The Nigerian Industrial Behemoth That Could Reshape the African Economy

或将重塑非洲经济的尼日利亚工业巨头 在本期节目中，作家Joe Studwell分析了为何非洲55个国家的经济发展在历史上偏离了二战后的东亚模式，并强调国家支持的制造业对于吸纳农村劳动力和推动持续增长仍至关重要。讨论探讨了中国在非洲钢铁和陶瓷领域的工业投资、人口结构变化下城市土地所有者精英（“非洲富农”）的崛起，以及从拉各斯混乱的活力到基加利威权式整洁的截然不同的城市治理模式。Studwell还解释了后殖民时期IMF改革后对资本管制的普遍取消，是如何导致银行资金流向消费品进口而非长期工业化的。 Studwell将其历时十年的研究项目从55个非洲国家缩小至15个重点国家，以系统分析该大陆的发展模式。 (25:00) 随着中国转向高科技出口并腾出低端制造业，有关中国制造业优势地位会阻碍非洲工业化的担忧被夸大了。 (26:35) 自动化和AI不会自动绕过非洲，因为在低利润制造业中，人工劳动在成本效益和灵活性上仍然具有极大优势。 (26:35) 中国产业资本正积极将钢铁和陶瓷等重工业转移至非洲，以利用该地区显著更高的利润率。 (29:45) 相较于服务业，制造业仍是更优越的经济发展引擎，因为它能有效吸纳低技能农业劳动力并培养基础技能。 (31:50)

Author Joe Studwell argues that African economic development hinges on state-backed manufacturing rather than services, with demographic growth and Chinese industrial investment creating viable internal and regional markets. However, contrasting financial structures, land dynamics, and varied political leadership across the continent present starkly divergent developmental paths. Manufacturing Versus Services for Labor Absorption Studwell contends that manufacturing remains the essential vehicle for developing economies because it absorbs low-skilled agricultural labor and imparts basic industrial skills, requiring only fundamental literacy and numeracy. By contrast, service-led development requires extensive, costly educational investments that poor states cannot easily finance. While India's service-oriented model achieved roughly 4.2% annual growth since 1991 reforms and directly employs approximately six million in IT, China's export-manufacturing approach averaged around 10% annual growth over 30 years by integrating massive rural populations. Chinese Industrial FDI and Automation Realities Disputing fears that Chinese dominance or automation will lock Africa out of industrialization, Studwell notes that China is vacating lower-tier, labor-intensive manufacturing to focus on capital-intensive goods like electric vehicles and solar panels. According to the Financial Times FDI database, China deployed $12.5 billion in greenfield manufacturing investment in Africa. Chinese steelmakers face domestic prices of $500 to $600 per ton compared to African market prices near $1,000 per ton, spurring plant relocations to Algeria, South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Ethiopia. Demographic Growth, Agrarian Shifts, and Kulaks Historically characterized by land abundance and labor scarcity—unlike post-WWII East Asia where land reform was critical—Africa is experiencing land pressure as its population moves toward 2.5 billion by 2050. Continental agricultural production has expanded at over 4% annually for 25 years. This surge has led urban elites, whom Studwell terms 'African kulaks,' to lease and purchase rural acreage, creating a newly landless peasantry in pockets like West Africa and the Ethiopian Highlands. Divergent Financial Controls and State Models Studwell highlights a sharp structural divergence between East Asian development and post-adjustment Africa. East Asian states maintained strict capital controls to channel domestic savings into industrial manufacturing. Conversely, African nations dismantled capital controls under IMF and World Bank programs, prompting private commercial banks to channel liquidity into consumer credit for imported goods rather than productive industry. Ethiopia has partially diverged by maintaining domestic currency controls while opening trade accounts for foreign profit repatriation. Meanwhile, Rwanda operates with zero capital controls to capture regional funds from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, positioning Kigali as an administrative and services hub alongside more traditional industrial contenders like Nigeria, Morocco, and Ethiopia. Whether African nations can replicate East Asian developmental successes remains constrained by historical political mindsets and fragmented financial structures. As rising internal population density builds domestic consumer demand, states face the challenge of replacing speculative consumer finance with disciplined industrial policy to capture regional trade.

研究学者 Joe Studwell 指出，非洲国家若要实现持久的包容性增长，核心仍在仿效东亚模式发展劳动密集型制造业，而非过早押注吸纳就业有限的高端服务业。随着中国向高附加值产业升级并向非洲转移重工产能，加之非洲人口激增带来的庞大内部市场，非洲具备工业化承接窗口，但其进程仍面临金融去管制后的信贷错配与土地兼并挑战。 制造业与服务业：劳动力吸收与增长引擎 Studwell 强调，制造业相较于服务业的根本优势在于能够大规模吸收自农业析出的低技能劳动力，并扮演基础技能培训学校的角色，新工人仅需基础读写与算术能力即可融入正规经济。相比之下，以印度为代表的高附加值 IT 与服务业虽然发展亮眼，但高度依赖昂贵且稀缺的高等教育投入；自1991年经济改革以来，印度年均经济增长率约为4.2%，且核心技术部门直接吸纳的就业仅约600万人，难以承担广泛的人口就业吸纳重任。这与中国依靠制造业实现30年年均约10%的高速增长形成鲜明对比。 针对人工智能与机器人将使非洲跳过传统工业化的普遍担忧，Studwell 认为这种预测忽视了微观成本结构。自动化改造需要极高昂的前期资本投入，而在马达加斯加等部分非洲国家，基础劳动力月薪可低至60美元。此外，人工操作在应对全球市场需求剧烈波动时具有机器人无法比拟的灵活性，企业无需承担增减机器设备带来的巨大固定资产购置与沉没成本。 产业外迁与利润驱动：中国对非制造业投资 对于“中国庞大的制造规模将阻断非洲工业化”的论调，Studwell 引用贸易数据指出，中国出口组合正由低货值、劳动密集型产品转向光伏设备与电动汽车等高技术、资本密集型产品，腾出的初级制造业正加速转移至柬埔寨、缅甸、斯里兰卡和印度等地。非洲国家中，尼日利亚、埃塞俄比亚、摩洛哥以及马达加斯加等具备国家发展意愿的经济体完全有能力承接转移。 据英国《金融时报》FDI数据库显示，中国已在非洲大陆部署了125亿美元的绿地制造业外资直接投资。此类产能转移的直接动力是巨大的利润率级差：中国本土钢材价格约为每吨500至600美元，而在非洲本地市场售价可高达约1000美元。目前中国钢铁企业已在津巴布韦、南非、阿尔及利亚建厂，并最新在埃塞俄比亚签署了设施协议；同时，伴随非洲城镇化进程而需求激增的建筑陶瓷等建材工业，也迎来了大规模中资落地设厂。 土地禀赋逆转与非洲富农阶层的兴起 在经济史维度上，非洲与战后东亚形成了基本对照：东亚因极端的人地矛盾而被迫推行激进的小农均田制土地改革；而非洲大陆历史上长期呈现“土地充裕、劳动力稀缺”的状态，除桑给巴尔及肯尼亚高地等极少数由特定殖民或封建精英垄断的个案外，全非55个国家基本未推行过正式的土地均分改革。然而，随着全大陆人口向2050年的25亿规模急速迈进，埃塞俄比亚高地、大湖区和西非局部地区已开始面临空前的人口与土地压力。 过去25年间，非洲农业以年均超过4%的增速位居全球首位。在食品消费需求大涨的推动下，城市富裕精英正在加速租赁与收购大面积乡村农田。Studwell 将这一新兴群体命名为“非洲富农”（African kulaks），指出他们正在将当地自耕农挤压为非洲历史上首次出现的大规模无地农民阶层；主持人 Joe Weisenthal 亦结合博茨瓦纳的案例补充道，即使土地相对辽阔，私人钻井水利等基础设施垄断同样在急剧放大乡村经济不平等。 金融去管制反差与双轨制发展试验 在金融与资本政策上，非洲的发展路径深刻偏离了东亚经典发展型国家模式。东亚国家普遍设立严格的资本管制以锁定民间储蓄，强制银行系统向本土出口制造业输送信贷；反观非洲，大部分国家在国际货币基金组织与世界银行的结构调整计划下取消了资本管制，导致外国私营商业银行涌入后，普遍将资金配置到高利润的进口消费贷款（如购买进口摩托车），未能培育长期的本土工业生产力。Studwell 澄清，埃塞俄比亚并未全面放开资本账户，其在维持国内储蓄资本管制的同时仅放开贸易账户，以确保外资利润可正常汇出。 城市治理与制度实践层面亦展现出显著反差。尼日利亚拉各斯展示了高密度、混乱而极具生命力的超级大都市经济图景；卢旺达首都基加利则在卡加梅总统的强人治下追求极致秩序与整洁，试图模仿新加坡打造低腐败的高端会展与非政府组织中心。此外，卢旺达推行零资本管制政策，实际上将其金融系统转变为吸纳并转移邻国刚果（金）东部丰沛矿产资源的金融管道，形成了独特的区域资本运作模式。 总体而言，尽管殖民划界历史留下了破碎的地缘结构，但人口红利的爆发正为非洲创造前所未有的内部统一消费大市场，区域内贸易增速已超过对全球出口增速。然而，非洲大陆能否真正摆脱传统政治精英对小农与制造业的偏见，纠正银行体系偏废生产性信贷的体制惯性，仍是其决定未来能否全面激活本土制造动能的关键所在。

## Background 本期节目由 Bloomberg 旗下的《Odd Lots》播客于 2026 年 8 月 24 日在各大播客平台发布。节目简介指出，尼日利亚的丹格特炼油厂（Dangote Refinery）近期锁定了 10 亿美元承销支持并筹备进行非洲历史上规模最大的 IPO，借此契机，主持人邀请了《非洲如何运作》（How Africa Works）的作者乔·斯塔威尔（Joe Studwell），深度探讨非洲经济发展历程、东亚模式与非洲现实的异同，以及卢旺达与拉各斯等重点区域的产业潜力。 ## TL;DR 节目围绕非洲首富阿里科·丹格特旗下超级炼油厂的上市展开，深入剖析了非洲从传统初级资源开采走向内需驱动型重工业的深层逻辑。斯塔威尔结合其对非洲 15 个核心样本国家的长期调研指出，非洲人口规模与密度的剧烈增长打破了历史上的地广人稀瓶颈，为本土大型制造企业和国内统一大市场奠定了基石。访谈进一步打破了“中国通吃导致后发国无梯可爬”和“微型信贷能拯救贫困”的认知误区，论证了本土巨型企业与劳动密集型制造业对吸纳过剩人口、推动生产力跃升的不可替代性。最后，对话还对比了埃塞俄比亚的工业韧性、卢旺达放弃资本管制的“离岸金融枢纽”路线与东亚传统发展型国家的制度差异。 ## Atmosphere & style 整期对话兼具宏大历史视野与鲜活的田野烟火气，摆脱了西方媒体对非洲“陷入战乱与资源诅咒”的陈词滥调。两位主持人以幽默轻松的聊天开场，随后在斯塔威尔严密扎实的发展经济学框架下迅速切入硬核产业现实；嘉宾用生动锐利的语言将拉各斯“高产出的混乱”与基加利李光耀式的极致规训并置，既充满思辨交锋，又透出对这片土地工业潜能的务实乐观。聆听过程如同展开一张立体的非洲当代产业地图，令人在破除固有偏见之余倍感振奋与开阔。 ## Bulletin - `02:40` 尼日利亚丹格特炼油厂获得10亿美元级承销支持并筹备上市，预计将成为非洲资本市场历史上规模最大的IPO，打破非洲长期出口原油却倒贴进口成品油的怪圈。 - `10:00` 非洲人口从二战结束时的2.2亿激增至目前的15亿，人口密度的急剧上升正在形成支撑规模型本土制造业和国内消费大市场的关键底层逻辑。 - `29:45` 针对中国制造业统治力的悲观论调，斯塔威尔指出中国出口结构中的低附加值产品比重持续下降，去年对非制造业直接投资高达125亿美元，巨大的价差与利润正驱动中国产能向非洲本地化转移。 - `50:00` 大多数非洲国家在IMF与世行建议下取消资本管制，导致外资银行多投向高息消费信贷而非工业生产；卢旺达则放弃资本管制以全力定位为区域离岸金融避风港。 ## Key takeaways - `00:00` 传统新古典经济学关于全球资本自发流向廉价劳动力实现‘全球经济趋同’的设想在非洲被证伪，大陆内部存在极端的贫富与现代化落差。 - `05:01` 丹格特通过抓住本土水泥保护政策起家击败国际巨头，随后斥资200亿美元打造超级炼油厂与大型尿素化肥厂，展现出非洲极其罕见的高效重工业项目交付与管理能力。 - `07:28` ‘非洲遍地是资源却陷入资源诅咒’是一个认知误区；按人均或单位面积计算非洲资源禀赋并不突出，以往的瓶颈在于缺乏深度工业加工与复杂工程落地的制度与执行能力。 - `10:00` 人口稀薄曾是非洲历史上工业化无法开展的底层瓶颈，如今15亿人口与高速城市化带来了税收沉淀、劳动分工以及足以支撑大工业内需的有效市场。 - `13:00` 拉各斯拥有1400万人口且贡献了尼日利亚20%的GDP，其展现的‘生产性混乱’融合了重工业制造、城市基建与庞大的文化创意产业动能。 - `15:45` 告别西方发展学界对微型金融（Microcredit）的迷信，中小微企业主要用于吸纳就业托底，唯有具备雄厚正向现金流的本土巨型企业才能推动技术跃升与产业升级。 - `18:25` 非洲制造业的‘雁行模式’正在以尼日利亚和埃塞俄比亚为领头羊启动，技术复杂度正在由水泥、天然气化工向现代炼化和浮法玻璃等门类阶梯式攀爬。 - `29:45` 工业机器人与AI尚未抹煞非洲的低成本劳动力优势，自动化设备的高昂固定资产成本和缺乏弹性的产能调节，使其在应对需求波动时不及低成本劳动力具备经济理性。 - `32:30` 制造业是转化农村过剩人口最有效的‘免费职业技能学校’，企图跨越低端制造直接跳入高附加值服务业极不现实，印度IT业吸纳就业的局限性即为明证。 - `35:00` 非洲政坛普遍存在厌恶小农、忽视制造业琐碎工艺的‘贵族特质’，但埃塞俄比亚在内战期间依靠坚实的产业基础仍保持5%-6%增速的示范效应正产生深远影响。 - `41:17` 由于全球贸易保护主义抬头，非洲制造业出口的核心增量将不再依赖欧美成熟市场，而是来自增速更迅猛的非洲大陆内部国家间贸易。 - `43:40` 非洲历史上的土地丰裕常态正随着人口激增走向终结，随着农业产出年均增速超4%，城市富裕阶层化身‘非洲富农’大举圈地，历史上首次催生出‘无地农民阶层’。 - `50:00` 东亚发展型国家通过严格资本管制锁定储蓄以实施定向产业贷款，而非洲多国过早开放资本账户导致外资银行只热衷于利润丰厚的消费借贷，无益于实体工业产能积累。 ## Detailed walkthrough ### `00:00` 非洲之行愿望与非洲大陆内部的巨大鸿沟 节目开场，主持人 Joe Weisenthal 透露自己最近总有一种强烈的冲动，想去非洲大陆走一趟，实地看看拉各斯（Lagos）、阿克拉（Accra）和基加利（Kigali）等充满活力的非洲主要城市。搭档 Tracy Allaway 随即打趣道，白人男性探索非洲的冲动在历史文献中早有详尽记载，Joe 此时不过是在遵循古老的本能。Tracy 回忆起自己过往在摩洛哥、埃及、坦桑尼亚、莫桑比克以及南非等地的旅行经历，感慨非洲大陆内部展现出的极端多元与发展落差。 在 Tracy 看来，埃及与莫桑比克完全是两个不同的世界。在南非和埃及，人们可以看到相当程度的现代化工业与城市发展；而在莫桑比克，贫困程度却令人震惊。在当地很多地方，甚至连货币都不起作用，居民更倾向于直接以物易物，旅客行李箱里多带的一件旧 T 恤都能直接充当交易的硬通货。这种现实刺破了过去半个世纪主流经济学界对于“全球经济趋同”的乐观设想。 正如 Joe 所反思的，如果在五十年前，新古典经济学界普遍坚信自由贸易能带来全球经济水平的趋同——即工厂会自发迁往劳动力最廉价的国家，从而带动所有地区迈入普遍繁荣。然而残酷的现实表明，全球资本与制造业的扩散极其不均衡，即使是在自然资源看似丰富的非洲，不同国家的发展轨迹也截然相反。 ### `02:40` 迟到两年的选题与非洲史上最大规模 IPO 面对复杂的非洲经济版图，近年来却涌现出不少引人注目的亮点，尤其是尼日利亚第一大城市拉各斯，伴随着近期的国际油价走势展现出强劲的经济势头。Joe 提到，两年前他们在伦敦录制节目时，曾遇到一位听众向他极力推荐关注正在尼日利亚兴建的超级炼油厂。虽然这个选题搁置了整整两年，但现在正是切入的最佳时机，因为由非洲首富阿里科·丹格特（Aliko Dangote）创立的丹格特炼油厂（Dangote Refinery）迎来了突破性进展。 新闻显示，丹格特炼油厂在筹备上市前已获得数亿美元的预融资，并锁定了来自数家投资机构高达 10 亿美元的承销支持，这将成为非洲证券市场有史以来规模最大的 IPO。然而，尽管丹格特本人长期稳坐非洲首富交椅、位列全球顶级富豪榜，但在欧美大众语境中，他的名字却鲜为人知。为了深入探讨丹格特背后的非洲工业化逻辑以及非洲发展受挫的深层原因，节目邀请了非洲城市实验室（Africa Urban Lab）高级研究员、海外发展研究院（ODI Global）高级客座研究员兼《非洲如何运作》（How Africa Works）的作者 Joe Studwell 进行深度对话。Studwell 此前撰写的《亚洲教父》（How Asia Works）曾对东亚制造业崛起与国家产业政策的成功路径做出过经典剖析。 - **丹格特炼油厂上市估值预期**：获得 10 亿美元级承销支持，将刷新非洲资本市场历史上的 IPO 最大规模纪录。 - **嘉宾背景**：Joe Studwell 耗时十年调研非洲工业与农业现状，致力于比较东亚出口导向型工业模式与非洲发展模式的异同。 ### `05:01` 阿里科·丹格特：从大宗商品贸易商到非洲工业巨擘 Joe Studwell 详细梳理了阿里科·丹格特的发家史与工业化跃升路径。丹格特出身于尼日利亚北部的商业重镇卡诺（Kano），是一个典型的穆斯林大宗商品贸易商家族后裔。他早年依靠软质大宗商品（如糖、面粉等）的进出口贸易积累了原始资本，随后抓住了尼日利亚政府推动本土制造的契机。