Boyar Sees Buying Chance as AI Panic Derates Broadridge, Booking

AI恐慌拉低Broadridge与Booking估值，Boyar视为买入良机 算法篮子抛售与多经理基金止损因夸大的AI颠覆威胁无差别打压高护城河复利型企业，为长期投资者创造了罕见的入场估值。 Jonathan Boyar与Josh Brown及Michael Batnick探讨了为何在长期跨度下跑赢大盘指数的个股不足四分之一，凸显了现代价值投资从格雷厄姆式清算法转变为以大幅折价买入稳健复利型企业的演进历程。讨论分析了多经理平台型基金与算法篮子抛售如何因夸大的即时生成式AI颠覆担忧，而无差别打压具备韧性的特许经营企业。Boyar阐述了被忽视的优质复利型企业的基本面看涨逻辑——例如Broadridge稳固的代理投票护城河、Booking Holdings碎片化的欧洲库存、Pool Corp年金般的维护性现金流，以及MGM计划中的日本赌场垄断地位——并指出暂时的估值倍数压缩为有耐心的长期资本创造了绝佳的入场点。 量化篮子抛售以及设有严格月度止损线（-2%至-5%）的多经理平台型基金，正在因AI颠覆相关的头条新闻而无差别抛售优质特许经营企业。 (22:16) 历史数据显示，在10年的持有期内，美国市值前500大股票中仅有23.2%跑赢标普500指数，凸显了主动选股的极高难度以及所伴随的税收摩擦。 (10:32) 尽管拥有具韧性的非可选消费维护现金流，Pool Corp的股价估值仍从500美元以上下挫至约167美元（约合15倍远期市盈率），该估值倍数底部水平上一次出现还是在2008年金融危机和互联网泡沫破裂时期。 (47:54) 在IAC撤回收购提议后，MGM Resorts目前的交易市盈率接近16倍，其即将在大阪落成的综合度假村有望自2031年左右起在日本获得为期4至5年的赌场垄断地位。 (59:48)

Jonathan Boyar of Boyar Value Group argues that systematic market distortions—driven by multi-manager pod shops, programmatic basket selling, and indiscriminate artificial intelligence disruption fears—are creating rare valuation discounts in durable, cash-generative franchises. The Harsh Math of Stock Picking and Quality Investing (4:20) Active stock selection faces severe structural headwinds, with Adam Parker's research showing that only 23.2% of the top 500 U.S. stocks beat the S&P 500 over a 10-year holding period and 27.7% over three years. Boyar rejects dogmatic 'buy and hold' as an inherent strategy, describing it instead as the organic outcome of continually re-evaluating competitive positioning and multiples. In taxable accounts, an investor requires an alternative idea roughly 25% better to justify triggering capital gains taxes, reinforcing the value of letting compounding winners grow into heavy portfolio concentrations of 10% to 15%. Boyar distinguishes modern opportunistic investing from traditional 1970s Benjamin Graham 'cigar butt' or net-net strategies, which he notes have largely devolved into value traps in obsolete industries. Boyar Asset Management focuses instead on Growth at a Reasonable Price (GARP), targeting durable businesses growing earnings at high single digits to mid-teens. While defensive staples like Walmart and Costco previously stretched to 40 to 60 times earnings—triggering severe multiple de-rating risks seen in cases like Nike and McDonald's—Boyar notes that the broader market outside staples has undergone widespread multiple contraction. Mechanical Selling and the Multi-Manager Pod Engine (22:16) Modern market structure amplifies equity drawdowns through programmatic basket trades and the dominance of multi-manager pod hedge funds like Millennium and Point72. Boyar and the hosts observe that pod managers operate under strict loss thresholds of 2% to 5% per month, triggering automated risk-mandated liquidations that force portfolio liquidations regardless of underlying business health. This creates aggressive downward liquidity cascades that patient, multi-year fundamental capital can exploit. Simultaneously, thematic algorithmic baskets indiscriminately punish companies. Following the launch of autonomous AI consumer apps designed to cancel unused subscriptions, Goldman Sachs constructed a 'consumer inertia' basket. The resulting quantitative dumping swept up highly engaged, high-intent businesses like The New York Times—which fell 7.2% in days—alongside Charles Schwab, Booking Holdings, and Airbnb, completely disconnecting price action from underlying customer loyalty and unit economics. Entrenched Monopolies Mispriced by AI Disruption Narratives (36:30) Boyar identifies several dominant platform businesses where market panic over AI obsolescence has compressed multiples despite resilient fundamentals. Broadridge Financial Solutions, an essential piece of financial plumbing that processes approximately 80% of U.S. corporate proxy votes and generates 63% recurring revenue, experienced its second-worst drawdown since 2008, sliding roughly 25% year-to-date from $280 to $160 amid speculative fears that blockchain or tokenized shares could bypass proxy governance. Similarly, Booking Holdings and Airbnb face recurrent selling on assumptions that conversational AI interfaces will displace travel intermediaries. Boyar points out that generative models lack direct hotel supply and must interface via APIs with Booking's proprietary, fragmented network of small European boutique hotels. While Josh Brown suggests companies follow Salesforce's playbook of high-profile AI partnerships to halt multiple compression, Boyar contends management teams should avoid locking into premature exclusivity deals and focus instead on long-term capital allocation. Cyclical Troughs, Turnarounds, and Re-Rating Catalysts (30:16) Boyar highlights deep disconnects in beaten-down operationally sound businesses. Uber Technologies continues to compress toward forward multiples as low as 12 times earnings despite 20% to 30% annual growth, projected 2027 free cash flow of $10 billion, minority investments in global autonomous vehicle fleets, and insider purchases from CEO Dara Khosrowshahi ($10 million) and the CFO ($5 million). Pool Corp, down from over $500 to around $167, trades near historic crisis troughs of 15 times earnings; while new U.S. pool installations dropped to a decade-low 60,000 units, the non-discretionary maintenance chemicals and equipment required for the existing installed base function as an annuitized cash flow stream. In consumer and leisure spaces, Restaurant Brands International (QSR) is executing an operational turnaround under Executive Chairman Patrick Doyle, revamping Burger King's franchisee economics ahead of peers despite high beef inflation. Meanwhile, in gaming, Boyar prefers MGM Resorts at roughly 16 times earnings over hyper-promotional digital sports betting pure-plays, citing MGM's long-term exclusive casino project in Osaka, Japan (slated for around 2031) as a major overlooked catalyst that could rival the revenue of the entire Las Vegas Strip. While Boyar and the hosts see compelling risk/reward setups in compressed compounders, holding these names requires enduring sharp, non-linear volatility. Multiple contraction can persist below 15 times earnings regardless of business quality, and turnaround theses depend on management discipline, channel stabilization, and the market eventually recognizing that core free cash flows remain insulated from automated disruption.

Boyar Value Group负责人Jonathan Boyar认为，受多管理人对冲基金强制止损、主题量化篮子无差别抛售以及对AI颠覆的过度恐慌影响，当前美股呈现出极端的估值压缩与因子扭曲，这为着眼于长期的耐性资本提供了以大幅折价买入高质黏性资产的罕见窗口。 量化踩踏与多管理人机制引发定价扭曲 (25:08) Boyar与主持人分析指出，当前市场结构已被多策略“平台型”（pod shop）对冲基金主导。这类机构对投资组合经理施加严格且零容忍的风控参数，若单一账户月度亏损达2%至5%，风险主管会立即强制平仓，从而形成自我强化的抛售循环，将基本面优质的企业无差别推向低谷。与此同时，主题量化篮子交易进一步加剧了定价脱节。例如高盛推出的“消费者惰性”做空篮子，因担忧AI自动取消订阅工具而机械式做空具有续费模式的公司，导致读者忠诚度极高且核心业务加速的纽约时报（The New York Times）数日内急跌7.2%，甚至波及嘉信理财（Charles Schwab）和Booking Holdings等底层逻辑完全不同的标的。 这种流动性踩踏亦体现在反常的因子表现上。Julian Klymochko的数据显示，高盛做空最多的股票篮子年内上涨约40%，而传统多空因子账簿则下跌约23%。此外，Adam Parker的数据揭示，在10年持有期内仅23.2%的大盘股能跑赢标普500指数，3年期胜率也仅为27.7%。市值加权指数的极度集中，使得偏离羊群效应的自下而上选股承受着前所未有的短期折磨，但也为三至十年维度的价值投资者创造了被动清盘带来的超额折价买点。 价值投资演进与防范高估值资产去评级 (13:00) Boyar回顾了其家族公司自1970年代以来的策略演变。格雷厄姆式的“烟蒂股”（低于清算价值的破产边缘资产）在现代信息透明、算法极速发现的时代已沦为价值陷阱，大量资金因陷入衰退的实体零售而亏损。现代价值投资已转向“合理价格增长”（GARP）与机会主义价值，重点搜寻盈利能保持高个位数至中双位数增长、具备5至15年复合能力的特许经营权企业。 然而，即便拥有优质护城河，投资者仍面临估值去评级（multiple de-rating）的巨大风险。Boyar警示，好市多（Costco）与沃尔玛（Walmart）等防守型蓝筹此前被推升至40至60倍市盈率，已形成类似1970年代“漂亮五十”的质量泡沫。麦当劳在年内144天内最大回撤达29%；而耐克（Nike）因过激切断Foot Locker与亚马逊等批发渠道、孤注一掷转向DTC直营，导致货架被On昂跑与Hoka蚕食，在利润与估值倍数双杀下股价腰斩却依然难言便宜。Josh Brown强调，即便企业基本面稳固，若市场持续将估值下压至15倍甚至更低，盲目认为低估值即底部的投资者仍将承受资本永久损失。 AI颠覆叙事下的平台垄断与金融基建 (39:53) 在Boyar最新筛选出的14家发生显著估值压缩的公司中，Booking Holdings与Broadridge是遭遇算法误伤的典型代表。市场认为生成式AI智能体能轻松颠覆在线旅游代理（OTA），但Boyar与Batnick认为这一逻辑忽略了供给端护城河：Booking的核心优势在于其耗费数十年在欧洲建立的高度分散的独立精品酒店网络，这些商家缺乏IT基础设施且受制于欧盟合规要求，新兴AI前端在缺乏真实房源库存的情况下，最终必须通过API接入Booking的底层系统，AI更可能成为其增量分发渠道而非替代者。至于Airbnb，试图通过AI绕过平台直接对接数百万分散房东的假想同样脱离商业现实。 在金融基础设施领域，从ADP拆分出的Broadridge处理着全美约80%的SEC强制代理投票，且63%的收入为高可见度的经常性服务费。尽管具备极强的收费站垄断属性，该股却因区块链代币化将颠覆代理投票等虚幻担忧，以及金融科技板块的情绪传染，从约280美元高点跌至160美元（年内跌约25%），企业价值收缩至200亿美元附近。此外，优步（UBER）在管理层自掏腰包购入数百万美元股票、商业化自动驾驶车队合作落地、预计2027年产生100亿美元自由现金流且年增速达20%至30%的情况下，仍被市场冷落至接近12倍市盈率，显现出基本面强劲但股票定价机能失调的特征。 周期性阵痛出清与管理层重塑反转机会 (47:54) 除科技与金融平台外，部分经历后疫情需求透支或处于管理变革期的企业也显露出安全边际。全美泳池分销龙头Pool Corp在疫情期间受家庭装修改造激增驱动录得27%的年化营收增长，市盈率曾攀升至55倍；随着高利率导致美国新建泳池数量滑落至约6万个的十年低点，股价从逾500美元重挫至167美元左右，估值降至约15倍市盈率，回落至历次重大危机时期的历史底部。Brown与Boyar指出，市场过分关注具有强周期性的新建泳池数据，却忽视了全美庞大存量泳池的不可递延性：泳池一旦建成即产生类似年金的水质化学处理、过滤泵维护等刚性开支，轻资产的分销属性使其资产负债表保持健康。 餐饮巨头跨国餐饮集团（Restaurant Brands International，QSR）则依托执行董事长Patrick Doyle展开业务重组。Doyle曾操盘达美乐披萨（Domino's）实现二十倍涨幅，其正在汉堡王（Burger King）复制“直面产品缺陷、升级数字化点餐、优化加盟商单位经济”的策略，使汉堡王同店销售改善进度领先于麦当劳，同时提供3%至4%的稳定股息率。在博彩领域，美高梅国际酒店（MGM Resorts）滑落至约33美元（约16倍市盈率），相较于在价格战和促销中自相残杀的纯线上博彩平台，其手握2031年前后开业的日本大阪独家综合度假村运营权，享有长达四至五年的独占期，有望释放相当于整个拉斯维加斯大道规模的营收增量。 节目的核心讨论表明，短期宏观利率环境与对AI技术的恐慌，掩盖了许多具有刚性护城河、健康资产负债表与可观自由现金流企业的长期复利价值。然而，与会者亦留下了一个关键隐忧：在多策略对冲基金极度主导短期流动性、市场广度长期恶化以及被动市值加权强者恒强的环境下，基本面优质但遭遇多重估值收缩的冷门股票，究竟需要经历多长的估值修复折磨期，以及企业是否必须通过激进的自发资本配置（如大规模回购或私有化）才能打破华尔街的冷漠，仍是摆在价值投资者面前未解的挑战。

## Background 本期视频于 2026 年 9 月 25 日由知名财经频道 The Compound 发布于 YouTube 平台。节目由 Downtown Josh Brown 和 Michael Batnick 共同主持，特邀 Boyar Asset Management 合伙人 Jonathan Boyar 担任嘉宾，深入探讨选股难度攀升、买入并持有策略的误区、美股头部过度集中、量化与 AI 恐慌引发的错杀抛售，以及当前价值投资者在 Uber、Broadridge、Booking、Pool Corp 等标的中发现的逆向投资机会。 ## TL;DR 节目深入剖析了当今美股选股胜率急剧下滑的严峻现实，指出资本过度向科技巨头倾斜并导致市值加权与等权重指数严重分化，同时批驳了盲目死守高估值资产的“买入并持有”教条。嘉宾 Jonathan Boyar 结合自身深耕数十年的内在价值研究，详细阐述了现代价值投资如何从“烟蒂股”转向合理估值下的优质复利企业（GARP）。针对近期华尔街量化基金“一篮子做空”和对冲基金严苛止损机制造成的踩踏，三人重点复盘了 Uber、Broadridge、Booking.com、Airbnb、Pool Corp 以及汉堡王母公司 QSR 等基本面坚挺却遭市场过度折价错杀的标的，指引长线资本如何在极端情绪砸出的“黄金坑”中寻找非对称风险收益比。 ## Atmosphere & style 整场对谈兼具老练华尔街投资人的睿智深度与纽约客式的犀利幽默，节奏紧凑且火花不断。Josh Brown 锋芒毕露、直击资本游戏痛点，Michael Batnick 穿插自嘲与离谱的亲身踩坑故事，而 Jonathan Boyar 则展现出家族传承深厚的稳健与从容。节目从调侃假名厨后裔、痛斥垃圾股暴涨的扭曲生态，一路深入到拆解财报细节与资本运作隐秘逻辑，听感犹如置身曼哈顿午后三位资深操盘手的内部复盘会，既辛辣清醒又充满反共识的思辨魅力。 ## Bulletin - [10:32](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qtyP1cIOQfc&t=632s) 美股选股难度持续攀升，近10年标普500大股票中仅23.2%能跑赢大盘，资本高度向头部巨头集中压低了个股整体胜率。 - [22:16](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qtyP1cIOQfc&t=1336s) 华尔街量化对冲基金盛行以AI Agent等叙事为由的“一篮子交易”，导致纽约时报、Booking和嘉信理财等优质资产遭遇脱离基本面的无差别砸盘。 - [25:08](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qtyP1cIOQfc&t=1508s) Pod Shop多经理人对冲基金严格执行2%至5%的短期强制止损机制，引发“抛售招致抛售”的踩踏下行，为3至10年维度的长期价值资本创造了绝佳击球区。 - [16:58](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qtyP1cIOQfc&t=1018s) 传统白马股面临“质量泡沫”与高估值杀倍数风险，好市多、沃尔玛等标的估值被推升至40-60倍PE，盲目买入并持有潜藏严重估值陷阱。 ## Key takeaways - [04:20](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qtyP1cIOQfc&t=260s) “买入并持有”从来不是孤立的投资策略，而是以合理估值买入优质资产并持续动态评估后的自然结果；若面临极端荒谬估值（如1998年可口可乐60倍PE）则必须果断离场。 - [04:20](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qtyP1cIOQfc&t=260s) 频繁减仓再平衡往往是长期复利的大敌，考虑到应税账户的资本利得税损耗，换仓必须确信替代标的预期收益高出约25%才具备划算空间。 - [13:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qtyP1cIOQfc&t=780s) 现代价值投资已从1970年代翻垃圾堆式的“雪茄烟蒂”净营运流动资产策略，演进为以合理价格买入具备宽护城河龙头的GARP与机会主义策略。 - [15:13](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qtyP1cIOQfc&t=913s) 在连续下跌一年后面对接踵而来的利空消息不再创新低，是极具价值的技术面见底信号，表明抛压已经枯竭。 - [20:18](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qtyP1cIOQfc&t=1218s) Nike因战略误判（激进直营、破坏零售伙伴关系、缺乏产品创新及过度透支Jordan品牌）遭遇基本面与估值乘数的双重腰斩，是反面教材级别的溃败。 - [22:16](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qtyP1cIOQfc&t=1336s) 量化基金将Booking和纽约时报等划入“消费者惰性”一篮子抛售极其荒谬，Booking在欧洲拥有海量无法被AI绕过的碎片化独家酒店供给与监管壁垒。 - [30:16](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qtyP1cIOQfc&t=1816s) Uber高管大额增持、预计2027年自由现金流达百亿美元，并通过注资第三方AI车队反向构筑自动驾驶护城河，属于被市场错杀的优质成长标的。 - [36:30](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qtyP1cIOQfc&t=2190s) Broadridge处理全美约80%的代理投票业务且拥有63%经常性收入，近期因区块链与代币化伪命题恐慌导致股价腰斩，具备极佳的垄断安全边际。 - [47:54](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qtyP1cIOQfc&t=2874s) 全美新建泳池量跌至十余年低位，但Pool Corp商业模式核心在于存量泳池不可逆的刚性化学品消杀维护年金收入，当前估值已回落至危机级别。 - [52:48](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qtyP1cIOQfc&t=3168s) QSR（汉堡王母公司）由传奇CEO Patrick Doyle操盘北美加盟商重组与产品改良，已率先跨越反转周期，并提供3%至4%的稳定股息回报。 - [56:52](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qtyP1cIOQfc&t=3412s) 严格规避“被广大消费者深恶痛绝”的商业模式（如StubHub），这类企业股权结构复杂、用户口碑恶劣，投资体验通常极差。 - [59:36](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qtyP1cIOQfc&t=3576s) MGM（美高梅）目前仅16倍PE，其预计于2031年开业的日本独家综合度假村赌场营收体量可对标拉斯维加斯，华尔街分析师模型尚未计入该长期催化剂。 - [01:02:28](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qtyP1cIOQfc&t=3748s) 赌场公司此前将实体地产打包卖给VICI等REIT以回购股票拉高高管奖金，剥离重资产后背负沉重租金，最终演化成双方双输的财务工程陷阱。 ## Detailed walkthrough ### [00:11](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qtyP1cIOQfc&t=11s) 节目开场与嘉宾介绍 节目开场由赞助商 Grayscale（灰度）赞助播出。主持人 Josh Brown 热情欢迎返场嘉宾 Jonathan Boyar。Jonathan 是 Boyar Value Group 的主要合伙人，旗下涵盖 Boyar Asset Management 以及创立于 1975 年的独立股票研究机构 Boyar's Intrinsic Value Research。该机构的订阅客户涵盖了全球顶级的几家主权财富基金、对冲基金、共同基金以及家族办公室；同时，Jonathan 本人还是播客《The World According to Boyar》的主持人。 Josh 回忆起上次邀请 Jonathan 上节目的时间是在当年的春末夏初，当时正值“SaaS 大溃败”（SaaS apocalypse）时期，市场情绪极度悲观。Jonathan 当时看好的一些科技股随后迎来了强势反弹，特别是对 Salesforce（CRM）的逆势看多。彼时 CRM 股价遭遇惨烈抛售，市场普遍担忧其业务会被 Anthropic 等前沿 AI 模型彻底颠覆；然而随后 Salesforce 选择与 Anthropic 展开深度合作，基本面和股价预期大幅改善。Jonathan 对此谦虚地表示“没人能做到百分之百正确，破钟一天也能对两次”，并指出过去几天市场似乎又在酝酿着与当时极其相似的逆向投资机会。 ### [02:27](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qtyP1cIOQfc&t=147s) 姓氏趣闻与选股世家 在正式探讨投资策略之前，Michael Batnick 开玩笑自嘲自己极其轻信他人。他提到上一次三人同台录制节目时，Josh 煞有介事地忽悠他说 Jonathan 来自著名的食品家族“Chef Boyardee”（著名罐装意面品牌），Michael 竟然信以为真，误以为自己正与商业皇室后裔坐在一起。 Jonathan 笑称这并不意外，因为不仅 Michael 被骗，甚至连自己居住的小镇上都有六七个邻居跑来问过他是不是 Chef Boyardee 的继承人。Josh 随即展开了一番考据：历史上确实有“Chef Boyardee”这位真实人物，他当年在克利夫兰经营一家意大利餐厅，只是罐头上的拼写与原本的意大利姓氏有所出入。此外，Josh 还探讨了“Boyar”这一姓氏在历史上的词源含义——在斯拉夫语系中意为“贵族”或地方长官（类似于德语里的 Burger/Bürgermeister，即市长）。Jonathan 幽默地接梗称这非常讽刺，因为自己的祖辈当年是在惨遭迫害后被赶出俄罗斯的，历史上他们属于苦难阶层而非统治者。不过话锋一转，Michael 正式确认 Jonathan 确实出身于真正的“选股世家”——他的父亲长期深耕于此，家族几代人一直在投资研究领域拥有极深造诣。 ### [04:20](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qtyP1cIOQfc&t=260s) 选股之难与“买入并持有”策略的本质 Michael 抛出了核心议题：随着市场结构、主流企业形态与过去几十年相比发生翻天覆地的变化，击败市场变得异常艰难。华尔街策略师 Adam Parker 近期发布的数据显示，无论是相对标普 500 指数，还是将范围扩大至全美前 2,000 只大中盘股，个股跑赢基准的比例都极低，甚至有文章宣称“买入并持有（Buy and Hold）策略已死”。Michael 借此向 Jonathan 发问：入行 20 年来，选股究竟是变得更难了？是需要更多耐心还是更频繁的交易？ Jonathan 从根本上反驳了所谓“买入并持有已死”的论调。他指出： - **投资理念的因果倒置**：“买入并持有”从来就不是一种孤立的投资策略本身，而是一种优秀投资策略最终呈现出来的**自然结果**。 - **持续重估与非盲目绑定**：投资者绝不应该与某只股票“结婚”。优秀选股者的工作是找到伟大的公司并以合理或低估的价格买入，但必须在持有过程中动态复盘两件事：第一，业务本身的发展是否稳健、管理层执行力如何、行业竞争格局是否恶化；第二，估值水平是否仍在合理倍数之内。 - **税收敏感与机会成本**：Boyar Asset Management 管理的绝大多数账户属于应税账户（taxable accounts），因此对资本利得税极度敏感。如果一家优质公司的股价出现一定程度的高估，并不能立刻成为卖出的理由——因为考虑到缴税损耗，你必须确信自己能找到一个预期收益率比它高出约 25% 的替代标的，调仓在数学上才划算。 - **承受集中度与逆风期的心理考验**：历史上标普 500 指数中真正能够长期显著跑赢大盘的股票可能只有 20 到 24 左右。如果幸运地选中了其中一只，就必须敢于长期拿住。这意味着投资组合的集中度会自然被动拉高，这只股票会占据极其不成比例的仓位权重；这也意味着投资者必须忍受业绩与大众大相径庭的孤独，并经受特定年份业绩严重逆风的煎熬。 Jonathan 以自己持有的微软（Microsoft）为例：在今年早些时候软件股暴跌时，微软股价从高位大幅回撤，当时账面表现非常难看，甚至让自己“感觉像个白痴”。但现在股价又涨了回来。如果当时自以为聪明地在高点卖出、试图在底部抄底——这在现实中是几乎不可能做到的——最终客户的处境反而会糟糕得多。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Buy and Hold Process accDescr: 解释为何买入并持有是优秀策略的结果而非原因 A["发现优质企业并以合理估值买入"] --> B["动态持续跟踪重估"] subgraph Evaluate ["两大核心评估维度"] B1["基本面与商业竞争格局"] B2["估值倍数与税后机会成本"] end B --> Evaluate Evaluate --> C{"是否出现极端过热泡沫？"} C -- 否 / 表现稳健 --> D["继续持有（忍受短期波动与高集中度）"] C -- 是（如 1998 年可口可乐 60 倍 PE） --> E["坚决卖出以规避漫长跑输风险"] ``` ### [07:40](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qtyP1cIOQfc&t=460s) 估值极限、巴菲特的教训与仓位管理的迷思 谈到何时必须卖出，Jonathan 指出必须以估值达到极端荒谬为底线。他提到身后的 Warren Buffett 肖像，直言即使被奉为“股神”，巴菲特历史上也绝非从不交易，如果一笔投资经过三四年验证不及预期，他也会选择换手。巴菲特本人承认过自己职业生涯中最大的失误之一，就是在 1998 年可口可乐（Coca-Cola）估值飙升至 60 倍市盈率（P/E）时没有选择卖出：那是一家极其伟大的企业，但估值极度荒谬，此后长达十几年可口可乐的表现大幅落后于标普 500 指数，且占用了原本可以投向更高回报资产的宝贵资本。 Josh 随后探讨了财经媒体和卖方分析师对“买入与卖出”二元对立的错误渲染。在电视节目或研报中，人们往往把看好某家公司视作全仓买入、减持视作“失去信心”的背叛： - 实际上，专业机构在核心持仓周围进行“微调交易”（trading around positions）是非常普遍的资产配置动作。 - 某位基金经理将某只股票减仓 20%，并不意味着他不看好该企业，可能仅仅是因为该标的在过去几年暴涨了 1000%，在总资产中的比例过高需要再平衡控仓，或者单纯是需要腾挪流动性去投资另外三家同样具有吸引力的新公司。 针对这一点，Jonathan 表达了略带分歧的视角：虽然机构需要风控，但普通个人投资者往往因为过早“减仓止盈（trimming）”而酿成大错。以苹果（Apple）为例，过去十几年中任何一次卖出或减仓事后看几乎都是错误的决定。如果一只原本正常的仓位凭借优秀的业绩自然膨胀到总投资组合的 10% 甚至 15%，完全没有必要为了纯粹的再平衡而盲目砍掉——毕竟只要持有标普 500 指数基金，单只巨头的被动权重本身就已经达到了 6% 以上。Jonathan 提到了近期做客他播客的 Chris Mayer（《100 Baggers》一书的作者），Chris 在书中反复强调了盲目卖出和随意减仓的巨大危害，认为在绝大多数情况下，“什么都不做（doing nothing）”才是长期投资者能做出的最明智的选择。 ### [10:32](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qtyP1cIOQfc&t=632s) 选股胜率急剧下滑与美股头部集中化趋势 三人由调仓卖出苹果（Apple）所带来的资本利得税问题切入，展示了一张引人深思的市场数据图表。根据分析师 Adam 的统计，选股不仅变得非常艰难，而且其难度正随时间推移而持续恶化： - 过去 10 年间，美股排名前 500 大股票中，仅有 **23.2%** 能够跑赢标普 500 指数（S&P 500）。 - 即使是 3 年的持有周期，跑赢指数的胜率也仅为 **27.7%**。 Josh Brown 询问这种从 2002 年至今逐步恶化的根源何在。Michael Batnick 指出，最直观的解释是自 2017 年以来的 FANG 概念股及随后的“美股七巨头”（Magnificent Seven，简称 Mag 7），也就是极度的市场集中度。但他强调，实际上早在此类科技巨头全面统治市场之前，跑赢大盘的股票比例就已经在下行。在正常市场环境中，指望 60% 的股票跑赢大盘本就不切实际，但若想回升至 50%，除非发生极端情况——比如 AI 泡沫破裂，导致苹果、英伟达（Nvidia）、谷歌（Alphabet/Google）、Meta 等集体下挫 70%，其他股票才可能出现超额表现。 Jonathan Boyar 完全赞同这一看法，并补充道，过去 20 年间标普 500 等权重指数（Equal Weight）的表现大幅落后于市值加权指数（Market Cap-Weighted），证明了资本集中的力量。Josh Brown 总结道，当今的市场结构遵循一条核心法则：“资金流向待遇最好的地方，而待遇最好的地方正是那些最优秀的公司”（Money moves to where it is treated best）。因此，普通股票根本无法与顶级优质公司获得同等估值与资金追捧。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 美股选股难度增加与集中化循环 accDescr: 资本追逐优质头部科技公司，导致市值加权指数走高并压低个股胜率。 subgraph CapitalDynamics["市场资金流向规律"] A["资本追求最佳收益与确定性"] --> B["资金过度集中于 Mag 7 等头部巨头"] end subgraph MarketStructure["指数与表现分化"] B --> C["市值加权指数（Cap-Weighted）大幅领跑"] C --> D["等权重指数及广谱个股显著跑输"] end subgraph LongTermOutcome["选股胜率走低"] D --> E["10年持有期仅 23.2% 股票战胜指数"] D --> F["3年持有期仅 27.7% 股票跑赢标普"] end ``` --- ### [13:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qtyP1cIOQfc&t=780s) 从“烟蒂股”到 GARP：博亚的价值投资演进 针对 Jonathan Boyar 的选股策略，Josh Brown 提出观察：Boyar 虽自称价值投资者，但其投资组合并非典型的“深度价值”（Deep Value）——他不买那些市盈率（P/E）仅有 11 倍的垃圾资产，而是更偏向高个位数至中双位数增长的优质公司。Michael Batnick 笑称他其实是“GARP”（合理价格下的成长，Growth at a Reasonable Price）风格，Boyar 笑着回应“品牌招牌太难改了”。 Jonathan Boyar 回顾了家族业务的发展历程： - **1970年代的“雪茄烟蒂”投资（Cigar Butt Investing）**：由父亲创立业务时，策略是寻找格雷厄姆式的“净营运流动资产”（Net-Nets）和极低估值资产，抽“最后一口免费烟”。那在没有竞争、没有计算机、甚至要亲自跑到纽约公共图书馆翻阅公开财报资料的年代非常有效。 - **现代价值投资**：如今信息完全透明，传统深度价值投资往往演变成“买入基本面不可逆的破产零售商”，这种模式可能已成为“全球最差策略之一”。 - **当下的投资哲学**：真正的投资是做一名“机会主义者”（Opportunist），以低于内在价值的价格买入能够长期持有 5 年、10 年乃至 15 年的具备护城河或独特竞争力的行业龙头。 --- ### [15:13](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qtyP1cIOQfc&t=913s) 技术面信号与左侧交易的风险控制 谈及在基本面研究中是否考虑价格信号（Technicals）与市场情绪时，Jonathan Boyar 解释道，他们尽量排除技术面噪音，但绝不会盲目去接“下坠的飞刀”（Falling Knife）。他以 Pool Corp（泳池用品分销巨头）为例： - 该股票在 400 美元时看似便宜，跌至 300 美元显得更便宜，跌到 200 美元时看似极具吸引力。若不顾走势莽撞抄底，就像“挡在呼啸而来的货运火车面前”（getting in front of a freight train），注定血亏。 Josh Brown 与 Boyar 探讨了关键的技术反转信号： - 当一家公司经历整整一年的下跌后，在接踵而至的利空消息面前却**不再创新低甚至止跌反弹**，这便构成了极有价值的技术面信号——表明市场上“已经没有卖家愿意在此价位抛售了”。 - Boyar 坦言没人能精准抄底，面对处于自由落体状态的优质目标，他们通常先建立约 2% 的底仓，留出空间随后续走势再分批加仓。同时，他也留意到近几日部分旅游概念股因非理性的荒谬理由遭市场砸盘，反而提供了风险收益比诱人的入场契机。 --- ### [16:58](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qtyP1cIOQfc&t=1018s) 2026 年的因子扭曲：做空垃圾被轧空与“买入并持有”的估值陷阱 谈到当下的市场环境，三人指出了一个反常现象：2026 年迄今表现最好的策略之一，竟然是“做多垃圾股，做空最高质量的低估值公司”。 - 引用 Julian Klymochko 的统计，高盛（Goldman Sachs）的“最受做空股票篮子”（Most Shorted Basket）年内上涨了整整 **40%**。 - 这直接导致对冲基金普遍采用的多空对冲策略（Long/Short）年内重挫 **23%**。 与垃圾股狂飙形成鲜明对比的是传统优质白马股的崩盘。麦当劳（McDonald's）从净资产收益率（ROE）等各项量化指标来看均属于顶尖企业，但在过去 144 天内股价暴跌了 **29%**（股价自当年 2 月见顶），这类非危机时期的剧烈下挫在历史上极其罕见，上一次需追溯至 COVID-19 疫情甚至互联网泡沫崩盘期。 Jonathan Boyar 指出，当前市场可能存在类似历史上的“漂亮 50”（Nifty 50）式的“质量泡沫”（Quality Bubble）： - 像 Cintas、好市多（Costco，市盈率极高）、沃尔玛（Walmart，市盈率达 40-50 倍）等优质标的，估值已被推升至 50-60 倍 PE。对于这类股票，除非投资视野长达 30 年，否则极难带来理想回报。 - Josh Brown 总结道，盲目“买入并持有”（Buy and Hold）在此类环境下具有致命危害，**耐克（Nike）** 就是典型代表： 1. 耐克常年享受远高于市场的估值溢价。 2. 当公司基本面出现波折、盈利连续数年承压下滑时，双重打击降临——既承受盈利基本面的恶化，又经历估值倍数的剧烈下修（Multiple Derating）。 3. 这导致股价直接被腰斩，但估值算下来依然算不上便宜，对长期死守的持有者构成了难以察觉却破坏力极强的杀伤力。 ### [20:18](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qtyP1cIOQfc&t=1218s) 掉落的飞刀与 Nike 的战略溃败 三人探讨了市场上那些“一旦崩盘就一蹶不振”的股票。Jonathan Boyar 指出，股票确实会有周期性回归，但这往往需要数年乃至极大的波折——以 2000 年代初期的麦当劳（McDonald's）为例，当时它也是一只彻底跌落的“坏股票”（broken stock），耗时数年、换了两三任 CEO（其中甚至有一位因突发心脏病去世）才最终实现扭转。试图去接飞刀极其危险，投资者必须看清背后的核心诱因。 谈及 Nike 近期的暴跌，主持人与嘉宾达成一致：Nike 的问题在于其产品彻底脱离了消费者的喜好，整个转型过程简直堪称“企业反面教材的大师级典范”（a master class on what not to do）。Josh Brown 直言，Nike 亲手断送了自己最稳固的渠道体系：管理层傲慢地让头号零售伙伴 Foot Locker “靠边站”，单方面押注 Nike.com 和官方 App 的 D2C（直接面向消费者）直销渠道；在亚马逊上建店后又出尔反尔退出，最终激怒了亚马逊，并在 Dick's Sporting Goods 等全美核心零售渠道中大举丧失了货架空间。更荒谬的是，在迈克尔·乔丹退役近三十年后，Nike 依然全靠 Jordan 品牌支撑业绩，而此时新兴竞争对手比以往任何时候都更加强劲。再加上当今年轻一代运动员已能直接打造自己的个人品牌与 D2C 影响力，Nike 作为平台的号召力大打折扣。Boyar 坦言自己选择彻底放弃 Nike，因为市场上要赚取回报，有比它轻松得多的途径。 * **麦当劳历史教训**：2000 年代初的深渊需要漫长的管理层迭代和重组才爬出来，绝非朝夕之功。 * **Nike 战略硬伤**：自毁 Foot Locker 与线下零售商货架份额；盲目过激转向纯 D2C 直营；产品缺乏创新并过度透支退役 30 年的 Jordan 品牌。 * **运动员生态变迁**：现今顶尖运动员不再绝对依赖 Nike 的背书，自身便具备直达消费者的流量变现能力。 --- ### [22:16](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qtyP1cIOQfc&t=1336s) “一篮子交易”的荒诞与 AI 概念无差别抛售 Boyar 认为，当今市场与 1970 年代最大的不同，在于普遍存在一种极度机械化的“一篮子交易”（Basket Trading），而这种荒唐的交易行为恰恰为价值投资者提供了绝佳的买入良机。近期 Instinct 和 Muse 这类具备 AI Agent 功能的消费级应用走红，其功能之一是帮用户自动筛查并一键取消长期闲置的自动扣费订阅。华尔街的量化机构和投行（如高盛设立的“消费者惰性”股票篮子）随即展开无脑程序化做空。 这一连串反应引发了荒谬的踩踏现象。如果说健身房运营商 Planet Fitness 被抛售尚有逻辑可循，那么《纽约时报》（The New York Times）在短短几天内大跌 7.2% 则完全脱离了基本面——《纽约时报》拥有极度忠诚的高粘性订阅用户群，业务正如火如荼，根本不可能因为一个取消订阅的应用就被颠覆。然而在被打包进一篮子资产后，量化基金“根本不带任何思考地”程序化平仓。同样遭殃的还有 Booking Holdings、Expedia、Airbnb 以及嘉信理财（Charles Schwab）。Michael Batnick 诧异地吐槽：“嘉信理财怎么可能算是什么‘消费者惰性’股票？难道有人会突然惊呼‘哎呀我忘了我在嘉信还有个账户，赶紧把它销掉’？这完全讲不通！”Josh Brown 调侃道，现在只要市场上出现任何具有颠覆性噱头的 AI 新品，交易员就像“对表一样准时”把嘉信理财拉出来狠揍一顿。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: AI 恐慌导致的一篮子抛售链条 accDescr: 展示 AI Agent 应用上线后，华尔街投行一篮子量化交易引发优质股无差别暴跌的逻辑流向。 subgraph Catalyst["AI 颠覆叙事催化"] A["Instinct / Muse 等 AI Agent 上线"] --> B["自动化扫描并取消闲置订阅"] end subgraph Mechanism["华尔街量化机制"] B --> C["高盛等机构设立<br/>'消费者惰性篮子' (Inertia Basket)"] C --> D["量化算法无差别程序化砸盘"] end subgraph MarketImpact["非理性杀跌受害者"] D --> E["逻辑关联股: Planet Fitness 等"] D --> F["被误杀优质资产: NYT / Booking / Airbnb / Schwab"] end ``` --- ### [25:08](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qtyP1cIOQfc&t=1508s) 对冲基金 Pod Shop 的残酷止损机制与流动性旋涡 深入探讨这种脱离基本面的极端股价波动时，嘉宾们将矛头指向了华尔街当下最主流的对冲基金模式——“Pod Shop”（如 Millennium、Point72 等多经理人多策略平台）。