion and if so how to apply motion blur Rendering is so computationally expensive here. In those days, each frame would take an hour or two to render, and they could only render like three and a half minutes of footage per week. They were on this Sun Microsystems hardware that was state-of-the-art at the time, And they had 117 of them clustered together to create a render farm for the film. Yeah, this last step just highlights what a fundamentally different thing this is from 2D animation. 2D animation is art. It's like you're painting a picture. What Pixar does is they are creating a universe. And then they are calculating every atom of that universe. That's exactly right. And where it really, really does have the same spirit as Walt and Disney is that every single one of those steps is also a story step. It's not just like, oh, great, we wrote the story. Let's throw it over to the tech guys and like turn it into the renders. It is all a collaboration creating a universe and constantly refining the story and making it better and better and better over years All right So back to Toy Story january 19th 1993 they get the green light from disney and specifically what they have is a deal to make up to three pictures just one for now and disney has the exclusive option to extend for two more where disney's basically hiring pixar to make a movie for them and here are the terms disney puts up all the capital for production it ends up being about $30 million. Initially, it was budgeted to be about $17 million. Disney is also responsible for the marketing costs. Pixar exclusively can make films with Disney. Pixar is entitled to a small amount of the profits, and that is profit after paying back some of the marketing costs. So that ends up being less than 10% of the profits, which is not exactly an engine that they can use to build a business. Yeah. Oh, by the way, Disney keeps all of the intellectual property rights to Toy Story. All the characters, all the merch, all that, et cetera, et cetera. Disney also will have the right to make sequels if they choose. They will offer Pixar to make the sequels with them, but if Pixar declines, they're still Disney's to make. And lastly, the three picture deal does not actually include those [135:00] sequels, even if Disney elects to make them. So if Disney wants a sequel, Pixar makes a sequel, but it does not count against the total of three. So it's kind of a crappy deal, but it is all of their dream, and it is basically the only option. And it's Disney, right? I mean, it's Disney, you do it. Right. Well, there's no other studio that would make this with them. And Disney did stuff like this. So they made The Nightmare Before Christmas with Tim Burton. It's like, hey, this is stop motion animation. It's something different than what we do here at Disney Animation. Let's get this out there. It's a boutique thing. We'll publish it. We're the best in the world at publishing animated family pictures and distributing them to theaters, marketing them. Great. Yep. So what are they actually making here? Pixar knows they want to make a film that is different than your typical Disney animation. They don't want to make it a musical because at this point in 1993, the last four were all musicals, and they don't want it to be a fairy tale. They don't want it to harken back to sort of the classic Walt's tales either. But that does sort of mean that they're in uncharted waters. They have to develop their own tone and style and process So they start translating John Lasseter vision into the storyboards and they keep going to Disney for notes which is both useful because Pixar doesn really know what they doing yet and contractually required So Katzenberg is at the helm at this point. He keeps pushing to make the film edgier. And through a combination of Pixar not really feeling their confidence in storytelling and the notes pushing them this way, Woody ends up very mean. He's got this brand of insult humor. He's so threatened by Buzz that that emotion overshadows every other action he could possibly take in any scene. He's actively and intentionally pushing Buzz out windows and behind dressers and stuff like that. So December of 93, the story reel screening happens down in Burbank. They're like, all right, here's all the notes that we've taken. Here's the story we've got. It goes over like a lead balloon. Katzenberg hates it. Roy E. Disney hates it. None of the characters were working. So Disney cuts it off. Disney says, I know we've got a deal, but we are stopping production. No more money. The Pixar team's like, whoa, whoa, whoa, crap. Like, that's our whole company. Can we have two to three weeks We just want to do a total rewrite We work day and night And so they go back up to Northern California and they make the version of the film that they want to make. And it's not perfect, but suddenly these characters get multidimensional. They come back, and it's good enough. There's real tension in the story. Disney, to their credit, looks at it again and says, okay, you're back on. Continue the process. Over the course of 1994, they're looking at their story reels. They're kind of iterating through. They're adding more depth. And the early tests of the scenes that have gone through most of the render pipeline, they're really good. The Pixar team knows it. Steve Jobs has become a believer. And he's starting to believe, hey, we've got a hit on our hands. And David, I know you've got this part. Yeah, so Steve being Steve starts thinking through this and realizes if Toy Story is a hit, what's going to happen, Disney and Michael Eisner, who's still CEO at this point in time, are going to realize that they actually just created their worst nightmare, a true animation competitor to Disney that can do something that they can So let play this out That happens He probably going to come back to us and want to renegotiate the deal to lock us up for longer. We want to have as much leverage as possible. In order to do that, we need to have our own capital to actually go in 50-50 on the production budget of the movies that we're making together. If we don't bring any capital, Disney will be able to walk all over us and keep the majority of the profits, plus take their distribution fee, et cetera, et cetera. Okay. How are we going to get the capital? We need to go public. And we can't go public now because the last four years have been losses and we have not yet released a movie. We don't want to wait too long after the movie comes out. So I think we should go public the week after Toy Story comes out. And this is where Steve was just brilliant because he He was like, if it's a success, we'll make a big splash. We'll be the darlings of the media. We'll have a big hit movie. That is the time to go public. If you're anyone else at Pixar, you have to be thinking, no, no, no, no. Can't we just do this one and see how it works out? But this is Steve Jobs. Yeah. So Toy Story comes out on November 22nd, 19th. [140:00] 1995, grosses nearly $400 million worldwide. It is the Thanksgiving movie for families to see. It made $29 million in its opening weekend, went on to become the number one film in the U.S., and it was the first ever animated film that was a blockbuster that was not created by Disney. And it was the highest grossing film of the whole year. Not children's movie, like highest grossing period. Period. So one week later, after Toy Story premieres, on November 29th, 1995, Pixar goes public. Right. Which means Steve had been like flying around, doing a roadshow, meeting with all these investment bankers. As Toy Story is finishing production and getting ready to go out, it's unbelievable. Well, this is actually a theme that we're going to come back to in a minute. There's no other business guys at Pixar. It's just Steve. Steve does everything that's not creative in making the movies. So Pixar closes its first day of trading at a one and a half billion dollar market cap. This is how big a hit Toy Story was and how much it was in the public consciousness. This is how Steve Jobs becomes a billionaire Yes The Toy Story IPO He didn make anywhere near that kind of money from Apple Toy Story and Pixar is how Steve Jobs makes his fortune. So that $140 million they raised makes it the largest IPO of the year, larger than Netscape. Netscape, yes. The numbers on Steve, he bought the company for $5 million. He actually did dump $54 million into it over nine years. He was like wiring money for payroll and stuff like that. And on IPO day, he owned 78% of the company. So what's that like 1.2 billion? Yes. Pixar alone made Steve Jobs a billionaire on IPO day. Yep. Incredible. Also, this was just a bet the company move. I mean, if Toy Story didn't work, then the IPO wasn't going to work. And then the whole thing would go bust. And if the IPO didn't work... Then Pixar would have gotten crushed by Disney in the next negotiations. Yeah. This was a series of successive bet the company moves that all needed to work in order for it to work at all. So what happens next? Steve was exactly right. Michael Eisner wants to renegotiate after realizing oh my god we only have two more films left with these guys and they the only credible competitor Jobs throws out hey let do it 50 with joint participation 50 in the upside Now that Pixar has the cash to do it, Michael Eisner agrees as long as they can expand into a brand new five-picture deal, rolling the remaining two from the old contract into the new deal. So after Toy Story, Disney would have the right then to make five more movies with Pixar in addition to sequels. Now, Disney also would be doing the distribution of the film, so they'd actually end up with more like 65%, not 50%. But that's some Hollywood accounting that I don't actually think Steve realized that at the time. Well, the story I heard was that he did, and it makes sense. Distribution has real costs and marketing, and of course Disney should get paid for that. for that story i heard is that steve found out later from george lucas that the terms of lucas's distribution deal with fox were better than the distribution terms that pixar got with disney and that's what he was pissed about so the second film they make is a bug's life this was also a big success 360 million at the box office pixar is sort of viewed as this hit factory you know it but they developing Toy Story 2 as the next film after that Meanwhile the relationship with Michael Eisner is Deteriorating. ...kind of deteriorating. Yeah, with Steve Jobs. Disney wants to go direct-to-video with Toy Story 2. This is actually interesting to flash back and think about this. Disney had never done anything except for direct-to-video for sequels. the thinking was that you make something great once you put it in theaters and then don't over exploit the ip that's exactly right but also the belief was that sequels can't possibly be as good you're always making this like lesser second tier thing and they actually hadn't done a ton of sequels which is quite funny that it's completely flipped now now the goal of creating the first film is to be able to create a franchise so they can exploit the ip more and more after that toy story too is where they learn the lesson that, oh, actually, that is a valuable business model. It's actually the Pixar team that goes to Disney and says, hey, this sucks. We don't want to create an A team and a B team at Pixar, because the A team's on Bugs Life. The B team is clearly working on the thing that's going to be lower budget, lower distribution, direct-to-video. We don't know how to do it. Disney says, okay. So in February, [145:00] Grave 98, Disney says, Toy Story 2, you are greenlit for theatrical release. But the question is, does it count towards the deal or not? So Steve realizes Toy Story 2 is going to be good. And again, he wants to renegotiate. He goes to Eisner and says, hey, can the five-picture deal include sequels? Meanwhile, Michael Eisner is like, why would I do that? The paper says what it says. We negotiated this for a reason. You want to change the terms of the deal. I don't want to change the terms of the deal, so we'll just stick with the deal we have. Yep. You can see why the relationship starts to deteriorate. Yes, yes. They make Toy Story 2. Doesn't count. They release it in theaters. It grosses almost $500 million. Pixar's highest grossing film yet. And Disney learns all the way to the bank that sequels can be real profitable. Yes, they do. So meanwhile, the backdrop to all of this is Steve Jobs had come back to Apple. By this point in time, Apple had bought Next. Steve is now CEO of Apple, leading the turnaround in the renaissance at Apple. The iPod comes out. iTunes comes out And one of the big marketing campaigns for the iPod and iTunes is Rip Mix Burn But you know who doesn like the word rip is Michael Eisner So Eisner goes and testifies in front of Congress in 2002 against the technology industry and specifically calls out Apple's RipMix Burn marketing campaign, saying it encourages theft of intellectual property via digital piracy. And Bob Iger has a quote about this in Rite of a Lifetime. It was clear that Pixar was gaining swagger as Disney was losing it. And these two strong-willed personalities were destined to battle each other for supremacy. See, man, and if you really want to poke Steve Jobs, it's one thing to go after him in the Pixar negotiations. It's another thing to come after him at Apple. Now, to be totally fair to Eisner here, Disney had a big music business, a big album business. I mean, album soundtracks for. And regardless at this point everyone sort of banding together and realizing like what going to happen to music doesn happen to movies next Yeah yeah So he had good reason to be worried here But yeah you probably don want to come after Steve Jobs and Apple one of your most important partners at Pixar. So then it gets even worse. Finding Nemo is the next movie in the deal. And as Nemo is coming together, Eisner sees an early screening of one of the reels of Nemo, decides he doesn't like it. Which is how story reels work. They're crap at first. This is Pixar's process to iterate and make them better. Early ones are always bad. Yep. So Pixar has become a board level topic at this point for Disney. After seeing the Nemo reel, Eisner writes a memo to the Disney board where he says that he's seen the Nemo reel. It's a bad movie. It's going to flop. And it'll be a, quote, reality check for those guys. And it'll be great for Disney's negotiating leverage for Pixar to fail. Never mind that Disney is getting over 50% of the economics in Nemo. So you should be incentivized to want it to succeed. The memo leaks, right? The memo gets leaked from the board to the press And Jobs can see that Michael thinks Nemo bad He actively rooting against it even though he the creative partner producing it with Pixar and that it give leverage over Pixar in a negotiation. You can almost interpret it as I'm going to actively work to make it fail so we can increase our leverage. Yeah. So Nemo comes out in 2003, and Michael could not have been more wrong. It grosses $871 million in theaters, making it the second highest grossing movie of 2003 behind only Lord of the Rings Return of the King. And then they put it out on home video on DVD. And so even before this, let's say the theaters get, I don't know, 400 million of that. So that's $470 million to Disney Pixar. Yeah. From this film, even before DVD. these were the days ben these were the days the finding nemo dvd was just like the lion king vhs was the high water mark for vhs the finding nemo dvd was the peak the absolute