Dalio Sees US Debt Cycle Escalating Threat of Stage-5 Economic Breakdown

达利欧：美国债务周期加剧“第5阶段”经济崩溃风险 雷·达利欧警告称，偿债成本上升与政治分歧正将美国推向晚期结构性崩溃，而人工智能投资亦面临利润率严重受蚀的风险。 宏观投资者雷·达利欧深入分析了威胁美国金融与政治秩序的系统性压力，并将当前危机置于五个历史宏观周期的框架中进行解读。他剖析了2万亿美元的年度财政赤字、不断攀升的利息支出以及极度的党派僵局如何阻碍政府推行结构性改革；与此同时，随着各国央行青睐无交易对手风险的货币而非债券资产，黄金价格大幅上涨。达利欧告诫称，K型经济与政治两极分化映射了历史上帝国晚期的内部衰败迹象。此外他还警告，虽然人工智能将重塑社会，但高昂的资本支出以及来自中国国家补贴开源模式的国际竞争，可能会导致AI投资泡沫陷入自我反噬。 达利欧（Ray Dalio）警告美国正面临不可持续的结构性债务危机，联邦年支出约7万亿美元而财政收入仅5万亿美元，累计债务达年收入的600%，巨额利息支出已占据年度赤字的一半。 (3:25) 政府效率部（DOGE）等行政改革在民主体制下面临结构性阻碍，短选期间的政治反弹与官僚惯性使得削减开支极其艰难，而广泛的欺诈与浪费正是债务周期晚期的典型症状。 (7:26) 达利欧建议在投资组合中配置5%至15%的黄金作为抵御货币贬值与主权违约的无对手方风险资产；而比特币目前更偏向高贝塔科技资产，因缺乏隐私、机构采纳不足及与科技股高度相关而波动剧烈。 (20:06) 针对人工智能热潮，达利欧警告“AI正在吞噬一切，且可能反噬自身”，巨额资本开支面临利润率不足的风险，加之中国若将前沿AI视为公共基础设施并免费开源，将对美国资本回报模式形成严峻冲击。 (42:24)

Investor Ray Dalio warns that the United States is locked in a late-stage macro cycle defined by an unsustainable debt burden, deepening political polarization, and heightened geopolitical rivalry. Dalio argues that massive capital expenditures into artificial intelligence risk self-cannibalization through commoditization, while urging defensive portfolio positioning in hard assets to counter ongoing monetary debasement. Compounding Sovereign Debt and Treasury Rollover Risks (3:25) Dalio calculates that the U.S. federal government faces a structural accounting shortfall, spending roughly $7 trillion against $5 trillion in tax revenue. This generates an annual $2 trillion deficit—half of which is now consumed solely by interest payments—while accumulated debt stands at approximately 600% of tax receipts. Furthermore, the Congressional Budget Office projects the 2026 deficit-to-GDP ratio at roughly 6%, double the 3% target Dalio considers necessary for a manageable financial transition. To fund these obligations, the Treasury must roll over $9 trillion in maturing debt alongside issuing $2 trillion in fresh debt. To anchor longer-term borrowing rates without immediately forcing the Federal Reserve into renewed quantitative easing, the Treasury has shifted toward issuing shorter-term maturities. Dalio warns this tactic substantially escalates debt rollover risk. At the same time, foreign central banks—which hold roughly one-third of U.S. public debt—are actively trimming Treasury allocations in favor of gold due to portfolio overconcentration and rising risks of geopolitical sanctions. Dalio supports targeted deficit reduction and views historical tariffs as a valid revenue tool to rebuild domestic industry, but he dismisses proposals to replace federal income taxes entirely with tariffs as unfeasible. Institutional Paralysis and Late-Stage Political Decay (7:26) Dalio diagnoses the U.S. as occupying 'Stage 5' of the classic internal order cycle, an unstable phase characterized by fiscal distress, irreconcilable values and wealth gaps, and political paralysis. Drawing a parallel to the collapse of the Roman Republic, he notes that when democratic institutions become intensely polarized and fragmented, societies historically turn toward strongman leadership to restore domestic order. He views this friction through a divergent 'K-shaped' economy, where speculative tech wealth concentrates at the top while roughly 60% of Americans read below a sixth-grade level, leaving blanket monetary policy unable to resolve opposing economic realities. Efforts to aggressively reduce government spending face near-insurmountable systemic barriers. Dalio points out that initiatives like the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) encounter severe democratic friction: swift spending cuts trigger immediate electoral backlash, hyper-partisanship prevents surgical restructuring, and entrenched federal bureaucracy functions with the operational inertia of an oversized DMV. In such bloated apparatuses, oversight mechanisms fail, rendering systemic waste and public fraud the predictable outcome of distributing trillions of unbacked dollars. Currency Debasement, Gold Allocation, and Bitcoin Limitations (11:19) As sovereign debt escalates, central banks systematically create currency to service obligations, steadily debasing paper money. Dalio emphasizes that paper currencies are merely debt claims carrying sovereign counterparty risk, whereas physical gold is an established reserve asset free from default liabilities. With gold rising from roughly $2,900 to over $5,200 an ounce to become the second-largest reserve asset held by global central banks, Dalio recommends that a neutral, diversified portfolio maintain a 5% to 15% allocation to gold as a core defense against credit deterioration and currency devaluation. Addressing alternative assets, Dalio explains why Bitcoin fell 25% during a window in which gold gained 80%. He attributes Bitcoin's volatility to structural shortcomings, including a trackable public ledger that limits operational privacy, non-adoption by central banks, unquantified risks from emerging technologies such as quantum computing, and a holder base closely tied to tech equities. When liquidity dries up or investors face margin calls, Bitcoin is frequently liquidated as a risk asset, contrasting with gold's historic function as a safe-haven reserve during systemic crises. AI Capital Intensity and Geopolitical Commoditization (42:24) Examining the technology landscape, Dalio separates the enduring societal impact of breakthrough technologies from the financial survival of the companies that build them. Paralleling the late 1920s and the 2000 dot-com crash, he observes that while revolutionary technologies persist, the vast majority of pioneering firms eventually fail. He cautions that 'AI basically is eating everything, and it might eat itself' because unprecedented capital spending on infrastructure and compute risks yielding inadequate corporate profit margins once foundational models are commoditized. This profitability challenge is further aggravated by divergent economic models between the U.S. and China. While American tech companies operate under private capitalist constraints requiring high investment returns, the Chinese state treats frontier artificial intelligence as an open-source public utility, akin to electricity. By distributing advanced models at low or zero cost to accelerate nationwide domestic productivity, Chinese competition threatens to drive down global software margins, severely impairing the ability of U.S. firms to recoup their massive capital outlays. Dalio concludes that human societies persistently fail the governance 'marshmallow test' by prioritizing short-term spending over long-term discipline. However, he cautions against imposing rigid constitutional spending caps that might stifle entrepreneurial innovation and technological experimentation. Instead, Dalio argues that studying long-term historical debt cycles remains the most reliable mechanism for policymakers and investors to navigate the inevitable breakdown and restructuring of political and monetary orders.

Ray Dalio指出，当前美国正深陷由不可持续的巨额债务、严峻的K型社会撕裂与地缘对抗驱动的“第五阶段”内部秩序衰退；在此背景下，由巨额资本开支驱动的人工智能面临变现困境与中美制度竞争的双重挤压，存在“吞噬自身”的技术泡沫风险。 财政失控与行政失灵：晚期债务困境 (3:25) Dalio分析指出，美国联邦财政正运行在不可持续的赤字轨迹上。国会预算办公室预计2026财年赤字占GDP比重将达约6%，远高于实现平稳过渡所需的3%。目前联邦政府每年支出约7万亿美元，而税收收入仅5万亿美元，产生高达40%的预算赤字（2万亿美元），累计总债务已达到年税收的600%。更为严峻的是，政府每年赤字中约一半（1万亿美元）纯粹用于支付利息，同时财政部不仅需要发行2万亿美元净新增国债，还面临高达9万亿美元到期存量债务的滚动再融资压力。外国债权人持有了约三分之一的美债，但由于地缘摩擦与制裁担忧，海外资本对持有美元债务的意愿正面临严峻挑战。 针对通过“政府效率部”（DOGE）等削减开支的尝试，Dalio认为在民主体制的晚期周期中，从结构上推行精简近乎不可能。他将庞大的联邦官僚机构比作巨型机动车辆管理局（DMV），指出大规模公款欺诈和低效是晚期债务周期与机构臃肿的必然产物。任何迅速削减开支的举措都会在选举周期内引发剧烈政治反弹，而高度极化的党派环境使外科手术式的体制改革无法推进。 货币重估：黄金避险价值与比特币局限 (11:19) 面对黄金价格从每盎司约2900美元飙升至逾5200美元（涨幅约80%），Dalio澄清这并非投机泡沫，而是市场与全球央行应对法币贬值风险的理性反应。他强调现代经济中的纸币本质上是政府或央行的无担保债务凭证，当债务规模不可维系时，央行必然开机印钞稀释纸币索偿权。与依靠第三方兑付承诺的流动资产不同，实物黄金是人类历史上确立的第二大央行储备资产，具备跨国境流动且无主权对手方违约风险的独特属性。Dalio建议，即使投资者对黄金走势持中性态度，在资产组合中配置5%至15%的黄金也是防范系统性货币贬值与信用违约的基本底线。 相比之下，在黄金大涨80%的同期，比特币却下跌了25%。Dalio指出比特币存在若干关键结构性劣势：其全网公开可追踪的账本缺乏业务隐私性，未被全球央行纳入储备，且面临量子计算等未来技术的不确定风险；更关键的是，比特币的持有群体与科技股高度重叠，导致其在科技投资者面临追加保证金或流动性挤压时屡遭抛售，走势更倾向于高波动的投机性资产而非避险储备。此外，近期白银虽有走强，但Dalio提醒其更多受制于供给约束和追涨投机情绪。 K型经济与政治极化：强人秩序的催化 (23:08) Dalio警告，美国的宏观政策正被日益极端的“K型经济”裂痕所瓦解。顶层1%的人口得益于科技股暴涨与资产集中，甚至出现了关于“首位万亿富翁”的投机讨论；而在底层60%的群体中，存在普遍的经济脆弱性，60%的美国人阅读能力低于六年级水平，极易受到人工智能普及带来的劳动力替代冲击。这种贫富悬殊导致单一利率政策陷入两难：极低利率会助长资产泡沫并剥削债权人，过高利率则直接促使脆弱的底层债务人违约。财政部只能通过大幅缩短发债期限来压低长期收益率，但这进一步推高了短期的再融资展期风险。 经济鸿沟与价值观对立已将美国推入内部秩序周期的“第五阶段”。Dalio援引古罗马共和国晚期恺撒遇刺等历史先例指出，当民主体制陷入超极化纷争、党派诉求凌驾于体制本身之上时，社会治理便会走向瘫痪与暴民乱象。柏拉图早在公元前350年就阐述了这一衰落循环：当社会陷入无法调和的内耗时，公众出于恢复基本秩序的渴望，往往会不可避免地导向强势领导人专政。 AI泡沫与中美博弈：技术吞噬自身风险 (42:24) 在科技演进层面，Dalio对当前的人工智能热潮提出了明确预警，指出投资者普遍混淆了“颠覆性技术”与“具体构建该技术的商业公司”之间的区别。回顾1920年代末的繁荣和2000年互联网泡沫，底层技术最终都重塑了社会，但绝大多数早期开创型企业最终走向了破产。Dalio直言，“人工智能正在吞噬一切，并且可能反噬自身”——巨额的资本开支如果无法产生相称的利润率回报，模型一旦沦为大宗商品化工具，高昂的先期投资将难以回收。 这一风险在中美对抗的宏观格局下进一步被放大。美国依托资本主义市场机制，要求科技企业必须通过明确的商业利润偿还投资人；而中国则采取国家主导的补贴模式，倾向于将前沿人工智能视为类似于“电力”的公共基础设施，通过免费分发开源模型以最大化提升全社会的综合生产力，而非追求单家企业的短期盈利。Dalio认为，中国将AI公用事业化的策略可能对美国重资本投入的商业闭源模式构成沉重压力，导致美国科技巨头更难实现预期的资本回报率。 Dalio总结认为，人类治理的根本软肋在于难以抵御“即时满足”的棉花糖测试，导致债务周期与帝国兴衰不断重复。但他反对制定过于僵化的宪政财政枷锁，因为过度的开支束缚可能会意外扼杀技术突破所必需的投机性实验精神。在他看来，决策层与公民唯有深刻理解历史大周期的内在运作规律，在财政审慎与创新冒险之间维系动态平衡，才能避免系统性滑向经济崩溃与制度瓦解。

