Chicago Fed President Austan Goolsbee says the central bank must abandon crisis-era forward guidance and withhold further rate cuts until stubborn services inflation definitively heads toward 2%.
## Background
Published by Bloomberg on August 28, 2026, on the Odd Lots podcast feed, this episode features Chicago Fed President Austan Goolsbee speaking from the Jackson Hole Economic Symposium. According to the show description, the discussion explores why central bankers are anxious about an overheating economy driven by AI and data center buildouts, Goolsbee's skepticism of unobservable metrics like r*, and the Fed's evolving approach to forward guidance and reaction functions.
## TL;DR
Austan Goolsbee examines whether current monetary policy is genuinely restrictive, arguing that real interest rates remain insufficient if underlying inflation hovers near or above 3%. He dismisses r* as a theoretical 'Sasquatch' impractical for near-term decisions and separates localized resource bottlenecks in AI data center construction from broad-based macroeconomic overheating. Supporting a pullback from crisis-era forward guidance and dot plots, Goolsbee emphasizes communicating a predictable, data-driven reaction function focused on tangible disinflation in sticky services. He also sheds light on boardroom dynamics under Chairman Kevin Warsh and explains the rationale behind his past dissent during a federal data blackout.
## Atmosphere & style
The dialogue blends relaxed, outdoor symposium banter with sharp macroeconomic debate, opening with jokes about Grand Teton bear sightings before tackling rigorous monetary theory. Goolsbee speaks with accessible academic wit and insider candor, using colorful analogies to demystify complex committee mechanics and boardroom culture without institutional stiffness. The interaction with hosts Joe Weisenthal and Tracy Alloway feels collegiate, intellectually brisk, and unvarnished throughout.
## Key takeaways
- `00:00` Monetary policy restrictiveness is determined by real interest rates rather than headline nominal rates; if underlying inflation runs at 3% or higher, policy remains far less restrictive than widely perceived.
- `04:47` Austan Goolsbee treats r* (the neutral rate) as a theoretical construct that cannot be observed in real time, noting that anticipated AI productivity booms can paradoxically create short-term demand overheating before boosting long-term supply.
- `07:22` Supply shocks like tariffs and energy spikes complicate inflation dynamics, but stubbornly high services inflation prevents the Fed from assuming disinflation is simply around the corner.
- `10:35` Localized bottlenecks from AI data centers—such as land, power, and electrician shortages—only constitute macroeconomic overheating if they spill over into aggregate wage and price pressures across the broader economy.
- `15:00` The Federal Reserve relies on blunt interest rate tools to cool aggregate demand regardless of whether growth is driven by consumption or capital investment, especially after months of weak productivity data.
- `18:00` The post-COVID inflation spike was driven roughly two-thirds by supply disruptions and one-third by demand, with aggressive rate hikes succeeding primarily by keeping long-term inflation expectations firmly anchored.
- `25:00` Rising long-term bond yields reflect shifting inflation expectations, higher-for-longer rate paths, and heavy Treasury issuance rather than market panic over U.S. default risk, adhering to Paul Volcker's principle that markets react to Fed policy rather than set it.
- `27:18` Goolsbee endorses Kevin Warsh's push to scale back explicit forward guidance to avoid tying the central bank's hands, distinguishing between listening to market price signals and being dictated by them.
- `29:45` Communications tools like the dot plot, post-meeting press conferences, and extended forward guidance were crisis-era mechanisms designed for the zero lower bound that now warrant fundamental reassessment.
- `32:00` The Summary of Economic Projections (SEP) often misleads the public by conflating anonymized median forecasts with a unified reaction function, damaging credibility when unpredictable shocks hit.
- `35:00` Sticky nominal wage growth acts as a lagging indicator rather than an insurmountable barrier to disinflation, because wages naturally surge after price shocks to catch up with the cost of living.
- `37:15` The 'Goolsbee reaction function' demands concrete empirical proof that inflation is returning to 2% before supporting rate cuts, which motivated his dissent against front-loaded easing.
- `39:50` Goolsbee dissented against rate cuts during a federal government shutdown because easing monetary policy during a total macroeconomic data blackout was unwarranted.
- `45:00` So-called 'silent dissents' occur because non-voting regional Fed presidents rotate annual voting rights, requiring non-voting members to voice policy disagreements primarily through speeches and public commentary.
- `46:50` Chair Kevin Warsh has reshaped the FOMC's internal culture to encourage sharper debate and rethink institutional habits, while former chair Jerome Powell continues serving as a committee member.
- `48:45` The central bank's upcoming policy stance hinges on whether leadership diagnoses current inflation as persistent or self-resolving, which will dictate how quickly interest rates are adjusted.
## Detailed walkthrough
### `00:00` Odd Lots at Jackson Hole and Assessing Monetary Restrictiveness
Broadcasting from the Jackson Hole Economic Symposium, *Odd Lots* hosts Joe Weisenthal and Tracy Alloway sit down with Chicago Fed President Austan Goolsbee. After trading lighthearted banter about wildlife sightings in the Grand Tetons—where Goolsbee jokes that seeing a black bear with the show's producers rather than a moose is hopefully not an omen for the wider economy—the hosts dive straight into the core debate surrounding monetary policy. Weisenthal asks whether current Federal Reserve policy should be characterized as restrictive given the prevailing yield curve and economic conditions.
Goolsbee argues that whether policy is truly restrictive depends entirely on what one believes the underlying rate of inflation to be. What matters for macroeconomic conditions is the real rate (nominal interest rates minus expected or actual inflation). While Goolsbee views a 3% nominal rate alongside 2% inflation (equating to a 1% real rate) as a reasonable eventual landing spot in the long run, current real rates look far less restrictive if underlying inflation is running at 3% or higher. Because the inflation trajectory over the preceding six months has looked concerning rather than clearly descending to target, he remains cautious about declaring policy sufficiently tight.
- **Event Setting**: Recorded at the Jackson Hole Economic Symposium on August 27.
- **Long-Run Neutral Benchmark**: Loosely framed around a 3% nominal policy rate, 2% inflation, and a 1% real interest rate.
- **Underlying Inflation Constraint**: If inflation runs at 3%-plus, the real rate remains substantially lower than headline nominal rates suggest, muddying the restrictiveness assessment.
```mermaid
flowchart TD
accTitle: Real Rate Determination Flowchart
subgraph Drivers["Policy and Inflation Rates"]
Nominal["Nominal Fed Policy Rate"]
Inflation["Underlying / Expected Inflation Rate"]
end
subgraph Outcome["Macroeconomic Stance"]
Real["Real Rate Calculation<br>(Nominal - Inflation)"]
Restrictive["Restrictive Policy Stance<br>(Cools Demand)"]
Accommodative["Insufficiently Restrictive<br>(Allows Overheating)"]
end
Nominal --> Real
Inflation --> Real
Real -- "If Inflation Moderates toward 2%" --> Restrictive
Real -- "If Inflation Stagnates at 3%+" --> Accommodative
```
---
`04:47` The "R-Star as Sasquatch" Dilemma and AI Productivity Shocks
Addressing Tracy Alloway's question on whether structural shifts like artificial intelligence provide any clearer view of $r^*$ (the neutral rate of interest), Goolsbee expresses deep skepticism regarding the metric's practical utility for near-term policymaking. Drawing on his thirty years in academia, he labels $r^*$ as the Fed's "Sasquatch"—a theoretical construct that can never be observed in real time, only suspected in retrospect once footprints are left behind. Consequently, he finds it unhelpful when deciding what the central bank's next interest rate move should be.
Over the longer horizon, however, structural increases in productivity growth necessarily push steady-state $r^*$ higher, as faster trend growth requires a higher equilibrium interest rate. Reflecting on a framework he presented at the Hoover Institution, Goolsbee explains that the macroeconomic impact of AI depends heavily on whether technological gains arrive unexpectedly or through front-loaded anticipation:
```mermaid
flowchart LR
accTitle: Productivity Shock Scenarios
subgraph Shocks["AI Productivity Shock Scenarios"]
direction TB
Unexpected["<b>Unexpected Supply Shock</b><br>Productivity lands unannounced"]
Expected["<b>Expected / Hyped Technology Bounty</b><br>Anticipated massive future returns"]
end
subgraph Results["Economic Outcomes"]
direction TB
Disinflation["Inflation declines;<br>Near-term rates can fall"]
Overheating["Front-loaded spending & investment boom;<br>Economy overheats; Rates must rise"]
end
Unexpected --> Disinflation
Expected --> Overheating
```
This dynamic mirrors the late 1990s tech boom, where elevated expectations and massive capital deployment created short-run demand overheating that required tighter monetary policy even alongside rising productivity.
---
`07:22` Decomposing Inflation: Transitory Supply Shocks vs. Sticky Services
When decomposing the drivers behind stubbornly warm inflation data, Goolsbee notes the difficulty of separating distinct economic shocks. Prior to recent policy shifts, he had cautioned that large supply shocks—such as newly implemented tariffs—can take far longer to work through the system than standard models forecast. Compounding tariff-induced price level shifts with energy price increases driven by war has created a messy, overlapping set of cost-push pressures.
While one-off price level jumps in goods and commodities should theoretically dissipate without causing ongoing inflation, Goolsbee points out that services inflation remains high. Services pressures cannot be pinned on tariffs or global oil shocks, which presents a deeper underlying concern for the Federal Reserve. Acknowledging that using the term "transitory" gives him "hives" after the post-pandemic experience, he emphasizes that the Fed cannot continuously assume that disinflation is just one quarter away. Instead, policymakers should wait for hard evidence across multiple data prints before acting.
Furthermore, repeated supply shocks alter the nature of central banking. While traditional business cycles feature demand-driven trade-offs—where unemployment rises as inflation falls—supply shocks push unemployment and inflation in the same direction, depriving policymakers of an easy playbook. This cascading uncertainty has manifested in a distorted labor market characterized by an unusual combination of low hiring and low firing.
---
`10:35` AI Data Center Buildouts: Sectoral Scarcity vs. Macroeconomic Overheating
Joe Weisenthal turns to the massive physical capital expenditures pouring into data centers and hardware, asking whether AI is creating real-resource bottlenecks across labor, materials, and power components. Goolsbee acknowledges that executive feedback from the Seventh Federal Reserve District frequently highlights severe localized constraints:
- **District Feedback**: During visits to places like Cedar Rapids, Iowa, local businesses report that data center developers are buying up vast tracts of land, driving up property prices, and monopolizing specialized labor.
- **Resource Bottlenecks**: Contractors, electricians, and HVAC technicians are in short supply, creating sharp sectoral cost pressures.
Despite these intense bottlenecks, Goolsbee distinguishes between sectoral resource reallocations and true aggregate overheating. An industry complaining bitterly about competing for electricians does not by itself prove the broader macroeconomy is running beyond capacity—unless those pressures break out of their specific lane to bid up aggregate wages and output across the nation. However, if massive capital expenditure creates broad-based excess demand above potential output and reverses disinflation, it indicates that monetary policy is simply not restrictive enough.
`15:00` Consumption vs. Investment Growth and the Productivity Mirage
Addressing the question of how the Federal Reserve distinguishes between an economy propelled by consumer spending versus one driven by capital investment, Austan Goolsbee explains that in the short run, the policy distinction is minimal. When demand pushes past capacity, the Fed relies on a blunt, "very unsophisticated tool"—raising or lowering benchmark interest rates. Because the most cyclical sectors of the economy are also the most interest rate-sensitive, monetary policy acts as the "tip of the spear" regardless of whether overheating originates in runaway housing construction, consumer spending fueled by a collapsed savings rate, or massive business investment outstripping supply.
```mermaid
flowchart TD
accTitle: Short-Term vs Long-Term Policy Dynamics
subgraph ShortRun["Short-Run Shock (Demand-Driven)"]
A["Overheating Sources:<br>Consumption, Housing, or AI Investment"] --> B["Fed's Blunt Tool:<br>Policy Rate Adjustments"]
B --> C["Hits Interest-Sensitive<br>& Cyclical Sectors"]
end
subgraph LongRun["Long-Run Potential (Supply-Side)"]
D["Productivity Growth<br>('Manna from Heaven')"] --> E["Expands Potential GDP Growth to ~3%"]
E --> F["Higher Equilibrium Rates (r*)<br>for Healthy Reasons"]
end
```
In the long run, however, the source of growth matters substantially. Sustained capital investment in technology can lift potential output, yielding non-inflationary productivity growth—an outcome Goolsbee describes as "manna from heaven." In that scenario, higher baseline interest rates would be welcomed as a sign of an economy expanding at 3% with rising real incomes for healthy reasons. Yet, Goolsbee urges caution against prematurely declaring a new economic regime, warning that despite optimism around emerging technologies, the economy has logged six consecutive months of lackluster productivity numbers.
- **Short-Term Policy Transmission:** The Fed manages short-run demand overheating through rate adjustments because cyclical sectors are the most responsive to financing costs.
- **Productivity Realities:** While technology investments promise long-run capacity gains, recent data showed six consecutive months of weak productivity growth, warranting skepticism toward claims of an immediate regime shift.
---
`18:00` Deconstructing Post-COVID Inflation and the Anchoring of Expectations
Reflecting back from August 2026 on the unusual nature of the post-pandemic cycle—where the housing market cooled dramatically while the broader labor market stayed resilient—Goolsbee shares his perspective on why inflation receded without triggering an economic crash. He estimates that the initial surge in inflation was driven roughly "two-thirds by supply and one-third by demand." Criticizing commentators on both sides who attempt to have it both ways—blaming stimulus for the spike while attributing the decline entirely to healing supply chains—he argues that monetary policy played an indispensable role.
The primary triumph of the aggressive rate hiking cycle was preventing long-term inflation expectations from unmooring. Goolsbee points out that even as headline CPI approached double digits (near 10%), five-year and ten-year TIPS breakeven rates held firm at around 2.3% CPI, which directly maps to the Fed's 2.0% PCE target. Standard historical models or an AI trained on prior cycles would have prescribed taking rates to 20% and forcing a brutal recession to tame such high inflation. Instead, the Fed recognized that an "immaculate disinflation" was achievable because a significant portion of the shock was transient supply disruption, even if policymakers were admittedly "slow out of the gate" when inflation first emerged.
- **Inflation Breakdown:** Goolsbee views the post-COVID inflation surge as roughly two-thirds supply disruption and one-third excess demand.
- **Inflation Expectations Anchor:** Throughout the spike toward 10% CPI, TIPS inflation compensation stayed anchored around 2.3% CPI (consistent with the 2.0% PCE target).
- **Historical Model Divergence:** Conventional models would have demanded punitive rate hikes (up to 20%) to crush inflation, overlooking the possibility that supply-side normalization could bring inflation down without surging unemployment.
---
`21:15` Commercial Break: Agentic Commerce and MBA AI Preparedness
The broadcast pauses for institutional messaging. PayPal highlights the advent of "agentic commerce," emphasizing the importance of transaction security and consumer trust as automated AI agents begin handling retail discovery and purchasing decisions.