pinnacle of home video of home video in the dvd era because even netflix isn't streaming yet [150:00] At this point, this is 2004. There's no streaming. This is the peak. So we heard in the research that Disney and Pixar would sell 65 million copies of the Finding Nemo DVD, all told across all time frame. At 30 bucks a pop. 30 bucks a pop. That is $2 billion in home video gross. So $3 billion, give or take, total gross revenue for Finding Nemo just between theatrical and DVD alone. That's not including merch. That's not including parks. That's not including TV rights. Steve and Pixar did get a reality check, and the reality check is that they don't need Disney at all. The LA Times had an article right around this time after Nemo. Pixar films have accounted for as much as half of the studio, Walt Disney's, operating income in recent years, and much of that is driven by Nemo. Remember, this is the same time that Disney Animation is releasing Treasure Planet and Atlantis The Lost Empire So Jobs is pissed He comes back with an even stronger counterproposal He thinks at this point Pixar is an established studio that knows how to make hits And he just looks at Disney as a financing and distribution partner. Yep. Which is true, but they did have a contract that still had two more movies in it. He proposes a deal to Eisner, and this is where the relationship becomes irreparable. Pixar should actually be getting 100% of the profits, not 50%, and they're now prepared to fund the budget themselves, too. Disney would just get a 10% distribution fee, much like Lucasfilm's deal with Fox, and to top it all off, Jobs asks Disney to relinquish its co-ownership of the past movies. Jobs knows that at this point, Disney needs Pixar real bad. Eisner stands his ground and declines. And in reality, I mean, Steve was asking for too much here. It actually wouldn't make economic sense for Disney to do it because they had such little upside in the straw man that Steve was putting together. But man, would it hurt to lose Pixar when it is really the only thing working right now Yep Except for ESPN Yep So all this comes to January 2004 where Pixar pulls the plug on the negotiations Yep. And they issue a press release. And listeners, we'll link to this. In fact, I think we'll put a picture of it in the email that we send out. I found it on the Wayback Machine. You can actually see Pixar posted it to their website. After 10 months of trying to strike a deal with Disney, we're moving on. We've had a great run together, one of the most successful in Hollywood history, and it's a shame that Disney won't be participating in Pixar's future successes. Classic Steve Jobs. That is definitely written by Steve personally. Definitely written by Steve. The deal will be up after Pixar finishes out the contract with The Incredibles in 2004 and Cars in 2005. Pixar is actively in talks with other Hollywood studios. They think at this point they just need a distributor. Disney actually does start a new studio inside the company called Circle 7 Animation that will be tasked with developing right away Toy Story 3 Monsters Inc 2 and Finding Nemo 2 Yep I think they had actually done work on Toy Story 3 Man you can bet that that is buried pretty deep in the vault these days Yes So all this happens in the last breaths of the Eisner administration Yeah, this is part of the backdrop happening during the Save Disney campaign, the Comcast offer, the shareholder proxy vote, the CEO search. In fact, in that earnings call that blew the doors off. Yeah, it wasn't just Pirates of the Caribbean. It was Nemo. Exactly, exactly. both of those movies opened in that quarter yep so this brings us back to bob eiger's phone call to steve and his conviction that pixar needed to come in and be part of disney and not just be owned by disney but take over disney animation which is a crazy call to get if you're steve jobs right like hey my predecessor burned the bridge i'd like to buy you i basically open to any price and also I would like you guys to come and take over the core business that we operate, the most prestigious animation studio in the world. We're waving the white flag we've lost. Please come in here and take over and fix this. Yep. And I think Steve is so surprised that it opens the door and it leads to... [155:00] It's a great relationship between the two of them. Once again, just like Bob made peace with Roy and instantly fixed that relationship, he pretty much instantly fixes the Steve Jobs relationship. So listeners, we talked to Bob Iger as part of the prep we were doing for this episode. Bob had this idea, and before he called Steve, he went to the board and said, hey, can I have authorization to open a conversation with Steve Jobs about buying Pixar? And he said that it was so unthinkable and such a surprise to the whole board that they forgot to say no. Yeah. That everyone was just like, uh, sure, call him, because they thought there was no chance that it could possibly result in Steve saying yes. So Bob calls Steve back and floats this idea. Disney will buy Pixar, keep it fully intact as an independent studio up in the Bay Area, its own email addresses, its own culture, nothing will change. John and Ed will still run it, and they'll also commute down to LA two days a week. and take over and run Disney Animation. And interestingly, Iger also said, hey, Lasseter and Catmull, you can also tell us you think Disney Animation is unrescuable or that you think that you kill both things by splitting your time and you can just tell us you want to shut down Disney animation and instead Pixar will just become our one studio And Lassiter and Catmull have this like, we couldn't possibly do that. Like Disney animation is so important to where we all came from in the world. And they fly down and they meet with people and they see, oh, there's actually great talent here. They're just not being led well. And we think we can apply our process and institute a brain trust and change the physical construction of the building and bring in the Pixar way and make this great again. And they do. I mean, that's the crazy thing is that it was John and Ed's option to look at the enemy and, you know, chop off their head. And instead they said, no, no, no, we're going to come in there and we're going to we're going to make this thing great. Yeah. So pretty quickly, they come to terms on a deal. $7.4 billion in Disney stock, newly issued Disney stock, which will make Steve Jobs the largest shareholder in Disney. 7%. Yep. I think it was a 7.7% stake in the company, and he'll join the board. Much larger than the entire Disney family put together by this point. Yep So it all done Both boards approve the deal They ready To announce it Bob flies up to Emeryville to the Pixar campus the morning of the announcement And before the official time when they going to announce the deal meet with the whole company Steve comes up to Bob and says let take a walk on the Pixar campus Just the two of us walk for a bit. They sit down on a bench and Steve says, I have to tell you something and you have to keep it confidential. My cancer is back. and I don't know how much longer I'm going to live. This is January 2006, right as they're about to announce the acquisition. And Steve says, I thought about it, and I feel I have an obligation to tell you before we announce the deal, and I want to give you an option to back out if you want, knowing that I'm about to become your largest shareholder, and I don't know what's going to happen to my stake after I die. Bob says, wow, that's a lot. and i've got 30 minutes yeah i've got 30 minutes to decide and i can tell no one steve is ever the negotiator uh but uh he makes the decision that the deal is still on but oh man it devastating so steve would end up living another five and a half years after this But he and Bob and Apple and then eventually the rest of the world knows soon It's just all borrowed time. And this is why Steve sold Pixar. One of the questions that we had going into the research for this episode was, could Pixar have actually built a full stack like flywheel based competitor to Disney if they'd remained independent I mean they had defeated Disney like they won on every dimension and why did they sell and we asked all the Disney people this we asked all the Pixar people this and we asked everyone we could this question because from the business strategy lens they have what it takes Yeah. Like they have the core IP. They have movies. They could slowly move into theme parks. After the five films, they would have control of their own sequel and merch rights and they could do it. And it took us talking to all the people involved to realize, no, there was no chance. Pixar never, ever, ever would have done what it takes to become Disney. So I think there's two reasons. One, Pixar... [160:00] is what Walt wanted the Burbank animation campus to be when he built it in 1940. It is a utopian, creative artist's paradise. There are no suits at Pixar. It's all about the stories and the art and the films. And amazingly, by getting acquired, they kept it that way. I mean, there were no suits in the early days, but all the suits are in Burbank. It just gets to be creative in Emeryville. It's this crazy course of history that allows this like treasure to exist in Emeryville in a way that it couldn't at Disney. Like it didn't work at Disney animation in Burbank to make it this utopian paradise because it had to be a business to. Yeah. The reason that could happen before they sold to Disney was Steve Jobs. Right. Like it was only Steve that could have done it. And I do think if Steve had lived and if he had felt he had the energy to do it alongside Apple, or maybe, who knows, even merge the two companies, he could have done it. He could have built a Disney competitor but he knew he was going to die Right But without Steve you could imagine the rest of the pixar folks looking at each other like who of us won has any interest in doing that no we just want to keep making unbelievably good stories and delighting audiences and making the very best feature films we can yeah which does not make a disney competitor yep so pixar had to find a home In particular, Disney is the home. This is the thing that brings it full circle. The Walt era of animation had a spiritual successor, which was the Disney Renaissance, which had a spiritual successor that was Pixar. Yes, absolutely. And this leads to the revival of Disney Animation, Princess and the Frog, Tangled, Frozen, Big Hero 6, Utopia, Moana, all Pixar era. Meanwhile, the hits just keep on rolling at Pixar, Cars, Ratatouille. That was like a big thing before the acquisition. Word had gotten out that Pixar was working on a movie about rats making food. In a kitchen. Yeah. Who could do that? What a terrible idea. Oh, amazing movie. WALL Up Toy Story 3 Brave Inside Out Just the best So years later after many of these movies come out during the months before Steve died he and his wife Lorraine have one last dinner with Bob Iger and his wife Willow. And during it, Steve raises a glass and a toast to Bob and them together and says, look what we did. We saved two companies. the first time i read that years ago i thought i don't really get it like i get that it saved disney but how did it save pixar and then now doing the full research and understanding steve was gonna die and that pixar really couldn't continue independently without him and that's how they saved two companies together it's just such an incredible story Yeah, it is. To validate the Disney animation thing, I mean, I really wondered about this. How did Disney animation turn into that hit factory? They're not Pixar movies, but they rhyme so closely. We were talking with Kristen Bell to prep for this episode who of course plays Anna in Frozen and she very much confirmed the way that Disney animation works today is similar to that Pixar blueprint from the early 90s It an iterative process all about making sure that you feeling if the story is landing when you're looking at the early reels and the scripts, this collaborative way to take the notes without ego, having a willingness to stop, take apart the story, rebuild it if it's not working. Her perspective was like, this actually has a lot to do with why Disney the company works. Yeah, I mean, super validating to hear that. Now, what is it, 20 years after the acquisition? Yeah. So if we sit here today and look back at the Pixar acquisition, it's just such an obvious, giant, giant success. I mean, the first thing is it clearly saved Disney Animation, which if you believe the thesis that that's the center of everything good and durable at the company, then great. Pencils down. Easy answer. They paid $7.4 billion, $6.4 billion when you back out the billion of cash. But effectively, 6.4 billion is the hurdle that you're trying to overcome. There's a couple of ways to slice it. David, you and I did the Finding Nemo exercise earlier. There's another exercise you can run, kind of going franchise by franchise. Toy Story alone did over 4 billion at the box office, which means one and a half to 2 billion to Disney, 30 billion in retail [165:00] sales so far, lifetime of all Toy Story consumer goods. So with Disney's 5% licensing fee on that, that's another $2 billion. So that's $3.5 billion conservatively in very high margin revenue to Disney before you even start thinking about the contribution to Disney Parks. They have 19 attractions across four lands with two hotels, or doing any attribution from Disney Plus revenue, or any of the licensing deals that they did for a long time with Netflix. Or, man, any of that sweet, sweet home video revenue back in the day from Toy Story 1 and Toy Story 2. So you get at least half, probably two-thirds the purchase price back from the Toy Story franchise alone, even without all of that ancillary sort of flywheel revenue. But really here, I think, is the most useful way to justify it. We've heard that the vast majority of the top 15 movies viewed every week on Disney Plus are either Pixar or Disney Animation. Not live action, not Star Wars, not the Avengers. The stuff that kids watch over and over. And those Disney Animation movies all the top ones that they actually watching kids these days are the post Catmull and Lasseter era films Kids are not sitting there binging Snow White on repeat They're watching Frozen and Encanto and Moana and Zootopia. And this is on Disney+, which is the biggest strategic bet that the company has made in the last decade. I mean, all of their chips are there for the future of the company. Yep. No question. Acquisition absolutely saved the company. So after Pixar, Bob and the Disney board are like, well, that worked well. What can we do next? And that sure is in line with Bob's point number one in his three-point strategy. Absolutely. Making the very best content. But before we talk about the other two of Bob's big three acquisitions, Marvel and Lucasfilm, Now is a great time to thank our friends at Anthropic, the makers of Claude. Yes. And today, we are going to share how Claude saved us on recording day a couple months ago on our Disney Part 1 episode. So, David, do you want to set the scene? Yes So we are in the middle of recording Part 1 and recording days are always very time crunched The whole thing feels like a high wire act And right when we got to Snow White box office numbers we realized that a bunch of authoritative sources listed eight million dollars as the revenue for Snow White's box office and its original release. But we also had Disney's actual 1940 financial statements in front of us, and they showed $4.5 