Allison Warns Trump-Bibi Iran Strategy Escalates War Risks

艾利森警告：特朗普与内塔尼亚胡的伊朗战略推高战争风险 美国在缺乏明确结局或长期国家建构战略的情况下对伊朗开展战术军事行动，面临引发严重全球经济连锁反应及地缘政治动荡的风险。 哈佛大学教授格雷厄姆·艾利森剖析了美以针对伊朗军事行动中的战略混乱与二阶风险，将其称为“比比的战争”，并概述了从内战到政权退化等潜在收场情景。他认为，鉴于北京内部的军队整肃及其长期政治战略，中国在2026至2027年间入侵台湾的概率低至5%。最后，艾利森探讨了现代核稳定的“80-80-9”框架，并警告美国极端的财富不平等对民主稳定构成了危险的政治威胁。 美以对伊军事打击充满战略模糊性，哈佛学者格雷厄姆·艾利森将其定性为“比比的战争”，由内塔尼亚胡二十年来的执念所推动，但尚无确凿证据表明伊朗当时存在迫在眉睫的攻击威胁或核突破。 (4:32) 对伊朗的军事行动引发了剧烈的全球连锁反应，不仅严重扰乱了台湾关键的天然气能源供应，还导致原定支援乌克兰的“爱国者”防空导弹被紧急抽调往中东。 (5:58) 面对约60%公众反对的民调以及11月大选前显现的国内经济压力，特朗普可能在削弱伊朗能力后寻求迅速抽身并宣布胜利，这与内塔尼亚胡彻底摧毁伊朗政权的目标形成潜在冲突。 (18:43) 艾利森评估2026至2027年中国大陆军事进攻台湾的概率仅约5%，理由在于北京期望2028年台湾选举推动和平统一、解放军高层清洗后尚需重建指挥战力，以及避免直接对抗重创经济。 (24:28)

Harvard national security scholar Graham Allison argues that the U.S.–Israeli military campaign against Iran is driven by Benjamin Netanyahu's decades-long strategic fixation rather than an imminent threat to the American homeland. While praising tactical military execution, Allison warns that undefined political objectives, domestic economic risks, and global ripple effects threaten U.S. stability far more than foreign flashpoints. Strategic Ambiguity and Risks of Iranian Regime Collapse (1:14) Allison characterizes the ongoing strikes against Iran as 'Bibi's war,' comparing Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to Captain Ahab pursuing an obsessive goal he spent 20 years pitching to successive U.S. presidents. Although tactical execution eliminated Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and 40 top military officials, Allison sees no evidence that Iran posed an imminent attack, was on the verge of a nuclear breakout, or possessed mainland-capable ICBMs. Instead, the campaign is obscured by shifting rationales and undefined timelines across the Trump administration. Achieving a functional democracy in Iran remains what Allison calls a 'way, way stretch.' Drawing parallels to the U.S. expenditure of over $1 billion and thousands of lives in Afghanistan—only for the Taliban to return—Allison cautions that dismantling a state twice Iraq's population and four times its land area risks triggering prolonged Syrian-style civil war or power vacuums. While Iranian military retaliation has so far resembled a 'paper tiger,' the broader fallout has already diverted Patriot missile batteries away from Ukraine and severed Middle Eastern natural gas exports that supply half of Taiwan's electricity. Trump's Exit Calculations vs. Netanyahu's Maxima (18:43) Allison expects a clash of endgames between Donald Trump and Netanyahu. Trump's core coordinates center on domestic political survival ahead of November 3rd elections, with public polling opposing the war roughly 60% to 40% and foreign affairs registering as a primary concern for only 1% to 2% of U.S. voters. Allison suggests Trump has retained the rhetorical room to declare victory within a week by arguing that the U.S. 'cut off the head of the snake' and degraded Iran's nuclear projection, leaving regime transformation to the Iranian public. Conversely, Netanyahu aims for the total destruction of the Iranian regime. Allison—identifying as 'pro-Israel and anti-Bibi'—notes that key figures across Israel's security establishment, including former heads of Mossad, Shin Bet, and military chiefs of staff, believe Netanyahu is eroding David Ben-Gurion's democratic legacy. Furthermore, aggressive West Bank settler policies, military tactics in Gaza, and disproportionate escalations are causing sharp drops in support among younger Americans and creating friction with Trump's MAGA base. Assessing Taiwan Risk and China's Industrial Momentum (24:28) Despite media reports of imminent cross-strait conflict, Allison estimates the probability of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan across 2026 and 2027 at only 5%. Beijing believes time favors peaceful reunification, especially as Taiwan's opposition-led parliament blocks an $11 billion U.S. arms package ahead of the January 2028 elections. Additionally, President Xi Jinping's sweeping purges of military leadership—including four-star equivalents overseeing Taiwan operations—have disrupted operational readiness, while high-stakes military escalation would devastate China's economy. Strategically, Allison highlights China's dramatic economic expansion: measured by Purchasing Power Parity, its economy grew from under 25% of U.S. GDP in 2000 to 25% larger by 2025, alongside controlling 35% of global trade versus the U.S. share of 25%. While China faces domestic headwinds like 15% to 20% localized youth unemployment and demographic decline, it is countering these with automation. China houses more than 50% of the world's operational industrial robots, demonstrated by Xiaomi building fully automated electric vehicle lines in three years—a feat Apple abandoned after spending $10 billion. The 80-80-9 Security Order and Proliferation Trajectories (48:58) Allison contextualizes post-WWII stability through his '80-80-9' framework: 80 years without direct war between great powers, 80 years without wartime nuclear detonations, and a global total capped at nine nuclear-armed states. This deliberate architecture prevented the nuclear proliferation predicted by John F. Kennedy, who in 1963 warned of 25 to 30 nuclear powers by the 1970s. However, regional containment models are fracturing. While Israel has enforced 'affirmative non-proliferation' via preemptive strikes—destroying Iraq's Osirak reactor in 1981, Syria's covert reactor in 2007, and targeting Iran today—the international failure to stop North Korea presents an alarming counterpoint. With Kim Jong-Un possessing over 100 warheads and ICBMs capable of striking the U.S. mainland, unchecked arsenals risk prompting non-nuclear neighbors like South Korea or Japan to seek independent nuclear deterrents. Domestic Wealth Inequality as an Existential Democratic Threat Looking inward, Allison identifies widening domestic wealth disparity as an urgent structural danger. Over the past generation, the top 10% to 20% of earners have captured 70% to 80% of economic gains, while stock market rallies of 15% to 16% completely bypass the 70% to 80% of citizens who hold little to no assets. Allison warns that a system where economic rewards flow to an elite few while every citizen maintains an equal vote makes populism and political instability inevitable. To address this without undermining economic productivity, Allison favors capital-building tools like Trump's proposal for children's investment accounts, and notes he would accept a 10% tax increase on high earners for structural adjustments. However, he rejects unconditional transfers like Universal Basic Income, asserting that paying non-working individuals erodes productive incentives. Without targeted reforms, Allison cautions, the democratic model will face severe political disruption. Allison concludes that the greatest vulnerabilities facing the United States stem from unresolved strategic endgames abroad and severe economic fragmentation at home. Whether managing military entanglements in the Middle East, balancing competition with China, or addressing the domestic concentration of wealth, long-term stability depends on aligning decisive actions with sustainable, clear political objectives.

哈佛大学学者Graham Allison认为，美以对伊朗的军事打击本质上是由以色列总理Netanyahu推动、缺乏清晰战略目标的冒险行动，特朗普或因国内政治经济压力迅速宣布战果并退出；与此同时，中东动荡、大国博弈及核扩散风险交织，而美国内部财富极端分化正对民主体制构成最深刻的长期威胁。 伊朗战事的政治动因与退出分歧 (4:32) Allison将当前战事定性为“Bibi的战争”，指出Netanyahu近二十年来执着游说推翻伊朗政权，最终促成特朗普动用武力。Allison明确表示自己“亲以色列但反Bibi”，并指出并无确凿证据证明伊朗当时即将发动对美袭击、实现核突破或具备洲际导弹能力。特朗普政府先后提出六种理由与五个目标，显现出极大的战略迷雾。 在战略退出方面，Allison指出特朗普的核心坐标是国内经济与临近的11月3日选举，民调显示公众反战比例达60%对40%。特朗普极可能在短期内以“砍掉蛇头”、重创伊朗军力为由单方面宣布胜利并抽身。然而，这与Netanyahu追求彻底摧毁伊朗政权的目标存在尖锐矛盾，双方分歧将决定冲突终局。 政权更迭的历史陷阱与次生危机 (3:01) Allison高度评价美以两国的战术与情报能力，并认为哈梅内伊政权被除不足惜，但严厉警告不可迷信政权更迭。阿富汗战争耗资逾10亿美元并付出惨重生命代价后塔利班依然掌权，证明摧毁目标易而国家重建难。将拥有近亿人口的伊朗改造成民主国家极其不现实，局势更可能滑向叙利亚式内战或军阀统治。 此外，空袭已引发严重的全球连锁反应：中东天然气供应链受阻导致台湾地区面临严重电力危机（其约半数电力依赖进口天然气）；为填补中东防空缺口，原本调配给乌克兰抵御俄军的爱国者导弹系统被紧急转移，暴露出战术冒险对全球战略资源的挤压。 台海风险评估与中美实力长周期对比 (24:28) 针对大陆可能攻台的传闻，Allison评估2026至2027年爆发军事冲突的概率仅约5%。北京倾向于静观其变，寄望于2028年台湾选举出现更有利的政治格局，且台立法院已搁置110亿美元美制军购；同时，解放军近期对战区司令与四星上将级别的全面整肃延缓了作战准备，直接开战亦将重创中国经济。在地缘现实与战略模糊框架下，攻台短期内并非优先选项。 长期来看，中国经济按购买力平价（PPP）计算已较美国高出25%，占全球贸易比重升至35%。尽管面临15%至20%的青年失业率与人口萎缩，但中国正通过工业自动化对冲压力——全球逾半数工业机器人部署在中国，小米仅用三年便实现高度自动化的电动车量产，展现出极强的工业迭代能力。 “80-80-9”安全架构与核扩散教训 (48:58) Allison提出以“80-80-9”概括战后国际秩序：大国之间维持了长达80年的无直接战争和平，80年未发生实战核爆，且全球拥核国被严格遏制在9个，远低于肯尼迪在1963年预测的25至30个。这一和平局面得益于对潜在核计划的早期压制，以及以色列对伊拉克、叙利亚核设施实施的先发制人打击。 相反，对朝鲜核武装的遏制失败构成了重大战略遗憾。目前朝鲜拥有超过100枚核弹头及可威胁美国本土的洲际导弹。Allison警告，若这一趋势继续失控，不仅对美构成直接威胁，更可能打破地区平衡，迫使韩日等盟国走上自主发展核武的道路。 财富集中对美国民主的根本侵蚀 Allison指出，当前最令人警惕的危机是美国国内财富的极度分化。过去一代人积累的巨额财富有70%至80%流向前10%至20%的高收入阶层，而绝大多数普通民众并未受惠于股市牛市。在一夫一票的民主制度下，底层70%民众被排斥在财富增长之外将直接诱发激进民粹主义，动摇政治基石。 在应对举措上，Allison赞同特朗普提出的儿童投资账户构想，主张从小赋予每个公民资本所有权，并表态愿意接受对富人增税10%用于结构性调整。但他明确反对破坏工作动力的全民基本收入（UBI），呼吁高净值群体主动承担更多社会责任，避免制度失衡导致不可挽回的危机。 总体而言，Allison呈现了地缘战术胜利与战略盲区并存的矛盾现实：美以对伊行动缺乏可行的政治终局，台海短期风险受制于现实平衡，而支撑全球和平的核不扩散架构面临侵蚀。但对美国而言，最大的隐患不在外部对手，而在于内部财富极化对民主制度合法性的销蚀。若无法让绝大多数民众分享发展成果，任何外部战略霸权都将失去根基。

## Background 本期视频由播客节目《All-In Podcast》于2026年3月9日发布在YouTube平台上。根据页面简介，主持人团队邀请了哈佛大学传奇学者格雷厄姆·艾利森（Graham Allison），深入探讨伊朗冲突的战略与终局、内塔尼亚胡对以色列及特朗普的影响、台海局势与中美谈判、格陵兰岛地缘博弈、核不扩散的“80-80-9”框架以及美国本土日益抬头的社会主义与财富不平等风险。 ## TL;DR 哈佛学者格雷厄姆·艾利森剖析了美以打击伊朗的军事行动，指出这是内塔尼亚胡如“亚哈船长”般的长期执念，警告打烂政权易但政权更迭和善后极难，需提防次生灾害与叙利亚化风险。在台海问题上，他基于解放军高层整肃、岛内政局演变及经济考量，研判短期内爆发武统的概率仅约5%，并倡导维持基辛格式的“战略模糊”。此外，艾利森阐释了维持现代和平的“80-80-9”核安全框架，并直面美国国内极其危险的财富鸿沟，警告顶层垄断大部分经济果实的现状正在动摇一人一票的民主根基并催生民粹反弹。 ## Atmosphere & style 整场对话在顶尖战略智囊的深厚洞察与硅谷精英的敏锐追问中展开，基调既理性审慎又充满思想火花。艾利森以其标志性的历史长镜头视角和生动风趣的比喻（如“F1赛车”、“办公桌上的墨点”、“达沃斯真人秀”），将复杂凶险的地缘博弈解构成极具画面感的博弈逻辑。对谈氛围在谈及核扩散与民主制度危机等沉重命题时显得严肃警醒，而在剖析政客心理与富豪责任时又不失机智幽默，最终在一种谦逊博学与惺惺相惜的温和共鸣中圆满收尾。 ## Bulletin - [04:32](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yAHfG6jU2qA&t=272s) 格雷厄姆·艾利森将对伊军事行动定性为“内塔尼亚胡的战争”，美以情报军力展现极高水准，但美国用来佐证伊朗迫在眉睫威胁的说辞几乎全无实质证据，摧毁政权易而战后重建极难。 - [24:28](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yAHfG6jU2qA&t=1468s) 艾利森研判北京在2026至2028年间全面进攻台湾的概率仅约5%，主因是寄望2028年岛内政局演变、解放军高层反腐整肃后指挥链仍在重构，以及对美介入带来的经济代价抱有顾虑。 - [34:32](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yAHfG6jU2qA&t=2072s) 中国按购买力平价（PPP）计算的经济体量已超美国25%，全球贸易占比攀升至35%，部署全球超半数工业制造机器人，正在以“角斗士式”的惨烈竞争重塑全球高精制造格局。 - [48:58](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yAHfG6jU2qA&t=2938s) 国际安全赖以维持的“80-80-9”奇迹框架（80年无大国战争、80年无实战核爆、仅9个拥核国）正遭受剧烈侵蚀，美国在朝鲜核扩散上的战略延误已成为针对本土的定时炸弹。 - [57:12](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yAHfG6jU2qA&t=3432s) 美国前10%至20%群体垄断了70%至80%的财富红利，艾利森警告在一人一票的民主体制下，极度失衡的贫富鸿沟在政治上绝不可持续，必然成为激进民粹与社会主义崛起的政治炸药。 ## Key takeaways - [01:14](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yAHfG6jU2qA&t=74s) 美以联军打击伊朗展现了顶尖的军事情报能力，但历史经验表明“破易立难”，强行推动政权更迭极易重蹈伊拉克与阿富汗的长期泥潭覆辙。 - [04:32](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yAHfG6jU2qA&t=272s) 内塔尼亚胡宛如《白鲸》中的亚哈船长，二十年来执念于消灭伊朗政权，此番成功游说特朗普开战，但白宫所列出的迫在眉睫威胁理由缺乏实质证据支持。 - [06:33](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yAHfG6jU2qA&t=393s) 特朗普对伊开战并非深谋远虑的跨战区宏大战略，而是战术窗口期诱惑与内塔尼亚胡描绘的“重塑中东蓝图”诱导下的即兴投机，伴随着巨大的次生灾害风险。 - [14:38](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yAHfG6jU2qA&t=878s) 对伊军事行动已触发剧烈的全球连锁反应，包括国际油气价格飙升、台湾面临天然气断供电力危机，以及原定援乌的爱国者防空系统被紧急调往中东。 - [16:34](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yAHfG6jU2qA&t=994s) 若伊朗政权彻底崩溃，由于其体量是伊拉克的数倍，可能演变为“叙利亚超级加强版”的长期派系内战与恐怖主义温床，带来美国无法承受的治安战代价。 - [22:24](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yAHfG6jU2qA&t=1344s) 内塔尼亚胡强硬的战争路线正在动摇以色列的民主根基，同时引发美国年轻一代选民及年轻犹太群体对以色列好感度的历史性暴跌。 - [24:28](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yAHfG6jU2qA&t=1468s) 北京短期内对台发动军事行动的概率仅约5%，因解放军高层经历大换血指挥链尚待磨合，且大陆内部倾向于等待2028年台湾选举出现两岸缓和契机。 - [29:37](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yAHfG6jU2qA&t=1777s) 特朗普在台湾问题上高度务实现实，曾用记号笔墨点比喻台湾、整张办公桌比喻中国大陆，地缘现实决定台湾生来极难单独防守，各方最优解是维持现状。 - [32:46](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yAHfG6jU2qA&t=1966s) 从2000年到2025年，中国在经济与工业维度完成了如同F1赛车般的惊人超车，按PPP计算的经济规模已反超美国25%，引发守成大国的深层战略焦虑。 - [37:18](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yAHfG6jU2qA&t=2238s) 中国不仅占据全球超过50%的工业机器人部署，更拥有让硅谷自愧不如的“角斗士式”残酷商业竞争生态，能以极高效率化解劳动力萎缩冲击。 - [39:50](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yAHfG6jU2qA&t=2390s) 特朗普谋求格陵兰岛更多是其一贯的“真人秀谈判”戏码，美国现有军事基地与长期租约已足以满足反导与北极安全需求，无需通过领土吞并来激怒核心盟友。 - [43:03](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yAHfG6jU2qA&t=2583s) 面对四倍于自身人口体量的中国全方位竞争，美国绝不能单打独斗，必须将加拿大、欧洲等具备战略分量的核心盟友紧密团结在跷跷板同侧。 - [48:58](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yAHfG6jU2qA&t=2938s) 战后国际秩序的核心支柱为“80-80-9”框架（80年大国无战事、80年无实战核爆、仅9个核国家），这一极脆弱的人工设计平衡正面临全面侵蚀。 - [52:44](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yAHfG6jU2qA&t=3164s) 放任朝鲜拥有上百枚核弹头及覆盖美国本土的导弹射程是历史上灾难性的外交失策，艾利森支持以色列对伊朗等潜在核能力的先发制人物理清零模式。 - [57:12](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yAHfG6jU2qA&t=3432s) 全美前10%至20%群体分走绝大部分繁荣蛋糕，而70%至80%的普通公众被彻底边缘化，这种贫富鸿沟与一人一票的民主制度天然冲突，正助推激进社会主义民粹浪潮。 - [01:01:12](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yAHfG6jU2qA&t=3672s) 面对潜在的民粹主义政治重构，掌握最多财富的顶层富豪面临最大的系统性风险，主动退让、加税或进行更具前瞻性的财富再分配是自我保护的必然选择。 ## Detailed walkthrough ### [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yAHfG6jU2qA&t=0s) 欢迎哈佛大学教授格雷厄姆·艾利森重返节目 主持人热烈欢迎哈佛大学传奇学者格雷厄姆·艾利森（Graham Allison）再次做客《All-In Podcast》。艾利森教授上次受邀是在洛杉矶举行的峰会上，自那之后，国际局势发生了剧烈的演变。主持人向听众介绍了艾利森的辉煌履历：他是哈佛大学肯尼迪政府学院（Harvard Kennedy School）的创始院长，自亨利·基辛格（Henry Kissinger）以来，他曾为历任美国国防部长提供咨询；在冷战结束时期，他曾协助拆解了 12,000 件苏联核武器；其著作《注定一战》（Destined for War）更是当今理解美中关系的奠基之作。 - 嘉宾身份：哈佛大学肯尼迪政府学院创始院长、资深地缘政治战略家。 - 主要功绩：为基辛格以来的历任国防部长建言献策、协助拆解 1.2 万件苏联核武、提出“修昔底德陷阱”与美中竞争分析框架。 --- ### [01:14](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yAHfG6jU2qA&t=74s) 伊朗变局：战争迷雾与至高军事情报展示 谈话切入眼下最紧迫的伊朗局势。美以联军正在对伊朗发动猛烈袭击，伊朗最高领袖阿里·哈梅内伊（Ali Khamenei）已经身亡，但政权体系仍在极力维持统治。面对主持人“这场冲突会把我们引向何方、我们是否正在梦游般迈向第三次世界大战”的提问，艾利森指出，当前最核心的事实是“疑问远多于答案”。正如克劳塞维茨所提出的“战争迷雾”（fog of war），如今这两大阵营各有强大的“造雾机”：一边是特朗普及其政府班子，另一边是本雅明·内塔尼亚胡（Benjamin Netanyahu），再加上外界各种喋喋不休的议论，局势充满了巨大的不确定性。特朗普和政府先后给出了多达六种开战理由，每一条都在摇摆；对于作战目标给出了五种不同版本；对于战事何时结束——是一天、一周还是一个月——没人知道。虽然公众习惯于寻求确凿的结论，但坦承“极度不确定”才是客观评估的起点。 艾利森紧接着提出了三个层面的鲜明判断：首先，这次行动展现了美国与以色列“顶级的军事与情报实力”（supreme military power and supreme intelligence power），过去一二十年积累的投资在实战中表现得超乎寻常，足以让全体美国人自豪；其次，对于哈梅内伊和伊斯兰共和国政权毫无同情可言，那是一个邪恶的领导人与邪恶的体制，它们遭遇任何毁灭性打击都值得拍手称快；但第三点也是至关重要的一点——“打烂一样东西远比重建一样东西容易”（breaking something is a lot easier than building something）。美军极为擅长摧毁既定目标，但历史一再证明，推动政权更迭（regime change）往往以失败告终。在伊拉克和阿富汗，当年政客们讲的每一套说辞和今天如出一辙，美国最终投入了上万亿美元并牺牲了数千名士兵的生命，结果美军进驻前塔利班在执政，美军撤离后阿富汗依然由塔利班统治。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 对伊军事行动的多维评估 accDescr: 艾利森教授对美以打击伊朗行动的核心观点拆解 subgraph Capability["能力与道义层面"] A["顶尖军事情报展示<br/>美以二十年技术积累"] B["消除哈梅内伊政权<br/>道义上毫无疑问的邪恶目标"] end subgraph Realities["现实与风险考量"] C["巨大的战争迷雾<br/>特朗普与内塔尼亚胡的双重造雾机"] D["破易立难的困境<br/>摧毁目标擅长，政权更迭失败率高（伊拉克/阿富汗）"] end Capability --> E["迅速赢得战术胜利"] Realities --> F["难以抽身甚至重蹈覆辙"] ``` --- ### [04:32](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yAHfG6jU2qA&t=272s) “这是内塔尼亚胡的战争”：亚哈船长的执念 艾利森提出了一个更为尖锐且更具争议的观点：“这是内塔尼亚胡的战争”（This is Bibi's war）。艾利森用经典小说《白鲸》（Moby Dick）中的亚哈船长（Captain Ahab）作比喻：亚哈终其一生痴迷于杀死那头白色巨鲸，而在过去二十年里，消灭伊朗政权就是内塔尼亚胡最压倒一切的头号诉求。内塔尼亚胡曾试图把这场战争兜售给奥巴马，接着兜售给第一任期的特朗普，又兜售给拜登，但都未成功。艾利森坦言，自己一直自认是“亲以色列但反内塔尼亚胡”（pro-Israel but anti-Bibi），对于内塔尼亚胡如何能够彻底“迷惑”（mesmerize）一向自诩精明的特朗普，他感到十分意外与震惊。 内塔尼亚胡在政治推销上固然才华横溢，但特朗普重复的许多开战借口在艾利森看来完全站不住脚： - 所谓“伊朗即将对美国本土发动袭击”：根本没有任何证据。 - 所谓“伊朗即将获得核武器”：看不到任何实质证据。 - 所谓“伊朗正在制造即将攻击美国的洲际弹道导弹（ICBM）”：同样毫无证据。 尽管伊朗政权劣迹斑斑，但政府用来佐证迫在眉睫威胁的说辞几乎全是站不住脚的。历史上战争总是“进去容易、抽身极难”。 --- ### [06:33](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yAHfG6jU2qA&t=393s) 特朗普的决策动机：地缘宏图还是即兴投机？ 主持人追问，特朗普下定决心的真正动机到底是什么？鉴于美国代表团下个月即将访华展开重磅谈判，特朗普是否把对伊开战当成在对华谈判前确立绝对优势的筹码？艾利森幽默地表示，如果这真是一盘深谋远虑的“宏大战略”（grand strategy），自己心里反倒会踏实很多，但现实并非如此。前一晚他刚刚与自己的前学生、知名评论员比尔·奥莱利（Bill O'Reilly）共进晚餐，两位资深“特朗普学者”（Trumpologists）在席间反复推敲这一决策逻辑。 艾利森分析，从战术时机来看，这纯粹是一次不可错过的窗口期：伊朗最高领袖与另外约 40 名高级领导层集体公开露面，构成了极佳的打击目标。但从战略层面来看，特朗普曾在竞选中高调承诺绝不重复过去的错误、绝不陷入“无休止且打不赢的战争”（endless winless wars），如今却毅然踩入泥潭。艾利森将此归结为两点：一是内塔尼亚胡单刀直入、善于雄辩的说服力确实如魔术师一般；二是特朗普本人行事高度依赖直觉且飘忽不定（erratic）。内塔尼亚胡极可能向特朗普描绘了一幅无比诱人的“战果愿景”——彻底根除伊朗政权及其所有代理人，从而重塑中东未来一代人的安全格局；如果整个中东能变得像阿联酋（UAE）一样繁荣现代，那对全人类都将是巨大福祉。特朗普很可能被这种无限美好的战果冲昏了头脑，完全忽视了背后的巨大风险与灾难性后果——如果次日就有美军军舰被击沉，或者数百名美军士兵丧生，整个舆论格局和战争性质就会瞬间逆转。 --- ### [09:23](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yAHfG6jU2qA&t=563s) 军事实力的“魔杖”效应与对华战略溢出 针对伊朗军事打击与此前针对委内瑞拉马杜罗（Maduro）政权的军事行动、以及下个月高规格访华谈判之间是否存在关联，艾利森认为它们并非完全割裂，但关联的机制在于心理认知。特朗普最初以为“关税”（tariffs）是一根无所不能的魔杖，但在经历波折后，他发现关税的实际威力并没有他在“解放日”所夸耀的那么灵验；然而，美国军队与情报系统展现出来的则是货真价实的“惊天魔杖”。对马杜罗的行动在军事情报层面精准绝伦，全球没有任何其他国家能够企及，这极大地提振了美国的自信。 然而，历史经验警示我们，这种绝对实力的展示也极易催生狂妄自大（hubris），让人误以为这根魔杖在任何领域都能百试百灵。艾利森赞同，让世界其他大国（包括中国）充分意识到美国拥有全球无可匹敌的绝对军事情报威慑力绝非坏事，这确实为即将到来的中美谈判提供了一个极为强势的战略背景。然而就打击伊朗的具体时间节点而言，它更多是战术机遇与被说服后的冲动，而非一盘精密的跨战区棋局。 - 关税 vs 军事：关税魔杖效果不及预期，而美军与情报系统的绝对威力让决策层信心爆棚并滋生傲慢。 - 对华谈判背景：强硬的实战军威客观上为对华谈判提供了威慑背景，但不能将其倒果为因地视为精密宏大战略的预设产物。 ### [11:02](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yAHfG6jU2qA&t=662s) 战争结束时间表与特朗普的预测市场逻辑 关于这场对伊战争究竟何时结束，各方的预期出现了明显的错位与脱节。特朗普计划于 3 月 29 日访问中国，如果战事持续三到四周，届时他已身在访华途中。如果按预测市场的逻辑来推断，特朗普极有可能在此之前就寻找台阶宣布战争“结束”，因为他需要腾出精力和时间将重心调整到中美高层博弈上。然而，五角大楼和以色列军方的官员却普遍认为，战事还会再持续至少一个月甚至更久。 - 特朗普的预定行程是其战略考量的关键锚点（预计 3 月底访华）。 - 国防部和以色列军方的时间表预期显著长于白宫，双方步调并不一致。 ### [11:44](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yAHfG6jU2qA&t=704s) 伊朗民主化幻觉与历史教训 对于乐观派设想的“伊朗从君主制到宗教独裁制，再在第三幕演变为 9300 万人口的现代民主国家”的前景，格雷厄姆·艾利森（Graham Allison）认为这种设想实在“太天真、太不切实际”。这让人不禁联想到伊拉克战争时期，小布什政府未能找到大规模杀伤性武器后，时任国务卿康多莉扎·赖斯（Condoleezza Rice）发表的演说，幻想着伊拉克能成为一个“向中东辐射稳定”的民主与市场经济灯塔。然而美国向来擅长描绘“我有一个梦想”式的蓝图，现实却往往相去甚远。 艾利森指出，更务实的目标并非奢求伊朗建立完美的民主，而是确保其政权不再谋求核武器、不再制造威胁美国及盟友的导弹、不再资助海外代理人。波斯文明拥有深厚悠久的历史，从居鲁士大帝到伯罗奔尼撒战争，文化底蕴极为辉煌，但当前却被一个极端政权所绑架。即便这个政权被推翻，现实中最可能接管权力的依然是“手里有枪的那批人”；只要这批新掌权者相对温和、不再敌视外部利益，就已经是相当理想的结果。 - 9300 万人口的伊朗若真能实现民主，对全球地缘博弈将是颠覆性的，但发生概率极低。 - 美国的合理诉求应是降低威胁门槛：弃核、限制弹道导弹能力、停止扶持中东代理人网络。 ### [14:38](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yAHfG6jU2qA&t=878s) 无法预料的连锁反应：全球能源、台湾断气与乌克兰防空被抽空 战争的最大铁律就是其不可预测性以及巨大的“次生灾害”（unintended consequences）。随着伊朗局势的恶化，国际油气价格飙升，其对全球其他经济体的冲击已经开始显现，许多国家因此将怨气撒在美国头上。 艾利森透露，就在前一天他还接到了来自中国台湾的紧急电话，对方直言：“有人考虑过这对我们会造成什么后果吗？”因为台湾大约一半的电力依赖进口天然气，而中东局势的恶化导致能源供应面临中断危险。与此同时，战火也波及到了欧洲战场——原计划部署给乌克兰用于抵御俄罗斯导弹袭击的爱国者防空系统（Patriot），被紧急抽调转向了中东以保护美军和盟友据点。虽然美军和情报部门的专业素养极高，且伊朗在开战首日的表现宛如“纸老虎”，但局势在多维度上的外溢与失控风险依然极高。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 对伊军事行动的全球连锁外溢效应 accDescr: 展示美国打击伊朗军事行动对能源供应、乌克兰军援以及全球盟友造成的连锁反应。 subgraph USAction["军事行动与直接打击"] A["美军军事行动推进"] --> B["波斯湾油气供应链受阻"] A --> C["战略军备资源重新调配"] end subgraph SecondOrderEffects["次生连锁冲击"] B --> D["台湾天然气断供危机<br/>(近半数电力依赖天然气)"] B --> E["全球油气价格飙升<br/>多国经济受挫并埋怨美国"] C --> F["爱国者防空系统调离欧洲<br/>乌克兰防空网络空虚"] end ``` ### [16:34](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yAHfG6jU2qA&t=994s) 彻底瓦解政权的风险：叙利亚化与中东泥潭 如果美军“过于成功”地彻底摧毁了伊朗政权，后果可能比想象中更危险。伊朗的体量远非伊拉克可比：伊拉克人口仅数千万，而伊朗拥有近 1 亿人口，国土面积是伊拉克的四倍，军事装备更精良，且伊斯兰革命卫队及其体制已经深深嵌入到整个国家的每一寸经济与工业脉络中。 如果按照康多莉扎·赖斯等人的建言，一鼓作气“彻底打垮对方”，留下的将是一个毫无基础设施、失去政治中枢、近亿人口陷于水深火热的巨大权力真空，这恰恰是极端主义恐怖势力滋生夺权的温床。美国根本没有资源和胃口再去承担一场长达数十年的“阿富汗/伊拉克 2.0”。潜在的恶果包括： - **叙利亚超级加强版（Syria Plus）**：国内各民族与派系爆发长期内战，甚至引发领土分裂与独立运动。 - **持久治安战泥潭**：重蹈阿富汗战争覆辙，在消耗海量资源和人力后依旧无法收拾残局。 ### [18:52](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yAHfG6jU2qA&t=1132s) 特朗普的撤出算盘与对内对外的政治撕裂 有人提出是否可能复制“委内瑞拉模式”——斩首最高蛇头但维持现有国家机器运转以避免全面崩溃。艾利森指出，尽管特朗普行事反复无常、冲动多变，但他有自己牢固的底层坐标：其权力的基本盘。 距离 11 月 3 日的大选节点并不遥远，经济状况是决定选情的核心变量，也是他处理中美关系的重要考量框架。国内对这场战争的支持度极低，民调显示反对与支持的比例约为六比四，因为白宫在动手前根本没有向公众做好政治动员。美国老百姓最关心的始终是经济和民生，外交事务通常只占选民关注度的 1% 到 2%。因此，特朗普很有可能在接下来的短时间内寻找说辞，宣布自己已经“斩断蛇头、摧毁其核能力与力量投射能力”，完成国防部口中的“削弱或毁灭”（destroy or degrade），然后声称接下来的路交由伊朗人民自己决定，从而体面抽身。 但这一计划的最大阻碍来自以色列总理内塔尼亚胡（Bibi），内塔尼亚胡坚持战斗直至伊朗政权彻底灰飞烟灭。更严峻的是美国国内政治维度的剧烈撕裂：此前国务卿马尔科·卢比奥（Marco Rubio）等人曾表态称“开战是因为以色列执意要打，美国别无选择”，随后又试图收回这一言论。在 MAGA 阵营内部，甚至蔓延出一种认为“特朗普背叛了他们、沦为以色列政府代理人”的强烈情绪与反犹暗流。对此，艾利森给出了自己的清晰立场：他本人一贯是“支持以色列，但坚决反对内塔尼亚胡”。内塔尼亚胡不代表整个以色列，他在以色列最尊重和熟悉的群体实际上是那些深具理性的国家安全建制派精英。 ### [22:24](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yAHfG6jU2qA&t=1344s) 内塔尼亚胡对以色列民主的冲击与美国代际裂痕 格雷厄姆·艾利森（Graham Allison）指出，以色列内部许多曾担任过国防军参谋长、摩萨德（Mossad）局长或辛贝特（Shin Bet，以色列国家安全局）负责人的资深安全界元老，以及庞大的情报与安全建制派内部人士，普遍形成了一种严峻共识：本雅明·内塔尼亚胡（Benjamin Netanyahu）正在亲手摧毁由大卫·本-古里安（David Ben-Gurion）所奠定、他们一生誓死捍卫的以色列民主根基。艾利森援引专栏作家托马斯·弗里德曼（Tom Friedman）的观点——外界绝不可能指责弗里德曼反犹，但他极其敏锐且勇敢地揭露了内塔尼亚胡对以色列民主机制造成的毁灭性打击。 这一政治演变对美国年轻一代犹太群体造成了极具破坏性的心理冲击。艾利森在哈佛等大学校园亲眼目睹了这种深刻撕裂：这些年轻学子原本渴望以以色列为荣，以色列建国数十年来的坚韧成就也完全配得上这种自豪感；然而，现实中他们看到的是约旦河西岸极端右翼定居者的肆意妄为、加沙地带令人窒息的人道惨状，以及一场甚至不再尝试以“相称性”（proportionality）原则来自我辩护的无休止战争。他们被迫发出痛苦的质问：“等等，这不是我想要为之自豪的国家。我想为伊扎克·拉宾（Yitzhak Rabin）的以色列自豪，想为埃胡德·巴拉克（Ehud Barak）的以色列自豪，想为本-古里安的以色列自豪。” 艾利森警告，内塔尼亚胡公然干涉美国内政并押注特定政治派系，必将招致严重的政治反噬。这种行为在民主党与共和党内部都将留下极其深远的长期负面遗产，尤其是在年轻选民群体中。民调数据显示，全美30岁以下年轻群体对以色列的支持率已经暴跌至令人震惊的冰点。 - **核心受损资产**：本-古里安确立的民主体制、历任安全部门（摩萨德、辛贝特、参谋本部）建立的建制信任 - **美以政治冲击**：美国年轻犹太群体的认同危机，以及美国30岁以下选民对以色列好感度的历史性暴跌 --- ### [24:28](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yAHfG6jU2qA&t=1468s) 台海局势研判：为何短期内武统概率仅有5%？ 讨论随后转向中美博弈的核心议题——台湾局势。主持人提到外界传闻委内瑞拉马杜罗政权若被颠覆可能会促使北京加速收台进程，且媒体披露美国中央情报局（CIA）曾就最早可能在次年爆发的突发事态警告过苹果首席执行官蒂姆·库克（Tim Cook）等科技巨头。艾利森澄清表示，外界可能误解了他的意思；虽然中国军队一直在严密观察并复盘全球战事，委内瑞拉局势或许只会让他们对美军的作战能力产生某种战略羡慕，但绝不会成为驱使北京进攻台湾的直接诱因。 艾利森明确给出判断：在2026年或2027年（甚至延续至2028年），只要台湾方面没有发生极端的重大挑衅，或出现偶发性不可控的第三方突发事件，北京对台发动全面进攻的概率极低。艾利森将其评估值定在与主流预测市场相当的水平——大约只有5%左右。针对主持人关于“为何概率如此之低”的追问，艾利森给出了三大核心逻辑支撑： ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 艾利森分析短期内台海冲突概率仅约5%的核心要素 accDescr: 流程图从政治演变、军队整肃、外部风险与特朗普立场四个维度展示为何北京短期内不会对台采取军事行动。 subgraph Internal ["对台政治策略与岛内演变"] A["坚持和平统一大纲"] --> B["民进党当局施政受阻<br/>(立法机构削减军购)"] B --> C["预期2028年大选<br/>国民党可能重新执政"] end subgraph Military ["解放军内部深度整肃"] D["军方高层深度清洗"] --> E["战区司令与四星将领级换血"] E --> F["对台作战指挥链体系重建仍需周期"] end subgraph External ["战略成本与白宫地缘博弈"] G["美国介入风险与经济代价"] H["特朗普务实交易风格<br/>(视台湾为小点、中国为整张办公桌)"] end Internal --> Decision{"短期内发动军事打击概率极低 (约5%)"} Military --> Decision External --> Decision ``` 首先，北京内部对局势发展抱有“和平统一”的战略定力，并认为当前趋势正朝着有利于自身的方向演变。民进党（DPP）当局在立法机构内部受到在野党阵营的强力牵制，甚至连美国批准的价值110亿美元对台军售案，立法机构很可能连一半预算都无法通过。现任台湾地区领导人处境维艰，北京研判在2028年1月的选举中，对大陆持相对温和、倾向对话的中国国民党（KMT）完全有可能重新上台，从而推动两岸关系回归缓和轨道。 其次，解放军近年来经历了一场罕见的深层内部反腐与军队高层人事大洗牌。艾利森直言，这种整肃规模在外界看来难以置信——相当于美军体制内所有四星上将、各大战区联合作战司令、乃至所有本该直接负责台海作战方向的关键战役指挥官都被解职撤换。尽管常规军事装备建设日新月异，但在指挥链和军事领导班子完成全面整合与重构之前，北京很难下定决心发动一场超大规模的跨海两栖战役。 第三，中方高层深知一旦动武，面临着美国军事介入的现实风险，这势必对中国经济基本盘造成严重冲击，而经济发展在当前依然是最高层的重中之重。 - **军售受阻现实**：美国此前批准的110亿美元对台军售计划，因岛内立法机构在野阵营杯葛，预计半数预算面临流产风险 - **军队整肃现状**：涉及多位相当于美军“四星上将”和“战区司令”层级的军事指挥官被替换，作战指挥架构仍处于重整期 - **短期冲突概率**：2026-2027年爆发武力夺岛行动的概率被评估为仅约5% --- ### [29:37](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yAHfG6jU2qA&t=1777s) 战略模糊、历史现状与特朗普的“办公桌比喻” 谈及美国领导人的应对风格，艾利森直言，在台湾问题上，唐纳德·特朗普可能是中国近年来遇到过的“最为随和、最不具教条主义倾向”（most accommodating）的美国总统。特朗普从不掩饰自己对台湾的地缘政治现实主义看法。艾利森分享了一则白宫回忆录中记载的著名逸事：在椭圆形办公室里讨论台湾问题时，有人问及他对台湾防务的看法，特朗普随即抓起手边标志性的黑色粗体 Sharpie 记号笔，在坚毅桌（Resolute Desk）的一个角落重重戳了一个墨点，说：“这是台湾。”随后，他用手掌在整张庞大的办公桌边缘画了一个巨大的大圈，说：“而这是中国。”这种纯粹从体量差距出发的直觉，决定了特朗普在台海介入意愿上的现实主义态度。 针对主持人提出的“台湾是否具备不可替代的防卫战略必要性，以及美国半导体回流是否属于对冲手段”的问题，艾利森剖析了地缘现实：台湾远在地球另一端，距离美国本土万里之遥，却紧挨着中国大陆海岸线仅约90英里；在极端地缘战术上，如果中国大陆倾尽国力决意摧毁或夺取台湾，台湾在地理上犹如冷战时期的古巴，本质上是“生来就极难单独防守的”（inherently indefensible）。 然而过去50年的和平红利证明，自基辛格破冰访华与《上海公报》确立“战略模糊”（strategic ambiguity）框架以来，这一现状行之有效： 1. **一个中国原则与各自表述**：美方承认海峡两岸都坚持一个中国、北京是唯一合法政府，同时对台湾与大陆的最终政治演变形式保持弹性，坚持任何解决方案都必须以和平方式达成； 2. **两岸各自发展的繁荣期**：在过去半个世纪里，台湾内部社会自由与经济发展获得了最黄金的窗口期，两岸人民均享受了历史上绝无仅有的50年和平繁荣。 艾利森经常向台湾地区的朋友忠告：“千万不要把这手好牌打烂了（Don't screw it up）。”对北京而言，艾利森的建议同样直白：如果北京关于“中国不可阻挡的历史性崛起”的核心叙事成立，那么再过一到二十年，相较于庞大强盛的中国本体，台湾在地缘体量上将渺小得“如同一只跳蚤”（look like a flea），届时根本不再构成难题；反之，若中国内部经济与现代化叙事受挫，台湾更不会是北京最主要的麻烦。因此，各方最好的选择就是继续维持现状，聚焦各自内部发展。 --- ### [32:46](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yAHfG6jU2qA&t=1966s) 经济放缓与大国崛起：F1赛车视角的中国速度 对话最后切入中国近期的宏观经济目标与其在全球投射影响力的长远战略。主持人指出，中国近期设定的GDP增长目标约为4.5%至5%，这在中国现代经济增长史上属于罕见的相对低位区间。主持人借此询问：在一个多极化格局逐渐显现的世界里，中国是否必须持续向全球输出地缘与经济影响力才能维持国内民生预期，抑或在更低的增速下依然能够稳住阵脚？ 艾利森首先校正了审视大国博弈的时间坐标系。他强调，中国依然是一个处于“流星般飞速崛起”（meteoric rising power）进程中的超级力量。人类近代文明史上，从来没有任何一个单一国家能够在如此之多的复合维度上，以如此惊人的速度从底层完成全方位跃升。 艾利森用了一个生动的“F1一级方程式赛车”比喻来概括中美两国综合国力的相对位移： - **2000年视角**：如果把中美博弈看作一场高速赛道上的F1角逐，在2000年拿出任何衡量国家实力的标准切片，我们在后视镜里根本找不着中国赛车的影子——因为它被远远甩在几个弯道之后，甚至连轮廓都看不见； - **2025年视角**：仅仅过了25年，到了2025年，我们在后视镜里同样找不着中国赛车了——不是因为它落后了，而是因为它已经直接与我们并排疾驰在同一条直道上，甚至在好几个关键细分技术与产业赛道中，它已经悄然领先了我们半个车身。 艾利森指出，这种在四分之一世纪内完成的历史性反超与并驾齐驱，无论从工业产能、科技迭代还是战略规模来看，都足以令人感到惊愕不已，这也是当今世界所有地缘政治剧震与心理焦虑的最根本源头。 ### [34:32](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yAHfG6jU2qA&t=2072s) 中美实力消长与“修昔底德陷阱”下的经济大叙事 格雷厄姆·艾利森（Graham Allison）深入剖析了支撑中美对抗的底层力量——急剧变化的经济与技术实力对比。在 2000 年，中国的 GDP 占全球比重不足 5%，换算下来还不到美国经济规模的四分之一；而如今按购买力平价（PPP）计算，中国的经济体量已经比美国大出 25%。贸易领域的反转同样惊人：2000 年中国仅占全球贸易总额的 5%，美国占 15%；如今中国攀升至 35%，美国仅占 25%。无论是 5G 还是电动汽车（EV），中国在前沿技术领域均已展现出惊人的崛起势头。这种不可阻挡的实力跃升，构成了中国“伟大叙事”的核心支柱：坚信中国必将重返国际秩序的顶端，先在自身区域内拔得头筹，进而扩大影响力；与此同时，这一叙事还对应着“美国无可挽回的衰落”，中国观察者认为美国卷入不必要的地缘战争正是其步入下坡路的明证。 这种天平两端力量的倾斜，打破了原有国际格局的均势，造成了一种极具流变性和危险性的动态结构。艾利森指出，这种剧烈变动往往让政策制定者感到茫然无措；最危险的情况莫过于在台湾海峡等热点区域发生意外或突发摩擦，随后引发一系列以牙还牙、报复升级的恶性循环，最终在双方都始料未及的情况下被卷入全面战争。 播客主持团队随后抛出中国的内部隐忧：一方面，中国矢志成为全球制造业的枢纽、世界铸造厂与总供应链；但另一方面，它正面临人口结构塌陷以及高企的青年失业率（部分地区高达 15% 至 20%）。随着人工智能、自动化和无人驾驶快速渗透，底层蓝领与司机岗位首当其冲，这是否会成为中国未来发展的巨大瓶颈？ - **经济体量对比**：按购买力平价（PPP）计算，中国经济规模已超美国 25%；全球贸易占比从 2000 年的 5% 激增至 35%（同期美国从 15% 变为 25%）。 - **修昔底德陷阱动力学**：新兴大国的崛起与守成大国的焦虑交织，台湾海峡等突发意外极易诱发无法挽回的连锁升级反应。 - **中国核心挑战**：人口出生率下滑与劳动力萎缩，叠加青年高失业率与 AI 自动化对就业岗位的替代压力。 --- ### [37:18](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yAHfG6jU2qA&t=2238s) 自动化、小米造车与黄仁勋眼中的“未来社会” 面对自动化与失业率的质疑，艾利森将视角转向了中国令人惊叹的工业自动化进程。他援引埃隆·马斯克（Elon Musk）的预言指出，未来世界上机器人的数量将远超人类，而令马斯克最感到危机、能在竞争中“痛击特斯拉”的顶级机器人研发力量，恰恰来自中国。艾利森回忆起自己前不久在 1 月份实地探访小米（Xiaomi）工厂的震撼经历：在目睹苹果公司耗资数十亿美元造车却无疾而终后，原本主营智能手机的小米仅仅用了 3 年时间就成功下线量产电动车，且市场需求极其爆棚。更惊人的是其制造能力——工厂内设有三条流水线，其中一条完全由工业机器人全自动化操作。 目前全球超过一半的工业制造机器人都部署在中国。因此，一部分战略学者认为，如果劳动力萎缩的问题主要在于“缺少工人”，那么高密度的机器人部署在很大程度上能化解人口结构带来的经济冲击。针对青年失业与教育错配问题，艾利森风趣地调侃道，中美两国其实同病相怜：中国有大量大学毕业生所学专业与市场需求严重脱节，而美国也有一大批攻读“DEI”（多元、平等与包容）相关学科的大学生毕业后根本找不到工作。 此外，艾利森强调中国社会对新技术的接纳与吸收能力极其激进。他提到英伟达（NVIDIA）CEO 黄仁勋（Jensen Huang）访问中国后的感慨：“天哪，我仿佛来到了未来。”在当今的中国城市，民众出门不仅不用硬币和纸币，甚至连支票和信用卡也彻底消失了，全靠人脸识别与移动支付便能畅行无阻。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 制造业智能化与技术采纳对比 accDescr: 展示中国在自动化转型与新技术采纳上的核心驱动机制与实际表现。 subgraph Automation ["工业智能化与产能转化"] A["劳动力结构承压<br/>(人口减少与青年失业)"] --> B["超高密度部署工业机器人<br/>(占全球工业机器人总量超 50%)"] B --> C["跨界极速制造落地<br/>(如小米 3 年造车完备全自动产线)"] end subgraph Adoption ["社会端技术适配与采纳"] D["无现金社会形态<br/>(无纸币/支票/信用卡，人脸识别与移动支付)"] E["产业高度竞争与迭代<br/>(黄仁勋感叹‘来到了未来’)"] end C -.