## Background 本期视频由知名播客《All-In Podcast》于 2026 年 3 月 3 日发布在 YouTube 平台上。视频简介指出，桥水基金创始人瑞·达利欧（Ray Dalio）第三次做客节目，深度剖析了重塑全球秩序的五大力量、美国债务危机的严峻现实与潜在崩溃风险，并探讨了政府效率部（DOGE）的体制阻碍、黄金与比特币的分化走势以及关税政策背后的宏观逻辑。 ## TL;DR 达利欧指出，当前美国正深陷巨额债务与财政失衡的大周期末期（第五阶段），面临国债展期受阻、财富与价值观极化以及不可调和的政治撕裂。由于法币体系本质上是债务凭证，且全球央行与投资者寻求主权安全资产，黄金的配置价值大幅超越受科技股投机驱动的比特币。在探讨关税与产业脱钩时，他直言税收即通胀，强调国家战略自足的重要性，并指出关税绝无可能完全替代所得税。面对生成式 AI 的热潮，达利欧警告技术的发展并不等同于早期企业的盈利能力，中美在 AI 商业化与公共基础设施化上的模式差异更可能引发严酷的商业颠覆。 ## Atmosphere & style 对谈整体呈现出一种沉稳清醒、直面现实的宿命感与历史厚重感。达利欧化身客观排查系统故障的“宏观机械师”，以冷静甚至带着一丝冷幽默的口吻，拆解了体制改革在民主政治下的执行悖论。主持团队的连环追问与达利欧基于数百年历史周期的宏大叙事层层递进，既有对眼下资产泡沫与政治极化的深层忧思，也透着一种洞察周期规律后的释然与通透。 ## Bulletin - [03:25](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u-vMNzHgSHI&t=205s) 美国联邦财政失衡加剧，年度支出约 7 万亿美元而收入仅 5 万亿美元，叠加 9 万亿美元到期债务展期与外国投资者配置饱和，国债供需面临严重挤兑风险。 - [16:08](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u-vMNzHgSHI&t=968s) 达利欧指出法币本质是债务凭证，在潜在流动性危机和财富税预期下，投资者应配置 5% 至 15% 的黄金作为无信用违约风险的对冲底仓。 - [33:48](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u-vMNzHgSHI&t=2028s) 关税在性质上属于累退消费税，财政规模上绝无法替代个人所得税；且加税实质等同于掏空民众购买力的通胀。 - [42:24](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u-vMNzHgSHI&t=2544s) AI 赛道面临巨额资本开支难以回收的风险，美国高定价闭源盈利模式正遭受中国视 AI 为公共基础设施的开源免费路线的强力冲击。 ## Key takeaways - [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u-vMNzHgSHI&t=0s) 人类历史 500 年的大周期由债务与货币周期、国内贫富与价值观分歧、大国地缘博弈、技术变革以及自然天灾五大根本驱动力共同塑造。 - [03:25](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u-vMNzHgSHI&t=205s) 资本市场如同人体循环系统，当高额债务本息支出挤压正常生产性投资时，经济循环便走向梗阻。 - [07:26](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u-vMNzHgSHI&t=446s) 民主政体下的政治选举周期、利益群体撕裂及行政执行悖论，使得类似 DOGE 的政府激进削减开支改革在体制结构上面临无法逾越的阻力。 - [11:47](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u-vMNzHgSHI&t=707s) 现代法币是央行承诺交付未来购买力的债务凭证，当债务过载且全社会财富集中变现时，法币体系必然依靠印钞稀释兑付，驱动硬通货回归。 - [16:08](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u-vMNzHgSHI&t=968s) 黄金暴涨反映了全球央行和投资者校正资产负债失衡的战略避险需求，即便对行情没有主观预判，组合中也应维持 5%-15% 的黄金基准配置。 - [20:37](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u-vMNzHgSHI&t=1237s) 比特币持有者结构高度重叠于科技股与杠杆资本，缺乏主权储备背书且受链上可追溯性约束，流动性紧缩时易被抛售，无法替代实物黄金的终极避险功能。 - [23:48](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u-vMNzHgSHI&t=1428s) “一个人的债务就是另一个人的资产”，利率过低引发投机泡沫，过高则引爆违约潮，微调空间在天文数字债务面前极其狭窄。 - [23:48](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u-vMNzHgSHI&t=1428s) “K型经济”严重撕裂：顶层追逐万亿财富，而全美约 60% 人口阅读能力不足小学六年级水平，单一货币政策无法兼顾底层劳动力面临的 AI 替代危机。 - [26:35](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u-vMNzHgSHI&t=1595s) 美财政部通过发行超短期国库券（T-bills）压低借贷成本，本质是大幅加剧债务展期风险的缓兵之计，未来美联储重回扩表量化宽松只是时间问题。 - [28:16](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u-vMNzHgSHI&t=1696s) 主流经济学界将税负增加排除在通胀指标之外是常识性误区；在全球滑向对抗秩序下，关税是重建战略自足与产业独立的必要防御工具。 - [36:24](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u-vMNzHgSHI&t=2184s) 国家成功的历史三大法则在于：优质教育与公民素养、运转良好且公平竞争的社会秩序，以及坚决远离对内内战与对外战争。 - [38:50](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u-vMNzHgSHI&t=2330s) 当前社会已进入大周期“第五阶段”，党派意识形态凌驾于体制之上，不可调和的政治极化与混乱摧毁了国家治理效能与生产力。 - [42:24](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u-vMNzHgSHI&t=2544s) 技术进步并不等同于科技企业盈利，AI 巨额研发投入若无法产生匹配的商业回报便会吞噬自身，且面临中美商业逻辑与开源公用事业逻辑的深层竞争。 - [45:37](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u-vMNzHgSHI&t=2737s) 全社会过度举债源于缺乏“延迟满足”的即时消费冲动，但死板的法律约束可能扼杀创新，唯有深刻理解历史大周期方能在审慎与进取间求得平衡。 ## Detailed walkthrough ### [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u-vMNzHgSHI&t=0s) 决定国家命运的五大历史驱动力 节目开场，主持人热烈欢迎桥水基金（Bridgewater Associates）创始人瑞·达利欧（Ray Dalio）第三次做客《All-In Podcast》。主持人回顾了双方上一次的对话，那次访谈恰逢特朗普（Donald Trump）总统就职典礼后几天，达利欧当时对新政府做出了极具预见性的前景展望。当时达利欧明确指出，美国正处于巨大的长期债务周期之中，受到财政与货币政策的双重挤压；如果美国能够将财政赤字占 GDP 的比重削减并维持在 3% 左右，整体经济或许还有机会平稳过渡。然而，根据美国国会预算办公室（CBO）对 2026 年的最新预测，赤字率预计仍将高达约 6%。 面对主持人抛出的核心问题——“回顾过去一年本届政府的运作、国会的作为以及经济走向，美国是否走在正确的道路上？还是毫无起色、甚至变革步伐过于迟缓？”——达利欧给出了系统性回答。他强调，自己在研究了过去 500 年的大周期历史后发现，所有大国的命运与秩序重塑都由五大相互交织的根本力量所决定： 1. **债务与货币周期（Debt and Money Order）**：资本市场与信用供给的结构性失衡，导致货币体系一次又一次走向崩溃。 2. **国内财富与价值观鸿沟（Domestic Wealth and Values Gaps）**：贫富差距与政治理念分歧演变为不可调和的矛盾，不仅加剧了左翼与右翼的对抗，也深刻动摇了税收体系、民主治理及法律运行的根基。 3. **国际大国博弈与地缘冲突（International Great Power Conflict）**：经典的新兴崛起大国挑战既有守成大国的修昔底德陷阱，促使世界从多边主义格局滑向单边对立格局。 4. **技术创新与变革（Technology Changes）**：纵观历史，技术飞跃一直是推动生产力重组的关键催化剂。 5. **天灾与大自然行为（Acts of Nature）**：包括干旱、洪水以及重大流行病大爆发等自然冲击。 达利欧指出，历史上没有任何一个政治体系、货币体系或国际秩序是一成不变的。虽然美国在长达 250 年的建国历史中保持了相对罕见的宪政连续性（仅经历过一次国内内战），但在世界舞台上，国际秩序和货币秩序必然在这些力量的交织冲击下走向重组。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 塑造大国周期的五大根本驱动力 accDescr: 展示债务周期、内部鸿沟、大国冲突、技术变革与自然天灾五大力量相互作用的体系 subgraph CoreForces["决定大国命运的五大力量"] F1["债务与货币周期<br/>(信用膨胀与财政失衡)"] F2["国内财富与价值观鸿沟<br/>(左右极化与政治僵局)"] F3["国际大国博弈<br/>(崛起大国挑战守成大国)"] F4["颠覆性技术变革<br/>(重塑生产力格局)"] F5["自然天灾与大流行病<br/>(外部不可控冲击)"] end F1 <--> F2 F2 <--> F3 F1 <--> F3 F4 --> CoreForces F5 --> CoreForces ``` --- ### [03:25](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u-vMNzHgSHI&t=205s) 走向梗阻的循环系统：不可持续的国债与拍卖危机 为了通俗地阐明美国当前的财政困局，达利欧指出，一个国家的经济逻辑与一家企业、甚至一个普通家庭别无二致，唯一的关键区别在于“政府拥有印钞权”。从财务报表来看，美国联邦政府目前预计的年度支出约为 7 万亿美元，而实际财政收入仅有约 5 万亿美元，这意味着联邦支出中竟有高达 40% 是通过赤字来支撑的。经过长年累月的赤字累积，美国的总债务规模已经膨胀到其年度收入的 6 倍（即 600%）。 达利欧将资本市场形象地比喻为人体的人体血液循环系统：“资本市场如同血管网络，将信贷资源输送到经济体的各个器官。如果这些信贷被用于高生产力领域，并产生足以覆盖还本付息的净收入，循环就是健康的。但如果由于过度借贷，债务偿付成本相对收入持续飙升，它就如同血管中不断增生的动脉粥样硬化斑块，逐步蚕食并挤压掉正常生产活动所需的空间。”在目前每年高达 2 万亿美元的财政赤字中，仅利息支出就占到了近半壁江山；更严峻的是，美国还面临着约 9 万亿美元存量到期国债的展期再融资（Roll over）。 这一窘境直接引发了严峻的国债供求危机。不仅要在市场上卖掉 2 万亿美元的新增国债，还必须为 9 万亿美元的到期债务找到买家接盘。达利欧拆解了买方市场的险恶现实： - 国债买家约有三分之一是外国投资者，但对他们而言，美元资产的风险正显著上升。 - 外国主权机构和投资者的资产组合中，美元债务的配比早已超出了审慎资产配置的合理上限。 - 地缘政治与制裁风险与日俱增。债务人与债权人之间发生冲突的可能性正在转化为实质风险，无论是中国还是欧洲盟友，都在重新审视自身的处境。欧洲人甚至开始忧虑未来是否会遭遇资产制裁或利息支付被冻结，而美国则不得不苦恼能否持续拉来足够接盘的资本。 达利欧指出，类似的供求枯竭与主权债务违约危机在历史上屡见不鲜，尤其是 1929 年至 1945 年的大萧条与二战周期中曾经反复上演，当前的财务失衡正与其他结构性矛盾叠加发酵。 --- ### [07:26](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u-vMNzHgSHI&t=446s) 改革的死局：DOGE为何在体制面前撞墙 主持人切入现实政治议题：既然达利欧很早之前就给出诊断，将赤字率降至 3% 是缓解危机的安全线，为何这一目标始终难以达成？大约一年前，当埃隆·马斯克（Elon Musk）挂帅政府效率部（DOGE）时，全美寄予厚望，期待其能挥舞利刃大刀阔斧削减联邦开支、彻查行政浪费与欺诈。DOGE 最终步履维艰，究竟是因为其采取的具体措施失当，还是因为体制在当前周期阶段已根本不可救药？当庞大的资本洪流将整个经济、无数商业机构与普通人深度绑定，体制在结构上是否已经无法自拔？ 听到主持人提出“改造低效政府使其变得高效”这一设想，达利欧忍不住失笑。他直言不讳地指出，这在当前的民主制度下几乎是“一项难以完成的魔术（a hell of a trick to pull off）”： - **政治周期的无情约束**：政府改革必须在极短时间内见效，但政治选举周期如影随形。任何改革一旦引起部分选民不适，执政者就会在下一轮选举中失去民意授权。 - **不可避免的社会争议与问责撕裂**：在当下高度两极化的社会生态中，不论改革者采取什么动作，都会招致舆论的狂轰滥炸和政治拆台。例如削减像学校免费午餐计划这样的公共福利项目，即便旨在做外科手术式的精简，也会瞬间引爆巨大的政治争议，甚至足以导致执政根基倒塌。 - **行政执行力与普遍满意度的悖论**：历史与常识证明，在多元民主制度中，极难出现一种既能强势推行激进效率变革，同时又能让大多数选民满意的卓越行政领导力。 当主持人感叹改革在这个发展阶段“结构上有些困难”时，达利欧反唇相讥：“‘结构上有些困难’？这简直是极度轻描淡写了！” --- ### [10:03](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u-vMNzHgSHI&t=603s) 机构溃烂的征兆与黄金的暴涨 随后，主持人提及全美广泛关注的明尼苏达州公共资金诈骗案：当地曝出大量根本不存在的“幽灵托儿所”，数十亿美元联邦资金却堂而皇之地流入个人囊中，由此引发了全美多地的公民新闻独立调查，揭露联邦开支充斥着大规模的欺诈和滥用。主持人询问达利欧，这究竟是个案，还是当前大周期末期的典型病理表征？ 达利欧回应称，这正是体制衰退阶段的必然产物。“如果你指望某件事被管理得井井有条，你真的能指望政府去管理好它吗？”达利欧用去车管所（DMV）办事的经历打趣道：整个官僚机构极其庞大、错综复杂且混乱不堪，行政低效与欺诈频发在如今根本不应令任何人感到意外。 在剖析完体制性顽疾后，对话迅速聚焦到金融市场的避险异动上。主持人回忆道，在上一次谈话中，达利欧曾明确透露其个人投资组合中配置了相当比例的黄金。令人瞩目的是，在过去一年左右的时间里，现货黄金价格已从约每盎司 2,900 美元一路飙升至惊人的每盎司 5,200 美元。主持人向达利欧抛出追问：黄金这一轮震撼市场的历史性暴涨，究竟意味着全球市场终于对达利欧多年来预警的“大债务周期终局”恍然大悟，还是主要是因为中国等主要主权央行在战略上实质性抛弃美元与美债、加速转向实物黄金？ ### [11:47](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u-vMNzHgSHI&t=707s) 货币的本质与黄金的回归：财富与货币的根本区别 播客主持人向瑞·达利欧（Ray Dalio）提问：为什么各国央行和市场参与者都在大举买入黄金？这究竟是投机者催生的市场泡沫，还是市场开始清醒意识到我们所处的大周期阶段？达利欧明确指出，这正是宏观“大周期”（The Big Cycle）运转的必然体现。多数人长期以来误将黄金视为一种供人投机的贵金属，但事实上，黄金是人类历史上最根基深厚、确立时间最长的货币形态，至今仍是全球央行持有的第二大储备资产。驱动央行和个人抢购黄金的核心驱动力，涵盖了经济供需失衡、国内政治对立以及地缘政治动荡等诸多因素，其本质是全市场都在急迫地寻找法币之外的替代货币。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 货币机制与财富变现的贬值陷阱 accDescr: 展示法币体系下财富转化为货币的过程以及央行印钞导致的贬值风险。 subgraph WealthLayer["实际财富 (Stuff)"] W1["资产：房地产 / 股票 / 企业股权"] W2["特点：规模庞大，但无法直接用于交易与消费"] end subgraph DebtSystem["法币债务体系"] D1["法币本质：债务凭证 (Debt Instrument)"] D2["持有承诺：换取未来购买力的承诺"] end subgraph CrisisRisk["流动性挤兑与印钞"] C1["变现需求：抛售资产以获取流动性现金"] C2["央行困境：债务过载时启动印钞机"] C3["最终结果：购买力遭稀释，催生硬资产避险"] end W1 --> C1 C1 --> D1 D1 --> D2 D2 --> C2 C2 --> C3 ``` 达利欧从底层逻辑拆解了“究竟什么是货币”这一机制问题。在现代法币体系中，货币本质上就是“债务工具”（debt instrument）：持有货币，意味着你持有一份别人承诺在未来交付真实购买力的借据。然而，当全社会的债务规模累积过大时，拥有垄断权力的中央银行唯一的脱困手段就是无休止地“印钞”。当主持人表示自己更渴望拥有具备已知物理上限、且便于跨境转移的实体资产时，达利欧深表赞同。达利欧进一步区分了“财富”（wealth）与“货币”（money）的巨大鸿沟： - 财富体现为“实物与资产”，例如建筑物、公司股权或实体设施，但财富本身无法直接拿去买面包或清偿债务； - 想要消费或偿债，就必须先卖掉财富换成货币； - 目前全球积累的财富总额相对于流动货币而言极度庞大，一旦市场参与者集中想要把资产变现，法币体系根本无力承受，最终必然走向历史上每一次法币崩塌的结局——通过疯狂印钞来稀释实际兑付压力。 ### [16:08](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u-vMNzHgSHI&t=968s) 资产负债失衡与潜在泡沫：为何每个人都该配置 5%-15% 的黄金 针对主持人关于“资金从法币/资产涌入黄金的逃生潮究竟进行到了哪一步”的提问，达利欧分析了全球央行的资产负债构成。长期以来，全球财富以及央行储备中的软通胀货币占比畸高，而像黄金这样的硬通胀货币比例曾被压缩到极低的水平。近期黄金价格的飙升与资产构成的转变，仅仅是将这一严重失衡的状态“从极小的数字推高到了一个不那么小的数字”，使其刚刚接近历史平均配置比例而已。然而，鉴于全球账面总财富相比真实货币依然过于庞大，潜在的流动性隐患始终如影随形。 达利欧以当前市场最关心的“资产泡沫”与“财富税”风险为例，深入剖析了流动性挤兑的形成机制： - 资产泡沫破裂的典型特征，往往不是大家不再喜欢某类资产，而是持有者突然面临“不得不筹集真实货币”的刚性需求； - 过去许多人通过杠杆借贷推高资产（如 AI 科技股），但当资产产生的现金流无法覆盖债务利息，或者政府因贫富差距过大而计划推行财富税时，持有者将被迫抛售资产变现缴税或还债； - 这种对现金的恐慌性需求会迫使全市场踩踏卖出，从而直接戳破泡沫。 正因如此，达利欧告诫不管是主权国家、机构还是个人，都必须自问一句：“什么才是真正安全的？”在多元配置模型中，黄金是极少数能在“灾难降临”（"when the hits the fan"）时独自逆势走强、对冲系统性风险的资产。达利欧直言，即便一个投资者对黄金走势没有任何主观判断或研究，在经典组合优化模型中，也应当配置 5% 到 15% 的黄金作为基石防护。 ### [20:37](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u-vMNzHgSHI&t=1237s) 黄金 vs. 比特币与白银：避险资产的真正考验 面对主持人的追问——“为何在过去这段时间里，黄金大涨了约 80%，而常被许多人视作‘数字黄金’和避险港湾的比特币却下跌了 25%？”——达利欧从资产本质、持有者结构与流动性属性三个维度进行了对比： | 资产维度 | 实体黄金（Gold） | 比特币（Bitcoin） | |:--- |:--- |:--- | | **机构与主权接受度** | 全球央行第二大储备资产，千年来公认的终极法偿硬通货。 | 主权央行几乎不愿也不会将其纳入法定资产储备。 | | **隐私性与审查风险** | 物理资产，离线交割，无法被链上代码直接冻结或全方位监控。 | 缺乏绝对隐私，链上交易记录公开可追溯，极易受到间接监管与控制。 | | **市场规模与波动** | 体量极其庞大，市场深度深厚，稳定性高。 | 整体市场规模较小，容易受到外部操纵或局部政策冲击。 | | **持仓相关性** | 与传统风险资产呈极强负相关，在危机时刻具备独特避险属性。 | 持有者重叠度高，与高估值科技股呈现极高正相关；遇流动性危机易被优先抛售变现。 | | **技术与长期挑战** | 物理属性稳定，无法凭空增发或被代码重构。 | 面临量子计算等新兴技术对底层加密算法潜在威胁的远期争论。 | 达利欧指出，比特币市场的资金受科技股行情和流动性平仓的牵动极大，当持币人在其他领域遭到杠杆挤压时，往往会变卖比特币来补充保证金。因此，在抵御货币危机与信用崩塌的层面上，“真正的黄金只有一种”。谈及同期大涨的白银时，达利欧补充道，白银的开采大多属于伴生矿产（residual commodity），供给弹性极低；虽然它在历史上曾长时期具备货币属性（如英镑体系下的银币），但在现代市场中，白银已经脱离了纯储备货币属性，衍生出了极强的独立投机性，“更多是资金因其涨势迅猛而跟风炒作”。 ### [23:08](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u-vMNzHgSHI&t=1388s) 债务重压下的三大杠杆与利率抉择 对话随后转回到美联储的政策应对与宏观利率走势。主持人回忆起上次达利欧反复强调的核心观点：在当前宏观去杠杆的大周期阶段，必须把利率维持在足够低的水平，才能防止庞大的债务负担直接拖垮实体经济。面对当前美联储的实际操作，达利欧重申了联邦政府面临的巨额负债现实。他指出，要消化如此庞大的联邦债务山洪，决策层手中真正能权衡的只有三大核心杠杆： - **税收政策（Taxes）**：通过增税汲取收入，但面临激化社会对立和压抑投资的政治阻力； - **财政支出（Spending）**：缩减预算与开支，但在两党政治对抗及福利刚性支出下举步维艰； - **基准利率（Interest Rates）**：直接决定巨额存量债务滚动发行的偿债成本，是调控宏观周期痛感最为敏感、也是最受制约的核心阀门。 ### [23:48](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u-vMNzHgSHI&t=1428s) 债务天平与“K型经济”的撕裂困局 瑞·达利欧（Ray Dalio）从最基本的金融第一性原理切入，剖析了宏观货币政策面临的深层困境。他直言，政策制定者无法在不付出代价的情况下，人为将利率压得过低，因为“一个人的债务就是另一个人的资产”。利率一旦被压低到债权人无法获得合理回报的程度，就会引发众人熟知的典型资产泡沫：借贷成本过低刺激大规模加杠杆，资金涌向各类投机资产，催生资产泡沫；但反过来，利率又绝不能定得过高，否则债务人将遭到无情挤压，引发违约潮与破产危机。这种在债权人与债务人之间走钢丝的平衡术极其脆弱，而当整个经济体积累了天文数字般的债务资产与负债敞口时，微调利率就变得难如登天。 更糟糕的是，当下的“K型经济”（K-shaped economy）让这种单一货币工具彻底捉襟见肘。达利欧指出，经济结构已经严重两极分化：在K字的上半截，狂热的资本正在竞相追逐“谁将成为人类历史上第一位万亿富翁”，最顶层的1%人群享受着资产狂欢；而在K字的下半截，全美有高达60%的人口阅读理解能力不足小学六年级水平。面对生成式AI和自动化的迅猛替代，如何让这60%的庞大底层人群具备生产力，成了几乎无解的挑战。达利欧感叹，现行的宏观调控试图通过单一的基准利率和笼统的财政政策去治理一个整体经济，却完全无法应对底层与顶层之间宛如天堑的生存境况，这种制度性失调简直就像在同时变几出不可能完成的杂技魔术。