Walter Russell Mead Says US Innovation Beats Centralized Powers

Walter Russell Mead称美国创新力胜过集权大国 尽管二战后的国际机构正在衰落，但美国依然保持着全球主导地位，因为其开放社会与快速的技术创新胜过了实行集权制的大陆竞争对手。 Walter Russell Mead提出了一个历史分析框架，阐述开放的海洋商业强国为何能持续战胜集权的大陆帝国。他概述了维持全球领导地位的五点策略，同时深入分析了美国当前面临的内外挑战。讨论涵盖了“技术汉密尔顿主义者”（Tech Hamiltonians）的崛起、中国和印度的地缘政治抱负、无人机战与人工智能的颠覆性影响，以及在关键全球区域维持威慑力的至关重要性。 1945年之后建立的基于规则的国际秩序正在瓦解，但得益于信息革命和巨大的国内生产力，美国的国力依然保持着非凡的活力。 (2:16) Donald Trump通过将纯粹的知名度和媒体饱和度转化为影响力，彻底革新了现代政治权力的运作模式，使争议带来的边际声誉成本实质上降为零。 (5:34) 在过去300年间，开放的海洋商业强国（联省共和国、英国、美国）屡次战胜集权的大陆帝国（法国、德国、苏联）。 (9:43) 盎格鲁-美利坚的全球主导地位依赖于一套五步策略：开放社会、全球贸易、全球战略视野、开放架构，以及武器化的战略相互依存。 (12:25) 中国迅速推广绿色能源并增加煤炭储备，主要是一项战略生存举措，旨在潜在冲突期间抵御美国海上封锁所造成的冲击。 (20:11)

Walter Russell Mead argues that while the post-1945 institutional order is fracturing, the United States remains the preeminent global power by leveraging a historical maritime strategy, rapid technological dynamism, and decentralized commercial strength. The Maritime Playbook of Global Hegemony (9:43) Mead frames modern geopolitical history as a recurring contest between open, commercial maritime powers and centralized continental land empires. Over three centuries, hegemony transitioned along a ten-letter continuum—from the United Provinces (Dutch Republic) to the United Kingdom, and finally to the United States. In each era, centralized rivals assumed technocratic, top-down control could overpower open societies, yet repeatedly succumbed to a distinct strategic playbook: fostering domestic openness and innovation, expanding global trade, securing strategic maritime nodes, inviting rivals into an open international architecture, and weaponizing trade interdependence to choke adversaries during wartime. Mead contends that China's leadership is acutely conscious of this structural vulnerability. If conflict erupted over Taiwan, the U.S. could establish distant blockades outside the combat zone to sever energy and agricultural imports. Consequently, Mead interprets China's massive investments in coal production, renewable energy, and oil stockpiling not as an environmental transition, but as a deliberate geopolitical hedge against a maritime economic cutoff. Institutional Decay and the Personalization of Power (5:34) While domestic American technological and economic engines surge, Mead observes that the post-World War II international architecture is rapidly unraveling. Predictable alliance guarantees and multilateral frameworks like the World Trade Organization have been increasingly displaced by transactional diplomacy and unilateral tariffs. Concurrently, governance across the world is shifting from twentieth-century bureaucratic committees toward personalized rule, as seen in leaders like Narendra Modi, Vladimir Putin, and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Mead attributes this transformation in the U.S. to Donald Trump, whom he compares to Napoleon in his mastery of modern, spectacle-driven power. Building on tactics first seen during the Clinton administration—where public shame lost its potency once a leader refused to accept media censure—Trump drove the marginal reputational cost of controversies to zero. By capturing global cognitive bandwidth through continuous media saturation, Trump established a personalized governing style that sidesteps institutional norms, though Mead cautions that raw mastery of power historically carries significant risks. Technological Disruption and the Ownership Society (22:10) Comparing the current AI boom to the First Industrial Revolution, Mead argues that global supremacy depends on a society's capacity to absorb disruptive technological shifts without collapsing into political radicalism. Historically, the U.S. preserved stability by maintaining an 'ownership society' that gave citizens a direct stake in the republic—first through nineteenth-century agrarian land distribution, and later through subsidized twentieth-century suburban homeownership. Because homeownership is increasingly unattainable near central economic hubs, Mead advocates constructing modern digital 'infostructure.' By combining high-speed connectivity, remote work incentives, and autonomous transit, commuting boundaries can expand from 40 to 75 miles, geometrically increasing the land available for affordable housing. Simultaneously, frontier software and AI models present national security challenges due to minimal capital replication costs. This reality has catalyzed the rise of 'Tech Hamiltonians'—technology leaders abandoning borderless, globalist assumptions in favor of state alignment, domestic computational security, and corporate patriotism. Asymmetric Warfare and the Fragility of Deterrence (48:54) On the military front, Mead warns that rapid technological adaptation is outpacing conventional doctrines. Drawing on observations in Ukraine, he notes that frontline combat is now dominated by aerial and ground drones, rendering legacy capital assets like tanks and major warships increasingly vulnerable. Because the United States maintains the world's largest inventory of legacy military hardware, it risks falling into an 'incumbent trap' unless it rapidly integrates agile, asymmetric technologies. Concurrently, Mead warns that eroding deterrence compounds geopolitical vacuums. In the Middle East, the collapse of historic Arab powers allowed Iran to assemble a Shiite Crescent threatening Gulf energy infrastructure and the Strait of Hormuz, requiring clear U.S. red lines. In Asia, where China's rapid growth has reduced India's comparative GDP from 60–65% of China's in 1980 to roughly 17% today, Mead argues U.S. grand strategy must actively support regional balancing coalitions—empowering India, Vietnam, and a rapidly rearming Japan—to convince Beijing that regional hegemony remains out of reach. Mead maintains that American success requires balancing technological disruption with domestic civic cohesion. While military automation and AI-driven deterrence introduce systemic risks, he remains optimistic that the wealth and medical breakthroughs generated by the intelligence revolution can alleviate domestic entitlement burdens, provided political leadership articulates a coherent strategy to the public.

学者沃尔特·拉塞尔·米德（Walter Russell Mead）认为，尽管二战后的国际多边规则与制度网络正加速瓦解，但凭借去中心化商业海洋强权的历史体制优势、持续爆发的技术生产力以及“科技汉密尔顿主义”的兴起，美国依旧维持着强劲的全球主导力；然而，这一优势正受到国内社会阶层断裂、技术扩散带来的威慑机制失效与关键区域地缘失衡的严峻挑战。 海洋帝国的五步霸权逻辑与对华战略封锁 (12:25) 米德指出，过去三百年的全球霸权演进遵循从荷兰共和国（UP）、大英帝国（UK）到美国（US）的海洋强权脉络，并在历史周期中反复挫败法国、德国与苏联等中央集权大陆帝国。其支配地位建立在成熟的“五步策略”上：在国内维持高度包容与创新的开放社会；依托商业网络推行全球贸易；确立统摄全球地缘要道的宏观战略；打造向外部竞争者开放的非排他性国际架构；并在挑战者打破秩序时，通过掌控全球公域实施战略切断。米德强调，中国战略层对此具有清晰认知，其最大的地缘梦魇正是冲突爆发时美国在战区外实施远距离反封锁，截断其原油输入、制造业出海及来自南美的粮食供应。据米德观察，中国当前极力扩充太阳能、水电、国内煤炭开采及石油战略储备，其本质动因并非环保倡议，而是为了在潜在封锁与持久对抗中确保生存底线。 技术革命下的所有权社会与国内阶层断裂 (22:10) 米德将当前由人工智能主导的变革比作第一次工业革命，指出大国维系霸权的核心在于能否在驾驭技术生产力这匹“烈马”的同时，化解其引发的剧烈社会动荡。美国历史上曾通过18世纪的家庭农场、19世纪的《宅地法》与铁路赠地，以及20世纪以市政债券补贴公路与郊区独栋住宅，成功将劳动者吸纳进共享资产红利的“所有权社会”。米德主张，面对当前核心城市的高房价危机，政府亟须出台数字化“信息结构”（infostructure）监管与政策激励，利用远程办公与自动驾驶将通勤半径从40英里延展至75英里，以几何倍数释放可用土地。但米德同时警告，二战后保障美国稳定的三大支柱——注重务实增资的蓝领工人阶层、管理受规管寡头企业的建制派商业阶层，以及进行利益调和的技术官僚阶层——如今已全面陷入内部混乱，国内共识的瓦解正成为美国维系国际领导地位的最大软肋。 科技汉密尔顿主义、企业爱国与文明分化 (36:28) 随着尖端人工智能与算力竞争成为大国博弈的核心，硅谷与华盛顿正走向深度融合。米德分析称，与依赖全球低成本劳动力和免税组装的传统跨国公司不同，以OpenAI和SpaceX等企业为代表的新势力形成了“科技汉密尔顿主义”，极度依赖本土国家安全支持、知识产权防御及算力主导权，并倒逼企业文化从用工国际化转向防范对华技术外泄的“企业爱国主义”。在地缘格局中，米德将印度视为不可忽视的关键变量；其执政党依托的国民志愿服务团（RSS）已从百年前数人聚会发展为遍布全印超8.6万个地方分会的庞大组织，外长苏杰生亦将印度定位为打破西方特权的“改革力量”，有别于试图颠覆现有秩序的中国。此外，米德反驳了全球化必然走向同质化的观点，指出信息革命反而赋予本土文化表达工具，促使土耳其、印度与日本等国文明特征日益鲜明并加速分化；在缺乏互信且生物与网络武器难以核查的环境下，这种分化显著放大了大国冲突风险。 战争形态突变、威慑危机与区域权力均势 (48:54) 乌克兰前线的技术演变已颠覆传统军事学说。米德援引实地考察指出，前线已沦为无人机完全主导的“灰色地带”，步枪伤亡几乎被无人机打击完全取代，甚至曾出现耗时63天方能撤离一名伤员的极端情形，而乌方依靠廉价海军无人艇便彻底瘫痪了俄罗斯黑海舰队的活动能力，这让坐拥庞大传统装甲车辆与大型战舰的美国面临严重的“在位者陷阱”。在威慑层面，米德认为中东传统泛阿拉伯力量瓦解后形成的权力真空催生了伊朗的“什叶派新月带”，直接威胁海湾国家海水淡化设施与霍尔木兹海峡能源安全，而历届美国政府的犹豫不决导致威慑机制严重失效。在亚洲，印度的GDP已由1980年相当于中国的60%至65%急坠至当前的约17%，失衡格局极易诱发误判；米德提出，美国大战略必须通过扶持印度、印度尼西亚和越南形成区域多极制衡，方能使亚洲达到类似欧洲的均势稳定，同时警惕将威慑机制让渡于AI自动化系统所带来的灾难性系统失控风险。 米德对技术爆发所带来的长期社会福祉（如AI加速医疗突破并有望降低联邦老龄医疗成本）抱有历史性乐观，但他留下的关键挑战在于：在唐纳德·特朗普所代表的以注意力饱和取代官僚体制的个性化政治崛起背景下，国内阶层严重割裂且民意涌动着孤立主义倾向的美国，能否在有效驾驭第四次工业革命剧烈震荡的同时，精准重塑对外有效威慑并构建可持续的大国均势架构。

## Background 该内容由知名商业投资播客《Invest Like the Best》（第 490 期）于 2026 年 9 月 8 日在 Colossus 平台发布，主持人为帕特里克·奥肖内西（Patrick O'Shaughnessy）。节目特邀《华尔街日报》专栏作家、著名地缘战略学者沃尔特·拉塞尔·米德（Walter Russell Mead），围绕美国能否持续称霸世界展开深度对话。节目简介指出，双方探讨了推动荷兰、英国及美国走向全球领导地位的五步法则、大陆集权国家的宿命缺陷、特朗普将戏剧性转化为权力的手段、美国外交政策四大流派与科技汉密尔顿主义的兴起，以及乌克兰无人机战争与中东威慑崩溃对全球安全格局的重塑。 ## TL;DR 米德指出，当今世界正处于“美国内生动力强劲突进”与“二战后国际体系加速解体”并存的二元悖论中，而海洋商业文明击败大陆集权帝国的历史规律仍未失效。对话系统梳理了海洋帝国长盛不衰的五步秘诀，并指出美国当前亟需借助远程办公等信息革命手段重塑年轻一代的“有产者社会”，以化解三大传统阶层瓦解带来的内部政治撕裂。随着硅谷从超国家全球主义转向拥抱国家安全的“科技汉密尔顿主义”，大国地缘博弈的重心已彻底转移至前沿技术竞争。从乌克兰战场颠覆传统的持续无人机革命、台海与日本觉醒的区域互动，到中东阿拉伯世界衰落引发的威慑侵蚀，米德强调美国必须先稳固国内治理与核心威慑边界。尽管算法决策与不可核查的新型技术带来了末日机器般的战略隐忧，但米德对前沿科技在攻克绝症、彻底降低医疗成本及带来社会丰饶方面的前景依然充满审慎乐观。 ## Atmosphere & style 整场对话洋溢着宏大的历史纵深感与冷峻现实主义的碰撞，米德以兼具睿智风趣与学者底蕴的从容语调，将横跨数百年的大国兴衰与前沿战场的严峻细节娓娓道来。主持人奥肖内西提问敏锐精准且节奏严谨，引导讨论在地缘推演的残酷现实与国内政治的幽微撕裂之间层层剥茧。听众在感受乌克兰泥泞杀戮区与算法威慑冰冷逻辑的同时，又能在结尾体会到老一辈学者对生命科学突破与人间善意的温情注脚，整体呈现出一种穿透纷繁乱象、凝练而从容的理性乐观主义基调。 ## Bulletin - `00:00` 美国的超级大国实力本身并未陷入危机，反而在信息革命与生产率爆发下拉满动能；当前真正走向解体的是1945年以来制度化的二战后世界秩序体系。 - `12:25` 过去三百年全球海洋商业霸权的更迭遵循五步逻辑（建立开放社会、积累全球财富、树立全球地缘视野、诱导对手融入、战时切断供给实施封锁），从荷兰、英国到美国一脉相承。 - `51:30` 乌克兰战场证明战争正经历“持续军事革命”，低成本无人机群彻底封锁出“灰色杀戮区”，美军传统重资产装备面临被低成本非对称杀伤武器系统性抵消的风险。 - `40:00` 硅谷与华盛顿正在经历技术与主权的“重新国家化”，脱胎出重视供应链安全与本土忠诚的“科技汉密尔顿主义”，颠覆了旧日无国界的全球化范式。 - `01:10:48` 大国竞争的底层挑战不在于资源匮乏，而在于技术爆发释放的“丰饶之角”速度远超社会治理架构的消化能力，AI与前沿医疗有望在50年内瓦解公共财政赤字压力。 ## Key takeaways - `00:00` 美国的国家权力实体与战后国际制度体系呈现脱节二元图景：内部创新冲刺依旧强劲，但二战后维系可预测性的多边秩序与盟友网络正在剧烈碎裂。 - `05:34` 特朗普将现代大众传播生态下的名气转化为权力，通过突破声誉机制大幅降低谎言边际成本，标志着官僚技术治理向全球个人强人政治的回潮。 - `09:43` 现代大国博弈的主轴自17世纪路易十四时期便已确立：以英美为代表的海洋商业自由秩序，轮番击败来自欧亚大陆集权陆权帝国的顶层挑战。 - `15:00` 海洋霸权体系设置了深层依赖陷阱：先通过自由贸易向对手全面开放红线体系，一旦爆发冲突便利用对海洋生命线的掌控实施致命资源封锁。 - `18:00` 中国能源结构（光伏、煤炭与战略储备）的深层战略动机，正是预先防范在台海冲突等极端情境下遭遇美国外线切断马六甲与远洋运输的反封锁。 - `20:00` 美国科技巨头与农业高度依赖全球三大贸易支柱（西半球、跨大西洋、跨太平洋），本土市场体量根本无法支撑前沿 AI 研发所需的超大规模经济循环。 - `22:45` 历史霸权更迭的核心铁律，在于哪个国家能在最高效榨取新技术生产力的同时，维持社会结构不因剧烈震荡而自我解体。 - `26:00` 美国历史上通过《宅地法》和战后郊区独栋住宅两次重构“有产者社会”，如今远程办公结合自动驾驶技术，可通过扩展通勤半径释放海量廉价土地解局青年住房困境。 - `30:00` 与传统高资本壁垒的铁路基建不同，AI 模型极易被竞争对手通过“模型蒸馏”以极低成本抽取复制，打破了既有的技术护城河逻辑。 - `34:29` 美国外交思维贯穿四大流派：汉密尔顿主义（商业与实力）、威尔逊主义（人权与制度）、杰斐逊主义（本土自由与反扩张）、杰克逊主义（民粹荣誉与毁灭性报复）。 - `43:51` 印度作为追求多极化的“改革主义大国”，既不满西方历史垄断，又拒绝照搬中国集权专制模式，正在成为大国博弈中不可忽视的第三极力量。 - `45:00` 工业革命推动全球制度趋同，而信息技术则因大幅降低本土文化生产与表达成本，反向激发全球各区域的“文明分歧”与本土化复兴。 - `48:54` 现代大规模杀伤性武器从“可观测核武”恶化为“不可核查的生物与网络战”，战略信任归零导致军备控制条约彻底失效。 - `52:45` 日本已将中国控制台湾视作直接国家生存威胁，其军费激增、军事学说重构与防卫觉醒成为打乱台海地缘算盘的最核心变量。 - `55:00` 二战后维系美国国内繁荣的产业工人、制度化商业寡头与中立技术官僚三大阶层全面瓦解，内部治理失序直接动摇了对外投射战略稳定的根基。 - `01:00:00` 中东地缘震荡的底层根源是泛阿拉伯民族主义崩溃后留下的权力真空，催生了伊朗“什叶派新月地带”的扩张并直接威胁全球海运生命线。 - `01:03:25` 战略博弈的核心在于事前威慑；一旦威慑侵蚀失效，任何事后军事介入都将演变为代价高昂、撕裂国内政治的泥潭。 - `01:10:00` 将 AI 引入国防反击闭环虽能排除政治怯懦建立绝对确定性威慑，却也逼近了算法自主触发全面战火的“末日机器”伦理险境。 ## Detailed walkthrough ### `00:00` 动态的超级大国与崩溃的世界体系 对谈在主持人帕特里克·奥肖内西（Patrick O'Shaughnessy）的介绍中拉开序幕。他提到，经由 Colossus 负责人杰里米·斯特恩（Jeremy Stern）的引荐，他期待与沃尔特·拉塞尔·米德（Walter Russell Mead）对话已久。米德在《特殊的上帝旨意》（Special Providence）与《上帝与黄金》（God and Gold）等著作中，系统剖析了英国及继承其霸权的美国如何在过去数百年间主导全球格局。奥肖内西请米德以此为背景，勾勒当下美国在世界舞台上的宏观定位。 米德指出，当前正处于一个极度矛盾而耐人寻味的转折点。一方面，美国在 1945 年二战后构建、并在 1990 年冷战结束后翻新加固的“美利坚治世”（Pax Americana）确实陷入了深重危机；那些曾经制度化维系全球运作的机制——例如与欧洲盟友建立的制度网络——正在烈火中坍塌损毁。然而，如果退后一步审视全貌便会发现，**美国的国家权力本身并未陷入危机**。恰恰相反，在信息革命的强力驱动以及全要素生产率的大幅飞跃下，美国自身依然在全力向前冲刺。 由此呈现出一种极其罕见的二元图景：一边是极具内在动能、持续突进的超级大国，另一边则是正在走向解体的世界秩序体系。虽然唐纳德·特朗普的总统任期极大地放大了这种脱节与动荡，使得当下的外部环境波涛汹涌，但米德对美国的中长期地位依然抱有坚定的乐观态度。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 现代美国实力的二元悖论 accDescr: 展现美国国家内生动能与二战后国际体系崩塌之间的脱节对比 subgraph InternalPower["美国内生实力：持续冲刺"] Tech["信息革命驱动"] Prod["全要素生产率爆发"] Tech --> Prod end subgraph GlobalSystem["二战后国际秩序：走向解体"] Inst["传统多边制度与条约"] Allies["跨大西洋盟友网络"] Inst -.->|"撕裂与边缘化"| Allies end InternalPower --- Paradox{"核心悖论：<br/>强劲实体 vs 碎裂体系"} GlobalSystem --- Paradox ``` --- ### `02:16` 制度网络的瓦解与“不可预测性”的权力打法 当被问及何为“正在崩溃的世界体系”时，米德对比了过去与现在的规则逻辑。在过去的几十年中，全球商业依托于像世界贸易组织（WTO）这样基于明文规则的体系运转；而如今，关税税率往往取决于“特朗普总统早上醒来时觉得它应该定在多少”。 二战以降，美国外交政策的核心基石始终是维持“稳定”与“可预测性”。美国全力让盟友与对手看清自身的战略红线；一份在 1955 年作出的安全承诺，除非经过大张旗鼓的公开宣布予以调整，否则数十年如一日坚如磐石，美国借此成为全球地缘秩序的压舱石。然而当下，这种模式被彻底颠覆： * **将不可预测性转化为筹码**：特朗普深信打破确定性才能使自身利益最大化，公然跨越以往领导人绝不敢碰触的红线（例如直接发出威胁：“如果你们不提高本国国防预算，我们就把你们的关税提高一倍”）。 * **弃用官僚渠道与跨国机构**：以往总统习惯通过传统外交渠道协商解决分歧，而特朗普认定这一套行不通，转而亲自砸碎这些长期充当美国权力载体的制度网络（包括北约盟约甚至联合国框架）。 * **不可逆的破坏效应**：这种对建制网络的破坏是深层次的，哪怕在特朗普卸任后，其继任者也将极难将其重新拼凑复原。 --- ### `05:34` 戏剧化即权力：特朗普的操作模式与“个人政治”回归 在探讨如何向外界系统讲授特朗普的政治手法时，米德直言不论外界对其毁誉如何，特朗普在权力运作上确实展现出一种独特的“天才”。他洞悉了当代大众传播生态下的权力本质，**成功地将名气转化为权力，将戏剧冲突（drama）转化为统治资源**，从而获得了极大的行动自由。 米德提出了一套精辟的“谎言边际成本”理论： > “如果你撒了足够多的谎，你撒第 10,000 个谎言的边际成本几乎为零；而对于普通政治家来说，撒第一、第二或第三个谎言的边际成本却高昂到难以承受。” 借此，特朗普完全豁免了声誉机制对传统政治人物构成的常规约束。米德认为，比尔·克林顿在莫妮卡·莱温斯基丑闻中首先发现了这一秘诀——“羞耻感只有在你允许它起作用时才会伤害你，它是一种只存在于别人脑海中的情绪”。当年无数人断言克林顿唯有辞职一条路，但克林顿意识到只要硬着头皮一步步往前走，“任凭狂犬吠日，驼队自顾前行”（The dogs will bark, but the caravan will move on），难堪自会过去。而特朗普将这一逻辑升级到了工业化体量。 ```mermaid flowchart LR accTitle: 现代媒体生态中的注意力与个人化政治权力转化 accDescr: 展示注意力垄断如何直接转化为政治豁免权与权力 A["持续制造戏剧冲突与议题"] --> B["吞噬全球媒体带宽"] B --> C["打破声誉约束与边际成本"] C --> D["极高自由度的个人专权"] ``` 特朗普将政治打造成了人类有史以来最引人入胜的“信息娱乐秀”（infotainment spectacle）。自文明破晓以来，没有任何一个活着的人类能像特朗普这样，常年霸占整个人类物种如此巨大的心智带宽与媒体注意力。无论在全球任何角落，无论人们对他持何种态度——热爱、痛恨、讥笑、惊骇抑或鄙视——他都无可争辩地居于舆论舞台的最中央。即便在 2020 年大选失利之后，他掀起的关注狂潮也丝毫不减当年。米德评价道，特朗普在其擅长的领域所达到的极致境界堪比拿破仑，“但别忘了，拿破仑最终兵败滑铁卢并在流放中度过余生，因此这绝不能保证整场壮观的大戏会迎来特朗普所期望的圆满结局”。 特朗普的崛起不仅是个体现象，更标志着一个深远的时代转折： * **委员会统治的终结**：20 世纪人们习惯于削弱领袖个人权威，信奉技术官僚、委员会和制度化运作。 * **个人政治（Personal Politics）的全球回潮**：在互联网与现代传播工具重塑大众心理后，全球选民展现出重新渴望“由具体的人来统治”的倾向。印度的莫迪、日本已故首相安倍晋三、以色列的内塔尼亚胡、土耳其的埃尔多安，以及普京与习近平，皆印证了这一从官僚治国向强势强人政治的大倒退，而特朗普正是这股全球浪潮中冲击力最为剧烈的一位。 --- ### `09:43` 几百年地缘较量的主线：海洋商业秩序对抗大陆集权帝国 将视线拉回更为宏阔的历史长河，奥肖内西请米德解析英美两国数百年主导地位的底层动力。