Kalshi Beats CFTC in Court to Secure 95% US Prediction Market Share

Kalshi胜诉CFTC，拿下美国预测市场95%份额 押上公司命运进行一场高风险联邦诉讼，最终被证明是让Kalshi突破监管封锁并主导美国事件合约市场的关键决定。 Tarek Mansour详细讲述了Kalshi成长为美国主导性预测市场平台的混乱且不同寻常的历程。在经历CFTC多年的监管阻挠、裁员和内部危机后，两位联合创始人做出了起诉联邦政府的冒险决定，并在2024年大选前三周斩获历史性胜利。Mansour阐述了公司的运营架构——近130人直接向他及联合创始人汇报、“文化契机营销”的重要性、金融市场与赌场的本质区别，以及他对风险的偏执关注如何与Luana Lopes Lara的非理性乐观形成互补。 Kalshi 放弃了传统的企业管理金字塔，在约 150 名员工中，有近 130 人直接向两位联合创始人汇报，通过这种刻意维持的扁平与混乱来确保组织能够每月快速进行战略调整与重构。 (13:34) 联合创始人团队采用“设计性分歧”机制来平衡极端合规风险与创新乐观主义，并践行“船体漏洞”原则，即创始人必须亲自盯紧公司最致命的核心生存威胁，而非将其推卸给中层掩盖。 (20:39) 面对 CFTC 多年监管阻挠与内外交困，Kalshi 坚守“万物交易所”的初衷拒绝转型，最终通过起诉监管机构并在大选前获胜，凭借合规壁垒占据了美国预测市场 95% 的份额。 (23:31) 在品牌与营销上，Kalshi 摒弃传统的 80/20 法则，认为品牌爆发力完全取决于最后 10% 的打磨，并采用“文化劫持”策略，提前备好宣传方案并在热点爆发数小时内迅速投放以实现最大化曝光。 (36:08)

Tarek Mansour argues that Kalshi's emergence as the dominant United States prediction market relied on an uncompromising regulatory strategy, an intentionally chaotic organizational structure, and cultural marketing. By choosing to navigate federal oversight rather than operating offshore, Mansour and co-founder Luana Lopes Lara accepted years of stagnation and legal risk to build an enduring financial exchange. Litigation and Onshore Market Dominance Kalshi was founded in 2018 to create an 'everything exchange' within the legal perimeter of the US financial system, rather than launching quickly offshore without licenses. This approach led to years of regulatory resistance from the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). In late 2022, the CFTC pocket-vetoed Kalshi's planned launch of election prediction markets, which triggered internal resignations and layoffs. Despite warnings from board members that suing a direct regulator carried near-certain corporate death, Kalshi filed suit against the CFTC in late 2023, driven by co-founder Luana Lopes Lara's push to bet the entire company without a fallback plan. Represented by litigator Yakov Roth, Kalshi endured prolonged audits and enforcement actions until winning the lawsuit roughly three and a half weeks before the November 2024 presidential election. The ruling permitted domestic election trading, unlocking a parabolic growth curve. Mansour reports that Kalshi captured 95% of the US prediction market share. Under his 'hole in the ship' management philosophy, founders must personally oversee existential threats rather than delegating them; Mansour consequently spent roughly 80% of his time directly managing regulatory and reputational risk. Co-Founder Friction and Flat Organizational Architecture (1:34) Kalshi operates under a non-traditional leadership division where Mansour and Lopes Lara intentionally disagree by design. Mansour characterizes himself as a disorganized, paranoid risk manager shaped by his upbringing amid Lebanon's unpredictable volatility. In contrast, he describes Lopes Lara as a relentless, highly structured optimist who handles daily execution and internal momentum. Mansour focuses on macro-strategy, regulatory policy, and granular consumer messaging, using this intentional internal tension to keep the business balanced between compliance and innovation. Rather than adopting a corporate hierarchy, Kalshi maintains a flat organizational structure where roughly 130 of its 150 employees report directly to the two co-founders. Mansour argues that corporate pyramids create rigid barriers during phases requiring monthly strategic pivots. This fluid architecture enabled Kalshi to rapidly shift its commercial mix over an 18-month sequence: after expanding a B2B broker infrastructure that reached 80% of revenue, the company pivoted aggressively back to its direct-to-consumer platform, successfully reducing broker volume concentration down to approximately 10%. Cultural Hijacking and Precision Product Polish (36:08) Mansour's growth philosophy contends that consumers do not inherently care about a product pitch; instead, platforms must attach themselves to existing cultural flashpoints at their exact moment of peak relevance. Kalshi prepares marketing campaigns months in advance and deploys them immediately after relevant news breaks. Historical examples include launching an integration with Lionel Messi two days before his final World Cup run, and releasing a pre-produced ad featuring Timothée Chalamet within 12 hours of viral news involving the actor and the New York Knicks. Rejecting standard business advice like the 80/20 rule, Mansour asserts that in consumer brand building, full resonance depends entirely on the final 10% of detail. For the 2024 election, Kalshi executed over 20 design iterations for digital billboards in Times Square and Los Angeles that connected live to the exchange's trading API to display real-time odds. To maintain agility, Mansour avoids hiring traditional corporate marketers, choosing instead to hire unconventional talent directly from social media—such as recruiting the operator behind the '@InverseCramer' account to lead brand initiatives. Exchange Economics Versus Casino Betting Models (54:22) Mansour rejects comparisons between prediction markets and gambling platforms, distinguishing an exchange's economic model from a casino's incentives. Casinos generate revenue directly from customer losses, which incentivizes them to ban skilled card players and promote continuous losses. By contrast, Kalshi operates as a neutral exchange taking a fixed 1% fee per transaction. Because user losses transfer to trade counterparties rather than to the house, Kalshi actively benefits from analytical traders who supply liquidity and increase forecast accuracy. Addressing parental and regulatory concerns regarding speculative trading behaviors, Mansour cites early 20th-century US Supreme Court precedent establishing that speculation on commodity exchanges produces legitimate public price discovery. Kalshi implements safeguards exceeding federal baselines, such as automated position throttling and daily loss limits. Additionally, the company established a 'Parent Portal' allowing guardians to preemptively lock their credentials, which Mansour states resolved approximately 95% of underage account creation attempts. Kalshi's courtroom victory enabled an onshore prediction market within the US, yet the broader sector continues to navigate public scrutiny regarding speculative excess and competition from offshore platforms. Mansour maintains that scaling an exchange requires enduring long periods of regulatory resistance and aligning operations with founder conviction, rather than pursuing shortcuts or conventional corporate playbooks.

预测市场交易所 Kalshi 联合创始人 Tarek Mansour 指出，公司通过坚持本土合规、与监管机构展开长期法律诉讼，并在内部推行扁平化的“蓄意混乱”管理，最终在经历了长达数年的停滞期后确立了在美国预测市场的主导地位。 对峙监管与诉讼胜利 Kalshi 创立于 2018 年，愿景是打造涵盖各类非传统资产的“万物交易所”（源自阿拉伯语词汇 Kalshi）。Mansour 回顾称，公司从一开始就拒绝走离岸运营路线，坚决在美国金融监管框架内申请牌照，这一合规路径导致其经历了长达数年增长停滞的“沙漠期”。在 2021 年底向美国商品期货交易委员会（CFTC）申请上线选举预测市场后，监管方采取了拖延战术，并在 2022 年中期选举前通过不予正式批复的“口袋否决”限制其业务，迫使公司在极受限的产品线中启动，进而引发了员工离职与裁员潮。2023 年底 CFTC 正式驳回申请后，面对红杉资本合伙人 Alfred Lin 等投资人关于小团队起诉监管机构极易招致报复性惩罚的警告，团队在联合创始人 Luana Lopes Lara 的推动下聘请诉讼律师 Yakov Roth 起诉 CFTC。在诉讼期间，CFTC 将原本 10 天的常规审计拖延至 9 个月，但 Kalshi 最终在 2024 年美国总统大选前约三周半赢得了诉讼胜利，扫清了上线大选市场的法律障碍，促成了后续交易量的爆发式增长。目前 Kalshi 已在美国预测市场占据约 95% 的市场份额。 联合创始人互补与扁平化管理 (1:34) Kalshi 采取了非常规的双人领导与组织架构。在全公司约 150 名员工中，约有 130 人直接向 Mansour 与 Lopes Lara 汇报，摒弃了传统的多层级管理模式。Mansour 承认这种结构看似混乱，但强调高管层的职责需要每隔一两个月根据外部环境调整重组，扁平化能消除官僚摩擦，实现持续的适应能力。在分工上，Lopes Lara 负责公司内部日常运营与执行节奏，而 Mansour 则聚焦于极宏观的长期战略、融资、监管事务，以及文案和品牌触感等微观细节。两人在决策中推行“蓄意分歧”，通过有意站在对立面来平衡监管合规风险与产品创新速度。Mansour 将其敏锐的风险意识归因于在黎巴嫩贝鲁特的成长经历，他自称是一个倾向于计算概率、寻找潜在失败点的“偏执型风险管理者”，而 Lopes Lara 则具备极强的非理性乐观精神，这种心理层面的对冲机制防止了团队走向盲目冒险或过度保守的极端。 修补破船原则与战略重心调整 (20:39) 在日常管理中，Mansour 信奉“船体破洞”法则，即每家公司都存在足以危及生存的致命软肋，创始人必须作为直接责任人（DRI）亲自面对并解决最严峻的问题，而不是将其下放给只会用中层管理手段掩盖隐患的人员。为了应对离岸预测平台引发内幕交易担忧从而波及整个行业的负面声誉，Mansour 将自身约 80% 的时间投入到监管沟通、公众认知教育及合规标准的建设中。在业务推进层面，Kalshi 展现出高度动态的调整策略：在 2024 年大选催化流动性后，公司先耗时六个月搭建 B2B 券商经纪基础设施，使该渠道迅速贡献了 80% 的收入；为了避免过度依赖外部伙伴这一单一脆弱点，团队随后在八个月内大举转向直面消费者（DTC）的产品端，将券商交易量占比成功稀释至约 10%。 细节打磨与文化借势营销 (33:08) Mansour 反对将“二八定律”套用在品牌构建上，认为消费品传播中所有决定性的价值都集中在最后 10% 的精细打磨中。例如在 2024 年大选期间，Kalshi 在纽约时代广场和洛杉矶投放了直连交易 API 的实时数字广告牌，界面与应用 UI 保持一致，并在历经 20 余次设计迭代后才正式发布，力求将其确立为实时概率事件的默认参考源。在增长策略上，Mansour 认为公众并不直接关心创业公司本身，品牌必须在关键节点无缝附着于当下的文化热点。为此，Kalshi 经常提前数月准备好完整的宣传方案并保持待命，在突发热点出现的数小时内迅速发布，先后借势了梅西的世界杯首战、演员 Timothée Chalamet 相关的病毒式新闻、字母哥（Giannis Antetokounmpo）的留队声明，以及 AI 生成艺术引发的全网大讨论。在用人上，Kalshi 偏好非传统的增长人才，例如其品牌负责人曾是运营反向追踪财经主播 Jim Cramer 的社交账号博主，该职位不带任何下属，完全专注于快速执行契合大众情绪的策划。 交易所模式与博彩机制的本质差异 (52:01) 针对预测市场是否助长年轻群体成瘾和投机赌博的质疑，Mansour 将预测市场与传统博彩业及金融衍生品的发展史进行了对比。他指出，商品期货在 20 世纪初也曾被州政府指控为非法赌博，但美国最高法院最终裁定公开撮合的订单簿具备至关重要的价格发现功能，确认了其金融衍生品属性。在商业模式上，赌场的核心收入直接来自于用户的本金亏损，因而有动力封禁理性盈利的高手并用促销诱导持续亏损的用户；Kalshi 则作为中立的交易撮合平台，仅按交易额收取固定的 1% 手续费，其利润与用户输赢完全脱钩，因此更鼓励能够提供流动性和提升预测精度的理性分析型交易者。为了遏制不健康的交易行为，Kalshi 引入了严格的账户限额、高波动限制和专门的“家长门户”，允许家长录入身份信息以预先封锁未成年人盗用凭证开户的行为。Mansour 表示，平台内部数据显示其高频过度亏损的用户比例显著低于传统散户股票日内交易与期权炒作群体。 Kalshi 通过数年坚守合规底线并依靠司法诉讼确立了美国本土预测市场的合法性，但其独特的扁平化管理结构与激进的高负荷运作模式能否在超越 150 人 Dunbar 数量级后继续维系，以及大众对预测市场“赌博化”的社会道德审视是否会进一步演化为新的监管壁垒，仍是平台面临的持续考验。

## Background 本期视频由红杉资本（Sequoia Capital）于 2026 年 7 月 9 日发布在 YouTube 平台。节目简介指出，Kalshi 联合创始人兼 CEO Tarek Mansour 自称是一名极度偏执的风控人员，却在几乎所有投资人反对的情况下孤注一掷起诉监管机构 CFTC 并赢得历史性诉讼；对谈深入探讨了他与联合创始人 Luana 如何以刻意设计的对抗机制管理 150 人扁平团队、捕猎公众注意力的极致营销时机把控，以及“创始人必须亲自盯防船体漏洞”的硬核经营法则。 ## TL;DR Tarek Mansour 深入回顾了 Kalshi 从未转型的“万物交易所”愿景，以及在经历监管口袋否决、团队裁员等漫长沙漠期后，通过起诉联邦政府在 2024 年大选前夕逆风翻盘并拿下全美 95% 预测市场份额的险绝历程。他详尽拆解了与联合创始人 Luana Lopes Lara 之间“盲目乐观 vs. 极度多疑”的对等制衡关系，以及让 150 人全员直报创始人的生物复杂系统式组织哲学。此外，Tarek 结合德州扑克的“期望值与方差”思维剖析了商业决策的滞后与残酷，分享了如何通过物理“共振频率”精雕最后 10% 的营销细节，并阐明了合规衍生品撮合模式与传统赌场的本质区别，将预测市场视为对抗社交媒体极端化与心智腐蚀的理性解药。 ## Atmosphere & style 整场访谈节奏紧凑、极其坦率硬核且极具张力，毫无传统企业公关式的辞令与成功学浮夸。Tarek 的表达混合着黎巴嫩童年动荡刻入骨髓的危机感、MIT 数学背景的量化理性，以及一种身处生死绝境时爆发出的狂暴狠劲，与主持人深谙创业甘苦的追问产生了极强的惺惺相惜感。对话如同在惊涛骇浪的豪赌记忆与冷酷清醒的哲学复盘之间穿梭，让听众切身体验到穿越监管荒漠时令人窒息的焦虑，以及绝境破局后的狂欢与释然。 ## Bulletin - [24:45](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l_Boz3KRtBQ&t=1485s) Kalshi 历经多年监管拉锯并孤注一掷起诉 CFTC 获胜后，拿下美国预测市场约 95% 的市场份额，验证了在合规基建上死磕的长期壁垒。 - [13:38](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l_Boz3KRtBQ&t=818s) 公司采用极其反常的扁平化治理，约 130 至 150 名员工几乎全员跨过中层直接向两位联合创始人汇报，以“刻意设计的混乱”换取组织极速应变能力。 - [03:04](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l_Boz3KRtBQ&t=184s) Tarek 与 Luana 践行“刻意对抗（disagree by design）”机制：极度条理且偏激进冒险的 Luana，与思维跳脱但偏执严控风险的 Tarek 形成对等平权制衡。 - [53:42](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l_Boz3KRtBQ&t=3222s) 不同于赌场的零和对赌，Kalshi 作为受监管衍生品交易所收取约 1% 交易手续费，平台利益不依赖用户亏损，并通过交易节流与家长门户严控成瘾及未成年人交易。 ## Key takeaways - [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l_Boz3KRtBQ&t=0s) 愿景先行而非为了做公司而创业：Kalshi 在阿拉伯语中意为“一切”，团队自始至终的目标就是打造交易一切资产的“万物交易所”，中途从未经历业务转型。 - [03:04](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l_Boz3KRtBQ&t=184s) 双核分工与刻意对抗：两位创始人拥有完全平等的权力与股权，在所有重大议题上刻意争辩与对冲，避免了单一创始人在缺乏制衡下的认知偏离。 - [06:43](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l_Boz3KRtBQ&t=403s) 偏执风险管理源于动荡童年：在黎巴嫩贝鲁特成长及强势母亲教育下，Tarek 形成了起飞前列出 20 种坠毁可能的灾难预警雷达，成为规避金融监管灭顶之灾的护盾。 - [13:38](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l_Boz3KRtBQ&t=818s) 无层级直报系统：全员 150 人几乎无中层管理，像复杂生物细胞般流动与动态重组，以极简敏捷对抗高度互联、加速变化的外部现实。 - [20:39](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l_Boz3KRtBQ&t=1239s) 创始人盯防漏洞理论（Hole in the Ship）：高增长公司永远存在致命隐患，必须由创始人亲自盯住漏水点，而非层层下放被下属用地毯遮掩。 - [24:45](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l_Boz3KRtBQ&t=1485s) 正规在岸合规是根本护城河：金融领域不适用“快速行动打破陈规”，虽然离岸竞品 Polymarket 抢跑，但唯有持牌清算合规才能赢得主流大众与华尔街机构信任。 - [34:27](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l_Boz3KRtBQ&t=2067s) 拒绝 80/20 法则，在最后 10% 激发“共振频率”：大众营销不存在线性收益，时代广场大选看板等顶级项目经历近 20 版推倒重来，唯有把细节微调至固有频率才能爆发万倍势能。 - [36:09](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l_Boz3KRtBQ&t=2169s) 分秒不差的时机捕获法：不自说自话，而是将营销嵌入全网焦点峰值——如借势尼克斯热点 12 小时内上线甜茶广告、趁梅西世界杯首战前 48 小时官宣合作。 - [42:43](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l_Boz3KRtBQ&t=2563s) 期望值与实际结果的方差认知：以扑克选手心态面对挫折，2022 年被 CFTC“口袋否决”导致裁员时饱受质疑，但坚持只要底层决策期望值为正，长周期终将均值回归。 - [46:01](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l_Boz3KRtBQ&t=2761s) 孤注一掷起诉监管：在 2023 年底遭遇正式拒绝后，面临撤销牌照与千刀万剐的死局，团队在 Luana 拍板下押上整家公司起诉 CFTC，并在 2024 年大选前三周半奇迹胜诉。 - [53:42](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l_Boz3KRtBQ&t=3222s) 商业模式的本质区别：传统赌场靠客户输钱牟利并封禁高手，Kalshi 靠促成交易赚取约 1% 手续费，反倒需要激励专业研究与真金白银的价格发现。 - [57:01](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l_Boz3KRtBQ&t=3421s) 预测市场是信息极化的解药：相比社交媒体算法放大极端对立和情绪腐蚀，预测市场用资金代价倒逼用户依据客观事实和概率理性思考。 - [59:08](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l_Boz3KRtBQ&t=3548s) 创业者绝无真正的“自由”：创始人本质上是在为全员、董事会和所有客户打工，且公司规模越大自由度越低；唯有与创始人本质深度契合的企业才能长存。 ## Detailed walkthrough ### [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l_Boz3KRtBQ&t=0s) 不是为了做公司而创业：Kalshi 的诞生与不可动摇的执念 对许多创业者而言，创业本身可能是一种职业路径，但对 Tarek Mansour 而言完全相反。在阿拉伯语中，“Kalshi”的意思是“一切”（everything），从第一天起，他们的愿景就是打造一个交易所有资产的“万物交易所”（the everything exchange）。在长达数年的时间里，Kalshi 从未改变过方向，哪怕一次业务转型（pivot）都没有过。Tarek 直言，如果人生能够掷骰子重新来过，按他的本性，他大概率会成为一名纯粹的交易员或风险管理者，绝不可能是个创业者；他们绝非为了“成立一家公司”去创业，而是为了让“Kalshi”这个构想变成现实，才不得不去建立一家公司。这个想法如此耀眼、强烈地摆在眼前，以至于他们完全是被这个念头拽着往前走，别无选择。 节目主持人随后回顾了 Kalshi 惊心动魄的发展历程：这家公司曾在漫长的岁月中“穿越荒漠”，陷入横盘停滞与监管死局；在几乎所有投资人与顾问的反对下，他们孤注一掷选择起诉美国联邦政府（商品期货交易委员会 CFTC）并不可思议地打赢了官司。自此之后，Kalshi 呈现出如同火箭升空般的爆发式增长，其增速轨迹宛如几年前的 OpenAI 或 Anthropic。数周前，主持人在投资人 Kevin O'Leary 家中举办的一场 CEO 晚宴上初次结识 Tarek，惊讶于他在管理和担任 CEO 方面极为反常识、反传统的理念，这也是促成本次对谈的契机。 --- ### [01:30](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l_Boz3KRtBQ&t=90s) 顶天与立地：Tarek 与 Luana 的“非典型”双核分工 关于 Tarek 与联合创始人 Luana Lopes Lara 之间近乎“联席 CEO”（semi-co-CEO）的关系以及具体如何分工，外界多年来不断询问，而他们过去总很难给出一个清晰干脆的标准答案，甚至一度以为这种模糊是一种组织弱点。如今 Tarek 彻底转变了看法：只要这种模式最适合他们，它就是最强大的结构。 在实际运作中，Tarek 的职责呈现出一种极其独特的“极高”与“极低”两极化分布——即所谓“头顶青天，脚踩泥土”。一方面，他负责极高维度的宏观战略思考，持续推演世界将走向何方、Kalshi 的胜算与核心竞争力（rights to win）究竟在哪里；另一方面，他又深入到常人无法想象的极微观细节中，亲自盯紧每一句文案、每一份营销物料、每一块路边广告牌，甚至用户在产品内交互时的每一种微小感知与情绪体验。除此以外，他还负责政府监管、政策应对、融资以及所有与销售和营销强相关的外部事务。而真正把控公司每日运转、确保庞大组织按部就班高效落地的“操盘手”，则是 Luana。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Kalshi联合创始人分工与制衡模式 accDescr: 展示Tarek与Luana分别在公司战略、落地运营、对外事务与风险创新中的动态分工 subgraph Tarek["Tarek Mansour（极高与极低维度）"] T1["高维战略与宏观推演"] T2["极端微观细节：文案/营销/广告牌"] T3["外部事务：监管/政策/融资"] T4["风险管理与概率防守"] end subgraph Luana["Luana Lopes Lara（核心组织运转）"] L1["公司日常运营管理与系统推进"] L2["高度条理化的业务落地"] L3["信念驱动的增长与产品创新"] end Tarek <-->|"刻意对抗与持续争辩"| Luana Luana --> Middle["动态平衡：逼近最优决策中点"] Tarek --> Middle ``` --- ### [03:04](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l_Boz3KRtBQ&t=184s) 刻意为之的对抗：用创始人之间的制衡抵御认知偏离 两个背景和性格迥异的人共同掌舵，分歧不可避免。但不同于很多管理学理念视“频繁分歧”为反模式（anti-pattern），Tarek 和 Luana 建立了“刻意对抗”（disagree by design）的决策机制：在绝大多数议题上，两人会天然且有意地各执一端。当团队全员为某个宏伟方案群情激昂时，Tarek 往往是会议室里泼冷水的那个人，立刻把方案可能遭遇的全部死法与致命隐患全盘摊在桌上。 这种永无止境的辩论与对抗，恰恰成了保护 Kalshi 生存的核心机制。Kalshi 是一家业务极其复杂且具有系统性金融风险的公司，必须在“创新”与“监管合规”这两根紧绷的钢丝之间寻求微妙平衡。持续的争辩像一股恒定施加的向心力，把他们从两个极端拉回正轨，最终落在一个即便不是绝对完美但也极其逼近最优解的平衡点上。Tarek 强调，拥有两位权力完全平等的联合创始人至关重要，因为在任何组织中，非创始人的雇员出于期权回报、权力层级等激励机制差异，绝不可能无所顾忌地永远对 CEO 讲真话，独断专行的单一创始人极易走入认知死胡同；而在他们之间，没有任何人会轻易发生认知偏离。 - **平权制衡的价值**：拥有对等股权与完全对等权力的创始人，是全公司唯一能够彻底打破信息不对称、直言不讳指出对方盲点的人。 - **避免钟摆式振荡**：对立视角的持续碰撞，让公司在激进冒险与因循守旧之间找到了极其稳定的中轴，不至于在极端之间大幅摇摆。 --- ### [04:34](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l_Boz3KRtBQ&t=274s) 盲目乐观 vs. 极度多疑：互补的认知模式与偏执专注力 主持人提到，在与 Luana 提前沟通时，明显感觉到 Luana 偏向于激进创新，而 Tarek 更加偏向防守和监管合规。Tarek 坦然承认了这一点：Luana 是一个“基于纯粹信念的超级乐观主义者”（faith-based optimist），甚至有时乐观到完全违背算术逻辑的地步，在没有推演清楚一件事为何能在数学上跑通前，就敢坚信其必定成功。这种做派曾让 Tarek 在数年间感到无比抓狂。 相比之下，Tarek 自称是个骨子里充满偏执的“风险管理员”（paranoid risk manager）。他习惯用期望值（expected value）和概率思维看待世界上的每一种可能，满脑子都是可能出错的环节。然而随着时间的推移，Tarek 发现了一个惊人的事实：只要时间跨度拉得足够长，Luana 那些看似非理性的直觉与信念最终往往都会应验；而他的职责，则是通过对监管法规和系统风险的严苛把关，充当那个不可或缺的现实约束机制，确保公司能够撑到黎明到来的那一刻。 在工作习惯上，两人的反差同样强烈： - **组织协调与执行**：Luana 极度自律且条理分明，能够有条不紊地编织协调全公司的复杂事项；Tarek 自嘲是一个完全不合格的执行者（operator），不仅做事拖延，日常生活与办公更是乱作一团。 - **偏执的深度沉浸**：Tarek 认为自己并非天生擅长营销，但他拥有一种一旦对某件事着迷就会陷入极端偏执的特质；当他顺着某一个极窄的专业兔子洞一路钻到底，就能在极短时间内把该领域琢磨得无比透彻。 --- ### [06:43](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l_Boz3KRtBQ&t=403s) 贝鲁特的动荡童年：在热气球起飞前列出 20 种坠毁方式 这种深入骨髓的危机意识并非凭空产生，而是深深植根于 Tarek 在黎巴嫩贝鲁特的成长岁月。Tarek 由单亲母亲抚养长大，是家里的长子，还有一个弟弟。外界提到黎巴嫩时，总被《纽约时报》等媒体的头条带偏，以为那里是一刻不停的战区；但在 Tarek 眼中，黎巴嫩更准确的定义是“极度动荡”（volatile）——它的生活充满大起大落，你可能上一秒还在享受极其惬意美好的高品质生活，下一秒就必须仓皇奔逃躲避飞来横祸。 面对这种动荡，母亲始终保持着高度警惕与焦虑，害怕兄弟俩无法承受外界飞来的种种厄运而走入极端，这种戒备心理在作为长子的 Tarek 心中刻下了无法磨灭的烙印。直到今天，他的大脑都被硬编码成了一套自动寻找灾难漏洞的雷达： - 哪怕只是坐上一个观光热气球，或者登上一架普通的民航客机，在起飞离地之前，他的脑海里就能瞬间列出这个机器可能坠毁倒霉的 20 种具体方式。 - 这种对灾难的敏锐预感，虽然让他在日常生活中显得神经紧绷，却成为了经营 Kalshi 最大的保护伞——在面对严苛的金融监管雷区与瞬息万变的市场风险时，这种近乎本能的危机预警机制，让公司得以精确识别并避开无数潜在的灭顶之灾。 ### [08:04](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l_Boz3KRtBQ&t=484s) 黎巴嫩童年与虎妈：把不可能之事拉入掌控范围 当被问及在过往播客中频繁提及的母亲时，Tarek Mansour 毫不掩饰地将其形容为一位极其严苛的“虎妈（Tiger Mom）”。母亲的性格极其强势、完全不容妥协，“要么听我的，要么滚蛋（my way or the highway）”，而 Tarek 坦言自己身上也继承了这种极具压迫感的高强度性格。父亲在他六岁时便离开了家庭，母亲为了抚养孩子牺牲了自己的职业生涯与个人生活，倾其所有只为让孩子们拥有最好的生活，并最终带他们回到美国（Tarek 出生于美国加利福尼亚州，后随家人回到黎巴嫩生活）。母亲最大的执念就是让孩子重返美国并考入顶尖名校，因此她将个人所有的尊严与骄傲都维系在孩子的成就上——“我人生的产出就是我孩子的成功”。 这种近乎孤注一掷的期望转化成了极高的家庭标准。无论参加网球还是足球比赛，目标只有胜利，“如果拿了银牌，那就意味着奇耻大辱”。这不仅塑造了 Tarek 极度好胜的天性，更植入了一种根深蒂固的信念：世上永远都有解决之道。每当家庭陷入财务危机或人生绝境时，放弃绝不是选项，“你去撞墙，向上走、向左走、向右走、向下走，怎么试都无所谓，但你必须把出路找出来”。 几十年后，这种严苛的烙印转化成了 Tarek 口中面对危机时的“更高档位（higher gear）”。在他看来，大多数人习惯将现实划分为两半——一部分是“我能掌控的”，另一部分是“我无法掌控的”。但他根本不认同这种非黑即白的二分法： > “我认为这完全取决于个人。有些人就是能把宇宙中原本看似无法控制的绝大部分事物，硬生生拉进自己的掌控领域……只要这件事情不违背物理学定律，我们大概就能把它做成，它就在我们的掌控范围之内。” --- ### [10:23](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l_Boz3KRtBQ&t=623s) “创业文盲”的摸索哲学与立足纽约的人才考量 谈及 CEO 的管理之道，主持人提到 Citadel 创始人 Ken Griffin 刚在大会上分享了如何博采众长、从杰克·韦尔奇（Jack Welch）等商业名宿身上吸纳管理实践来组装自己的 CEO 剧本，并询问 Tarek 是有崇拜的标杆还是纯粹“边走边摸索（make it up as you go）”。Tarek 坦白承认，自己和联合创始人 Luana Lopes Lara 绝大多数时候都是边走边摸索，甚至在创业理论上近乎“创业文盲（entrepreneurially illiterate）”——他们从未系统读过那些经典的创业方法论书籍，也不爱听商业播客；虽然 Tarek 经常刷 X（前 Twitter），但纯粹是因为 Kalshi 的用户聚集在那里，而不是去学什么“打造公司的四个步骤”。 即便如此，Tarek 依然会敏锐地吸收特定领袖的优秀特质： - **Elon Musk**：极度大胆的冒险魄力，以及招揽世界顶级人才的强大号召力； - **Tony Hsieh（谢家华）**：在 Zappos 极具挑战的电商与履约泥潭中展现出的顶尖运营纪律与执行力； - **具备品牌光环的企业**：能够构建超越产品本身的品牌气场，吸引远超业务范畴的顶尖人才。 Tarek 强调，Kalshi 真正的长项在于“快速试错与高频迭代”——无论是人员招聘、做事方法还是他个人的沟通口吻，只要发现行不通就立刻调整。他认为企业文化终究是创始人特质的投射，如果不符合自身本性，连产品营销都会变形。 在解释为何将总部设在纽约而非硅谷时，Tarek 解释虽然留在西海岸可能更容易被同行“劝退”某些疯狂的想法，但更核心的考量是人才适配度。Kalshi 的愿景是构建“无限市场（infinite market）”、下一代交易所，从底层重塑华尔街。纽约聚集的精英人才与这种“属于大众的全新金融基建”愿景有着极强的市场匹配度（Talent-Market Fit），这让 Kalshi 有信心招揽到当地前 1% 的顶尖人才；而在湾区，聚光灯几乎完全被 AI 或其他非金融科技领域所占据。 --- ### [13:38](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l_Boz3KRtBQ&t=818s) 130 人扁平直报与“刻意设计的混乱系统” 针对外界最感震惊的管理结构——Kalshi 约 130 名员工几乎全部跨过中层、直接向 Tarek 和 Luana 两人汇报，主持人直言这种既无层级又双线汇报的模式极其反常，询问他们如何避免陷入彻底的失控。Tarek 的回答出人意料：“它确实很混乱，但你可以建立一个在混乱中正常运转的组织。” ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Kalshi 扁平化组织与快速重组流程 accDescr: 展示了 Kalshi 扁平化的双 CEO 直报机制如何在复杂系统中根据机遇与挑战无摩擦快速重构。 subgraph Leaders ["联合创始人"] T["Tarek Mansour"] L["Luana Lopes Lara"] end subgraph DirectReports ["全员直报架构（约 130+ 员工）"] E["跨职能团队 / 员工集群\n（几乎零管理层级）"] end subgraph DynamicAssembly ["动态适配机制"] O["重大机遇与挑战出现"] A["像复杂生物细胞般自由流动重组"] R["无摩擦极速响应"] end T <--> E L <--> E E --> O O --> A A --> R ``` Tarek 解释说，这种扁平与混乱换来的是**极致的持续适应能力**。传统企业在面对战略转折或调配资源时充满摩擦，而 Kalshi 的团队如同生物学中的复杂系统，“细胞和有机体在以太中漂浮、流动，然后随时重组”。因为现实世界本身就是一个在不断加速的混乱复杂系统，强行自上而下套用僵化的金字塔层级是逆自然规律的；面对加速变化的环境，组织结构必须保持最大的弹性与适应性。 当主持人提及硅谷当前关于 CEO 剧本重构的探讨——例如 Brian Armstrong 和 Jack Dorsey 讨论的“去层级化圆形组织”，由 AI 居中处理决策、员工负责喂养系统、取消传统工位和薪酬体系时，Tarek 坦承自己根本没听说过这套理论，完全是凭借直觉和现实需求在实践。两人最后笑着调侃管理风格绝无标准答案：如果把英伟达的黄仁勋（Jensen Huang）扔去掌管 Citadel 对冲基金，或者把 Ken Griffin 空降到 OpenAI 当 CEO，整个场面绝对会荒谬得不可思议。 ### [16:14](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l_Boz3KRtBQ&t=974s) 加速的世界与“非结构化”的动态规划 世界正以前所未有的速度高度互联与运转，学习与演进的节奏正在极度压缩。过去企业或许每三到四年、或者每年需要进行一次根本性的战略重置，但如今哪怕是两个月前做出的决策，放到当下可能都已不再适用。面对这种剧烈的动态变化，主持人好奇 Kalshi 究竟如何做前瞻规划——尤其是在每年 12 月底面对 Alfred Lin 等红杉董事会成员时，团队究竟该呈现一份怎样的答卷。Tarek 坦言，Kalshi 的规划极为动态，甚至在董事会眼中一度显得“不够有结构”，直到大家逐渐适应了这种敏捷节奏。 更令人意外的是，Tarek 透露 Kalshi 内部其实并不像外界想象的那样“极度迷信数据指标（metrics-obsessed）”。除了与交易风险、客户保证金机制等直接关乎产品生死底线的金融风控参数会被极其硬核地监控外，在宏观战略决策层面，他们更看重定性的市场脉搏：“客户在说什么？真实需求聚集在哪些能量爆发点？我们在哪里可以最先切入、最激进地布局并确立取胜的权利（right to win）？”对 Kalshi 而言，战略永远聚焦于组织当前面临的极其尖锐、关乎生死的一两个核心战役。 ### [18:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l_Boz3KRtBQ&t=1080s) 18个月内的四次跃迁：从飞轮网络到摆脱渠道依赖 回顾过去一年半的历程，Kalshi 在短短八个月内连续经历了数次业务维度的剧烈切换。在大选市场引爆后，团队首当其冲的问题是如何防止用户流失并实现交叉销售（cross-sell）。他们将大选带来的爆发性需求转化为平台底层流动性，进而成功带动其他预测市场，形成网络效应的链式反应。随后，为了践行成为传统金融级基础设施的愿景，团队开辟了 B2B 经纪商（Broker）分发战略，试图验证平台能否同时驾驭消费级直营（D2C）与 B2B 基础设施两种模式。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Kalshi 过去 18 个月的战略重心演变 accDescr: 展示 Kalshi 如何从大选红利、经纪商扩张、回归直营流动性，最终走向主流监管防御。 subgraph Phase1["第一阶段：需求沉淀"] A["2024大选流量爆发"] --> B["构建跨品类流动性网络"] end subgraph Phase2["第二阶段：基础设施化"] B --> C["拓展外部经纪商 (Broker)"] C --> D["Broker 收入飙升至 80%"] end subgraph Phase3["第三阶段：摆脱依赖与主流化"] D --> E["利用厚流动性反哺 D2C 直营"] E --> F["Broker 交易量降至 10%"] F --> G["面对主流社会与监管审视"] end ``` 然而，经纪商路线跑得过快又带来了新的结构性危机——经纪商分发一度占据了公司 80% 的收入，令 Kalshi 极度依赖少数大型合作伙伴。面对这种潜在风险，Tarek 和团队立刻掉头重押 D2C，借助外部经纪商注入的高流动性生态反哺直营端，迅速将经纪商交易量占比成功压回 10% 左右。从选举衍生品、体育、传统金融，再到 D2C 与 B2B 企业级合作的往复攻防，Kalshi 几乎是在极短时间内横跨了完全不同的商业组织形态。 - 大选结束后，核心问题在于跨品类承接，通过流动性提升促成了全市场的低成本飞轮效应。 - 经纪商通道虽然迅速贡献了 80% 的营收，但为了避免沦为附庸，Kalshi 主动调整战略重心重新做大直营盘。 - 进入大众视野后，社会大众和监管机构的疑虑激增，如同 Airbnb、Uber 和 AI 初创公司在主流化过程中必经的社会审视阶段。 ### [20:39](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l_Boz3KRtBQ&t=1239s) 创始人盯防漏洞理论（Hole in the Ship） 如此剧烈频繁的战略重心转移，需要完全不同的组织能力来支撑：打造一流的 C 端营销体系对 B 端经纪商谈判毫无帮助，反之亦然。Tarek 坚信，在公司这种高增长阶段，每一个最棘手、最重大且必须做对的核心难题上，必须至少有一位创始人作为直接责任人（DRI）亲自坐镇。他和联合创始人 Luana Lopes Lara 始终轮流承担被放在火上烤的角色，亲自直面那些决定公司命运的风暴。 对此，Tarek 提出了著名的“船体漏洞”类比：一家高速狂奔的公司就像一艘全速前进的大船，但船底永远都有一个正在漏水的破洞。管理组织通常有两种选择： 1. **创始人亲自盯防**：CEO 或创始人日复一日把眼睛死死盯在那个漏水洞口上。这极其残酷、痛苦，甚至近乎无休止的精神折磨，但它能保证最致命的隐患时刻处于受控状态。 2. **委派他人处理**：许多组织选择将这种极度痛苦的问题推给下属，而后者的本能往往是在破洞上铺上一块地毯遮羞，假装业务仍在繁荣增长，直到不可挽回的积水彻底将整艘大船吞没。 ### [22:23](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l_Boz3KRtBQ&t=1343s) 当前的致命漏洞：离岸乱象对全行业的反噬 谈及 Kalshi 当前最大的“破洞”，Tarek 坦言自己现在大约 80% 的时间都扑在这个问题上：向公众和监管层彻底划清合法合规的在岸市场与充斥着内幕交易风险的离岸市场之间的界限。普通公众往往无法分清像 Kalshi 这样受正规监管的美国在岸合规交易所，与像 Polymarket 这类离岸运作平台之间的本质差别，后者的违规操作和负面新闻正在持续给整个预测市场行业带来巨大的声誉污名。 对于近期《华尔街日报》点名 Polymarket 的营销违规行为以及国会对其展开调查的动态，主持人询问这对 Kalshi 而言究竟是利好还是利空。Tarek 毫不犹豫地回答：“这对我们是坏事（it's bad for us）。”在他看来，真正的创业竞争从来都不是威胁的核心，行业的系统性风险才是。面对新兴科技引发的恐慌，正确的应对方式不是因噎废食地全面刹车，而是制定精准的防护边界（guardrails）；若无法让社会大众理解合规预测市场的透明价值，单一玩家的越轨行为最终只会引来监管铁拳对整个赛道的无差别重创。 ### [23:45](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l_Boz3KRtBQ&t=1425s) 竞争思维与大市场中的“丰饶心态” 对谈从竞争策略切入。主持人回顾了在 HubSpot 与 Salesforce 竞争的岁月：每当 Salesforce 稍稍转向，HubSpot 内部就有人喊着必须朝同一方向跟进，而主持人的策略则是“当对手向左（zig），我们就要向右（zag）”。然而，Tarek Mansour 提出了更具包容性的视角。他认为，竞争从来都不是真正的“公司杀手”。只要你身处一个足够庞大的市场，哪怕将市场蛋糕与竞争对手平分，也能斩获巨大的份额；如果身处小市场，真正该做的是迅速迭代产品、开辟新的未被满足的增量赛道，并在其中取胜。 在 Tarek 看来，在创业时抱持“丰饶心态”（belief in abundance）至关重要。尤其是回顾过去几年的科技爆发与市场演变，蛋糕本身正在飞速扩大，零和博弈的你死我活并不是常态。 ```mermaid flowchart LR accTitle: 创业竞争策略对比 accDescr: 对比零和博弈与丰饶心态在应对市场竞争时的不同路径 subgraph 零和博弈视角 direction TB A["对手向左 (Zig)"] --> B["盲目跟从或反向 (Zag)"] B --> C["陷入存量争夺"] end subgraph 丰饶心态视角 direction TB D["身处大市场"] --> E["专注产品迭代与合规基建"] E --> F["共享巨额蛋糕 / 开拓增量市场"] end ``` --- ### [24:45](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l_Boz3KRtBQ&t=1485s) 为什么坚持正规军路线：重塑纽交所与合规底线 当被问及 Kalshi 如何从长期落后于竞品（如离岸快速启动的 Polymarket）一路反超、拿下美国预测市场高达 95% 的市场份额时，Tarek 拆解了公司从 2018 年创立以来的根本战略分歧。