Hamilton Lane CEO Rejects Private Equity Non-Correlation Claim

Hamilton Lane首席执行官驳斥私募股权“非相关性”论调 Hamilton Lane首席执行官Erik Hirsch表示，一旦消除报告滞后效应，私募股权便直接趋同于公开市场走势；随着公开交易市场规模收缩且集中度上升，配置私募增长资产已变得不可或缺。 Erik Hirsch破除了关于私募市场的普遍迷思，指出私募股权与公开股票看似不相关，很大程度上只是90天估值报告滞后造成的假象。在回应散户沦为机构退出流动性的质疑时，Hirsch强调，管理人业绩差异巨大，需要严格的机构尽调与精选组合构建，而非被动指数化投资。他以稳定的2%违约率反驳了媒体对私人信贷的耸动报道，将散户基金赎回激增归因于财富渠道的不成熟和投资顾问的职业风险，并阐释了为何二级市场的“首日估值上调”是GAAP会计准则的硬性要求，而非误导性定价。Hirsch最终指出，鉴于公开市场正在缩减并高度集中于科技巨头，而早期企业的价值创造日益发生在非公开领域，投资者承受不起放弃私募市场的代价。 Hamilton Lane的全权委托资产管理规模达到约1460亿美元，咨询资产规模超过1万亿美元，使其成为资金配置方与数千家专注中端市场的通用合伙人（GP）之间的中介解决方案提供商。 (0:16) 私募股权与公开市场之间所谓的非相关性，主要是季度报告时间滞后造成的人为假象；若消除这种滞后，底层企业的股权表现与公开基准完全同频。 (3:10) 面向散户的募资高度集中在大约20家超大型发起人手中，致使数千家传统私募股权投资机构仍完全依赖机构资本的配置。 (14:39) 二级市场交易中颇具争议的“首日估值上调”，反映的是GAAP公允价值会计准则的强制要求以及数月的报告滞后，而非收购方基金经理的随意定价选择。 (31:16) 直接借贷违约率持续徘徊在2%左右，且现金付息收入稳健，这表明近期半流动性工具中散户赎回激增源于销售渠道不成熟及耸人听闻的媒体头条，而非投资组合的广泛恶化。 (24:49)

Hamilton Lane CEO Erik Hirsch argues that the expansion of private markets into wealth channels is driven by structural shifts and product evolution rather than institutional offloading, though wide manager dispersion and reporting lags require rigorous curation. Correlation Myths and Extreme Manager Dispersion (3:10) Hirsch disputes the premise that private equity is inherently uncorrelated with public equities, stating that apparent lack of correlation is primarily a mathematical byproduct of a three-month financial reporting lag. When that quarterly lag is removed, private and public equity performances move together. However, unlike public markets where indexing thrives, private asset classes exhibit extreme return dispersion driven by post-acquisition operational execution, capital allocation choices, and management decisions rather than initial entry multiples. The Exit Liquidity Thesis and Retail Access (12:20) Amid a roughly 25% year-over-year decline in private equity exit activity and constrained institutional cash distributions, critics contend that asset managers are turning to retail investors as exit liquidity. Hirsch acknowledges that post-pandemic markets experienced aggressive overpaying and loose underwriting, resulting in severe dispersion across 2021 to 2023 vintages. However, he rejects the exit liquidity narrative, maintaining that wealth channel expansion is driven by regulatory changes and purpose-built evergreen and semi-liquid structures. Hirsch points out that retail fundraising is confined to approximately 20 mega-cap firms with the requisite distribution and operational scale. The thousands of specialized middle-market general partners have no mechanism to tap retail capital and remain entirely dependent on institutional limited partners. Furthermore, standard data showing plunging private market fundraising capture only closed-end funds, omitting rapid expansion in perpetual vehicles and secondaries. Private Credit Pressures and Retail Channel Immaturity (24:49) Private credit expanded after post-2008 bank regulations curtailed regional bank lending to middle-market enterprises. While floating-rate structures shielded private lenders during 2022's rate hikes, the subsequent capital rush produced numerous spinout managers who have never operated through a downturn. Batnick highlights recent retail redemption strains, such as Apollo Debt Solutions capping quarterly redemptions at 5% following repurchase requests exceeding 14% of shares. Hirsch attributes this redemption wave to structural immaturity in retail wealth channels rather than widespread asset distress. With direct lending default rates hovering near 2% and minimal migration to payment-in-kind income, institutional capital has remained net positive. In contrast, financial advisors face asymmetric career risk, often choosing to return client capital during negative news cycles to preserve client relationships rather than defend sound underlying credit fundamentals. Secondaries Pricing, GAAP Rules, and Valuation Lags (31:16) Addressing controversy over "day-one markups" in private secondaries—where assets acquired at discounts are recorded higher upon purchase—Hirsch explains that GAAP fair-value accounting mandates these adjustments. In passive secondary transfers, incoming buyers are required to record holdings at the valuation established by the fund's general partner, separate from whatever discount the selling limited partner accepted. Current secondary discounts average roughly 13%, driven by institutional allocators actively reallocating or seeking liquidity rather than asset insolvency. Hirsch notes that valuation lags further amplify perceived pricing discrepancies. Because private reporting operates on a 90-day delay and secondary transactions require two to three months to close administratively, pricing negotiated against March statements may not enter a buyer's books until January. By that point, valuations reflect updated September marks and months of intervening business performance. Public Market Skepticism versus Private Realities (40:00) Despite Hamilton Lane's incentive fees climbing to $175 million for fiscal year 2026, public markets have heavily discounted alternative asset manager equities over fears of decelerating retail inflows. Hirsch regards this as irrational public market sentiment, noting that firm buybacks and personal insider purchases have responded to the selloff. Hirsch argues that abandoning private allocations leaves investors overconcentrated in a narrowing public market dominated by mega-cap technology firms. Because high-growth private businesses now enjoy abundant private financing, they face minimal pressure to conduct initial public offerings, ensuring that substantial early equity compounding occurs well before companies reach public exchanges. While Hamilton Lane maintains that high manager selectivity and portfolio construction protect against private market hazards, an open question remains whether retail semi-liquid products can withstand sustained macroeconomic stress and redemption demands without broader regulatory interventions or investor disillusionment.

Hamilton Lane 首席执行官 Erik Hirsch 指出，私募股权与公开市场高度相关，其低波动表象主要源自季度报告的时间滞后；尽管面临退出放缓和散户充当机构“接盘流动性”的质疑，他认为资产类别扩张是中型市场融资演进的必然结果，核心挑战在于管理人之间巨大的业绩离散度。 收益非相关性幻象与管理人业绩离散 (3:10) 主持人 Michael Batnick 与 Erik Hirsch 一致认为，私募股权本质上就是商业股权，声称其与公开市场不相关的说法并不符合事实。私募资产看似具备平滑波动的特征，核心原因在于有限合伙人（LP）收到的财务报告通常比季度末滞后至少整整一个季度。一旦在数学模型中消除这一汇报时间差，私募股权与公开市场的走势高度一致。业内过度强化“私募”标签和兜售虚假的相关性脱钩，反而损害了行业的透明度。 与此同时，随着传统杠杆收购的流动性折价红利消失，私募市场的收益离散度仍处于历史高位。不同于公开市场可以通过指数化投资获取平均收益，收购投资的成败严重依赖通用合伙人（GP）投后的运营整合与资本配置能力。面对市场上宣称位列前四分之一的数千家基金管理人，专业机构的核心职能已转变为在每年约 1500 只募资基金中进行严苛筛选，以规避由于执行力差距导致的极端业绩分化。 散户财富准入与机构“接盘流动性”辨析 (12:20) 针对市场质疑资产管理机构在机构配置饱和、并购退出活动同比下降约 25% 的背景下转向财富管理渠道，将个人投资者作为“接盘流动性”的观点，Hirsch 承认 2021 年低利率环境下行业存在过度支付和尽调松懈，导致 2021 至 2023 年份基金的质量差距急剧拉大。过去三至五年，受标普 500 指数重仓板块差异影响，私募市场整体表现确实落后于公开基准，净资产价值（NAV）分配比例亦明显下滑。 然而，Hirsch 否定了散户化即系统性接盘的推论。他指出，面向个人财富的扩张在结构上仅集中于约 20 家具备分销基础设施的巨型资管公司，且主要依托新型常青基金（Evergreen）及半流动性工具，并非将封闭式旧资产打包倾倒。行业内数千家中小型 GP 完全无法进入财富渠道，仍受制于严苛的机构再投资审查。此外，主流统计通常只覆盖传统封闭式基金，忽略了快速扩张的常青基金与机构间活跃交易的二级市场份额。 私人信贷结构演进与顾问不对称风险 (18:41) 私人信贷的兴起源于 2008 年金融危机后监管收紧导致区域性银行退出中型企业贷款，留下了持续存在的资本缺口。2022 年传统固收资产因加息下挫约 15% 时，私人信贷凭借浮动利率特性提供了 10% 至 12% 的收益率，引发大量资金涌入与管理机构激增。尽管部分激进承销或聚焦过热软件领域的下层基金面临资产质量压力，但 Hirsch 强调直投业务违约率仍稳定在 2% 左右，并未出现大规模强制实物支付（PIK）或破产潮，其追踪的优质组合中 99% 的资产运行平稳。 近期以 Apollo 旗下规模达 260 亿美元的 ADS BDC 触碰 5% 赎回上限为代表的赎回压力，反映了财富渠道的“不成熟”。Batnick 指出，理财顾问面临严峻的职业风险不对称：坚持持有面临潜在亏损与解约风险，而顺应客户恐慌赎回现金再配置则无实质下行代价。相比之下，机构投资者展现出逆向配置特征，在舆论风波中仍注资支持信贷工具。市场上甚至出现一边赎回优先债权、一边认购次级股权的非理性错配行为。 二级市场折价机制与长期配置逻辑 (31:16) 针对二级市场交易中引发争议的“首日加价”现象，Hirsch 解释这属于 GAAP 公允价值会计准则的强制合规要求。在被动 LP 份额转让中，底层资产估值由 GP 统一裁定，即使卖家出于流动性需求或自身折价预期以 65 或 87 美分出售，买家在入账时依法必须按 GP 标定的账面净值（如 100 美分）登记。同时，由于私募估值存在约 90 天的滞后，从定价基准到交易交割历时数月，入账期间的企业基本面增长与现金分配进一步加深了外界对估值跃升的误解。 在公开市场大幅折价另类资管机构股票的背景下，Hirsch 强调 Hamilton Lane 在二级市场审查中拒绝了 99% 的标的，保持着极高筛选标准。如果投资者因恐惧而彻底撤出私募领域，将被迫将资本全部暴露于高度集中在少数 AI 科技巨头的公开指数中。考虑到当前诸如 SpaceX 或 Anthropic 等高增长企业更长时间停留在私有阶段，普通投资者若完全放弃私募资产配置，将错失早期阶段的核心价值创造；通过区块链代币化等技术创新，投资门槛已进一步降至 500 美元。 尽管公开市场因担忧资金外流而大幅折价另类资管机构股票，Hirsch 坚信随着财富渠道认知成熟与透明数据补充，私募市场将持续分化而非崩溃；但对普通投资者而言，如何在缺乏公开强制披露与信息劣势的环境中辨别底层资产质量并承受流动性限制，仍是长期实践中的核心挑战。

## Background 本期视频由 YouTube 频道 The Compound 于 2026 年 9 月 28 日发布。节目中主持人迈克尔·巴特尼克（Michael Batnick）与汉密尔顿巷（Hamilton Lane）首席执行官埃里克·赫什（Erik Hirsch）展开深度对话，探讨了私募市场的爆发式增长、私募股权与公募市场的实际相关性、私人信贷的崛起与赎回潮争议，以及二级市场（S 基金）和投资组合构建在当前复杂宏观环境下的核心地位。 ## TL;DR 埃里克·赫什澄清了私募股权“零相关性”的营销神话，指出纸面低波动实由财报滞后所致，且资本涌入并未消除头部与尾部管理人之间的巨大业绩分化。针对近期关于私人信贷坏账隐患及散户恐慌赎回（如阿波罗 BDC 触发门限）的舆论，赫什拿出违约率与现金付息数据予以反驳，强调赎回潮源于散户与投顾在面对惊悚媒体头条时的不成熟心态，而非底层资产崩溃。同时，他详尽解释了二级市场“首日溢价记账”背后严谨的会计准则与交易时滞逻辑，并指出随着越来越多高成长企业选择长期留在未上市阶段，投资者若想避免过度集中于公募巨头、捕获实体经济红利，配置私募市场是不可或缺的路径。 ## Atmosphere & style 整场对话充满专业张力与求真务实的交锋感，巴特尼克以尖锐直率的发问代表市场和公众提出各种质疑，直击“割韭菜接盘”与“首日记账造假”等敏感话题。赫什的应对则冷静、通透且极具说服力，频频用“酒店翻新”、“长岛贝果店”等生动比喻打破专业壁垒，同时毫不避讳地批评部分同行的误导性宣传与媒体的标题党浮躁。两人在快节奏的辩论与坦诚交流中层层剥开另类资产的神秘面纱，既有硬核的数据拆解，又充斥着理性批判与行业反思的沉浸感。 ## Bulletin - [00:16](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qs2hjGtHqgs&t=16s) Hamilton Lane 的受托资产管理及咨询总规模已突破 1 万亿美元，其全权委托管理的资产规模（AUM）达到约 1460 亿美元，角色定位于连接大型机构、散户与数千家细分基金管理人的外包解决方案提供商。 - [26:23](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qs2hjGtHqgs&t=1583s) 针对近期关于散户踩踏与流动性冻结的争议，Erik Hirsch 指出私募信贷的违约率仍稳定在 2% 左右的历史健康水平，赎回潮的核心症结在于财富顾问面临不对称的解雇风险，而非底层资产实质性暴雷。 - [31:16](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qs2hjGtHqgs&t=1876s) 针对二级市场“首日溢价记账（Day-One Markups）”的质疑，Hirsch 澄清这是遵循会计准则的必然操作，买方作为被动 LP 必须按原 GP 出具的公允价值记账，折价主要是由卖家自身急需流动性导致的。 - [42:10](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qs2hjGtHqgs&t=2530s) 公募市场对另类资管机构出现严重情绪化超跌，但越来越多优质企业（如 SpaceX、Anthropic）选择长期保持私有化，迫使寻求全经济敞口的投资者必须涉足私募市场以捕获早期价值创造。 ## Key takeaways - [01:14](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qs2hjGtHqgs&t=74s) Hamilton Lane 并非黑石或 KKR 等单纯的底层资产管理人，而是提供资产配置、尽调筛选和投后监督的万亿级外包解决方案平台。 - [03:10](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qs2hjGtHqgs&t=190s) 私募股权与公募市场“零相关”纯属报表时间滞后（Quarter Lag）制造的假象，若在模型上消除时滞，二者本质上呈现高度相关性。 - [05:30](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qs2hjGtHqgs&t=330s) 海量资本的涌入并未如专家预期般抹平超额收益，私募股权与私募信贷内部的业绩离散度（Dispersion）依然处于历史高位，投后运营赋能远比初始买入估值关键。 - [09:46](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qs2hjGtHqgs&t=586s) 顶级私募管理人往往仅需联络少数大机构便能迅速超额认购，造成全市场 90% 的普通投资者不仅拿不到优质项目份额，也无法穿透获取底层真实数据。 - [14:44](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qs2hjGtHqgs&t=884s) 散户资金的进入并非单纯充当机构套牢资产的接盘侠，而是常青基金（Evergreen）等产品架构创新的结果；全行业成千上万家机构中仅有约 20 家头部巨头具备搭建零售渠道的资格。 - [17:21](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qs2hjGtHqgs&t=1041s) 统计数据中传统封闭式基金募资的大跌存在盲区，它遗漏了正迅猛增长的常青基金及提供流动性的 S 基金（Secondaries）交易。 - [18:41](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qs2hjGtHqgs&t=1121s) 2022 年加息周期中，公开债市下挫约 15%，私募信贷凭借浮动利率特性避免了久期风险并交出 10% 至 12% 的亮眼回报，成为引爆资本流入的催化剂。 - [18:41](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qs2hjGtHqgs&t=1121s) 私募信贷崛起的结构性根源在于区域性银行的放贷意愿与能力萎缩，实体企业在不稀释股权的诉求下，倒逼更专业且规模化的直接借贷机构补位。 - [28:10](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qs2hjGtHqgs&t=1690s) 散户投资者与年轻投顾缺乏穿越完整周期的经验，面对媒体负面报道极易恐慌挤兑；而投顾若坚持持有面临被客户解雇的不对称风险，因而倾向于顺水推舟赎回退场。 - [31:16](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qs2hjGtHqgs&t=1876s) 在二级市场（Secondaries）中，折价买入后按原净值（NAV）记账并非机构虚构数据，而是会计法规强制要求买方被动遵循原 GP 报告的账面公允价值。 - [34:10](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qs2hjGtHqgs&t=2050s) 二级市场全行业交易平均折价率维持在 13% 左右（约以 87 美分成交），在考虑换取即时现金与免受长达十年资金锁定的代价后，属于健康合理的市场常态。 - [37:47](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qs2hjGtHqgs&t=2267s) Hamilton Lane 在 S 基金投资中保持低于 1% 的实际出资入选率，通过严苛的底层债务穿透与组合构建，实现了旗下半流动性产品在行业逆风中无一家设立赎回门限（gate）。 - [40:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qs2hjGtHqgs&t=2400s) 公募市场将另类资管机构股价腰斩与底层业绩提成激增相割裂，过于情绪化地放大了逆风因素，Hamilton Lane 管理层因此持续在二级市场以真金白银回购增持。 - [42:10](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qs2hjGtHqgs&t=2530s) 大量高估值企业能够凭借充裕的一级市场资金无限期推迟 IPO，公募市场散户已难以捕获企业早期的爆发性增值，私募市场成为投资全经济图景的必经通道。 - [44:22](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qs2hjGtHqgs&t=2662s) Hamilton Lane 正通过主流券商直销及区块链代币化（Tokenization）技术降低投资门槛，部分基金起投额已大幅下放至 500 美元。 ## Detailed walkthrough ### [00:16](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qs2hjGtHqgs&t=16s) 汉密尔顿巷的崛起与万亿级资产版图 节目开场，主持人迈克尔·巴特尼克（Michael Batnick）热情迎来了汉密尔顿巷（Hamilton Lane）首席执行官埃里克·赫什（Erik Hirsch）。两人开门见山地调出了一张展示汉密尔顿巷资产管理规模（AUM）的历史图表。赫什在大约两年半前出任 CEO，但他早在 20 世纪 90 年代末就加入了公司，称得上是见证行业变迁的元老。图表数据可以追溯至 2005 年，当时公司的资产管理规模仅有约 60 亿美元，而到了二十年后的今天，这一数字已经膨胀至约 1460 亿美元；若算上其提供投资咨询服务的资产规模（AUA），总量更是突破了 1 万亿美元大关。 面对如此惊人的复合增长，巴特尼克直接向赫什抛出了核心疑问：对于那些还不熟悉汉密尔顿巷的受众来说，这家巨型上市另类资产管理机构究竟是做什么的？你们在这个庞大生态中扮演着怎样的角色？ - **管理规模演变**：资产管理规模（AUM）从 2005 年的 60 亿美元增长至约 1460 亿美元。 - **咨询资产体量**：受托咨询资产（AUA）规模合计已超过 1 万亿美元。 - **掌舵者背景**：埃里克·赫什于 90 年代末加入 Hamilton Lane，约两年半前正式出任首席执行官。 ### [01:14](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qs2hjGtHqgs&t=74s) 并非黑石或 KKR：私募市场解决方案提供商的角色定位 赫什用一句幽默的自问“你是谁？你为什么在这里？”拉开了对公司定位的阐释。他明确指出，汉密尔顿巷与黑石（Blackstone）或 KKR 等传统基金管理人截然不同。他们本质上是“私募市场解决方案提供商”，是将资本配置到黑石、KKR 以及成千上万家类似机构背后的推手。其客户群体极为广泛，涵盖养老基金、捐赠基金、主权财富基金、保险公司、银行等各类大型机构投资者，同时也包括不断涌入的个人投资者。赫什直言，市场对另类投资存在一个巨大误区——许多人以为可以“自己单干”，但实际上私募市场的水极深。寻找准入渠道、筛选顶尖管理人、构建科学组合，这些即便对于顶尖的大型机构而言也极难完全内部化，绝大多数机构都会选择外包，而汉密尔顿巷正是承接这一重任的外包解决方案专家。 谈及私募市场的广度，赫什指出另一个普遍的认知偏差：当大多数人聊起私募市场时，脱口而出的往往只是那十来家声名显赫的巨头，随后便哑口无言。但现实是，全球活跃着数千家绝大多数人闻所未闻的基金管理人。这些机构各自掌管着 10 亿至 20 亿美元的资金，深耕不同的国家地区与垂类细分赛道，默默吸收着机构资本。要想在这片浩瀚而复杂的海洋中航行，单靠个人或普通团队的认知远远不够。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 汉密尔顿巷在私募市场中的资本传导架构 accDescr: 展示投资者资本通过汉密尔顿巷筛选后流向数千家底层基金管理人的流程 subgraph Investors["多元投资者群体"] LP1["机构投资者\n(养老金/主权基金/保险/捐赠基金)"] LP2["个人与高净值投资者"] end subgraph Solutions["专业解决方案平台"] HL["Hamilton Lane\n(资产配置/尽调筛选/组合构建)"] end subgraph Managers["全球底层基金池 (数千家)"] M1["大型知名PE/信贷机构\n(Blackstone, KKR 等)"] M2["垂直细分与区域性中型管理人\n(规模10-20亿美元，数千家)"] end LP1 --> HL LP2 --> HL HL --> M1 HL --> M2 ``` ### [03:10](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qs2hjGtHqgs&t=190s) 破除“零相关”神话：财报时间滞后与真实的公开市场联动 巴特尼克坦言自己绝非私募市场的反对者，但对业内充斥的一些营销说辞颇有微词。他强调，私募股权归根结底依然是“股权”，底层投资的是企业的股东权益，其长期收益不可能与公开股票市场完全脱钩。赫什对此深表赞同，并直言不讳地指出，行业里那些宣称私募股权与公开市场“不相关”的言论完全是无稽之谈，“这应该让你抓狂，因为那根本不是真的，它与公开市场完全高度相关”。 赫什解释道，之所以纸面上看起来相关性很低甚至完全不相关，纯粹是因为繁琐的“财报时间滞后”（Reporting Time Lag）。作为私募股权基金的有限合伙人（LP），投资者收到的季度报表往往要比当期季度末至少滞后整整一个季度。正是这种纸面上的时间错配，人为制造了不相关的假象；一旦在数学模型上消除这一时滞，两者的相关性便展露无遗。巴特尼克回应称，作为理性投资者，他完全能够理解非流动性溢价，甚至喜欢这种“不需要每天盯盘估值”的心理舒适感，因为公开市场常常会出现与企业基本面完全无关的恐慌性暴跌。但他要求行业保持坦诚，“别撒谎说它不相关，这仅仅是一种不同的估值记账机制而已”。赫什叹道，私募行业常常是自己最大的敌人，把“私密”做到了极端反而缺乏有效沟通，劣质代言人的误导性宣传最终导致了公众的深层误解。 ### [05:30](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qs2hjGtHqgs&t=330s) 耶鲁模式之后的演变：收益分化为何未被资本洪流稀释 话题随后转向了私募资产的平民化历程与行业演进。巴特尼克回顾道，从宏观历史来看，该行业在大卫·斯文森（David Swensen）开创“耶鲁模式”后迎来了爆发式增长。20 世纪 80 年代贝恩资本（Bain Capital）等先锋崛起时，未上市公司因流动性匮乏而以极其诱人的折扣折价出售，叠加当时的杠杆杠杆工具，投资简直就像“在木桶里捞鱼”一样容易。但那种遍地捡钱的黄金时代早已成为数十年过去的陈迹。巴特尼克指出，不可能所有人都永远享有超额 Alpha，私募资产的价值更可能在于提供差异化的回报现金流，例如标普 500 指数覆盖不到的基建领域，投资人不必被“不投私募就只能在美股七巨头（Mag 7）暴跌时等死”的恐慌叙事所绑架。 赫什表示认同，并补充了一个令许多分析家始料未及的现象：过去多年来，常有专家断言随着私募资产规模急剧膨胀、涌入的资金成倍增长，行业收益率必然会大幅压缩收窄。然而现实却是，收益的离散度（Dispersion）从上到下依然极其宽泛，顶尖管理人与平庸管理者之间的差距在今天与二十年前一样巨大。无论是风投（VC）、传统私募股权（PE），甚至是大家普遍认为偏稳健的私人信贷（Private Credit），其内部的业绩分化程度都令人咋舌。 - **历史拐点**：20 世纪 80 年代依靠极端估值折扣和杠杆倍数的粗放红利期已彻底终结数十年。 - **专家预言落空**：海量资本涌入并未抹平收益差距，私募各领域的头尾业绩分化程度依然处于历史高位。 - **全谱系分化**：不仅在早期风险投资中分化剧烈，在成长期私募股权及私人信贷领域同样呈现极大的业绩鸿沟。 ### [07:38](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qs2hjGtHqgs&t=458s) 操盘的艺术与“1500 挑 6”的残酷筛选 为了形象地解释为什么业绩分化如此剧烈，赫什打了一个生动的比方：假设把一个由上百名行业人士聚集的会议酒店买下来，在接下来的上百年里，给在座的每个人轮流担任 CEO 并享有全权改造酒店的自由。有人会选择把预算砸在餐饮升级上，有人会全力装修客房，客人的用脚投票最终会导致截然不同的经营结局。赫什强调，在私募股权领域，买入价格往往并不是决定最终成败的最核心因素，真正的分水岭在于“接手资产后你做了什么”。这完全取决于企业管理层以及背后提供战略赋能的私募机构的专业操盘能力，正是这种强烈的“人为干预因素”与决策差异，导致了极为悬殊的收益分布。 巴特尼克随即调侃道：“我可从来没收到过哪怕一封自称‘我们收益处于垫底四分之一（Bottom Quartile）’的推介邮件。”赫什笑着表示，如今谁要是进办公室推销时还拿着所谓的“前 25% 分位数（Top Quartile）”说事，简直令人发笑——因为行业基数太大，所谓的前四分之一意味着你不过是“两三千家最好机构中的一员”而已，毫无指导意义。对普通 LP 而言，要获得充分的分散化，每年配置的基金数量通常远低于 10 只；毕竟一只基金底下就包含 10 到 30 家以上的投资组合公司，配置 8 只基金就足以穿透覆盖数百家实体企业。赫什总结道，这正是汉密尔顿巷存在的核心价值所在：当市场上一年有大约 1500 只基金正在募资，而客户的组合配额仅仅需要 6 只时，团队必须完成极其繁重深度的尽调与过滤工作，才能完成这场“从 1500 到 6”的残酷选拔。 ### [09:46](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qs2hjGtHqgs&t=586s) 私募尽职调查的双重困境：获取渠道与信息不对称 Michael Batnick 指出，在私募资产的讨论中，人们往往把焦点放在产品架构、业绩表现和流动性上，而投资组合管理（Portfolio Management）与底层资产尽职调查反而常常被当成事后补充。即便是业内人士，如果坐在一线分析师或投资经理身后，面对底层组合里的 30 家公司、复杂的股债资本结构以及错综复杂的外部共同投资者，普通人甚至机构投顾（RIA）也根本无从判断交易的优劣。因此，投资者配置 Hamilton Lane 这类机构的产品，本质上是将沉重的尽调工作全权外包。 Erik Hirsch 赞同这一说法，并坦言 Hamilton Lane 拥有全权委托（discretionary）管理权限。他进一步拆解了私募投资中最核心的两大难题： 第一是**渠道获取（Access）问题**。市场上没有任何规定要求私募股权基金募资时必须向所有人开放。真正顶尖的管理人希望尽可能压缩募资时间，将精力聚焦在资产配置与投后管理上；由于他们业绩优异，只需联络少数几家大机构便能迅速完成超额认购，这意味着全球 90% 的投资者根本无缘得见这些头部项目。 第二是**尽职调查（Diligence）的信息不对称**。私募领域并不存在“全市场披露相同信息”的法规。Hamilton Lane 凭借庞大的体量与行业话语权，能够全面调取底层 30 家公司的明细、穿透资本与债务结构，并与外部投资者直接对话；而资金规模较小的分散投资者不仅拿不到入场券，即便获准参与，也绝不可能拿到同等深度的数据资料。Hirsch 直截了当地指出：“这是一个高度不对称的行业，它本身就是不公平的。” ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 私募市场双重准入门槛示意图 accDescr: 展示顶尖私募机构在获取渠道与尽职调查深度上的不对称优势 subgraph Access["第一道门槛：获取渠道 (Access)"] TopGP["顶尖管理人 (Top GP)"] --> FastRaise["闪电募资 / 极简窗口"] FastRaise --> LargeLP["大型机构 (如 Hamilton Lane) 锁定份额"] FastRaise -.->|"90% 市场被隔绝在外"| SmallLP["中小投资者 / RIA"] end subgraph Diligence["第二道门槛：尽调深度 (Diligence)"] DataRoom["底层资产数据 (30+ 家组合公司)"] LargeLP -->|"话语权驱动"| FullAccess["完整资本结构 / 债务穿透 / 深度交叉核验"] SmallLP -.->|"资金体量不足"| ShallowAccess["受限资料 / 浅层披露"] end ``` --- ### [12:20](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qs2hjGtHqgs&t=740s) 万亿规模背后的职能与“散户接盘论”的质疑 Batnick 补充提及，Hamilton Lane 不仅管理着 1,460 亿美元的全权委托资产（AUM），其非全权委托（non-discretionary）资产监管规模更是推动公司总资产规模突破了 1 万亿美元大关。Hirsch 解释称，在这部分万亿级资产中，部分业务是为客户提供策略咨询，但绝大部分工作是充当“中后台管家”——当客户自主做出投资决策后，Hamilton Lane 负责后续的资产监控、投后核验与运营管理。 随后，Batnick 抛出了当下市场最尖锐的怀疑论调： - 过去依托“耶鲁模式”（Yale Model）的成功，机构投资者的私募资产配置比例普遍飙升至 30% 甚至更高。 - 2021 年前后，公开市场与私募市场陷入集体“狂欢饮酒”（Drunken party），滋生了大量不严谨的粗糙投资与虚高估值。 - 五年过去，预期的回报迟迟未能兑现，项目退出（Exits）同比下滑约 25%，资金回流的飞轮明显失速。 - 借由 PitchBook 等机构的统计图表可见，无论是实物资产、私募信贷还是私募股权，全球封闭式基金的募资规模全线收缩。 由此，市场上产生了一种充满讽刺意味的舆论：在机构投资者配额过载、流动性冻结、拿不回本金的关口，行业开始大肆宣扬“私募民主化”，把此前配置比例几乎为零的个人散户和财富管理资金迎进大门。媒体与质疑者普遍质疑：机构吃饱被套后，是否正在把缺乏流动性的大包袱甩给普通的“散户父母”（Mom and Dad）来接盘？ --- ### [14:44](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qs2hjGtHqgs&t=884s) 疫情期的狂欢、业绩大分化与个人投资者的真相 Hirsch 坦承，这种说法并非单纯的阴谋论或冷嘲热讽，其前半部分描述在事实上完全准确。疫情期间确实充斥着狂热情绪与不良行为： - **粗糙的承销标准**：大量资金在居家远程办公期间被极其草率地募集和投放。 - **激进的估值买入**：管理人以透支未来的超高估值争抢资产，尽调流程漏洞百出。 - **回报明显滞后**：过去三到五年中，私募市场的整体表现明显落后于公开市场（尽管标普 500 指数受到科技巨头的异常驱动，二者行业权重结构截然不同）。 - **流动性极度贫乏**：分配给投资者的现金流占净资产价值（NAV）的比例大幅萎缩，底层资产的平均持有周期显著拉长。 然而，Hirsch 强调不能一概而论，关键在于**业绩极差（Dispersion）**。2021、2022 与 2023 年份基金（Vintages）中，头部清醒的管理人与盲目跟风者的表现差距被急剧拉大。 关于“散户沦为机构接盘侠”的观点，Hirsch 提出了反驳。他认为个人投资者的兴起并非机构把烂资产倒手给零售资金，而是源于制度创新： - **监管松绑与结构演进**：专门适配个人投资者的基金产品架构（如常青基金、半流动性工具）日渐成熟。 - **准入门槛极高**：在全行业成千上万家私募基金管理人中，真正具备品牌、渠道和合规能力去吸纳个人财富资金的机构凤毛麟角，全行业“大概只有 20 家头部巨头”有能力搭建可行的零售资管业务。 - **数千家腰部机构无法迁移**：绝大多数传统私募机构根本无法涉足财富管理业务，它们的生死存亡完全维系在自身历史业绩以及机构 LP 的审视之下，无法靠散户资金脱困。 --- ### [17:21](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qs2hjGtHqgs&t=1041s) 被低估的常青基金与正在崛起的 S 基金市场 针对 Batnick 展示的募资断崖式下跌图表，Hirsch 指出该图表存在一定的统计盲区。该数据仅统计了传统的**封闭式基金（Closed-end funds）**，因而漏掉了两股正在重塑行业版图的增量资金： 1. **常青基金（Evergreen funds）**：不设固定投资期限、允许定期申赎的半流动性工具，正在承接海量的财富管理资金，但这部分并未被纳入传统封闭式募资的柱状图中。 2. **S 基金（Secondaries，私募二级市场）**：在传统退出渠道受阻的背景下，投资者之间通过买卖既有 LP 份额、重组资产包来获取流动性的交易呈现爆炸式增长，这一规模庞大的次级交易同样游离在该统计口径之外。 Batnick 赞同这一补充，并示意即将把话题引向 2022 年市场剧变对整个私募信贷与流动性生态带来的深远拐点。 ### [18:41](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qs2hjGtHqgs&t=1121s) 私募信贷的“完美风暴”与兴起根源 2022 年对私募信贷（Private Credit）而言，堪称一场“良性的完美风暴”。当时美联储激进加息，债券市场遭遇重创（传统 60/40 组合中的固收部分亏损约 15%），并拖累了股票市场；然而私募信贷凭借其浮动利率（floating-rate）特征脱颖而出，既避开了久期风险（duration risk），又没有遭遇预想中的信贷违约周期。结果，私募信贷在 2022 年向投资者交出了 10% 至 12% 的亮眼回报。这一惊艳表现彻底点燃了资金引信，引发海量资本迅猛涌入该领域。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 私募信贷兴起的宏观与结构性驱动 accDescr: 展示传统银行借贷收缩与 2022 年宏观环境如何共同催生私募信贷爆发 subgraph STRUCT["结构性根源（20年演变）"] A["实体企业需要扩张资本<br/>（如长岛贝果店）"] B["不愿稀释股权，寻求贷款"] C["区域银行放贷能力与意愿大幅退潮"] A --> B --> C end subgraph MACRO["2022 宏观催化剂"] D["公开债市大跌 ~15%"] E["浮动利率特性避免久期冲击"] F["提供 10%–12% 稳健收益且无违约潮"] D --> E --> F end C --> G["私募信贷机构补位<br/>提供规模化、专业化直接借贷"] F --> G G --> H["资本爆炸式涌入，行业引信彻底点燃"] ``` Erik Hirsch 进一步补充了私募信贷诞生的根本原因。20 年前，如果两个人在中西部经营一家木材厂，或者像来自长岛的 Michael Batnick 提议的经营一家“贝果店（bagel business）”，当他们想开分店却不想稀释股权时，标准做法是穿上最好的西装、打好领带，走进存放公司支票账户的当地区域性银行（regional bank），找熟识的信贷经理商谈贷款。这是美国实体经济经典的融资飞轮——地方银行服务熟悉的企业主。然而，随着监管环境和银行业格局巨变，区域性银行的放贷能力与放贷意愿急剧萎缩。企业的融资需求并未消失，必须有新的资金渠道予以替代，规模更大、更机构化、更专业的私募信贷便顺理成章地承接了传统区域银行的角色，为实体企业提供生命线。 ### [21:06](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qs2hjGtHqgs&t=1266s) 机构激增、衍生分裂与业绩分化 资本的大量涌入迅速重塑了私募信贷的行业生态。大型私募信贷机构的员工看到遍地黄金，纷飞自立门户：高级员工（如“Bob 和 Sally”）离开老东家创办自己的基金，他们招进来的年轻人（如“Tommy”）不久后也出去单干，导致市场上私募信贷管理机构呈指数级增长。Erik Hirsch 重点指出，许多新晋管理人非常年轻，“他们从没经历过真正的经济下行周期”。 面对市场上充斥的“信贷资产到处都是蟑螂（隐患）”的唱衰言论，Erik Hirsch 直言已近两年过去，宏观数据并没有印证这种悲观预测。但这绝不意味着行业高枕无忧： - **坏账隐患确实存在**：部分机构的投资组合确实暴露出承销标准过宽、过度集中于特定风险资产（如特定软件行业）或缺乏多元化的问题。 - **巨大的离散度（Dispersion）**：与私募股权类似，私募信贷经理之间的质量天差地别。在查阅大量机构账目（包括 Hamilton Lane 自身）时，99% 的资产都在健康履约；但几年后回头看，市场必将呈现巨大的分化——优质机构业绩卓越，而草率经营的机构则遭遇惨败，不能一概而论。 ### [22:58](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qs2hjGtHqgs&t=1378s) 媒体炒作、BREIT 先例与 Apollo BDC 赎回潮 Michael Batnick 联想起黑石旗下非交易型房地产信托基金 BREIT（Blackstone Real Estate Income Trust）经历的挤兑风波：当时商业地产（特别是写字楼）确实面临巨大压力，加州公务员退休基金（CalPERS）等机构进行了注资，尽管舆论哗然，但四五年过去后 BREIT 依然稳固运营，并未归零。同理，私募信贷绝不可能在 5 年后沦为一个“被淘汰的过气笑话”，其体量只会比今天更庞大。 Erik Hirsch 批评了当前金融媒体的浮躁风气。过去一年有关私募信贷风险的新闻层出不穷，但几乎都缺乏硬性数据支撑，充斥着“某匿名消息人士称更大危机即将到来”的臆测与点击率诱饵。而 Hamilton Lane 选择不断公开详实图表，就是为了消除这种无端揣测。 然而，持续不断的负面头条确实吓坏了个体投资者。就在当天早晨，彭博社报道称规模高达 260 亿美元的 Apollo 债务解决方案商业发展公司（Apollo Debt Solutions BDC）再次触发季度 5% 的赎回上限（quarterly redemption gate）——本季度申请赎回的份额比例达 14.7%（虽然较上季度的 16.8% 有所下降，但依然严重超限）。 针对这场赎回风波，Michael Batnick 提出追问：责任究竟在谁？ - 是私募信贷机构盲目承销、“随处撒钱”？ - 是批发销售人员（wholesalers）未能充分教育财务顾问？ - 是财富顾问（advisers）将“10% 至 12% 票息且零波动”作为无脑推销的卖点？ - 还是底层投资者本身缺乏认知？既然账面净值（NAV marks）尚未下跌，普通投资者出于避险心理选择以 1 美元全额套现离场，本身也是完全理性的自保行为。 ### [26:23](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qs2hjGtHqgs&t=1583s) 资产基本面现状与散户市场的“不成熟” Erik Hirsch 强调，下定论为时尚早，必须用冷峻的数据来拆解这一现象： | 考察维度 | 实际数据与市场表现 | 对应行业现状 | |:--- |:--- |:--- | | **违约率（Default Rates）** | 长期徘徊在约 2% 的历史健康水平 | 整体资产负债表依然强韧，未见系统性破产潮 | | **实物支付（PIK）比例** | 绝大多数贷款维持现金付息（Cash Pay），转向 PIK 的极少 | 上市私募信贷机构财报显示资产质量依然健康 | | **资产估值（Marks）** | 账面净值并未出现大幅度下调 | 底层资产正在按计划产生现金流 | | **散户准入门槛与历史** | 个人投资者接触私募信贷基金仅有两三年时间 | 市场处于极度初期的“幼稚阶段（immaturity）” | Erik Hirsch 分析道，之所以会出现基本面未崩却遭遇巨额赎回的脱节现象，核心在于整个散户信贷生态的“不成熟（immaturity）”。个人投资者进入该领域才短短几年，缺乏跨周期的认知积累；许多财富顾问也是新手上路，刚开始研读和理解这类另类信贷产品。当这群经验尚浅的顾问与投资者，突然面对铺天盖地的惊悚新闻头条时，恐慌性踩踏赎回便在所难免。 ### [28:10](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qs2hjGtHqgs&t=1690s) 私募信贷的恐慌与投顾的不对称风险 在媒体负面头条铺天盖地时，散户投资者往往极易被吓退。Michael Batnick 指出，散户的心态通常是“反正我没必要非待在里面不可”，如果去参加鸡尾酒会，被朋友问起“你也投了私募信贷（Private Credit）吗”，他们更希望云淡风轻地回答“没我份，我很聪明，早就退出了”，而不是面对读过 50 篇看空报道的朋友去费力辩解。Erik Hirsch 表示完全理解这种心态，人们往往一感到紧张就选择“拿钱回家”。 然而，这背后的核心症结还在于**理财顾问（Financial Advisor）所面临的不对称风险**。对投顾而言，如果他们顶住客户的质疑坚持既定策略，万一最终出现亏损，就会直接面临被客户解雇的结局；相反，如果投顾直接把本金赎回还给客户，即便最初推荐的产品表现不尽如人意，投顾显得不够英明，但也绝不会因此丢掉客户。更甚者，投顾将资金赎回转投其他资产后，若恰好躲过波折，甚至还能被客户奉为“力挽狂澜的英雄”。因此，投顾在机制上缺乏坚持到底的动力。 Erik Hirsch 认为，随着市场沉淀更多数据、经历更多周期，这种恐慌性赎回未来会越来越少——就像当今成熟的投顾在公开市场暴跌时会劝告客户“保持冷静，现在处于底部，绝不能割肉抛售”一样。对比之下，机构投资者（如养老基金）的行为截然不同，因为首席投资官（CIO）必须为自身投资决策负责。