million. We immediately thought, well, those can't both be right, and started reconciling the two numbers. We couldn't, and so we had to pause recording. So this was actually the day that Fable 5 came out. So while David and I were trying to sort through, I figured I'd let Claude kind of give it a shot. We uploaded photos we took of the original financials, along with another annual report that we had showing how the revenue breakdowns actually worked, and Claude untangled the whole thing for us. There are actually two different ways to report movie revenue. Gross box office, which was that $8 million, and film rentals, which is Disney and the distributor's share after the theaters take their cut. That is the $4.5 million number. All the sources we found saying $8 million in revenue to Disney were actually wrong and Claude figured that out Which is what led us develop the novel point that we hadn seen anywhere else Snow White profits alone couldn pay for the Burbank animation campus Walt had to go borrow more money, which created the cascading set of events that we talked about in the rest of the episode. So 20 minutes later, we were back to recording, and we were able to finish the episode both on time and be factually correct, which is the clearest example I've ever personally had of Claude being able to solve a problem in the moment using analysis from primary sources that we couldn't find anywhere else in the middle of a live recording day within minutes. So listeners, if you want to try out Fable now or you just want to learn more, go to claude.ai slash acquired. And if you're inquiring for your team or for API use, just tell them that Ben and David sent you. All right, so David, Star Wars. Star Wars and Marvel. Well, Marvel is first. So in 2009, Disney acquires Marvel for $4 billion. This was like highly contrarian at the time. People thought you're spending $4 billion for a comic book company. The Marvel movies had already started to come out. Iron Man had come out, I think a couple others, and had been hit. [170:00] But nobody could see what Marvel would end up becoming under Disney. Yeah, superhero movies were not obviously formulaically going to work. Like, there had been Batmans many years before. There had been Supermans many years before. There had recently been a Spider-Man, which actually was licensed to Sony. Before pursuing this strategy, Marvel actually licensed out their best characters to other studios. studios and so the acquisition was weird because it was kind of buying all these leftover characters you couldn't use x-men because fox already had that you couldn't use spider-man because sony already had that they already made a a film out of iron man and the big dogs superman and batman were over at dc so what are you even buying when you're buying marvel but the team at marvel studios and Disney really figured it out. We're not gonna go into all the details here, but they crafted the Marvel Cinematic Universe in a way that became the blueprint for anybody else who wants to universify their franchise. This very careful world building of all these interconnected movies eventually culminating in the Avengers movie The first three phases of the Marvel Cinematic Universe were really this franchise building masterclass to behold. By 2025, the Marvel Cinematic Universe has become the most successful film franchise in history, generating nearly $32 billion at the box office. That's more than Star Wars, that's more than James Bond, anything else. Now, it helps to have 37 films plus Avengers Endgame, which was the second highest grossing film of all time, second only to Avatar, I think. And it's pretty difficult to estimate the profitability on this because there's too many assumptions you have to bake in. But it's fair to say there are single digit billions in profit from the box office alone on Marvel movies. And then, of course, there's the consumer products, and the park adaptations and actually home video for a while since those Marvel movies were still in the Blu-ray era. And then, of course, part of the reason people subscribe to Disney+. So Marvel's also been great. Yeah, Marvel's also been fantastic. I think really it was another version of the same thesis of Pixar which was there are great stories and storytellers here and let's give them a bigger canvas to paint on yep and it worked incredibly well incredibly incredibly well and then lucasfilm in 2012 for another four billion dollars i would argue Again, very different dynamics, but a same version of the story. Here is one of, if not maybe the greatest story of the last hundred years in humanity. The original Star Wars saga. Of myth-making. Of myth-making. Yeah. And let's give that a greater canvas to paint on. Yeah, it's pretty interesting reflecting back on these, what a tear Iger was on of identifying tier A plus intellectual property franchises that had running room ahead of them and building the stable. Because now Disney owns so much of it that there's not much left. I mean, there's Harry Potter. There's the Nintendo universe. There are a few things left but Iger kind of saw this before anyone else went in with a bigger checkbook that I think a lot of people would have been willing to go in with Deluded Disney to do it These were you know stock acquisitions or many much of it was But now they own these things. It's also fun to sort of speculate on why Lucasfilm and Marvel were lower price tags than Pixar was, like dramatically lower. Lucasfilm seems easy to me in that it certainly hasn't generated as much. They didn't have movies in production. Right. It was certainly right to pay less than Pixar. Turns out they should have paid well less than whatever they were willing to pay for Marvel, too, because Star Wars just didn't turn out to have that much more exploitation ahead of it. And frankly, they weren't done as well. But, you know, we'll get to that in a minute. Yeah. Yeah. Avengers had 37 films. And there's there's new Star Wars stuff I like. Andor's unbelievably good. Rogue One is unbelievably good. But yeah. Yep. So on the back of these three acquisitions, the Disney flywheel is revived and soaring again. The core film characters and stories are back to all time heights, not only at Disney animation, but now Pixar, Lucasfilm and Marvel to the core of Disney is much bigger and more diverse than it used to be. Consumer products after Frozen comes out, Disney sells three million. [175:00] Billion Elsa and Anna dresses in the first year after the movie's released. By 2015, Disney is doing over $50 billion a year in gross sales at retail of merchandise, up almost 2x over the past five years. That is the health of the characters and IP in the company right there. Music, hit songs are back for Disney. Let It Go wins the Oscar for best song. And get this, this is wild. The Frozen soundtrack is the best-selling album of 2014, selling 10 million copies with streaming equivalents in there, even beating 1989 from Taylor Swift. Wow. My girls love Taylor, but they might love Frozen even more. Wow. The parks are revived. Disney launches Cars Land in L.A. in 2012. So fun fact about that, they were originally, before the acquisition of Pixar, developing Car Land. And then they bought Pixar and they thought, oh, well, let's just make Cars Land. This is back when the Imagineers independently developed lands that were unrelated to franchise flywheel stuff Yep Overall parks revenue nearly doubles and operating income nearly triples in the decade from 2005 when Bob takes over to 2015. And yeah, overall during that time period, Disney's market cap is up 4x to $200 billion, up from the $50 billion when Bob took over. Overall revenue grows from $32 billion to $52 billion. Operating income goes from $4.7 to $14.7 billion. Incredible. And I'm going to keep bringing this back to cable profits because that continues to be this guaranteed contractual cash gushing business that they have. If you go line up those three acquisitions, which sound ludicrous on their price tags, especially when you didn't know how they were going to pay off. Pixar at 7.4 billion, let's even include the cash in there, that's about two and a half years of cable's then profit. Marvel at 4 billion, that's less than one year in 2009 of cable profits. And Lucasfilm in 2012 their 4 billion was well under a year of cable profits ESPN kept providing the cash to do all of this Such a good point ESPN paid for Pixar Marvel and Lucasfilm With about four years of ESPN cable profits. It's almost like a Buffett type thing, where Buffett has things in his portfolio that are cash producers and cash consumers, and he's just trying to construct the most efficient way to get cash out of the cash producers where you can't effectively reinvest the capital and put the cash into places where you can reinvest the capital. Yep. So speaking of ESPN, come 2015, ESPN and all the rest of Disney is really riding high. The strategy looks completely genius. And Wall Street loves it. And consumers love it. And the franchises are all healthy and producing stuff people love. And the parks are doing great. Everyone at Disney looks like geniuses. Yep. As you pointed out, it's like Bob has finally figured out a way to marry these two sides of the company, use the cash flow geyser from ESPN to add and feed to the flywheel on the Disney side. It's all working great. Yep. Unfortunately the stock hit an all time high on the very same day as Disney Q3 2015 earnings call Well, an all-time high except for that weird COVID aberration. There was a little short-lived moment there where it went even higher there in 2021. Yep. So on that earnings call on August 4th, 2015, Bob Iger mentions that ESPN was experiencing, quote, modest subscriber losses due to consumer cord cutting of cable subscriptions. It would come out later in Disney's annual report that ESPN lost three million subscribers that year, which still meant it had 92 million in total. But still, they'd only ever grown. I mean, I think they hit around $100 million and kind of stayed flat for a while because $100 million households— Basically is all of America. Yeah. But ESPN and anything related to ESPN, revenue only ever went up. Profits only ever went up. So this was a shock. Even though everyone had been talking for a while about— Oh, cord cutting is coming. And young people, when they move, they don't necessarily activate a cable subscription. [180:00] They'd like to access stuff online. It was like, yeah, but the numbers are still up into the right. So we're all good. Yep. This sets off a barely controlled freak out across the entire media landscape with ESPN and this earnings call as like ground zero. People knew that this was coming, like you said, but I mean, Netflix was already a $50 billion market cap company at this point. So shouldn't have been a surprise to anyone. But the very next day, Disney stock drops 10%. And over the next couple of days, Fox, Time Warner and Discovery all experience similar drawdowns. And Viacom, which people view as even more index to cable network landscape, gets whacked over 20%. And we should say, just so we don't bury the lead, Disney stock price today is what it was then. It's gone up and down, but it is flat to 11 years ago. Yeah. Meanwhile, the S&P 500, David, what did you tell me is up how much in that time? 3.5x over that time period. Yeah. Now market cap isn everything but it is a measure of what the investment community believes your company cash flows are worth in the extreme long run So we not here saying you know Disney revenue's been flat or profit's been flat, although we'll get to all that. But what we are saying is 11 years ago, people thought Disney's future was exactly as bright in the form of future cash flows that they believe today. Yeah. Well, we're about to talk about what happens to the whole rest of the traditional media landscape after this earnings call. Yeah. Disney managed to stay independent. Yeah. Yeah. So that moment kicks off. I really don't know how to say it other than the most insane period of panicked frenzy in media landscape history. I mean, maybe in any industry's history. Basically, everyone in the TV and film landscape decides all at once that they need to take dramatic action to respond to cord cutting and the rise of streaming. So over the next couple of years Time Warner sells itself to AT AT changes its mind spins out Time Warner which then merges with Discovery Viacom re with CBS but none of those brands are any good so they decide to name themselves Paramount after the studio that they own. Paramount almost collapses under its debt load, and David and Larry Ellison, yes, of course, that Larry Ellison, buy it and merge it into Skydance Media, so it becomes Skydance Paramount. Which is the thing that David Ellison kind of founded and runs. Yep. And then, of course, this all culminates in what's happening here real time here in 2026, where Warner Brothers Discovery almost gets bought by Netflix and instead looks like it's getting merged into the Paramount Skydance fever dream. So like it's insanity out there. Well, now on hold pending legal challenges as of recording date. So we'll see. But what's really happening is that all of these traditional media companies, with the exception of Disney, have basically all become kind of surfs in the streaming kingdoms of the technology companies, of which Netflix and YouTube are actually the winners here Yeah I think that the right way to phrase it I mean if you just do the very simple exercise of looking who generates profits in the movie TV Hollywood landscape right now it is Netflix YouTube and Disney generating the large profit streams Yep. So Disney decides to launch Disney Plus. Bob and the board basically draw a line in the sand and they say we are not going to just sit around and let ourselves get Netflixed like everyone else. We're going to stand and fight toe to toe. We are going to build our own direct to consumer streaming company. This goes back to Bob's priority number two in his strategy presentation to the board when he became CEO. And like, look, this is totally laudable. It's also arguably necessary. I mean, without Disney Plus and its own streaming service, Disney wouldn't have the ability to control discoverability of its films and shows. And like, that's so important. You want to get people into the parks. They got to interact with the IP and the characters. Yeah, it's funny. You and I sort of had this thesis coming in where you just keep the hundreds of millions of dollars that Netflix is paying you each year and you keep putting your money in the world. [185:00] content on Netflix and other places. And everything downstream of that, all the consumer products and parks and everything works better because you're spreading your content across the whole world. And the problem with that thesis is that once Netflix's algorithm controls whether families see your movies or not, you've got a big problem. That's right. That's right. You have no sort of guaranteed distribution. having Disney Plus, and we'll talk about all the trade-offs involved in this in a minute, because God or their trade-offs. But the thesis is, if we do this and we stand up our own streaming service, then we can form deep, direct relationships with consumers. We can create these whole sort of universes on Disney Plus that more deeply explores the characters from given movies, which creates more IP that the parks can use, which creates these merchandising opportunities, spinoff shows all this stuff and on top of this it's crazy to think that disney didn't have any relationship with any of their customers