竞品在 2019 年成立后，选择无牌照离岸迅速上线，赚足了舆论眼球与早期先机；而 Kalshi 尽管早在 2018 年就已起步，却直到 2022 年底才重新向公众开放，并在 2024 年底——历经数年诉讼彻底拿回选举等核心合约市场的上线资格后——才算真正全面发力。 Tarek 坚守正规合规路线的原因包含两个维度： 1. **务实底线**：在金融服务与医疗健康两大领域，硅谷崇尚的“快速行动、打破陈规”（move fast and break things）是行不通的。一旦出现系统性差错，其后果将是灾难性的。想要获得主流大众与华尔街机构投资者的深度接纳，监管完备性与合规透明度是建立“信任”（trust）的唯一根基。 2. **哲学初心**：Tarek 骨子里想做的是从体制内部革新系统，建立下一代“纽约证券交易所”（New York Stock Exchange），而非躲在海外灰色地带搭建一个边缘副业产品。 这种看似缓慢笨重的“打地基”策略，在合规大门最终被依法叩开后，展现出了惊人的复利效应。平台的安全感与合规壁垒让用户放心注入资金，业务轨迹随即呈现出陡峭的抛物线式增长（parabolic growth）。 - **市场份额**：Kalshi 在取得合法资格后，在美国预测市场迅速占据了约 95% 的市场份额。 - **时间跨度**：2018 年创立，2022 年底面向大众初步重开，2024 年底关键法律胜利后真正全面爆发。 - **用户信任度**：合规资质打消了资金安全疑虑，为主流体育赛事（如红袜队对阵洋基队）及重大政治经济事件的交易提供了机构级保障。 --- ### [26:52](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l_Boz3KRtBQ&t=1612s) 穿越沙漠：为了 Kalshi 的使命而创办公司 在 2018 年到 2024 年漫长的攻坚期中，Kalshi 宛如在无垠的荒漠中跋涉。美国商品期货交易委员会（CFTC）等监管机构频频施压，甚至几度试图掐灭其生机。被问及最绝望的低谷时，Tarek 坦言自己甚至已经记不清具体的某一天，因为那是一种持续且漫长的精神煎熬。在极度的干渴与绝望中，团队常常会产生“海市蜃楼”（mirages）般的幻觉——误以为迎来了监管转机或业务突破，随后却发现只是泡影，这种心理落差往往让人心碎。 然而，在漫长的暗黑期中，Kalshi 从未考虑过转型（pivot）。Tarek 指出，“Kalshi”在阿拉伯语中意为“一切”（everything），他们从第一天起就渴望建立交易一切资产与事件的“万物交易所”。更本质的区别在于： > “我们不是为了创办一家公司而做 Kalshi，我们是为了把 Kalshi 变成现实，才不得不创办了一家公司。” Tarek 回忆，如果重新投胎掷骰子，他大概率会留在交易台做一名交易员或量化风控经理，他本身毫无非当创业者不可的执念。正因这种“概念先行、被宏大构想拖拽着往前走”的驱动力，一旦放弃了这个理念，公司的存在本身也就失去了全部意义。 --- ### [28:16](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l_Boz3KRtBQ&t=1696s) 创业维艰：执拗的合伙人与永不消逝的沙漠 谈及如何熬过至暗时刻，Tarek 引用了本·霍洛维茨在《创业维艰》（The Hard Thing About Hard Things）中的洞察：创业之所以艰难，不在于工作本身多重，而在于没有任何人能向你保证这种折磨何时会结束。面对每天清晨醒来“我到底在干什么”的内心动摇，联合创始人 Luana Lopes Lara 成为了团队中最不可动摇的支柱。 Tarek 笑着提到，Luana 身上有一种极具韧性的倔强与硬气，每当面临绝境时，她的反应往往非常直接粗暴，带着一种“别像个懦夫一样哼哼唧唧（stop being a little bitch），生活还得继续，接着干”的韧劲，拽着团队往前推进。Tarek 总结道，在创业中只要给予足够长的时间跨度，胜利在数学概率上是具有必然性的，真正的致命风险只有一个——主动放弃。 针对当前很多创业者在沙漠中盲目耗损机会成本的现状，Tarek 提出了对创业动机的深度反思： - **纯粹热爱与使命**：如果你对这个想法本身怀有极致的热情，坚信不做会抱憾终身，那么就必须咬牙挺住。 - **功利幻觉的陷阱**：如果坚持只是为了贪图“世俗成功后的光环与回报”，这往往是个极其危险的理由。 Tarek 警醒道，创业从不是一段熬过终点就能松口气的冲刺。所谓“穿过沙漠到达绿洲”的浪漫幻想根本不存在，创业者胃里翻江倒海的焦虑与压力永远不会消失。真实的创业历程，无非是从一片没有水源的干旱沙漠，跨入另一片偶有补给的沙漠，抑或是直接撞进下一场遮天蔽日的暴风雨（storm）之中——混乱与压力只是不断变换着外壳，永无宁日。 ### [30:59](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l_Boz3KRtBQ&t=1859s) 光环之下的真实日常：从早八到晚十的“非强制苦修” 在外人看来，执掌一家估值狂飙的明星创业公司（Rocket Ship）似乎风光无限，仿佛创始人已经“成功上岸”，可以站在神坛上尽情享受人生。但 Tarek Mansour 对这种幻象嗤之以鼻——现实中根本没有所谓的奢华与惬意。他直言，创业者一旦滋生出“我终于做成了、可以好好享受生活了”的念头，公司离走向下坡路也就不远了。 谈到个人生活与工作节奏，Tarek 坦承自己几乎将全部精力倾注在工作上。他有一位相伴四年多的伴侣，并在访谈中由衷感慨伴侣为他做出的巨大牺牲：“无论是在最艰难的低谷期，还是在那些看似光鲜、实则同样充满煎熬的‘高光期’，她都一直在背后支持我。”在日常作息上，Tarek 每天清晨 7:00 起床，8:00 准时抵达办公室，通常一直忙碌到晚上 22:00 离开；回到家后还会处理些许事务，最后刷半小时的 Instagram 短视频彻底放空，随后入睡。 到了周末，星期五晚上他往往因为一周的连轴转而精疲力竭，通常只能选择周六晚上外出吃顿晚餐。至于周六和周日的大部分白天时间，Tarek 依然会待在办公室。值得注意的是，Kalshi 内部并未推行打卡或强制周末加班的狼性文化。Tarek 认为： - 强行逼迫全员“7×24 小时硬核磨砺”毫无意义，甚至会适得其反。 - 创始人拥有最高的股权激励与心理驱动力，理应身先士卒、在办公室泡得最久。 - 当创始人自发加班时，团队中真正有自驱力的人也会被感染；周六的办公室往往更安静，员工们乐于借此时机坐到创始人身旁，一起无拘无束地碰撞点子与脑暴。 --- ### [33:08](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l_Boz3KRtBQ&t=1988s) 150 人团队边界与反直觉的“重品牌、轻销售”扩张模型 访谈中，主持人提及 Kalshi 团队人数刚从 130 人增至 150 人，并指出 150 正好是著名的“邓巴数”（Dunbar's number）——一旦跨过这个门槛，创始人将极难记住每一张面孔与业务细节，通常不得不开始大肆招募中层管理者。主持人拿 Column 联合创始人 William Hockey（坚持将团队死死卡在 130 人以内）为例，询问 Kalshi 未来几年的扩张节奏究竟会走向几百人，还是刻意保持精简。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Kalshi 极简人力与业务扩张飞轮 accDescr: 展示 Kalshi 如何通过自动化剥离线性客服，并将高品质品牌营销转化为自发漏斗，规避中层官僚膨胀。 subgraph Support ["客服层：极致自动化"] A["数百万级活跃用户"] --> B["< 10 人精简客服团队"] B --> C["高度定制的 AI 自动化流"] end subgraph Growth ["增长引擎：品牌共振"] D["创始人级 100% 细节打磨"] --> E["极具破圈力的顶流品牌营销"] E --> F["受众自发引流与自裂变"] F --> G["极大降低直销人力线性依赖"] end ``` Tarek 表示自己对 William Hockey 的精简克制非常钦佩，而 Kalshi 在组织架构上也极力避免“随业务线性膨胀”的低效陷阱： - **客服端（Customer Support）**：虽然面对数百万级用户，但 Kalshi 的客服团队不足 10 人，全靠深度训练的自动化工具与系统高效消化海量诉求。 - **机构端与销售端（Sales）**：随着机构业务的拓展，销售人员可能会呈现一定程度的线性增长，但 Tarek 更推崇“品牌营销驱动增长”（Brand Marketing as Top-of-Funnel Enabler）。 - 他坚信，只要将品牌与顶层营销做到极致，受众与潜在客户就会像多米诺骨牌一样自发跟进，根本无需堆砌庞大的地面销售大军。 --- ### [34:27](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l_Boz3KRtBQ&t=2067s) 拒绝 80/20 法则：在最后 10% 逼出“共振频率” 主持人追问，Tarek 拥有 MIT 计算机科学与数学的硬核背景，按理说是个数据极客，但他却对文案字句、视觉设计等品牌细节展现出近乎病态的苛求，这种特质究竟因何而来？ Tarek 笑称，这种完美主义与轻微强迫症（OCD）遗传自他的母亲。但更深层的商业哲学在于：商业世界里通用的“二八定律”（80/20 法则）在顶级营销中根本行不通。当所有人都在用 80% 的精力敷衍出差不多合格的产物时，真正的超额回报与爆发力全都藏在无人愿意涉足的“最后 10%”之中。 Tarek 引入了物理学中的**“共振频率”（Resonant Frequency）**概念： - 营销就像寻找一个系统的固有频率，当你把细节微调到严丝合缝、正好击中那个振动点时，产生的能量是数万倍的质变，而非线性的微调。 - **2024 年大选全国实时看板**：Kalshi 在 2024 年大选出圈期间，在纽约时代广场、洛杉矶等地铺设了巨幅数字广告牌。Tarek 要求广告牌必须完完全全复刻产品原貌，并通过 API 与交易引擎无缝直连——每当 App 上产生一笔真实的大选交易，数千里外的巨型荧幕瞬间实时跳动刷新。为了让路人路过抬头时形成“看胜率预测就找 Kalshi”的肌肉记忆，这个项目在设计、工程与接口上推翻重来了近 20 版，把设计师与工程师逼到几近虚脱。Tarek 直言：“这种折磨人的苦活，除了创始人，没有哪个职业经理人能推得动。” --- ### [36:09](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l_Boz3KRtBQ&t=2169s) 极致的发布时机：捕猎公众注意力的“瞬时风口” 除了产品维度的绝对完美，Tarek 的另一大执念是**对发布时机（Timing）近乎分秒不差的精准把控**。他指出，大众骨子里根本不关心某家创业公司说了什么，公众永远只关心自己，以及当下几小时内信息流里正在爆炸的话题。随着互联网碎片化加速，公众焦点的生命周期已经从“月”缩短到“天”，甚至每隔几小时就彻底翻篇。 因此，做营销绝不能站在岸上强行向用户兜售产品，而必须将 Kalshi 的存在生拉硬拽到正在咆哮的“时代浪潮中心”： - **梅西（Lionel Messi）合作**：卡在梅西职业生涯最后一届世界杯首场比赛打响的前 48 小时官宣。当时全球所有目光与情绪都在向梅西汇聚，影响力被成百倍放大。 - **甜茶（Timothée Chalamet）广告片**：团队早早就完成了广告拍摄，原本打算在奥斯卡颁奖季放出，但 Tarek 压住不发，一直在耐心潜伏等待。直到纽约尼克斯队（Knicks）突发爆火全网的突发新闻、全网都在热议身在场边的甜茶时，Kalshi 在短短 12 小时内果断上线商业片，瞬间吃尽全网热度红利。 - **AI 商业广告**：在全网激烈争论“AI 是否会砸掉传统艺术家饭碗”的舆论峰值期，Kalshi 率先推出了纯 AI 生成的先锋概念广告；而等到后来市场上充斥着拙劣的 AI 广告跟风者时，Tarek 立即果断转向——因为此时风向已变，回归真实质感才是新的酷。 - **字母哥（Giannis Antetokounmpo）签约**：精准选在他宣布不离开雄鹿队的次日官宣，借着转会迷局峰回路转的最高关注点引爆体育圈。 - **传统主流媒体集成（CNN、CNBC、Fox）**：在秋季官宣媒体合作时，公众正热议“传统有线电视新闻是否已死”的话题。Kalshi 并没有以高高在上的合作方姿态做冷冰冰的公关声明，而是顺应大众心理，将叙事包装成“传统新闻媒体正在借由预测市场走向现代化”。 主持人指出，想要卡死这些转瞬即逝的黄金窗口期，往往要与合作明星的团队、CNN、纽约时报等极其官僚繁琐的对手方博弈，对方往往拖沓冗长。Tarek 总结道，创始人必须亲自下场撕开那些层层审批的繁文缛节，打破流程，唯快不破，才能抢在公众注意力转移前精准扣动扳机。 ### [38:49](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l_Boz3KRtBQ&t=2329s) 独特的营销哲学：从“反向克莱默”推特主到引爆时代的文化抓手 当被问及 Kalshi 内部是否有职业市场营销人员时，Tarek 坦言他们并没有传统意义上那种按部就班的市场部门负责人。如果一个合伙人或营销负责人需要搭建一整套繁复的组织架构，做一个方案还要规划三周，那在 Kalshi 根本行不通。Kalshi 确实有一位出色的首席营销官（CMO）Alan，但他专注于营销中高度科学化的部分，极其擅长以高投资回报率（ROI）精准把控预算开销；而负责品牌文化与公关传播的人则完全是另一种风格——他手下没有任何直接汇报的下属，整天在全美各地到处飞，专门策划好玩、酷炫的事情。 更有意思的是这位品牌负责人的背景：他最初是华尔街知名恶搞账号“反向克莱默”（Inverse Cramer）的操盘手——该账号专门跟踪著名财经主持人吉姆·克莱默（Jim Cramer），每当克莱默在电视上极力看好某只股票时，账号就反向押注其下跌。Tarek 发现这个人极具网感，便直接向他抛出橄榄枝：“你想来帮我们做社交媒体吗？”加入 Kalshi 后，不仅社交媒体由他操刀，连后来大获成功的 AI 营销创意也是他的主意。他拥有一种罕见的天赋，能够用极其奇特、小众且深奥的角度切入流行文化，让品牌精准融入时代精神（zeitgeist）。 让主持人感到意外的是，这种看似只适用于大众消费者的无厘头营销，在大型金融机构客户面前同样奏效。Tarek 解释说，外界普遍以为华尔街机构只看重西装革履的严谨作风，机构确实需要和首席风控官对话、需要坚如磐石的合规底层基础，而 Kalshi 也确实把这套地基打得极其扎实；但与此同时，让品牌“时刻留在客户脑海中”（top of mind）同样不可或缺。即便面对机构决策者，保持持续的品牌心智占领依然是致胜法宝。 ### [40:18](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l_Boz3KRtBQ&t=2418s) 荒漠时期的至暗时刻：2022年中选中遭遇监管“口袋否决”与裁员震荡 话题随后转回了 Kalshi 穿越创业荒漠的核心冲突：起诉监管机构 CFTC（美国商品期货交易委员会）。起诉自己的直接监管机构，在任何创业者看来都是近乎疯狂的举动。Tarek 直言：“这真的很疯狂，即便我们最终打赢了，整个过程也依然是疯狂的。”因为在商业世界里，现实远比“法律站在哪一边”更加残酷，很多事情受政治风向左右。面对近乎拥有绝对权力的联邦政府，初创公司处于极端劣势——当你终于等到政府被问责的那一天，你的公司往往早就倒闭了，诉讼的经济成本和时间成本足以拖垮任何一家初创企业，而政府本身却不需要为诉讼承担任何实际损失。 Kalshi 的这次豪赌并非临时起意，而是一场长达数年的拉锯战。早在 2018 年创立、并在 2021 年底正式向公众开放之前，Kalshi 就已经开始与监管部门沟通上线大选预测市场的计划。Tarek 当时向政府详细陈述了大选市场的必要性、它将如何成为最精准的民意晴雨表，以及其完全合规合法的法理依据。监管部门起初态度暧昧，表示“好的，我们会与你们配合推进”。然而接下来的日子里，监管机构却一个月接一个月地无限期拖延。 Tarek 当时将整个公司的未来全部押注在 2022 年美国中期选举的预测市场上，董事会也为此做好了全力冲刺的准备。然而，CFTC 最终采取了类似“口袋否决”（pocket veto）的手段——他们从未正式出具拒绝函，只是通过极其礼貌的程序性拖延，硬生生把时间耗到了中期选举结束。2022 年底，监管方实质性禁止了大选市场的推出。耗费四年心血准备的产品被直接封杀，平台只能依赖极其有限且难以起量的小众标的运转。这给团队带来了灾难性的打击，许多骨干员工心灰意冷选择离开，Kalshi 被迫实施了裁员，整个公司跌入冰点。 ### [42:43](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l_Boz3KRtBQ&t=2563s) 决策的期望值与方差：德尚的世界杯困境与德州扑克手的心态定力 回顾 2022 年那场毁灭性的挫折，Tarek 展开了一段极富哲理的思考：创业中“期望结果”（Expected Outcome）与“实际结果”（Outcome）之间往往存在着巨大的方差（variance）。期望结果取决于你的决策质量和所付出的努力，这是创业者唯一能掌控的东西；然而真实世界充满随机性，总会裹挟着不可控的方差将你推向意想不到的结局。 残酷的是，商业世界从不以“期望结果”来评判英雄，人们只根据“实际结果”来论成败。当命运的抛硬币掉到了反面，外界所有声音都会在瞬间指责你：“你的战略错了，你的执行太烂了。”Tarek 以足球世界做了一个鲜活的类比：他是梅西的铁杆球迷，2022 年阿根廷夺得世界杯让他狂喜；但在阿根廷夺冠的次日，法国国内却掀起了要求解雇主帅迪迪埃·德尚（Didier Deschamps）的声浪。德尚是率领法国队夺得 2018 年世界杯的功勋教头，在卫冕冠军普遍难以小组出线的魔咒下，他顶住压力再度将法国队带入决赛，并一路战至最后的点球决战。点球大战在概率上纯粹是抛硬币，但硬币落地没有偏向法国队的那一刻，所有人就想立刻把他赶下台。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 决策期望值与现实方差模型 accDescr: 展示创始人如何通过理性的决策期望值对抗外界的实际结果评价与方差波动 subgraph Control ["创始人可控领域"] A["高质量决策 & 扎实基本功"] --> B["期望结果 (Expected Outcome)"] end subgraph World ["现实随机世界"] B --> C{"不可控方差 (Variance / 抛硬币)"} C -- 正向波动 --> D1["成功: 被誉为天才战略"] C -- 负向波动 --> D2["失败: 团队动摇、外界指责战略失误"] end subgraph Mindset ["顶尖创始人/牌手特质"] D2 -. 坚持高胜率打法.-> E["拉长周期，静待方差均值回归"] E --> A end ``` 这种被结果偏见绑架的局面，恰恰是 Kalshi 当时的写照。团队内部信心瓦解，大家都在劝他们转型做别的方向。然而，从德州扑克中领悟到的思维支撑着 Tarek：顶尖的扑克牌手在拿到一手高胜率的好牌时，能够平静接受单局的巨大方差甚至惨败，因为他们知道只要坚守正确的打法，在足够多的局数之后，数学期望终究会让胜率均值回归。正如埃隆·马斯克（Elon Musk）或 Robinhood 的弗拉德·特内夫（Vlad Tenev）等多次在鬼门关走过的创始人一样，他们在极端风险和剧烈波动中淬炼出了一种极难形容的定力与超额认知（Alpha）——“我经历过这一切，我完全可以承受这种起伏”。 ### [45:03](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l_Boz3KRtBQ&t=2703s) 绝处逢生的反骨：2023年正式遭拒与起诉监管机构的生死豪赌 在熬过 2022 年底的低谷后，Tarek 和联合创始人 Luana Lopes Lara 重新整理了局面。他们心里清楚，无法上线选举预测市场的 Kalshi 就不是真正的 Kalshi，这个核心愿景绝不能妥协。于是他们重新向董事会汇报，决定在 2023 年再次向 CFTC 提出申请。当时董事会的很多人甚至觉得他们“已经开始陷入妄想了”。 整整又煎熬了一年后，到了 2023 年底，最糟糕的结果发生了：这一次监管机构不再拖延，而是正式下达了否定裁决，明确予以拒绝。公司再次从低谷坠入了更深的谷底。但在那个充满绝望的会议室里，两人没有选择认输。实际上在 2023 年夏天，Luana 就敏锐地预见到这次申请大概率还会被驳回，于是早早就提议：“我们应该开始准备起诉书，如果他们敢说不，这次我们就直接起诉他们。” 当他们正式向董事会提出要起诉美国联邦监管机构时，红杉资本合伙人阿尔弗雷德·林（Alfred Lin）和迈克尔（Michael）的第一反应是：这简直不可思议。Alfred 更是当面直言不讳：“这是一个疯狂至极的想法。你们只是一家羽翼未丰的微型初创公司，即便奇迹发生打赢了官司，过程中耗费的元气也可能让你们遭受不可承受的重创；更大概率的是，你们会输得一干二净。” - **时间跨度与节点**：Kalshi 于 2018 年创立，2021 年底向公众开放前即开始申请大选市场，2022 年底遭遇 CFTC 隐性否决并被迫裁员，2023 年底遭遇正式拒绝，随后正式引爆对监管部门的法律诉讼。 - **团队共识与分歧**：在遭遇否决后，大部分外部投资人和内部团队倾向于业务转型（pivot），认为原有战略和执行全盘皆错，而两位创始人坚持非大选市场不做的核心定位。 ### [46:01](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l_Boz3KRtBQ&t=2761s) 孤注一掷：起诉联邦监管机构的前夜与纠结 在决定起诉自己的直接监管机构 CFTC（美国商品期货交易委员会）之前，外界的所有声音几乎都是压倒性的警告：“以你们这种体量的初创公司，甚至更庞大的巨头，都绝对不可能告赢联邦政府。他们拥有对你们的绝对生杀大权，起诉他们无异于自寻死路。”Tarek 坦言自己内心其实一直在剧烈摇摆，每天都在担忧监管机构不仅会彻底毁掉公司，还会对创始人发起针对个人的全面清算。这种摇摆不定是极其折磨人的，即便他尽量在团队面前掩饰，焦虑依然肉眼可见。 直到正式提交诉讼的前一晚，团队还在开会，Tarek 依然在权衡风险、纠结不决。这时，联合创始人兼 CTO 卢阿娜·洛佩斯·拉拉（Luana Lopes Lara）彻底爆发了，她强硬地打断了犹豫，直接拍板道：“去他的（Fuck this），我们必须直接干，别再浪费时间了！”那一刻，整个会议室里的传教士式使命感被彻底点燃——既然已经顶着巨大压力走到了这一步，与其被慢慢勒死，不如全面开战，把整个身家性命押上去（bet the farm）。从德州扑克的期望值（Expected Value）来看，CFTC 随时能撤销清算所（Clearinghouse）牌照，用“千刀万剐”（death by a thousand paper cuts）的方式耗死 Kalshi；但只要赢的可能哪怕只有微小的概率，一旦打赢，其潜在回报与壁垒也极其惊人，在没有退路（No plan B）的情况下，他们决定放手一搏。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 起诉监管机构的决策博弈 accDescr: 展示 Kalshi 面对 CFTC 监管扼杀时，在放弃妥协与全面诉讼之间的期望值权衡 subgraph Risk["监管窒息风险"] R1["撤销清算所牌照 (Yank Clearinghouse)"] R2["漫长恶意审计与执法行动"] R3["创始人个人面临法律清算"] end subgraph Decision["起诉决策"] D1["内部剧烈摇摆与迟疑"] D2["联合创始人 Luana 强硬拍板：全面开战"] end subgraph Outcome["不对称期望值 (EV)"] O1["胜率极低但胜果极大"] O2["押上公司命运 (Bet the farm) 别无退路"] end Risk --> D1 D1 --> D2 D2 --> Outcome ``` --- ### [48:02](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l_Boz3KRtBQ&t=2882s) 胜诉电话与办公室里的狂欢 为了打赢这场官司，Kalshi 几乎面试了全美所有的顶尖诉讼律师，最终选定了琼斯戴律师事务所（Jones Day）的合伙人雅科夫·罗斯（Yaakov Roth）。Tarek 看中的不仅是他的聪明才智，更是他骨子里那种罕见的传教士气质——“这个男人每天早晨醒来，脑子里想的都是如何去制衡联邦政府的权力扩张”。在漫长的诉讼期间，两人平时全靠短信沟通。2024 年夏天有一次雅科夫突然打来电话，把 Tarek 吓得心脏狂跳，以为判决提前下来了，结果只是普通琐事。Tarek 当场对律师下达了死命令：“求你千万别再打电话给我了！只有在法院判决真正下来的那一刻才能打，平时一律发短信，因为接电话那十秒钟能把我吓死。” 到了 2024 年夏末的一天，Tarek 正坐在工位上，身旁坐着工程师莱纳（Rainer），手机屏幕上突然弹出了雅科夫·罗斯的名字。Tarek 整个人瞬间像被电击般浑身麻木僵硬，颤抖着接起电话，劈头就问：“你为什么给我打电话？”电话那头只传来一句平静而有力的话：“我们赢了。”随后发生的事情完全陷入了失控的狂喜之中，全公司上下在办公室里疯狂掀桌子、砸椅子，几乎把整个办公室彻底砸翻。 在胜诉之前的整整一年里，团队承受了难以想象的非人折磨： - **竞争对手的抢跑**：离岸无监管平台 Polymarket 凭借加密货币在全球迅速打响品牌，而坚持走正规牌照路线的 Kalshi 却被戴着镣铐前行。 - **监管的报复性审查**：CFTC 频繁试图抽掉其清算所牌照的根基，凭空罗织各种理由发起一项又一项的突击执法。 - **马拉松式恶意审计**：原本常规只需 10 天左右的例行合规审计，被监管机构恶意拖延拉长至整整 9 个月，试图通过官僚程序耗尽创始团队的精力与心智。 --- ### [50:19](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l_Boz3KRtBQ&t=3019s) 离大选只剩三周半：幸运背后的运气表面积与拼命冲刺 法院判决下达的节点堪称神来之笔——距离 2024 年美国总统大选仅剩三个半星期。然而，当他们满怀期待地正式上线大选预测合约时，前几天几乎没有激起任何水花，“你赢了诉讼，满心欢喜上线产品，结果什么都没发生”。任何消费级产品的爆发都不是开关一按就能自动运转的，品牌势能和用户习惯需要一点点搭建。 很多人将这次天时地利的胜诉归结为运气，Tarek 坦然承认其中确实有运气的成分，但他强调，这是团队苦熬五六年、不断扩大“运气表面积”（expanding that luck surface area）的结果——只有在牌桌上坚守足够长的时间，当机遇闪现时才接得住。面对大选前仅剩的 20 多天黄金窗口，整个公司进入了战时状态。所有人连轴转驻扎在办公室，Tarek 自己甚至四天才洗一次澡，脑子里只有一个念头：“这是我们唯一的翻盘机会，其他一切都不重要。”经过前四天极其艰难缓慢的冷启动，飞轮终于开始加速咬合，网络效应彻底被点燃，平台数据迎来了指数级爆发。 --- ### [51:25](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l_Boz3KRtBQ&t=3085s) 面对“交易还是赌博”的质疑与既得利益者的阻击 随着预测市场在年轻人中迅速走红，主持人提出担忧，指出自己 21 岁的儿子和身边的朋友们都在疯狂玩 Kalshi，虽然官方定义为金融交易，但它所调动的心理冲动机制与赌博高度相似，公众难免会担心年轻群体成瘾和受害。 Tarek 对此并不回避，他认为任何真正走向大众主流的创新产品，都不可避免地要经历两个层面的巨大阻力： 1. **大众的认知恐惧与防御心理**：公众面对颠覆性技术时，初期往往因为不理解而产生本能的恐惧。正如很多人看不懂 AI 的长期价值，只会抱怨“为什么要把工作拱手让给一个帮我们做作业的机器”一样，新产品需要漫长的市场教育。 2. **既得利益者（Incumbents）的道德围剿**：每当一个新平台开始切走传统行业的蛋糕，老牌巨头绝不会说“我们的利润受到了威胁”，而是必然会打出道德与安全的旗号进行精准打击。正如当年传统出租车行业围剿 Uber 时，绝口不提份子钱，而是大肆宣传“Uber 极度不安全、乘客会被绑架”；传统酒店业围剿 Airbnb 时，也会抓住极少数极端恶性事件在主流媒体上大做文章。对于 Kalshi 而言，最容易被既得利益者用来攻击的借口，就是给它贴上“赌博”的标签。 Tarek 进一步从金融史的角度指出，人类历史上几乎所有如今被视为理所当然的金融交易工具，在诞生之初都曾背负过“赌博”的骂名。比如大宗商品谷物期货（Grain futures），在 20 世纪初期的美国也被各州政府扣上赌博帽子并告上法庭，直到 1905 年联邦最高法院做出里程碑式裁决才最终确立其合法地位。而在美国法律框架下，大宗商品期货的法定交易年龄本身就是 18 岁，将年轻人的理性对冲与交易冲动直接贬低为盲目赌博，本身就是对金融交易本质的误读与过度简化。 ### [53:42](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l_Boz3KRtBQ&t=3222s) 商业模式的本质分歧：赌场靠输钱牟利，衍生品市场靠撮合收费 面对将预测市场与赌博混为一谈的质疑，Tarek Mansour 回顾了投机监管的历史演变。在过去没有加密货币和 Meme 币等花样百出的投机工具时，早期交易形式曾被指责为纯粹的赌博；然而美国最高法院裁定，尽管投机在表面上与赌博极其相似，但公开透明交易所中买卖双方的对抗交易具备核心的“价格发现”（price discovery）功能，这正是金融市场的立足之本。Tarek 明确区分了两者的商业模式底层逻辑：赌场的利润完全建立在客户的损失之上，“赌场的收入等于客户的亏损”。为了追求利润最大化，赌场会封禁那些精通数学和做足功课的聪明赢家，同时向不断亏钱的赌徒推送优惠活动以维系其成瘾性，因而传统博彩业在商业利益上绝无动力真正解决赌博成瘾问题。 相反，Kalshi 作为受监管的衍生品交易所，其核心商业模式是平台手续费。交易者的输赢与平台自身利益脱钩，输家的资金直接流向赢家，Kalshi 仅从中收取大约 1% 的交易手续费（"I take a 1% fee whether somebody lose or not"）。这种机制决定了 Kalshi 没有任何动力去鼓励用户非理性爆仓，反而有充分的激励去监测和遏制恶意行为与病态交易，维持一个健康可持续的市场生态。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 传统赌场与 Kalshi 商业模式激励机制对比 accDescr: 对比传统博彩与预测市场衍生品交易在收入来源与平台激励上的本质差异 subgraph Casino ["传统赌场模式 (零和对赌)"] C1["平台利润 = 客户亏损额"] --> C2["排斥聪明赢家 / 封禁算牌客"] C1 --> C3["向亏损玩家提供促销以维系粘性"] C3 --> C4["放大成瘾机制，难以主动限额"] end subgraph Kalshi ["Kalshi 衍生品交易所模式 (双边撮合)"] K1["平台利润 = 约 1% 交易手续费"] --> K2["输家资金流向赢家，平台不赚亏损钱"] K2 --> K3["欢迎专业研究者，提升定价准确度"] K2 --> K4["主动引入节流限额，抑制病态非理性交易"] end ``` ### [55:13](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l_Boz3KRtBQ&t=3313s) 智者飞轮与交易节流：在高度竞争的市场中自我规范 当主持人追问，赌场排斥高手以保护“散户韭菜”，而在 Kalshi 上，大量专业交易高手（card sharks）直接与凭直觉下注的普通年轻散户对赌时，Tarek 坦然承认了这种对抗的存在，但他强调平台的正向飞轮正是建立在聪明资金之上的。Kalshi 需要激励用户深入做研究，因为市场流动性越充裕、交易越理智，预测结果就越真实可信；越权威的预测数据吸引越多人关注，进而为整个平台带来更大的用户漏斗。正如股票市场、期权交易、NBA 决赛或欧冠联赛一样，高水平竞技环境从不保证人人获胜，胜出者永远是少数，但 Kalshi 提供的是公平透明的规则，让每个人都有机会凭借扎实的研究获胜。 为了防范过度沉迷与不可承受的财务损失，Kalshi 实施了严格的“节流”（throttling）机制。尽管数据显示 18 至 20 岁年龄段的行为并无显著异样，但面对社会层面的担忧，平台对该群体施加了更强力的交易风控限制： - 当用户出现过度亏损或异常交易模式时，系统会施加限额并要求额外的身份与资质验证，人为增加交易摩擦力，阻止其盲目上头。 - 推出“家长门户”（Parent Portal）：未成年人绕过风控往往依靠冒用父母身份证，Kalshi 允许父母主动提交证件并声明“禁止任何人使用此身份开户”，一举消除了 95% 的未成年冒名交易风险。 - 数据显示，Kalshi 上出现过度亏损或病态交易特征的用户比例，不仅明显低于期权交易，也低于股市的日内高频交易（在日内股票交易中，通常有 75% 到 80% 的散户以亏损告终）。 ### [57:01](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l_Boz3KRtBQ&t=3421s) 治愈极化的解药：用理性下注对抗社交媒体的“精神腐蚀” Tarek 谈到了自己与年轻交易者父母的沟通，许多父母对于自己 25 岁的孩子在 Kalshi 上交易感到十分欣慰。在他们看来，这让年轻人开始主动关注现实世界并变得更加睿智；相比之下，年轻一代沉溺在 Instagram 等社交媒体上，每天被极端对立、仇恨言论和持续不断的“脑残短内容”（brain rot）所侵蚀。虽然刷社交媒体不会像投资一样直接输掉金钱，但 Tarek 直言“他们在心智上失去的要多得多”，因为算法牢牢锁住了心智。 在社交媒体上，极端煽动、非黑即白的言论往往能获得最狂热的点赞，而深思熟虑、理性权衡的观点却鲜有人问津。然而，预测市场通过“真金白银的代价”颠覆了这一激励结构：在真金白银的交易中，唯有严谨、理性、经过校准的客观认知才能获得回报。Tarek 坚信预测市场不仅是金融工具，更是对抗当下社会极端化与信息茧房的“终极解药”。它正在潜移默化地训练年轻一代学会用概率思维和事实依据看待复杂世界，促使大众从无脑站队转向理性思辨。 ### [59:08](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l_Boz3KRtBQ&t=3548s) 穿越戈壁的忠告：虚幻的“自由”与创业的真实性法则 访谈接近尾声，面对众多处于困境、在漫长“戈壁沙漠”中挣扎的创业者与 CEO 听众，Tarek 给出了两点极其冷峻而透彻的建议： 第一，必须极度拷问自己创办公司的核心初衷。如果追求的是浮华光环或纯粹的财富回报，这条路绝非良选。在今天，加入一家高速成长的独角兽企业的机会成本极高，若按风险调整后回报（risk-adjusted return）以及创始人所承受的生活方式牺牲和巨大痛苦来综合衡量，选择从零创业在纯理性层面上“近乎是一件蠢事”。当被问及如果弟弟说“我想创业，因为我想当自己的老板”时，Tarek 直言会立即严词反问： > “你根本算不上自己的老板。你有董事会，你实际上在为所有员工打工，为所有客户打工。你其实在为所有人工作……那种所谓的‘自由感’从来都不是真的。事实上，你是所有人里最不自由的一个，而且公司做得越大，你就越不自由。” 第二，创业项目必须“忠于自我”（it has to be true to you）。Tarek 坚信，如果一款产品或一家公司的内核与创始人本人的特质背道而驰，创始人是绝对无法把它做大、做好并成功推向市场的。真正卓越的大企业，其气场和企业文化往往是创始人和 CEO 性格的绝对镜像——正如主持人所感叹的那样，走进一家优秀公司的办公室，你就会发现“那座办公室本身就是创始人的化身”。 ### [01:01:18](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l_Boz3KRtBQ&t=3678s) 做真实的自己：创始风格与公司的深度绑定 在对谈收尾阶段，Tarek Mansour 感慨道，当你真正见到某些公司的创始人时，往往会恍然大悟：“原来这家公司之所以是现在的样子，全是因为他这个人。”然而在现实中，很多创业者并没有真正贯彻这种认知，反而总是试图去寻找某种放之四海而皆准的“正确做事方法”。Tarek 认为根本不存在所谓通用的标准模式，否则所有人都会去照搬同一套模版。主持人随即引用了王尔德的名言回应道：“‘做你自己，因为其他人都有人做了（Be yourself. Everyone else is taken）。’你毫无疑问完完全全就是你自己。”双方在对整场访谈的意犹未尽中正式结束了对话。 ### [01:01:49](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l_Boz3KRtBQ&t=3709s) 主持人复盘：使命驱动、长期主义与互补的联合创始人 访谈结束后，主持人分享了自己的三点核心感悟与总结： 第一，**极致的使命驱动（Mission-Driven）**。Tarek 脑海中始终对世界应当如何运转有一套极其清晰的构想，创立 Kalshi 纯粹是为了完成这一崇高使命而打造的工具载体。这与当年 HubSpot 的创立历程不谋而合——当时团队的目标是彻底将营销方式从传统的外推式（Outbound）转变为集客式（Inbound），公司本身只是为了实现这一理念才被建立起来。在如今许多创业者热衷于在社交媒体上短视争胜的浮躁环境下，Tarek 的执着显得弥足珍贵。 第二，**耐心的深层底座押注**。主持人指出，很多当代创业公司每天都在试图“赢得当天的 Twitter 舆论”，不断做出妥协性的短期决策。而 Kalshi 与 SpaceX 极为相似的地方在于，它们都敢于在最底层的核心根基上押下重注，并展现出超越常人的极大耐心，直到这些长期投入彻底开花结果并带来巨大的复利回报。 第三，**反差鲜明的合伙人动力学**。Tarek 与联合创始人 Luana Lopes Lara 之间的合作模式极具戏剧张力且与外界预想完全相反。通常人们会以为技术或运营合伙人相对稳健保守，但事实是 Luana 极其井井有条却热爱寻求风险（Risk-seeking），而散漫跳脱的 Tarek 骨子里却是个极度偏执的风险厌恶者（Risk-averse）。正是这种性格与认知上的极致对冲，构成了“1 + 1 = 3”的绝佳互补状态，这让主持人深有共鸣地联想到了自己在 HubSpot 与 Dharmesh Shah 之间长达数年的合伙关系。 - **使命优先于商业形式**：Kalshi 的成立并非为了做公司而做公司，而是为了落实预测市场的全球愿景；这与 HubSpot 改变营销范式的初衷高度相似。 - **底层重注与耐心**：不被日常喧嚣所绑架，像 SpaceX 攻克火箭复用一样在监管诉讼和市场基建上死磕，最终换来统治级的行业领先。 - **互补的“阴阳”合伙机制**：条理清晰且激进冒险的 Luana，搭配思维发散但对风险极度敏感的 Tarek，形成了极其罕见且坚韧的创业二人组。 ## Notable quotes > [08:04](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l_Boz3KRtBQ&t=484s) 我认为这完全取决于个人。有些人就是能把宇宙中原本看似无法控制的绝大部分事物，硬生生拉进自己的掌控领域……只要这件事情不违背物理学定律，我们大概就能把它做成，它就在我们的掌控范围之内。 — Tarek Mansour > [13:38](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l_Boz3KRtBQ&t=818s) 它确实很混乱，但你可以建立一个在混乱中正常运转的组织。 — Tarek Mansour > [26:52](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l_Boz3KRtBQ&t=1612s) 我们不是为了创办一家公司而做 Kalshi，我们是为了把 Kalshi 变成现实，才不得不创办了一家公司。 — Tarek Mansour > [28:16](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l_Boz3KRtBQ&t=1696s) 别像个懦夫一样哼哼唧唧，生活还得继续，接着干 — Luana Lopes Lara > [34:27](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l_Boz3KRtBQ&t=2067s) 这种折磨人的苦活，除了创始人，没有哪个职业经理人能推得动。 — Tarek Mansour > [40:18](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l_Boz3KRtBQ&t=2418s) 这真的很疯狂，即便我们最终打赢了，整个过程也依然是疯狂的。 — Tarek Mansour > [45:03](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l_Boz3KRtBQ&t=2703s) 这是一个疯狂至极的想法。你们只是一家羽翼未丰的微型初创公司，即便奇迹发生打赢了官司，过程中耗费的元气也可能让你们遭受不可承受的重创；更大概率的是，你们会输得一干二净。 — Alfred Lin > [46:01](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l_Boz3KRtBQ&t=2761s) 去他的，我们必须直接干，别再浪费时间了！ — Luana Lopes Lara > [48:02](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l_Boz3KRtBQ&t=2882s) 求你千万别再打电话给我了！只有在法院判决真正下来的那一刻才能打，平时一律发短信，因为接电话那十秒钟能把我吓死。 — Tarek Mansour > [48:02](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l_Boz3KRtBQ&t=2882s) 我们赢了。 — Yaakov Roth > [53:42](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l_Boz3KRtBQ&t=3222s) 赌场的收入等于客户的亏损 — Tarek Mansour > [59:08](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l_Boz3KRtBQ&t=3548s) 你根本算不上自己的老板。你有董事会，你实际上在为所有员工打工，为所有客户打工。你其实在为所有人工作……那种所谓的‘自由感’从来都不是真的。事实上，你是所有人里最不自由的一个，而且公司做得越大，你就越不自由。 — Tarek Mansour > [01:01:18](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l_Boz3KRtBQ&t=3678s) 做你自己，因为其他人都有人做了。 — Oscar Wilde ## Mentioned Tarek Mansour, Luana Lopes Lara, Kalshi, CFTC（美国商品期货交易委员会）, Sequoia Capital, Alfred Lin, Polymarket, HubSpot, Dharmesh Shah, Kevin O'Leary, Ken Griffin, Citadel, Elon Musk, Tony Hsieh, Zappos, Jensen Huang, OpenAI, Anthropic, Brian Armstrong, Jack Dorsey, William Hockey, Column, Yaakov Roth, Jones Day, Didier Deschamps, Lionel Messi, Timothée Chalamet, Giannis Antetokounmpo, Jim Cramer, Inverse Cramer, CNN, CNBC, Fox, Wall Street Journal, Ben Horowitz, 《创业维艰》（The Hard Thing About Hard Things）, SpaceX, Robinhood, Vlad Tenev, Uber, Airbnb, Salesforce ## Video description Tarek Mansour calls himself a paranoid risk manager - the guy who can list 20 ways a hot air balloon will go down before it leaves the ground. Then he bet his entire company on suing its own regulator. Kalshi spent years walking through the desert. The CFTC pocket-vetoed its election markets ahead of the 2022 midterms, people left, and the company took a layoff while the government piled on audits and enforcement actions. Death by a thousand paper cuts. Instead of pivoting, Tarek and co-founder Luana Lopes Lara sued the federal government against the guidance of nearly all their investors and advisors. They won, three and a half weeks before the 2024 election, and Kalshi now claims 95% U.S. market share in prediction markets. We get into how two co-founders run 150 people with nearly everyone reporting directly to them, why it’s intentionally chaotic, why the two of them disagree by design, and Tarek's poker-player theory of expected outcome vs. outcome. He also breaks down his obsession with marketing timing - like launching the Timothée Chalamet spot 12 hours after the Knicks news broke - and his "hole in the ship" rule: a founder has to be the one staring at the leak. Tarek and Luana's dynamic reminded me a lot of me and Dharmesh at HubSpot: total opposites, and one plus one equals three. [Source](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l_Boz3KRtBQ)

[8:04] Tarek Mansour: 我认为这完全取决于个人。有些人就是能把宇宙中原本看似无法控制的绝大部分事物，硬生生拉进自己的掌控领域……只要这件事情不违背物理学定律，我们大概就能把它做成，它就在我们的掌控范围之内。 [13:38] Tarek Mansour: 它确实很混乱，但你可以建立一个在混乱中正常运转的组织。 [26:52] Tarek Mansour: 我们不是为了创办一家公司而做 Kalshi，我们是为了把 Kalshi 变成现实，才不得不创办了一家公司。 [28:16] Luana Lopes Lara: 别像个懦夫一样哼哼唧唧，生活还得继续，接着干 [34:27] Tarek Mansour: 这种折磨人的苦活，除了创始人，没有哪个职业经理人能推得动。 [40:18] Tarek Mansour: 这真的很疯狂，即便我们最终打赢了，整个过程也依然是疯狂的。 [45:03] Alfred Lin: 这是一个疯狂至极的想法。你们只是一家羽翼未丰的微型初创公司，即便奇迹发生打赢了官司，过程中耗费的元气也可能让你们遭受不可承受的重创；更大概率的是，你们会输得一干二净。 [46:01] Luana Lopes Lara: 去他的，我们必须直接干，别再浪费时间了！ [48:02] Tarek Mansour: 求你千万别再打电话给我了！只有在法院判决真正下来的那一刻才能打，平时一律发短信，因为接电话那十秒钟能把我吓死。 [48:02] Yaakov Roth: 我们赢了。 [53:42] Tarek Mansour: 赌场的收入等于客户的亏损 [59:08] Tarek Mansour: 你根本算不上自己的老板。你有董事会，你实际上在为所有员工打工，为所有客户打工。你其实在为所有人工作……那种所谓的‘自由感’从来都不是真的。事实上，你是所有人里最不自由的一个，而且公司做得越大，你就越不自由。 [61:18] Oscar Wilde: 做你自己，因为其他人都有人做了。

[13:34] Tarek Mansour: What you get out of chaos is like continuous constant adaptability... you want to constantly reorient and reassemble around the biggest challenges or biggest opportunities for the company. [23:31] Tarek Mansour: In financial services and healthcare, I don't think you can cut too many corners... when things go wrong, they go wrong bad. [28:26] Tarek Mansour: Luana had a lot more than you know, 'Stop being a little bitch,' basically. Like, you know, life is fine, whatever—let's move on. [36:08] Tarek Mansour: People don't care about us... You have to basically bring Kalshi to whatever is happening in the wild, not try to push whatever you're offering to people. [45:04] Luana Lopes Lara: fuck this, we should just do it, we're wasting time. [48:50] Yakov Roth: We won. [51:12] Tarek Mansour: I don't care about anything. This is my shot. [59:08] Oscar Wilde: Be yourself. Everyone else is taken.