米德由此切入当下的中美战略博弈，指出当今中美竞争并非孤立的新现象，而是现代历史上反复上演的核心戏剧的最新篇章。 中美对立呈现出鲜明的双边特质：一侧是像中国这样的陆权大陆帝国（land-based continental empire），它坚信自己无需采纳政治自由主义和混乱喧闹的民主政体，完全可以通过强有力的自上而下体制，在技术和军事实力上匹敌对手。 米德强调，这种理念在现代历史上并非首次出现。近代第一个真正践行这一逻辑的君主是法国的“太阳王”路易十四： * **集权技术专僚 vs 混乱代议制**：路易十四深信，依靠法国由专家组成的高度中央集权的技术官僚政府，完全能够击垮海峡对岸麻烦不断的英国人——毕竟英国政局在当时看来荒诞混乱不堪，“每隔二十年他们就要砍掉国王的头，或者把国王赶下王位”。 * **数百年未变的地缘主轴**：自路易十四时代起直至今日，全球大国政治最核心的主旋律始终如一：**以英语国家为代表的海洋商业自由经济秩序的崛起，与欧亚大陆上一系列集权大陆强权对该秩序发起的轮番挑战**。挑战者的接力棒从当年的法国一路传递，构成了理解英美长期霸权演进的关键线索。 ### `10:00` 霍比特人的胜利与三百年霸权交接 回顾现代史上的几场巅峰对决，从路易十四统治下的法国，到拿破仑帝国，再到一战中的普鲁士、二战中的纳粹德国，直至冷战中的苏联，每一场博弈都异常艰难。在这些历史关头，集权式、技术官僚驱动的欧陆陆权强国往往看起来胜券在握、势不可挡；反观那个由英语国家主导的商业海洋世界，则常常显得混乱不堪、荒诞滑稽、政策摇摆迷茫。然而令人匪夷所思的是，历史的结局总是“霍比特人不断赢得胜利”。 沃尔特·拉塞尔·米德（Walter Russell Mead）打趣道，美国的这套全球战略其实是“偷”自英国，而英国又是从17世纪的荷兰那里“偷”来的。在他所著的《上帝与黄金》（*God and Gold*）一书中，他将过去三百年的近现代历史高度浓缩为十个字母的交接历程：**UP（尼德兰联省共和国）到 UK（联合王国），再到 US（美国）**。面对当下的国际局势，世人都在问下一个接棒的会是谁，但米德明确表示，中国并不具备真正击败美国的底层条件。 ```mermaid flowchart LR accTitle: 三百年海洋霸权转移图谱 accDescr: 展示从荷兰联省共和国到大英帝国再到美国的海洋霸权转移逻辑 subgraph Hegemony["海洋商业霸权演进"] UP["UP 荷兰联省<br/>（17世纪商业资本）"] --> UK["UK 联合王国<br/>（18-19世纪日不落帝国）"] UK --> US["US 美国<br/>（20世纪至今全球霸权）"] US -.-> Next["???<br/>（中央集权陆权国难以替代）"] end ``` --- ### `12:25` 称霸全球的“秘密五步法则” 为了讲清海洋强国长盛不衰的密码，米德半开玩笑地提醒听众“必须妥善保管这份信息，要是落入坏人手里可就糟了”，随后拆解了这套通行三百年的五步策略： * **第一步：建立国内开放社会**。以17世纪的荷兰为例，尽管国内加尔文派占据主导，但对待路德派的态度是“他们虽然是人渣、迟早下地狱，但在下地狱之前完全可以合法纳税、建设经济”；天主教徒只要不当街举行公开仪式，便听之任之；犹太人也能安居乐业。伽利略在欧陆面临宗教裁判所牢狱之灾时，荷兰学者若发表教会反感的论文，同行只会在刊物上口诛笔伐，绝无肉体消灭。农民的儿子想经商随时能放手一试。这种宽容不仅孕育了现代公共财政、股份制公司、先进航海技术以及血液循环理论，更吸引约翰·洛克（John Locke）等欧洲最顶尖的大脑流亡至此著书立说，大学与思想极度繁荣。 * **第二步：带着产品走向全球，积累巨额财富**。凭借领先的创新技术，荷兰开启全球贸易。17世纪全荷拥有约一万艘远洋商船游弋于五大洋，赚得盆满钵满。米德常建议学生去大都会艺术博物馆观赏荷兰大师画作，不要只盯着精妙的笔触与构图，而要看画中商人所拥有的奢华陈设：身着来自中国的丝绸长袍，壁炉架上立着来自土耳其的工艺品或来自巴西的宠物鹦鹉标本，那种充盈的物质财富令人震撼。 * **第三步：树立全球地缘视野，实现降维打击**。坐拥滚滚财源后，海洋帝国的战略视野跳出了区域泥潭。18世纪腓特烈大帝与奥地利的玛丽亚·特蕾西亚为了争夺西里西亚——米德调侃其为“位于现代波兰境内一片香肠形状的美丽省份”——大打七年战争，打到双方财政破产，最终仅决出谁是“大帝”、谁是输家；而同一时期的英国人却将眼光投向全球，趁机把法国势力彻底逐出印度、加拿大和北美大陆，一举奠定了延续至今的现代世界秩序基石。 --- ### `15:00` 诱人的特洛伊木马：开放红利与深层依赖陷阱 构建起全球网络后，海洋强国会祭出极为致命的第四步与第五步组合拳，这是一种甚至堪称“阴险狡诈”的制度设计： * **第四步：向所有竞争对手开放体系，诱其入局**。西班牙帝国在拉美奉行排他性垄断，严禁外人通商，最终滑向停滞；而19世纪的英国则在帝国境内推行自由贸易，英国皇家海军出海清剿海盗是为全人类护航，而非仅保护英国船只。美国独立后虽在1812年与英国交火，但此后始终选择融入英国制定的贸易体系，成为大英帝国秩序的最大受益者。后来普鲁士统一后的德意志帝国也深度参与其中，德资企业在阿根廷和智利大肆投资，商业版图甚至逐步挤压英国本土商人。 * **第五步：战时切断供给，利用依赖实施致命封锁**。这正是海洋体系暗藏的“杀手锏”。一战爆发时，德国猛然发现，虽然融入全球化曾带给它无与伦比的财富、尖端技术与庞大陆军，但在关键物资上已彻底受制于人。一旦与英国开战，来自阿根廷和美洲的粮食瞬间断绝，来自马来亚生产战车轮胎所必需的天然橡胶也被完全切断。深度融入国际分工的德国，反被全球体系勒住了咽喉。 冷战结束之后，美国同样自然而然地沿用了这一历史惯性。正如1945至1947年间美国邀请战败的德国与日本融入西方体系并将其培育为当今世界支柱一样，华盛顿也曾向俄罗斯与中国敞开大门：“进来吧，享受这套体系的红利。”然而，后两者最终没有走向康拉德·阿登纳（Konrad Adenauer）式的和平融合路线，反而踏上了类似德皇威廉二世的对抗老路，这促使现代地缘政治再次进入极限测试阶段。 --- ### `18:00` 北京的清醒噩梦与应对布局 针对中国知识界与高层的研判，米德分享了自己过去与中国学者、官员深入交流的经历。他指出，中国决策层对这套海洋地缘战略的运行逻辑心知肚明，如果说有什么事情能让最高层夜不能寐，那必然是深知在与美国的潜在冲突中，中国经济极易面临原材料、能源与出海口被全面封锁的风险。 假设台海爆发冲突、中国对台湾实施封锁，美军完全有能力在向外延伸数百英里的外围区域反向对中国实施外线反封锁： * 中东石油无法通过马六甲海峡运抵本土； * 中国庞大的制造业产品无法运往西方主要买家； * 与巴西、阿根廷农场主签订的数千万吨大豆进口合同全部无法交割。 外界在近期中东动荡期间对中国巨大的战略石油储备感到吃惊，但从底层逻辑来看，这正是其未雨绸缪的自保举措。无论是大力发展光伏、特高压与水电，还是在西方环保主义者欢呼“绿色转型”的同时仍在开足马力大肆开采燃煤，中国当前能源政策的深层动机都是为了摆脱对全球海洋供应链的致命依赖，确保在与美国发生最极端摊牌时能够具备长期战争的支撑能力。 --- ### `22:10` 孤立主义回潮与美国的自毁风险 面对主持人的提问——鉴于美国出口占GDP比重极低、本土资源极其丰富，且坐拥两洋天堑，美国是否会主动退回孤立主义，甚至放弃亲手打造的这套全球互联网络？米德对此表达了深刻的忧虑。 他坦言，孤立主义始终深深根植于美国的历史脉络之中，宛如周期性发作的潜伏思潮，在某些历史阶段会格外汹涌，而当下正是孤立主义强势抬头的危险关头。这种试图退守美洲大陆、认为无需依靠全球霸权体系即可自给自足的心态，正在对美国维系了数百年的海洋大战略构成真正的内部侵蚀。 ### `20:00` 必须拥抱全球：规模经济与传统自由贸易的破局 美国的安全与经济繁荣从根本上决定了它不能退回孤立主义，必须深度融入全球体系。这并非出于充当“全球社工”的道德优越感，而是高度自利的现实考量。当前美国的对外贸易呈现出均衡的三分格局：大约三分之一在美洲西半球，三分之一跨越太平洋，另外三分之一则跨越跨大西洋，美国承受不起失去其中任何一个方向的代价。尽管新冠疫情期间暴露出的供应链脆弱性令人警醒，尤其是各领域对中国制造的惊人依赖迫使美国重新审视战略安全，但现实是美国既不可能在本土制造所有所需工业品，也无法在国内凑齐一切关键原材料。 更重要的是，美国的顶尖产业天然需要远超本土维度的庞大市场。历史上美国国内最具自由贸易倾向的政治游说集团向来是农业界，因为美国农场主的产能足以“养活半个地球”；如果将他们局限在本土市场，农产品价格势必暴跌，导致全行业无法盈利。如今高科技与人工智能产业面临着完全相同的规模经济定律：若美国的 AI 巨头和顶尖科技公司只能依靠美国国内市场变现，其产生的收入与扩张速度根本不足以支撑维持技术迭代所需的庞大研发资本，不仅无法在与中国的竞争中拉开身位，甚至连维持平分秋色都极其困难。 然而，强权无法仅凭枪炮迫使别国买单，健康的经贸往来必须建立在双方互利共赢的基础之上。长期以来，美国决策层陷入了一种教条化的自由贸易神话，对来自中国的系统性违规与非关税壁垒视而不见。这种不对称贸易安排很大程度上源于二战后的历史遗留问题——当时为防止满目疮痍的西欧与战败国倒向共产主义阵营，美国主动承担了单边让利角色，不仅向德国等国开放国内市场，还纵容对方对美国商品征收高额保护性关税以重振其经济。这种应急性的战略扶持在战后被彻底体制化，演化为今天诸多极不公平的非关税壁垒。特朗普团队直面并试图打破这一陈旧秩序的方向并非毫无道理，现代经贸政策早已不能单靠自由贸易教科书上的理想教条来指导，而必须在确保供应链自主安全与维系全球共赢市场之间寻找全新支点。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 美国经济融入全球的内在动力模型 accDescr: 展示美国农业与科技产业为何必须依托全球市场以维持技术领先与规模效益 subgraph DomesticScale ["美国本土市场局限"] A["超级产能与研发高投入<br/>（农业、前沿科技与 AI）"] B["本土吸纳能力有限<br/>（无法支撑持续增长）"] A --> B end subgraph GlobalReach ["全球市场赋能"] C["全球三大贸易支柱<br/>（西半球、跨大西洋、跨太平洋）"] D["规模经济变现与资本回流"] C --> D end subgraph StrategicResult ["战略竞争结果"] E["维持对华技术代差与全球领先地位"] F["避免贸易单边让利，重构双赢供应链安全"] end DomesticScale --> GlobalReach D --> StrategicResult ``` --- ### `22:45` 驾驭科技烈马：霸权更迭背后的社会承受力法则 纵观全球资本市场格局的剧烈演进，20年前全球市值排名前十或前二十的企业尚且呈现出行业与国别的多元杂烩，而如今榜单几乎已被一众美国科技巨头彻底垄断。即便在 OpenAI、Anthropic 以及 SpaceX 掀起最新一轮颠覆式突破之前，这种绝对的数字化技术统治地位就已然确立。面对科技与 AI 正在如何重构全球秩序的质询，历史是最有效的透镜：眼下的变革唯有第一次工业革命能够与之相提并论。当年率先引爆并掌控第一次工业革命的英国，借此力量统治了全球长达150年之久。 自17世纪现代世界成型以来，大国崛起的终极铁律便从未改变：**哪个国家能够以最高效的方式开发、驾驭和榨取颠覆性新技术的能量，同时又能在内部抗住新技术对社会结构造成的剧烈震荡而不至于自我解体，谁就能登上全球霸主的宝座**。历史上英国和美国之所以能够相继接力主导世界，根本原因就在于两国比大陆集权国家更擅长“骑上这匹暴烈的野马”。 然而，科技力量的狂飙突进并不自动保障社会秩序的稳固。当下美国社会正在经历前所未有的撕裂与反噬：民间涌现出针对数据中心建设的激烈抵制浪潮，而在极左翼的政治光谱中，美国民主社会主义者（DSA）内部的托洛茨基主义分子甚至幻想从最陈腐落后的马克思主义教条中寻找救赎方案。这种巨大的成就与内部秩序的断层表明，原有的社会治理契约已被新技术的冲击波震碎，美国必须建立一种与数字化新时代相适应的全新社会秩序。 --- ### `26:00` 有产者社会的自我救赎：从自耕农、郊区住房到远程办公革命 如果美国希望在未来150年继续平稳驾驭这匹科技烈马，其破局的核心密码依然深植于其传统基石之中——维持一个充满活力的“有产者社会”（Ownership Society）。美国建国先贤之所以坚信这个新生国家能在没有君主专制的情况下维系民主共和，关键逻辑在于当时的美国并非由寄居在拥挤都市中一无所有的受雇劳工组成，而是一个由拥有独立产权的自耕农主导的社会。这种作为土地所有者的生活体验本身就是最好的公民教育课堂： > 比如一个农场主可能会盘算：“我确实很想要在家门前的小溪上建一座新桥；但如果政府修桥，就必须提高我的税收。” 这种基于财产利益的权衡取舍，迫使每个独立公民学会理性计算、深度参与国家公共治理，从而奠定了共和国的自由根底。 ```mermaid flowchart LR accTitle: 美国有产者社会的三个发展阶段 accDescr: 展示美国如何从农业时代自耕农、工业时代郊区房产演进到数字时代的居住空间重构 subgraph Phase1 ["18-19世纪：农业时代"] P1["《宅地法》与铁路大扩张<br/>自耕农拥有独立农场"] end subgraph Phase2 ["20世纪：工业时代"] P2["州际高速路网与免税市政债<br/>郊区独栋住宅取代家庭农场"] end subgraph Phase3 ["21世纪：信息时代"] P3["远程办公与自动驾驶<br/>通勤半径扩大激活土地供应"] end Phase1 --> Phase2 --> Phase3 ``` 回溯过去两百年，美国制度展现出了惊人的动态进化能力，两次成功化解了工业化对“有产者社会”的瓦解危机： - **第一次危机（19世纪工业革命与铁路崛起）**：伴随大都市崛起与传统乡村受到挤压，联邦政府通过将巨量公共土地授予铁路巨头迅速构建起统一的全国性大市场，同时同步出台《宅地法》（Homestead Act），规定普通平民只要在一块土地上耕作居住满5年便能免费获得其完整产权。这种安排既纵容了私人资本快速铺设跨大陆工业基础设施，又直接再造了数以百万计的独立自耕农阶层。 - **第二次危机（20世纪家庭农场衰败）**：现代农业的资本集约化彻底击垮了传统家庭农场，大批破产农民涌入工厂沦为城市工薪族。为避免自由共和体制蜕变为被无产阶级矛盾撕裂的社会，美国用“郊区独栋住宅”（Single-Family Home in the Suburbs）成功替换了“单户农场”。联邦政府一方面斥巨资修建跨州高速公路网络，另一方面在税法中赋予地方市政债券完全免税的特权。城镇政府得以低成本发债修建学校、供水管网等公用基础设施以吸引房地产开发商和工薪阶层购房；随之而来的地产增值反哺了地方税基，不仅能轻松偿付市政债券本息，更让每一个普通美国工薪家庭通过按揭购房分享到了国家资本增长的时代红利。 如今，这台维系美国社会稳定的“超级财富制造机器”再度触碰到了增长极限：在毗邻传统就业中心的核心地带，普通年轻人倾尽所有也无力负担高昂的独立住宅，高昂的生活成本与折磨人的极端通勤正在催生新一代年轻群体的巨大不满与政治动荡。然而，新一轮的信息技术革命（IT）、远程办公（Remote Work）、混合办公模式以及未来自动驾驶技术的落地，恰恰为这一死局提供了物理上的解药。如果员工每周或每月仅需进城通勤极少数次数，可接受的通勤半径便能从传统的40英里跃升至75英里以上。依据几何法则，可开发住宅的土地面积将随着通勤半径的延伸呈“平方倍数”的几何级数激增。只要政策引导得当，信息技术的合理部署完全有能力释放出海量廉价土地，为未来两代美国年轻人重新打开通往“有产者社会”的大门。 - **三大关键数据与历史机制**： - **对等贸易破裂根源**：二战后美国为阻止欧洲赤化，单向允许德国等盟友对美征收高关税并不予反制，该制度沉淀为后来的长期结构性贸易失衡。 - **《宅地法》（1862年）**：普通公民连续耕作生活5年即可免费获得多达160英亩的联邦公共土地产权。 - **通勤半径与土地供给的几何定律**：可开发住宅土地总量与通勤半径的平方成正比（$S = \pi r^2$），通勤半径从40英里扩大到75英里，可利用土地总面积将激增至原来的约3.5倍。 ### `30:00` 信息架构与人工智能带来的地缘经济新挑战 任何重大技术革新绝不会像天使降临般凭空恩赐万物，它必然伴随着巨额代价与阵痛——正如汽车的发明导致无数交通事故，高速公路网络的建设也耗费了天文数字的公共财政。面对人工智能与数字化浪潮，社会需要的是一种全新的“社会想象力”。基础设施（Infrastructure）关注的是桥梁、道路等实体工程的建设，但今天更迫切需要的是“信息架构”（Info structure），即相配套的制度、法律与监管框架。只有搭好这套架构，AI 才能真正落地，提升医院患者的诊疗效果，或是深层次重塑司法体系。以居住和办公为例，政府若能对推行 60% 居家办公的混合办公模式提供税收激励，表面上看是税收减免，实质上却大幅削减了道路磨损与公共基建的扩张压力，并在财政预算的另一端实现了净节省。 这种数字化技术与过往的工业革命有着本质区别。传统的铁路或州际公路系统具有高度的物理垄断性，竞争对手无法直接“复制”你的铁轨，必须真金白银地自主投资铺设。但在人工智能领域，以中国为代表的地缘竞争对手能够利用美国斥巨资训练的前沿模型，通过所谓的“蒸馏”（distill）技术，在极低资本投入下获得性能相当的模型系统。这种技术扩散和规模经济特性的剧烈转变，直接对美国的对外战略和竞争法则提出了崭新拷问。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 传统工业基建与AI技术扩散特征对比 accDescr: 对比传统铁路基建的高资本物理壁垒与AI模型被蒸馏复制的技术扩散差异 subgraph Traditional ["传统工业时代（如铁路系统）"] A1["重资本实体投入"] --> B1["难以被直接抄袭"] B1 --> C1["必须自主铺设完整网络"] end subgraph ModernAI ["智能时代（如前沿AI大模型）"] A2["前沿实验室巨额算力投入"] --> B2["开源/黑盒输出易被蒸馏抽取"] B2 --> C2["对手以极低成本获取同等能力"] end ``` --- ### `34:29` 贯穿美国历史的四国外交政策传统学派 美国在对外政策上的大辩论具有惊人的重复性。每当新的地缘议题浮现，当下的争论方式与乔治·华盛顿时代如出一辙，国民与精英的观点总会落入四大经典学派之中。每个人手中的牌都像是扑克牌里的不同花色，鲜有人只抓一手清一色的单一学派，但每个人心中总有权重更高的主导花色： - **汉密尔顿主义（Hamiltonian）**：承袭自亚历山大·汉密尔顿，主张建立强大的资本主义商业经济，依靠高效的全球贸易为国家提供资金与技术进步，维持国内社会繁荣稳定，并构筑坚不可摧的国防实力。该学派支持强有力的联邦政府在国内推进基础设施，并在国际上积极扶持美国龙头企业扩张（典型如老布什）。 - **威尔逊主义（Wilsonian）**：认为唯利是图过于庸俗，外交必须以人权和道德为先。威尔逊派认为威胁美国的根源在于独裁统治——民主国家之间不打仗，独裁者和将军才嗜战。美国的核心任务应是向全球推广民主制度、建立国际组织，从根源上消灭战争。 - **杰斐逊主义（Jeffersonian）**：视个人自由为美国立国之本，警惕政府管得过宽和征税过重。无论面对威尔逊主义的人权十字军东征，还是汉密尔顿主义的大国均势与国际金融操盘，杰斐逊派都坚决反对，担忧这些行动会滋生庞大的保密官僚机构、畸形膨胀的国防预算以及无休止的海外战争，最终落得“征服了世界，却丢掉了本土自由”的悲惨下场。 - **杰克逊主义（Jacksonian）**：源自安德鲁·杰克逊，代表平民阶层的朴素民粹直觉。他们不在乎外国是否民主，也无意干涉别国内政，但底线是外国绝对不能侵犯美国或践踏美国的荣誉。一旦遭到袭击，杰克逊主义者主张毫不留情地彻底粉碎对手，将所谓交战法规抛诸脑后，像对待害虫一样将敌人打服碾碎，令其永远不敢再向美国伸手。 和平时期，杰克逊派看似与孤立主义的杰斐逊派步调一致，但只要遭遇类似“珍珠港事件”或“9·11事件”的突袭，杰克逊主义就会被瞬间激活，爆发恐怖的报复力量。 --- ### `36:28` 当代政治联盟的重塑：从建制派共识到特朗普联盟 从二战后直至冷战结束，以克林顿政府为代表的传统建制派共识，本质上是“汉密尔顿主义”与“威尔逊主义”的执政联盟。他们试图构建一个既能巩固美国经济安全、又能推广人权与民主的全球化体系，坚信这一模式能够让美国既富足又享有持久的世界和平。在《特殊的眷顾》（Special Providence）于 2001 年 9·11 事件前后出版时，外界一度以为华盛顿只存在汉密尔顿与威尔逊这两种声音，随后才惊觉狂怒的杰克逊主义力量已然觉醒，甚至有人叫嚣要直接用核武器抹平阿富汗。 反观唐纳德·特朗普的政治联盟，则是“杰斐逊主义”与“杰克逊主义”的奇特混合体，囊括了孤立主义者与强硬鹰派： - 像 J.D. 万斯（J.D. Vance）这类角色更倾向于杰斐逊主义立场，主张美国应从海外纠纷中抽身，认为乌克兰危机根本不是美国的战争； - 像马可·卢比奥（Marco Rubio）这类的鹰派则展现出鲜明的杰克逊色彩，对联合国毫无兴趣，在委内瑞拉问题上只求清除宿敌马杜罗（Maduro），绝不会像奥巴马或拜登那样大费周章地把“恢复委内瑞拉民主制度”当作首要目标。在乌克兰议题上，杰克逊派的态度则是将俄罗斯视作敌人，主张趁机给普京迎头痛击。 --- ### `38:22` 科技巨头与华盛顿的“双向奔赴”与科技汉密尔顿派崛起 现代美国政治史中最具戏剧性的转折之一，莫过于硅谷科技界与联邦政府从相互轻视到紧密绑定的“双向发现”。在 1990 年代“历史终结论”与全球化鼎盛期，跨国公司普遍宣称自己是跨越国界的“全球公司”，而硅谷更是这种思潮的极致阵地。当时的科技精英坚信赛博空间自成一体、Google 无远弗届，华盛顿的官僚甚至连互联网的基本运行原理都弄不明白，科技界完全游离于地缘政治之外。 如今，科技领域彻底沦为国际大国竞争的核心战场。面对中国试图打造自主可控、并旨在压制美国的技术圈（technosphere），硅谷意识到这关乎科技企业的生存命脉，而华盛顿也猛然意识到这决定了美国的国家权力与主权独立。在彼此错愕之中，科技与国家权力被外力强行推向了融合，促成了一场科技与经济体系的“重新国家化”（renationalization）。 科技界的核心经济诉求，与二战后崛起的传统跨国制造集团（如老牌汽车制造巨头）有着截然不同的底层逻辑： - **传统跨国贸易企业**：商业命脉完全系于全球分工与自由贸易。一辆汽车的零部件来自世界各大洲，工厂遍布全球，企业必须仰赖无缝流动的金融市场、大宗商品市场以及托马斯·弗里德曼（Tom Friedman）笔下“扁平的地球”；同时在建筑和酒店等劳动密集行业中，廉价且勤奋的移民劳动力不可或缺。 - **新兴科技汉密尔顿派**：Alphabet 这类现代科技巨头并不需要频繁进行大规模实体货物的进出口，其对无边界自由贸易的依赖程度远低于传统工业巨头，这使得科技行业在国家安全战略和地缘抗衡中展现出了全新的汉密尔顿主义特质。 ### `40:00` 科技汉密尔顿主义与企业爱国主义的兴起 在过去传统的跨国企业叙事中，全球化追求的是完全无国界的“可互换劳动力”，无论员工来自斯里兰卡还是台北，都只是随时可以替换的标准螺丝钉；然而，随着地缘政治与产业重心转向科技领域，商业利益的关注点发生了根本位移。正如 Walter Russell Mead 所指出的，即使南部边境没有更多非熟练劳动力涌入，导致清洁或园艺服务成本上涨 30%，对于科技企业而言也无关痛痒——它们真正焦虑的是供应链安全与核心知识产权保护。 如今的科技企业越来越意识到，它们需要员工具备强烈的爱国主义认同。在新的安全逻辑下，员工必须在价值观层面认定“向外部对手出售核心技术是不可饶恕的背叛”，甚至同事之间会毫不犹豫地举报泄密行为。科技行业的经济议程与其文化、政治立场正在经历重构：旧时代的全球主义冷感，正被重视国家安全和本土忠诚的“科技汉密尔顿主义”（Tech Hamiltonians）所取代。 --- ### `43:51` 走出中美两极：印度与全球南方的新权力维度 全球舆论往往被中美两强争霸的叙事完全占据，但 Mead 强调，世界舞台上正在涌现出不容忽视的第三极力量，其中最引人注目的便是印度。一个世纪前，作为印度人民党（BJP）思想母体的国民志愿服务团（RSS）不过是“五个人围坐在一所民居里”，如今却已壮大为一个每周在全印举行约 86,000 场基层集会的庞大群众运动。这股动态政治力量不仅将莫迪推上权力巅峰，更赋予了印度极度清晰的国家认同与愿景。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 印度与中国对国际秩序构想的差异 accDescr: 对比中国修正主义与印度改革主义对待现有国际体系的不同态度与权力诉求。 subgraph StatusQuo["当前国际体系困境"] SQ["西方历史主导格局<br/>14亿人口拥有核武的印度<br/>在联大仅与卢森堡同享一票"] end subgraph CN["中国方案 (Revisionist)"] C1["修正主义力量"] --> C2["自上而下的专制集权模式"] C2 --> C3["重塑替代性国际秩序"] end subgraph IN["印度方案 (Reformist)"] I1["改革主义力量"] --> I2["主张多极化 (Multipolar)"] I2 --> I3["拒绝照搬中国专制路径<br/>在现有体系内争取与其体量相称的话语权"] end SQ --> CN SQ --> IN ``` 印度外长苏杰生（Subrahmanyam Jaishankar）曾对此作出精准概括：“中国是修正主义大国，而印度是改革主义大国。”印度对西方在二战后搭建的国际秩序现状深感不公——一个拥有 14 亿人口的核大国在联合国大会中竟与列支敦士登或卢森堡一样仅有一票；但印度绝不认同中国那种自上而下的集权专制模式，而是寻求一种更平衡的“多极世界”，并在自身强大的软件与渐进式 AI 产业支撑下，探索属于文明古国的现代化路径。 - **多极化认同**：印度的全球抱负不是颠覆体系建立霸权，而是在多极格局中争取与其庞大体量和文明地位匹配的改革话语权。 - **伊斯兰文明的觉醒**：除印度外，涵盖海湾国家与土耳其的伊斯兰世界也是一股强劲的重塑力量。它的光谱极其宽广，既有顶尖的学者与思想精英，也有北非手持砍刀点燃村落的极端分子，但其整体文化凝聚力与地缘权重正在持续走强。 --- ### `45:00` 技术浪潮的离心力：文明趋同到文明分歧 工业革命曾是一股强大的“同质化”力量：为了铺设铁路、修建高速公路、建造巨型制造工厂与机场，各个社会在制度与组织架构上被迫全盘采纳欧洲和西方的生活与政治方式。然而，当下的信息革命却展现出了截然相反的动态——它降低了本土文化的表达与生产成本，使得不同文明能够直接以自身的语言和文化作为平台，催生了“文明的分歧”而非趋同。 Mead 引用早期 MTV 进入拉丁美洲的案例：起初所有人惊呼美式摇滚将摧毁本土文化，但不久后，本地艺术家借助廉价的摄录技术创作出契合本土审美的情感表达，迅速挤占了美式内容。如今这种现象正在全球尺度上演：土耳其比 25 年前更具有土耳其本土特质，印度更加印度化，日本也更加日本化。信息技术并没有抹平差异，反而放大了各自文明的独特内核，而生成式 AI 的崛起势必为这一本土化趋势火上浇油。 --- ### `48:54` 信息革命的阴暗面：无法核查的毁灭性风险 历史上的技术跃迁从来都伴随着沉痛的文明代价。工业革命在长期带来了繁荣，却也直接催生了社会秩序瓦解的极端阵痛——数以百万计的农民脱离世代耕作的土地涌入城市遭受剥削，传统的社会缓冲机制失效，最终引爆了两次世界大战以及极权意识形态屠杀上亿人的惨剧。如今的信息革命同样正在急剧动摇原有的社会契约与认知结构，将文明推向不可预测的风险边缘。 在未来的地缘对抗中，最令人窒息的威胁在于大规模杀伤性武器从“可观测”向“不可核查”的恶化： - **核扩散 vs. 生物与网络武器**：在过去 60 年的核对抗中，制造核武需要大规模浓缩铀离心机或反应堆，大国有足够的预警时间（Lead time）侦测并进行威慑干预；但在网络战与合成生物学领域，任何人在地下室实验室里都有可能合成出摧毁半个地球人口的致命病原体。 - **战略信任归零与军备失控**：在毫无战略互信的地缘环境下，由于军备控制条约从根本上失去了“可核查性”（Verifiability），传统的外交履约机制彻底失效，各方只能在猜忌中陷入加速军备竞赛，大幅推高了大国直接冲突乃至爆发全面战争的概率。 --- ### `51:30` 乌克兰前线的无人机革命与战争形态的彻底重构 技术革命不仅在改变战略威慑，更在从底层重塑常规战场的物理现实。Mead 回顾了他多次前往乌克兰战场的实地考察见闻。在战事爆发初期，他在乌克兰的一处无人机作坊里看到的还只是简陋的战场临时应急：技术人员拆解儿童玩具卡车，改装成能够将地雷运送到敌方坦克底盘下的原始地面无人车。 而当数月前 Mead 再次重返乌克兰前线时，战术迭代的跨度令人震惊。前线医疗人员直言，他们“在野战医院里已经几乎见不到子弹造成的枪伤，全部伤亡均来自无人机打击”。传统的营级对攻战线已经完全消失，取而代之的是由侦察无人机与 FPV 自杀式无人机严密封锁的“灰色杀戮区”（Gray Kill Zone）。在被无死角全天候监控的战场上，任何成建制的部队集结都会在几分钟内招致毁灭，步兵只能以两三人为极小作战单元分散蛰伏在废墟泥泞之中，常规武器与战术条令在智能化技术洪流下正被无情推翻重写。 ### `50:00` 无人机战与军事革命的连续颠覆 乌克兰战场的现状彻底改变了现代战争的形态。米德讲述了一个令人震惊的现实细节：如今在战场上伤员的撤离变得极其困难，军方甚至不得不专门研发一种新型地面无人机——它能开到前线运载伤员或遗体，上方罩着金属防护装甲，并在多架空中无人机的协同掩护下将其推出来，因为空中必须时刻防备敌方无人机的自杀式追击。曾有前线人员告诉米德，有一名负伤士兵足足耗费了 63 天才成功从交火区后送撤离。这种景象与仅仅六年前的战争模式已经大相径庭。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 现代无人机战场伤员撤离流程 accDescr: 展示乌克兰战场上地面无人救援车在空中掩护集群配合下的撤离流程 subgraph Ground["地面救援系统"] UGV["特种地面无人机 (UGV)"] --> Load["回收伤员并合上金属护盾装甲"] Load --> Evac["缓慢推移/撤出危险交火区"] end subgraph Air["空中伴随掩护集群"] Recon["侦察无人机"] --> Watch["监控空域敌方自杀式无人机"] Watch --> Counter["拦截/压制企图突袭的敌机"] end Air -.->|实时空地协同协同掩护| Ground ``` 面对这种战局，米德对五角大楼的适应速度提出了严肃质疑：当传统的坦克和步枪正在变得如同当年的“骑兵冲锋与马刀”一样过时，美国到底拥有什么样的武装部队？未来又到底需要什么样的部队？战场上的技术优势窗口期被急剧压缩，基本上每六个月就会被彻底改写。当下乌克兰人占据的某种战术优势，随时可能发生逆转。 