Historian Jäger Warns Voter Surge Yields No Policy as Parties Hollow

历史学者耶格尔警告：政党空心化致使选民激增却难产政策成果 西方民主国家正面临创纪录的政治动员却缺乏政策成果的局面，因为大众中介机构的瓦解导致权力在算法短视主义与技术官僚否决之间四分五裂。 Ezra Klein 与 Anton Jäger 深入剖析了现代“超政治”（hyperpolitics）的悖论——这一现象表现为高涨的政治动员与创纪录的选民投票率，与走向衰败、空心化的公民及政治机构并存。他们梳理了从20世纪纪律严明的大众政党、到1990年代冷漠的“后政治”，再到当前时代的演变脉络，分析了算法媒体、短视治理和制度僵化如何将公民与精英一同困在反复无常的愤怒循环中。最后，他们权衡了这种动荡局势究竟是一种政治虚无主义的体现，还是一个能够破除僵化正统观念、为新民主结构开辟道路的必要颠覆性阶段。 历史学者 Anton Jäger 将“超政治”定义为一种前所未有的分歧现象，其特征是创纪录的选民投票率与大规模抗议，伴随着工会和大宗政党等中介机构的近乎彻底衰亡。 (1:33) 与20世纪中叶能够数十年如一日推行纲领性纪律的全能型大众政党不同，现代政治形态更像流动的市场，参与者在短暂的争议之间迅速转移注意力。 (3:55) 结构性去机构化不仅影响了公众，同样侵蚀了政治精英，导致治理飘忽不定，并使立法系统陷入“否决型体制”的瘫痪状态——在此类状态下，阻挠行动远比通过建设性政策容易得多。 (32:20) Jäger 认为，尽管超政治加剧了不稳定性与精英阶层的短视，但它也代表着对1990年代冷漠的“后政治”的一次具复兴意义的告别，重新唤醒了大众的政治素养以及对意识形态利害关系的认知。 (58:55)

Historian Anton Jäger and host Ezra Klein argue that Western democracies have entered an era of 'hyperpolitics' characterized by high political engagement alongside the collapse of mediating civic institutions, leaving intense public passions structurally incapable of generating durable policy change. The Hyperpolitics Paradox: Engagement Decoupled from Institutions (1:33) Jäger defines hyperpolitics as a historical scissor shape: while individual political participation surges across voter turnout, street demonstrations, and political violence, traditional mediating bodies like labor unions and mass political parties continue to atrophy. Unlike the mass politics of the early-to-mid 20th century, which disciplined high political passions through structured party programs, and the low-engagement 'post-politics' of the 1990s, hyperpolitics mobilizes massive crowds that leave behind virtually no lasting institutional residue. Algorithmic Acceleration and Volatile Elite Short-Termism (6:05) While resisting pure technological determinism, Jäger and Klein note that modern political culture operates like an attention-driven financial market where participants intensely trade into controversies for a few weeks before dumping them for the next issue. This volatility operates at divergent speeds: the broader public rapid-hops across cultural themes, while political leaders lose programmatic discipline, reversing past stances without formal political cost. Klein cites figures like Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez acknowledging that pandemic-era slogans like 'defund the police' were swept along by a radically open Overton window before being abandoned. The Illusion of Collective Leverage and Historical Nostalgia (19:40) Addressing the pervasive modern sense of political helplessness, Klein questions whether historical voters actually wielded direct leverage over policy, noting that major breakthroughs like the New Deal and Great Society were rare bursts catalyzed by catastrophic crises rather than routine citizen input. Jäger maintains that mid-century mass institutions, despite being coercive and socially invasive—such as French Communist Party rules dictating which car models members could drive—provided the structural muscle needed to extract sustained concessions from capital. State Ossification and the Rise of Veto Politics (48:53) Beyond civic decay, formal governance mechanisms have ossified into a gridlocked veto state. Beginning in the 1970s and 1980s, policymaking authority systematically shifted away from elected legislatures into insulated technocratic bodies such as independent central banks. Because both ordinary citizens and rival elites find it virtually impossible to push constructive programs through this architecture, political actors increasingly default to building 'kill switches' to block opposing agendas, driving civic energy away from policy toward low-cost expressive posting on digital platforms. Nihilistic Churn Versus a Democratic Cleansing Fire (58:55) Klein and Jäger debate whether hyperpolitics marks a purely destructive descent into political exhaustion or a necessary cleansing fire that shatters stale institutional orthodoxies. Jäger emphasizes that the end of post-political apathy is fundamentally positive, pointing to doubled voter turnouts—such as regional elections in Saxony jumping from roughly 44% in 2006 to around 77%—and a heightened public awareness that everyday material burdens like rent and prices stem from deliberate political choices rather than unchangeable economic laws. The central unresolved dilemma remains whether contemporary hyperpolitics can ever cultivate durable institutional vehicles to translate heightened democratic awareness into lasting reform, or whether political action will remain permanently trapped in a cycle of short-term digital virality and state gridlock.

历史学家安东·耶格尔（Anton Jäger）与埃兹拉·克莱恩（Ezra Klein）指出，当代西方政治正处于前所未有的“超政治”（Hyperpolitics）状态：公众政治参与度和意识形态情绪达到历史高点，却与传统中介制度的衰落彻底脱节。这种高政治化与低机构化的结构性不对称，导致澎湃的政治能量演变为剧烈震荡却难以转化为持久政策成果的狂热循环。 超政治的悖论：高动员与弱机构 (1:33) 耶格尔将“超政治”定义为一种西方政治文化变迁。20世纪初至中叶的大众政治时代兼具高政治化与强机构化，公民行动受工会和政党等严密组织锚定；1990至2000年代的“后政治”时代则两者皆低，社会普遍陷入政治冷漠与意识形态共识。当前的超政治呈现出鲜明的剪刀差：选民投票率、街头示威和政治暴力指标激增，然而传统中介结构如工会与政党党员规模却持续萎缩。 克莱恩与耶格尔指出，这种脱节使公众参与呈现类似金融市场的投机特征。公民在数周内对单一叙事倾注极高情绪，一旦热度衰退便迅速转向下一争端。超政治在空间上能动员创纪录的抗议人群，在时间上却极度压缩；由于缺乏能将诉求转化为法案的组织机器，庞大的动员能量迅速消散，难以沉淀为长效制度成果。 数字回音壁与政客纲领纪律的瓦解 (10:00) 克莱恩认为超政治在很大程度上由算法注意力经济驱动，商业平台依靠道德义愤加速议题爆发；耶格尔则主张社交媒体并未凭空制造不满，而是落在早已失去中介机构且面临严峻物质矛盾的社会土壤上。但两人均指出，建制精英往往比普通选民更深陷网络剧场，如特朗普依赖Truth Social，民主党人活跃于X平台，直接绕过党内建制煽动舆论。 这种数字互动削弱了职业政客的纲领纪律。耶格尔指出，传统大众政党领袖受制于具约束力的纲领，背离立场的代价极高；如今如美国民主社会主义者（DSA）等团体本质上是激进运动而非严格政党。例如奥卡西奥-科尔特斯（Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez）等政客可在疫情期间拥抱“撤资警察”等激进主张，随后因缺乏党纪惩戒轻易收回言论并称昔日潮流“过于疯狂”，暴露出意识形态立场的极度不稳定。 历史大众政党代价与当代无力感 (19:40) 回顾20世纪中叶欧洲大众政党，耶格尔指出当时的党派身份具有世袭性，组织深度干预私生活与道德行为，退出成本高昂。这种带威权色彩的刚性组织虽曾催生极端主义灾难，但也正是工会与政党凝聚的集体杠杆，迫使资本让步并建立了福利国家。耶格尔直言“人不能克隆恐龙”，重返过去不切实际，但这些机构的瓦解确实让大众丧失了将诉求兑现为政策的集体议价工具。 克莱恩强调，现代人的无力感源于信息超载与行动杠杆的严重错配。智能手机实时推送全球灾难与冲突，极大地刺激了公众的道德焦虑；然而社交平台提供的点赞与跟帖只是完成了心理上的即时泄压，对现实权力毫无触动。加之关键治理权力被移交给独立央行等不受选举约束的技术官僚机构，公众处于极度知情却极度无力的分裂境地。 否决体制与结构性短期主义 (38:42) 去机构化同时造成了国家治理机器的严重僵化。耶格尔指出，新自由主义时期削弱工会并将权力让渡给非选举机构，封死了常规民主通道，促使各派普遍诉诸“否决开关”——运用阻挠议事或司法手段瘫痪对手政策。即便强大游说力量或工商业巨头联手推动基建法案，也难以打破僵局，使社会变革在体制上下均陷入停滞。 治理瘫痪驱使政治全面倒向以24小时新闻周期为核心的短期主义。克莱恩分析称，特朗普宛如一台天然的“人类注意力算法”，凭借媒体本能制造即时轰动，却缺乏长远规划能力；其阵营中万斯（J.D. Vance）等系统化理论家在纯粹流量面前反而受限。相比能推行长远规划的国家机制，西方政坛充斥着朝令夕改的戏剧化决策与频繁的政府更迭，折射出制度性规划能力的根本性衰退。 政治冷漠破除与清洗之火的考验 (58:55) 针对超政治的未来走向，克莱恩提出核心疑问：这究竟是无法积累成果的虚无主义，还是一场打破陈腐教条的“达尔文式清洗之火”？特朗普虽然未能提升治理效能，但打破了关于贸易、移民的正统观念；左翼新生力量亦在冲撞传统秩序。超政治打破了过去将政治简化为“百事与可口可乐间抉择”的“别无选择”（TINA）教条。 耶格尔肯定了清洗之火的积极意义，指出多国投票率飙升（如德国萨克森州地方选举投票率从2006年的约44%跃升至约77%），表明民众重新认识到物价与民生均由政治决定。耶格尔认为，政治冷漠的终结值得肯定，当下的真正课题不是退回1990年代昏睡的共识政治，而是探索能够承载并转化公众激情的持久性制度形态。 本期对话剖析了当代政治狂躁与无能并存的结构性根源，但留下了制度重建的根本悬念。当严苛的历史大众政党已无法复刻，而数字网络只能助长易逝的舆论热潮与否决政治时，当代民主面临着既无法承受治理瘫痪、又缺乏持久中介载体的双重困境。超政治究竟是一场催生新制度的阵痛，还是走向无序消耗的开端，仍有待历史检验。

## Background 该视频由 YouTube 频道 The Ezra Klein Show 于 2026 年 9 月 8 日发布。根据页面简介，节目针对过去十年西方政治剧烈起伏、公众高度参与却深感无力推动持久政策变革的怪异节奏，邀请《纽约时报》观点撰稿人、历史学家安东·耶格尔（Anton Jäger）共同探讨其提出的“超级政治”（Hyperpolitics）概念，剖析这一时代的形成根源与突破路径。 ## TL;DR 本期节目深入探讨了安东·耶格尔的“超级政治”（Hyperpolitics）理论，即当下西方社会呈现出投票率和街头抗议高涨等“极度政治化”，却伴随着工会与政党等传统组织萎缩的“低制度化”剪刀差现象。对话梳理了从 20 世纪高度制度化的大众政治、90 年代冷漠的后政治，到如今注意力算法驱动下短期投机式政治的演变，剖析了以特朗普和 AOC 为代表的政治精英如何深陷媒体周期的剧烈摆动。双方进一步探讨了治理机构僵化与“否决政治”盛行导致的普遍无力感，并辩证审视了超级政治在打破冷漠、提升公众政治素养的同时所带来的疲惫与制度重建挑战。 ## Atmosphere & style 整场对话展现出极具深度的高阶智性交锋与思辨质感，克莱因以敏锐犀利的追问不断对理论边界提出挑战，而耶格尔则以扎实的历史视野与冷静客观的社会学剖析从容应对。现场氛围兼具对当代政治困境的忧虑审视与理性质询，既有对社交媒体情绪闭环与精英失能的冷峻解构，又始终克制着怀旧情绪，呈现出一种在时代迷茫中奋力辨析历史走向的深沉探索感。 ## Bulletin - [01:33](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PurFyLK-zlk&t=93s) 历史学家安东·耶格尔提出“超级政治”（Hyperpolitics）概念，指出当代西方社会呈现“极度政治化与去制度化并存”的剪刀差现象：公众参与度和投票率屡创新高，但传统政党与工会等中介组织严重萎缩，导致澎湃的政治激情缺乏制度容器，难以转化为长期的政策变革成果。 - [06:05](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PurFyLK-zlk&t=365s) 社交媒体并未凭空制造撕裂，而是作为“放大镜与加速器”作用于早已原子化的社会土壤，线上极度低廉的表达门槛引发了发帖成瘾与边际效应递减，加剧了“注意力极度过载与个体政治无力感”的深层心理矛盾。 - [32:20](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PurFyLK-zlk&t=1940s) 政治精英自身同样深陷去制度化危机，其极化内斗与24小时新闻周期的短视投机模式（以特朗普为典型）导致治理机器陷入否决政治死结，使得任何重大政策推进都寸步难行。 - [56:35](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PurFyLK-zlk&t=3395s) 欧美陷入“输入合法性高但输出合法性极低”的治理瘫痪，相比之下，超级政治虽唤醒了大众政治素养并打破了新自由主义“别无选择”的教条，但未来的关键在于能否建立起超越网络愤怒的持久制度载体。 ## Key takeaways - [01:33](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PurFyLK-zlk&t=93s) “超级政治”的核心特征是极高政治化程度与极度缺乏组织制度并存，动员门槛骤降，但政治行动因缺乏制度锚点而呈现极强的短视性与投机性。 - [10:05](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PurFyLK-zlk&t=605s) 缺乏传统大众政党的纲领约束与纪律机制，当代政治人物（如 AOC）容易随网络舆论热点（The Current Thing）产生剧烈立场摇摆，且事后撤回承诺的政治成本极低。 - [15:13](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PurFyLK-zlk&t=913s) 20世纪大众政党虽然提供了强有力的自下而上集体议价权，但其对私生活的全权控制和极高的退出成本带有威权色彩，旧制度无法也不应被简单“克隆”。 - [21:25](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PurFyLK-zlk&t=1285s) 美国历史上如“新政”与“伟大社会”等重大制度变革多是百年罕见危机带来的“间断平衡”，并非公民常规参与的线性演进，而工会密度的崩溃直接削弱了大众向资产阶级索取政策让步的杠杆。 - [28:51](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PurFyLK-zlk&t=1731s) 智能手机让即时灾难与争议无孔不入地刺激公众情绪，但在深蓝深红极化选区及官僚机构面前，个体能动性极度微弱，形成了“无休止被激怒却彻底无能为力”的现代心理闭环。 - [30:03](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PurFyLK-zlk&t=1803s) 社交媒体不仅侵蚀大众，更使将政治作为终身事业的精英阶层变得最为失序与“神志昏乱”，精英不再扮演理性过滤网，反而通过极化飞轮将极端选项推向公众。 - [38:42](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PurFyLK-zlk&t=2322s) 特朗普的执政模式体现为“时间的内爆”，其思维如同行走的互动算法，决策完全围绕霸占未来24小时新闻头条展开，这种去意识形态化的表演风格在碎片化媒介环境中对传统政客构成了降维打击。 - [44:47](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PurFyLK-zlk&t=2687s) MAGA 运动虽然在第二任期展开了针对国家机器（如 ICE）的制度化尝试，但依然缺乏拥有深厚群众基础的政党架构支撑，本质上仍脆弱地维系于短周期的媒体注意力泡沫之中。 - [50:38](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PurFyLK-zlk&t=3038s) 20世纪80-90年代新自由主义对工会的瓦解以及将权力向独立央行等非民选机构转移，导致自下而上的社会变革与自上而下的精英规划双双瘫痪，体制内外普遍滑向对“否决选项”（Kill Switch）的消极依赖。 - [56:35](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PurFyLK-zlk&t=3395s) 西方政治当前面临深刻的合法性失衡：尽管选举投票率与政治敏感度持续走高（高输入合法性），但在政策落地与国家建设上却深陷死锁与无能（极低输出合法性）。 - [58:55](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PurFyLK-zlk&t=3535s) 超级政治并非一无是处，它打破了后政治时代的冷漠与“别无选择”假象，显著提升了选民对政治直接影响生活的认知素养，未来的出路在于寻找能够承载这种能量的全新组织机制而非倒退回政治冷漠。 ## Detailed walkthrough ### [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PurFyLK-zlk&t=0s) 时代的政治节奏与“超级政治”（Hyperpolitics）概念的提出 要描绘一个政治时代的整体形态、质感与节奏，历来是极其困难的。在过去十几年中，公众经历了剧烈摇摆的政治浪潮：一方面是左翼“觉醒文化”（wokeness）的高涨，伴随着街头激进的口号与“第一代觉醒（Woke 1.0）简直疯狂”的感叹；另一方面则是特朗普主义（Trumpism）卷土重来，伴随着集会上“我被上帝拯救以让美国再次伟大”的狂热欢呼。这种政治运动在极短时间内席卷整个社会文化，随后又迅速消退或引发剧烈反弹。人们虽然在政治上展现出前所未有的投入度与高投票率，却鲜少像今天这样感到无力推动任何持久的政策变革。 历史学家、也是《纽约时报》观点栏目撰稿人安东·耶格尔（Anton Jäger）在其著作《超级政治：无政治后果的极度政治化》（*Hyperpolitics: Extreme Politicization Without Political Consequences*）中，提出了“超级政治”（Hyperpolitics）这一概念，精准切中了当下的时代脉搏。该理论试图解释一种奇特而混乱的现状：政治似乎无处不在，公众的政治观点和投入情绪极度高涨，社会议题激烈震荡；然而，这些激情并未锚定在牢固的政治制度或组织结构之中，使得排山倒海的大规模动员最终往往如潮水般退去，未能沉淀为实质性的长久制度成果。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 政治形态的历史演变模型 accDescr: 坐标轴对比二十世纪大众政治、九十年代后政治与当下超级政治在政治化与制度化维度的差异。 subgraph 历史阶段演进 A["二十世纪大众政治<br/>(Mass Politics)<br/>高政治化 + 高制度化<br/>（政党、工会深度绑定）"] B["1990-2000年代后政治<br/>(Post-Politics)<br/>低政治化 + 低制度化<br/>（冷漠、去意识形态）"] C["当下超级政治<br/>(Hyperpolitics)<br/>极度政治化 + 低制度化<br/>（高参与、无实质政策后果）"] A --> B --> C end ``` --- ### [01:33](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PurFyLK-zlk&t=93s) 何为“超级政治”：去制度化的极度政治化 安东·耶格尔在节目中阐述了“超级政治”的核心定义：这是一种西方政治文化的深刻转变，表现为各类政治活动指标的全面上升——包括选民投票率、街头抗议乃至政治暴力的激增；然而，这一激增并未伴随制度力量的同步成长。相反，如果观察工会会员人数、传统政党成员数量或其他公民社会组织的指标，会发现它们在长期停滞甚至持续萎缩。这种“极高政治参与度”与“极度脆弱/缺乏组织制度”并存的剪刀差现象，在整个20世纪乃至19世纪的政治史上都罕有先例。 为了理清这一概念的历史坐标，耶格尔引入了“政治化程度”（politicization）与“制度化程度”（institutionalization）两个分析维度： - **20世纪大众政治（Mass Politics）**：尤其在1920年代与1930年代，社会高度政治化，但也高度制度化；个人的政治行动通常意味着置身于特定的制度、工会或群众性政党之中。 - **1990年代至2000年代的“后政治”（Post-Politics）**：双重指标齐跌，既表现为制度的衰落，也表现为政治激情的退潮与冷漠。 - **当下的超级政治（Hyperpolitics）**：形成奇特的“剪刀形态”（scissor shape）——集体动员门槛大幅降低，参与的紧迫感与冲动陡增，却彻底脱离了制度容器，呈现出极大的混乱与支离破碎，进而导致政治行动无法转化为实质性的政策后果。 --- ### [03:55](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PurFyLK-zlk&t=235s) “超级”的狂热节奏：制度缺位与短期政治投机 埃兹拉·克莱恩指出，该理论最打动大众之处在于其字面所蕴含的“超级”（Hyper）特质，即一种狂乱、极速起落的震荡节奏。公众可能在某一年全身心投入“黑人的命也是命”（Black Lives Matter）与觉醒运动，但在极短时间内，整个社会的文化氛围便转向特朗普主义，旋即又发生逆转。仿佛没有任何事物能够沉淀下来，但当下发生的一切又被赋予了极高的生死攸关感。 耶格尔回应道，这种剧烈波动与狂热正是超级政治的本质特征。传统制度在政治生活中扮演着极其关键的功能：提供长期稳定性、赋予代表权与委托机制（delegation），并在组织内部建立纪律。缺乏这些制度作为锚点，政治行动必然陷入实质上的“短期主义”（short-termism）： - **注意力周期驱动**：行动者会在两三周内对某一特定议题倾注巨大的激情，紧随媒体周期的起伏；一旦热度退散或议题失去新鲜感，人们便迅速转向下一热点，没有任何组织能够出面制定长期议程或统筹全局愿景。 - **空间维度的“超级”**：行动能极快席卷庞大人群，过去十年西方各大抗议活动的参与人数屡创新高。 - **时间维度的“超级”**：政治参与演变成类似“政治金融市场”的投机行为——个体如同在某只股票升值时高位跟进，一旦发现其舆论价值暴跌，便迅速割肉抛售并转向下一个概念标的。 --- ### [06:05](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PurFyLK-zlk&t=365s) 这仅仅是社交媒体的产物吗？技术决定论与注意力经济的辩论 克莱恩对耶格尔的著作提出了一项尖锐批评：这种高度动态、情绪撕裂、意识形态弥散且充满流动性的超级政治，本质上难道不就是由数字算法驱动的“线上政治”（online politics）吗？政治本就是注意力的下游产物，而当下的注意力分配机制完全被算法重构——各大平台非道德地、永不停歇地追逐争议与新鲜感，致力于激怒受众。建立在这种怪异注意力上层建筑之上的政治，自然会演变成眼下的模样。 耶格尔并不否认数字技术与超级政治的高度契合，但他警惕将一切归结于技术的“单一因果论”（monocausal explanation）。他反对将超级政治完全等同于“极度网瘾政治”（extremely online politics）： - **历史归因的局限**：不能将英国脱欧（Brexit）或特朗普胜选草率归咎于“俄罗斯水军”或“定向广告”，正如阿拉伯之春初期被盲目称作“Facebook革命”一样；这些说法忽略了更底层的社会土壤。 - **放大器而非造物主**：社交媒体并非凭空捏造了现实危机，像大规模监禁、警察暴力、社会不平等或右翼关注的移民问题，都是沉重而真实的现实矛盾。 - **土壤与载体的配合**：算法之所以具有极强的成瘾性和粘性，是因为数字平台进入社会时，面对的是一个已经高度原子化、公民组织网络彻底瓦解的社会；公众之所以大规模转向线上寻求政治表达，正是因为线下制度基础设施早已退化。社交媒体扮演的是既有社会裂痕与趋势的“放大镜”与“加速器”，单纯批评平台无法触及危机的本质根源。 ### [10:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PurFyLK-zlk&t=600s) 制度精英的超政治化与 AOC 的“觉醒 1.0”反思 Ezra Klein 指出，当今社会并不是完全缺乏机构或党派，例如美国民主社会主义者（DSA）近年来迅速崛起并形成了实质性的制度化架构，更有许多人将一生奉献给民主党或共和党。然而，这些身处既有制度内部的人，往往比普通大众更深刻地展现出“超政治”（hyperpolitics）的特征：他们极度沉迷于网络上所谓的“当前热点”（the current thing），情绪随着舆论浪潮剧烈起伏，却无法将其转化为长期的政治实践。 甚至在短短数年之后，他们回顾不久前的政治热潮时，常常会产生“我的天，我们当时到底在干什么”的荒诞感。