[0:00] The thing that was unique about us is we [0:01] never pivoted. It was always Kalshi. I [0:03] mean, Kalshi is everything in Arabic. [0:04] Like, we always wanted to build the [0:05] everything exchange, the exchange for [0:06] all these different assets. [0:08] And we didn't build Kalshi to build a [0:10] company. We built the company to build [0:11] Kalshi. It It's a It's a bit different. [0:13] >> I see. [0:13] >> We were dragged by the idea. I I I [0:14] wasn't the type that wanted to be an [0:16] entrepreneur or Like, I I think if you [0:18] re-rolled the dice multiple times, I'd [0:19] probably just be a trader or risk [0:21] manager. Like, I would not be an [0:22] entrepreneur. [0:23] >> Got it. [0:23] >> But, the idea was so like glaring in [0:25] front of us that we just had to do it. [0:27] Like, we we felt that we had to do it. [0:29] And so, the whole point of doing this [0:30] whole thing is the idea. [0:35] >> [music] [0:39] [music] [0:49] >> Hey everybody. Today we have Tarek on [0:50] from Kalshi. He is a gem. This is a [0:53] really good episode. [0:55] They walked through the desert for many, [0:57] many years in this company and went [1:00] sideways. Then they made a very risky [1:03] bet to sue the federal government and [1:05] won. And this thing has ripped ever [1:07] since. It's growing [1:10] you know, similar rates to OpenAI and [1:12] Anthropic, but a few years behind. I [1:15] think you're going to like it. I'll be [1:16] back at the end for my takeaways. [1:18] We just met for the first time a couple [1:19] weeks ago at Kevin O'Leary's house and [1:22] it was a CEO dinner. [1:24] And you had some very unusual ideas [1:27] about CEO-ing. This is why I wanted to [1:29] have you on the pod. [1:30] >> Yeah. [1:30] >> And so, I want to get into those. Let's [1:32] just start with your co-founder. [1:34] >> Yeah. [1:35] >> It sounded like it's a semi-co-CEO [1:37] relationship. How do you two run the [1:40] company? How do you split it up? [1:43] >> Yeah, it's interesting. You know, we've [1:45] over the years you know, constantly been [1:46] been asked this this question and and [1:48] and um we never really had a very clean [1:50] answer to this. And we always thought it [1:51] was sort of like a weakness. And our [1:53] perspective on that has changed. I mean, [1:55] dramatically. I actually think whatever [1:56] model works for us works for us. Great, [1:58] you know, and then if you figure that [2:00] out then, you know, [2:00] >> Yeah. [2:01] >> Um and you know, the way the best way to [2:03] describe it is I I think [2:06] like I operate at the very high-level [2:09] strategy, [2:11] make sure that we're going in the right [2:12] direction. Where's the world heading? [2:13] Where are rights to win? [2:15] And just thinking, a lot of thinking [2:17] continuously. [2:18] And then I'm very very low in the [2:20] details. [2:21] >> Okay, you're high and low. [2:23] >> Yeah, extremely high. [2:24] >> Head in the sky, feet in the ground. [2:25] >> Yeah. [2:26] >> Okay. [2:26] >> But very very low. I'm talking like [2:28] >> Coding? [2:30] >> Yeah, and more specifically like like [2:31] marketing and the copy and the details [2:33] and like everything around how we're [2:35] marketing something. [2:36] >> Yeah. How we're talking about the [2:37] product, all these little things that [2:39] like the end consumer, whether it's [2:40] someone looking at a billboard or [2:41] someone who's like in the product is [2:43] going to experience. Like what are they [2:44] going to feel? [2:45] And everything else that is actually [2:47] running the company is Luana. [2:49] >> Okay. [2:49] >> That's basically, you know, I think one [2:51] of the best way to describe it. And then [2:52] I do the external stuff, the regulatory, [2:53] the policy, you know, the the and fund [2:55] rate all the other external aspects of [2:57] the job that tie to marketing and sales. [2:59] But the the day-to-day running of the [3:00] company, like making sure that the [3:02] company's actually run, is Luana. [3:04] >> How do you dis- You must disagree about [3:06] stuff. [3:06] >> a lot, like all the time. [3:07] >> So, how's that play out? [3:09] >> I actually think we kind of disagree by [3:10] design. Like we we have this thing this [3:11] dynamic over time [3:13] it's become a thing where like we [3:15] essentially will always take the [3:16] opposite side of the argument. [3:18] >> Are you a contrarian? [3:20] >> I'm the guy in the room that will be [3:21] sort of the negative, like everybody's [3:23] pumped about a plan, I'm like, oh, here [3:25] here's how it's going to fail and how [3:26] and all the issues. I have, you know, [3:28] But but we tend to sort of just like [3:30] disagree with each other often. [3:33] And I think also like, you know, again, [3:34] it's a people like, oh, you know, how [3:35] you disagree and it it disagreement like [3:37] continuous disagreement is a is an [3:38] antipattern, but for us it ended up [3:39] being a pattern because we're we're [3:40] coming to we're this very complicated [3:41] company that has this constant [3:43] continuous delicate balancing between [3:45] how much risk to take [3:47] on the regulatory front and like, you [3:48] know, innovation and regulatory. And you [3:49] have to always balance those two those [3:50] two things out. [3:52] And you see it now in our safety and [3:53] innovation all of that. And like [3:55] that sort of debate [3:57] could could is a continuous force to [3:59] drive us to the middle. We end up [4:00] getting, you know, not always the right [4:01] answer, but we're not too far from the [4:03] right answer. And we never oscillate [4:05] between the two extremes. And I think [4:06] that's one of the powers of having like [4:07] two equally powerful like co- two [4:09] co-founders in an organization. [4:12] Because if you're if you're the only [4:13] one, you know, anyone like anyone that [4:15] reports you or whatever, like anyone [4:16] that you hire that is not a founder [4:18] it it it's inevitable that they won't [4:20] always tell you the truth. It's [4:21] inevitable. Like no matter what culture [4:23] you build, etc. Like [4:25] there's different incentive structure [4:26] than someone who's a founder that owns [4:27] as much equity as you, etc. [4:29] And so you can stray. [4:31] Right? And and and here it's very hard [4:33] for either of us to stray. [4:34] >> So I talked to Luana to prepare for the [4:36] interview. It sounds like you're kind of [4:38] the more conservative of the two. [4:41] >> Yeah. [4:42] >> And maybe you're on the regulatory side [4:43] and she's on the innovation side. Is [4:45] that the way it sort of plays out? [4:47] >> More often than not, yeah. [4:48] >> Okay. [4:48] >> Luana is very faith-based [4:51] like optimist. Sometimes I would say [4:52] like over like incre- like I super [4:54] irrational optimistic. Like she she she [4:56] sometimes doesn't really do the [4:58] the math on how something is going to [4:59] work out. Like like on why it's going to [5:01] work out. And that's And continuously [5:03] happened at Kalshi. And that used to fr- [5:05] I mean throughout for years it [5:06] frustrated me. I was like this is like [5:07] this really like [5:09] it doesn't make any sense. And I'm the [5:11] other side. I'm like I I'm I'm a risk [5:14] matcher. I'm par- I'm I have a paranoid [5:15] demeanor and and and [5:17] which is also usually an anti-pattern [5:18] for a founder. [5:20] I'm I I think about risk and expected [5:23] values and like I I think [5:24] probabilistically about the world. And [5:25] here's all the things that could go [5:26] wrong. [5:28] And I think that sort of that tension [5:30] has led to [5:32] all the decisions that we've made over [5:33] time. But it's interesting because you [5:35] know, like Lu- Luana's [5:38] uh approach to things [5:41] and now I now believe that given enough [5:42] time horizon is going to end up being [5:43] true. No matter how irrational it [5:45] sounds. It's kind of it's kind of [5:46] amazing. But I think [5:48] my side is the thing that like for right [5:50] you know for a company it has to get [5:51] regulatory right. You have to make sure [5:53] that like you [5:54] uh you're doing things the right way. [5:56] Like I'm kind of that forcing function [5:58] in the company. And again so I think we [6:00] land somewhere in the middle where we [6:01] managed to achieve the results where [6:02] we've achieved. I'm actually very bad at [6:04] a lot of things. [6:05] >> Okay. [6:05] >> It's actually shocking. Like if if you [6:06] see my day-to-day [6:07] >> Cuz you're obsessive. You're very good [6:08] at a couple things. [6:10] >> Exactly. [6:10] >> You're a lot of founders are obsessive. [6:12] >> Yeah, but I'm I'm kind of a [6:13] procrastinator. [6:14] >> Huh. [6:14] >> Like I'm so disorganized. Like if if [6:17] like people that work around me ask them [6:18] it's just like such a show. But [6:20] like Luana like orchestrates everything. [6:22] >> She's organized. [6:23] >> Very and like she drops. But like I'm [6:25] like the opposite of what you imagine [6:26] for an operator. [6:28] But I can get so obsessed with certain [6:30] things that I want to get good at that I [6:31] can get good at pretty fast and I like [6:33] get good. [6:34] So I don't think I'm a good marketer. I [6:35] just like obsessed about it for long [6:36] enough that I you [6:37] >> It's how it worked with my co-founder. [6:38] He's very obsessive and he goes very [6:40] deep down a rabbit hole and you can't [6:41] get him out of that rabbit hole. [6:43] You've had a long strange [6:45] growing up in Beirut. [6:47] >> Yeah. [6:47] >> Uh certainly an unusual childhood. Is [6:49] the risk aversion sort of rooted in [6:53] growing up in such an unusual place? [6:55] >> For sure. I mean you most most things [6:57] right that end up sticking with you are [6:58] are really how you grew up. Um this [7:00] definitely applies here. I mean so I [7:02] grew up with a single mom [7:03] and I grew up in Lebanon. And in Lebanon [7:05] you know it's it's not a [7:06] I feel like often times the headline [7:07] make it sound like a [7:10] >> Sounds like a constant war zone if you [7:11] read the New York Times. [7:12] >> Yeah, it's not. It's actually more of a [7:14] volatile [7:15] >> Yeah. country. [7:15] >> Yeah. Like the word is volatility. It's [7:17] a lot of ups, a lot of downs. You can [7:18] have a lot of fun, great life and then [7:20] all of a sudden you're like you know [7:21] running from a So so the mix of those [7:24] two, my mom was paranoid. She she she [7:25] would she was always afraid we would [7:27] sort of take a lot of issues that would [7:29] be thrown at us to the extreme and we [7:30] would carry them as like and I was [7:32] really young and I'm I'm the eldest [7:33] child. We're two brothers. [7:35] And that doesn't leave you. So so my my [7:37] brain is wired to think about all the [7:39] ways that something is going to you know [7:41] go wrong. [7:42] Right? Like if I get on a a hot air [7:44] balloon, I I I can like list you all [7:47] >> Like any Yeah, on a flight, too. Like I [7:48] can list you immediately all the 20 ways [7:50] this thing is going to go south, right? [7:52] >> Okay. [7:52] >> Um but it's important for our company. [7:54] We're coming at take, you know, that has [7:55] financial risk involved, regulatory I [7:56] mean all these different things. But [7:57] that has helped us over time really [7:59] become very hyper tuned to what exactly [8:02] is our risk in a variety of different [8:04] ways and where we can take risk and [8:05] where we can't. [8:05] >> Okay, I've heard you on other pods bring [8:07] your mom up. [8:09] Just can you just give us some more [8:10] paragraphs on her and [8:12] like riff on your mom? [8:14] >> she's a like she's definitely a tiger [8:15] mom like and that, you know, so tiger [8:18] mom very intense. Like very very [8:21] intense. My way or [8:22] >> too. [8:23] >> Yeah, I am very intense, too. Yeah, but [8:24] yeah, my way or the highway. [8:26] Uh we're like uncom- completely [8:28] uncompromising. [8:30] Completely. And then [8:31] it was a sort of thing where like So, [8:33] what happened is I think she had to [8:34] basically sacrifice a lot of her life to [8:36] to because my my dad left us at age six [8:38] kind of and she had to sacrifice a lot [8:40] of like her career, everything she was [8:42] wanted to do to basically make sure that [8:44] we're okay and she wanted us to have the [8:45] best life we could and come back, you [8:46] know, come back to America. So, I was [8:47] born in California. I went to Lebanon [8:48] and she wanted us to come back and get [8:50] to a top school, etc. [8:52] And so, what happened is I think like a [8:53] lot of her personal pride ended up being [8:55] attributed to her kids. Like my kids' [8:56] success are going to be what I deliver [8:58] in life. [8:59] And so, so her bar was so high on us. [9:03] Everything. Like we would do a sport, [9:04] like go play tennis or play soccer and [9:06] you have to win. And if you come silver, [9:07] like it's bad. [9:09] So, it it just creates like a hyper [9:11] comp- competitive um [9:13] uh a nature, but also there's this this [9:15] feeling of like [9:17] there's always an answer. Like, you [9:18] know, whenever we had like a financial [9:20] issue or like [9:22] you know, like you don't give up. You [9:23] you bang your head against the wall, you [9:25] go up, you go left, you go right, you [9:27] you go down. I mean, it doesn't really [9:28] matter. You're going to figure something [9:29] out. [9:30] All of that I think ends up, you know, [9:31] now like, you know, decades later, [9:33] right? Like it it's all in me and it it [9:37] it matters because there's a sort of [9:38] higher gear sometimes that like so most [9:40] people have this thing of like well [9:42] there's certain things that are within [9:43] my control and certain things are not. [9:45] I don't really believe that in that [9:47] dichotomy. I think it depends on the [9:48] person. [9:49] Like some people can just [9:51] make a significantly larger subset [9:54] of the universe of things that are like [9:56] >> I feel like you can make things happen [9:58] maybe irrational. [9:59] >> Yeah. You can make you can bring more [10:01] things into the control [10:03] >> Yes. [10:04] >> if you have you know it's like some some [10:06] people just think like okay like I [10:08] >> I can do it. [10:08] >> Yeah and it could the scale of the [10:10] problem can even become big I mean it's [10:12] I mean Elon has a little bit of it [10:13] right? Like [10:13] >> He's a lot. [10:14] >> Yeah. Like I I feel like Elon sometimes [10:16] and I'm not you know my sense is like as [10:18] long as it doesn't break the laws of [10:19] physics like we probably can make it [10:20] happen. It's in our control. [10:21] >> Yeah. [10:22] >> Yeah. [10:23] >> Uh we're going to get into some more CEO [10:24] stuff. We just heard uh Ken Griffin from [10:27] Citadel [10:28] uh speak at this conference we're at. [10:31] And he talked about picking best [10:33] practices from different companies and [10:35] sort of assembling his CEO playbook from [10:37] other people he learned from Jack Welch [10:39] etc. etc. Do you look up to one CEO or [10:43] do are you following a playbook or you [10:45] just I'm going to make it up as I go? [10:47] >> I have a lot of I'm going to make it up [10:48] as I go. [10:49] >> Yeah. [10:49] >> So you know and I think that applies to [10:50] Luana too like both of us we're probably [10:53] very sort of like entrepreneurially [10:55] illiterate. Like we haven't read all the [10:57] books we haven't watched all the [10:58] podcasts. [11:00] >> I I do Twitter a bunch just because a [11:01] lot of our users are on Twitter but not [11:03] not like in the sort of like here are [11:05] the four steps to build a company [11:06] >> Okay. [11:07] >> uh sense. Um [11:09] >> Okay. You're not in that ecosystem. [11:10] >> have I have I look up to like there's a [11:12] lot of aspects a little bit like Ken [11:14] honestly like a lot of aspects of CEOs I [11:16] look up to like I I I think the extreme [11:18] boldness of Elon and his ability to [11:20] attract talent is amazing. I think [11:22] Tony Hsieh I always go back to because I [11:23] think [11:25] his operational discipline and execution [11:26] I think is [11:27] honestly is one of the best. [11:29] Uh his business is so hard. [11:31] >> Mhm so hard. So is yours by the way. [11:33] Yeah, was our business is hard in [11:35] marketplace and all these issues. I [11:36] mean, but I I think those are two names [11:38] that consistently come to mind. But [11:39] there's everyone like there's so many [11:40] people I mean like the call centers have [11:41] done such a great job at like creating [11:44] this sort of brand aura around their [11:46] company to attract like incredibly like [11:48] talented people to to you know build [11:49] build something that just goes beyond [11:51] what the company is exactly building. [11:52] And so I observe a lot of these [11:54] different things and figure out like [11:55] what I can take. But then after that [11:57] it's continuous iteration. Like what we [12:00] do well I think is like we just try and [12:03] we try fast. And we're continuously like [12:05] did this work didn't work? Okay, like [12:07] change it fast. Whether it's a hire [12:08] whether it's our approach to things [12:09] whether it's my own voice what whatever [12:11] it is. I think we do this you know and [12:13] and I think that's the best way to find [12:14] the right answer because often times [12:15] these things are very like [12:18] I'm going to say company dependent but [12:19] as I was saying that it's very like CEO [12:21] or founder dependent. Like it's to your [12:24] image. It's very hard you know to market [12:27] even your product if it it's not coming [12:29] truly from what you're [12:31] from who you are. [12:32] Because the company is going to be to [12:34] your image no matter what you do. And [12:35] your your headquarters in New York do [12:37] you think if you were based here you [12:39] would be more in the mold of every other [12:41] company? [12:42] Probably. I also think it would have [12:44] been harder because [12:46] >> You would have been talked out of some [12:47] of your crazy ideas. [12:48] >> Yeah, maybe to some extent. [12:51] The the harder piece I was thinking is [12:52] just recruiting. I mean one of the [12:53] reasons we moved at the time [12:55] What I like about New York is for our [12:57] company's mission which is you know like [12:59] figuring out how to build this idea of [13:01] infinite market the next generation [13:03] exchange like fundamentally rebuilding [13:05] Wall Street like this new Wall Street [13:06] that is more like global more for the [13:08] people. Um [13:11] It it attracts it has a a stronger let's [13:14] call it like [13:15] market fit with the talent in New York. [13:17] >> Yeah. [13:18] Much better. [13:19] >> Much better and then and there I felt [13:20] confident we could hire the the top 1% [13:22] of talent whereas here [13:24] maybe but I don't see it it doesn't feel [13:27] like it burns as cleanly. I think here [13:28] it's really AI right now and and I think [13:30] even if I mean we didn't necessarily [13:32] know that in 2020, but like even if it [13:34] wasn't AI it was going to be something [13:35] that is not finance, right? [13:37] >> Yeah. Okay, you and Luana have I think [13:39] it's 130 [13:41] sort of direct reports. Have I got that [13:42] about right? [13:43] >> Yeah. Yeah, pretty much. I mean, there's [13:46] some functions that like [13:47] we sort of let them do the like what [13:49] they do. [13:50] And but pretty much most of the company [13:52] reports to between the two of us. [13:54] >> Okay, that's unusual. [13:55] >> Yeah, it's beyond unusual. [13:56] >> Uh [13:58] five years from now are you [14:00] It's unusual cuz it's small and it's [14:01] unusual cuz it's zero hierarchy and it's [14:03] unusual because they report to both of [14:04] you. [14:05] Um how does that actually work? How is [14:07] it not chaos? [14:09] >> It's kind of chaotic. [14:09] >> Okay. [14:10] >> But I I I think you could build an [14:11] organization that's somewhat okay with [14:13] that. Because what you get out of chaos [14:14] is like continuous constant [14:16] adaptability. It's very easy for a [14:18] company to adapt, very easy. I mean Sam [14:20] talked about pivoting and I I I pivoting [14:22] feels like a bit of a strong word, but [14:23] like the point is like [14:25] you want to constantly reorient and [14:27] reassemble around the biggest challenges [14:29] or biggest opportunities for the company [14:31] and you want to be able to do that with [14:33] no friction. [14:34] That's inherently chaotic. [14:36] >> How do you [14:36] >> That's a complex right? Like it's a [14:37] complex system like it's like organisms [14:39] and cells are sort of moving around and [14:40] like floating in the ether and then they [14:42] you know what I mean? [14:43] >> Yeah. [14:43] >> And so [14:44] like that's a like the world is [14:46] inherently chaotic system so so you know [14:49] what I mean? And so we're trying to [14:50] impose structure that is unnatural given [14:52] how the world is moving and in a world [14:53] that's accelerating over time. [14:56] You kind of have to be more sensitive to [14:58] the fact that it's increasingly more [14:59] chaotic and so your structure needs to [15:01] be as adaptable as possible. [15:02] >> Okay, this is sort of the crux of the [15:03] podcast because the CEO playbook that I [15:06] grew up with [15:07] like handed down through the [15:09] generations, I think it's getting a big [15:10] rethink. [15:12] Um [15:13] and like Brian Armstrong and Jack Dorsey [15:15] are talking a lot about this new way to [15:17] organize where it's not a pyramid, it's [15:19] a circle. AI's in the middle. You're [15:21] training the AI. All your systems are [15:23] legible, your people are feeding the AI, [15:25] and the AI makes more and more [15:26] decisions. Work chart's gone, [15:28] compensation's different, all the things [15:31] are getting thrown out. Are you [15:33] following along with any of that, or are [15:35] you just kind of making it up as you go? [15:36] >> Making it up as we go. [15:38] I didn't even know about that. I never [15:39] heard about that. But like um [15:41] it's interesting. [15:42] >> One of the things I've learned by the [15:43] way about all this, I've interviewed all [15:44] these CEOs, there's no one way to do it. [15:47] You know what I mean? [15:47] >> Yeah, it's [15:47] >> You look at the way Jensen does it, [15:48] totally different than Elon, totally [15:50] different from [15:50] >> Yeah, it's [15:51] Imagine Jensen running Citadel. [15:53] >> Yeah, totally. [15:54] >> [laughter] [15:54] >> That would be nuts. And you know, or or [15:57] you know, so I don't know. I mean, I [15:59] think that like um [16:00] or like even funnier, like imagine Ken [16:02] getting dropped into Open AI to run it. [16:04] Like it it would [16:05] >> [laughter] [16:05] >> it would be so crazy. But like um [16:10] I I don't know. I I'm actually curious [16:11] to hear your thoughts. I mean, like the [16:12] the [16:14] the world is more interconnected [16:18] than ever. [16:19] And I think just things are [16:20] accelerating. [16:21] Like the rate of learning, the rate of [16:23] change is like if it used to be I mean, [16:25] maybe like you have to readjust [16:26] fundamentally every three to four years, [16:29] then every year. I mean, I honestly [16:30] think you have to readjust fundamentally [16:31] what every month or two now. [16:32] >> I kind of agree. I'm learning so much [16:33] faster than I used to learn. I'm picking [16:35] up skills so much faster than I used to [16:37] learn. Um yeah, the world has changed. [16:40] >> to today, it like what it's it's so [16:41] crazy. I mean, it like how it's it's [16:44] hard for me to imagine [16:46] making a certain set of decisions in [16:47] January. [16:49] >> Okay. [16:49] >> that truly applies still