对于美国这样在传统武器装备上拥有最庞大库存的超级大国而言，技术跃迁反而带来了最沉重的负担： - **存量包袱的脆弱性**：当坦克被低成本的“坦克杀手”轻易摧毁，拥有最多坦克的国家蒙受的系统性损失反而最大。 - **黑海上的非对称制海权**：乌克兰几乎没有任何像样的传统海军舰艇，仅凭一些微型快艇配合自杀式无人艇和无人机，便成功将强大的俄罗斯黑海舰队驱逐出黑海核心控制区。这对于传统上海权居于核心主导地位的美国而言，是一个必须深思的警讯，但对台湾的防御而言却是一个利好信号。 - **从“一次性革命”到“连续军事革命”**：20 世纪 90 年代人们热衷于讨论“军事事务革命”（RMA），仿佛只要掌握并适应了一套新的信息化范式就能一劳永逸；但如今的世界已经进入了无休止的“持续军事革命”（continuing revolutions in military affairs），技术与战术永不停歇地在实战中彼此颠覆。 --- ### `52:45` 台湾海峡的博弈暗流与日本的历史性觉醒 谈到台海局势时，米德认为中国最高层确实有着统一的坚定意志，但这并不意味着“床头摆着一个固定日期的闹钟”。发动对台行动的代价与风险极高，一旦失败对决策者将是灾难性的，因此只有在具备极高胜率的前提下才会跨出实质性一步。 然而在“全面武力攻台”与“按兵不动”之间，存在着大量的中间过渡地带。米德分析，北京很可能会寻求建立一种“软性封锁”（soft blockade）： - **低烈度主权确立**：例如颁布海关法令，要求任何驶往台湾港口的商船必须先停靠大陆港口接受清关检查，以实际管控来彰显主权，并对拒绝配合的船只设置通航障碍。 - **雷达之下的切香肠战术**：采取各种恰好处于美军直接军事干预门槛之下的行动，逐步在温水煮青蛙中改变地缘现实，使其全面向有利于己方的方向倾斜。 ```mermaid flowchart LR accTitle: 台海博弈态势与灰区战术演进 accDescr: 展示台海博弈中软封锁灰区手段与美日地缘反应的对抗结构 subgraph GrayZone["灰区与软封锁策略"] A["法律战与主权宣示"] --> B["海关清关与海上拦截"] B --> C["门槛以下改变现状"] end subgraph Resistance["区域应对机制"] D["日本战略觉醒: 视台湾为生存底线"] E["国防开支翻倍 / 重构军事学说"] F["美日同盟协同与威慑重塑"] D --> E --> F end GrayZone -.->|遭遇新型战略阻力| Resistance ``` 但棋局中出现了一个关键的新变数——**日本的彻底觉醒**。日本如今已经极其明确地将中国大陆控制台湾视作对日本国家独立与安全的直接致命威胁。尽管日本的转型才刚刚起步，但他们已经开始大幅提高国防开支、彻底反思重构自身的军事学说，并使本国文化适应全新的地缘战略环境。从历史上看，日本民族在真正感受到生存危机并认定必须转型时，展现出的应变与转向能力向来极为敏捷高效。日本这条学习曲线能走得多快、在自身防卫上展现出多大决心，已经成为打乱中国对台战略算盘的最核心复杂变量。 --- ### `55:00` 美国战后三大阶层的瓦解与内部治理危机 米德将视野从国际前线拉回美国国内结构。二战后美国长达数十年社会繁荣与稳定的基石，建立在三足鼎立的社会阶层结构之上，这一模式后来也外溢到了西方世界： 1. **产业工人阶层（蓝领阶层）**：拥有稳定的全职工作，通常由工会紧密组织。他们在政治上务实，完全以自身经济利益为导向。左翼与右翼的选战较量，核心在于“谁能更有效地提高工人的生活水平”，这使得当时两党的政治竞争被锚定在一个相当理性的轨道上。 2. **制度化的商业阶层**：到了 20 世纪 40、50 年代，约翰·D·洛克菲勒（John D. Rockefeller）或老摩根（J.P. Morgan）那种初代家族巨鳄已被其孙辈、职业经理人以及公众持股的上市公司所取代。商业运作高度制度化，充斥着受国家严格监管的垄断或寡头企业——比如全国只有一家电话公司、有限的几家航空公司以及三大主流电视网，商业生态秩序井然。 3. **专家技术官僚阶层（Technocrats）**：居于工人与大企业之间的是行政官员、政策顾问和学者专家。他们依据经由同行评审的社会科学理论进行科学决策——一方面监管大企业以防止其贪得无厌，另一方面遏制工会提出过分要求导致系统崩溃，扮演着整个系统的中流砥柱与平衡阀。 | 阶层类型 | 战后黄金时代的特征 | 当前现状与困境 | |:--- |:--- |:--- | | **产业工人阶层** | 工会化、经济导向务实、追求生活水平提升 | 制造业去中心化、阶层撕裂、政治锚点丧失 | | **商业精英阶层** | 职业经理人、公众上市公司、受监管的寡头秩序 | 科技新贵与全球资本脱轨、制度化约束被打破 | | **技术官僚/专家阶层** | 依靠社会科学决策、平衡劳资利益的理性平衡阀 | 公信力全面塌陷、深陷文化部落战、无法应对 AI 等前沿剧变 | 米德尖锐地指出，**当今美国社会中的这三大阶层正陷入全面的混乱与瓦解**。面对 AI 等颠覆性科技引发的新型难题与剧烈震荡，旧有的治理机制已经彻底失灵，美国正处于一种在惊涛骇浪中漫无方向的“迷航状态”（out at sea）。作为当今全球秩序唯一潜在的稳定支柱，美国自身的内部失序与语无伦次，必然会严重动摇整个世界的稳定基石。这给当下的知识分子、决策精英以及普通公民施加了极大的历史责任：必须摸索出一条新路径，建立新型的政治与社会契约，唯有先重建国内的内在稳定，才谈得上对外投射稳定力量。 --- ### `01:00:44` 何谓美国人：血统归属、观念认同与誓词纽带 面对日益碎片化的社会，究竟什么才是“成为一个美国人”（being an American）的核心内涵？米德分享了极其接地气的心路历程。 当今主流知识界普遍强调“美国是一个建立在崇高政治理念（Ideas）之上的国家”。但米德直言，自己在南方老家成长时，直到读大学之前几乎从未见过有谁是这么思考问题的： - **作为血土与原生归属的美国**：“在南方，人们认为自己是美国人，仅仅因为身边所有人都是美国人，家族从记事起世世代代都是美国人。这就像一个法国人自然是法国人、一个土耳其人自然是土耳其人一样。我属于这里并不是因为我‘信仰’某种关于美国的政治哲学，而是因为我就生在这里，而且也没有别的地方会收留我。” - **观念与多元主义的美国**：与此同时，确实有数以千万计的移民与公民是因为信仰自由、平等与宪政的理念而深爱这片土地并作出贡献。这两种视角都是真实的，米德坦言自己并不觉得自己比一个上周刚刚宣誓入籍的新公民“更具备美国人资格”。 对米德而言，血缘文化认同与崇高政治理念之间的真正交汇点，正是那段看似朴素的《效忠宣誓》（Pledge of Allegiance）： > “我宣誓效忠美利坚合众国国旗，以及它所代表的共和国：上帝之下，不可分割的一个国家，自由与正义属于全体人民。” 米德由衷赞叹这段誓词的精练与深刻：任何人只要发自真心地念出这句话并身体力行，他就是一个真正的美国人。 --- ### `01:03:25` 中东深层暗流：阿拉伯民族主义的坍塌 谈话转向错综复杂的中东局局势（涉及伊朗、以色列以及周边阵营的大洗牌）。米德指出，在所有纷繁复杂的新闻头条背后，贯穿整个中东地缘政治变迁的最深层背景，正是**阿拉伯民族主义（Arab nationalism）以及传统阿拉伯身份认同的全面内爆与衰亡**。以往试图以统一的泛阿拉伯语言、文化或世俗民族主义来团结整个区域、对抗外敌的宏大叙事已不复存在，留下了一个巨大的地缘与意识形态真空，诱发了伊朗什叶派势力的渗透扩张与区域盟友关系的彻底重构。 ### `01:00:00` 中东局势：阿拉伯世界的衰落与伊朗的霸权威胁 在梳理中东的地缘政治演变时，Walter Russell Mead 回顾了历史：20 世纪 50 年代，埃及的纳赛尔（Gamal Abdel Nasser）曾是阿拉伯认同与泛阿拉伯主义的核心支柱；尽管在 1967 年第三次中东战争受挫，此后叙利亚、伊拉克，甚至卡扎菲统治下的利比亚都曾试图接过这一旗帜。然而后来的历史众所周知——伊拉克崩塌（美国在其中起到了重大作用），叙利亚也在未受美国过多干预的情况下自身瓦解。这种阿拉伯核心力量的集体崩溃，给了非逊尼派、非阿拉伯政权的伊朗前所未有的机会，逐步建立起从黎巴嫩、叙利亚、伊拉克延伸至伊朗本土的“什叶派新月地带”（Shia Crescent）。 尽管在 10 月 7 日巴以冲突爆发后，以色列在很大程度上打破了这一地带的某些链条，但阿拉伯世界底层的结构性脆弱依然未变。海湾各君主国在经济与资源利用上固然手段高明，但根本无法独立抵御伊朗的军事威胁，离开外部力量的庇护便无法立足。这直接关系到霍尔木兹海峡的安危——该区域是全球经济稳定与运行的生命线。如果美国不遏制伊朗，伊朗就会获得对中东石油资源的绝对控制权，从而具备敲诈全球经济的能力，并攫取不可估量的地缘资源。以色列由于体量太小、且在文化上异质于中东腹地，根本无法承担起制衡伊朗的区域霸权角色；而美国自奥巴马政府以来却始终在“踢皮球”，既不愿亲自下场划定并严厉执行红线，又想避开正面冲突。然而历史是残酷的：“我们要么亲自阻止伊朗，要么就坐视伊朗掌控中东的石油霸权。” ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 中东地缘权力结构演变与威慑危机 accDescr: 展示从泛阿拉伯主义瓦解到伊朗什叶派新月地带崛起，再到海湾国家安全脆弱性与外部威慑机制的失效逻辑。 subgraph ArabDecline["阿拉伯支柱力量崩塌"] Nasser["纳赛尔与泛阿拉伯主义衰落"] --> Collapse["伊拉克与叙利亚崩溃"] Collapse --> Void["阿拉伯世界出现底层权力真空"] end subgraph IranHegemony["伊朗地缘扩张与海湾威胁"] Void --> Crescent["什叶派新月地带形成<br/>(黎巴嫩-叙利亚-伊拉克-伊朗)"] Crescent --> GulfThreat["威胁霍尔木兹海峡与海湾关键基础设施<br/>(如海水淡化厂)"] end subgraph DeterrenceFailure["威慑失效与现实困境"] GulfThreat --> Fragility["海湾资本外逃与转型计划破灭"] IsraelLimit["以色列过于微小/孤立<br/>无法充当抗衡伊朗的核心支柱"] USVacillation["美国缺乏政治决断与民意支持<br/>自奥巴马时代起回避硬性红线"] GulfThreat --> USVacillation IsraelLimit --> USVacillation end ``` --- ### `01:03:25` 威慑的侵蚀：大国深陷泥潭的真正根源 当主持人问及为何中东常被称为“帝国坟场”、大国为何总在此难以奏效时，Mead 将讨论引向了核心命题——**威慑的侵蚀（The erosion of deterrence）**。他强调，现代战略的关键绝不是去帮助乌克兰打赢一场与俄罗斯的战争，而是必须在事前让俄罗斯明确意识到：进攻乌克兰的后果将极其恐怖，以至于根本不值得冒险动手。一旦威慑失效，随之而来的必然是漫长、昂贵、分裂且代价不可估量的血腥冲突。威慑的垮塌不仅是海外的地缘灾难，更会反噬为国内政治的剧烈震荡。 在海湾地区，威慑缺失带来的具体威胁更加隐蔽而致命。伊朗最大的底牌并不单是用无人机袭击几艘油轮，而是只需将几架廉价无人机砸向海湾国家的海水淡化厂，就能瞬间让整座现代化都市断水而彻底变得无法居住。在这样的阴影笼罩下，任何理性的外国投资者都会退避三舍，海湾国家寄托于经济转型与多元化的宏伟蓝图都将化为泡影，甚至演变为灾难性的混乱。面对这种危机，美国政客却无法凝聚民意，因为当今没有哪位总统能像二战后的哈里·杜鲁门或实施“炉边谈话”的富兰克林·罗斯福那样，开诚布公地向民众讲明世界的残酷运转机制并赢得信任。 - **基础设施的脆弱点**：对海湾现代化城市而言，海水淡化厂是比油轮脆弱得多且更具毁灭性的打击目标，摧毁淡水供应即可令大都市瘫痪。 - **政治沟通的断层**：数十年来，美国领导层缺乏向公众清晰解释全球战略代价与收益的能力，导致一旦涉及前沿威慑便出现严重的内政撕裂。 --- ### `01:05:00` 未来二十年的美国战略与力量平衡 展望未来 20 年，Mead 认为美国的首要任务是在信息革命中“站稳脚跟”。美国必须将新技术带来的庞大财富转化为解决社会撕裂的资源，让普通民众深切感受到系统依然有效、繁荣依然惠及自身。如果做不到这一点，美国不仅会在对华科技竞赛中败下阵来，国内政治更会沦为“笼中相互撕咬的狂犬鼬鼠（rabid ferrets fighting in a cage）”。唯有稳住国内基本盘，美国总统才能在外交上重获公信力与行动力。 在明确的地缘战略上，Mead 提出了三条不可动摇的底线： 1. 不允许任何大国主导欧洲； 2. 不允许任何大国主导亚洲； 3. 不允许任何势力基于非商业条款切断中东石油的正常进出流动。 他指出，这一目标并非不可承受之重。在亚洲，当前的失衡源于经济体量的巨大落差：1980 年印度的 GDP 相当于中国的 60% 至 65%，而如今仅约 17%。正是这一悬殊差距，让中国产生了主导亚洲的战略诱惑，也迫使美国必须在天平上投下重注。但随着印度、印度尼西亚和越南等国的逐步崛起，亚洲的整体格局终将让任何单一国家意识到“亚洲大到没有任何人能够独自吞下”。就像德国最终学会在欧洲与他国和平共处一样，只要遏制住单极霸权，各大战区就能自发形成自然的均势，使美国无需不断无休止地膨胀军费或增派军队奔赴前线。 --- ### `01:08:53` 信息与智能革命：AI 对全球均势与威慑逻辑的重塑 关于主持人将“信息革命”具体延伸至“人工智能革命”的提问，Mead 剖析了其对大国格局的颠覆性潜力。目前公众的普遍共识是 AI 赛道已经彻底两极化——只剩下中美两个玩家，房间里再无他人。但 Mead 对这一格局能维持多久表示怀疑。他用冷战时期的核武器发展进行了类比：最初核俱乐部也仅有美苏两强，但随后法国、英国、中国乃至以色列都纷纷掌握了这一能力。 ```mermaid flowchart LR accTitle: AI 与核武器在大国均势中的扩散类比 accDescr: 展示核武器历史扩散路径与 AI 潜在扩散路径的技术与战略门槛对比。 subgraph NuclearAnalogy["核均势历史进程"] US_SU["早期两极独占<br/>(美国 / 苏联)"] --> MultipolarNuke["技术扩散与三方进入<br/>(中国、以色列等相继打破垄断)"] end subgraph AIArena["人工智能地缘动态"] US_CN["当前两极垄断<br/>(美国创新 / 中国工程落地)"] --> ThirdParties["潜在技术外溢与追赶<br/>(印度、欧洲、以色列的跟进能力)"] end NuclearAnalogy -.->|历史逻辑映射| AIArena ``` Mead 指出，中国在许多关键技术上以相对较少的“原始脑力消耗（original skull sweat）”追赶了上来，那么其他第三方力量（如印度、欧洲、以色列）完全可能通过类似甚至更高效的方式迎头赶上。更深层的战略命题在于 **AI 对国家安全决策与威慑机制的改造**。威慑的核心在于向对手释放无可置疑的确定性信号：**“如果对手做了 X，我方必能执行 Y，且百分之百有意愿执行 Y。”** 当外交与军事决策流程中引入 AI 与自动化机制时，它将从根本上排除人为犹豫、动摇与妥协的灰色空间，彻底重铸现代大国博弈中的威慑法则。 - **核武器扩散时间差对照**：以色列在科技与工业体量有限的情况下，仅在中国拥有核武器后数年便成功研制出核装置，展示了战略技术扩散的必然性。 - **自动化决策对威慑的作用**：人类决策易受政治懦弱或误判干扰，而基于算法或自动响应的决策闭环会极大提高报复信号的可信度，使威慑底线变得不可试探。 ### `01:10:00` AI 与“末日机器”：威慑逻辑的终极演变 对话延续了对威慑机制的深入剖析。如果将防御与威慑的触发完全交给 AI，逻辑就会变成：只要 AI 判定对手越过了红线，反击系统便会瞬间启动，没有任何犹豫或谈判空间。相反，只要中间保留了人类决策的环节，对手就会推测“人类在关键时刻可能会选择退缩”，威慑力便大打折扣。这就引发了一个极为棘手且发人深省的命题：人类是否真的准备好制造出一种类似“末日机器”（Doomsday Machine）的系统，完全由算法来决定是否发动战争、甚至是否使用核武器？这种技术与威慑结合的前景既引人入胜，又令人不寒而栗。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 威慑机制对比 accDescr: 对比传统人类决策与算法触发威慑机制在可信度与风险上的差异 subgraph HumanLoop["保留人类决策"] H1["对手试探红线"] --> H2["人类权衡评估"] H2 --> H3["对手推测可能退缩 / 威慑被削弱"] end subgraph AutoAI["算法全自动威慑"] A1["对手试探红线"] --> A2["AI 瞬间自动反击"] A2 --> A3["绝对威慑 / 伴随末日机器失控风险"] end ``` ### `01:10:48` 乐观的未来图景：医疗突破与丰饶时代的来临 当被问及未来最令人兴奋的事物时，沃尔特·米德列出了一张几乎没有止境的清单。他最为关注的是 AI 与前沿技术带动的医疗科研加速度。无论是寻找全新疗法还是攻克绝症，其进展节奏都达到了前所未有的水平。他提到了自己的朋友、前参议员本·萨斯（Ben Sasse）。萨斯此前被诊断出患有晚期胰腺癌，虽然病情依旧非常严峻，但得益于一款一年前根本不存在的全新药物，他不仅维持着生命，还能正常与人交往、处理事务，仿佛获得了一道生命的“暂缓执行令”。米德感慨，回顾家族中过去因各种疾病离世的亲人，很多病症在仅仅一代人之后就变成了完全可治愈的状态。 除了治疗突破，米德预言医疗领域即将迎来一场彻底的“成本革命”。在未来五十年内，人类将享受到比今天更好、且费用远比今天低廉的医疗保健。这种技术红利将从根本上瓦解当前困扰国家的财政难题——以联邦医保（Medicare）为代表的福利支出赤字将不再是拖垮国家财政的无底洞，老年人也能获得更有尊严、更优质的照护。在他看来，很多看似走入死胡同的社会矛盾，实际上都在快速迎来技术层面的解法。人类眼下面临的真正挑战，并不是资源的匮乏，而是信息革命所解锁的“丰饶之角”（cornucopia of wealth）喷涌而出的财富与变化实在太快，以至于现有的治理架构来不及有效消化与管理。总体而言，人类正站在一个崭新的转型、复兴与发展纪元的门槛上。 - **医疗范式转变**：AI 辅助的药物研发将研发周期从数年缩短至几个月，以往被视为绝症的病症逐渐转化为可控的慢性病。 - **公共财政减负**：医疗成本的结构性暴跌有望从根源上缓解美国长期面临的福利支出与联邦赤字压力。 - **时代的核心矛盾**：技术带来的生产力爆发速度，远远超过了制度、文化和治理体系的适应节奏。 ### `01:14:26` 漂浮在善意之海：人生最温情的馈赠 在播客标志性的收尾问题中，主持人询问米德：“你所经历过最善良的事是什么？”米德坦言，要挑选出单一的一件事极为困难，因为自己一生都在“漂浮在一片善意之海”（float on a sea of kindness）中，享受了太多未曾奢求过的恩惠。他深情地回忆起在外交关系协会（Council on Foreign Relations）时担任会长的莱斯·盖尔布（Les Gelb），称其为一位无与伦比的导师——每当米德犯傻做蠢事时，盖尔布总能一针见血地帮他看清问题，同时更会耐心地指引他该如何迈出下一步。 米德的感激之情同样洋溢在日常生活的细微之处。他打趣道，家里的年轻亲戚们总是极具耐心地听他滔滔不绝地讲那些乏味的“老战争故事”；而在职场上，雇主们也始终给予他极大的包容与支持，比如《华尔街日报》的社论版主编保罗·吉戈（Paul Gigot）放手让他长期撰写“全球视野”（Global View）专栏。面对沿途遇到的每一份宽厚、指引与陪伴，米德认为自己唯有感恩，这些绵延不绝的善意构成了他整个人生与学术道路最坚实的底色。 ## Notable quotes > `05:34` 如果你撒了足够多的谎，你撒第 10,000 个谎言的边际成本几乎为零；而对于普通政治家来说，撒第一、第二或第三个谎言的边际成本却高昂到难以承受。 — Walter Russell Mead > `05:34` 羞耻感只有在你允许它起作用时才会伤害你，它是一种只存在于别人脑海中的情绪 — Walter Russell Mead > `05:34` 任凭狂犬吠日，驼队自顾前行 — Walter Russell Mead > `05:34` 但别忘了，拿破仑最终兵败滑铁卢并在流放中度过余生，因此这绝不能保证整场壮观的大戏会迎来特朗普所期望的圆满结局 — Walter Russell Mead > `09:43` 每隔二十年他们就要砍掉国王的头，或者把国王赶下王位 — Walter Russell Mead > `12:25` 必须妥善保管这份信息，要是落入坏人手里可就糟了 — Walter Russell Mead > `12:25` 他们虽然是人渣、迟早下地狱，但在下地狱之前完全可以合法纳税、建设经济 — Walter Russell Mead > `22:45` 哪个国家能够以最高效的方式开发、驾驭和榨取颠覆性新技术的能量，同时又能在内部抗住新技术对社会结构造成的剧烈震荡而不至于自我解体，谁就能登上全球霸主的宝座 — Walter Russell Mead > `26:00` 比如一个农场主可能会盘算：‘我确实很想要在家门前的小溪上建一座新桥；但如果政府修桥，就必须提高我的税收。’ — Walter Russell Mead > `43:51` 中国是修正主义大国，而印度是改革主义大国。 — Subrahmanyam Jaishankar > `01:00:44` 我宣誓效忠美利坚合众国国旗，以及它所代表的共和国：上帝之下，不可分割的一个国家，自由与正义属于全体人民。 — Walter Russell Mead > `01:00:00` 我们要么亲自阻止伊朗，要么就坐视伊朗掌控中东的石油霸权。 — Walter Russell Mead > `01:08:53` 如果对手做了 X，我方必能执行 Y，且百分之百有意愿执行 Y。 — Walter Russell Mead ## Mentioned Walter Russell Mead, Patrick O'Shaughnessy, Jeremy Stern, Special Providence, God and Gold, Pax Americana, Donald Trump, WTO, NATO, Bill Clinton, Monica Lewinsky, Napoleon Bonaparte, Narendra Modi, Shinzo Abe, Benjamin Netanyahu, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Vladimir Putin, Xi Jinping, Louis XIV, Frederick the Great, Maria Theresa, John Locke, Konrad Adenauer, Kaiser Wilhelm II, OpenAI, Anthropic, SpaceX, DSA, Homestead Act, George Washington, Alexander Hamilton, Woodrow Wilson, Thomas Jefferson, Andrew Jackson, George H.W. Bush, J.D. Vance, Marco Rubio, Nicolas Maduro, Barack Obama, Joe Biden, Google, Alphabet, Tom Friedman, BJP, RSS, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, MTV, Gamal Abdel Nasser, Muammar Gaddafi, Harry Truman, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Ben Sasse, Les Gelb, Paul Gigot, Wall Street Journal, Council on Foreign Relations ## Video description My guest today is Walter Russell Mead. Walter is a columnist at the Wall Street Journal and the author of Special Providence and God and Gold, two of the best books written on American power.&nbsp; He has spent decades studying how the United States came to dominate the world, and our conversation is about whether it can keep doing so.&nbsp; Walter lays out the five step playbook that carried the Dutch, then the British, then America to global leadership, and why the same pattern keeps beating centralized continental powers.&nbsp; We discuss how Trump turned fame into power, the four schools of American foreign policy and the rise of the tech Hamiltonians, what the drone war in Ukraine means for the Pentagon, and why the erosion of deterrence is the deeper story in the Middle East.&nbsp; Please enjoy my conversation with Walter Russell Mead. For the full show notes, transcript, and links to mentioned content, check out the episode page ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠here⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠.&nbsp; ----- Become a Colossus member to get our quarterly print magazine and private audio experience, including exclusive profiles and early access to select episodes. Subscribe at ⁠colossus.com/subscribe⁠. ----- ⁠Ramp’s⁠ mission is to help companies manage their spend in a way that reduces expenses and frees up time for teams to work on more valuable projects. Go to⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ ⁠ramp.com/invest⁠⁠ to sign up for free and get a $250 welcome bonus. ----- Trusted by thousands of businesses, ⁠Vanta⁠ continuously monitors your security posture and streamlines audits so you can win enterprise deals and build customer trust without the traditional overhead. Invest Like the Best listeners get a special offer of $1,000 off Vanta when you go to ⁠vanta.com/invest⁠.&nbsp; ----- WorkOS⁠ is the infrastructure B2B and AI-native companies use to sell to enterprise. It covers everything enterprise security requires: SSO, SCIM, RBAC, Audit Logs, AI governance, and more. Trusted by 2,000+ fast-growing companies, including OpenAI, Anthropic, Cursor, and Vercel. ----- Rogo is the AI platform for finance. They're building agents for Wall Street that are trained to understand how bankers and investors actually do work: from diligence and modeling, to turning analysis into deliverables. To learn more, visit rogo.ai/invest. ----- ⁠Ridgeline⁠ has built a complete, real-time, modern operating system for investment managers. It handles trading, portfolio management, compliance, customer reporting, and much more through an all-in-one real-time cloud platform. Visit⁠ ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ridgeline.ai⁠. ----- Editing and post-production work for this episode was provided by The Podcast Consultant. Timestamps: (00:00:00) Welcome to Invest Like the Best (00:02:16) America and the World Today (00:05:34) Trump’s Method of Power (00:09:43) Why America Keeps Winning (00:12:25) The Five-Point Plan for Global Dominance (00:20:11) China and American Power (00:22:10) The Risk of American Isolationism (00:25:50) Technology and Global Power (00:28:42) Riding the Technological Wild Horse (00:34:29) Four Schools of American Foreign Policy (00:40:22) The Rise of Tech Hamiltonians (00:43:51) India and the Next Great Powers (00:48:54) The Risks of the Information Revolution (00:51:30) How Technology Is Changing War (00:55:06) Taiwan (00:57:20) The Future of American Society (01:00:44) What It Means to Be American (01:03:25) Iran and the Middle East (01:06:28) The Erosion of Deterrence (01:08:53) America’s Role in the Next 20 Years (01:12:08) AI and Global Power (01:14:26) Reasons for Optimism (01:16:33) The Kindest Thing [Source](https://traffic.megaphone.fm/CLS4316656997.mp3)

[5:34] Walter Russell Mead: 如果你撒了足够多的谎，你撒第 10,000 个谎言的边际成本几乎为零；而对于普通政治家来说，撒第一、第二或第三个谎言的边际成本却高昂到难以承受。 [5:34] Walter Russell Mead: 羞耻感只有在你允许它起作用时才会伤害你，它是一种只存在于别人脑海中的情绪 [5:34] Walter Russell Mead: 任凭狂犬吠日，驼队自顾前行 [5:34] Walter Russell Mead: 但别忘了，拿破仑最终兵败滑铁卢并在流放中度过余生，因此这绝不能保证整场壮观的大戏会迎来特朗普所期望的圆满结局 [9:43] Walter Russell Mead: 每隔二十年他们就要砍掉国王的头，或者把国王赶下王位 [12:25] Walter Russell Mead: 必须妥善保管这份信息，要是落入坏人手里可就糟了 [12:25] Walter Russell Mead: 他们虽然是人渣、迟早下地狱，但在下地狱之前完全可以合法纳税、建设经济 [22:45] Walter Russell Mead: 哪个国家能够以最高效的方式开发、驾驭和榨取颠覆性新技术的能量，同时又能在内部抗住新技术对社会结构造成的剧烈震荡而不至于自我解体，谁就能登上全球霸主的宝座 [26:00] Walter Russell Mead: 比如一个农场主可能会盘算：‘我确实很想要在家门前的小溪上建一座新桥；但如果政府修桥，就必须提高我的税收。’ [43:51] Subrahmanyam Jaishankar: 中国是修正主义大国，而印度是改革主义大国。 [60:44] Walter Russell Mead: 我宣誓效忠美利坚合众国国旗，以及它所代表的共和国：上帝之下，不可分割的一个国家，自由与正义属于全体人民。 [60:00] Walter Russell Mead: 我们要么亲自阻止伊朗，要么就坐视伊朗掌控中东的石油霸权。 [68:53] Walter Russell Mead: 如果对手做了 X，我方必能执行 Y，且百分之百有意愿执行 Y。