如今资金不再流向传统坚守价值的独立多空头经理，而是涌入了这类由众多彼此独立的交易小组（Pods）拼盘组成的庞大平台。 这些 Pod 内部实行极度冷酷且短暂的风险敞口控制（Short leash）。新进团队通常只有极窄的授权范围，只要单月亏损达到 2% 至 5%，风险控制经理（Risk Manager）就会立即介入强制平仓，甚至当场开除。Josh Brown 生动描摹了那种高压场景：“风控官会直接告诉你：‘不，你不能再守下去了，必须立刻平掉所有仓位！现在就把你和你女儿在泳池边的合照塞进硬纸箱卷铺盖走人，你连下一周的机会都不会有。’”这种“亏损必须立即砍仓”的刚性铁律造成了“抛售引发更剧烈抛售”（selling begets selling）的恶性下行循环。Boyar 强调，虽然这种资金管理机制对于做基本面研究的人来说看似畸形，但对于着眼于 3 到 10 年维度的长线价值投资者而言，这种由机构自残踩踏砸出来的非理性低估，恰恰是不可多得的入场黄金窗口。 * **对冲基金生态重塑**：昔日坚守基本面的长线多空对冲基金失宠，资金大规模向 Millennium、Point72 等严格止损的 Pod 平台集中。 * **微小波动引发雪崩**：2%~3% 的浮亏阈值即可触发风控强平，导致个股短线跌幅被数倍放大。 * **长线投资者的红利**：机构受制于短线考核而被迫交出廉价筹码，为耐心资本制造了完美的击球区。 --- ### [27:51](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qtyP1cIOQfc&t=1671s) Uber 的两难困境：亮眼基本面与疲软估值的拉锯 当被问及目前最振奋人心的标的时，Boyar 再次提到了 MSG Sports、Atlanta Braves Holdings 以及 Uber。Josh Brown 随即打断，要求 Boyar 针对 Uber 当前极其尴尬的处境展开深入剖析。Brown 充满挫败感地指出，华尔街现在对 Uber 呈现出一种“油盐不进”的冷漠态势：“无论他们说什么、做什么，华尔街根本不在乎。” 具体来看，Uber 的首席执行官 Dara Khosrowshahi 不久前自掏腰包购买了 1000 万美元的自家股票，CFO 也自购了 500 万美元，公司同步实施了大规模回购计划，且在多座城市的街道上已经与多个伙伴落地了实质性的 Robotaxi（自动驾驶出租车）合作业务。然而，在管理层自购后的第二天，股价依然应声下跌。Brown 沮丧地表示，以当前的势头，这只股票仿佛要被杀到仅剩 12 倍市盈率（P/E）。Boyar 则坚决捍卫多头观点：在一家每年保持 20% 到 30% 稳定高增长且基本面极其扎实的公司面前，估值不可能永远维持在被严重压制的状态，这正是那种值得坚定持有的经典标的。Brown 追问，如果 Boyar 坐在 Uber 管理层、CFO 和投资者关系顾问的对面，除了踏实把业务运营好之外，到底还能给这只受锤的股票开出什么资本运作处方。 * **内部高管大额真金白银增持**：CEO 斥资约 1,000 万美元，CFO 斥资 500 万美元入市买入自家股票。 * **业务执行力极强**：自动驾驶网约车（Robotaxi）商业化合作在多地全面铺开，整体年增速依然维持在 20%~30% 之间。 * **估值陷阱困局**：即便利好频出且公司大举回购，市场仍旧持续打压其估值乘数，形成显著的基本面与股价脱节。 ### [30:16](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qtyP1cIOQfc&t=1816s) Uber：被错杀的超级现金流机器与自动驾驶隐形赢家 关于 Uber 的多空博弈仍在继续。Jonathan Boyar 指出，公司管理层应当在保留充足现金缓冲的前提下，尽可能激进地回购自家股票，哪怕发起要约收购（Tender Offer）也是极佳的选择。特别值得注意的是内部人士的增持动作——CEO 达拉·科斯罗萨西（Dara Khosrowshahi）此前一直是股票卖家，直到最近开始真金白银地买入，这向市场释放了强烈的积极信号。乔纳森笑称，Uber 在他的投资组合中几乎每年都要在“表现最好”与“表现最差”之间轮流坐庄，投资者必须保持足够的耐心。当被问及自由现金流预测时，他们提到 Uber 到 2027 年预计将产生高达 100 亿美元左右的自由现金流；相对于其当前市值而言，这是一个极其惊人的吸金能力，证明管理层在运营执行层面几乎挑不出毛病。 Josh Brown 紧接着指出了市场的巨大偏见：Uber 目前正在积极入股自动驾驶（AV）车队，而这在两年前还是管理层明确表态不愿涉足的领域。Uber 现在的战略逻辑非常清晰——他们必须确保市场上拥有大量非 Waymo、非特斯拉路线的无人驾驶车队在路上跑，而实现这一目标最快的方式就是直接向制造这些汽车的原始设备制造商（OEM）注资，或者投资欧美及亚洲第三方 AI 公司组建的无人车队。然而，面对 Uber 在全球范围内的这一关键布局，华尔街却完全没有给予其任何估值溢价或认可。 三人探讨了技术面与基本面投资者的心理差异。Michael Batnick 与 Josh 坦言，面对这类破位下跌的“问题股”，技术派往往会谨慎观望，试图等待抛压彻底衰竭再介入，但实际操作中往往会陷入“别人没抄到底，难道我能抄到底”的经典迷思，最终不得不追高甚至割肉。然而，正如当年 Meta 业绩爆雷后绝地反击的案例一样，Uber 绝不是一家基本面崩盘的公司（Broken Business），仅仅是一只失宠的股票（Broken Stock）。Uber 从 1 月至今的盈利指引与业绩预期完全完好无损，一旦市场情绪在某个早晨因为突发利好而反转、开盘暴涨 10% 甚至 20%，场外等待“形态走好”的投资者将陷入极度痛苦的踏空心理。 - **自由现金流爆发力**：市场普遍预期 Uber 到 2027 年将实现约 100 亿美元的自由现金流规模。 - **高管态度转变**：CEO 达拉·科斯罗萨西结束长期减持周期，转为公开市场净买入。 - **自动驾驶破局路径**：不依赖单一供应商，通过在全球（美国、欧洲、亚洲）为 OEM 厂商和第三方 AI 车队提供股权资金，反向构建运力护城河。 ### [33:28](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qtyP1cIOQfc&t=2008s) “重新审视”名单与全市场估值压缩之谜 话题转向 Boyar Asset Management 备受机构订户推崇的年度研究特刊——“重新审视”（Fresh Looks）。Jonathan 介绍，其团队定期会梳理覆盖的 200 只股票池，从中筛选出值得投资人重新评估的核心标的，今年最终锁定了 14 家公司。入选这些名单的企业普遍呈现出一个鲜明特征：并非基本面恶化，而是经历了极其剧烈的估值倍数压缩（Multiple Compression），实际经营状况平稳甚至持续向好，这为价值投资者提供了极佳的赔率和入场赔率。 Josh 敏锐地指出，除必需消费品（Staples）等少数防御板块外，今年美股几乎所有行业都出现了大范围的估值下杀。市场常常简单粗暴地将这种压力归咎于 10 年期美债收益率徘徊在 5% 高位或 AI 颠覆性冲击。Jonathan 对此提出了不同看法：从历史长周期（例如 80 年代与 90 年代）来看，美股在 5% 的利率环境下完全能走出波澜壮阔的牛市；当前市场的阵痛在于，投资界此前享受了太久“免费资金”（零利率）的狂欢，重新适应资金成本需要数年时间的心理过渡。 此外，估值压缩的成因并非单一要素，而是多重压力的复合体：部分板块确实承受了 AI 替代的恐慌情绪，而另一些板块则仍在消化疫情期间透支需求的“宿醉效应”（COVID Hangover）。说到这里，几人忍不住调侃起 Michael 最关注的泳池设备巨头 Pool Corp，Josh 甚至戏谑道：“Pool Corp 现在该把业务从挖游泳池转型去挖坟墓了——反正用的是同一种挖掘机，无非是坑挖得更小一点罢了。” ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 全市场估值压缩成因分析 accDescr: 展示利率中枢抬升、AI叙事威胁以及疫情透支后遗症共同导致股票倍数压缩的逻辑框架 subgraph Macro["宏观资金成本重构"] R["10年期美债收益率达 5% 左右"] --> Cost["告别零利率/免费资金时代"] Cost --> Mindset["投资者估值模型与心理深度调整"] end subgraph Sentiment["板块情绪与叙事分化"] AI["AI 潜在颠覆威胁"] --> Fear["软件/后勤服务等赛道估值承压"] COVID["疫情期繁荣透支需求"] --> Hangover["非耐用品与居家消费宿醉期<br/>（如 Pool Corp 周期下行）"] end Mindset --> Compression["除必需消费品外<br/>多数板块遭遇严重估值倍数压缩"] Fear --> Compression Hangover --> Compression Compression --> FreshLook["孕育‘重新审视’（Fresh Looks）<br/>优质被错杀资产的黄金坑机会"] ``` ### [36:30](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qtyP1cIOQfc&t=2190s) Broadridge：拥有垄断壁垒的“金融收费站”为何遭遇腰斩？ 作为“重新审视”报告中的首只重点标的，Broadridge Financial Solutions（NYSE: BR）成为了深度剖析的对象。许多普通投资者并不熟悉这家公司，但 Jonathan 将其定性为金融系统的“合规管道”与隐形垄断者。Broadridge 最初由人力资源巨头 ADP 分拆独立，长期深耕高壁垒、强监管的金融后勤业务。根据美国证监会（SEC）等监管机构的要求，上市公司与金融机构必须向股东履行代理投票（Proxy Voting）及相关信息披露程序，而 Broadridge 几乎以一己之力垄断了这一市场。 三人列举了 Broadridge 极其罕见的护城河数据： - **市场绝对垄断**：处理全美约 80% 的股东代理投票业务。 - **极高的现金流确定性**：高黏性的经常性收入（Recurring Revenue）占公司总营收的 63%。 - **类似收费站的公用事业属性**：业务不可替代且深度融入金融日常结算与合规流程。 就是这样一家历史业绩极其稳健的“金融收费站”，近期股价却从 280 美元的高点一路暴跌至 160 美元附近，跌幅超过 25%，创下其自 2008 年全球金融危机（GFC）以来的第二大回撤幅度。Michael 顺势联想到了此前爆发信任危机的 Fiserv，指出很多原本看似枯燥、安稳的金融后台服务公司容易因管理层操作违规而爆雷。不过 Jonathan 澄清，Broadridge 经营十分正规，内部治理透明，并不存在财务猫腻；除了核心的投票代理外，它还拥有庞大的高利润交叉销售业务，例如替资产管理机构统一处理繁琐的股东集体诉讼索赔申报，赚取稳定分成。 谈及暴跌背后的真实诱因，Jonathan 认为这完全是一场非理性的情绪杀跌：市场上弥漫着荒谬的空头叙事，部分空头甚至臆测股票代币化（Tokenization）与区块链交易在未来可能会彻底消灭传统股票代理投票的需求。目前 Broadridge 的企业价值（Enterprise Value）回落至 200 亿美元左右，估值泡沫已被彻底挤出。当被问及该标的是否存在被私募股权或巨头整体收购的可能时，Jonathan 认为在高利率环境下巨额并购虽有阻力，但鉴于其无与伦比的垄断管道地位与充沛现金流，成为并购目标的可能性完全无法排除。 ### [39:53](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qtyP1cIOQfc&t=2393s) AI 颠覆恐慌与在线旅游巨头：Booking.com 的护城河 讨论延续了市场对成熟软件与服务企业的过度恐慌。Josh Brown 指出，很多时候并不需要一个具体的催化剂，从价值投资的角度来看，市场完全是在非理性地杀估值（derating）。等到风头过去，人们终究会发现这些老牌巨头根本没有被 AI 取代，甚至还能通过在内部运用 AI 进一步提升利润率，维持其在细分领域的垄断优势。 Jonathan Boyar 赞同这一观点，并指出正如 Salesforce 和 Broadridge 一样，Booking Holdings（旗下拥有 Booking.com、Priceline、Kayak 等）也正在经历类似的由头条新闻引发的“一揽子恐慌性抛售”（headline basket selling）。针对外界鼓吹的“AI 代理（如 Muse 等工具）将彻底接管酒店预订”这一论调，Boyar 斥其为极其荒谬的逻辑： - **线下供给与碎片化关系**：Booking 相比 Expedia 的最大优势在于欧洲等地的海量小型精品酒店（boutique hotels）。这些小旅店很多甚至连自己的官网都没有，Booking 经过数十载深耕才建立了独家合作与技术对接，协助其日常运营。 - **监管与行业壁垒**：欧洲对旅游业有着极其繁琐严苛的监管政策，新兴 AI 平台根本不可能凭空搞定合规与跨国结账。 - **库存困境**：像 Muse 这类 AI 工具手中根本没有现成库存（inventory）。连当年的 Google 和 TripAdvisor 都没能颠覆这套体系，AI 代理更不可能仅凭“打个响指”就调动全球房源，它们最终仍必须接入 Booking 的后台数据与预订接口。 - **管理层韧性**：首席执行官 Glenn Fogel 长期执掌公司，历经数次“公司即将完蛋”的舆论危机，每次都成功带领公司完成转型。 对于用户是否真的需要所谓的“一键预订（one-click booking）”，Josh 与 Michael 展开了实际体验上的反思。Josh 认为普通消费者根本不想要盲目的一键下单，大家依然需要查看房间尺寸、景观朝向、具体位于拉斯维加斯大道的北端还是南端等细节。用户真正期待的是 AI 能够瞬间筛选出性价比最高的目标房源，而最终的交易与履约闭环依然离不开拥有忠诚度计划（如免费早餐等权益）的 Booking。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: AI 代理与在线旅游 OTA 平台关系 accDescr: 展示 AI 前端工具无法绕过 OTA 底层供给与库存的关系链条 subgraph AI_Layer["前端交互层"] A["用户查询需求"] --> B["AI 代理 / 语言模型<br/>(例如 Muse / ChatGPT)"] end subgraph Barrier_Layer["行业壁垒与痛点"] B -.->|"缺乏直接房源库存<br/>缺乏独立结算与客服"| C{"能否绕过 OTA？"} C -->|"无法履约<br/>受制于欧盟繁琐监管"| D["重回现有生态"] end subgraph Booking_Moat["Booking 等 OTA 护城河"] D --> E["海量精品酒店独家关系"] D --> F["全球库存管理系统"] D --> G["用户忠诚度积分与权益"] end ``` --- ### [44:05](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qtyP1cIOQfc&t=2645s) 暴跌的阵痛、Google 的广告隐忧与 Airbnb 的非理性抛售 市场近期的恐慌情绪蔓延得极其剧烈。Boyar 提到个股在短短一个月内就可以从 215 美元直接下杀至 157 美元，此类由 AI 叙事驱动的抛售烈度在以往极为罕见。 Josh 补充了一个耐人寻味的行业现象：旅游类别可能是 Google 广告收入中排名第二或第三的现金牛，这与人们耗费大量时间搜索航班和度假酒店的日常体验高度吻合。然而市场一面幻想 Gemini 等 AI 会替用户搞定一切、终结传统搜索，一面却忽略了如果旅游搜索量和相关竞价广告断崖式下跌，对 Google 本身的商业模式究竟会造成多大冲击。 这种非理性抛售同样重创了团队看好的另一家标的——Airbnb： - **荒谬的替代假设**：市场居然相信 AI 能够直接越过平台，逐一私聊全球数以百万计的独立房东来完成租房。 - **股价坐过山车**：Airbnb 股价此前一度借财报利好跳空暴涨 10%，从 150 美元飙升到 190 美元，随后又在 AI 恐慌中被砸回 150 美元。 - **持股的心理考验**：散户若抱着 2 至 4 年的长远视角尚能忍受波动，但对于每季度都要接受业绩考核、随时面临解雇风险的专业基金经理来说，这种大幅杀估值是极其残酷的折磨。 关于何时才能迎来反转，Josh 认为最快的方法莫过于管理层直接与 OpenAI 或 Anthropic 签署战略合作协议——正如 Salesforce 首席执行官 Marc Benioff 在 Dreamforce 大会上拉着 Dario Amodei 的手登台亮相一样，瞬间就能扭转“被 AI 颠覆”的市场偏见。但 Boyar 强调，真正优秀的企业应该专注做对长期业务最有利的决策，而不是为了迎合短期的股价救市去草率出卖独家经营权或过早站队。 --- ### [47:54](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qtyP1cIOQfc&t=2874s) Pool Corp：从疫情狂欢到周期底部的深度价值机会 讨论随后转向了近年来在二级市场上表现极其惨烈的行业龙头——泳池设备与耗材批发分销巨头 Pool Corp（股票代码：POOL）。 过去两年，美国独栋住宅建设陷入低谷，全美新建私人泳池数量年均仅约 60,000 座，创下十余年来的历史最低水平。受此拖累，Pool Corp 的股价经历了漫长而痛苦的下跌通道。 三人深入剖析了该公司的真实商业模式与市场定价错配： - **轻资产分销模式**：Pool Corp 本身并不直接施工建造泳池，而是充当独立泳池承包商与维护团队的批发供应链枢纽，提供水处理化学品、滤水系统、水泵及维护零配件。 - **存量维护的年金效应**：泳池建成后业主不可能轻易用混凝土将其填平，为了防止水质恶化变成绿藻池塘，每年夏天都必须持续采购化学药剂进行消杀维护。因此，过去十年间不断扩大的泳池保有量（installed base）本质上构成了高壁垒的年金式经常性收入（annuitized revenue）。 - **疫情透支效应与均值回归**：在新冠疫情期间，居家红利催生了全民建泳池的狂潮，公司的年化营收增速一度飙升至惊人的 27%，严重透支了后续几年的新增需求。如今市场正经历需求正常化的剧烈阵痛。 - **估值已至历史底部危机水平**：由于市场目前只紧盯疲软的新建泳池数据，忽视了庞大存量市场的刚性维护现金流，导致股价从高位 500 多美元一路腰斩至 167 美元左右。当前的前瞻市盈率已回落至约 15 倍，这一估值倍数基本上只有在 2008 年金融危机、9/11 事件后以及互联网泡沫破裂期才会出现，展现出极具吸引力的风险收益比。 ### [49:58](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qtyP1cIOQfc&t=2998s) 泳池巨头 Pool Corp：从估值泡沫到回归理性 对话延续了对泳池用品分销巨头 Pool Corp 的深入探讨。在疫情巅峰期，整个市场沉浸在狂热中，坚信未来每家每户都会挖一座私人泳池，推动该股估值一度飙升至惊人的 55 倍市盈率（P/E）。彼时投资者盲目将其视作“永动机式的复利机器”（Compounder）。伯克希尔·哈撒韦（Berkshire Hathaway）的投资经理托德·库姆斯（Todd Combs）曾建仓该股，但在他离开后，伯克希尔迅速清空了全部持仓。Jonathan Boyar 指出，外界不必过度解读为巴菲特讨厌这家公司，这更像是典型的“操盘手离职后清理遗留持仓”的操作。迈克尔·巴特尼克（Michael Batnick）甚至推测，鉴于其稳固的商业模式，伯克希尔未来甚至有可能将整家公司整体私有化收购。 Jonathan 回顾了 Boyar Asset Management 与这家公司的渊源：早在 2009 年消费股低迷时，他们便以 20 美元的价格撰写了针对 Pool Corp 的深度研报，同期推荐的还有万豪酒店（Marriott）。过去几年团队一直心动想重访该标的，但估值始终居高不下；直到今年夏天，其市盈率回落到 17 至 18 倍左右，他们才重新建仓推荐。尽管目前美国新建泳池数量仍受高利率压制——许多业主依赖房屋净值信贷额度（HELOC）来贷款挖泳池，行业拐点何时到来尚无定论，但 Pool Corp 具备卓越的分销背景董事会、极低的财务杠杆，且股权结构分散、无控股股东，甚至可能引来私募股权基金的收购觊觎。不过 Jonathan 坦言，作为长线价值投资者，他并不希望公司被私募资本捡走，因为其拥有极其可观且类似于年金的后期维护保养收入（Maintenance revenue），更适合长线持有享受复利。 - **历史估值对比**：疫情高点 55 倍 P/E vs 2024年夏季回落至 17-18 倍 P/E。 - **历史推荐价格**：Boyar 团队早在 2009 年就以 20 美元的价格首次撰写研报挖掘该股。 - **核心基本面优势**：低负债杠杆、分散股权结构、强大的分销管理层背景，以及极其稳定的耗材与日常泳池维护现金流。 --- ### [52:48](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qtyP1cIOQfc&t=3168s) 餐饮集团 QSR：达美乐传奇掌门操盘的汉堡王逆袭 话题转向母代码为 QSR 的餐饮巨头 Restaurant Brands International（旗下拥有汉堡王 Burger King、Tim Hortons、Popeyes 以及 Firehouse Subs）。在整个快餐板块因减肥药（GLP-1）恐慌和牛肉通胀等逆风承压之际，QSR 展现出了极强的防御韧性。Jonathan 强调，其核心关键在于执行董事长帕特里克·多伊尔（Patrick Doyle）的入局。多伊尔此前曾执掌达美乐披萨（Domino's Pizza），在其任内将达美乐股价推升了整整 20 倍。乔什·布朗（Josh Brown）兴奋地回忆起多伊尔当年的成名之战：他当年公开推出纪录片式广告，直面消费者吐槽“自家的披萨难吃得像硬纸板”，随后彻底推翻改良食谱、往番茄酱里添加大蒜、升级外卖披萨饼底，并斥巨资打造了全行业体验最好的外卖 App，亲手力挽狂澜。 如今，3G Capital 将这位传奇操盘手招致麾下。Jonathan 分析指出，与正处于减肥药阴影与成本风暴中的竞品相比，QSR 拥有更便宜的估值倍数，且其北美汉堡王业务已经进入了实质性的反转阶段——门店同店销售额显著改善，加盟商盈利能力修复，目前反转进度已过半，而麦当劳的调整才刚刚起步。虽然乔什调侃汉堡王“每隔五到七年就会被私募股权转手私有化一次”，但 Jonathan 指出如今 QSR 的企业价值（Enterprise Value）已高达约 450 亿美元，体量庞大，且 3G Capital 自 2011/2012 年入主以来持续打造业务，投资者在持有等待期间还能稳收 3% 到 4% 的股息收益率。嘉宾们还穿插了幽默的幕后趣闻：汉堡王起源于迈阿密大学，其商学院至今立有创始人的半身像；而多伊尔上任后最受欢迎的举措之一，就是彻底废除了那个被大众吐槽“像塑料模特般诡异惊悚”的国王吉祥物（The King）。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Patrick Doyle's QSR Value Creation Strategy accDescr: A flowchart illustrating the turnaround pillars Patrick Doyle applied to Restaurant Brands International. subgraph Heritage["达美乐成功经验"] A["直面产品缺陷<br/>公开改良配方"] B["极致数字体验<br/>自研外卖点餐 App"] end subgraph QSR_Execution["QSR / 汉堡王反转执行"] C["改善加盟商单店经济学<br/>Unit Level Economics"] D["北美同店销售额提振<br/>领先麦当劳调整周期"] E["品牌重塑<br/>废除惊悚国王吉祥物"] end subgraph Investor_Returns["股东回报体系"] F["3% - 4% 股息收益率"] G["横向收购餐饮品牌能力<br/>(Tim Hortons/Popeyes)"] end Heritage --> QSR_Execution QSR_Execution --> Investor_Returns ``` --- ### [56:52](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qtyP1cIOQfc&t=3412s) 估值分歧中的 Comcast 与避雷消费者厌恶型公司 对于有线电视及宽带巨头康卡斯特（Comcast），Jonathan 承认这在 Boyar 内部是极具争议的标的。