Klein 举例提到，众议员亚历山大·奥卡西奥-科尔特斯（Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez，简称 AOC）在近期接受采访时，便直言“觉醒 1.0”（woke 1.0）非常疯狂。在回溯当时支持削减警察经费（defund the police）等激进立场时，AOC 解释称，在 COVID-19 疫情和封控期间，失业率处于历史高位，“奥维顿之窗”（Overton window）被极大地打开，促使人们去探讨任何能够带来变革的激进政策方案。Klein 认为，这生动展示了网络政治如何让原本根植于现实世界的理念走上极端形态，以至于当事人在几年后都不愿再为其辩护。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 社交媒体对制度内政治精英的影响机制 accDescr: 展示政治精英如何通过社交网络相互激化，导致政策立场极端化与后续剧烈摇摆的循环 subgraph Digital_Sphere["数字沟通领域"] A["网络热点与情绪浪潮<br/>(The Current Thing)"] --> B["精英内部互动平台<br/>(X / Truth Social)"] end subgraph Institutional_Sphere["制度与政客表现"] B --> C["极端议题迅速极化<br/>(例如 'Defund the Police')"] C --> D["脱离实质纲领的剧烈摇摆<br/>(回溯并撤回激进承诺)"] end ``` Klein 进一步反驳了将“现实制度”与“数字网络”割裂为两个独立领域的二元看法。事实上，机构的掌权者正是通过社交网络互相交流、转发推文，唐纳德·特朗普（Donald Trump）也是直接通过 Truth Social 领导共和党。领导层本身沉浸于数字媒介，导致制度本身也陷入了剧烈震荡与摇摆之中。 --- ### [13:06](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PurFyLK-zlk&t=786s) 多速超政治与缺乏纲领约束的政治人 Anton Jäger 赞同这一观察，并指出超政治在不同群体中以“不同的速度”推进。普通选民与职业政客对超政治的感知截然不同：在普通大众眼中，它是从一个热点议题跳跃到另一个热点议题的短期主义；但在政治专业人士身上，它表现为意识形态连贯性的断崖式下跌，以及长期社会转型愿景的缺位。 AOC 之所以能够轻易撤回几年前言之凿凿的激进承诺，核心原因在于这些政治选择背后缺乏坚实的意识形态支撑，也没有一套能够约束其言行的严肃政党纲领（party program）。在 20 世纪的大众政党模式中： - 政党虽然拥有魅力型领袖和个性鲜明的成员，但全党必须围绕统一的政治纲领运作。 - 改变或背离既定纲领需要付出极高的政治代价。 - 相比之下，AOC 虽然与 DSA 保持关联，但 DSA 并非传统意义上的正式政党，既无法提供严密的纲领指引，也缺乏在政治人物改变路线时对其进行纪律处分（discipline）的机制。 --- ### [15:13](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PurFyLK-zlk&t=913s) 20 世纪欧洲大众政党：沉浸式生活与高昂退出成本 为了反思当下的浮动状态，Jäger 回顾了 20 世纪以欧洲为代表的“大众政党”（mass parties）时代。那是一个现代人难以想象的政治环境，政党身份完全不是选民个人的“消费选择”，而是具有强烈的世袭性与包揽性： - **身份的世袭与社会压力**：党籍往往在家族内代代相传，脱党或投票给对手政党会面临严重的社会污名化，当事人甚至可能被迫搬离所在街区。选民的投票行为完全由其制度身份决定，根本不存在“摇摆选民”。 - **对私生活的全面渗透**：政党严密介入成员的日常生活。例如在 20 世纪 70 年代，法国共产党（French Communist Party）的党员被禁止购买或驾驶特定类型的汽车；而基督教民主党派则对成员的家庭与私人生活保持高度道德规训。 - **高昂的退出壁垒**：这种沉浸式归属往往持续一生，退出成本极高。Jäger 强调，这绝非人人平等参与的民主天堂，很多时候呈现出极强的威权色彩。 ```mermaid flowchart LR accTitle: 20 世纪大众政党与当下超政治模式的对比 accDescr: 展现从过去高退出成本、高纲领约束的政党模式，向如今低约束、高波动超政治模式的转变 subgraph 20th_Century["20 世纪大众政党"] M1["世袭与沉浸式党籍"] --- M2["生活全面规训 / 严明纪律"] M2 --- M3["高昂退出成本"] end subgraph Contemporary["当代超政治环境"] H1["网络议题驱动"] --- H2["缺乏纲领约束与纪律惩戒"] H2 --- H3["低成本随意撤回立场"] end ``` 相比欧洲，美国由于极早实现了大众民主化，从未诞生过欧洲意义上的大众政党。但 Jäger 反驳了“美国政党半个世纪以来未发生巨变”的论调。过去五六十年间，美国政党虽偏向国家机器而非社会组织，但曾拥有庞大的公民社会“腹地”（hinterland）——民主党依赖工会与各类少数族裔团体，宗教机构和教会则长期构成双方政党的社会根基。随着这片公民社会腹地不断萎缩与干涸，美国政党与整体社会的关系被彻底重构，进而催生了美国特有的超政治形态。 --- ### [18:31](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PurFyLK-zlk&t=1111s) 极权幽灵与对“组织化过去”的审视 Klein 对此提出审视：表面上看，当代人对政党空洞化、浮躁多变、缺乏公民归属感的现状感到不满，容易对过去的群众组织产生浪漫化的怀旧情绪。 然而，那种无所不包、全面控制生活的全权政党（totalizing parties），在历史上同样孕育了深重的政治灾难。右翼的法西斯政党与纳粹党，正是利用这种高进入壁垒、高退出代价的组织机制，推行彻底的意识形态灌输与人身控制。让一个政党全权规训个人看待世界的方式，绝非值得轻易留恋的过去。 ### [19:40](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PurFyLK-zlk&t=1180s) 既不怀旧也不复制：大众政党的历史双刃剑 对过去那种具有高度包容性甚至“全权性”（totalitarian）特征的政党体制，埃兹拉·克莱因（Ezra Klein）坦言自己并无多少怀念——在那种赞助与恩宠网络（patronage models）主导的世界里，一旦个人观点与所属阵营不同，就可能在社交甚至职业上遭遇惩罚。安东·耶格尔（Anton Jäger）赞同这一点，并指出他的著作《超政治》（*Hyperpolitics*）明确保持了一种“专注的模糊性”（focused ambiguity），绝非对旧世界的怀旧悼亡。那套制度存在极其不平等和令人不适的一面，因此在1990与2000年代，许多人乐于从制度的全面压制中解放出来，享受个人自由。 耶格尔用了一个形象的比喻：“我们无法克隆恐龙。”当代社会无法提取20世纪政党的DNA并直接植入当下，期待它们在现在的环境中复活。然而，去制度化（deinstitutionalization）带来的不仅是个人的解放，还引发了普遍的“社交危机”与孤独流行病（loneliness epidemic）。更关键的核心在于**权力（Power）**：人们加入组织不仅为了排遣孤独，更因为政党历来是汇聚集体行动、保障集体力量的载体。随着欧美大众政党的解体（除了中印等国仍保有特殊形态的大众政党外），自下而上将个人偏好转化为集体力量与实质政策结果的能力出现了明显衰退。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 大众政党制度的利弊与衰落影响 accDescr: 对比20世纪大众政党的负面代价与权力保障功能，以及当代去制度化后的双重困境。 subgraph Past ["20世纪大众政党体制"] A["沉浸/全权性控制<br/>恩宠依附体系与从众惩罚"] --> B["负面代价：个体自由受限"] C["强组织化载体<br/>工会与基层群众支部"] --> D["正面权能：自下而上的集体议价权力"] end subgraph Present ["当代去制度化状态（超政治）"] E["个体解放与自主性"] F["集体行动能力瓦解<br/>个体政治偏好难以转化为政策变革"] end B -.->|"90-00年代挣脱束缚"| E D -.->|"制度消亡无法克隆"| F ``` --- ### [21:25](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PurFyLK-zlk&t=1285s) 政策转化之争：全民医保、新政与制度权力的真实效力 针对“过去普通人更能将政治诉求转化为政府改革”这一论断，克莱因提出了尖锐质疑。他要求耶格尔为此论点提供扎实的辩护，直言不少政治学研究在这一点上非常模糊。当耶格尔以“全民医保”（Medicare for All）为例——指出其民调支持率长期过半却始终无法立法落地时，克莱因立即指出这个例子极其站不住脚： - 克莱因依据长期的政策报道经验反驳称，全民医保在抽象提问时确实民调极高；但一旦向选民讲明具体细节（“税率将大幅提高”、“现有私人雇主保险将被取消”），支持率就会断崖式下跌。面对极其复杂的颠覆性变革，公众天然伴随着强烈的恐惧心理。 耶格尔退一步解释，制度力量只是影响国家治理与政策能力的要素之一，不能忽视国家能力（state capacity）等其他渠道。但他强调，从历史纵向来看： - 在1930至1940年代“新政秩序”（New Deal order）的黄金期，美国福利国家的搭建与底层大众权力的勃兴存在强烈的正相关； - 在麦卡锡主义打击左翼、以及民权运动动能受抑之后，伴随着大众力量的瓦解，向美国商业资产阶级（business class）争取实质让步变得极其艰难； - 欧洲战后福利国家的建立绝不仅是技术官僚的功劳，而是工会与群众压力倒逼的结果； - 美国工会密度（union density）的长期溃退，与其当前触目惊心的贫富不平等（staggering levels of inequality）之间，存在不可否认的相关性。大众组织制度正是让民意具体兑现为政策成果的杠杆。 --- ### [24:21](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PurFyLK-zlk&t=1461s) 历史的顿挫性：究竟是群众赋权，还是信息过载下的无力感？ 克莱因从另一重视角重新审视了美国政治史。他认为过去普通公民“更有权力”在很大程度上是一种假象： - 美国的政治体制在漫长时期内对任何实质改革都具有极强的抵抗力。 - 1930年代罗斯福新政能够推行，根本原因不是工会密度的突然飞跃，而是大萧条这一百年罕见的危机彻底撕裂了体制，并在政治上近乎摧毁了共和党，赋予民主党在国会前所未有的压倒性统治地位。 - 1960年代林登·约翰逊的“伟大社会”（Great Society）之所以能扩充福利国家，是因为肯尼迪遇刺带来的特殊政治遗产；而在此之前，南部保守势力长期把持国会委员会，几十年来阻击民权法案几乎全靠参议院的“冗长辩论”（filibuster）。 因此，重大历史变革往往是离散的、具有高度偶然性的“间断平衡”（punctuated moments），而非公民日复一日参与所带来的线性演进。克莱因进一步切入当代政治的核心心理悖论：**注意力的过剩与真实权力的匮乏**。 - **超载的刺激机制**：现代人比以往任何时候都知晓更多世界动态，而且这些信息被算法刻意调教得极具情绪煽动性（emotionally arousing）。 - **无力感与去中心化的冲突**：一边是铺天盖地、无时无刻不在激发愤怒的信息输入，另一边却是个人极度微弱的政治能动性，以及与传统机构的彻底脱节。 - **结构性的无效选票感**：在当下美国极度极化的红蓝州格局下，生活在深蓝州或深红州的选民心知肚明选情走向，深感“投不投票毫无区别”。这种被强行拖入政治旋涡、却发现万事皆不受自身掌控的割裂感，才是催生极度无力感的根源。 耶格尔对此表示认同，但也补充了两个历史与结构维度的修正： 1. **个体无力感绝非当代独有**：二战后冷战初期的核军备竞赛，曾被乔治·奥威尔（George Orwell）称为“最反民主的武器”，当时的人们同样深陷彻底的毁灭恐惧与无力感中。 2. **权力中枢的结构性转移**：即使当下重建了大众组织，政策推进依然困难重重。现代国家权力已大量转移至非民选的技术官僚机构手中（例如欧美央行），它们基本不承受常规的选举压力或大众街头运动的直接约束。要取得实质改革，光有自下而上的大众力量还不够，依然离不开精英阶层内部的分裂与同盟构筑。 ### [28:51](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PurFyLK-zlk&t=1731s) 政治极度关注与无力感悖论 过去二十年来，大西洋两岸在政策推进上陷入普遍停滞，其关键原因之一在于：大众政治参与和政治化程度大幅提升的同时，大众力量的制度化根基却遭到了严重削弱。这种日益增强的曝光度与当代政治动员的运作机制形成了一种鲜明悖论。如今，智能手机屏幕随时随地向人们推送千里之外的灾难影像——无论是中东的种族冲突还是世界另一端的屠杀暴行。这种高度的即时性极大地唤醒了公众的政治敏感度，但随之而来的却是一种强烈的彻底无力感。这与20世纪四五十年代人们面对核军备竞赛的处境截然不同：那时人们只能通过报刊阅读相关消息，而非像今天这样，通过社交媒体将无休止的暴行现场直播投射进自己的客厅，这也让无力感被无限放大。 ```mermaid flowchart LR accTitle: 数字时代的政治行动悖论 accDescr: 描述数字时代信息即时输入与无力感、廉价表达与微弱成效之间的闭环 subgraph S1["信息刺激"] A["即时灾难画面"] --> B["政治敏感度激增"] end subgraph S2["情感闭环"] B --> C["极端无力感与焦虑"] C --> D["廉价线上表达<br/>(发帖/点赞/评论)"] end subgraph S3["现实结果"] D --> E["压力暂时释放"] D --> F["政策成效递减"] end ``` ### [30:03](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PurFyLK-zlk&t=1803s) 被社交媒体侵蚀的政治精英 社交媒体最耐人寻味的一点，在于它为其抛出的焦虑设计了一个看似完备的闭环：眼前出现了可怕的不公，你能做的就是发帖、评论或点赞。这种模式混淆了“行动”与“效果”的界限——这是一种可能毫无实效的行动，却恰好完成了一个即时的压力释放闭环（instant stress cycle）。这种精神受困的状态在政治精英身上尤为显著，他们甚至比普通大众更加“神志昏乱”（brain addled）。 回顾沃尔特·李普曼（Walter Lippmann）在1922年左右出版的名著《公众舆论》（Public Opinion），面对“脑海中的图景与外部客观世界的错位”，李普曼开出的药方是建立无所不知的精英技术官僚委员会。然而，这一构想的前提假设是精英阶层能够保持理性清醒。在当下，事实却截然相反：没有人比唐纳德·特朗普（Donald Trump）、埃隆·马斯克（Elon Musk）或是白宫核心层对这些碎片化信息更上瘾。普通人往往习惯向全职从政者寻求行为与情绪指引，但在现实中，那些将政治视为终身事业的精英，反而因这种扭曲的注意力模式变成了最疯狂、最不值得盲从的群体。 ### [32:20](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PurFyLK-zlk&t=1940s) 表达成本暴跌与上层治理失序 从底层视角来看，在线交流极大地降低了政治表达的成本。过去面对道德丑闻或明显不公，人们必须给报社编辑写信、联络地方政党领袖，或是亲自去公共广场振臂高呼；如今动动手指即可低成本发声，但随之而来的是“边际效应递减”——发声越廉价，真实的推动力越微弱。 当把目光转向社会顶层时，“超政治”（hyperpolitics）呈现出另一种病态特征。例如，特朗普第二任期的执政风格充斥着短视主义、缺乏规划以及不愿规划，反映出不同精英派系之间的去制度化与严重失序。近期埃隆·马斯克接受《经济学人》（The Economist）主编采访的交锋极具代表性：主编直截了当地质问马斯克，作为世界首富，依仗自身权力干预西方民主政治，是否意识到许多人对他的憎恶；马斯克则满不在乎地反唇相讥，称自己坐拥两亿五千万关注者，喜欢自己的人远多于讨厌自己的人，并且坚称“比起讨厌我，更多的人实际上厌恶你和主流媒体”。两名同属社会精英阶层的人物在公共领域如此公开对骂，展现出精英阶层内部难以弥合的巨大裂痕。 - 政治表达成本显著下降，导致公众抗议形式碎片化、成效递减。 - 精英内部缺乏能够协调社会、行业和地域利益的制度化平台。 - 网络环境加剧了派系极化，使统治阶层无法就长期利益达成战略共识。 ### [35:25](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PurFyLK-zlk&t=2125s) 精英阶层分裂的历史常态与极化飞轮 针对马斯克与媒体精英的互撕，埃兹拉·克莱恩对“同阶层本应具备阶级团结”的假设提出质疑。纵观历史，跨阶层对抗固然存在，但精英内部的残酷倾轧从来不是孤例——从20世纪60年代小威廉·F·巴克利（William F. Buckley Jr.）与戈尔·维达尔（Gore Vidal）在电视辩论中公开威胁要对对方挥拳相向，到麦卡锡主义时期政客间互扣“通共”帽子并试图将政敌彻底逐出公共生活，精英内部从来充斥着敌意。 安东·耶格尔承认，这种对“统治阶级理应具有共同本能”的期待混杂了一种“庸俗马克思主义”的直觉。事实上，由于美国幅员辽阔、产业门类繁杂，精英分裂与派系竞争才是历史常态。在欧美历史上，精英阶层唯有在面临有组织的工人阶级威胁时才会展现出空前的团结——例如冷战初期的反共浪潮，或是罗纳德·里根（Ronald Reagan）执政时期全行业雇主联手重击劳工运动。一旦外部的工人阶级对手被彻底削弱并瓦解，精英内部的派系混战就会死灰复燃。克莱恩指出，这种极化不应被简化为广义的社会大众极化；正是精英阶层自身的极化，将更加极端的选项推向公众，从而形成了一个自我强化的“政治极化飞轮”。 ### [38:42](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PurFyLK-zlk&t=2322s) 时间的坍塌与特朗普的短视统治模式 埃兹拉·克莱恩（Ezra Klein）引用了政治学者伊万·克拉斯特夫（Ivan Krastev）在《金融时报》上发表的一篇观点文章，克拉斯特夫在文中指出，特朗普主义革命的本质是“时间本身的内爆”（the implosion of time itself）。安东·耶格（Anton Jäger）对此进行了展开分析，认为这一观察非常准确地描绘了特朗普独特的执政模式。对过去两年来关注新闻与社交媒体的人而言，特朗普与历任美国总统截然不同，其最显著的特征就是极端短视（short-termism）——他的政治思考几乎从不超出 24 小时新闻周期的范围。他的许多政治决策，本质上都是根据该决策在媒体周期中预期的曝光效果和即时关注度来制定的。 耶格指出，这并不意味着特朗普身边没有出谋划策的宫廷圈子。诸如马可·卢比奥（Marco Rubio）或埃尔布里奇·科尔比（Elbridge Colby）等不同意识形态派系，都有各自重建新世纪美国霸权的宏大方案。然而，特朗普对待这些建议的方式，完全是拿去衡量其在媒体上的吸睛效率：“这能让我在接下来的 24 小时内霸占新闻头条吗？如果我轰炸某个国家或采取某项行动，能否引爆舆论？至于 48 小时之后，我们再想别的办法。”这种决策模式将特朗普去个人化，揭示出他实际上是一种更广泛制度弊病的表征：当整个行政团队完全依赖领导者的个人喜怒无常，且共和党并非真正意义上的群众性政党，而是一个依附于国家机器的小集团（camarilla）时，政府便无法提前一两周做规划。这与依然能制定五年规划的中国共产党形成了极为鲜明的反差。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 特朗普的媒体驱动决策闭环 accDescr: 展示政策智囊向特朗普提交宏观方案后，特朗普依据24小时媒体曝光效果进行过滤并迅速推翻更替的决策过程。 subgraph EliteInput["意识形态顾问建言"] A["智囊派系方案<br/>（如 Rubio / Colby 等地缘战略）"] end subgraph TrumpFilter["特朗普的筛选机制"] B{"媒体注意力评估<br/>（能否主导未来24小时新闻头条？）"} end subgraph RapidOutcome["短期化政治行动"] C["即时推行引发轰动的举措<br/>（如突发轰炸、争议政策）"] D["48小时后快速更替甚至全盘推翻"] end A --> B B -->|高曝光/强冲击| C C --> D D --> B ``` ### [41:01](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PurFyLK-zlk&t=2461s) 短视是个人特质还是结构性必然？ 克莱恩就书中“如果短视本身已成为一种结构性现象该如何理解”这一命题与耶格展开讨论。克莱恩提出，舆论常常争论特朗普究竟是一个与特定时代高度契合的异质心理样本——克莱恩曾将其形容为“行走的互动算法”（a human engagement algorithm），其思维完全同构于 Twitter（现 X）或 Truth Social 的运行逻辑——抑或他是一个时代先锋。克莱恩指出，像 J.D. 万斯（J.D. Vance）、马可·卢比奥或斯蒂芬·米勒（Stephen Miller）这样的人其实并非短视者，他们具备长远的意识形态框架；甚至乔·拜登（Joe Biden）的捍卫者也曾辩称拜登的政策是以数十年为尺度规划的，无奈选举周期只有寥寥数年。但纵观全球，例如英国频繁更换首相的动荡政局，这种极端的政治波动性似乎不仅限于特朗普个人。 耶格借用达尔文主义的“物种与环境”隐喻来剖析这一现象： - **外部环境的结构性重塑**：制度解体与算法媒介共同构成了新的政治生态环境。 - **特定物种的高度适应**：特朗普正是最能在这种新环境中茁壮成长的物种。他经历了从 80、90 年代和 2000 年代真人秀电视明星，向社交媒体算法时代的无缝过渡。 - **意识形态反而成为负累**：对于万斯或卢比奥这样的人来说，坚守宏大的意识形态世界观在当代媒体环境中反而是负担。而特朗普则完全不受意识形态认知框架的束缚，这使他能够纯粹以表演者的姿态行事。像万斯这样试图通过著书立说阐释世界观转变的政客，在面对注意力高度碎片化、心理极不稳定的现代选民时，其说服力远不如特朗普纯熟的“手艺人式”表演。 ### [44:47](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PurFyLK-zlk&t=2687s) MAGA 是新时代的法西斯群众运动还是虚幻的媒体泡沫？ 克莱恩进一步追问，即便特朗普本人是个异类，但“让美国再次伟大”（MAGA）运动是否构成了某种更具实体性的存在。MAGA 拥有集会文化、追随者共享的意义感，甚至正逐步发展出自己的制度与领导群体，看起来比近年来任何其他政治现象都更具传统政治时代的特征。 耶格分析了 MAGA 运动的性质及其制度化尝试： - **第一任期与第二任期的本质差异**：特朗普在 2016 年胜选时毫无准备，但在第二任期，伴随着传统基金会（Heritage Foundation）的“2025 计划”（Project 2025），右翼展开了高度自觉的制度化推进。 - **国家机器的武器化与准军事特征**：针对学界关于“特朗普是否是法西斯主义者”（所谓的“F 词辩论”）的探讨，第二任期确实出现了对国家安全机器（例如移民和海关执法局，即 ICE）的武器化利用，并通过国家财政资源绑定支持者利益。这些举措在形态上确实令人联想起 20 世纪法西斯主义的准军事冲锋队。 - **缺乏群众性党派支撑的脆弱性**：尽管塔克·卡尔森（Tucker Carlson）或玛乔丽·泰勒·格林（Marjorie Taylor Greene）试图在特朗普之后扛起大旗，但除了若干播客和自媒体渠道外，MAGA 并未将共和党改造为一个拥有广泛党员基础的群众性政党。许多体制内执行者（如 ICE 探员）的依附，更多是出于安全国家扩张带来的经济利益，而非深层的意识形态效忠。 耶格总结认为，MAGA 无法像 20 世纪的群众性政党那样跨越 5 年、10 年甚至 20 年的周期韬光养晦、蓄势待发。它在根本上被困在极度短暂且波动的现代媒体周期中，其势头的消亡可能同它的崛起一样迅速。 ### [48:14](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PurFyLK-zlk&t=2894s) 从公民社会侵蚀到治理权力的制度僵化 谈话转向了另一个维度的制度困境。克莱恩指出，此前的讨论大多聚焦于民间公民社会机构的瓦解与被侵蚀，但硬币的另一面是美国国家治理机构与权力机制本身的僵化（ossification）。这种体制在面对任何形式的权力——不仅是个体权力，甚至包括任何政治集团的有效统治——时，都表现出极强的抗药性与阻滞性。美国政治高度极化对立、势均力敌的现实，使得整个治理机器愈发陷入难以运转的深层死结。 ### [48:53](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PurFyLK-zlk&t=2933s) 否决政治的盛行与向线上发帖的撤退 埃兹拉·克莱因（Ezra Klein）指出，如今在西方政治中，跨党派妥协越来越难以达成，阻挠议事（filibuster）频频上演，通过重大法案的能力随着时间推移急剧衰减。更讽刺的是，哪怕一项法案背后汇聚了强大的政经力量，结局往往依然是胎死腹中。例如在贝拉克·奥巴马（Barack Obama）执政时期，美国商会（Chamber of Commerce）与代表劳工的劳联-产联（AFL-CIO）罕见地同时为一项基础设施法案背书，然而法案依然毫无进展；移民改革法案当时同样拥有多方强力支持，最终也彻底搁浅。国会内部充斥着无数可以“扼杀”法案的关卡，法庭上也有层出不穷的法律战手段去阻截政策落实；在欧洲，公众也普遍感受到欧盟机制带来的迟缓，以及一股来自遥远机构的官僚权力在支配生活。 克莱因推测，当前政治能量之所以大规模转移到话语争夺、社交媒体发帖等低门槛行为上，很大程度上源于公众对建制机构的彻底幻灭。在这些错综复杂、相互制衡的既有体制中，任何实质行动都寸步难行，而在网络上发帖，至少能立刻获得某种反馈。人们常以为金钱在政治中拥有绝对发言权，但克莱因认为金钱的影响力被高估了，因为在现实中往往能看到海量政治献金以失败告终。"阻止任何事情发生，远比促成任何事情要容易得多"，这种常态甚至导致大众开始不再相信现实中还能取得任何真正的制度成果。 ### [50:38](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PurFyLK-zlk&t=3038s) 去机构化、独立技术官僚与“断路开关”的诱惑 安东·耶格尔（Anton Jäger）赞同金钱万能论的破产。他举例称，乔治·索罗斯（George Soros）向各类政治事业挥洒了数以亿计的资金，但只要审视当今世界的真实走向，就很清楚他根本不具备某些阴谋论者所描述的绝对控制力。虽然美国和欧洲在法律上全面放宽了选举外部政治献金，游说集团力量大增，但政策目标的达成却并未变得更加容易。这构成了当代政治的一个深层谜题：自下而上的社会变革受阻，自上而下的精英规划同样深陷泥潭。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 去机构化与否决政治的恶性循环 accDescr: 展示80-90年代新自由主义去机构化如何削弱社会组织并将权力转移给非民选机构，最终导致自下而上与自上而下的政策瘫痪与否决政治盛行。 subgraph S1["20世纪80-90年代变革"] A["去机构化进程"] --> B["削弱社会组织<br/>(打击工会等通胀'元凶')"] A --> C["权力移交非民选机构<br/>(独立央行、技术官僚隔离政治)"] end subgraph S2["权力与行动力的脱节"] B --> D["基层群众丧失组织抓手"] C --> E["机构对民意与精英游说双重脱钩"] end subgraph S3["否决政治的固化"] D --> F["政策推动陷入死局"] E --> F F --> G["'断路开关'(Kill Switch)成为唯一有效手段"] G --> H["全面蔓延的否决权依赖与制度僵局"] end ``` 耶格尔解释道，这种现象必须追溯到去机构化对社会和国家层面的双重重构。通常被称为“新自由主义”的历史转向实际上更加深远： - **在社会层面**：政府对被视为阻碍经济复苏的机构（尤其是工会）展开集中瓦解，将通胀归咎于工人组织，认为只有摧毁它们才能恢复经济常态。 - **在国家层面**：政治决策权被刻意转移到非民选、非选举产生的技术官僚机构手中（例如赋予独立中央银行超然地位），以避免受到短期精英利益或民意群体的干预。 这一重组导致权力机构既抵御了底层民众的诉求，也削弱了精英自身的调控能力。当任何建设性议案都无法顺利落地时，体制内外便催生出对“否决选项”（veto option）的极端依赖——如果无法促成变革，大家便致力于设置各种“断路开关”（kill switch），至少确保自己能阻止讨厌的事情发生。耶格尔强调，仅仅取消否决权也无法根治顽疾，因为这种防御性心理根植于机构体系的长期退化。相比之下，中国的国家能力离不开中国共产党（CCP）的组织架构，该政党承担着连接不同阶级与精英派系的组织功能，而欧美政治体系中完全找不到类似具有统合力的制度枢纽。 ### [53:30](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PurFyLK-zlk&t=3210s) 治理效能的对比：西方的停滞与特朗普的“奇观幻觉” 克莱因顺着中国的对比展开探讨。他指出，尽管中国公众在国家高层治理中极度缺乏个人发言权，但多项客观数据表明，中国民众在人工智能（AI）等前沿领域普遍展现出远高于美国的乐观情绪和能动感。在中国，即便普通个体无法直接干预世界，但能够确凿感知到"有人一直在做事，变化与进展在持续发生"。克莱因坦言自己绝不愿生活在那种威权体制之下，但也承认这给西方制度构成了尖锐的对照拷问：人们究竟想要“拥有权利但一事无成”，还是“缺乏权利但雷厉风行”？ 这种对照进一步照出了唐纳德·特朗普（Donald Trump）的统治困境。特朗普上台时摆出了一副要砸碎体制的雷霆姿态，大张旗鼓地签署并向集会人群抛掷包括取消出生公民权在内的各种行政令，将政治治理演变成了一场混合了职业摔角联盟（WWE）狂欢秀的视听盛宴。