[5:34] Walter Russell Mead: the dogs will bark, but the caravan will move on. [12:25] Walter Russell Mead: secret five-point plan for global dominance [30:00] Walter Russell Mead: infostructure [36:28] Walter Russell Mead: Tech Hamiltonians [40:00] S. Jaishankar: revisionist [40:00] S. Jaishankar: reformist [48:54] Walter Russell Mead: gray zones [55:06] Walter Russell Mead: soft blockade [60:00] Walter Russell Mead: I pledge allegiance to the flag of the United States of America and to the republic for which it stands, one nation, indivisible under God, with liberty and justice for all. [60:00] Walter Russell Mead: Shiite Crescent [65:00] Walter Russell Mead: rabid ferrets fighting with each other in a cage [65:00] Walter Russell Mead: too big for China to eat

[0:00] Hello and welcome, everyone. I'm Patrick O'Shaughnessy, and this is Invest Like the Best. This show is an open-ended exploration of markets, ideas, stories, and strategies that will help you better invest both your time and your money. If you enjoy these conversations and want to go deeper, check out Colossus, our quarterly publication with in-depth profiles of the people shaping business and investing. You can find Colossus along with all of our podcasts at colossus.com. Thank you. Walter, I've been looking forward to this for many, many months. We were introduced through Jeremy Stern, who runs Colossus, who I know credits you with a lot of his skill in writing and thinking about the world. I've been so excited to do this with you. We've got such a wide range of topics that I thought it would be appropriate to begin by having you frame... your view of America in the world today. In very, very broad strokes, you've written a lot about how and why the UK and then sort of us as the successor in America have sort of won the last several hundred years of global affairs. I'd love you to talk about the sweep of that winning, how you conceive of us and our role in the world today. It's a really interesting time because on the one hand, the Pax Americana that we kind of developed after 1945 and then refurbished in 1990, the end of the Cold War. is really in crisis. But if you step back a little bit, American power is not in crisis. The networks that we built up, the way of dealing with the world, the institutionalized relations with Europe and so on. Those are all burning or crumbling. But the United States as a power, it seems to me, is if anything, thanks to the information revolution and sort of this... extraordinary raises in productivity that I believe we have experienced and are about to experience, I think we're still charging ahead. It's this odd picture of a dynamic country and a collapsing world system. The Trump presidency has kind of exaggerated a lot of the disruption. I'm optimistic about America's position, medium to long term. I do think we're in rough waters right now. What do you mean by collapsing world system? Well, you think about the World Trade Organization. We used to have this rules-based system for trade. Now your tariff is more or less what President Trump wakes up in the morning and thinks it should be. As a country, we exercise more of our power through institutions, the NATO alliance. UN even at times. And we're not doing that since World War Two. It's been sort of a principle of American foreign policy that we want to be steady, predictable. You want everybody to know where America's red lines are. You want everybody to be able to rely. If we made a commitment in 1955, unless we announced with great fanfare that it's changing, it's still there. So we're trying to provide this bedrock of solidity in the world. And we're obviously not trying to do that anymore for President Trump. I think he believes he maximizes his advantages by being completely unpredictable. And also crossing a lot of lines so that past presidents... probably would not have said things like, OK, if you don't raise your defense budget, we're going to double your tariffs or something of that kind and try to solve problems through channels. Trump would make the argument that didn't work. And so he's now... completely trashing the institutional networks that for a very long time were the vessels of American power. And I think he's doing it in a way that's going to be very hard for his successors to rebuild. How would you teach someone else his method? You've written a lot about this. I'm very curious how you framed it. He's an interesting president, no doubt, whether you're for or against what he's been doing. How would you teach his method to somebody that was curious to learn how he operates? So distinctive. He really is a genius. He's discovered, I think, One of the secrets of power in the contemporary world which is he's managed to turn fame into power, drama into power, And to do it in ways that leave him completely free to act. If you lie enough, the marginal cost of your 10,000th lie is nothing. While the marginal law of your first, second, or third, the marginal cost is very high. All of the normal [5:00] constraints on political figures, reputational and so on. He does not pay. In some ways, I think President Clinton first discovered that shame only matters if you let it. Shame is an emotion that exists in other people's minds. A lot of people thought when the Monica Lewinsky thing came out, he would have no choice but to resign. This was so overwhelming, so dreadful. He basically realized, no, if you just keep putting one foot in front of the other, you just pass through it. The dogs will bark, but the caravan will move on. Trump has deployed that concept on an industrial scale. You talk about this notion of speech and spectacle. Can you say more just about what you mean there? The Donald Trump show is the most compelling entertainment, infotainment spectacle that humanity has ever seen. Since the dawn of time, no living human being has occupied the amount of bandwidth of the human race that Donald Trump does. And we say, well, global media and so on. But You know, it's very hard to think ever of a single ruler who just dominated Egypt. Everything. Anywhere you go in the world today, I don't care where it is, what you hear is Trump, Trump, Trump, Trump, Trump. Some people hate Trump. Some people love Trump. Some people laugh at Trump. Some people are astonished by Trump. Some people spend their lives thinking about their contempt for Trump, but he remains the center of everything. And he sees that as the key to his unique power. A lot of people thought that when he lost in 2020, it would go away, that that was it. He was just about as dominant out of office as he had been in office. At what he does, he is as good as Napoleon was at what he did. I observed that Napoleon also lost at Waterloo and ended in exile, so... This is no guarantee that it will be what Trump would consider a happy ending to the whole spectacle. But he is a major historic figure. who has developed a new understanding of how power works in an era of mass communications industry. social media and the rest of us are just trying to deal with it. How do you think the world is or will be the the most different because of his role in it? Well, I think he has vastly accelerated the disintegration of the post-World War II slash post-Cold War structures. They're not going to be the same. He's not the only one who's done this, but I think we're entering an era of much more personal and much less bureaucratic politics. That is. I think for a long time in the 20th century, people got into the habit of thinking, I'm one-person rule or a central figure. should be downgraded and we should be run by institutions and bureaucrats and committees. I think that one of the impacts of the Internet is that people want to be ruled by people again. So that in India, you see a Modi. We saw Abe in Japan, Bibi in Israel and Erdogan in Turkey and Trump in the United States. Trump is sort of the greatest of these, the most globally. impactful of this new wave of Putin, Xi Jinping. We're back to an era of personal politics. If you think about the broader, longer arc of dominance or power leading up to this moment, I love the historical context. You're an amazing historian. And Talk about why, whether it's maritime dominance or other major reasons that you think the UK and America up until, let's say, you know, the end of the Cold War or something had such an incredible run. Let's just start with the U.S.-China rivalry today, and what you see is The sort of two sides. One is a land-based continental empire, China. which believes that it can match the technological and therefore military strength of the other power without all that political liberalism and messy democracy. Okay, great idea. The first, I think, ruler in modern times to really embrace that was Louis XIV, who thought that his technocratic government of the experts in France could beat those pesky English with all of that ridiculous, you know, every 20 years they kill the king or kick him out or who knows what they do. But it's utterly chaotic. The French idea was we can do that with a strong centralized system. From the time of Louis XIV right up until now, you could sort of argue the dominant theme of Global power politics has been this rise of this English-speaking maritime commercial economy. liberal order. And then it's being contested successively by a series of great power continental states, France. [10:00] Hence, under Louis XIV, again with Napoleon, Germany, Germany, Prussia in World War I and then World War II, the Soviet Union. And that these contests have been incredibly difficult. There have been moments in every case... where the technocratic centralized land power looked like it was just walking away in the ridiculous, confused, commercial, English-speaking maritime world. Alliance was muddled, lost, crazy. And yet somehow in the end, The hobbits keep winning. I should say that we stole our global strategy from the British. They stole it from the Dutch. who had been doing this earlier in the 17th century. In God and Gold, one of my books, I say that you could sum up the last 300 years of modern history in 10 letters, UP, United Provinces, to UK, to US. Now, obviously, that raises the question to question mark, question mark, question mark. I don't think China has it in it to beat us. What is that strategy, the maritime strategy? What are these three entities done that's been so effective to let the hobbits win? I don't know if I can really reveal all this. The secret five-point plan for global dominance. Okay. Why not? Right. I'm just going to ask everyone who hears this to kind of be careful with how they use this information. It would be terrible if it fell into the wrong hands. Step one is have an open society at home. Think of the Dutch in the 17th century. OK, everybody had these wars of religion. Well, the Dutch are pretty Calvinist, but they say, well, you know what? These Lutherans, they're scum. They're going to hell. Everybody knows that. But, you know, until they do, they could kind of pay taxes and contribute to the economy. And even the Catholics, I mean, of course, they can't do their filthy idolatrous rights in the streets or anything. But yeah, live and let live. The Jews live and let live. If an intellectual scientist publishes some kind of scientific paper that the church doesn't like, well, people will write nasty comments about it in other journals. But when Galileo doesn't go to the prison, there's no inquisition. And also, if you have an idea, you can try it. If you are the son of a peasant and you want to sort of try it as a merchant and you can find some people who let you do it. Go right ahead. They come up with new ideas for government finance that we still use, the joint stock company, new seagoing technology, circulation of the blood. Locke comes to Holland and writes a lot of his best work there. That's step one. You have this open, dynamic society and you've got the intellectuals are flocking there. Your universities are flourishing. Step two is now with all of these products that you've developed and innovative technology, you take the show on the road. You trade globally. So you have, I think, there were 10,000 seagoing ships coming from the Netherlands in the 17th century. Right. And they're traveling all over the world. And what this does is it makes you stinking rich. I advise my students sometimes to go to the Met Museum here or any number of places to see the Dutch masters, not to look for, oh, like the brushstrokes and the composition that's so exquisite, all of which is true. But just look at like all the stuff that these people have in their painting. You know, here's the merchant with his like silk robe from China. Turkey and he's got a stuffed parrot from Brazil on his mantle base. There's just this astounding amount of wealth. which then allows you to start thinking globally. 