Following this, Carol Masser delivers the *Bloomberg Tech Minute* sponsored by ChatGPT. Reporting on a Graduate Management Admission Council (GMAC) survey of corporate recruiters hiring 2026 business school graduates, the segment reveals that traditional foundational skills—communication, problem-solving, and adaptability—remain the top traits sought in MBA hires. Dedicated artificial intelligence training ranked in the bottom third of recruiter priorities for recent graduates, even though recruiters expect AI fluency to grow in importance over the next five years. For now, employers view business school graduates as only somewhat prepared for AI and primarily seek candidates capable of using AI tools to automate routine workplace workflows.
`25:00` Bond Yields, the Long End, and the Volcker Principle
The discussion pivots from TIPS (Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities) to the broader bond market, where a puzzling dynamic has emerged: short-term interest rates remain relatively steady, while longer-term yields have climbed significantly, even as TIPS fail to price in much inflation. Asked how a central banker interprets this steepening at the long end of the curve, Austan Goolsbee cautions against obsessing over every temporary blip and tweet. Disentangling the underlying drivers takes time. A surge in long-term yields can reflect higher inflation expectations, an assumption that the Federal Reserve will hold policy rates elevated for longer, or simply a surge in supply and competition from heavy Treasury issuance—and it is likely an amalgam of all three.
He firmly rejects the catastrophic narrative that the spike in long yields signifies panic over the creditworthiness or default risk of the United States. If markets genuinely feared a U.S. sovereign default, yields would not be sitting around 5% or 5.25%, which remains a historically standard level. While the Fed must monitor these market movements because borrowing costs affect real economic conditions, policymakers must navigate what Goolsbee calls the "reflection problem": market prices inevitably reflect what investors anticipate the central bank will do next. In anchoring his mindset, Goolsbee invokes the blunt advice once given to him by former Fed Chairman Paul Volcker:
> "Our job is to act and the market's job is to react, and let's not get the order mixed up."
- **Potential drivers of higher long-term yields**:
- Rising long-run inflation expectations.
- Anticipation that the Fed's policy path will remain higher for longer.
- Heightened bond issuance and supply competition in the Treasury market.
- **Credit risk skepticism**: Yields around 5.00% to 5.25% reflect historically normal baseline rates, not a widespread market belief in an imminent U.S. default.
- **Statutory mandate**: Under the Federal Reserve Act, the Fed is legally mandated to pursue maximum employment and price stability—asset prices in the stock or bond markets are merely inputs to analyze, not masters to obey.
---
`27:18` Embracing Less Forward Guidance vs. Listening to Markets
The hosts bring up former Fed Governor Kevin Warsh's argument that the central bank should dramatically pull back on forward guidance, treating the bond market less like a referee and more like a player sending useful price signals. Goolsbee agrees with the spirit of re-evaluating institutional habits, emphasizing that it is healthy for any organization to periodically question its routine operations. Speaking strictly for himself rather than the FOMC as a whole, Goolsbee reveals that he has personally embraced Warsh's push to dial back explicit forward guidance.
When central bankers publicly pre-commit to rate paths—declaring where borrowing costs will be in six months or promising rate hikes or cuts if a single condition is met—it handcuffs the committee and amplifies market volatility. However, Goolsbee distinguishes between abandoning explicit promises and letting the market dictate policy. Bond markets provide valuable real-time information, but the Fed's legal mandate is price stability and maximum employment, not keeping financial indices calm. Central bankers must extract market intelligence without mistaking market movements for policy instructions.
```mermaid
flowchart TD
accTitle: Market Feedback vs Fed Policy Mandate
accDescription: Diagram showing how economic data guides the Fed mandate while market prices serve purely as informational inputs, avoiding a circular feedback loop.
subgraph FedDecision ["Federal Reserve Mandate & Reaction"]
Statute["Federal Reserve Act<br/>(Max Employment & Price Stability)"]
Reaction["Fed Reaction Function<br/>(How tools adjust to data)"]
Action["Policy Action<br/>(Setting the Policy Rate)"]
end
`29:45` Zero-Lower-Bound Relics and the Modern Fed Communication Review
The conversation turns to the history of the Fed's communications toolkit. The hosts observe that press conferences, dot plots, and explicit forward-guidance regimes are remarkably recent inventions—crafted primarily as emergency fixes during the Great Recession and the zero lower bound (ZLB) crisis of 2008–2009. Goolsbee nods to the physical symbol of the boardroom—noting that the FOMC table is the largest table he has ever seen in his life—and insists that absolutely every tool should be on that table for reconsideration, including the frequency of FOMC meetings and whether press conferences or the dot plot should be modified or discarded entirely.
An outside-led task force is actively reviewing these communications practices. Back during the aftermath of the 2008 crisis, nominal rates were pinned at zero, and standard macroeconomic policy rules suggested ideal rates deep in negative territory (with Goolsbee joking that Taylor-style rules implied rates like negative 96%). Under those extreme conditions, unconventional tools such as qualitative forward guidance (pledging that rates would stay zero until unemployment fell below a threshold, known as the Evans Rule) were necessary innovations. Today, with the economy operating far away from the zero lower bound, Goolsbee argues that the rationale behind these crisis-era instruments no longer holds up, making a complete reassessment essential.
The hosts share an aside about their own careers at Bloomberg, reminiscing about the early panic among journalists and visual designers when the dot plot was first introduced and newsrooms had to assemble all-hands task forces to figure out how to chart the dots for readers. One host humorously compares the introduction of the dot plot to a generational milestone—akin to where someone was when the Bank of England retired its fan charts.
---
`32:00` The Problems with the SEP and Demarcating Reaction Functions
Goolsbee lays out his long-standing, public criticisms of the Summary of Economic Projections (SEP). When Fed officials write down explicit forecasts for variables like GDP, unemployment, and inflation across one-, two-, three-year horizons and the long run, those numbers are treated by the public as hard promises or prophecies. When economic shocks inevitably throw those projections off course, central bank credibility takes a hit, leaving critics to dismiss policymakers as "bozos" who failed to predict the future.
Furthermore, Goolsbee explains why the dot plot fails in its purported mission to illuminate the Fed's reaction function:
- **Disconnected Median Data Points**: The median dot for interest rates and the median projection for inflation or unemployment often come from completely different participants.
- **Unstated Underlying Assumptions**: Because individual dots are anonymized and decoupled from each member's specific macroeconomic model, the public cannot see how any individual policymaker adjusts their rate stance in response to incoming data shifts.
- **Forward Guidance vs. Reaction Function**: Goolsbee and the hosts stress that these two concepts are routinely conflated:
- *Forward Guidance* involves committing to future actions over time horizons ("we will keep rates unchanged for six months"), which unnecessarily ties the Fed's hands and removes flexibility.
- *Reaction Function* communicates the conceptual framework through which policymakers evaluate incoming economic data to deploy their policy tools.
Goolsbee emphasizes that while central bankers should avoid holding the market's hand or promising future rate paths, providing the public with a transparent, cohesive understanding of their reaction function remains vital.
`35:00` Forward Guidance, Reaction Functions, and Wage-Price Dynamics
Austan Goolsbee draws a sharp conceptual line between explicit forward guidance and a central bank's reaction function. Forward guidance, in its literal formulation, involves policymakers committing in advance to specific interest rate adjustments at upcoming meetings—a practice that inherently "ties their hands." By contrast, communicating a reaction function is about transparency regarding how policymakers interpret the macroeconomic landscape, which indicators they prioritize, and what conditions would trigger policy adjustments. In the 2010s following the Global Financial Crisis, for example, the Federal Reserve signaled that it would look past occasional hot inflation prints because repairing the labor market took precedence. Conversely, in 2022 and 2023, the reaction function shifted: policymakers had to signal that they were prepared to tolerate labor market softness in order to forcefully stamp out high inflation.
To illustrate how an analytical worldview shapes a policymaker's reaction function, Goolsbee recounts the prevailing debate when he arrived at the Chicago Fed in early 2023. At the time, conventional commentary argued that inflation could not decline while nominal wage growth remained elevated, since labor constitutes the lion's share of services costs. Goolsbee disagreed, maintaining that this perspective misdiagnoses the underlying sequence of economic shocks. Because wages are notoriously stickier than consumer prices, a supply or demand shock pushes prices up first. Nominal wages subsequently surge to catch up to the cost of living; once price inflation recedes, wage growth eventually follows it down. Viewing high wage growth as a lagging indicator rather than an insurmountable barrier to disinflation kept him from panicking about wage persistence.
```mermaid
flowchart TD
accTitle: Wage and Price Shock Sequence
subgraph ShockSequence["Macroeconomic Shock Sequence"]
A["Macroeconomic Shock Hits"] --> B["Price Inflation Spikes First"]
B --> C["Wage Growth Accelerates to Catch Up"]
C --> D["Price Inflation Cools"]
D --> E["Sticky Wages Gradually Moderate"]
end
subgraph ConventionalError["Conventional Fallacy (Early 2023)"]
F["High Wage Growth"] -.->|"Mistakenly viewed as"| G["Permanent Services Inflation Barrier"]
end
```
- Forward guidance restricts policy flexibility by pre-committing to specific rate moves, whereas a reaction function explains how the committee interprets incoming data.
- The 2010s reaction function tolerated isolated inflation spikes to boost employment, while the 2022–2023 regime accepted labor softening to crush price surges.
- Nominal wages behave as a lagging, sticky metric rather than a leading driver; high wage growth alone does not prevent disinflation.
---
`37:15` Deciphering Chairman Warsh and the "Goolsbee Reaction Function"
The conversation pivots to the communication strategy under Federal Reserve Chairman Kevin Warsh. The host points out that Warsh's press conferences have marked a deliberate departure from his predecessors by phasing out rigid forward guidance. However, this shift has left Wall Street sell-side analysts frustrated, with flood of research notes expressing confusion over what the Fed's current reaction function actually is. When the interviewer presses Goolsbee to demystify Warsh's internal reaction function, Goolsbee quickly ducks the trap with a laugh, noting that members are not permitted to speak on behalf of colleagues: "You constantly try to get me in trouble... Go ask him what his reaction function is. I'm telling you mine."
Pushed to articulate his own criteria—the "Goolsbee reaction function"—he explains that his policy stance is anchored almost entirely to tangible proof on inflation. Reflecting on his decision to dissent against rate cuts at the final Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meeting of the prior year (when he held voting rights), Goolsbee stresses that he was deeply uncomfortable "front-loading" rate reductions on the mere assumption that stubborn inflation would prove transitory. While inflation initially saw substantial progress, that disinflationary momentum stalled and briefly reversed. Even with recent modest easing, progress remains fragile, particularly in sticky core services. Until sustained empirical evidence proves inflation is convincingly returning to the 2% target, Goolsbee remains reluctant to accelerate easing.
- Sell-side market research has consistently demanded greater clarity on the Fed's baseline reaction function in the post-forward-guidance regime.
- Goolsbee dissented against the year-end rate cut due to discomfort with front-loading accommodation without concrete evidence of disinflation.
- Although recent inflation readings show slight cooling, Goolsbee insists policy must remain vigilant until services inflation definitively heads back to the 2% target.
---
`39:50` The Reality of Dissenting and Operating in a Data Blackout
Asked how it feels on a personal level to cast a formal dissent—joking whether he feared FOMC "goons are going to come punch me"—Goolsbee demystifies the internal dynamics of the committee. Far from facing hostile phone calls or institutional retribution from the Chair or colleagues, he found the process respectful and collegial. He had repeatedly communicated his specific benchmarks and made his hesitation about aggressive easing transparent across several meetings prior to casting his vote. Outside the Eccles Building, however, public and market reactions were less restrained, with plenty of external commentators calling him a "jerk."
A critical, complicating factor during that particular rate-cutting meeting was an ongoing federal government shutdown, which created a total macroeconomic data blackout. Goolsbee argued inside the room that cutting rates in the complete absence of official economic reports was reckless: "The government was literally shut down and we didn't even have the data. So my thing was, let's not just keep cutting. We don't even know what's in the data. Like, let's at least get some data before we act." He notes that while the FOMC has seen a mild uptick in dissents recently compared to the near-unanimous eras immediately preceding it, current levels of formal dissent remain exceptionally low by historical standards.
- The dissent occurred during a federal government shutdown that halted official statistical releases, depriving policymakers of crucial economic data.
- Goolsbee advocated for holding rates steady until official data resumed rather than making speculative cuts during a blackout.
- Internal committee discussions remained thoroughly professional and deliberative, despite angry feedback from external market participants.
- FOMC dissents have seen a modest resurgence recently, but stay far below the frequency seen in earlier decades of modern central banking.
---
`41:40` Bloomberg Tech Minute and Mid-Roll Advertisements
The episode transitions into sponsor announcements and a news capsule. Carol Masser presents the *Bloomberg Tech Minute*, sponsored by ChatGPT at Work. The segment examines whether generative AI has truly permeated global corporate workplaces, citing a survey of corporate campus recruiters visiting business schools. The findings indicate that foundational soft skills—specifically interpersonal communication, complex problem-solving, and adaptability—continue to dominate employer priorities, matching the previous year's rankings. Specialized AI training ranked in the bottom third of desired competencies, with recruiters grading current MBA graduates as only "somewhat prepared or less" to operate modern AI tools and criticizing business schools for lagging curricula. Recruiters anticipate, however, that AI automation skills will become significantly more vital over the next five years.
The break wraps up with partner messages from Cincinnati Insurance and Asana:
- **Cincinnati Insurance:** Highlights more than 75 years of experience delivering commercial, home, and asset protection through independent agents, emphasizing crisis preparedness against unforeseen property loss or business interruption.
- **Asana:** Positions itself as an enterprise "operating system for human-agent teams," offering pre-built, no-setup AI teammates across marketing, operations, and IT workflows that automate routine cross-functional tasks.
`45:00` "Silent Dissents" and the FOMC Voting Dynamics
The conversation turns to the mechanics of dissent within the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) following a Goldman Sachs analyst note highlighting "silent dissents" alongside official dissenting votes. Austan Goolsbee clarifies the reality behind the concept: because regional Fed presidents rotate voting rights each year, policymakers sitting around the table who strongly disagree with the majority decision cannot cast an official dissenting vote if it is not their voting year. For those non-voting members, their only avenue of dissent is to outline their views publicly in speeches and media appearances.
Goolsbee pushes back, however, against the idea that members ever vote contrary to their actual beliefs just to maintain false consensus. While transcripts detailing the full word-for-word deliberations are sequestered for five years—with the current batch scheduled for release in four years and nine months—the post-meeting minutes already capture the breadth of perspectives voiced in the room.
Voters --> Official["Cast Official Recorded Dissent"]
NonVoters --> Public["Public Speeches & Policy Commentary"]
Official --> Minutes["Immediate FOMC Minutes & Future Transcripts (5-Year Delay)"]
Public --> Minutes
```
- **Rotation and Voting Rights:** Non-voting reserve bank presidents participate fully in FOMC debates but express policy disagreement primarily through external communication rather than a formal ballot.
- **Transcript Embargo:** Official verbatim meeting transcripts are published after a five-year lag (noted as four years and nine months away for the current cycle).