-> E ``` --- ### [39:50](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yAHfG6jU2qA&t=2390s) 格陵兰岛争端：北极地缘战略、导弹防御与特朗普的“真人秀谈判” 讨论随后转向了北极圈与格陵兰岛这一长远的地缘竞争高地。主持人提出，特朗普推动获取格陵兰岛的举动，背后是否是出于防范中俄跨越北极圈的军事威胁？格陵兰岛究竟具有何种不可替代的战略地位？ 艾利森给出了相当直接的研判：“根据我最敬重的专家的判断，美国完全不需要通过入侵或购买来拥有格陵兰岛，就能获得我们所需要的一切。”从军事与国家安全角度来看： 1. **反导战略前哨**：格陵兰岛长期以来是美国导弹防御预警体系的关键节点，拥有图勒空军基地（Thule Air Base，现皮图菲克太空基地）。美国虽然关闭了过去的两个附属基地，但只要需要，随时可以根据意愿增设更多军事设施，丹麦与格陵兰当地政府对此态度相当配合。对于特朗普嫌弃短期租赁并追求彻底控制权的立场，艾利森打趣道，签一份类似“99年期的长期租赁合同”就已经完全够用了，“在 99 年之后，天晓得世界会变成什么样”。 2. **北极航道与海上封锁现实**：随着北极冰川消融，极地海上航线逐渐开辟。沿海各方对区域海权展开声索，主要利益攸关方是俄罗斯和加拿大，美国则依托阿拉斯加分得一杯羹。然而海军专家向艾利森透露，极地航道的封锁在现代海战中已经改变了形态——军方不再需要派遣水面战舰去人工拦截狭窄水道，而是依托智能水雷、空袭或水下潜艇实施伏击。 艾利森诙谐地评价，特朗普对收购格陵兰岛的狂热，很大程度上更像是一种“找乐子”的游戏作风。熟悉特朗普性格的知情人士常提醒道，特朗普骨子里首先是一位“真人秀制片人兼领衔主演”：他最享受的流程就是平地起惊雷般制造一出戏剧性冲突，把外界胃口和紧张气氛拉到最高点，随后顺理成章地推进并达成某种戏剧化的协议解决。 --- ### [43:03](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yAHfG6jU2qA&t=2583s) 欧洲社会主义担忧、“角斗士式”资本主义与盟友杠杆 针对艾利森将格陵兰岛视作特朗普“真人秀谈判”的观点，主持团队提出了严肃的逆向假说：有鹰派观点担忧西欧国家的治理模式正全面滑向“社会主义”；长此以往，欧洲国家很可能会在经济与地缘政治上更深地落入中国的影响力轨道。假若丹麦的外交政策受到北京的间接左右，美国如果在今天不果断对格陵兰岛建立实质性的长远控制权，未来一旦面临大国摊牌，就可能彻底丧失北极咽喉要地。 艾利森坦言这种视角新颖，但他提醒人们不要机械地给意识形态贴标签： - **中国经济体制的真实底色**：中国虽然在政治上是威权主义且由一党领导，但其国内经济生态在许多领域却是极其残酷的“丛林资本主义”。艾利森援引一位商界友人的生动比喻：中国的商业竞争完全是一场“角斗士式的大决斗”，其惨烈程度让硅谷引以为傲的竞争显得苍白无力、温和如水。 - **以新能源汽车为例的残酷淘汰赛**：政府选定赛道（如电动车）后会向初创企业发放扶持与补贴，随后便任由成百上千家公司在竞技场内自相残杀，沿途淘汰踩碎无数跟不上节奏的失败者，最终决出五到十家巨头。被淘汰的边际产能和过剩库存为了活下去，会完全抛开沉没的资本开支（Capex）以超低价向全球疯狂抛售清仓。 回到欧洲地缘政策与盟友关系上，艾利森发出关键警示：特朗普政府过去在战略决策上的一大硬伤，就是未能充分认清“大国制衡的天平规律”。如果美国决心要与拥有自身四倍人口体量的中国展开全方位的超级大国竞争，就绝不可能单打独斗，必须将具有真正分量和影响力的核心盟友牢牢维系在跷跷板的同一侧，唯有如此，才能确保自身在博弈中不被压垮。 ### [46:03](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yAHfG6jU2qA&t=2763s) 对待盟友与达沃斯峰会上的“真人秀”戏剧 格雷厄姆·艾利森（Graham Allison）谈到美国与核心盟友的外交策略时指出，偶尔给盟友“冲个冷水澡”（give your ally a cold bath）以促使其清醒、振作，确实是一种外交手段；但如果把加拿大推向美国的对立面、甚至让加拿大人将美国视为敌人，这种策略就极其荒谬且反常了。艾利森以马克·卡尼（Mark Carney）为例，回忆自己早在卡尼于哈佛读本科时就已相识，直言卡尼骨子里几乎就像美国人一样亲近。然而，一旦你在公开场合威胁一个政治家的政治生存，甚至扬言要吞并或剥夺别国领土，这就踩中了最致命的红线，必然会激起强烈的敌意与反弹。在需要争取具备重量级实力的盟友站在自己这一侧“跷跷板”上时，这种极限施压的打法显得极不寻常。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 达沃斯峰会上的特朗普外交真人秀演变过程 accDescr: 展现特朗普在达沃斯峰会上通过悬念、威胁、缓和与协议构建的四步真人秀模式 subgraph Phase1["悬念铺垫"] A["前两日半全场屏息猜测"] --> B["全城停摆围观两小时脱口秀"] end subgraph Phase2["极限施压与教父式台词"] B --> C["高调扬言准备入侵格陵兰"] C --> D["搬出黑手党威胁：'轻松解决还是痛苦解决'"] end subgraph Phase3["峰回路转与降温"] D --> E["轻描淡写宣布放弃入侵计划"] E --> F["会场紧张情绪瞬间释放并降温"] end subgraph Phase4["落定框架"] F --> G["宣布成立和平委员会并达成协议框架"] end ``` 谈及前不久的达沃斯世界经济论坛（WEF），艾利森分享了现场荒诞而戏剧化的一幕。整个达沃斯几乎被特朗普彻底主导：前两天半，全场政商精英都在焦灼地猜测特朗普到场后究竟会说些什么；当他登台进行长达两个小时的脱口秀式演讲时，整个小镇几乎陷入停摆，随后两天大家又都在手忙脚乱地分析和解读刚刚发生了什么。在特朗普首届政府中短暂任职白宫通讯联络办公室主任的安东尼·斯卡拉穆奇（Anthony Scaramucci，“The Mooch”）早在第一晚的活动中就对艾利森准确预言了整场戏码：这就是一部纯粹的“真人秀”。 - **剧情开场与极限威慑**：先抛出足以引爆舆论的重磅炸弹——扬言要入侵盟友格陵兰岛，全场震惊；随后在演讲中拉扯铺垫，甚至搬出类似《教父》里的黑手党台词，威胁对方“你可以选择轻松解决，也可以选择痛苦解决”（the easy way or the hard way）。 - **反转与情绪降温**：就在所有人惶恐不安、以为大难临头时，特朗普在讲稿中轻描淡写地插了一小段，宣布“我决定不入侵格陵兰了”，顷刻间把枪从谈判桌上拿走，会场气氛骤然缓和。 - **协议收尾**：到了第三天，他又宣布启动和平委员会或达成和平框架协议。艾利森笑称，特朗普在很多时候其实是在乐在其中、享受这种自编自导的戏剧效果，但这种手段确实能够彻底抓住全世界的注意力。 --- ### [48:58](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yAHfG6jU2qA&t=2938s) 国际安全的“80-80-9”分析框架 面对国际局势的剧烈震荡，艾利森提出了一个用以审视当代大国安全本质的核心框架——“80-80-9”。这三个看似简单的数字，分别回答了三个决定当今世界秩序的根本问题。只要理解了这三个数字背后的含义，就能看清几乎所有生活在当代的人（包括我们父母这一代）所经历的世界安全全貌。 ```mermaid flowchart LR accTitle: 艾利森80-80-9国际安全框架 accDescr: 展示80年无大国战争、80年无核武用于实战、当今仅9个核国家的逻辑架构 subgraph F80_1["第一个 80"] A["80年无大国战争"] --> A1["二战与罗马和平以来最长和平"] A1 --> A2["极其脆弱的人工设计秩序"] end subgraph F80_2["第二个 80"] B["80年无核武器用于实战"] --> B1["广岛长崎后未再用于战争"] B1 --> B2["在1945年预测赔率高达万比一"] end subgraph F9["关键数字 9"] C["全球现存仅9个拥核国"] --> C1["原预测70年代达25-30国"] C1 --> C2["防扩散机制面临严重侵蚀"] end ``` - **第一个“80”：大国之间已维持了整整80年没有爆发世界大战**。自古罗马和平（Pax Romana）以来，这是人类有文字记载的历史上持续时间最长的和平时期。艾利森强调，这绝非历史的“自然状态”，而是极其反常的例外。它并非偶然发生，而是二战亲历者痛定思痛、为了避免在一战和二战之后迅速爆发第三次世界大战而刻意设计的国际新秩序。古巴导弹危机等重大节点原本极易擦枪走火，这套秩序是一项需要不断修补的脆弱工程，如今正因多重因素不可避免地遭受侵蚀。 - **第二个“80”：自广岛和长崎之后，整整80年没有核武器被用于实战**。如果倒退回1945年或1950年，在预测市场上押注未来80年人类不再将核武用于战争，赔率至少是一万比一。作为终结二战的终极大杀器，在长达八十年的大国冷战与博弈中竟一次也没有被再次引爆于战争，这本身就是一个近乎不可思议的奇迹。 - **数字“9”：全世界目前仅有9个拥有核武器的主权国家**。核武器通常被视为终极安全保障，早在1963年，美国总统约翰·肯尼迪就曾悲观预测，到1970年代全球将出现25至30个拥核国，因为任何具备技术能力的国家都会倾向于研发核武。而现实中，目前世界上有90至95个国家只要下定决心，在一两年内就能造出原子弹。在1970年代，瑞典、韩国甚至中国台湾都曾拥有严肃的核武器研发计划，但美国通过施压将其叫停，并主导建立了国际核不扩散体系，才奇迹般地把拥核国数量锁死在9个。 艾利森感叹，人们在盘点值得感恩的事物时，最该感恩的就是这80年没有大国战争；否则今天所有人都不可能坐在这里讨论这些议题。然而，这三个数字所代表的脆弱平衡正在加速瓦解，绝不能被视为理所当然。 --- ### [52:44](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yAHfG6jU2qA&t=3164s) 阻止核扩散的失误：朝鲜教训与以色列模式 对话转入具体的核扩散风险。主持人指出，伊朗此前几乎就要成为第10个核武装国家，而最近挤进这个“俱乐部”的两个国家是巴基斯坦和朝鲜，历史上还发生过巴基斯坦核科学家阿卜杜勒·卡迪尔·汗（A.Q. Khan）跨国兜售核技术的恶劣事件。主持人发问：西方、东方乃至全人类领导层当年容许巴基斯坦和朝鲜拥核，是否犯下了历史性大错？ 艾利森对以色列在核扩散问题上的“先发制人模式”（affirmative non-proliferation，积极防扩散）给予了高度关注。以色列的核心逻辑非常直白：绝不允许自家后院出现核武器。从早年奔袭伊拉克摧毁奥斯拉克（Osirak）核反应堆，到十多年前定点清除叙利亚境内由朝鲜援建的核设施，再到近期主导（并由美方协同参与）对伊朗核设施实施毁灭性打击，以色列始终通过军事手段直接消灭潜在核能力。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 以色列与大国核防扩散策略对比 accDescr: 对比以色列坚决摧毁敌对核设施的硬性阻断路线与美中在朝鲜半岛的外交延误失策 subgraph IsraelModel["以色列：积极防扩散路线"] I1["摧毁伊拉克奥斯拉克反应堆"] I2["摧毁叙利亚境内朝鲜援建核设施"] I3["联合美国主导打击伊朗核设施"] I1 --> I2 --> I3 --> I_End["物理清零潜在威胁"] end subgraph KoreanLesson["半岛教训：大国博弈失控"] K1["朝核早期研发推进"] --> K2["美中缺乏强力硬牌制约"] K2 --> K3["金正恩坐拥百枚以上弹头及洲际导弹"] K3 --> K_End["形成针对本土的定时炸弹"] end ``` 尽管艾利森对发动战争持审慎态度，但面对核扩散的巨大威胁，他直言支持打击伊朗核武库的行动，并对当年在朝鲜问题上的外交失败感到痛心疾首。他曾当面向中国官员直言，美中两国在防范朝鲜拥核上犯下了灾难性错误： - **错失的摊牌时机**：艾利森认为，美方当年最该对中方亮出的强硬底牌是：“核武器要么朝鲜和韩国同时拥有，要么双方都不得拥有，由你们二选一。”通过施加连带后果迫使各方全力掐灭扩散苗头。 - **现实的安全噩梦**：如今朝鲜最高领导人金正恩已掌握超过100枚核弹头，且导弹射程足以覆盖美国本土。艾利森提醒道，人们都在紧张关注伊朗潜在的导弹射程，但实际上朝鲜发射导弹打到波士顿，仅仅比从伊朗打过来多飞大约20到25分钟。放任朝鲜拥核是一颗不折不扣的定时炸弹。 - **外交尝试的彻底失败**：特朗普第一任期曾倾注巨大精力试图解决朝核危机，虽然无功而返，但艾利森认为那已经是一次极具诚意的尝试；因为在此之前，美国尝试过的其他20种常规外交手段同样一无所获。 - **大国的地缘顾虑**：中国官方对朝鲜拥核在国际舆论中多少感到难堪，但更令中方难以忍受的是连锁反应——若局势持续恶化促使韩国或日本建立核武库，将是北京的终极噩梦；这好比美国绝不可能坐视委内瑞拉或加拿大研发核武器一样。 --- ### [56:20](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yAHfG6jU2qA&t=3380s) 转向美国本土：民主社会主义抬头与2028年政治风险 在结束全球地缘政治与安全大局的探讨后，对话视角转回美国国内政治生态。主持人指出，自双方上次交流以来，全美多地相继选出了公开自称“民主社会主义者”或隶属于“美国民主社会主义者”（DSA, Democratic Socialists of America）的市长与地方官员。一股带有鲜明社会主义色彩的民粹主义浪潮正在美国政坛迅速蔓延，许多政治候选人不仅言行举止符合典型深层社会主义者的特征，更在积极推动极端的社会主义再分配与管制政策。 主持人向艾利森抛出了一个关乎美国长远未来的尖锐问题：如果这种民粹社会主义潮流继续沿着现有轨迹演变，将给美国的经济根基与体制稳定带来多大的系统性风险？尤其是展望2028年大选，假若届时民主党同时赢下参众两院的控制权，并推举出一名风格极其激进、带有强烈DSA色彩的民粹派总统候选人，美国将被带向何方？ ### [57:12](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yAHfG6jU2qA&t=3432s) 财富鸿沟与民主危机：不平等的政治炸弹与政策探讨 格雷厄姆·艾利森（Graham Allison）坦言，主持人们提出的问题虽然激进且令人不适，但却无比真实且亟待面对。近期他仔细审视了美国贫富差距的相关数据，直言其悬殊程度令人难以置信。在过去整整一代人的时间里，经济发展的红利几乎全部被最顶层的极少数人——无论是前 0.01%、1%、10% 还是 20%——所攫取，而这正是台上嘉宾及其实际认识的所有人所身处的世界。因此，当精英阶层欢欣鼓舞地庆祝股市连续三年迎来牛市、收益率攀升 15% 或 16% 时，全美 70% 到 80% 的普通民众在现实生活中根本无法分享分毫。艾利森发出严厉警告：在一人一票的民主体制中，如果社会顶层 10% 到 20% 的群体分走了 70% 至 80% 的经济蛋糕，这种架构在政治上是绝对不可持续的。 这种日益加剧的脱节与不公感，必然成为民粹主义和煽动家崛起的政治催化剂。艾利森指出，面对如此悬殊的财富鸿沟，甚至不需要刻意煽动，任何人都会本能地高呼“这不公平、不合理”。他坦承这一问题极其危险且积重难返，尽管自己平时专注于国际安全事务，但回头审视这些残酷数据时依然心惊肉跳。面对愈发激进的思潮，艾利森赞同为儿童设立投资账户以让他们在国家财富中拥有资产份额的方案，甚至表示自己完全愿意多缴纳 10% 的税款来进行社会财富调节；但他对直接发钱的救济机制或无条件基本收入（UBI）持保留态度，认为靠政府兜底供养缺乏生产力的人群会侵蚀奋斗动机。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 财富鸿沟导致民主政体不稳定的传导机制 accDescr: 资本牛市收益集中在顶层阶层，底层70%到80%民众被边缘化，进而催生民粹主义与对体制公平性的质疑。 subgraph Economy["经济结构失衡"] A["股市繁荣与资本增值"] --> B["前10%至20%群体分走70%至80%的财富蛋糕"] C["全美70%至80%普通民众被边缘化"] end subgraph Politics["政治后果与反馈"] B & C --> D["一人一票的民主体制"] D --> E["公平感知崩塌：'这不合理、不公平'"] E --> F["激进民粹主义与煽动性政客崛起"] end ``` - **财富集中现状**：长达一代人的经济红利被前 0.01% 至 20% 的富裕阶层垄断，而连续多年的大牛市与 70% 到 80% 普通公众的现实生活完全脱节。 - **民主制度与分配冲突**：普选权赋予每位选民平等的投票权，当极少数人拿走绝大部分社会财富时，体制天然缺乏长期稳定的根基。 - **政策取向分歧**：支持通过政策让下一代获得资产分配份额（如特朗普提及的儿童账户），认可向高收入群体额外加税 10% 进行财富再平衡；但对 UBI 等消磨奋斗动机的直接救济保持高度戒备，坚持“给大众涂抹面包的果酱必须分润到 70% 的人手中”。 --- ### [01:01:12](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yAHfG6jU2qA&t=3672s) 顶层阶层的自救与责任：从慈善号召到全期对谈致谢 主持人们随之跟进讨论指出，当前政坛正在热议最低工资法案和各类财产税提议。弗里德伯格（David Friedberg）与主持人们强调，处于金字塔顶端的人实际上在这场潜在的社会巨变中“拥有最多可以失去的东西”，他们本就拥有几辈子都无法耗尽的财富，因此最应该主动思考如何更具战略性、更慷慨地回馈与再分配财富。特朗普在国情咨文中便公开点名赞扬了戴尔（Michael Dell）等商界领袖率先做出重大捐赠承诺，主持人们认为这种来自最高层的公开呼吁切中要害，也促使很多高净值群体反思自己是否应该采取不同的行动。 节目尾声，主持人们向艾利森致以极高敬意，引用名言“衡量一个人的博学与深刻，莫过于看他的谦逊与优雅”，盛赞他洞悉当今世界最复杂的地缘政治与经济困局，却始终保持极高的温和与谦逊。主持人们表示与艾利森的深度对话是全年的重头戏，期盼未来能每年线下常态化相聚。艾利森则风趣地回应，感谢主持团队提出如此尖锐且充满挑战的难题，笑称今晚回家得在被窝里好好思考“社会主义”的课题了。对谈在轻松愉快的笑声与节目标志性的全情投入（All-In）宣告中落下帷幕。 - **财富税与最低工资争议**：政策层面上虽然存在执行难度与理念分歧，但顶层富豪通过更具前瞻性的慈善捐赠主动疏导社会矛盾已成共识。 - **富豪阶层的危机感**：顶层精英掌握着花不完的资本，在民粹风暴面前承担着最高的系统性风险，主动退让与分享财富实为自我保护。 - **学者风范与幽默收尾**：艾利森以极其谦逊的态度面对全球危机探讨，幽默感叹这场关于贫富分化与社会主义的深度交锋将成为他今夜难以入眠的思想作业。 ## Notable quotes > [01:14](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yAHfG6jU2qA&t=74s) 打烂一样东西远比重建一样东西容易 — Graham Allison > [04:32](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yAHfG6jU2qA&t=272s) 这是内塔尼亚胡的战争 — Graham Allison > [14:38](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yAHfG6jU2qA&t=878s) 有人考虑过这对我们会造成什么后果吗？ — 来自中国台湾的通话者 > [22:24](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yAHfG6jU2qA&t=1344s) 这不是我想要为之自豪的国家。我想为伊扎克·拉宾的以色列自豪，想为埃胡德·巴拉克的以色列自豪，想为本-古里安的以色列自豪。 — Graham Allison > [29:37](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yAHfG6jU2qA&t=1777s) 这是台湾……而这是中国。 — Donald Trump > [29:37](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yAHfG6jU2qA&t=1777s) 千万不要把这手好牌打烂了 — Graham Allison > [37:18](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yAHfG6jU2qA&t=2238s) 天哪，我仿佛来到了未来。 — 黄仁勋（Jensen Huang） > [39:50](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yAHfG6jU2qA&t=2390s) 根据我最敬重的专家的判断，美国完全不需要通过入侵或购买来拥有格陵兰岛，就能获得我们所需要的一切。 — Graham Allison > [46:03](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yAHfG6jU2qA&t=2763s) 你可以选择轻松解决，也可以选择痛苦解决 — Donald Trump > [52:44](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yAHfG6jU2qA&t=3164s) 核武器要么朝鲜和韩国同时拥有，要么双方都不得拥有，由你们二选一。 — Graham Allison > [57:12](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yAHfG6jU2qA&t=3432s) 在一人一票的民主体制中，如果社会顶层 10% 到 20% 的群体分走了 70% 至 80% 的经济蛋糕，这种架构在政治上是绝对不可持续的。 — Graham Allison ## Mentioned 格雷厄姆·艾利森（Graham Allison）, All-In Podcast, 哈佛大学肯尼迪政府学院（Harvard Kennedy School）, 亨利·基辛格（Henry Kissinger）, 《注定一战》（Destined for War）, 阿里·哈梅内伊（Ali Khamenei）, 本雅明·内塔尼亚胡（Benjamin Netanyahu）, 卡尔·冯·克劳塞维茨（Carl von Clausewitz）, 唐纳德·特朗普（Donald Trump）, 《白鲸》（Moby Dick）, 亚哈船长（Captain Ahab）, 贝拉克·奥巴马（Barack Obama）, 乔·拜登（Joe Biden）, 比尔·奥莱利（Bill O'Reilly）, 尼古拉斯·马杜罗（Nicolás Maduro）, 康多莉扎·赖斯（Condoleezza Rice）, 居鲁士大帝（Cyrus the Great）, 爱国者防空系统（Patriot）, 伊斯兰革命卫队（IRGC）, 马尔科·卢比奥（Marco Rubio）, 大卫·本-古里安（David Ben-Gurion）, 摩萨德（Mossad）, 辛贝特（Shin Bet）, 托马斯·弗里德曼（Tom Friedman）, 伊扎克·拉宾（Yitzhak Rabin）, 埃胡德·巴拉克（Ehud Barak）, 蒂姆·库克（Tim Cook）, 苹果（Apple）, 中央情报局（CIA）, 民主进步党（DPP）, 中国国民党（KMT）, 《上海公报》, 埃隆·马斯克（Elon Musk）, 特斯拉（Tesla）, 小米（Xiaomi）, 英伟达（NVIDIA）, 黄仁勋（Jensen Huang）, 图勒空军基地（Thule Air Base / 皮图菲克太空基地）, 马克·卡尼（Mark Carney）, 世界经济论坛（达沃斯峰会）, 安东尼·斯卡拉穆奇（Anthony Scaramucci）, 约翰·肯尼迪（John F. Kennedy）, 阿卜杜勒·卡迪尔·汗（A.Q. Khan）, 金正恩（Kim Jong Un）, 美国民主社会主义者（DSA）, 迈克尔·戴尔（Michael Dell）, 戴维·弗里德伯格（David Friedberg） ## Video description (0:00) The Besties welcome legendary Harvard professor Graham Allison (1:14) Iran Conflict: Strategy, Netanyahu’s influence, Trump’s motivation, redefining Middle East security (11:44) Iran endgame scenarios: Democracy, extremism, second-order effects (21:07) Israel: Is Netanyahu destroying Israel’s democracy? (24:28) China: Taiwan invasion, trade, and Trump's April meeting (39:50) Greenland: Importance, deal scenarios, EU socialism angle (48:58) Nuclear proliferation: 80-80-9 framework explained (56:20) Rising socialism in America: wealth inequality and political risk Follow the besties: https://x.com/chamath https://x.com/Jason https://x.com/DavidSacks https://x.com/friedberg Follow on X: https://x.com/theallinpod Follow on Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/theallinpod Follow on TikTok: https://www.tiktok.com/@theallinpod Follow on LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/company/allinpod Intro Music Credit: https://rb.gy/tppkzl https://x.com/yung_spielburg Intro Video Credit: https://x.com/TheZachEffect #allin #tech #news [Source](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yAHfG6jU2qA)

[1:14] Graham Allison: 打烂一样东西远比重建一样东西容易 [4:32] Graham Allison: 这是内塔尼亚胡的战争 [14:38] 来自中国台湾的通话者: 有人考虑过这对我们会造成什么后果吗？ [22:24] Graham Allison: 这不是我想要为之自豪的国家。我想为伊扎克·拉宾的以色列自豪，想为埃胡德·巴拉克的以色列自豪，想为本-古里安的以色列自豪。 [29:37] Donald Trump: 这是台湾……而这是中国。 [29:37] Graham Allison: 千万不要把这手好牌打烂了 [37:18] 黄仁勋（Jensen Huang）: 天哪，我仿佛来到了未来。 [39:50] Graham Allison: 根据我最敬重的专家的判断，美国完全不需要通过入侵或购买来拥有格陵兰岛，就能获得我们所需要的一切。 [46:03] Donald Trump: 你可以选择轻松解决，也可以选择痛苦解决 [52:44] Graham Allison: 核武器要么朝鲜和韩国同时拥有，要么双方都不得拥有，由你们二选一。 [57:12] Graham Allison: 在一人一票的民主体制中，如果社会顶层 10% 到 20% 的群体分走了 70% 至 80% 的经济蛋糕，这种架构在政治上是绝对不可持续的。

[3:01] Graham Allison: there's no tears to be shed for Khamenei and the Islamic Republic regime [4:32] Graham Allison: Bibi's war [18:43] Donald Trump: cut off the head of the snake [21:07] Graham Allison: pro-Israeli and anti-Bibi [43:03] Graham Allison: gladiatorial conflict that makes the competition in Silicon Valley look tame... [47:01] Donald Trump: the easy way or the hard way [47:01] Donald Trump: Board of Peace [61:12] Graham Allison: If the jam is not getting spread to 70% of the people, that's not a sustainable political situation.