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 货币政策与K型经济的双重困境 accDescr: 展示利率平衡难题与K型经济社会分化对宏观政策的相互制约关系 subgraph Rates["利率平衡难题"] R1["利率过低: 滋生过度借贷与资产泡沫"] R2["利率过高: 债务人遭残酷挤压与违约潮"] end subgraph Split["K型经济结构分化"] K1["顶层1%与AI资本: 财富激增、角逐万亿美元身家"] K2["底层60%劳动力: 阅读能力不足六年级，面临AI替代"] end Policy["单一宏观货币与财政政策"] --> Rates Rates --> PolicyDilemma["政策失灵: 顾此失彼的治理死结"] Split --> PolicyDilemma ``` - 核心矛盾：“一个人的债务就是另一个人的资产”，对债务人有利的超低利率是对债权人的惩罚，反之亦然。 - 教育与劳动技能危机：全美约60%的人口实际识字与阅读水平低于六年级，在AI加速普及的浪潮下，劳动替代风险剧烈上升。 --- ### [26:35](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u-vMNzHgSHI&t=1595s) 美债困局、缩短久期与美联储主席提名 针对全球金融市场的最新异动，主持团队提出，过去一年有大量报道显示全球多家央行正在放缓甚至停止购买美国国债，转而将储备资产大举换成黄金。这是否意味着美联储重启量化宽松（QE）与扩表已成历史必然？达利欧认为，美联储最终重回扩表之路只是时间问题。然而在当前阶段，美国财政部和货币当局正采取一种缓兵之计：通过大幅“缩短发行久期”（shortening of maturities），将发债重心向超短期国库券（T-bills）倾斜，减少长端国债的发售。 达利欧指出，这种操作的战术意图在于全力压低短期利率，从而借由期限利差机制拉低长端利率，减轻发债利息负担；但这种做法的致命隐患在于急剧放大了“债务展期风险”（debt rollover risk）。与此同时，美国政府不得不全力施展政治与外交说服力，向盟友及贸易伙伴施压，要求他们继续购买并持有美债，或者将其他形式的海外资本引入美国市场。当主持人问及凯文·沃什（Kevin Warsh）被提名为下任美联储主席的前景时，达利欧评价称这是一份极其艰巨的工作，但他认可沃什是一位“务实的决策者”，能够清醒洞悉各种政策选择的利弊权衡。 - 短期展期博弈：通过大量发行短期国债替代长期国债来抑制长期收益率，代价是展期频率激增、偿付风险积聚。 - 地缘资本博弈：面对全球央行去美元化、增持黄金的趋势，美方高度依赖外交政治影响力吸引外国资本回流接盘。 - 对凯文·沃什的评价：高度务实，深谙政策两面性，但即将接手的是美联储历史上最烫手的山芋之一。 --- ### [28:16](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u-vMNzHgSHI&t=1696s) 关税的经济学真相：国家独立性与被忽视的税收通胀 在复盘关税政策时，达利欧针对主流经济学界普遍对关税持强烈反对态度（认定关税必然推高通胀、削弱消费、拖累GDP增长）发表了逆风观点。他直指经济学家群体犯了一个常识性错误：“经济学家在计算通胀时从不把税收算作通胀。”达利欧辛辣反问：如果居民的税负增加，钱包里的实际购买力被剥夺，这和房价上涨导致的生存成本增加有什么区别？从本质上讲，税收增加就是一种通胀，它切切实实掏空了老百姓的口袋。纵观人类历史，关税在绝大多数国家和大部分时期里，恰恰是政府最重要的财政收入来源，它原本就是一种完全合法的增收方式，并且能让一部分税负由外国承担。 更核心的逻辑在于大国博弈的大周期（The Big Cycle）。达利欧强调，美国当前最致命的危机并非关税本身，而是国家彻底丧失了独立性，国内制造业与中产阶级经历了大面积的产业空心化。长期累积的巨额贸易逆差，对应的是美国在金融层面上对外国资本盈余的极度依赖，这种单向失衡是不可持续的。当今世界已经从多边主义秩序彻底滑向基于硬实力的对抗性丛林体系（a power-based confrontational world economy），资本战与商品禁运威胁随处可见。达利欧表示，通过关税倒逼国内产业链重构、保障战略产业自给自足是完全成立的策略，但这必须嵌入一套更大的国家战略中，配合主动的产业政策与基建投资，否则单纯谈论关税的利弊根本切不中要害。 ```mermaid flowchart LR accTitle: 贸易赤字与地缘对抗循环图 accDescr: 展示产业空心化如何导致外部资本依赖，并在地缘对抗中演化为关税与产业回流战略 subgraph Vulnerability["结构性脆弱"] A["制造业空心化与中产萎缩"] --> B["巨额贸易逆差"] B --> C["过度依赖外部资本盈余"] end subgraph Transition["地缘秩序巨变"] D["多边规则瓦解"] --> E["强权对抗与断供威胁"] end subgraph Solution["国家战略重塑"] F["关税壁垒作为调节工具"] G["基础设施建设与产业自主"] end C --> Transition Transition --> F F --> G G -.重建独立性.-> A ``` - 税收即通胀：主流宏观数据将税赋增加排除在通胀指标之外，达利欧认为这掩盖了居民生活成本因加税而实际恶化的真相。 - 历史维度的关税：在现代所得税诞生前，关税长期是全球政府最倚重的财税支柱，具有天然的财政筹资与贸易保护双重职能。 - 秩序重塑：世界正由“多边规则秩序”转变为“基于权力的对抗性秩序”，供应链脱钩与制裁风险迫使国家必须以关税和产业补贴换取战略自足。 --- ### [33:48](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u-vMNzHgSHI&t=2028s) 关税能替代所得税吗？生产力鸿沟与联邦政府裁员的效率考量 主持人提到特朗普总统在国情咨文（State of the Union）中抛出的构想：通过全面加征关税来彻底取缔并取代联邦个人所得税。达利欧对此给出了极其明确且坚定的否定回答：“绝不可能，规模完全对不上。”他解释说，关税本质上是一种消费税，具有极强的“累退性”（regressive），主要由普通消费群体承担。如果完全用关税取代累进所得税，将极其严重地恶化贫富差距。在达利欧看来，贫富差距的内核是“生产力差距”（productivity gap），化解矛盾的关键在于通过基础设施和教育提升绝大多数普通人的生产力，而推行所谓的“3%跨党派法案”（通过税收、开支削减和利率优化三管齐下，各挤出1%左右，合计将赤字压缩至GDP的3%以内）才是可行、理性的路径。 对话随后延伸至联邦政府机构精简与效率改革。主持人指出，全美有将近一半的劳动力直接或间接受雇于政府部门、政府采购服务商及承包商，过去一年联邦雇员缩减了约31.7万人（约占联邦劳动力总数的14%）。主持人追问：这些被精简的雇员究竟能否顺利流入私营部门转化为有效生产力，还是仅仅被州、地方政府或外包服务商重新吸收？达利欧坦承自己尚未对具体流向数据做细致研究，但他毫不避讳地指出，美国政府的运作极其低效，即便在教育这类最核心的公共职能上，其投入产出比也远逊于其他国家。达利欧由衷感叹，全社会最值得投资的领域莫过于教育，倘若被精简的人员无法真正投入到具备实际产出的领域中，体制性冗余与低效的痼疾依然无法得到根治。 - 替代所得税伪命题：关税具有累退消费税属性，在财政体量上无法完全填补所得税缺口，且会进一步扩大社会底层的生活成本压力。 - 跨党派“3%方案”：达利欧主张通过压缩支出、调整税率以及压低利息支出三合一路径，将联邦赤字控制在GDP的3%以内。 - 机构精简困境：联邦裁撤14%（约31.7万名）雇员，但体制低效问题根深蒂固，核心在于如何让转移劳动力投入教育等真正能拉动生产力的领域。 ### [36:24](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u-vMNzHgSHI&t=2184s) 资本主义机制、社会契约与国家成功的“三大法则” 对话探讨了资本主义体制的根本驱动力。资本主义如果缺乏下注的资本或无法产生利润，就无法维系。然而放眼当下，到处都充斥着低效的人群与低效的系统。主持人由此提出核心疑问：当前国家面临的根本问题，究竟是缺乏足够的以生产力为导向的经济增长来让大众提升收入与财富，还是人们根本没有接受到能够产生生产力的充分教育，以至于整个体制正在辜负他们？ 面对这一追问，Ray Dalio 提炼出纵观人类历史、任何国家要想取得成功必须做好的三件核心大事： 1. **良好教育下一代**：不仅要让孩子们具备创造生产力的技能，还必须培养他们的“文明素养”（civility），使彼此之间能保持文明、理性的互动。 2. **构建秩序良好、运转高效的环境**：年轻人步入社会后，需要一个有秩序且文明的环境，使大众能够在公平竞争与协同合作中发挥生产力，让机制惠及绝大多数人。 3. **远离战争**：必须坚决避免内部内战（Civil War）以及外部国际战争（International War）。 从古至今，只要把这三点做好，国家就会繁荣昌盛；而当前美国在这三项上全面亮起了红灯。针对工会运动抬头、社会主义思潮扩散以及旨在解决贫富差距的财富税倡议，Dalio 认为解决之道不是互相攻伐，而是回归这三条基本面。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 国家成功的历史三大基石 accDescr: 展现Dalio提出的国家长期繁荣所必须做好的三大核心要素及相互关系 subgraph CoreFoundations ["国家长期成功的核心支柱"] E["1. 优质教育与文明素养<br/>具备生产能力 + 相互尊重公德"] O["2. 良好秩序与竞争环境<br/>为绝大多数人提供协作与竞争平台"] P["3. 远离内外战争<br/>无内部内战 + 无对外冲突"] end E --> O O --> S["国家持久繁荣与生产力跃迁"] P --> S ``` --- ### [38:50](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u-vMNzHgSHI&t=2330s) 不可调和的裂痕：走向大周期第五阶段的政治乱局 Dalio 发出严厉警示：当前社会已经陷入了“不可调和的矛盾”（irreconcilable differences）。当个体或群体所追求的党派诉求与意识形态高于体制本身时，整个体制就已经危在旦夕。如今的社会现实是，人们既不接受现有体制，也不接受妥协方案，唯一的选择就是无休止的内斗。 以即将到来的中期选举为例，即便民主党重新夺回众议院，也没有人能够真正成功治理国家，因为所有人都在忙于内耗与政治清算。这种“暴民式的混乱与低效”（mob disorder and inefficiency）直接摧毁了国家生产力。Dalio 引用公元前 350 年柏拉图对民主体制退化周期的经典论述，指出眼下的局面与古罗马共和国末期恺撒在元老院遇刺前夕的政治碎片化如出一辙。要打破这种死结，往往需要强有力的跨党派领导者强行推动严苛的改革，迫使四分五裂的群体停止内斗、重新专注于生产力。 当主持人问及这是否意味着历史正无可避免地在“某种形式的社会主义与某种形式的法西斯主义”之间做出残酷二选一时，Dalio 明确表示，社会目前正处于他所定义的历史周期中的“第五阶段”（Stage 5）： - **恶劣的财政状况**：巨额债务堆积与政府财政赤字。 - **贫富与价值观鸿沟**：悬殊的贫富差距与尖锐对立的价值观。 - **不可调和的分歧**：体制信任彻底崩塌，对抗取代合作。 - **内外双重威胁**：国内秩序动荡叠加外部地缘政治冲突。 Dalio 强调自己并非出于意识形态评判，而是像一名客观排查故障的“机械师”，依据市场和历史规律直视这一危险现实。 --- ### [42:24](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u-vMNzHgSHI&t=2544s) AI 泡沫的真相：技术会延续，但公司会流血 谈及当下围绕人工智能（AI）的市场狂热与泡沫争议，Dalio 指出投资者常犯的致命认知误区：**买入科技公司的股票并不等于在押注技术本身**。技术的发展路径与商业公司的存活轨迹存在天壤之别。回顾 2000 年互联网泡沫甚至 1920 年代末的技术狂潮，历史规律表明：绝大部分早期公司根本无法在残酷竞争中活下来，最终存活并盈利的企业凤毛麟角；但与此同时，底层技术本身却会持续向前迭代并深刻改变世界。 在 Dalio 看来，眼下的 AI 呈现出一种奇特的景象——“AI 正在吞噬一切，而且它可能反过来吞噬自己”（AI is eating everything - and it might eat itself）。所谓“吞噬自己”，是指行业投入了难以想象的巨额资本，却极可能面临无法产生与之匹配的合理利润的尴尬境地。 更深层的系统性风险来自于中美两国在技术哲学与经济模式上的根本差异： - **美国的资本回报逻辑**：以利润为核心导向，商业公司必须通过高昂的软硬件收费来回收庞大的研发与算力基础设施投资。 - **中国的公共品逻辑**：利润往往被放在次要位置，更倾向于将 AI 视为类似“自来水或电力”的基础公用事业，大力推进开源和免费，力求通过全社会的广泛应用来驱动整体生产力提升。 Dalio 警告称，如果中国的人工智能技术水平与美国不相上下（事实上差距并不大），却以免费、开源的方式向全球提供，那么依靠高定价来偿还资本支出的美国盈利型商业模式将面临极其严峻的竞争冲击。 | 维度 | 美国商业模式 | 中国公共品模式 | |:--- |:--- |:--- | | **核心驱动** | 资本回报与企业利润为首要目标 | 推动技术普及与全社会生产力提升 | | **分发策略** | 专有闭源、订阅制及高额商业收费 | 大力推进开源、免费或低成本公共基础设施化 | | **类比定位** | 高端商业级创新产品 | 类似电力、自来水等社会公共资源 | | **潜在系统风险** | 资本开支过大而商业变现不足，导致自身被吞噬 | 全球免费开源冲击美国依赖高定价回收成本的商业生态 | --- ### [45:37](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u-vMNzHgSHI&t=2737s) “棉花糖测试”、创新与审慎的历史平衡 在对谈结尾，主持人抛出了一个终极假设：如果 Dalio 能回到建国初期成为制宪先驱之一，面对如今巨额的债务、庞大的政府开支以及深陷风险的金融系统，会在宪法中写下哪一到三条规则来防患于未然？ Dalio 借用著名的心理学“棉花糖测试”（Marshmallow Test）作答：给年幼的孩子一个选择，是立刻吃掉眼前的一个棉花糖，还是忍耐 20 分钟以获得两个棉花糖？能够延迟满足的孩子未来往往能做出更优秀的决策。当下的国家困境正是因为全社会深陷于“即时满足”（immediate gratification）的诱惑，肆意举债消费，而完全不顾这些开支未来是否具备实际的生产力回报。 然而，Dalio 坦言试图通过机械的法律条文来杜绝这一问题极其困难： - **制度具有自我修复性**：美国历史上多次经历危机、出清债务并最终走出泥潭。 - **条文管制的两难困境**：如果在法律中对财政实施过于严苛的限制，虽然能守住财务审慎的底线，但也极可能会扼杀高风险的科学实验、企业家精神与前沿创新（正如当前的 AI 革命，在初期谁也无法预判其最终能否盈利）。 - **终极答案是读史明智**：与其迷信固化的死板规则，最重要的防线是“阅读历史”（Read history）。只有理解历史的大周期规律，才能在承担失败痛苦与投入创新之间找到微妙而至关重要的动态平衡。 ### [48:18](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u-vMNzHgSHI&t=2898s) 结语与致谢：跨越周期的深度对谈 节目在融洽而真诚的氛围中走向尾声。主持人对达利欧（Ray Dalio）再次做客播客表达了由衷的感谢，坦言能在当下这个节点倾听达利欧的宏观视角弥足珍贵。主持人感慨道，回顾过去这一年，科技创新与地缘政治层面发生了翻天覆地的剧变，但审视底层那些历史与债务周期的运行规律，又仿佛“有太多事物从未改变”（"so much has changed in the last year and yet so much hasn't"）。能够借助达利欧系统化的宏观框架来审视全球趋势，对所有试图在不确定性中看清方向的人来说都极具启发与帮助。 面对主持人的致谢，达利欧也表达了对节目团队的高度的赞赏与敬意。达利欧坦陈自己一直是节目的忠实观众，深深被节目的内容所吸引（"riveted to your program"），并直言几位主持人为公众认知做出了卓越的贡献。在他看来，这种深入探讨硬核经济规律、政府改革困局以及技术冲击的对话，不仅停留在宏观理论层面，更对广大的从业者和普通大众具有“极其切合实际的指导意义”（"really practical helps for a lot of people"）。在双方互致感谢后，节目在经典的标志性片尾声中正式收尾。 - **对谈总结**：达利欧肯定了《All-In Podcast》通过坦率、高质量的公共对话，帮助大众拆解复杂宏观变局的现实价值。 - **节目尾声**：伴随主持人的致意与标志性的节目录制结束语，本期围绕债务危机、AI 演进、政府效能与全球秩序的深度对谈圆满结束。 ## Notable quotes > [03:25](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u-vMNzHgSHI&t=205s) 资本市场如同血管网络，将信贷资源输送到经济体的各个器官。如果这些信贷被用于高生产力领域，并产生足以覆盖还本付息的净收入，循环就是健康的。但如果由于过度借贷，债务偿付成本相对收入持续飙升，它就如同血管中不断增生的动脉粥样硬化斑块，逐步蚕食并挤压掉正常生产活动所需的空间。 — Ray Dalio > [07:26](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u-vMNzHgSHI&t=446s) 一项难以完成的魔术（a hell of a trick to pull off） — Ray Dalio > [07:26](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u-vMNzHgSHI&t=446s) ‘结构上有些困难’？这简直是极度轻描淡写了！ — Ray Dalio > [10:03](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u-vMNzHgSHI&t=603s) 如果你指望某件事被管理得井井有条，你真的能指望政府去管理好它吗？ — Ray Dalio > [23:48](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u-vMNzHgSHI&t=1428s) 一个人的债务就是另一个人的资产 — Ray Dalio > [28:16](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u-vMNzHgSHI&t=1696s) 经济学家在计算通胀时从不把税收算作通胀。 — Ray Dalio > [28:16](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u-vMNzHgSHI&t=1696s) 基于权力的对抗性世界经济（a power-based confrontational world economy） — Ray Dalio > [33:48](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u-vMNzHgSHI&t=2028s) 绝不可能，规模完全对不上。 — Ray Dalio > [42:24](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u-vMNzHgSHI&t=2544s) AI 正在吞噬一切，而且它可能反过来吞噬自己（AI is eating everything - and it might eat itself） — Ray Dalio > [42:24](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u-vMNzHgSHI&t=2544s) 买入科技公司的股票并不等于在押注技术本身。 — Ray Dalio > [45:37](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u-vMNzHgSHI&t=2737s) 阅读历史（Read history） — Ray Dalio ## Mentioned Ray Dalio, All-In Podcast, Bridgewater Associates, Donald Trump, Congressional Budget Office (CBO), Elon Musk, Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE), Federal Reserve, Kevin Warsh, Bitcoin, Plato, Julius Caesar, Airwallex ## Video description (0:00) Dave Introduces Ray Dalio (1:29) 5 Forces That Will Decide America’s Future (7:26) Why Government Reform Is Nearly Impossible (11:19) Gold vs. Bitcoin (28:16) What Economists Got Wrong About Tariffs (41:11) Is America Heading Towards Collapse? Airwallex is a leading global payments and financial platform for modern businesses, offering trusted solutions to manage everything from business account, payments, treasury, and spend management to embedded finance. Check it out: https://airwallex.com/allin Ray Dalio joins the All-In Podcast for the third time to break down why America's debt crisis is worse than most people realize, and what comes next. Dalio covers the five forces reshaping the global order, why DOGE faced structural limits, what's driving gold to all-time highs while Bitcoin stumbles, the real story behind tariffs and trade deficits, and why he believes the US might be approaching a collapse. Follow Ray Dalio: https://x.com/RayDalio Follow the besties: https://x.com/chamath https://x.com/Jason https://x.com/DavidSacks https://x.com/friedberg Follow on X: https://x.com/theallinpod Follow on Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/theallinpod Follow on TikTok: https://www.tiktok.com/@theallinpod Follow on LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/company/allinpod Intro Music Credit: https://rb.gy/tppkzl https://x.com/yung_spielburg Intro Video Credit: https://x.com/TheZachEffect #allin #tech #news [Source](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u-vMNzHgSHI)

[3:25] Ray Dalio: 资本市场如同血管网络，将信贷资源输送到经济体的各个器官。