---
`46:50` The Culture Shift from Powell to Warsh
Reflecting on leadership styles within the FOMC, Goolsbee details how the atmosphere inside the boardroom has shifted under Kevin Warsh compared to Jerome Powell. A unique dynamic is that Powell has not departed entirely; instead, the former chair has literally shifted over a couple of chairs around the table. Goolsbee describes Warsh as bringing an entirely distinct worldview, openly seeking to rethink foundational issues and encourage sharper internal debate.
This cultural shift extends from macroeconomic philosophy down to everyday operational rules. Warsh has introduced subtle institutional changes, such as barring snacks from the press conference room and requiring them to remain outside alongside personal phones. While Goolsbee politely deflects questions about any personal friction between the current and former chairs, he notes that Warsh is actively putting his own imprint on how meetings are formatted and run.
- **Boardroom Dynamics:** Former Fed Chair Jerome Powell continues to serve on the committee, sitting just a few seats away from Chair Kevin Warsh.
- **Meeting Reforms:** Warsh has publicly signaled a desire to encourage more vigorous debate and revise standard committee formats.
---
`48:45` Previewing the Jackson Hole Address and Inflation Persistence
Looking ahead to Warsh’s keynote address at the Jackson Hole Economic Symposium, Goolsbee shares what would cause him to sit up and take notice. Rather than tactical short-term signaling, Goolsbee is hyper-focused on how the chairman frames the Fed's broader reaction function—specifically whether inflation is viewed as persistent or transitory. If policymakers judge inflation to be stubborn and persistent, the central bank will be forced to tighten or maintain higher rates, whereas if it is perceived as self-resolving, policy can take a substantially different posture.
Following the interview, hosts Joe Weisenthal and Tracy Alloway reflect on the critical distinction Goolsbee drew between explicit forward guidance and a predictable policy reaction function. They note that the post-Global Financial Crisis era forced the Fed into unconventional communication—such as the dot plot and extended forward guidance—because Taylor rule models called for an impossible -6% nominal policy rate. In a higher-rate regime, returning to an older model of central banking (reminiscent of Alan Greenspan's shorter statements and absence of press conferences or dots) may render heavy-handed forward guidance obsolete.
- **Core Keynote Focus:** Central bank reaction to persistent versus transitory inflation pressures.
- **Historical Communications Context:** Dot plots and forward guidance emerged to provide monetary accommodation when rates hit the zero lower bound, but task forces are now evaluating whether such extensive communications tools remain necessary.
## Notable quotes
> `25:00` Our job is to act and the market's job is to react, and let's not get the order mixed up. — Paul Volcker
> `15:00` manna from heaven — Austan Goolsbee
> `18:00` two-thirds by supply and one-third by demand — Austan Goolsbee
> `37:15` You constantly try to get me in trouble... Go ask him what his reaction function is. I'm telling you mine. — Austan Goolsbee
> `39:50` The government was literally shut down and we didn't even have the data. So my thing was, let's not just keep cutting. We don't even know what's in the data. Like, let's at least get some data before we act. — Austan Goolsbee
> `04:47` Sasquatch — Austan Goolsbee
> `15:00` tip of the spear — Austan Goolsbee
> `18:00` immaculate disinflation — Austan Goolsbee
## Mentioned
Austan Goolsbee, Joe Weisenthal, Tracy Alloway, Kevin Warsh, Paul Volcker, Jerome Powell, Carol Masser, Alan Greenspan, Odd Lots, Bloomberg, Federal Reserve, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Federal Open Market Committee, Jackson Hole Economic Symposium, Hoover Institution, Bank of England, Graduate Management Admission Council, Goldman Sachs, PayPal, ChatGPT, Cincinnati Insurance, Asana
## Video description
<p>Inflation remains high and the 2% target is farther away than it was this time last year. There are signs all over that the economy is overheating — the strange labor market where hiring and firing remains low, while GDP is growing, but mostly due to AI and the data center buildout — and Chicago Fed President Austan Goolsbee is worried about how uncertain central bankers are about what to do to cool the economy. The next shock, he tells us, could be around the corner. In this conversation, recorded at the Jackson Hole Economic Symposium, Goolsbee explains why he is skeptical of metrics like r*, why he is embracing Kevin Warsh's philosophy around reducing forward guidance, the purpose of the new Fed task forces, and the economic indicators that influence his thinking around reaction function.</p><p>See <a href="https://omnystudio.com/listener">omnystudio.com/listener</a> for privacy information.</p>
Chicago Federal Reserve President Austan Goolsbee warns that persistent inflation undermines the perceived restrictiveness of monetary policy, arguing that central bankers should abandon rigid forward guidance in favor of a data-dependent reaction function.
Real Interest Rates and the Neutral Benchmark (0:00)
Goolsbee contends that determining whether monetary policy is restrictive depends on underlying inflation rather than nominal interest rates. While a 3% nominal rate paired with 2% inflation yields a long-run neutral real rate of 1%, actual policy looks far less restrictive if inflation remains entrenched at or above 3%. Because inflation over the preceding six months showed concerning momentum rather than a clear descent toward the central bank's target, Goolsbee urges caution before declaring financial conditions sufficiently tight.
AI Capex Bottlenecks Versus Aggregate Overheating (4:47)
Weighing the macroeconomic effects of artificial intelligence, Goolsbee labels the unobservable neutral rate (r*) as the central bank's 'Sasquatch'—a theoretical metric visible only in retrospect that offers little practical guidance for near-term rate decisions. Structural gains in productivity can eventually expand potential output to roughly 3% and warrant higher equilibrium rates, but data in recent quarters has reflected sluggish productivity growth. Furthermore, Goolsbee notes that technology shocks present distinct cyclical risks: if expected productivity gains prompt a front-loaded surge in capital expenditure, demand overheats before supply expands.
This dynamic is already producing acute microeconomic pressures. In Seventh District communities such as Cedar Rapids, Iowa, rapid data center construction has absorbed real estate and created localized shortages of electricians, HVAC technicians, and contractors. While Goolsbee stresses that sectoral resource competition does not inherently constitute aggregate macroeconomic overheating, aggressive capital spending that drives up broader wages and stalls disinflation would signal that monetary policy is insufficiently restrictive.
Supply Distortions and Inflation Expectations (7:22)
Analyzing the drivers of post-pandemic inflation, Goolsbee attributes roughly two-thirds of the initial surge to supply disruptions and one-third to excess demand. While goods price shocks tied to tariffs and energy fluctuations complicate policymaking, persistently elevated services inflation remains a distinct concern that cannot be explained away by transitory supply factors. In response, Goolsbee emphasizes that the central bank cannot base decisions on the assumption that disinflation is perpetually one quarter away.
Nevertheless, aggressive rate hikes prevented an economic crisis by keeping long-term inflation expectations anchored. Even as headline CPI approached 10%, five- and ten-year TIPS breakeven rates stayed near 2.3% CPI—consistent with the Fed's 2.0% PCE target. This stability allowed the economy to achieve disinflation without the punitive recessions and 20% rates prescribed by standard historical models.
Reaction Functions Over Forward Guidance (27:18)
Goolsbee advocates for ending rigid forward guidance, aligning with efforts led by Chair Kevin Warsh to scale back crisis-era communication tools. Instruments such as the Summary of Economic Projections (SEP), the dot plot, and threshold-based pledges were adopted when nominal rates hit the zero lower bound following the 2008 financial crisis. With interest rates now far above zero, Goolsbee argues that published forecasts are often misconstrued by the public as binding commitments, which needlessly ties the Fed's hands and damages institutional credibility when unexpected shocks occur.
Instead, Goolsbee stresses that the Fed must clearly articulate its reaction function—how it assesses incoming data—without promising specific policy moves. Illustrating his framework, he explains that high nominal wage growth should be viewed as a lagging reaction to cost-of-living increases rather than an insurmountable barrier to lower inflation. When explaining his dissent against an earlier rate cut during a federal government shutdown, Goolsbee underscored this discipline, arguing that easing policy during an official data blackout was imprudent without empirical proof of disinflation.
Shifting FOMC Culture and Dissent Mechanics (45:00)
Goolsbee clarifies that dissent on the Federal Open Market Committee is often structured by procedural rules rather than personal discord. Because regional Fed presidents alternate voting rights annually, non-voting members who oppose committee consensus must express their reservations through external speeches rather than recorded ballots, even as meeting minutes reflect their arguments. Verbatim transcripts covering these deliberations remain sequestered under a five-year embargo.
Inside the boardroom, the transition from Jerome Powell to Kevin Warsh has ushered in an institutional shift focused on re-evaluating operational routines and fostering debate, with Powell continuing to participate as a seated committee member. Goolsbee notes that his attention remains fixed on whether leadership frames inflation as persistent or transitory, which will ultimately dictate the path of borrowing costs.
The broader trajectory of Fed policy hinges on whether persistent services inflation and localized capital expenditure bottlenecks broaden into aggregate demand overheating. While an external task force reviews the relevance of post-2008 communications tools, the Fed faces the ongoing challenge of steering policy without forward guidance while incoming data remains difficult to parse.
## Background
本期节目由彭博(Bloomberg)旗下的播客节目《Odd Lots》于 2026 年 8 月 28 日在 RSS 及网络平台上发布。根据页面简介,当时通胀依然顽固,经济出现 AI 与数据中心基建拉动下的过热迹象,芝加哥联储主席奥斯坦·古尔斯比(Austan Goolsbee)在杰克逊霍尔全球央行年会期间接受采访,就中性利率(r*)的不可测性、减少前瞻性指引的利弊以及美联储的政策反应函数展开深入探讨。
## TL;DR
在与主持人乔·威森塔尔和特雷西·阿洛韦的深度对谈中,古尔斯比指出当前的实际利率可能并未达到外界想象的紧缩程度,且短期内数据中心与算力基建的资本开支存在加剧宏观总需求过热的风险。他将中性利率(r*)戏称为无法实时观测的“大脚怪”,并坚决主张美联储应放弃僵化束缚双手的前瞻性指引与点阵图中长期预测,转而向外界清晰传递基于数据驱动的政策反应函数。此外,他还披露了新任主席凯文·沃什上任后 FOMC 内部文化的剧烈变革,并重申若缺乏通胀稳定回归 2% 目标的确凿证据,央行必须警惕并对潜在的二次通胀风险保持紧缩定力。
## Atmosphere & style
对谈在大提顿国家公园杰克逊霍尔年会的现场录制,以偶遇黑熊等轻松风趣的开场寒暄切入,迅速转向针锋相对的高密度宏观交锋。古尔斯比延续了其学者出身特有的机智、通俗与直率,用“大脚怪”、对“暂态”过敏起荨麻疹等接地气的比喻化解枯燥的学术概念,同时在谈及投票反对票和新领导层会场新规时展现出微妙而严谨的克制。整个对话节奏紧凑、信息量极大,在幽默风趣的学术闲谈与关乎全球金融神经的严肃推演之间自如切换,充满现场感与宏观政策转折期的微妙张力。
## Bulletin
- `00:00` 芝加哥联储主席奥斯坦·古尔斯比(Austan Goolsbee)对当前通胀保持警惕,指出若基础通胀卡在3%以上,实际利率限制力度将远低于预期,并不支持激进前置降息。
- `04:12` 古尔斯比戏称中性利率(r*)为不可测的“大脚怪”,并警告AI基础设施与数据中心建设热潮若溢出为全社会总需求与劳动力成本过热,当前的政策利率就依然偏松。
- `27:15` 古尔斯比赞成凯文·沃什(Kevin Warsh)削减前瞻性指引(Forward Guidance)的主张,呼吁央行应专注于清晰解释反应函数(Reaction Function),而非预先对利率路径做僵化承诺。