today. [16:51] >> Okay, so how do you plan? [16:53] >> Dynamically, right? [16:55] >> Okay. So but it's the end of December, [16:56] you got a board meeting, Alfred Lin's on [16:58] your board. What do you actually even [17:00] present to the board? [17:00] >> Yeah, it's it's kind of like hazy a bit, [17:02] like it's you know, the the board used [17:03] to be like, oh, it's not structured [17:04] enough. But now I think it's they [17:06] they're kind of used to it. [17:07] >> What is it? [17:08] >> It's usually So look, I I I yeah, yeah, [17:10] it's a good question. [17:12] I tend to not have too much structure. [17:14] And I and and one other thing actually I [17:15] can actually we're not super metricsy. [17:17] >> Okay. Oh my god, I thought you'd be the [17:20] opposite. [17:20] >> No, we're metricsy very hardcore on like [17:22] risk, like how much margin you're giving [17:24] to customers, like things that are like [17:26] go directly into the product. But in [17:28] terms of decision-making, [17:30] um [17:31] it's it's it's we should be a little bit [17:34] more and we will probably get to to [17:35] there a little bit more over time, but [17:36] it's it's really more like, what are the [17:38] customers saying? [17:39] What are the pockets of demand that like [17:41] basically the energy is about and where [17:42] is where can we basically be first or be [17:44] most aggressive or have a right to win? [17:46] That's all the conversation where it's [17:48] at, right? And then there's usually like [17:50] one or two key challenges that tend to [17:52] be the single most important challenges [17:54] in the organizations. Like [17:56] >> And yeah, like what? [17:57] >> let me give you the last sort of like uh [18:00] maybe 18 months. So, off of the election [18:02] the all the conversations what are we [18:03] going to do about election? How are you [18:04] going to cross-sell people? Are they [18:05] going to stick? [18:06] >> Yep. [18:07] >> And I was saying at the time it was [18:07] like, well, let's prove that this sort [18:09] of this network effect engine now that [18:10] we had we had a massive growth catalyst [18:12] that it is going to create the chain [18:13] reaction. Let's figure out how to like [18:15] make sure that people are, you know, [18:16] adopting other products and like get [18:18] going. And that worked. Like we really [18:20] we really created that network network [18:21] effect where we used that new demand to [18:23] attract more liquidity which boosted all [18:24] the other markets and then the houses [18:26] get demanded at a lower cost. And then [18:27] we basically compounded there. Then [18:29] after that, it was essentially like, [18:30] okay, we we need to prove our broker [18:32] strategy is working. So, we had the [18:33] direct-to-consumer that was growing [18:35] pretty well, but we wanted to make this [18:36] bet that um becoming an infrastructure [18:39] layer like all traditional financial [18:40] markets that we enable a bunch of [18:43] brokers to basically go and like could [18:45] we prove that we can do both at once and [18:46] that one was going a little bit slower. [18:47] So, the next six months we're like [18:48] scaling that. We got a bunch of brokers [18:50] that sort of really started working out. [18:52] Then the next challenge was actually [18:53] proving that we're not too dependent on [18:55] the brokers. [18:55] >> Okay. [18:56] >> Cuz those became or too well. They [18:58] became 80% of our revenue. Okay. So, all [18:59] of a sudden it's like, oh, amazing, the [19:01] revenue like ripped, but like now you're [19:03] super dependent on a bunch of the your [19:05] big bro broker partners. [19:07] So, what are you going to do now? It's [19:08] like, okay, now we have to go back to [19:09] focus on the direct and like really [19:10] scale that now that we have an extremely [19:12] liquid ecosystem because the brokers [19:13] brought more demand, more liquidity. The [19:14] whole thing is flowing now. [19:16] Now the brokers are like 10% of our [19:18] volume. [19:19] >> Okay, all the way back to 10. [19:20] >> Yeah, so so that [19:21] and I I I want to talk a little bit [19:22] about this adapt- adaptability thing [19:24] because all of these were very I mean, [19:25] we're talking about like going from like [19:27] elections and like sports then we got [19:29] into financials then you went to a [19:31] consumer business and then a B2B [19:32] enterprise motion and we went back and [19:34] we did all these in the span of like, [19:35] you know what? Like 8 months, right? [19:37] And then it was like a lot of the policy [19:38] stuff and and we should talk about that [19:40] a little bit but like, you know, you're [19:41] like exciting exciting exciting all the [19:42] way to till you get mainstream and when [19:44] you get mainstream, society all of a [19:46] sudden is like, "Whoa, whoa, stop. Stop [19:48] right there. Let's figure out what this [19:49] is. We don't understand it, you know." [19:50] Now you have the grandmas and the moms. [19:53] >> Yes, exactly. It's been going on for 6 [19:54] months but like in AI, you know, AI is [19:56] battling with it like [19:57] Airbnb, Uber, all of them at some point [20:00] you get a reckoning. And and now like [20:02] number one priority since January and I [20:04] think we've done a great job at sort of [20:05] positioning ourselves as a safe [20:06] responsible actor but [20:08] >> Uh particularly right now after all the [20:10] news about Polymarket recently. [20:11] >> Yeah, I think we've done a good really [20:12] good job at always being kind of [20:14] regulatory first do the right thing but [20:15] but we had to kind of tell that story [20:16] and that's also hard and comes with all [20:17] these challenges. But I mean, think [20:19] about that, right? Like it's it's [20:21] completely different functions like you [20:23] know, [20:24] even if I build the best [20:26] consumer marketing company, how's that [20:27] going to help me with the brokers? And [20:28] if I build the best sales function, [20:29] how's it going to help me you know, and [20:32] and so it goes back to like I I think [20:34] okay, how do we resolve these problems? [20:35] You know, [20:36] um [20:37] generally [20:39] there needs to be at least one founder [20:40] in any of these [20:42] big meaty [20:43] problems that we need to get right. [20:45] I I really strongly like I I [20:47] affirmatively strongly believe in that. [20:49] >> And so is there one of you that's the [20:50] DRI on these big hairy issues? Okay. [20:53] >> Like like it the responsibility, the [20:55] person that you that is going to get [20:56] grilled is one of Luana and I on these [20:58] top issues, these things that we need to [21:00] get right. And I I cannot I and I may be [21:03] wrong and I maybe over time as the [21:05] company gets more mature, I may change. [21:07] So maybe in in a few years we should [21:08] have another chat and and see what I [21:10] think. But, in my in this sort of level [21:12] like this growth phase and all and and [21:14] all that like [21:17] it's my analogy to this is a bit and I [21:19] think honestly this applies to any [21:20] company at any scale. I really really [21:21] think so. [21:23] It's like you're like on this big ship [21:25] and you're driving, you know, the ship [21:26] as fast as you can. You're trying to win [21:27] this but there's always a hole in the [21:29] ship. [21:31] And that hole is leaking. There's water [21:32] coming out of it. [21:34] And I mean, there's two types of [21:36] organizations. [21:37] One where the CEO or the founders are [21:40] straight up staring at the hole all day [21:42] every day, which is brutal. It's [21:43] painful. It's like you're [21:44] >> That was me. [21:45] >> Yeah, it's you, right? I think you [21:46] talked about that, you know. [21:47] And and the other type of organization [21:49] that like sort of either gives it to [21:51] someone [21:51] >> Yes. [21:53] >> And generally that what that someone is [21:54] going to do I mean, it's very painful. [21:55] Why would they why would they take [21:56] through all that pain? I mean, you you [21:57] know how painful it is, right? It's [21:58] constant pain. It's like it's [21:59] essentially like [22:01] continuous torture, right? [22:02] >> Yep. [22:03] >> So, they add like a rug on top of the [22:04] hole. You know, I like it you know, like [22:06] we're good. You know, things are growing [22:08] and then but I I inevitably that hole at [22:10] some point is going to start sinking the [22:11] ship. Inevitably. And whether this is [22:14] your Google and AI is coming after you [22:15] or, you know, your AI and like 90% of [22:19] America hates you or like you know what [22:21] I mean? Like and that's [22:22] >> What's your hole now? What what what [22:23] hole have we got? [22:25] >> I think in January what I would say our [22:26] big hole was like we need to [22:27] differentiate ourselves with the [22:28] unregulated stuff and the insider [22:29] trading issue. [22:30] Cuz you've always taken it seriously but [22:31] like you know, you poll people and they [22:33] no idea. They have no idea what the [22:34] difference is. You know, like the [22:36] regulated onshore market prediction [22:37] market like calcium Robinhood and others [22:39] and so on like Polly and others are [22:40] doing it offshore and that was really [22:42] bad for the industry. So, so we had this [22:44] we had to kind of kind of like clean up [22:46] the industry's reputation and I would [22:49] say we've made a significant amount of [22:50] progress but that hole is not fully [22:52] covered yet. Like we still have work to [22:53] do in terms of like explaining that like [22:55] look, there is the the right solution to [22:57] all these things is get it regulated, do [22:58] it the right way and there are people [22:59] doing it the right way and here's how. [23:01] Like with all things, right? There's a [23:02] right solution for AI. You don't [23:03] decelerate AI. You you you add the right [23:05] guardrails. And I think figure out what [23:06] those guardrails are and figure out how [23:08] to communicate effectively and figure [23:09] out why they're the right ones [23:11] is the whole. And um that's where I [23:14] spend pretty much like 80% of my time in [23:16] right now. [23:17] >> Okay, the whole is an interesting spot [23:18] and your competitor [23:20] has been called out by the Wall Street [23:21] Journal for their marketing practices [23:23] and Congress is taking them up on it. [23:24] You're used to all this stuff. [23:26] Is this [23:27] thing that's happening to Poly market at [23:29] this moment good for you or bad for you? [23:31] >> it's bad for us. [23:32] >> I think it is, too. [23:33] >> Yeah, for sure. Like I I think you know, [23:35] when you start competing, you realize [23:36] competition is actually [23:38] really never real problem. [23:41] I really think so. [23:43] I mean, unless [23:45] unless you're in a small market. Unless [23:46] maybe that's a that's a problem. But if [23:48] you're in a small market, then you [23:48] figure out the next big market and [23:50] figure out how to go take it and split [23:51] it with the competition. It's okay. [23:52] >> We used to always say at HubSpot, we [23:54] compete with salesforce.com. [23:56] And every time Salesforce would like [23:57] move the ship a little bit, everyone in [23:59] the company would be like, "We got to [23:59] move the ship in the exact same [24:00] direction." I would say. "Every time [24:02] they zig, we got to zag." [24:03] >> Yeah, yeah. There's always I mean, but I [24:05] I just think I don't think that's a [24:07] and maybe let me like say it maybe a [24:09] slightly like more nuanced way. Like I [24:11] don't think competition will be like a [24:13] is ever a true sort of like company [24:17] killer. Like I I I I you know, it's like [24:19] if you're in a big market, you're going [24:20] to have a big piece of the pie. And if [24:22] you're not, you should probably be in a [24:23] like should be constantly iterating and [24:24] shipping product and finding new [24:26] untapped markets to basically go and win [24:27] in. And and you know, it like there's I [24:31] I I believe in abundance. I mean, it's [24:32] hard not to believe in abundance, right? [24:33] Like look at the last like 5 years. It's [24:35] crazy. [24:35] >> And so [24:37] you were you were well behind them and [24:39] you've [24:40] from what I can tell you, passed them a [24:42] lot of it in sports, like really [24:44] crushing that. [24:45] >> We're we're bigger than across I mean, [24:46] we're like in the US 95% market share [24:48] now. [24:49] >> Okay. So, like how across the board? [24:50] >> How'd you do it? [24:51] >> I mean, I think it's like [24:52] >> You were way behind, right? [24:54] >> We were way way behind in the headlines, [24:56] like maybe. But like so we started the [24:58] company in 2018. It's been a long time, [25:00] eight years, right? Like [25:02] But we didn't relaunch the general [25:03] public until end of '22 and I think our [25:05] proper launch was end of '24 when we [25:06] were allowed to do the markets that [25:07] people really want, which is the [25:08] election and other markets and and [25:11] they launched in 2019, a year later, or [25:13] started the company and then they [25:14] launched immediately without a license. [25:16] So they were the brand that sort of did [25:18] it, but we were very dogmatic in our [25:19] approach, which was we're going to do it [25:20] the right way. [25:21] >> Why? [25:21] >> I think there's two reasons. One that is [25:23] practical, which I I think in financial [25:25] services and health care, [25:27] I don't think you can cut too many [25:28] corners. [25:28] >> I see. [25:29] >> I don't really believe in that. Like I [25:31] know in Silicon Valley it's like move [25:32] fast and break things and figure out how [25:33] to regulate later. Like not in financial [25:35] services. I think in financial services [25:36] inevitably things go wrong and when they [25:37] go wrong, they go wrong bad. [25:39] Uh and so I if you want to build true [25:42] mainstream adoption and true like [25:44] institutional adoption and like all of [25:45] that, these people will care. Like how [25:46] are you doing things? Are you regulated? [25:48] What like so they they will care. And [25:49] and I think so that was one. [25:51] Number two is honestly like it's a bit [25:52] it's a bit more philosophical. I was [25:53] excited about changing the system, [25:56] fundamentally like building the next [25:57] generation New York Stock Exchange [25:59] from within. Like change the system no [26:00] matter how hard it is, than going [26:02] offshore and building something on the [26:03] side and you know, like that was just [26:05] not exciting to me. I I I didn't feel [26:06] like I'm I'm pumped about doing that. So [26:09] and we were we stayed dogmatic about [26:11] that approach, but what we were doing is [26:13] building an incredibly great product and [26:14] great infrastructure and and great [26:16] regulatory infrastructure that like like [26:18] the word trust, like I think people [26:19] trust us more. Like when they put their [26:21] money, they're they feel good about [26:22] putting money with us. They feel good [26:23] there's not to be [26:24] >> Put some money on the Red Sox last [26:25] night. They beat the Yankees. Yes. [26:27] >> Oh, nice. Great. [26:28] >> [laughter] [26:28] >> But I but I think that was that. I think [26:30] when we did get regulated and like we [26:31] got approved, our our trajectory just [26:33] went, you know, really parabolic and I [26:35] think it's a mix of that sort of [26:37] foundation laying that we've done for a [26:38] while, which I really believed in. I [26:39] think if you if you believe in that [26:40] you're going towards a good market, [26:42] building a solid foundation, [26:43] even if you're not growing is okay. And [26:45] then I think we just have superior [26:46] execution on product and and growth. We [26:48] were we we compound at a much much [26:50] faster rate and give it enough time, the [26:52] results start showing. [26:52] >> While you're there, 2018, you start the [26:55] company. You wandered through the desert [26:56] for a long, long time. [26:59] >> time, yeah. [26:59] >> Uh CFTC was smacking you, saying no. [27:03] >> Yeah, the government was trying to kill [27:04] us. [27:04] >> Yes. It was must have been brutal. Did [27:06] you What was the lowest point? [27:09] >> Honestly, I don't even remember. It was [27:10] basically like it was it was truly like [27:12] just sort of like it was bad. Like it I [27:15] mean it was it was so bad. And and [27:17] it's like you're constantly in a state [27:18] of grief, and then you start like [27:21] you know, you're like in this desert, [27:21] and you start seeing like you lit- [27:24] literally start like you're so desperate [27:26] you start seeing fake [27:27] >> mirages. [27:28] >> Mirages, yeah. You you you know, you you [27:30] see something, oh, here's here it is, [27:31] finally, and then it's not true, and [27:32] it's disheartening, and [27:34] it's just hard. But the thing that was [27:36] unique about us is we never pivoted. It [27:38] was always Kalshi. I mean, Kalshi is [27:39] everything in Arabic. Like we always [27:40] wanted to build the everything exchange [27:41] exchange for all these different assets. [27:44] And we always stayed sort of because [27:46] part of it and looking back and when I [27:48] was thinking about it we didn't build [27:50] Kalshi to build a company. We built a [27:51] company to build Kalshi. It's a it's a [27:53] it's a bit different. [27:54] >> I see. [27:54] >> We were dragged by the idea. I I I [27:56] wasn't the type that wanted to be an [27:57] entrepreneur or [27:58] like I I think if you re-rolled the dice [28:00] multiple times, I'd probably just be a [28:01] trader or risk manager. Like I would not [28:03] be an entrepreneur. [28:04] >> Got it. [28:05] >> But the idea was so like glaring in [28:07] front of us that we just had to do it. [28:08] Like we we felt that we had to do it. [28:10] And so the whole point of doing this [28:11] whole thing is the idea. [28:13] >> Okay. [28:13] >> that's the case, then like if you lose [28:15] the idea, then you know [28:16] >> A lot of people listening to this are [28:17] walking through that desert. [28:19] >> Yeah. [28:19] >> And I I I read this book a long time [28:21] ago. It was called The Dip. And you're [28:22] cruising along, you get down in the dip, [28:24] and you don't know if you're about to [28:25] hit the bottom and come out, or if it [28:27] keeps going. [28:29] You Everyone thinks you're delusional. [28:31] >> Yeah. [28:31] >> Advice for the CEOs out there walking [28:33] through the desert. [28:35] >> You know, the book what is is it is it [28:36] Ben Horowitz wrote a lot about the [28:39] >> Hard Thing About Hard Things. [28:40] >> Yeah, that there's that that that [28:41] paragraph that's so good about it, which [28:42] is like the the reason why it's hard is [28:44] not like you're lifting something heavy [28:45] or whatever. It's it's it's it's like no [28:47] one can reassure you that it's going to [28:48] end, right? Like what I feel firmly [28:50] believe, and I really do, is the number [28:52] one risk [28:52] >> Did you want to give up? [28:54] >> For sure. Every day you wake up and [28:55] you're like, "What am I doing?" [28:56] >> And was Luana like, "No, we're sticking [28:57] with it." Like what was the dynamic? [28:58] >> we [28:59] both had our points. Luana was [29:00] definitely much more stubborn. [29:02] >> Okay. [29:02] >> Continuously. [29:04] Like Luana is is just like, "Yeah, you [29:05] you know, like [29:06] Luana had a lot more than you know, stop [29:08] being a little bitch." Basically, like [29:09] you know, just just life is fine, [29:11] whatever. Like let's move on. [29:13] >> Yeah. [29:13] >> And what I believe is basically, if you [29:16] give yourself enough of a time horizon, [29:18] you inevitably win. [29:19] >> Or you run out of out of money. [29:21] >> Yeah, but I think that's like a [29:23] I don't think it's a real killer of [29:24] companies. [29:25] >> Okay. [29:25] >> You can always extend your runway and [29:27] like it's not that hard to raise money [29:28] these days. [29:28] >> Nowadays, yes. [29:29] >> And you can pivot with a new idea and [29:30] like [29:30] >> Nowadays. [29:31] >> It's It's really the number one risk is [29:32] giving up, right? And And so but But [29:34] then But that It's interesting because [29:36] when I say that, to me the message [29:37] should not be like, "Oh, I should like [29:38] do it at all costs." [29:39] >> I see a lot of founders and they're [29:41] walking through the desert. I think they [29:42] should give up cuz there's opportunity [29:43] cost. [29:44] >> Yes. [29:44] >> If you're 35, you're going to spend the [29:46] next four years walking through the [29:47] desert, [29:48] start something new. [29:49] >> I think just ask yourself why you're [29:50] doing it, right? Right? So So it goes [29:51] back I mean, you know that you know [29:52] this. Like to me [29:54] maybe like there's a few buckets. [29:55] There's like the idea is something that [29:57] you're really passionate about, you [29:58] should keep going. [29:59] Right? Because you're going to regret. [30:00] There's I think it's hard. I mean, maybe [30:02] you're not, but like [30:03] then there's a a second bucket that's [30:05] sort of all the things [30:07] that people believe to be true after you [30:10] make it. [30:11] And I think that's a bad re- I really [30:13] think that's a bad reason. I I like [30:15] because [30:15] I mean, you know this. Like it's it's [30:18] it's a career, right? It doesn't end. [30:21] You have all sorts of different issues [30:22] over time. That like thing in your gut [30:24] stays there. It never leaves you, right? [30:26] You're always stressed. You have to make [30:28] sacrifices on your Like like Like [30:30] entrepreneurs don't have a a good life [30:33] in the traditional sense of the term, [30:34] right? You You don't get to that oasis [30:36] that you thought you were going to get [30:37] to, right? You actually just get into [30:38] different deserts. [30:40] And those deserts get maybe less There's [30:42] some water in the desert, but like [30:44] >> [laughter] [30:44] >> Okay, I like this. [30:45] >> But but maybe maybe it's better analogy [30:46] is like you go from a desert to like uh [30:49] like a storm. [30:51] And that storm sometimes is like very [30:52] clean water, sometimes it's storm, [30:53] sometimes it's like, you know, and then, [30:55] you know, but it's a different type of, [30:57] you know, craziness. I or or and and [30:59] maybe it's more motivating day-to-day. [31:01] It's stress and it's not just like [31:02] depression, but like but it's not the [31:04] life that you like oh you you you [31:05] finally made it, you're successful, [31:07] you're on the pedestal, like [31:08] >> Okay, so what do people think about what [31:10] the life of a rocket ship CEO is like [31:13] versus the reality? What do people have [31:15] wrong? [31:16] >> It it's just like a like a [31:17] >> Is it glamorous? [31:19] >> No, no. [31:20] I mean, you especially if you do I mean, [31:21] look, some people I think I I see it [31:23] sometimes it's like when you get to that [31:24] and it's finally made like they're all [31:26] really going to enjoy life, but it never [31:27] be then like the company is going to go [31:28] sideways. [31:29] >> What's your life like? [31:30] >> I work a lot, all the time. I mean, [31:33] um [31:34] >> Are you married? Do you have kids? [31:36] >> I I have a partner that it's been like [31:37] four four years and some and [31:40] >> Complains a lot? [31:41] >> Uh [31:42] no, she's honestly great, but like it's [31:43] tough, right? She sacrificed a lot also [31:45] to for for me to get here because [31:47] she supported me in the hard times, she [31:48] supported me in the in in the good [31:49] times, which are also hard. [31:50] >> Keep her. [31:51] >> Right. Yeah, yeah, she's