在铺天盖地的看空报道中，机构资金仍在持续涌入私募信贷。例如 Hamilton Lane 在负面新闻最凶猛的阶段推出了一款半流动性信贷产品，其基石投资人正是某大型养老基金。该机构看透了底层数据，并未被舆论左右。Hirsch 讽刺地指出，市场上荒唐的一幕在于：“投资者和顾问们一边急着从信贷基金中赎回跑路，另一边却忙着签署认购文件买入私募股权（PE）基金——如果排在优先受偿位置的信贷都出了问题，位于下层的股权又怎么可能幸免？” --- ### [31:16](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qs2hjGtHqgs&t=1876s) 二级市场机制与“首日溢价记账”争议 随着私募市场退出流动性枯竭，二级市场（Secondaries）交易极度活跃。针对市场上许多 LP 愿意以净值（NAV）折价出售资产（如以 89 或 91 美分卖出账面值 1 美元的资产），Michael 认为这是合理的流动性折价；但他直接抛出了业内争议的核心——**首日记账溢价（Day-One Markups）**。媒体近期频频质疑 Hamilton Lane 等机构通过折价买入资产后，在账面上立刻按原净值（1 美元）记账，借此虚增报表表现，Michael 质疑如果以 65 美分的极端深度折价购入，“那它绝不可能值 1 美元”。 Erik Hirsch 坚决反驳了这一质疑，澄清这并非 Hamilton Lane 的独创手法，而是严格遵循会计准则（Accounting Regulations）的行业通用做法： 1. **被动 LP 份额的属性**：在二级份额交易中，买方只是承接原 LP（LP X）的被动份额成为新 LP（LP Y）。 2. **GP 估值权的独立性**：底层基金资产的估值公允价值完全由基金管理人（GP）决定并报告。GP 既不参与底层份额的转让交易，也不会因 LP 之间打了折就调整资产估值。 3. **强制会计记账标准**：作为被动的入场 LP，会计准则明确要求必须按照 GP 官方出具的账面估值记账。如果以 65 美分买入 GP 记账 1 美元的资产，买方只能在账上反映为 1 美元。 4. **折价成交的现实原因**：出资人以 65 美分卖出并不代表资产变质，往往是因为原投资人自身急需流动性而无法等待长达 10 年的清算期，或是原投资人不再信任该 GP，自认资产仅值 50 美分，能以 65 美分脱手便已心满意足。 ```mermaid flowchart LR accTitle: 二级市场LP份额转让流程 accDescr: 展示原LP与新买方在GP估值体系下进行被动份额交易的折价记账逻辑 subgraph FundManagement["基金管理端"] GP["基金管理人 (GP)"] NAV["官方资产估值<br/>(例如: 1.00 美元)"] GP --> NAV end subgraph SecondaryTransaction["二级市场交易端"] LPX["原LP (LP X)<br/>急需流动性/不愿再等10年"] LPY["买方/新LP (LP Y)<br/>例如 Hamilton Lane"] LPX --"以折价转让 (如 0.65 美元)"--> LPY end NAV -.->|"会计准则要求<br/>按GP估值入账"| LPY ``` --- ### [34:10](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qs2hjGtHqgs&t=2050s) 市场竞争、折价演变与时间滞后造成的错觉 针对“海量资金涌入二级市场是否会压缩超额收益（Alpha）并抹平折价”的提问，Erik Hirsch 回顾了历史变迁。Hamilton Lane 早在 2000 年就完成了其第一笔二级交易（当时 Hirsch 还是负责建模的年轻分析师），过去 25 年间，二级市场从买家寥寥、折价幅度巨大的小众领域，发展成为今天买方林立、投资中介完善的高流动性竞争市场。目前全市场的**平均交易折价率大约维持在 13% 左右**（即约以 87 美分成交），在考虑换取即时现金与免受长达十年资金锁定的代价后，这一折价水平非常合理。 此外，导致“首日溢价记账”显得极为扎眼的另一个关键盲区在于**私募估值报告的时间滞后性（Quarter Lag）与交易周期的交织**： - **基准日与报告滞后**：以机构 CIO 决定调仓并出售 6 只不再追加投资的基金为例，若在 9 月中旬商谈定价，双方能够依据的最新官方季度报告其实是 3 月底（一季度）的净值。 - **交易交割的时间拉长**：双方基于 3 月底的资产净值谈妥价格（例如打折到 92 美分），但完成交割往往需要耗时数月。 - **入账估值的时间错配**：当交易在次年 1 月正式进入 Hamilton Lane 账面时，会计上采用的已是最新更新的 9 月底（三季度）估值。在这几个月期间底层资产本身的价值变动，进一步放大了买入价格与最终入账数字之间的落差。 Michael Batnick 坦言，这套机制在习惯了每日实时报价的公开市场投资者看来，“听起来既不公平又像在造假”。Hirsch 对此完全表示理解，坦承从外部视角看确实如此；但只有置身于私募市场的实际操作中，才会明白这纯粹是面对繁琐监管、会计准则以及非流动性资产流转时自然形成的复杂现实。 ### [37:47](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qs2hjGtHqgs&t=2267s) 逆势吸金与严苛的投资筛选法则 Michael Batnick 指出，对于普通百万美元级净值的投资者而言，某些复杂策略可能超出了其认知与实际需求。随后他将话题转向 Hamilton Lane 的最新财报：在截至 6 月的季度中，公司旗下所有策略录得近 6.4 亿美元的净流入，半流动性产品（semi-liquids）的管理规模突破 190 亿美元。更令人侧目的是，在许多同行（尤其是私募信贷基金）面临赎回潮并启动流动性门限（gate）的背景下，Hamilton Lane 不仅未对任何基金设置申赎门槛，旗下 12 支基金中更有 10 支实现了净流入。面对当前散户舆论压力与赎回负面消息缠身的机构，Batnick 询问 Hamilton Lane 在挑选合作方与资产标的时，是否会刻意避开这些面临散户赎回风波的公司。 Erik Hirsch 回应称，投资的核心在于“投资组合构建”（portfolio construction）。他直言，私募市场通常热衷于吹捧明星投资经理或单个惊艳的交易项目，却极少深入探讨组合配置逻辑；但只要来到 Hamilton Lane，组合构建就会占据全天交流的重心。此外，公司保持着极高的筛选标准与纪律性： - **不到 1% 的入选率**：在规模庞大的 S 基金（secondaries）业务中，Hamilton Lane 每年经手海量项目，但最终实际出资投资的标的不到所见项目总量的 1%，对 99% 的项目果断说“不”。 - **全方位穿透审查**：在整个投资平台中，团队会极其审慎地穿透评估哪些细分行业将承受宏观压力、标的公司基本面究竟如何、背后提供贷款的债权人是谁，以及股权持有方是谁。 - **强化投资者教育**：针对“私募市场是否适合百万级普通投资者”的疑问，Hirsch 认为关键在于弥补投教鸿沟。行业必须提供透明的数据支持与公开讨论，提升公众的认知水平，由投资者自行评估是否匹配，而非因知识匮乏而全盘否定。 ### [40:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qs2hjGtHqgs&t=2400s) 公募市场的过度反应与另类资管的估值错配 Batnick 抛出了一个尖锐的估值悖论：很多投资人此前奉行“与其当 LP 交管理费，不如买入 GP 的股票做股东”的逻辑，但近期公开股票市场对整个另类资管板块毫不留情，Hamilton Lane 也未能幸免。数据显示，Hamilton Lane 在 2026 财年迄今的业绩提成（incentive fees）高达 1.75 亿美元，较 2022 财年的 5400 万美元实现爆发式增长，利润率与管理费收入均“一路向右上方”狂飙；然而，其公开交易的股票价格却几乎腰斩。Batnick 尖锐发问：公募股票市场到底漏算了什么？他们是在质疑增长不可持续、散户资金将全面撤出，还是直接否定了另类资产的 Alpha？ ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 公募市场与私募资产价值创造的割裂机制 accDescr: 展示公募市场情绪驱动的短期极端波动与私募股权在底层企业早期价值捕获上的根本差异 subgraph PublicMarket["公募市场表现与逻辑"] A["短期情绪主导<br/>（过度放大负面叙事）"] --> B["资管机构业绩飙升<br/>但股价遭到拦腰斩断"] B --> C["高集中度、高相关性<br/>（高度绑定超大市值 AI 巨头）"] end subgraph PrivateReality["私募底层现实与应对"] D["企业长周期留存一级市场<br/>（无需被迫 IPO 融资）"] --> E["早期捕获超级增值<br/>（如 SpaceX、Anthropic）"] E --> F["管理层回购股票<br/>Erik Hirsch 个人真金白银增持"] end A -.->|"错误定价与脱节"| D B -.->|"倒逼估值修复"| F ``` Hirsch 直言这种市场定价令人恼火，但公募市场向来情绪化严重、走极端。公募市场常标榜自身“永远正确”，却往往能在底层公司基本面毫无变化的情况下，因单一交易日的情绪恐慌而断崖式下挫（如软件板块的集体抛售与随后的报复性反弹）。作为回应，Hamilton Lane 不仅在公司层面积极回购股票，Hirsch 本人也在二级市场真金白银持续增持。 ### [42:10](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qs2hjGtHqgs&t=2530s) “把话说完整”：为什么投资者无法彻底脱离一级市场？ 针对市场上唱衰“个人投资者正撤离私募市场”的论调，Hirsch 提出了犀利的“完成半句话”反驳法： > “我对那些人说：‘把话说完整。’他们看着我问：‘什么意思？’我说：‘你漏掉了后半句。完整的句子是：他们正在撤离私募市场，并且要把每一分积蓄都放回公募市场——放进一个相关性极高、完全被超大市值 AI 概念股驱动的市场里。’因为如果不投私募，他们还能怎么办？把钱塞进床垫里吗？” Hirsch 强调，公募市场绝不可能成为解决资产配置的唯一答案： - **上市公司供给缩水**：公开上市公司的总数并未增加，越来越多优秀企业主动选择不上市；如今一级市场资金极其充沛，企业完全有能力无限期保持私有状态。 - **价值创造节点前移**：以 SpaceX 或 Anthropic 为例，超额收益并非由公募投资者赚取，而早已被早期私募投资者锁定。当公募散户能买到这些标的时，其估值往往已从几亿美元膨胀至几千亿甚至上万亿美元，公募买家已沦为后期的接盘者。 - **全经济敞口与分散化诉求**：若投资者希望真正捕捉全经济图景的增长红利并实现资产分散，涉足私募市场是不可逆转的必由之路。 媒体当前的质疑与唱衰部分事出有因，但优质头部机构的长期增长轨迹从未停滞，公募市场终将纠偏并重新定价这部分资产。 ### [44:22](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qs2hjGtHqgs&t=2662s) 渠道生态变革与超低门槛 Tokenization 探索 在对谈结尾，Batnick 询问普通投资者目前购买 Hamilton Lane 基金的准入路径：究竟只能通过注册投资顾问（RIA）等传统中间机构，还是能直接通过 Charles Schwab、Fidelity 等主流券商平台自主下单。 Hirsch 确认，个人投资者完全可以直接通过这些主流经纪平台自主认购。更前沿的是，Hamilton Lane 已经对其多支基金进行了代币化（Tokenization）改造： - **大幅降低起投门槛**：通过区块链代币化技术，部分基金的最低投资门槛被下放至令人咋舌的 500 美元。 - **开创性接入场景**：代币化为原本门槛极高的一级市场资产提供了全新的通道形态与流动性可能。 Batnick 随即约定下次将围绕代币化专题展开深度探讨，并感谢 Hirsch 到场厘清市场视听。 ## Notable quotes > [01:14](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qs2hjGtHqgs&t=74s) 你是谁？你为什么在这里？ — Erik Hirsch > [03:10](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qs2hjGtHqgs&t=190s) 这应该让你抓狂，因为那根本不是真的，它与公开市场完全高度相关 — Erik Hirsch > [03:10](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qs2hjGtHqgs&t=190s) 别撒谎说它不相关，这仅仅是一种不同的估值记账机制而已 — Michael Batnick > [07:38](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qs2hjGtHqgs&t=458s) 我可从来没收到过哪怕一封自称‘我们收益处于垫底四分之一（Bottom Quartile）’的推介邮件。 — Michael Batnick > [09:46](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qs2hjGtHqgs&t=586s) 这是一个高度不对称的行业，它本身就是不公平的。 — Erik Hirsch > [21:06](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qs2hjGtHqgs&t=1266s) 他们从没经历过真正的经济下行周期 — Erik Hirsch > [28:10](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qs2hjGtHqgs&t=1690s) 投资者和顾问们一边急着从信贷基金中赎回跑路，另一边却忙着签署认购文件买入私募股权（PE）基金——如果排在优先受偿位置的信贷都出了问题，位于下层的股权又怎么可能幸免？ — Erik Hirsch > [31:16](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qs2hjGtHqgs&t=1876s) 那它绝不可能值 1 美元 — Michael Batnick > [42:10](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qs2hjGtHqgs&t=2530s) 我对那些人说：‘把话说完整。’他们看着我问：‘什么意思？’我说：‘你漏掉了后半句。完整的句子是：他们正在撤离私募市场，并且要把每一分积蓄都放回公募市场——放进一个相关性极高、完全被超大市值 AI 概念股驱动的市场里。’因为如果不投私募，他们还能怎么办？把钱塞进床垫里吗？ — Erik Hirsch ## Mentioned Hamilton Lane, Erik Hirsch, Michael Batnick, Blackstone, KKR, David Swensen, Bain Capital, PitchBook, BREIT, CalPERS, Apollo Global Management, Apollo Debt Solutions BDC, Charles Schwab, Fidelity, SpaceX, Anthropic ## Video description On this episode of Live From the Compound, Michael Batnick is joined by Eric Hirsch, CEO of Hamilton Lane, to discuss the state of private markets, why private equity is more correlated with public markets than investors may think, and what separates the best private market managers from the rest. They get into the rise of private credit, concerns around defaults and investor redemptions, the growing role of individual investors, why manager selection and portfolio construction matter so much, the booming secondaries market and controversy around day-one markups, plus why Hirsch believes private markets will continue to play a bigger role in investor portfolios. 👕 Check out The Compound shop: https://www.idontshop.com ►00:00 - Start ►00:28 - Hamilton Lane ►03:10 - Private Equity ►05:31 - The Democratization of The Industry ►09:50 - Portfolio Management and Oversight ►18:26 - The Perfect Storm for Private Credit ►23:08 - BREIT ►31:16 - Secondaries ►37:57 - Looking Ahead ►39:56 - The View of Public Markets 🎙️Listen to our podcasts: TCAF: https://podcasts.thecompoundnews.com/show/TCAF/ Animal Spirits: https://podcasts.thecompoundnews.com/show/animalspirits/ Ask The Compound: https://podcasts.thecompoundnews.com/show/ATC/ The Compound Newsletter: https://www.thecompoundnews.com/subscribe Linkedin: https://www.linkedin.com/company/the-compound-media/ Instagram: https://instagram.com/thecompoundnews Twitter: https://twitter.com/thecompoundnews Tik Tok: https://www.tiktok.com/@thecompoundnews Investing involves the risk of loss. This podcast is for informational purposes only and should not be or regarded as personalized investment advice or relied upon for investment decisions. Josh Brown and Michael Batnick are employees of Ritholtz Wealth Management and may maintain positions in the securities discussed in this video. All opinions expressed by them are solely their own opinion and do not reflect the opinion of Ritholtz Wealth Management. See our disclosures here: https://ritholtzwealth.com/podcast-youtube-disclosures/ The Compound Media, Incorporated, an affiliate of Ritholtz Wealth Management, receives payment from various entities for advertisements in affiliated podcasts, blogs and emails. Inclusion of such advertisements does not constitute or imply endorsement, sponsorship or recommendation thereof, or any affiliation therewith, by the Content Creator or by Ritholtz Wealth Management or any of its employees. For additional advertisement disclaimers see here https://ritholtzwealth.com/advertising-disclaimers. #thecompound #investing #stockmarket #stocks [Source](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qs2hjGtHqgs)

[1:14] Erik Hirsch: 你是谁？你为什么在这里？ [3:10] Erik Hirsch: 这应该让你抓狂，因为那根本不是真的，它与公开市场完全高度相关 [3:10] Michael Batnick: 别撒谎说它不相关，这仅仅是一种不同的估值记账机制而已 [7:38] Michael Batnick: 我可从来没收到过哪怕一封自称‘我们收益处于垫底四分之一（Bottom Quartile）’的推介邮件。 [9:46] Erik Hirsch: 这是一个高度不对称的行业，它本身就是不公平的。 [21:06] Erik Hirsch: 他们从没经历过真正的经济下行周期 [28:10] Erik Hirsch: 投资者和顾问们一边急着从信贷基金中赎回跑路，另一边却忙着签署认购文件买入私募股权（PE）基金——如果排在优先受偿位置的信贷都出了问题，位于下层的股权又怎么可能幸免？ [31:16] Michael Batnick: 那它绝不可能值 1 美元 [42:10] Erik Hirsch: 我对那些人说：‘把话说完整。’他们看着我问：‘什么意思？’我说：‘你漏掉了后半句。完整的句子是：他们正在撤离私募市场，并且要把每一分积蓄都放回公募市场——放进一个相关性极高、完全被超大市值 AI 概念股驱动的市场里。’因为如果不投私募，他们还能怎么办？把钱塞进床垫里吗？

[3:10] Erik Hirsch: It's totally correlated to the public markets. The reason why it can look less correlated or is even sometimes uncorrelated is the reporting time lag... if you're a limited partner in that fund, you're getting your statements at least a quarter lag after the prior quarter end. Well, that time lag, that's what again on a piece of paper creates the notion of, well, this doesn't look super correlated. [5:31] Erik Hirsch: shooting fish in a barrel [9:46] Erik Hirsch: 90% of the world may never see the opportunity. [9:46] Erik Hirsch: This is a very asymmetrical industry. It's not fair. [14:39] Erik Hirsch: There's no migration for them over to the other side of the wall. [18:41] Michael Batnick: perfect storm in a good way for private credit [21:06] Michael Batnick: cockroaches everywhere [23:08] Erik Hirsch: If you look at the last year of coverage about the industry and look at how many of those stories actually had hard data, specific examples versus a lot of speculation and 'one off-the-record source noted that there's probably a lot of problems coming'... it's juicy. It's fun to click on. It's interesting headlines, but let's bring data to the discussion. [28:10] Michael Batnick: Nope, not me [28:10] Michael Batnick: I understand your concerns, but I'm sticking to my guns [35:36] Erik Hirsch: unfair and fake [40:00] Michael Batnick: why be the LP when you could be the GP just buy the equity [40:00] Erik Hirsch: finish the sentence