- `29:45` 新任主席沃什上任后重塑了美联储内部沟通与研讨文化,美联储外部特别工作组正全面检视点阵图与经济预测摘要(SEP)等危机时期的沟通机制。
## Key takeaways
- `00:00` 货币政策的实际限制性取决于基础通胀率,若通胀持续处于3%以上,当前的实际利率并未达到能够强力抑制经济的偏紧水平。
- `04:12` 中性利率(r*)在现实中不可实时观测,古尔斯比将其比作“大脚怪”,认为其无法为短期具体的议息会议决策提供实质指引。
- `04:12` AI技术冲击若引发过度炒作与前置资本开支繁荣,将导致短期需求增速超越供给承载力,诱发过热并迫使央行维持或抬高利率。
- `06:40` 本轮通胀上涨与回落粗略呈现“三分之二供给、三分之一需求”格局,持续坚挺的服务业通胀暗示内需惯性依然显著。
- `09:50` 连续供给冲击主导下,劳动力市场呈现反常的“低招聘与低解雇并存”现象,反映雇主在宏观不确定性中的防御性囤工心态。
- `11:15` AI数据中心建设引发了熟练工种和电力土地的局部资源争夺,若这种狂热演变为宏观总需求过热,将坐实当前利率限制力度依然不足。
- `15:00` 长期中性利率若由扎实的生产率提升推高属于健康稳态,但近半年生产率数据疲软,绝不能过早断言经济已步入生产率新时代。
- `20:00` 美联储激进加息的关键功绩在于牢牢锚定了2%的长期通胀预期,成功杜绝了预期的二次脱锚。
- `25:00` 长期美债收益率上升主要源于通胀预期、紧缩维持时间及国债供给竞争,而非主权违约风险,决策者需防范债市的“反身性”陷阱。
- `27:15` 央行应坚决告别预先承诺利率路径的“前瞻性指引”,回归阐明数据依赖逻辑的“反应函数”。
- `32:30` 点阵图和经济预测摘要(SEP)存在中位数预测脱节与损耗公信力的制度缺陷,美联储特别工作组正对其进行系统性检视。
- `35:00` 工资具有后滞粘性,短期名义工资补涨不等于通胀无法回落,决策者应认清通胀率先见顶、工资滞后放缓的微观传导链条。
- `37:25` 古尔斯比阐明其反应函数的核心:反对在缺乏数据验证时过度前置降息,必须紧盯服务业通胀并确信其持续向2%回落。
- `46:40` 沃什执掌美联储后带来截然不同的决策风格,鼓励委员会内部开展更多观点的交锋与制度反思。
## Detailed walkthrough
### `00:00` 杰克逊霍尔年会的开场与黑熊插曲:货币政策是否具有限制性?
彭博播客节目《Odd Lots》的主持人乔·威森塔尔(Joe Weisenthal)与特雷西·阿洛韦(Tracy Alloway)亲临怀俄明州大提顿国家公园的杰克逊霍尔全球央行年会现场录音。本次录制时间为 8 月 27 日,正逢新任美联储主席沃什(Kevin Warsh)发表重磅演说前夕。两位主持人邀请到了节目的老朋友——芝加哥联储主席奥斯坦·古尔斯比(Austan Goolsbee)。在切入严肃的经济政策之前,三人展开了轻松的寒暄。特雷西和乔打趣问他是否在山间偶遇了传闻中的“驼鹿之王”,古尔斯比则笑着透露,自己前一天和节目的几位制作人一同撞见了一只小黑熊,引得特雷西调侃道:“希望这并不预示着宏观经济正走向‘熊市’(Bear Market)。”
寒暄过后,话题迅速切入核心宏观议题:当前美联储的利率水平、收益率曲线以及经济整体运行状态,到底算不算法律意义或经济学意义上的“具有限制性”(restrictive)?古尔斯比指出,这个问题的答案完全取决于人们对“底层基础通胀率”的判断。他强调,在货币政策分析中,真正起作用的是实际利率,即名义政策利率减去预期通胀或实际通胀水平。从长期来看,古尔斯比心目中的稳态着陆点大致是名义利率 3%、通胀率 2%,从而形成约 1% 的实际中性利率。如果当前的基础通胀率仍停留在 3% 以上甚至更高,那么折算出来的实际利率其实远低于外界想象,政策的实际限制力度也就大打折扣。他坦言,尽管自己赞成“走着瞧、边走边看”(wait and see)的审慎观察态度,但过去六个月的通胀走势确实令人有些焦虑,并未展现出持续降温的理想态势。
- **长期中性稳态构想**:政策名义利率约 3%,通胀目标维持在 2%,对应的长期均衡实际利率(Real Rate)约为 1%。
- **实际限制力度的分歧**:若通胀卡在 3% 或更高区间,当前的实际利率并未达到能够强力抑制经济的偏紧水平。
- **近半年物价压力**:过去 6 个月的通胀读数并不尽如人意,导致政策是否真正具备充分限制性引发了内部疑虑。
---
### `04:12` $r^*$ 即“大脚怪”与 AI 生产率冲击的两面性
面对特雷西关于中性利率($r^*$)在 AI 浪潮下是否发生结构性漂移的技术性追问,古尔斯比给出了极其形象且接地气的评价。拥有 30 年学术生涯的他戏称,自己向来主张跳出脱离现实的纯理论象牙塔,在联储内部他一直将 $r^*$ 蔑称为“大脚怪”(Sasquatch)——“你永远不可能在当下亲眼目睹它,只能在它早已离开、留下一个脚印后,才恍然大悟它曾经来过”。正因其实时不可测的特性,古尔斯比认为 $r^*$ 在决定下一次美联储议息会议该加息还是降息时,根本无法提供实质性的指引。
不过,从长期生产率视角来审视,AI 的大规模介入确实会重塑潜在产出增长率。古尔斯比回顾了自己在胡佛研究所会议上的专题演讲,指出技术革新对当期中性利率的影响存在两种截然相反的传导路径,其核心分歧在于这一生产率红利是“意料之外”还是“预期过度”:
```mermaid
flowchart TD
accTitle: AI技术冲击对中性利率与通胀的传导路径
accDescr: 展示意料之外的供给激增与过度炒作的预期繁荣对实际利率和通胀的不同影响
subgraph Unexpected["路径 A:非预期的技术与供给释放"]
A1["技术突破直接转化为供给能力"] --> A2["商品与服务产出激增,物价承压回落"]
A2 --> A3["经济在短时间内无需过度调整行为"]
A3 --> A4["实际均衡利率下降,美联储可降息"]
end
subgraph Hyped["路径 B:过度炒作与前置预期繁荣"]
B1["对未来 AI 生产力红利极度乐观"] --> B2["资本支出、基建借贷与前置消费暴增"]
B2 --> B3["需求端增速远超当期实体供给承载极限"]
B3 --> B4["经济在短周期内迅速过热,迫使央行加息"]
end
```
古尔斯比提醒大家,20 世纪 90 年代中后期的互联网繁荣正是第二种模式的鲜活写照:如果资本市场和企业界将未来的技术红利提前过度变现,资本支出激增就会在短期内推高总需求,引发经济过热,美联储就必须维持甚至提高政策利率以平抑通胀冲动。
- **$r^*$ 的现实局限性**:由于在现实中不可直接观测,难以作为短期货币政策操作的精确校准工具。
- **生产率提高对长期利率的推力**:长期稳态经济增速一旦因技术进步而永久性上移,长期的自然利率和稳态利率水准也必然随之抬高。
- **历史镜像参考**:当前的生成式 AI 狂热同 1990 年代中后期 IT 浪潮前置推高投资需求、诱发经济过热的情形高度神似。
---
### `06:40` 通胀归因之辩:关税、油价与顽固的“暂态”阴影
乔将问题从抽象理论拉回到现实数据,要求古尔斯比对目前高企且隐有反弹迹象的通胀成因进行结构性拆解。古尔斯比回顾了早在“解放日”(Liberation Day)之前以及关税政策落地之初的内部警告:他在 COVID-19 疫情期间吸取了惨痛教训——那些在教科书假设中本应是“暂态”(transitory)的供给冲击,一旦规模过大、链条过长,其消散所耗费的时间往往会大幅超出模型的预测。
在现实宏观冲击的叠加效应下,经济体先是承受了关税带来的价格总水平跃升,而在关税冲击尚未被完全消化前,地缘政治冲突引发的国际油价上涨又接踵而至。这两项因素理论上均属于一次性的外生价格推升,但令古尔斯比更加警惕的是粘性极强的服务业通胀。服务业价格的上涨根本无法甩锅给关税壁垒或原油期货,它折射出更深层次的内需压力。古尔斯比自嘲称,现在每当自己说出“暂态”(transitory)这个曾引发巨大公信力危机的“T 开头词汇”时,自己都会“起一身寻麻疹”(giving myself hives even using that word)。美联储绝不能每个季度都自我安慰通胀将在三个月后自然消失;即便看到一两次向好的数据,也至多能允许联储多观察一两次议息会议,而绝非宣布抗通胀胜利的理由。
- **多重供给冲击叠加**:关税政策带来的价格水平上移与地缘冲突引爆的能源价格震荡相互交织,延长了物价回落周期。
- **服务业通胀的深层隐忧**:核心服务业通胀的坚挺无法归因于贸易政策或大宗商品冲击,暗示总体需求仍然具有惯性。
- **央行审慎性验证**:单一月份或季度的通胀回落不能轻信,必须通过连续数个政策周期的严密验证才能确立降温趋势。
---
### `09:50` 连续供给冲击下的“低招聘、低解雇”怪象与央行思维转变
特雷西进一步发问:既然外部地缘政治、大宗商品和贸易政策层面的意外冲击接二连三,中央银行是否应当在底层政策思维(thinking)中系统性地纳入这种常态化的高波动与不确定性?古尔斯比给出了高度肯定的答复。他剖析指出,传统的宏观调控世界依赖于常规的商业周期需求驱动:在教科书式的菲利普斯曲线下,失业率上升往往伴随着通胀回落,通胀攀升则对应着失业率下降,政策应对有迹可循。
然而,当接二连三的供给冲击主导现实时,通胀上行与经济放缓风险并存,传统政策工具箱便陷入了两难境地。这种由关税摩擦、地缘冲突交织而成的深度不确定性,在当前的劳动力市场中具象化为一种极其罕见的反常动态——“低招聘率与低解雇率并存”(high low hiring, low firing)。企业因对未来大环境极度缺乏安全感而不敢贸然扩招,但同时又因劳动力获取困难而极力囤积现有员工,拒绝裁员。这种非正常的就业黏性充分反映了企业界在持续冲击下的防御心态,也迫使全球央行必须重新审视并重构其应对外生供给冲击的反应机制。
- **传统调控范式失灵**:单纯基于总需求波动的商业周期模型,无法有效应对由连续外部供给冲击引发的“滞胀式”共振风险。
- **劳动力市场的避险异象**:低招聘(Low Hiring)与低解雇(Low Firing)的反直觉结合,是雇主面对政策与宏观高度不确定性时的典型应激行为。
- **央行决策维度的革新**:美联储等全球主要央行必须将“长期处于多重冲击与结构性不确定性中”设为核心假设。
---
### `11:15` AI 与数据中心基建热潮:局部挤出还是全经济过热?
乔将视角转至当下的实体经济微观层面:即便撇开 AI 对未来生产率的深远影响不谈,眼下科技公司对数据中心、电力设施和算力基建的资本开支规模堪称天文数字,这是否已经在物理供应链层面形成了对真实资源的实质性争夺?古尔斯比承认,来自企业高管的类似抱怨确实不绝于耳,但他从宏观经济学角度提出了一个关键的审辨维度:单一产业的繁荣与资源争夺,究竟属于“行业间的相对价格调整与资源挤出”,还是已经蔓延成了“全经济维度的总需求过热”?
```
【行业级资源竞争】 【宏观整体过热传导】
AI数据中心拿地 / 抢夺电力 / 挖角技工 ──► 若其他行业因此被迫收缩投资/开支 ──► 总产出与就业在宏观上净效应持平
│
▼ (若产生溢出效应)
导致建筑工、电工、暖通技工工资普遍暴涨 ──► 传导至全社会工资水平与商品定价 ──► 核心通胀上行,美联储政策偏松
```
如果科技巨头高薪争抢电工和建筑工,导致传统制造业或民用建筑无工可用,但与此同时其他行业被迫收缩,宏观层面的总产出、总体 GDP 增速与全国失业率依然平衡,这就谈不上宏观经济过热。然而,古尔斯比在考察芝加哥联储所辖的中西部地区时,亲眼看到了物理层面的巨大瓶颈。在爱荷华州的锡达拉皮兹(Cedar Rapids),当地商业领袖向他诉苦:数据中心开发商在当地大肆圈地,推高地价,使得普通工程根本无法开工,市场上连一个暖通空调(HVAC)技工或电工都聘请不到。
古尔斯比总结道,一旦这种基建投资狂热溢出自身赛道,演变成全面的劳动力成本推动与过度需求,推动经济总产出持续超出潜在产出上限,通胀将彻底逆转下行轨迹。若事实证明这一幕正在宏观总量层面全面上演,那就坐实了美联储当前的利率水平“根本不够具有限制性”(not restrictive enough),货币政策将不得不面临更加强硬的紧缩压力。
- **微观瓶颈实录**:以爱荷华州锡达拉皮兹为例,数据中心建设对土地储备、电力配额及 HVAC(暖通空调)和专业电工等熟练蓝领劳动力造成了极端挤兑。
- **宏观界定标准**:区分“局部行业资源争夺”与“全社会总需求过热”的核心,在于工资与物价上涨是否突破行业边界,扩散至整体宏观指标。
- **限制性充足性的终极检验**:如果 AI 基础设施的巨额投资已在总量上驱动经济增长超越潜在产出并推高通胀,美联储当前的政策利率就绝非偏紧,而是依然偏松。
### `15:00` 消费驱动与投资驱动:美联储如何应对 AI 浪潮下的经济过热
主持人以一句诙谐的吐槽开场,抱怨自己看牙医竟然得排队等上三个星期,笑称这全得怪“数据中心抢占了资源”。随后对话切入严肃的宏观议题:对美联储货币政策而言,由消费主导的经济增长与由投资(如 AI 基础设施和数据中心建设)主导的增长,究竟存在怎样的区别?芝加哥联储主席奥斯坦·古尔斯比(Austan Goolsbee)指出,就短期商业周期而言,两者的政策应对其实没有太大差别。历史上经济过热的形式多种多样:有时是房地产建设超出了经济承载能力;有时是储蓄率降至零、消费支出过热;而当下则是企业资本投资带来的潜在过热风险。美联储手中的工具本质上是非常粗放的(“a very unsophisticated tool”)——无非就是加息或降息。这一工具之所以能奏效,是因为经济中最具周期性的行业往往也是对利率最敏感的部门,因此央行政策理所当然充当着宏观调控的“矛头”(“tip of the spear”)。
然而放眼长期,两者的影响截然不同。如果当下的巨额资本投资能在未来 5 到 10 年转化为更高的潜在产出并持续推高生产率,那将是经济学界梦寐以求的“天赐甘霖”(“manna from heaven”)。古尔斯比表示,在生产率驱动下,若经济能实现每年 3% 的无通胀增长且居民收入稳步提升,那么即使长期中性利率(r*)维持在较高水平,也是最健康的局面。但他话锋一转,提醒市场保持清醒:尽管他很早就关注技术变革对潜在生产率的提振,但最新数据显示,过去连续六个月的生产率增长其实相当疲软。因此,在技术红利真正全面反映在宏观数据之前,绝不能过早断言我们已经步入了“新时代”。
```mermaid
flowchart TD
accTitle: 资本投资对货币政策的长短期影响路径
accDescr: 展示短期需求过热与长期供给提升在货币政策应对上的差异
subgraph ShortTerm["短期影响:总需求与商业周期"]
A["AI与数据中心资本投资激增"] --> B["总需求扩张超出经济承载力"]
B --> C["美联储运用利率工具逆周期降温"]
end
subgraph LongTerm["长期影响:供给侧潜在产出"]
A --> D{"投资能否实质转化为生产率增长?"}
D -- "若生产率提升" --> E["潜在产出增加 / 实现3%无通胀增长"]
E --> F["长期利率可在健康增长中保持较高水平"]
D -- "若数据持续疲软" --> G["警惕过早假设进入'新时代'"]
end
```
### `18:00` 通胀回落之谜:大激进加息与破除的“房地产即商业周期”
针对疫后通胀从高位大幅回落、而失业率却未见飙升这一“完美去通胀”(immaculate disinflation)现象,讨论转向了美联储在 2022 至 2023 年间激进加息的真实贡献。主持人提到,以往宏观经济学界有一句格言叫“房地产周期就是商业周期”,然而坐在 2026 年 8 月的当下回望,即便房地产市场持续降温受挫,整体经济与通胀的关联却似乎与房地产彻底脱节,甚至通胀在较高水平上还隐现重新抬头的迹象。
关于通胀飙升与回落的归因,古尔斯比直言,政界和学术界往往陷入“双标”的怪圈——批评者在通胀上行时全盘归咎于财政刺激与货币放水,而在通胀下行时却把功劳全推给供应链修复,不给美联储留任何信用。古尔斯比给出了自己的量化视角:他认为通胀大涨大跌的驱动力中,大致是“三分之二归因于供应链冲蚀与修复,三分之一归因于总需求”。尽管加息本身无法直接修理港口拥堵或疏通供应链,但美联储果断采取的激进紧缩,完成了一项至关重要的历史任务:阻止了另一只“致命的靴子”落地。
- **通胀动因拆解**:古尔斯比认为本轮通胀上涨与回落粗略呈现“三分之二供给、三分之一需求”的格局。
- **脱节的传统指标**:房地产市场的持续低迷未能像以往周期那样将整体经济拖入衰退,原有的周期规律在 AI 投资与供给侧调整中被打破。
- **党派与学术争论**:政策辩论双方往往不愿客观面对现实,要么完全忽视货币政策的托底约束,要么彻底无视供给冲击的客观修复。
### `20:00` 锚定 2% 目标与 AI 决策模型的反思
古尔斯比深入阐释了激进加息带来的关键成果:彻底稳住了长期通胀预期。他向听众普及了一个历史经验法则:2.3% 左右的 CPI 通胀率通常对应着美联储 2.0% 的 PCE 核心目标。在 CPI 飙升逼近 10% 的危机时刻,通过通胀保值国债(TIPS)隐含的通胀补偿指标来看,市场对长期 CPI 的预期始终稳稳钉在 2.3% 附近。这强有力地证明,美联储长久确立的 2% 通胀目标发挥了不可替代的“锚”(anchor)的作用。假使美联储行动迟缓导致预期脱锚,治理通胀的代价将不堪设想。
他还打了一个生动的比方:如果当时把历史宏观数据喂给 ChatGPT 或主流 AI 模型,询问通胀达到目标两三倍时美联储该如何应对,AI 给出的答案必定是“把利率暴力拔高至 20%,并制造一场极具破坏力的大衰退”,因为人类历史上的数据样本仅支持这种药方。美联储的功绩在于及时识别出了供给冲击的非永久性,并清醒认识到“完美去通胀”在现实中确实可行。不过,古尔斯比也坦诚承认,回顾当初的启动阶段,美联储的起步行动确实慢了半拍(“they were slow out of the gate”)。
- **通胀锚定指标**:即便 CPI 见顶逼近 10%,TIPS 计入的预期 CPI 依然牢牢锁定在 2.3%,完美贴合 2.0% 的 PCE 调控目标。