当时尼日利亚政府提出，只要企业投资建立本土水泥生产线，就能获得国内市场的关税与进口保护。丹格特敏锐地抓住了政策红利，不仅成功在尼日利亚本土建成了现代化的水泥工业，更将水泥版图扩张至非洲十多个国家。 在水泥业务的发展过程中，丹格特甚至正面击败了曾垄断非洲市场的跨国水泥巨头（如瑞士水泥巨头豪瑞 Holcim），展现出异乎寻常的商业竞争力和执行力。但这仅仅是他工业雄心的起点。在尼日利亚政府数次尝试自行兴建国有炼油厂均以腐败和低效告终后，丹格特力排众议，在拉各斯东部耗资逾 200 亿美元启动了超级炼油厂项目。目前该炼油厂不仅成功点火投产，且产能仍在进一步扩充。除了解决尼日利亚长期“守着石油出口原油却倒贴进口成品油”的怪圈外，丹格特还在炼油厂旁配建了世界级规模的巨型尿素化肥厂，直接消化炼油副产品，如今不仅满足了尼日利亚国内几乎所有的化肥需求，还在向非洲第二人口大国埃塞俄比亚复制这一模式。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 丹格特工业帝国的演变历程 accDescr: 描绘了阿里科·丹格特从大宗商品贸易走向水泥制造，再到大型石化联合体的升级路径 subgraph S1["1. 贸易起步阶段"] A["卡诺软质商品贸易<br>（糖、面粉等进口）"] --> B["获取国家进口替代政策支持"] end subgraph S2["2. 水泥工业扩张"] B --> C["建设尼日利亚本土水泥产能"] C --> D["击败跨国巨头 Holcim<br>扩张至非洲十余国"] end subgraph S3["3. 超级石化联合体"] D --> E["斥资200亿美元打造拉各斯炼油厂"] E --> F["配套世界级尿素化肥厂"] F --> G["产业链出海：进军埃塞俄比亚"] end ``` Studwell 指出，丹格特最核心的优势在于建立了一套在非洲极其罕见的高效大型项目交付与管理能力。即将到来的丹格特炼油厂 IPO 必然会引发国际投资者的疯狂超额认购，因为这是全球资本第一次能够真正接触到非洲本土高水准、具备世界级制造水准的上市工业资产。 ### `07:28` 水泥的基础地位与“资源诅咒”的误区 在讨论丹格特的发展历程时，Tracy 提出了一个普遍存在的现象：为什么在几乎所有发展中国家（无论是尼日利亚还是缅甸），水泥产业总是最先崛起且规模最庞大的工业门类？Studwell 解释道，经济发展的本质首先是资本积累、基础设施建设和物理资产的形成，城市化、公路、港口与厂房均离不开水泥，因此水泥生产是任何发展中经济体最不可或缺的基石产业。 然而，针对丹格特的炼油和尿素业务，Tracy 提出了关键质疑：炼油和尿素化肥本质上仍紧密依托于化石能源与油气资源，这究竟算是一场真正的现代工业成功转型，还是非洲反复陷入的“资源诅咒”（Resource Curse）的换汤不换药？ Studwell 对此给出了出人意料的澄清。他指出，外界对非洲一直存在严重的认知偏差，误以为非洲大陆遍地都是无穷无尽的油气和矿产资源。这一错觉的产生，是因为在过去几十甚至上百年的时间里，非洲绝大多数国家除了初级资源开采之外，几乎没有任何现代工商业活动，导致资源开采在 GDP 中显得异常庞大。但如果按人均或单位国土面积来算，非洲的资源禀赋甚至远低于美国。以往非洲面临的问题不是资源太多，而是缺乏将本土资源进行深度工业加工和复杂项目落地的制度与执行能力，而丹格特的石化和化肥联合体恰恰打破了单纯出口未加工原料的原生诅咒。 ### `10:00` 人口密度与内需驱动：非洲工业化的底层逻辑 乔·斯塔威尔（Joe Studwell）指出，丹戈特集团（Dangote Group）的崛起代表了一种与非洲过去资源开采型经济截然不同的模式，其核心驱动力在于“内需的爆发”。无论是成品油炼化、水泥还是化肥，这些重工业投资之所以能够成立，完全得益于非洲人口总量及其密度的剧烈增长。非洲大陆的人口目前已达到15亿，其人口密度大致相当于1960年代的亚洲。与二战刚结束时相比，非洲经历了翻天覆地的变化——当时全非洲仅有2.2亿人口，人口密度仅相当于公元1500年的欧洲。斯塔威尔强调，过去非洲之所以缺乏经济增长，最根本的瓶颈恰恰在于极其稀薄的人口密度，导致国内根本无法形成支撑规模化生产的有效市场。 人口密度对一个国家的工业化能力具有决定性影响。首先是必须具备规模化的城市消费市场；其次，现代国家绝大部分税收来自城市，没有足够的人口集聚和资本沉淀，国家财政就根本无力承担基础设施和治理成本；最后，密集的城市人口带来了分工与专业化。根据全球公认的规律，全球80%的GDP都是在占地面积极小的城市中创造的。斯塔威尔在书中援引英国的案例佐证：英国仅大伦敦地区就创造了全国70%的财政盈余，整个英国只有伦敦和东南部地区拥有财政盈余，其余七个地区全部处于财政赤字状态，本质上全靠人口最密集的中心区域进行财政补贴。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 人口密度驱动经济发展的机制图 accDescr: 展示从人口密度增长到城市化、分工及工业化落地的全流程传导机制。 subgraph Demographics ["人口与集聚"] A["人口规模扩张与密度上升"] --> B["大规模城市化与集中市场"] end subgraph EconomicSpillover ["分工与财政"] B --> C["劳动分工深化与专业化创新"] B --> D["城市税基扩大与财政盈余形成"] end subgraph Industrialization ["工业能力落地"] C --> E["规模化制造业可行"] D --> F["基础设施与公共治理投资"] E --> G["大企业涌现与生产率跃升"] F --> G end ``` - 非洲大陆人口从二战结束时的2.2亿激增至目前的15亿，人口密度追平1960年的亚洲。 - 城市仅占地球很小的空间，却创造了全球80%的GDP。 - 英国除伦敦和东南部地区以外的七大区域均处于财政赤字，依赖最密集的都会区反哺。 --- ### `13:00` 尼日利亚的农业繁荣与拉各斯的“生产性混乱” 面对“尼日利亚人口密度很高但为何此前常被视作表现不佳”的质疑，斯塔威尔给出了不同的反驳视角。尼日利亚当前人口密度约为每平方公里250人，远高于非洲大陆平均水平。尽管人们常批评尼日利亚在政治和组织层面上高度失能，但在2000年以来的非洲经济回暖浪潮中，其底层基本盘的发展相当迅猛。最典型的指标是农业：随着贫困人口收入稍有起色，人们的第一反应就是吃得更多更好，因此尼日利亚农业自2000年以来的年均增长率接近6%，这一增速不仅快于非洲其他地区，甚至超过了历史上大部分亚洲国家及同期的中国。 宏观层面的低效并不能掩盖微观局部的爆发力，最好的缩影便是拉各斯（Lagos）。这座拥有1400万人口的超级大都会，以极其逼仄的土地贡献了整整五分之一的尼日利亚经济产出，是这个人口大国中密度最高的核心极。初到拉各斯的人往往会被其铺天盖地的嘈杂与无序震撼，感叹“我的天，这简直是一场大灾难”，但在这片看似无序的混乱中，极其庞大的经济动能正在高速运转。从丹戈特的大型工业制造基地、港口与基础设施建设，到横扫整个非洲大陆的诺莱坞（Nollywood）电影工业与尼日利亚流行音乐产业，拉各斯展现出的正是斯塔威尔所定义的“高产出的混乱”（productive chaos）。 - 尼日利亚人口密度约为250人/平方公里，显著高于非洲平均值。 - 自2000年以来，尼日利亚农业部门年均增速接近6%，甚至快于亚洲和中国当年的部分阶段。 - 拉各斯单座城市人口达1400万，经济总量占整个尼日利亚GDP的20%。 --- ### `15:45` 告别微型信贷迷信：为什么生产力跃升必须依赖巨型企业 过去二十五年间，西方主流发展经济学界长期沉迷于“微型金融（Microcredit）与小微企业”叙事，认为发展的秘诀在于给贫困农民提供一笔小额手机贷款，让他们买头奶牛或农机。斯塔威尔直言，这种迷信掩盖了工业化的本质。中小微企业（SMEs）固然有其价值，但它们主要承担的是“吸纳就业”的功能；如果要真正触动经济结构的“生产力指针”，推动国家技术跃迁与工业升级，唯一的依托只能是本土大型企业。因为只有具备雄厚现金流的规模型企业，才有能力系统性地培训高技术工人、购置先进设备并承担资本密集型研发。 在除南非（由于其成熟经济体背景很早就有大企业）之外的撒哈拉以南非洲，丹戈特这样年营业额数十亿美元的巨头过去是前所未有的。但现在，它已不再是孤例。非洲多个国家正不断冒出年营业额达到数十亿美元的本土商业巨头。许多企业最初发轫于农业产业链的下游加工端——因为非洲人不再满足于买玉米回家手磨，而是大量消费经过工业化加工的包装食品。以坦桑尼亚的巴克雷萨集团（Said Salim Bakhresa & Co）为例，这家企业从最初的面粉与粮食碾磨起家，一路扩张至七八个非洲国家，如今已成长为一个庞大的综合财阀，旗下业务囊括食品深加工、职业足球俱乐部、电视台、房地产以及摆渡客运航线。 - 西方经济学过去过度高估微型信贷的作用，小企业解决的是就业托底，大企业才能拉动生产率跃升。 - 只有大型企业才具备足够的正向现金流来承担长周期的人才培训与工业资本开支。 - 坦桑尼亚巴克雷萨集团（Bakhresa）从粮食加工跨国扩张至媒体、地产、体育与航运，成为非洲本土大型集团崛起的标杆案例之一。 --- ### `18:25` 非洲版“雁阵模型”与制造业爬坡的复杂性阶梯 针对节目中提及的里卡多·豪斯曼（Ricardo Hausmann）“猴子在树林间跳跃”的产品空间理论与东亚经典的“雁行模式”（Flying Geese Paradigm），斯塔威尔认为雁行模型终将在非洲应验，但其时间跨度往往比理论家预想的要漫长得多。例如孟加拉国现今拥有雇佣数百万人、规模庞大的成衣制造业，但这一转变整整耗费了六七十年。当前在非洲，引领这一波大企业演进和制造业承接的领头羊，正是人口规模最大的尼日利亚与埃塞俄比亚。 谈及非洲制造业是否正在“沿着复杂性阶梯向上攀爬”，斯塔威尔给出了肯定答复。虽然不能以偏概全地认为全非55个国家都在同步发生质变，但在排头兵国家，技术复杂度的进阶清晰可见。丹戈特的产业轨迹本身就是最佳例证：水泥生产并非毫无技术门槛，化肥生产涉及天然气化工则更加复杂，而现代炼油厂的复杂程度更是登峰造极。类似的技术突破也在埃塞俄比亚发生——斯塔威尔提到，自己两三周前刚刚考察了埃塞俄比亚的第一座浮法玻璃厂，该厂将生产用于现代建筑窗户的高标准平板玻璃。非洲与东亚发展历程的最大差异在于，东亚普遍拥有执行力极强的“发展型国家”（Developmental States）政府在背后大力扶持，而非洲各国的公共治理目前普遍孱弱，导致民营私营部门不得不靠自身力量承担起原本属于国家的超额工业重任。 - 雁行模式在非洲正在启动，但制造业落地需要极长的周期，绝非一蹴而就（参考孟加拉国成衣业耗时60至70年）。 - 工业制造技术复杂性阶梯正在非洲头部国家显现：从普通水泥，进阶到天然气化工（化肥），再到现代炼化与浮法玻璃工业。 - 制度对比：东亚依靠强有力的“发展型国家”政府主动作为；非洲政府往往治理能力较弱，逼迫本土私营大企业承担更多超常规的重资产开发责任。 --- ### `21:20` 从亚洲到非洲：比尔·盖茨的提问与斯塔威尔的研究转向 作为写出《亚洲大逆转：亚洲各国的繁荣与兴衰》（*How Asia Works*）的权威学者，斯塔威尔向非洲研究的转向引起了外界的极大好奇。他透露这一转变始于2018年前后：当时埃塞俄比亚和卢旺达两国政府主动邀请他前往考察并提供咨询。斯塔威尔最初十分推脱，直率地表示“承蒙抬爱，但我对非洲一无所知，去了也是白去”，但两国政府官员极其执着，回应称“我们请你来，不是要你讲非洲，我们是想深入探讨东亚的发展政策”。这次实地考察让他深受震撼，看到了非洲大陆上正在发生的、货真价实且令人瞩目的进步尝试。 随后，比尔·盖茨（Bill Gates）的一场会面进一步坚定了他的研究方向。盖茨本人是《亚洲大逆转》的忠实读者，在两人一次深度交流的尾声，盖茨直截了当地对斯塔威尔说：“我真正想知道的，是你对非洲怎么看，因为我的大部分慈善资金都砸在那里。”这一连串的契机促成了斯塔威尔长达数年的非洲驻地调研。他坦言自己至今已走访了约15个非洲国家，他特意避开了所谓的“失败国家”（Failed States），因为其研究的核心始终聚焦于“经济发展与产业跃升”的机制与路径。正是基于在埃塞俄比亚、卢旺达、尼日利亚等国工厂车间和基建前线的第一手观察，斯塔威尔表示自己对非洲未来的乐观程度，明显超过了国际上许多持怀疑态度的观察家。 - 2018年埃塞俄比亚和卢旺达政府邀请斯塔威尔，并非咨询非洲本土事务，而是为了学习东亚产业政策与国家发展路径。 - 比尔·盖茨因自身大量慈善与发展资本投入非洲，亲自向斯塔威尔提出探寻非洲发展规律的诉求。 - 斯塔威尔的研究团队先后深入15个非洲国家进行长期田野调查，有意识地聚焦有推进产业意愿的核心国家，而非陷入战乱的失败国家。 ### `25:00` 聚焦非洲研究：从55国中提炼出15个核心样本 面对幅员辽阔、国情极其复杂的非洲大陆，主持人体会到一种巨大的认知畏难感：如果要为一个自己几乎一无所知的庞大洲际经济体立传，光是决定从何处着手、如何将繁复漫长的经济发展史浓缩成一本可读性强的著作，就足以令人望而却步。乔·斯塔威尔（Joe Studwell）坦言，这项浩繁工程的第一步其实是“做减法”——明确应该舍弃什么。非洲共有55个国家，他经过深思熟虑后将研究范围精简至15个最具代表性的关键国家，这些样本足以向读者清晰呈现整个非洲大陆的发展脉络。即便如此，这也绝非轻松的差事，斯塔威尔将其作为全职主业潜心研究了整整五年，才最终成书。 随后，对话转向了当下全球经济的核心议题：亚洲制造业的崛起。近年来，中国与韩国等东亚经济体的强劲繁荣引发了广泛讨论。市场上流传着一种悲观论调，认为中国凭借极致的效率与绝对的制造业统治力，“踢掉了其他发展中国家向上攀爬的梯子”。批评者认为，中国如今既能制造尖端芯片，同时又保留着整座整座专门生产圣诞彩带等极低附加值产品的小商品之都，这挤压了非洲通过低端制造业起步、逐步培育复杂工业生态的空间。不过也有观点指出，来自中国的廉价化肥和农业机械等物资，反过来也显著提升了非洲的农业生产率。针对这一复杂关系，主持人向斯塔威尔询问了他眼中的中非制造业互动现实。 ### `27:30` 破除“中国通吃”迷思：非洲制造业的现实竞争与机遇 斯塔威尔指出，外界普遍存在一种认知偏差，误以为中国仍在源源不断地向全球输出其制造过的“所有东西”。然而海关贸易数据给出了截然相反的结论：中国出口结构中低附加值产品的比重正在持续下降，诸如服装纺织等劳动密集型行业早已大规模转移至柬埔寨、缅甸、斯里兰卡以及印度等地。中国自身则加速转向资本密集度更高、技术更为前沿的绿色能源产品及先进制造业。因此，如果非洲国家要发展服装成衣等出口工业，真正的竞争对手并非中国，而是南亚与东南亚国家，而非洲完全具备与这些地区一较高下的潜力。 斯塔威尔强调，非洲当前面临的核心症结根本不在于外部竞争，而在于绝大多数非洲政府严重缺乏发展制造业的长期政治意愿与政策承诺。除了在工业政策上始终抱有坚定决心的埃塞俄比亚、在部分领域深耕的尼日利亚、具备一定基础的摩洛哥，以及马达加斯加等少数产业聚集区外，大多数非洲国家并没有建立起严肃的产业支持体系。他严肃告诫，“告诉非洲人他们不可能在制造业上取得成功，不仅极其危险，而且是一个彻头彻尾的糟糕建议”。从他在非洲各地工厂的实地调研来看，只要给予基本支持，当地制造业的运转状况完全良好。斯塔威尔坚决驳斥了所谓“人工智能与机器人普及将彻底斩断非洲工业化路径”的流行预言。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 制造业劳动力转化与服务业跨越陷阱对比 accDescr: 对比制造业作为职业培训学校吸收农村劳动力，与跳过制造业直接发展服务业所面临的人力资本与就业门槛瓶颈。 subgraph MFG["传统工业化路径：制造业阶梯"] A["农村低技能劳动力<br/>（仅需具备基础读写与算术）"] --> B["进入现代化工厂"] B --> C["在岗培训（干中学）<br/>工厂化身职业技术学校"] C --> D["大规模创造就业<br/>推动城市化与产业升级"] end subgraph SRV["跨越式发展陷阱：高附加值服务业"] E["贫困农业人口<br/>（无力承担高等教育成本）"] -. "阶层与技能鸿沟<br/>（资金与教育门槛极高）".-> F["高附加值现代服务业<br/>（如IT外包、金融软件）"] F --> G["受益群体极小<br/>（如印度IT行业仅约600万人）"] G -. "无法消化海量富余劳动力".-> H["国家增长动能受阻"] end ``` ### `29:45` 中国资本涌入与成本算力：制造业转移的底层逻辑 在审视中国对非影响时，斯塔威尔认为廉价农业机械固然重要，但更具决定性意义的力量在于中国对非制造业的巨额直接投资。英国《金融时报》（FT）的外商直接投资微观数据库显示，中国去年在非洲的制造业投资高达125亿美元。推动这股庞大资金南下的底层动力非常朴素——利润率。当前中国本土制造业产能充沛，价格竞争极其白热化，许多行业利润薄如刀纸；而在非洲就地设厂、供应非洲本土消费市场，能够获取远高于中国国内的利润空间。 钢铁与建筑陶瓷就是这一趋势的典型缩影： - **钢铁差价显著**：中国国内的钢材售价目前在每吨500至600美元左右，而在非洲部分市场，钢材售价能够达到每吨1000美元上下。在巨大价差驱动下，大量中国民营钢铁企业将高炉和轧钢厂直接搬迁至津巴布韦、南非、阿尔及利亚，近期在埃塞俄比亚也签署了大型钢铁投资协议。 - **卫浴陶瓷刚需**：伴随快速城市化，各类建筑卫浴陶瓷在非洲发展中国家消费量极大，中国企业在多国进行了广泛设厂与资本布局。 - **自动化成本现实**：西方热议的工业机器人与AI并未击垮非洲的劳动力优势。工业机器人单台购置与调试成本高昂，属于沉没成本，而且缺乏应对市场波动的弹性——产线满负荷时无法随意调高机器人的运转速度，扩产周期漫长。相比之下，在马达加斯加等地，工人工资仅约为每月60美元；当海外或本地订单波动时，工厂招工与解雇的调整速度极快。对于任何精打细算的制造商而言，选用充裕的廉价劳动力依然是远比一次性重资产投入机器人更为理性的经济决策。 ### `32:30` 为何制造业不可替代：跨越式发展陷阱与印度教训 对于许多发展中国家企图“跨过脏乱的低端工厂、直接跃入高科技服务业”的想法，斯塔威尔基于其先后在东亚与非洲的长期研究，剖析了制造业在经济现代化中无可替代的独特机制。制造业的本质魔力在于，它能够无缝对接从农村自然经济中释放出来的海量过剩人口。工厂对初期劳动力的教育门槛要求极低，工人只要掌握最基础的读写和算术能力即可上岗。进入车间后，工人们在流水线上“边干边学”，工厂事实上升格为发展中经济体最高效的免费职业技能学校，在极短时间内将传统农民转化为具备现代纪律与生产技能的产业工人。 相反，如果一个贫穷国家妄图直接跳入高附加值服务业，这一路径从底层逻辑上就无法成立： - **教育投资死结**：高附加值现代服务业对从业人员的教育水准和专业技能有着刚性门槛。无论是贫困农民自身，还是本就财政匮乏的穷国政府，都根本拿不出巨资在前期提供如此普遍的高等教育与职业培训。 - **印度的前车之鉴**：印度常被作为“绕道服务业实现起飞”的样板引用，凭借印度理工学院（IIT）的历史积累，印度确实孕育了一大批高素质技术毕业生并建立了举世瞩目的IT外包外销产业。然而，光鲜亮丽的印度IT核心部门至今仅吸纳了大约600万就业人口，这在拥有十数亿人口的国度里不过是沧海一粟。由于长期忽视严肃的制造业产业战略，即便当前莫迪政府大声呼吁振兴制造，印度的庞大年轻人口依然无法有效转化为工业动能，其整体增长效益与大众脱贫速度远不能与走通了制造业梯级进阶的国家相提并论。 ### `35:00` 发展主义心态与非洲政治的“贵族特质” 乔·斯塔威尔（Joe Studwell）指出，比较印度和中国的成长路径能给非洲带来深刻启发：自 1991 年启动改革以来，印度经济的年均增速为 4.2%；而中国在政策上全力扶持制造业，实现了长达 30 年年均 10% 的惊人增长。因此，斯塔威尔经常对尼日利亚或埃塞俄比亚的政策制定者抛出一个根本性问题：“你们到底想成为印度，还是更想成为中国？” 在被问及这种“东亚式发展主义思维”（Developmentalist Mindset）为何在非洲大陆分布极不均衡、是否受制于根深蒂固的政治生态时，斯塔威尔承认虽然缺乏绝对的定量数据支撑，但他坚信非洲政治具有极其鲜明的“贵族特质”（Aristocratic Politics）。执政领袖及其核心圈子往往自带贵族式的傲慢与偏见：他们厌恶小农，偏爱大规模农场；对繁琐复杂的制造业缺乏兴趣，更习惯坐在豪华办公室内坐等他人进贡或求见。 不过，斯塔威尔强调经济学上的“示范效应”（Demonstration Effects）正开始发挥强大作用。如同当年东亚各国先后目睹日本、随后是韩国和中国台湾的崛起而形成追赶浪潮一样，非洲各国看到拉各斯的蓬勃活力或埃塞俄比亚的飞速发展，也会受到极大震动： - 埃塞俄比亚在过去 25 年间，经济年均增速从未低于 5%。 - 埃塞俄比亚曾是全球最贫困的国家，人均 GDP 仅有 100 美元左右，导致其基数极低、长期未被外界关注；但如今其经济年均增速维持在 10% 左右，人均 GDP 已跃升至数千美元水平。 ### `37:45` 埃塞俄比亚的内战韧性与非洲的人口地缘演变 针对埃塞俄比亚在 2020 年爆发的内战是否削弱了其作为“非洲经济成功典范”的说服力，斯塔威尔给出了非常积极的评估。他指出，正是因为在内战爆发前该国就打下了扎实的产业政策基础，再加上现任总理阿比·艾哈迈德（Abiy Ahmed）推动了一系列市场化微调、向私营部门进一步开放，埃塞俄比亚经济即使在残酷内战期间依然保持了 5% 至 6% 的增长。这充分证明了建立强大的制度能力与推行正确政策所带来的抗风险韧性。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 埃塞俄比亚经济韧性与非洲人口压力机制 accDescr: 展示埃塞俄比亚如何顶住内战维持增长，以及非洲人口激增如何打破历史上的土地充裕格局 subgraph GrowthResilience ["埃塞俄比亚经济韧性"] A["早期工业化政策根基"] --> C["内战期间仍维持 5%-6% 增长"] B["阿比政府推行私营部门开放"] --> C end subgraph DemographicShift ["非洲大陆人口与族群演变"] D["历史常态：广袤土地充裕"] --> E["发生冲突时部族直接迁徙避让"] F["人口剧增：15亿向2050年25亿迈进"] --> G["部族边界紧绷碰撞，摩擦加剧"] end ``` 谈及更深层的社会矛盾，斯塔威尔指出族群割裂（Ethnic Cleavage）几乎存在于非洲的每一个社会，这同样根植于其独特的人口历史： - **历史上的部族分流**：根据历史学家的考证，历史上这片大陆拥有 3,000 多种不同语言的数千个族群，过去很少爆发你死我活的长期冲突。