prior to this unless you had visited a park for a hundred years if you bought a home video you bought it from a retailer if you went to a theater you went to a theater or if you had a cable subscription disney did not know who you were yeah disney didn collect revenue directly from consumers except in the parks And they didn collect email addresses or home addresses or demographic information They just got the checks from the people that they were distributing through and trusted there was an end consumer on the other side. Yep. So after August 2015, Bob and the board decide very quickly, let's go build our own Netflix competitor or more accurately, let's go buy the pieces we need to build it because Disney doesn't have like any in-house capabilities to go build and operate an Internet streaming service here. Right. And this is when Disney almost buys Twitter. The forgotten chapter. The forgotten chapter. Thankfully, the chapter that did not come to pass. So yeah, they start looking around at like, okay, what scaled internet companies are out there that we could buy and use as a base to set up our streaming service. And basically, the only ones within reach are Twitter and Snapchat. Everything else is just too big. I mean, giant market cap companies. Jack Dorsey happens to also be on the Disney board at the time. So they basically get all the way to a deal. And then at the last minute, Bob backs out. He just can imagine Disney owning and operating Twitter and that was probably the right decision I think it was all papered and they were going to sign Monday morning and announce it Right Yep Yeah It was like Sunday night that he bailed on it Yep. Something like that. It was very last minute. So once the Twitter deal falls apart, they turn to a far more logical candidate, although a more hidden one. BamTech. Yes. BamTech is this incredible story. It is a streaming technology platform that was part of Major League Baseball. They began a streaming service for baseball games all the way back in 2002. Initially, I remember this from the research when I went back and looked at it, to start streaming Seattle Mariners games to Japan. That's right. Because Ichiro had come to MLB and was a phenomenon back in Japan. And I think Nintendo owned the Mariners at this point. That's right. That's right. Nintendo of America owned the Mariners. This group actually started Advanced Media by making websites for MLB baseball teams. And then they got into streaming for Japan and Ichiro. Yep. And then their first, when they spun out of baseball, they, I think, stood up the streaming back end for the then fledgling HBO Now. Yes yes And they also had taken on the NHL So they were doing the NHL streaming service So it kind of perfect They can do sports streaming They run HBO Now a streaming service for HBO It's perfect. So August 2016, Disney buys a 33% stake in BAM Tech from Major League Baseball with an option to increase that to a majority stake over the next couple of years. The next year in 2017, they announced that they're going to accelerate that option to purchase a controlling stake in BAM Tech. And they announced publicly that they will be launching an over-the-top direct-to-consumer streaming service for ESPN the next year in 2018, and then a Disney streaming service in 2019. And as part of the same announcement, Ben, like you alluded to, they say they will be ending their content agreements with Netflix and pulling all Disney, Pixar, Marvel, and Lucasfilm content off of Netflix by 2019, which Netflix was already paying them hundreds of millions of dollars annually for that content. Yep. And that's just pure profit. Yeah, no expenses associated with that. Which Disney at that point was generating about $15 billion in Disney-wide operating income at that time. So that's too... [190:00] Which percent of the company's profits are coming from that one Netflix deal. And they're just saying, all right, we're going to we're going to rip that up. We think it is worth it in the long run for us to start from zero, build an entire customer base and then reach this customer base directly. And look, this is another point where having ESPN as part of the company as a bulwark, even though ESPN is now declining, is critical. Like that's what enables Disney to do this. That's a great point. And it means that you have to nerf the ESPN offering on streaming because you need to keep that gravy train flowing in. So the ESPN plus thing that ended up debuting in 2018. It's kind of a nothing burger. Yeah. All the content that almost no one wants to watch because all the good stuff is still on ESPN, the cable channel that prints cash. So we're going to leave it there. Thank you very much. And like, look, it's a really tough thing for the ESPN side of the business to move to direct to consumer because part of the whole magic of the affiliate fee business model is you get paid a subscriber fee whether those subscribers watch the channel or not. All of a sudden you now going to actual usage based of like hey I only going to get paid by the people who want to watch this Well this is the magic of bundling is you get some money from the people who would never have paid you any money before if you were trying to sell just one product There are way fewer people who are willing to subscribe for a high dollar amount, call it $30, to ESPN directly than there are people who are willing to pay $50, $70, $80, $100 for all the channels. You're missing out on all of those sort of casual fans or the non-consumers. That's right. That's right. So Bob basically issues an all-hands-on-deck directive. He directs all the creative studios within Disney, Disney Animation, Disney Live Action, Pixar, Lucasfilm, Marvel, to start producing content and gearing up specifically for the new first-party Disney streaming service coming in 2019. on top of all the existing slate of content that they were also working on. And then he gets a call from Rupert Murdoch. And Rupert says that he and Fox are obviously going through the same strategic reviews and exercises as Disney and every other media company. And Rupert has concluded that the best path forward for Fox is to combine with Disney and lend its scale its content and its efforts to Disney first streaming service to compete with Netflix Well to combine some of its assets Basically, Fox did an analysis and looked at everything that had a library value, you know, rewatchability, and they kind of looked at it and said, the highest and best use of a library over the coming decades is going to be on these streaming services. The deep catalog, like I fall asleep at night watching The Office. So I have Peacock because they have library content so I can watch The Office. Same thing with Arrested Development, same thing with Seinfeld. They ran all the numbers and decided we don't really want to be in the streaming game over here at Fox. Let's try to fetch a high value for people who do and who need that library content, but I think will keep everything that has all of its value on first run. So news, sports, they sort of went all in on linear TV instead of keeping the library, which would require building out the streaming service. It's the opposite of Disney. Disney's keep things that have high rewatchability and monetize them over and over Yep Now you said Rupert and Fox ran some analysis on their library vis streaming I suspect part of that analysis also led them to the conclusion that hey our library just isn't strong enough to be compelling as a streaming product. Like, it's true. You know, it's got Avatar. It's great. It's got The Simpsons. Come on. How often are people rewatching Avatar? Exactly. Simpsons are rewatchable, maybe. Family Guy. Family Guy is rewatchable. Yep. The National Geographic channel. But, you know, it's a lot of live action film IP. We do have the FX network, which has always sunny and a bunch of great shows. Right. It's not zero, but it's not anywhere near enough to be compelling on its own. And its synergy value is actually a lot higher than the value is just to Fox. Because if you start to look at some of these things, X-Men, Deadpool, Wolverine, Fantastic Four. Huh, those are actually worth a lot more to Disney than they are to us. Exactly. Bingo. So December 2017, they announced the deal. Disney will be acquiring all the entertainment and international assets of Fox in a $52 billion all stock transaction. So not Fox News, not Fox Sports, not the Fox News. [195:00] broadcast network, but the library and all the general entertainment assets. And that $52 billion was after a lot of back and forth negotiation. It was best and final. Everyone at Disney ran all the models they possibly could to see what is the very most we could pay to get the value that we need out of these assets. So the deal's done-ish. It just needs regulatory approval, which is going to take several months, as it always does. During the regulatory approval process, there's a different ruling that happens around AT&T's merger that causes Comcast to go, huh, you know, we previously counted ourselves out for these assets because we didn't think it was going to pass regulatory approval. I bet it would have. Let's see if we can lob in a bid. Even though Disney and Fox say they have a done deal, let's just throw in a bid and see. Comcast once again. Disney ends up getting bid up to $71.3 billion. A full 19 billion more than they had originally signed the deal on That a free 19 billion for Fox shareholders because Comcast lobbed in the bid Yep Disney total market cap at the time was around billion So this is like 40% of the value of the entire Walt Disney Company. Way more, way more than Pixar, Marvel, and Lucasfilm all combined. Now, to be fair, so they do the deal. So Disney is able to pay down a lot of that purchase price pretty quickly through divestitures of Fox's regional sports networks and then their stake in Sky, the British pay TV operator. Yeah, those numbers were $14 billion and $15 billion. So together, you can actually back it down $29 billion. The real price of what Disney paid and the assets they kept was about $44 billion. So that's sort of the hurdle to overcome in trying to make this acquisition payback. Yep. And they probably don't get anywhere near $44 billion worth of value out of the assets that they do get. As we talked about the library assets for the streaming service sure they nice to have but they not really going to drive that many signups or retentions for the service Wolverine and Deadpool had a big box office win Avatar now has lands in the parks Yep. True. Yeah, it's not nothing. They did get a third of Hulu as a part of this deal. So they already owned our third. This gave them a third. So then they had a controlling interest. Yep. Another big part of the strategic rationale for the deal and for the increased price was that Fox had a lot of India assets, both content and distribution. And this is back to Bob's strategic pillar number three for the company. Great, we need to enter India. This is a great way to do it. Those assets end up not performing for Disney nearly as well as they thought they would. They end up merging them with Reliance in 2024 in a deal that values them at only a fraction of what they value them in the Fox acquisition. Yeah, but the general philosophy of we're going to go buy a deep library and we're going to buy a third of a general streaming service with Hulu, not a specialized curated one with universes like Disney. It does kind of give them this kitchen sink in addition to their highly curated thing with Disney where you can get kind of scale this general entertainment platform without diluting the pristine Disney brand as long as you can keep Disney Plus really separate from Hulu in the mind of consumers That's kind of the strategy. Yep. But certainly it's the worst of the four big acquisitions. Five, if you include BAM Tech. Yep. Either way, the deal closes in March 2019, right in time before Disney launches the long-awaited Disney streaming service the very next month in April 2019 at an investor day that they hold to announce Disney+. The vault is now open. I loved this. It was great. The clarity of product vision of the original Disney Plus is incredibly laudable. Totally. It was a very compelling product. All of Disney IP, Pixar, Lucasfilm, Marvel, the Fox assets coming in. And then they announced the price, $6.99 a month for the initial price. Consumers go nuts. Nuts. They beat every early projection that they had to sign up for this thing. Wall Street loves it. The stock jumps 11% the next day by [200:00] The end of April 2019, the stock is up 20%. When the service finally launches in November, Disney gets 10 million signups within the first 24 hours, 26 million in the first quarter. And the setup for all this looks great. Here we are midway through 2019. Pixar and Disney animation are soaring. Lucasfilm is crushing it. They're two-thirds of the way through the new Star Wars trilogy, Plus, they've made Rogue One, which is an amazing, amazing movie. High art. Oh, so great. The Marvel run is just reaching its apex, its peak. I mean, unprecedented in Hollywood history. Avengers Endgame is about to come out and set new records all over the world. $2.8 billion in box office gross just from that film. Yep. But unfortunately, all is not quite as well as it seems. Under the hood, each of Disney's core IP pillars is actually not in a great place right now. So I'd call them fully exploited. Well that part of it There a bunch of problems So at Pixar and Disney Animation they in the midst of a major leadership transition John Lasseter has just been kicked out of the company and Ed Catmull has just retired. So they need new leadership at both of the marquee studios of Disney. Lucasfilm looks great, but it's on the cusp of a major crisis. Solo just bombed in theaters, and audiences don't know it yet, but Episode IX is in trouble. Like, major trouble. Well, Episode VIII and IX did not have a cohesive vision between the two and had different directors. So Episode VIII went in this interesting but somewhat not Star Wars-y direction. And then Episode IX had to smear Star Wars Vaseline all over the top of it so that you would remember that it was still Star Wars. so much so that we got Palpatine back from the dead again and like 10,000 Star Destroyers rising up from a planet. It was bad. A little foresight and vision would have been nice. Yeah, yeah. But nobody knows this yet because the film doesn't come out until December of that year. Episode 8 was so different than the films around it it like no one was talking to each other And there was no plan for Episode 9 That was the problem And then Marvel I mean Marvel on this absolute high with Avengers Endgame but the problem is it's literally an endgame. Like, the story ends. Right as Disney is now saying, oh, hey, Marvel, we need you to start pumping out even more content for the streaming service. And it ends in this beautiful cinematic fashion. Like it tied 15 different strings all together. Marvel actually did have a tremendous amount of foresight. It was highly coordinated. I think I cried in that last scene where they're showing each character as they're sort of reflecting back on the whole thing and the way they handled the snap. The character development of the villain with Thanos, like it's a very relatable villain. It's a villain that is like trying to do the right thing. It's the best kind of villain. Really elegant if the end game is the end game. Right. Really inelegant if you're about to follow it up by increasing production 50% in the studio. Yes. Yeah, which they do And if you do