[0:16] Welcome to Live from the Compound. My [0:18] name is Michael Batnik and I am very [0:19] excited. I've been looking forward to [0:20] this for a long time. I'm joined today [0:22] by Eric Hirs. Eric is the CEO of [0:24] Hamilton Lane. Eric, welcome. Happy to [0:27] be here. All right. So, I want to start [0:30] with uh a chart of Hamilton Lane's AUM. [0:33] You took over as CEO when? [0:35] >> So, about two and a half years ago. [0:36] >> Okay. But you've been with the company [0:37] for a while. [0:38] >> Long time. Joined there in the late '9s. [0:40] >> Oh, wow. Okay. So, we have this going [0:43] back to 2005. We took this from you. Uh [0:45] six $6 billion in assets under [0:48] management. To say nothing of assets [0:49] under advisory, which puts you guys over [0:51] a trillion dollars. But from 2005, [0:53] you've grown from $6 billion in assets [0:56] to around $146 billion 20 years later. [1:00] Pretty incredible run. Obviously, you [1:02] guys have done something right. So, for [1:04] the audience who doesn't know Hamilton [1:06] Lane, a gigantic publicly traded [1:08] alternative asset manager, who are you? [1:11] What are you guys all about? [1:12] >> Who are you and why are you here? [1:14] >> Hamilton Lane is what we think of as a [1:16] private market solutions provider. So we [1:19] are not a fund manager like a Blackstone [1:22] or a KKR. We're really a provider of [1:25] capital into firms like that and many [1:27] many many others. And so our client base [1:30] is really any investor who's looking to [1:32] access the private markets. So think of [1:34] that as lots of institutional investors, [1:37] pension funds, endowments, sovereign [1:39] wealth funds, insurance companies, [1:40] banks, etc. And then lots of individual [1:43] investors. And one of the misnomers [1:46] around this asset class is that most [1:48] people assume, well, I can just do it [1:50] myself. Doing the private markets is [1:53] really hard. Finding access, identifying [1:55] managers, building portfolios is frankly [1:57] not something even very large [1:59] institutional investors do themselves. [2:02] They mostly outsource. And so we are [2:04] effectively that outsource provider. [2:06] >> I totally agree that this area of the [2:09] market, you said it's an asset class. [2:12] Um, yeah, sure. There's a million [2:14] different subasset classes. I mean, even [2:16] private credit has a million different [2:17] layers under that hood. [2:18] >> That's another misunderstanding is that [2:21] I meet most people and we talk about the [2:23] private markets and I say, "Name me as [2:26] many private market fund managers as you [2:28] can." And the kind of the common names [2:31] come spilling out very quickly. But once [2:33] we get past, you know, 10 names or 12 [2:35] names, they kind of get very quiet. And [2:38] I say to them, okay, well, we have [2:40] thousands and thousands and thousands [2:42] more to go if we're going to actually [2:44] name all the players in the market. So, [2:46] the vast majority of our market, the ma [2:48] the players in that space, no one's ever [2:50] heard of them because they're raising [2:53] primarily institutional capital, they [2:55] are managing a billion dollars or $2 [2:57] billion and there's lots of them and [2:59] they're all over the globe and they're [3:01] all operating in different local and [3:03] different geographies, different [3:05] subsectors to your point. So, it's a [3:07] huge industry and navigating that is [3:09] hard. [3:10] >> Yeah. So, I want to lead with this. I am [3:13] not anti-private markets at all. Um, I [3:16] think that there are there are some [3:17] things with the industry and some of the [3:20] things that I do have issues with which [3:21] we can get into. For example, not to [3:24] harp on this point, but private equity [3:26] to me is equity. I don't think that it's [3:28] going to be that returns are going to be [3:30] divorced from public equity returns. [3:31] It's not going to be the same exact [3:33] thing, but we're investing in the equity [3:35] of a business. That's what we're doing [3:37] here. [3:37] >> I agree. I mean, our industry when [3:39] people used to say and some people still [3:41] say incorrectly that, well, it's not [3:43] correlated to the public market. [3:44] >> That drives me nuts. It [3:46] >> it should drive you nuts because it's [3:47] not true. It's totally correlated to the [3:49] private to the public markets. reason [3:51] why it can look less correlated or is [3:54] even sometimes uncorrelated is the [3:57] reporting time lag, which is also [3:59] another frustration about our industry, [4:00] which is if you're in a private markets [4:03] fund, a private equity fund, and you're [4:05] a limited partner in that fund, you're [4:07] getting your statements at least a [4:10] quarter lag after the prior quarter end. [4:13] Well, that time lag, that's what again [4:16] on a piece of paper creates the notion [4:18] of, well, this doesn't look super [4:20] correlated. Yeah. Yeah. Because you just [4:21] timelagged it out. But when you kind of [4:24] erase that and and mathematically you [4:26] can, they're correlated. Equity markets, [4:29] >> if we have an honest conversation about [4:30] it, as an investor, I understand um that [4:36] maybe even forget about an illquidity [4:38] premium. I love the fact that it's not [4:41] marked on a daily basis, but don't lie [4:43] to me about it. Don't tell me that it's [4:44] not correlated. It's just a different [4:46] marking system. Now, oftentimes public [4:48] markets have a freakout that has nothing [4:51] to do with the underlying fundamentals [4:53] of the business. And so, it's okay that [4:56] this um gap exists, but let's just be [4:59] honest and call it what it is. [5:00] >> I completely agree. I I mean I think [5:02] just generally our our asset class has [5:04] been its own worst enemy because we [5:07] generally don't do a great job talking [5:09] about it. We took private to sort of the [5:11] extreme and so people thought that that [5:13] was a good idea to kind of not talk [5:14] about stuff. We've been misleading [5:17] around this idea of correlation. So I [5:21] think there's been a lot of you know [5:23] sort of bad spokespeople for the [5:25] industry that have then created some of [5:28] these misunderstandings which are just [5:29] not reality. [5:30] >> Yeah. Um the democratization of this is [5:33] another thing and maybe we could talk [5:35] about it. The history of the industry in [5:38] private assets at a 10,000 foot view. It [5:41] started not started it really blew up [5:44] after David Swenson created the Yale [5:46] model. Tons of alpha Bane and others [5:49] came in in in the 80s and these private [5:52] companies were selling at a legitimately [5:55] unbelievable discount to public markets [5:59] because there was an illquidity discount [6:02] >> which the leverage factor back then [6:06] shooting fish in a barrel [6:07] >> right agree [6:08] >> that that era is long gone [6:11] >> long gone [6:12] >> it has been gone for decades [6:14] >> okay so there can't be alpha for [6:16] everyone [6:17] always. And so you could say that [6:20] private assets offer um maybe different [6:24] return streams, different so [6:26] infrastructure. Yeah, that has nothing [6:28] nothing. That is not really where the [6:30] S&P 500 makes its bread and butter. Um [6:33] so we could be honest about that without [6:35] saying if you're in the S&P 500, you're [6:37] just invested in the MAG 7 and we're all [6:39] going to die if that falls apart. [6:40] >> Agree. So, there are lots of good [6:43] reasons to be in the private markets, [6:46] but I would never recommend that a good [6:49] way to access the private markets, you [6:51] can't anyhow, would be through an index [6:53] because not surprisingly, if we're [6:55] talking about an asset class that has [6:56] thousands and thousands and thousands of [6:58] managers, you're going to have some [7:00] really amazing managers and you're going [7:01] to have some really lousy managers. And [7:03] what's been interesting is the pundits, [7:06] if you will, had sort of told us over [7:08] time, hey, as this asset class gets [7:10] bigger and more capital gets raised and [7:12] time goes by, returns are going to [7:14] compress. [7:15] >> They have to. [7:16] >> They haven't. So, they've actually [7:17] stayed really wide. The dispersion of [7:20] performance from kind of top to bottom [7:22] is basically as big today as it was 20 [7:25] years ago despite a lot more capital [7:27] coming in. [7:28] >> But dispersion where? Venture, for [7:30] example, the dispersion is huge. [7:31] >> Dispersion is massive. It's also massive [7:33] in private equity. It's also big by the [7:35] way in dispersion in private credit has [7:36] really wide dispersion. [7:38] >> That's surprising. [7:38] >> Yeah. Be because it comes down to [7:41] choice. The example I always use is [7:44] let's say that you know I'm speaking to [7:46] an audience in a room of hundred people. [7:48] I say okay we're all we're going to buy [7:50] the hotel that we're sort of in for this [7:52] event and for for the next hundred years [7:55] right each of us is going to get a [7:56] chance to be the CEO cart blanch full [7:59] control. do whatever you want to do with [8:01] that with this hotel. Try to make it as [8:03] good as possible. We're going to have [8:05] wildly different outcomes with that. [8:08] Someone's going to choose to invest in [8:09] the food. Someone's going to choose to [8:11] upgrade the rooms. And the the clientele [8:14] will tell you sort of what happens, but [8:15] the results aren't going to be the same. [8:17] And so when you look at private equity, [8:19] things like purchase price tend not to [8:21] be a huge determinant of the outcome. [8:24] It's what you do with the asset once you [8:26] own it. And that comes down to the skill [8:28] of the actual management team and the [8:30] private equity firm that's backing them. [8:33] And it's that human component to this [8:35] that causes dispersion to be very very [8:37] wide because good choices get made and [8:40] bad choices get made. [8:41] >> I've never got an email saying we're in [8:42] the bottom cile of returns. [8:44] >> No, no one has ever said that. I mean, [8:45] it's been it's it's laughable today if [8:47] someone even comes in our office and [8:49] wants to talk about quartortiling [8:50] because you sort of go, okay, you're top [8:52] quartortile, so you're what? one of the [8:54] top two or three thousand best fund [8:57] managers. The question is, how many [8:59] funds does an LP or an investor need to [9:02] do to kind of get appropriate diversity? [9:04] The answer for the Hamilton Lane [9:06] customers is that most of them are doing [9:07] far fewer than 10 funds per year. [9:10] >> I mean, I would hope so, [9:11] >> right? Because you think about each fund [9:12] is going to do 10 to 20 or 30 plus [9:14] companies inside of it. And so just [9:17] doing eight funds gives you hundreds of [9:19] companies and that's enough [9:20] diversification. So, one of the reasons [9:23] why we exist is if we're going to see, [9:25] you know, 1,500 funds this year that are [9:27] in