目前罗伯茨家族（Roberts family）似乎有意收缩战线，公司正计划分拆为两大业务：一方面是 NBC环球（NBCUniversal），另一方面是康卡斯特传统宽带业务。然而，宽带业务正陷入固定无线接入（Fixed Wireless）和星链（Starlink）等新技术带来的严峻竞争泥潭。尽管如此，在仅有 5 到 6 倍 EBITDA 的估值水平下，对于偏好深度价值（Deep Value）的投资者而言，其安全边际依然具有吸引力。 随后主持人提问：最近有没有哪家公司原本想看好，但最终实在无法说服自己买入？Jonathan 提到了二手票务平台 StubHub。他总结了一条深刻的投资教训：“千万不要投资那些被广大消费者深恶痛绝的业务（businesses that are hated by consumers）。” StubHub 股权结构复杂，且在消费者端怨声载道，投资这类标的即便能赚钱，体验也极其糟糕。 迈克尔·巴特尼克随即分享了自己遭遇的离谱亲身经历来印证这点：几年前因为要出门，他把一张尼克斯队的季后赛门票同时挂在了 Ticketmaster 和 StubHub 上售卖，结果两边同时成交。由于无法向 StubHub 的买家交票，迈克尔自认倒霉准备赔付违约金。然而 StubHub 的后台系统竟然在未经告知的情况下，任由同一张已经失效的球票在其平台上连续自动售出了整整七次，并直接从他的账户中扣掉了近 9,000 美元。当时迈克尔正与乔什在洛杉矶出差，乔什亲眼目睹了迈克尔在电话里与客服疯狂交涉、脸色惨白的全过程，最终迈克尔不得不紧急联系运通（Amex）申请交易争议才将损失追回。这一荒诞的真实事故，引得全场哄堂大笑的同时，也彻底坐实了该平台极度糟糕的用户口碑。 ### [59:36](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qtyP1cIOQfc&t=3576s) 体育博彩股的恶性竞争与 MGM 的深层价值 话题从在线博彩行业的困境展开。主持人询问 Jonathan Boyar 对 DraftKings 和 Flutter 等体育博彩股票的看法，指出这些标的表现非常惨淡，Flutter 甚至创下了历史新低。市场上的玩家不仅相互激烈厮杀（Caesars、BetMGM、DraftKings 等互相争夺份额），如今连 Robinhood 也想入局分一杯羹。 Jonathan Boyar 指出，他们重点跟踪并持有观点的是美高梅（MGM Resorts）。录制当天 MGM 股价下跌约 10%，原因是 Barry Diller（IAC 董事长）撤回了收购报价。此前 Diller 曾给出每股 48 美元的出价，后来降到 38 美元，而目前 MGM 交易价格已跌至 33 美元附近。Boyar 认为 Diller 很可能会卷土重来。从基本面看，MGM 是一门极其优质的生意，估值并不苛刻，目前的市盈率仅在 16 倍左右。 更关键的长期催化剂在于日本市场：预计到 2031 年，MGM 将在全日本拥有唯一的综合度假村赌场，并且享有至少 4 到 5 年的独占先发优势。尽管 MGM 是与日本本土伙伴合作、并非 100% 控股，但该项目未来创造的营收体量几乎可以与拉斯维加斯相媲美，而华尔街分析师目前的财务预测模型中基本完全没有计入这部分收益。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: MGM 长期价值与短期催化剂 accDescr: 展示 MGM 面临的短期股价波动与长期在日本市场的独占优势对比 subgraph ShortTerm ["短期市场扰动"] A["Barry Diller 撤回收购出价<br/>(股价跌至 ~$33)"] B["宏观与地缘情绪影响<br/>(访美游客波动/中国业务隐忧)"] end subgraph LongTerm ["长期价值支撑"] C["极具吸引力的估值<br/>(~16倍市盈率)"] D["2031 日本独家赌场项目<br/>(4-5年先发优势 / 营收对标拉斯维加斯)"] E["分析师预期差<br/>(模型尚未计入日本项目收益)"] end ShortTerm --> LongTerm ``` - Josh Brown 分享了一个关于博彩独占权的行业内幕：Hard Rock 每年向佛罗里达州政府支付高达 5 亿美元的特许费用，以此换取该州唯一的合法线上博彩应用运营权（结合了当地印第安塞米诺尔部落的权益），这也是为什么 DraftKings 等竞品根本无法进入佛罗里达市场的原因。 - 针对拉斯维加斯的现状，Boyar 认为短期存在游客减少的问题（例如部分加拿大游客由于情绪影响减少赴美旅行），但这些扰动是暂时的，到 2028 年左右格局会有所好转。 - 至于预测市场（如 Kalshi）这类新兴业态，Boyar 认为未来必将面临严格的牌照监管，而合规运营的实体赌场和 BetMGM 依然具有不可替代的人流吸引力。 --- ### [01:02:28](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qtyP1cIOQfc&t=3748s) 博彩板块普跌、中国敞口与 VICI Properties 的“售后回租”灾难 Josh Brown 提到整个博彩板块都在暴跌，尤其是高度依赖中国澳门市场的永利度假村（Wynn Resorts）和金沙集团（Las Vegas Sands）——金沙的股价从去年 12 月的 70 美元近乎腰斩至当前的 38 美元。Boyar 承认，MGM 同样在中国有业务敞口，地缘政治与宏观不确定性确实令人担忧，但这也正是仓位管理（Position Sizing）的意义所在：必须权衡风险并给以合理的风险权重。 随后 Josh Brown 抛出了一个更具灾难性的案例：标普 500 指数成分股房地产信托基金 VICI Properties（股票代码：VICI）。Josh 将其讽刺为“拉斯维加斯的地主”。他深度复盘了激进投资者时代各大赌场公司的自杀式操作： 1. **卖出重资产**：赌场管理层在激进股东的推动下，“把灵魂卖给了 REIT”，将赌场名下的混凝土重资产与地皮全部打包卖给 VICI 等房地产信托基金。 2. **高位回购股票**：赌场套现出数十亿美元的流动现金后，没有用来筑深护城河，而是在周期顶部大举回购自家股票。 3. **管理层套现走人**：高位回购推高了股价与每股收益，让高管们兑现了极其丰厚的天价年终奖金。 4. **惨烈后果**：赌场失去了底盘，背上了沉重的长期租金包袱；而持有这些资产的 VICI Properties 如今也陷入泥潭。作为一只本应提供稳定股息回报的防御性 REIT，其股价从去年夏天的 33 美元跌到如今的 23 美元左右，跌幅惊人。 VICI 拥有拉斯维加斯大道（The Strip）上核心的 103 处标志性物业，包括 Caesars Palace、MGM Grand 以及 The Venetian 等名胜的地皮与物业，却在激进财务工程的退潮下演变成了一场资本闹剧。 --- ### [01:04:40](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qtyP1cIOQfc&t=3880s) 节目尾声与 Boyar Research 的投资理念 在节目的最后，Josh Brown 和 Michael Batnick 邀请 Jonathan Boyar 介绍其公司的研究服务与资产管理业务。 Boyar 介绍，投资者可以通过访问其 Substack（`boyarresearch.substack.com`）阅读其研报，或者前往 `boyarvaluegroup.com` 获取其旗舰研究报告“Fresh Looks”的精选样本。谈及旗下资产管理业务的表现，Boyar 表示公司迎来了稳健的资金流入，当下市场分化严重、许多被错杀的优质公司正在浮现，对于寻找长期主义、有耐心且注重税务效率的价值投资者而言，现在正是一个极佳的建仓时机。 Josh 调侃道“第一商业法则就是要懂得推销自己”，赞同若自己都不宣讲自己的价值，别人更不会在意。三人在融洽的笑谈中结束了对谈，Josh 与 Michael 盛赞 Boyar 带来的深度思考与专业输出，并向打分、留下好评的播客听众致谢，互道周末愉快后结束了本期节目。 ## Notable quotes > [00:11](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qtyP1cIOQfc&t=11s) 没人能做到百分之百正确，破钟一天也能对两次 — Jonathan Boyar > [10:32](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qtyP1cIOQfc&t=632s) 资金流向待遇最好的地方，而待遇最好的地方正是那些最优秀的公司 — Josh Brown > [13:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qtyP1cIOQfc&t=780s) 买入基本面不可逆的破产零售商，这种模式可能已成为全球最差策略之一 — Jonathan Boyar > [15:13](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qtyP1cIOQfc&t=913s) 挡在呼啸而来的货运火车面前 — Jonathan Boyar > [16:58](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qtyP1cIOQfc&t=1018s) 做多垃圾股，做空最高质量的低估值公司 — Josh Brown > [20:18](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qtyP1cIOQfc&t=1218s) 企业反面教材的大师级典范 — Josh Brown > [22:16](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qtyP1cIOQfc&t=1336s) 嘉信理财怎么可能算是什么‘消费者惰性’股票？难道有人会突然惊呼‘哎呀我忘了我在嘉信还有个账户，赶紧把它销掉’？这完全讲不通！ — Michael Batnick > [25:08](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qtyP1cIOQfc&t=1508s) 不，你不能再守下去了，必须立刻平掉所有仓位！现在就把你和你女儿在泳池边的合照塞进硬纸箱卷铺盖走人，你连下一周的机会都不会有。 — Josh Brown > [27:51](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qtyP1cIOQfc&t=1671s) 无论他们说什么、做什么，华尔街根本不在乎。 — Josh Brown > [33:28](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qtyP1cIOQfc&t=2008s) Pool Corp 现在该把业务从挖游泳池转型去挖坟墓了——反正用的是同一种挖掘机，无非是坑挖得更小一点罢了。 — Josh Brown > [56:52](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qtyP1cIOQfc&t=3412s) 千万不要投资那些被广大消费者深恶痛绝的业务 — Jonathan Boyar > [01:02:28](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qtyP1cIOQfc&t=3748s) 把灵魂卖给了 REIT — Josh Brown ## Mentioned Grayscale, Downtown Josh Brown, Michael Batnick, Jonathan Boyar, Boyar Value Group, Boyar Asset Management, Boyar's Intrinsic Value Research, The World According to Boyar, Chef Boyardee, Adam Parker, Salesforce, Anthropic, Microsoft, Warren Buffett, Coca-Cola, Apple, Chris Mayer, 100 Baggers, Nvidia, Alphabet, Google, Meta, Julian Klymochko, Goldman Sachs, McDonald's, Cintas, Costco, Walmart, Nike, Foot Locker, Dick's Sporting Goods, Amazon, Michael Jordan, Instinct, Muse, Planet Fitness, The New York Times, Booking Holdings, Expedia, Airbnb, Charles Schwab, Millennium Management, Point72, MSG Sports, Atlanta Braves Holdings, Uber, Dara Khosrowshahi, Waymo, Tesla, Broadridge Financial Solutions, ADP, Fiserv, Glenn Fogel, Marc Benioff, Dario Amodei, OpenAI, Pool Corp, Berkshire Hathaway, Todd Combs, Marriott, Restaurant Brands International, Burger King, Tim Hortons, Popeyes, Firehouse Subs, Patrick Doyle, Domino's Pizza, 3G Capital, Comcast, NBCUniversal, Roberts family, StubHub, Ticketmaster, American Express, DraftKings, Flutter Entertainment, Robinhood, Caesars, MGM Resorts, Barry Diller, IAC, Hard Rock, Kalshi, Wynn Resorts, Las Vegas Sands, VICI Properties, Caesars Palace, MGM Grand, The Venetian ## Video description On episode 261 of The Compound and Friends, ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Downtown Josh Brown⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ and Michael Batnick are joined by Jonathan Boyar of Boyar Asset Management to discuss why stock picking has gotten so difficult, the dangers of buy-and-hold investing, market concentration, AI-driven stock selloffs, and where value investors are finding opportunities today. They get into Uber, Broadridge, Booking Holdings and Airbnb, Pool Corp, Burger King, Comcast, MGM and the casino business, the pressure on sports betting stocks, plus why seemingly great companies can still be terrible investments at the wrong valuation. This episode is sponsored by Grayscale. To learn more, visit⁠ https://www.grayscale.com ►00:00 - Start ►00:44 - Intro ►02:21 - Jonathan Boyar ►04:20 - How Difficult Stock-picking is ►15:13 - Price Signals ►16:58 - The Current Environment ►22:16 - Basket Trading ►27:51 - Stock and Market Opportunities ►36:30 - Broadridge ►40:45 - Booking.com ►47:54 - Pool Corp ►52:48 - Burger King ►56:52 - Comcast 👕 Check out The Compound shop: https://www.idontshop.com 🎙️Listen to our podcasts: TCAF: https://podcasts.thecompoundnews.com/show/TCAF/ Animal Spirits: https://podcasts.thecompoundnews.com/show/animalspirits/ Ask The Compound: https://podcasts.thecompoundnews.com/show/ATC/ The Compound Newsletter: https://www.thecompoundnews.com/subscribe Linkedin: https://www.linkedin.com/company/the-compound-media/ Instagram: https://instagram.com/thecompoundnews Twitter: https://twitter.com/thecompoundnews Tik Tok: https://www.tiktok.com/@thecompoundnews Investing involves the risk of loss. This podcast is for informational purposes only and should not be or regarded as personalized investment advice or relied upon for investment decisions. Josh Brown and Michael Batnick are employees of Ritholtz Wealth Management and may maintain positions in the securities discussed in this video. All opinions expressed by them are solely their own opinion and do not reflect the opinion of Ritholtz Wealth Management. See our disclosures here: https://ritholtzwealth.com/podcast-youtube-disclosures/ The Compound Media, Incorporated, an affiliate of Ritholtz Wealth Management, receives payment from various entities for advertisements in affiliated podcasts, blogs and emails. Inclusion of such advertisements does not constitute or imply endorsement, sponsorship or recommendation thereof, or any affiliation therewith, by the Content Creator or by Ritholtz Wealth Management or any of its employees. For additional advertisement disclaimers see here https://ritholtzwealth.com/advertising-disclaimers. #thecompound #investing #stockmarket #stocks [Source](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qtyP1cIOQfc)

[0:11] Jonathan Boyar: 没人能做到百分之百正确，破钟一天也能对两次 [10:32] Josh Brown: 资金流向待遇最好的地方，而待遇最好的地方正是那些最优秀的公司 [13:00] Jonathan Boyar: 买入基本面不可逆的破产零售商，这种模式可能已成为全球最差策略之一 [15:13] Jonathan Boyar: 挡在呼啸而来的货运火车面前 [16:58] Josh Brown: 做多垃圾股，做空最高质量的低估值公司 [20:18] Josh Brown: 企业反面教材的大师级典范 [22:16] Michael Batnick: 嘉信理财怎么可能算是什么‘消费者惰性’股票？难道有人会突然惊呼‘哎呀我忘了我在嘉信还有个账户，赶紧把它销掉’？这完全讲不通！ [25:08] Josh Brown: 不，你不能再守下去了，必须立刻平掉所有仓位！现在就把你和你女儿在泳池边的合照塞进硬纸箱卷铺盖走人，你连下一周的机会都不会有。 [27:51] Josh Brown: 无论他们说什么、做什么，华尔街根本不在乎。 [33:28] Josh Brown: Pool Corp 现在该把业务从挖游泳池转型去挖坟墓了——反正用的是同一种挖掘机，无非是坑挖得更小一点罢了。 [56:52] Jonathan Boyar: 千万不要投资那些被广大消费者深恶痛绝的业务 [62:28] Josh Brown: 把灵魂卖给了 REIT

[4:20] Jonathan Boyar: buy and hold is a result of an investment strategy, not an investment strategy in and of itself [7:40] Jonathan Boyar: most of the time doing nothing is the best thing someone can do [20:18] Michael Batnick / Josh Brown: a master class on what not to do [27:51] Josh Brown: My take is nothing they say matters. The Street just does not give a [s---]. [33:28] Jonathan Boyar: Same equipment, smaller holes. [45:54] Josh Brown: we know 15 times is not the bottom. [45:54] Josh Brown: like two prize fighters at the end of a match [45:54] Jonathan Boyar: They don't want to get married... start dating. [52:48] The food sucks [62:28] Josh Brown: sold their soul [64:38] rule number one is be self-serving [64:38] if you don't promote yourself, nobody else will.