如果这些信贷被用于高生产力领域，并产生足以覆盖还本付息的净收入，循环就是健康的。但如果由于过度借贷，债务偿付成本相对收入持续飙升，它就如同血管中不断增生的动脉粥样硬化斑块，逐步蚕食并挤压掉正常生产活动所需的空间。 [7:26] Ray Dalio: 一项难以完成的魔术（a hell of a trick to pull off） [7:26] Ray Dalio: ‘结构上有些困难’？这简直是极度轻描淡写了！ [10:03] Ray Dalio: 如果你指望某件事被管理得井井有条，你真的能指望政府去管理好它吗？ [23:48] Ray Dalio: 一个人的债务就是另一个人的资产 [28:16] Ray Dalio: 经济学家在计算通胀时从不把税收算作通胀。 [28:16] Ray Dalio: 基于权力的对抗性世界经济（a power-based confrontational world economy） [33:48] Ray Dalio: 绝不可能，规模完全对不上。 [42:24] Ray Dalio: AI 正在吞噬一切，而且它可能反过来吞噬自己（AI is eating everything - and it might eat itself） [42:24] Ray Dalio: 买入科技公司的股票并不等于在押注技术本身。 [45:37] Ray Dalio: 阅读历史（Read history）

[7:26] Ray Dalio: taking an inefficient government and making it efficient [11:19] Ray Dalio: the most established money [37:01] Ray Dalio: When the causes people are behind are more important to them than the system, the system is in jeopardy. [42:24] Ray Dalio: AI basically is eating everything, and it might eat itself

[0:00] Ray Dalio, welcome back to the All-In [0:02] podcast. Third time's the charm. Thanks [0:04] for being here. [0:04] >> It's always always a blast to be here. [0:06] Thank you for having me. The last [0:08] conversation we had was so popular, and [0:11] it was so timely because it was just a [0:13] few days actually after the inauguration [0:15] of President Trump, and you had provided [0:18] some very kind of prescient outlooks for [0:21] the administration that I think we all [0:24] thought would be very helpful to get on [0:26] the record. At the time, you had [0:28] highlighted and and as you have been for [0:30] some time, [0:32] this great debt cycle we're in, the [0:34] fiscal and monetary policy issues that [0:37] are driving that debt cycle, [0:40] and provided some [0:43] input that if we were able to cut our [0:45] deficit to GDP to roughly 3%, [0:49] we may have a shot at a smoother [0:52] transition here. Today, the CBO [0:54] estimates that the 2026 deficit to GDP [0:58] is about 6%. [1:07] If you were building a global financial [1:08] system from first principles today, you [1:10] wouldn't build it on 50-year-old legacy [1:12] rails. You'd build Airwallex. It's the [1:14] single platform for global accounts, [1:16] cards, and payments that treats the [1:18] entire world like a local market. Stop [1:21] paying the legacy tax and start building [1:23] the future at airwallex.com/allin. [1:26] Airwallex, build the future. [1:29] So, the first question I have for you [1:30] looking back on the past year of the [1:32] administration [1:34] and the actions of Congress and the [1:36] economy, [1:37] are we on a good path? Are we on no [1:41] different a path than we were, say, a [1:43] year ago? Are we moving too slowly? I've [1:45] studied these [1:47] big cycles in history going back 500 [1:49] years, and there are five big forces [1:52] that are intertwined to determine the [1:54] answer to your question, which is [1:56] uh there's the debt money one and I'll [1:58] I'll take you into that at in a minute. [2:01] There is the [2:03] um [2:04] domestic [2:06] gaps, the wealth and values gaps that [2:08] are causing irreconcilable differences [2:12] between [2:14] the left and the right that is affecting [2:16] how [2:18] taxes, democracy and everything works. [2:20] There's the international [2:23] great power conflict, the classic rising [2:26] of a great power challenging existing [2:28] great power and changing the [2:31] international world order. Then there's [2:34] technology all through these cycles [2:37] there have been technology and then [2:39] there's acts of nature, droughts, floods [2:41] and pandemics. So [2:43] and when we think of orders we're [2:45] talking about there's always a monetary [2:47] order and all monetary orders have [2:50] broken down for the same reasons. All [2:53] uh [2:54] political orders, domestic political [2:56] orders, they all always change. In the [2:59] the United States less so, we have 250 [3:02] years here, but [3:04] they always change. There was one civil [3:06] war in there. And then they [3:08] but internationally they always change, [3:11] all orders change. And the international [3:14] geopolitical order going from the [3:17] a [3:18] multilateral to a unilateral world order [3:20] is changing and certainly technology is [3:22] changing. Okay. So getting that fact [3:25] that they're all on there, now I'll go [3:27] down to explain the government's [3:29] finances and answer your question. The [3:31] economics of a country are basically the [3:35] same as the economics of a company or an [3:38] individual except the government has a [3:41] ability to print money. Look at it like [3:43] a company or like your own. Basically [3:46] it's projected to spend about $7 [3:49] trillion and [3:50] take in about $5 trillion. [3:52] so it's running a 40% deficit, 40% of [3:56] its spending. It's been running deficits [3:59] for a long time, so it has a debt that [4:02] is 600% six times the amount of money [4:07] that it takes in [4:08] and we can project that number. [4:11] Um, the problem with debt cycles [4:15] and you can see them transpire, they're [4:18] um [4:19] almost like the circulatory system of [4:22] the body, the capital markets uh bring [4:27] credit to different parts of the economy [4:29] and if that credit is used to be [4:32] productive and produces an income that [4:36] pays for the debt service, it's a [4:37] healthy process. But what happens is [4:41] that if the [4:43] um income the debt service grows [4:46] relative to the income because it's not [4:50] paying for it, it's like a plaque in the [4:53] system uh growing up and it squeezes out [4:56] spending and so we now have that $2 [4:59] trillion deficit. Half of that is [5:02] interest payments. [5:04] Plus we have to roll over $9 trillion [5:07] of debt [5:09] that has been accumulated and is [5:11] maturing. Okay, so now if you were to [5:14] look at a company like that or an [5:16] individual like that, you have that [5:19] problem. So it was a handy [5:21] number, 3% of GDP would sort of [5:25] stabilize the situation. Very unhealthy [5:28] condition. It's not just unhealthy [5:30] because it's squeezing out those [5:32] spendings, but also because there's a [5:35] supply and a demand. In other words, [5:38] you have to roll over the $9 trillion [5:42] of debt that's coming due [5:43] and you have to sell $2 trillion more, [5:47] something like that. Okay? [5:49] So, now you go to the buyers, and the [5:51] buyers, who are the buyers? [5:54] There are some domestic buyers and there [5:55] are foreign buyers. About a third are [5:57] foreign buyers, and now it's a riskier [6:01] situation from their point of view. [6:04] It's riskier First of all, it's a lot to [6:06] acquire. [6:07] They [6:08] dollar-denominated debt is already a [6:11] large percentage of their portfolio, [6:13] larger than it would be if just decided [6:16] on on a prudent basis. [6:18] So, but also [6:20] we have political geopolitical risks [6:24] that also extend to possibly [6:27] the risks that [6:29] the debtor [6:30] and the creditor will have a conflict. [6:33] You could imagine that with China. You [6:35] could imagine that with Europe even. [6:38] And you know, Europeans could wonder [6:41] whether they will get sanctioned. In [6:43] other words, the debt service payments [6:44] might not be made as a sanction, and the [6:48] United States has to worry about whether [6:50] it's going to bring in that money. Now, [6:53] the things that I'm describing have [6:55] happened repeatedly through history. [6:58] So, in other words, I'm not just making [7:00] this stuff stuff up. If you were to see [7:03] particularly, you know, in the 1929 to [7:07] 45 period, you saw this dynamic. You saw [7:10] it before. So, there was this financial [7:12] piece which in and of itself is not [7:15] healthy for the US government. [7:18] And it's [7:20] but it's also problematic because of the [7:23] other factors compounding the problem. [7:26] You highlighted this problem. [7:30] You provided a diagnosis that if we [7:31] could get to 3%, we could soften the [7:34] effect, but it hasn't happened. We were [7:37] all very hopeful [7:38] last year around this time when Elon [7:41] Musk decided to lead DOGE, [7:44] the Department of Government Efficiency. [7:45] He was going to go in and there were [7:47] going to be these kind of big sweeping [7:48] changes to reduce government spending, [7:51] find fraud, waste, and abuse, and so on. [7:53] Did DOGE [7:55] fail [7:57] because the actions that were taken were [7:59] wrong, or did DOGE fail because the [8:01] system itself cannot be changed at this [8:03] point in the cycle? [8:04] That there's too much capital flowing, [8:07] the economy is too dependent on it, [8:08] there are too many individuals and [8:09] businesses are dependent on it. [8:11] And it's structurally impossible to pull [8:13] our way out of it. I mean, does DOGE [8:15] tell us something [8:16] about what's possible at this stage? [8:18] Yeah, you're talking about uh [8:20] taking an inefficient