Bessent Bond Buybacks Fail to Stem Yield Surge Amid $40 Trillion US Debt

美债规模突破40万亿美元，贝森特国债回购难抑收益率飙升 白宫试图通过财政部国债回购和向美联储施压来压低借贷成本，但在结构性赤字与顽固通胀背景下，此举因侵蚀市场信誉而适得其反。 Ezra Klein与财经记者Robin Wigglesworth深入探讨了作为全球借贷成本基石的美国国债市场的核心作用，阐释了收益率上升如何直接推高房贷、车贷和信用卡债务成本。他们分析了推动收益率走高的多项结构性压力，包括超过40万亿美元的国债总额、持续的通胀、霍尔木兹海峡周边的能源供应受阻，以及国债持有者从稳定的外国央行向高杠杆对冲基金的不稳定转变。讨论还审视了特朗普政府自相矛盾的财政与货币操作，尤其是财政部长Scott Bessent收效甚微的债券回购计划，以及对新任美联储主席Kevin Warsh施加的政治压力。展望未来，Wigglesworth与Klein推演了从AI基础设施崩盘到1970年代式滞胀等潜在情景，并特别指出投资者存在显著的认知失调——他们虽然承认财政危机爆发的概率极高，却并未采取任何防御性调仓行动。 美国国债总额已突破40万亿美元，随着疫情时期的低息债务以更高利率展期，联邦年度净利息支出已超过了整个美国国防预算。 (0:00) 对冲基金在美债市场的份额已扩大至近8%，超过了日本、中国和沙特阿拉伯持仓量的总和，这给全球基准避险资产引入了依赖回购杠杆的脆弱性。 (22:40) 财政部长Scott Bessent扩大债券回购的举措，与日交易量达1万亿美元的庞大市场在规模上严重失衡，犹如用水枪扑救山火，同时也损害了机构公信力。 (35:06) NBER的一项调查显示，机构债券投资者认为未来十年美国爆发债务危机的概率达50%，但各机构的投资组合却表现出近乎绝对的惰性，未做出任何资金配置调整。 (54:49)

Financial journalist Robin Wigglesworth argues that the $40 trillion U.S. Treasury market faces severe structural strain from compounding deficits, sticky inflation, and leveraged ownership, while the Trump administration's contradictory tactics and technical debt maneuvers fail to suppress long-term borrowing costs. Treasuries as the Foundation of Borrowing Costs (6:56) The U.S. Treasury market functions as the baseline for global finance, trading approximately $1 trillion in nominal value daily and establishing the risk-free rate that dictates the price of credit across the economy. Because private and consumer loans are priced as a spread above sovereign yields, any upward movement in Treasuries directly increases interest rates on 30-year home mortgages, car loans, and corporate debt. With the gross national debt exceeding $40 trillion and annual net interest outstripping the entire national defense budget, structural fiscal expansion is exerting upward pressure on baseline financing costs, undermining the White House's consumer affordability objectives. Shifting Ownership and Hidden Market Fragility (22:40) The investor composition supporting American debt has shifted dramatically away from the 2000s 'global savings glut.' While foreign central banks historically absorbed Treasuries as price-agnostic holders, their appetite has diminished, leaving leveraged hedge funds to increase their market share from roughly 2 percent to 8 percent—a collective stake exceeding that of Japan, China, and Saudi Arabia combined. Because hedge funds rely on repo-market financing with leverage ratios reaching up to 100-to-1, they cannot absorb sustained paper losses; sudden funding shocks or margin calls force rapid position liquidations, turning traditional safe-haven assets into sources of yield volatility during market panics. The Limits of Administrative Bond Market Interventions (35:06) In response to rising yields, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent expanded debt buyback operations for older, illiquid securities, framing them as a policy toolkit to manage borrowing costs. Wigglesworth criticizes this approach as 'putting out a wildfire with a water pistol,' pointing out that modest buyback operations scaled in single-digit billions cannot re-anchor macro yields in a market that turns over $1 trillion daily. Furthermore, while the administration publicly demands rate cuts from the Federal Reserve to reduce mortgage costs, prematurely lowering policy rates in an inflationary or debt-heavy environment signals institutional capitulation, which frightens bond investors and pushes long-term yields upward. Unconventional Crisis Risks and Investor Inertia (49:15) Because the United States borrows in its own currency and retains money-printing authority, Wigglesworth views a formal debt default as vanishingly unlikely. Instead, a genuine sovereign crisis would manifest through high inflation, currency debasement, or institutional capture if the White House subjugates the central bank to monetize federal borrowing. Despite a National Bureau of Economic Research survey showing that institutional bond investors assign a 50 percent probability to a U.S. debt crisis within the next decade, market actors display collective inertia, maintaining their standard portfolio allocations rather than actively hedging against systemic structural breakdown. The discussion concludes that technical Treasury facilities cannot substitute for fundamental fiscal discipline and central bank independence, leaving borrowing costs structurally elevated unless underlying deficits and inflation pressures are resolved.

Ezra Klein 与金融记者 Robin Wigglesworth 认为，规模突破40万亿美元的美国国债市场作为全球金融的基石与借贷成本锚点，正因财政赤字高企、黏性通胀以及持有者转向高杠杆对冲基金而日益脆弱；特朗普政府试图通过言论施压与财政部技术性回购来人为压低收益率，不仅无法解决基本面失衡，反而损害了核心机构的公信力。 金融基石与居民借贷成本的传导机制 (6:56) 美国国债市场日交易量约1万亿美元，是全球流动性最充裕、规模最大的主权债务市场，其收益率构成了全球资产定价的无风险基准利率。从挪威的商业银行贷款到中东主权财富基金的资产配置，全球借贷资本实质上都在与美国财政部竞争资金，所有私人与海外信贷均以国债收益率为基底并叠加风险溢价进行定价。 Wigglesworth 指出，对不直接参与债券交易的普通家庭而言，国债收益率直接决定了现实生活的可负担性。当国债收益率从过去的2%至3%攀升至4%到5%乃至更高水平时，银行资金成本水涨船高，迅速传导至30年期房贷、汽车贷款、助学贷款和信用卡利率，导致全社会的借贷成本中枢系统性上移，使得行政层面对物价和生活成本的纾困承诺面临根本性的结构阻力。 债务滚存与杠杆对冲基金的结构脆弱 (14:00) 美国联邦债务总额已跨过40万亿美元门槛，年净利息支出自二战以来首次超过了全年的国防预算总额。Wigglesworth 解释称，过去在1%至2%超低利率时期发行的海量廉价债务正在密集到期，财政部被迫在4%至5%的高息环境下进行债务滚存，使利息支出呈现自我滚雪球式的结构性膨胀。 更为危险的是国债买方构成的剧烈重塑。过去由海外央行与主权基金构成的“全球储蓄过剩”买家群体逐步退潮，不计价格变动而追求绝对安全的基石资金减少。对冲基金在国债市场的份额已从约2%扩张至近8%，总持仓超过日本、中国和沙特的总和。由于对冲基金重度依赖回购市场进行高达数十倍杠杆的基差交易，一旦融资利率出现波动或抵押品紧缩，极易引发强制抛售，导致国债在流动性危机中反常大跌并推高收益率。 白宫干预冲动与财政部水枪式回购 (35:06) 面对借贷成本居高不下，特朗普甚至公开发表动用军队干预债券市场的非常规言论，而财政部长 Scott Bessent 则宣布将长期名义附息国债的流动性支持回购规模翻倍，试图以此压制收益率。然而，Wigglesworth 将财政部的回购操作比作“拿水枪去灭森林大火”：国债市场日交易量达上万亿美元，而财政部仅动用几十亿美元购回流动性较差的非在跑旧债，在数学规模上根本无法扭转宏观收益率方向。 市场上唯有具备法定货币创造权力的美联储才拥有通过扩表压低长期收益率的真正火力。Bessent 在上任前曾严厉谴责上届政府依靠短期国库券与回购是危险的“激进财政部政策”，如今却自相矛盾地依样画葫芦。这种脱离财政部法定职责的微观干预在短线脉冲过后迅速失效，收益率重拾升势，反而向市场暴露了决策层的焦灼与政策工具的匮乏。 降息脱节与美联储独立性考验 (19:38) 白宫一方面指责地缘冲突与霍尔木兹海峡封锁推高了能源通胀，另一方面又要求美联储大幅降息并压低长期借贷成本。然而，Wigglesworth 强调当前的高收益率主要源于和平繁荣时期异乎寻常的战时级别赤字。长期国债收益率由市场对未来经济增长、赤字供给与通胀的综合预期决定，与美联储控制的隔夜短期政策利率存在根本脱节。 若美联储屈从于行政指令在通胀黏性依然存在的背景下贸然降息，债券投资者将解读为央行放弃了物价稳定底线，反而会要求更高的长期通胀风险补偿，促使10年期与30年期国债收益率加速飙升。新任美联储主席 Kevin Warsh 在杰克逊霍尔会议上倡导减少“前瞻指引”，试图打破央行必须过度呵护市场波动的惯性，但在总统的多重矛盾诉求下，货币当局能否抵御政治俘获仍是市场最大的神经痛点。 非常规危机场景与市场认知失调 (49:15) Wigglesworth 认为，由于美国以本币举债并拥有发币权，名义上的主权违约概率极低；真正的非常规危机将以恶性通胀、美元急剧贬值以及行政部门强行收编美联储推行财政赤字货币化的形式展开。展望未来情景：若人工智能基建泡沫破裂引发经济衰退，避险情绪与央行紧急降息可能将收益率压回1%至3%；但若财政扩张与通胀预期彻底失锚，收益率或将冲上6%至7%，将经济拖入1970年代式的滞胀深渊。 全美经济研究所（NBER）的一项调查显示，半数受访的机构债券投资者认为美国在未来十年内发生债务危机的可能性达到50%，但几乎没有人据此实质性调整投资组合与资产配置。Wigglesworth 将此比作面对渐进式灾难时的人性惯性：明知迎面驶来的列车具有毁灭性，机构投资者却因日常系统的平稳运转而选择视而不见。 本期节目展现了政治短期意愿与主权债券市场客观约束之间的尖锐冲突。虽然当前AI基建投资尚未在宏观尺度上实质性挤出主权融资，但巨额存量债务展期、高杠杆投机资金取代传统央行买家等结构性问题，已使国债市场的安全垫大幅缩减。若缺乏实质性的财政纪律与清晰可信的央行决策，仅凭行政口头喊话或边际微调技术工具，难以扭转全球借贷成本中枢上升的长期趋势。

## Background 本期节目由播客频道 The Ezra Klein Show 于 2026 年 8 月 28 日发布在 YouTube 上。页面简介指出，作为全球经济基石的美国国债收益率持续攀升至金融危机以来的罕见高位，导致房贷、车贷和信用卡等全社会借贷成本激增并波及股市；对此，主持人 Ezra Klein 连线了《金融时报》（Financial Times）旗下 Alphaville 编辑 Robin Wigglesworth，深入探讨收益率走高的诱因、特朗普政府略显混乱的救市举措以及未来可能面临的宏观经济风险。 ## TL;DR 对话深入拆解了美国国债市场近期的异动与潜在系统性危机。随着联邦债务突破 40 万亿美元且利息支出超越国防预算，高通胀预期、巨额财政赤字以及高杠杆对冲基金成为主力买家等因素，共同推高了美债收益率并削弱了其传统的避险属性。面对借贷成本飙升，特朗普政府与财长贝森特试图通过扩大微小规模的技术性回购进行行政干预，却被批评为如同‘用水枪扑灭野火’般徒劳且透支制度信誉。双方进一步推演了美债危机的非常规形式与 AI 资本支出的扰动，揭示出全球投资者明知风险逼近却陷入‘圣奥古斯丁式拖延’的集体认知失调。 ## Atmosphere & style 整场对话在严密硬核的宏观金融分析中穿插着辛辣讽刺与英式幽默。面对特朗普声称动用军队干预债市的荒唐言论，两人时而哑然失笑，时而借由历史典故一针见血地戳穿华盛顿决策层的自相矛盾与底牌尽失后的慌乱。Klein 的追问步步紧逼且直击普通人生活成本的痛点，而 Wigglesworth 的解构则游刃有余、形象生动；节目在专业通俗的剖析中隐隐透出对庞大债务机器走向失控的冷峻担忧与时代宿命感。 ## Bulletin - [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1TfGBoQVgGc&t=0s) 美国联邦债务总额突破40万亿美元大关，年度国债利息支出自二战后近一个世纪以来首次超越国防预算总额。 - [33:21](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1TfGBoQVgGc&t=2001s) 面对国债收益率攀升与借贷成本压力，财政部长贝森特扩大技术性回购计划以期压低收益率，但其数十亿美元体量相比每日上万亿的美债市场无异于“水枪灭野火”。 - [22:50](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1TfGBoQVgGc&t=1370s) 美债微观结构发生历史性逆转，海外央行等无杠杆买家退潮，对冲基金持仓占比升至近8%且高度依赖杠杆，导致美债在动荡期频现去杠杆踩踏与异常暴跌。 - [54:49](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1TfGBoQVgGc&t=3289s) NBER最新调查显示，受访债券投资者平均认为美国在未来十年发生债务危机的几率为50%，但几乎没有人据此调整投资组合。 ## Key takeaways - [06:56](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1TfGBoQVgGc&t=416s) 美债收益率是全球所有借贷成本的底层锚点，房贷、车贷和企业债利率均在其基准上加点形成，其走高直接扼杀家庭负担能力。 - [14:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1TfGBoQVgGc&t=840s) 由于借新还旧机制，美国此前发行的1%至2%超低息旧债正被迫以4%至5%的高息展期，导致利息支出出现滚雪球式激增。 - [17:26](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1TfGBoQVgGc&t=1046s) 通胀是固定收益资产的天生宿敌；若美联储展现坚决抗通胀的加息决心，反而能因锚定远期通胀预期而拉低长端美债收益率。 - [21:18](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1TfGBoQVgGc&t=1278s) 科技巨头在AI基础设施上的发债潮达5000亿美元，虽然规模庞大，但主要挤压的是普通企业债空间，对美债收益率仅产生微幅基点扰动。 - [22:50](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1TfGBoQVgGc&t=1370s) 对冲基金通过高杠杆填补外国央行留下的配置缺口，打破了美债在传统危机中必受避险买盘推升的历史铁律，加剧了市场脆弱性。 - [26:16](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1TfGBoQVgGc&t=1576s) 2008年金融危机后的负实际利率与免费借贷时代彻底终结，2022年债市暴跌后各界期待的3%至4%温和新常态已被高赤字和政策不确定性打破。 - [29:39](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1TfGBoQVgGc&t=1779s) 特朗普施压美联储降息以求压低房贷利率的诉求与其扩大赤字的财政方针自相矛盾，降息引发的通胀反弹反而会推高长端房贷基准。 - [37:25](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1TfGBoQVgGc&t=2245s) 财政部本用于修补老券流动性的技术性回购被政治化为干预工具，反而暴露出政策层底牌匮乏，动摇了市场对宏观决策信誉的信心。 - [39:24](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1TfGBoQVgGc&t=2364s) 白宫内部滋生揣摩上意的政治氛围，即便深知微额回购在经济学上无效，官员们仍在“既要又要”的压力下推出短视的补救手段。 - [42:59](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1TfGBoQVgGc&t=2579s) 凯文·沃什在杰克逊霍尔会议上倡导减少前瞻性指引，认为适度的利率不确定性能遏制投机者盲目冒险，避免过度温和的确定性滋生资产泡沫。 - [46:37](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1TfGBoQVgGc&t=2797s) “债券卫士”并非幕后操纵者，而是普罗大众和机构资金的集合体，能够通过要求更高风险溢价或缩减放贷规模对主权政府形成实质性约束。 - [49:15](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1TfGBoQVgGc&t=2955s) 美国凭借本币借款和无限印钞能力几乎不可能发生传统意义上的主权硬违约，真正的尾部风险是行政权力强行压低利率、大肆印钞所引发的恶性通胀与系统痉挛。 - [51:26](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1TfGBoQVgGc&t=3086s) 未来若国债收益率回落到3%甚至1%，更有可能是AI投资泡沫破裂或经济严重衰退所迫使的避险降息，而非健康的宏观调整。 - [54:49](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1TfGBoQVgGc&t=3289s) 债券市场面对50%的潜在危机概率依然选择按兵不动，呈现出“主啊，请让我保持贞洁，但不要是现在”的典型圣奥古斯丁式群体拖延心理。 ## Detailed walkthrough ### [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1TfGBoQVgGc&t=0s) 美债市场的异动与特朗普政府的焦虑 美国国债市场是全球最关键的金融基石，其重要性无出其右。尽管大多数普通人早晨醒来并不会直接买卖美债，但它却暗中决定着一切金融成本：从股市的最终表现，到个人房贷、车贷和信用卡账单的利息，几乎没有任何金融领域能避开它的影响。然而，近期的美债市场却显得异常诡异。美国政府的借贷成本持续飙升，这在很大程度上是因为美国国债规模已跨过 40 万亿美元的骇人门槛，导致每年支付的债务利息甚至超过了全年的国防预算。 与此同时，特朗普的公开表态愈发飘忽不定，他宣称“历史上从未有过像现在这样涌入一个国家的巨量资金”；而财政部长斯科特·贝森特（Scott Bessent）也在市场上展开了愈发激进的操作，将其比作“拉满的弹弓”，称其中积聚了大量将转化为动能的势能。面对美债的异样与特朗普政府的焦虑，Ezra Klein 连线了《金融时报》（Financial Times）旗下博客 Alphaville 的编辑 Robin Wigglesworth。Wigglesworth 长期追踪债券机制，也是《金钱的故事》（*The Story of Money*）播客的主持人以及《不可思议的债务：债券如何构建现代世界的史诗》（*A Fabulous Debt: The Epic Story of How Bonds Built the Modern World*）一书的作者。 - **债务里程碑**：美国政府总负债近期正式突破 40 万亿美元大关。 - **利息负担**：美国每年为国债支付的利息总额已正式超过国防预算。 - **采访时间**：本次对谈录制于 2026 年 8 月 24 日，当时美债市场正处于剧烈波动与政策干预的中心。 --- ### [01:38](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1TfGBoQVgGc&t=98s) 财政部的“厨房水槽”策略与特朗普的军事威胁 谈话直接切入上周五特朗普就贝森特干预债市所作出的令人咋舌的回应。当记者提问是否指示了贝森特干预债券市场时，特朗普表示完全没有，夸赞贝森特是个能干的人，对“债券和利率有着极好的直觉与触觉”。当记者追问在收益率再度反弹后是否会采取其他干预手段时，特朗普语出惊人：“我们有许多干预手段……终极手段是我们的军队。如果必须动用军队，我们就会动用。”对债券市场亮出军事威慑这种荒诞发言让全场哑然失笑，Ezra 打趣道这话题升级得实在太快，历史上还从未听过有人要派军队去镇压债市。 回到现实层面，Robin Wigglesworth 剖析了贝森特目前的救市动作。他指出贝森特正在使用一种“除了厨房水槽什么都往里扔”（kitchen sink approach）的混乱打法，急迫地想把国债收益率压下去。由于美债收益率直接决定了全社会的借贷成本，随着中期选举临近，执政团队迫切希望通过压低收益率来缓解美国家庭的通胀与生活成本压力。但尴尬之处在于，财政部长本身的工具箱相当贫乏，贝森特实际上是在用一些原本并非用于调控宏观收益率的奇特工具硬撑门面。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 财政部干预工具与市场反应 accDescr: 展示财政部扩大回购操作但未能阻止美债收益率回升的逻辑流程 subgraph FedTools["财政部政策动作"] A["常规工具箱权限有限"] --> B["扩大流动性支持回购规模"] B --> C["针对长期名义附息国债增配数十亿资金"] end subgraph MarketReaction["市场博弈与反馈"] C --> D["体量过小：无法扭转数万亿级别的供给大势"] D --> E["短暂企稳后，国债收益率重新调头向上攀升"] end ``` 市场消息显示，财政部将用于长期名义附息国债的流动性支持回购操作规模翻倍。但 Wigglesworth 强调，在这类回购计划中哪怕增加数十亿美元、甚至直接扩大十倍，在万亿美元体量的美债面前也根本无法撼动基本面。这就是为什么业内人士对贝森特的操作感到匪夷所思，而在消息初期的短暂反应过后，美债收益率很快重新掉头攀升。 --- ### [03:38](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1TfGBoQVgGc&t=218s) 什么是美国国债：极致安全性与万亿流动性 为了理清这一错综复杂的机制，对谈回到了最底层概念：到底什么是美国国债？简而言之，美国国债就是一种由美国政府发行的、可公开交易的借款凭证。传统的借贷合同很难转让，而债券的本质则是标准化的可流通借单，按固定利率定期支付利息。因为美国是全球最大的经济体和超级大国，处于全球金融体系的绝对顶端，美国国债也就成了全球最具流动性、交易最活跃的金融资产，让美国政府长年得以极其低廉的成本进行自我融资。 投资者狂热追捧美债的核心支撑主要由两座支柱构成： 1. **确定性与极致安全**：如果持有特斯拉或苹果公司的股票，即便作为优质资产，跨越 10 年维度的走势也是不可预测的，企业亦存在破产风险。但如果购买了票面利率 5% 的美国国债，它就会在未来 10 年、20 年或 30 年间如时钟般精准地持续派息，并在到期时全额归还本金。即便美国人有时对本国政治感到荒诞，但全球投资者依然深信 30 年后美国政府仍会屹立不倒。 2. **惊人的流动性（Liquidity）**：这是美债常被低估的支柱。“流动性”虽是金融黑话，本质就是买卖极其容易。美债市场单日交易量即可达到惊人的 1 万亿美元。这意味着不论是丹麦的养老基金、中东的主权财富基金，还是巴西的中央银行，即使手握数千亿美元的头寸，也能确信在需要变现时迅速在市场上抛出且不会引发踩踏。这种超强流动性正是维系美债神话的“魔法调料”，使得美债在债务担忧绵延数代人的背景下依然稳居全球资产中枢。 --- ### [06:56](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1TfGBoQVgGc&t=416s) 为什么普通人必须在乎：债市是万物的底层定价器 对于不持有任何债券的普通民众而言，美债的异动绝非事不关己。Wigglesworth 解释道，虽然股票市场每天被铺天盖地报道，但真正构成整个现代金融基石的其实是枯燥的债券市场。政府与银行的大部分融资均在此完成，更为关键的是，美债收益率直接锚定了全社会的资金价格——它是所有企业债务、居民住房抵押贷款、汽车贷款、学生贷款以及信用卡利率的终极基准。 一旦国债收益率过高，借贷成本剧烈抬升，股市便会随之陷入剧烈震荡。政治层面同样对此极为敏感：在“解放日”（Liberation Day）股市暴跌时，特朗普和贝森特并未过度恐慌；唯独当债券市场开始吃不消、显露出特朗普所谓的“有点坐立难安、有点吓破胆”（getting a little bit yippy, a little bit afraid）的退缩迹象时，白宫才火速叫停并试图插手。因为股市下跌只是影响富人的账面财富和心理预期，而债市一旦“发脾气”（tantrum），其实体经济破坏力会立竿见影且难以收拾。 