- **AI 模型的局限性**:基于历史样本训练的算法只会盲目复刻类似沃尔克时期的极端紧缩与人为衰退,缺乏对非传统供给恢复的动态判断。
- **政策得失客观评价**:美联储初期反应存在滞后,但中期的坚决加息有效杜绝了恶性二次脱锚,给供给侧修复赢得了宝贵窗口。
### `22:00` 商业资讯与彭博科技前沿:企业对 AI 技能的冷思考
在节目的商业赞助与快讯环节,首先讨论了智能电商(Agentic Commerce)兴起背景下数字支付的信任问题。随着消费者越来越多地借助 AI 工具进行产品发现与比价,下单前那一瞬间的信任疑虑成为交易成败的核心,PayPal 正在这一前沿领域为企业提供品牌自主可控的交易底层服务。
随后,彭博主播卡罗尔·马瑟(Carol Masser)播报了由 ChatGPT 赞助的“彭博科技一分钟”(Bloomberg Tech Minute)。根据管理专业研究生入学考试委员会(GMAC)针对全球顶尖商学院招聘官的调查显示,企业在 2026 年招聘商学院硕士及 MBA 毕业生时,最看重的核心素质依然是传统的沟通能力、解决问题能力和应变适应能力,AI 工具的相关培训反而排在技能需求列表的后三分之一。尽管雇主普遍认同 AI 技能在未来五年会变得愈发关键,但他们认为当前的商学院在 AI 教学方面表现欠佳,毕业生使用 AI 的准备程度普遍偏低。就当前现实需求而言,绝大多数企业对候选人 AI 技能的最高期待,仅仅是能够利用其自动化处理日常繁琐的例行业务。
### `25:00` 长期美债收益率上升之谜与“反身性”陷阱
对话从通胀保值债券(TIPS)延伸到当前的债券市场异象。主持人指出,当前市场处于一个奇怪的节点:短期利率基本保持平稳,而长端收益率却在持续走高;与此同时,TIPS 隐含的通胀预期并未显著攀升。针对长端利率上行传递的信息,芝加哥联储主席奥斯坦·古尔斯比(Austan Goolsbee)强调,作为中央银行决策者,绝不能被债市或社交网络上的每一次短期波动牵着鼻子走,必须给市场一点时间沉淀,弄清背后的驱动因素。
在古尔斯比看来,长端收益率上升通常是多种复杂力量交织的结果:
- **市场通胀预期**:投资者可能认为未来的通胀压力依然存在;
- **政策路径预判**:市场押注美联储未来不得不将高利率维持更久;
- **国债供给与发债竞争**:新发国债规模庞大,发行端竞争加剧推高了收益率;
- **排除主权信用违约恐慌**:古尔斯比明确驳斥了“市场在担忧美国政府违约”的论调。他指出,若市场真在为违约定价,利率绝不可能是 5% 或 5.25% 这种历史常态区间的水平。
此外,古尔斯比提醒决策者防范“反身性(reflection problem)”陷阱:金融市场的走势很大程度上是在反向押注美联储下一步的行动。他引用前美联储主席保罗·沃尔克(Paul Volcker)曾对他说过的格言:“**我们的职责是行动(act),市场的职责是做出反应(react),千万别把两者的先后顺序搞反了。**”
```mermaid
flowchart TD
accTitle: 债市反身性与央行决策闭环
accDescr: 展示美联储行动与市场预期相互交织的反身性风险,以及沃尔克所主张的主被动顺序。
subgraph FedRole["美联储核心职能 (按法律授权)"]
A["评估双重使命数据<br/>(物价稳定 + 充分就业)"] --> B["美联储决议与行动 (Act)"]
end
subgraph MarketRole["市场机制与预期"]
B --> C["市场消化并做出反应 (React)"]
C --> D["资产价格波动与收益率变化"]
end
subgraph ReflectionRisk["反身性陷阱 (Reflection Problem)"]
D -. "误将市场预期当作行动指针".-> A
end
```
---
### `27:15` 赞同凯文·沃什:告别前瞻性指引,绝非“向市场交出控制权”
针对前美联储理事凯文·沃什(Kevin Warsh)公开发表关于“美联储应减少前瞻性指引(Forward Guidance)、让市场当运动员而不是当裁判”的观点,古尔斯比表示,任何机构定期审视并反思原有模式都是健康的。就他个人而言,他非常赞成大幅缩减前瞻性指引。
他解释道,那种明确向市场承诺“未来六个月利率会怎么走、一旦 X 发生我就保证投票加息或降息”的做法,不仅会加剧市场波动,更会无谓地捆绑美联储的手脚。少一些前瞻性指引绝不意味着美联储要反过来听命于市场。《联邦储备法》(Federal Reserve Act)明确规定美联储的法定职责是促进充分就业与物价稳定,法案里从未写过要看股票市场或债券市场的脸色。决策者应当充分利用金融市场反映的信息,但绝不能把市场信号直接当成行事的指令。
---
### `29:45` 非常规沟通工具的历史渊源与外部特别工作组
当主持人谈到点阵图(Dot Plot)和记者会其实都是 2008 年金融危机后为了应对特定困境而诞生的产物时,古尔斯比深表赞同,并打趣道:“联邦公开市场委员会(FOMC)的会议桌是我这辈子见过的最大的桌子,上面有足够的空间容纳所有讨论。”目前美联储已经组建了一个由外部专家牵头的特别工作组(Task Force),正全面检视现有的沟通机制。
古尔斯比带大家回顾了历史:在 2008 年至 2009 年危机期间,政策利率降到了零下限(Zero Lower Bound, ZLB)。在模型计算显示合意利率应当深跌至负区间(如极度负利率)的特殊背景下,前瞻性指引和“埃文斯规则(Evans Rule)”(承诺在失业率降至特定门槛之前绝不加息)成为了央行在无法降息时创造宽松的应急方案。然而,当前经济早已远离零下限环境,当年的特殊工具在当下完全有必要重新推敲与取舍。主持人在此穿插了一段回忆彭博社当年为了如何在终端上呈现点阵图而大动干戈的趣事,并打趣称这就像是老一辈人“记得肯尼迪遇刺那天自己在哪里”一样深刻,而自己当年在英格兰银行(BOE)宣布弃用扇形图(fan charts)时也感到无比失落。
---
### `32:30` 区分“前瞻性指引”与“反应函数”:经济预测摘要(SEP)的核心缺陷
古尔斯比直截了当地指出了目前经济预测摘要(SEP)与点阵图的根本缺陷。他长期以来对美联储官员在 SEP 中做出中长期预测持怀疑态度:
- **公信力成本**:当官员们写下的预测被市场当成承诺,而随后经济走势完全偏离时,公众就会质疑“当年预测通胀回落的笨蛋不就是你们吗”,这严重损耗了央行的公信力;预测长达一至三年乃至长期的数据,其必要性极其存疑。
- **反应函数与点阵图脱节**:点阵图之所以无法真正反映美联储的“反应函数(Reaction Function)”,是因为其公布的预测中位数与利率点位并不绑定。引用的中位数通胀率预测者,与勾选中位数利率点位的成员很可能根本不是同一个人。
```mermaid
flowchart LR
accTitle: 前瞻性指引与反应函数的本质区别
accDescr: 对比前瞻性指引对行动的僵化预先承诺,与反应函数基于数据规则的动态调整逻辑。
subgraph Guidance["前瞻性指引 (Forward Guidance)"]
G1["预先设定利率路径承诺"] --> G2["绑架政策灵活性 / 增加市场波动"]
end
subgraph Reaction["反应函数 (Reaction Function)"]
R1["清晰界定评估框架与思维逻辑"] --> R2["依据传入经济数据 (Data-dependent)<br/>动态调整工具应用"]
end
```
古尔斯比和主持人最后明确拆解了被外界严重混淆的两个概念:
- **前瞻性指引(Forward Guidance)**:对未来的政策操作做预先承诺(Pre-committing),甚至“给市场牵手护航”。这种做法在当下环境弊大于利,应当果断放弃;
- **反应函数(Reaction Function)**:向外界清晰解释中央银行在面对经济数据变化时,将以怎样的思维方式和逻辑来使用其政策工具。这种透明度非但不该削弱,反而是央行沟通中极其宝贵的核心资产。
### `35:00` 前瞻指引与反应函数的本质区别及工资-通胀动态
主持人与奥斯坦·古尔斯比就美联储的沟通哲学展开了深入辨析。在古尔斯比看来,所谓“前瞻指引”(Forward Guidance),本质上是“我打算在利率上采取什么行动、我认为下次会议做出怎样的加息或降息决策才合适”,这种做法往往会演变成“束缚自己的双手”(tying of hands)。这与清晰阐释“反应函数”(Reaction Function)截然不同。反应函数的核心在于向外界说明:“这是我当前对经济运行的看法、我正在紧盯哪些核心指标,比如我必须看到通胀不再具备粘性,并确信它正在向目标回落。”
主持人指出,从历史阶段来看,美联储的反应函数确实有着清晰的时代印记:在2010年代全球金融危机(GFC)之后,美联储需要传达的是“哪怕出现一两次偏高的通胀数据,我们也不会过度反应,因为当务之急是把失业率降下来”;而到了2022年和2023年,美联储则必须明确表态——“即便劳动力市场出现一定程度的疲软,我们也必须全力以赴把通胀压下去”。古尔斯比对此表示认同,并举了一个他刚入职美联储时的典型案例:
在2023年初他刚加入美联储时,公开舆论充斥着“高通胀无法回落”的悲观论调。当时许多人认为,工资增长极其迅猛,而劳动力成本占服务业总成本的大头,因此只要工资不降,通胀就绝无可能回落。古尔斯比当时就反驳了这种观点,认为其完全搞反了微观经济动力机制。这些人忽视了“工资比物价更具粘性”(wages are stickier than prices)的基本常识:当通胀冲击发生时,往往是物价率先飙升;随后劳动力市场滞后反应,引发名义工资补涨;而当物价涨幅见顶回落之后,工资增速才会随之放缓。因此,短期内看到较高的工资增速,并不意味着通胀无法回落。这种理解经济运行传导链条的“世界观”,恰恰构成了制定货币政策反应函数的基石。
```mermaid
flowchart TD
accTitle: 工资与物价滞后传导机制
accDescr: 展示冲击到来时物价与工资在时间维度上的先后响应阶段
subgraph S1["第一阶段:外生冲击"]
A["外生冲击爆发"] --> B["物价率先快速上扬"]
end
subgraph S2["第二阶段:粘性传导"]
B --> C["名义工资滞后跟进补涨"]
end
subgraph S3["第三阶段:逐步降温"]
C --> D["商品与服务价格通胀见顶回落"]
D --> E["工资增速随后滞后放缓"]
end
```
### `37:25` 沃什主席的沟通风格与古尔斯比的反应函数
谈及当前美联储的领导层,主持人提到了新任美联储主席凯文·沃什(Kevin Warsh)与前任截然不同的新闻发布会风格。外界普遍评价“前瞻指引时代已经落幕”,但主持人直言,市场目前根本摸不清沃什主席的反应函数究竟是什么,并追问委员会内部是否心里有底。面对这种尖锐的问题,古尔斯比幽默地抗议道:“你总是试图让我惹上麻烦!我当然不能代替别人去解释他的反应函数。别问我,你去问他自己,我只能讲我自己的。”
主持人强调,过去五六周内收到的每一份卖方研报,无一例外都在呼吁美联储必须对其反应函数给出明确指引。古尔斯比随即清晰阐述了他个人的“反应函数”,其核心完全聚焦在通胀端:
- **反对激进的前置降息(Front-loading cuts)**:古尔斯比谈到他在去年担任FOMC票委时投下反对票的原因——当时他极力反对在通胀数据尚不稳定时就急于大幅前置降息,不能一厢情愿地押注本轮通胀只是“暂时的”(transitory)并会自行消散。
- **需要确凿的数据验证**:他要求看到明确的客观证据,证明通胀确实处于持续迈向2%目标的轨道上。如果这一趋势得到确认,“那就系好安全带”,货币政策完全可以回到此前讨论的平稳降息节奏。
- **警惕通胀进展的停滞与反复**:他指出,抗击通胀最初取得了实质性进展,随后陷入停滞,甚至一度出现向错误方向反弹的势头;近期通胀虽然出现了一定程度的缓和,但整体局面依然充满变数(iffy)。
- **紧盯服务业通胀**:他的反应函数非常看重证据链,虽然在等待数据出炉期间保持耐心是可以接受的,但一旦服务业通胀等核心数据再次抬头、背离目标,他便会立即重回警惕与紧张状态。
### `40:00` 在美联储投下反对票是怎样的体验
主持人向古尔斯比抛出了一个私密的幕后问题:在美联储决策会议上投下反对票究竟是种什么感觉?会不会让人神经紧绷、担心“有人会冲过来收拾你”?古尔斯比笑着表示并没有那么夸张,当时投反对票的也并非只有他一个人,委员会内部的氛围依然保持着充分的专业与尊重。
古尔斯比回忆,在那次投票之前,他已经在内部多次坦诚阐明了自己的标准和疑虑,再三强调自己对于过度前置降息深感不安。更为关键的是,那次FOMC会议召开时,美国联邦政府正处于关门停摆(government shutdown)状态,官方统计数据根本无法按时发布。古尔斯比的核心立场是:“在政府停摆、连底层经济数据都完全缺失的情况下,美联储绝不能盲目持续降息,我们至少应该先拿到数据再做抉择。”
他坦言,会议结束后,无论是主席还是其他委员都没有打来兴师问罪的恶劣电话;相反,真正的压力来自外界公众舆论,许多人在网上痛骂他是“混蛋”(jerk)。但他强调,美联储是一个高度审慎的研讨型机构(deliberative body),每位成员都极其严肃地对待自己的职责,带着各自审视世界的经济学框架前来参会,出现观点交锋是极为正常的。尽管近期的反对票数量相比此前极度一致的时期略有增加,但若放眼美联储的百年历史长河,现在的公开反对频率依然远低于早期历史时期。
### `41:52` 商业赞助环节:ChatGPT 职场技能调查、辛辛那提保险与 Asana
节目的尾声切入了多则商业赞助播报:
- **彭博科技速报(Bloomberg Tech Minute)由 ChatGPT 赞助播报**:主持人卡罗尔·马瑟(Carol Masser)分享了一项针对全球商学院企业招聘官的最新调查。结果显示,全球职场普及 AI 的关键拐点“尚未真正到来”,距离全面落地可能还有数年时间。目前雇主在选拔 MBA 毕业生时,最看重的前三项核心能力依旧是沟通表达、解决复杂问题以及适应能力;人工智能工具的培训技能目前仅排在技能需求榜单的后三分之一。不过招聘官普遍预测,AI 技能在未来五年内的重要性将大幅跃升,而当前毕业生在运用 AI 工具方面的准备程度普遍被评估为“一般或较差”,企业最迫切需要的实际能力是利用 AI 自动化处理日常繁琐事务。
- **辛辛那提保险(Cincinnati Insurance)**:强调在关注投资与机遇的同时,更需防范无法预料的意外风暴、管道爆裂或企业突发损失。该机构拥有超过75年的历史,通过独立代理人为商业资产、房产及个人贵重物品提供全方位保障。
- **Asana 智能协作平台**:介绍其作为“人机协同团队的操作系统”,为营销、运营和 IT 等部门提供开箱即用的预构建 AI 队友(AI teammates),无需进行繁琐的提示词工程(Prompt Engineering)即可无缝融入现有工作流。
### `45:00` 所谓的“无声异议”与美联储轮候投票机制
主持人提出一个有趣的现象:高盛(Goldman Sachs)近期在研报中探讨了美联储会议上的“无声异议”(silent dissents)。报告指出,尽管上一届 FOMC 会议上只有三名公开投出反对票的成员,但市场上许多经济学家开始推测并试图统计那些未被记录在案的“无声反对”。
Austan Goolsbee 对此幽默地表示,试图去统计“并未发生的事情”确实很有意思,但这取决于人们如何定义“没发生”。他解释了美联储特殊的治理机制:
- **无投票权成员的立场**:在每次 FOMC 会议上,并非围坐在桌旁的所有联邦储备银行行长都拥有投票权。如果某些非轮候投票的成员在拥有投票权时本会投出反对票,他们此时并没有制度化渠道在表决中表达反对,唯一的发声途径便是在公开演讲中阐述自己对经济的不同看法。从这个意义上说,制度层面的“无声异议”确实存在。
- **违心投票的假说**:针对分析师暗示的是否有票委“言行不一、投出与自己真实想法不同选票”的情况,Goolsbee 明确反驳称,这绝不是他的亲身经历。美联储的决策是透明的,完整的政策纪要(Minutes)很快会公开发布,大众能看清每个人的基本观点;而在几年之后,逐字逐句的会议记录(Transcripts)也会全部解密。
```mermaid
flowchart TD
accTitle: FOMC 内部观点表达与异议路径
accDescr: 展示具有投票权与无投票权官员在表达异议时的不同制度路径。
subgraph Table["FOMC 会议圆桌"]
Voter["轮候投票委员 (Voting Member)"]
NonVoter["非投票成员 (Non-voting Participant)"]
end
subgraph Expression["政策表达渠道"]
OfficialDissent["正式投反对票 (Official Dissent)<br/>计入决议与公报"]
PublicSpeech["公开演讲与观点阐述 (Public Speeches)<br/>所谓'无声异议'"]
end
subgraph Disclosure["信息解密流程"]
Minutes["政策纪要 (Minutes)<br/>数周后公布大致观点"]
Transcripts["逐字会议记录 (Transcripts)<br/>约 5 年后完全公开"]
end
Voter --> OfficialDissent
NonVoter --> PublicSpeech
OfficialDissent --> Minutes
PublicSpeech --> Minutes
Minutes --> Transcripts
```
---
### `46:40` 从鲍威尔到沃什:美联储主席更迭下的内部文化巨变
主持人回顾了去年在杰克逊霍尔全球央行年会(Jackson Hole)上向 Goolsbee 提出的问题——为什么美联储内部公开投反对票的情况往往非常罕见?当时 Goolsbee 认为,既是因为大家对宏观图景的看法有共识,也是因为时任主席杰罗姆·鲍威尔(Jerome Powell)极其擅长凝聚共识、协调 FOMC 内部立场。针对即将等待四年零九个月才能解密的美联储会议实录,主持人追问:在新的领导层之下,FOMC 内部的氛围是否已经大不相同?