she's like [31:52] she's the best. I mean, I think the the [31:54] but there's sacrifice on that front. I [31:56] think that [31:57] I I travel a lot. I I wake up so [32:00] basically I wake up every day at 7:00. [32:02] Uh I'm usually at the office by 8:00 and [32:04] I work I leave the office usually at [32:06] 10:00. [32:07] Uh [32:08] I work a little bit at home. [32:11] I usually like maybe like waste time on [32:13] Instagram reels for like 30 minutes and [32:14] I go to bed. [32:15] >> What's What's the weekend like? [32:18] >> Um [32:19] I usually try to like go out for dinner [32:22] one of Friday or Saturday. [32:24] Um [32:25] Generally Saturday. If it's Friday, I'm [32:26] so tired, like I I just need to rest. [32:29] And if I'm not tra- [32:30] like if I'm I'm basically in the office [32:31] Saturday, Sunday. Like I go to the [32:32] office Saturday. So I kind of like being [32:33] in the office. [32:35] >> Is everybody in the way, you're getting [32:36] >> most people like [32:37] >> They're in there. [32:38] >> Yeah, I mean but it's not forced. It's [32:39] not like oh, you know, like the hardcore [32:41] >> Yep. [32:42] >> I we try to do it in a way of like so no [32:44] one is ever kind of like slapped or [32:46] there's no expectation you need to be in [32:47] the office at these hours. I don't [32:49] believe in that sort of like put [32:50] everyone in the office 24/7 hardcore [32:52] grind. That's that's going to I I do [32:55] believe the founders can do it because [32:56] we have the most incentive to do it. And [32:57] if the founders do it naturally others [32:59] are like motivated. They want to be next [33:00] like they like coming on Saturday [33:01] because there maybe a little bit less [33:02] people and they can sit next to you and [33:03] ideate about a bunch of things. And [33:05] hopefully you got the right people that [33:06] would show up but they don't have to, [33:08] you know. [33:08] >> Okay, let's just get back to the CEO-ing [33:10] since we're there. [33:12] 100 What do we say? 130 150 direct 130 [33:15] to [33:15] >> 150 now. We grew a little bit. [33:16] >> 150. You're [33:19] And like 150 is an interesting number [33:21] because it's Dunbar's number. It's hard [33:23] to keep track of anything north of 150. [33:25] It's hard to interview those people. [33:27] Most companies start hiring middle [33:28] managers. [33:30] What is Is it Is it like 170 3 years [33:34] from now? Is it 500? Are you like [33:37] William I I'm friends with William [33:38] Hockey at Calm and he's like at 130. [33:41] He's like at staying at 130. Is that [33:43] you? [33:44] >> Uh [33:46] William is very good. I think he's done [33:47] a great job. I I don't know. I mean um [33:50] I'm just thinking about the things that [33:51] scale linearly. So historically support [33:53] We have less than 10 support people. We [33:55] have you know, obviously millions of [33:56] customers. [33:56] >> You can automate a lot of that. [33:57] >> Yeah, it works really well. Honestly [33:59] like if you train the right it's it's [34:00] amazing, honestly. [34:02] Um So that's that's a linear thing [34:04] that's gone. I mean as we scale our [34:06] instructional side I think potentially [34:07] sales could scale somewhat linearly but [34:11] I don't know. You know, I'm kind of a [34:12] believer in my I'm actually curious what [34:14] you think but I'm kind of believer in [34:15] like a strong marketing and brand [34:17] marketing as a as a fundamental enabler [34:19] of sales and like enabler enabler of top [34:21] of funnel. [34:22] >> Yeah. Where is it going to go? Yeah. [34:23] >> Yeah, if you do that very well I [34:25] I think people will just sort of follow [34:27] each other. [34:27] >> Where does that come from from you? You [34:28] mentioned that a couple times like [34:29] you're really detailed in the copy and [34:31] all that. You didn't grow up You grew up [34:33] as a kind of mass CS [34:35] guy. Where's that come from? [34:38] And is it all got feel or just [34:39] >> but the perfectionism that came from my [34:41] mom like I I'm I'm like I I tend to have [34:43] OCD and obsessive with these things and [34:44] I want things to be really perfect like [34:46] as perfect as possible. And actually, [34:47] this is [34:48] It really matters. This is the key [34:50] thing. Like the all the results are in [34:52] the last [34:54] 10%. Like most people 80/20 it. That [34:56] doesn't work. Everybody's an 80/20. [34:58] >> Okay. [34:59] >> It has to be perfect. [35:00] >> Okay. [35:01] >> And if you it's like this sort of [35:03] especially with marketing, there's like [35:04] this sort of like a resonant frequency [35:06] that you have to [35:07] >> mom Rick talking right now. [35:08] >> But but it's This resonant frequency [35:10] concept is very interesting because I [35:11] think when you hit it, you get these [35:13] dramatically improved results, right? [35:16] And [35:16] and like [35:17] >> an example. [35:19] >> You know the the There's so many of them [35:21] but I I'll do I'll give two separate [35:22] ones specifically on marketing. So one [35:24] is like [35:25] So when we first went mainstream was [35:27] during the 24 election. And one of the [35:28] ideas I had is like we should do [35:29] billboards across the country. And the [35:31] billboards are basically the product. It [35:33] has to be the exact same as the product [35:34] and it's live and it has to be piped [35:35] with the API and every time a trade [35:37] happens [35:38] on the app, it's going to be projected [35:39] out in Times Square and in LA and all [35:41] these billboards in real time. [35:43] That had to be perfect. [35:45] So that every time people look up, they [35:47] build a habit of like I want to see the [35:48] odds and like Calshi is there for me to [35:50] see the odds. [35:51] And if it is, then you get the viral [35:52] mechanism and like, you know, all of it [35:54] works. And it worked. And but it took [35:56] maybe something like 20 iterations of [35:58] putting it out there, retaking it back [36:00] and to get it right. [36:01] >> Okay. [36:01] >> It's brutal. Like your designer get [36:02] exhausted the time, the engineer gets I [36:04] mean everyone is exhausted. [36:05] >> Yes. [36:06] >> And but that's sort of stuff that no [36:08] one's going to do other than the [36:08] founder. The other thing I think I [36:10] believe strongly in marketing is [36:12] the timing needs to be [36:14] like exactly right. It really matters. [36:17] And you know, people always you know, [36:19] even when for example, they [36:19] >> What do you mean? What rem what? [36:22] >> Pretty much everything. The more [36:24] important like people don't care [36:27] about us. People don't care about [36:28] anything. Like they just care about what [36:29] themselves and then what they're reading [36:30] on any given I mean used to be any given [36:32] month and week [36:34] day and maybe now every every few hours [36:36] that changes. They forget. There's so [36:37] much stuff going on all the time. [36:39] You have to basically bring calcium to [36:41] whatever is happening or [36:42] yourself to whatever happening in the [36:43] wild not try to kind of push whatever [36:45] you're offering to people. And so what I [36:47] mean by that like so in the last few [36:48] months if you look at all the marketing [36:49] integration we do a lot like we partner [36:51] with this and that. So we did Messi two [36:53] days before his first game of his last [36:55] World Cup. Why? Because well it's two [36:56] days before his last game. I mean he's [36:58] peak relevance right now, right? Timothy [36:59] Chalamet we launched that commercial [37:03] 12 hours after the whole thing that [37:04] happened with the Knicks. Why? Because [37:06] everyone was talking about Timothy [37:07] Chalamet at the time. Right? If we had [37:09] done it now [37:10] >> You also did the AI video before anyone [37:12] did the AI video. [37:12] >> Yeah, because it was a time where you [37:13] know the artist there was a whole debate [37:15] about the like you know the artist are [37:17] they going to go now it's not cool to do [37:18] >> Because that's you. You're obsessive [37:20] about that kind of thing and nailing [37:21] that kind of thing. [37:22] >> And always knowing what But now if you [37:23] do the AI video like you should not do [37:25] AI videos anymore now. It's done. Now [37:26] it's cool to do real things. [37:27] >> Yes. [37:28] >> Right? But that that's so the timing [37:31] with these things is like [37:32] >> Okay, that's what you mean by that. The [37:34] the Messi timing was incredible and the [37:37] Timothy Chalamet timing was incredible. [37:39] I assume you had that in process with [37:41] >> Yeah, but we were always waiting. I mean [37:43] Yiannis when we announced him as an [37:44] >> Like the Knicks get knocked out in the [37:46] earlier round. You're still going live [37:47] with that. [37:48] >> Yes, but we we're waiting for the right [37:50] So we were used to think we were going [37:51] to do it at the Oscars but then we [37:52] waited. [37:53] >> I see. [37:53] >> And so we were waiting for the perfect [37:54] moment because then that's when you get [37:56] the 100x outcome, right? When Yiannis [37:59] when we announce Yiannis the basketball [38:00] player was essentially a day after he [38:03] announced that he's not going to leave [38:04] uh his team there was all Yeah, exactly. [38:09] >> Now he's going to Miami. He's peak [38:10] relevance at the time and now he's peak [38:12] relevance again. But um [snorts] [38:14] but that applies to everything the AI [38:16] ads I think we've done a lot of work on [38:18] the um uh like a when we did the news [38:21] integrations back in in the fall, we [38:24] announced CNN and CNBC and Fox. All of [38:26] these were like we really wanted to time [38:27] them at peak moments where people were [38:29] talking about this debate between is the [38:31] news sort of like [38:33] uh gone? Is it like a thing of the past? [38:35] And for us the angle was never like, [38:36] "Oh, Cathie Partners." It was like the [38:37] news is actually modernizing. [38:39] >> How how did you I know you want to time [38:40] it well, but does Timothy care? Does CNN [38:44] care? Does The New York Times care? Do [38:45] the Do the counter [38:46] >> You have to battle battle all these [38:47] different things and you cannot have too [38:48] much processing and you have to break [38:49] down their own processes. You know, it's [38:51] all of the same that we discussed. [38:52] fight. [38:53] >> If you have a head of partnership that's [38:55] doing, you know, a whole structure and [38:57] they plan for 3 weeks, you can't do [38:58] that. [38:58] >> Did you hire any professional marketing [39:00] person inside your company? [39:02] >> Not like a head in any way. I I could [39:04] not in any I mean, we have a CMO, Alan [39:06] is incredible. So, Alan takes care of [39:08] all the scientific pieces, very good at [39:10] spending money to basically with high [39:11] ROI. Um and then the rest is like, you [39:15] know, so the person that leads our brand [39:17] or leads is doesn't have any direct [39:18] reports. They're just sort of flying [39:19] around the country and like doing cool [39:21] stuff. [39:22] And he he ran a Twitter account before. [39:24] The You know the inverse Cramer? [39:25] >> That wait, that's where he started? [39:27] >> He was in He's the inverse Cramer [39:28] account. [39:29] >> Remind me I I I I don't know [39:31] >> know the inverse like Jim Cramer when he [39:33] every time he picks a stock, it goes [39:34] down. [39:34] >> So, he's like the inverse Cramer like [39:36] index or whatever. [39:37] >> betting against Cramer. [39:37] >> Yeah, exactly. So, and like I thought he [39:39] was like [39:39] >> was him? [39:40] >> Yeah. And I hired him. I was like, "You [39:41] want to come and do our social?" He [39:42] started doing our social and [39:44] and he had like a knack for He came up [39:45] with the AI idea. [39:47] Um he he has a knack for these sort of [39:49] like [39:51] weird [39:52] esoteric ways to just like be part of [39:54] the zeitgeist. And And you know what's [39:56] interesting? [39:57] That has worked equally for consumers [40:00] and for institutions. [40:01] >> Okay, I didn't expect you to say that. [40:03] >> you you people would think like, "Oh, [40:05] you know, institutions want sort of [40:06] this." They do and like they want to [40:09] they want to be able to talk to your [40:10] chief risk guy and like they they will [40:11] and we have all of that. Like we have a [40:12] very strong robust foundation. But being [40:14] top of mind just matters. [40:16] Continuously top of mind very important. [40:18] >> a knack, I'll give you that. Um okay, I [40:21] want to wind the clock back cuz we [40:22] haven't [40:23] completely finished the desert story. [40:26] At some point the conversation happened [40:28] inside of the company. Hey, we should [40:32] sue the CFTC. Whose idea was that and [40:35] what was the reaction? [40:36] >> I mean [40:37] um [40:39] >> What did you say? [40:40] >> They mean it's crazy, right? Like the I [40:42] mean it is crazy. It is actually crazy [40:44] and all I mean ended up being crazy all [40:46] of it even though we won. I mean the [40:47] because like um it's so much more than [40:50] just being right. Like it's so much more [40:51] than just the law being, you know, [40:52] right? It's unfortunately, but it's the [40:54] truth. A lot of things are political and [40:56] depends on how the winds are shifting [40:58] and um [40:59] and [41:01] the government is truly all powerful. [41:03] Like they they can just do things for [41:04] private to private companies or or [41:06] probably or companies just like [41:07] companies in the private sector because [41:09] um [41:10] by the time you help hold the government [41:12] accountable to that thing, you probably [41:14] will be dead. [41:15] Basically. Or the cost would be so [41:17] enormous. And you know, the government [41:18] doesn't really incur any cost. They're [41:19] protected from any cost. [41:20] >> Okay, but take me in the room when she [41:21] brought it up. [41:22] >> So so so so you know, [41:24] there's a little of context there [41:24] because we started trying and this goes [41:26] back to how much foundation we built. [41:28] Like people always think overnight [41:29] success always been 2 years, but it [41:30] hasn't. All of this has been like part [41:32] of a very long-term plan. A bit like [41:34] Jensen, right? Like he's built such a [41:36] foundation for so long and that's how [41:37] these things go. [41:39] And [41:40] we started engaging by the election [41:41] market before we even launched to [41:42] general public in the end of '21. [41:44] So I started telling the government [41:45] saying we want to do this. It's very [41:46] important. Here's why it's going to [41:48] work. It's going to be the most accurate [41:49] gauge. And here's how it's legal, which [41:51] it is. [41:52] Um and they're like, "Okay, fine. We'll [41:53] work with you." [41:55] You know, whatever. [41:56] Month after month they wouldn't give it [41:57] to us. They wouldn't give it to us. I [41:59] had bet all of them company on like the [42:00] election market for '22 the '22 [42:01] midterms. That was what we're aiming [42:03] towards. The board is ready for it, etc. [42:05] And they keep like delaying delaying [42:07] delaying up until they pushed it after [42:08] the midterms. So they pocket vetoed. [42:10] Like they didn't say no, they just [42:11] managed to [42:12] politely delay us enough that it didn't [42:14] happen. So that was heartbreaking. [42:16] You know, it's been like so we started [42:17] 2018, we finally got to 2021, finally [42:20] excited about launching and they're not [42:21] letting [42:22] >> company was excited. Everyone's excited [42:23] >> they let us launch and all the issue [42:25] about launch so we work with the [42:26] election market and it gets banned at [42:27] the end of 22. So now we launch with a [42:29] very limited set of things that's going [42:30] to be very hard to get them exchange [42:31] running but they banned us. [42:33] We lost a lot of the team over it. And [42:35] you know with these situations what's [42:36] what's really hard about these [42:37] situations [42:37] >> push them out or they left? [42:39] >> A bunch of people left. [42:41] >> Did you do a layoff? [42:42] >> And then we had to do a layoff. [42:43] Uh [42:44] And and what because what happens in [42:46] these situations is that [42:48] I'm going to go on a tangent. I think [42:49] it's an interesting thing. [42:49] >> Let it rip. [42:50] >> So there's this concept of expected [42:52] outcome and outcome. [42:53] >> Yep. [42:53] >> And they're often often times not the [42:55] not the same. There's a variance for the [42:56] outcome and the expected outcome is, you [42:57] know, based on your decision-making [42:59] where it should land and then there's a [43:00] bunch of variance in the world that [43:01] pushes you in either direction. [43:03] Um [43:04] The world doesn't reward you for [43:06] expected outcomes. They reward you for [43:07] outcomes. Expected outcome is what you [43:09] have control over. It's like the work [43:10] you do. [43:11] And it's interesting because I think at [43:12] that point like the coin flip landed [43:13] against us and the entire world is like [43:15] wrong strategy, wrong execution, etc. [43:17] And it's interesting because that was [43:18] the same time where I I'm a big Messi [43:20] fan. So so Argentina won the World Cup, [43:21] I was super happy. [43:23] But you know, the day after Argentina [43:24] won the World Cup, I don't know if you [43:25] you know know this but the French [43:28] you know, the the the the France, the [43:30] country really, the population wanted to [43:32] kick out the French coach. [43:34] Deschamps [43:36] who is an absolute legend. Like the guy [43:38] won them the prior World Cup in [43:39] incredible performance. [43:41] Got them to the final of the next World [43:42] Cup and to the to the penalties. [43:45] And obviously penalties are a coin flip. [43:46] I mean um and they blamed him. [43:49] And you know, it's you know how hard it [43:50] like the the number of teams that made [43:51] it past the sort of group stage after [43:53] having won a World Cup is basically [43:54] trivial. It's very hard you know, [43:55] usually the team is very hard it's very [43:57] hard to get a go twice in a row. [43:59] So [44:00] And it was an interesting thing which is [44:01] like he he he flipped the coin landed [44:03] against him and people wanted to ask him [44:04] immediately, right? [44:05] And so we lived through that. [44:07] >> Did any [44:08] >> Did they want else to you? [44:09] >> No, I think but like people lost [44:11] confidence is like we should pivot and [44:12] like it's the wrong strategy, wrong [44:13] strategy, wrong execution, all of that. [44:15] Like we were not doing a good job, [44:16] basically. It's on us. And it's fine. [44:18] You you should hold the fire the [44:19] founders accountable. But the key [44:21] learning with that, what's interesting, [44:24] a little bit with poker, the best poker [44:25] players, they know when they're playing [44:27] a good hand and they're okay with the [44:28] variance. They can lose a lot but [44:29] they'll stick to their game. And then [44:31] they know that over time the variance is [44:32] going to come back and with enough plays [44:33] they're going to get to, you know, [44:34] they're going to win over time. [44:36] And you'll see with Elon, you'll see [44:37] with with some of these founders that [44:38] can take these extreme risks [44:40] as long as they know that expected [44:41] outcome and they can intake the variance [44:43] over time. [44:43] >> Yep. [44:44] >> And I think there's a lot of alpha in [44:45] there. [44:45] >> Yep. [44:46] >> Because and for founders that have gone [44:48] through that multiple times, I see it [44:49] with Vlad at Robinhood, I see it [44:51] over time they they gain a certain level [44:52] of confidence [44:53] >> Yes. [44:54] >> that is hard to describe but it's like I [44:55] I've gone through it. I'm okay with the [44:56] fluctuation. [44:57] >> this making sense in the rearview mirror [44:59] or or is that making sense at the time? [45:02] >> No, not at the time. [45:03] >> Okay. [45:03] >> But now in the rearview mirror. Because [45:04] okay, so 22 happens and we So, our [45:06] answer at the time [45:07] a whole we got to reset, we're going to [45:09] do something else. We're going to figure [45:11] out what to do. But again, we're so we [45:12] want to build Kalshi, that's what we [45:13] want to build. [45:14] And we cannot do it without the election [45:15] markets, so we're going to try again. [45:16] >> Okay. [45:17] >> So, you go back to the board, we're [45:17] going to try again. Everyone's like, I [45:19] mean, okay, these guys are starting to [45:20] get delusional. [45:22] We try till the end another year, end of [45:23] 23, now they say no. [45:25] They reject us. [45:26] >> Okay. [45:27] >> So again, you know, it's like it goes [45:28] from a low to a lower. [45:29] >> Yes. [45:30] >> And this was, you know, we're in the [45:31] room, it's like, oh, what do we do [45:32] again? [45:33] >> Roller coaster. [45:35] >> You know what? This time we'll sue them. [45:36] You know, so it's like [45:38] >> Like was it How did it actually work? [45:40] Like you got the email that It's like, [45:41] no. And then right away she's like, we [45:43] should sue them. [45:43] >> You want to and that summer was like, [45:44] we're probably going to get a no again, [45:45] so we should start preparing the [45:46] lawsuit. [45:47] >> Okay. [45:47] >> should sue them and start talking to the [45:49] board. Now, we had a lot of conversation [45:50] with Alfred, you know, Michael's at the [45:52] board at the time. [45:52] >> And what did Alfred say the first time [45:54] you pitched him on it? [45:55] >> He's like, it's a crazy idea. Like [45:56] you're a tiny startup, even if you win [45:58] you're probably going to like incur a [45:59] significant loss. You're probably going [46:00] to lose. And he's right that we we were [46:01] probably going to lose. And he's like, [46:04] "Coming of your size, even if for bigger [46:05] companies, you never win against the [46:06] government. It doesn't, you know, it's [46:07] your own They have all power over you. [46:09] They're your own regulators. Suing them [46:10] is going to Like they're going to kill [46:11] you." [46:12] And [46:14] and when I was super dogmatic, I was [46:16] sort of battling it, etc. [46:18] But then there's a few things that sort [46:19] of came out of that. Like one one I was [46:20] sort of complete no-brainer. It was [46:22] pretty much I mean, I I would oscillate [46:23] all the time. I would just be like, [46:24] "This is crazy. I mean, they're going to [46:26] going to come after us. They're going to [46:26] come after us personally." [46:27] >> CEOs are going to love this because I [46:29] oscillate all the time on stuff like [46:30] that. [46:31] >> I oscillate a lot. Which I think is [46:32] okay. [46:32] >> I I hid my oscillation as much as I [46:34] could, but it definitely showed up. [46:35] >> Yeah. And I think it's okay, honestly. [46:37] Like I I I because it's hard to have the [46:39] right I mean, the the so complicated, [46:41] right? And but um [46:43] and I would oscillate, etc. And I [46:44] remember we got to a meeting at some [46:45] point and like I was still oscillating [46:47] and like, you know, it's the night [46:48] before we're going to file, etc. And [46:49] like Yona was like, "Are you [46:50] me?" Like, you know, it was basically [46:51] it's She like went so hard and [46:53] said, you know, "Fuck this. Like, you [46:54] know, like we should just do it. Like [46:55] we're wasting time." [46:57] And [46:58] and I was like everyone else in the [47:00] room, but there was this sort of feeling [47:02] that the missionary feeling, you could [47:03] feel it of like [47:05] you know, we