Ezra Klein 强调，在当前选民最在意的“生活负担能力”（affordability）议题上，债市正是万物价格的绝对底层： - **加点定价逻辑**：全社会的借贷全部以国债收益率为基准进行加点（Treasury yield + X%）。 - **连带放大效应**：若国债收益率为 3%，各类消费贷款就是在 3% 之上加点；一旦国债基准推高至 5% 甚至 7%，房贷和车贷就会被动跳涨至 7%、9% 乃至更高，直接扼杀家庭消费力。 - **潜在波动危机**：过去数年美债收益率始终处于一种顽固且持续的上升通道之中，这不仅构建起昂贵的高息底层环境，更时刻潜藏着剧烈波动的系统性风险。 ### [09:52](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1TfGBoQVgGc&t=592s) 贝森特的“3-3-3计划”与全球利率之锚 埃兹拉·克莱恩指出，如果执政者想让民众感受到物价正在下降，那当借贷成本（即“钱的价格”）一路攀升时，这几乎是不可能完成的任务，因为资金成本会直接传导至整个经济的方方面面。此时，特朗普政府的财政部长斯科特·贝森特（Scott Bessent）提出了一项被戏称为“3-3-3计划”的宏伟蓝图：将联邦财政赤字压减至 GDP 的 3%、实现 3% 的实际经济增长，并将美国国内原油日产量再提升 300 万桶。当克莱恩半开玩笑地询问“目前进展如何”时，罗宾·威格斯沃斯笑着直言：“我看很不乐观。” 威格斯沃斯强调，美债不仅仅是美国自身的内政问题，而是一场牵动全球的金融现实。美国是全球最庞大的经济体，其国债规模已高达约 32 万亿美元，构成了全球金融体系的“无风险利率”（risk-free rate），是世界上规模最大、流动性最强的政府债券市场。威格斯沃斯以自身为例解释道，即使他身在挪威向当地银行申请贷款，其本质上也是在与美国财政部争夺资金配额——因为包括挪威银行在内的所有机构，其放贷定价都是在美国国债基准收益率的基础上叠加信用利差。正如金融界的名言所言，“当美债市场打个喷嚏，全世界都会感冒；而一旦美债市场患上流感，全球金融体系就会彻底陷入混乱”。 - **斯科特·贝森特的“3-3-3计划”目标**： - 将联邦预算赤字降至 GDP 的 3%； - 推动美国经济增长率达到 3%； - 美国原油日产量增加 300 万桶。 - **美债的全球基准地位**：规模达 32 万亿美元的美债市场是全球资本定价的基石，无论企业还是外国个人借贷，实质上都在与美国财政部竞逐资金。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 美债收益率全球传导机制 accDescr: 展现美国财政部发债成本如何通过无风险利率基准向全球借贷成本和消费者端传导。 subgraph US_Treasury["美国国债市场 (基石)"] UST["美债收益率上升 (无风险利率)"] end subgraph Intermediaries["金融传导机制"] Spread["全球银行在美债基准上叠加利差"] GlobalDebt["多国借款主体与美国财政部争夺资本"] end subgraph Real_Economy["实体经济端承压"] Mortgage["房贷与汽车贷款利率上升"] Corp["企业借贷与再融资成本攀升"] end UST --> Spread UST --> GlobalDebt Spread --> Mortgage GlobalDebt --> Corp ``` --- ### [11:17](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1TfGBoQVgGc&t=677s) 国债是如何发售与交易的：从威尼斯集市到一级交易商拍卖 针对许多普通人对债券运作机制的盲区，克莱恩坦承，尽管自己常年报道国债上限危机和财政预算，但直到现在仍很难直观想象这些债券究竟是如何被买卖的——各方难道是登录一个专门的政府网站下单吗？威格斯沃斯借此梳理了债券交易的演进史：人类历史上最早的债券市场现已变成了意大利威尼斯的一处菜市场，而当今的国债交易早已全部电子化，大多依托彭博终端（Bloomberg Terminal）等系统日夜不停地流转。 作为全球最大的借款实体，美国财政部的首要诉求是“可预测性”与“稳健”，力求扮演一个负责任的市场参与者。尽管普通个人确实可以通过美国政府的官方网站（如 TreasuryDirect）直接递交投标认购国债，但市场上绝大多数的大买家——无论是塔吉克斯坦的央行，还是墨西哥的养老基金——都必须借助由顶级华尔街机构构成的“一级交易商”（Primary Dealers）网络，例如摩根大通（JPMorgan Chase）和高盛（Goldman Sachs）。作为承担做市义务、维持市场双向流动性的回报，这些投行获得了直接参与财政部拍卖的特权。 在日常运作中，国债拍卖通常被刻意设计成波澜不惊的“枯燥事件”，因为借债最忌讳突发意外。投行根据二级市场的既有交易水平及实际认购需求计算出投标报价，从而形成当天的拍卖收益率。然而，一旦出现变数——例如近期某次 30 年期美债拍卖中需求异常疲软——美国政府就不得不提供更高的收益率补偿以吸引买家，这随即在整个金融市场引发了关于借贷成本失控的连锁担忧。 --- ### [14:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1TfGBoQVgGc&t=840s) 从财政盈余到40万亿美元：美债危机的演变史 回顾过去数十年的美债演变，威格斯沃斯指出，整部现代金融史大致可划分为“2008年全球金融危机前”与“危机后”两个截然不同的时代。在 20 世纪 90 年代克林顿执政时期，美国甚至一度出现财政盈余并开始偿还债务，当时华尔街甚至严肃讨论过一个如今看来匪夷所思的假设：“如果美国国债彻底归零，缺乏了核心抵押品与基准的现代金融系统该如何运转？” 然而 2008 年金融危机彻底扭转了这一轨迹。为避免经济崩溃，各国政府被迫大幅举债救市；面对长达数年的经济衰退阵痛，大规模财政支出变成了极难戒除的政策依赖。随后暴发的新冠疫情更是火上浇油，直接将联邦债务总额推升至史无前例的 40 万亿美元大关。克莱恩补充了一个极具震撼力的现实参照：当前美国政府每年仅仅为了偿还债务利息所支出的费用，就已经超过了整个国家的年度国防预算。 威格斯沃斯解释称，利息支出超过军费是自二战以来近一个世纪内首次出现，历史上这种现象通常只在强权帝国面临生死攸关的重大战争时才会发生。问题的核心不仅在于存量债务庞大，更在于再融资利息的激增：过去政府发行的大量债券票面利率仅为 1% 或 2%，而借新还旧的机制迫使这些到期债券必须以当下 4% 甚至 5% 的高息重新展期，形成了沉重的“利息滚雪球”。威格斯沃斯引述了前美联储主席杰伊·鲍威尔（Jay Powell）卸任前对大学生的告诫：“债务的现有绝对水平并非不可维系，但其增长路径是绝对不可持续的。”如果未来二三十年维持现状，美国债务将从令人不安直接演变为不可收拾的庞然巨兽。 - **债务规模分水岭**： - 1990 年代：财政实现盈余，各界曾忧虑国债“枯竭”； - 2008 年危机：开启赤字常态化与超量借债周期； - 现今：债务总额突破 40 万亿美元大关。 - **利息负担警报**：年度债务利息支出在二战后首次超越国防预算；大量 1%-2% 历史低息旧债正被被迫置换为 4%-5% 的高息新债。 --- ### [17:26](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1TfGBoQVgGc&t=1046s) 通胀、霍尔木兹海峡与债券的“宿敌” 除了财政部被迫天量发债带来的供给过剩压力外，驱动国债收益率居高不下的另一大引擎是通货膨胀。新冠疫情引发的全球供应链紊乱与俄乌战争的爆发，共同掀起了一场全球性的严重通胀浪潮。尽管美联储等各国央行随后以激进节奏大幅加息，但通胀在通往 2% 目标的“最后一英里”上陷入停滞，各主要经济体的通胀率普遍顽固地停留在目标位上方。 雪上加霜的是，近期围绕伊朗爆发的冲突波及了关键战略咽喉霍尔木兹海峡，导致原油及能源外运渠道大面积受阻，再度引发能源价格暴涨。市场骤然警醒：通胀不仅未能回到既定的 2% 轨道，反而存在再度加速的风险。威格斯沃斯直言，通胀是债券的天生“宿敌”——因为债券支付的是固定的票面利息，如果一张债券每年支付 5% 的名义利息，而通胀率恰好也是 5%，投资者的实际收益便荡然无存，债券本身的吸引力与现值自然急剧贬值。 针对特朗普此前宣称“终极干预手段是军事干预”的言论，克莱恩给出了最为宽容的解读视角：特朗普与贝森特试图将当前债券收益率飙升的祸因完全归咎于地缘政治外部冲击，即伊朗封锁霍尔木兹海峡造成的“暂时性影响”。特朗普政府的逻辑在于，只要采取强硬军事行动重新打通能源走廊、平抑油价，通胀便会回落，美债收益率自然会随之下降。然而克莱恩提出质疑：过往的军事干预经验表明这种策略往往未能奏效，特朗普与贝森特将美债市场异动的根本原因归咎于伊朗，这一论点在逻辑与事实上究竟能否站得住脚？ - **通胀对固定收益资产的杀伤力**：当通胀率比肩或超过债券固定收益率时，投资者实际购买力收益归零，促使市场要求更高的风险溢价。 - **白宫的逻辑链条**：特朗普与贝森特将长端美债收益率走高定性为伊朗封锁霍尔木兹海峡带来的暂时性能源通胀冲击，企图借由军事威慑与解除封锁来压低收益率。 ### [19:38](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1TfGBoQVgGc&t=1178s) 财政赤字与美联储博弈：为何加息反而能压低长端美债收益率？ 针对特朗普关于中东局势与通胀关系的表态，罗宾·威格斯沃斯（Robin Wigglesworth）坦言，虽然那段视频播出后他收到了不少债券投资者带着戏谑意味的恐慌短信，但他部分认同这种地缘视角的解释：重开霍尔木兹海峡、实现中东和平、促使能源价格回落，确实能在短期内平息市场焦虑。然而，眼下更根本的顽疾在于美国惊人的负债规模和财政赤字。美国在经济基本面相当强劲的和平时期，却维持着近乎战时状态的巨额赤字水平。更令市场不安的是，特朗普任命了新的美联储主席，而这位新主席似乎迫于白宫的指令，对加息表现出极大的抗拒。威格斯沃斯指出，这造成了一种反直觉的困境：如果美联储敢于采取行动适度加息，反而能有效平抑通胀预期并拉低长期美债收益率。 当埃兹拉·克莱恩追问为何“提高利率反而会降低债券收益率”时，威格斯沃斯阐明了宏观信号与市场心理的微妙互动。通胀从本质上讲是经济体中泛滥的流动性过多，加息会提高资金成本、抽走流动性并为过热的经济降温。但在现代债券市场中，很大程度上这关乎“氛围感（vibes）”与前瞻性信号。对长久期债券投资者而言，一个敢于公开宣布“愿意加息、不惜一切代价遏制通胀”的美联储，能够给予市场极大的定心丸；一旦美联储展现出这种“硬气（manned up）”的抗通胀决心，投资者对远期通胀失控的恐慌就会消退，10年期乃至30年期的美债收益率便会迅速应声下跌。相反，如果央行展现出犹豫或被政治掣肘，市场就会要求更高的风险溢价。 ### [21:18](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1TfGBoQVgGc&t=1278s) AI 基础设施投资潮：万亿资本支出是否正在挤占美债需求？ 面对高企的国债收益率，市场上出现了一种盛行的新论点：各大科技巨头为支撑人工智能（AI）热潮，正在发行数额惊人的企业债来兴建数据中心与能源基础设施，这种庞大的私营部门融资需求是否在“挤占”原本属于美国国债的投资资金，从而推高了政府的借贷成本？ 威格斯沃斯对此给出了审慎的评估：在边际效应上确实存在挤出，但绝非主导因素。AI的基础设施扩张规模固然令人瞠目结舌，但目前全球与AI相关的债券发行总量大约在5000亿美元左右。尽管半万亿美元在任何标准下都是一笔巨资，但它在资本市场中主要是挤占了其他普通企业的发债空间，导致其他公司借款成本微幅上升。对于规模庞大的美国国债市场而言，AI发债潮充其量只给美债收益率增加了几个基点（即百分之零点零几的微小涨幅），完全无法解释当前借贷成本系统性上升的核心原因，市场背后还有宏大得多的力量在起主导作用。 ### [22:50](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1TfGBoQVgGc&t=1370s) 对冲基金的高杠杆隐忧：美债市场脆弱性与“纸手”风险 国债市场微观结构发生的巨变，是当前金融体系中被严重低估的核心断层线。回顾21世纪初，全球处于前美联储主席伯南克所描述的“全球储蓄过剩（Global Savings Glut）”时代，全球各大央行和主权财富基金坐拥巨额闲置资金，涌入美债市场进行无差别配置。这些官方机构是典型的“对价格不敏感的买家（price-agnostic investors）”，他们购买美债看重的是其极高的流动性和安全性，而非追逐丰厚的回报。然而在过去十年中，全球储蓄过剩的红利逐步减退，海外央行的购买力度放缓甚至回落，与此同时美国国债的总发行量却呈爆炸式膨胀。 在这一供需缺口中，对冲基金大举进场填补了空白。官方数据显示，对冲基金在美债市场中的持有份额已从过去的约2%飙升至近8%，其实际持有量甚至超过了日本、中国和沙特阿拉伯三国官方持仓的总和。威格斯沃斯强调，对冲基金提供流动性固然有其市场价值，但致命的软肋在于其高度依赖杠杆：对冲基金往往仅用1000万美元或1亿美元的本金，通过回购协议等杠杆工具撬动高达10亿美元的国债仓位。一旦融资成本微幅波动或波动率骤升，这类高杠杆机构就会被瞬间“震荡出局（shaken out）”。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 对冲基金美债杠杆交易的脆弱性传导链 accDescr: 展示海外官方买家退潮后，高杠杆对冲基金填补美债市场空白所带来的流动性反转机制 subgraph Shift ["买家结构的历史性演变"] A["传统官方买家退潮<br/>（中/日央行与主权基金，无杠杆、对价格不敏感）"] B["高杠杆对冲基金填补缺口<br/>（持有份额从 2% 飙升至近 8%）"] A --> B end subgraph Stress ["冲击发生时的流动性反转"] C["借贷/融资成本上升或波动加剧"] D["保证金压力迫使对冲基金被迫平仓"] E["美债集中踩踏式抛售"] F["收益率异常飙升，避险属性失效"] B --> C C --> D D --> E E --> F end ``` 这种机制彻底颠覆了美债传统的避险属性。克莱恩指出，与养老基金或央行不同，高杠杆对冲基金为了自保必须迅速砍仓，这会导致极其危险的关联性抛售。在传统危机中，投资者会卖出股票、涌入坚固安全的美债避险，从而推低美债收益率；然而高杠杆对冲基金绝非散户炒散户概念股时所谓的“钻石手（diamond hands）”，他们的持仓脆弱而不稳定。正如2020年3月的流动性危机以及2025年4月“解放日（Liberation Day）”政策震荡之后所呈现的异象：当市场受到惊吓时，美债不仅没有迎来避险买盘，反而因对冲基金去杠杆而遭遇集中抛售，导致收益率逆势暴涨。包括前财长珍妮特·耶伦（Janet Yellen）以及斯科特·贝森特（Scott Bessent）在内的决策层对此都心知肚明，这也解释了为何在债券市场发生颤抖时，当局往往不得不迅速做出政策妥协。 - 对冲基金目前在美债市场中的份额接近8%，持仓规模超过中国、日本和沙特阿拉伯的官方总和。 - 对冲基金的基差交易与套利高度依赖杠杆，常见杠杆倍数使1000万至1亿美元的本金能撬动10亿美元的国债资产。 - 市场动荡期对冲基金的被迫平仓曾在2020年3月和2025年4月重创市场深度，打破了美债“危机时期收益率必跌”的历史铁律。 ### [26:16](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1TfGBoQVgGc&t=1576s) 廉价资金时代的终结与不可想象的“新常态” 克莱恩回忆起自己在《华盛顿邮报》Wonkblog担任财经记者时期的经历：在2008年金融危机后的很长一段时间里，他们一直在撰文呼吁政府应大规模借债投资于基础设施，因为扣除通胀后的实际借贷成本一度为负。全球资本因为极度渴求安全、高流动性的资产，几乎是在倒贴钱借给美国政府使用。但从疫情之后、再到特朗普上台以来的激进财政扩张与捉摸不定的政策走向，这种近乎免费借贷的时代已彻底终结，房贷利率从过去的2%到3%不可逆地拾级而上。随着赤字狂飙和不可预测性加剧，2026年让越来越多的人清醒认识到：长期底层逻辑已经彻底改写，之前所谓的“暂时性”只是幻觉。 威格斯沃斯深表赞同，并指出极低利率本身就是长期经济沉疴与病态的体现。从历史长河来看，2022年堪称全球债券市场的“灾难之年（annus horribilis）”，遭遇了近三个世纪以来最惨烈的年度暴跌。在经历了这场历史性的剧烈清算之后，市场原本抱有一种宣泄式的乐观预期，以为通胀会如美联储所言逐渐消退，全球央行激进加息后各方会紧缩财政，美债收益率将稳定在3%至4%的所谓“新常态”。 然而现实打破了这种幻想。特朗普时代的政策不可预测性，使得曾经被视为天方夜谭的极端假设变得不再遥不可及。美国至今依然高度依赖海外资本为其巨额赤字埋单，但在当下的政治氛围中，外国资本感受到的不再是欢迎，而是警惕与排斥。中国等海外主要债权国已在悄然缩减美债风险敞口，逐步撤离这个市场。威格斯沃斯坦言，即便像他这样几年前对美债体系深信不疑的专业观察者，如今也不得不承认，过去那些看似牢不可破的底层信任已经产生动摇，并在整个全球金融体系中掀起了难以平息的阵阵涟漪。 ### [29:39](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1TfGBoQVgGc&t=1779s) 特朗普与债券市场的对抗：打破白宫传统 在过往的美国政治史中，白宫历来对债券市场怀揣敬畏。比尔·克林顿的前高级顾问詹姆斯·卡维尔（James Carville）曾留下过一句著名玩笑：如果有来世，他希望能转世为债券市场，因为那样所有人就都不得不听他的话。面对国债收益率走高与债务赤字压力，传统总统通常采取两套标准动作：一是任命一位在华尔街享有极高声望的稳健人选执掌美联储；二是通过财政紧缩和缩减赤字来向市场释放定心丸。 然而，唐纳德·特朗普的执政风格完全打破了这一惯例。他强势向杰罗姆·鲍威尔施压，公开叫板美联储降息，并在挑选继任者时任命了凯文·沃什（Kevin Warsh）。尽管沃什在专业圈内算是有威望的学者型官员，但他的任命却被笼罩在一层疑云之下——市场怀疑他在私下向特朗普作出了降息让步以换取职位。与此同时，特朗普政府大肆推行减税与扩张性财政支出，丝毫没有大妥协削减赤字的意图。新任财长斯科特·贝森特（Scott Bessent）虽有对冲基金与外汇交易员的出身背景，但将财政部长视作“债券操盘手”来直接干预市场价格，在政策逻辑上显得相当混乱。 这种政策自相矛盾的核心在于对利率体系的误解： * **短端利率 vs 长端收益率**：美联储通过隔夜拆借利率直接控制短端资金价格并传导至银行系统；而作为长期房贷与商业贷款基准的美国国债收益率，则是由全市场供求与通胀预期决定的长端价格。 * **相互冲突的政策目标**：特朗普既希望压低长端收益率以实现低息房贷，又施压美联储大幅降息，但若通胀预期因降息而重燃，国债收益率反而会被大幅推高。 * **人选博弈的底线**：在备选名单中，特朗普最终放弃了彼得·纳瓦罗（Peter Navarro）或比尔·普尔特（Bill Pulte）等激进派，选择相对体面的沃什，正是因为他清楚若在美联储主席位置上放进一个毫无资质的狂热分子，债券市场必将报以毁灭性的剧烈抛售。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 传统白宫模式与特朗普政府对债市策略的对比 accDescr: 对比传统总统面对收益率上升时采取的财政紧缩与专业美联储人选，以及特朗普政府施压降息、扩大支出与直接干预的差异。 subgraph Traditional["传统应对路径 (稳健信誉)"] T1["国债收益率攀升 / 赤字高企"] --> T2["财政紧缩与缩减赤字"] T1 --> T3["任命市场尊重的专业美联储主席"] T2 & T3 --> T4["恢复市场信心，稳定长端利率"] end subgraph TrumpAdmin["特朗普式应对 (干预与扩张)"] M1["追求廉价房贷与低长端利率"] --> M2["施压美联储降息 + 任命沃什"] M1 --> M3["扩大减税与财政支出"] M2 & M3 --> M4["通胀预期反弹，长端收益率被推高"] end ``` ### [33:21](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1TfGBoQVgGc&t=2001s) 贝森特的“工具箱”与治标不治本的国债回购 在一则 CNBC 的访谈中，财长贝森特宣称财政部拥有“庞大的工具箱”，坚称当前国债收益率并未反映经济基本面，并承诺将与白宫预算主管拉塞尔·沃特（Russ Vought）联手推动财政整顿。这种“基本面强劲”的表态被埃兹拉·克莱因调侃为令人回想起约翰·麦凯恩（John McCain）在 2008 年金融危机市场崩盘前夕的名言，不仅毫无说服力，反而透露出决策层的窘迫与焦虑。 贝森特工具箱中最具争议的核心举措，是扩大财政部的一项技术性回购计划（Treasury buyback program）。这项机制原本设计极为专业且体量微小，旨在改善部分“非基准老券”（off-the-run Treasuries）的流动性： * **老券流动性沉淀**：刚发行的 10 年期基准国债（on-the-run）流动性极佳，单笔卖出数十亿美元也不会扰动市价；但随着时间推移，该债券逐渐变为 9 年、8 年或 7 年期老券，大多被银行或养老基金锁定在保险库中，交易稀少并带有折价。 * **财政部常规操作**：财政部动用数亿美元买回这些沉淀的老券，同时发行等额的超高流动性基准 10 年或 20 年期国债进行对冲置换，以疏通局部流动性。 * **贝森特的政治化扭曲**：贝森特突然扩大了回购规模，名义上称是修补市场流动性，实质上则是赤裸裸地试图靠官方下场买债来强行压低长端收益率。 然而，这一干预手段在体量上存在着荒谬的不对称。全球美债市场每日交易量超过一万亿美元，而财政部拿出的回购资金仅有区区数十亿美元。罗宾·威格斯沃斯将这一行为讽刺为“拿水枪去扑灭森林大火”（putting out a wildfire with a water pistol）。由于财政部并不具备无限制印钞的资产负债表能力，当交易员们从官方信号的短暂停歇中回过神来后，短暂的反弹便迅速被抹平，收益率旋即逆转回升。 ### [37:25](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1TfGBoQVgGc&t=2245s) 信誉透支：用“水枪扑灭野火”引发的市场疑虑 财政部不仅没能达成压低收益率的诉求，这种“知其不可为而为之”的干预行动反而产生了严重的逆向心理效应。当贝森特公开将真金白银押注在买债上时，交易员嗅到的不是底气，而是底牌尽失后的慌乱。 - **信誉机制的反噬**：美国政府在几十年跨党派更迭中积累的核心资产是制度可预测性与规则信誉。当全球最具影响力的宏观经济掌舵人采取这种连入门交易员都能轻易识破的无效手段时，市场开始担忧决策层在其他领域是否也会作出更加不可预测、不理性的极端抉择。 - **弄巧成拙的恐慌传导**：长端国债收益率的攀升原本属于正常的市场定价——投资者普遍认为通胀可能会在更高水平持续更久，因此要求更高的期限溢价作为风险补偿。 - **政策的失常反应**：对这一合乎规律的经济现象，财政部本应以宏观财政纪律应对，却反常地采用带有操纵色彩的行政微操手段，不仅没有安抚市场，反而让机构投资者愈发神经紧绷，直接催生了抛售国债、推高收益率的反向定价潮。 ### [39:24](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1TfGBoQVgGc&t=2364s) 贝森特的自相矛盾与白宫的“吃蛋糕”困境 罗宾·威格斯沃斯（Robin Wigglesworth）坦言，当前国债市场的波动虽然存在直接风险，但远未达到失控的地步，绝非2020年3月新冠疫情初期国债市场因流动性挤压而彻底瘫痪的惨状。令他感到真正困惑的是，财政部长斯科特·贝森特（Scott Bessent）本身是一名经验极其老练的对冲基金债券与货币交易员，对债券市场的运作机理了如指掌，但他此刻却在推行连他自己都深知根本行不通、甚至错误的干预政策。埃兹拉·克莱恩（Ezra Klein）随即指出，贝森特此前在拜登政府时期曾严厉批评过前财长珍妮特·耶伦（Janet Yellen），斥责后者开展规模更小的债券回购以及大幅增发短期国库券（T-bills）是“激进主义财政政策”（activist Treasury policy），如今自己掌权却完全如法炮制。威格斯沃斯认为，这种批评在一定程度上属于常规的党派政治虚伪，但在明知无效的情况下依旧硬推，反映出某种非同寻常的政策混乱。 克莱恩分析认为，特朗普政府内部出现的这种混乱往往只有一种解释：唐纳德·特朗普想要某件事，或者下属揣测他想要某件事。尽管特朗普公开声称自己与财政部干预债券市场毫无关系，但特朗普显然无法容忍收益率不断走高，他既想要低借贷成本、更可负担的物价，又想要超高的经济增长率，恨不得“鱼与熊掌兼得”。威格斯沃斯对此打趣说，每个人都喜欢“既保有蛋糕又能大口吃掉它”。他引用了英国历史上的经典典故——当年亨利二世脱口抱怨一句“谁能替我除掉这个惹麻烦的教士？”（Who will rid me of this troublesome priest?），随从骑士便心领神会地跑去谋杀了托马斯·贝克特（Thomas Becket）。如今白宫内部也存在类似氛围：官员们感知到总统的意图后，即便深知从长远来看实际上会损害总统的目标，也依然会盲目推出短视的补救手段。威格斯沃斯直言，真正能平抑收益率的直接方案其实是美联储加息或释出明确的鹰派决心，加之尽快平息伊朗危机、恢复霍尔木兹海峡的通航，这远比财政部那点微不足道的债券回购管用得多。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Bessent Policy Dilemma accDescr: 财政部与白宫在国债干预政策中的矛盾循环 subgraph WhiteHouse["白宫的核心诉求"] A["特朗普期望：低利率 + 高增长 + 物价可负担"] end subgraph Treasury["财政部的无奈妥协"] B["贝森特深知回购无效<br/>（曾严批耶伦同类政策）"] C["强推短期干预与小额回购<br/>（'谁替我除掉这个教士'心态）"] end subgraph Market["市场实际反应"] D["干预杯水车薪<br/>债券收益率仍居高不下"] end A --> B B --> C C --> D D -.->|"倒逼更深层矛盾"| A ``` --- ### [42:59](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1TfGBoQVgGc&t=2579s) 凯文·沃什亮相杰克逊霍尔：打破前瞻性指引的神话 谈话转向了正在举行的杰克逊霍尔（Jackson Hole）全球央行年会，这是凯文·沃什（Kevin Warsh）出任美联储主席以来的首度亮相。历任美联储主席通常倾向于在这一场合保持稳定、避免兴风作浪，但沃什显然不走寻常路。威格斯沃斯指出，自己相当同情沃什的核心哲学——即债券市场保留一点点波动性，从长远来看反而对整个金融体系的健康更有利。传统央行教条认为，极高的政策可预测性能压低利率波动，从而促进经济增长；但这种过度温和的确定性同样会滋生盲目冒险。2000年代房地产泡沫膨胀期间，美联储就曾以极其平缓、机械的节奏稳步加息，结果不仅没能吹散资产泡沫，反而让市场觉得毫无后顾之忧。适度的不确定性能迫使投机者收敛，让人在不敢确定美联储会作何反应时少做蠢事。 克莱恩指出，沃什与前任们的关键分野在于对“前瞻性指引”（Forward Guidance）的态度：近年来的央行极度痴迷于提前向市场全盘预告未来动作，而沃什公开释放的前瞻性指引却是“未来将减少前瞻性指引”。威格斯沃斯认为，关于前瞻性指引的辩论在赞成派与反对派之间都被夸大到了滑稽的地步： - **反对派的夸大**：声称前瞻性指引就像把央行捆绑在桅杆上动弹不得，剥夺了根据最新数据灵活决策的自由。威格斯沃斯驳斥这完全是胡扯，因为一旦经济数据骤变，全球没有哪家央行会犹豫撕毁指引。 - **支持派的夸大**：声称通过口头承诺长期将利率维持在零或低位，就能给市场无穷的安全感以拉动借贷与投资。然而现实中投资者心里清楚，一旦像2021至2022年那样爆发恶性通胀，央行会火速推翻承诺，因此指引在实践中并没有想象中那么神效。 --- ### [46:37](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1TfGBoQVgGc&t=2797s) 谁是“债券卫士”？金融市场的无形否决权 当公众担忧美国政府债务失控时，往往会搬出令人闻风丧胆的术语——“债券卫士”（Bond Vigilantes）。克莱恩打趣道，这是否就是特朗普扬言要动用军队去对付甚至抓捕入狱的目标。威格斯沃斯解释说，“债券卫士”听上去极具画面感，但实际上根本不是坐在阴暗会议室里搞秘密WhatsApp群组操纵市场的金融寡头，它本质上就是普罗大众的集合体——是你我存入银行的钱、养老金计划、共同基金、保险机构、主权财富基金，以及瑞士私人银行里的账户。债券卫士唯一的反制手段不是跑去暴力揍人，而是集体行使资金权力：要么停止向特定国家放贷，要么大幅削减购债规模，要么要求更高的风险溢价与利率回报。 在掌控全球储备货币发行权、能自主印钞的美国，国债市场的韧性与违约风险显然不能与巴基斯坦、斯里兰卡甚至严重依赖外币发债的阿根廷同日而语。但威格斯沃斯强调，“债券卫士”这一概念仍具有无法忽视的现实威慑力。在一个完全依靠信用扩张运转的全球经济体中，提高信用成本或切断资金供给是无可匹敌的生杀大权。最典型的现代例证莫过于2022年秋季的英国：金融市场对特拉斯（Liz Truss）内阁未经测算的减税方案发起猛烈抛售，引发国债危机，最终在短短45天内直接迫使这位首相体面扫地地下台。虽然此类灾难更常见于缺乏政策缓冲的贫穷国家，但它向所有主权政府证明了债权人群体随时可能施加的严酷反噬。 ### [49:15](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1TfGBoQVgGc&t=2955s) 美国债务危机的真实面貌与非常规风险 Ezra Klein 提出一个极具现场感的问题：当债券交易员几杯酒下肚、深夜吐露真心时，或者财政部长 Scott Bessent 在凌晨辗转反侧之际，他们真正担忧的恶劣场景到底是什么？如果未来几年局势走向失控，在业内人士眼中，最糟糕的结局究竟长什么样？ Robin Wigglesworth 坦言，主权债务危机与债务重组是他最着迷的话题之一，虽然沉迷于此“可能让我显得有些可悲”，但这确实是金融、经济、政治与地缘政治最激烈的碰撞点。然而，历史上典型的债务危机往往发生在规模较小、较为贫穷的国家，美国的债务危机将完全不同于世界上任何其他地方： - **无法被动破产**：美国借入的是本币（美元），且自身拥有无限印钞权。只要一个国家能创造用于借款的货币，它除非主动选择违约，否则在技术上根本不可能走向传统破产。 - **危机的替代表现形式**：虽然硬违约的概率“微乎其微”，但无限印钞的代价是失控的恶性通货膨胀，以及因泛滥的美元印钞而陷入剧烈动荡的整个金融体系。 - **非常规债务危机**：深夜交谈中，极少有债券投资者真正担心美国会发生传统意义上的违约。他们真正忌惮的是非常规风险——例如行政权力彻底挟持美联储（Federal Reserve），特朗普式地强行要求降低利率，并不计代价地开动印钞机。这种强行干预将在全球市场引发难以预测的连锁反应。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 美债危机演变路径 accDescr: 对比传统主权债务危机与美国特殊主权债务危机的核心差异与传导机制。 subgraph Normal["传统小国债务危机"] A1["借入外币/无法印钞"] --> B1["流动性枯竭与资不抵债"] B1 --> C1["传统主权硬违约"] end subgraph US["美国非常规债务风险"] A2["债务全以美元计价"] --> B2["无限印钞能力消除硬违约"] B2 --> C2["政治干预美联储强行压低利率"] C2 --> D2["失控的恶性通胀与金融系统痉挛"] end ``` ### [51:26](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1TfGBoQVgGc&t=3086s) 收益率走势迷局：AI 繁荣与经济情景推演 讨论转向具体的国债收益率预期。目前 10 年期美债收益率大致在 4% 到 5% 之间徘徊，Ezra Klein 询问：到 2028 年 11 月下届大选时，美债收益率飙升到 6% 至 7% 的概率有多大？ Robin Wigglesworth 强调，债券市场最具魅力的地方在于它无休止地综合处理着庞大信息——包括经济增长、通胀走势、全要素生产率以及制度健康度。试图准确预测市场的聪明人往往以出丑告终，但他勾勒出了两个极端的宏观逻辑： - **收益率维持高位或上升**：若经济持续繁荣，国债收益率走高反而是健康的经济信号；但若一路飙至 6% 到 7%，则意味着通胀彻底失控，美联储可能已经默许放弃了物价控制目标，经济将滑向经典的“停滞性通胀”（滞胀），即增长过低、通胀过高，且货币政策彻底失去调节效力。 - **收益率暴跌至 1%**：这绝非好事，而是极度恶劣的经济衰退信号。 - **AI 资本开支的双刃剑效应**：当前的人工智能狂热是最大的变量。科技巨头在数据中心等基础设施上的巨额 Capex（资本支出），规模之大堪比历史上的“铁路投机热潮”（Railways Splurge）。短期内，它在边缘上吸走了一部分国债市场的资金，但极大提振了美国整体经济；若缺乏这一投资浪潮，美国当前的宏观图景将截然不同。 Klein 对此补充，如果 AI 最终被证实是一场资产泡沫并轰然破裂，大量支撑经济的投资将瞬间崩塌。届时，私人部门对债务的需求剧减，资本将涌入国债避险；同时美联储将被迫大幅降息以挽救衰退。即便收益率回落到 3% 甚至更低，那也是因为经济深陷危机，而非健康调整。正如 Wigglesworth 所言，健康的收益率回落必须建立在“通胀低且稳定、波动被彻底平息”的基础之上。 ### [54:49](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1TfGBoQVgGc&t=3289s) 圣奥古斯丁式拖延：投资者的认知失调 Klein 提及美国全国经济研究所（NBER）近期发布的一项令人震惊的调查：接受调研的债券投资者中，平均认为未来十年内美国爆发债务危机的概率高达 50%；然而，几乎所有受访者都明确表示，自己的投资组合策略并未因此做出任何调整。Klein 感到非常费解：如果市场自认为面临五成几率的危机，却毫无避险行动，这到底意味着什么？ Wigglesworth 引用了圣奥古斯丁（St. Augustine）的名言来点破这种心理：“主啊，请让我保持贞洁，但不要是现在”（"Lord, make me chaste, but not yet"）。他认为这生动展现了人性面对宏大灾难时的普遍反应，正如应对气候变化一样： - 人们心知肚明风险真实且巨大，最多只会在日常习惯的边缘微调，却不会真正改变根本行为。 - 人们嘴上呼吁政客采取行动，但一旦政策对当下个人利益产生切肤之痛，就会本能地抗拒。 - 这一调查结果既令人惊愕，又完全在情理之中。它道尽了人性的弱点：即便看到隧道尽头有一辆巨大的灾难列车迎面驶来，人们依然心存侥幸，下意识地希望那抹亮光代表着某种有利的好事。 ### [56:23](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1TfGBoQVgGc&t=3383s) 嘉宾好书推荐 在节目尾声的传统荐书环节，Wigglesworth 坦承挑选书目令人头疼，甚至能“感受到背后书架上的书在愤怒地盯着自己”。他最终挑选了三部兼具非虚构叙事魅力、证明财经商业也能生动引人入胜的经典巨作： 1. **《门口的野蛮人》（Barbarians at the Gate）**（Bryan Burrough 与 John Helyar 著） - **推荐理由**：当代叙事类商业报道的“黄金准绳”（Gold Standard）。通过雷诺兹-纳贝斯克公司（RJR Nabisco）著名的杠杆收购案，以及其中各路性格荒诞疯狂的人物，将过去一个世纪的美国商业史展现得淋漓尽致。 2. **《石油风云》（The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power）**（Daniel Yergin 著） - **推荐理由**：同类全球行业史写作的鼻祖（OG）。全书从石油市场这一极其独特的切入点，重构了整部 20 世纪的现代世界史，充满了戏剧性的人物与激荡的历史碰撞，无论是作为记者业务学习还是普通读者开阔眼界，都极具启发性。 3. **《金融之王：毁了世界的四位银行家》（Lords of Finance: The Bankers Who Broke the World）**（Liaquat Ahamed 著） - **推荐理由**：讲述了一战到大萧条之间动荡年代的传世之作。作者通过当时主导世界经济的四位主要央行行长的生平与互动，将极其错综复杂的金融和宏观经济脉络，以非凡的文采和活力（Verve）串联起来，为如何向大众生动解释硬核金融问题树立了标杆。 ## Notable quotes > [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1TfGBoQVgGc&t=0s) 历史上从未有过像现在这样涌入一个国家的巨量资金 — 唐纳德·特朗普 > [01:38](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1TfGBoQVgGc&t=98s) 我们有许多干预手段……终极手段是我们的军队。如果必须动用军队，我们就会动用。 — 唐纳德·特朗普 > [09:52](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1TfGBoQVgGc&t=592s) 当美债市场打个喷嚏，全世界都会感冒；而一旦美债市场患上流感，全球金融体系就会彻底陷入混乱 — 罗宾·威格斯沃斯 > [14:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1TfGBoQVgGc&t=840s) 债务的现有绝对水平并非不可维系，但其增长路径是绝对不可持续的。 — 杰伊·鲍威尔 > [29:39](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1TfGBoQVgGc&t=1779s) 如果有来世，他希望能转世为债券市场，因为那样所有人就都不得不听他的话。 — 詹姆斯·卡维尔 > [39:24](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1TfGBoQVgGc&t=2364s) 谁能替我除掉这个惹麻烦的教士？ — 亨利二世 > [54:49](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1TfGBoQVgGc&t=3289s) 主啊，请让我保持贞洁，但不要是现在 — 圣奥古斯丁 ## Mentioned Ezra Klein, Robin Wigglesworth, Scott Bessent, Donald Trump, Jay Powell, Kevin Warsh, Janet Yellen, James Carville, Russ Vought, Peter Navarro, Bill Pulte, Liz Truss, Thomas Becket, Bryan Burrough, John Helyar, Daniel Yergin, Liaquat Ahamed, Financial Times, Alphaville, JPMorgan Chase, Goldman Sachs, Bloomberg Terminal, TreasuryDirect, Federal Reserve, NBER, RJR Nabisco, A Fabulous Debt: The Epic Story of How Bonds Built the Modern World, Barbarians at the Gate, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power, Lords of Finance: The Bankers Who Broke the World ## Video description A lot of things are on track to get more expensive. The U.S. Treasury market is the bedrock of the global economy. When yields on those Treasuries go up, mortgages, car loans and credit cards get more expensive, and it can hit the stock market, too. And yields have been going up – to levels we haven’t seen consistently since before the Great Recession – inspiring some erratic and futile efforts from the Trump administration to push them back down. So why are yields creeping higher? What is the administration trying to do about it? And if this continues, what’s in store for the economy? Robin Wigglesworth is the editor of the Financial Times blog Alphaville, a host of the podcast “The Story of Money” and the author of the forthcoming book “A Fabulous Debt: The Epic Story of How Bonds Built the Modern World.” This conversation was recorded on August 24, 2026. 00:00 Intro 03:38 What Is a Treasury Bond? 06:56 How Bonds Impact You 11:17 How Bonds Are Traded 22:40 Hedge Funds and Hidden Fragility 26:07 Is the Cheap-Money Era Over? 29:37 Trump vs. the Bond Market 33:21 Bessent’s Bond ‘Tool Kit’ 42:59 Kevin Warsh at Jackson Hole 46:37 Bond Vigilantes 49:46 What a U.S. Debt Crisis Would Look Like 52:50 How A.I. Fits Into This 56:23 Book Recommendations Read the full transcript here: https://www.nytimes.com/2026/08/28/opinion/ezra-klein-podcast-robin-wigglesworth.html Watch more on @EzraKleinShow Thoughts? Guest suggestions? Email us at ezrakleinshow@nytimes.com. You can find transcripts (posted midday) and more episodes of “The Ezra Klein Show” at nytimes.com/ezra-klein-podcast. Book recommendations from all our guests are listed at https://www.nytimes.com/article/ezra-klein-show-book-recs.html [Source](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1TfGBoQVgGc)

[0:00] 唐纳德·特朗普: 历史上从未有过像现在这样涌入一个国家的巨量资金 [1:38] 唐纳德·特朗普: 我们有许多干预手段……终极手段是我们的军队。如果必须动用军队，我们就会动用。 [9:52] 罗宾·威格斯沃斯: 当美债市场打个喷嚏，全世界都会感冒；而一旦美债市场患上流感，全球金融体系就会彻底陷入混乱 [14:00] 杰伊·鲍威尔: 债务的现有绝对水平并非不可维系，但其增长路径是绝对不可持续的。 [29:39] 詹姆斯·卡维尔: 如果有来世，他希望能转世为债券市场，因为那样所有人就都不得不听他的话。 [39:24] 亨利二世: 谁能替我除掉这个惹麻烦的教士？ [54:49] 圣奥古斯丁: 主啊，请让我保持贞洁，但不要是现在

[0:00] Donald Trump: there's never been in history the kind of money coming into a country as we have right now [1:33] Donald Trump: We have many types of intervention. That's one. The ultimate intervention is our military. And if we have to use that, we will. [6:56] Donald Trump: getting a little bit yippy, a little bit afraid [9:52] Robin Wigglesworth: When the U.S. bond market sneezes, the world can catch its cold [14:00] Robin Wigglesworth: not money we owe to Mars, it's money we owe to ourselves [14:00] Jerome Powell: The level of the debt is not unsustainable, but the path is not sustainable. [19:38] Robin Wigglesworth: A lot of it's just signaling. It's vibes. And for bond investors, a Federal Reserve that says we are willing to raise interest rates shows that they're willing to do what it takes to bring inflation down, they will be feel reassured. And you'll see those kind of 10-year bond yields, the 30-year Treasury yields, they'll come down, I think, pretty quickly if the Fed kind of manned up and decided to raise interest rates. [35:06] Robin Wigglesworth: putting out a wildfire with a water pistol [39:24] King Henry II: Who will rid me of this troublesome priest? [42:59] Kevin Warsh: there will be less forward guidance [54:49] Saint Augustine: Lord, make me chaste, but not yet

[0:00] The US Treasury market is the most [0:02] important financial market in the world. [0:04] Bar none. Nothing is even close. Most of [0:08] us don't participate in it directly. We [0:10] don't go in the morning and buy treasury [0:11] bonds. But treasury bonds define [0:14] everything from how the stock market [0:16] ends up performing to the cost of a [0:18] mortgage, a car loan, a credit card. [0:21] There is almost nothing financial they [0:24] do not touch. And the US Treasury [0:26] market, it's been looking a little weird [0:28] lately. The cost of borrowing for the US [0:30] government is going up. Probably because [0:32] our debt recently passed $40 trillion. [0:34] We now spend more on interest [music] on [0:36] that debt yearly than we spend on the [0:38] entire defense budget. But also, Donald [0:41] Trump has been more and more erratic. [0:43] [music] [0:44] >> There's never been in history the kind [0:46] of money coming into a country as we [0:49] have right now. [0:49] >> His Treasury Secretary, Scott Bessant, [0:51] has been making some more aggressive [0:52] moves into the market. [0:54] >> You think of it as pulling back the [0:55] slingshot here. We have a lot of [0:56] potential energy that will turn into [0:59] kinetic energy. [1:00] >> What is going on with US treasuries? Why [1:03] does the Trump administration seem so [1:05] freaked out? And what might happen from [1:07] here? Robin Wigglesworth is the editor [1:11] of the Financial Times blog, [1:12] Alphavville. He's co-host of their [1:14] podcast, A Story of Money, and author of [1:17] the forthcoming book, A Fabulous Debt: [1:20] The Epic Story of How Bonds Built the [1:22] Modern World. A quick time stamp here [1:25] because a lot is happening in the bond [1:27] markets lately. We spoke on Monday, [1:28] August 24th. [1:33] [music] [1:35] Robin Wilksworth, welcome to the show. [1:38] Thanks for having me on. So, I wanted to [1:40] begin with this clip of Donald Trump [1:42] being asked last Friday about Treasury [1:45] Secretary Scott Besson's recent [1:47] interventions in the bond market. [1:49] >> Did you direct Secretary Besson to [1:51] intervene in the bond market, but [1:53] Not at all. [1:54] >> No. He's a very capable man. He wanted [1:56] to do it. He's very good at it. He is a [1:59] good touch. Very good natural touch for [2:01] the bonds and interest. And he did that. [2:04] Yeah. [2:04] >> The yields have come back up since then. [2:06] Have you talked to him about another [2:08] type of intervention? Is that something [2:09] he will do? [2:10] >> We have many types of intervention. [2:11] That's one. The ultimate intervention is [2:14] our military. And uh if we have to use [2:17] that, we will. Yeah. [laughter] [2:20] >> Yeah. [2:21] So, I would say that escalated fairly [2:23] quickly. Uh, I've not heard of people [2:26] trying to use the military against the [2:27] bond market before. [2:28] >> Why don't we start in the more [2:30] comprehensible part of it before we go [2:31] there? [2:32] >> What has Scott Bessett been doing? [2:35] >> Well, it feels a little bit like he's [2:37] doing a bit of a kitchen sink approach [2:39] to bringing bond yields down. The core [2:42] reason is that bond yields, the price of [2:44] the US government borrowing flows into [2:47] everything else. And clearly before the [2:49] midterms, they would like interest rates [2:51] and bond yields to be lower to make [2:53] affordability better for for American [2:55] households. But in the toolkit that the [2:58] Treasury Secretary has, there's actually [3:01] not that much. And Bessant seems to be [3:03] really trying to kind of use some weird [3:06] tools for purposes they weren't really [3:08] designed for. [3:09] >> Breaking market news for you. The [3:11] Treasury Department is doubling the size [3:14] of liquidity support buyback operations [3:16] that are being used for longerdated [3:18] nominal coupon securities and you know [3:21] jacking up the buyback program uh by a [3:25] few billion dollars even even 10xing it [3:27] is not going to move the needle which is [3:29] why people are scratching their heads [3:31] over why he would do this and why [3:33] frankly after the initial reaction uh [3:35] treasury yields have started climbing [3:37] again. I think to have this [3:39] conversation, we need to just set the [3:42] table on this whole structure that [3:45] people sometimes see flash by them on [3:47] CNBC or in the financial pages, but [3:49] maybe don't have that much familiarity [3:51] with. So, just at the simplest level, [3:54] what is a US government bond? A US [3:56] government bond is a tradable loan [3:58] issued by the US. So, bonds are just [4:01] tradable loans. You can buy them, sell [4:03] them. They pay a fixed interest rate and [4:06] they're kind of designed to be able to [4:07] you can buy and sell it very quickly [4:09] unlike a conventional loan. And the US [4:12] government is the