18th century, the Prussians fight Frederick the Great fights with Maria Teresa over Silesia. The Seven Years War. This is a beautiful, I've been there. I've been to Silesia. I love Silesia. It's a sausage-shaped province in modern Poland. And seven years, both countries go bankrupt. And in the end, Frederick gets it, which means he's Frederick the Great, And it's just Maria Teresa who lost. But during that seven years war, the British basically kicked the French out of India and Canada and North America. and establish the foundations of the world order that we still live today. So you're thinking globally. Once you have built this global system, you then do something extremely treacherous, which is you invite everyone else to participate in your system. So you don't do, say, what the Spanish did in Latin America, where you say, this is ours. We conquered this. Nobody else can trade here. You people stay out, which obviously condemns it to a certain stagnation. The British in the 1960s, [15:00] century, they have free trade in the British Empire. Everybody can trade, and the British Navy keeps piracy down for everybody, not just for the Brits. And what this does is. It encourages other countries to participate in your system. as we did with Britain. We didn't fight with them after 1812. We came close a couple of times, but at the end of the day, We traded in the British system. We were among the greatest beneficiaries of what the British did. And the Germans did the same thing. Prussia, the German Empire became a great trading power. They had investments in Argentina and Chile, and in many places, their commerce was driving out the British. Then the Germans discovered that we have another little trick up our sleeves. They go to war in World War I. And they suddenly discover that while they were integrating into the world, that made them very rich, gave them great technology, a lot of military power. But now they're dependent on suddenly their war with the UK and they can't get all that grain from Argentina and America that fed their people. They can't get that imported rubber from Malaya. that provides the tires that they need for war. So they've grown dependent on that international system. And you're able to cut it off. And this is one of the big reasons the English won so many of these wars. So this system exists. I think a lot of Americans really aren't conscious of it, but we sort of revert to these patterns. Things happen and we just behave in these ways. So after the end of the Cold War, what do we say to Russia and China? Come on in. And just as we said to Germany and Japan in 1945, benefit from the system. Actually, we waited about 47 to do that. But in any case, come on in, benefit. And now both Germany and Japan, are principal pillars of the world system. We sort of hoped that Russia and China would do that too. They've taken more of the Wilhelm II path than the Konrad Adenauer path. We are now testing what happens there. It's one of the reasons I'm worried. But it's a pattern that has been recurring. And so far, whenever it finally comes to the test, our side has been winning. If I were to imagine an equivalent of me and an equivalent of you sitting somewhere in China today, and I asked you the same question about how power is formed today, What do you think they would say there under a very different system? I used to have these conversations in China. Some of my books have been published in Chinese and I've gone to. Chinese universities and had these conversations with scholars and officials. And what I can say is they are very aware of this dynamic. If there are things that keep Xi Jinping awake at night, I think one of them is his awareness of that in any kind of conflict with the United States, China would face being cut off from so many countries. of the raw materials and so on and markets that's economy needs. I mean, Let's imagine China declares a blockade of Taiwan, which could very easily happen. The United States, just from 100 miles further out, imposes a counter blockade on China. Nothing is going in or, you know, no oil is coming in or out. No manufactured goods are being sold. What happens to the Chinese economy? All the soybean contracts they have with farmers in Brazil and Argentina. Not getting delivered. We've all been surprised with the Iran war to see just how big the Chinese oil stockpiles have become. A lot of Chinese energy policy can be understood as trying to avoid the trap of dependence on the global economy. They're doing the solar. They're doing as much hydro as they can. And some of our friends in the environmental movement are saying, oh, it's so wonderful. They're so green. Let's cooperate with China to build a new world. They're also digging as much coal as they possibly can because what they're trying to do is make themselves less dependent on the outside world so that in a worst case scenario with the U.S., they can actually fight for the long term. Do you think the U.S. runs the risk of trying to do that same thing, become more isolationist? You know, our exports are relatively low as a percent of GDP compared to lots of other countries throughout the world. We are fairly self-sufficient. Like, America is an amazing place. natural resource, rich, two oceans on either side. Like we have these amazing advantages. Maybe we could do it without this interdependent thing that's created this amazing power structure as you laid out. Does that worry you that we like trend more, in the direction of being isolationist or something? Well, I think, look, there is obviously in American history, we have a tradition of isolationism that is a stronger at some times than others. And it's definitely coming up now. And it does worry me a good deal because [20:00] I do think American security and the American economy do ultimately require us to be engaged globally, not necessarily as global social workers or something. But you think about our trade, roughly a third of it is in the hemisphere, a third of it across the Pacific, a third of it across the Atlantic. We couldn't really very easily do without any one of those. We saw during the pandemic that our dependence on China for all kinds of things was really quite alarming. People look at our supply chains and they can see a lot of vulnerabilities. But we can't make everything that we need right here. We can't get all the raw materials that we need right here. But also, our producers need more than the American market. Traditionally, the most free market lobby in the United States has been the agricultural lobby, because America can do a lot more than feed ourselves. Our farmers can feed practically the world. And if they're reduced to only feeding the American market, they can't make money. The prices are so low. They need that market The same is true You know there so many economies of scale If our AI companies if our tech companies can only benefit from the internal American market that's actually not enough to generate the revenue and growth that they need, even to stay technologically equal, say, to China, much less be ahead and be super profitable. Our business needs the world. And then there's the question of, OK, well, you can't really make people buy your stuff at the point of a gun, and you don't really want to have a gun around all the time. So you have to have a trading relationship that works for both sides. Both sides have to agree to the trade. There are ways of doing that. We got very doctrinaire in this belief that a simple free trade system would work. We didn't look for systematic cheating from China. But we also, after World War II particularly, a lot of the European countries were so poor and devastated from the war, that reviving their economies became necessary for American security, otherwise they would have gone communist and we didn't want that. So we said, okay, fine Germany, you can have really high tariffs on American goods, but we won reciprocate because it in our interest for you to grow A lot of that stuff got institutionalized There are many many cases now where you have non tariffs and our barriers have been lower. I think the Trump people were not wrong to say, okay, this needed to change. We're also seeing with the need for supply chain security and so on, you can't simply take your economic policy out of a free trade textbook. On the other hand, you do still need trade. Trade needs to be beneficial on both ends. I want to talk about the changing orientation of us versus the world, sort of our foreign policy. But first ask about technology, because when I started my career, I'm 41, so 20 years ago, call it. I remember seeing, I've always been an investor. If you looked at the top 10 or 20 market cap companies, it was a total global mix of companies from many different industries. It looked like this kind of potpourri list. Now that same list is literally just American technology companies, basically one through 20. There's a couple exceptions. It's more or less total dominance by American technology companies. And that was true before OpenAI and Anthropic and SpaceX. Now those are resurgent even on top of our great technology companies. And I love to just hear you reflect on how tech of course AI you have to ask about that as well are changing the nature of global order in such a digitally dominant set of technologies that we're once again the leader in. How do you process it? I do try to look to historical analogies. There's nothing exactly the same as this. The closest you really can see is to the actual industrial revolution. Interestingly, the country that led the first industrial revolution, Britain, then dominated for 150 years, became a dominant power. History is moving a lot faster now, but I think we absolutely have been in this position of the first to really see and use this potential source of power. I think since the 17th century, the key to power in the modern world is which countries can be most effective at developing, harnessing, exploiting the power of new technology without blowing up internally because of the social stress and upheavals that new technology causes. And for a lot of reasons, I think first the British and then we were just better at riding that wild horse than other people were. I think that is still true, but you can look at American society. [25:00] today and see the reaction against tech, this sort of anti-data center thing. And you've got Trotskyites in the DSA thinking that the most retrograde forms of Marxism are our only salvation in this terrible situation. It's not a given that we will be able to pull it off again. Enormous progress and yet total chaos and dissension. The relationship between achievement and order right now has broken down because we need a different kind of order than we've had because our technology has created a new kind of world. It is changing the way power works. It is changing the nature of power. So far, America is doing what we've been doing for a very long time, which is dominating the cutting edge. So we've developed it. We have the horse. What's the key of riding the wild horse? Because I think everyone in America would say, yeah, I hope the next 150 years we dominate. And it's because... But in a nice way. Because that's the kind of people we are. How would you have us do that? What are the keys to doing that? Well, now that we have the horse. America always been an ownership society Why did a lot of the founders think that the United States could survive as a reasonably democratic republic And one of the big answers was instead of being a country of people who lived in cities and basically owned nothing and worked for other people, America was by and large a country of independent farmers who were kind of small business people and who own their own land, had a stake in the system, and their life experience as an owner teaches them citizenship. So, boy, I really would love to see a new bridge over the stream here. On the other hand, if they build that, they're going to have to raise my taxes. You know, I then calculate in a rational way what I would like to happen. And that is the kind of political education that prepares me to take a thoughtful role in the councils of the country. Plus, I'm independent. And then with the Industrial Revolution, can this continue? We're getting the big cities. We're getting industry. Well, the first stage we do with the railroads and the Homestead Act, they kind of come in together. The government gives a ton of land and often somewhat corrupt ways to railroads to build transcontinental railroads that turn the country