原因在于土地极其广阔，一旦紧张局势升级，其中一方就会直接拔营迁徙，永远有未开垦的土地可供定居。 - **现代人口的紧密碰撞**：如今非洲人口已达 15 亿，并预计在 2050 年攀升至 25 亿。各大族群在地理上开始前所未有地紧密挤压在一起，过去那种靠物理迁徙回避矛盾的机制彻底失效，迫使他们必须直面并克服狭隘本能的族群摩擦。 ### `41:17` 大陆内部贸易与地缘制造布局 针对非洲内陆国家因路途遥远、深居内陆而导致“制造业运输成本抵消劳动力廉价优势”的质疑，斯塔威尔首先强调了非洲幅员的辽阔：“它的面积大到不可思议，你可以把中国、印度、欧洲和整个美国全部装进非洲大陆。” 他纠正了外界对非洲出口制造的一个普遍认知偏差： - **非洲内部贸易是核心引擎**：如果单纯指望向欧美等世界其他地区大规模出口，内陆运输成本确实是个严重劣势；但非洲制造业出口的最大增量将来自非洲大陆内部的国家间贸易。现有数据表明，非洲内部贸易的增长速度已经明显超过了其对外部世界的出口增速。 - **临近主要市场的地理特例**：当然，外部出口取决于具体的区位。例如地处北非的摩洛哥（Morocco），距离欧洲大陆仅有 14 公里。摩洛哥在最靠近欧洲的丹吉尔港附近建立了著名的丹吉尔地中海工业园区（Tangier Med Industrial Parks），两家大型跨国汽车制造商已在此设厂，并吸引了大量追求低成本且要求临近欧洲市场的航空航天制造企业，园区雇工人数已超过 10 万人。 ### `43:40` 土地丰裕的终结与“非洲富农（Kulaks）”的崛起 与战后东亚（如中国土地革命、越南战局后期的土地改革）因人地矛盾极度尖锐而将土地分配视作决定政权生死的核心议题完全不同，非洲历史上从未出现过声势浩大的“无地农民运动”。这是因为非洲大陆长期地广人稀，“非洲的问题从来不是土地短缺，而是人口稀缺”。在全非洲 55 个国家中，除了肯尼亚高地以及桑给巴尔（Zanzibar，因独立前所有土地均由阿曼封建精英垄断而具有极特殊的改革背景）等极少数特例外，几乎从未有过真正的土改。即便在今天，像坦桑尼亚这样的大国依然拥有大片丰沛的闲置土地。 然而，这一历史常态正在发生剧烈分化： - **局部土地压力抬头**：在东非大湖区、埃塞俄比亚高地以及西非的部分地区，土地紧张问题已显著升温。 - **关键生产要素的垄断**：正如斯塔威尔在书中关于博茨瓦纳（Botswana）的案例分析所展示的，即便土地充沛，关键生产配套资产的匮乏同样会导致严重的社会不平等——博茨瓦纳的精英阶层通过垄断为牛群提供饮水的水井（Boreholes），牢牢掌控着财富与经济权力。 - **“非洲富农”的圈地潮**：过去 25 年来，非洲全大陆的农业产出年均增速超过 4%，位居全球各大洲之首。随着粮食需求飙升，城市富裕阶层（斯塔威尔在书中将其称为“非洲富农”，African Kulaks）开始大举抢购或长期租赁大片土地，将原本耕种的传统自耕小农排挤驱逐出去。非洲历史上第一次开始出现“无地农民阶层”（Landless Peasantry）。 期间对话中还穿插了一段词源小插曲：当主持人提问“Kulak”一词的词源时，斯塔威尔被难住了，主持人随后解释该词在俄语中原意为“拳头”（Fist），引申指那些攥紧拳头、极其吝啬不拔的小地主和富农。 ### `48:38` 城市镜像：混乱活力的拉各斯与“非洲新加坡”基加利 当被问及如果一位对野生动物巡游毫不感冒、只想实地观察城市经济与民众真实生活的旅行者初次前往非洲应首选何处时，斯塔威尔毫不犹豫地推荐了尼日利亚的拉各斯（Lagos）。他形容拉各斯“简直令人疯狂”（Insane），那种扑面而来的人潮、喧嚣与混乱中展现出的无尽活力，是任何地方都无法比拟的震撼体验。 主持人随后提到在马德里为儿子购买的马德里竞技足球俱乐部球衣，上面醒目地印着卢旺达旅游局赞助的广告语“Visit Rwanda”，并询问卢旺达首都基加利（Kigali）是否值得一去： - **极致整洁与李光耀式治理**：斯塔威尔极力推荐基加利，并感叹去那里会让人大开眼界，因为它是“世界上最干净的城市之一”。卢旺达总统卡加梅（Paul Kagame）推行全民清洁日，每周六早晨动员全民上街清扫，尽管街道上原本就几乎找不到任何垃圾杂物，展现出极强的“李光耀式”社会动员与规训风格。 - **区域金融中心的定位辨析**：对于一个缺乏海港的内陆小国卢旺达能否成为“非洲的新加坡”或大陆唯一的离岸金融枢纽，斯塔威尔持务实态度。他认为非洲体量巨大，未来不大可能只出现一个单一的金融中心，但基加利完全有能力成为其中重要的一极。目前卢旺达在招商引资方面表现优异：不仅成功吸引了大量跨国科技人才，还积极承办大型国际会展，并促成了诸多多边国际组织的区域总部落户。 ### `50:00` 卢旺达模式与东亚发展型国家在金融管制上的本质分歧 对话首先深入探讨了卢旺达的地缘政治与金融野心。乔·斯塔威尔（Joe Studwell）指出，卢旺达总统保罗·卡加梅（Paul Kagame）在外交和地缘上展现了极其无情但高效的手腕。他在事实上将刚果民主共和国（DRC）东部从其本土撕裂开来，并作为卢旺达事实上的“殖民地”进行控制与资源运作。尽管近两三年国际社会在外交层面对卡加梅的施压略有增加，但总体上依然十分克制。 主持人顺势将话题引向斯塔威尔两部核心著作（《亚洲模式》与《非洲运作方式》）的相通主线——金融在国家发展中的核心地位，尤其是定向信贷政策的作用。在很多发展中国家，发展性贷款与总统亲信间的裙带利益输送往往只有一线之隔。主持人特别提及，一心将自身打造为“非洲新加坡”的卢旺达，其显著特征是完全放弃了资本管制。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 金融政策与发展模式对比 accDescr: 对比东亚发展型国家与华盛顿共识下非洲各国的金融与资本管制路径。 subgraph EastAsia["东亚传统发展型国家"] A["严格资本管制"] --> B["锁定国内居民储蓄"] B --> C["政府主导定向贷款"] C --> D["财政贴息与兜底损失"] D --> E["培育本土工业与制造业"] end subgraph IMFRoute["非洲普遍模式（IMF与世行建议）"] F["全面废除资本管制"] --> G["外资与私人银行大量涌入"] G --> H["发放高息消费信贷"] H --> I["借贷消费进口摩托车/消费品"] I --> J["无益于本土工业产能积累"] end subgraph RwandaRoute["卢旺达模式（新加坡离岸金融路线）"] K["零资本管制 / 资金自由进出"] --> L["吸纳刚果(金)东部与周边富豪资金"] L --> M["定位于区域财富避风港与金融枢纽"] end ``` 斯塔威尔深入分析了这种金融路径的分野：卢旺达完全不打算走控制本国金融以培育工业的传统东亚“发展型国家”道路。相反，卢旺达取消一切资本管制，纯粹是为了成为区域离岸金融中心，吸引来自刚果（金）东部的资金以及各方富豪存放资产的“安全岛”。而东亚发展型国家的根本基石则是： - **锁定国内储蓄**：通过严格的资本管制，防止居民将资金轻易转移至纽约等海外金融市场追求更高收益，强制资金留在国内。 - **政策性定向信贷与财政补贴**：银行系统高度受政府引导，政府通过财政贴息和亏损兜底，支持银行承受扶持产业政策时可能面临的坏账风险。 - **关于埃塞俄比亚的报道澄清**：媒体（包括彭博等）近期广泛报道埃塞俄比亚取消了资本管制，这完全失实。埃塞俄比亚仅仅是在贸易账户上实行了开放，以便外资投资者能够自由汇入与汇出外汇利润，资本管制依然牢固存在。 - **非洲多数国家的失策**：非洲55个国家中的绝大多数都在国际货币基金组织（IMF）和世界银行的自由化建议下取消了资本管制。这导致外资私人银行蜂拥而入，但它们进入后既不承担工业政策风险，也不投资长期制造业，而是转向极易获利的消费信贷业务。斯塔威尔直言：“银行借钱给民众去买进口摩托车，对发展本土工业产能根本毫无益处。” 斯塔威尔结束访谈后，主持人表达了极高的赞誉。他们感叹，在当下媒体环境被“中国做了什么”、“AI颠覆了什么”以及特朗普政治动态等过度刷屏的语境下，能够深入探讨非洲这样一个看似不在潮流风口（un-zeitgeisty）、却关乎世界未来极其关键的议题，令人耳目一新。 --- ### `55:00` 人口密度变革、制造业迁移瓶颈与非洲内部大市场的崛起 送别斯塔威尔后，乔·维森塔尔（Joe Weisenthal）和特雷西·阿洛威（Tracy Alloway）继续进行节目复盘与讨论。他们首先反思了非洲大陆的复杂性——非洲绝非铁板一块（monolith），将无数原本语言、文化毫无关联的部族用直线强行圈在一个国界框内，使得许多国家从诞生之初就缺乏内部凝聚力，埋下了长期的政治动荡隐患。过去，非洲大部分地区一直呈现“土地富饶、劳动力稀缺”的特征。 然而，两人认为斯塔威尔关于“人口密度正在快速增长”的论点最具颠覆性，这一结构性变化正在重构非洲的经济前景： - **跳过单纯的出口导向竞争**：传统的制造业发展神话建立在“雁行理论”（flying geese）或“猴子在树枝间跳跃摆荡”的假定之上，即低成本国家承接富裕国家的劳动密集型产能，制造廉价商品出口全球。但当前全球经济格局已变：一方面中国在供应链端具备极其庞大的工业规模与成本护城河，另一方面全球贸易保护主义普遍抬头，新兴国家单纯依赖出口换取发展的空间被严重挤压。 - **本土大市场的消化力**：随着人口密度急剧攀升以及各大超大城市的涌现，非洲内部市场自身正在成长为足以支撑本土制造业的终端消费腹地。这种不断增长的本地需求，为非洲规避外部关税壁垒、孵化自身工业体系提供了全新的可能。 --- ### `57:30` 摩洛哥高速公路轶事、拉各斯实地考察约定与尾声 在节目尾声，维森塔尔提及了一条近期颇具戏剧性的国际财经新闻：摩洛哥正在计划修建一条通往欧洲的高速公路，并将其命名为“唐纳德·特朗普高速公路”。维森塔尔打趣道，仔细查阅背后原因才发现，摩洛哥正指望从美国进出口银行（Export-Import Bank of the United States）获得关键融资来修筑这条公路，这让该命名的政治算盘瞬间显得十分合理且生动。 特雷西·阿洛威则分享了自己对摩洛哥基础设施的个人体验，特别提到摩洛哥的高速公路服务区： - 摩洛哥的高速服务区堪比美国著名连锁加油站 Buc-ee's； - 服务区不仅极为干净、可靠，更以极其出色的地道美食闻名，是旅途中不可错过的体验。 最终，两位主持人互相约定，未来一定要在尼日利亚的丹格特炼油厂（Dangote Refinery）现场录制一期《Odd Lots》特别节目，并共同前往拉各斯进行深度实地走访。随后主持人公布了播客团队的社交平台联系方式、Discord 社区加入指引，并以资深投资人巴里·里霍尔茨（Barry Ritholtz）的《商业大师》（Masters in Business）播客推荐广告结束了整期节目。 ## Notable quotes > `21:20` 承蒙抬爱，但我对非洲一无所知，去了也是白去 — Joe Studwell > `21:20` 我们请你来，不是要你讲非洲，我们是想深入探讨东亚的发展政策 — 埃塞俄比亚与卢旺达官员 > `21:20` 我真正想知道的，是你对非洲怎么看，因为我的大部分慈善资金都砸在那里 — Bill Gates > `27:30` 告诉非洲人他们不可能在制造业上取得成功，不仅极其危险，而且是一个彻头彻尾的糟糕建议 — Joe Studwell > `35:00` 你们到底想成为印度，还是更想成为中国？ — Joe Studwell > `41:17` 它的面积大到不可思议，你可以把中国、印度、欧洲和整个美国全部装进非洲大陆 — Joe Studwell > `43:40` 非洲的问题从来不是土地短缺，而是人口稀缺 — Joe Studwell > `50:00` 银行借钱给民众去买进口摩托车，对发展本土工业产能根本毫无益处 — Joe Studwell ## Mentioned Joe Weisenthal, Tracy Allaway, Joe Studwell, Aliko Dangote, Dangote Refinery, How Africa Works, How Asia Works, Africa Urban Lab, ODI Global, Holcim, Said Salim Bakhresa & Co, Ricardo Hausmann, Bill Gates, Paul Kagame, Abiy Ahmed, Donald Trump, Barry Ritholtz, Masters in Business, Export-Import Bank of the United States, IMF, World Bank, Tangier Med Industrial Parks, Nollywood ## Video description <p data-renderer-start-pos="126">Earlier in August, it was reported that Nigeria's Dangote Refinery secured a $1 billion underwriting for its upcoming stock market listing, which is set to become Africa's largest IPO. Indeed, the whole the continent has seen lots of economic growth in the last few years: According to the United Nations, growth across Africa was expected to reach 4.0% in 2026. The history of economic development on the continent is a vexed one; access to critical resources, whether its minerals or petrochemicals, has not always equated to improved economic conditions. To understand what is going on in Africa, we talk to Joe Studwell, the author of <em data-renderer-mark="true">How Africa Works: Success and Failure on the World's Last Developmental Frontier</em>. The product of a decade of reporting, Studwell's book argues that African countries, in many instances, have failed to adopt development strategies (an industrial policy that favors export manufacturing for instance) that mirror Asian counterparts. And while development has been uneven, Studwell is optimistic that the seeds of sustained development are increasingly taking root, at least in some countries. We speak to Studwell about the Dangote IPO, why development has historically been so difficult, Rwanda's dreams of becoming Africa's Singapore, and why Lagos is one of the most impressive cities in the world.</p> <p data-renderer-start-pos="1466">Read more:<br><a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-08-21/dangote-offers-east-african-nations-30-stake-in-new-refinery?utm_medium=referral&utm_source=podcast&utm_campaign=odd_lots&utm_content=article" data-renderer-mark="true" data-is-router-link="false" data-testid="link-with-safety">Dangote Offers East Africa Nations 30% Stake in New Refinery</a><br><a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-08-21/t-rowe-price-says-nigeria-attractive-even-after-64-stock-rally?utm_medium=referral&utm_source=podcast&utm_campaign=odd_lots&utm_content=article" data-renderer-mark="true" data-is-router-link="false" data-testid="link-with-safety">T. Rowe Price Says Nigeria Attractive Even After 64% Stock Rally</a></p> <p data-renderer-start-pos="1604">Only <a href="http://bloomberg.com/" data-testid="inline-card-resolved-view">Bloomberg - Business News, Stock Markets, Finance, Breaking & World News</a> subscribers can get the Odd Lots newsletter in their inbox each week, plus unlimited access to the site and app. Subscribe at&nbsp; <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/subscriptions/oddlots?in_source=oddlotspodcast" data-renderer-mark="true" data-is-router-link="false" data-testid="link-with-safety">bloomberg.com/subscriptions/oddlots</a></p> <p data-renderer-start-pos="1776"><a href="http://bloomberg.com/subscriptions/oddlots" data-renderer-mark="true" data-is-router-link="false" data-testid="link-with-safety">Subscribe to the Odd Lots Newsletter</a><br><strong data-renderer-mark="true">Join the conversation:</strong> <a href="https://discord.gg/oddlots" data-renderer-mark="true" data-is-router-link="false" data-testid="link-with-safety">discord.gg/oddlots</a></p><p>See <a href="https://omnystudio.com/listener">omnystudio.com/listener</a> for privacy information.</p> [Source](https://podtrac.com/pts/redirect.mp3/tracking.swap.fm/track/UVBrz8bN8aM2Xe47PEPu/traffic.omny.fm/d/clips/e73c998e-6e60-432f-8610-ae210140c5b1/8a94442e-5a74-4fa2-8b8d-ae27003a8d6b/568c6e3c-2159-45c2-8e4d-b4ad011d7c22/audio.mp3?in_playlist=982f5071-765c-403d-969d-ae27003a8d83)

[21:20] Joe Studwell: 承蒙抬爱，但我对非洲一无所知，去了也是白去 [21:20] 埃塞俄比亚与卢旺达官员: 我们请你来，不是要你讲非洲，我们是想深入探讨东亚的发展政策 [21:20] Bill Gates: 我真正想知道的，是你对非洲怎么看，因为我的大部分慈善资金都砸在那里 [27:30] Joe Studwell: 告诉非洲人他们不可能在制造业上取得成功，不仅极其危险，而且是一个彻头彻尾的糟糕建议 [35:00] Joe Studwell: 你们到底想成为印度，还是更想成为中国？ [41:17] Joe Studwell: 它的面积大到不可思议，你可以把中国、印度、欧洲和整个美国全部装进非洲大陆 [43:40] Joe Studwell: 非洲的问题从来不是土地短缺，而是人口稀缺 [50:00] Joe Studwell: 银行借钱给民众去买进口摩托车，对发展本土工业产能根本毫无益处