biggest government in [4:15] the world. It's the most powerful [4:16] country. It is at the apex of the entire [4:19] global financial system. So that's why [4:21] treasuries are so important and why [4:22] everybody loves having them. They're [4:24] kind of the [snorts] most easily [4:26] tradable [4:28] uh bond on the planet. And one of the [4:32] reasons why the US government can fund [4:34] itself so cheaply is because everybody [4:36] loves buying them. [4:37] >> And they love buying them because [4:38] they're safe. If you have a, you know, a [4:41] share of Tesla stock or of Apple stock [4:44] or of all kinds of things, even a good [4:47] bet for a company over a 10-year time [4:50] frame is pretty unpredictable. [4:52] >> But if the US government says, you know, [4:54] you've bought this bond at 5%. that bond [4:57] is going to pay you 5% for 10 years or [4:59] 20 years or 30 years or whatever it is [5:01] and then give you the underlying money [5:04] on the loan back at the end of that like [5:07] clockwork. [5:08] >> Yeah. [5:08] >> And that's what makes it such an [5:09] important global financial instrument [5:11] that people need something that is [5:12] perfectly reliable and the US Treasury [5:14] Bond is considered as close to perfectly [5:16] reliable as any financial instrument on [5:19] earth. as crazy as it sounds sometimes [5:22] to Americans but yes uh I would say that [5:25] you know there are multiple pillars to [5:27] this and one of it that it's safe that [5:29] if I lend money to the government not [5:31] just over the next 5 years the next 30 [5:33] years I'm pretty confident that there [5:35] will be a US government around in 30 [5:37] years you couldn't say that about every [5:39] country on the planet or even most [5:41] companies you know companies do go [5:42] bankrupt as well uh but the US [5:44] government that feels pretty safe but [5:47] I'd say one of the underappreciated [5:49] pillars is of the treasury market is [5:51] that it's so easy to buy a ton of them [5:54] or sell a ton of them. It's liquidity, [5:57] which is kind of a weird financial [6:00] jargon word that gets abused a lot, but [6:03] it just means that you can buy and sell [6:05] something very easily. The treasury [6:07] market, I mean, that trades a trillion [6:10] dollars a day. And that's why, you know, [6:12] whether you're a pension plan in [6:14] Denmark, a sovereign wealth fund in the [6:16] Middle East, a central bank in Brazil, [6:18] for example, everybody likes treasuries [6:21] because even if you have hundreds of [6:23] billions of dollars worth of them, you [6:25] know, you're going to be able to sell a [6:27] lot of them very quickly if you have to. [6:30] And that's almost like the magic source [6:32] that that that helps keep the Treasury [6:36] market aloft even though concerns about [6:38] US indebtedness have been growing for [6:40] what generations now. So that's the [6:43] financial plumbing side of it. That's [6:46] why treasuries end up being so crucial [6:48] to the financial system. They're they're [6:50] the liquidity. They're like what what [6:52] runs through the arteries of the global [6:53] financial system. [6:55] >> But let's say I am not a pension fund. I [6:58] am not the Brazilian central bank. I [7:01] don't to my knowledge own any bonds. [7:04] Why do I care? Does this affect or could [7:07] this affect me as a normal person? Uh [7:11] unfortunately, yes, it will affect you. [7:13] Uh I mean, stepping really far back, the [7:16] bond market, you know, it's it's seems [7:18] boring. People don't care about it as [7:20] much as the stock market, but really is [7:22] it is the the bedrock of the entire [7:24] global financial system. uh is where [7:26] governments fund themselves. It's where [7:28] banks fund themselves largely. It sets [7:31] the costs of money for governments, for [7:33] companies, for households, through [7:35] mortgages, car loans, student loans, the [7:37] whole nine yards essentially. And it [7:40] flows into the stock market as well. If [7:41] bond yields go too high, if borrowing [7:43] costs are too high for companies, well, [7:45] actually, it it causes the stock market [7:47] to wobble as well. And that's why we've [7:49] seen people like Besson and Trump, they [7:51] actually care less about the stock [7:53] market than people think. Remember [7:56] Liberation Day? The stock market crapped [7:58] out quite violently. It was actually [8:00] when the bond market started to buckle [8:03] that Bessent and Trump very quickly [8:05] said, "Hang on, the bond market is [8:07] getting yippy." Uh, as as Trump put it, [8:09] >> they were getting yippy. You know, they [8:11] were getting a little bit yippy, a [8:13] little bit afraid. [8:14] >> Uh, we need to take a time out. And I [8:17] think that's quite indicative of how [8:19] they see the relative strength and [8:21] importance that the stock market can [8:23] fall and it's not great. Trump wants it [8:26] to be higher, but the bond market [8:28] buckling, the bond market throwing a bit [8:30] of a tantrum that has a real economic [8:32] impact very quickly and can get quite [8:34] scary sometimes. [8:35] >> Yeah, I want to hold on this point that [8:36] the bond market is bedrock of how much [8:38] everything else costs because I think [8:40] it's worth expanding this. So you think [8:41] about an affordability agenda, right? [8:43] The cost of everything is the central [8:45] political issue now. [8:47] The stock market affects how rich people [8:50] both feel and are. The bond market [8:53] affects how much you pay for things [8:55] right now. So when you are getting an [8:57] auto loan, when you are paying uh [8:59] getting a credit card or paying credit [9:00] card debt in the future, that all of [9:03] these things are set on top of the cost [9:05] of money in the treasury market. And so [9:10] if treasuries are paying out at 3%, it's [9:13] 3% plus X, right? plus whatever they [9:15] think they need to add on top of that. [9:17] >> If treasuries are 5%, if they're 7%, [9:21] then mortgages, autos, everything else [9:24] are 5%, 7%, 9% plus something on top of [9:29] that. And so you you're kind of creating [9:32] the base layer of how much everything [9:35] that includes debt is going to cost. To [9:39] say nothing of what happens if you [9:40] actually begin having volatility in that [9:42] market, then things get really scary. [9:43] We've not really seen too much of that [9:45] yet, [9:45] >> but but this has been going up now in a [9:48] kind of persistent way for a couple of [9:49] years. And if you're Donald Trump, [9:51] you're the Republicans [9:52] >> and you want people to feel things are [9:54] getting cheaper. It is very very very [9:55] very very hard to get people to feel [9:58] that life is getting cheaper if the cost [10:01] of money, which again feeds into [10:03] everything else basically, is going up. [10:06] >> Well, Treasury Secretary Scott Besson [10:08] has a 333 plan as he's dubbed it. He [10:11] wants to uh lower the budget deficit to [10:14] 3% of GDP. He wants to get 3% uh growth, [10:18] economic growth. And he wants to [10:21] increase oil production in the United [10:23] States by 3 million barrels a day. [10:26] >> How are we doing on that? [10:27] >> Not well, I think. [laughter] [10:29] But like but this is a global issue [10:31] because because the US is the world's [10:33] most important economy and its financial [10:35] system is huge. You know, when I borrow [10:37] money here in Norway, I'm essentially [10:39] competing with the US Treasury. The US [10:42] government is the the risk-free rate. [10:43] It's the safest government bond market, [10:45] the biggest, the most liquid government [10:46] bond market in the world. The US [10:48] Treasury market is $32 trillion. So, [10:52] when Treasury yields go from 2% or 3% or [10:54] 4% or 5% there, I'm paying a spread on [10:57] that. I'm essentially when I borrow from [10:59] a Norwegian bank, everybody is in some [11:00] way or respect competing with the US [11:03] government for money. But broadly, [11:05] that's why when the US bond market [11:07] sneezes, the world can catch its cold. [11:09] And that's just when it sneezes. When it [11:11] has a a the flu, it gets really nasty. [11:14] That's the volatility that you [11:15] mentioned. You know, I have thought [11:17] about Treasury bonds more than probably [11:18] most people have. I've covered this in [11:20] and out and debt sealing crises and all [11:21] the rest of it for many years. But I [11:24] have never, even to this day, I don't [11:26] have a conceptualization really of how [11:29] these bonds are bought and sold. Is [11:31] there a website they all log into? I [11:33] mean, how quite literally are these [11:36] bonds bought and sold? [11:38] >> They are quite literally bought and sold [11:40] all the time, albeit not in a in a big [11:42] marketplace. So, the first bond market [11:43] is now a food market in in Venice in [11:46] Italy. And now it's all electronic on [11:48] Bloomberg terminals, uh, for example. [11:51] But it has evolved over the years, but [11:53] the US now is a big borrower, so it's [11:55] got pretty sort of strong processes [11:58] built up around this. It wants to be [12:00] predictable. It wants to be steady. is a [12:02] responsible actor. uh you can buy [12:04] treasury bonds, you can put in bids uh [12:06] on on website the government has set up [12:09] you as an individual but most of the big [12:11] buyers the the central banks of of of [12:14] you know Tajjakistan or a pension plan [12:17] in in Mexico they'll buy through banks a [12:21] club of banks called primary dealers and [12:24] they're kind of serious big [12:26] organizations like JP Morgan and Goldman [12:29] Sachs they in return for promising to [12:32] make markets making sure that the [12:34] markets are steady, that there are [12:35] buyers and sellers and they'll match [12:37] them, they are allowed to bid at auction [12:41] from the US government and and so then I [12:43] mean this is a very basic question but [12:45] how is the yield we're talking about [12:47] whether it's 3% or where it is now 4 to [12:49] 5%. [12:51] How is it set? It just it's supply and [12:53] demand that morning how many people are [12:55] buying? How many people are are selling? [12:56] Like what what is happening that lands [12:59] us on any given day at you know 4.2% 2% [13:02] or whatever it might be. [13:04] >> Well, I mean, they look at where they're [13:06] already trading. Uh, but the banks will [13:08] basically come up with an idea or what [13:10] they think they should pay depending on [13:13] what the the the demand is. Most of the [13:15] time, these auctions are non-events. [13:17] They're kind of designed to be boring. [13:19] You don't want excitement when the US [13:21] government is issuing debts. But [13:23] occasionally, there are little curve [13:24] balls. For example, you know, we saw [13:26] this recently. there was slightly limp [13:29] demand for an auction of a 30-year [13:32] Treasury bond and suddenly that that [13:34] yield the US government had to pay a bit [13:36] of extra on top and that kind of cause [13:40] concerns. Well, things be getting less [13:42] boring. So, walk me through the story of [13:44] the bond market over the past I mean you [13:47] can choose the time range here but you [13:48] know 5 10 years. [13:51] How much higher is it than it was? And [13:55] what is it that is starting to get [13:57] people nervous about where it's going [13:58] from here? [14:00] >> Well, I guess I mean so much in the [14:01] world can be divided into the pre global [14:04] financial crisis and post global [14:06] financial crisis. Let's start then. The [14:08] US, you know, it's crazy to us now, but [14:10] you know, Ezra, when you and I were [14:11] younger, a debate in the United States [14:14] was what would happen if the US [14:15] government had no debt? Like in the [14:17] '90s, people were genuinely worried that [14:19] the US government might run out of debt. [14:21] It was it had budget surpluses and it [14:23] was paying down debt. So how does the [14:25] financial system when operate when the [14:28] bedrock just doesn't exist? Now of [14:31] course it's just radically different. [14:32] The big change was the financial crisis. [14:35] Countries around the world just had to [14:37] borrow money and and you know support [14:40] economic growth for years afterwards and [14:42] we've never really recovered from that. [14:45] Now, financial crisis cause these [14:47] massive usually like seven-year [14:49] hangovers economically speaking and [14:52] governments quite rightly decided we [14:55] need to spend our way out of this. But [14:57] then of course, you know, it's it's a [14:59] hard habit to kick and then co came and [15:03] just kind of jacked all those trends up [15:05] to new levels. I mean, we saw, you know, [15:07] recently uh the US government debt [15:09] burden has crossed the $40 