[0:11] Curious about crypto and not sure where [0:13] to start? Start with Grayscale. [0:15] Grayscale is the world's largest [0:16] cryptofocused investment platform and [0:19] has been in crypto for over a decade. [0:21] That's a long time when you consider how [0:23] early we still are in crypto adoption. [0:26] In markets like these, education matters [0:28] more than ever. Grayscale provides [0:30] research, insights, and long-term [0:32] perspective to help investors better [0:34] understand digital assets and the [0:36] evolving crypto ecosystem. Whether [0:39] you're exploring crypto for the first [0:40] time or looking to deepen your [0:42] knowledge, let Gayscale be your guide. [0:45] All right. All right, ladies and [0:46] gentlemen, welcome to the compound and [0:49] friends. [0:51] I'm so excited. We have a return guest [0:53] today. Jonathan Buyer is a principal the [0:57] Boy Value Group which includes Boy Asset [1:00] Management and Boyarm's Intrinsic Value [1:02] Research, an independent equity research [1:05] boutique founded in 1975, [1:08] whose subscribers include some of the [1:10] world's largest sovereign wealth funds, [1:12] hedge funds, mutual funds, and family [1:15] offices. He also hosts the world [1:18] according to Boyar podcast. Jonathan, [1:20] welcome back to the show. We're so happy [1:22] to see you. Thanks for having me back. [1:24] >> Yeah. [1:24] >> When when did we have Jonathan on? [1:26] >> I was going to say we had him in the [1:28] summer during the SAS uh early late [1:32] spring, early summer during the SAS [1:34] apocalypse and uh a lot of the stuff he [1:37] was talking about ended up being right. [1:39] We've seen some pretty big comebacks in [1:42] some of his technology names. Do I have [1:43] that? [1:44] >> Not all not not all the stuff. [1:46] >> Not everything, but like nobody's [1:48] nobody's perfect. [1:48] >> Broken clock twice a day. No, no, don't [1:51] say that. Well, you you were uh I think [1:54] I think pretty bullish on uh CRM. [1:57] >> Y [1:58] >> and the stock was hammered at that point [2:00] and obviously the picture has now [2:02] changed. They have partnered with [2:04] Anthropic rather than having their [2:06] throat slit by it. I don't think uh a [2:08] lot of people felt uh bullish at the [2:11] time, but you did. [2:12] >> Yeah. [2:12] >> Um so so congratulations on that one. [2:15] >> No, thank you. We're we're starting to [2:17] get a similar setup now over the last [2:19] couple days. It's interesting. [2:21] >> Okay. So, we're going to get into that. [2:22] Uh, Michael, why don't you uh why don't [2:25] you take us into the first thing we want [2:26] to talk about? [2:27] >> I will. Uh, I'm excited to talk with a [2:31] lifelong stock picker. Before we get [2:33] into the first topic of how difficult [2:36] stock picking is. You know, I'm I'm a [2:39] very gullible man. And the first time [2:41] that the three of us were in studio [2:43] together, Josh said that you were of the [2:47] famed Chef Boy RD family. And I I bought [2:51] it. I bought it at Hookline and Sicker. [2:52] I really thought that you were that you [2:54] were that I was talking to royalty. [2:56] >> Royalty. [2:57] >> Sorry. Sorry to disappoint, but my whole [3:00] town all actually like I had probably [3:04] six or seven people come up to me and [3:06] ask if I was really from from that. So, [3:09] you weren't the only one. You were in [3:10] good company. [3:10] >> Josh is very Josh is very convincing. [3:12] >> Yeah, I sold it. Well, two things. Chef [3:15] Boy Rard was a real person. I think he [3:17] was uh making Italian food in Cleveland [3:20] or something. It's like a I don't I [3:22] don't think it was spelled the way they [3:24] ended up spelling it on the can, but it [3:26] was a real guy. That's one. Two. Do you [3:28] know what your last name means? [3:30] >> Uh it means noble, which is really [3:33] ironic since we were thrown out of [3:34] Russia. [3:35] >> Well, [3:36] >> we were we were slaves. But before but [3:38] before you were thrown out of Russia [3:40] before the pgrams [3:41] >> the boy the boy was like the mayor of [3:45] the town [3:46] >> and in German they called it burger. So [3:48] everyone you know with a last name [3:49] burger that that person somewhere in [3:52] their line they were descended from a [3:55] guy that ran a town. [3:57] >> So those are two different versions of [3:59] the same word. So, uh, you you were [4:01] Mayor Mche back in somebody in your, uh, [4:05] in your bloodline was, uh, was an [4:07] organizer, was an important person. All [4:10] right. Uh, [4:11] >> wait, but in all seriousness, Jonathan [4:13] does come from a line of stock pickers. [4:15] Your father has been in this business [4:16] for a long time. So, [4:18] >> Josh and I did this on what are your [4:19] thoughts, but I wanted to share with [4:20] you. We have some data from Adam Parker [4:23] on how difficult stock picking is, [4:25] particularly when you benchmark yourself [4:28] to the S&P or if you even expand it to [4:31] not just the S&P but the top 2,000 [4:34] stocks. But before we show the data, [4:37] you've been doing this for a long time, [4:39] did this surprise you? [4:41] And how has your experience as a stock [4:44] picker changed over the last 20 years in [4:46] terms of just wherever you want to go? [4:48] Is it harder? Is it uh does it require [4:50] more patience? Does it require the [4:52] opposite? Like do you need to be trading [4:54] more? How has your strategy evolved over [4:57] time given that the landscape whether [4:59] it's market structure? The the companies [5:02] today clearly things look a hell of a [5:04] lot different in every way possible than [5:07] they do uh today than when you started. [5:09] >> Yeah. I think that article was like buy [5:11] and hold is dead. I think there were [5:13] something it's a it's a buy and hold [5:15] doesn't work. [5:16] >> Buy buy and hold. I don't think it ever [5:18] worked. I I I I kind of reject the [5:21] premise of buy and hold. I I think buy [5:23] and hold is a result of an investment [5:26] strategy, not an investment strategy in [5:29] and of itself. [5:30] >> It's good. [5:31] >> So, so that's that's kind of how if you [5:34] are a good stock picker and you're able [5:37] to find great companies and buy it at a [5:40] reasonable or an attractive price, hold [5:43] on to it, but continuously re-evaluate [5:46] it. This is not you know you're not [5:48] married to the stock you're you you have [5:52] to constantly say see two things one [5:54] how's the business doing are they [5:56] executing you know how's the competition [5:59] etc and if it's going fine keep it and [6:03] valuation is it selling at a reasonable [6:06] multiple I would say most of our [6:08] accounts at Ber asset management are [6:10] taxable so we're extremely taxsensitive [6:13] so I'm fine if something gets a little [6:16] bit overvalued valued because you [6:17] basically have to, you know, you have to [6:21] find something that's 25% better [6:23] essentially. I mean, the math's not [6:25] exactly that way. So, it's okay. It just [6:28] I think if you are able to find, I think [6:31] they said there's only like 23 or 24 [6:32] stocks that outperformed the S&P 500 or [6:36] 23%. [6:37] >> John, chart on. So, you're right. Keep [6:40] talking, Jonathan. [6:40] >> Yeah. about about 20. So, if you can [6:43] find one of those, stick with it. But [6:45] you have to be prepared to look really [6:47] different than most people and most [6:49] people don't like to be different. You [6:51] have to be prepared to have lots of [6:53] concentration. [6:55] Um because these stocks are going to [6:57] become disproportionate parts of your [6:59] portfolio and you also have to prepare [7:01] be prepared to have years where things [7:04] go against you. You know, the beginning [7:06] of this year was horrible for a lot of [7:08] our accounts because we own Microsoft [7:10] and I felt like a when it went [7:12] from 579 or whatever it was to whatever [7:16] wherever it went. But, you know, now [7:20] it's back. I I would have been I would [7:22] never have known when to buy it back and [7:24] my clients would if I was smart enough [7:26] to buy it at the top, which is [7:28] impossible, and then buy it again when [7:30] it, you know, uh, trough. and my clients [7:34] would have been really worse off. So, [7:36] you have to just stick with it and [7:40] unless things get blatantly overvalued [7:42] and that happens, you know, I don't [7:43] know. You know, we're big I think you [7:45] have a Warren Buffett or Charlie Munger [7:47] thing behind you there. I think [7:49] >> I do. It's my fault. [7:51] >> Yeah. I mean, he's he's the goat, but he [7:54] >> traded all he traded all the time. [7:56] >> Traded all the time. If you know if [7:59] something lasted two or three years, he [8:00] generally kept it or four years he but [8:04] he said one of his biggest mistakes ever [8:06] was in 1998 [8:09] not selling Coca-Cola when it was at 60 [8:12] times earnings. Great business, terrible [8:15] valuation and since then it dramatically [8:17] underperformed the S&P 500 and he wasn't [8:20] able to invest it in things that were [8:23] higher, you know, returning. So you have [8:25] to be you have to be careful with both [8:27] things and you have to pay attention [8:28] with both things. I I have this I have [8:31] this like uh I have this concept in mind [8:34] when I think about Buffett and probably [8:36] some of the great investors is like [8:39] first of all people trade around [8:40] positions [8:42] like if you think about the way the way [8:46] people talk about stocks on TV let's say [8:49] or the way sell sign analysts talk about [8:52] stocks when they put a buy rating a sell [8:54] rating whatever [8:56] it seems so black and white like I like [8:59] the stock. I'm buying this. You might [9:01] like a stock, but you might want to take [9:03] 20% of it off. That doesn't mean you [9:05] don't like it anymore. That could mean [9:07] it's gone up so much that it's become a [9:10] concentrated position in your portfolio. [9:12] It could mean there are three other [9:14] names that you just need capital to [9:15] allocate to. It could mean so many [9:18] things. We We don't talk about position [9:20] sizing and trading around positions on [9:23] TV almost because it's like a gotcha [9:25] moment. Mhm. [9:26] >> Like the way it's presented to the [9:28] audience is, uhoh, are you you're losing [9:30] faith in Apple? [9:32] >> No, the stock is the stock's up a [9:34] thousand% over 10 years. I'm taking some [9:37] off. Is that okay with you? Um, so the [9:40] the am I a bull, am I a bear? That's [9:43] problematic. But it's the way the media [9:45] talks about stocks. [9:47] >> But I but I think that concentration is [9:49] okay. I mean, it's a lot harder for an [9:51] individual investor to do it. And you [9:54] know, anytime you've sold Apple, pretty [9:57] much it's been wrong. And those trims [9:59] were a bad idea in in retrospect. And I [10:02] don't think there's anything wrong with [10:03] having um you know, a 15% position, 10% [10:07] position in Microsoft if if it grew that [10:10] way. Why not? I mean, if you own the if [10:11] you own the S&P 500, you have a 6% [10:13] position in it anyway. Uh so I think [10:17] yeah, I think I you know, I just had [10:19] Chris Mayer, who's great. He he wrote a [10:21] book called Hunbaggers on my podcast and [10:24] he talks about the dangers of trimming. [10:26] And most of the time doing nothing is [10:29] the best thing someone can do because I [10:32] mean even when you trim you trim that [10:33] apple, you're going to have a big gain [10:34] and you're going to have to pay Uncle [10:35] Sam. [10:36] >> Yeah. Um put put the chart back up. [10:41] It's not just that the that stock [10:43] picking is hard. So what this is showing [10:44] is the percentage of stocks beating the [10:46] S&P 500 over the last three years. Um [10:50] it's so this is this is Adam only 23.2% [10:55] of the top uh 500 US stocks held for 10 [10:58] years beat the index. [11:00] >> Brutal. [11:00] >> For threeyear holding periods uh for [11:03] three-year holdings the hit rate is [11:04] 27.7%. [11:07] But it looks like it's getting harder [11:08] over time is the message of what Adam [11:12] was saying. Do you do you guys have an [11:14] opinion uh what what are the factors [11:17] that's making it actually getting worse [11:19] and worse and worse? The the chart is [11:22] going from 2002 [11:24] uh through today. So it's like a bit [11:27] it's been a progression. [11:29] >> The obvious answer is that since at [11:30] least 2017, it's been the fang stocks, [11:35] the Mac 7, it has been concentration. [11:37] But it is also true that that line was [11:39] going down well before Apple became the [11:43] dominant company. [11:45] So I don't know that we're ever going to [11:46] get a level where it's back up to 60% of [11:49] the of first of all that would be [11:51] ridiculous. Why would you expect 60% of [11:53] stocks to beat the stock market? Could [11:55] it get back up to 50%. Yeah. If there [11:58] was an AI, if there was an AI meltdown, [12:00] if Apple, Nvidia, Google, Meta, [12:02] whatever, if they all go down 70%, I [12:04] would hope that there will be other [12:06] stocks that are outperforming them. But [12:07] absent that, I think it's going to [12:09] continue to be very difficult. [12:11] >> Yeah. Yeah. I full I fully full fully [12:14] agree with Michael. Uh and if you look [12:17] historically, the the LA over the last [12:20] 20 years, the equal weight has [12:22] significantly underperformed the the cap [12:23] weighted index. And that kind of proves [12:25] the point there. But there have been [12:27] periods of time where that hasn't [12:30] happened. I think over time most stocks [12:32] are not going to outperform the S&P 5. [12:34] >> So here's why. Here's why. Think about [12:36] think about market structure today. [12:38] >> Mhm. [12:38] >> This is not how individuals invest, but [12:40] this is how the market works. Money [12:42] moves to where it is treated best. And [12:45] money is treated best with the best [12:47] companies. So the idea that most stocks, [12:50] forget about the stock pickers, that [12:52] most stocks are going to be treated [12:54] equal to the other best companies, [12:56] that's just not the case. It's not going [12:57] to happen. So Jonathan, as far as how [13:00] your stock picking strategy goes, when [13:02] I'm looking at your your portfolio or [13:04] the list of stocks that you do research [13:06] on, and we're going to talk about this [13:07] later in the show, I don't view you as a [13:09] deep value investor. You're not owning [13:11] the biggest pieces of that are [13:13] trading at 11 times earnings. [13:14] >> Yeah. you but you are you are a value [13:17] investor and your portfolio is not one [13:19] thing. [13:19] >> I think he's gar I think he's more Garpy [13:21] than value. I know he calls himself [13:24] value but [13:25] >> so [13:25] >> it's hard to change a name. I have all [13:27] these signs. I have everything. [13:28] >> But but on the growth side like your [13:30] companies tend to be [13:33] high singledigit mid- teens growers. [13:35] Like you are investing in businesses [13:37] that you believe are good companies. You [13:40] know, we've morphed when my dad started [13:41] the business and it's how time, you [13:44] know, how how the market has changed in [13:45] the 70s. It was buying net nets. You [13:48] were buying, you know, really cheap [13:51] cigar butt investing. That's what [13:53] worked. That's been totally, [13:55] >> you know, [13:56] >> what is what is that? Can you describe? [13:57] It's like a business that you know is in [13:59] decline. [14:00] >> Yeah. [14:00] >> But it's like the market has overdone it [14:03] on the valuation. So you you buy it like [14:06] knowing it's not a great business, but [14:08] it's just so ridiculously oversold [14:11] >> in terms of a cigar, but yeah, you have [14:12] like kind of one like final puff at it. [14:16] And it's a it was a great way. I mean, [14:18] >> nobody was doing that. [14:19] >> Yeah, it was a great way to do it when [14:21] when you had no competition. No one even [14:24] barely had a calculator. You had to go [14:26] to the New York Public Library to get, [14:28] you know, information. That that world [14:30] is gone. deep. If you're a deep value [14:32] investor, you're investing in, you know, [14:35] broken retailers. [14:36] >> That doesn't work. Deep deep value is [14:38] maybe the worst strategy on the planet. [14:40] >> It's it's terrible. It might have like [14:41] small periods of, you know, [14:43] outperformance. They're very, very [14:45] small. I want to buy something that I [14:47] can hopefully I mean, it's impossible. [14:49] No one can tell 5 10 years in the [14:51] future, but you have the chance of [14:53] owning it for 5, 10, 15 years. A great [14:55] business, a dominant business, or [14:57] something that's unique. Um, and I would [15:00] say, you know, if you had to say, are [15:02] you growth? Are you value? I'm value. [15:03] But I would say I'm an opportunist. I [15:06] want to make money for myself and my [15:07] clients. And how I do it is, you know, [15:11] try to buy something for less than it's [15:12] worth. [15:13] >> Do you take any price signals into [15:17] account in your research? Do you because [15:19] I I read your stuff. Um, but you don't [15:22] get into technicals really, but I'm sure [15:25] like you want to know if a stock is [15:27] currently going up or going down or if [15:30] like how else do you gauge sentiment if [15:32] not for technicals I guess would be the [15:34] the question. [15:36] >> I mean, we look at it a little bit but [15:38] we try and blind it out as best as we [15:41] can but we also you don't want to catch [15:43] a falling knife. You know, one of the [15:45] stocks we'll talk about, you know, Pool [15:47] Corp, we can talk about it later. You [15:49] know, that stock looked somewhat cheap [15:52] at 400. It looked cheaper at 300. It [15:54] looked even cheaper at 200. Fortunately, [15:56] we didn't buy it. But you have to, you [15:59] know, you have to pick your spots. You [16:01] don't want to get in front of a freight [16:03] train. That's just a recipe to lose [16:05] money. [16:06] >> So, you w you do care. If you if you see [16:09] a stock that spends a year in decline [16:12] >> and then all of a sudden stops going [16:14] down even on continued bad news, that's [16:17] a technical signal. [16:19] >> Yeah. [16:19] >> That's buyers and sellers. [16:21] >> Yeah. [16:21] >> Like the the fundamentals are what they [16:23] are, but like the signal there is, wait [16:25] a minute, there's nobody left to sell [16:27] anymore. [16:27] >> Yeah. [16:28] >> The news is horrible and the stock's [16:29] going up. [16:30] >> Yeah. Uh or even if a stock's in [16:33] somewhat in freef fall, maybe I'll buy a [16:34] 2% position with the hope of adding more [16:37] later on because no one's ever going to [16:39] be able to pick a bottom. It's it's [16:41] impossible. [16:41] >> Yeah. [16:42] >> But there's also the market is so fast [16:44] moving that like the last couple days [16:47] you had an opportunity to buy some of [16:50] these travel stocks for idiotic reasons [16:53] that the chart didn't look good. But I'm [16:55] I'm like why not take a chance on these? [16:58] So let's let's get let's get into the [17:00] current environment because it is an it [17:02] is a very interesting time to be an [17:04] investor AI stuff aside [17:07] >> um well