[26:35] Joe Studwell: Fears that AI and automation will bypass traditional manufacturing development in Africa overlook basic cost dynamics. [26:35] Joe Studwell: Factory automation requires massive upfront capital investments, whereas labor in countries like Madagascar can cost as little as $60 per month. [31:50] Joe Studwell: Manufacturing facilities act as primary vocational training schools for developing nations, requiring only basic literacy and numeracy from incoming workers. [35:20] Joe Studwell: Traditional political elites often favor large-scale agrarian estates or administrative rent-seeking over hands-on industrial planning. [45:00] Joe Studwell: African kulaks [47:32] Joe Studwell: about the cleanest city in the world [47:32] Joe Studwell: polishing the city [47:32] Joe Weisenthal: Visit Rwanda [50:00] Joe Studwell: Rwandan colony

[0:00] The Big Take podcast from Bloomberg News keeps you on top of the biggest stories of the day. My fellow Americans, this is Liberation Day. Stories that move markets. Chair Powell opened the door to this first interest rate cut. Impact politics. Change businesses. This is a really stunning development for the AI world and how you think about your bottom line. you get your podcasts. Hello, OddLods listeners. I'm Joe Weisenthal. And I'm Tracy Allaway. We're the hosts of the OddLods podcast, and we've got something exciting for you. That's right. So one of the best parts of hosting our podcast is we get to actually meet and interact with our listeners. And we know we have some listeners over in Los Angeles. That's right. So if you're in L.A., we're going to be recording a live show, some live recordings. at the Vermont Theatre in Hollywood on September 17th. We have some really exciting guests lined up, have some really great conversations planned. So go ahead and get your tickets. You can find those over at Bloomberg.com forward slash oddlots or click the link below in the show notes and come and say hi when you're there. Bloomberg Audio Studios. Podcasts, radio, news. Hello and welcome to another episode of the Odd Lots podcast. I'm Joe Weisenthal. And I'm Tracy Allaway. I don't know what it is, Tracy. I kind of have this urge to do an Africa trip. Like, I sort of want to go to some of these capitals, Lagos, Accra, Kigali and so forth. Like, I don't know. I'm like, I've never been there. And now I'm like, I'm kind of curious. Well, you know, the urge to explore Africa is well documented among the history of men, of white men in particular. So really, you're just following your instinct here. That's right. Yeah. I've been to Africa. various places. Morocco, Egypt, Tanzania, Mozambique, South Africa, briefly. I have some insane stories I could tell you. But probably the one thing that stands out to me is... the diversity of that particular continent, obviously. So Egypt is very, very different to a place like Mozambique. And I will say, you know, like, I saw some, some, a lot of development in places like South Africa, Egypt, to some extent, Mozambique was one of the poorest places I've ever seen in my life, to the point where, you know, A lot of people don't even want money. They would just barter for goods, like an extra T-shirt in your luggage or something like that. It is pretty extraordinary, just generally, you know. I think if you had gone back 50 years ago or something like that, you would have had this view that countries around the world over time converge economically, particularly in a world of free trade. The factories chase the countries that have the cheapest labor, etc. And therefore, everyone in a world of free trade, you get this sort of like broad growth and wealth. extraordinary. Absolutely. So you have places like Nigeria, like Lagos, I think you mentioned, which seems to some extent be booming at the moment with higher oil prices. You have a very, very big IPO coming down the line. Yeah. So this is what I'm particularly interested in. I met a listener, a predestined one minute doxum when we were in London a couple of years ago. that's being built in Nigeria. Anyway, this is for him. I hope he's listening at this point. It took two years, but we're doing it. We're doing it because there's the news today that Dangote Refinery, or sorry, the news this week, we were recording this August 20th, came out earlier in the week that they had secured $400 million ahead of planned IPO, that there's $1 billion in backing from a few other firms, and also that the founder of this I believe he's one of the richest people in the world. And I don't think Dan Gote is anywhere close to being a household name. No, and it's going to be the biggest stock market listing in African history ever. So we should definitely talk about it. And I think it's good to talk about it in the context of why development in Africa has or hasn't happened in certain cases. Absolutely. Well, I'm very excited to say we really do have the perfect guest, someone we've never talked to on the podcast before. has been very influential to people of our cohort over the last several years. [5:00] who are interested in things like industrial policy and so forth. We are going to be speaking with Joe Studwell, senior fellow at the Africa Urban Lab, senior visiting fellow at ODI Global, and the author of the recent book, How Africa Works. And of course, many readers may have read his previous book, How Asia Works, talking about how some of these East Asian economies got as wealthy as they did. So, Joe, thank you so much for coming on AdLots. Thank you for having me. Let's start with the simple question. What is this company, Dengote, and who is the founder? So Aliko Dangote is from Kano in the north of Nigeria. He's a Muslim trader, archetypal Muslim trader. He grew up trading soft commodities, got a substantial business doing that. in Nigeria, in return for creating local cement production. And he did that. But not only did he do that, he went on to do it across Africa. He's in a dozen countries doing cement now, and he's beaten, in most places, the multinational cement producers like the Swiss Holcim and whatever who previously dominated the business. up and said wow this guy has got something and then he decided he'd do something much bigger and he decided he would uh build a uh an oil refinery in a country where a couple of times previously government had tried to to to develop refining capacity and it was just a disaster an industrial policy disaster um dangote did it he spent 20 billion dollars it's uh east of lagos a and it worked it is working and not only that he's expanding it now so in the course of doing that he became the richest guy in africa but he doesn't stop because he's developed such capability in terms of project management and project delivery that he just goes on to other things so next to his oil refinery is a very large urea plant fertilizer plant which is now supplying consumed in Nigeria and he's recently signed up to do the same thing in Ethiopia, the second most populous African country after Nigeria. And yeah, he just keeps rolling forward. And so this listing, I think, will be will be pretty heavily oversubscribed because it's investor access to the first real market quality, listed industrial asset pack on the continent. I have a, this is just a sort of tangential question, but you mentioned that he was first in cement production. Why does cement production seem to be such a thing in developing nations in particular, such that if you go to a place like Nigeria or like Myanmar, you will see a lot of is producing cement. Yeah, because it's so fundamental to development. I mean, development is about investment, construction, creation of physical assets. And so cement is just absolutely fundamental. Okay, a serious question now, then. So what does the Dangote example actually say about, I guess, the diversification? prospects for Africa? Because when I think, okay, it's a petroleum refinery that, you know, urea production, that's kind of industrialized, but it's also very connected to resources, right? And we've all heard about the resource curse. We know that various African nations have experienced it to some extent throughout time. So how much of this is actually an industrial success story versus like kind of more of the same? I would say it's different to what we saw in the past in Africa so Africa has a reputation of having tons and tons of hydrocarbons and minerals resources it's not really true actually we just perceive Africa that way because in the past there wasn't much other economic activity so it seemed like minerals and hydrocarbons were dominant but if you compare it with somewhere like the United States and you look at what African countries have got, it's nothing like that. [10:00] the mineral and hydrocarbon resources as a share of GDP. So I would say that it's different to what we had in the past because You look at all of Dangote's businesses and it's really a demand driven story. And what I mean there is that the growth of population and the growth of population density in Africa is now creating markets, particularly urban markets of a type that we just didn't have before. for refined oil products, the same for fertilizer. Africa as a continent now has 1.5 billion people. That's about the same population density as Asia in 1960. So it's still not very densely populated, but it is when you compare it with immediately after the Second World War when Africa had 220 million people. So it's gone from 220 million to 1.5 billion. And when after the Second World War, Africa had 220 million people, that was the same population density as Europe in 1500. And that, to me, is the fundamental reason why you didn't have a lot of economic growth. How does population density per se play an important role in a country's capacity to industrialize? Yeah, I mean, for all the reasons that you would expect, I've