trillion [15:12] mark. That's a lot of debt. Uh it's a [15:14] record shattering amount of debt. Uh [15:17] >> just give people I want to give people a [15:18] bit of a context on this. So that means [15:20] in interest we are now paying every year [15:22] in debt interest more than we are [15:24] spending on defense. [15:26] >> Yes. Uh for the first time in almost a [15:28] century in fact since World War II and [15:31] it's it's huge and that's because you [15:34] know the US borrows a lot of money has [15:36] borrowed a lot of money in the past but [15:37] also that debt is becoming more [15:39] expensive as interest rates have gone [15:40] up. So the US is essentially has lots of [15:43] bonds that used to cost maybe 1 or 2% a [15:46] year. Well, they're getting refinanced [15:48] because governments always borrow more [15:50] money to pay back the old money. That's [15:51] getting refinance at a higher and higher [15:53] rate and that's just kind of jacking up [15:55] the interest rate burden. So I was [15:58] always like I've never been hugely [16:00] worried about government debt, the size [16:01] of it, like it's big, but it's not money [16:04] we owe to Mars, it's money we owe to [16:06] ourselves, broadly speaking. But now [16:09] seeing you know co you know it's you [16:11] know it's a decade half a decade since [16:13] we emerged from from the hangover there [16:16] and budget deficits are in most [16:18] countries as large as they've ever been [16:20] if not you know certainly not much [16:22] smaller and that debt burden just keeps [16:25] growing bigger and bigger and and Jay [16:26] Powell he was asked about this by some [16:28] students uh shortly before he stepped [16:30] out his chair was pushed out out his [16:32] chair and the students asked him you [16:34] know should we worry about this and he [16:36] said the level of the debt is not [16:37] unsustain ustainable but the path is not [16:39] sustainable and [16:40] >> I think that's the nuance here that I [16:42] think people are too worried about the [16:43] debt where it is now but of course the [16:45] trajectory just doesn't look good I the [16:47] US like you said is already spending [16:49] more money on on just paying its [16:52] interest bill than it does on defense [16:55] that typically only happens to great [16:57] powers and in times of great emergency [16:59] major wars and things like that and um [17:02] you know I think over the next 20 30 [17:04] years if the present conditions continue [17:08] the US debt burden is going to look it's [17:11] going to go from uncomfortably high to [17:13] monstrously big and that's a worry. [17:16] >> If you're not a subscriber to the New [17:17] York Times, we have some news for you. [17:20] You can now explore the Times for free [17:21] without any pay walls at all during your [17:23] first month in the New York Times app. [17:26] All right, so that's one thing that's [17:27] happening. You're having uh the [17:29] government has to buy more or sell more [17:31] bonds rather because it has to finance [17:33] this increasing large debt. What else is [17:35] going on? Well, there's inflation. Uh [17:38] inflation. We had that massive uh burst [17:41] of inflation after co supply chains went [17:44] kind of haywire. Uh Russia invaded [17:46] Ukraine. There was a lot going on. Uh uh [17:48] lots of people always think inflation is [17:50] uniquely domestic, but this has been a [17:52] global problem. Central banks maybe [17:55] belatedly jacked up interest rates to [17:57] kind of dampen down the economy, dampen [17:59] down prices. And it's it it has it it [18:01] has worked, but they haven't maybe [18:03] gotten that last mile down. So inflation [18:05] is in most countries slightly above [18:08] target including in the United States [18:10] and you know the recent war on Iran has [18:13] not helped. That has blocked off uh [18:15] large parts of energy that used to flow [18:17] through the straits of Hormuz and that [18:20] has pushed up energy prices and has kind [18:22] of made people uncomfortably aware that [18:24] inflation never got back down to the [18:26] central bank's 2% target and might very [18:29] easily drift higher from here. And [18:31] that's not great for bonds. Inflation is [18:32] kind of the the arch nemesis of bonds [18:35] because a bond pays a fixed interest [18:38] rate. So let's say it pays 5% a year. [18:40] Well, if inflation is 5% then [18:41] essentially you're just running to stand [18:43] still. So it becomes less valuable. If I [18:46] had to be maximally generous to that [18:49] Trump clip I played at the top. This is [18:51] what I think he was saying that if you [18:53] listen to Scott Besson, if you listen to [18:54] Trump when they've been talking about [18:55] bonds, they're talking about bonds as [18:58] often the primary problem is Iran. I [19:00] don't think that's true. But I think [19:03] that when Trump is saying the ultimate [19:05] intervention is military, he's saying [19:08] that about they could re-engage military [19:11] inter intervention against Iran. Uh now [19:14] that the reality is that hasn't worked. [19:17] So again, I'm not sure why that would [19:18] bring down bond yields, but the Bess and [19:22] Trump argument seems to be that the [19:25] Treasury markets are looking weird, that [19:27] bond yields are going up because of the [19:30] transitory influence of Iran's closure [19:33] of the Straight of Hormuz. [19:36] Do you buy that actual argument that [19:38] this is all a transitory Iran driven [19:40] phenomena? Well, I agree with your [19:43] interpretation about what Trump was [19:45] talking about, even though I got a lot [19:46] of panicky text messages from bond [19:48] investors uh after that clip. Uh [19:51] slightly tongue and cheek, of course. Um [19:53] and to a certain extent, I agree that [19:56] you know, open the streets of Amuz, [19:58] bring peace to the Middle East, energy [20:00] prices come down, things will quieten [20:03] down. But the the underlying issue is [20:05] this the size of the US indebtedness, [20:07] the size of the budget deficit which you [20:10] know we are now running sort of full [20:12] wartime levels of deficit at a time when [20:14] the economy is actually doing pretty [20:15] well and also the fact that Trump has [20:18] put a new chair of the Federal Reserve [20:20] in and he seems unwilling maybe because [20:24] from instructions from his boss to raise [20:26] interest rates. The Fed could actually [20:28] do a lot to bring bond yields down and [20:30] inflation down if it just raised [20:32] interest rates a little bit. And that [20:34] seems to be the set they just are [20:36] unwilling to take for whatever reason. [20:38] >> Why does raising interest rates bring [20:39] down bond yields? [20:41] >> Well, inflation should be, you know, is [20:44] a sense of there's too much money [20:46] sloshing around the economy. If you [20:47] raise interest rates, you raise the cost [20:49] of money. There's less of it and it [20:51] should dampen the economy. But a lot of [20:53] it's just signaling. It's vibes. And for [20:55] bond investors, a Federal Reserve that [20:58] says we are willing to raise interest [20:59] rates shows that they're willing to do [21:01] what it takes to bring inflation down, [21:04] they will be feel reassured. And you'll [21:06] see those kind of 10-year bond yields, [21:08] the 30-year Treasury yields, they'll [21:10] come down, I think, pretty quickly if [21:12] the Fed kind of manned up and and and [21:16] decided to raise interest rates. So one [21:18] other argument I've been hearing is that [21:20] the level of AI buildout, the amount of [21:24] money that the various AI companies are [21:27] borrowing in order to finance all this [21:29] infrastructure, the data centers, the [21:32] energy, that that's actually creating uh [21:35] the private sector is almost crowding [21:37] out demand for bonds because they're [21:38] soaking up so much investment that some [21:41] of it might normally go to treasuries [21:42] and that is reducing the demand for [21:45] treasuries and pushing up the um amount [21:47] of yield. [21:48] the government has to pay. Do you buy [21:50] that [21:50] >> on the margin? Yes. And the AI buildup [21:53] is staggering, remarkable in scale. It [21:57] is huge. Uh and that is having an effect [22:00] on the margins, but we're still talking [22:03] I think globally in AI related bond [22:07] issuance half a trillion dollars. Now [22:10] that's that's big money even today half [22:11] a trillion dollars. you know, it [22:13] matters, but it's mostly displacing [22:15] other corporate like other companies are [22:18] finding it a little bit pricier to [22:20] borrow. The US Treasury, yes, I'm sure [22:22] maybe adds a few basis points, like a [22:25] smidgens of a percent on the top, but it [22:28] is not massively meaningful for the the [22:32] cost of US borrowing. There are so many [22:34] other larger forces at play here. So, [22:36] it's a factor, but not the factor. And [22:39] then one of the other things people have [22:40] been talking about is that hedge funds [22:42] are playing a different role in the [22:44] treasury market and they are introducing [22:47] volatility that wasn't there before. C [22:49] can you explain why? [22:51] >> Yeah, I mean this is a a huge topic and [22:54] I still think probably under discuss. So [22:56] if you cast your mind back to sort of [22:58] the the 2000s uh there was all this talk [23:02] of a global savings. So you had all [23:04] these central banks and and investors [23:05] around the world were saving a lot of [23:06] money and they were putting into [23:08] treasury bonds. Uh and you could see the [23:10] the foreign ownership of the treasury [23:12] market became very big and it was mainly [23:15] central banks and sovereign wealth funds [23:16] and they were known as price agnostic [23:19] investors. They were buying treasury [23:20] bonds because their liquidity they were [23:22] very easy to buy and sell not [23:24] necessarily as a sort of to make great [23:26] returns. [23:28] That has stabilized and even shrunk a [23:31] little bit. This global savings glut is [23:33] looking a little bit less gluty these [23:35] days. Uh and the treasury market has at [23:39] the same time grown enormously over the [23:43] past decade. And into the breach we've [23:47] seen hedge funds step in. But it has [23:49] meant that the treasury market has [23:52] become increasingly beholden to hedge [23:54] funds. So I think it's gone from around [23:56] 2% to close to 8%. So officially now [24:00] hedge funds own more of the treasury [24:02] market than Japan and China and Saudi [24:05] Arabia combined and that's a huge change [24:08] and normally that doesn't matter that [24:10] much because you know you want a diverse [24:13] ecosystem and hedge funds are playing an [24:15] important role in the treasury market a [24:18] valuable role I'd even say but they are [24:21] also very leveraged they borrow money to [24:25] hold these treasury bonds so let's say [24:27] you put down $10 million, well certainly [24:30] $100 million, you can buy a billion [24:33] dollars worth of treasury. So if [24:34] suddenly the cost of your leverage, your [24:36] borrowing that goes up, well then you're [24:38] just shaken out of that trade. Uh and [24:40] that I think is something that policy [24:41] makers, I'm Janet Yellen's talked about [24:43] this before. I'm sure Scott Bessent is [24:46] aware of this issue. I think this is one [24:47] of the reasons why they backtrack quite [24:50] quickly when the bond market started [24:52] quivering a bit after Liberation Day in [24:54] April 2025. [24:56] But it is definitely one of the [25:00] biggest fault lines running through the [25:02] financial system right now. [25:03] >> And the concern here is that hedge funds [25:05] when they're leveraged compared to the [25:07] way pension funds act or the way other [25:10] central banks act, things can happen [25:12] that require them to move much faster to [25:15] keep themselves from going under. So you [25:17] could have correlated sell-offs of [25:19] treasuries happening very very quickly [25:21] in a way that would not be typical of [25:23] the way central banks act under [25:25] pressure. Yeah, normally when there's an [25:28] economic crisis, Treasury yields fall [25:31] because people buy Treasury bonds [25:32] because they're safe and solid and you [25:34] want to get the hell out of stocks. Uh [25:36] but because of this dynamic, you can see [25:40] different uh phenomena happen. We saw [25:42] this in March 2020. We saw this in April [25:45] 2025 when Treasury yields actually [25:47] started shooting higher as Treasury [25:50] bonds were sold off because hedge funds [25:51] were essentially being shaken out of [25:53] those trades. There were very heavy [25:54] leverage. That means that they're not [25:56] strong hands. You know how you know meme [25:58] stock traders talk