然而事实证明，特朗普并没有真正参透破解系统死锁的密码： - 他通过的实际立法比历任总统更少，大量强推的行政命令随即被法院全盘推翻； - 那些看似以惊人势头推进的政府效率重组举措，在短时间的冲劲后迅速彻底崩溃； - 他在面对真实国际事件时显得手足无措，深陷无法掌控的伊朗等对外冲突局势； - 随着执政推进，特朗普在会议上打瞌睡，在即将到来的中期选举中面临惨败。 这种“注意力奇观”退场后，选民发现物价并没有下降，美国并没有变好，没有任何人真正掌控大局。克莱因感慨，西方世界目前正处于危险的政治漂流中，不仅自由主义体制缺乏行动力，那些反自由主义的民粹力量也同样没有征服治理官僚体系。 ### [56:35](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PurFyLK-zlk&t=3395s) 输入与输出合法性：欧洲精英的失能与历史的演进 耶格尔对美中对比作出了进一步修正。他提醒道，中国政治并非完全缺乏民意吸收机制（例如针对防疫政策的街头抗议直接促成了高层的转向），核心差异在于“输入合法性”（input legitimacy）与“输出合法性”（output legitimacy）的失衡： | 政治合法性维度 | 西方现状 | 中国现状 | |:--- |:--- |:--- | | **输入合法性 (Input Legitimacy)** | 选举投票率持续走高，大众政治热情高涨 | 缺乏竞争性选举，但偶发的抗议与反馈仍能迫使政策调整 | | **输出合法性 (Output Legitimacy)** | 政策产出极度匮乏，重大议程频频陷入死锁 | 具备极强的基础设施建设与政策执行转化能力 | 耶格尔强调，讨论国家能力不能脱离支撑国家行动的具体组织机构。去机构化不仅瓦解了工人阶级，也使西方精英失去了长远规划与结盟协调的能力。欧洲目前在这方面表现得尤为典型：面对中国的产业竞争、特朗普式的高额关税冲击以及复杂的地缘政治对抗，欧洲精英完全拿不出一套连贯的战略对策；尽管桌面上漂浮着各种宏大方案，却没有任何机构枢纽能够协调各大资本派系与跨国利益。耶格尔带着左翼学者的自嘲感叹道，自己如今竟沦落到要“呼吁精英们自救”、恳请统治阶层尽快建立协调机制的地步，而过去十年间的欧洲政治评论，本质上几乎沦为了对精英彻底失能的无休止控诉。 克莱因随后将话头引回整部政治演变史的宏观框架：西方政治如何从20世纪的“大众政治”（mass politics），滑向90年代比尔·克林顿（Bill Clinton）和托尼·布莱尔（Tony Blair）时期那种宣称“历史终结”、去政治化的“后政治时代”（post-politics），并最终催生了当前动荡的狂热政治周期。 ### [58:55](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PurFyLK-zlk&t=3535s) 制度僵化、毁灭主义还是政治活力的重塑？ 从金融危机、反政治浪潮，到占领华尔街运动（Occupy Wall Street）和茶党运动（Tea Party），一系列对传统制度充满敌意的运动接连涌现。它们既不寻求以传统方式夺取建制权力，也不致力于长效权力的构建，最终催生了当下的“超政治”（Hyperpolitics）。Ezra Klein 指出，看待这一时期的超政治有一种视角：它在本质上是毁灭性的，但这种毁灭或许不可避免。过去数十年来，西方的文化、政治体制与官僚机构早已严重僵化，唐纳德·特朗普（Donald Trump）并非一个合格的解药，但他以及类似政府效率部（DOGE）的构想证明，某种激进打破僵局的可能确实存在。从贸易、移民到对华政策，诸多曾经坚不可摧的意识形态教条已被彻底打破；而在左翼阵营，美国民主社会主义者（DSA）及佐兰·马姆达尼（Zohran Mamdani）等新生代力量也展现出蓬勃的动态生机。 随之而来的关键拷问在于：这种剧烈的动荡究竟会滑向虚无与毁灭——因为没有任何力量能够长期掌权并建立起持久的新秩序，还是如达尔文式的演进过程一样，成为制度复兴前必须经历的痛苦阵痛？这正是许多人频繁引述安东尼奥·葛兰西（Antonio Gramsci）名言的缘由：“旧世界正在死去，新世界尚未诞生，在这黄昏时分，群魔乱舞。”面对 Klein 提出的究竟是“洗礼之火”还是“单纯被焚烧”的追问，Anton Jäger 阐明了自己的历史定位：葛兰西所处的二十世纪初意大利是一个真正的“革命前夜”，而当下的西方社会显然并不处于革命爆发的关口。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 超政治演变与影响逻辑图 accDescr: 展示从后政治时代的僵化，经过反政治浪潮，走向超政治及其利弊后果的演进过程。 subgraph Phase1["后政治与反政治"] A["后政治时代：体制与官僚结构僵化<br/>TINA 教条：选举沦为两可选择"] --> B["反政治运动兴起<br/>占领华尔街 / 茶党运动"] end subgraph Phase2["超政治爆发"] B --> C["超政治现象<br/>特朗普打破教条 / 左右两翼激进化"] end subgraph Phase3["双重效应与未来挑战"] C --> D["积极面：打破政治冷漠<br/>选民觉醒、投票率上升、政治素养提高"] C --> E["疲惫感与困境<br/>无休止的文化争论、网络狂躁、缺乏长效组织机制"] D & E --> F["核心问题：<br/>能否找到超越单纯愤怒的长效制度载体？"] end ``` Jäger 认为，左翼必须坦诚承认右翼冲击所带来的澄清效应。特朗普至少终结了撒切尔时代流传下来的“别无选择”（TINA - There Is No Alternative）教条——那种在投票箱前只能在“可口可乐”与“百事可乐”这两种换汤不换药的产品中做选择的假象已被彻底击碎。选民开始清晰地感知到选择的存在，并明白政治能够真正影响自己的生活。 - **政治素养的普及**：超政治带来的一大积极遗产是“政治素养”（Political Literacy）的提升。越来越多民众意识到，自己的房租水平、道路基础设施、物价涨跌并非纯粹的自然规律，而是直接由政治决策塑造的。 - **选民参与度回升**：在欧洲与美国，选民投票率大幅攀升。例如德国萨克森州的选举投票率从 2006 年约 44% 翻倍上升至近 77%，这并非“民主的危机”，而是大众重新认识到政治选择严肃性的体现。 - **政治倦怠与怀旧**：由于生活中的一切都被过度政治化（例如在家庭聚会中不得不与亲戚争论“觉醒文化”（Woke）），很多人对 1990 年代和 2000 年代那种远离政治争执的平静岁月产生了强烈的怀旧情绪。 - **超政治的未来走向**：Jäger 明确强调自己的著作绝非要求回到过去的“去政治化”时代，人们关心政治本身是一件好事；真正的症结在于，我们能否探索出一种制度性形式，让超政治超越短暂的情绪爆发与网络愤怒，转化为持久的政治建设。 --- ### [01:03:24](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PurFyLK-zlk&t=3804s) 终局问答：安东·耶格尔的推荐书单 在访谈的尾声，Klein 按照惯例请 Jäger 向听众推荐三本值得阅读的著作。Jäger 选出了三部体裁迥异但影响深远的作品，跨越了严肃政治史、讽刺寓言文学与极具争议性的当代个人回忆录。 第一本书是波兰历史学家艾萨克·多伊彻（Isaac Deutscher）撰写的托洛茨基三部曲传记《先知》（*The Prophet*，包括《武装的先知》、《被解除武装的先知》与《流亡的先知》）。多伊彻直到三十岁出头才学习英语，却写出了二十世纪最伟大的政治人物传记之一。这部巨著不仅深受托派分子的推崇，当年甚至连诸多新保守主义知识分子乃至英国前首相托尼·布莱尔（Tony Blair）也深受其文字启发。Jäger 在二十岁出头时首次阅读该书，近期又通过有声书重温，盛赞其文笔精妙绝伦，既是一部生动刻画列昂·托洛茨基（Leon Trotsky）生平的史诗，也是一段波澜壮阔的政治历史，展现了一个虽与当代相去甚远却依然发人深省的历史转折时刻，即便对于坚定的反共立场者来说，这同样是一部难以抗拒的文学杰作。 | 推荐书籍 | 作者 | 题材与核心内容 | 推荐缘由 / 时代隐喻 | |:--- |:--- |:--- |:--- | | **《先知》三部曲** (*The Prophet*) | 艾萨克·多伊彻 (*Isaac Deutscher*) | 列昂·托洛茨基的政治史诗传记 | 语言造诣极高，跨越意识形态阵营的必读政治史经典，展现动荡时代的革命命运。 | | **《奶酪》** (*Cheese* / *Kaas*) | 威廉·埃尔斯霍特 (*Willem Elsschot*) | 1930 年代比利时/弗拉芒短篇小说 | 讲述中年男子因暴富幻想转行推销自己厌恶且从不吃的奶酪并走向失败，精准隐喻当代社会强迫性买卖与商品异化的荒谬。 | | **《我生命中的几个月》** (*Some Months from My Life*) | 米歇尔·维勒贝克 (*Michel Houellebecq*) | 当代法国文学名家的自传回忆录 | 记录作者卷入成人影片纠纷的混乱经历，借此深入剖析性、文化战争与当代政治困境。 | 第二本书是弗拉芒作家威廉·埃尔斯霍特（Willem Elsschot）于 1930 年代创作的小说《奶酪》（*Cheese*）。这部小说情节看似荒谬简短，讲述了一名肩负家庭重担的中年男子一心想通过经商致富，于是开始倒卖一种自己平日极度反感、碰都不碰的商品——奶酪，并最终以惨败收场。Jäger 认为这是献给二十一世纪的一则绝佳寓言：在当下社会中，买卖商品已经演变成一种近乎强迫症般的日常惯性行为，人们陷入无休止的市场交易网络，却对自己真正生产和消费的物品本身漠不关心、陷入精神麻木。 第三本推荐书是法国极具争议的作家米歇尔·维勒贝克（Michel Houellebecq）的非虚构回忆录《我生命中的几个月》（*Quelques mois dans ma vie*）。维勒贝克在 Jäger 的《超政治》一书中曾多次作为分析当代理论现象的核心主角登场。书中记录了维勒贝克个人生活中极为荒诞混乱的几个月——他曾被卷入一部荷兰色情电影的拍摄纠纷中并试图阻止其流出。Jäger 直言，在这部看似荒唐的事件回忆背后，维勒贝克展开了关于人类欲望、当代性关系、文化冲突以及政治现状的深刻冥想，全书展现出一种惊人且深沉的情感力量。 针对维勒贝克在小说领域展现出的“时代预言家”特质，Klein 进一步请教：对于尚未读过其虚构作品的读者，应该从哪一部小说开始切入？Jäger 建议： - **入门首选**：维勒贝克的处女作《斗争领域的延伸》（*Extension of the Domain of Struggle*），这是理解其世界观与叙事风格的最佳起点。 - **中后期代表作**：推荐《血清素》（*Serotonin*）。该书出版时在法国引发巨大轰动，被外界赋予诺查丹玛斯般的预言色彩，因为他在书中惊人地提前勾勒了席卷全法的“黄背心运动”与农民抗议浪潮。 - **小说美学价值**：Jäger 总结道，当下的世界正在变得越来越不具备文学性、甚至对小说叙事产生抗拒，但维勒贝克依然能够用其锐利的笔触，为这个不再诞生典型小说人物的当代世界，谱写出无与伦比的现实主义挽歌。 ## Notable quotes > [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PurFyLK-zlk&t=0s) 第一代觉醒（Woke 1.0）简直疯狂 — 亚历山大·奥卡西奥-科尔特斯 (AOC) > [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PurFyLK-zlk&t=0s) 我被上帝拯救以让美国再次伟大 > [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PurFyLK-zlk&t=0s) 超级政治：无政治后果的极度政治化 — 安东·耶格尔 > [19:40](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PurFyLK-zlk&t=1180s) 我们无法克隆恐龙。 — 安东·耶格尔 > [32:20](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PurFyLK-zlk&t=1940s) 比起讨厌我，更多的人实际上厌恶你和主流媒体 — 埃隆·马斯克 > [41:01](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PurFyLK-zlk&t=2461s) 行走的互动算法 — 埃兹拉·克莱因 > [38:42](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PurFyLK-zlk&t=2322s) 这能让我在接下来的 24 小时内霸占新闻头条吗？如果我轰炸某个国家或采取某项行动，能否引爆舆论？至于 48 小时之后，我们再想别的办法。 — 安东·耶格尔 > [48:53](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PurFyLK-zlk&t=2933s) 阻止任何事情发生，远比促成任何事情要容易得多 — 埃兹拉·克莱因 > [58:55](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PurFyLK-zlk&t=3535s) 旧世界正在死去，新世界尚未诞生，在这黄昏时分，群魔乱舞。 — 安东尼奥·葛兰西 > [58:55](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PurFyLK-zlk&t=3535s) 别无选择 — 玛格丽特·撒切尔 ## Mentioned 安东·耶格尔 (Anton Jäger), 埃兹拉·克莱因 (Ezra Klein), 亚历山大·奥卡西奥-科尔特斯 (Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez / AOC), 唐纳德·特朗普 (Donald Trump), 埃隆·马斯克 (Elon Musk), J.D. 万斯 (J.D. Vance), 马可·卢比奥 (Marco Rubio), 斯蒂芬·米勒 (Stephen Miller), 埃尔布里奇·科尔比 (Elbridge Colby), 乔·拜登 (Joe Biden), 贝拉克·奥巴马 (Barack Obama), 托尼·布莱尔 (Tony Blair), 比尔·克林顿 (Bill Clinton), 罗纳德·里根 (Ronald Reagan), 林登·约翰逊 (Lyndon B. Johnson), 富兰克林·德拉诺·罗斯福 (Franklin D. Roosevelt), 乔治·索罗斯 (George Soros), 乔治·奥威尔 (George Orwell), 沃尔特·李普曼 (Walter Lippmann), 安东尼奥·葛兰西 (Antonio Gramsci), 伊万·克拉斯特夫 (Ivan Krastev), 塔克·卡尔森 (Tucker Carlson), 玛乔丽·泰勒·格林 (Marjorie Taylor Greene), 小威廉·F·巴克利 (William F. Buckley Jr.), 戈尔·维达尔 (Gore Vidal), 佐兰·马姆达尼 (Zohran Mamdani), 艾萨克·多伊彻 (Isaac Deutscher), 威廉·埃尔斯霍特 (Willem Elsschot), 米歇尔·维勒贝克 (Michel Houellebecq), 列昂·托洛茨基 (Leon Trotsky), 美国民主社会主义者 (DSA), 传统基金会 (Heritage Foundation), 2025 计划 (Project 2025), 移民和海关执法局 (ICE), 美国商会 (Chamber of Commerce), 劳联-产联 (AFL-CIO), 政府效率部 (DOGE), 中国共产党 (CCP), 法国共产党 (French Communist Party), 基督教民主党 (Christian Democratic parties), 《超级政治：无政治后果的极度政治化》 (Hyperpolitics), 《公众舆论》 (Public Opinion), 《先知》三部曲 (The Prophet), 《奶酪》 (Cheese / Kaas), 《我生命中的几个月》 (Quelques mois dans ma vie), 《斗争领域的延伸》 (Extension of the Domain of Struggle), 《血清素》 (Serotonin), 黑人的命也是命 (Black Lives Matter), 茶党运动 (Tea Party), 占领华尔街运动 (Occupy Wall Street), Truth Social, X (原 Twitter), 《经济学人》 (The Economist), 《纽约时报》 (The New York Times), 《金融时报》 (Financial Times) ## Video description Behind the intense political movements of the last decade, from Trumpism to wokeness and back again, there’s a strange and erratic rhythm. Movements saturate the culture seemingly overnight, only to evaporate or spark backlash just as rapidly. We’re extremely politically engaged, yet we’ve rarely felt so powerless to create lasting policy change. I haven’t seen many very successful attempts to explain what is driving this volatility. But one concept that has taken off recently, and captures what so many of us are feeling, is “hyperpolitics.” The idea comes from Anton Jäger, a historian and contributing writer to New York Times Opinion. In his book “Hyperpolitics: Extreme Politicization Without Political Consequences,” Jäger theorizes what it means to live in a moment marked by hyper-engagement — high voter turnout, mass protests, trends that flare up and fade with extreme rapidity — yet where institutional trust is low, institutional relationships are decayed and people are disconnected from the structures that make political efforts stick. I think Jäger’s theory cuts to the core of this political era. So I invited him on the show to break down what hyperpolitics is, how we got here and what it actually takes to build lasting change today. 00:00 Intro 01:33 What Is “Hyperpolitics”? 03:55 Volatility Without Institutions 06:05 Is It Just Social Media? 10:05 AOC and Woke 1.0 15:13 The Mass Parties of the 20th Century 30:41 Elite Hyperpolitics 44:47 Is MAGA Institutionalizing? 48:14 Governance Gridlock 01:03:24 Book Recommendations Read the full transcript here: https://www.nytimes.com/2026/09/08/opinion/ezra-klein-podcast-anton-jager.html Watch more on @EzraKleinShow Thoughts? Guest suggestions? Email us at ezrakleinshow@nytimes.com. You can find transcripts (posted midday) and more episodes of “The Ezra Klein Show” at nytimes.com/ezra-klein-podcast. Book recommendations from all our guests are listed at https://www.nytimes.com/article/ezra-klein-show-book-recs.html [Source](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PurFyLK-zlk)

[0:00] 亚历山大·奥卡西奥-科尔特斯 (AOC): 第一代觉醒（Woke 1.0）简直疯狂 [0:00] 我被上帝拯救以让美国再次伟大 [0:00] 安东·耶格尔: 超级政治：无政治后果的极度政治化 [19:40] 安东·耶格尔: 我们无法克隆恐龙。 [32:20] 埃隆·马斯克: 比起讨厌我，更多的人实际上厌恶你和主流媒体 [41:01] 埃兹拉·克莱因: 行走的互动算法 [38:42] 安东·耶格尔: 这能让我在接下来的 24 小时内霸占新闻头条吗？如果我轰炸某个国家或采取某项行动，能否引爆舆论？至于 48 小时之后，我们再想别的办法。 [48:53] 埃兹拉·克莱因: 阻止任何事情发生，远比促成任何事情要容易得多 [58:55] 安东尼奥·葛兰西: 旧世界正在死去，新世界尚未诞生，在这黄昏时分，群魔乱舞。 [58:55] 玛格丽特·撒切尔: 别无选择

[10:00] Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez: Woke 1.0 was crazy [19:40] Anton Jäger: one cannot clone a dinosaur [32:20] Zanny Minton Beddoes: Do you see why this makes people think that this man, who has all this power, he's the world's richest man, he thinks he has a right to influence our politics? It makes people—it's why, you know, we started this conversation saying superlatives, it's why people loathe you. I mean, some people do loathe you. [32:20] Elon Musk: Maybe some people do loathe me. And that's probably true. I don't care. But the fact that, as you pointed out, a quarter billion people follow me is that I think a lot more people actually like me than don't. And I think a lot more people hate you and the media more than you realize. [38:42] Ivan Krastev: the implosion of time itself [41:01] Anton Jäger: what if short-termism is structural now? [41:01] Ezra Klein: human engagement algorithm [41:01] Anton Jäger: unburdened by any ideological convictions

[0:00] One of the hardest things to do is [0:02] describe the overall shape, texture, [0:05] rhythm [0:06] of a political era. We'll talk about [0:09] wokeness. [0:09] >> ALL COPS ARE BASTARDS. [0:11] >> WOKE one was crazy. [0:13] >> [laughter] [0:14] >> Woke one was crazy. [0:15] >> We'll talk about Trumpism. [0:16] >> I was saved by God to make America great [0:20] again. [0:21] >> [applause] [0:23] [cheering] [0:24] >> But getting at the the overall form in [0:27] which they all take place is is really, [0:29] really difficult. [0:30] One idea for this that has taken off a [0:32] bit recently that I've been hearing a [0:33] lot around me is hyper-politicization. [0:37] Hyper-politics is a concept from Anton [0:39] Jaeger. He's a historian and [0:41] contributing writer at New York Times [0:43] [music] Opinion. [0:44] And he's also the author of this book, [0:45] Hyper-politics: Extreme Politicization [0:47] Without Political Consequences. And what [0:50] he's [music] describing is an era in [0:52] which politics feels like it is [0:53] everywhere, the intensity of political [0:56] opinion and commitment is really, [0:58] really, really high, [0:59] that things are swinging wildly from one [1:01] side to the other, [music] [1:03] but things are not securely attached to [1:05] political institutions and structures. [1:08] And so these powerful periods [music] of [1:11] intense mobilization don't seem to have [1:13] lasting consequence. [1:15] I think it's a really interesting way of [1:17] trying to get at [music] [1:18] what is happening behind what we're all [1:21] feeling. He joins me now. [1:26] >> [music] [1:29] >> Anton Jaeger, welcome to the show. [1:31] >> Thank you. Thank you for having me. [1:33] >> So let's just begin at the beginning. [1:35] What is hyper-politics? [1:37] >> Hyper-politics is a concept [1:41] that describes a change in political [1:43] culture in the West in which we see an [1:46] increase in political activity on a [1:48] variety of metrics, whether it's voting, [1:50] protest, but also political violence. [1:53] But that increase in political activity [1:55] is not matched by an increasing [1:57] institutional strength. So, if you look [1:59] at the indices of union membership, [2:01] party membership, or other civil society [2:03] organizations, those have stagnated or [2:06] have continued to decline. And that is a [2:09] situation, I think, which doesn't really [2:10] have a proper precedent across the 20th [2:13] century, maybe also not the 19th. And [2:15] for that reason, I introduced the [2:17] concept to make sense of a new, [2:19] confusing political present. [2:21] >> So, you're describing a situation in [2:23] which [2:24] people and moments [2:27] feel more political, in some cases [2:28] they're doing more political things. You [2:30] have huge mass protests, like in Black [2:33] Lives Matter, [2:34] but there is a deinstitutionalized [2:37] reality to politics. They're not parts [2:39] of parties in the way they once were, [2:41] unions, civic organizations are are in [2:43] decline. And so, they're not civically [2:46] or institutionally attached. It's this [2:48] kind of mixture of political activity [2:50] absent institutional membership? [2:55] >> That's right. Yes. And of course, the [2:57] story I'm telling is a historical one, [2:59] and it comes with contrasts. So, if [3:01] you're using these two axes, [3:03] politicization, as I call it, and [3:04] institutionalization, [3:06] you can get a certain chronology of [3:08] political forms, as well. So, I talk [3:10] about the mass politics of the 20th [3:12] century, which could be highly [3:13] politicized, particularly, let's say, [3:15] the 1920s and 1930s, but was also very [3:18] heavily institutionalized. So, to be be [3:20] politically active often meant to be in [3:23] an institution. And I contrast it also [3:25] to the post-politics of the 1990s of the [3:27] 2000s, as it's called, in which you had [3:29] a decline on both of those indices. So, [3:32] low institutionalization and low [3:33] politicization. And what we're looking [3:35] at now, indeed, is this strange scissor [3:38] shape, namely, a lot of the collectivity [3:41] has also become easier, and it's become [3:43] more necessary to pursue it, but it [3:45] doesn't really have an institutional [3:46] form. So, it feels very incoherent, and [3:48] as I claim, that also means it doesn't [3:51] have as many policy consequences as it [3:53] used to have. [3:55] >> So, I don't want to question your [3:57] definition of your own concept, but but [3:59] one thing I feel like that doesn't quite [4:03] pick up on, but which is part of why [4:05] this idea has resonated, is the [4:07] hyperness of hyperpolitics. This feeling [4:11] of things rising and falling with [4:13] incredible rapidity. It's like one year [4:16] you're deep inside Black Lives Matter [4:18] and and wokeness, and then it's like the [4:19] vibes have shifted to Trump, and then, [4:21] you know, they come all the way back. [4:23] Nothing seems to last, but everything [4:25] seems incredibly important. You have a [4:28] very, um, [4:29] thoughtful iconic style here, but but I [4:32] want to get at this kind of frenzied [4:34] nature of it, which you do describe in [4:35] the book. [4:37] >> Yes, so I think the volatility or the [4:39] frenzy you're pointing at is a [4:42] quintessential feature of the phenomenon [4:44] I'm describing, because what do [4:46] institutions do with political activity? [4:48] They stabilize it, and they give it [4:50] longevity over a longer time period. [4:53] And if you don't have these institutions [4:55] to tie your political action to, [4:58] and also not, let's say, the mechanisms [5:00] of delegation or representation that [5:02] come with these institutions, I'd say [5:04] also maybe discipline, [5:06] that means that short-termism is a de [5:08] facto mode of a lot of political action, [5:11] because you can be enormously interested [5:14] and invested in one question for a [5:16] couple of weeks, you follow the media [5:17] cycle, [5:18] but then, once, let's say, the [5:20] popularity fades or it doesn't seem as [5:22] urgent, you move on to the next thing. [5:24] And there's no institution that's [5:25] actually there to set the agenda, to [5:26] help you articulate a long-term vision [5:28] that might unite your politics across [5:31] all these short-term issues. So, the [5:33] hyper has both a spatial and a temporal [5:36] side to it. Spatial insofar as it can go [5:40] everywhere, and it can gather loads and [5:42] loads of people. I mean, there are are [5:43] record numbers in in of turnout, not [5:45] just in the US, but across the West for [5:47] protests in the last 10 to 15 years, but [5:50] it's also hyper in that it [5:53] doesn't cover very long time span, and [5:55] almost like a political market, you can [5:57] invest in a product, and then when you [5:58] see that its value is plunging, you can [6:01] dump your shares, and you can move on to [6:02] the next [6:03] issue. [6:05] >> One of my critiques of the book is that [6:09] you often will gesture at what seems [6:11] very obvious about this to me, [6:13] which is that this is digital politics. [6:16] This is online politics. This is [6:17] algorithmically mediated politics. You [6:20] write about hyperpolitics, it is [6:22] dynamic, intense, and polarizing, yet [6:25] also ideologically diffuse, visibly [6:28] modeled on the fluidity of the online [6:30] world. [6:31] You don't spend much time in the book [6:33] describing or theorizing the fluidity of [6:35] the online world, but I I want to spend [6:38] some time on it here because the [6:40] politics you're describing are politics [6:41] I recognize and live through. [6:44] This just feels like not even what [6:46] institutions are or are not able to do [6:48] now, [6:49] as much as [6:51] politics, which is fundamentally [6:54] downstream of what we pay attention to, [6:56] and our attention is fundamentally [6:58] shaped now [7:00] by algorithms that care about [7:02] controversy, that care about newness, [7:04] that are hunting [snorts] [7:05] amorally and constantly for whatever [7:09] will get a rise out of people, and if [7:11] you build politics on that completely [7:14] bizarre superstructure of attention, [7:17] this is what you get. [7:20] >> I'm broadly in agreement, and I don't [7:22] think it necessarily contradicts or [7:26] is in friction with the thesis I'm [7:27] defending. I'm a bit hesitant about a [7:30] lot of theories, particularly in the [7:31] last 10 to 15 years, that assign not [7:34] just a primary, but as we say a [7:36] monocausal role to digital technology, [7:39] where somehow the internet explains [7:40] everything, and then the book shouldn't [7:42] have been called hyperpolitics, but just [7:44] extremely online politics. And then it's [7:46] just a a book about the digitalization [7:49] or the increasingly digital nature of [7:51] our political lives. [7:53] I want to resist that collapse, or I [7:56] want to resist equating hyperpolitics [7:58] just with extremely online politics. [8:01] For the reason that many of the theories [8:03] we've had, let's say that tried to [8:05] describe the Brexit vote or the Trump [8:07] vote through something like Russian bots [8:09] or bought Facebook ads. There was of [8:11] course during the Arab Spring already a [8:13] theory that these were so-called [8:14] Facebook revolutions, that it was [8:16] digital platforms that were really [8:17] driving the upsurge. But also recently [8:20] the idea that the reason [8:23] social media is playing this role is [8:24] primarily because it's the only thing we [8:26] pay attention to. And I I don't think [8:29] that's very compelling. For the very [8:31] reason that you also have to pay [8:33] attention to the environment in which [8:35] digital media was launched. And there [8:38] it's not as if social media did all the [8:39] work on itself. It's more that the civic [8:42] or social landscape in which it entered [8:45] it found a population that was ready to [8:48] experience so much of politics online. [8:51] Of course these algorithms are [8:52] addictive, but the question is always [8:53] why does it stick? Why are people so [8:56] taken to it? And at the same time a lot [8:59] of the reason there are protests doesn't [9:00] just have to do with hallucinations [9:03] online. These are very, very real and [9:05] very important topics, whether it's mass [9:07] incarceration or police violence in the [9:08] US. [9:10] Let's say inequality, but surely on the [9:12] right let's say migration. And these are [9:14] not simply things that digital platforms [9:17] have somehow conjured up out of nothing. [9:20] It's more that I think social media has [9:22] acted as a magnifying glass and an [9:24] accelerator of certain trends that came [9:27] before, [9:28] but which I think surpass the digital. [9:30] And if we reduce everything to the [9:31] digital, we [9:33] are only having a conversation about [9:34] platforms when I think it should be a [9:36] much broader [9:37] >> I always think of the conversation about [9:39] what you're calling digital as a [9:40] conversation about attention. And you [9:42] can have that conversation well or [9:45] poorly. And I agree with you, dissolving [9:47] things down to Russian bots or Facebook [9:50] ads is ridiculous. I didn't believe that [9:52] in the 2016 election, I don't believe it [9:54] now. [9:56] But but let me push this a little bit. [9:58] Because when I say it's my critique of [9:59] the book, I don't mean I think you have [10:00] it wrong in the book. I actually just [10:02] wish there was a chapter on it in the [10:03] book. [10:04] >> Mhm. [10:05] >> And [10:06] one thing I was thinking about as I read [10:09] the argument you're making about [10:11] institutions [10:13] is well, what do I see happening [10:16] with the institutions we have today? [10:18] Because it's not as if all institutions [10:20] are gone or nobody is part of a party. [10:23] You can look at the DSA, which is rising [10:25] in America and is has a real [10:27] institutional formation. There are [10:30] people who, you know, devote their lives [10:32] to the Democratic Party, to the [10:33] Republican Party. [10:35] And one thing I would say about all of [10:37] these people, [10:38] not literally every individual, but many [10:40] of them, [10:41] is they exhibit [10:44] the tendencies of hyper-politics [10:48] even more than normal people do. [10:50] Right? The the tendency to get overly [10:52] invested in what gets called online, the [10:54] current thing, to have like incredible [10:57] waves of sentiment, but then not be able [10:59] to kind of translate it over a long [11:00] period of time, [11:01] the sort of tendency to look back on [11:03] something like two or three or four or [11:05] five years ago, something recent, think, [11:06] "Oh my god, what were we just doing?" [11:08] Right? Famously, AOC just gave an [11:10] interview where she said woke one was [11:11] crazy. [11:12] >> I have a local city councilman that has [11:15] this uh [11:17] uh [11:17] saying woke one was crazy. [11:19] >> [laughter] [11:20] >> Woke one was crazy. Okay, that's [11:22] interesting. [11:22] >> And uh [11:23] and I think that what's important is [11:25] that we have to assess what [11:27] >> Was it? I mean, did did the movement go [11:28] too far with some of those positions? I [11:30] mean, you you briefly supported the idea [11:32] of defunding the police. [11:33] >> Well, [11:34] >> Um [11:34] >> you know, I think I think that [11:37] during this time and during especially [11:40] during COVID, there was a huge opening [11:42] of the Overton window. We were shut [11:44] down. There was some of the highest [11:45] unemployment rates that we have seen [11:47] because of those shutdowns. And I think [11:49] that the the doors were really open in [11:52] trying to entertain any and every policy [11:56] that was going to get us to a better [11:58] place. And I actually think that the [12:00] discussions that had that were had in [12:02] that time were quite fruitful. [12:05] >> I think what she's describing there is [12:08] the way online politics led ideas that [12:12] are real and rooted in the real world [12:15] to sort of take some forms and be [12:19] expressed in ways that people no longer [12:20] wish to defend. [12:22] And so the the way I think there's a [12:24] connection here [12:26] is it that people even who are [12:27] institutions and the way institutions [12:30] work and collectivities work, those [12:32] people are also communicating with each [12:33] other online and tweeting at each other [12:35] and we tweet retweeting each other. [12:37] Donald Trump communicates with the [12:38] Republican Party through Truth Social. [12:42] So sort of saying there are these two [12:43] spheres, institutions [12:45] and the digital world, it doesn't feel [12:48] real to me. I watch people who lead [12:50] these institutions communicating with [12:52] each other [12:53] through this digital world and thus the [12:55] institutions [12:57] end up [12:58] in a kind of a like a like a the same [13:01] sort of back and forth slightly wild [13:03] oscillation [13:04] quality. [13:06] >> Yes. [13:07] It's very clear that the types of [13:08] politicization that are typical of the [13:11] contemporary world also have an effect [13:13] on how people affiliate with [13:14] institutions. Then I would say [13:16] hyperpolitics obviously moves at [13:17] different speeds in different groups. So [13:19] with the political professional and [13:22] the let's say voter who maybe He voted [13:25] in a couple of elections and isn't [13:27] professionally involved in politics. [13:28] Obviously, hyper politics going to have [13:30] very different effects. So, the [13:31] volatility or the