[0:00] Welcome to another episode of the All In [0:01] interview. I'm really excited to be [0:03] joined by back to All In, Harvard [0:06] Professor Graham Allison. Professor [0:07] Allison, welcome back to All In. Thanks [0:10] for having me. [0:11] We last had you at the summit in Los [0:14] Angeles, so it's great to have a [0:16] conversation. A lot's happened since we [0:18] last got together. For the audience, [0:20] Graham Allison's the founding dean of [0:22] the Harvard Kennedy School. He's advised [0:24] every Secretary of Defense since [0:26] Kissinger. [0:27] He's helped dismantle 12,000 Soviet [0:30] nuclear weapons, and his book Destined [0:32] for War remains the definitive framework [0:35] for understanding the US-China [0:37] relationship. I think it's worth kind of [0:40] bringing forward some of the things that [0:41] have happened in the world since we last [0:43] met. [0:44] >> I'm going all in. [0:51] If you were building a global financial [0:53] system from first principles today, you [0:55] wouldn't build it on 50-year-old legacy [0:56] rails. You'd build Airwallex. It's the [0:59] single platform for global accounts, [1:01] cards, and payments that treats the [1:02] entire world like a local market. Stop [1:05] paying the legacy tax and start building [1:07] the future at airwallex.com/allin. [1:11] Airwallex, build the future. [1:13] >> [music] [1:14] >> Let's start with Iran. The US and Israel [1:17] are in the middle of an attack on Iran, [1:19] and the supreme leader is dead, but the [1:21] regime is still holding on to power. [1:23] Where do you think this conflict will [1:25] take us, and [1:27] are we sleepwalking into World War III? [1:29] Well, thank you again for having me [1:31] back. I feel you have a great podcast. I [1:34] enjoyed the summit, and I'm sorry we're [1:36] not there in person to to catch up, but [1:39] I think [1:40] >> Yeah. about Iran, [1:42] I have much to say, so this could be a [1:44] long lecture. Let me just do four or [1:45] five quick points. First point, most [1:48] important point, is that there's more [1:50] questions than answers. [1:52] So, there's a huge level of uncertainty [1:55] currently [1:56] about what's happening and about what's [1:58] likely to happen. [2:00] Part of this is Clausewitz's famous fog [2:03] of war, [2:04] but this is a fog of war that's actually [2:06] increased because we got two big fog [2:09] machines [2:10] uh adding to the confusion, [2:13] uh namely Trump and the administration [2:15] on the one hand and Bibi on the other. [2:18] And then we got all the chattering us [2:21] around it. So, I would say [2:23] why did Trump decide to go to war now? [2:27] And there's six different reasons he and [2:28] the administration have given, and each [2:31] one they back around. What's the [2:32] objective? Uh there's five different [2:35] objectives, back and around. And when is [2:38] this war going to end? [2:39] I don't know. [2:40] A day, a week, a month? [2:43] Who knows? So, it's very uncomfortable [2:45] to recognize how uncertain things are. [2:49] And most of the conversation about it [2:51] tries to make it more confident. But I [2:53] think the place to start is there's a [2:55] huge amount of uncertainty. Having said [2:57] that, I'll still give you my prejudices [2:59] about a few of the points. [3:01] Point two, this has been an an [3:03] extraordinary [3:05] uh demonstration of supreme military [3:08] power and supreme intelligence power. US [3:12] military and the intelligence community [3:14] and the Israeli counterparts have been [3:16] way, way, way off the charts. And I [3:19] think this should make all Americans uh [3:21] proud of what's [3:23] been built over this decade over two [3:26] decades of investment, but especially in [3:28] the past decade. Uh third point, there's [3:30] no tears to be shed for Khamenei and the [3:34] Islamic Republic regime. It's an evil [3:37] leader, an evil regime. Uh there's no [3:40] bad thing that could happen to them that [3:41] we shouldn't be cheering over that. Uh [3:44] next point though, [3:45] breaking something's a lot easier than [3:47] building something. [3:49] And destroying targets is something that [3:52] our military knows very well how to do. [3:55] Building a new regime, regime change, is [3:59] something that we know historically [4:02] doesn't work very well, at least in Iraq [4:05] and Afghanistan. [4:06] We had every word said [4:09] that's been said in this case. [4:11] And we then went in all in [4:14] and spent more than a billion dollars [4:16] and many, many thousands of American [4:18] lives. [4:19] And when we went through Afghanistan, [4:22] the Taliban were ruling. When we left [4:25] Afghanistan, the Taliban were ruling. [4:27] So, I would say unfortunately, it's [4:29] against a backdrop that's hard. The next [4:32] point, slightly more controversial, [4:34] but I think this is Bibi's war. If [4:37] you're reader or if you listen to this [4:38] and remember Moby Dick, they should go [4:40] look at it again. Ahab had this [4:43] fixation, obsession with the white whale [4:46] and tried to find a way to kill the [4:48] white whale whenever he could. For the [4:50] last two decades, that's been Bibi's [4:52] number one, number two, number three [4:54] agenda. He's tried to sell that war [4:57] to [4:58] Obama, [5:00] to Trump one, to Biden. And how he [5:03] succeeded in mesmerizing Trump, who [5:05] might thought had his number, I'm [5:07] surprised. So, I'm pro-Israel but [5:10] anti-Bibi in this respect. And I think [5:12] that's [5:13] I understand he's a brilliant [5:16] politically, but I don't think this [5:19] uh [5:20] uh the arguments that were made that [5:23] that Trump has actually repeated, that [5:25] Iran was about to [5:27] attack us, I see no evidence for that. [5:30] That Iran was about to get a nuclear [5:32] weapon, I see no evidence for that. That [5:34] Iran was building an ICBM that was going [5:37] to attack the US, I see no evidence for [5:39] that. There's many, many bad things [5:41] about the Iranian regime, but not most [5:44] of the claims that that were made. So, [5:47] I I look this and I hope it turns out [5:49] well, [5:50] but I remember that in wars very [5:52] frequently it's easy to get in and it's [5:55] quite difficult to get out. Let me [5:58] double click on that point. You [5:59] mentioned there's multiple reasons that [6:01] the administration has messaged for [6:02] doing this, multiple views on what [6:04] success looks like, multiple timelines [6:06] on ending it, [6:08] and that this is Bibi's war. [6:10] How do you think Trump was motivated to [6:14] do this? [6:15] What is the real motivation? And I will [6:17] ask this in the context of the big [6:20] delegation and visit to China coming up [6:22] next month. Was Trump motivated [6:24] fundamentally to create leverage with [6:26] China [6:27] and use this as a tool to try and [6:29] maximize his negotiating leverage going [6:31] into the Chinese negotiations? That's a [6:33] great question and I wish that the [6:36] answer was this was all part of a grand [6:39] strategy. That would make me feel uh [6:41] hugely better. But uh [6:43] I tried I do Trumpology and I was [6:46] actually having dinner last night with [6:48] Bill O'Reilly, a former student, who I [6:50] think is one of the better Trumpologists [6:52] who are trying to interpret and we were [6:54] going back and forth through this. It's [6:56] easy enough to see why the window, [6:59] tactically, the window in which this [7:01] attack occurred was chosen because here [7:04] you got 40 you got the supreme leader [7:07] and 40 of the other leaders of Iran out [7:09] in public. So, that's an opportunity as [7:11] a target. And then the best opportunity [7:14] that's come along. The question is why [7:16] would you be attacking them? [7:17] And especially Trump given his [7:20] uh campaign and his previous views about [7:24] not repeating the mistakes of the people [7:27] that took us into endless winless wars. [7:29] And I think it's I mean I I think Bibi [7:32] is a magician. [7:34] I think his single-mindedness [7:37] uh is impressive. [7:39] I think his agility in making arguments [7:42] and developing arguments is impressive. [7:46] How he managed to persuade Trump this [7:49] was a good idea for the US now, I don't [7:52] have a good idea. And I think that [7:55] I think if I listen to the reasons why [7:58] even the people closest around him have [8:00] given or that Trump have given, they [8:03] don't seem persuasive. Now, partly [8:05] Trump is erratic. [8:08] Uh partly he sort of you know, uh acts [8:11] on the basis of instincts. [8:13] Uh somehow it came to him that this was [8:16] uh [8:17] you know, something that could be done. [8:19] I think actually maybe painted a pretty [8:23] uh I mean the upside of this picture [8:25] if if it's successful, and I hope now [8:28] that we've gone into it it would be, [8:30] would be redefining security in the [8:32] Middle East for a generation. [8:35] So, getting rid of the Iranian regime as [8:38] the uh [8:40] uh Bibi and company have gotten rid of [8:42] the proxies of the regime earlier, which [8:44] again, since October 7th, been extremely [8:47] impressive, could possibly, you could [8:49] say well, there's going to be a whole [8:51] new Middle East. And if the if the [8:52] Middle East were all like the UAE, [8:56] uh that would be fantastic. Uh fantastic [8:58] for all the human beings that live [9:00] there. [9:01] So, I think maybe he got excited by the [9:03] upside, not quite [9:05] uh careful enough about the risks or the [9:08] downside cuz it the number of ways in [9:11] which this could go wrong, you know, if [9:13] if we woke up tomorrow or today and a [9:15] couple of ships have been sunk [9:17] or a couple of hundred of Americans have [9:19] been killed, it's going to have a very [9:21] different uh [9:22] a different image. And you think that [9:24] this is independent then [9:27] of the action with Maduro and [9:29] independent of [9:31] the big delegation headed to China for [9:34] big negotiation next month? Well, I [9:37] wouldn't say entirely independent. I [9:39] would think with Maduro, [9:41] so Trump, I think this again, this is my [9:44] uh whatever armchair Trumpology, but I [9:46] would say initially he thought tariffs [9:49] were a magic wand. [9:51] And every [9:52] leader thinks if you have a magic wand, [9:54] that's fantastic. He's tried the tariff [9:57] magic wand and discovered it [10:00] didn't quite have all the effects that [10:02] he imagined on liberation day. [10:04] Uh he didn't [10:06] discover the American military, which [10:08] genuinely is a huge wand. [10:10] And the Maduro operation was just [10:13] spectacular. I mean again, it's a [10:15] military and intelligence operation, [10:18] brilliant. No other country in the world [10:20] could even imagine doing something like [10:22] that. And that had actually, you know, [10:25] makes all of us stand taller. [10:28] It can also provide a little or [10:31] historically encourages hubris and an [10:34] imagination that this magic wand can [10:36] work in many other arenas. [10:38] I don't mind at all the proposition that [10:42] every other country should take account [10:43] of the fact that the US has the most [10:46] remarkable military and intelligence [10:48] community in the world. And that's not a [10:51] bad backdrop for China and for a China [10:54] trip. So I agree that things may not be [10:58] completely disconnected, but I think in [11:00] terms of the timing, I mean right now, [11:02] when is the war going to be over? If you [11:04] talk about three or four weeks, we're [11:07] we'll already he'll be in China March [11:10] 29th. [11:11] So my [11:13] inclination, again, if we were just [11:15] doing a prediction markets, is that he's [11:18] going to find a way to declare this over [11:20] before then, cuz he's needs a little [11:22] time to get his mind set on that. But if [11:25] you ask the folks at the Defense [11:27] Department, if you ask the people in [11:29] Israel, they thinking this is another [11:31] month or beyond this war. So again [11:34] there's things I don't think are quite [11:36] you know in sync. Jason joined us for [11:38] some hours and it's always a treat to [11:40] have you here on here. [11:40] >> see you. Nice to see you. It's just [11:42] amazing to have you on here and to give [11:44] us this time. If things were to go [11:46] extremely well and Iran went from a [11:50] monarchy to a dictatorship and now in [11:53] this third act here in in the modern day [11:55] to a democracy [11:57] and you actually had a democracy with 93 [12:00] million citizens in the Middle East. [12:02] What impact would that have on the [12:03] region? [12:05] We've seen the Gulf monarchies evolve [12:08] human rights but they're still [12:09] monarchies. You have one other I I guess [12:11] democracy in the region in Israel but [12:13] this could be extraordinary if it was a [12:15] democracy. What what would that mean to [12:16] the [12:17] to the global chessboard? [12:19] Well, it's a good question. I mean if [12:21] this could occur [12:23] it