about diamond hands? [26:00] They're never going to sell at GameStop. [26:02] Well, hedge funds are not solid hands [26:04] all the time. And so we've gone in this [26:07] period in this post financial crisis [26:09] period to now [gasps] [26:12] from a place where the borrowing cost [26:14] for the US government was just [26:16] incredibly low. [26:17] >> Yeah. I remember back when I was at Wonk [26:19] Blog at the Washington Post and we would [26:21] constantly cuz we were we were arguing [26:23] that we should actually borrow more at [26:24] that time and invest in infrastructure. [26:26] We had constantly put up these 10-year [26:29] [snorts] uh tables showing that at a [26:32] real rate, the borrowing cost was [26:34] negative. That when you took inflation [26:35] into account, people were almost paying [26:36] the US government to borrow because they [26:38] were so desperate for US government debt [26:41] because it was safe, because it was [26:42] liquid, because you could actually work [26:44] with it at a time of of great [26:46] uncertainty. [26:48] So one dimension of the US economy in [26:51] that period was we had incredibly low [26:53] borrowing costs and just slowly and then [26:56] kind of postcoid more rapidly and then [27:00] post Trump more unpredictably [27:02] that's been changing you know you're not [27:05] going to get that 2 or 3% mortgage [27:06] anymore and so you're you're having this [27:09] sort of like stepping up of the ladder [27:12] of how much our money costs [27:15] and it this year has felt to like the [27:18] year when people are starting to think, [27:21] oh, this is going to change the way you [27:23] should think about the US economy going [27:25] forward if something doesn't happen. [27:26] Because people felt the inflation a [27:27] couple years ago was transitory. The Fed [27:29] would bring up rates and it would bring [27:31] it back down. But the way the Trump [27:33] administration is spending, the lack of [27:35] predictability in US policy, it seems to [27:38] me that there is a shift in bond [27:41] markets, in the conversation about how [27:44] to think about the US. So what is the [27:47] shift [27:50] has multiple dimensions. I I agree with [27:52] everything and it was remarkable right [27:54] how low bond yields were for a long time [27:56] and obviously it was a a sign of [27:58] malaise. It was not a healthy thing and [28:00] it showed that we should have been [28:01] spending more money then arguably um [28:04] 2022 was kind of the year of the [28:06] reckoning that was like the Anna's [28:08] herulous for the bond market. It was one [28:10] of the worst years for the global bond [28:12] market in centuries. I mean by in three [28:15] centuries by some reckoning and I think [28:19] people think that after you have a [28:20] reckoning well then there's cathosis you [28:23] move on and things kind of settle down [28:25] to a new level and inflation will come [28:27] down the Fed finally jacked up interest [28:29] rates the European Central Bank jacked [28:31] up interest rates governments would [28:32] start tightening their belts after co so [28:35] there was also in the bond market you [28:37] and we can see this on the prices the [28:39] bond market kind of agreed with the Fed [28:40] that inflation would be transitory and [28:42] we would return to, you know, it's a [28:44] massively overused phrase, but a new [28:46] normal. And that new normal would be [28:48] inflation back to where it should be and [28:50] bond yields at maybe Treasury yields at [28:52] 3%, maybe 3 4%. And then I think look [28:57] pre and post Trump also mark I think a a [29:01] sense of things you thought were [29:03] unimaginable before are now certainly [29:06] not unthinkable anymore. the US, you [29:09] know, still depends on a lot of money [29:10] coming in from foreign investors to buy [29:13] treasuries. Uh, and and you know, that [29:16] money doesn't feel quite as welcome as [29:18] it used to. We can see China and other [29:20] countries tiptoeing a little bit away [29:22] from the Treasury market. So suddenly [29:24] things that even I maybe foolishly [29:26] believed firmly a few years ago, I think [29:30] you wouldn't feel quite as confident [29:32] about today. And I think that ripples [29:34] certainly through the financial system [29:36] as well. One thing that has been a [29:39] little unusual here. So in my political [29:42] lifetime, typically presidents and [29:46] administrations are [29:48] they tiptoe quite gingerly around the [29:50] bond market. James Carville when he was [29:52] a top adviser to President Clinton had [29:54] this joke that when he when he was [29:56] reincarnated, he wanted to come back as [29:58] the bond market because then everybody [29:59] would have to listen to him. [30:01] >> It's a great question. And you have in [30:04] general uh presidents tend to do two [30:07] things around the bond market. One is if [30:09] it's going up you want to put in charge [30:12] of the Fed somebody who markets are [30:15] going to treat with a lot of respect and [30:17] esteem. The other thing you'll tend to [30:19] see presidents do when they are worried [30:21] about uh the price of money and they [30:24] have a big debt or deficit is beginning [30:27] to move towards deficit reduction, [30:30] fiscal contraction. [30:32] >> Donald Trump is not really doing either [30:34] of these things. He was very aggressive [30:36] in pushing uh Powell out. He talked a [30:39] lot about how he wanted to see the [30:41] Federal Reserve bring down rates. um he [30:43] brought in Kevin Worsh who is a [30:45] relatively wellrespected guy but he's [30:48] coming in under this cloud of what did [30:50] he have to tell Donald Trump and what [30:51] has he promised in order to get that [30:52] job. Then on the other side Trump has [30:55] done huge amounts of spending, huge [30:57] amounts of tax cuts. Nobody thinks [30:59] they're about to do a big pivot to a [31:01] grand budget bargain. [31:04] So you have a very different orientation [31:06] right now it seems to me from the US [31:09] president towards the bond market and [31:11] towards what you should do if yields are [31:14] going up and you don't like it. Like as [31:17] he said Besson has a touch with the bond [31:20] market, a touch with industry. He's a [31:21] former currency trader, but you don't [31:23] usually use the head of the Treasury [31:25] Department as a trader. [31:27] >> No, [31:28] >> he's supposed to implement fiscal [31:29] policy. So, how would you characterize [31:32] where they're going on this and what [31:33] that might mean? [31:35] >> You know, I'm a journalist as well and I [31:36] always try to sort of project of almost [31:38] steal man the other side's argument, but [31:41] I do feel some of the policym around [31:43] this has been charitably incoherent. [31:47] Uh, and some of it is due to some almost [31:50] very natural misunderstandings like [31:52] people think of interest rates but there [31:53] obviously lots of different interest [31:55] rates. The Fed decides interest rates on [31:57] the short end essentially like what [31:59] overnight's interest rates are and that [32:01] filters through the banking system, but [32:02] the Treasury markets interest rates, the [32:05] bond yields, they are set by markets. [32:06] They're set by price and demand and [32:08] they're obviously affected by interest [32:09] rates, but all sorts of things. And you [32:12] know, Donald Trump wants bond yields and [32:14] the bond market to behave because he [32:16] wants that affordable mortgage for [32:18] Americans. That's clearly he's talked a [32:20] lot about that. Uh but he also wants the [32:22] Fed to lower interest rates and they [32:24] don't really play well together if at [32:26] all. You know if if you want bond yields [32:29] lower uh I mean the quickest way is for [32:32] the Fed to jack up rates or just [32:34] engineer some sort of massive recession. [32:36] Neither are really that much fun, right? [32:37] But like you say, you want a credible [32:39] federian. And I think that's why he [32:41] chose somebody with like Walsh who in a [32:43] fairly horrific long list of candidates [32:46] was by far probably the most credible [32:48] one certainly on the short list. Uh [32:51] because he realized if you put somebody [32:54] completely uh unqualified uh in in the [32:58] Fed chairmanship, then suddenly you'll [33:00] you'll see quite a violent bond market [33:02] reaction. [33:02] >> Yeah. chair Peter Navaro would not have [33:04] been good for. [33:05] >> Oh, Bill PY was the one that that really [33:08] I mean as a financial journalist I love [33:10] you know messy stuff [laughter] [33:12] >> but [33:13] >> that'd be pretty py would have been [33:15] pretty bad I think but uh you know him [33:17] and Bessant don't play well together [33:18] either. [33:19] >> I want to bring up a clip of Bessant [33:22] from the other day on CNBC. [33:24] >> Yeah, I I I was going to ask how how big [33:26] this could get. If if if the signal here [33:29] is that you're not happy with the [33:30] direction of yields, you know, they've [33:32] they've gone back the other way. We [33:34] you've erased most of the Treasury rally [33:36] that you got yesterday with that big [33:37] surprise. So, how much more are you [33:39] willing to do? [33:40] >> Well, again, uh we we have a big [33:42] toolkit. So, we we'll see. And part of [33:46] it is signaling here and to show that we [33:49] we believe that the yields don't reflect [33:51] the underlying fundamentals. you know, [33:53] this Iran conflict, we will get on the [33:56] other side of this. Uh we we don't know [33:59] when and we can talk about the economic [34:01] measures we're going to be taking [34:02] against Iran in a minute. And you know, [34:05] we are in the administration. We are the [34:09] announcing probably at the end of this [34:12] week, beginning of next week, an [34:13] increased focus on fiscal consolidation. [34:16] And you know, it's the coming from [34:18] President Trump. uh Russ Vote and myself [34:21] will be examining both on the revenue [34:24] side and the cost side uh what we can [34:27] do. [34:28] >> All right. So I want to go through a [34:29] couple pieces of that because one thing [34:31] you hear there is something I was [34:32] mentioning a few minutes ago which is at [34:33] least beginning to signal they would [34:35] like to do fiscal consolidation. But [34:37] given how little they've done with [34:38] Congress, I don't think anybody's taken [34:39] that seriously at all. [gasps] [34:41] But what does he mean when he says we [34:44] don't believe the yields reflect the [34:46] underlying fundamentals? Reminds me a [34:48] little bit of the John McCain quote that [34:50] was very famous after when the markets [34:52] were collapsing. [34:53] >> The fundamentals are of our economy are [34:55] strong. [34:56] >> Uh that quote did not age well at that [34:58] moment. What do you hear when Bessant [35:00] says that [35:02] I truthfully I hear a little bit of [35:04] desperation. [35:06] I I don't think bond yields are going to [35:08] go massively higher. uh this is not a [35:12] massive crisis but the rolling out of an [35:15] enlarged buyback program a technical [35:17] program supposed to you know very nerdy [35:20] it's not supposed to be something that [35:22] has a major effect so when the US [35:24] government sells a 10-year bond for [35:25] example which is the standard type of [35:27] bond kind of the benchmark bond that's [35:29] super tradable it's super easy you can [35:31] sell a billion dollars of it without [35:33] moving the price but as that kind of [35:35] becomes a 9-year bond an 8year bond a [35:38] seven-year bond it becomes It's a bit [35:39] stale. It's kind of locked away in [35:41] vaults and pension plans at banks. So, [35:43] it doesn't trade that much. So, the [35:45] price usually kind of reflects that and [35:47] then you can typically buy them at a [35:49] slight discount. So, what the Treasury [35:51] has been doing for a while is spending a [35:53] few billion dollars on buying some of [35:55] those stale slightly cheap bonds and [35:59] paying for it by issuing those those [36:01] super liquid 10-year bonds, 20-year [36:03] bonds. Uh, Besson enlarged that program. [36:08] He says because the liquidity was [36:10] getting worse in some parts of the [36:11] Treasury bond market, but it looks like [36:15] a a fairly naked attempt at lowering [36:18] those bond yields again. Uh but sort of [36:21] completely ignoring the scale of what [36:23] we're talking about. We're talking a few [36:24] billion dollars. There's over a trillion [36:27] dollar worth of treasuries that trade [36:29] every day. I this is like putting out a [36:31] you know a wildfire with a water pistol. [36:33] And that's why you saw the bond market [36:36] first reacted to the signal. he was [36:37] sending that we we want yields down and [36:40] you know when the