short-termism which we [13:33] detect in the general population and [13:35] their relationship to politics will also [13:37] find its counterpart even with uh [13:40] subjects that find themselves in these [13:42] institutions, which I think is a [13:43] striking illustration for AOC, but you [13:47] could make the argument for a couple of [13:48] other figures as well, is that the [13:51] reason one can easily rescind certain [13:54] positions or then step back on [13:55] commitments that were made quite [13:58] vociferously a couple of years ago, is [13:59] that there doesn't really seem to be a [14:03] solid ideology behind many of these [14:05] political choices and preferences. And [14:07] and this is important for an [14:08] institutional side of story, there isn't [14:10] a sort of program to which you can tie [14:11] herself. And across the 20th century, I [14:14] mean, political parties always had [14:15] leaders or certain charismatic figures [14:17] that led them forward. They always had [14:19] people that were more individualized as [14:22] a member of that party than others, but [14:24] at the same time, there was a program [14:25] around which everyone could orient [14:27] themselves. And this means that changing [14:30] or reneging on some of those aspects of [14:32] that program came with with costs. And [14:35] the question with AOC is [14:37] well, she has a relationship to the DSA. [14:39] The DSA is obviously not an official [14:40] political party, it's a socialist [14:42] organization, but the question is what [14:44] is the DSA's program she's listening to [14:46] or she feels she has to be accountable [14:49] to and how can they discipline her when [14:51] she then decides that she now wants to [14:53] pursue a different political path. And I [14:55] think that's the hyper politics at [14:57] different speeds I'm talking about. In [14:58] the general population, it's, let's say, [15:00] hopping from one theme to another, but [15:02] even for political professionals, it [15:04] means a decline in ideological [15:06] consistency or even the question of what [15:08] is my party line or what is my long-term [15:11] vision for the transformation of [15:12] society. [15:13] >> You tell a historical story in the book [15:15] about these other periods in politics, [15:16] and maybe it's worth sitting in one of [15:18] them for a few minutes, which is [15:20] practically mass membership politics. [15:23] And I think you're more describing [15:26] European political parties in this than [15:28] American political parties, which have [15:29] always been somewhat different. [15:31] But it's such a different world to try [15:33] to mentally inhabit if you're an [15:35] American in, you know, the year 2026 [15:38] that [15:39] I'd like you to sort of draw that [15:41] picture, that that what it was like [15:43] to be at least in some of these parties, [15:46] you know, in in this other period that [15:47] you're describing. [15:49] >> So, the portrait I'm painting is very [15:52] much reliant on cases on the left, but I [15:56] also want to highlight that it's not [15:58] exclusive to the left. There are [16:00] right-wing variants of this, [16:01] but [16:03] the case was that to be a member of a [16:05] political party was not something [16:06] optional and was often something that [16:08] was handed down in families. So, it was [16:11] hereditary in many cases. Describing it [16:14] as voluntary is almost tricky in so far [16:17] as the social stigma for leaving a party [16:19] or for not voting for it would be quite [16:22] severe. You might have to move out of [16:24] your neighborhood. And at the same time, [16:27] it also meant that your electoral choice [16:29] was very much a function of your [16:31] institutional membership. There was no [16:33] question who you were going to vote for [16:34] because you were already a member and [16:36] and this means that your political [16:37] preferences were completely determined [16:39] by that affiliation. [16:41] And that obviously also meant that the [16:43] party had a lot of control over your [16:45] private lives as well. So, there are [16:47] cases in the 1970s, for example, that [16:49] members of the French Communist Party [16:50] were not allowed to buy certain cars or [16:52] drive them. [16:53] Of course, the Christian Democratic [16:55] parties had very strong views on, what [16:57] happened in the bedroom. And [17:00] it was a very authoritarian world in [17:02] many cases as well. I don't want to [17:04] pretend as if it was egalitarian, as if [17:06] people had complete control over these [17:08] parties, but membership was immersive. [17:11] It was sometimes something that could [17:13] last a lifetime and for which the exit [17:15] costs were quite high. [17:18] Um now, of course, the US is very [17:20] different because the US never developed [17:22] mass parties in the way that Europe did. [17:24] That probably had to do with the fact [17:25] that the US democratized very early. But [17:28] at the same time, I want to resist the [17:29] idea that American parties haven't been [17:32] profoundly transformed in the last 50 to [17:35] 60 years, the period I'm covering. [17:37] Because even as parties that are more [17:40] part of the state than of society, they [17:42] still had this hinterland of civil [17:43] society organizations, particularly in [17:45] the case of the Democratic Party, for [17:47] example, unions or [17:49] different minority group interests. [17:52] >> church would be a good example of this, [17:54] I think. [17:54] >> Yes. And of course, religious [17:56] institutions are massive, massively [17:58] important and have been for both parties [17:59] for a while now. [18:01] But even as that hinterland has started [18:03] to [18:05] shrink or desiccate, that also meant [18:07] that even American parties that are not [18:09] not mass parties have reconfigured their [18:12] relationship to society as a whole. And [18:15] they now fulfill a very, very different [18:16] function than they did across the 20th [18:19] century. Of course, as I say, it is a [18:21] different story because there never was [18:23] the membership model as as we knew it in [18:24] Europe, and this means that the story of [18:26] hyperpolitics, American style, has to be [18:28] told differently than the European [18:30] variant. [18:31] >> One of the things that I thought about [18:33] reading [18:34] that that part of the book, and and [18:35] you're signaling it here, [18:38] is that [18:39] I think at a high gloss, [18:42] that sounds good to people, right? This [18:44] idea that we have hollow political [18:45] parties now, and everything just moves [18:47] too fast. You can't stretch ideology [18:50] over an actual structure of civic [18:51] belonging and civic membership and civic [18:53] action. [18:55] But these much more totalizing parties [18:58] that you describe, [19:00] it led to a lot of [19:03] horror, among other things. And you sort [19:04] of gesture at the the parties of the [19:06] right, fascist parties, the Nazis, [19:10] that it is the case that ideology could [19:14] bring you into a much more immersive [19:16] world where the cost of exit was much [19:18] higher [19:19] and the [19:21] pressure for total ideological [19:23] indoctrination [19:25] was more constant. [19:28] >> So, is this a thing to look back on with [19:30] nostalgia? I mean, indoctrination is not [19:33] a concept I think we look back on [19:35] with a lot of fondness and having a [19:37] party sit there and tell me how I should [19:38] look at everything in the world and be [19:40] able to socially or possibly [19:42] professionally in patronage models [19:44] punish me if I don't look at it that [19:45] way. [19:46] That's not a a world I'm so eager to [19:48] live in either. [19:51] >> No, so I talked about the inegalitarian [19:54] aspects of that system. Um the book also [19:57] wants to maintain a focused ambiguity [19:59] without too much nostalgia about what [20:01] this world was, how unpleasant it could [20:03] be for certain people. It starts of [20:05] course with um portraits of figures in [20:08] the '90s and 2000s who are happy to be [20:10] liberated from that world, who also [20:11] experience a degree of individual [20:13] freedom precisely because those [20:14] institutions don't dominate their lives [20:17] anymore. And also with the idea that one [20:18] cannot clone a dinosaur. So, we cannot [20:20] take the DNA of those parties and [20:22] implement them in the present and hope [20:24] that they will revive and survive the [20:26] current environment. Um at the same time [20:30] it is also very clear that there is a [20:33] question of power there. People don't [20:35] simply join institutions because they [20:37] don't want to be lonely. That's also a [20:39] reason and I think it's part of the [20:40] story that the book also tells in the [20:41] crisis of sociability. The loneliness [20:44] epidemic as it's called is obviously [20:45] also a part of the [20:46] deinstitutionalization the book is [20:48] trying to analyze. Um but except for the [20:51] sociability element, parties are also [20:53] guarantees of collective power. I mean, [20:55] they're instruments for collective [20:56] action. [20:57] And as they have declined and as [21:00] sometimes their immersive or [21:01] totalitarian aspects have disappeared, [21:03] there has also been an increasing [21:05] difficulty of translating individual [21:07] preferences into collective action. [21:10] Particularly in the West, I think there [21:11] are few exceptions to this, maybe China [21:13] and India that do have these weird mass [21:16] parties left, but for the rest, the [21:17] decline of parties has gone hand in hand [21:19] with an inability or declining gradient [21:22] of popular power, particularly from [21:24] below. [21:25] >> Can you expand on that? That's a thing [21:27] people sometimes say and then move very [21:28] fast. [21:30] Defend that position for me that [21:32] somebody sitting around in American [21:34] politics in 1973 or 1954 was more [21:38] capable of translating individual [21:41] politics into collective power into [21:44] governmental reform. [21:46] >> Well, [21:48] there is political science research [21:49] about this. So, obviously about the [21:51] negative correlation, for example, [21:52] between public preferences and policy [21:55] results. So, I mean, the typical case, [21:57] for example, is Medicare for all, where [21:58] there has been a majority for now for a [22:00] while, but the chance of it getting [22:01] implemented and it is [22:04] >> This is a very weak example. Different [22:06] states, I've covered these fights. [22:08] Medicare for all, you pull it, it pulls [22:10] high. You then tell people, "Here's what [22:12] the taxes will be, your insurance is [22:13] going away." It pulls low. And it's a [22:16] very common thing when you have a [22:18] complex policy, you can frame it at the [22:20] outset and people are like, "Great." And [22:22] it's a gigantic change and they are [22:23] very, very afraid when you begin [22:25] actually putting a change on them. So, [22:28] in this comparative take you're making, [22:30] like, I I I want to hear this defended [22:31] that we were so much better at at [22:33] getting what we wanted politically in [22:35] another era. I I found a lot of the [22:37] political science on this when I do read [22:38] it a little bit confused. So, that's why [22:40] I'm I'm pushing this point before we [22:42] just escape by it. [22:44] >> Yeah, it's also important to keep in [22:45] mind that this is not the only factor [22:47] feeding into this capacity. There is a [22:49] question of state capacity, there are [22:51] other kind of channels that need to be [22:52] examined. There is just one element, [22:54] namely, how is the decline of these [22:55] institutions negatively affected the [22:58] capacity for policy change? And I do [23:01] think if you look at the heyday, let's [23:03] say what is called the New Deal order in [23:04] the 1930s and the 1940s when [23:08] the American welfare state, which was [23:09] never as spectacular as the European [23:11] variant, was built, there is a very [23:13] clear correlation with mass power that [23:15] at the time. Um and it is also very, [23:17] very clear that after McCarthyism and [23:19] particularly after the subduing of the [23:21] civil rights movement, um the fall of [23:24] this mass power goes hand in hand with [23:25] the difficulty of actually getting [23:28] concessions, particularly from America's [23:30] business class. Now, in Europe, it's [23:32] different, but it's also very clear that [23:33] for example, Europe's welfare states [23:35] were not just built by technocrats, but [23:37] were built through the exercise of mass [23:39] pressure. Now, once again, mass pressure [23:41] is not an intrinsic uh good. It can have [23:44] very negative consequences. Um but at [23:46] the same time, um there to me very, very [23:49] clearly is the case that the set of [23:52] social rights that were built up in [23:53] Europe and the US in the middle of the [23:55] century were also a function of mass [23:57] power, not only a function of mass [24:00] power. I mean, it seems indisputable to [24:02] me that the decline of union power in [24:03] the US probably has something to