into national market but then also gives free land to the American farmer You go live on your farm for five years and it yours Amazing. For the ordinary person, all right, I'm getting a free farm out of the system and I'm a farmer. And yet you're doing this in a way that is simultaneously allowing the infrastructure of a new industrial society to take place. To get in the 20th century, think about how as the family farm begins to decay economically, it can't compete. You have to be very well capitalized to farm under modern conditions and so on. And where people are starting to work in cities and be employees, is this going to endanger the republic? Are we still going to be a free society of free people? Essentially, we came up with the idea of the single family home in the suburbs to replace the single family farm. A lot of government policy was around Think about not only building the freeways and the highways but subsidies to the tax code so that municipal bonds are tax free which means towns can build the infrastructure that you need to attract the developers and the homeowners who will then raise the value of the property And so you can repay the bonds out of the higher property values that the infrastructure has created So this kind of wealth machine Well right now we seem to be in a place where we're reaching the limits of that wealth-creating machine because it's just too expensive for the average person to buy a house and land close enough to where you work so that the commute isn't killing you. You look at why are so many young people really unhappy with the way the economy is working. Home ownership is one of the real big problems. IT can kind of address this between remote work and hybrid work and self-driving cars. If you only have to go into work once or twice a week or twice a month or whatever, you can work farther out. If you expand the commuting radius, say from 40 miles to 75 miles, the amount of land that is developable for housing goes up with the square of the radius. It's geometric. So you can open information technology appropriately deployed, can open up for another two generations this well [30:00] creating machine. Is there something equivalent to Homestead or the subsidy of homes that could drive this expansion? It seems like a really, really important thing to get right for America. I think so. I think we should be doing things like encouraging remote and hybrid work. Now, there are problems with it. Mentoring, there are benefits. Fine. All right. There are problems with every form of technology. How many people has the car killed since we started using cars? How much money has it cost for the highway systems and so on? A new technology just doesn't appear like an angel and grant wishes everywhere. You have to think really hard about how to make it work. I think of this as infrastructure. Infrastructure is building the bridges and the physicals. Info structure is the institutional legal regulatory framework that can allow AI technology to develop, give better results to patients in a hospital. That's actually incredibly complicated or that could transform the legal system. Very complex stuff. You need a new kind of social imagination for that which I think we need to develop But in this housing example if a company says fine you can stay home 60 of the time that less wear and tear on infrastructure, fewer needs for construction. A tax benefit for companies that move toward greater hybrid and remote work is not a net cost for government because, in fact, you're saving on another part of the budget. This technology seems so unique because, and I'm curious where you think about it, in the case of AI, we've seen with China, it seems to be the other great power today, that through using our technology that we've invested in, they're able to distill would be the term in the AI world and have fairly comparable systems without the capital investment. It's very different than the highway system or the railroads. You can't copy those things. You have to do it yourself. And so the economy of scale is easier for me to like get my head around when it's a railroad than when it's, you know, a frontier lab model or something like this, which makes me wonder about the right kind of foreign policy. And it's a good excuse to talk about your four kinds of American foreign policy historically. Maybe you could just quickly tick through them and outline them as an intro before we talk about the notion of tech Hamiltonians that I thought was quite interesting of yours. One of the interesting things about America is that our foreign policy arguments are very repetitive Basically if something comes up in foreign policy we argue about it in many of the same ways they would have done in George Washington day Our views of the country and of foreign policy fairly predictably fall into one of four baskets. One is what I do call Hamiltonian, Alexander Hamilton. What you see is a strong capitalist economy that is trading effectively with the rest of the world, provides the money and the technological progress that holds society together. People are making money at it and they're happy and also gives you the strength so that no other country can attack you. We should have a strong federal government that does things like promote infrastructure at home, that sees itself as trying to help major American companies succeed internationally. George H.W. Bush in some ways. Then you have people who say, oh, money, that's just so vulgar. What about human rights? And I would argue, you know, what causes the threats that America faces? Well, it's bad governance, dictatorships and democracies don go to war Dictatorships do Generals like to fight Moms don American foreign policy should be about promoting democracy globally promoting international institutions. Let's get rid of war by getting rid of the causes of war. And that's a kind of Wilsonian approach, which he certainly had actually long before Woodrow Wilson. Then you've got people who say, wait a minute, the thing that's great about America is personal liberty. The fact that the government doesn't control us all and isn't taxing us to death. If we get involved, whether it's these Wilsonians crusades for human rights or Hamiltonian great power balance of politics, international finance, what we're going to have is a powerful government that has secrets from the American people, runs colossal defense budgets, gets us into endless wars, and that will destroy the liberty. We can conquer the world and lose our freedom at home. What kind of foreign policy is that? And again, we've been having this since the 1790s. And then finally, there's the group I call Jacksonian after Andrew Jackson, who sort of say, well, listen, foreigners, they can be democratic. I don't really care what the foreigners do as long as they don't attack us. [35:00] or impugn our honor. If somebody attacks us, we should just go out and crush them. And laws of war, no, like rats, you should exterminate them. And you beat them and pound them and crush them until they understand that the last thing they should ever do is raise their hand against the United States. And Jacksonians often look like Jeffersonians, the isolationists in times of peace. But something happens like Pearl Harbor and 9-1-1, and suddenly the Jacksonians are activated. So I think we've been having these things for a very long time. We still have them today. I say these are like suits in a deck of cards. Very few of us have just like all 13 Hamiltonian cards. We generally all have a mixed hand, but we tend to have some suits are stronger than others. Which of those suits do you think most defines us today? Well, I think the old Democratic consensus, let's say the Clinton consensus, was very much a coalition of Wilson and Hamilton. Build a global system that advances the country's economic security, but also promotes human rights and democracy And that will both make us rich and build a lasting global peace That been kind of the predominant establishment idea really since World War II Special Providence came out right around the time of 9-1-1, and people at that time weren't really aware that there was anything but Hamilton and Wilson, and then suddenly discovered, oh, wait a minute, there are these Jacksonians there who want to nuke Afghanistan or whatever came up after that. I would say that Trump's coalition is a mix of Jeffersonians and Jacksonians, isolationists and hawks. You could say Vance as the isolationist champion in some ways and Rubio as the hawk. Rubio is not interested in the United Nations or, you know, look at in Venezuela. Let's get rid of our enemy, Maduro, but we're not going to make the restoration of democracy in Venezuela the key of everything, which someone like an Obama, I think, or a Biden would have tried much harder to do. So on Ukraine, you can see the Jeffersonians are saying, well, this is not really our fight. Let's stay out of it. While the Jacksonians are saying Russia the enemy Let knock Putin and punch him in the nose while we can They all active today Maybe say one word more about this notion of tech Hamiltonians as a key faction that emerged Typically, tech and the government were, in my career, different concepts. One of the biggest things that happened in modern American history is the mutual discovery of tech and government. in the 1990s, which was back in the old end of history, end of nations, companies would say, oh, I'm not an American company. I'm a global company, right? And nowhere was that stronger than in the world of tech, where Google has no boundaries. The cyber world is completely different. All of that stuff is irrelevant to us. Washington doesn't even understand us, and we will just do what we do. Today, tech is actually the locus of international great power competition. And China's attempt to build a technosphere that can dominate the American technosphere to American tech companies, this is really critical to your business, but also to the American state, American government, it's critical to power and independence. much I think to the surprise of both the tech world and the political world They been driven in on each other And there a kind of renationalization of tech and of the economy that we see And the tech folks, and you may know better, certainly Jeremy understands them a lot better than I do. But my sense is that when the tech folks think about what are their economic interests, they're different from what you might call a legacy multinational, the post-World War II, that are basically global trading and manufacturing companies. I make cars from things I import from all over the world. I have factories all over the world that make cars. So for these companies, free trade is the essence of their business. I need financial markets, I need labor markets, and I need manufactured goods markets that are seamless and open. As Tom Friedman put it, I need a flat earth. But if you're a tech company, you don't. Alphabet is not importing and exporting a lot of goods, even something like immigration, which is if you're a hotel company or a construction company, having hardworking, cheap migrant labor is pretty important to your business model. If you're Silicon Valley company and suddenly there's [40:00] no more unskilled labor crossing from Mexico, the cost of your janitorial and gardening services rises 30%. So what? You're much more concerned about security of supply chain, security of intellectual property. And I think increasingly, companies are starting to realize that they need their employees to be patriotic. That is, your employees need to think it's an evil sin to sell IP to China. Your co-workers will rat you out in a heartbeat if they think you're doing something like that. Both the economic agenda of the tech sector of the business world and the kind of cultural political attitude is changing. Because again, with the legacy multinationals, I want to have a completely international workforce. I don't want it to matter whether my employees are from Sri Lanka or Taipei or, you know, wherever. I need interchangeable units that I can plug in anywhere. If you take a big step back with all of this context and just think about global power, I feel like almost the whole world has decided that it the Americans and the Chinese that have any real power or are contenders to be the powerful nation of the next period of time What are the other interesting sources of power that have your interest and curiosity, like with all the attention on just these two? We'll keep talking plenty more about these two as well, of course. But what other areas of power are most interesting to you right now? Well, I've gotten very interested in India. I've been lucky enough to get to know a number of the folks that are close to the BJP and the RSS, which is the kind of Hindu nationalist group that helped to create the BJP. And this is a group of people who 100 years ago, it was basically five guys in a house. And they've now built this mass movement that has something like 86,000 small groups around India that meet weekly. their incredibly dynamic political force. They powered Modi and they have very strong ideas about what India should be, what makes a country. India is now the most populous country in the world. India has been pretty successful at developing a tech industry It not in the frontier of AI I think it may get there faster than people think And it has its own sharply different view of what the world should be like Which is what? Multipolar, but not in the