Treasury Secretary [36:42] says that and acts that way the [36:44] knee-jerk reaction is oh we're going to [36:46] buy bonds but then people realize well [36:47] actually no this is clearly not going to [36:49] have an effect and it's one of the [36:52] reasons why the the bond market is so [36:54] tricky for people why Carville made that [36:56] amazing quote about how you can [36:58] intimidate everybody because you can't [37:01] push around trillions of dollars very [37:03] easily the only people that could really [37:05] do it they have the resources to do it. [37:07] There's only one place in town that can [37:09] print unlimited dollars and that's the [37:11] Federal Reserve. So, the Federal Reserve [37:13] has done this in the past, has beaten [37:14] down bond yields uh after the financial [37:17] crisis and in in co um but the Treasury [37:21] just doesn't have the the resources. [37:25] Well, one thing that I've heard a lot of [37:27] traders talking about and one reason [37:30] maybe you saw this rapid movement where [37:32] Bessant announced a policy where they [37:34] increased these buybacks and that seemed [37:37] to bring yields down for a minute and [37:38] then yields bounce back up. [37:40] >> Yeah. [37:40] >> Is it you keep saying this is looking a [37:42] little bit desperate. [37:44] It's maybe worth expanding on what that [37:46] actually means because what he is saying [37:48] is that I am trying to bring things into [37:50] alignment with the fundamentals. you [37:52] know, we're even willing to put our [37:53] money where our mouth is on this. It [37:55] seems in many cases have the uh opposite [37:58] effect of actually scaring people a [37:59] little bit that if they're willing to do [38:01] this, what does that actually make you [38:03] think about where this is all going? But [38:05] how do you see that dimension of it? [38:08] Like why why does it have this sort of [38:11] effect on expectations? It is in the [38:13] opposite direction of the Treasury's [38:15] purchases. [38:18] Well, this boils down to credibility. I [38:20] mean the US has for a very long time [38:23] over across many many administrations of [38:25] both from both sides of the aisle built [38:28] up a ton of institutional credibility [38:31] about how it acts how it behaves its [38:35] predictability [38:36] when you see you know the world's most [38:40] influential economic policy maker acting [38:44] I wouldn't say erratically but acting [38:46] the way that you know most bond traders [38:48] sus out very quickly that this was not [38:50] going to work. [38:52] It makes you doubt other parts of what [38:56] what what else are they thinking about [38:58] if they're unpredictable? What what else [39:00] could happen? And that makes people [39:02] skittish. And I I don't think people are [39:04] panicking about the US or worrying at [39:06] all. And I think, you know, frankly, it [39:08] was weird that Bessant would respond so [39:10] forcibly to what looked like a [39:13] unfortunate but entirely natural [39:15] increase in Treasury bond yields because [39:18] of, you know, people think inflation [39:20] might stay a bit higher for a bit longer [39:22] to, you know, compensate you for that [39:24] direct risk you're taking. But it wasn't [39:27] out of whack. This was not like we saw [39:29] in liberation day. This was Mar not [39:31] March 2020 when the Treasury market [39:34] really crapped out on the pressure from [39:35] CO. So I'm I'm honest a little bit [39:39] baffled because as as Trump said himself [39:42] in that opening clip that you know [39:44] Bessant I'm not sure he has a deaf hand [39:47] with the bond market but he is a former [39:49] bond and currency trader. He does [39:51] understand these things. He's doing [39:53] things he himself knows to be wrong and [39:56] won't work. I don't doubt for a second [39:59] he know this doesn't work. [40:00] >> Didn't Besson criticize Yelen when she [40:02] was doing a more modest version of these [40:03] same buybacks? [40:05] >> He did. And he also criticized the Biden [40:08] administration for issuing more bills. [40:11] So the the idea was that this was you [40:13] know activist Treasury policy and of [40:15] course they're doing the same thing. I [40:18] chalk that more up to sort of standard [40:20] political partisanship. [40:22] uh you know you're always going to [40:23] criticize incumbent government for [40:25] anything and yes it looks massively [40:27] hypocritical when you do exactly the [40:29] same thing uh but that feels standard. [40:33] What doesn't feel standard is this kind [40:35] of incoherence and doing things that [40:37] people in the administration know won't [40:40] work well. Usually when there's [40:42] incoherence in the Trump administration [40:44] it comes because either Donald Trump [40:46] wanted something or people thought [40:47] Donald Trump wanted something. Now, when [40:49] asked, Donald Trump said, "Of course, I [40:51] had nothing to do with my Treasury [40:53] Secretary engaging with the bond market [40:55] and intervening in this way." I'm going [40:58] to take that as something that I don't [41:00] uh believe has truth value one way or [41:02] another. Uh Besson also came out this [41:04] week with this FT oped about, you know, [41:06] just a complete trend to do an economic [41:08] annihilation of Iran to to end that. So [41:12] this feels to me like there is a debate [41:14] happening inside the Trump [41:15] administration somewhere where they're [41:17] upset about what is happening in Iran, [41:18] upset about the bond market. So how much [41:21] is the answer to why is Besson doing [41:23] things that at another time he seemed to [41:25] know you shouldn't do simply that the [41:28] president is telling people that he [41:31] [snorts] does not like the path of the [41:33] bond market and he wants it to you use [41:36] the word behave earlier. I would just [41:38] say be lower, right? He wants yields [41:40] lower. He wants money cheaper. He wants [41:42] things more affordable. He wants the [41:44] economy growing faster. And even though [41:46] that is maybe contrary to a bunch of [41:48] other things he's done on the policy [41:49] side, maybe some of the problems here [41:50] actually of his causing, he wants all [41:53] the things at once. [41:54] >> Yeah. Who doesn't want all the good [41:56] things at the same time, right? I I'm [41:58] the same. I like my cake and I like to [42:00] eat it. But it does feel I agree that [42:03] you I'm not an administration watcher. I [42:05] just watch the bond market. But it does [42:07] feel there has elements of that. I can't [42:09] remember which Henry it was one of the [42:11] English kings who said who will rid me [42:13] of this troublesome priest and then you [42:16] know somebody went out and murdered [42:17] Thomas Abeckett that you know he will [42:19] say that he wants certain things and [42:21] people will feel the need to go out and [42:23] somehow do it even when they know that [42:26] in practice this is not going to help [42:28] the king it's going to probably harm him [42:30] uh it's a very sort of short- termist [42:33] way of thinking I mean like I said the [42:35] simple solution here is that the Fed [42:37] raises interest rates Well, at the very [42:39] least signals a strong willingness to do [42:41] so. That I think would restore a lot of [42:43] calm. It would do way more than these [42:45] measly buybacks. Uh ending the war in [42:49] Iran and and restoring free passage [42:51] through the straits of Amuz would [42:52] certainly help a lot as well, but we're [42:54] really talking, you know, there's a lot [42:56] of things going on. We're we're talking [42:58] in the week of the Jackson Hole [43:00] Symposium, which is the annual big [43:01] central bank conference. This will be [43:03] the first where Kevin Worsh is there as [43:05] Fed chair. What are you expecting him to [43:09] say? Do [43:11] >> you know normally Fed chairs have not [43:14] wanted to rock the boat too much at [43:16] Jackson Hall. [43:18] Walsh does not think that. And I have to [43:20] admit I have some sympathy with his view [43:21] that maybe some volatility in the bond [43:24] market just a little bit might actually [43:27] be a healthy thing in the long run. So [43:30] the central bank view and I have some [43:32] sympathy with that too is that uh [43:35] predictability [43:36] means that bond market volatility and [43:38] interest rates volatility is low and [43:40] that's better for economic growth. That [43:42] is completely true. I believe that [43:44] wholeheartedly. [43:46] But some unpredictability can maybe make [43:49] the system as a whole safer. So if you [43:52] think back in 2000s when the Fed was [43:55] actually jacking up interest rates [43:57] because the housing bubble was [43:58] inflating, they saw some of this. They [44:00] were raising interest rates in a very [44:02] predictable steady way in a way that [44:05] maybe didn't really blow away the froth [44:07] and a bit of uncertainty about what the [44:08] Fed might do might be on the whole be [44:11] healthy for the system because it kind [44:12] of re in a bit of risk-taking. You you [44:14] feel less confident about doing dumb [44:17] stuff if you don't really know how the [44:19] Fed is going to react to certain things. [44:21] I've never seen Walsh articulate it [44:23] quite in that way. Uh and maybe he does [44:26] so at Jackson Hole, but it's going to be [44:29] fascinating to see because I mean this [44:31] is a new era of central banking uh at [44:34] the world's most powerful central bank. [44:36] So it's going to be probably one of the [44:37] most interesting Jackson holes for a [44:39] very long time. I'm certainly getting my [44:41] popcorn ready. I mean this is a way in [44:43] which wars is differing a little bit [44:45] from those who came before. I mean, it [44:46] sounds very [44:48] >> it's a weird thing to be arguing over, [44:50] but yeah, Fed recent Fed chairs have [44:52] been very into forward guidance. They [44:56] >> tell you what they're going to do well [44:58] before they do it, so you know what [44:59] they're going to do and you can react [45:01] and everybody can plan. And Wars has [45:04] been [45:05] uh I don't want to say opposed to all [45:07] forward guidance, but he has announced [45:10] his forward guidance has been there will [45:12] be less forward guidance. [laughter] [45:14] Yes. Uh why? So I I have to should say [45:18] that I think both the proponents of [45:20] forward guidance and that's most central [45:21] bankers around the world and enemies of [45:23] it have almost to a comical degree [45:27] overstated the case for and against that [45:30] you know the enemies of forward guidance [45:32] have indicated that this is central [45:34] banks binding themselves to the mast [45:36] that if they say they're going to do X [45:38] they have to do X and it takes away the [45:40] the flexibility to be able to do [45:42] anything respond to incoming data and [45:45] that's just below [45:46] Central banks have issued forward [45:48] guidance and when the data changes they [45:49] change their mind. We've seen that [45:51] happen in every central bank including [45:53] the Federal Reserve. I think central [45:55] banks have frankly overstated the [45:58] advantages of forward guidance as a way [46:00] of sort of stimulating the economy. They [46:02] said that well if we say we're going to [46:04] keep interest rates low for super long [46:07] or until X or Y sometimes there being [46:09] concrete triggers um that that will give [46:12] people so much safety that we're not [46:14] going to raise interest rates that [46:16] they'll go out and borrow money [46:17] stimulate the economy get all that [46:19] economic growth going and I think also [46:21] again people don't really listen to that [46:23] because they also do understand that if [46:25] inflation suddenly erupts as it did in [46:27] 2122 then central banks are going to [46:30] very hurily backtrack on this forward [46:32] guidance, it just doesn't matter that [46:33] much. [46:35] >> So when people used to worry about bonds [46:38] and the US government debt, the thing [46:40] you would hear them talk about was the [46:42] coming of the dreaded bond vigilantes. [46:45] So who are the bond vigilantes and is [46:49] there any reason to still worry about [46:51] them? [46:52] >> So these are the people that Trump is [46:53] going to deploy the military against, [46:55] right? Um [46:57] >> only it's it's our it's our last option. [47:00] Our last option is jailing all the [47:01] bonds. [47:02] >> Last option. Yes, exactly. Well, jailing [47:04] them. Um, so I mean there I mean it's [47:07] you and me. It's our pension plans, our [47:10] mutual funds, our banking, the money [47:12] that we have in the banking system. Uh, [47:14] the bond vigilantes is kind of a very [47:16] amorphous phrase. It's a wonderful I've [47:18] used and used it many times