Goolsbee 坦言,新主席上任后整个氛围确实“感觉非常不同”。最戏剧化的细节在于,卸任主席鲍威尔并未彻底离开,而是仅仅把座位往旁边挪了两个席位,依然以理事身份留坐在会议桌旁。这种前任主席与新任主席同处一室的格局在美联储历史上极为罕见。
谈到新主席凯文·沃什(Kevin Warsh)带来的风貌转变,Goolsbee 指出了几处生动的细节与深层变化:
- **会场规矩与微观习惯**:新主席治下的记者会和内部规矩变了,会场内严禁携带零食,点心与手机一并被留在了会议室门外。
- **世界观与决策风格**:沃什拥有截然不同的世界观,无论是新闻发布会还是公开讲话都展现出全新风格。他公开表态希望能激发更多的讨论与交锋,重塑甚至调整会议的组织形式。
- **坦然拥抱变革**:面对主持人试图引探前任与现任主席之间是否存在微妙张力的玩笑,Goolsbee 谨慎避开内幕细节,但强调新领导层正以自己的方式全面重构运作机制,他个人对这种激发内部争辩和反思旧有范式的做法持完全开放的态度。
---
### `49:15` 反应函数与杰克逊霍尔前瞻:通胀的本质决定政策去向
面对次日即将登场的沃什主席杰克逊霍尔主题演讲,主持人询问 Goolsbee 究竟什么样的话会让他从椅子上直起身子、意识到货币政策迎来重大转折。Goolsbee 直言,他最为聚焦的核心是主席对**广义反应函数(Reaction Function)**的定义,即主席如何看待当前的经济状态。
最根本的分水岭在于对通胀性质的定性:
- **若通胀具有持久性(Persistent)**:如果通胀黏性强且难以自行回落,这必将倒逼美联储以及任何央行采取进一步紧缩行动以给经济降温。
- **若通胀具有暂时性(Transitory)**:如果数据表明通胀正在自行消退,或者具备自然回落的条件,整个政策考量将彻底转入完全不同的轨道。
---
### `50:40` 节目复盘:拆解前瞻性指引的消亡与泰勒规则的局限
在 Goolsbee 离场后,播客主持人 Tracy Alloway 与 Joe Weisenthal 展开了深入复盘。两人调侃道,如果全市场都在紧张屏息等待沃什就经济是否过热、是否需要加息表态时,沃什却在讲台上大谈特谈四十分钟的金融创新、稳定币(Stablecoins)与 FedNow 支付系统,那将会是极具戏剧性的讽刺场面。
随后,两位主持人深入讨论了访谈中澄清的核心概念差异:
| 讨论维度 | 前瞻性指引(Forward Guidance)与点阵图 | 央行反应函数(Reaction Function) |
|:--- |:--- |:--- |
| **运作机制** | 预先向市场沟通未来的利率路径与点位,提供手把手的市场指引 | 明确央行面对通胀与就业等关键变量变化时的原则与应对逻辑 |
| **历史渊源** | 2008 年金融危机后极端低利率环境下的产物(克服零利率下限) | 格林斯潘时代的传统模式(极短声明、无点阵图、无例行记者会) |
| **当前反思** | 危机期间泰勒规则(Taylor Rule)算出的名义利率高达 -6%,无法实施才催生了口头承诺;如今这一危机工具或已完成历史使命 | 沃什主导的特别工作组(Task Forces)可能倾向于削减过度沟通,回归基于反应函数的政策本源 |
复盘最后指出,当前经济的核心矛盾仍是 Goolsbee 所警惕的通胀风险——通胀回落的担子依然沉重,在缺乏明确改善证据前,更高的利率环境随时可能被触发。随着本期播客收尾,美联储特别工作组的政策重塑与次日沃什的讲话,将成为揭晓美联储全新沟通框架与政策路径的关键时刻。
## Notable quotes
> `00:00` 希望这并不预示着宏观经济正走向‘熊市’(Bear Market)。 — 特雷西·阿洛韦 (Tracy Alloway)
> `04:12` 你永远不可能在当下亲眼目睹它,只能在它早已离开、留下一个脚印后,才恍然大悟它曾经来过。 — 奥斯坦·古尔斯比 (Austan Goolsbee)
> `06:40` 每当说出“暂态”(transitory)这个词时,我都会起一身荨麻疹(giving myself hives even using that word)。 — 奥斯坦·古尔斯比 (Austan Goolsbee)
> `11:15` 如果 AI 基础设施的巨额投资已在总量上驱动经济增长超越潜在产出并推高通胀,美联储当前的政策利率就根本不够具有限制性(not restrictive enough)。 — 奥斯坦·古尔斯比 (Austan Goolsbee)
> `15:00` 美联储手中的工具本质上是非常粗放的(a very unsophisticated tool)……在生产率驱动下,若经济能实现每年 3% 的无通胀增长且居民收入稳步提升,那将是经济学界梦寐以求的天赐甘霖(manna from heaven)。 — 奥斯坦·古尔斯比 (Austan Goolsbee)
> `20:00` 回顾当初的启动阶段,美联储的起步行动确实慢了半拍(they were slow out of the gate)。 — 奥斯坦·古尔斯比 (Austan Goolsbee)
> `25:00` 我们的职责是行动(act),市场的职责是做出反应(react),千万别把两者的先后顺序搞反了。 — 保罗·沃尔克 (Paul Volcker)
> `29:45` 联邦公开市场委员会(FOMC)的会议桌是我这辈子见过的最大的桌子,上面有足够的空间容纳所有讨论。 — 奥斯坦·古尔斯比 (Austan Goolsbee)
> `37:25` 你总是试图让我惹上麻烦!我当然不能代替别人去解释他的反应函数。别问我,你去问他自己,我只能讲我自己的。 — 奥斯坦·古尔斯比 (Austan Goolsbee)
> `40:00` 在政府停摆、连底层经济数据都完全缺失的情况下,美联储绝不能盲目持续降息,我们至少应该先拿到数据再做抉择。 — 奥斯坦·古尔斯比 (Austan Goolsbee)
## Mentioned
奥斯坦·古尔斯比 (Austan Goolsbee), 乔·威森塔尔 (Joe Weisenthal), 特雷西·阿洛韦 (Tracy Alloway), 凯文·沃什 (Kevin Warsh), 杰罗姆·鲍威尔 (Jerome Powell), 保罗·沃尔克 (Paul Volcker), 卡罗尔·马瑟 (Carol Masser), 美联储 (Federal Reserve), 联邦公开市场委员会 (FOMC), 芝加哥联储 (Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago), 英格兰银行 (Bank of England), 彭博社 (Bloomberg), Odd Lots, 杰克逊霍尔全球央行年会 (Jackson Hole Economic Symposium), 胡佛研究所 (Hoover Institution), 高盛 (Goldman Sachs), ChatGPT, PayPal, Cincinnati Insurance (辛辛那提保险), Asana, GMAC (管理专业研究生入学考试委员会), FedNow, 埃文斯规则 (Evans Rule), 泰勒规则 (Taylor Rule), 经济预测摘要 (SEP)
## Video description
<p>Inflation remains high and the 2% target is farther away than it was this time last year. There are signs all over that the economy is overheating — the strange labor market where hiring and firing remains low, while GDP is growing, but mostly due to AI and the data center buildout — and Chicago Fed President Austan Goolsbee is worried about how uncertain central bankers are about what to do to cool the economy. The next shock, he tells us, could be around the corner. In this conversation, recorded at the Jackson Hole Economic Symposium, Goolsbee explains why he is skeptical of metrics like r*, why he is embracing Kevin Warsh's philosophy around reducing forward guidance, the purpose of the new Fed task forces, and the economic indicators that influence his thinking around reaction function.</p><p>See <a href="https://omnystudio.com/listener">omnystudio.com/listener</a> for privacy information.</p>
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Source quotes
[0:00] 特雷西·阿洛韦 (Tracy Alloway): 希望这并不预示着宏观经济正走向‘熊市’(Bear Market)。
[4:12] 奥斯坦·古尔斯比 (Austan Goolsbee): 你永远不可能在当下亲眼目睹它,只能在它早已离开、留下一个脚印后,才恍然大悟它曾经来过。
[6:40] 奥斯坦·古尔斯比 (Austan Goolsbee): 每当说出“暂态”(transitory)这个词时,我都会起一身荨麻疹(giving myself hives even using that word)。
[11:15] 奥斯坦·古尔斯比 (Austan Goolsbee): 如果 AI 基础设施的巨额投资已在总量上驱动经济增长超越潜在产出并推高通胀,美联储当前的政策利率就根本不够具有限制性(not restrictive enough)。
[15:00] 奥斯坦·古尔斯比 (Austan Goolsbee): 美联储手中的工具本质上是非常粗放的(a very unsophisticated tool)……在生产率驱动下,若经济能实现每年 3% 的无通胀增长且居民收入稳步提升,那将是经济学界梦寐以求的天赐甘霖(manna from heaven)。
[20:00] 奥斯坦·古尔斯比 (Austan Goolsbee): 回顾当初的启动阶段,美联储的起步行动确实慢了半拍(they were slow out of the gate)。
[25:00] 保罗·沃尔克 (Paul Volcker): 我们的职责是行动(act),市场的职责是做出反应(react),千万别把两者的先后顺序搞反了。
[29:45] 奥斯坦·古尔斯比 (Austan Goolsbee): 联邦公开市场委员会(FOMC)的会议桌是我这辈子见过的最大的桌子,上面有足够的空间容纳所有讨论。
[37:25] 奥斯坦·古尔斯比 (Austan Goolsbee): 你总是试图让我惹上麻烦!我当然不能代替别人去解释他的反应函数。别问我,你去问他自己,我只能讲我自己的。
[40:00] 奥斯坦·古尔斯比 (Austan Goolsbee): 在政府停摆、连底层经济数据都完全缺失的情况下,美联储绝不能盲目持续降息,我们至少应该先拿到数据再做抉择。
Source quotes
[25:00] Paul Volcker: Our job is to act and the market's job is to react, and let's not get the order mixed up.
[15:00] Austan Goolsbee: manna from heaven
[18:00] Austan Goolsbee: two-thirds by supply and one-third by demand
[37:15] Austan Goolsbee: You constantly try to get me in trouble... Go ask him what his reaction function is. I'm telling you mine.
[39:50] Austan Goolsbee: The government was literally shut down and we didn't even have the data. So my thing was, let's not just keep cutting. We don't even know what's in the data. Like, let's at least get some data before we act.