market trying to raise capital and [9:29] we've got a customer that says, "Hey, my [9:32] portfolio only requires six, the [9:35] Hamilton Lane team needs to do a whole [9:36] lot of work to take 1,500 to six." And [9:39] that's again back to kind of why we get [9:41] to exist. You mentioned the work and the [9:44] fact that most investors and it doesn't [9:46] matter if you're an individual investor, [9:48] an RA, a big platform, an institutional [9:51] investor, it's really hard to diligence [9:53] these companies. [9:54] >> Hard the the funds, the the underlying. [9:56] So, I feel like when we're talking about [9:59] private assets, we talk a lot about the [10:01] structure. [10:01] >> Yep. [10:02] >> We talk about the the the performance. [10:04] We talk about liquidity, but I feel like [10:08] the portfolio management is actually [10:11] weirdly almost an afterthought. And [10:13] let's say I was sitting over the [10:14] shoulder of some of your analysts and [10:16] some of your portfolio managers and I'm [10:18] in the industry, but I wouldn't know [10:20] what I'm looking at. I would under [10:22] generally, but how would I know a good [10:23] deal from a bad deal? How would I be [10:25] able to diligence all 30 of the [10:27] portfolio companies in there? Would I be [10:28] able to understand the debt and equity [10:31] capital structure? Who are the outside [10:32] invest? I all of it it requires a lot of [10:34] expertise. So it's difficult to [10:36] diligence individually. So when people [10:38] are investing in the Hamilton Lane [10:40] funds, I would imagine that they're [10:41] outsourcing their diligence to you and [10:43] they're getting comfortable with your [10:44] team. [10:44] >> Correct. So we are the asset manager for [10:48] them. So we have discretion over the [10:49] assets and we're doing that work. I [10:51] would say two things. one, the the pro [10:54] the first problem, if you will, actually [10:56] starts with the access issue because [10:59] there's no rule that says, "Hey, you're [11:01] going to go raise your private equity [11:02] fund. You have to show it to everybody." [11:05] The answer is the good managers want to [11:07] do as little fundraising as possible [11:09] because that's not where they want to [11:10] spend their time. They want to spend [11:11] their time on deploying successfully and [11:13] then managing those assets. No [11:15] fundraiser wants to say to you, no, no [11:18] asset manager wants to say to you, hey, [11:19] the the the time I most enjoy about my [11:21] job is fundraising. They want to try to [11:23] compress that as much as possible. So, [11:25] if you're really excellent, you can [11:27] compress that time frame a lot because [11:30] you don't have to go to very many [11:31] sources to go get your capital, which [11:33] means these 90% of the world may never [11:37] see the opportunity. So, the access is [11:39] kind of problem number one. Problem [11:42] number two is the diligence, which is [11:44] there's no rule that says everybody has [11:47] to see the same information. That's not [11:49] a thing. And so Hamilton Lane's ability [11:52] because of our size and scale and [11:53] importance in the industry means that we [11:55] do get to see all 30 companies and we do [11:57] see the cap structure and we are able to [11:59] talk to the other investors and we are [12:01] able to look at the debt structure. this [12:03] investor over here who's deploying a [12:05] tiny amount of money a may never see it [12:08] access and b may not get the access to [12:11] the diligence material at the level that [12:13] we would say we require. So this is a [12:16] very asymmetrical industry. It's not [12:19] fair. [12:20] >> I don't want to sell you guys short. I [12:22] mentioned that you have $146 billion of [12:25] assets under management. There is a [12:26] non-discretionary piece which takes you [12:28] guys over a trillion dollars. Correct. [12:29] What does that mean? What are you doing [12:31] with those clients? So, in some cases, [12:32] we're providing them advice on those [12:34] assets, but what we're mostly doing is [12:36] we're kind of monitoring and managing [12:38] those assets. The client made the [12:40] investment decision, and we're [12:42] essentially kind of dealing with now [12:44] what happens afterwards. We're the back [12:46] office. We're the check-in. We're doing [12:48] all of that. [12:49] >> Okay. All right. Let's back up. Talk [12:50] about the industry where we are today. [12:52] The cynical view or the skeptical view [12:53] would say this. Here's the story. I [12:55] mentioned the Yale model. a lot of [12:57] excitement, so much alpha and it worked [13:00] really well for the industry and for the [13:01] investors frankly. Everybody did very [13:03] well. Um, and institutional investors on [13:07] average are 30% privates, whatever the [13:10] number is, it's well above zero, [13:12] >> well above. [13:13] >> And we got there was a period of time in [13:17] 2021ish [13:19] where both public and certainly private [13:22] markets got a little bit drunk. And I'm [13:23] not pointing fingers because we were all [13:25] involved in the same party together. And [13:26] there was a lot of sloppy behavior and a [13:28] lot of bad investments. And we're now [13:31] five years removed from that. And some [13:33] of the returns that people had hoped to [13:35] get are not showing up. And therefore, [13:37] this is a flywheel and it's not spinning [13:39] as fast as it was because um a lot of [13:42] the exits were not we're not seeing. I [13:44] think exits are down 25% year-over-year. [13:45] Whatever it is, everybody knows the [13:46] story. But Daniel, show a chart too. And [13:48] credit to you guys. This is from Oh, no. [13:49] That's not from you. Did I pull some I [13:50] pull this from pitchbook? Maybe it's [13:52] from your deck from pitchbook. So global [13:54] private markets fundraising and we're [13:56] looking at closed end funding [13:57] fundraising by broad asset classes. And [13:59] it doesn't matter if you're looking at [14:00] real assets or credit or equity. It's [14:02] down. So in comes [14:06] the wealth manager. In comes the [14:09] individual investor who is basically at [14:12] zero. And there was the story is it's [14:15] very obvious. So the cynical take would [14:16] say all right here's individual [14:17] investors and their exit liquidity. Um, [14:19] and I think the the uh media, not [14:23] wrongly, so I'm not saying like, oh, the [14:24] media, but they've harped on the story [14:26] in a big way and they're running with [14:27] it. And I don't think it's completely [14:28] unfair. So, how do you answer the [14:31] cynical version of, well, yeah, [14:33] institutional investors are full. They [14:34] can't deploy money. They're not getting [14:35] their money back. Mom and dad are are [14:38] going to hold the bag. [14:39] >> So, I don't think that's cynical. I [14:40] think the first part of that's not [14:41] cynical at all. It's factually accurate. [14:44] So, let's break it into pieces. And the [14:47] listeners weren't hearing me nodding [14:48] along as you were in agreement with you [14:50] as you were talking. [14:54] Drunken bad behavior coming out of COVID [14:55] and during COVID, high prices paid, a [14:58] lot of euphoria, a lot of questionable [15:00] underwriting. [15:02] Money was very fluid. There was lots of [15:05] it. Fundraising was happening very [15:07] quickly. People were doing all of that [15:09] remotely. Questionable diligence. So, [15:12] all of that happened. All that's true. [15:14] That's not to say everybody did that [15:17] because again I go back to my dispersion [15:19] comment. The dispersion that we're [15:21] seeing for those vintage years which is [15:22] kind of how we as the industry think [15:24] about it. So the difference between the [15:26] managers in 2021 the best to worst and [15:28] 2022 best to worse 2023 best to worse [15:32] really wide gapping because the behavior [15:34] wasn't uniform. And so you had people [15:36] who were sober and they weren't at the [15:38] party and they were actually making [15:40] really good choices. So really wide [15:42] performance. But what is true is if we [15:44] take the industry as a whole, a for the [15:47] last 3 to 5 years it's been lagging the [15:49] public markets. Now we can I think we [15:51] can agree the public markets have been [15:53] on fire. [15:53] >> Yeah, I wouldn't I wouldn't fault you [15:54] guys for lagging. [15:55] >> We we can debate rational or irrational [15:57] and if you look at the industry waitings [15:59] between kind of what's in the S&P 500 [16:01] and what's in the private markets, the [16:02] industry waitings are really different. [16:04] So that's not shocking, but it is true [16:05] that they've been lagging. It's also [16:07] completely true factually, not [16:09] cynically, factually, that distributions [16:11] are way down. And so I think about [16:13] distributions as kind of total liquidity [16:15] provided as a percentage of sort of the [16:17] industry's net asset value. That's a way [16:19] to kind of normalize for size and it's [16:22] down. It's been down. And so the other [16:25] piece is again not cynical factual [16:27] holding periods are going up. So all of [16:31] that is absolutely true. I think that's [16:34] uncorrelated to the idea of well now the [16:36] retail investor is is entering because [16:39] the idea is not simply people are trying [16:41] to sell assets out of the institutional [16:43] bucket and sell them into the individual [16:45] bucket. I think the rise of the of the [16:48] individual investor into the asset class [16:51] I think has to do with more about some [16:53] changing structures some regulation [16:55] change the invention of some different [16:57] fund structures that kind of create [16:59] vehicles that work for them. But there's [17:01] no question that that is helping to kind [17:05] of offset some of the fundraising [17:07] pressure that has occurred. But the [17:11] number of fund managers in the private [17:12] markets who are participating in any [17:14] way, shape or form in with the [17:16] individual investor is like teeny teeny [17:19] teeny teeny teeny tiny. [17:21] >> What do you mean by that? [17:21] >> 20 firms. 