do with [24:06] the staggering levels of inequality that [24:07] the US currently has. Now, it's a [24:09] correlation and then the causal [24:11] mechanism is complicated, but I think [24:13] that's one illustration of how, let's [24:15] say, institutional power can translate [24:17] into uh policy results more concretely. [24:21] >> One of the reasons I'm pushing on this [24:23] is that I think there is a widespread [24:26] view and I think this view is correct, [24:28] that people feel particularly powerless [24:30] over right now. [24:32] And so then like the next step in [24:34] thinking about that view is whether it [24:37] is a perception or whether it is true. [24:40] And you you know, I would tell the story [24:42] you just told a little bit differently, [24:43] right? You have an American political [24:46] system that is very resistant to kinds [24:48] of reform for very, very long periods of [24:49] time. [24:50] The Great Depression fractures the [24:53] system. [24:54] It functionally annihilates the [24:56] Republican Party for a period of time. [24:59] FDR does not pass all that policy [25:01] because all of a sudden union density [25:03] jumps. FDR passes all that policy [25:05] because there is a level of democratic [25:07] dominance over Congress that is [25:09] unimaginable to us today. [25:11] Lyndon Johnson's Great Society, where [25:13] you have another big period of expansion [25:14] of the uh [25:16] welfare state, comes after Kennedy is [25:18] assassinated. Kennedy is not getting [25:19] things done. The civil rights movement [25:22] is stymied for a very long time by uh [25:25] southern power over Congress. The [25:26] filibuster is used basically exclusively [25:29] to stop civil rights bills for, you [25:31] know, decades in American politics. [25:33] And so you have these sort of punctuated [25:35] moments when a lot can get done. But [25:37] they tend to come for unusual reasons. [25:39] Now, I'm not saying mass power is [25:40] important in that, and I do agree with [25:42] you, by the way, that union density is a [25:44] reason we've had um inequality rise. [25:46] Because a lot of that, as you say, [25:48] people can argue over. [25:50] The reason I bring all this up is it uh [25:52] one of the things that does not always [25:54] seem obviously true to me is that the [25:56] average person had so much more power in [25:59] these times. Like you needed this sort [26:01] of moment, and then like the, you know, [26:03] the Overton window cracks open, and all [26:04] of a sudden a bunch of things happen, [26:06] but it's very, very contingent. It's not [26:08] a linear process in which the work you [26:11] are doing as a citizen day in and day [26:13] out is feeling like it is getting [26:15] anywhere most of the time. [26:17] One of the things, going back to [26:18] attention, which I just think is [26:20] under-theorized in in politics so much [26:22] as we do talk about it, is it people [26:24] today [26:26] they know so much more about the world. [26:29] They know so much more about it so [26:31] constantly than they could before. [26:34] So, you have all of this information, [26:36] and the information is now tuned to be [26:39] much more arousing emotionally than it [26:42] was at another time. [26:44] One of the things that I suspect is it [26:46] is [26:47] the mixture of how much you know and how [26:49] much you are being made to feel at all [26:51] moments. Mixing with like the [26:53] powerlessness that actually is real, [26:55] right? The amount of power an individual [26:56] has, and then the amount of institutions [26:58] you're tied to is low. [27:01] That creates this feeling that [27:03] everything is being done [27:05] without your consent, without your [27:06] control. There's no way for you to [27:07] affect it. In America now, with the sort [27:10] of red-blue system where you live in a [27:11] blue state and, you know, your vote [27:13] barely matters in national elections, [27:15] you know, the same thing in very red [27:16] states, right? Everybody knows how your [27:17] state is going to go, so what does it [27:19] matter how you vote? That [27:22] that I think we always want to put this [27:23] as a a question of individual capacity, [27:25] but is it a question of individual [27:26] capacity, or is it a question of [27:29] the amount you're being pulled into [27:30] politics, and then your absence of [27:33] capacity conflict with each other for [27:35] you? [27:38] >> Yes to both, with some modifications, [27:40] maybe I'd say. So, for the first, I [27:42] think that individual powerlessness, [27:44] this is also not completely without [27:45] precedent. So, the heyday of mass [27:47] politics in, for example, the '30s and [27:49] '40s, maybe a bit in the '50s, was also [27:51] the start of the nuclear race, which to [27:53] many people seemed as the supreme [27:55] expression of powerlessness of the 20th [27:57] century, as the most anti-democratic [27:58] weapon, as George Orwell said. So, it's [28:01] not as if that wasn't with us before. [28:04] Um and I also don't want to pretend as [28:06] if re-institutionalization or rebuilding [28:08] those institutions today will [28:10] automatically mean that they it will [28:12] become easier to implement certain [28:14] policies, because there's also a [28:16] question of where power has moved, even [28:18] on the level of the state. So, I don't [28:21] think that in the '50s and '60s, let's [28:22] say, unelected bodies, both in Europe [28:24] and the US, like central banks, had as [28:25] much power as they do today, and they're [28:27] not, let's say, subject to popular [28:29] pressure or even electoral pressure in [28:31] the same way. So, there's no immediate [28:33] guarantee. [28:34] And [28:36] it's one factor among many. So, you do, [28:39] I think, have to have certain coalitions [28:40] within the elite, together with mass [28:42] power, to get some of these policy [28:43] results done. And it could also be that [28:45] the constellation is favorable, and then [28:48] it turns out that it works. [28:50] I do think that one of the most [28:51] important factors in the policy blockage [28:55] we're witnessing across both sides of [28:56] the Atlantic in the last 20 years is [28:58] that the factor of mass power has been [29:01] severely reduced even as politicization [29:04] has risen and that probably explains why [29:06] it's become more difficult. When it [29:08] comes to the paradox of increasing [29:10] visibility [29:12] or the dynamics of contemporary [29:14] political mobilization, I fully agree. I [29:16] mean, the kinds of footage you can now [29:20] get beamed onto your smartphone screens, [29:22] whether it's a genocide in the Middle [29:23] East or let's say mass murder on the [29:25] other side of the planet, increases [29:27] political awareness greatly. So, there's [29:29] an immediacy to the experience, but [29:31] there's also a feeling of complete [29:33] helplessness. And I do think that's [29:34] different in that if you heard about the [29:36] nuclear race in the 40s and 50s, you [29:38] read about it, but it's not something [29:39] you could sort of live stream into your [29:42] living room all the time. That is [29:44] something you can do now, particularly [29:46] if you spend a lot of time on social [29:47] media and that probably increases the [29:51] feeling of helplessness. [29:52] >> [music] [30:03] >> One of the other things I think is [30:04] interesting about social media [30:06] is that it does create an answer to the [30:10] question it poses. [30:12] You have seen something terrible in [30:14] front of you. [30:15] And what you can do is post [30:18] or comment [30:20] or like. [30:21] And I I do think it creates [30:25] this somewhat confusion between action [30:28] and and effect. It's an action that may [30:30] not have an effect. [30:31] But it it does sort of complete an [30:33] instant stress cycle. You've just seen [30:35] something terrible. [30:36] We have to do something. Well, in the [30:38] place you're in, [30:39] what you do is post. [30:41] And again, one reason that I I focus [30:43] here is that I think this is truer for [30:45] political elites than for anything else. [30:47] And I think one of the unusual things [30:49] about this whole story we're in [30:51] is that the elites are more addled than [30:54] anyone else is. [30:55] So, you go back to Walter Lippmann's [30:56] book Public Opinion, which I think comes [30:58] out in 1922, if I'm not wrong, right [31:00] around there. [31:01] And Walter Lippmann's answer to the [31:05] reality that the world outside our heads [31:08] differs from the world inside our heads, [31:09] that our pictures of reality are always [31:11] flawed. So, how do we engage with this [31:13] world that we don't really understand? [31:15] Is this famously quite unsatisfying. [31:18] Well, there should be these technocratic [31:20] elite panels, and they know everything. [31:22] And one of the ways that that ends up [31:23] being an obviously wrong answer [31:26] is it assumed the elites would not be [31:29] addled. But in fact, nobody is more [31:32] brain addled right now by social media [31:33] than Donald Trump or Elon Musk, you [31:36] know, than the top people in the White [31:38] House. That there is such a [31:41] that nobody is more attentionally hooked [31:45] on this kind of information [31:48] than the people who've made politics [31:50] their life's work. [31:52] And that just creates, I think, a [31:53] strange thing because, you know, normal [31:55] people will then sort of turn to people [31:58] who are engaged in politics all the time [32:00] for cues on what to do and how to feel [32:02] and where to join. [32:04] And not always, but often, [32:07] they're the worst people [32:08] to ask or to follow because they're the [32:11] most [32:13] crazed [32:15] by these, you know, by this form of [32:17] political attention. [32:20] >> Yeah, so this is a book that's mainly [32:22] written from below in some sense. I [32:24] mean, it's not just for the left, but [32:26] it's written from the left. And that [32:28] means it describes the effects of like [32:31] the declining cost of political [32:33] expression through the online. So, as [32:36] you say, you're faced with an obvious [32:38] wrong or a a moral scandal, and [32:42] before you maybe had to write a [32:44] newspaper editor, you had to let's say [32:46] contact your local party chief, or you [32:47] had to go and stand in the middle of the [32:49] of a square and start shouting, now you [32:51] can do something else. You can express [32:53] yourself politically much more cheaply [32:55] and easily than before, but then there's [32:57] a question of diminishing returns as [32:58] well. Like it's easy, but what are the [33:00] actual effects? [33:02] Now, that is a question of how the [33:05] decline of cost of political expression [33:07] affects popular capacity for social [33:10] change. When you look at it from the top [33:12] of society, we can see as you say that [33:14] there's also a variant of hyperpolitics [33:16] there. I think the modus of government [33:20] of the second Trump administration, its [33:22] short-termism, its incapacity to plan, [33:24] its unwillingness to plan, also [33:26] indicates that deinstitutionalization [33:29] or incoherence between different [33:31] factions of the elite has also had [33:33] severe consequences, let's say for the [33:36] people who are actually in charge. I [33:37] mean, there's a really spectacular [33:39] example of this of Elon Musk being [33:41] interviewed by the editor of The [33:43] Economist recently. [33:45] And I mean, it gets very brutal. [33:47] >> But do you see why this makes people [33:49] think [33:50] that this man, who has all this power, [33:52] he's the world's richest man, he thinks [33:54] he has a right to influence our [33:55] politics? It makes people It's why, you [33:58] know, we started this conversation [33:59] saying superlatives, it's why people [34:00] loathe you. [34:02] I mean, some people do loathe you. [34:03] >> Yes, some people do. [34:05] >> But do you understand why? [34:06] Do you think what you're doing is [34:07] helpful for Western democracy? [34:09] >> Maybe maybe some people do loathe me. I [34:11] And that's And that's probably true. I [34:13] don't care. Um the uh [34:16] But But the fact that uh [34:18] as you pointed out, a quarter billion [34:20] people follow me is that I think a lot [34:22] more people actually like me than don't. [34:26] And I think a lot more people hate you [34:28] and the media [34:29] uh more than you realize. [34:31] >> When he openly insults her also [34:33] afterwards on his own private platform. [34:35] But the striking thing about the [34:37] interview is that these are two members [34:38] of the same class. They're shouting at [34:40] each other in the middle of the public [34:41] sphere. Normally in a different [34:43] situation, you'd expect some class [34:45] solidarity from both sides. I mean, [34:46] we're in this together. We have to think [34:48] about a common project. And the elite is [34:51] severely divided, particularly in the [34:53] US, but also in Europe. And they don't [34:55] actually have institutions to reconcile [34:57] their social, sectoral, geographic [35:00] interests. And what the online world [35:02] does is that I think