flash forward the post 2021 movie slate might actually be negative on a theatrical return If you look at the Marvels Ant Quantumania Eternals this is even ignoring the Disney Plus shows some of which were very cool, Loki and WandaVision, but the existence of them, by trying to be bigger and broader and more expansive, even than the movies, make the original universe feel unimportant. Like my beef with Loki is who cares about Thanos when he's killing people in just one strand of an infinite multiverse. And like all you kind of should care about is what Loki's doing versus that pathetic little thing called the MCU. So that, you know, like I just spent a decade of my life investing in that. And now you're telling me it didn't even matter. So there's this big issue that it's kind of supposed to be over. And both creatively and commercially, the stuff that comes after, people don't want it, whether it's on streaming or whether it's in theaters, other than the second Black Panther, which was amazing. That was great. But all of this and everything you're saying highlights the strategic tradeoff that Disney made in pursuing the streaming strategy to go toe-to-toe with Netflix. Operating a tier one direct-to-consumer streaming business is yet another platform [205:00] wholly and completely different business model than either the core Disney flywheel or the ESPN affiliate fee model. Yep. If you're going to try and operate a tier one streaming service, a service that is going to reach the maximum number of subscribers, not a niche service, but a Netflix type competitor, your number one job is to retain subscribers that have signed up. You got to feed the beast. You need to give the beast those existing subscribers content or they're going to churn. Exactly. So I want to quote Ben Gilbert here. When from the end of Acquired's 2019 Disney Plus episode in which we were incredibly excited about Disney Plus. I mean, it was so exciting back then. But you did say one thing at the end of the episode. He said, quote, one reason to doubt it, it being Disney Plus, is I think Disney may be underestimating just how much content people need to stay satiated. It's a beautiful and amazing thing to have access to the entire back catalog of all these really storied franchises But am I going to pay a month to keep an option available to go watch those things No If I ever want to rewatch a Star Wars movie I just reactivate my subscription at a given time They really do need to aggressively turn on a fire hose of content here. Oh, man. You summed it up. You summed it up. This is the problem. that whole strategy of a fire hose of content is completely orthogonal to yes the flywheel strategy of only the best content very infrequently and that is what disney did the best content infrequently with a theatrical release a cultural moment around it and then be quiet for a while and harvest the fruits of that one movie, but be quiet for a while. And streaming is the exact freaking opposite. It is every time I open that, there better be something new and fresh for me to consume. And I got to wonder how much the Disney folks knew that when they made this decision to push all their chips in and accelerate going to streaming in a direct consumer way The biggest issue really is that Disney had something to lose they had two things to lose they had an existing content library that was highly differentiated and when you bolt things onto a universe of a differentiated library it makes the original content less valuable yep i remember watching the obi-wan tv show on disney plus and being like oh man that kind of shatters how I think about Obi-Wan. Yeah, it's not as cool as I thought it was. Yeah, because you have something to lose, you actually risk destroying the stuff you had that's great by sort of corrupting it and destroying the competitive advantage that you have in the marketplace. This is such a good point. In a top-tier, high-quality content stories and characters world, every time you make a sequel, you're taking a big risk. And this is the risk. This is why Disney didn't make sequels prior to the 90s. Yep. Now, Pixar proved to them that you can make sequels and they can be great. And you can do it well. But you need to put that same amount of care and effort and time into it. Yeah, Pixar does one every seven years. Yep. You can't increase the production line. The second thing is that the Disney brand itself means something Yes The Netflix brand doesn mean anything to anyone The Netflix brand is the button that I push on my TV when I want to watch stuff And sometimes it great stuff but if it not great stuff whatever It whizzes by. I don't think one way or another about Netflix. The Disney brand has something to lose. And so if you have a bunch of bombs in a row, I think less of the Disney brand, which again takes away your compounding competitive advantage by being Disney. whereas if you release a bunch of great things in a row even if they're more spaced out over time and you're really judicious with it which is not congruent with the streaming operating model then it can really add to the the brand bucket of the disney brand so disney sort of has this compounding asset that is at risk when going head to head with netflix yep yep yep so that's all the strategic trade-offs on the disney film and tv side then there's the whole cable espn side of the house. Yes. Like what is going on there in this 2018-19 period? Well, as you can imagine, cable subscriptions are only getting canceled at a faster and faster rate, which can actually still be fine. You can actually still grow your revenue for a while if you're in the high leverage position that ESPN is because you can just raise your prices faster than... [210:00] Cancellations are happening. Exactly. But later on, around 2023, even this would come to a head. The declines were happening too rapidly, and affiliate fee increases could no longer outpace subscriber losses. And revenue then would start to decline 23 into 24. So basically, cable and ESPN enter the endgame, to use an Avengers term. Yes, yes. So that's on ESPN's revenue side. On the cost side, there's another big problem. Sure, people are churning off cable, but I don't know, that's manageable as long as your costs stay fixed. But the sports leagues have now realized that they can extract much more value, that it turns out that in this whole value chain of watching a sports game, way more of the profits should be going to the sports league than to the network that's sort of sitting in the middle. And the NFL, the NBA, I think they just didn't fully extract everything that they could have for decades. That probably is true. But they were hamstrung because there really weren't any other bidders except ESPN for so much of these rights. Because ESPN had this whole scale economies power where because they were getting the most cash and affiliate fees they could pay the biggest prices for sports rights and block everybody else out Except for the like really, really big stuff that the broadcast networks would come after, too. Now, other bidders show up in the form of the tech companies. And the tech companies not only have these incredibly deep pockets, at least until all of them started destroying all their free cash flow doing AI CapEx. Building data centers. Yes. But they have more ways to monetize the consumer. So they can afford to bid more for the same consumer than an ESPN or that a TV network could because Amazon can get you as a prime subscriber. This is Amazon's NFL deal right here. Yes. Yeah, so any student of economics will kind of see the writing on the wall here. The price is set by the highest bidder. And if somebody has a business model that structurally can out-monetize what you can, then they're going to win and the price is going to be set by them. Yep. This is why ESPN won for many years, and this is why the tech companies are winning now. The other thing driving the prices up is as you get a more and more abundance of content online online and onlineness there is an increasing return to shared cultural experiences happening live in a way that made sports way more important than they ever have been before The prices people were paying for World Cup final tickets and Taylor Swift tour tickets and Super Bowl tickets, that sort of manifests in rights deals too. Right, there's a trickle-down effect. Exactly, exactly. So in 2006, just look at the Monday Night Football package that ESPN buys. 06, it was $1.1 billion. 2011, it was at $1.9 billion a year. And by 2021, it went up to $2.7 billion a year now. And the viewership for Monday Night Football is actually going up, even amidst all this cord cutting. It turns out that the NFL is the thing that we all want to watch. Yep. So the structural force, though, that's working against ESPN here is that ESPN used to be the only place that you could go to watch highlights and replays. And now you can get a lot of that on social media. So in the long run if the main reason to subscribe to any given channel ends up being actually about the game content itself and not differentiated by stuff around the game then the excess profits in the long term will just be captured by the rights holders like the NFL and the NBA Yep And to be clear we probably undersold ESPN's creativity and innovation in this episode. I mean, highlights, SportsCenter, everything they did was absolutely incredible. Even more recently, Pat McAfee show or my God, Manningcast. I cannot wait for fall to watch Manningcast and Monday Night Football. It is the thing I look forward to from, I don't know, July 15th onward. They really are the best of the best at high quality content production around sports. However, this is not the same as Disney. Sports have a very limited shelf life. You are not going back and watching Manning Cast episodes from last season. The flywheel does not apply here. So you can't build long-term value around that original content. You know, sure you can with like 30 for 30 and stuff like that, but that's so small and niche at ESPN. The vast majority of the production that ESPN is making has very, very limited shelf life. That's so interesting because the content has very limited shelf life, but they've locked up these in [215:00] incredibly predictable revenue streams. Yeah, there's ad sales. They have to figure out how they're going to do in the ad sales, but that's plus or minus a few percent. They know a few years from now how much free cash flow they're going to get from ESPN in a way that they have no idea from their movie slate. It has been this stabilizing force. Oh, yeah. The beauty that we've talked about on this episode that Iger ended up realizing of having these two businesses together was take that stable cash flow and use it to invest in the Disney flywheel. Right. I'm just making the point that it's not like as ESPN has come under this pressure that they could start building their own flywheel here. It's like, no, no, this is a declining asset. Right, right, right, right. All right. So take us forward. How does Disney Plus go? How does ESPN Plus go? So for better or for worse, I think Disney either doesn't see or doesn't have to deal with the fact that they have these pretty major strategic issues on both sides of the house with their streaming strategy. because the minute after they launch it, the entire world gets turned upside down. Yep. Disney Plus launches in November 2019. It unbelievable that was just sitting there right on app stores and in TVs the moment COVID hit Yeah February 2020 Bob Iger retires as CEO This COVID thing is starting to happen He says hey, I'm going to remain as executive chairman for a little while to just help stabilize the transition, especially, you know, in the parks here, the couple of weeks before we reopen everything here. Oh, man. Bob Chapek, of course, who was head of the parks division, has come in is the new CEO. March 2020 comes and everybody realizes this COVID thing isn't a couple week kind of thing here. Disney's market cap drops 40% in March of 2020 because the parks business goes to zero, actually zero. Nobody's there. I mean, Disney's net income that year was actually negative. Yeah. Yeah. And then the roller coaster goes up. Ben, as you said, Disney Plus is just sitting there. Everybody's at home now. When they announced Disney Plus originally, Disney said that their goal was to get 60 to 90 million subscribers within five years. All of a sudden COVID happens, everybody sitting at home Disney gets 100 million subscribers within 16 months March of 2021 they announced they passed 100 million subscribers blown way past even their most aggressive projections The stock goes to the moon. Well, that's the other thing. It was zero interest rates. So any good sign the market's amplitude is higher than normal. Yes. Disney's market cap in March of 2021 on this announcement hits $360 billion here at its peak. They all look like geniuses. And for the moment, they were. All these strategic questions we've talked about are non-issues. And worth noting, it hit that peak right around January 1st of 21. And by October of 21, it had begun its fall right back down to where it started. Yep. So that December of 2021, Bob Iger fully retires. As we head into the next year, there start to be some cracks in the Disney Plus strategy. Subscriber numbers are still good, but churn is high. And they spending a lot of money acquiring and reacquiring subscribers Of course this is the treadmill of a Netflix competitor streaming service You gotta not only provide the content to people every month, but you gotta tell them about it. I mean, on the ESPN side, ESPN didn't do the marketing to consumers. That was the cable company's job. They got the subscribers. They managed the churn. On the Disney side... Yeah, you gotta advertise a new movie so that you spend tens of millions or hundreds of millions of dollars advertising the new film. But there's no concept of churn. Right. You're not trying to keep everybody. Right. So the interesting thing, they're all in on this Disney Plus and Hulu, this streaming strategy. And the question is, is there actually a pile of gold worth chasing in streaming? It's structurally a worse business, as you were just mentioning, than the old cable bundle where you just got checks. Consumers can cancel easily. They do so every few months. It's expensive to make the amount of content you need to make, especially now with the quality that people expect out of streaming content. They expect like cinema-like TV shows. Yeah. Consumers don't want to have a zillion services. You have to build your own technology and keep the user experience great as platforms add new features and change the UI and everything, which is very, [220:00] Expensive to hire and pay good engineers, good designers, good product people. You have to acquire your own customers directly. Expensive. You have to retain your own customers directly. Expensive. When they turn, you have to reacquire them. That's right. And critically, you don't get a second exploitation window the way that a limited edition home video re-release has. Theatrical re-releases followed by home video windows. That was the business to be in. And sitting here grumbling about it and wishing that that could come back is not the answer. But Disney is sort of seeing the reality in 23, 24 that, oh, my God, streaming wasn't just like invest some money to build it out one time and then we've got this great asset. It's this constant expensive nurturing thing that we haven't had to deal with before. Yep. So heading into 2022, Bob Chapek does a reorg, basically reorging the