myself [47:20] because it's so evocative. But in [47:22] reality, it's just, you know, a vast [47:25] ecosystem of money that is in a mutual [47:30] fund, a pension plan, an insurance [47:32] company, a bank, a sovereign wealth [47:33] fund, a private bank in Switzerland. Uh [47:36] even you and I, we can buy treasuries [47:38] directly from the US government. Uh and [47:40] the idea is that, you know, the [47:42] vigilantes would, you know, stop lending [47:45] to countries. And it's really the only [47:47] power. They can't go around beating [47:48] people up, [47:49] >> which is to say they would stop buying [47:50] these bonds. [47:51] >> Yeah. Or maybe just buy the less of them [47:53] or or want a slightly higher interest [47:55] rate. Um so it's both a overdone phrase [48:01] and I think certainly in the place like [48:02] the United States that can literally [48:04] create dollars. The US bond market is a [48:07] very different beast than it is in let's [48:08] say a Pakistan or Sri Lanka or even [48:12] Argentina that tends to borrow a lot in [48:14] in foreign currencies. Uh but it does [48:17] actually you know it's has a bit of [48:20] truthiness to it because in a world in a [48:23] global economy that runs on credit [48:26] the ability to raise the cost of credit [48:28] or deny it altogether is an incredible [48:30] power and this is not set by you know a [48:34] bonesses in a secret WhatsApp group but [48:37] it is the individual decision of a [48:41] million people sometimes acting in [48:43] concert but you do sometimes the bond [48:46] market just get [48:48] jittery about certain countries, certain [48:51] companies at certain times. Most [48:53] famously in the UK in 2022 where they [48:56] managed to oust a prime minister in I [48:58] think 45 days, but typically more in [49:01] poorer countries that frankly don't have [49:03] the resources that a large advanced [49:06] fellow economy does. [49:08] >> So you have more conversations with bond [49:10] traders than I do. Uh, it's not a super [49:13] high bar to clear, but you clear it. [49:15] >> Some of my best friends are born [49:17] traders. [49:18] >> When you guys are a couple drinks in and [49:20] they're describing [49:23] the bad scenarios, the stuff they worry [49:25] about or they think about, the stuff [49:27] that maybe Bessant is worried about in, [49:29] you know, the wee hours in the morning. [49:33] What does this look like over the coming [49:35] couple of years if this goes [49:37] wrong? I mean, what do informed people [49:40] think bad outcomes here might look like? [49:44] >> Well, so Ezra, one of my favorite topics [49:46] in the whole world, and this does make [49:48] me a very sad human being probably, but [49:51] a sovereign debt crisis and sovereign [49:53] debt restructuring. I just think it's [49:54] there are just this fascinating [49:56] collision of finance, economics, [49:58] politics, geopolitics, everything comes [50:00] together. But they usually affect uh [50:02] smaller, poorer countries, of course. Uh [50:04] but because of my interest, I actually [50:06] had thought probably an unhealthy amount [50:09] of time about what a US debt crisis [50:11] would look like. Uh a US debt crisis [50:14] would not look anything like anything [50:17] else in the world. [50:19] First of all, the US can't really go [50:21] bankrupt unless it chooses to. I mean, [50:24] the US only borrows in dollars and it [50:26] can create dollars. It's very hard to go [50:29] bankrupt if you can create the currency [50:31] that you're borrowing. Now that can have [50:34] other um crisis-l like outcomes like [50:37] runaway inflation, a financial system [50:39] that you know convulsed by all this [50:42] dollar printing. But but a classic [50:44] default is unlikely or or vanishingly [50:49] unlikely. And that's why when I've [50:50] talked to bond investors, including in [50:52] the the the early hours of the morning [50:55] and a few drinks in, very few bond [50:57] investors I know are genuinely worried [50:59] about a debt crisis in the conventional [51:02] sense. But you can see lots of [51:04] unconventional types of of severe debt [51:08] issues in the United States. Like for [51:10] example, if they suddenly start if they [51:11] suddenly are managed to co-opt the [51:13] entire Federal Reserve and start [51:15] creating dollars like Trump says, I want [51:18] interest rates lower and we're just [51:19] going to print as many dollars to do so [51:22] as possible. That has ripple effects [51:25] everywhere. [51:26] >> What do you think the Cuz we're What [51:29] What is the Treasury rate at right now? [51:31] You probably looked at Bloomberg this [51:33] morning and I didn't. Well, 10 year is [51:36] kind of yeah it's around four four [51:37] between it's been between four and 5% [51:39] for a while which is why you know I [51:41] don't get why they were freaking out so [51:42] much. What's the chance in your view [51:45] that come you know November of 2028 [51:49] we'll use election day here as a a kind [51:52] of marker [51:53] >> that the rate is [51:57] 6 to 7%. [51:59] I mean, one thing that I love about the [52:01] bond market is that it synthesizes just [52:04] an insane amount of information. Uh, [52:07] economic growth, inflation, [52:09] productivity, [52:11] health of institutions, things like [52:12] that. Uh, and I'd say that, you know, I [52:17] people smarter than me embarrass [52:19] themselves trying to predict the markets [52:22] all day long. So, I I just don't know. [52:23] But as long as the economy is booming [52:25] and we want that, then Treasury yields [52:27] should go higher. That would be a [52:29] healthy signal. And if bond yields go [52:32] back to, let's say, 1%, if you and I are [52:34] talking in in November 2028, and [52:37] Treasury yields are at 1% again, well, [52:40] that's a very terrible economic [52:42] backdrop. Uh, which way it would go [52:45] right now, I don't know. I mean, AI is [52:48] the big factor right now. I mean, it's [52:50] kind of the investments are happening in [52:52] data centers. I they're maybe on the [52:54] margins sucking a little bit of [52:55] investment away from the treasury [52:57] market, but they're certainly juicing [52:58] the economy. Uh the US economy would [53:01] look I think rather different if we [53:03] weren't seeing these huge capex programs [53:06] that you know the biggest is the [53:08] railways splurge. Uh and then you know [53:11] it depends like is this going to get the [53:12] economy going or is it just going to end [53:15] in another sort of the infrastructure [53:17] bust and that would probably decide what [53:20] things look like in in November. [53:22] >> To try that out you can imagine a world [53:24] where AI proves to be a bubble. [53:26] >> There's a big pop. this investment that [53:29] is powering so much collapses [53:33] and then you probably would get to lower [53:34] bond yields because one there would be [53:36] less private demand for debt and so more [53:39] of the more of those funders could buy [53:42] treasuries. Second, the Fed would [53:44] probably have to bring down rates [53:45] because you'd be going into a recession [53:47] or very likely going into a recession. [53:49] So that'd be a world where yeah, maybe [53:51] bond yields are down to 3% but it's not [53:53] a good world. They're down there because [53:55] the economy has gone into crisis. [53:58] >> Now, we want bond yields to go down for [54:01] the right reasons and that is that [54:03] inflation is low and stable and [54:05] quiescent and not uh very volatile and [54:11] but you want you want some interest on [54:13] your treasury bonds. It should be fair [54:15] to expect that. Um but whether they're [54:18] up at the 6 7% you talk about that also [54:20] is I think probably a very unhelpful [54:22] will because that would imply that [54:25] inflation is not under control. It [54:27] probably implies the Fed is tacitly [54:30] probably unstatedly given up on [54:32] controlling it to a large extent and we [54:33] are heading into what we have seen in [54:36] the past as a proper stagflation where [54:39] both growth and inflation are you growth [54:43] is too low, inflation is too high and [54:45] interest rates have kind of lost the [54:47] power to move things around too much. [54:49] Well, there's something weird in all [54:51] this. So, you wrote about a National [54:53] Bureau of Economics research survey that [54:55] I found genuinely shocking that said [54:58] among bond investors surveyed, they [55:01] believed there to be a 50% chance of a [55:05] US debt crisis [snorts] in the next [55:06] decade. [55:08] But then almost all those investors said [55:10] they had no change in their portfolio [55:12] strategy based on this. So, I had [55:15] trouble making heads or tail. On the one [55:17] hand, if the bond market actually [55:18] believes we're going to have a 50% [55:19] chance of a debt crisis, I wasn't clear [55:21] what that actually meant. But then also, [55:23] if they believe it's that high and [55:24] nobody's doing anything, [55:27] um, that's weird. What did you make of [55:29] that? How would you explain what that [55:30] survey was revealing? And what did you [55:31] make of it? [55:33] I mean, Paul Santo, is it St. Augustine [55:36] who said, "Lord, make me chased, but not [55:38] yet." [55:39] >> Uh, and it's how we humans respond to so [55:41] many things like climate change. you [55:43] know, we we we know it's a it's a big [55:45] deal and it's coming and we maybe might [55:48] tweak it a little bit around the edges [55:49] of our own lifestyle, but in reality, we [55:51] don't. And we might say we want [55:53] politicians to do X or Y, but in [55:55] practice until it actually starts [55:57] affecting us on a daily basis, you can [55:59] see people don't really like that. And I [56:01] think it's it's both shocking but also [56:04] incredibly unsurprising because it just [56:06] sums up human nature, right? Even when [56:08] you can see something big and nasty [56:10] potentially coming, you know, down the [56:12] tunnel towards you, you still think that [56:14] light might be something favorable. I [56:18] think that is a good place to end. So [56:19] then always our final question. What are [56:21] three books you recommend to the [56:22] audience? [56:23] >> I have to admit I I've been dreading [56:25] this because you know, you ask me [56:27] tomorrow, they'll probably be different [56:28] books. Uh, but I I I'm going to choose [56:32] three books that show that finance, [56:35] economics, and business can actually be [56:37] really fun and interesting and riveting [56:39] even. Um, I think the obvious first [56:42] place, the first book is is Barbarians [56:44] at the Gate. I I genuinely think it's [56:46] kind of the gold standard of of [56:48] narrative business journalism today, but [56:51] really it's kind of like um a history of [56:54] American business over the past century [56:57] told through the prism of this private [56:59] equity deal and all the crazy characters [57:01] involved. It is astonishing. Um [57:05] my second book, uh Daniel Jurgens's the [57:08] prize. It's a history of the oil market. [57:11] It's kind of the model for a lot of [57:13] similar books that came first, but [57:15] Jurgen's kind of the OG. Uh, it's I I [57:19] love those histories that kind of tell a [57:20] history of the world. This is almost a [57:22] history of the 20th century, but through [57:24] a completely different angle. So, it [57:26] tells it through the oil market. It's [57:28] tremendous. Has crazy characters, of [57:30] course, and just I I learned so much [57:33] just as a journalist, but also just as a [57:35] a person. Um, [57:38] my third one. God, I can almost feel [57:41] some of the books behind me. Uh, [57:43] screaming. [57:43] >> Hoping to be picked. [57:45] >> Hoping to be picked. I mean, yeah, [57:46] they're glaring at me. I can feel it. [57:49] Uh, I think I'm going to go with Leak [57:50] Ahmed's Lords of Finance. Uh, it's just [57:53] a fabulous book about this kind of [57:56] tumultuous interwar period, uh, in the [57:58] run-up to the Great Depression. uh and [58:00] it tells you know what is an incredibly [58:03] complex multiaceted financial economic [58:06] story uh through these the heads of the [58:10] the the major central banks at the time [58:13] and you know in my day job at the FT I [58:16] spend a lot of time trying to kind of [58:18] pass these things and make them [58:19] digestible to a general audience and [58:21] make them sort of uh riveting and fun [58:23] and and you know it's I I don't think [58:25] I've seen such a complex story told with [58:28] such verve as well as as in Leak's book. [58:32] So, I think that'll have to be my third [58:34] pick and I'll just have to accept the [58:35] books some of the books behind me [58:37] staring down at me angrily. Robin [58:39] Wigglesworth, thank you very much. [58:41] Thanks for having me on.