already talked about markets. You've got to have markets for what you're going to produce, particularly urban markets are very important. Urban markets are also important because cities produce most of the tax that is paid in any country. capital basis until you've got the people you're not going to be able to afford it and then there are um questions of division of labor when you get concentrated populations in cities you get much better division of labor much greater specialization and in turn you get much greater creativity um so you know the famous uh statistic that's always rolled out is that 80 percent um of of gdp around the world is created in cities yeah even though they don't occupy that much physical space. In the Africa book, I use the example of the UK, where one city, London, generates 70% of the UK's fiscal surplus. You have London and the southeast region of the UK are the only two parts of the UK that produce a fiscal surplus. Seven other regions of the UK are all in fiscal deficit and essentially are subsidised by the most densely populated part of the country. Thank you. Here are five reasons to subscribe to Bloomberg News Now. Number five, you get the latest news from around the world instantly. Number four, it saves you time. Your day's busy. Catching up takes just a few minutes. Three, it's available 24 hours a day whenever you need it. Two, it's convenient. Listen on your smartphone or smart speaker. And number one, it's easy to find. Subscribe on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, or anywhere you listen. Five reasons. One, simple way to stay on top of the news. News Now. Are there limits to the population density thesis? Because I take the point and Again, if you think of Africa, like it is absolutely huge and we can get into some of the geographical limitations later on and populations are, you know, relatively scattered. But thinking back to the Nigeria example, I mean, Nigeria population like has been one of the denser populated areas on the continent for a while, but it has actually, I think, underperformed relative to a lot of other countries. So what does that say about the importance of population density? Yeah. So you're right. Nigeria is about 250 people per square kilometre, which is... significantly higher than the than the african average today i wouldn't say though that it has overall underperformed in the period since 2000 when the whole african economy has picked up um nigerian agriculture which is the thing i would expect to show growth first as population grows because when poor people will will just eat more i mean that's the first thing they they do they consume more more more in the way of foodstuffs um nigerian agriculture since 2000 has been growing close to 6% a year. That's faster than anywhere that I'm [15:00] in Asia, faster than someone like China. So things are moving. They're not moving crazy fast, because Nigeria is a pretty dysfunctional country at the level of its politics and organizationally. But within it, There are places that are moving fast already, and you already alluded to Lagos, which is the city of 14 million people. people, which already accounts for a fifth of the Nigerian economy, just this one city. And it's the most densely populated part of a densely populated country. And although when you go there, you think, oh, my God, this is just mayhem. But the fact is, an awful lot is getting done. You know, whether it is in terms of Ali Kodangoti's industrial development, whether it's in terms of infrastructure construction, whether it's in terms of the film industry or the Nigerian music industry that dominates the continent. It's chaos, but it's productive chaos. You know, I remember... 25 years ago, you would read these things and they would say the importance, the key to economic development is microcredit and small businesses and someone gets a loan on their phone and then they buy a cow or a tractor, etc. in Africa? And why is the size itself a sort of reason to think that this could have positive flywheel effects? Outside of South Africa, where obviously you have a much more mature economy and higher revenues in big companies, Dangote is pretty unique. But Dangote doesn't stand alone in the sense that you see in different African countries the growth of Australia. significant numbers now of companies that turn over billions of dollars a year. So this is small change in terms of US multinationals, but it's previously unheard of in Africa. Quite a lot of these companies originate in agriculture in one way or another. They often are the manufacturing end of agriculture. So they process foodstuffs to produce processed foods, which is what Africans corn or whatever at home and then they go on and they do other things so there's a big uh big firm for instance in tanzania called buck raiser comes out of milling and moved into milling in about seven or eight different african countries but now it's doing everything from owning a football club to owning a tv station to real estate um to running the boats out to the growth of bigger companies companies in Africa. So then why do we need bigger companies? We need them for the same reason you need big companies in every economy, because only big companies have the cash flows to really be able to train people and move the needle on productivity. All right. So you're right. There's a huge amount of attention is paid to SMEs. It's not necessarily wrong, but when people talk about SMEs, it's an employment consideration. They employ people, But if you want to move the needle on productivity, you need big firms. So the animal economic paradigm that we're most used to discussing on Odd Lots is monkeys swinging from trees per Ricardo Hausman's theory. But there's another one that you mentioned in your book, which is the flying geese paradigm. Would something like that apply to Africa in its current state? Do you see any evidence that industries are sort of trading up as countries actually advance and develop? Yeah, I think that the clearest evidence of... of the evolution of big firms is in the two most populous countries at the moment in Nigeria and in Ethiopia. And, you know, some countries are going to have to lead first in Africa, as they did in Asia. And the flying geese thing will ultimately prove to have some truth as it did in Asia. It's just that the timeframe tends to be rather longer than the people who come up with these theories has a pretty large garmenting sector employing millions of people. But it did take about 60, 70 years for that to happen. [20:00] Thank you. What do we see in terms of what we would call moving – up the manufacturing ladder. Do we see things that we would call like, you know, the story was for years in China, it's like, okay, they make a million T-shirts and that gets them like one Boeing plane or something like that. And then eventually they make more advanced things and they can import more Boeing planes. Do we see that evidence currently of just the increased ability to do reasonably complex things? reasonably complex assembly. Yeah, we do. We don't see it as across 55 countries in Africa, but we do. I mean, I've talked about Dangote proving that he can do three. Cement's not uncomplex. Fertilizer, quite complex. You've got to work with gas. It's not just a straightforward manufacturing process. And an oil refinery is unbelievably complex. And you do see signs of similar things in other countries. Again, to go to Ethiopia, two, three weeks ago, I was standing in what will be the first float glass plant. making you know regular modern glass used in in windows and whatever so um you Countries are moving forward in that respect. I mean, one observation I'd make in Africa is that governments tend to remain so weak that the private sector has to do more heavy lifting than it ever had to do in Asia, where you had developmental states with governments providing tremendous support to the private sector. You tend not to get that. in the game. But again, you know, it's demographics. We have to hope that the depth and quality of African governments will improve. And in theory, it should do so with thicker, denser populations, because that means that you've got bigger cities and you can raise more tax and more income is what a lot of African governments need to enable them to do more things. Thank you. Gain insight on the innovators, disruptors, and tech-driven trends shaping today's complex economy. I'm Carol Masser. And I'm Tim Stenevec. Wrap up your workday with the Bloomberg Business Week Daily Podcast. We bring you deeper dives into the story shaping your world, from the evolution of AI to the shifting priorities of global business. Plus, Silicon Valley power players and the latest tech trends. Catch up on the conversations you miss during the day. Subscribe to the Bloomberg Business Week Daily Podcast on Apple, Spotify, or anywhere you listen. you So you mentioned being in Ethiopia a couple weeks ago, and I'm very curious how much time you're spending on the ground in the region now. And I feel like we should allow you to maybe provide a bit of context here, because a lot of people will know you from How Asia Works, which was this, you know, now it's a seminal book, but when it came out, it was kind of out of consensus. And then suddenly you're turning your attention to Africa. What's going on here? Why the transition? Yeah. Well, that happened a while ago back in about 2018. So, I mean, the first thing that happened was that the Ethiopian and Rwandan governments invited me to go out and see what they were doing. And I said, it's... It's very flattering that you're inviting me, but I don't know anything about Africa, so there's no