obviously involved but there's [17:09] just a lot of things happening in the [17:10] market. So one of them in 2026 in [17:12] particular is that the be one of the [17:15] better performing investment strategies [17:17] this year was to buy the junkiest stocks [17:20] and I do mean like quantitatively junky [17:23] >> and short the most highest quality [17:26] undervalued businesses. So Julian [17:28] Klotchko has a chart that shows the [17:29] Goldman Sachs most shorted basket is up [17:33] 40% year-to date. The most shorted. So [17:36] companies that hedge fund managers are [17:38] saying are the biggest pieces of crap [17:41] while the uh so I'm sorry. So the the [17:44] most shorted basket is up 40%. So the [17:47] long short is down 23%. Which is [17:50] unbelievable. And I think McDonald's is [17:53] a great example of this. McDonald's is [17:55] in free-for-all right now. I would I I [17:57] would think that this is a quality [17:59] business. Not just me saying it's [18:01] quality, but if you look at return on [18:03] equity and the things that are [18:04] quantifiable, it is a quality business. [18:07] And yet the stock is in freef fall. It's [18:09] down 29% over the last 144 days. It [18:13] peaked, I think, in February. And this [18:15] sort of crash is really rare. You had [18:17] this uh during co I believe but before [18:20] that you had to go to the.com bubble [18:21] like and and McDonald's is just one of [18:24] many stocks that are in freefall. [18:27] >> Quality is not bailing anybody out this [18:29] year. It's not it's not working as a [18:31] factor. [18:32] >> You fish in this pond. [18:33] >> Well, I mean the I I gave a presentation [18:36] earlier this year on is there a quality [18:37] bubble and compared it to the nifty50 [18:40] and had names like Cintas in there, [18:43] >> Costco, [18:44] >> Costco. and these names. It's it's kind [18:46] of like going back to the Coca-Cola [18:48] example. You know, it's hard to make a [18:51] money if you buy a stock at 60 times [18:53] earnings. [18:54] >> Walmart, I think, was Walmart 50. I know [18:56] Costco is up there. [18:57] >> I think Walmart's 40 50 times earnings. [19:00] >> That's crazy. [19:00] >> It's it's hard to make an investment [19:03] case. May I mean, if you have a if [19:04] you're a really really long-term [19:06] investor, uh, sure, if you're looking [19:08] out 30 years, the math works, but I [19:11] mean, I think that's when buy and hold [19:15] doesn't work. [19:16] >> Oh, and it's it's even worse than that. [19:18] Like, it sneaks up on you, but then you [19:22] get into a situation where you're buying [19:23] a quality company, they stumble. [19:27] >> Yeah. And not only does it get dragged [19:29] down because earnings are falling, but [19:31] the like the multiple that you started [19:34] at is so high, [19:35] >> you could have a stock get cut in half, [19:37] still not be cheap. [19:38] >> Like I feel like Nike is a poster child. [19:41] Like Nike had an above market multiple [19:44] pretty much forever and that really [19:46] worked against the buy and hold crowd [19:48] because not only did it come down on [19:51] falling earnings for I don't know going [19:53] on five years in a row now but also the [19:55] multiple keeps derating. [19:57] >> Yeah. [19:57] >> So that actually as bad as the [19:58] fundamental outlook is the stock is even [20:01] worse than that. [20:02] >> Yeah. [20:02] >> And that phenomenon is just an absolute [20:05] killer for the buy and hold investor. It [20:07] just it it crushes you and it sneaks up [20:11] on you. You can't see it coming until [20:12] you're already stuck in the middle of [20:14] it. [20:14] >> Yeah. [20:15] >> Has it always has it always been like [20:16] the chat, Jonathan, or is that a more [20:18] recent phenomenon where once a stock is [20:20] done, it's just [20:22] it [20:23] >> Well, it comes back. I mean, I mean, you [20:25] you you talked about McDonald's, you [20:27] know, McDonald's in the early 2000s, I [20:29] think, as you alluded to, you know, was [20:31] a broken stock and it took a few years. [20:34] It took I think two or three CEOs, one [20:35] of them had to have a heart attack in [20:37] order for it to happen. I mean, it was a [20:40] uh it was a problem. So, yeah, you I [20:42] mean, this is I think that's a feature [20:44] of the market. You just that's that's [20:46] what it is. And you know, catching these [20:50] trying to catch these falling knives are [20:51] are difficult, but I think that's why [20:53] you have to pay attention. Why is Nike [20:55] going down? I mean, I think that's the [20:57] reason its products aren't resonating [20:59] with consumers. It's, you know, it tried [21:01] to go direct. It tried to bypass all of [21:04] their retail. [21:05] >> They did everything wrong. [21:06] >> It was a It was a master class on what [21:09] not to do. [21:10] >> They They told They told Foot Locker to [21:11] go themselves. That was like their [21:13] number one retailer. They uh they [21:17] thought they would be pure direct to [21:19] consumer selling through Nike.com in the [21:21] app. Um they pissed off Amazon. They put [21:24] up a Nike store at Amazon and then they [21:26] sort of like backtracked. So, they lost [21:29] shelf space in all the retailers like [21:31] Dicks and like all the places that [21:33] matter. [21:34] >> Uh they're riding the Jordan brand. [21:36] >> Yeah. [21:37] >> Like 30 years after Michael Jordan [21:39] retired. It's like sort of unbelievable, [21:41] but that's still their their top. Like [21:44] it's it's everything that could possibly [21:46] go wrong has gone wrong. And they have [21:48] stronger competitors now than they ever [21:50] did. [21:50] >> And also the still might not be a buy. [21:52] It still might not be attractive. [21:54] >> And it's also the athletes don't need [21:55] them anymore. Like before Michael [21:58] Jordan, not saying he I mean it la [22:00] helped launch Nike and also helped [22:02] launch his career. Now now athletes can [22:05] go direct to consumer. So the the Nike [22:07] is less relevant as a platform. So I I [22:10] it's one that I have just passed on. You [22:13] could make a lot of money from here. I [22:15] think there are a lot easier ways to [22:16] make money. One one thing that happens [22:19] that I think is unique not I think one [22:22] market dynamic that is different today [22:25] than the 70s that I think provides [22:28] opportunities for investors. One of the [22:30] dumbest things that happens and you see [22:32] it all the time is this basket trading. [22:34] So something happens most recently these [22:38] apps Instinct and Muse which are [22:40] unbelievable. I feel like this is the [22:42] consumer app that we've all been waiting [22:44] for. Holy And one of the things [22:46] that it does for you very easily is it [22:48] goes through um your subscriptions and [22:52] it can either cancel or whatever. So [22:55] there's it's an AI assistant. So there's [22:57] a basket a consumer inertia basket from [22:59] Goldman Sachs. And ever since the launch [23:01] of these AI agents, the the stocks are [23:04] the stocks are getting killed. And so [23:06] Planet Fitness, all right, I get it. [23:08] Like cancel my damn subscription. What [23:10] what am I still doing there? But New [23:11] York Times, this stock is down 7.2% 2% [23:15] over a couple of days. This has not this [23:18] is not this has this is not at risk at [23:21] all for disruption because of Muser [23:24] Instinct. This is a hardcore loyal [23:26] audience. The business is on fire and [23:28] this [23:29] >> they they think that Muse and Instinct [23:32] are going to tell the user, hey, you [23:37] have like 12 subscriptions that you [23:39] never use. [23:40] >> Yes, but there's no thinking, Josh. This [23:41] is the point. It's in a basket of [23:43] stocks. And so it is programmatically [23:45] happening. There's nobody thinking it's [23:47] the quant shops. So Jonathan, for people [23:49] like you, when you see this and and [23:51] Expedia and Booking, which which we'll [23:53] talk about, you must lick your lips [23:55] because you know historically what [23:57] happens to some of these business that [23:59] you followed for a long time when some [24:01] of the automation competition comes in [24:02] because you've seen this before. [24:03] >> Yeah. I mean, booking and Airbnb, [24:08] why it was in that basket and how [24:09] Goldman comes up with these baskets, I [24:11] have no idea. It it's absolutely [24:14] ridiculous. And this will turn out to [24:16] be, I think, a great buying opportunity. [24:18] I don't know why some of those banks are [24:20] in there. I mean, are you [24:21] >> Yeah, Schwab's in here. Josh, remember I [24:23] was asking the other day, what the hell [24:24] is going on with Schwab? How is How is [24:26] Schwab uh at How is this a um inertia [24:30] stock? Oh, no. I forgot I had an account [24:32] at Schwab. Let me move it. What? Makes [24:35] no sense, [24:36] >> you know. Well, it's not I don't It's a [24:38] cash sweep. I think [24:40] >> it's in the basket. It's in that basket. [24:42] Yeah, I think so. Schwab is funny. You [24:45] could set your watch by this. Anytime [24:48] there's a disruptive AI product on the [24:50] tape like that's the poster ch like [24:53] let's go beat the out of Schwab. Uh [24:55] Adobe's in we should make a list of the [24:58] stocks, you know, are going to be down [25:00] anytime people get excited about AI. Um [25:04] there's probably there's probably a [25:06] reflexive counter trade there. [25:08] >> But Josh how stupid this is. I'm not [25:10] prized. What does that have to do with [25:11] this? When when Hazel launched and [25:14] Schwab and LPL and Ray fell 10% we were [25:16] like what in the hell and then when [25:19] Vanguard actually bought Hazel bought [25:21] Altruist which could which could [25:23] ostensibly not which is going to compete [25:25] with Schwab Schwab is down like 40 basis [25:28] points. There is so much uh computerized [25:31] trading that is providing opportunities [25:33] for people that know what they're doing. [25:35] >> Yeah. Yeah. I mean, I think I I don't [25:37] have statistics to back this up, but [25:39] there are huge I feel like there's been [25:42] disproportionate moves in stocks. I [25:43] think a lot of it has to do with these [25:45] pod shops that get these guys get fired [25:48] if they're down two or 3% and they blow [25:50] them out of the positions. I mean, I [25:52] think that's a horrible way to manage [25:53] money, but that's a whole other, you [25:55] know, thing to to discuss. And [25:57] >> that's a really good that's a really [25:59] good point. like they're so the most [26:02] popular format for a hedge fund these [26:04] days is not a standalone long short [26:06] manager like battling it out with the [26:09] rest of the market. Uh though the [26:10] market's wrong, I'm right. Like that's [26:12] sort of I'm not going to say it's gone, [26:15] but the flows are not going to those [26:16] funds the way they used to. The flows [26:18] now go to Millennium and firms like [26:21] that. Uh 72 is now like a pod shop. like [26:24] the flows are going to these fund of [26:28] fund platforms. You got like six guys in [26:32] a group and their purview is like they [26:34] only do this type of trade. But they're [26:37] told when they're hired like you're [26:40] going to have a really short leash and [26:42] we're not going to give you 6 months for [26:44] a theme to play out. And if you're down [26:47] like 5% in the course of a month, you're [26:50] going to be dragging down the total [26:52] returns of of the whole thing and we're [26:55] going to scrutinize that. And so I think [26:58] that's the right take. It's like, oh my [27:00] god, this stock's down 5%. Should we [27:03] take advantage of it? And the risk [27:05] manager is like, uh, no, actually, you [27:07] should get flat right now. uh reduce [27:10] your exposure immediately and start [27:12] putting those photographs of of you and [27:15] your daughter at the swimming pool into [27:17] a cardboard box because you're not going [27:19] to get another week to do this. And that [27:22] exacerbates the losers. [27:24] >> Yeah. [27:25] >> And probably the winners on on the short [27:27] side [27:28] >> and selling begets selling. It just it's [27:30] just a loop. It eventually ends but it [27:32] it Yeah. I think this creates [27:34] opportunities. I think you get creates [27:36] opportunities for very short-term [27:39] oriented people who kind of look at [27:41] fundamentals and people like myself who [27:43] are looking three, five, 10 years down [27:45] the line because you're able to get [27:46] these great entry points and you know [27:49] you just you kind of you take what the [27:52] market gives you and I think it's giving [27:53] you some opportunities now. [27:55] >> Okay, let's talk about them. What do you [27:58] >> what uh what are you most excited about? [28:02] >> What stock am I most excited? I don't [28:03] want to do I don't want to do a repeat [28:05] of of last time. Uh but the just to just [28:09] for the record, I think my you know Uber [28:11] I still love MSG Sports and Li Atlanta [28:14] Braves Holdings. Great stocks. [28:17] >> Give me an update on Give me an update [28:19] on the Uber thesis because my take is [28:23] nothing they say matters. [28:25] >> It's hard to disprove a negative. [28:27] >> The street just does not give a [28:29] They're So all right. So now Dra just [28:32] bought how much? How how much did he [28:34] just spend buying stock for himself? [28:35] >> I think 10 million [28:36] >> and and the CFO I think did five [28:39] >> and stock still won't go up. [28:40] >> Yeah. [28:40] >> The stock went down the next day. So now [28:42] they're doing a buyback, [28:44] >> corporate buyback. The insiders are [28:46] buying. [28:47] >> Um they actually have concrete like uh [28:52] robo taxi partnerships on the streets of [28:55] multiple cities with multiple partners. [28:58] It doesn't matter. This feels like it's [29:00] going to trade at 12 times earnings. [29:03] >> That directionally that feels like where [29:05] it's headed. [29:05] >> I I think it's almost impossible if it's [29:08] going to continue growing at 20 to 30% a [29:11] year for the stock to stay the way it [29:13] is. I don't I can't tell you what the [29:14] catalyst is. Um but you have a great [29:18] business and this is one that you hold [29:20] on to. I I think this is an example of a [29:22] buy and hold because the the [29:25] fundamentals of the business are great. [29:26] >> Why Why don't they just buy back? Why [29:29] don't they just buy back 20% of the [29:31] shares that why don't they do a tender [29:32] offer? [29:34] >> If you were advising if you were [29:36] advising Uber talking to the investor [29:39] relations people, the corporate [29:41] treasurer, the C CEO, like [29:43] hypothetically, so you've been involved [29:45] in a lot of stocks that were uh way [29:48] underpriced relative to their growth [29:49] over the years. [29:51] >> How do you get a happy ending here? What [29:53] would you be telling them that they [29:54] could be besides running the business [29:56] and executing which obviously that's [29:58] what they're doing. What would you be [30:00] telling them on on like the management [30:02] of the stock market side if they think [30:06] that they are still able to invest in [30:08] the business? And I I I would say they [30:12] should put whatever they do they need to [30:14] invest in the business and have a little [30:16] cash cushion and then just buy stock as [30:19] much as they possibly can. Uh, a tender [30:22] is not a terrible idea. I like these [30:24] insider purchases. DAR had been a seller [30:26] until recently. I think it's a great [30:28] signal to the market. Um, so but I think [30:31] you just have to be patient. It hasn't [30:32] been that long. Every year this is [30:34] either my best or worst performing [30:35] stock. [30:36] >> How about how how much how much free [30:38] cash flow are they going to generate in [30:40] 27? [30:41] >> It was like 10 billion or something. [30:43] >> Insane number. [30:44] >> Yeah. [30:44] >> Relative to the market cap. [30:46] >> It's it's crazy. I I I'm doing it from [30:48] memory, but I think it's something [30:49] like10 billion dollars. I mean, they're [30:51] they're executing. They're doing [30:52] everything right. At some point, they'll [30:54] be rewarded. Um, I think the bare case [30:58] is silly, but, you know, [31:00] >> they're making equity investments in [31:02] fleets of autonomous vehicles, which was [31:04] something that two years ago they said [31:05] they're not interested in doing. [31:07] >> Yeah. [31:07] >> But I think from their perspective, they [31:10] need to seed the market with fleets that [31:14] are not Whimo and Tesla. Like, they need [31:16] to get cars on the road. And the fastest [31:19] way to do that is to give money to the [31:21] OEMs that are making the cars. [31:24] >> Yeah. [31:24] >> Or to invest in fleets that are coming [31:26] along from like third party AI [31:29] companies. So they're doing that in [31:32] Europe, in the United States, in Asia. [31:34] The market is giving them no credit for [31:37] any of these investments being good [31:38] investments. Are you surprised by that? [31:41] >> No. I mean, it's market, you know, does [31:44] what the market does. It's it hasn't [31:45] been that long. I mean, this was a $100 [31:47] stock not too long ago. So, I think I I [31:50] just have to be patient. Um, you know, [31:52] it's it's one of those things. It's [31:54] frustrating, but it is what it is to why [31:56] you [31:57] >> Yeah. [31:58] >> Josh and I are tend to be certainly with [32:02] broken stocks a little bit technically [32:04] cautious where we wait for the sellers [32:07] to stop before we dip our toe and then [32:09] most of the times we end up we end up [32:11] being wrong like everybody else and we [32:12] send we sell at lower prices. You know [32:14] that meme, did it work for you? know, [32:15] but it might work for me. That's what [32:16] it's usually like when you buy these [32:17] broken stocks. But sometimes, [32:20] >> sometimes sometimes in the case of these [32:21] businesses, [32:22] >> the turn happens faster than you can [32:26] catch up to it. I think Meta is a really [32:28] great example of that. You can't wait [32:30] for a technical setup because the news [32:32] can happen overnight. And who knows, [32:34] same thing could happen with Uber where [32:35] there's a headline stock gas up 10% and [32:38] it just doesn't [32:38] >> business. So, that's a great that's a [32:40] great point. And the thing that Meta and [32:43] Uber have in common in both cases, these [32:46] were not broken businesses. [32:48] >> Not at all. Yeah. [32:48] >> These are just stocks that fell out of [32:50] favor. Meta's last earnings report was [32:52] great [32:53] >> and the one before it [32:55] >> and the outlook. [32:56] >> Um same with Uber. Like they haven't [32:59] they they've done nothing with their [33:01] earnings estimates. Like they the [33:03] guidance is intact from January. [33:05] >> Yeah. [33:06] >> It just it's a definitely a broken [33:08] stock, but not at all. or is this a [33:10] broken business? [33:11] >> And and if you decided to exit the stock [33:14] and wait till something happens, are you [33:16] gonna buy it 20% higher? That's the [33:18] problem. That's the psychology of it. [33:20] And you know, I'm, you know, that's why [33:23] I, you know, you take your pain, but I [33:25] think the