20 firms that have viable [17:24] franchises that are actually raising [17:26] capital. [17:27] >> But they're the biggest firms. [17:28] >> They are the biggest firms. We But we go [17:30] back to there's thousands and thousands [17:31] and thousands of firms. None of those [17:33] people are participating in this at all [17:35] >> and they're probably happy they didn't. [17:36] None of them. [17:37] >> Well, they're going to live and die with [17:38] the how the institutional experience [17:39] goes. I mean, that that is their market [17:41] there. There's no migration for them [17:43] >> over to the other side of the wall. [17:45] >> Yeah. They can't do it. [17:46] >> They're in they're institutional funds [17:47] only. Period. End of story. There's no [17:49] changing that. So, their track record, [17:51] their ability to survive is going to be [17:53] completely dictated on how their returns [17:55] are, how the institutional investor sort [17:57] of sees them. The fundraising chart you [18:00] showed is a little misleading. So you [18:03] said it correctly that that is closed [18:05] end fundraising, but that's it. Like [18:08] period. That's [18:08] >> So it doesn't show the evergreen part of [18:09] it. [18:10] >> It doesn't show the evergreen part. What [18:11] it also doesn't show is as as you know [18:14] because you've talked about it there [18:15] there's a rise of our secondary world [18:18] has been rising. So people trading [18:20] funds, buying other LP stakes, that's [18:22] sort of our secondary world. [18:24] >> So we we'll definitely get there. Can I [18:25] just say one thing? [18:26] >> So that's that's not captured here [18:27] either, [18:27] >> right? So, sorry to cut you off, but one [18:29] other piece of the story that I think is [18:31] critical, critical, critical is 2022. [18:35] I also want to make sure that I get to [18:38] ask you how you view the the investing [18:41] alongside the companies that are going [18:43] to retail versus just the institution. I [18:44] want to make sure we get to that. Um but [18:46] okay, 2022 was the perfect storm in a [18:50] good way for private credit because [18:54] bonds got smoked the 60 and it brought [18:57] down stocks with it and you had this [19:00] thing that was actually negatively [19:03] correlated. You had the floating rate [19:04] aspect of private credit. Amazing, [19:07] right? So you didn't get hit on the [19:08] duration and miraculously there wasn't [19:11] really a credit cycle. And so investors [19:14] in 2022 in private credit got 10 to 12% [19:17] whatever it was okay while bonds were [19:19] down 15%. And then the the the fuse was [19:24] lit and the money came pouring in very [19:27] very fast. [19:29] Agree. I'm going to throw in a few more [19:31] ands. [19:31] >> Go ahead. [19:33] >> Why does private credit exist? Because [19:35] if we went back 20 years ago and you and [19:38] I owned a uh a lumber business in uh in [19:41] the Midwest, [19:42] >> let's call bagel business. I'm from Long [19:43] Island. [19:44] >> Great. Let's do that. And we want to go [19:46] out and and and make some sort of we [19:47] want to expand. We want to open. We got [19:49] to go we got to go get some capital to [19:51] do that. We don't want to go like give [19:53] up our equity because we like our bagel [19:54] company. And so what we would have [19:56] typically done is you and I would have [19:57] put on our, you know, best looking suits [19:59] and ties and we would have marched down [20:00] to the regional bank where we, by the [20:02] way, keep our checking account for our [20:04] for our bagel business. And we would [20:06] have talked to our guy there and said, [20:07] "Hey, we need a loan." That was a big [20:10] provider of where, you know, private [20:12] businesses got financed. It's the [20:14] classic story of that, you know, that [20:15] local bank that, you know, they know all [20:18] the business owners in that town and [20:20] they're kind of providing capital to [20:21] them. Well, that went away. the regional [20:25] banks and their ability to lend and [20:27] their desire to lend has gone away [20:29] dramatically. And so the capital need [20:31] from the companies didn't go away. So [20:34] something needed to replace it. And so [20:36] in comes private credit effectively [20:39] taking the place in a more uh scaled [20:42] maybe more professional in some cases [20:44] lending to private companies in lie of [20:47] what the regional banks were doing. So [20:49] that's that's sort of the first part of [20:50] the equation [20:51] >> and that's not bad. [20:52] >> Uh none of that's bad. I mean that [20:54] that's sort of what makes our economy [20:56] flywheel work. It's like you want people [20:58] to be entrepreneurs and you want us to [20:59] expand our bagel business and you want [21:01] all those things to happen. So at this [21:03] point there's nothing wrong with that. [21:06] >> Now we go to your point which is kind of [21:07] what I'll call the middle of the story. [21:09] So fuse is lit etc etc etc. A lot of [21:12] capital comes coming in. Well, what [21:14] happens is the number of private credit [21:17] firms [21:18] also grows exponentially because Bob and [21:23] Sally who were working for this big [21:25] large private credit firm are like [21:27] there's a lot of money to be had out [21:28] here. We're going to start our own. So [21:30] they spin out and they go start their [21:32] own private credit shop. And then the [21:34] person that they hired, you know, Tommy [21:35] in their shop also spins out and he [21:37] starts his own private credit shop. So [21:39] all of a sudden you have a whole bunch [21:41] of managers kind of getting spinouts and [21:44] kind of creating lots of lots of other [21:46] private credit firms. We should put in [21:48] parentheses here. Parenthesis. A whole [21:51] lot of these people had never been [21:52] operating in a down cycle because [21:54] they're pretty young. And so that's [21:56] where we sit here today. So what I get [21:59] asked about the whole private credit. So [22:02] we had the whole there's cockroaches [22:03] everywhere. Well, we haven't really seen [22:05] the data bear that out yet. [22:06] >> That was almost two years ago. [22:07] >> Yeah. We're waiting. I'm still looking. [22:10] Now, it's not to say there aren't [22:11] problems, because I will tell you, we [22:13] can see it. There are absolutely private [22:15] credit portfolios that have problems. [22:18] >> Too risky, not diversified enough [22:21] software, maybe. [22:21] >> Yep. Questionable lending standards. But [22:23] again, this is back to our dispersion [22:25] comment. I got plenty of private credit [22:28] fund managers, so I'm looking through [22:29] their books, including our own, where I [22:30] go, 99% of the stuff is performing. I'm [22:33] not seeing any cockroaches. Things are [22:35] fine. So, I think this is becoming a [22:38] space where it's going to be really hard [22:39] to paint with an overly broad brush [22:41] because I think what fast forward 5 [22:43] years, you and I are going to be back [22:45] sitting here hopefully and we're going [22:46] to be talking about, wow, private credit [22:50] had this really big gapping of great [22:53] examples of it working and really [22:55] terrible examples of it not working. [22:58] >> When this happened, I understand why [23:01] everybody from pundits to the media [23:04] last. It's a very juicy juicy story. [23:06] >> Oh, sure. [23:07] >> Right. Like it it's it's a great story. [23:10] I was reminded of what happened with [23:13] Beit. [23:13] >> Okay. [23:14] >> When they needed uh not a rescue, but I [23:17] think it was Kalpers that threw in a big [23:19] infusion of capital. And there was [23:21] legitimately [23:22] massive problems in real estate, [23:26] particularly the office space. Nobody [23:27] would deny it. And we're four or five [23:30] years removed from that. They're still [23:31] around. They didn't they didn't go to [23:33] zero [23:34] >> and doing well [23:34] >> and doing fine. So with what little I [23:38] understand about the private credit [23:40] industry, I don't believe that this is [23:42] like going to be I don't think that in 5 [23:44] years we're going to say, "Holy cow, [23:46] could you do you guys remember private [23:47] credit? That was cute." Or whatever. [23:48] That was ridiculous. It's not I think [23:50] it's going to be a lot bigger than it is [23:51] today. [23:52] >> It absolutely will be. But this is where [23:54] again I I I will join you in sort of not [23:57] saying like the media. The problem is is [24:00] that data around you know this industry [24:03] is hard to come by still. That's [24:06] unfortunate. You can see we put out a [24:08] lot of information because we think it's [24:09] healthy. I'd rather you have the chart [24:12] than trying to sort of guess or [24:13] speculate. But if you look at what's [24:16] take the last sort of year of of sort of [24:18] coverage about the industry and look at [24:21] how many of those stories actually had [24:25] hard data, specific examples versus a [24:30] lot of speculation and one off thereord [24:32] source noted that there's probably a lot [24:34] of problems coming. It it's just we've [24:36] we've become very speculative around [24:38] what problems might because I agree with [24:40] you. It's juicy. It's fun to click on. [24:42] It's interesting headlines, but I kind [24:45] of go back to like let's bring data to [24:47] the discussion and then let's talk about [24:49] this. [24:49] >> You know that it's okay for now and I'm [24:52] not saying that there's not smoke or [24:53] that there won't be problems, but if [24:54] there was any inklings of a problem, it [24:56] would be headline after headline after [24:58] headline. And unfortunately, that [25:01] spooked a lot of individual investors [25:03] because we're still seeing outflows from [25:05] a lot of private credit funds. Apollo [25:06] this morning, Apollo debt solutions BDC [25:08] has about $26 billion. That's huge. told [25:11] investors on Tuesday. This is from [25:12] Bloomberg, that it would again cap [25:14] withdrawals at 5% of outstanding shares [25:15] after 14.7% [25:17] sought to pull their cash down from [25:19] 16.8% last quarter, but still. So, I [25:21] have a question for you. Who's [25:22] responsible for this? Is it, and it's [25:24] not one person's fault, um, is it the [25:27] private credit companies just getting so [25:30] much money and just spraying it around? [25:33] Maybe I'm using that ter, you know, [25:34] being a little aggressive with that [25:35] term, spraying, but sloppy underwriting [25:37] standards because the money's coming in, [25:38] it's got to be deployed. Is it the fault [25:40] of their wholesalers not educating the [25:42] adviserss? Is it the fault of the [25:44] adviser? Because the easiest thing in [25:45] the world in the world to sell is 10 to [25:48] 12% coupons with no volatility. Who [25:50] doesn't want that? Is it the investor's [25:53] fault for not not to point fingers at [25:55] the end investor, but for not really [25:57] understanding what they're getting into [25:58] because they're outsourcing their [25:59] diligence to the adviser. It's the [26:00] adviser ultimately that the buck stops [26:01] there. But now the investors are pulling [26:04] out which might be rational because [26:07] we'll get to this. the marks the marks [26:09] aren't even down really. And so a [26:11] rational investor might think, well, if [26:14] there's smoke coming and if there will [26:16] be problems and I can get a dollar for a [26:18] dollar, why the hell would I stick [26:19] around? That's rational behavior. So [26:22] unpack all of that. [26:23] >> So I think I think the the honest answer [26:25] right now is it's too early to tell. And [26:27] let's let's break it down. [26:31] There are despite all the headlines, [26:34] there's not enough data today to say to [26:38] you that we're going to see huge [26:40] performance declines across that [26:42] segment. In fact, the data right now [26:45] indicates that we're not seeing [26:46] bankruptcies rising materially. Default [26:48] rates are basically sitting around 2%. [26:50] And so that sort of is showing you a [26:53] pretty healthy book. Also, a lot of the [26:55] managers, certainly those that are big [26:56] private credit that are publicly traded, [26:59] have been very vocal on earnings calls [27:01] about quality of the portfolio. How much [27:03] is sitting in cash pay? How much is [27:05] actually flipped over to pick? Not that [27:07] much. And so today, [27:11] they're saying, "Hey, the marks are fine [27:14] because I'm marking and the portfolio is [27:16] performing, but you're still seeing huge [27:18] withdrawals. So, let's start with the [27:20] with the withdrawal part first. Who's to [27:22] blame for that? I think what you have is [27:27] this industry is pretty nent. Think [27:29] about how long you've had a chance for [27:31] individual investors to invest in [27:34] private credit funds. Couple years. [27:36] >> Yes. No, [27:36] >> it's very new. [27:37] >> And so I'll use this word, you know, [27:40] kindly. There is an immaturity around [27:44] this whole space that is not surprising. [27:47] If you've only done it for a couple [27:48] years and you don't have tons and tons [27:50] of data and your education is still in [27:53] its early phases because you just [27:55] started doing it and your advisor is [27:58] also in a similar spot where they just [28:00] started doing it too and they've just [28:01] started to kind of read about this and [28:03] they've just started to study about it. [28:05] It's not surprising with that as the [28:07] backdrop that with a kind of avalanche [28:10] of headlines that people get pretty [28:13] spooked because like I don't have to [28:16] stay in. I'd rather be at the cocktail [28:19] party when I get asked like, "Hey, are [28:21] you in private credit?" to be like, [28:22] "Nope, not me." As opposed to be like, [28:25] "Yeah, is there a problem? Have you read [28:27] that?" You know, he's like, "Have you [28:27] read these 50 articles?" I I don't [28:29] really want to answer that sort of in [28:30] that manner. I'd rather be like, "Not [28:32] me. I'm smart. I'm not there." [28:33] >> Yeah. So, I think there's a lot of that. [28:36] It's sort of like I'm just going to go [28:38] and I'm just going to go home. I don't [28:40] really want to be around this. I'm sort [28:41] of nervous. [28:42] >> Well, also the rest are asymmetric from [28:44] the advisor's point of view. [28:45] >> 100%. [28:45] >> Because on the one hand, if you think [28:47] you're giving proper advice, and I think [28:48] all advisers do, [28:49] >> sure, you could really fight and push [28:51] back and say, "Listen, I understand your [28:53] concerns. I think [28:54] >> I'm sticking I'm sticking to my guns [28:55] here, [28:56] >> okay?" And then you're wrong and it [28:58] turns out and you're fired [29:00] >> 100%. Or if you give your client a [29:01] dollar back, yeah, you might look like [29:03] sort of a jackass for recommending [29:04] something that didn't work out, but [29:05] you're fine. You're not getting fired. [29:07] >> 100%. By the way, you give them their [29:09] dollar back and depending on what you [29:11] choose to put it in, [29:11] >> well, by well, by fine. [29:13] >> You could actually look like a hero. You [29:14] could be like, well, I got out of this [29:16] and I did this, [29:16] >> right? [29:17] >> Okay. So, I I'm with you. Like I go, [29:19] yep, that none of that to me is all that [29:21] surprising. By the way, I think fast [29:23] forward a few years, this will happen [29:25] less and less. more data, more maturity, [29:28] more experience, more willingness to [29:30] kind of stick through things. Think [29:32] about the adviser through a lens of [29:35] something happens that's panicky in the [29:37] public market. You know, back in the [29:39] day, they might have been like, "Okay, [29:40] we got to get liquid." Now, those [29:42] advisers say to, "Hey, calm down. We're [29:44] not we're not pulling out right now. [29:46] We're at a trough. Like, we're going to [29:47] ride this back out. Like, stay with me [29:49] here." And the client does on the credit [29:52] side. Let's go and look at a different [29:54] data point. what's the institutional [29:56] investor doing? Because they don't have [29:59] that dynamic that CIO of that [30:01] institutional investor needs to own that [30:04] decisionm and and needs to sort of hang [30:07] with it. There you're continuing to see [30:10] institutional investors moving money [30:12] into private credit right now. So for [30:15] Hamilton Lane, we actually launched a [30:17] semi-liquid credit product right in the [30:19] eye of the uh headline hurricane that [30:23] was seated by a pension fund. [30:26] Headlines going off everywhere. Pension [30:30] fund very sophisticated, very smart, [30:32] says, "Yeah, I see the headlines. I see [30:35] also see the data and I'm not seeing a [30:37] problem. I'm in different behavior." Uh, [30:42] I find it funny that we spend so much [30:44] time worrying about private credit. [30:46] Guess what? If the credit's bad, what [30:49] does the equity look like? [30:50] >> This was the other part that again I go [30:52] back to, and again, I'm saying this [30:53] kindly because it's it's I it's it's [30:55] just it's I think it's to be expected. [30:58] You were literally seeing advisors and [31:01] investors lining up to redeem out of a [31:05] credit fund [31:08] and then filling out the subdoccks to go [31:11] into an equity fund [31:12] >> backwards. [31:13] >> It's like guys, [31:15] >> yeah, it [31:17] let's let's talk about secondaries [31:19] because um this is an area where you [31:22] guys are super active and [31:26] I [31:28] Okay, on the one hand, there have been a [31:31] there has been a lack of exit liquidity [31:34] and so a lot of LPs say, "Okay, we think [31:38] this is worth a dollar. I'll take 89 [31:40] cents. I'll take 91 cents." [31:42] >> Totally reasonable, rational behavior. [31:45] >> I think where the problem is, and [31:46] there's been reporting in the headlines, [31:48] and you guys have been named [31:48] specifically about this, are the day one [31:50] markups. [31:51] >> Yep. Now, if you buy something because [31:54] you have scale and you have [31:55] relationships and you are fortunate [31:57] enough to buy something for 91 cents [31:58] that you believe it's worth a dollar, I [32:00] could understand you marking on that [32:02] your books as a dollar. And I don't know [32:04] where the line is, but if you buy [32:05] something for 65 cents, it is not worth [32:08] a dollar. So, I disagree. So, let's talk [32:10] about it. So, one, this is not a [32:13] Hamilton Lane practice. This is an [32:15] industry practice because this is [32:17] actually following accounting regs. So [32:19] that sounds like a very defensive [32:21] statement, but it's true. But it's [32:22] absolutely true. [32:23] >> You're not the only ones. [32:24] >> Yeah. So let's talk about how the [32:26] secondary space works. One, when we're [32:28] talking about secondary trades for this [32:30] for this purpose, because this is the [32:32] day one mark issue, we're talking about [32:35] buying a passive LP position in a fund. [32:40] So lots of LPS in a fund. That's what [32:42] we're talking about. LPX wants to come [32:45] out and LPY steps in as the buyer of [32:48] that position. [32:50] So in that situation, it's the GP, it's [32:52] the fund manager who's setting the [32:54] marks. The GP is unaware of any trades [32:57] that occur between we don't need to go [32:59] to the GP. We're not there's no reason [33:01] for us to disclose that LPX is out when [33:03] we sort of file paperwork. So the GP [33:06] knows we're now the investor of record. [33:08] But this is happening separate and [33:11] apart. So the reason why the accounting [33:14] regs are what they are, which is when [33:17] you come in as a passive LP, however you [33:19] came in, the mark is whatever the GP of [33:22] that fund tells you it is. So if we buy [33:25] something at 65 that the GP has marked [33:28] at a dollar, we have to take it on our [33:31] books at a dollar. [33:32] >> But you know the GP must be a if [33:33] they're selling a dollar for 65 cents. [33:35] >> Well, the GP is not selling it, right? [33:36] The LP is selling it. So that what the [33:38] GP says is [33:41] >> Yeah. [33:43] Johnny needed liquidity and didn't want [33:45] to wait the 10 years or Johnny doesn't [33:48] have faith in me as the fund manager and [33:50] so I say it's worth a dollar. Johnny [33:53] thinks it's worth 50 and so Johnny's [33:56] like, "Well, if I can sell for 65 cents, [33:58] I'm a hero." So there's lots of examples [34:01] as to why you're going to have different [34:04] valuations occurring at the trade time. [34:07] And that's not to me that's just not [34:09] surprising. [34:10] >> Yeah, I get that part of it. But with [34:11] with so much money coming into [34:13] secondaries, it's a new asset class, [34:15] doesn't that have to doesn't that have [34:18] to squish the alpha down? You can't [34:20] possibly buy something at that steep of [34:22] a discount because somebody else would [34:23] say, "Whoa, whoa, whoa. I'll give you 66 [34:25] cents [34:25] >> 100%." So, yes. I mean, I think that [34:28] this is if you look at secondary pricing [34:31] over long periods of time. So, when did [34:33] we do our first secondary deal? Hamilton [34:36] Lane did ours in 2000. I I remember cuz [34:38] I did it. I was like the young analyst [34:40] and did the model and and that all [34:42] happened. So we've been doing these for [34:44] over 25 years. The industry by the way [34:47] back in 2000 was teeny teeny teeny tiny. [34:49] And so yes, you're absolutely right and [34:51] you could get big discounts back then [34:53] because there was very few buyers and [34:55] today one there's a lot of buyers and [34:58] two there's a lot of brokers that sort [35:01] of help sellers run efficient processes [35:04] and make it competitive. So all that's [35:06] fine. So what's like an average discount [35:09] today? [35:09] >> So today you're probably looking at [35:10] average discounts running about 13%. [35:12] >> All right. So that seems reasonable. [35:14] >> Yeah. I mean again for for if I needed [35:17] money that's like a reasonable discount. [35:19] >> Rewind 15 minutes when you and I were [35:21] talking about how long holding periods [35:22] are and how long you're waiting for [35:24] capital to get back. The idea of I can [35:27] have my cash now or I can wait another [35:30] 10 years. That's not surprising that [35:33] there's going to be a discount around [35:34] that. Here's the other piece that I [35:36] think people don't understand and it [35:38] makes this whole day one issue seem more [35:40] alarming. [35:42] So you are the CIO of a pension fund and [35:45] by the way you don't need liquidity. So [35:48] what are you doing in the secondary [35:49] space selling stuff? The answer is you [35:52] might have a view on valuations that is [35:54] might be contrary to some of your [35:55] managers or you've decided that you [35:58] don't like manager X anymore. you didn't [36:01] re-up in their new fund. And so your [36:04] team is like, "Look, if we're not [36:05] re-uping with them, we should just sell [36:07] the current positions that we have [36:09] because it's not an ongoing [36:10] relationship." So you call us as a [36:14] potential buyer. So you call Hamilton [36:15] Lane, "Hey, I've got six funds I want to [36:17] purchase." And we say, "Okay, we got to [36:19] set we got to set a date on which we're [36:21] valuing those." Well, we went, you and I [36:24] already talked about the whole quarter [36:25] lag on the