would be spectacular. [12:25] Even I think but I would say this is way [12:28] way way [12:29] too ambitious. There's 100 things [12:32] that would be wonderful outcomes [12:35] better than what's likely [12:37] that would be short of that. I remember [12:40] uh in Iraq after Bush failed to find [12:44] nuclear weapons which was the initial [12:47] I would say somewhat up rationale [12:50] for our going into Iraq. [12:52] Condi Rice who was the secretary gave a [12:54] speech about well how wonderful it'll be [12:57] when Iraq is a democracy and market [12:59] economy quote radiating stability [13:02] through the Middle East. So we're pretty [13:04] good at doing I have a dream you know in [13:06] that version. I think that's a way way [13:09] way stretch. I would be very happy with [13:12] a regime there that simply was not about [13:15] um building nuclear weapons, was not [13:18] about building missiles that threaten [13:21] the US and our friends and allies in the [13:23] region and not about supporting proxies. [13:27] And if it's a pretty cruel regime, [13:29] unfortunately that's unfortunate for the [13:32] Iranian people. [13:34] The Persian people, [13:36] and when I'm a student of history, I [13:38] love Persia. You know, I remember [13:41] Cyrus, and I remember [13:43] the Peloponnesian War. I remember, you [13:45] know, this is a fantastic culture and [13:47] history. They've been hijacked by a [13:49] terrible, terrible group of people. And [13:52] if those people can be somehow ousted, [13:55] you know, wonderful for [13:57] Iranian people and wonderful for the [13:59] world. I'm I if I were betting it, [14:02] again, I'd say go back to the first [14:05] point. It questions uncertainty, [14:09] finding signals in the noise extremely [14:11] difficult. But if I were betting it, [14:13] it'll end up that the guys with the guns [14:16] will in some version [14:18] be the next generation. And [14:21] if they're tamer [14:23] and less [14:25] uh [14:25] uh determined [14:27] uh to threaten our interests, [14:30] will this have been worth it? Well, [14:32] again, [14:33] we'll have to look at, [14:35] you know, [14:36] over the longer run. I think the other [14:38] thing that we know about wars [14:40] is that [14:42] they're unpredictable [14:44] and that they have many unanticipated [14:46] consequences. You know, I think as we [14:48] watch what's happening now and see what [14:50] impact does that have on oil and gas [14:53] prices, predictable. So, you can see, [14:55] and going and going. Well, what impact [14:58] does that have on other countries? [15:00] A huge. So, the number of countries now [15:04] whose economies are being disrupted by [15:07] this impact [15:08] and therefore blaming us for it. [15:11] So, I had a call from someone in Taiwan [15:14] yesterday saying, "Wait a minute, did [15:16] anybody think what this is doing for [15:17] us?" Since they get about half of their [15:21] uh their electricity comes from their [15:23] natural gas that that is now coming you [15:25] know now not not coming. [15:28] Uh [15:28] if you ask about what is this meaning [15:30] for [15:32] for Ukraine all the patriots [15:35] that were [15:36] to hope to prevent [15:39] missile strikes from Russia on Ukraine [15:43] are now [15:44] in the Middle East. [15:46] Mhm. So that's that many more target. So [15:49] this just unfortunately it unfolds in so [15:51] many so many different directions. Now I [15:54] don't want to seem too pessimistic about [15:56] it because again I think we've been [15:58] shocked [15:59] fortunately on the upside by how [16:03] a professional our military has and [16:05] intelligence folks have been [16:07] and also how pathetic uh or hollow the [16:11] Iranians have been. First day of the [16:13] attack I was at the the the Defense [16:15] Department and I gave them a list of 11 [16:18] things that I would do [16:20] and be capable of doing if I were [16:22] playing the Iranian hand. [16:24] I and uh [16:26] they seem to be [16:28] I don't know. I mean I I I don't know [16:30] how to even want to say out loud but [16:32] they they act like a paper tiger. Do you [16:34] think there's there's more damage [16:37] that can be done by being more [16:39] successful? You know if we think back to [16:42] Iraq [16:43] Iran is twice as many people 100 million [16:46] versus 50 million four times the land [16:49] area a much better equipped military and [16:53] arguably the military system the regime [16:57] is embedded in every aspect of industry. [17:00] So the more successful the United States [17:02] is in dismantling [17:05] the Iranian regime [17:07] and as was advised by Condoleezza Rice [17:09] who apparently was just in the White [17:11] House today and [17:12] advising the president and publicly [17:14] stated it's time to finish them off. [17:17] It's time to go all the way, etc. [17:20] Does that not then leave a country with [17:23] no infrastructure, no leadership, 100 [17:26] million people in tatters, and that's [17:28] the classic breeding ground [17:30] for some of these extremist groups to [17:32] seize control and seize power. And we [17:35] don't have the resources to go in and [17:36] have another multi-decade [17:38] Afghanistan-Iraq problem. I'm afraid I [17:40] agree. Yes, I think the [17:42] the uncertainties about that I mean, you [17:45] can do four or five different scenarios [17:47] for how this might conceivably end. It [17:50] could end up being a an extended civil [17:52] war in in Iran among the various [17:55] national groups, even some of them [17:57] possibly seceding. So, again, fairly [18:00] chaotic. Look like Syria plus, okay? [18:04] It could look like Iran or Afghanistan. [18:07] Well, excuse me, we were there for more [18:08] than a decade [18:10] with unlimited resources. [18:12] Hardly any constraints on the number of [18:14] people. And how did that work out? [18:17] So, I I I'd say that I'm I'm a small-c [18:21] conservative and [18:24] kind of think history [18:25] is not always [18:27] not it's certainly not the only guide, [18:28] but it's a good place to start. [18:30] Well, I'm I'm I would say nervous, yeah. [18:33] Is it too late to have a Venezuelan [18:35] outcome where we've taken out the head [18:37] of the snake and we've simply replaced [18:38] it? The snake can continue operating and [18:41] living without too much destructive [18:43] damage and effect, but it seems like we [18:45] may be a little too far gone now in [18:46] Iran, and that to take this all the way [18:48] might be very difficult to manage. I Is [18:51] it too late? [18:52] >> If I were again, we're all in the dark [18:54] and all the uncertainty, so back to [18:56] point one. But after that, I would say [18:59] Trump is erratic, [19:01] impulsive, [19:03] but he has some coordinates. And one of [19:06] them is is his power. [19:08] See? Mhm. November 3rd is a big day for [19:11] him. [19:12] He's focused on that. The economy is a [19:15] crucial element of that. That's part of [19:17] the framing of the of the China [19:19] relationship. [19:22] The impact of this on the economy is [19:25] already evident, okay, and could become [19:28] more evident. [19:29] The [19:30] public opinion [19:31] Again, I think he's I saw today uh [19:35] uh in the journal that he's sent Hicks [19:38] Hicks Smith out to sell the war. [19:40] Mhm. Good luck. [19:42] >> [laughter] [19:42] >> Mhm. I'm not sure he can sell uh so [19:45] public opinion of this is about six to [19:48] four unfavorable. [19:50] Mhm. Cuz [clears throat] they didn't [19:51] make the case for the war in advance. [19:53] Uh the impact of this on other parties [19:57] including uh parties that we care about [20:00] is negative. [20:02] Uh [20:03] So I I can easily imagine [20:06] in the next week even [20:08] uh and declare [20:10] If you look at actually the way in which [20:12] he's left himself room to declare [20:14] victory [20:16] at having, as you say, had a cut off the [20:18] head of the snake, destroyed their [20:20] military their nuclear capabilities, [20:22] destroyed their [20:24] ability to project power or in the [20:27] Defense Department we always say destroy [20:29] or degrade. [20:31] Degrade has a lot of dimensions as you [20:33] would point out and uh [20:37] now it's up to the Iranian people to [20:39] seize their own government and take [20:41] advantage of themselves. The difficulty [20:42] with that will be Bibi wants to fight on [20:45] till the regime is destroyed. [20:48] And that'll be an interesting struggle [20:50] to see how that goes. Earlier, Trump [20:53] demonstrated that when he thought [20:55] it was in American interest he was [20:57] prepared to pull Bibi's chain. [20:59] So, we'll see. This is I think in before [21:02] we move out of the MENA region [21:05] a topic that's coming up. [21:07] There's obviously no support for this [21:09] war in America. Most Americans put [21:11] foreign affairs today at 1 or 2% of [21:14] their concern. Economy and many other [21:16] issues are are high on their list. [21:19] And he's been pretty clear, "Hey, we're [21:20] not going to put boots on the ground." [21:21] And then there's this anti-Semitic [21:24] underpinning that's happening in America [21:26] that's become pretty acute. [21:29] And you had Rubio, who [21:32] mentioned earlier, say, "Hey, we did [21:34] this because [21:35] uh the Israelis were going in anyway and [21:37] we had no choice." And then they walked [21:38] that back. Explain to [21:41] the audience how we should look at that [21:44] turn of events where there's a group of [21:46] people in America, specifically people [21:48] in the MAGA party, who believe Trump has [21:50] betrayed them and that he's captured by [21:53] the Israeli [21:55] um government in some way and he's doing [21:58] their bidding. I'm not saying that [21:59] that's my perspective, but that is a an [22:01] undertone that we're seeing. And that's [22:03] something new in our lifetime, I think. [22:05] It It certainly is. So, this is a big [22:07] topic, but I'd say [22:09] when I talk about it, I I I say, "I'm [22:12] pro-Israeli [22:13] and anti-Bibi." [22:15] So, Bibi is not Israel. The people whom [22:18] I know mostly and respect mostly in [22:20] Israel are the national security barons. [22:24] The people who've been the [22:26] chief of staff or the head of Mossad or [22:28] the head of Shin Bet or the people that [22:30] work in that in those structures. And [22:34] they believe that Bibi is actually [22:37] destroying [22:38] the [22:39] Ben-Gurion's Israeli democracy [22:43] that they cared about. Or if take Tom [22:45] Friedman, it's pretty hard to accuse him [22:47] of being anti-Is- [22:49] you know, anti-Semitic, uh [22:51] but he's been I think very clear and [22:54] very courageous in pointing out that [22:57] what Bibi's doing to Israel's democracy [23:00] is really [23:01] destroying it. And the impact of that on [23:04] Jewish kids in America, [23:06] I mean, I see this on campus, where they [23:08] want to be proud of Israel. They they [23:12] deserve to be proud of the country that [23:14] has been built over these years, but [23:16] they look at the behavior of these crazy [23:19] right-wing settlers and their activities [23:22] in the in the occupied West Bank, or [23:24] they look at some of the activities in [23:27] Gaza, or they look at now the kind of [23:30] unlimited uh [23:32] war without any [23:34] any even attempt to make arguments about [23:36] proportionality, and just say, "Wait a [23:38] minute. That's not [23:40] the country I want to be proud of. I [23:42] want to be proud of of Rabin's Israel. I [23:44] want to be proud of Ehud Barak's Israel. [23:46] I want to be [23:47] proud of Ben-Gurion's Israel." And I'm [23:50] I'm pretty much of that of that [23:52] persuasion. I think what what uh [23:56] what Bibi risks in this, [23:58] and risked earlier, uh with uh siding [24:04] I mean, inter- interfering in American [24:06] politics, [24:08] in- [24:09] invites pushback. [24:11] So, [24:12] I think this could have a big long-term [24:14] negative effect both in the Democratic [24:17] Party and the Republican Party, [24:18] especially on the under younger people. [24:20] If you look at the polling for the under [24:23] 30s on Israel, it's just like shocking, [24:26] you know. [24:27] Mhm. [24:28] Can we move to China because I think [24:32] that again, this is going to be the big [24:33] story over the next month. You've said [24:37] publicly that ousting Maduro from [24:40] Venezuela could embolden China to [24:42] accelerate a Taiwan takeover. [24:45] The CIA, it has been reported in media, [24:48] warned Tim Cook of Apple and other tech [24:50] companies about a possible invasion as [24:52] soon as next year. You've separately met [24:55] publicly with Chinese officials. [24:57] What's your view on the likelihood and [25:00] the timeline of a China attempted [25:03] takeover of Taiwan? And what are these [25:05] kind of motivating factors that might [25:07] make that happen sooner? So, let me [25:10] clarify. I I'm not sure or I may have [25:12] been misinterpreted, but obviously the [25:14] Chinese watch very carefully. They study [25:16] wars and they will learn lessons from [25:19] what's going on here, but I don't think [25:21] that is a I don't think the Venezuelan [25:24] operation other than making them feel [25:27] envious [25:28] about the capabilities will impact their [25:31] likelihood of attacking Taiwan. So, [25:33] Taiwan, number one, [25:35] I think the likelihood of an attack on [25:36] Taiwan [25:38] this year or next year [25:40] or even in the '28, but let me just do [25:42] '26 and '27, absent some major [25:46] provocation by Taiwan or some other [25:50] third incident is very low. I'd put it [25:52] at about where the [25:55] where the prediction markets are, 5% or [25:57] something low. So, I'm not counting on [26:00] that. So, why is that so low? I'm just [26:02] curious. Why 5%? Yeah. Okay, because, [26:06] first, [26:07] they they have a theory of the case [26:10] of what they call peaceful reunification [26:13] and they think things are evolving in [26:15] that direction. Uh the theory of the [26:17] case is that the current uh government, [26:21] which is a [26:22] DPP government, which currently is is [26:26] stymied [26:27] by its opposition in the parliament, so [26:30] they can't even buy the arm sales that [26:33] we [26:34] previously gave them. There's $11 [26:35] billion [26:36] arm sales that the Chinese have [26:38] complained about, but Taiwan is the [26:41] legislature probably won't buy half of [26:43] that, okay? So, [26:45] the current president is struggling. [26:49] There's going to be election in January [26:51] '28 [26:52] and they think it's likely that the [26:55] former [26:56] uh party the KMT will be elected. [26:58] Somebody that will be much more [26:59] sympathetic [27:00] to China and uh [27:03] a a devolving relationship. So, that's [27:05] number one. Number two, [27:07] the Chinese have been engaged in a [27:10] a deep deep purge of all of their [27:13] military leadership. I mean, it's hard [27:15] to believe and you read about in the [27:16] paper from time to time that he fired [27:19] this guy, he fired this guy. He's fired [27:21] the equivalent of every four-star [27:24] in our whole political system [27:26] and every combatant commander [27:29] and every commander who would be [27:30] commandeering the force commanding the [27:32] forces over, you know, to deal with [27:35] Taiwan. [27:36] So, while they've been building up that [27:37] military capability, [27:39] takes a long time to get that back in [27:42] the order in my view. So, I would say [27:44] that part's makes me feel less likely. [27:47] Third, I think he understands that uh if [27:50] he were to do this, there's a risk, not [27:52] a certainty, but a risk that the US [27:55] would become involved and that the [27:57] impact of that either on China's [27:59] economy, which he's got to worry about [28:01] first, and also what its evolution would [28:04] be significant. So, I'm I'm looking for [28:08] uh and oh sorry, finally, in Trump, [28:11] uh he has the most accommodating [28:15] president [28:16] uh that China's likely to see with [28:18] respect to Taiwan. So, Trump has made no [28:20] secrets. I mean, he talks publicly of [28:22] his views about Taiwan. In I think a [28:25] couple of the memoirs, there's this [28:28] discussion where [28:30] he's in the Oval and he's talking about [28:32] Taiwan and he picks uh somebody asks him [28:34] about Taiwan, he picks up one of those [28:36] Sharpies and goes thump, you know, on a [28:39] spot on the Resolute Desk and he said, [28:42] "That's Taiwan." Then he draws a sand [28:44] around the whole desk, He "That's [28:46] China." [28:47] So, I'd say, you know, I'm less worried [28:51] about Taiwan in the [28:53] in on the on the current path. Now, over [28:56] the longer run, [28:57] the Chinese are absolutely clear, she [28:59] and all the leadership, that Taiwan is [29:02] an inseparable part of China. [29:04] And how that could be satisfied in a way [29:07] that allow the Taiwanese [29:10] the degree or substantial degree of the [29:13] uh freedom for both their economy and [29:16] their society is the challenge that [29:18] we've been struggling with for a long [29:20] time. But, the good news is we've been [29:22] doing this for 50 years, [29:25] and Taiwan has never seen [29:27] such a manners, you know, such such [29:29] circumstances. So, I say to the [29:31] Taiwanese friends, you know, basically, [29:34] don't uh don't screw it up. Are we [29:37] taking the right course of action, do [29:39] you think? I guess the big question for [29:41] for you is what's the strategic [29:44] imperative [29:45] to keep Taiwan from falling under direct [29:48] Chinese control for the United States, [29:51] and are we taking the right actions to [29:54] hedge our bets, if you will, against [29:56] that happening? Meaning, onshoring of [29:58] semiconductor manufacturing, but also [29:59] maybe from a defense perspective and [30:01] positioning perspective, you can share a [30:03] little bit about whether we're [30:04] >> Sure. That's a big big question. So, [30:07] first uh [30:40] >> complicated situation to begin with. [30:42] Uh secondly, [30:45] Taiwan is halfway around the world as [30:47] President Trump says, and 90 mi off the [30:49] shore of China. And we're far away, and [30:52] we have a lot of other things to worry [30:54] about. So, it's a little bit like Cuba. [30:57] So, inherently indefensible [31:00] if China is were seriously determined to [31:03] either destroy it or to take it. Now, on [31:06] the other hand, [31:08] since the opening to China and the [31:11] Shanghai Communique, there's been an [31:14] agreement of maintaining a status quo [31:18] uh with the US commitment being what's [31:20] called strategic ambiguity, in which uh [31:24] the US and China have been committed to [31:27] Taiwan [31:29] internal development is left to its own [31:31] device, [31:32] and China doesn't use military force to [31:35] prevent that, but we say [31:38] Taiwan is this one China, and the only [31:41] China's capital is Beijing, and then we [31:44] have a a little bit of ambiguous way to [31:47] talk about the relationship between [31:48] Taiwan and China, but certainly letting [31:51] it evolve in any way that the parties [31:53] would be prepared to live with. Most [31:56] people expecting that over time this [31:59] relationship will work its way out. And [32:02] I when I talk to Chinese about it, I say [32:04] to them, "First, you've never seen 50 [32:07] better years on either side of the [32:09] straits. [32:10] So, this has been fantastic for both [32:12] societies in terms of what they care [32:14] about. And secondly, if they look at [32:17] this situation, if China's [32:20] core strategy is correct, [32:23] uh which is the inexorable rise of [32:24] China, [32:26] and that continues, [32:28] in another decade or two, [32:31] Taiwan will look like a flea. [32:33] And therefore, not going to be an issue. [32:35] If it if If China's main narrative [32:38] doesn't work, [32:40] Taiwan is not going to be their biggest [32:42] problem. [32:43] So, they should work on the other [32:44] issues, yeah. If you think about China [32:46] projecting influence around the world, [32:49] how important is it for them to continue [32:51] to do that? There was recently [32:54] an objective, I think, of a GDP growth [32:56] in the 5% range, 4 to 5%. Is that right [32:58] for China, which [32:59] >> The 4 and 1/2 to 5, yeah. 4 and 1/2 to [33:01] 5, [33:02] which is a record low in recent history [33:06] for them. [33:07] Is it imperative for China to continue [33:10] to extend [33:12] geopolitical and economic influence [33:14] around the world to grow its economy? [33:17] You know, going back to the framing of [33:19] the rising power, do they still need to [33:21] do that to keep people happy at home, or [33:25] is China going to be able to maintain [33:28] happiness at home in a multipolar world, [33:32] where China and perhaps the US and [33:34] perhaps some other countries share [33:36] influence around the world? [33:38] This is one you [33:40] raised and we talked about the last [33:42] time, which is interesting. I think we [33:44] agreed. So, let me [33:46] just again for people that don't [33:47] remember, start. So, first, China is a [33:51] meteoric rising power. [33:53] Never has a country risen so far, so [33:56] fast, on so many different dimensions. [33:58] If you take a snapshot of the year 2000 [34:02] and the year 2025 [34:04] and compare China on any metric of [34:06] power, it's just dumbfounding. [34:09] Dumbfounding. So, a country [34:11] that [34:12] I have compared it to kind of like a [34:15] Formula 1 racing. [34:17] A country that we couldn't find in our [34:18] rearview mirror [34:20] in 2020, or sorry, 2000, because it was [34:23] so far behind, [34:25] we have trouble finding in our rearview [34:27] mirror today because it's beside us or [34:29] in many races even slightly ahead of us. [34:32] Now, that's GDP, it was less than 5% of [34:37] global [34:39] or it was less than a quarter the US in [34:42] 2000. Today, by purchasing power parity, [34:45] it's 25% larger. In 2000, trading, it [34:49] was [34:50] 5% of global. Today, and we were 15, [34:54] today it's 35 and we're 25. If you do [34:56] advanced tech [34:58] in any any area, take 5G, my goodness, [35:02] take EVs, my goodness, take whatever. [35:06] Okay, so rapidly rising power. [35:09] That's essential. [35:11] That's the infrastructure for their [35:13] grand narratives, which is the [35:15] inexorable rise of China to its natural [35:18] position in the international order, [35:21] which they think is at at the top of the [35:23] pyramid. [35:24] So, they are absolutely determined to be [35:26] number one [35:28] in their own arena to begin with. And [35:30] then after that, [35:32] you know, maybe more. And they also they [35:34] have a second the second proposition. [35:37] There's the inexorable decline of the [35:41] US. [35:42] And they look at the various parts of [35:44] the US and the components, including [35:47] getting involved in unnecessary wars [35:50] as part of that story, as part of their [35:52] narrative. And that [35:54] dynamic, the shifting of the seesaw, is [35:57] what gives you this fluidity and dynamic [36:00] that we discussed before, which most [36:02] often, hard as it is to believe, but [36:05] most often discombobulates people so [36:07] much that then some incident or [36:09] accident, like something that happens [36:11] over Taiwan, leads to a vicious circle [36:14] of actions and reactions [36:16] that drags them into a war, [36:18] after which they think, my god, how did [36:20] this ever happen? So, that's a long [36:22] story, but I would say the economic [36:24] piece is essential for this. And that [36:28] economic peace means they want to be the [36:30] manufacturing work workshop for the [36:33] world and the foundry for the world and [36:35] the supplier for the world. There are [36:37] two [36:38] major challenges they have. I believe [36:41] one of them is population decline, the [36:43] other is unemployment and the AI that [36:46] we've seen and what's hitting first [36:49] could hit them in a major way. [36:51] Manufacturing is moving to robotics at [36:53] an alarming place. Then you have things [36:55] like self-driving which is a major job [36:58] there for for many people. So [37:01] on those two axis when you see the youth [37:03] unemployment which I think is 15 or 20% [37:06] in some locations in China and [37:08] population decline, is that she's two [37:11] biggest challenges to deal with and then [37:13] how does that affect [37:14] this, you know, bi- this uh Sure. uh [37:17] relationship? [37:18] >> Good question and this is more in your [37:20] old space than mine cuz I've tried to [37:22] follow but Elon says there's going to be [37:24] more robots than people, okay? [37:26] >> Yeah. [37:27] And if you ask him where where are the [37:29] most advanced robots in the world, the [37:32] ones that are kicking his ass or he [37:34] worries about, they're China. So they [37:35] got a huge number of robot companies. [37:38] When I was there in [37:40] uh last [37:41] When was I last there? In uh [37:45] uh [37:46] January, I went to see a factory of [37:49] Xiaomi Xiaomi, the phone company. They [37:52] Xiaomi 3 years ago decided that they [37:55] would make cars. [37:57] After watching Apple spend $10 million [37:59] not able to make a car, [38:01] within 3 years that factory is producing [38:04] cars right now. [38:06] And they have a huge demand for these [38:08] cars. They have three lines. One of the [38:11] lines is all robots. [38:13] Okay? So they're putting a lot of robots [38:15] to work. All right? More than half of [38:17] the working the factory worker robots in [38:20] the world are in China. Uh and so some [38:25] of the people are saying, well, you [38:26] know, if