government [8:23] and making it efficient. [8:25] >> [laughter] [8:26] >> Okay, and having to do it quick [8:29] because there are elections and if [8:31] people don't like it, then, you know, [8:33] you lose your mandate. [8:35] And in a um society in which, no matter [8:39] what you do, you're criticized and and [8:42] torn down. So, you know, we have the [8:44] fact of uh the question of does [8:46] democracy and our system lend itself [8:50] toward the sort of um executive [8:54] leadership that both makes it efficient [8:57] and makes it acceptable for all people. [9:01] You know, there was a lot of uh cutbacks [9:04] um you know, [9:06] things like school lunch programs and [9:08] things, you know, um and then trying to [9:10] do it surgically. So, it's um [9:14] how do you do that [9:16] effectively, quickly, [9:19] in a manner that uh doesn't uh [9:23] cause so much controversy [9:25] that the government falls. So, if you [9:28] look at history, [9:29] that's why I deal with the political. [9:32] If you deal with history [9:34] and you deal just even common sense, [9:36] think, you know, like um are you going [9:38] to have the executive leadership that's [9:41] going to be able to make this [9:43] satisfactory with most people? [9:45] You know, and do that quickly. [9:48] I think that's [9:49] that's a hell of a [9:51] hell of a trick to pull off. [9:54] Right. So, it might just be structurally [9:56] it's a little difficult at this stage. [9:58] What an understatement. Structurally a [10:00] little difficult at this stage. Yeah. [10:03] Well, there was another big news story [10:05] recently that there may be quite a lot [10:07] of fraud going on with public dollars in [10:10] Minnesota that there were these daycares [10:12] that don't exist and billions of dollars [10:14] are flowing to individuals to run these [10:15] daycares. And now there's a lot of this [10:18] sort of citizen journalism going on [10:19] across the country [10:21] that federal spending is actually being [10:25] fraudulently abused. [10:28] Do you think that this is a symptom of [10:30] this stage of the cycle? What's your [10:32] view on how this relates to this problem [10:35] that we're generally kind of talking [10:37] about? [10:37] >> Yeah, it's both the stage of the cycle. [10:39] And if you're going to have something [10:41] well managed, are you going to have the [10:43] government well manage it? I mean, how [10:45] how how well managed, you know, go to [10:48] the Department of Motor Vehicles for [10:49] your [10:51] >> [laughter] [10:51] >> It's so big and complex [10:54] and such a [10:56] you know, such a mess like [10:59] you know, like when when you think is [11:02] this a surprise to you that there's all [11:06] of this stuff going on all over the [11:08] place in terms of inefficiency? Is that [11:10] a surprise to you? No. Uh but, you know, [11:14] I guess the question is are people [11:16] waking up to this? Because last time we [11:18] spoke [11:19] you highlighted that a piece of your [11:22] portfolio was in gold. You had invested [11:25] quite a bit in gold. Since we spoke, I [11:27] think gold has climbed from 2,900 an [11:29] ounce to 5,200 an ounce. What has [11:32] happened with gold over the last year? [11:34] Is it that markets are waking up to the [11:37] point in the cycle that we're in that [11:38] you've been highlighting for a number of [11:40] years at this point? Or is it because [11:42] China is structurally abandoning the US [11:45] dollar and treasuries and moving more [11:47] into gold and other central banks are [11:48] moving into gold? Is it because [11:51] individual [11:52] speculators and market participants are [11:55] getting bubbly with gold? What's your [11:56] view on what's going on with gold and [11:58] how it relates to the market's [11:59] acknowledgement of the stage that we're [12:01] in? It's the big cycle and [12:04] what what you have to understand is that [12:07] gold is not a precious metal that's [12:10] speculated on like most people [12:14] have come to think of it as. [12:17] Um it is um the most established money [12:21] that it's the second largest reserve [12:23] country currency [12:25] that central banks hold. [12:27] And so what we've seen is for various [12:30] reasons that I've pretty much covered, [12:33] the economic, the supply demand, the [12:36] political, the geopolitical, for those [12:39] reasons central banks themselves have [12:42] acquired [12:44] gold to build that up. [12:47] And individuals and others are looking [12:49] for an alternative money. The question [12:52] is what is money? So when we're thinking [12:55] about this, money [12:57] mechanistically, money is debt. What I [13:00] mean by that [13:02] is that if you're holding money, you're [13:05] holding it in the form of a debt [13:06] instrument. [13:08] And if you um [13:11] are holding a debt instrument, [13:14] what you're getting is a promise from [13:16] somebody to deliver you money. [13:19] Okay? [13:20] And what I as I mentioned in the [13:22] beginning, the power of the central [13:25] banks when they have too much debt, [13:28] is to print money. [13:31] Okay. So, if you've got that down, [13:34] okay, then you can understand what's [13:36] happening. [13:38] Okay? Because the question is, Dave, [13:42] what money do you think is safe? Right. [13:46] Given what I've just said. [13:49] Okay. [13:49] >> have Yeah. Yeah, I can asset back. [13:52] Right, I want an asset. I want to have [13:53] something that's got some physical known [13:56] limitation to it. And particularly what [13:58] you want is [14:00] that can be transferred from one place [14:02] to another, because money is both a [14:04] medium of exchange and a store hold of [14:07] wealth. [14:08] So, in other words, if you if one [14:10] country's central bank or government [14:13] wants to pay another [14:16] government, it can't just be in fixed [14:18] assets like buildings. [14:20] Okay? If you want to transact, you have [14:23] to transact in something that you can [14:26] transfer to them, and so on. And gold is [14:29] the only [14:31] asset it's a long-term historic asset [14:35] for for reasons. That means that it can [14:38] be transferred, they can't print a lot [14:41] of it. Um and um it is not dependent on [14:46] somebody giving you something. In other [14:49] words, most money most if you hold debt, [14:52] or you hold stocks, or you hold [14:53] something, [14:54] you're holding a promise from somebody [14:57] to give you buying power. [14:59] Okay? So, you can [15:01] Like, wealth is important to think to [15:02] distinguish wealth from money. [15:05] Okay? Wealth is in stuff. It's you know, [15:09] it's in buildings, it's in companies, [15:11] and so on. But, you can't spend wealth. [15:13] You have to When you want to spend it, [15:16] and that's the purpose of money, [15:18] you have to sell it, [15:20] and then you get money to spend. [15:23] And right now we have an awful lot of [15:26] wealth [15:28] relative to money. And the question is [15:30] what is that money? And there's the risk [15:33] that you go to get convert your wealth [15:35] into money [15:36] that they're going to print money cuz [15:37] that's what they've always done since [15:39] we've had fiat currencies. [15:41] So as you look out and have [15:42] conversations with all the market [15:44] participants that you know, and you know [15:46] everyone that's of size and scale, [15:50] where are we in terms of folks [15:52] converting their wealth into gold or [15:55] their money into gold? Like how much [15:57] more do we have to run [15:59] in terms of the dollar denominated value [16:02] of gold in the market cycle as this [16:05] great rush for the doors, rush for the [16:07] exit happens? [16:08] >> Two things that come to mind. What I [16:10] what I look at is literally [16:13] who has what assets [16:16] including like central banks. What is [16:18] the money and what [16:20] uh And and what is that mix? [16:23] And I look at the amount of uh wealth [16:26] relative [16:28] to money or I look at the amount of [16:30] wealth relative uh to gold. [16:34] And what we've seen is that there's an [16:36] enormous amount of wealth [16:40] and there was an enormous amount in [16:42] central banks of the other money [16:45] relative to hard money gold. And so [16:49] we've seen about [16:51] what I would call [16:54] it go from an extremely small number [16:58] to something [17:00] that is [17:02] a less small number. That price increase [17:04] and that change in composition [17:07] has brought it almost not quite, but [17:11] almost [17:13] toward [17:14] uh the average of what it's been [17:16] uh over a period of time. So, uh being [17:19] out of balance. However, [17:21] because the wealth is total wealth is [17:23] still so large [17:25] relative to money, that's a real uh [17:28] issue. So, let me give you a practical [17:30] example of of of this. Wealth taxes and [17:34] wealth [17:36] being a risk. One question that might be [17:38] asked are are we in a bubble? [17:41] In other words, are AI stocks and other [17:43] such stocks in a bubble? That's a [17:46] If you want to get into that, we'll get [17:48] into that. But, one of the things [17:51] that we know from that [17:53] is that one of the characteristics of [17:56] bubbles [17:58] is that there becomes a need for money [18:02] that requires people to sell their [18:05] assets [18:07] to get money [18:09] to meet that need. Now, quite often that [18:11] need comes from borrowing money to buy [18:15] those assets. [18:17] Okay? And then the assets go up in price [18:19] and and so on. But, what happens is it [18:22] can't be sustained because you have to [18:24] make the debt service payments and [18:26] they're not throwing off the cash that [18:29] to make that. And so, they have to start [18:31] to sell that and then you [18:33] and when you have to sell it cuz you [18:35] need money, you need cash to pay your [18:38] debt