entire company around the streaming strategy, consolidates all the studios altogether into one reporting segment, Disney Media, I think, DMED. And meanwhile losses at Disney Plus are just piling up as they spending all of this money in production and customer acquisition costs and churn management and technology development It culminates in November 2022 in Disney's fiscal Q4 earnings call when investors start asking a lot of questions about these losses at Disney Plus and Bob JPEG and the company's strategy for addressing them. And it does not go well. Well, and there's all these other self-inflicted wounds. I mean, all over the company, they announced they're moving a bunch of Imagineers to Florida, and then they cancel that expansion, even after a bunch of them already bought houses. Then there's the whole spat between Chapek and the governor of Florida. Oh, yes. Then they designed, built, opened, and operated a Star Wars-themed hotel at Disney World that I was very excited to go to. I mean, it's super expensive, but I really want to say it. You would have paid it, yeah. And then they promptly closed it. It felt like a company in complete disarray, even streaming challenges and losses aside. After the earnings call the board meets and fires Bob J Beck as CEO of Disney two and a bit years into his tenure And Bob Iger returns out of retirement to come be ceo again and stabilize the ship yeah you and i have been kind of going around and around back and forth why did bob come back why did bob need to come back what does it mean that bob came back ultimately i kind of think they just chose the wrong guy in bob chapek and i think eiger's mistake in recommending bob chapek for the job was thinking that the company was about to enter a peacetime. Yeah. A time where it needed like a caretaker and it needed the exact opposite. Like, oh, yeah, all the pieces are in place. Disney Plus, it's doing great. But they weren't. What Disney Plus ended up being is so different than the original thing they conceived of Disney Plus as. It's a super different business, different business model. And I think all the downstream effects of the Disney Plus strategy, it wasn't just like, great, execute the strategy now. It's like we're still learning a lot in real time. So it's almost like the person that set that in motion kind of needed to see it through. And it was by no means just a keep your hand on the wheel and make sure the company is cared for time. Yep. And then things got crazier. 2023 was the year of the Hollywood strikes Yeah And then there another proxy shareholder fight this time with Ike Perlmutter who was the previous owner and chairman of Marvel and his friend and activist investor Nelson Peltz They launched a public proxy fight against Disney. Ultimately, it doesn't go anywhere, but it's a major distraction that costs a lot of time and money. And then there's this big question of what to do with the declining asset of ESPN. It's so funny. I'm just sitting over here chuckling this declining asset of ESPN. Yeah, it's a declining asset that does $3 billion a year now in operating income. Right, right. I mean, this is like still this cash gusher. I'll take that declining asset. Thank you very much. Right. And when you say declining, I mean, might be more fair to call it flat. The cable side is declining, but the thesis is maybe they can, using the ESPN streaming service. I don't know that Disney would acknowledge that it is a declining asset. Which actually sort of explains Wall Street agitation to spin it out. Oh, it's not any good in Disney anymore. I would like that, please. Right. In response to that, in October of 2023, they do separate ESPN out into its own business segment for the first time in Disney's financial reporting. [225:00] It's now a sports business segment, which is ESPN. Basically, that's creating optionality to spin it out. If that's the thinking, then I want them to make a segment for general streaming entertainment. Like Hulu with Fox-like assets on it. That should be its own non-Disney company. All right, well, we'll get there. We'll get there. In 2025, they do a deal with the NFL. The NFL trades the NFL network cable channel into ESPN in return for a 10% stake in ESPN itself. I love this deal in so many ways. Great deal for everybody. The NFL gets 10% of ESPN, which is great if you're ESPN, honestly. It's like, whew, good. They're invested in our success. And then what is the NFL doing in this content production and distribution business? Made no sense. So having NFL Network and Red Zone and all that live over an ESPN, which their core competency, what they're good at, I love it. And for the NFL, they want ESPN to continue to be a viable bidder for their rates. So it's in their interest to prop up ESPN. Yep. Finally, at the end of the year, they launched the long full direct ESPN service ESPN Unlimited So 30 bucks a month full unlimited access to all ESPN channels They aggressively bundle it with Disney Plus and Hulu Basically, if you subscribe to ESPN Plus, you can add Disney and Hulu for only an extra $6 a month. No-brainer, which actually is done for two reasons that I did not fully appreciate at first. The first is obviously the general bundling theory, which is, eh, even if I'm not that big of a Disney Plus fan, I'll just subscribe to this whole bundle. And that way you get subscribers that you wouldn't have otherwise, the casual fan. The second that I didn't realize that Disney has really keyed into is churn mitigation. Yeah, the bundle subscribers turn at a much lower rate than any individual streaming service, because you're not thinking that hard about how much value am I getting out of this particular app this month? Yeah, I mean, there was just so much that Disney had to learn about operating direct to consumer streaming services. Yep. The real story of the last couple of years, though, has been the parks. Man, coming out of COVID, the parks have just been crushing it. And there all sorts of criticisms that you could levy at them and people do like they charging too much They nickel and diming But especially as ESPN has been declining and as Disney Plus streaming has had a rocky go at best over the last couple of years, the parks have totally filled that gap. David, it's so funny you say they've been crushing it. Visitors are actually down. On a financial basis. Everything is about price increases. There's 145 million people that visit the parks each year. before the pandemic, it was actually 157 million. That was their all time high. So they are down from the pre pandemic high even six years after the pandemic. But of course, the amount that they make per visit is is way up and has climbed, I don't know, 5% per year for decades now. Yeah, which, yeah, maybe that is a double edged sword. But maybe it's not. On the other hand, every time I go to Disneyland, it's super full. it doesn't seem to be keeping people away. Yeah, exactly. That was the point I was going to make, too. I think consumers have had some version of that complaint about Disney ever since Michael Eisner took over in 1984. And it doesn't keep people away. And if it did they would stop doing it Yep Because it in Disney interest to keep a giant middle class wrapped around the Disney brand I mean if you could get the same amount of revenue from 200 million visitors a year or 100 million visitors in a year you want it more dispersed because you want all 200 of those people imbuing Disney fandom into their core childhood memories. Yep. So parks is now almost 60 percent of the company's operating income, while ESPN and sports is down to 16 percent. So it's a total reversal from the situation 10 years ago. Wow. And all that leads to February of this year, 2026, where Josh DeMauro, the head of Disney Parks and Experiences, is announced as the next Disney CEO. effective six weeks later in March with Dana Walden, who came over from Fox, named president number two and chief creative officer of the company, a new role within the company. And Bob Iger will stay on as a senior advisor and board member until his full retirement at the end of this year in 2026. Yep. So before we get to the business today, we should talk about the beginning and end of Bob Iger's tenure, just like we did [230:00] with Michael Eisner. So when Bob Iger came in September 30th, 2005, market cap of about $50 billion, the stock price 5x by the time he left. So, you know, that second decade, like we talked about flat, but that first decade had 5x growth in it. Revenue tripled from $31 billion in 2005 to $94 billion 20 years later, and net income went from $2.5 billion to $12.4 billion. So interestingly, net income outpaced revenue. They became five times more profitable while generating three times more revenue. Interesting, which also is the same thing that happened under Eisner. Right. So it's been an exercise for two big CEO stretches making the company more profitable. Which probably says more about the company back in 1984 than it does over the last 40 years. But yeah, I think that's right. Okay, so should we talk about the business today? Yep. First, some stats on Disney Plus, since that is the strategic focus of the company today. 132 million people are Disney Plus subscribers. A little under half of those are in the US and Canada. Hulu has 64 million subscribers ESPN Plus has 24 million subscribers So here a crazy number When they last reported this in 2024 Disney generated over billion in subscription revenue, up from essentially zero in 2017 when they launched any of these streaming services. That $19 billion of revenue, probably closer to $22-ish billion now. They've stopped reporting it individually, which is around a quarter of the company's revenue and their single largest source of revenue. We've been talking about Disney Plus in this like, oh, it's low margin or, oh, it costs a lot of money to build it out. But the revenue is huge. They have transitioned revenue sort of from other places into Disney Plus now. And as of now, it is still subscale compared to Netflix. Netflix has 325 million subscribers around the world. That's the last time they reported it. It's up since then. Yeah. So it's nearly triple Disney Plus. Yep And last year generated 45 billion in revenue So what almost twice as much as Disney 25 billion that they doing in streaming revenue Yeah And that Hulu and Disney Plus combined Yep How much operating income does Netflix generate $13.5 billion compared to negative for Disney, right? No, Disney is now positive on their direct-to-consumer segment, but for a long time it was negative. But so Netflix's operating income on streaming, their entire business, is the same as Disney's entire company operating income. Yep. That is a completely new phenomenon. Just to go back in time, in 2017, Netflix's operating income was under a billion. Wow. Disney's was $14 billion. Right. Disney had that severe dip from COVID, parks closing, investing in Disney+, massive losses from investing in Disney+, and they're almost back to where they were. Whereas Netflix, over that eight-year stretch, has taken their operating income from sub-billion to now equal to Disney. Yep. And look I mean streaming is a scale economies business So the more scale you have the more operating leverage you should have Yep So to put numbers on the investment into Disney Plus cumulatively there were billion or so of losses that Disney incurred in building it out in that segment But David, they are now profitable. They generated about a billion dollars last year. This is not and probably never will be the margins of owning cable channels, but it is definitely a writing of the ship versus how expensive it used to be to run Disney+, acquire, retain subscribers, all that stuff. And really, this is what Bob Iger spent the last couple years since coming back from retirement doing. Moving over to the parks, like we said earlier, there's 145 million people who visit the parks each year. They have 12 parks across six locations. They're designing a new park in Abu Dhabi. They have eight cruise ships, which is growing to 13, bringing on a new cruise ship almost every year for the next several years. Yeah, cruises we didn't talk about, but has been a big success for the company. Yeah, that was an Eisner thing. The thesis actually originally was after you finish up at Disney World for three or four days, you may want to go hop on a cruise for three or four days, and so you sort of depart from Florida and then go down to the Bahamas. [235:00] come back up. They were kind of wrong that people would want to do those things at the same time. That was clearly a strategy not devised by people who actually have young kids. But people love the cruises. They're awesome. I've done them. They're great. This area is where the company is investing the most heavily. So in 2023, they announced that they're investing $60 billion of capital expenditures over the next decade into parks and cruises. A lot of that is probably going to build those cruise ships, one giant cruise ship year. $30 billion of it will be used in domestic parks in Florida and Anaheim. So if you live in the U.S., get excited because there's lots of new rides and lots of new lands that are opening. The mental model I have around this is they had a cash gusher in cable affiliate fees. It's going away. They had a very profitable box office, especially in the golden era where you could make and market a film like Avengers, the original one, for, I don't know, $200, $300 million and and then gross a billion and a half at the box office, that kind of seems to be over. ESPN affiliate fees are declining, sports leagues are commanding more of the profits, people aren't going to the movies like they used to, and these big IP movies are more expensive than ever I saw a rumor go by that Avengers Doomsday is going to cost million between production and marketing Well, that'll come out this December. And of course, Disney, along with the whole world, has shifted to streaming, which has proved to not be as profitable of a business that they sort of had hoped. And so where do you make your profits? Parks. But theme parks, unfortunately, don't really scale the way that cable profits did. There's a constraint of physical room in the parks and rooms in hotels. So that's why they turn to charging more per guest, since they really can't cram more guests in. And what do you have to do to justify a trip to Disney World or a cruise costing thousands of dollars now? You better invest $60 billion and make it worth it. So that's like how you can kind of wrap your mind to this giant investment and the price increases in the parks. So overall business, $94 billion in revenue, $13 billion in net income. The segments are actually pretty interesting to look at. Entertainment is $42 billion. That's movies, streaming, content. Experiences is $36 billion. So somewhat comparable to entertainment Sports is smaller at billion But profits are where it gets interesting So in entertainment the operating income is billion But in experiences, the operating income is $10 billion. So despite comparable revenue between entertainment and experiences, the parks and the cruises are generating twice as much profit. And this is Disney+. It should not be the case in theory that a media content product is a lower margin product than a physical theme park product, except when you're investing heavily into a streaming service. Yep. Almost 60% of the profits of the entire company come from Parks and Cruises. This is why Josh is CEO. Yes. And when I say the entire company, that includes the $3 billion a year of profits from ESPN. And