Chinese way. Jay Shankar, who's the foreign minister of India, once said that China is a revisionist power. India is a reformist power. that India is not really happy with the global status quo. In the United Nations system, India, with 1.4 billion people in nuclear weapons, has exactly as many votes in the General Assembly as Liechtenstein or Luxembourg. One vote. It's ridiculous. And there's a certain kind of Western domination to the way a lot of international life is organized, because it was basically organized by the Europeans and the Americans at a time when nobody else really had much of a standing. There are a lot of changes they want to make, but they really don't see the kind of Chinese autocratic top-down approach as possible for India or also good for the world. They're an interesting power with different ideas and I very much looking to see how that develops I think the Islamic world again we are seeing the world of Islam It ranges from super sophisticated scholars and intellectuals and writers to jihadis in North Africa with machetes, torching huts or something. All of this range, It's an immense civilization. But as a force in the world, there's more of it. It's becoming stronger. Understanding how it's changing, how the culture in the Gulf states and Turkey is changing and developing. I think the Industrial Revolution forced societies to become similar to each other, because if you're going to have big manufacturing plants, big infrastructure, trains, highways, airports, all of this, there are certain things you just have to do institutionally and organizationally that tend to kind of force you toward what we would think of as a European Western way of life and politics. The information revolution enables countries to use their own cultures, languages, and so on as platforms. And Turkey is more Turkish. [45:00] It's less like Europe now than it was 25 years ago. India is becoming more. I think Japan is becoming more Japanese so that in the Industrial Revolution, there was a tendency toward convergence of the great civilizations. Now, I think we're seeing a divergence. I'm not sure if I understand the reason why that is. Can you explain it a little bit more? MTV, when it first went into Latin America, it was showing American rock videos on there. And everybody said, oh, this is going to know it's the end of indigenous Latin culture and so on. But before long, they weren't showing many American videos at all because local artists were able really in a pretty cheap way to have their own music, their own videos that responded to those sensibilities. So I think we're seeing a lot of that now, where instead of having to be on the mainline programming of global programming, you're much freer to go off into your own civilization. In that structure, I'm sure AI just pours fuel on that fire. What scares you the most? Like as you think about the global power dynamics and I assuming your vision of the future that optimistic would be progress and prosperity or something What most would get in the way of the kind of future that you want to see A lot of things The Industrial Revolution was in the long run a pretty good thing, but it had little side effects like the Communist Party, the killing 100 million people, World War I, World War II, reign of terror. Why were those necessarily side effects of the Industrial Revolution? Because I think the social stresses that come with these new technologies, uprooting millions of peasants from the farms where they've lived forever, and now they're in cities and they're getting exploited, yeah, discontent. And the old social institutions that used to manage discontent, legitimate the state, don't work as well in this new context. Everything is changing. Everyone's heads are scrambled and things happen. So I think the information revolution, which is like exactly. So I definitely see that. But then I look at things like somebody's one of the biggest geopolitical problems of the last 60 years has been nuclear proliferation continues to be obviously to this day. But when I think about weapons of mass destruction in the future obviously biology cyber all kinds of things While we have not been able to completely stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons you can usually tell when somebody trying to build them. Usually you have enough lead time to try to do something about it. How could you verify whether somebody was abiding by some sort of cyber arms control agreement or bioweapons, arms control, when basically in a basement lab somewhere you can cook up a pathogen that could destroy half the planet. The idea that we're going to have accelerating arms races in a condition with an almost utter lack of strategic trust, where you can't appeal to verifiability as a way of ensuring compliance, I think it's a pretty serious problem. So I think the rapid and dynamic technological change across a whole range of disciplines and technologies is destabilizing the balance of power. And this, I think, does significantly increase the chance both of confrontation and ultimately even of war between great powers. Speaking of maybe Ukraine is the right flashpoint for this but it does seem like there been quite an evolution of non of mass destruction just regular old weapons This is a highly contested topic now because of the conflict in Iran and some reports that we run out of certain types of munitions even as the United States of America. What have you learned from the last several years of conflict about the nature of military technology, weapons, their relative importance in the AI world and so on? Unfortunately, I've learned a lot because there's been a lot of war. The first time I went to Ukraine after the war. I went to this drone factory and it really was remarkable because in real time, they were starting to get results from the battlefield and then they were adapting. But at that time, it was a very simplistic stuff. They were like getting kids toy trucks and re-engineering them into ground drones that could put a landmine on a tank. I was back there a couple of months ago. The advances are just unbelievable. The intensity is the same, but the scope of change is amazing. I talked to people who said that they don't treat bullet wounds anymore. It's all drones. The Ukraine war is no longer a battalion over here shooting at a battalion over there. With these drones, you have this sort of gray kill zone, gray zone, where in most you'd have a couple of soldiers together. One of the hardest progressives [50:00] in warfare now, they tell me, is you'll get somebody wounded. How do you evacuate someone who's wounded? They're having to build a new kind of ground drone that can go retrieve a body or a person and then cover them with a kind of metal shield and wheel them out. But even to do this, you need a whole team of drones working with this thing because they're looking for other drones that would try to attack this. They told me they had one soldier, that it took them 63 days to get them evacuated after a wound. This is so unlike what war was even six years ago. And I asked myself too, how fast is the Pentagon learning if the tank and the rifle are becoming as obsolete as the cavalry charge and the sword. What kind of forces do we have? What kind of forces do you need? And again, it changes every six months. Right now, the Ukrainians have kind of a battlefield advantage that could flip And it also for us as the power that has the most stuff We actually the most vulnerable to technological change because we got so many tanks that the tank becomes useless That's more of a problem for us than it is for somebody who's figured out the tank killer or Navy, you know, the Russian Navy on the Black Sea. The Ukraine doesn't really have a Navy. They got a few little tiny boats. They don't have battleships and stuff. They have kept the Russian Navy out of the Black Sea with drones. Good news for Taiwan, actually. But American power traditionally is about sea power to a very large extent. How does that change over time? We've gone from, you remember in the 90s, you look like you're just old enough to remember the 90s. They used to talk about the revolution in military affairs. We've shifted now. OK, there's this one thing happening. And once we've mastered and gotten used to it, then we're good to go. Now it's continuing revolutions in military affairs. That's something that I've learned about war by watching. What do you think is the most likely thing to happen in Taiwan? Well the Chinese Xi Jinping I think is committed to trying to get it I don think he actually has an alarm clock by his bed that will ring on the day that has to happen The Chinese I think need a very high probability of success to commit themselves past a certain point because failure would be catastrophic for whoever launched it. But there are a lot of steps in between an invasion and doing nothing. And we see the Chinese, I think they're trying to get themselves into a position where they could have a soft blockade. They could give the orders that any ship that wants to go to Taiwan first has to stop at a Chinese port and go through a customs clearing process to assert sovereignty and so on and make it difficult for ships that don't do that. They'll be looking for things that fly just under the radar that don't actually cause us to really respond, but which alter the situation in their favor. So I see them moving in that kind of way. The big new factor is that the Japanese have woken up and the Japanese would see Chinese control of Taiwan as a direct threat to Japanese independence. I mean they really see this And so they are much more engaged They only beginning you know they raising their defense spending they rethinking their doctrine they beginning to kind of reshape their culture around the new strategic environment. Historically, the Japanese have actually been pretty good at changing direction when they genuinely feel threatened or feel the need to change in some way. How this works out, I don't see, but I think it's one of the things people really need to keep an eye on is how fast do the Japanese come up the learning curve? How serious does it turn out they really are about their own defense? And how does that affect China's calculations in Taiwan if Japan is a new and complicating issue for them? If I combine all these things, the changing forces of power, technology, military technology, the other things we've talked about with your observation that politics in the future is going to be more personal. Are there any other rates of change, things changing in the world that we haven't talked about yet that you think are especially important for what the future will look like? There were three basic classes in American society during the kind of post-World War II era of stability, and they spread a lot in the rest of the world. [55:00] One was an industrial working class. which is kind of more or less in stable jobs with color kind of work. Yeah, exactly. Often organized in unions. They had a very pragmatic political attitude and they were economically focused and political competition between the left and the right. was who can figure out how to raise living standards for the workers better. And that kind of centered politics on a fairly rational basis. Then you had the business class. And by the 1940s and 50s, it was no longer the founders, you know, the John D. Rockefeller originally or the first J.P. Morgan. It was grandsons and it was publicly traded companies. professional managers, And so there was a kind of institutionalization. of business. That was also the era of these very regulated monopolies and oligopolies. So there's one phone company, a limited number of airlines, the three networks, very structured business world. And then between them, this organized, rationally focused working class and organized, regulated, publicly managed business class. You had this expert class, the technocrats, the administrators, and so on. who, according to the dictates of the best social science Peer-reviewed social science were like making the decisions. regulate the businesses so they don't get too greedy. but also keep the workers from being so demanding that the whole system collapses, etc. And they were the balancing group. I would say in American society today, all three of those classes are in total disarray. And yet we are facing a whole series of very serious problems. changes, perplexities, what do we do about AI? just being one of many. We're not organized to answer these in the old ways. So we are really out at sea. And because America has been for so long and still, I think, remains the only potential pillar of global stability and organization, The internal incoherence of America faced with all of these changes can't help but undermine any chances of global stability. So I think what that means is for people like... you and me and maybe our listeners in the show, a tremendously heavy responsibility to try to figure out answers and see some path through this and try to build a new kind of American politics and social order that can allow us once again to be reasonably stable for ourselves and then project that globally. What do you think against that backdrop it's going to mean or does mean you What does it mean? Americans think about being American in different ways. They have for a long time. You hear a lot of people talk these days about America as a country founded on ideas and Honestly, I think I was maybe in college before I met anybody who thought that