demographics is going to be not [38:28] so big a problem because if demographics [38:31] is only a problem because of workers, [38:33] which you know, we're going to have [38:35] worker In fact, the American workers are [38:37] more worried about, you know, taking our [38:39] jobs. So, that's a Now, the issue with [38:42] for the [38:43] uh impact on education, they have uh a [38:48] number of people that have been educated [38:50] in arenas that are now no longer, you [38:53] know, high-demand jobs. [38:55] And unfortunately, we have a lot of [38:56] that, too. I mean, if you look at people [38:58] college graduates now that graduated in, [39:01] I don't know, DEI subjects, they're [39:04] having trouble [39:05] uh getting jobs. So, I would say uh it's [39:08] a little There are more similarities [39:10] there than differences. The other thing [39:11] is Chinese have demonstrated a great [39:14] much greater capacity or readiness to [39:17] adopt and adapt to new technologies. [39:21] So, if you look at the [39:24] I'm sure you have or you all have [39:25] probably had him on, Jenson uh Huang, uh [39:28] but when he went to China, he said, [39:30] "Gee, I think I came to the future." You [39:32] know, that uh [39:33] uh the people don't, you know, they [39:35] don't use Not only do they not use [39:38] uh [39:39] uh [39:40] coins, they don't use bills, they don't [39:43] use checks, they don't use credit cards, [39:45] they just have their face [39:48] and then go through the store. Let's [39:50] shift around to [39:52] what some have described as the [39:55] longer-term playing field, which is near [39:57] the Arctic. [39:59] Some have argued that uh much of the [40:01] recent push for Greenland by the United [40:04] States is driven [40:05] by the military threat coming over the [40:08] Arctic from Russia and from China. I'm [40:11] wondering if you could just help frame [40:12] for our audience, why is Greenland so [40:16] strategic to the United States, [40:19] and is this effectively a proxy for [40:22] defense against China and Russia, and [40:26] why now? Another big question. [40:29] So, let me start with the bottom line. I [40:30] think the [40:33] at least from the [40:34] judgments of the people whom I [40:38] respect the most, we can we the US can [40:41] get everything we want from Greenland [40:44] without invading it or owning it. So, [40:47] Greenland has been an important base [40:50] for missile defenses, a tool tool base. [40:53] We had two other bases that we closed. [40:56] But we can open as many other bases as [40:59] we want, and they're very amenable to [41:01] that. I think President Trump's right to [41:03] say, "Well, yeah, but I I don't want a [41:05] short-term lease on these spaces." [41:07] Well, I would say a 99-year lease sounds [41:10] like a pretty good lease to me for, you [41:12] know, in 99 years, God knows what's [41:13] going to be happening. But to the extent [41:16] that missile defense and [41:18] is part of it, which it is, I would say [41:20] that's a part. For the naval component, [41:23] yes, there I think the as the Arctic [41:28] uh melts, [41:29] you already now have an opening of sea [41:32] lanes, and [41:34] the way that the [41:36] uh [41:37] uh [41:37] territorial ownership uh the abutters [41:41] have their claim to the local and the [41:43] regional. [41:45] And there the [41:46] the main claims are Russian and [41:47] Canadian. We have a chunk from Alaska, [41:50] and then Greenland would be a piece of [41:52] that. So, I would say that's relevant, [41:54] but those sea lanes uh [41:57] at least for the navy people I talked to [41:59] are they're not as important as they [42:01] used to be, because now there's so many [42:03] different ways to get at you're not [42:06] going to [42:07] try to blockade a [42:08] a uh [42:10] you know, a a waterway [42:12] uh with ships. You're going to do it [42:14] with smart minds or you're going to do [42:15] it simply by attacking the ships on the [42:18] on the way. And if it's underwater, [42:22] underwater is pretty much all the same. [42:24] But it's good to have narrow places and [42:26] shallow places for looking for things. [42:29] But [42:30] uh [42:30] So I I I would say I think Trump's uh [42:35] uh Greenland venture was more like for [42:37] fun. Uh plus [42:39] uh I mean I think uh one of the people [42:42] that knows him well uh says uh remember [42:45] he's first of a reality TV producer and [42:49] star. So he just has fun [42:52] starting with a a drama, uh getting [42:54] people very excited, uh letting the [42:57] tension rise, and then finding a [42:59] resolution. And I think we're attracted [43:01] to a resolution there. Let me push back [43:03] just on that point. What I have heard is [43:06] that there's rising [43:07] socialism in Western Europe, growing [43:10] concern that over time as socialism [43:14] becomes more of the mainstay in the [43:16] governing models in Western European [43:18] nations, those nations fall more under [43:21] the influence of China. And as a result, [43:24] if you think about the influence that [43:25] China could then have on on Denmark and [43:28] on Danish foreign policy, if the United [43:31] States doesn't secure what it needs for [43:33] the long term, and it may not know what [43:36] it needs for the long term physically in [43:38] Greenland today, we only know what we [43:40] need today, that we're at risk of China [43:43] having outsized influence over Greenland [43:46] tomorrow. And that that's the real [43:48] reason for the big push today for [43:51] Greenland. How does that sit with you? [43:53] And does that align kind of with with [43:55] what some folks are are concerned about? [43:58] I have to think about it. I hadn't heard [43:59] that argument just that way. Again, what [44:02] is socialism is complicated. Uh [44:05] certainly the Chinese Well, yes, they're [44:07] socialists in some respect. I would say [44:11] capitalism is I mean, they're autocratic [44:14] and they're party-led. But then their [44:16] economy is essentially [44:18] uh, fiercely uh, capitalist. I mean, you [44:21] have a [44:22] uh, the uh, [44:24] um, [44:26] uh, one of the one of the one of the one [44:27] of my friends was gladiatorial [44:30] conflict that makes the competition in [44:33] Silicon Valley look look tame as the you [44:36] know, as the parties fight each other. [44:38] Uh, [44:39] Well, cuz you can't make money cuz the [44:40] taxes are so high. But that's [laughter] [44:42] another [44:43] Well, [44:44] and in their case, you know, they they [44:47] they [44:48] they decide they're going into an arena, [44:49] let's say for example, EVs. [44:51] And so they give uh, [44:53] uh, advantages to companies getting [44:55] started, even subsidies. And then they [44:58] let them fight it out. And lo and [45:01] behold, at the end there'll be [45:03] uh, you know, 10 or five. But it's [45:05] fiercely competitive in the meantime, [45:07] and a lot of guys will get, you know, [45:09] trampled along the way. And then those [45:11] guys are excess capacity and they'll [45:13] sell things off, [45:15] you know, without any [45:17] concern about the capex. They're just as [45:19] long as they can stay ahead of the game, [45:21] you know, selling items or even selling [45:23] out their inventory. So I think the uh, [45:27] I think watching the way watching the [45:30] evolution of other countries, including [45:32] Europe, and when I think uh, and their [45:35] relations with China as well as with us [45:39] in this game is a very relevant point. [45:42] And [45:43] I would say that [45:45] uh, [45:45] one of the things that the Trump [45:47] administration has had trouble with is [45:50] recognizing that [45:52] if we're in a fierce rivalry with China, [45:54] they have four times as many people. [45:57] We need to have some allies with heft on [46:00] our side of the seesaw to keep it from [46:03] going the wrong direction and [46:06] so yes [46:08] kind of sometimes you need to give your [46:10] ally a cold bath [46:11] in order to get them to shape up [46:14] but uh [46:16] I think [46:17] uh [46:18] uh [46:19] getting Canadians to think of us as an [46:21] enemy is a pretty [46:23] wild idea uh uh I mean any treatment [46:27] that comes to that conclusion and if you [46:30] take Carney whom I know from when she [46:32] was in Harvard college kid he's he's as [46:35] American as anybody or he was but the [46:38] idea if you go and threaten a [46:41] politician's survival that's a pretty [46:43] good way to [46:44] piss them off and [46:47] if you threaten to take territory from [46:49] people [46:50] that's a pretty good way to make them [46:52] feel [46:53] hostile [46:55] so this is an unusual treatment if we're [46:57] trying to you know get guys with heft on [47:00] our side of the seesaw. At the World [47:01] Economic Forum I wasn't sure if it was [47:03] Davos or another one of their forums. [47:05] Were you at the Davos one this year? [47:07] Sure. So as a total aside just bringing [47:10] President Trump's impact [47:12] it was two and a half days of people [47:14] wondering what he would say when he got [47:15] there. [47:16] The town shut down as people watched his [47:19] two-hour stand-up Yeah. you know [47:22] delivery and then another two days of [47:24] people [47:25] sort of trying to understand and figure [47:27] out what happened there. So I there's [47:29] something [47:30] It was really It was a reality TV show [47:32] for sure. Yeah. So it took over the [47:35] whole place. This fellow uh [47:37] uh Butch who was his communication guy [47:40] for [47:41] a week or 10 days till he got fired in [47:43] the first administration said on the [47:45] first night I was at an event he said [47:47] remember this is going to be a real [47:49] reality TV show it's going to start with [47:51] the claim that we're going to invade [47:53] Greenland which by God invading an ally [47:56] that's a pretty big deal. He said, then [47:59] you're going to watch the drama build. [48:01] When Trump had a chance to speak, he's [48:02] speaking this long way back and forth, [48:05] back. But he then had a just a paragraph [48:08] in which he said, he basically took the [48:10] gun off the table. [48:12] But before that, he was doing a mafioso [48:14] act, even some some mafioso lines about, [48:17] you know, you could either have it the [48:19] easy way or the hard way. One of the [48:21] That's a Godfather line. And so people [48:23] were saying, yikes, you know, this what [48:25] it what it what has been loose on us. So [48:27] now you have all this drama, but then he [48:30] says, I've decided we're not going to [48:32] invade Greenland. You know, he he just [48:34] passes that off. So now the temperature [48:36] goes down. And now the third day he does [48:39] some other as [48:41] Institute of or Board of Peace, and he [48:45] says, we now have a framework of an [48:46] agreement. So [48:48] I think I think half of the time he's [48:50] having fun. Yeah. [48:53] You know, it's sort of ex- it it does [48:55] get people's attention. Sure it does. [48:58] You [48:59] on a substantive basis shared a [49:01] framework, 80 89. [49:04] And I think it you know, I've I've spent [49:06] a a bunch of time listening to the talk [49:07] he gave and and some people's reaction [49:10] to it. Maybe you could share it with the [49:11] audience and why it's important. Oh, [49:14] thank you. I'm glad you [49:15] So I think this is a big idea. [49:18] So these are three numbers, [49:20] each of which is the answer to a [49:22] question. [49:24] And if you can remember the three [49:25] numbers, [49:27] and you can identify the question to [49:29] which each one is the answer, [49:31] you have the big picture about [49:33] international security in the lifetime [49:36] of yourself [49:38] and even your parents. That's virtually [49:40] everybody who's alive today. So the [49:43] first 80 is the answer to what? How long [49:46] it's been since a World War. How many [49:48] years since a great power war? Since a [49:50] World War. Yeah. Now, whoa, wait a [49:52] minute. 