it's still 60% come from Parks and Cruises. And my last observation, I could not believe this. I thought I was misinterpreting their annual report. Disney does report sub-segments of their business. Their segment for theatrical distribution, that's movies released in theaters, is $2.6 billion. In revenue. That is 3 of their overall revenue From the outside we think about the Walt Disney company as these movies and box office and that is not the business that three percent of the revenue of this company yep it's streaming's world and disney is just living in it yep well i think that is probably the perfect tee up to transition to analysis and the main question here which is is was Disney plus the right strategy? Like, could Disney actually viably have done anything different back in 2015, 2017, 2019? Right. The only way to answer this question is to answer it with a real thing they could have done differently because do nothing was not actually an answer. Right. Like enjoy the wonderful profits of the past was not an option. Well, yeah. So just to start off, clearly what would have happened in the do nothing category is what happened to every other major media company, which is consolidate, get acquired or slim down significantly. Yep. It's funny that one thing that I did want was for them to slim down significantly in my heart. [240:00] I want Disney Plus to be a boutique streaming service with just high quality content on it, to not be messing around with Hulu, to just focus on the core franchises, and somehow also to discover a streaming business model that doesn't require a content treadmill, that just treats these gems as the special gems that they are. I don't think that's a business, even though I like the product. I know, I know. I so wanted this to be the answer to all throughout our research of the past several months of making these episodes. As a consumer and as a parent, I want Disney Plus just to be what it is to me, which is the very best parenting product ever invented in the history of humankind. And the laying around on Saturday and throwing on a Marvel movie thing. Yeah, exactly. But I don't think it's realistic. Yeah. And the reason I don't think it's realistic, people just don't go to the movie theater anymore. Yep. And the old Disney business model and content model was completely dependent on that The way that you seeded new stories and characters and reinvigorated old stories and characters into the public consciousness was through the movie theater People go once or twice a year for a huge event movie. They'll go for the Odyssey. They'll go for Toy Story 5. I'm going for the Odyssey on Saturday. And the reason I haven't gone before is because I've been prepping for this episode and I don't have time. But like that is, I went literally to Toy Story 5 and I'm going to the Odyssey and I have no other plans to see movies. Oh, Dune 3, I'll go see. Nice. Yeah, I'll go see that too. But they're probably not going to go see a film like Ratatouille. Oh, that's interesting. Yep. They're not going to go see Encanto. And they're not going to go see Tangled. And those franchises are so important to Disney. So the only way that Disney can make sure that the maximum number of people and the maximum number of generations get exposed to those franchises is to have a widely available streaming service. You know, it's interesting. It is backed up by the numbers. If you look at the new Pixar films developed in the last 10 years, 9, 10 years, none of them have set new records. Yep. The only record setters and real smash hits are these sequels Yep Toy Story 5 is going to be a banger But again 5 I don think Pixar has gotten any worse at doing the Pixar thing I think these have been great films, the original ones that have come out but only generated two, three, four hundred million box office. It's that the bogey has moved. Product market fit is an evolving thing, not just because the product is changing, but the market is changing. And the market is not one that goes and sees Ratatouille's when they enter the movie theater anymore. And so what is going to get Ratatouille in front of consumers? It's either the Netflix algorithm or the YouTube algorithm, or it's a first party streaming service that Disney owns and can make sure that Soul or Turning Red or Elemental or Encanto gets in front of consumers. even though you can't be that profitable by running said service. Yep. But when you're making $10 billion out of the parks and that's the IP that's feeding the parks, you damn sure need a way to make sure people see it. Yep. Could you have your cake and eat it too? Could you run a high skinny service that reaches I don know 30 to 50 million people who really just want the straight drip of Disney but also make hundreds of millions of dollars licensing that content elsewhere but just kind of spreading it around to make sure that when you have a big thing that you think is the equivalent of a box office hit, you do release it on Netflix to their 350-ish million people. That's the only other viable strategy that I could think of. Sounds like you ended up in the same spot. Disney Plus also constrains your reach. I mean, it was quite bold to think that you could go and build a Netflix competitor 10 years after Netflix started and just bet that the Disney IP was enough to sort of catch you up to them and then also be as good as they are at going and getting filler content, even when you have the high prestige Disney brand holding you back from smashing as much filler content as you can in. So the result is you don't, and you end up with a subscale streaming platform. So they do have Disney Plus. It does have 130 million people subscribed, but 130 is not 350. And so your content that you want to drive people to the parks and to merch is only reaching 40% of the people that it could if it were on Netflix or whoever the biggest streaming service of the day would be. Yeah, you'd be subservient. [245:00] them and actually showing it to people. But you are hamstringing yourself by not giving your content the most reach that you possibly can. In the theatrical world, you'd come out with a Disney movie. It would go to every theater. Everyone would see it. You know, you had reach in the Disney Plus world. Disney Plus doesn't actually give you the reach that being on the biggest streaming services would give you. Yep. I still think it probably doesn't work. And the reason is the algorithms. Netflix is not the movie theater. Yeah, but if your content is unbelievably compelling, it will rise to the top. Sure. For people that Netflix knows will be interested in that content. Again, it's not like the movie theater. The movie theater rises to the top for everybody. People go to the movies. No, I disagree with that. In an alternate universe where the Disney Netflix deal is still in place, whenever a new Disney movie would get released on Netflix, It would be a top 10 movie for sure, both organically. And if it's a good movie, then people are going to talk about it and they're going to tell their friends. And it going to get more popular and it going to bubble up in the algorithms Yes but even a top 10 top five top three movie on Netflix in a given month what percentage of Netflix subscriber base is watching it I don think it a super high percentage. It's a supermarket driven by an algorithm. It's not a movie theater with a curated finite set of stalls that are showing a reel. It's not parallel distributed enough where the big content each month gets 70% of people to watch it. You're saying any given piece of content tops out at like 10% of viewers or something like that. You're competing with Seinfeld on Netflix. You go to the movie theater, you're competing with whatever else is out that week and the seven other, you know, writers in the movie in the Megaplex. Yeah. Yeah, it's interesting. All that to say, same as you, I went in wanting there to have been a different strategy and I'm actually not sure I could come up with a better one. And any pontificating we could do lacks data and Disney has all the data. And so if there were a better strategy, they're real smart. Like they probably would have come up with it and they have access to more information than we do. Yeah. The one thing that I don't think has become true is that Disney Plus provides a deeper relationship with customers. It's not like there's any synergy with the park. Yep. I mean they finally unified my login but it not like my park experience is any different based on my Disney Plus viewing habits I not even sure I would want that I can think of any of the synergies that you would actually want It sounds good in a pitch to say oh we have this direct and personal relationship But like the biggest benefit I can tell is what we already talked about, that you actually can force content in front of my eyeballs this way. Yeah. But this general insight that I didn't have before starting the episode, that if you want to operate a streaming service that gets to scale, and if you're going to operate a streaming service, it has to get to scale since the fixed costs are so high, then you must have a broad set of content. That is weird. That it must be a broad set of content because you must appeal to lots of people and therefore you need diverse content to appeal to all of them. Put another way, the winning streaming service will be the kitchen sink. Yep. Yep. Yep. And that's what Netflix is. And that's how bundles work. I mean, the winning thing in TV was the kitchen sink, the cable bundle. Yep. That's a kitchen sink. That's what Hulu is. Yep. Again, I don't know that I actually could come up with a different, better strategy, but the world that Disney and all the traditional media companies entered starting in 2015 is just a fundamentally worse one for their content To run content businesses Yes Yeah And specifically for Disney because they got to increase their production output so much And the whole brand promise of the company is founded on scarce content that always great Yeah. Kind of interesting. Is it a worse world for content businesses, but we actually live in the best world ever for consumers of content? like consumers have an immense amount of choice you can and you can choose from everything from someone influencing on their phone to high quality cinema available both in the movie theater in imax and on your tv a mere 45 days after it comes out in the theaters right immense amount of choice for a minuscule amount of money compared to the old world right right it's the best deal ever for consumers yeah youtube is free netflix services combined cost approximately the same price as a cable bundle right and compare that to going to the movie theater every weekend the only case i can possibly make that we live in a worse environment is the um over exploitation of ip franchises and and sequel itis yep but we live in a pretty amazing content type [250:00] Yep. Okay. So I think we should move this into bull and bear. Bull case and bear case for Disney from here. Let's start with the bear case. The core of the Disney flywheel and the ESPN beautiful affiliate fee business model are both compromised and perhaps permanently impaired. Yes. That's the core of the bear case to me. Yes. Illustrated by this question, has Disney produced a single new franchise in the last decade that has been a commercial success? Everything I can think of that did big dollars after 2016 at the box office, and I picked 2016 because that's when Moana and Zootopia came out. Everything after that that was big box office for the company is harvesting existing IP. Yep, yep. And coincides exactly with when streaming kind of became king. Yeah. If you wanted to have a big concern, I think that's sort of it. What's the Lion King of tomorrow or the Toy Story of tomorrow or the Avengers of tomorrow? Coco and Kanto are probably the best shots at it maybe elemental But it interesting because those did not have big box offices And so you sort of have to rely on streaming to tell you that it big And number two to kind of carry it. And it's kind of case in point. As awesome as those movies are and those franchises are and they're showing up in the parks, they're not Frozen. Frozen might have been the last mega hit. It's fascinating. My other one is that the three acquisitions, Marvel, Pixar, Lucasfilm, were brilliant. But in retrospect, it's kind of looking like they provided amazing fuel for about 20 years, but not for 50 years. I mean, where does Star Wars go next? And is Marvel fully exploited now? and and the company has bet so big on these ip flywheels that like you know every new thing in the park is tied to one of them all the sequels are tied to them and when you run out of sequels i gotta tell you i'm scared for avengers doomsday i saw the trailer and i was like i remember when i used to be really really excited about this i know i know and i just have a feeling in my stomach like i just not anymore i barely even aware that it coming which is even a worse place to be which says a little bit more about the cultural importance of theaters although i bet you knew the odyssey was coming yep i bet you knew dune 3 is coming yep yep so okay bull case i will take the exact opposite side of what you just laid out in the long run i think these franchises, whether it's core Disney, Pixar, Lucasfilm, Marvel are just like luxury brands. You cannot kill them. They will have uptimes and they will have downtimes, but they will always come back because these are the core myths of our society and they get handed down generation to generation. And when they are at their lowest point, that is the moment that they will turn around and surprise us in new ways. That's a great narrative. I have no way to push back. And to make your point, at some point here in the next couple of years, I can't wait to show my son Star Wars for the first time and he's going to grow up watching Star Wars. And is he going to care that they made a crappy Obi-Wan show? No he never see it Yeah it it still the core myth of his time In fact didn George Lucas do like a Star Wars holiday special way back in the 80s And you know what none of us have ever seen and never affected any of the myth making The Star Wars holiday special. Yeah. And I think it's actually the story of this whole episode. And it always comes back. It always comes back. These franchises, these studios, and these characters and stories are going to live forever. Yep. All right. I've got a few reasons for optimism here. Great. Despite the fact that they intentionally accelerated the demise of their older profitable businesses, they're back to all-time highs on total profits now. They took those kind of rebuilding years, five, six years in the middle, had a pandemic in the middle of it that shut down all their parks. But I think in 2026, it's looking like they'll set a brand new net income record ever based on the way it's trending. And just five years ago, it was negative during COVID. and really kind of dug out of that hole after losing all this money in streaming. So yeah, for all the headwinds that we described, they're gonna continue to set new financial records. Now it's not growing at the speed that you'd want for a business to justify a high multiple or a fast growing stock price, but in many ways, [255:00] is a scale company that has kind of accomplished its mission. So I don't know that I want it to be a 20% year-over-year grower. As a consumer, I quite like that it's a 3% or a 5% growth company. Yeah. I think this might even be a version of the same thing, too. The Disney parks are also a fundamental part of our culture