aggravates the [35:05] dispolarization to such an extent that [35:08] they cannot think long-term about what [35:12] their interests are. So, hyperpolitics I [35:13] think has [35:15] compounding and very severe consequences [35:18] for the elite as well. It's just that [35:19] the book doesn't provide a full [35:22] theoretical model of how you should [35:24] probe these effects. [35:25] >> I I want to come back to that in a [35:26] second as you did write a very [35:27] interesting piece in the New Left Review [35:28] that is more in this direction and and [35:30] think about Donald Trump. But but [35:32] quickly because as you say the book is [35:33] written from within the left, something [35:35] you said there pinged for me, which is [35:37] that you would expect a kind of class [35:39] solidarity [35:40] between Elon Musk and the editor of The [35:42] Economist. [35:44] Can I ask why you would expect that? [35:46] Because when I look back on past [35:48] interviews, you have huge divisions [35:50] between, you know, the elites of [35:52] different countries at all times. [35:54] I mean, Musk is a highly right-wing [35:56] American elite who is highly politicized [35:58] himself. He's not just a you know, [36:00] random [36:01] CEO at this point. The press is often [36:04] very antagonistic. [36:06] You know, I think about say like the [36:07] Buckley [36:08] the Dahl debates where they're [36:09] threatening to punch each other in the [36:11] face, you know, on on live television. [36:13] >> Yeah. [36:13] >> Stop calling me a crypto Nazi. [36:15] >> Let's stop calling names and let's stop [36:17] my damn face. I will [36:18] >> stay plastered. [36:19] >> Gentlemen, let's [36:21] >> Tell me about your intuition that there [36:24] is an absence now of elite class [36:27] solidarity when in the past that [36:28] existed. Because I know my read of [36:30] history, you think about McCarthyism, [36:32] right? Where they're getting each other [36:34] like destroyed from public life, you [36:37] know, on the assumption being a [36:39] communist whether or not it's true that [36:41] elite politics has often been very [36:43] rivalrous and that assumptions of [36:46] solidarity have never held at any for [36:49] any great number of them. [36:52] >> So, I have to confess that this is [36:55] a manifestation of a vulgar Marxism [36:57] that's probably in me where [37:00] I [37:01] see two creatures that should have the [37:03] same class instinct and should be [37:04] naturally sympathetic to the each other. [37:08] But as you say, actually elite division [37:11] or elite [37:13] rivalry is the rule rather than the [37:16] exception across history, particularly [37:18] in the US because the country's so [37:19] large. You have all kinds of economic [37:22] sectors. It's very difficult to unite [37:24] each fraction of the elite into one [37:25] organization. The only periods in [37:28] American history and I'd say also in [37:29] European history and and more broadly on [37:32] a global scale that you do have elite [37:34] unity and solidarity is when there's a [37:36] working class threat on the other side. [37:38] So, when it comes to anti-communism or [37:41] crushing the labor movement under [37:42] Reagan, that is really the last time you [37:44] had a concerted employer offensive. But [37:47] once that opponent is severely weakened [37:50] and fractures, you immediately have [37:53] elite factionalism showing up. So, yes, [37:55] you're right. They should not like each [37:57] other or they're not destined to like [37:59] each other. Still, I think it's striking [38:01] because it is violence within a specific [38:03] class and it should not be confused for [38:06] the type of [38:07] radical polarization that we've often [38:09] been taught to think about in the last [38:11] 10 years where somehow society is highly [38:13] polarized. I think a lot of recent [38:15] politics can be more explained through [38:16] elite polarization rather than social [38:18] polarization as a whole. But that's [38:20] still, I mean, a different discussion. [38:22] >> I've [38:23] I wrote a book on polarization a couple [38:24] years back, and this is actually the [38:25] argument of the book that the elites are [38:27] polarizing. [38:28] And then they're giving the public much [38:30] more polarized choices, which is [38:31] polarizing the public in turn, and it [38:33] creates a kind of flywheel. [38:35] And I think that's very true. [38:36] Uh I I want to go back to this piece you [38:38] did in the New Left Review where which [38:40] is more focused on Trump and Trump's [38:42] second term. [38:43] And you quote the political scientist [38:45] Ivan Krastev, uh [38:46] who writes that the essence of the [38:48] Trumpian revolution [38:49] is the implosion of time itself. [38:53] Tell me a bit about that idea. [38:57] >> Well, I mean, it's a it's a fascinating [38:58] piece which you wrote for the Financial [39:00] Times. It's a bit speculative. So, it's [39:03] trying to [39:04] make a couple of observations about [39:06] Trump's mode of rule, which, I mean, [39:08] anyone who's turned on the television or [39:10] logged on to their social media [39:11] platforms has probably gotten a taste of [39:13] in the last 2 years. And it is [39:15] obviously, I think, very different from [39:17] previous American presidents. But [39:19] there's one thing that really stands [39:20] out, and that is it short-termism, or or [39:23] the fact that [39:24] there's no thinking beyond the 24-hour [39:26] news cycle. In fact, a lot of political [39:28] decisions seem to be informed by the [39:32] presumed effects those decisions will [39:33] have on a media cycle and on its [39:35] perceived popularity. That doesn't mean [39:37] there isn't a court around Trump that [39:40] feeds ideas into the machine. So, [39:42] obviously, there are different [39:43] ideological factions, whether it's Rubio [39:45] or it's Colby that have certain plans on [39:48] how to reestablish American hegemony in [39:50] the new century. But it seems that what [39:52] Trump does is that he takes these [39:54] suggestions, and then he evaluates them [39:57] on their [39:59] efficacy in terms of media effects. Will [40:02] this keep me in the news for the next 24 [40:04] hours? If I bomb this country, or if I [40:06] do this, and then afterwards, for the [40:08] next 48 hours, we'll come up with a [40:09] different plan. [40:11] And I I thought it it's a very [40:14] illuminating observation because it [40:16] depersonalizes Trump to some extent as [40:20] the symptom of a wider malaise that can [40:22] also be institutionally explained. It's [40:24] because everyone's so personally [40:25] dependent on his caprices and because [40:28] the GOP, despite some theories, is not a [40:30] mass party. [40:32] It's still, let's say, a small camarilla [40:34] or a small clique that [40:38] is very strongly attached to the state. [40:40] That probably also explains why the [40:42] administration cannot think a week in [40:45] ahead or 2 weeks in ahead. I mean, it's [40:47] a striking contrast with a Chinese [40:49] Communist Party that is still [40:50] formulating 5-year plans or 5-year [40:53] designs [40:54] and a a Trump admin that I think can [40:58] revise a decision [41:00] during, I mean, 1 day. [41:01] >> Yeah, you have this line in there that [41:03] what if short-termism is structural now? [41:06] And I've been thinking about that line [41:08] because [41:10] I do think there is this constant [41:12] question around Trump and Trumpism [41:16] of whether or not with him you're [41:17] looking at a very idiosyncratic [41:19] psychology [41:21] >> Mhm. [41:21] >> that is highly tuned to the particular [41:24] moment. I've often described him as a [41:26] like a human engagement algorithm. [41:28] >> Mhm. [41:29] >> And he really reflects to me the way [41:31] Twitter thinks and the way X or Truth [41:34] Social, whatever it is, feel. [41:37] The people around him don't necessarily. [41:39] You know, I I got a lot of critiques to [41:41] make of [41:42] a J.D. Vance, a Marco Rubio, a Stephen [41:45] Miller. [41:46] They're not actually short-term [41:48] thinkers. All of them [41:50] consider things on a longer time frame, [41:51] think in a more to other political [41:54] elites recognizably ideological way. [41:57] >> [snorts] [41:57] >> Joe Biden was [41:59] towards the end of his administration, [42:02] one of the things that his defenders [42:03] were saying was that his plans were [42:04] measured in decades, but unfortunately [42:07] elections happen in, you know, mere [42:09] years. [42:11] And so there's a question of whether [42:13] what Trump is is a kind of harbinger [42:16] of what is coming or what is really [42:18] going on, the short-termism, [42:21] you know, [42:22] for reasons of both [42:22] deinstitutionalization and maybe online [42:24] algorithms and other things, [42:26] is coming, and he's like a tuning fork [42:29] for the future. [42:31] Or not. Um, [42:33] but I do look at a place like the UK and [42:35] they're like running through prime [42:37] ministers at incredible clip. [42:39] Like there is a kind of volatility out [42:41] there [42:43] that is not affecting China in the same [42:44] way. [42:46] And and so, yeah, I guess I'd like to [42:47] hear you talk more about to what degree [42:49] you think this is short-termism is [42:51] structural, to what degree you think the [42:54] Trumpism that you're describing there is [42:55] distinctive to a kind of person, [42:58] is it simply an adjustment period in a [43:00] kind of a new formation of technology? [43:02] How do you see that? [43:05] >> Yeah, I mean, it's a loaded metaphor, [43:07] but I think some Darwinian reading in [43:10] that you have the species and you have [43:12] the environment. And the environment has [43:14] obviously changed, so that is the [43:15] structural story we're telling. But [43:17] there does seem to be one species or one [43:19] particular example of that species that [43:21] really flourishes in this new [43:22] environment, and that's [43:24] Trump. And I do think there is a [43:25] personal dimension to it. I mean, he [43:28] himself went through the transition of [43:30] different media regimes. He was the man [43:31] of television, the kind of showman of [43:33] reality TV, the '80s, '90s, and 2000s, [43:36] and then he [43:37] I think handily transitioned or moved [43:39] into the era of the algorithm and social [43:42] media. [43:43] But it's very clear that in the case of [43:45] Rubio and Vance, the ideology is [43:47] actually a burden. And it's precisely [43:49] because Trump is unburdened by any [43:51] ideological convictions. This doesn't [43:52] necessarily mean he doesn't believe [43:54] anything. It's more that [43:56] ideology as a kind of cognitive frame [43:58] that filters your decisions is not [44:00] something that he's very familiar with. [44:02] Um, he has other concerns that come [44:04] first. And that probably also allows him [44:06] to be such a showman and that's why he [44:08] is [44:09] was able to win those two elections. And [44:10] I think someone like Vance who you can [44:12] sense is opportunistic but is more [44:14] invested in the idea of ideology, wants [44:17] to write books in which he talks about [44:18] his conversions and expose or sorry [44:21] expounds his worldview. I'm not sure [44:23] that his pitch to the contemporary media [44:26] adult volatile voter will be as [44:28] convincing as that of the showman [44:30] himself. And it's very clear that some [44:32] politicians also in Europe have tried to [44:33] ape that Trumpian style. [44:35] It's it's hard. I mean there is a [44:38] there's a certain skill or or even [44:40] artisanal quality to how he does it, [44:42] which once again is a question of [44:44] structure and agency at the same time. [44:47] >> Trump himself is a unusual case, but [44:50] MAGA [44:51] MAGA as a a kind of broader movement [44:54] that for many of its people you can [44:56] really live in. It really does have [44:59] ideas, increasingly it has institutions [45:01] that are associated with it and leaders [45:03] who are associated with it. You can live [45:05] in its world. It it it can give you a [45:07] sort of meaning. It has rallies. It has [45:10] in some ways it seems very much more [45:12] like past eras of politics do than [45:16] anything we've seen more recently. [45:18] So, from your perspective, is MAGA [45:22] hyperpolitics? Is it the coming of [45:24] something new? How do you see what is [45:26] happening there on the American right? [45:30] >> I think it's an interesting and [45:31] complicated question because the first [45:33] Trump term and the second Trump term are [45:36] obviously very different. And I do think [45:38] the second Trump term is much more [45:39] institutionalized. I mean for the first [45:41] election victory, he himself and his [45:44] entourage were surprised that he even [45:45] won. That wasn't the case second time [45:47] around. The Heritage Foundation Project [45:49] 25 that indicates that they were better [45:51] prepared and that there was a project of [45:53] institutionalization [45:55] which they consciously pursued. The [45:58] question whether MAGA is a mass movement [46:00] and whether they've managed to reinvent [46:02] I'd say even certain forms of 20th [46:04] century