[4:47] Austan Goolsbee: Sasquatch
[15:00] Austan Goolsbee: tip of the spear
[18:00] Austan Goolsbee: immaculate disinflation
Original transcript
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[5:00] It's because I don't think our star, while the concept exists, I don't find it helpful for me in determining, well, what should the next monetary policy move be? Because it's not observable. Even in the best of times, not observable. Um, that said, I think if you start thinking longer run, what does an increase in the productivity growth growth rate due to our star? I think it increases it because faster growth, you got to have a higher steady state, um, interest rate. And I gave a speech last year, I mean, at the, at the last Hoover conference that was kind of thinking about if you think AI is increasing productivity, it makes a big difference to what that means for the here and now R-star. Is this expected or is it unexpected? So if it's unexpected landing on you, then inflation goes down and in a way people aren adjusting their behavior in the short run and rates can go down But if the bigger the hype the more we about to have a giant bounty that going to come from technology you could easily overheat the economy in the short run and you have to raise the rates. And we kind of live that through the mid to late 90s. Yeah, that's right. How about we maybe try to reverse, take the question from the opposite direction? So setting aside theoretical questions about R-Star, setting aside how we would measure restrictiveness. Let's just take your point. The inflation data is still warm. There are signs that it's going in the wrong direction, even if, you know, here, whatever. Why? How would you decompose the drivers of either persistently high inflation or the upward rate? That's what we're still trying to figure out. Yeah. I was saying before, even before Liberation Day, as the tariffs came in, I warned, you'll remember, let's be careful. We learned during COVID that if a supply shock that is supposed to be transitory if it big enough can end up taking a lot longer than we initially forecast And that was my fear that while one tariffs are supposed to be an increase to the price level increase to the price level and a temporary inflation shock, where was the evidence that that was true? We've been dealing with that. To add an oil price, war-driven price shock on top of it before that one went away, that's a dicier proposition. some component of the increase in inflation is from those two parts tariffs and and one-time increase in price of oil which hopefully should go away as inflation but if you look at services that's not really caused from tariffs that's not really caused from oil prices that's a deeper level of concern so in my is it a decomposition i'm hopeful that much of it came from those temporary slash transitory factors i giving myself hives even using that word And if so then we should see it It should go away. We can't, it can't be that each quarter we say, ah, yes, it's about to go away. Just not yet, you know, three months from now. And so that's why I was okay with if we get one or two readings of inflation that are moderating, it's perfectly fine to say let's wait a meeting or two meetings or whatever. Let's see if this is the heralded introduction of the temporary party. So, in a normal world, these shocks are supposed to be, again, using the dreaded T word, transitory, like one-off levels to the price, and then they kind of fade away. I think it's fair to say, in recent years, we've seen shock after shock after shock. Do you think that the central bank needs to start incorporating that kind of uncertainty into its mandate? Yeah, probably. Just assume that the world's more uncertain. Into its mandate. Sorry, not into the mandate, into its thinking. Yeah, into its thinking, yes. I think that you're honest, it does feel like we're getting more supply shocks.
[10:00] The traditional world shocks aren't the main thing happening. It's not commodity prices. It's normally the grubby reality of the business cycle, demand-driven. Unemployment goes up when inflation goes down. Inflation goes up when unemployment goes down. When both of those things are moving together, like what happens with these supply shocks, There's not an automatic playbook of what to do. I do think that we at the Fed and the central banks all around the world should be contemplating at the least, what are you going to do if we're going to get more and more shocks? That's a slightly different, you kind of raise a second point, which is with the tariffs and with the war. here i think that has piled this uncertainty on top of itself and i think that's what's led in the labor market to this kind of high low hiring low firing yeah which is not a normal combination i think it a combination that characterizes uncertainty So yeah we should start thinking that way Just on AI real quick, look, none of us know what AI as a technology will mean for productivity. Hopefully great things happen. In the here and now, though, there's another factor that people talk about, which is just there's an extraordinarily high amount of spending going on in the build out of it. And I'm curious on both the maybe like theoretical level, but also in a conversations that you have with businesses in your district level. Does that show up? Does it feel like, OK, if we look at supply chains, they are getting tighter because data companies that are building this out are competing for real resources, whether we're talking about labor, materials, commodities, parts and so forth. Yes, and you hear it from business executives, but in some ways I feel like maybe too much that if you look at the price pressures coming from AI data centers, the build out of very high investment this isn the first time that there been high investment as an indicator of economic growth But the overall overheating of the economy is kind of the deeper question Sectoral AI is going up and some other industry is competing for electricians and construction and complaining bitterly about that, that's not the same thing as the economy's overheating. It has to get out of its lane of just direct competition and drive up wages, drive up prices outside of just its lane. Because if this one going up leads this one to go down in the aggregate, in a way, the national unemployment rate and the national GDP growth rate tell you a lot about where you are in the aggregate economy. That said, you hear it. You go around the Midwest. The Chicago district is kind of hard to the Midwest. We're in Iowa, Cedar Rapids, Iowa. I'm like, what's the biggest problem? And they're like, the data centers are buying up all the land. They're driving up the prices. Nobody can construct can do any construction You can get an HVAC person So it doesn feel like we far from what is the sort of traditional excess demand and outputs above potential, and that's driving up inflation. And if it does, back to your first question, then we're not restrictive enough. If that starts happening in the aggregate, we're not restrictive enough. I don't know how to say, is this restrictive or not restrictive? Everything's relative to something. And if inflation starts going the wrong way, driven by just old fashioned investment is so high and growth is so high that that we're getting that impulse, then I think it's not restrictive enough. It is true that people complain about not being able to get contractors like all the time. And now it's just, oh, it's the data. So that is what I mean. Yeah, yeah. That's filled into the boogeyman is if you can't find an electrician, I half expect they've
[15:00] I need to go to the dentist. They can't see me for three weeks. Thanks a lot, data centers. Well, OK, what's the difference when it comes to Fed policy between an economy that's growing mostly because of consumption versus an economy that's mostly growing because of investment? Like, how do you treat that difference? In the short run, it's probably not that different. Just in the business cycle sense of There are many different ways you could go. We've seen overheating from housing instruction getting out faster than the economy can handle. We've seen consumer spending, savings rate go to zero, consumer spending is faster than economy can handle. We're seeing a business investment driven threat to more than economy can handle. In the short run, if it's demand driven, I kind of think it's not the fed has a very unsophisticated tool we can raise the interest rate lower the interest rate what makes it work is that usually the most cyclical industries are the most interest rate sensitive industries so it kind of does make sense that the the fed be that the tip of the sphere uh tip of the spear If by that question you asking the deeper thing of well, what does it mean long run? You hope that the investment will enhance potential output in the future. So then it would be different down the road, five years, 10 years, if productivity growth remains high. But then we're also sort of back to our discussion. Well, what does that mean for rates long run? I actually think rates could be higher if the growth rate is higher for all the best reasons. I mean, that's the manna from heaven, productivity growth. That's the normalization that people wanted for the year. We would love that. We would love that normalization if we could grow 3% a year and incomes are growing. without inflation because of productivity growth. At the same time, let's be a little wary. I've been, from early on, highlighting maybe some of this technology is raising the productivity growth rate but we now gotten six months in a row of pretty crummy productivity growth So let not all conclude before it actually manifested that we had a change of era I want to keep speculating about what the future is going to be. But I want to ask one more question about the past, actually, because we've actually had a few different over the years. we've had a few different versions of this conversation, this question, which is inflation has come down quite a bit from its peak in the post-COVID era. But there's this question of why, right? Because the unemployment rate never took off. It was kind of immaculate, except there has been significant housing cooling. In a different era, they used to say the housing cycle is the business cycle. That hasn't been the case in several years from now. It's totally disconnected. Do you have any – sitting here in August 2026, and you look at housing continue to be soft, you look at where inflation is, maybe signs of it gathering steam again from an elevated level. Do you have any theory of the case of the last few years of the relationship between what the Fed did the hikes and what they really did to the economy and how much they contributed to taking the economy off the boil in 2022 2023 I thought you were going to go a different way back to the old how much was supply and how much was demand in the rise up in inflation Yeah, no, but I'm sort of talking about what you did, the aggressive rate of rate hikes. I think the aggressive rate hikes, the shoe that did not drop, I think that supply was a major driver of the run up to inflation. and the healing of supply eventually was a major component of the drop to inflation. As long as you say that, as long as you're not trying to have it both ways, and both sides, it feels like in that debate, want to have it both ways in the sense they want to blame the run up on fiscal policy, say, but then the and the fiscal and monetary policy that it was all about stimulus and then they would say well why did it come down then they want to say no no that was they don't deserve any credit for that that was all from supply chain healing I think it was loosely two thirds supply and one third demand then I wasn't there when it went up so I can't blame you can't blame
[20:00] But I do think that the Fed's aggressive action permitted the one shoe not to drop that was hugely important. And that is, side note for odd lots listeners, you will know that historically, CPI of 2.3%, we kind of think correlates with a PCE of 2.0%. Even as CPI was pushing close to 10% inflation, if you looked at inflation compensation in the tips, it remained steadily at 2.3% CPI. So exactly 2% inflation target. To me, that was a piece of evidence that having a 2.0% inflation target was exactly the anchor that its advocates said. And I think it was critically important that the Fed not lose control If they had lost the anchor I think we would have had a heck of a time trying to get rid of the inflation So I think the Fed deserves a lot of credit at that moment And then if you had plugged into chat GPT or some AI, trained on all the data through history, and said inflation is double, triple the target. what should the Fed do? It would have said, jack the interest rate up to 20% and have a huge recession because that's the only way you ever get rid of inflation. And I do think the Fed's understanding that there was a component that was not going to be permanent and that the much maligned or mocked immaculate disinflation was in fact possible, I do think that the Fed deserves credit for recognizing that too. On the other side, they were slow out of the gate. You can't look back and say they weren't. They clearly were. Thank you Did you ever notice how you spend hours shopping online only to pause right before you hit buy now That tiny hesitation, the one where you wonder if it is trustworthy, can make or break the sale. Now, with AI changing the way consumers discover and compare things, that split-second trust question matters more than ever. That's where PayPal comes in. For more than 25 years, PayPal has been a leader in online payments. And now they're at the forefront of agentic commerce, making it work for businesses, letting them maintain control of their brand and their customer relationships. So even as the way people shop changes, the moment that matters most still feels familiar and deeply dependable. Built for payments, growth and agentic. PayPal Open. Built for all business. Visit paypalopen.com to get started. This is the Bloomberg Tech Minute brought to you by ChatGPT. Now with ChatGPT work. I'm Carol Masser. Has the AI moment arrived at corporate offices worldwide? Not yet, and it's perhaps several years away, according to one survey of corporate recruiters who circle the world business schools each fall and spring Bloomberg Rob Mandelbaum notes that according to the Graduate Management Admission Council the skills recruiters sought most among 2026 graduates of business school master's programs, including MBAs, were communication, problem-solving, and adaptability, which changed little from last year. Training in artificial intelligence tools ranked in the bottom third of the skills list, but recruiters did say AI-specific training will be more important in five years. On that, recruiters rated current graduates as only somewhat prepared or less to work with AI tools and said business schools are not doing a good job of teaching AI skills. Bottom line, according to the survey, what most companies want when it comes to AI skills is for candidates to be able to automate routine work. That's the Bloomberg Tech Minute brought to you by ChatGPT. Put ChatGPT to work on your most ambitious ideas and projects. Get started at ChachiPT.com today by selecting Work Mode, available on Plus and Pro Plans. If you listen to financial news, you know a lot of time is spent thinking about what's next. The next opportunity. The next investment. The next move. But sometimes what matters most is being ready for what you never saw coming. A storm damages a second home. A pipe bursts above a collection.
[25:00] you spent decades building. An unexpected loss puts a growing business on pause. Those are the days no one sees coming. But for more than 75 years, Cincinnati Insurance has been ready when they do. With deep expertise, coverage for businesses, homes, valuables, and more, Cincinnati Insurance works with independent agents who take the time to understand what matters to you. Together, they help protect more than what you own. They help protect what you're building toward. And when a bad day does come, Cincinnati Insurance has real people there to help make things right. Because planning for the future isn't only about knowing what's next, it's about making sure you're ready for what you can't predict. Let Cincinnati Insurance make your bad day better. Find an independent agent at CINFIN.com. So since you brought up tips, we should talk about the bond market, right? So we're at this weird point in time in the bond market where short-term rates are still pretty steady. the longer term yields have been going up. Tips haven't really been pricing in that much inflation. So when you look at bond yields at the moment, especially at the long end of the curve, like what is that telling you If you a central banker or you one of the Fed heads don get into every blip in Twitter of the bond market I kind of think you need a little bit of time to sort out what driving it Long yields going up. Could be people are expecting inflation. Could be people think that the Fed is going to have to be on a path that rates will be higher. Could be there's a lot more competition in issuance and just more bonds getting put out. And it's probably some combination of all of those. I don't put that much credence on the argument that there's a general freak out about the credit worthiness of the United States. Because if you really think that a country is going to experience default, the rates aren't whatever, 5%, you know, five and a quarter percent. That's just a historically pretty normal rate. So I think, look, we're watching that. It does have an impact on the economy. But whenever you looking at market reactions you got to think a little bit about this reflection problem That part of it is what do they think the Fed is going to do And so I don like but Paul Volcker used to tell me our job is to act and the market job is to react and let not get the order mixed up And that's kind of where I start. This is exactly what I was going to ask you next, because Kevin Warsh has gone on the record saying that he thinks there should be less forward guidance from the Fed and that the market should be playing more ball versus being the referee. So he's suggesting that the bond market can send a useful signal through you. I think you learn a lot from bond markets. As you know, the rules, I don't speak for anybody else or weigh in of what somebody else's message is. personally, speaking only for myself, I agreed with the, and I think it's healthy, in a general way to refresh every once in a while what any organization's doing and have a rethink. But on the specific thing of should we have less forward guidance of saying, here is where we think raids are going in the next six months. If X thing happens, then I promise I'm going to vote for an increase a cut a blah blah blah I think that adds to volatility and threatens to get us into a tying of our hands that I don think is healthy So I have embraced this Let engage in last forward guidance. That's different from should the market tell us what to do? I'm not a fan of it, but the Federal Reserve Act says by law what we're supposed to look at, maximizing employment, stabilizing prices doesn't say anything about stock market doesn't say anything about bond market so gathering information from them i'm totally for using that as a ah then that's what we should do i'm i'm less well speaking then of communication technologies this is the thing that always makes me feel very old is reminding people that press conferences dot plots and so forth are very recent innovations. Yeah, right. And they were brought in because the Fed had a specific problem in 2008, 2009, et cetera. They solved the problem perhaps at the time. As we think, like, what is suitable for this new era? Could it say, like, maybe it doesn't make sense to have press conferences. Maybe dots have outlived their usefulness. Maybe we don't need as many meetings as we used to have or something like that. Should all these...