service or to pay nowadays wealth [18:42] taxes. [18:43] Oh, okay. So, now we have a dynamic. The [18:46] bubble will burst [18:48] as that dynamic takes place. There are a [18:50] number of things we could talk about [18:51] about the bubble if you're interested. [18:53] But, just imagine if you put in wealth [18:55] taxes. Everybody can talk about whether [18:58] they like or don't like wealth taxes or [19:00] something. But, anything that's If you [19:02] put in wealth taxes and there's a lot of [19:06] fear of wealth taxes [19:08] in and of itself [19:09] that can drive money uh wealth to cash. [19:13] Uh and and there's only one way you're [19:15] going to get the cash with the wealth, [19:17] and that's either sell it or to borrow [19:19] against it with that which causes its [19:21] its own cash flow issues. And we have a [19:23] dynamic having to do with the social [19:26] part of this, you know, the wealth gap [19:29] that makes that politically an issue. [19:32] So, anyway, all I'm saying is people [19:35] should worry [19:37] and and companies should worry or [19:39] countries should worry. [19:41] Do they have enough gold? I mean, if you [19:43] didn't know what the [19:45] if you didn't know what [19:48] gold was likely to do and you had no [19:50] view on gold, [19:52] one should have between 5 and 15% of [19:55] their portfolio in gold because of the [19:58] fact of how it works with the other [20:01] components. In other words, it's a [20:03] diversifier [20:04] when [20:06] when the hits the fan, [20:08] okay, gold does well and the other [20:11] things don't, generally speaking. [20:14] And because of that correlation, [20:16] depending on what else is in the [20:19] uh portfolio, if you put it through an [20:21] optimizer, you'd have something like [20:23] that. So, I'm not trying to tout people [20:26] on buying gold, but I would say, what is [20:29] safe? [20:30] What is safe? [20:32] And it's safe is somewhere, if you had [20:34] no view, between 5 and 15%. [20:37] >> Why hasn't Bitcoin performed in the same [20:40] way? In the same period that gold [20:41] climbed 80% since we last talked, [20:43] Bitcoin's down 25%. [20:46] What's your view on what's happened with [20:47] Bitcoin and why that hasn't played the [20:50] role that many thought it was going to [20:51] play, which is the safe haven asset? [20:53] >> There There's an important [20:54] differentiating characteristics of [20:57] Bitcoin, and then there's also, you [20:59] know, like who owns it and why they buy [21:01] why they bought and sell. Okay, so [21:03] Bitcoin does not have privacy. Tra- any [21:07] transactions [21:09] uh can be monitored and then uh [21:12] indirectly perhaps controlled. Central [21:14] banks are not going to want to buy [21:16] Bitcoin and being able to hold it. So, [21:19] it's not just individuals, it's [21:21] institutions and so on, but most you [21:24] know, and central banks. So, there there [21:27] are attributes of that. There has been [21:29] um some question or thoughts of the [21:33] development of, you know, new [21:34] technologies like quantum computing and [21:37] so on. Can there be issues regarding [21:39] that? [21:40] And then there's um you know, who owns [21:42] it and what are the other exposures that [21:45] they have in their portfolio. It tends [21:47] to have a [21:49] a pretty high correlation with uh the [21:51] tech stocks. [21:54] So, from an ownership, you know, just [21:56] the supply demand is affected by if [21:59] somebody gets squeezed in one thing, [22:01] they sell something that what whatever [22:04] else they have. So, there are those [22:06] dynamics. It's a long way [22:09] as and it's a relatively small market [22:11] that's a relatively controllable market. [22:14] I think a lot of attention has been [22:15] given to Bitcoin, but as a money, you [22:18] know, it's it's it's it's small in [22:20] relationship to uh gold and so you know, [22:24] those are the dynamics. There is only [22:27] one gold. What about silver? I mean, [22:29] silver has had a big run-up in the past [22:31] year as well. Is that a derivative to [22:33] gold and it's effectively people playing [22:36] off of the wake of gold price movement? [22:40] >> silver in its production is a residual [22:43] commodity. The supply of it is difficult [22:47] to increase [22:48] and through history, uh you know, like [22:51] the pound sterling, silver was perceived [22:54] as a monetary [22:57] uh item. [22:59] Uh but it uh has also taken on a [23:01] speculative life of its own. [23:04] So, you know, people are, um, you know, [23:06] hot in it because it's been hot. I just [23:08] want to shift gear a little bit back to [23:11] something you touched on, but the last [23:12] time we met, you also talked about the [23:14] importance of making sure that interest [23:16] rates remain low for us to kind of [23:18] manage the effect and the impact of the [23:20] stage of the cycle that we're in. What's [23:22] your view, I guess, today on where rates [23:25] are and how the Fed has acted over the [23:27] past year relative to what needs to be [23:30] done [23:31] to soften the effects of the stage in [23:34] the cycle that we're in. Because we have [23:35] so much debt, federal debt, [23:38] um, [23:39] interest rates are one of the three main [23:42] considerations. There's the, [23:44] um, taxes, there's spending, and then [23:47] there's interest rates are the on the [23:48] debt. But, you can't make interest [23:50] rates, [23:51] um, [23:52] severely artificially low because one [23:55] man's debts are another man's assets. [23:58] And if you make those interest rates [24:01] too low [24:03] for the creditor, [24:05] you will produce the dynamic that we [24:08] understand. In other words, they'll [24:09] produce a lot more borrowing, they'll [24:11] put it into things, and you can fuel a [24:14] bubble. [24:15] And so, at the same time, [24:18] uh, you can't have them so high that the [24:22] debtor gets squeezed [24:25] unaffectedly. So, there's a balancing [24:27] act, you know, keep them high enough [24:30] that they're adequate for the creditor, [24:32] but not so high that the debtor. So, [24:34] when you have a lot of debt assets and [24:37] liabilities, cuz for every debt asset, [24:40] there's a debt liability. And when you [24:42] have a lot of those, that balancing act [24:44] is is very difficult. This made more [24:47] difficult, you know, because of what's [24:49] called the K economy, you know, in other [24:52] words, there are bubble elements that [24:54] are going on in the part [24:57] of the economy, you know, where [25:00] um [25:02] you know, the question is who will be [25:03] the first to be a trillionaire and and [25:06] and that, you know, that top [25:08] 1% of the population and all of that at [25:12] the same time as you have the other part [25:15] of the economy where um for example, 60% [25:19] of all Americans have below a [25:21] sixth-grade reading level. [25:24] And and to make them productive [25:27] particularly as we are also having AI [25:31] have replacements for them [25:34] um is a particularly difficult thing to [25:38] achieve. In other words, when you have [25:39] so much dead assets and liabilities and [25:43] then you have such a disparity in [25:46] conditions between those that are at the [25:48] top and let's call it the bottom 60% of [25:52] the population, what that's like. [25:54] That's uh you know, another [25:57] hat trick. That's another [26:00] difficult thing to pull off. So [26:04] this is a challenging situation. As for [26:06] as far as monetary policy [26:11] exists the idea of setting an interest [26:15] rate and having [26:17] a fiscal policy and a monetary policy [26:20] that's for the economy as a whole [26:24] and doesn't deal with the differences in [26:28] the [26:28] in the circumstances may be more [26:32] well, it is more challenging. Well, so [26:35] taking a look at Fed action [26:38] and market activity [26:40] there's been a lot of reporting over the [26:43] past year that a number of global [26:45] central banks [26:47] have stopped buying US Treasuries and [26:49] are shifting to gold. [26:51] Does this mean that Fed in the US is [26:54] going to have to start buying treasuries [26:56] and expand their balance sheet again? Is [26:59] it inevitable that we see a re-expansion [27:01] of the Fed's balance sheet in this [27:03] phase in the cycle given what's going on [27:05] with global market action? I think that [27:08] it's likely down the road. Um, [27:10] uh, right now, uh, there's [27:13] um, [27:14] the shortening of maturities, [27:17] um, as a means of trying to deal with [27:20] that. Of course, [27:21] that increases the debt rollover risk. [27:25] Uh, but the, you know, sell less long [27:27] debt, [27:28] uh, try to, uh, hold the short rate down [27:32] so that the longer rates attachment to [27:35] it doesn't get, you know, helps to hold [27:37] the long rate down. [27:39] And then, uh, try to, [27:42] um, [27:43] use [27:45] the government's power of persuasion [27:48] on other countries to either buy the [27:51] debt or to hold the debt or to have [27:55] other forms of capital enter the United [27:57] States. How do you like Kevin Warsh's [27:59] pick for Fed chair? What's your view on [28:02] how he's going to guide interest rate [28:04] policy for the Central Bank and when he [28:06] assumes his term? It's a very, very big [28:08] challenge. I think he's a practical man. [28:10] He understands both sides of the pros [28:13] and cons. I think it's a tough job. One [28:16] of the other things that I would say was [28:18] pretty surprising over the past year [28:21] is [28:23] how adamantly against [28:26] tariffs for fear of inflation and [28:29] reduced consumption, which would mean a [28:32] negative effect on GDP growth, perhaps. [28:35] Tariffs might be. The president and the [28:37] administration put in place a number of [28:40] tariffs under the emergency [28:43] economic