80 years. This is the longest [49:55] peace in recorded history [49:58] since Rome. [50:00] This is not natural. [50:02] This is very abnormal. [50:05] This is a didn't happen by accident. [50:08] This was what the people who founded [50:11] the international order after World War [50:13] II [50:14] were trying to build a new world order. [50:16] Cuz they had just lived through a [50:17] terrible World War II. [50:20] Simply one generation before, they [50:22] remembered, "Hey, there was World War [50:24] I." [50:24] Mhm. So, if we just keep doing this, [50:27] we should expect World War III. [50:29] Mhm. It should [clears throat] have [50:30] already happened. If it could have [50:31] happened at the Cuban Missile Crisis. [50:33] So, no great power war, fantastic. And [50:36] but a a fragile [50:39] a work in progress all the time, [50:41] eroding [50:43] inevitably for many, many different [50:45] reasons. Right? Second 80. [50:47] How many years since we've [snorts] had [50:49] a nuclear bomb go off? Fantastic. So, [50:52] think about that. If you had gone [50:55] if there'd been prediction markets, and [50:57] you'd gone in 1945 or 50, you would have [51:00] got 10,000 to one odds against that. [51:03] It's impossible. [51:04] The weapon that ended World War II, and [51:06] you're not ever going to see any use of [51:08] those weapons in war? Whoa. [51:11] And then, nine? The number of countries, [51:14] nation-states, that have nuclear [51:17] bombs today. [51:17] >> Fantastic, Jack. You're right. How in [51:20] the world could you have only nine [51:22] countries having nuclear weapons? [51:24] Nuclear weapons being your kind of [51:26] ultimate security blanket. [51:28] Again, John Kennedy in 1963 [51:32] said, "By the '70s, there'll be 25 or 30 [51:35] nuclear weapon states." [51:36] Cuz he thought that as states acquired [51:39] the capability to build nuclear weapons, [51:41] they would do so. [51:43] Today, 90 95 states could have nuclear [51:45] weapons in a year or two if they decided [51:48] to build them. [51:49] Actually, into the '70s, Sweden had a [51:51] serious nuclear program. South Korea had [51:54] a nuclear program. [51:55] Taiwan had a nuclear program. US closed [51:58] those down, [51:59] created a so-called non-proliferation [52:01] regime. [52:02] That's accounted for this nine, but I [52:06] would say again, [52:07] uh fragile, [52:09] eroding, not likely to be sustained. So, [52:12] when I try to [52:14] do my uh giving thanks for [52:16] uh you know, things that I should be [52:18] thankful for, [52:19] thankful for 80 years without a great [52:22] power war? [52:23] If there were a great power war, you and [52:25] I we wouldn't be here, and we wouldn't [52:27] be having this conversation, and all the [52:30] other issues we have to deal with. So, I [52:32] would say that 80 the 80 and nine we [52:34] should not take for granted. [52:36] We should give thanks for the work that [52:37] was done to to build them, and then we [52:39] should notice what's going to be [52:40] required [52:42] to sustain this. And we almost had a [52:44] tenth nuclear power in Iran. We did. And [52:47] we had the latest two, if I'm correct, [52:49] you'll correct me cuz you're the expert, [52:51] Pakistan and North Korea, and we had [52:53] that one doctor Khan, I believe his name [52:56] was from Pakistan, who was trying to [52:57] spread and sell these. So, Absolutely. [53:01] Did we make a critical error, [53:03] we being the West, even the East, [53:05] humanity, the leadership, of letting [53:08] Pakistan and North Korea into this club? [53:11] Well, I mean, not not into the club, but [53:13] allowing them to get nuclear weapons, [53:15] which is right. The Israelis have had a [53:18] different idea. [53:19] Uh this goes back uh uh [53:22] uh to the original attack on Iraq, [53:26] on Osirak. [53:28] Uh [53:29] they got call it affirmative [53:30] non-proliferation. [53:32] So, they say, "We're not allowing [53:34] nuclear weapons in our neighborhood." [53:36] And they've uh destroyed the nuclear [53:39] weapon project in Iraq. [53:42] They destroyed the nuclear weapon [53:44] activity in Syria when the North Koreans [53:47] were building a plant there half dozen [53:49] years ago. And now they've been the [53:51] leaders in the destruction of the [53:53] Iranian nuclear program, which we [53:55] participated in. [53:57] I, however, [53:59] I'm uncomfortable about the wars and [54:02] even in Iran. [54:03] I had to cheer for this because I fear [54:06] additional nuclear weapon states. And I [54:08] wish that we had managed somehow, let's [54:11] say, the North Korean case. [54:13] I've even said this to Chinese [54:15] officials. I said, "You know, we and you [54:18] made a terrible mistake. [54:20] Maybe we made a bigger mistake [54:22] to let North Korea get nuclear weapons. [54:25] But what we should have said to you is, [54:28] 'Hey, we have an idea. Nuclear weapons [54:30] are either good for North Korea and [54:32] South Korea [54:35] or they're good for neither of them. [54:37] Your choice.' [54:38] And that would have been hardball, but I [54:42] I think uh [54:44] uh [54:45] the idea of having Kim Jong-un [54:48] have now more than 100 nuclear warheads [54:51] and missiles that can reach the American [54:53] homeland [54:54] is crazy. [54:56] I mean, here we're talking about Iran [54:59] and what it might be. [55:01] Excuse me. [55:03] It takes uh 20 minutes longer from Korea [55:07] to get to Boston than from Iran or maybe [55:11] 25 minutes. [55:12] So, I I think that uh [55:15] that's a useful perspective to remind us [55:17] that we let this thing happen. [55:19] It's a ticking bomb as far as I'm [55:22] concerned. If you ask me what to do [55:24] about it, [55:25] I I makes me you know [55:28] cry because Trump in the first [55:30] administration focused on this problem [55:33] very very seriously and did everything [55:35] that he thought he could. And I thought [55:38] it was a good a good effort, [55:40] even though it was not successful. [55:42] But the 20 other ways we've tried to [55:44] deal with that problem were all equally [55:47] unsuccessful. [55:47] >> How does China feel about nuclear [55:49] proliferation and North Korea having [55:51] these bombs? Well, I think they feel a [55:54] little ashamed at least [55:56] about what happened in North Korea and [55:58] kind of think, "Well, that wasn't really [56:00] our problem." But now, uh when you say, [56:03] "Well, if this keeps if things on the [56:06] current path, well, maybe South Korea or [56:09] Japan will have nuclear arsenals in [56:11] their backyard." They think that's a [56:12] terrible idea. And we would be not very [56:15] enthusiastic about a Venezuelan or [56:18] Canadian nuclear bomb, yeah. So, Dr. [56:20] Allison, just to kind of wrap our tour [56:23] of the world here, come back to the [56:25] United States. [56:27] Since we last spoke, there have been a [56:29] number of mayors elected in this country [56:32] that are self-declared socialists or [56:35] Democratic Socialists of America, DSA, [56:38] and there's a rising populist movement [56:40] in the United States that seems to be [56:42] manifesting in many cases candidates [56:45] that look and act like true deep [56:48] socialists and want to [56:50] enact socialist policies. What is the [56:52] risk to the United States if this [56:55] continues to go the way it's going? And [56:58] what is the [56:59] risk to the United States, do you think, [57:01] in 2028 [57:03] if we have a Democrat controlled House [57:05] and Senate and a very populist Democrat [57:08] candidate that looks like a DSA member? [57:10] Where does this take us? [57:12] Well, I can't good for you all for [57:14] thinking of uncomfortable radical [57:17] questions, but real. Uh [57:19] So, [57:21] if you look at the numbers, [57:24] I have I I've been looking at them [57:26] lately. They're hard to believe [57:28] in terms of the split between wealthy [57:31] and poor or [57:33] uh rich and poor. [57:35] If you look at the uh who's benefited [57:37] for the last generation in terms of the [57:41] uh 0.01%, the 1%, the 10%, the 20%, or [57:45] that's us and all the people that we [57:47] know, virtually. And therefore, when we [57:50] say the market is, you know, third year [57:52] in a [57:54] in a in a bull market, and my goodness, [57:57] here it's up 15 or 16% or this 80% or [58:01] 70% of people, this is not part of their [58:03] lives. And when I look at the numbers [58:06] about both what I think the facts are, [58:09] and then even more people's perception, [58:12] uh [58:13] uh [58:14] it's just not stable in a democracy if [58:16] everybody gets a vote. [58:19] And if uh [58:21] uh the top 10 or 20% are taking 80% or [58:24] 70% of the pie, [58:27] that's not [58:28] stable and sustainable, I think. And [58:31] it's the political invitation [58:34] for a populist and demographic demagogic [58:38] uh uh just I mean, you don't even have [58:40] to be a demagogue to say, "That's not [58:42] fair. That's not reasonable." [58:44] Uh [58:44] So, I think that it's not this I mean, [58:47] this is beyond my [58:49] I mean, I I I can hardly deal with the [58:51] problems I [58:52] I focus on. This one is one that I look [58:54] over my shoulder and think, "Gee, wait a [58:56] minute. This person this can't be true." [58:59] But then, whenever I've been looking [59:01] into the numbers lately, they look as [59:03] bad as they appear. [59:05] And then, [59:07] this is extremely dangerous. And I would [59:09] say, "Yes." And so, I haven't heard [59:12] people talking about plausible ways [59:17] in which uh [59:19] you know, this could be addressed. [59:21] And I but I think it's a it's a [59:24] it's an invitation, [59:27] you know, for some more radical ideas. [59:30] And uh [59:31] So, while I like very much the Trump uh [59:34] accounts for kids to give them some [59:37] stake, I think that's a that's a [59:39] fantastic thing. I I I could probably be [59:42] persuaded [59:43] that [59:46] people even at my level of income [59:48] should pay another 10% of taxes or [59:51] whatever for [59:54] uh for some more [59:56] adjustment. I think the kind of [59:58] adjustments [60:00] that are basically putting people on the [60:02] dole [60:03] uh or [60:05] uh [60:06] support for [60:07] non-productive or semi-productive [60:10] activity [60:12] makes me very uncomfortable. Uh [60:14] I mean, unless they're lame or you know, [60:16] ill or or aging. [60:18] >> UBI proposals? Uh people getting a [60:20] universal basic income that that takes [60:22] motivation out of [60:23] >> me less I I I like incentive. I mean, I [60:25] think the the stuff of America has been [60:28] the opportunity for people to [60:31] to be incentivized to invent, create, [60:33] and create wealth that's benefits for [60:36] everybody. But, if the if the jam is not [60:40] getting spread [60:41] to 70% of the people, [60:43] that's not a sustainable political [60:46] situation. And And I think [60:49] I mean, I thought it was in the [60:51] in the New York campaign, we got to see [60:53] some preview of a bit of this. [60:56] And in the primaries, you're seeing [60:58] people going into this space. I haven't [61:00] seen anybody with a with a coherent [61:03] program yet. But, I think for serious [61:06] people thinking about what's good for [61:08] the country, [61:09] that's a [61:11] it's a good one to worry about. Well, it [61:12] seems Fred Berg that there's there's a [61:14] couple of proposals here. Minimum wage, [61:17] maybe some type of a wealth tax. There [61:18] are things that people are talking [61:20] about. We may not all agree with them. [61:23] And they may be hard to execute, but one [61:25] of them is for the people at the top. I [61:26] think you would agree, [61:27] uh Professor Allison, [61:29] the people at the top have the most to [61:31] lose here. And they should be thinking [61:33] about it and and maybe there's [61:34] generosity in [61:36] you know, maybe giving away wealth in a [61:38] more thoughtful way because there's so [61:41] much wealth in this top 1% 10% that they [61:44] can't possibly spend. And so this might [61:46] be something that that group of people [61:49] should be thinking a a little bit more [61:50] about. In the State of the Union, Trump [61:52] called out, you know, Dell and couple of [61:55] other people for having stepped up and [61:57] say, "Okay, I'm you know, I'm going all [62:00] in on this." I would say there's [62:01] something quite Well, that certainly [62:05] got my attention and made me think maybe [62:07] I should be doing something different. [62:08] Yeah. Yeah. Right. [62:10] Well, Professor Allison, you know, they [62:12] they say that you can measure a man's [62:14] knowledge and thoughtfulness by his [62:17] humility. I will say you have [62:19] extraordinary depth and you've thought [62:21] so deeply about so many of these issues [62:23] that this world is facing right now. [62:26] And yet you act with such humility and [62:28] grace when you speak about them. I want [62:30] to thank you for that. I want to thank [62:31] you for taking the time to be with us [62:33] today. Really appreciate it and look [62:35] forward to doing it again in person [62:36] soon. Yeah, thank you so much on behalf [62:38] of the audience and just on a personal [62:40] basis. This is such a delight and [62:42] privilege to be able to do with this [62:43] with you every year or two and man, I [62:45] hope we can just do it every year [62:47] because it's the highlight of my year [62:49] when we get to talk. And excuse me, it's [62:50] an honor for me. Thank you so much and [62:52] thank you for what y'all are doing and [62:54] thanks for thinking of such hard [62:56] questions out here. It's taking me home [62:59] tonight to think about socialism. Yes. [63:01] Yeah. Okay. Thank you, sir. Thank you. [63:03] I'm going all in. [63:19] >> [music] [63:20] >> I'm going all in.