point. And they said, no, no, no, we want to talk about Asian development policy. So I went and I saw things that I thought were genuinely interesting and impressive. And then subsequent to that, I met with Bill Gates, who was a fan of how Asia works. And at the end of that meeting, he said, oh, what I really want to know is what you think about Africa, because that's where I'm spending all my money. year. So I haven't been everywhere in Africa. I've worked so far in about 15 countries. I don't go and spend my time in what you might call failed states because it's not the nature of my work. My work's about economic development and progress. But I have thoroughly enjoyed what I've seen in so far. And yeah, and I'm reasonably positive. I mean, I'm not crazy positive, but I'm more positive than a lot of people are, I think. Well, can I just ask you a process question? Because [25:00] If someone if if someone ever they wouldn't, but if they ever came to me and said, like, I don't think so. We want you to write a book about Africa, which is a very big place that I admittedly know nothing about. I would be incredibly intimidated about starting that research process and just editing, you know, basically the history of economic development in all of Africa down to a consumable economy. publication, how did you decide like what your research process would look like? And how did you decide which things to tackle versus others? Because if I mean, It's huge. It's a huge amount that you just took on. Yes, I mean, the process in the beginning was to decide what to leave out. So you've got 55 countries. And I whittled that down to 15 that I thought were important and would tell the reader enough about the continent as a whole. And of course, that then makes the work a bit more manageable. But I knew that it was going to be a huge task. And I did it as my main occupation over a period of five years. It took a long, long time. One of the debates that's been going on that I see, I mean, part of, you know, like, obviously, like the Asia stuff is just very hot right now. You see the booming, you know, the booming Chinese economy, the booming Korean economy, etc. Something that I'm curious to hear your take on is one of the things people are saying is that China's manufacturing dominance, its absolute efficiency gains, etc. depriving other parts of the world from having climbed the same ladder. That, for example, China, yes, it can make some of the most advanced chips in the world, but there might still be an entire city that's devoted to making Christmas tinsel or something like that. And this is the extremely low margin types of manufacturing that historically might have been the first seeds of a more complex ecosystem in another country. But on the other hand, and some of this in your book, you could argue that some of the gains that we are seeing and some of the encouraging African success stories are in part thanks to cheap inputs from China. I'm thinking like fertilizer and probably cheap machinery, et cetera, that allows for improving agricultural productivity, which in your view is very key. Why don't you talk to us like your take on the relationship between the incredible gains we've seen in Asia and China specifically, for African prospects right now. yeah I So first of all, I think that people tend to perceive China as continuing to export absolutely everything that it's ever made. But if you look at the trade data for China, what you see is that China's actually exporting less and less of the low value added stuff that it began with. And quite a lot of that is going to places like Cambodia, which I just mentioned. and other green energy products that are much more sort of cutting edge and capital intensive in terms of what it did in the past. So if Africa is competing against garmenting exports, for instance, it's much more competing against stuff coming out of Myanmar, out of Cambodia, out of Sri Lanka, out of India. So I think that Africa is capable of doing that. problem, its main problem is that it doesn't have much commitment from government to developing manufacturing sectors outside of, to an extent, Nigeria and Ethiopia, which has always had that commitment, Morocco to an extent as well, and then one or two other enclaves in places like Madagascar. And Africa needs to build that up. I think that telling Africans that they're not going to succeed in manufacturing is very difficult. dangerous and very bad advice. I absolutely think that they can succeed in manufacturing. And the places that I've seen them manufacturing, they seem to be doing fine. I don't buy into the idea that there's been a change or there is an ongoing change now based around robotics and AI that means that there will be no manufacturing development. in Africa. You're right that some cheap inputs from China have been helpful to development in Africa, but the thing I would emphasize much more than that that's come from China is large amounts of manufacturing investments. So if you look at the FT's micro database of FDI for last year, China put 12 and a half billion dollars. [30:00] into manufacturing investment in Africa. And if you then dig into like, why are they doing that? The answer is usually because they can get better margins manufacturing in Africa. particularly for African consumption, than they can in China. I mean, an awful lot of manufacturing in China today has very, very, low margins. So Chinese money is looking, you know, steel is one example, steel In China, at the moment, sells for about $500 to $600 a ton. In Africa, it sells for about $1,000. So unsurprisingly, a number of Chinese firms have relocated steel mills to Africa. There's one in Zimbabwe, there's one in South Africa, there's one in Algeria, and there's one that's just been signed in Ethiopia. investing widely in all kinds of other businesses ceramics um you know to produce bathroom stuff that's consumed in vast quantities in developing countries um all sorts of things so i don't buy the idea that there's this paradigm change in in manufacturing and i think the final point there i conversations about robotics and AI and the effect on manufacturing, they tend to never introduce the question of cost. So robots cost a lot of money, and they are also a sunk cost that when you buy them for your factory, you pay for the whole thing up front. On the other hand, in Africa at the moment, somewhere like Madagascar, you can get labor for $60 a month. So my feeling is that any manufacturer who can make use of labor, instead of paying up front for robots, is likely to continue to do so. Not least again because People don't talk about the inflexibility of robots. They can do a certain amount when your demand goes up. You can't turn the speed up on most robots in factories. They continue to do the same amount. You've got to get new robots, but that's not quick. Whereas when you need to hire and fire labor, that is very quick in developing countries. So I have a bunch of questions, specific questions on Africa's manufacturing potential, but just a step back question first. You emphasize technology. the development of manufacturing as like this important step in the growth of an economy. And you do this both in how Asia works and how Africa works. Explain what it is that seems to make manufacturing in some sense special when it comes to economic development. And could you ever have a situation in Africa where, I don't know, maybe a government is like, I don't want to mass produce a bunch of... toilet ceramics. I want to leapfrog ahead to a service industry and just start there. Yeah. So what makes manufacturing special is that you can take people usually out of the rural economy, out of the farm economy and bring them into the modern urban economy. And you can do that with relatively low levels of education. They just need to be numerate and literate and they're in a factory. And then they largely learn on the job and factories become the kind of vocational training schools for developing economies. economy the problem that you have when you want to jump into value-added services is that value-added services almost always require a higher level of education and training so who's going to pay for that the person who's coming out of agriculture hasn't got the money to pay for that and you know is the employer you know so the government's going to come with the money i you know the government's not going to have the money because definitionally it's the government of a um of a poor country you example really is To look to is always India for where you go with like value added services because of the Indian Institutes of Technology, the history there. They've always had a supply of highly trained tech graduates who allowed entrepreneurs to build very successful IT businesses. But the IT sector in India still only employs about six million people. It's just nothing compared with the employment generated by manufacturing. And then you look at the overall impact on growth. India, which has never really had a serious manufacturing strategy, although Modi kind of talks it up at the moment, but it's never really had one. If you look back to India. [35:00] The period since 1991 when India's reforms began, India's grown at 4.2%. percent a year average. If you look at China, which really maxed out support for manufacturing, that's an economy that grew for 30 years at 10 percent. a year that to me is the difference and so i often say to to you know people in countries like Nigeria and Ethiopia, what do you want to be? Do you want to be India or do you want to be something more like China? Huh. So I'm curious, like you mentioned that one of the issues is that the sort of like