powers act, which the Supreme [28:45] Court in the last week or so overturned. [28:49] But, looking back [28:52] on the economic effect of tariffs, what [28:55] do you think economists got right and [28:57] wrong about their predictions about the [29:00] effect tariffs would have on the [29:02] economy, on consumption, on inflation? [29:05] And are there things that economists [29:07] fundamentally missed or didn't [29:08] understand and why? Yeah, I I think so. [29:11] First of all, um there's the uh tax [29:14] revenue part of them. I mean, thinking [29:18] of that just as [29:20] uh revenue. And I think that people [29:23] don't [29:25] all economists [29:26] make the mistake of not including taxes [29:30] in inflation. [29:32] Mhm. And what I mean by that [snorts] is [29:35] if your [29:36] if your taxes go up, [29:40] that's inflation. [29:42] It I mean, why shouldn't it be any [29:44] different than if your cost of housing [29:47] goes up, why shouldn't it be part of the [29:49] inflation calculation number? It's tak- [29:53] it's taken money out of your pocket. I [29:55] mean, it's probably the you know, for a [29:58] lot of people the biggest expense. And [30:00] so, when they say inflation is something [30:03] separate, [30:04] you know, I I [30:06] I think it's changing the form of [30:10] uh of inflation in a sense. So, what I [30:13] mean is, you know, through history, [30:16] tariffs used to be the biggest source of [30:19] uh [30:20] revenue for the government thro- [30:22] throughout most history. And in most [30:24] countries. Okay. So, it is a um [30:29] I think it's viewed [30:30] It's It's a totally valid way of raising [30:33] money, and it should be kept kept in [30:36] consideration [30:37] for that. And And you get the foreigners [30:40] paying a portion of it. But, it there's [30:42] also, as part of the big cycle question, [30:45] is the problem that we have that [30:49] we are not independent. Okay, we've had [30:51] a hollowing out. [30:54] This is the big question, you know, that [30:56] we've had a hollowing out of [30:58] manufacturing, the middle class, [31:01] and so on. Now, are we going to try to [31:04] build that? [31:06] And what is the plan to build that? Or [31:08] are we going to continue on with large [31:11] trade deficits? [31:13] And um [31:14] so, you have unsustainable [31:17] trade deficits that the United States [31:20] has, [31:21] and which are capital [31:24] um [31:24] surpluses. In other words, the [31:26] dependence on foreign capital is the [31:28] other side of those trade balances, and [31:31] that's unsustainable. So, because that's [31:34] unsustainable, [31:36] um you need uh [31:38] some way of uh rectifying that. Okay, so [31:42] what is the plan to rectify that? [31:45] Partially, that plan [31:48] uh can have trade tariffs. [31:50] I think they're totally valid, [31:53] uh but it all has to be part of another [31:56] greater plan, which is to develop [32:00] the industries that we need to have [32:01] developed, which we're seeing happen in [32:03] a much more proactive way. In other [32:05] words, you're seeing more [32:07] government [32:09] um [32:10] activity to create infrastructure, [32:13] to bring in industries, and so on. You [32:14] need that not only economically, but you [32:17] need it geopolitically, because you [32:19] can't have dependencies. [32:22] In other words, we're entering a world [32:24] of greater conflict. We moved from a [32:26] multilateral world order to a a [32:29] power-based confrontational [32:31] world economy. [32:33] And in that environment, everybody's [32:36] threatening to cut off everything from [32:38] it. You know, the uh goods and capital [32:41] wars that we can have are threatening. [32:45] And so you have to build independence. [32:48] And so [32:50] that's part of a plan to try to build [32:52] that independence. [32:54] So I I think when I look at that, I [32:57] don't think that's the problem. I [33:00] I'd say and it's misunderstood. So yes, [33:03] I think people are misunderstanding [33:05] that. [33:06] And the important thing is we get the [33:08] other things right. You know, like Let's [33:11] get down to 3% and and by the way, [33:14] there's a bipartisan bill that on this. [33:17] And [33:19] Uh The three the 3% bill. [33:21] >> to this [33:23] has come out in favor of it. I'm in [33:25] favor of it. I mean lots of people are [33:27] in favor of you know, [33:30] what I'll call the 3% three-part [33:33] solution. 3% of GDP, three parts, [33:38] a bit from [33:39] one thing, a bit from another, taxes, [33:41] spending and [33:43] and hopefully interest rates. And just [33:45] to take the inflation question to its [33:48] conclusion at the State of the Union [33:50] this week, President Trump shared his [33:53] vision, which is that tariffs can [33:55] completely replace an income tax in the [33:57] United States. Do you think that that's [33:58] a feasible path? Does it make sense at [34:00] some point for tariffs, which are [34:02] effectively consumption taxes [34:03] >> it's I don't think it's going to No, I [34:05] don't think it's anywhere near [34:07] that [34:09] both because of the combination of the [34:11] size and then the impact of that size. [34:14] Tariffs are regressive. [34:17] And I think that there needs to be [34:21] some [34:22] We have to deal with the wealth gap. [34:26] To me the wealth gap, the biggest [34:27] problem of the wealth gap, which is a a [34:30] social problem, is also the productivity [34:33] gap. [34:34] And you have to make most people [34:36] productive. [34:38] And you have to do that through [34:39] infrastructure and so on. And I I don't [34:43] think I think that needs to be [34:44] addressed. It's a really important point [34:47] you just made. I think my [34:50] analysis [34:52] indicates that nearly half of Americans [34:56] either work for a government agency [34:59] or a government service provider or a [35:00] contractor. The data over the past year [35:04] is the federal workforce declined by [35:06] 317,000 [35:08] employees, roughly 14% of the total [35:11] federal workforce. [35:13] As this administration has reduced the [35:16] size of some of these agencies, reduced [35:18] the size of that workforce, [35:20] what happens to those individuals? Do [35:22] they go work in the private workforce [35:24] and become productive, or do you think [35:26] they're getting subsumed by other [35:28] government agencies, either state or [35:30] local, or government service providers [35:32] to do work that fundamentally is not [35:34] productive to growing the economy? I I I [35:37] haven't studied the numbers. [35:39] I don't think I can adequately answer [35:41] that. I would say [35:45] government is extremely inefficient. [35:49] It has a role. It has an important role, [35:51] but even that role it's handling very [35:54] inefficiently. Other governments handle [35:57] that role of maybe education, [36:01] some of these things in a better way. We [36:04] need fundamental We need [36:06] You know, best thing you could invest in [36:08] is education. [36:10] But anyway, where they go and what they [36:12] do [36:14] from the government and and you know, [36:16] the other inefficiencies [36:18] is a problem. The one thing that's good [36:20] about [36:21] uh the system [36:23] that [36:24] the capitalist system in a sense is it [36:26] doesn't live if it can't uh if somebody [36:29] either won't bet on it or it doesn't [36:31] make a profit. So, um yeah, so I think [36:36] wherever it goes, um it's wherever those [36:39] people go, [36:41] there's just so many inefficient people [36:44] and inefficient systems. [36:47] Is there not enough productivity-driven [36:49] economic growth in this nation at this [36:52] time [36:53] to give more people the opportunity to [36:55] improve their income, improve their [36:57] wealth, improve their livelihoods? [37:01] Is that the fundamental issue we're [37:03] dealing with at the moment? Or is it [37:05] that, you know, people aren't prepared [37:07] or educated to be productive and [37:09] therefore the system itself has failed [37:12] them? There are three things basically [37:15] that you need to do to be successful. [37:17] You have to first educate your children [37:20] well. [37:21] And so that they are capable of being [37:23] productive and also educate them in [37:26] civility. [37:28] So that they are civil with each other. [37:31] The second is then they have to come out [37:33] to an environment [37:35] that is an orderly, civil environment [37:38] that people can compete and work with [37:41] with with and and compete and work with [37:44] each other to be productive that that [37:47] works for the most people. [37:49] And the third thing is you have to stay [37:51] out of wars. You have to stay you don't [37:53] have to have no civil war and no [37:56] international war. If you do those three [37:59] things right, you will have a successful [38:01] country. That's all throughout history. [38:04] Okay, we're having problems with those. [38:06] And are those three things the antidote [38:09] to some of the rising movements that [38:12] we're seeing in increased unionization [38:16] and effects that unions are having on [38:18] the political process, which is also [38:20] leading to these rises in socialism [38:22] and support for socialist movements in [38:25] the United States as well as the wealth [38:27] taxes which [38:29] from the view that's shared by those [38:31] participating in those movements, they [38:33] are meant to solve income inequality, [38:35] wealth gap issues that we're seeing in [38:37] the United States. So that's their [38:38] solution. Is the solution to those [38:42] movements education and civility, [38:44] creating a civil environment and staying [38:46] out of wars? Is that all we need to do [38:48] to make this successful or is there more [38:50] to the end? [38:50] >> Yes, that's that's that's that what we [38:52] need [38:54] is is is to stop fighting. Okay, we're [38:57] now at a stage [38:58] where we have irreconcilable [39:01] differences. [39:03] In other words, [39:04] when [39:06] when the causes people are behind [39:09] are more important to them than the [39:11] system, [39:12] the system is in jeopardy. [39:15] Our system is in jeopardy [39:18] because [39:21] um [39:23] they people will not accept the system [39:26] or the alternatives. And so they're [39:29] going to fight. [39:31] You know, I think [39:32] I think when we have we're going to have [39:34] the midterm elections, [39:36] you're going to go past the midterm [39:37] elections with [39:39] probably that uh Democrats will take the [39:42] house and be and maybe I don't know, [39:44] it's going to be difficult. And you know [39:46] what? Nobody can succeed [39:49] because everybody's going to be [39:50] fighting. [39:51] Uh they're going to all be fighting. [39:53] Okay? So how does that affect [39:55] productivity? Uh okay. And then when you [39:58] deal with things like how do you get a [40:00] good education system? So you have now [40:03] almost the mob disorder. [40:07] Mob disorder and inefficiency. [40:10] Nobody's allowed to take charge of this. [40:12] If if you go back in history, [40:16] Plato, you know, I think it was like 350 [40:19] BC wrote about the cycle [40:22] you know, of democracies and the threat [40:24] to democracies. [40:26] What's happening now is similar to [40:30] Julius Caesar and Rome [40:33] and beings [40:35] you know, stabbed in the Senate and and [40:37] what you need is you need [40:41] a bipartisan [40:43] you need you need the country to have [40:45] have a strong almost [40:48] a strong leader. We do need a strong [40:50] leader to get the the reforms done to [40:54] make the country work well, but I mean, [40:57] so how do you force [41:00] this mob of people who are behaving this [41:04] way including in the elections and so [41:07] fragment to create order. [41:10] So, you need a a tough leader will force [41:13] them to do different force things to [41:15] difficult things [41:17] and not fight with each other and [41:19] [laughter] [41:20] focus on being productive. That's what [41:22] you need I think. It sounds a little [41:24] like there may be this [41:27] inevitable path of the choice that no [41:29] one wants to make between some form of [41:31] socialism and some form of fascism. Is [41:34] that where this goes? [41:35] >> I think you were we're moving toward the [41:38] that war. We're in that war. We're in [41:40] what's state what I call stage five of a [41:43] cycle. Okay. In the book I described the [41:46] pattern that's happened over and over [41:48] again and when you get to this position [41:51] when there are a bad finances [41:55] combined with large wealth and values [41:59] gaps [42:01] and irreconcilable differences [42:05] and you have external threats as well as [42:08] domestic threats [42:10] you have this dynamic. I think that's [42:13] where we are I [42:14] I'm like a mechanic. My goal I'm not [42:16] ideological. I'm just a practical guy [42:19] trying to make money in the markets and [42:20] trying to describe things and that's [42:22] what it looks like. I think when we look [42:24] at the bubble question on AI, what a lot [42:27] of people don't realize in [42:30] bubbles is [42:32] that through all technologies, they [42:35] think that they [42:37] are betting on the technology when they [42:39] buy the stocks in the companies. [42:42] That's not true. [42:44] Okay, there's a giant difference [42:47] between the behavior of the companies [42:50] and the behavior of the technologies. [42:53] And that the norm is in these is that a [42:56] lot of companies won't survive in the [42:59] start. Very small percentage and they'll [43:01] all fight [43:03] and so on, but the technologies will go [43:05] on and it'll be great. The technologies [43:08] will. So, I want to emphasize to people [43:11] that dynamic and I can go on [43:14] and describe, you know, what it's like. [43:17] Uh uh [43:17] Of course, we've seen it to some extent [43:19] with the 2000 bubble in the technologies [43:23] and what went on, but [43:25] even if I describe what it was like in [43:27] the late '20s, [43:28] but you know, it's just it was [43:30] unbelievable, but the technologies will [43:32] go on, but the companies [43:34] um won't necessarily go on. And um so, [43:37] when I'm looking at that, [43:39] that has big implications. Right now, it [43:42] looks to me [43:44] like AI [43:46] uh basically is eating everything [43:49] and it might eat itself. [43:52] And [43:53] uh what I mean by that is not produce [43:56] adequate profits. We can't take just a [43:59] domestic view of that. We have to look [44:01] also at what's happening in China [44:04] and um Um, make interesting distinctions [44:07] there. you know? There's a difference in [44:09] philosophy [44:10] that's carried through in the economy [44:13] of how the economies of the United [44:15] States and China work [44:17] in that we have basically primarily a [44:19] profit-based system. [44:22] They have a system in which they might [44:25] believe that profits are a second [44:28] consideration. They're not necessarily [44:30] needed [44:31] in order to achieve the best results. [44:34] For example, in China, they would say [44:38] usage of AI is fantastic. So, it should [44:42] be like electricity [44:45] or something, and let's make it free for [44:47] everyone. [44:49] And let's make it open source for [44:50] everyone. [44:53] Okay, and they might get much higher [44:54] usage, and they'll get their [44:56] productivity gains through the usage. [45:00] And we have a profit system to pay back. [45:04] Okay, well, now we're in one world. How [45:06] do you compete in that world? What do [45:08] you do with that? In other words, just [45:09] imagine that their technologies are [45:12] almost as good as ours, cuz they are. [45:15] They're not far behind. [45:16] And and and then but that you could get [45:19] them for free. [45:21] Open source. [45:23] Okay, now you got to pay it back. [45:26] Okay, so [45:27] I just want to emphasize [45:30] that these are also systematic risks [45:34] that enter into the picture of of AI. [45:37] But you certainly Yeah. Uh, there are a [45:40] lot of unknowns here. As we wrap, [45:43] looking [45:44] back on the history of this nation, I [45:46] ask myself the question a lot, how did [45:49] we get to the point that we've gotten to [45:50] in terms of the amount of debt, the [45:52] amount of government spending, the role [45:54] that the central bank has played, and [45:56] the risks that we find ourselves in [45:58] today that all seem largely avoidable if [46:00] we hadn't taken [46:02] or made the decisions we made along the [46:03] way. You've highlighted that they repeat [46:05] over and over again. But if you could go [46:07] back and restructure the United States [46:09] and be a founding father and write the [46:11] Constitution yourself, [46:13] what are one to three things that you [46:15] would have done differently? What would [46:17] you have written into the Constitution [46:19] that may have prevented us from getting [46:20] into the situation that we're in today? [46:22] Well, the I mean, it's like the [46:24] marshmallow test. [46:26] You know the marshmallow test? You know [46:28] you you want to see it. [46:30] It is a kid going at early age you give [46:33] them the choice between one marshmallow [46:35] now and two marshmallows in 20 minutes. [46:39] And the kid that chooses the two [46:41] marshmallows in 20 minutes is going to [46:43] have a better life and make better [46:44] decisions kind of thing. [46:46] I mean, that therein lies our problem. [46:49] The immediate gratification and also the [46:51] not knowing if things are going to be [46:53] productive. [46:54] But the system has been remarkably [46:56] adaptable, too. In other words, we've [46:59] gone through crises, we've wiped out [47:01] debts, [47:02] and we've gotten past it. And there are [47:05] certain ways of getting past it. But you [47:08] you know, it's a it's a tough question [47:10] to balance [47:13] financial prudence with [47:15] innovative inventions. [47:18] You know? Because you [47:20] like particularly like take AI now. [47:23] Nobody knows what's going to come of it [47:25] in in what what way, right? Is it going [47:28] to pay? Is it not going to pay? And all [47:30] of that. And so, what do you write into [47:34] the law [47:35] that [47:36] is going to get you financial prudence [47:40] and controlled? And do you when you [47:42] write it into the law, does that lessen [47:44] the experimentation [47:47] and you know, the entrepreneurship and [47:49] all of the things that you know? So, [47:51] it's tough to do this with [47:54] with rules. I think maybe the main thing [47:57] is I would say read history. [47:59] Read history and know these things and [48:02] try to get that balance right, you know, [48:05] everything's a matter of the balance. So [48:07] the balance of the pain [48:10] of failing or the pain of putting money [48:13] into a something that fails. Well Ray, I [48:16] want to thank you once again for taking [48:18] the time to be here with me. It's always [48:20] great to catch up here your perspective. [48:22] Obviously so much has changed in the [48:24] last year and yet so much hasn't. It's [48:26] been great to to get your view on it and [48:28] I think it's really helpful to do this. [48:30] So so thanks so much. And and thank you [48:32] for what you guys do. I'm I'm I'm [48:34] riveted to your program and I think you [48:37] make a great contribution. [48:40] So conversations like this are [48:43] are really practical helps for a lot of [48:45] people. So anyway, thank you for letting [48:47] me participate and thank you for what [48:49] you do for a lot of people. Thank you. [48:51] >> That's right. I'm going all in. [49:07] I'm going all in.