[30:00] - Things beyond the table in terms of like-- - Yeah, look, you've seen the table. I always say the biggest table I've ever seen in my life is the FOMC table. - Yeah. - There's room for plenty of stuff on that table. All of that should be on the table. We have this... outside task force headed by outside folks. that's contemplating a lot of these issues about communication. I think it's healthy. Let's say, let's, Let's rethink all of those. You're right to remind the history. we were at zero. The interest rate was at zero. And If you plugged into the... formulas, what should the interest rate be? It was like 96%. And so, The Fed at that time was facing unprecedented challenges. And they were trying to, what do you do when the interest rate is already zero? Giving forward guidance. in an environment where you're at the zero lower bound, where you're like, not only is the rate not going to go up, it's not going to go up for years. It's not going to go up till the unemployment rate comes down. The, All of those things can work at a time. The Evans role. Each of those is kind of a creative solution to a problem that they were facing. We're in a totally different environment. Um, And so we should look, we should think through all of those. Joe, do you remember, I think when the Fed first started the dot plot, we were both at Bloomberg. Do you remember? We were not at both at Bloomberg. Oh, were we not? No, it was definitely earlier. You need to be like, you weren't at Bloomberg. I was at Bloomberg. But I remember there was this all-hands committee at one point to try to figure out a way to display the Fed's dot plot. This part is true. As it became clear that this became a thing, there was a lot of effort to formalize the presentation of the dot plot. Right. I thought you were going to say this is like our... My mom's generation. Everybody remembers where they were. You remember the day the dog. I remember where I was when the B.O.E. retired the fan charts. I was really sad. That's it. Wait. So, OK, you talked about the Fed was trying to solve a problem with rates at the zero bound in terms of communications. Like, what is the problem that you think the Fed is trying to solve now in terms of comms? Like, why have the task force other than there's a new Fed chair? through some of these issues. I think We're not anywhere near the zero lower bound. So some of the logics of the communication tools that existed before, we should revisit. And I've been on public record for years about the SEPs. I don't like... Any time. the Members of the Fed... are making, are writing down what they're interpreting as predictions that don't turn out to be true. I think you pay a little price in terms of credibility, that people can go back and look and say, wait, aren't you the bozos who said that, you know, by now, whatever, inflation would be 2%, the unemployment rate would be something. That it asks about one year, two years, three years ahead and the long run. Do we really need all of that? That was my expressed starting point. Right. And... in the dot plot itself... I find... the It can use a purpose. I think it's important that the world be able to understand something like the reaction function. worldview of the members of the committee. And in a way, The dot plot could serve as that, except the... assumptions are not tied to to the rate of the dots. So to quote the median inflation and the median rate, but that's not necessarily the same person. And so it doesn't actually serve as a reaction function. So, I think there's a lot of things you could do with the SEP. I'm actually glad you brought up reaction function as a distinct thing from forward guidance. Yes. Because I feel like when people talk about the Fed, they are distinct. They are distinct. Agreed. And they often get conflated. Agreed. And so people say, like, we don't want forward guidance. And they say, oh, we're not going to hold the market's hand. We're not going to say what we're going to do with the next two minutes. It's like, great. There's no reason for the central bankers to be pre-committing what they're going to do. valuable to have some understanding of how the central bank is thinking about its tools in relation to the data. And what do you see in the world? That's where my head is. So when I
[35:00] Say forward guidance. I mean, literally of the form. Yeah. Here is what I intend to do with rates. Here is what I think is the appropriate rate move at the next meeting. And it's the tying of hands. Yeah. That's different from here is how I see the economy right now. What am I looking at? I'm looking at inflation. I really want to see that inflation is not persistent, that we are coming into that. They're related, of course, but they're different. But like, I think like, so for example, in the 2010s or coming out of the GFC, it was important for the Fed to communicate that if you get a hot inflation print here or there, we're not going to react too much because right now, it's important for us to get the employment right down. Then comes 2022 or 23 and the Fed needs to communicate, you know what, we might get a little labor market softness, but we got to smash that inflation down. And that is our thing. To me, to my mind, that's reaction function. I agree with you. And I'm curious. I give you an example I give you a tiny microcosm When I first got to the Fed at the beginning of 2023 there was a lot of public discussion about the can inflation come down And people said no it can come down because look at how fast wage growth is And wage growth wages are the lion share of costs and services So inflation can't come down until you see wages come down. I don't think that's correct, but I think that gets the dynamics wrong. They're forgetting that wages are stickier than prices. So when shocks hit, it tends to be prices go up first. You see the price inflation, then the wage inflation, and then it comes down and then the wages come down. So in the short run, this is a reaction function. Call it reaction function, but it's just here's my worldview of what I'm watching in the economy and why I don't. If I see wage growth as high, that doesn't make me nervous that inflation can't come down. So just the last part of this question. Chairman Warsh's press conference have been different so far, have been different from his predecessors. They say, oh, the Ford got in here. It's coming to an end. Fine. I don't feel like I have yet to establish a handle on what his reaction function is right now. And I curious if you in the committee feel like you have a fear You constantly try to get me in trouble Yeah of course I not allowed to talk about somebody else reaction function And you're like, no, no, okay, don't ask me. What do you think his reaction function is? I'm not going to tell you what the chairman's reaction function is. Go ask him what his reaction function is. I'm telling you mine. Every sell-side analyst note that has come into our inbox for the past five or six weeks has been talking about the need for clarity on the Fed's reaction function or something about the reaction function. You want me to speak for the committee? I'm not allowed to. I can tell you. Speak for yourself. Here's what's the goofy reaction function. We'll settle for that. What I'm looking at is especially tuned to the inflation side. I thought front loading of rate cuts. The reason I dissented, I'm not a voter this year. I was last year. The reason I dissented in the last meeting of the year when they cut rates was I'm not comfortable front loading the rate cuts, counting on this inflation to be transitory and go away. I want some evidence that it is going away that we are headed back to 2 And if we get that then I totally fine Let strap put on the seatbelts We headed back to the 3 2 1 that we talked about before. Not only did our progress, we were making substantial progress on inflation. Then it stalled out. Then it started going the wrong way. And now we've had a not a blip, but a bit. We've had a bit of easing of inflation, but it's still iffy. And so my reaction function is heavily geared toward I need evidence that inflation, that this inflation shock is not going to be persistent. And I'm okay with waiting as we're getting that, but if the evidence starts coming back, especially on services, that it's high, it's going the wrong way, we're not making progress, then I'm going to be nervous. Wait, can I ask a personal question? You got to wait until you... I might not answer it. That's fine.
[40:00] That's your right. But... What's it like when you've just sent? Like, is it, does it make you nervous? Like, Oh, are they going to come? They're like, the goons are going to come punch me. They didn't really, they, Mm-hmm. it was, I wasn't alone. Um, And – people are, I found them respectable. I had... laid out my criteria. I, was expressing multiple times. Hey, okay, we're doing this, but I'm really uncomfortable with front-loading too many rate cuts. And if you remember, that was the meeting where... The government was literally shut down and we didn't even have the data. So, so my, my thing was, let's not just keep cutting. We don't even know what's in the data. Like, let's at least get some data before, before we act. So the. There wasn't, I didn't get any mean and nasty. calls from the chairman or the other committee members. It was plenty of in the public, you jerk. But... Thank you. It's a deliberative body, as we've talked about many times. And people take the job real seriously. And everybody's comes there with a worldview and, It's okay. You know, we've seen... a little more dissents lately than in the immediately preceding period. But by historical standards, there's still way fewer dissents nowadays than there were in the old days. This is the Bloomberg Tech Minute brought to you by ChatGPT. Now with ChatGPT work. I'm Carol Masser. Has the AI moment arrived at corporate offices worldwide? Not yet, and it's perhaps several years away, according to one survey of corporate recruiters who circle the world's business schools each fall and spring. including MBAs, were communication, problem-solving, and adaptability, which changed little from last year. Training in artificial intelligence tools ranked in the bottom third of the skills list, but recruiters did say AI-specific training will be more important in five years. On that, recruiters rated current graduates as only somewhat prepared or less to work with AI tools, and said business schools are not doing a good job of teaching AI skills. Bottom line, according to When it comes to AI skills is for candidates to be able to automate routine work. That's the Bloomberg Tech Minute brought to you by ChatGPT. Put ChatGPT to work on your most ambitious ideas and projects. Get started at ChatGPT.com today by selecting work mode. Available on plus and pro plans. If you listen to financial news, you know a lot of time is spent thinking about what's next. The next opportunity. The next investment. The next move. But sometimes what matters most is being ready for what you never saw coming. A storm damages a second home. A pipe bursts above a collection you spent decades building. An unexpected loss puts a growing business on pause. Those are the days no one sees coming. But for more than 75 years, Cincinnati insurance has been ready when they do. With deep expertise, coverage for businesses, homes, valuables, and more, Cincinnati Insurance works with independent agents who take the time to understand what matters to you. Together, they help protect more than what you own. They help protect what you're building toward. And when a bad day does come, Cincinnati Insurance has real people there to help make things right. Because planning for the future isn't only about knowing what's next. It's about making sure you're ready for what you can't predict. Let Cincinnati Insurance make your bad day better. Find an independent agent at CINFIN.com. That's the gap Asana is built to close. Asana is the operating system for human agent teams, your easy button for AI productivity across every team. Ready-to-go AI teammates pre-built for marketing, ops, and IT. No prompt engineering, no setup. They show up where the work is happening, already onboarded in your workflows, ready to deliver. And the more they work with your team, the smarter they get. With Asana, your whole company can work on it.
[45:00] The same plan towards the same goal, whether you're a team of 10 or 10,000. Asana, where humans and agents workflow together. Try it at asana.com. That's A-S-A-N-A dot com. I'm going to ask a weird question, but are silent dissents a thing? And the reason I ask is because I saw a Goldman Sachs analyst note where they were talking about like, oh, sure, there were three official dissents at the last meeting, but what about all the silent dissents? And we don't know what number those are at. And it's kind of funny to think about, you know, there's economists out there trying to count up something that's not happening. The thing is, there's not happening and then there's not happening, which is to say not everybody gets to vote at every meeting. So to that extent, there are silent dissents. If there are people sitting around the table who if they were a voter, they would be dissenting. They just have no way to express dissent except to go out and say in public, here's what I think about the economy. So to that extent, of course, there are silent dissents. It sounded like a little bit they making an argument though There people voting differently than what than what they think Like that be a different type of silent dissent i don that hasn been my experience um but look the minutes come out you see you know basically what everyone says and and in a couple of years you'll start getting the word for word transcripts i know we just have to wait five years i can't wait that'll actually see well this this actually leads to my final question four years nine months oh okay that's right yeah But this is actually good for my final question, which is that I think last year here at Jackson Hole, one of the questions I asked you, and it had to do with dissents, was the sort of like the why are dissents generally rare? And is it because you generally see the view? Did you see the thing similarly, or is the chairman particularly good at like more or less corralling the FOMC? Does it seem like right now? And I said both. Okay. But I think you primarily said that you credited Powell. Powell was quite good at that. So we'll read these transcripts in four years and nine months. But in the FOMC, does it feel any different than it did under the Powell era? It feels very different. I mean, just personally, it feels very different, of course, when there's a different chair. Who kind of does the chair always gives kind of a summary at the end or you know where the chair head is It's always different. I only was there for one chair. It is kind of unusual that the former chair has now just kind of moved his seat over a couple of spaces, so he's still there. But I think it feels different. Interesting. And the chair's new. I mean you can see in the press conference there's no snacks the snacks are outside with the phones you can't bring you're not supposed to bring the snacks in there he just has a different worldview I mean you can see it in the press conferences you can see it in the talks he just has a different worldview and he's wanting to rethink a bunch of the issues he's publicly said he would like to get a little more stir up a little more debate I think there was debate before and if we're going to have more change the format of the meetings or stuff like that I'm open to thinking those through Powell still there and you sort of like two tension I don know Now you trying to get me in trouble on a different role I'm not allowed to say what happens at the moment. I just feel like the tone is there's a new person, there's new leadership, he's trying to do it different ways. He's clearly getting his bringing it into his own of how he wants to to run this stuff we're gonna stop trying to get you into trouble and i'm not gonna ask what you think warsh is gonna say tomorrow and again we're recording this ahead of the speech but like what should we be looking out for what would make you sit up in your seat and go like oh wait a second this is different well this is different than what then previous jackson holes previous fed shares something to take notice of i'm i'm going to be paying attention to broadly defined reaction function. How do you see the economy as the chairman? And I'm hyper focused on this question of, is inflation going to be transitory or is it going to be persistent? Because if inflation is going to be a change, it's going to be a change.
[50:00] going to be persistent, then it's going to force action by the Fed or by any center. If it's going away on its own, or if you even feel like it could go away on its own, then it puts us in a very different circumstance. So I think we're all going to be looking out for that. All right, Austin Gillespie, thanks for playing ball with us. Thanks for letting us try to get you into trouble. Really appreciate you coming back on Oslo. Tracy, that was a lot of fun. I always love talking to Austin. I appreciate that he doesn't mind our efforts to get him into trouble to try and cause a little bit of tension. He plays along. I appreciate it. I got to say, I know this episode is going to come out after Warsh's speech on Friday, But I'm so intrigued to see what he actually says. And now I'm kind of thinking, wouldn't it be funny, but not really, if you just spoke about financial innovation and payments for 40 minutes. Everyone is waiting for the chairman to say something about the state of the economy where the rate hikes are necessary And he like oh I going to talk on theme And I going to talk about the state of Stablecoins and FedNow for 40 minutes Yeah, exactly. That would be extremely funny. Although, I guess we'll see. I'm glad we got into this point with Austin about the distinction between reaction function and forward guidance. Yeah. Because I actually do think there's a lot of sloppy discourse about it. And people allied the two. And I think it makes it, you know, if you go back to the Greenspan, there weren't dots in those days, there weren't press conferences, etc. The statements were a lot shorter. It's very clear that the Fed is capable of operating with far less sort of like both literal communication and quote hand-holding about what it's going to do. I do think the deeper question is still what we got in with Austin, which is, okay, right now, as Austin said, he's more anxious about inflation. That's the sort of the burden is on the inflation side to improve. And otherwise, that would probably call for higher rates. And that is the reaction function question. And that is what we really haven't got yet from the chairman, at least as of the 27th. Well, I also think it's funny. I remember under Powell when the Fed deviated from some of its forward guidance and people were writing This is the death of forward guidance back then And now suddenly everyone like oh it dying again I think this phrase was always kind of bad And I think this actually gets to the point that maybe we didn't need those dots forever. They served a purpose. Were there press conference or any of it? And it was helpful to hear Austin describe it. He's like, yes, you plug the conditions of the time post-GFC into a Taylor rule and it gets you to negative 6%. That's impossible. The Fed can't do that. So then layers on all these other things. We've got to talk about it. We've got to do whatever. Maybe these things really did not need to exist for as long as they did. And again, if maybe the task force says we really don't need all this talk and dots and all this stuff, that might be totally wise. This is the other question about tomorrow because Warsh could talk about findings from the task forces, right? So early indications. So I guess anything and everything from stable coins to Fedcoms is up for grabs. But shall we leave it there for now? Let's leave it there. All right. This has been another episode of the All Thoughts podcast. I'm Tracy Alloway. You can follow me at Tracy Alloway. And I'm Jill Weisenthal. You can follow me at The Stalwart. Follow our producers Carmen Rodriguez at Carmen Ehrman Dash O at Dashbot Kale Brooks at Kale Brooks and Kevin Lozano at Kevin Lloyd Lozano And for more OddBots content you should check out our daily newsletter You can find that at Bloomberg forward slash OddBots You can chat about all of these topics 24-7 in our Discord, discord.gg slash OddBots. And if you like this conversation, if you enjoyed the video, then please like or leave a comment or better yet, subscribe. Thanks for watching or listening. Thank you. If you've ever waited on a refill or couldn't schedule an appointment, you get it. That's the kind of stuff Optum is changing. They're using data and technology to integrate patient care, pharmacy, and everything else. So healthcare is connected, not complicated. What's that look like? Cheaper prescriptions that are easier to get and care that looks at the whole person.
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