the developmentalist mindset, as you understand it, or the optimal developmentalist mindset is unevenly distributed throughout Africa. So there are leaders who might want to talk to you about like, well, what is a realistic way in which we can develop along the East Asian path and then others not? When you look at the uneven distribution of this, is this just about like? Some people have different opinions. Or is this about like there is something endemic to the politics in certain countries such that whoever is going to be the person that winds up in the seat, winds up as president and so forth, is maybe going to be more likely to fundamentally say, oh, their political allegiance to, say, medium sized farms or something like that, such that the developmentalist approach is going to be off the table. because that is not the politics out from which they come. Well, I have never managed to get data to sort of nail this down very well. But my personal view is that endemic to the politics of Africa is that politics in Africa are particularly aristocratic. Um, so you particularly have, uh, leaders and the people around them who are aristocrats with all the kind of prejudices that go with that. They don't like small farmers. They're like big farms. Um, they're not terribly interested in, in, in manufacturing. It's kind of, you know, sit in my office and wait for people to come to me. That has been the, um, That's been, to me, the reality and the tradition. But I think that what is also very important is that demonstration, what economists call demonstration effects count for a lot, and that as countries see Places like Lagos or economies like Ethiopia moving fast, right? Ethiopia has not grown less than 5% for 25 years now. Wow. It was the poorest country in the world. That's why it's taking a long time to get on the radar. You know, when you're a hundred bucks GDP per capita to starve, you know, You know, the maths are pretty ugly for a long period, but now it's still growing 10% a year and it's at a couple of thousand dollars. So that makes some difference. But, you know, so the point is that when people see what's going on in these countries, as was the case in East Asia, when people first saw what was going on in Japan and subsequently saw what was going on in Korea and Taiwan, it makes a difference. Spiral. Wait, since you brought up Ethiopia, what? Well, your book came out earlier this year. Before, I think it was in 2020, Ethiopia, there was a civil war that broke out in Ethiopia. So I'm curious how you think of the relationship between economic development, the Ethiopian economic success story versus political stability. Because I imagine, you know, had you maybe written this book in 2019 or something like that, You already hold out Ethiopia as a success story in the current version, but maybe it would have been even more of a success story before the Civil War. To be honest, the remarkable thing is that the policy tracks that were laid in Ethiopia prior to the civil war, combined with some adjustments and more opening to the private sector that's come under Arby, the current PM, have just meant that the economy kept growing 5-6% through the civil war. So, you know, that is that's what happens when you build institutional capability and you get the right policies in place. But it's a fact of life in Africa. And again, it goes back to demographics that ethnic cleavage is present in pretty much every society on the continent. uh, term groups didn't it seems from what historians can make out come into conflict [40:00] very much because whenever conflict was brewing, one group or the other would just take off and there was always more land available. There was always massive amounts of land for people. And so all these thousands of different groups with 3,000 different languages were continued to survive. But of course today with population up to 1.5 billion, going to 2.5 billion in 2050, these ethnic groups now are pushing up against each other in a manner that they never have before, and they have to find ways of getting past these kind of visceral ethnic reactions that they sometimes have. You mentioned something there that reminded me of what I wanted to ask you about export manufacturing in particular, which is, again, you think of Africa. And as you said, it's just this huge amount of land, including like some very, very remote tracks of land and nations, landlocked nations in the middle of the continent where it takes days and days and days to actually travel anywhere else. labor competitive edge starts to wear off once you start factoring in the need to, you know, put manufactured goods on a train for three weeks or something like that. Yeah. So just start by contextualizing the bigness of Africa. You can fit China, India, Europe and the United States inside Africa. that's how big it is it's it's crazy big um so And then your question, I think, makes a lot of sense so long as what we are thinking about is africa exporting to other parts of the world but my response to that would be that i think that a lot of export growth in africa most export growth in africa is going to come from exporting to other states within the african continent and the data are beginning to show that The rate of growth of exports within the continent is already growing faster than to other parts of the world. It doesn't mean that Africa won't export to other parts of the world. It just kind of depends where you are. on this huge continent. If you're up in North Africa, if you're in Morocco, and you're only 14 kilometers away from Europe, it makes sense to be exporting, which is why two of the are making their cars there now and aerospace and other manufacturers that need to be close to Europe at what low costs have gone there. To Morocco? To Morocco, yeah. There's a development called Tangier Med, Tangier, up there, just basically near the closest bit to Europe. And they've opened industrial parks. Not huge, but there's, you know, 100,000 plus people working in the industrial parks there doing cars and aerospace stuff and other things. Can you talk a little bit more about, I think it was in your book that I saw, or maybe it was something, it was probably in your book, maybe it was something that I saw after reading it, but like this phenomenon that what makes Africa or what had made Africa unusual is that you didn't have this great landless peasant movement. the public and that in Africa that had never really been the issue. And that makes it a fundamentally different story. Can you talk a little bit more about just the sort of weird reverberations that come from a underlying condition where land is just not a particularly scarce resource? Yeah, it's very un-Asian. So after the Second World War in East Asia, land was the most explosive issue because there just wasn't enough of it. And that's why the Chinese Communist Party won control of the country largely by redistributing land and giving land to people who agreed to fight for the People's Liberation Army. and even in the 70s when the US was losing in Vietnam, sent people in to start doing land reform just before the fall of Saigon. But it was too late. So that is demographics. And then the demographics of Africa, as we've been saying, [45:00] It's a very sparse population, so everybody's got land. The only place that I'm aware of in Africa, in 55 countries that ever had any kind of land reform was, oh, well, there was Kenya. I suppose there was in the highlands in Kenya, there was, but I was thinking of Zanzibar. which was a very particular case because you had this sort of feudal Amani elite who owned all the land when it became independent. But no, that's been the case. And there are still large parts of countries that have super abundant land. I mean, somewhere like Tanzania, there's still loads of land left. But because of population growth, there are other parts of the African continent where there is now some rising land pressure. lakes, in the Ethiopian highlands, and some bits of West Africa as well. But yes, as you say, it's not been an issue, scarcity of land in Africa. The problem in Africa was scarcity of people. Well, but there is still scarcity of assets that make the land viable as well, right? And the only reason I know that is because I read the chapter on Botswana, where you talk about how, all the elites own the boreholes that produce the water for the cattle. And so you still end up with a very... unequal economic society. Yes, exactly. You can still get that. And there's a tendency all over Africa today as demand for foodstuffs increases, as Africa has now had for 25 years, the fastest rate of the whole continent has had the fastest rate of agricultural growth in the world, just over 4%. There is the tendency for urban wealthy people, you know, what I refer to as African kulaks in the book, to buy up chunks of land or lease chunks of land and displace peasant farmers. So for the first time now in Africa, you're beginning to see a kind of landless peasantry, something that has never existed before. Tracy, do you know what the etymological root of the word kulak is? No. Do you know Joe? I don't know. No, it's good. You've stumped us. Yeah. It means fist as in they were perceived to be tight fisted. And so that they were like, had, yeah, that's like where that word came from. That's like the one thing I, I know about them. All right. Last question for me, you know, like I've never been, I do want to travel to Africa, but it's a whole continent. I've never been particularly interested in the past because I'm not interested like, I'm like going on, you know, seeing wild animals or something like that. I want to visit a city. I like to