way. I'm from the South and Down there, you sort of thought, well, I'm an American person. Because everybody I know is American. My family, as long as I have any idea who the heck they were, they're Americans. I'm an American the same way a Frenchman is French or a Turkish Turk. Not because I believe in America, but because I'm here. I'm here and no one else would have me. And, you know, it's like this is it. But there really are other people who love America and contribute to America who experience, yes, it's a country of ideas and ideas. We are a pluralistic country in this way. And I don't myself feel more American than somebody that was naturalized last week. I think for me, in some ways, the sort of meeting ground between identity and ideas is Honestly, it's the Pledge of Allegiance. I pledge allegiance to the flag of the United States of America and to the republic for which it stands, one nation, indivisible under God, with liberty and justice for all. And I would say anybody who says that and means it is an American. Pretty remarkable, huh? Well written. It's good. It's good. One thing I haven't asked about that I'm deeply curious about, as I'm sure everyone is. is your interpretation of what's going on in the Middle East, both with Iran, with Israel, with all the other key players where alliances seem to be shifting around for the first time in a long time. How do you interpret what's happening? What are the deeper currents and messages that you're focused on? A lot of things obviously going on in the Middle East. One background to a lot of stuff. is just the sort of collapse of Arab nationalism and, and kind of Arab identity. [60:00] as an organizing force in the Middle East. In the 1950s, Nasser and Egypt were the great pillars of Arab identity and pan-Arabism. After the '67 war, they took a hit, but you would still have countries like Syria, Iraq, even for a while under Gaddafi, Libya, aspiring to that mantle. If we look at what happened, Iraq collapsed. Certainly America had a lot to do with that. Syria collapsed without America having a lot to do with it. So Iran, as a non-Sunni, non-Arab power, had created what people call that sheer crescent. from Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, into Iran. While that, thanks to sort of Israel primarily since October 7th, That's broken up. But what hasn't broken up is the underlying weakness of the Arab world is still there. And you have the Gulf states that are very effective in many ways. and are using their oil and their money very effectively, but they still can't defend themselves from Iran. They still, without outside help, they cannot stand. And that leads to the Strait of Hormuz in that region. which remains incredibly important for the economic stability and health of the world. That is in chaos. If the United States or some other power doesn't hold Iran back in some way. It has a hegemony over the oil resources in the Middle East in a way that allows them to blackmail a lot of people economically. and provides them with the kinds of resources that would not certainly be used to our benefits. Israel, I think, may have hoped that. that it could kind of bear the weight of being a counter hegemon to Iran. Israel is too small and too alien to the rest of the Middle East and, to really play that role effectively, I think. Since Obama, the United States has been fundamentally unwilling to do that itself. And we want to kick the can down the road. We want to find some other way other than us. putting down a red line that we enforce with Iran. History doesn't give us a choice. We stop Iran ourselves or Iran asserts and maintains hegemony over the oil resources in the Middle East. Why have we been unaffected? Obviously, we have vastly superior military capability or whatever. This is a specific question about Iran in the Strait of Hormuz, but also people used to call Afghanistan the graveyard of empires. Why do world powers seem to have such a difficult time being effective at all in the Middle East? with Russia. is the erosion of deterrence what you don't want to do is help ukraine win a war with russia what you want is for russia to feel that If they attack Ukraine, the consequences would be so terrible that it's just not worth doing it. Anything other than deterrence involves long, difficult, expensive, divisive, Wars with uncertain outcomes and enormous costs. The decline of deterrence... becomes a massive geopolitical problem overseas and a massive political problem at home. For example, right now, One of the real facts in the strait is it's not even as important that Iran can hit a tanker with a drone as it is that Iran could put some drones on some desalinization plants. and make the cities of the Gulf essentially uninhabitable. As long as that's the case, I'm not going to make big investments in the Gulf if I'm a foreign country. It's really, really scary. And that means that these whole sort of economic development plans that those countries have for their future political stability go up in smoke because it doesn't work. and holy hell breaks out. But I think as a country, we're not at the point where a president of the United States can say it and mean it and have the public back him up. For that, we need presidents who can explain to people, okay, this is how the world works. What Harry Truman did after World War II, for that matter, what Franklin Roosevelt did, in the fireside chats. Take the American people into your confidence. Have a clear vision of what you're doing, why you're doing it. be enough of a communicator to be able to put it across. We haven't really had anybody do that in a very long time. What do you hope we do? What do you hope America's role is in the next 20 years? [65:00] I hope we, first of all, figure out how to Keep our balance as we enter the information revolution, that we figure out how to use the wealth and the resources the information revolution creates. to deal with the stresses and problems that it inevitably causes and also draw from it the abundance that will keep the American people feeling like America's working, it's working for them. The way things are going is basically a good thing. You have that going, then people will back an American president, American foreign policy in a serious way. And I think if you don't have that, And if we don't do that, We lose ground in the information revolution to China in the tech race. We get challenged overseas and at home. We're just... rabid ferrets fighting with each other. in a cage and that's just not pretty and not fun. And if we can get that going, then I think we act purposefully. We say, okay. We don't want any great power dominating Europe. We don't want any great power dominating Asia. And we don't want any power able to interrupt the flow of oil in and out of the Middle East on commercial terms. And we build the alliances and the relationships that do it. I don't think that is an unsustainable ask. Germany and Japan in particular have a lot of resources and a lot of ability to but also... Our problem in Asia is not that China is so big and the rest of Asia has fallen behind. In 1980, India's GDP was something like 60%, 65% of China's. Today, it's about 17% of China's. That gap, in a sense, is the imbalance of power that, that sort of tempts China into thinking hegemony in Asia is really possible. and also ensures that without us putting a really heavy weight on the balance scale, It can't be stopped. If we can create a world that there's room for others to prosper, that not only India, but Indonesia and Vietnam are growing. I think what we're going to see is China will kind of reach this point of understanding that Asia is too big for China to eat. Nobody can eat it. And so we need to learn to live with folks, which Germany has done in Europe. It's possible. And in the same way, if Russia is stopped in Ukraine and Ukraine goes like Poland and becomes a prosperous country and all of this. That door is closed without American soldiers fighting and dying to keep it closed. So there is, I think, the potential for the kind of natural balance of power in these key theaters to emerge. in a way that we can have the sort of world that is good for us economically and from a security point of view, but does not require an ever escalating defense budget and ever escalating series of American commitments. Is there anything especially unique? You call it the information revolution. I would think about it maybe as the intelligence revolution, like to make it very specific to AI. Is there anything that you're thinking about that excites you most or worries you most about this very unique brand of technology? in global affairs? Well, it is interesting how it seems, at least for now, to have simplified the international playing field so that people, as you were saying earlier, just... They said there's America and there's China and there's no one else in the room. First of all, I wonder how long that will last. Because. Originally, there were two nuclear powers, America and Soviet Union, and nobody else was in the room. But then a bunch of other people started getting into the room. Is AI more replicable? Are we going to start seeing things? Other countries come up with their equivalent of these technologies. The Chinese have obviously done it with less need for original skull sweat than we did. Can third parties look comparing the U.S. and China? do more. So I'd be definitely watching that one. And there, I think, you know, the Indians and the Europeans, And the Israelis are all very interesting in that respect. Israelis, got their nuclear bomb just a couple of years, a few years after China. So look at that. I do think... The whole question of AIs and national security decision-making and deterrence is interesting because The whole goal of deterrence is you want to make the adversary believe that there's no question. If I do X, they will do Y. They will be able to do Y, and they are willing to do Y. Automating your foreign policy decision-making process increases [70:00] deterrence. And so we've turned that over to the AI. And if the AI thinks you're doing this wham, And anything less than that is, no, I'm leaving a human decision point because I might decide not to do it. That's interesting when you think about how that might play out in the world of deterrence. And are we really willing to have the doomsday machine decide whether we're going to go to war or use nuclear weapons or something like that. Very interesting and somewhat perplexing. Maybe to end on a positive note, what are you most excited about In the future. The list is almost endless. when I think about the acceleration of medical research that's going to be coming. Let's just look at what AI and generally advances in tech are doing in the field of medicine. The rate at which cures are being found or treatments. My friend, Ben Sasse, who was diagnosed with terminal pancreatic cancer, I mean, he's still in a very bad situation. But a drug that didn't exist a year ago is keeping him not just breathing, but interacting with people and doing things. It is a stay of execution. But the point is, I can look back at people in my own family who died of various conditions, which would now if they had them, Be treatable, and that's in one lifetime. And I also believe that we're going to be seeing a cost revolution in health care. that people will have 50 years from now Better health care and cheaper health care. than anybody has today. I think this means that things like the federal deficit due to entitlement programs, are actually solvable, that we're going to have Medicare is going to be less of a drag and the seniors are going to get better care. So I think many of the problems that are driving us really crazy right now are actually amenable to solution and the solutions are appearing. at a fast rate. And that our biggest problem is that this cornucopia of wealth. that the information revolution unlocks. The stuff is coming out of this cornucopia so fast. We just don't know how to manage it. I am fundamentally optimistic that we are on the cusp of a unique era of human transformation, renewal and development. And it's really exciting to be able to see it. I've been reading your books and your thinking and your writing for so long. It's such a thrill to do this together in person. When I do these, I ask everyone the same final question. What is the kindest thing that anyone's ever done for you? I think of Les Gell, but the Council on Foreign Relations was just a magnificent mentor. who, when I would do something stupid, would help me see it, but also help me figure out the next step forward. I have had so much undeserved kindness from so many people in so many dimensions of life. Younger relatives now who put up with their endlessly boring, cognitive Another one of those old war stories. Employers who keep me going, put up with me. The Wall Street Journal Paul Gigo letting me be the Global View columnist at the Journal. I float on a sea of kindness. And I don't know that it's easy to say there's one thing kinder than another. I've just been blessed. It's a beautiful visual to close on floating on a sea of kindness. Thanks so much for your time. If you enjoyed this episode, visit Colossus.com. You'll find every episode of this podcast complete with hand edited transcripts. quarterly print, digital, and private audio publication featuring in-depth profiles of the founders, investors, and companies that we admire most. Learn more at Colossus.com slash subscribe. Outro Music.