came so far. [47:06] Like it. [47:08] Let's just go full-on war. Let's bet [47:09] everything, you know. [47:11] >> head, were you like, "There's probably a [47:12] 20% chance this will work. There's a 1% [47:14] chance." [47:15] >> It was so hard to prize, but I I thought [47:17] through all of it, which was basically [47:18] and like Alpha was right in many ways, [47:19] but like [47:22] they could kill us because they could [47:24] essentially yank the clearinghouse from [47:25] under us [47:26] and kill the company. We would die. [47:29] Maybe even before we even get the [47:30] result, which is a risk. They would [47:33] They could like death by a thousand [47:34] paper cuts. They can start doing a bunch [47:35] of things for you. [47:36] But then I was like, "If it does work, [47:38] the outcome is so big and the expected [47:40] value seems pretty attractive, actually. [47:42] Even at low percentage odds of success, [47:44] the outcome is so big." [47:46] >> Were you Okay, so obviously [47:48] >> bet. It's a It's a big one. We bet the [47:49] farm and we're like, "Let's see what [47:51] happens. No plan B." [47:52] >> In the moment you the timing was [47:53] extremely good on on winning. [47:56] What was Was it an email? Did someone [47:59] call you? And what was the What was [48:01] going on in Where were you? [48:02] >> Yeah, so you know, I the litigator Yakov [48:05] Roth who who led this and you know, we [48:08] interviewed everybody. I picked him [48:09] because he's extremely smart, but the [48:11] thing that I felt he was really good at [48:12] he like [48:14] he had a missionary [48:15] like This man wakes up in the morning [48:17] and thinks about how to put the federal [48:19] government in check. [48:20] >> Okay. [48:21] >> You know, you want that person just sort [48:22] of [48:23] so it's like he's an amazing litigator, [48:25] but like [48:26] in the summer of 24 [48:29] you know, usually we text and all that. [48:31] He called me. And I got really anxious. [48:33] I thought that the court hearing came. [48:35] Like I I was like what like you know [48:37] He's like what's up? And he like talked [48:38] to me about something you know and like [48:39] I was like dude, my heart dropped. Don't [48:41] ever call me. [48:42] Like you should only call me once you [48:44] have the court decision. Like never call [48:46] me ever again. Text me. I don't want you [48:47] to call me because you know, in the 10 [48:49] seconds where I have to pick up the [48:50] phone, my heart dropped. [48:52] He's like okay, fine. I won't call you [48:53] until the decision. And I was sitting, [48:55] you know, on my desk I remember like [48:56] Rainer one of our engineers sitting next [48:58] to me and like his name pops up on my [49:00] phone. [49:00] >> Okay. [49:01] >> And like I could like my entire body [49:03] like I just could feel you know, you [49:06] know these moments where you feel your [49:07] entire body just sort of like paralyzed [49:08] like oh And so I pick up the phone [49:11] and I was I was like why are you calling [49:12] me? You know, and then he's like we won. [49:15] And after that I I don't remember. Like [49:16] we was throwing like chairs in the [49:18] office. I mean yeah, we were throwing [49:19] chairs in the office. We like we like [49:21] basically destroyed the office. You [49:22] [laughter] know, it's like [49:23] it was unbelievable because you know, [49:25] it's like you want and in that year we [49:27] suffered so much. [49:29] Cuz you had like the competitor like [49:31] we're you know, Poly was getting the [49:32] brand and we were staying true to our [49:33] strategy. We're going to stick with it. [49:35] The government was yanking the [49:36] clearinghouse from under us. [49:38] Um [49:39] enforcement action after the other. They [49:41] were finding random things to just like [49:43] create actions against us. [49:45] Audits, you know, the audits that [49:46] usually take 10 days they were [49:49] mailed to 9 months. It was just sort of [49:52] like truly painful. Like, you know, the [49:55] the whole like warfare thing? [49:57] It truly happened. [49:59] And they make your life miserable. And [50:01] not just the company, you own [50:02] personally. It's like kind of this [50:03] intimidation tactic up until you cave, [50:05] up until it they, you know, you're so [50:07] exhausted. [50:08] And [50:10] And it was just so vindicating. It was [50:11] so nice, right? Like that And finally, [50:13] like we find It felt like we finally had [50:15] the opportunity to just sort of like [50:17] win. For the first time. [50:19] >> Okay, you win. And of course, you knew [50:21] this was going to work. Did it work like [50:24] way better than you thought? [50:27] >> Not in the first few days. [50:29] >> Oh, really? [50:29] >> Yeah, it's like all things. You have to [50:31] build a motion and you have to build a [50:32] brand and you have to So, we But this is [50:34] the thing, you win and then you're like, [50:35] "Oh, let's launch it." And then nothing [50:37] happens. [50:38] >> By the way, the time you won this case [50:39] like a [50:40] >> Four weeks like three weeks and a half [50:41] before the election. [50:42] >> Was that random [50:43] timing? [50:44] >> Yeah. [50:46] You got to get it sometimes, you know. [50:47] >> Fascinating. [50:48] >> No, Tony says it sometimes, like you You [50:50] need luck sometimes. [50:51] >> Yeah. [50:52] >> Is it because we're just lucky? I think [50:53] part of it. Yeah, you need to be You [50:54] need to get lucky, but I think [50:55] >> You took risk. [50:56] >> And we took 5 6 years of expanding that [50:58] luck surface area so at some point we [51:00] could [51:00] >> But it didn't work even better than you [51:01] imagined. [51:02] >> After we started compounding. So, it [51:04] takes time. Everything takes time. But [51:05] in those three weeks and a half, we're [51:06] like, "Look, we have three weeks and a [51:07] half to make this go mainstream. [51:09] Everybody's in the office. I don't care [51:10] I like basically, honestly, would shower [51:12] maybe like once every four days. Like, I [51:13] was just like, "I don't care about [51:14] anything. This is my shot." [51:16] And so, we worked so hard in those four [51:18] days. It was slow slow slow, but then it [51:20] started upticking and then the machine [51:21] started going. And then when it started [51:22] going, it was beautiful. It was amazing. [51:25] >> I got a 21-year-old son, and he and all [51:27] his friends use Cal Chat. [51:29] >> Yeah. [51:30] >> And I know you're going to say it's [51:32] trading, not gambling, [51:35] but I'm a little afraid [51:37] some of them are going to get addicted [51:39] and [51:39] >> They're similar impulses. I mean, look, [51:40] I I think there's a few ways to think [51:42] about it. So, so, let's talk about the [51:43] policy and then actually what we're [51:44] doing. Because I care about Like, I [51:45] think about that a lot and I care about [51:46] that. [51:47] >> Yeah. [51:47] >> Um [51:48] That's like my parent would bring. I [51:49] don't want people to get hurt. And with [51:51] all technologies, people inevitably get [51:52] hurt. They will use it in a bad way, [51:54] right? This is true for Airbnb and you [51:56] know [51:56] >> And are you hearing from others? [51:57] >> Yeah, and and actually it's mixed [51:59] because so let me kind of walk through a [52:01] few things. So, first the policy [52:02] aspects. I think [52:04] and this is important for everyone. At [52:05] some point you're going to build [52:06] something very big, [52:08] especially in consumer. And when it [52:09] truly hits mainstream, you're going to [52:11] get haters. [52:13] There's going to be a bucket of society [52:14] that's going to be worried because they [52:14] don't understand it or they don't get it [52:16] and they're worried about the risks and [52:17] they don't see the like a lot of people [52:19] don't see the point of AI. Why? Why lose [52:20] our jobs over someone something that can [52:22] do our homework better. I think they're [52:24] missing the point, obviously, but you [52:25] need to educate that part of society. [52:27] And then you have incumbents because [52:28] inevitably if you go mainstream, you're [52:29] going to be taking it for someone. [52:31] And those incumbents will go very hard [52:32] after you. When the taxis went after [52:34] Uber, they didn't go after them saying, [52:35] "Hey, our margins are not threatened. [52:36] That's why you should shut it down." [52:38] What did they say? They said, "It's [52:39] unsafe and kids are getting hurt and [52:42] kidnapped." And Airbnb was the same [52:44] thing with the hotels. Like they would [52:45] find one case of one person [52:47] that, you know, had a very terrible bad [52:49] experience or something really horrible [52:50] happened and they would blow it up in [52:52] the New York Times. [52:53] And on and the press likes scandals and [52:55] drama and, you know, so [52:57] for us the easy [52:59] low-hanging fruit is to call it [53:00] gambling. [53:02] And it's interesting because pretty much [53:04] all trading products that has ever come [53:06] to society [53:07] have come through a fight [53:09] like have basically emerged through a [53:11] fight of them being called gambling. [53:12] So, grain futures were actually [53:14] legalized with the Supreme Court [53:15] decision in the 1900s. Like futures is a [53:17] boring commodity futures market. At the [53:20] time, the states were were suing and [53:23] there was lots of [53:24] >> is not trading commodity futures in that [53:26] market. [53:26] >> used to be. [53:27] >> Fine. [53:28] >> The farmers were. [53:29] >> but kids were. [53:30] >> No, I That's not true. Like I I mean [53:32] >> it really? I I don't know anything [53:33] >> were 20 in 18. By the way, the the age [53:36] to trade futures is 18. [53:38] >> Okay. [53:38] >> Right? It's It's actually [53:40] you know, that's what it is. I mean, now [53:42] there's other more interesting [53:43] >> Maybe my son runs in a different crowd, [53:45] but none of them [53:46] >> by the way, I want to address it No, no, [53:47] but I [laughter] want to address this. [53:47] But I'm saying but that's because [53:49] society evolved. Like there's now crypto [53:50] and meme coins and all these other [53:52] things, right? Like at the time there [53:53] was nothing else. That that's this was [53:55] the primary mechanism of speculation. [53:56] That's what everybody was doing. But the [53:57] claim at the time was like this is [53:59] gambling and we should basically [54:00] regulate as gambling and not as a [54:01] financial market. And Supreme Court said [54:04] speculation does look like gambling [54:05] because it does. [54:06] >> Yeah. [54:06] >> You're speculating [54:07] >> stock market. [54:07] >> Yes, exactly. But [54:10] there's a price discovery aspect to this [54:12] where you're on an open transparent [54:14] exchange where people are trading [54:15] against each other that makes it a [54:16] financial market. And that's why we need [54:18] to regulate as a financial market and so [54:19] on and so forth. Pass over to us. [54:22] There's a few things are very important. [54:24] One, the incentive structure in the [54:25] model. [54:26] Gambling, I don't gamble. I you know, I [54:28] I don't like I I I don't really like [54:30] gambling. I I like trading. [54:32] Gambling is a business model where like [54:33] the revenue of the company is equal to [54:35] customer's losses. So over time you [54:37] block the winners, which is what they [54:38] do. They don't want the smart [54:40] mathematically oriented people that are [54:41] doing research. And they want the people [54:42] that continuously lose. And those people [54:43] they give them promos to come back and [54:45] that's how you create these addictions [54:46] and [54:47] but they cannot really solve the problem [54:48] of addiction because the revenues are [54:49] equal to the losses. So over time, what [54:51] do you do? Well, you have to increase [54:52] the losses. That's what you do. You have [54:54] to create those types of behaviors or at [54:56] least not throttle them too much. [54:58] The losses don't go to me on Kalshi. [55:00] >> Yes. [55:00] >> That's the beauty of a of a of a [55:01] derivative market and the market fee. [55:02] >> yeah. [55:03] >> Yeah, I take a 1% fee whether somebody [55:05] lose or not. So when someone is [55:06] exhibiting bad patterns, that those [55:07] losses are going to someone else. [55:08] I have all the incentive in the world [55:11] to basically throttle them and figure [55:12] out how to get it right. [55:12] >> So But let me just push back a little [55:14] bit on that. In the casino [55:16] um they try to block the the card [55:18] sharks. Um [55:20] >> Yeah. [55:21] >> But in your world, there's a lot of card [55:23] sharks betting against my son's friend [55:25] who [55:26] >> For sure, but that's like [55:27] >> who's going on a gut feel. [55:28] >> Yeah, that that's absolutely right. Like [55:31] absolutely. That No. It depends on the [55:32] incentive structure. I want [55:34] I want smart trading. I want to [55:36] incentivize people to do research [55:37] because the more liquid [55:39] the better the forecast, the more [55:40] truthful my forecast, the more people [55:42] look at it, the more my total funnel [55:43] increases. I want the smart traders, [55:46] which is a very different structure from [55:46] the casino, which is like you don't want [55:48] the smart behavior. You want trust [55:51] >> Yep. [55:51] >> the excessive money-losing, continuously [55:54] money-losing behavior, right? So, there [55:55] is that. Now, it's important to [55:57] understand not everybody wins on Kalshi. [56:01] >> Of course. [56:02] >> Not everybody wins in the stock market, [56:04] not everybody wins in the options [56:05] market, not everybody wins [56:07] in athletic competitions. Not everybody [56:08] wins in competitive environments, in [56:10] highly competitive environments, right? [56:11] It's a highly competitive It's a [56:12] competition. It's a highly competitive [56:14] activity in nature. [56:16] And in every bit there's going to be [56:17] some people that win and win more. Like [56:18] how many people win the NBA finals or [56:20] how many people win, you know, the [56:21] Champions League? It's a small [56:22] percentage of participants. Now, here's [56:24] what's interesting. [56:25] Everybody can win. [56:27] It's a fair and neutral platform and my [56:29] incentive is to give as many tools as [56:30] possible for people to do the right [56:31] thing and do research and do all of [56:33] that. [56:34] And what we do and what we do really [56:35] well is we do take this sort of issue of [56:38] excessive behaviors pretty seriously. [56:39] So, [56:40] for for example, the 18 to 20 buckets, I [56:43] think, um [56:45] the data doesn't show dramatically [56:46] different behaviors, but society tends [56:47] to be worried about that. We add a lot [56:49] more throttling to the accounts. [56:50] >> What does that mean? [56:51] >> Like you cannot basically lose too much [56:53] in excess. We add throttling and we [56:54] start asking for additional verification [56:56] that makes it so hard add a lot of [56:57] friction for you to keep going or to [56:59] keep going going in this success. [57:01] And the reason we do that because [57:02] the positive sides of this, so when I I [57:04] ask to parents in the mom question and [57:06] their 25-year-old is trading on Kalshi, [57:07] what they get excited about is like [57:09] they're actually getting smarter about [57:10] the future. They're sm- smarter about [57:12] the world because the alternative is [57:13] they're spending time on [57:14] Instagram and social media where it's [57:16] like [57:17] extremist and all the hate and [57:19] constant brain rot and all these [57:20] different things. Whereas here [57:22] >> And they get addicted to that, of [57:24] course, but they can't lose all their [57:25] money on it. [57:26] >> I mean, they're losing a lot more in the [57:27] brain. [57:28] >> their They can you They turn their brain [57:29] off. [57:29] >> I think I sometimes I'm losing my brain [57:31] on that. I mean, you know, but like I [57:32] think there's all sorts of other issues [57:33] there. But my point here is like [57:36] they're spending time getting smarter [57:37] about the world, which I think is the [57:38] whole premise of what we're building. [57:40] Like [57:41] I think this is going to be the ultimate [57:42] antidote to a lot of the polarization [57:44] and extremism we're seeing. [57:45] Because, you know, these [57:48] these calibrated well-reasoned takes are [57:51] not getting rewarded on social media, [57:52] but they get rewarded in prediction [57:53] markets. [57:54] And that trains people over time to get [57:55] a little bit smarter. And I want it to [57:57] be a tool for that, especially for [57:58] younger people, rather than a tool that [57:59] will I'm losing all my money and I'm [58:01] doing excessive behaviors. And there's [58:02] easy ways to do that, which is like you [58:03] can cap how much people are doing. You [58:05] can throttle these accounts. [58:07] Um you know, one of the things we do [58:08] very well, I think better than even some [58:09] of the financial brokers or traditional [58:11] brokers, [58:12] um we think we self-regulate. We don't [58:14] just do what regulation requires us to [58:16] do. We go above and beyond because I [58:17] think about all the risks. So, minors, [58:18] for example, we obviously they're banned [58:20] and we do KYC and all these different [58:21] things. [58:22] But the way that minors access all these [58:24] platforms is they use their parents' [58:25] IDs. So, one of the things is we created [58:26] is a parent portal where moms and [58:28] parents can give us their ID and tell us [58:29] don't let anyone use it. That solves 95% [58:32] of the issue. [58:33] And I I think we're doing a great job [58:35] and the numbers show like you know, the [58:37] percentage of people that show these [58:39] signs of these patterns of excessive [58:40] behaviors or losing excessively or [58:42] losing in general on Kalshi is actually [58:43] lower than [58:45] um options trading. And it's lower than [58:47] any active trading of stocks. So, if you [58:49] buy a stock and hold it for 5 years, [58:50] that's investing. But if you're trading [58:52] it on a daily basis, etc., [58:54] 75-80% of people lose. [58:56] And I think people have not come to [58:57] terms that there there are irresponsible [59:00] behaviors in all these markets and we [59:02] the way to do it is basically you have [59:03] to [59:04] figure out how to flag these behaviors [59:05] and basically get better at throttling [59:07] them. [59:08] >> Okay. I guess my last question, this [59:10] this [59:11] this pod is a lot of CEOs and founders [59:13] listen to it. You've had a really [59:16] unusual like really long strange trip. [59:19] >> Yeah. [59:20] >> One last piece of advice or tips for [59:22] folks going through going through the [59:24] desert. [59:25] >> I I think that like [59:26] I [59:27] I would say a few things but like one [59:29] like really question [59:31] really hard why you're doing it. [59:34] You know, because the thing that you're [59:35] like if it's not for the company itself [59:37] the thing that you're hoping to get [59:39] I don't know if it's really there. [59:42] Which is a glamorous [59:43] >> Yeah. [59:44] >> You know. [59:45] >> I never found it the least obviously [59:48] financially rewarding at some point [59:49] after the very [59:50] >> There's many ways to do that these days. [59:51] The opportunity cost is very high, [59:52] right? Like if you I mean you can join a [59:55] fast growing company. I mean there's so [59:56] many ways to do that, right? Um so I [59:58] just think the monetary reward just [60:01] feels like uh [60:03] um [60:04] >> Risk adjusted is probably a stupid move. [60:06] >> Yes. And if you adjust also for [60:08] lifestyle and amount of pain [60:10] >> Yeah. [60:11] >> It gets pretty unattractive, right? [60:14] >> So [60:14] >> Okay, your little brother comes to you [60:16] and says I want to start a company, what [60:17] do you say? [60:18] >> I just say why? [60:19] >> You push back. [60:20] >> Yeah, why? Like what like like explain. [60:23] What is it? Like Oh, I want to be my own [60:25] boss. [60:25] >> Mhm. [60:26] You're not really your own boss. You've [60:28] got a board. You've got you work for all [60:29] your employees and your customers, [60:31] right? [60:31] >> users. I mean if you're good to all your [60:33] basically [60:33] >> You work for everybody. [60:34] >> Yeah, I I mean I don't think it's that [60:36] sort of sense of freedom is real in any [60:38] way. Actually you're you're the least [60:39] free, right? And the more it grows the [60:40] less free you are, right? [60:41] >> I [60:42] >> You know, so [laughter] like [60:44] the second thing is like [60:46] Um [60:47] I really believe in the sort of theory [60:50] like I really strongly believe in the in [60:52] the in the theory of like um it has to [60:54] be true to you. [60:56] Like it's going to be very hard to build [60:58] a a company, market a product, build a [61:01] product that is not you. [61:03] It's very hard. I don't I honestly don't [61:05] see how that works. And it's so because [61:07] every time you see a big company and [61:09] then you meet the founder or the CEO of [61:10] that company [61:12] You'd probably agree with me on this [61:13] like it's shocking yes [61:16] >> The office is them. [61:18] >> Like you meet them and you're like oh [61:18] it's it's I now totally understand why [61:21] that company is the way it is. [61:23] Right? And and so and I I feel like [61:25] people I don't know. I feel like that's [61:27] not [61:29] put into practice enough. [61:31] Does that make sense? Like I think [61:32] people just try to, you know, figure out [61:35] all the right ways to do things. I just [61:37] I mean, I wish there was, but I if there [61:39] was then everybody would do [61:40] >> good quote, "Be yourself. Everyone else [61:42] is taken." You're definitely yourself. [61:44] Thanks for coming on the pod. [61:45] >> lot for having me. It's great. [61:49] >> Okay, hope everybody liked that. I [61:50] really enjoyed talking to him. [61:52] Uh it's the second time I met him. Uh [61:54] he's a gem. Couple of my takeaways, holy [61:57] crap is he mission driven. He had a a [62:00] mission out of how he wanted to see the [62:02] world change. And the company was just [62:05] like, "Okay, we're going to build a [62:06] company to pull that mission off." [62:08] People talk about mission a lot. Very [62:10] much in his case. It rhymes with kind of [62:13] how HubSpot started. Our vision mission [62:15] was we wanted to change marketing from [62:17] outbound to inbound and we just were [62:19] like, "Oh, we need to create a company [62:21] to pull that off." It wasn't originally [62:22] a company. It was an idea. So, I like [62:25] that and I like founders who are [62:28] he's very obsessive and very mission [62:31] driven. I feel like today with startups [62:33] everyone's trying to win [62:35] win Twitter for the day and sometimes [62:37] making short-term decisions. The thing I [62:39] like about Cal Shi and the thing I [62:41] really like about SpaceX [62:43] is they made some big foundational bets [62:46] and were super patient and were really [62:48] rewarded once those things paid off. And [62:51] I think more founders can learn from [62:52] that. Last thing I would say is he's got [62:55] a unique relationship with Luana, his [62:57] co-founder. Luana's the kind of [62:59] organized one [63:01] and very risk-seeking. [63:04] And he's a little bit all over the place [63:07] and he's risk-averse. It was the exact [63:09] opposite of what I thought those two [63:11] relationship with were. [63:13] Uh but it's very much 1 + 1 = 3. It's [63:15] reminded me of my relationship with [63:18] Garrosh and how complimentary the two [63:20] are. [63:21] Hope you liked it. [63:23] >> [music]