pain will be well worth it. uh [33:28] you you put out this uh fresh looks uh [33:31] thing and I love it and I couldn't read [33:34] every stock on your list, but um you go [33:38] you said you go through your universe of [33:39] 200 stocks and see there it is. [33:44] >> Dude, it's awesome. [33:45] >> Thanks. [33:46] >> And we'll we'll tell at the end of the [33:47] show, we'll tell people how they can get [33:48] a copy of it. Um, but you go through [33:50] your universe of 200 stocks and you ask [33:53] yourself which of these names deserves a [33:56] fresh look. [33:57] >> Yeah. [33:58] >> Uh, what do you mean by that? Like [33:59] stocks you haven't written about in a [34:01] while and a lot has happened. [34:04] >> It could be. It could be. Or we've [34:06] written about it relatively recently and [34:08] a lot still has happened and we just [34:10] want to let our subscribers know that [34:12] this is the time to really take a fresh [34:16] look at the company. And it's um and the [34:19] theme in most of them is now there's [34:22] been significant multiple compression. [34:24] The businesses are fine to to improving [34:27] and I think investors have a great setup [34:30] and I I you know we we I think we did 14 [34:33] names this year uh on it and our [34:36] subscribers love it and I I think it's [34:39] they're they're names in an AI dominated [34:42] market that are worth you know taking a [34:44] look at. I want to ask you before we get [34:46] into the individual names. There has [34:48] been a lot of multiple compression in [34:50] the market this year [34:51] >> all over [34:52] >> every sector. Every sector except for [34:53] staples. [34:54] >> Yeah. So is that interest rates and oil? [34:58] What like what's behind like we can't [35:01] just say oh it's AI [35:03] >> because that would be dumb because AI is [35:05] actually fueling the earnings growth. So [35:07] maybe in some cases it's the perceived [35:09] threat of AI, but like h how difficult [35:12] is it to still like some certain stocks [35:16] in a 5% 10year interest rate world or do [35:20] you not really think that that's a valid [35:22] conclusion to draw? [35:23] >> I think it's not a valid conclusion to [35:25] draw if you take a three or four year [35:27] period because we've been stocks have [35:30] done well in those type of interest [35:32] rates environments. It's been quite a [35:33] while and I think it's going to take [35:35] investors a long time, a couple of years [35:37] to get used to investing in a world [35:39] where money isn't free. I mean, [35:40] >> the '9s had 5% tenure. [35:42] >> Yeah. And stocks did just fine. I mean, [35:44] and what about the 80s? I mean, [35:46] >> but do you but do you think whether or [35:48] not it's valid aside, do you think that [35:51] that is the primary reason for all of [35:53] the multiple compression that we're [35:54] seeing? Cuz other people believe that. [35:57] >> I think I think I don't think you can [35:58] pin it to one thing. I think that's a [36:00] significant factor. I think the AI [36:02] threat on some of these names um is is [36:06] another reason. I still think in certain [36:08] businesses there's still co hangover um [36:11] as well even though it's a it's still a [36:12] few years. One of the names Pool Corp is [36:15] you know that I can talk about in a [36:16] minute. I know it's it's Michael's [36:18] favorite stock. Um so uh I can't wait to [36:21] get yelled at by him. [36:22] >> Poolp Pool Corp needs to pivot from [36:24] digging swimming pools to digging [36:26] graves. [36:27] >> Same same equipment, smaller holes. [36:30] Let's start with Broadidge just because [36:32] that's the the first one we have in [36:33] front of us. What what is this company? [36:36] What's wrong with it? [36:38] >> I mean, Broadidge is is it I wouldn't [36:42] say it does the plumbing of the [36:43] financial system, but it helps you, [36:45] let's say, do proxies. It has lots of [36:47] businesses. If you're if you're a [36:49] company and you need to vote your [36:50] proxies because you're required to by [36:52] the SEC, they do that. They do all the [36:55] boring things. This was a spin out of I [36:58] believe ADP years ago and it was a [37:00] fantastic stock for many years and it's [37:02] it's stubbed its toe recently. So it's [37:05] just ingrained. We like these companies [37:08] that are ingrained in regulatory heavy [37:11] businesses that are that they're needed [37:14] and people monopoly too [37:15] >> and it's it's essentially a monopoly. I [37:17] mean they're market 80 according to you [37:19] guys 80% of all proxy votes they handle [37:21] among other things. It's not their only [37:22] business, but it's it's uh 63% [37:25] >> uh I'm sorry, their recurring revenue is [37:27] 63% of total revenue. And yet this [37:30] stock's been around forever. And this is [37:31] its second worst draw down. [37:33] >> Yeah. [37:33] >> Since since the GFC, I mean, this is a [37:35] steady this is like a toll booth [37:36] business typically. [37:38] >> Yeah. [37:38] >> And you know, uh didn't Ferve blow up [37:43] like a year ago [37:44] >> and it was in the sort of in the same [37:45] position. Fiser had all these boring [37:48] back office financial businesses and [37:51] there was tons of reliability [37:53] and then I guess the CEO ran it off the [37:56] cliff or some something but like it went [37:59] from being this boring thing to a stock [38:01] that fell 20% in one day. [38:03] >> I think the the CEO ended up working for [38:06] the Trump administration sold his stock [38:08] at basically the high. didn't have to [38:10] pay any capital gains or had them [38:12] deferred and it looked like I don't want [38:14] to say he was cooking the books, that's [38:16] not what he was doing, but he [38:17] >> there was some going on. [38:18] >> There was some not kosher stuff. So, [38:22] yeah, I Broadidge is a legit company. [38:25] It's it's well-run. They cross-ell. [38:27] Like, for example, if you're if you're a [38:30] uh a money manager and you have um all [38:34] these shareholder lawsuits that come to [38:36] you because you own shares, they'll take [38:38] care of it for you for a fee. um where [38:40] they'll go in, they'll file your claims, [38:42] etc. They have a lot of these boring [38:44] little businesses that do really well. [38:46] Uh it's it's it's an interesting company [38:48] that, you know, has had decent multiple [38:51] compression. It's a good business. As [38:53] Michael said, it's kind of a toll booth [38:55] type business and uh it's worth a you [38:57] know, for [38:58] >> why is it crashing? [38:59] >> It went from 280 to it's now 160 and it [39:02] was way way lower. Is this Yeah. to [39:03] Josh, is this AI stuff like what what's [39:06] happening? PE people are worried that [39:08] these token, you know, one of the bare [39:09] cases is these tokens uh that where you [39:12] can trade stocks, they're not going to [39:14] have to do proxies, etc. for them. I [39:17] mean, there there are a lot of just [39:18] things that just don't make a heck of a [39:20] lot of sense uh for it. And it's it's [39:23] been a sentiment driven uh name. Yeah, I [39:25] think it's driven like about 25% this [39:29] year uh gone down. I mean, it's [39:31] >> how big how big is this company? [39:33] >> This company enterprise value about 20 [39:35] billion or so. So, it's a real it's a [39:37] real business. [39:38] >> Okay. Could it like could it get [39:40] acquired? [39:41] >> I mean, I think it's, you know, with [39:44] interest rates this high, who knows? But [39:45] I it could be. I mean, it wouldn't it [39:47] wouldn't shock me. A lot of the [39:48] businesses because of the way we look at [39:50] it end up being acquired. [39:51] >> So, when you look at this though, you [39:53] don't need that to happen. You don't [39:54] need a catalyst. It from your [39:56] perspective, the market is irrationally [40:00] derating the stock. And when the dust [40:02] settles, people will realize they [40:04] weren't displaced at all. they weren't [40:06] um they weren't disrupted at all by AI. [40:09] You might even get a benefit uh in terms [40:11] of using AI internally. [40:13] >> Yeah. [40:14] >> Which could actually serve to enhance [40:15] the profitability and they'll keep their [40:17] monopoly over all of these uh little [40:20] businesses. [40:21] >> Yeah. I mean we generally want a [40:22] catalyst and I think you can if you had [40:24] to stretch the catalyst was will be [40:27] people finally realizing a AI or tokens [40:30] are not going to kill their business. So [40:31] it's a similar story to the insight that [40:33] you had with Salesforce, similar in [40:36] Broadidge and as well as Booking. So if [40:39] you know the businesses, you could sit [40:42] back and laugh. I mean, I know it's not [40:43] fun when when these companies are [40:45] getting sold into oblivion, but for [40:47] Booking, which is a company that you [40:48] own, and that's Booking.com and Price [40:50] Line and Kayak, you said that ChatBT [40:53] tried to do this in September 2025. They [40:55] launched instant checkout and then by [40:57] March they said, "Never mind, actually [40:59] not that easy." and Google tried to do [41:02] this. [41:02] >> So, it's the same thing. It's like it's [41:04] headline [41:05] >> basket selling. Yes. And you're like, [41:07] "Wait a minute. Hello. This this is not [41:09] going to happen. We've been here and [41:10] done that." So, what's the story with [41:12] these AI and the uh the Trip Advisor [41:14] type stuff? [41:15] >> Yeah. I mean, I think that this is a [41:18] really dumb rationale. They're saying [41:20] that Muse is going to be able to, you [41:22] know, do this whole book you a hotel, [41:25] etc. How are they going to do it? how [41:27] how how they're going to call all these, [41:29] you know, booking specialized and that's [41:30] why we like it more than Expedia in [41:33] these small boutique hotels. They don't [41:36] have some of them don't even have [41:38] websites. They they have relationships [41:41] with um with all of these proprietors. [41:44] They help them with their business. Uh [41:47] the EU has tremendous amount of [41:50] regulation uh when it comes to travel. [41:53] Muse isn't going to do all this stuff. [41:54] They're going to use booking. This is a [41:56] positive for booking, not a [41:57] >> of course. It's going to use it's going [41:59] to use the site. No. [42:00] >> Uh I'm in the middle on this. Part of me [42:03] is like does anybody even want oneclick [42:06] booking? [42:08] >> Like don't don't you want to know like [42:10] what the room size is and uh what hotel [42:13] you're staying at and like I don't think [42:15] people actually want oneclick. I do [42:17] think what the agents will do and [42:20] booking will probably build their own [42:21] agent. So, but I I do think what people [42:24] want is instantly what is the cheapest [42:28] room that is over 500 square ft, has a [42:32] good view. [42:33] >> Yeah. [42:33] >> Um and is on the west end of the Las [42:36] Vegas strip, the north end of Las Vegas [42:38] strip instead of the south. Like people [42:40] want that. [42:42] >> They want that answer spat back at them [42:44] instantly. That's not the same as I want [42:47] to skip the the the booking process [42:50] >> and and just instantly have a room. [42:52] >> Yeah. [42:52] >> May maybe in some cases for really savvy [42:55] travelers or for business if you already [42:57] know where you want to stay. [42:59] >> Yeah. [42:59] >> So for for example, I know I'm going to [43:02] this hotel anyway. So maybe it's like [43:06] book me a room at this hotel, the same [43:08] room I book every year. But [43:11] >> but yeah, but booking has a loyalty [43:14] program where you get, you know, [43:16] breakfast or whatever it is. These [43:19] companies are going to want to use [43:20] booking. And also, Muse doesn't have [43:22] inventory. Do you know how hard it is to [43:24] get inventory throughout the world to to [43:28] do this? Muse just can't like snap their [43:30] fingers. You know, if Google couldn't do [43:32] it, if Trip Advisor couldn't do it, I [43:35] see no reason why they they will be able [43:38] to do it. Glenn Fogle V uh has run this [43:41] thing since I think 2004. He's done a [43:43] fantastic job transitioning the company [43:46] through through a variety of perceived [43:49] this company is now dead. And I I think [43:52] this is going to be a positive and not [43:53] not a negative for the for the business. [43:55] >> Jonathan, in September alone, the stock [43:57] went from 215 down to 157. It's crazy [44:00] how violent these AIdriven sell-offs [44:04] are. I I haven't seen anything like [44:05] this. [44:05] >> You know what else is funny? Travel. I [44:08] think I read this somewhere. Travel [44:10] might be the number two or number three [44:13] contributor to Google's ad revenue. [44:17] >> Wow. [44:17] >> I think it's like I think it's like the [44:20] like the number two or three category of [44:22] ad spend on Google is travel which [44:26] tracks with your own life experience, [44:27] right? Think about how much time you [44:29] spend like searching for hotels, [44:31] vacations, flights. Like it's a it's a [44:33] big one. [44:34] >> Yeah. It's so funny this idea that like [44:37] Gemini is just going to do all that [44:40] for you so you don't have to search. [44:42] Well, is that going to be necessarily [44:44] great for Google [44:45] >> that all those searches for travel [44:47] related stuff go away and the ad revenue [44:49] associated with them? [44:51] >> Like I don't I don't know. Is that is [44:53] that revenue neutral for Google or maybe [44:56] worse? Yeah, I yeah, that's that's [44:59] outside of my purview, but I I I what I [45:01] do know is a company like Booking and [45:04] the one that's I think even more [45:06] ridiculous where it took it down hard [45:08] was Airbnb, which is a name we like. [45:11] >> I mean, what Muse is now going to go [45:13] directly to every single homeowner who's [45:15] renting their home to uh to see if they [45:18] want to rent it out to to to someone. I [45:20] mean, it's just the these things are [45:22] they're nonsensical. [45:24] >> And Airbnb was on fire. Yeah, [45:26] >> the stock gapped up, I don't know, 10%, [45:29] ran from 150 to 190, and now it's back [45:31] down to 150. So, you need like serious [45:35] nerve to buy and hold stocks these days, [45:38] individual stocks, it's it's hard. [45:40] >> Yeah, it's it's hard. Um, but if you if [45:44] you don't if you're able to really tell [45:46] yourself you're going to have that 2, [45:47] three, four view, it's much easier as an [45:50] individual, as a money manager who gets [45:52] graded and can get fired, that's much [45:54] harder. Put up the forward. Put up the [45:56] forward PE multiple. [45:58] Uh, no offense. This could just be [46:01] getting started. [46:04] Like the business could be great, but [46:06] the multiple could keep derating. Like [46:08] we know 15 times is not the bottom. [46:11] >> Oh, absolutely. [46:13] >> Okay. [46:13] >> Yeah. It's [46:14] >> okay. You could be right on the [46:16] fundamentals and still wrong on the [46:18] stock, which is the danger for everybody [46:20] in all of these stocks. [46:22] >> Yeah. No. Yep. [46:24] >> Do you have a catalyst here? [46:26] >> I Well, one if oil going down I think [46:30] will be significantly [46:33] uh beneficial for the company which also [46:35] obviously if if things are solved in [46:38] Iran that that's helpful and just [46:40] general fears over AI disruption. Uh [46:44] plus more you know I think those are [46:46] those are what's going to make the stock [46:47] kind of ascend in value. There's no one [46:49] concrete thing that you're gonna put [46:52] your hat on. [46:52] >> Okay. Am I stupid? I actually disagree [46:55] with you. I think one announcement with [46:56] Open AI and and the D-rating is over. [47:00] >> Yeah. [47:00] >> We just saw We just saw that with [47:02] Salesforce. [47:03] >> Mhm. [47:03] >> He brings Daario on stage at at [47:06] Dreamforce and they hold hands and raise [47:09] them together like two prize fighters at [47:11] the end of a match and that's it. It's [47:12] over. [47:13] >> Yeah. [47:14] >> Now it's a new story, right? Like why [47:17] don't they all justing do deals with Sam [47:18] Alman and put an or or with Dario and [47:20] put an end to this Is that the [47:22] fastest way to fix this problem? [47:25] >> I think what they want to do in is pay [47:28] less attention to the stock price and do [47:30] what's best for the business and to sign [47:32] a deal prematurely to one or the other. [47:34] G giving exclusivity etc. It may solve [47:37] your temporary stock price problem but [47:39] okay [47:40] >> I think you want to figure out you know [47:42] this is still very new. I mean every you [47:45] know first Chat Gebt was in the lead [47:47] then Claude now back to Chat Gebt who [47:49] knows who you are. [47:50] >> They don't want to get married. They [47:51] don't want to get married. Okay. [47:52] >> Start dating. [47:54] >> Jonathan let's talk about one of the [47:56] biggest pieces of stock on the [47:57] planet. Pool Corp. [47:59] >> So over the last two years we know we [48:01] know residential construction is a [48:03] disaster. Over the last two years new [48:05] pool construction in the US averaged [48:07] approximately 60,000 the lowest level in [48:09] over a decade. I guess fortunately [48:12] whatever pool Corp is the largest [48:14] wholesaler distributor. [48:16] >> So it's a low capital intensity [48:18] business. They're just a distributor. [48:20] They're not building the product. But my [48:21] god, man, this stock just keeps going [48:23] lower and lower and lower. It's it's [48:25] it's taking another leg lower down. [48:27] >> What does it mean? What does it mean? [48:28] >> What does it mean distributor? So, so [48:31] they independent companies that build [48:34] pools buy their equipment from Pool [48:38] Corp, [48:38] >> like chemicals, uh, filters, all that [48:41] kind of stuff. [48:41] >> So, construction, maintenance. [48:43] >> Yes. Mostly maintenance. But, yes. [48:46] >> Okay. So, you would think like you build [48:49] a pool, you're not going to fill it in [48:50] with cement 2 years later. [48:52] >> Yeah. [48:52] >> You would think the installed base for [48:54] swimming pools has grown substantially [48:57] just in the last 10 years. And that's [49:00] annuitized revenue. You have to treat [49:03] your pool all summer. Every summer, you [49:06] can't take a year off. You'll have an [49:08] algae pond. [49:09] >> Yeah. [49:09] >> So, but it does it doesn't seem to [49:12] matter. So, what does the market rate [49:14] the stock based on? New poolool [49:15] construction only. Is that the only [49:17] thing they care about? [49:18] >> Well, revenue hasn't really grown [49:21] because from like during the co era, it [49:23] grew like 27% annualized. So there's a [49:27] there was a lot of pull forward kind of [49:29] demand and now it's [49:30] >> everyone got a pool all at once. [49:31] >> Oh, everyone got a pool all at once. [49:33] Everything is now starting to normalize [49:35] and that's why you see the stock go from [49:37] 500 and whatever to $167 a share. Now [49:42] you're buying it at 15 times earnings [49:45] which is roughly [49:46] >> cheap enough. [49:47] >> Well, I mean that's what it traded for [49:48] in the financial crisis and what it [49:51] traded for after 9/11. Uh so I think you [49:55] know in in you know do com bust so I [49:58] think