that gets transferred from generation to generation, that parents take their kids. And it's just always going to be that way. Yep. The parks are amazing. No competitor has the sort of brand affinity they have, the flywheel infrastructure they have. Yeah, a lot of reason to be optimistic. All right. Then I've got one more point to the bull case for Disney. Are you going to pitch Josh tomorrow on doing an acquisition? Absolutely. But here's what it is. I think Disney still is just like it was when Bob took over. I think it's still the very best home for the best characters and stories and IP franchises in the world when they need a home. And there are two extremely obvious ones to me out there right now One is Bluey which you know is the greatest children show ever made That also much more than a children show It already quasi within Disney It got placement in the parks It's got a deal with Disney+. Bluey is not Pixar. It's not at that scale, but it's so many echoes of Pixar right now. It's not really capable of continuing and standing alone on its own. Like Joe Brum isn't going to make Bluey into a Disney competitor. but disney can be the very best stored for all the future of bluey and bluey has so much more running room ahead of it in terms of what it can be yep all right so that's one and then the other one the opposite of the spectrum is nintendo man nintendo has fallen on hard times do you know what nintendo's market cap is right now 50 billion but down 50 from last year whoa yeah i mean you could pick up Nintendo for less than the cost of Fox now. Now, I don't know that Nintendo would ever sell. Japan would not let it. There's no way. But, you know, look, they have this relationship with Universal now I mean it is a travesty frankly that Disney let Nintendo go to Universal Nintendo is like Pixar Marvel and Lucasfilm combined I mean they have some of the very best IP in the entire world They've got three franchises that can stand toe-to-toe with anything at Disney in Mario, Zelda, and Pokemon. And then they've got a whole slew of other great stuff. Donkey Kong, Metroid, Kirby, Star Fox, Animal Crossing. I mean, there are movies for decades to be made here. plus the video games and then the parks. I took my girls to Nintendo Land at Universal Studios in L.A. It was amazing. And it's like one 50th the size of Disney World with the bigger Disney canvas. Nintendo physical experiences could be so much more. There you go. That's my pitch. I like it. Seven powers. Powers. Yes. All right. So listeners, this is the part of the episode where we use Hamilton Helmer's framework to discuss why a company gets to be more profitable than its nearest competitor. And there are seven of them. Scale economies network economies counterpositioning switching costs branding cornered resource and process power Man how do we do this this time I think we do it this time for the streaming era disney plus versus streaming competitors yep yep yep so the pitch of disney plus versus other vertical competitors peacock or paramount plus is that it has higher quality durable franchise intellectual property that those other ones don't really have yep cornered resource yep and they have them forever, just like the vertical ones, you know, that Peacock has The Office forever or that Paramount Plus has Star Trek forever. But Disney just has a lot more of those than the other vertical ones. The funny thing that I'm struggling with here is it's not like they actually do generate more profits than the real competitor than Netflix. Yeah. Well, I think it's really simple. It all just comes down to scale economies in the streaming business. This is why Netflix Netflix has, what did we say, $45 billion in revenue and $13.5 billion in operating income. And Disney streaming business is half of that in revenue and barely profitable. That is the clearest illustration of scale economies that I can present to you. Yeah. Hmm. So, does the world end up where you have Netflix, which is the giant winner-take-all [260:00] economies player in paid streaming. Then you have YouTube, which is the giant winner-take-all one in ad-supported, free, creator-led content instead of professionally created content. And Disney can sort of stay subscale because it's subsidized by the profits from their other businesses. So it doesn't need to be as competitive on a like-for-like basis with Netflix. Yeah, I think Disney's best bet here is to be a clear number two. And they probably shouldn't lean into that, because if you're trying to be number one, then you're going to chase the content kitchen sink all the way there. Yep. Yep. They need enough of a content kitchen sink to be superior to Peacock, etc. But frankly, they're already there. Right. They can dial back content production a lot and let the flywheel heal itself a little bit. Agree. And still be just fine. Keep Hulu Hulu. Hulu and Disney Plus keep getting closer and closer together the more they bundle it and put the content in each other's apps. Are you starting a Make Hulu Great Again campaign here I starting a spin co of Hulu and Fox Assets campaign here That what I doing Keep Avatar in Disney but everything else has to go All right. Quintessence. Listeners, this is our exercise to wind down the episode, bring it home, and talk about kind of the one big idea that stuck with us. Yep. My quintessence is that the environment changed. Yep. Disney used to operate in an unbelievable and easy environment. The cable bundle allowed ESPN to generate huge profits basically on autopilot. Partially because of ESPN, all the other TV channels that Disney offered also were super profitable. Customers used to go to the movies super often, and Disney had some of the most profitable and successful movies. Then to put this on steroids, they could box and sell the movies after that and make giant profits again. You had everything going for you. That was peak traditional media. Then the modern environment is the exact opposite. Cable bundle is getting destroyed. Disney could no longer realize those profits. People stop going to movie theaters, so box office gross dries up. Streaming turns out to be expensive to build, expensive to maintain, expensive to acquire customers, harder to create events around. People don rally around them like they did movie theaters It expensive to retain customers it far less profitable and it not a replacement for the theatrical revenue And ultimately because of all this there just not as much cushy surplus everywhere And you have to make a lot of really shrewd business decisions if you want to keep generating the same or more profits each year. So where does this leave us? Disney's going to be fine. And if managed very carefully, thrive. They're still going to produce beloved characters and stories we all love. But the prosperity from the late 90s and the 2005 to 2019 era, that was a complete anomaly due to how good all the structural forces around the business were. And it's just brutal that as a company, they will forever be compared against those eras. Yep. Yep. And frankly, the management team in that era just knocked it out of the park in terms of seizing those opportunities and innovating all the stuff they added. Home video, Broadway, the stores in the malls, the parks and transforming Walt Disney World into a resort. You know what it is? You could make money in media then. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Like you had to do clever stuff, but like there was money to be made. There was room for creativity to thrive There much less of that now Totally agree Absent a completely different business model like being Mr Beast There a whole other universe where you can create very successful media business models now But it's so far from Disney's universe that you can't even see a path to it. Yep. And that leads right into my quintessence. I guess I'm ever the optimist on this front. Disney is the home of generational myths and you'll never kill it. It's what I said in my case. Unkillable. It'll have its ups and downs and maybe we'll never see another era like the 90s. And that was truly peak Disney from a business and creativity standpoint. And the early 2010s. And the early 2010s too. Yep. Yep. Absolutely. But this is sort of my point. It goes in 20 year cycles and I wouldn't be surprised if it's back on top of the world in another 10 years. Love it. Carve outs. Carve outs. Let's do it. This is the part where we talk about products that we have been loving that have nothing to do with this episode, but we want to share with you listeners. I have a Warby Parker one to share with everyone. Ooh, fun. I have been wearing glasses more recently. And in the summer months, it's nightmarish to carry two pairs of glasses with you. [265:00] So, what's the answer? Transition lenses. But transition lenses just look so derpy. Classically, transition lenses are like, there's a treatment on regular glasses, and when you're wearing regular glasses and they're tinted, it just looks really bad. So, Warby Parker has a product called their Transitions Extra Active, which are dark outdoors. They even transition in the car. And I got them in brown. And I think this is the key unlock. They don't look as dorky when the tint is brown as when the tint is just regular gray. And if you get them in a frame that can kind of play as both indoor-outdoor, then it can work. So for the first time in my life, I've been wearing a form of transition lenses that I like. and, yeah, brown Extra Active from Warby Parker. Nice, nice. At some point, this is like my fifth sunglasses carve-out. My carve-outs will exclusively be forms of eyewear. We should start an acquired retail sunglasses. Yep. All right moving on I have three carve So my first one that I was sure you were going to take is Michael Arndt Toy Story 3 lecture on YouTube Michael was the screenwriter for Toy Story 3 and shared this lecture on YouTube about how story works at Pixar. It was part of our research for this episode. So many people told us about it. And not only did he share a talk, he got permission to share a bunch of the early story reels. So you get to see the rough drafts of what the story was before the brain trust weighed in and made it better. Yeah, it's so good. Well worth it. It's like an hour and 20 minutes of your time. If you care at all about story or even just understanding what goes into making the magic of a Pixar movie. Yeah, go check it out. Then I have a carve out request also related to the episode. So we were in New York recently for the event that we did with Sierra. And I brought the family and my older daughter was super excited to go to the Nintendo store in Rockefeller Center in New York because she thought that there in New York at the flagship, they might have Princess Peach costumes. They did not have Princess Peach costumes As far as I can tell Nintendo does not make first party Princess Peach costumes This is why Disney needs to acquire Nintendo because the fruit is just laying there right hanging off the trees Josh David wants to come in and do strat planning with you, so bring him in. I don't care if it's Disney or Nintendo or Universal or whoever, just make some Princess Peach costumes for my almost five-year-old. And then my last carve-out is the Golden State Valkyries, the WNBA franchise here in San Francisco. We've gotten to know Jess Smith, the president of the Valkyries. We have done a few events with her. Yeah, she's so great. Actually, at the Century event that we did, what, last year? Yes. What she and the whole Valkyries organization and the Warriors organization, it's the same ownership group, have done with the Valkyries is nothing short of incredible. It's the second year of the franchise. It is the most successful women's sports franchise in the entire world. It's worth over a billion dollars now. We went for the first time to experience it. I've never been to anything like it. It was one of the best sporting events I ever been to period My little girls were so into it It like magic They were standing up cheering applauding yelling The arena was sold out They sold out every single game they've ever played. It's really awesome. If you're in San Francisco, go to a game. All right, off to come down. Well, with that, listeners, we have some thank yous for everyone who helped us with this episode. First to our partners, Sierra. Sierra helps the Great companies of the world build better, more human customer experiences. Sierra.ai slash acquired. To WorkOS, start selling to enterprise customers with just a few lines of code and build authentication in minutes instead of months. That's workos.com. To Sentry, application monitoring software considered not bad by millions of developers. That's Sentry.io slash acquired. and also Sentry is our partner for the annual Acquired Meetup this year happening on September 17th. More info at acquired.fm slash meetup. And to Anthropic, Claude is a truly incredible AI product that thinks with you just like it thought with me in preparing for this episode, claude.ai slash acquired. You can click the link in the show notes to learn more about any of our partners and as always, all the sources and books and everything for this episode are [270:00] in the show notes. So some thank yous. First, as always, to Arvind Navaratnam at Worldly Partners for his great write-up on Disney linked in the show notes. Check out worldlypartners.com. Yep. Well, I've got a long list of folks to thank for all their time and conversations helping us prepare for this episode. First to Nancy Lee, to Bob Iger, to Josh Damaro, to Pete Docter, Jim Morris, and all the incredible folks who hosted us for the day at Pixar, including Danielle Feinberg, Catherine Serafian, and the incredible people who run the Pixar archives. That was an experience like none other. To Kristen Bell, the voice of Anna in Frozen, who helped us think about Disney animation and Pixar. To our friends Ravi Nandan at A24, Chase Carey at Liberty Media and Fox and to Mitch Lasky at Benchmark, to Robbie Whelan at The Wall Street Journal, who has a book on Disney coming out later this year. Also to Ben Fritz and Emily Nelson at The Wall Street Journal. And I know you have a list too. To Ed Catmull, who needs no introduction, to Jeffrey Katzenberg, same thing, to Bill Block, who formerly led Miramax, to Ben Thompson for his exceptional analysis of Disney over the last decade. That inspired a lot of my thinking. I I think I read every Stratechery piece on the company to prepare for this. And lastly, to our friend Sean Bailey, former executive at Disney and led one of the studios there and has helped us with a bunch of episodes. But obviously this one was particularly close to home so thank you so much Sean If you like this episode go check out Disney Part 1 on Walt Life Some other episodes you may like the NFL Coca Vanguard or if you willing to dive very deep into the acquired back catalog we've got Pixar, Marvel, Lucasfilm, ESPN, BamTech, a Disney Plus episode from 2019. I may be forgetting some, but there's plenty of Disney sprinkled around in the back catalog. You can click the link in the show notes to get access to the companion PDF. with visuals, charts, tables, and key illustrations from this episode. You can join the email list at acquired.fm slash email to get access to all the photos that we talked about and to learn a hint at what next episode will be. That's acquired.fm slash email. Join the Slack at acquired.fm slash Slack. And with that, listeners, we'll see you next time. We'll see you next time. Who got the truth? Is it you? Is it you? Is it you? who got the truth now. Thank you.