see how people live and how urban economies are happening, etc. Where would you recommend I buy a ticket to? I think you've got to see Lagos. It's just insane. I mean, just the... the people, the chaos, you know, and yeah, you just... I got my son a jersey from when we were in Madrid. I got my son a jersey from the team Atletico Madrid. And on the jersey, they're sponsored by the Rwanda Tourism Board. And so on his jersey that he wears, it says Visit Rwanda. So would you recommend also Kigali Chopra? Yeah, I mean, that then will blow your mind because it's about the cleanest city in the world. You know, Kagame sends people out on Saturday morning picking up litter. There isn't much litter to pick up, but I mean, you know, polishing, polishing the city. Lee Kuan Yew coding. Yeah, right. And so, right. So when you mentioned the cleanliness aspect... That's interesting. Where is Rwanda on that trajectory? And could you see a plausibility where it's a tiny landlocked country, unlike Singapore that has ports and stuff like that? But could it be the sort of like financial capital of Africa where that's the first stop for money, which then is invested elsewhere? Thank you. I don't know that it will be. I mean, I don't think there'll be a single financial center for Africa. I think that's unlikely, but I think that Kigali can be one of them. You know, they've done a very good job bringing in tech people. They've done a very good job making it a conference center. They've done a very good job bringing in various multilateral organizations. [50:00] to be headquartered there. And of course, you know, what no one talks about is the fact that Kagame has expanded his country by essentially manipulating Eastern DRC, separating it from the rest of the DRC, and running it as a sort of Rwandan colony, which is handy because it's got, I mean, the world has got a little bit more tough in diplomatic terms on Kagame in the last sort of two, three years, but not very tough. And... Yeah, he plays an extraordinary, but I think, you know, utterly ruthless. And Actually, this just reminded me, there's a through line between how Asia works and how Africa works. There's a bunch of them. But the other one we haven't talked about yet is the importance of finance, and I guess, directed lending to developmental projects. And it seems like Rwanda in particular, setting itself up as the sort of Singaporean model, I think they chose not to have capital controls at all. Thanks. When you think about finance in developing economies, you might often think about corruption and the difference between a legitimate developmental loan to an up and coming company versus, you know, a crony of the president or something can sometimes be very narrow. But what's the importance of finance here and how are you thinking about it? Okay, well, I mean, first on Rwanda, you're right. So Rwanda wants to be Singapore. So they are looking to have no capital controls so that money can freely come in and out because they want to... get all money related to Eastern DRC, money from other wealthy people who kind of feel secure about keeping it in Kigali. So they're not in a developmental category game whereby they want to control their domestic finances for development. But that is what the tradition from East Asia is when you have a developmental state. One of the key things that you do is that you have capital control so that your domestic savings are locked down and your population can't decide to move its money to New York to get a better rate of return. The money stays at home. And then you have a banking system, which, and there are a number of ways, been done but essentially you have a banking system which takes a lot of direction from government and also gets a bit of subsidy fiscal subsidy as well to support it for losses that may be incurred in supporting industrial policy so you know inevitably money is very important. And I wouldn't say that things have changed much in terms of what you want to do if you are more of a developmental state. So I mean, I've been very intrigued by the reporting of Ethiopia over the last couple of years, which has been, I don't know on Bloomberg, but widely reported to have got rid of capital controls, which is completely untrue. They've we all know, as capital controls. And so, you know, but they're open on the trade account so that investors in Ethiopia now know that the foreign exchange, they can get it in and they can remit it to their ultimate goal. owners. However, across Africa, if we look across 55 countries, what we see is that most countries got rid of capital controls, and they did so at on the advice of the IMF and the World Bank. That means that then you get private banks that are interested to come in and invest, and they go, oh, look, all these foreign banks have come and invested. Isn't that good? But what the private banks do that come and invest is basically just push out consumer credit. And it's not conducive to development of domestic industrial capacity just to have your banks lending people money to buy imported motorcycles. Joe Studwell, it's fascinating. We could go on for a very long time. It's a shame that it took us so long for us to get you on the podcast, but very fascinating new book, very fascinating new work, and I think something that maybe – You know, I feel as though So many of the stories we hear these days are just over and over again. China does this, AI does this, China... Trump did this. I find it refreshing to hear this topic that kind of feels un-zeitgeisty, but also very interesting and important. So I really appreciate you taking your time. Thank you. See you guys. [55:00] I thought that was super interesting. I thought it was like really, you know, look, you're talking about like, it's just such a cliche and you have to mention Africa as a place is just extraordinarily diverse and like there's no common geography or common anything. The point about like land abundance and labor sparsity as this sort of like defining aspect. And then the way I hadn't really like put it together, which is like, if you can have, The unfortunate tribes that are totally separate. And then suddenly you draw a big square around them or you draw a big shape around them. And they have no internal cohesiveness. You can understand how that creates this sort of permanent political problem. Right. Well, the thing I find really interesting about the other Joe's argument is the population density aspect of it. Because that feels to me like something which... is changing. You can see it in the numbers that it's starting to change. And if you do get more dense cities, I guess just more customers for potential goods produced within Africa, then that takes care of a lot of the manufacturing challenges that you could foresee. When you think about manufacturing, you think normally like, okay, we're going to produce stuff cheaply, and we're going to export it. And then we're going to do the flying geese thing. And then we're going to do the monkeys swinging from the trees thing. And that's how we become a developed economy. But then as you were pointing out, you know, Development doesn't happen in a vacuum. You have huge competition from places like China. You also have a broad landscape globally of just people becoming more protective with their own trade. Right. So so that would be a massive challenge for a place like Africa. Again, not a monolith, but. We're talking about it as such. But... If the population density means that the domestic market actually increases, then... Then that's a huge market. It could be a huge market. Totally. By the way, did you see this story? It didn't come up that Morocco named a highway after President Trump. No, I didn't. OK, so there is a story that is like it's funny. And for whatever the reason, there's a Trump highway. through Morocco into Europe. And this is the key bit that they're hoping to get financing from the American Export Import Bank to build that. And suddenly I was like, oh, maybe I do get why you would want to name your highway after President Trump. But like, anyway. Can I say one thing about Moroccan highways? Yeah. I know you're a fan of Buc-ee's. Oh, yeah. Moroccan gas stations are amazing. I gotta go. You would love them. And they actually have really, really good food and are extremely dependable and for the most part clean. But the food is the thing to go for. I really want to go. So, OK, we're going to do live odd lots in at the Dengote or, you know, we'll take a tour of the Dengote refinery. I'll go to Lagos with you. I haven't been. We should go. And great. We'll make that happen. All right. Shall we leave it there? Let's leave it there. This has been another episode of the All Thoughts Podcast. I'm Tracy Allaway. You can follow me at Tracy Allaway. And I'm Jill Wazenthal. You can follow me at The Stalward. Follow our guest, Joe Studwell. He's at Joe Studwell. Follow our producers, Kerman Rodriguez at Kerman Armand, Dashiell Bennett at Dashpot, Kale Brooks at Kale Brooks, and Kevin Lozano at Kevin Lloyd Lozano. And for more All Thoughts content, you should check out our daily newsletter. And you can chat about all of these topics 24-7 in our Discord, discord.gg. Thank you. Hi, I'm Barry Ritholtz, inviting you to join me for the Masters in Business podcast. Every week, we bring you conversations with the people who shape markets, [60:00] investing and business. I speak with CEOs, Nobel laureates, market innovators and legendary investors. Whether you own stocks, bonds, real estate, commodities, even crypto, these are discussions you absolutely need to hear. Subscribe to the Masters in Business podcast on Apple, Spotify or anywhere you listen.