reporting. If we're buying an [36:28] asset today in the middle of September, [36:31] we're basically working off of the March [36:34] valuation. Well, a lot's happened since [36:37] March, but that's the last sort of date [36:39] of record that we actually have a [36:41] quarterly statement for to say here, [36:43] this is going to be what we're pricing [36:45] off of. By the way, when are we going to [36:47] close this transaction? It's going to [36:49] take a couple months to close the [36:50] transaction. So, now we sort of priced [36:53] you on a March date. So we said, "Hey, [36:55] it's going to be 92 cents on the dollar [36:57] off of the March date. By the time it [36:59] comes on to Hamilton Lane's books, it [37:02] comes on our books in January." That's [37:04] using a September valuation. So time is [37:08] also occurring here and that's causing [37:10] valuations to move up or down. [37:12] >> This is so complicated. [37:14] >> It's super complicated, but it's also [37:15] been like we've been doing this for 25 [37:17] years and the SEC's been looking at all [37:19] this. There's kind of like I I it it [37:21] sounds it sounds ridiculous, [37:24] particularly when you're wearing a [37:25] public equity hat, which is how most of [37:28] our listeners [37:29] >> It sounds It sounds unfair and fake. [37:31] >> It it 100% sounds that way. And when you [37:33] sort of sit here and sit [37:34] shoulder-to-shoulder with us and watch [37:36] us do this, [37:37] >> I get it. [37:37] >> You sort of go, "Oh, yeah. This is [37:39] really weirdly complicated." [37:41] >> So, when I say it's super complicated, [37:43] I'm saying that through the lens of this [37:45] is not for people with a million [37:47] dollars. It's just not they they don't [37:50] they can't possibly understand the fact [37:52] forget about whether they need it or [37:54] not. It is it's just too much. So I want [37:56] to I want to transition to a question. [37:59] In the last call earnings call, you guys [38:01] reported that for the quarter ended of [38:03] June, you generated nearly $640 million [38:05] of net inflows across all strategies um [38:09] and ended the period with over $19 [38:10] billion of of AUM [38:12] >> in our semi-liquids. [38:13] >> Okay. Y [38:14] >> um importantly, [38:15] >> yes, [38:15] >> we did not enact gates on any of our [38:18] funds and we saw positive net inflow [38:21] across 10 out of 12 funds. That is very [38:23] impressive. True. And so the question [38:24] that I have for you is because a lot of [38:26] funds are experiencing outflows, [38:27] particularly private credit funds. Um [38:29] >> how do you think about deploying capital [38:32] into companies that are facing retail [38:35] investors that do have the headlines and [38:37] the negative flows? Are you staying away [38:39] from them or do you or do you does that [38:40] not factor into your thinking? Look, I [38:43] so one, we're big believers in portfolio [38:45] construction. You said it right before, [38:47] which is it's not really a thing that [38:49] gets talked about in the private [38:50] markets. We all like to talk about the [38:51] manager that we like or the deal, but [38:53] you rarely hear anybody talk about [38:55] portfolio construction. Come visit us at [38:58] Hamilton Lane and you're going to have a [39:00] huge part of your day on portfolio [39:02] construction because we think it's [39:03] essential. So the other piece is how [39:06] picky are you? So in our secondary [39:08] business, we're big player, deploy a lot [39:10] of capital. Okay, of all the deal flow [39:11] we see in a given year, how much do we [39:13] invest in? Less than 1%. So, we're [39:16] saying no to 99% of the stuff that we're [39:18] seeing. And that kind of holds true sort [39:19] of across our investment platform. So, [39:22] yes, we're really mindful about looking [39:24] at what industries are going to come [39:26] under pressure, what companies [39:27] specifically, who are the lenders into [39:30] that, who's got the equity, all of that [39:32] becomes important. Let me go back to [39:33] your comment of this isn't for the [39:35] million-dollar investor. It it may not [39:36] be. However, what we most believe in is [39:40] we need a lot more education. We need [39:43] these discussions happening where people [39:45] can listen to this and see data and then [39:48] they can decide whether that's [39:49] appropriate for them or not. But I think [39:52] right now we're still at a at an [39:54] undereducated level and that needs to [39:58] rise. All right, I know I don't have you [40:00] forever. I want to talk about how public [40:03] markets are viewing the equity of these [40:06] alternative asset managers. I have been [40:08] of the mindset of listen to paint with a [40:12] broad brush maybe there's some great [40:13] funds in here. Of course there are [40:14] obviously but why be the LP when you [40:16] could be the GP just buy the equity. Um [40:19] equity public equity markets have not [40:21] been kind to the entire asset class and [40:23] you guys are not you guys are not immune [40:25] from that. So, Daniel, try 12, you guys [40:27] are killing it on the incentive fees. [40:31] Uh, $175 [40:33] uh million in incentive fees for fiscal [40:35] year 2026 so far. I mean, it's up and to [40:37] the right where you guys were in 2022. [40:39] It was a fraction of this. It was it was [40:41] 54. I mean, nothing. And yet, your stock [40:45] has almost been cut in half. And again, [40:47] I should say you are definitely not [40:48] alone. But what are public equity [40:51] investors missing? because they do not [40:53] believe that either the story is [40:55] sustainable, that the outflows will [40:57] stop, that the alpha is there, whatever [40:58] it is, they're calling BS. They don't [41:00] like it. I [41:00] >> I agree. [41:01] >> So, I assume that you're excited as a [41:05] somebody that likes to buy something at [41:06] a at a discount. Yeah. [41:08] >> How do you think about the public marks [41:09] of your companies? [41:10] >> Um, it's funny, you know, as as the [41:12] private market person, we we we spend a [41:14] lot of time talking about why the public [41:16] markets can be very flawed because [41:18] certainly there's no shortage of talking [41:19] about why why we're flawed. Um, and I [41:22] think, you know, the public market is [41:23] not always rational. We always like to [41:25] say, "Oh, the market's never wrong. The [41:26] market's never this." You said it [41:28] earlier. It's like you can have this [41:29] sort of single day reaction where the [41:31] world like implodes. Nothing's happened [41:33] to the underlying companies. [41:34] >> Yeah. Software, [41:35] >> right? It's like, "Oh my god, it's all [41:36] they're all going away now. They're all [41:37] coming back." So, to me, the public [41:39] market kind of swings too far in [41:41] extremes. And and and [41:42] >> this has to piss you off, though. [41:44] >> Uh, sure. I mean, look, it it pisses me [41:45] off. And what we're doing is we've been [41:47] buying back stock. I've been personally [41:48] buying. So all that's publicly, you [41:50] know, public available if you took so [41:52] you you chose to look at the incentive [41:54] fees. You could have looked at anything. [41:55] You could have looked at margin, [41:57] >> management fee, earnings. It's all going [41:59] up into the right. But you're right, the [42:01] public market, quote unquote, the public [42:03] market is saying, "Yeah, I know that was [42:06] another good quarter, but it can't [42:08] continue. It can't happen." And when we [42:11] talk about sort of the the sort of [42:12] individual investor behavior and them [42:15] sort of leaving [42:16] what I sort of and I'm now getting a [42:18] little bit more aggressive about this. I [42:19] say to people, "Finish the sentence." [42:22] And they look at me and they go, "What [42:23] do you mean?" I go, "No, finish the [42:25] sentence. You left off half of the [42:26] sentence." And they're like, "Well, [42:28] what?" I go, "Well, here's the full [42:30] sentence. They're leaving the private [42:32] markets and they're going to have every [42:35] dollar of savings in the public markets [42:39] in a increasingly highly correlated [42:42] massively mega cap AIdriven that's what [42:46] they have to do because if they're not [42:47] going to do the privates then they have [42:48] to go back are they are are they going [42:50] to put it in their mattress? I mean what [42:51] are they going to do with it? And I [42:53] think once you start to get people to [42:54] sort of think about that I think a [42:56] little bit of a light goes on. The [42:58] public markets can't be the sole answer [43:00] for investors. We're not seeing a [43:03] growing number of public companies. A [43:05] lot of companies don't want to be [43:06] public. And by the way, today, no one [43:09] has to go public. You can stay private [43:11] forever. There's plenty of capital to [43:13] finance you. And investors should be [43:15] realizing that when you look at [43:17] something like SpaceX, I got asked [43:19] recently by somebody, are you bothered [43:20] by how the stock is performing? I go, [43:22] I'm I'm not bothered by that. our cost [43:24] basis is a teeny teeny teeny tiny [43:26] fraction of where that stock is trading. [43:29] And same thing, it's going to be with [43:30] anthropic, AI, all of that. The money is [43:32] not going to get made in a major way by [43:35] the public holders. It's already been [43:38] made by the private holders. That's who [43:40] was backing these businesses when they [43:42] were a couple billion dollar valuation, [43:44] not when they're now a trillion dollars. [43:46] And so if you want exposure to the [43:49] entire set of the economy and if you [43:50] want diversity, if you want all those [43:52] things, you're going to have to come to [43:53] the private markets. And I think that's [43:55] what the public investors are getting [43:57] wrong right now, which is we're taking [43:59] some lumps in the media. And by the way, [44:01] some of it's wellfounded. I'm not [44:02] sitting here. We've been agreeing on a [44:04] lot of the cynicism stuff, [44:07] but long-term, the growth is continuing [44:10] for good firms like ourselves, and [44:13] that's not going to stop. And so at some [44:15] point the market will realize like oh [44:17] okay this is this is actually real and [44:20] sustainable and and we'll go back. [44:22] >> Last question before I let you get out [44:23] of here. Are you are people accessing [44:24] your funds only through intermediaries [44:26] like only through their adviser or are [44:28] they able to get it just through swap or [44:30] fail or whatever. [44:30] >> So they can 100% get it directly through [44:32] those places. They can also we've also [44:34] tokenized a bunch of our funds. [44:35] >> Next conversation we'll do that next [44:36] time. [44:37] >> Yeah. But so but that's you can also get [44:38] it that way and that's actually like a [44:40] much lower minimum. like some of these [44:41] are like $500 minimums. Uh which I think [44:44] is just another interesting access [44:45] point. [44:46] >> Okay. Um Eric, this is great. I'm glad [44:48] that we had the you on on here to set [44:50] the record straight. Thank you for doing [44:51] this. [44:52] >> Thanks for the conversation.