that's it's I mean this stock and [50:00] this is goes back to the Coca-Cola [50:02] example sold for 55 times earnings in uh [50:06] at the height of co [50:08] >> this did [50:09] >> yeah 55 times [50:11] >> people thought it people thought it was [50:13] a compounder [50:14] >> people thought yeah everyone they're [50:15] going to build this many pool every they [50:17] thought everyone in the country was [50:19] going to have a pool essentially [50:20] >> Bkshire Hathaway Bergkshire Hathaway [50:21] took uh Todd Combmes bought about this [50:24] and then Todd Combmes left Berkshire and [50:26] they dumped the whole position. [50:28] >> Yeah, that's what that's what he seems [50:30] to do. Yeah, I wouldn't read too much [50:32] into that Warren hates this. I think it [50:34] was just he left. Let's sell his let's [50:37] sell the stock. [50:38] >> I feel like Bergkshire could be the type [50:39] of company that that just buys this [50:40] whole thing. [50:41] >> Is this the type of thing where you say, [50:44] "All right, obviously I was wrong on the [50:46] stock. It's down so much, but maybe [50:48] there's an opportunity to be rescued by [50:50] some sort of white knight." I mean, I I [50:53] would prefer that not to happen because [50:56] I think [50:56] >> that might be terrible for you. [50:57] >> I I mean, we just I just a little [51:00] background. We wrote this up in 2009. We [51:03] did a um we did an issue discussing, you [51:07] know, now is the time to buy consumer [51:10] oriented stocks. So, we did Pool Corp at [51:12] $20. We did Marriott. We did a few of [51:15] these names. We hadn't revisited it [51:19] until this summer. [51:20] >> Wow. So, for the last couple of years, [51:23] we've been tempted. We really wanted to [51:25] write it up, but it just didn't get [51:27] cheap enough. But when we wrote it up [51:30] this summer, I think it was 17 times, [51:32] maybe 18 times. We're like, "Wow, it [51:34] could get a little cheaper." And it has, [51:36] but it is a cheap cheap stock now. [51:40] >> Put up the ch uh put up the chart of [51:42] annual new pool construction in the US. [51:45] Is this like is this bottomed or is [51:48] there no way to really know? It's like [51:49] very interest rate sensitive, right? [51:51] People [51:52] >> borrow money, do a heliloc to dig a new [51:55] pool. So like we don't even know if [51:57] we've seen the worst of it. [51:59] >> We don't know we we've seen the worst of [52:01] it, but it's pretty there's there are [52:02] signs that there are this is a very [52:05] well-run company. The board is [52:06] fantastic. If you look at it, they're [52:08] all distribute have distribution [52:11] backgrounds and this is a country [52:13] company with extremely low leverage has [52:16] no controlling shareholder and as [52:19] Michael pointed out, you know, this [52:21] certainly could be uh someone t a [52:23] private equity firm uh could take a run [52:26] at this company. Uh so I mean that's not [52:28] the investment thesis and as a long-term [52:30] investor I would rather you know this is [52:32] a great business. It's, as you said, [52:34] it's I don't want to say it's an annuity [52:36] like business, but it's but it's close. [52:38] There's a lot of maintenance revenue [52:39] there. I'd rather be able to own and [52:41] compound this over time. [52:43] >> Okay. Uh, you want to do Burger King? [52:47] >> Sure. [52:48] >> Why Why is this one of the few [52:51] uh QSRs, which is its ticker? Why is [52:53] this one of the few that's hanging [52:55] tough? I mean, it got sold off the past [52:57] couple of days, but this has been a [52:58] really, really difficult category. [53:01] >> Yeah. Uh, a few reasons. One, Patrick [53:05] Doyle has done a great job. He's [53:07] executive chair. Um, 3G recruited him to [53:10] be executive chair of the company. He [53:12] was at Domino's. And, you know, under [53:15] him, do he was a CEO. Under him, [53:16] Domino's went up, I think, 20x. [53:19] >> Disaster. [53:20] >> Yeah. He He's a great Well, since he [53:23] left, it's been a disaster. He He picked [53:25] a good He picked a good time to lead to [53:27] lead. Is he the guy that came in and [53:30] started doing the videos online about [53:32] how bad the food is? [53:33] >> Yes. Yeah. At Domino's. Yeah. And and [53:37] >> he saved he saved the company. [53:39] >> Exactly. [53:39] >> It was It was like a It was a train [53:41] wreck. And he came in and he said, "The [53:43] food sucks." [53:44] >> Yes. [53:44] >> Let's And [53:45] >> he said it tasted like cardboard. [53:47] >> Yeah. He did a focus group and they [53:49] started to improve the recipe and Yeah. [53:51] >> I don't know what they really They put [53:52] added garlic to the to the tomato sauce. [53:55] It was like this revelation. [53:56] >> Yeah. I think they made a a crust that [53:58] travels better. [54:00] >> Um that like like they did they did [54:02] meaningful things with the food. [54:04] >> Yeah. [54:04] >> But they also were brilliant with the [54:07] app. [54:07] >> Yeah. [54:08] >> They had the best food delivery app at [54:11] at one point. They probably still do. I [54:13] don't know. [54:13] >> Still do. It's great. [54:14] >> Made it so easy to order and it [54:17] remembers what you like and it remembers [54:19] your instructions how to deliver it and [54:21] they just they crushed it. So this is [54:24] the guy now that was brought into this [54:26] is Burger King and Tim Hortons and [54:29] Popeye's. So all health all health food. [54:32] >> Yeah. And Firehouse Subs. [54:34] >> Firehouse Subs. Can't [54:35] >> Yeah. All [54:36] >> But Jonathan, a lot a lot of the [54:37] competitors are getting killed, I think, [54:39] because of GLPs. Like I think that's [54:41] part of the story. Why is Burger King [54:43] and Tim Horton Why are they immune? [54:46] >> They're not immune, but they're in the [54:47] middle of their turnaround. They they [54:48] they addressed this. I mean, listen, [54:51] they have to deal with 20% 25% beef [54:53] inflation like like everyone else. Uh, [54:56] the stock one had a cheaper multiple [54:58] than the other ones going in. Um, and [55:01] two, uh, Burger King North America is [55:05] now in a turnaround phase. And they're [55:08] in the middle of the turnaround. Um, and [55:10] >> why are they turning around? What does [55:11] that mean? [55:12] >> Like the franchises weren't happy. The [55:13] unit level economics for for the stores [55:16] weren't doing doing well. You know, same [55:19] source sales weren't good. Now they now [55:20] saving source sales have improved. They [55:23] um they're basically halfway through the [55:26] recovery that McDonald's is just [55:28] starting. [55:29] >> So the the great thing about the great [55:32] thing about this is every 5 years it [55:34] goes private, [55:37] >> right? [55:38] >> Burger King goes private every five to [55:41] seven years. Somebody somebody takes it [55:42] private. [55:43] >> 3G bought them in 2011 2012. I think [55:48] they're going to stay for a long I think [55:49] they've built a great business that [55:51] they're getting paid a 3 4% yield while [55:54] they wait. Um they're going to be able [55:56] to have opportunities to buy other [55:58] restaurants. May yeah, maybe it gets [56:00] sold, but now I think the I think the [56:01] enterprise value is $45 billion, so it's [56:03] a little bit harder. I mean, this um the [56:07] the Burger King take private was I think [56:11] on a percentage basis the the best [56:14] private equity deal of all time. [56:16] >> Yeah. Fun fact, the company was founded [56:18] at the University of Miami. [56:20] >> Really? [56:21] >> Yeah. It's like it's like one of their [56:23] big claims to fame uh at the business [56:25] school. There's like a bust of the the [56:26] founder. [56:27] >> Yeah. [56:27] >> The guy the guy was like a genius. I [56:29] forget the whole story. [56:30] >> Was he really a king or [56:32] >> not? He was not actually a king. I think [56:33] he was in the military. I don't I [56:35] forget. [56:35] >> His last name was Burger. [56:38] >> Yeah, last name was Jonathan. [56:41] >> Yeah, Patrick also got rid of the uh the [56:43] king, I think, too. Oh, that that [56:46] idiotic uh mascot where it's like [56:48] mannequin. [56:49] >> Yeah. Yeah, I think he got rid of it. [56:50] >> Super creepy. Okay. [56:52] >> What do you What do you see in Comcast? [56:54] This is not to me a Garpy business. [56:58] What's going on here? [56:59] >> Yeah, Comcast is controversial within [57:01] our our firm. Some people like it, some [57:03] people don't. I I think now the Roberts [57:07] family looks like they're ready to [57:10] potentially exit. They're now splitting [57:12] it into two businesses. you know, you're [57:14] going to have NBC Universal and then [57:15] you're going to have uh the Comcast [57:18] broadband business, but the broadband [57:20] business is a tough tough business. [57:21] You're going to have lots of [57:22] competition, fix wireless, you're going [57:25] to, you know, have Starlink, etc. Even [57:28] though Starlink has their issues within [57:29] cities, but at five or six times Ebida, [57:33] it's pretty cheap. So I mean our service [57:36] goes to people who are Garpy goes to [57:38] people who are somewhat deep value go so [57:40] we have a you know you know different [57:42] flavors within it is I will will people [57:46] make money here yes but it's probably [57:48] less interesting than the others. [57:50] >> What is the last company you looked at [57:52] and wanted to like it but you just you [57:55] couldn't bring yourself to be bullish [57:58] and what was the reason? Can you think [57:59] of anything recently? [58:01] >> I can't think of anything. It happens to [58:03] me all the time is why I ask. [58:04] >> Oh. Uh, [58:06] >> what about what about what about [58:07] StubHub? [58:08] >> Oh god. StubHub. [58:10] >> Weren't you close to pulling the trigger [58:11] on that one or No, [58:12] >> I was close to the pulling the trigger. [58:13] Luckily, I mean, unfortunately, we wrote [58:15] it up for subscribers. You know, one of [58:18] the things I think I've learned uh is to [58:20] not buy businesses or or look at [58:23] businesses that are hated by consumers. [58:25] Um, [58:27] >> I hate StubHub. [58:28] >> Yes. [58:28] >> A lot. [58:29] >> Every everyone hates StubHub, right? [58:31] >> Yes. That's a thing. [58:33] >> Yeah. It's like, why am I buy? Yeah. So, [58:35] I mean, could you make money here? Yeah. [58:37] It's a It's a convoluted story. It's a [58:39] convoluted ownership structure. Could [58:42] you make money? Yes. Is it our our [58:44] favorite? No. But we, you know, we have [58:46] to come up with a lot of ideas in a [58:48] given year. Not all of them we're going [58:49] to like equally. [58:51] >> Let me tell you a quick Let me tell you [58:52] a quick step-up story. Couple of years [58:53] ago, I was away, I think, for a Nick [58:56] game, a Nick playoff game or something, [58:57] whatever the case was. And I listed it. [58:59] I So, I took responsibility. I messed [59:01] up. I listed on ticket master and [59:03] StubHub. They both sold simultaneously. [59:06] I had to deliver the ticket to StubHub [59:07] buyer. I couldn't. That's up. And [59:09] so I had to pay whatever the value was [59:12] to make good. My hand up. I messed up. [59:15] But they didn't tell me that it [59:16] happened. And they allowed the same [59:18] ticket on Stubup to sell seven times. [59:20] And they tried to they tried to charge [59:22] me. In fact, they did charge me like [59:24] $9,000 or something like that. And Josh, [59:26] you and I were in Los Angeles when this [59:28] happened. [59:29] >> And I had to go to AMX. face. Your face [59:31] was white. [59:32] >> I was talking to the customer service. [59:34] I'm like, "How could you allow this?" [59:36] >> Yeah. [59:37] >> Like I if it happens once, okay, fine. [59:38] Take the listing off. How could you [59:40] allow this? And the the reason is this [59:42] is this is a big profit center for them. [59:44] >> Yeah. [59:45] >> So, yeah, consumers could stop up. [59:46] >> Consumers do. [59:48] >> Do you do you have uh do you have [59:50] coverage or a view on any of the sports [59:53] betting uh stocks like DraftKings and [59:57] Flutter? These stocks are not doing well [59:59] either. Yeah, [60:00] >> I I think they're ripping each other [60:02] apart competitively. Like Caesars, Bet [60:05] MGM, [60:06] >> Flutter hit an alltime low. Flutter's at [60:08] an alltime low today. [60:09] >> There's just so many and now Robin Hood [60:11] is is in the game. Like it's Is that the [60:14] problem here? [60:15] >> Yeah. I mean, I think my the one that we [60:17] have a view on is MGM, which is down [60:19] about 10% today because Diller pulled [60:21] his bid. Um I think he's going to come [60:23] back. You know, he had a $48 bid. Now [60:26] it's going to be 38. uh now it's a $33 a [60:29] share. Uh he tried to buy it through IA. [60:32] That's a great business selling at you [60:35] know a not demanding multiple here. Uh I [60:39] think it's you know 16 it's trading at [60:41] about 16 times. Um and what what what's [60:45] interesting to us about MGM in 2031 [60:48] they're going to have the only casino in [60:50] all of Japan. uh like they're and [60:54] they'll they'll have like a four or five [60:55] year at least head start on everyone [60:57] >> that exclusivity matters. [60:59] >> Yeah. [60:59] >> I was I was talking to somebody this [61:01] week. Do you know Hard Rock pays the [61:05] state of Florida $500 million for the [61:09] exclusive [61:11] gambling app in the state. [61:12] >> Wow. [61:13] >> And the the seinals are invol like the [61:15] tribe is involved in that. It's part of [61:17] how they pulled it off. But like I don't [61:19] know if that I didn't independently [61:21] verify that but somebody who knows this [61:22] stuff was like yeah they pay half a [61:24] billion dollars and that's why there is [61:27] no DraftKings in Florida. [61:29] >> I had no idea. [61:31] >> That's a crazy just to be clear they [61:33] don't have like an exclusive [61:35] relationship. I mean they have a three [61:36] or four year fiveyear head start because [61:38] it takes a long time to build these [61:39] things. So it's great they have a [61:41] Japanese partner there. They don't fully [61:43] own it, but it's going to be the the [61:45] revenues that they're going to have are [61:46] going to be s pretty not similar, but [61:49] very close to what they have in Vegas. [61:51] And analysts aren't putting that into [61:52] their forecast. I think the uh the [61:57] sports regulated the the the sports [62:00] books are going to be not the sports [62:02] books, I'm sorry, the like the calcies [62:04] of the world, those are going to be [62:05] regulated. I think Bet MGM is going to [62:07] be just fine. I think people are going [62:10] to want to visit casinos. I think, you [62:12] know, there's a temporary problem. [62:14] People aren't going to Vegas from Canada [62:16] because the Canadians hate the [62:17] Americans. That's going to change. You [62:19] know, 2028's not that far away. So, [62:22] there's lots of things to like about it. [62:23] Again, if you can take a two or threeear [62:25] view, you might not even have to because [62:26] I think Diller is going to come back. [62:28] >> I know this is not this is not uh a US [62:32] casino story alone, but have you looked [62:34] at the stocks of Win and Las Vegas [62:36] Sands, which I know is a lot in China, [62:38] they're going straight down. Uh Las [62:40] Vegas Sands was 70 bucks in December. [62:42] It's 38 right now. [62:44] >> The whole sector is out of favor. I [62:46] mean, I guess there's ch obviously [62:47] there's China China worries and you [62:49] know, Ben MGM has a China business and [62:52] that does, I think, worry me a little [62:55] bit about the stock because you don't [62:56] know what's going to happen there. But [62:57] there's enough other things to like and [62:59] I think that's what, you know, Josh [63:00] talked earlier about position sizing. I [63:03] think that's one of the things that you [63:04] have to do is, you know, look at the [63:06] risk of a stock and, you know, size it [63:09] accordingly. [63:10] >> If you think the casino stocks look bad, [63:13] allow me to introduce you to Vich [63:15] Properties. [63:16] >> What is that? [63:17] >> Holy VIC. This is the landlord of [63:21] Las Vegas. [63:23] So what happened [63:25] >> during the activist shareholder era what [63:28] happened with all these casino companies [63:30] is they sold their soul by which I mean [63:33] they sold their real estate to this REIT [63:36] and the idea was we're we have all this [63:40] money encumbered in like concrete let's [63:44] let's sell the real estate to Vichi and [63:47] we'll take the cash [63:48] >> and we'll use that cash to buy back [63:50] stock. [63:51] >> Yeah. disastrous. So they bought back [63:54] all this stock at the top which [63:56] obviously enriched the management cuz [63:58] these guys took huge bonuses for [64:00] themselves. Um, and ever since it's been [64:04] nothing but down and now the REIT looks [64:07] even worse than the casinos. And this [64:10] thing was uh last summer 33. It's now 23 [64:16] and for a REIT for like a yield play [64:18] that is [64:19] >> dude this is this is nuts. [64:21] >> So I never Josh I never heard of this. [64:22] It's an S&P 500 REIT. [64:24] >> Um it owns 103 assets. Uh [64:28] >> uh [64:29] >> they own all the land in Vegas. They own [64:30] the whole strip. [64:31] >> Caesar's Palace, MGM Grand, and the [64:33] Venetian. Oh my goodness. Debacle. [64:38] >> All right. Way to end on an up note. We [64:40] did good. Guys, uh I I want to finish by [64:42] letting people know how they can learn [64:44] more about about uh Boyar Asset [64:46] Management and all the great research [64:48] that you're doing. Give us like the uh [64:50] give us the give us the rundown of how [64:53] people can learn more from you. [64:54] >> Sure. Uh you can go to our visit our [64:56] subsack at boyer research.subsack.com. [64:59] subsack.com. If you want to get a few [65:02] samples of the fresh looks, go to uh [65:04] Boyervalgroup [65:06] SL. [65:08] >> I will be leaking that in its entirely [65:10] entirety on the internet shortly. No, we [65:13] want people to sign up and subscribe to [65:15] your stuff and uh and and tell us about [65:17] the asset management business. How's it [65:19] going this year? What's happening? It's [65:21] >> good. You know, we're having some good [65:22] flows. It's uh business is good and I [65:24] think it's a great time to invest. [65:26] Obviously, that's extremely self- [65:27] serving, but there are a lot of [65:28] opportunities out there and we're, you [65:30] know, if you're looking for a long-term, [65:32] patient, tax efficient investor, you [65:34] know, uh, consider us. [65:37] >> Rule number one is be self- serving. [65:40] >> Got to, if you don't promote yourself, [65:42] nobody else will. [65:43] >> Exactly. [65:43] >> Jonathan Buer, you are you are the man. [65:45] We have so much the the time just flies [65:48] by when we talk to you. We learn so much [65:50] from you and uh s super fun session [65:53] today. Thank you so much for coming on. [65:54] Thanks for having me, [65:56] >> guys. Thank you so much for watching. [65:57] Thank you for listening. Especially [65:59] thanks to everyone who is leaving [66:02] reviews and rating the show. It means so [66:04] much to us. We really appreciate it. [66:06] Have a great weekend. We'll talk to you [66:08] soon.