far-right mass politics, which I [46:08] think is also related to the so-called F [46:11] question debate, whether Trump is a [46:12] fascist or not. [46:14] I think yes, the second Trump term is [46:16] different from the first. [46:19] There has been a weaponization, for [46:20] example, of parts of the security state [46:22] such as ICE. There has been an attempt [46:25] to create a solid base of supporters [46:27] that will remain with them also through [46:29] the fact that there's now all kinds of [46:30] state funding involved. And of course, [46:34] these kind of paramilitary organizations [46:36] do resemble the 20th century [46:39] squads that we usually associate with [46:41] fascist politics. [46:43] At the same time, the question always [46:45] remains whether there will be a Trumpism [46:48] without Trump. There's maybe a question [46:50] whether Tucker Carlson or Marjorie [46:51] Taylor Greene and some of the first [46:54] Trumpers now see themselves as carrying [46:57] that movement forwards, also by [46:59] dissenting from certain types of GOP [47:02] orthodoxy. [47:03] I'm just less convinced that they have [47:05] the institutional structure, except for [47:07] a couple of podcasts and media channels, [47:09] to keep that going. So, that is [47:11] obviously an open question. We'll see [47:13] what happens, but the GOP has not [47:16] transformed itself into a mass [47:17] membership party. The buying of a lot of [47:20] the agents of ICE does seem to be [47:22] heavily reliant not on their ideological [47:24] agreement, but more on their financial [47:27] opportunities they have in joining [47:30] the security state. And when they lose [47:33] the midterms and [47:35] we'll see obviously what happens with [47:36] the next election, I'm just not sure [47:38] that it will persist for such a long [47:40] time. There could of course be another [47:41] mass movement that goes further and [47:43] radicalizes it, but I don't think that's [47:45] the same as a party [47:48] throughout the 20th century that could [47:49] bide its time across cycles of 5 to 10 [47:52] to even 20 years and then strike. [47:55] When MAGA, I think, is so beholden to [47:58] these contemporary media [music] cycles [47:59] that are very short and very volatile [48:01] that it could [48:03] yeah, as easily rise as it could fall. [48:06] >> [music] [48:14] >> One thing that we've been talking about [48:16] here is the way [48:18] institutions, but we've I think [48:20] primarily been talking about civic [48:22] institutions have eroded. [48:24] I think there's another question, which [48:27] is about the way that the institutions [48:30] of governance and power have ossified. [48:35] And this maybe goes back to what you [48:37] were saying earlier [48:39] about the ways in which a system might [48:41] have become more resistant. Not in this [48:43] case to me just at individual power, but [48:45] almost to any form of power, which is to [48:47] say that in America [48:49] where, you know, we have a much more [48:51] closely divided politics where it's less [48:53] I you're less likely to get bipartisan [48:55] compromise, you get more filibusters, [48:57] your ability to pass big bills has gone [49:00] down over time. And and that is true [49:02] even when power is arranged behind the [49:04] bills. Like I remember for Barack Obama, [49:06] you had the Chamber of Commerce and the [49:08] AFL-CIO both supporting an [49:09] infrastructure bill. It went nowhere. [49:11] There was a lot of power behind [49:13] immigration bills in that era. They went [49:15] nowhere. Right? Because you could kill [49:16] so much more in Congress, there were so [49:19] many more ways to wrap things up, so [49:21] much more you can do in the courts. In [49:23] Europe, um it's a situation I know less [49:25] well, but certainly there is a a broad [49:27] sense that the European Union has [49:30] created more slowness, more [49:34] powers that are acting upon you from far [49:36] away. [49:38] And I wonder if some of the movement of [49:41] political energy [49:43] to spaces of discourse, of posting, of [49:48] things that on the one hand are [49:49] low-effort, but at least [49:51] some kind of answer comes back to you [49:53] quickly. [49:54] I wonder if it reflects to some degree [49:57] a [49:59] disillusionment [50:01] with what you can get done [50:04] in institutions that are now very hard [50:06] to get anything done in. Just, you know, [50:07] they've been around a long time. They're [50:09] balancing out a lot of different [50:11] interests. People know how to work them [50:13] better. [50:14] Uh [50:15] money can talk very loudly, but I [50:18] actually always think it doesn't talk as [50:19] loudly as people think it does cuz I've [50:20] watched a lot of money fail to get its [50:22] way in American politics and elsewhere. [50:25] That it's just so much easier to block [50:27] anything than to achieve anything [50:31] that [50:32] almost people don't believe in [50:35] achievements. [50:38] >> I I think I mean George Soros is of [50:40] course a spectacular example of someone [50:42] who's been spraying millions at certain [50:44] causes. And if you look at where the [50:45] world is headed, put it to clean, it's [50:46] not very clear that he has the total [50:48] control which some conspiracy thinkers [50:50] attribute to him. Um I think yes, it is [50:53] absolutely true that even on the level [50:56] of the elite, so there's been a complete [50:58] legalization of let's say outside [51:00] election spending also in the US. It's [51:01] also become easier in Europe, but it's [51:03] not very clear that this increasing [51:05] lobbying power actually also makes it [51:07] easier to achieve your policy aims. And [51:09] that I mean that is a paradox, right? [51:10] Because you could say okay, social [51:12] change has become impossible from below, [51:15] but if you say also from above it's [51:17] become very difficult to pursue. There's [51:18] a much more profound puzzle to be [51:21] examined there. [51:23] I think there is [51:27] there is a question about the story of [51:30] deinstitutionalization as affecting [51:32] society but also affecting the state. [51:34] Because what the adjustments in the '80s [51:37] and '90s, the story that's often told as [51:39] neoliberalism but which I think goes [51:41] much deeper, is that it on the one hand [51:45] entails a concerted attack on certain [51:46] institutions which are seen as hampering [51:49] economic recovery, particularly unions, [51:51] which are blamed for inflation and [51:53] thereby you have to get rid of them to [51:54] basically restore economic normality. [51:56] But on the level of the state, there is [51:57] also a concerted displacement towards [52:01] unelected, non-electoral bodies, also to [52:04] keep them shielded from certain elite [52:06] pressure groups. To say a central bank [52:08] has to govern in the interest of [52:09] everyone, [52:11] and thereby they shouldn't be meddled [52:13] with. But what's interesting is that [52:15] that does two things. It did moves power [52:18] to institutions that are not open to [52:21] pressure, whether it's elite or popular [52:23] pressure. Obviously, it's still easier [52:24] for the elite to get access, but not as [52:26] easy as as many people think it is. [52:29] And at the same time, it increases the [52:32] attractiveness of the veto option you're [52:34] describing. So, if we cannot get certain [52:37] things through these institutions, what [52:40] we have to do is just build a kill [52:42] switch or [52:44] create something that at least makes it [52:45] possible to stop something if we don't [52:48] want it going through. And that also I [52:50] think becomes attractive from the lower [52:52] half of society. [52:54] I do think that just eliminating these [52:57] veto capacities is not going to solve [52:59] the problem either, because the problem [53:01] is much more structural insofar as the [53:03] attractiveness of the veto is a function [53:06] of an institutional issue that's older. [53:08] And if you want to make the contrast [53:10] with China, [53:12] Chinese state capacity means very little [53:14] without the Chinese Communist Party. [53:16] That's not just a state, that's an [53:18] institution that plays, I mean, a very [53:20] strange role in uniting classes, but [53:22] also different factions of the elite. [53:24] I don't see an American equivalent of [53:26] the CCP, let alone a European [53:27] equivalent, that could play that role. [53:30] >> I think China is such an interesting [53:31] counterexample here. I don't ever [53:33] pretend to know the structure of Chinese [53:35] public opinion, [53:36] but across a number of measures that [53:39] people do look at, and I do think we, [53:41] you know, [53:42] feel like we have some confidence in. [53:44] There is more optimism and sense of [53:47] agency around things like AI in China [53:49] than in America. Less pessimism. [53:52] And you know, China's a place where as [53:54] an individual you really don't have say [53:57] in governance. You really There's very [53:59] little you can do to affect what the top [54:01] levels of the CCP are going to do. [54:04] On the other hand, somebody is doing [54:06] something constantly. [54:08] And change is happening and movement is [54:10] happening. [54:11] And even if you are not the one acting [54:13] upon the world, the world is there to be [54:16] acted upon. [54:18] I am not [54:20] I would not want to live under that [54:21] system. I'm not [54:23] lauding it in that respect. [54:25] But I do think it sits now as a a kind [54:27] of counter example to a lot of Western [54:30] systems where it almost has created this [54:32] choice of [54:34] do you want rights and inaction [54:37] or few rights and action? [54:41] Trump is interesting from this [54:42] perspective to me because he comes into [54:45] office [54:46] and is able to make a very big show [54:49] of cracking the system, it appears, in [54:52] half and doing things which [54:55] people thought couldn't be done. He [54:57] signs all these executive orders [54:58] including one ending birthright [54:59] citizenship and throws them out into the [55:01] crowd and [55:03] it looks like a WWE rally mixed with a [55:06] governance function. [55:08] But it turns out he has not cracked the [55:10] code. [55:11] He is passing less legislation than [55:13] other presidents. Many of his things end [55:15] up turned back in courts. Dodge moves [55:17] with incredible force and speed for [55:19] little while and then collapses [55:20] entirely. He seems overwhelmed by [55:22] events. He's in an Iran war he clearly [55:24] has no control over. And so, you know, [55:27] Trump had maybe an an attentional [55:29] answer. He was able to create the [55:31] spectacle of things happening. [55:34] But then you're a member of the public [55:36] and well, what has really happened that [55:38] is different now for you? Are your [55:39] prices lower? Does America seem like it [55:41] is doing better? Is anybody really in [55:43] control? And the answer again is no. And [55:45] now Donald Trump is like falling asleep [55:47] at meetings, and [55:48] they're going to lose the midterms. And [55:50] so, [55:51] that sense of nobody is I am not in [55:53] control, but nor is anybody else [55:54] persists. [55:56] And I think you have this dilemma right [55:58] now of a West that seems in a kind of [56:01] political drift, often a dangerous one. [56:05] But it is not like the illiberal forces [56:07] in the West have mastered the system, [56:09] either. [56:11] China is moving very fast, and I think [56:12] it exerts a kind of pressure on the West [56:15] to move faster, but it's not really [56:17] clear how to respond to it. [56:19] And I just wonder about the politics [56:21] that creates on both sides. [56:24] The the politics of action there, but [56:27] without much individual agency. The [56:29] politics of individual agency here, but [56:31] without much ultimate promise of action. [56:35] >> Yes. I mean, I'd careful to say there's [56:38] no such thing as input legitimacy in [56:40] China, either. [56:42] So, there is obviously not the electoral [56:45] system [56:46] that exists in the West, but it's very [56:48] clear that, for example, protests around [56:50] COVID did have an effect on how, let's [56:52] say, the Chinese leadership refigured [56:55] its its policies. And [56:59] there is a kind of distinction one could [57:00] make between input and output [57:01] legitimacy, where [57:03] parts of the West have seen an increase [57:04] in input legitimacy. There's increasing [57:06] turnout in elections, but when it comes [57:08] to output legitimacy, which the Chinese [57:10] state is so spectacularly good at, it's [57:12] not very clear that that's happening. To [57:15] me, the question is [57:17] whether the discussion about state [57:20] capacity, or the discussion about [57:22] getting some of these policy packages [57:24] through, can be linked not just to a [57:26] discussion about what the state can do, [57:28] but rather what institutions are [57:29] necessary for it. Because, as you say, [57:32] deinstitutionalization also makes it [57:34] harder for elites to plan. And Europe is [57:37] I mean a striking instance of this [57:39] where in the face of let's say Chinese [57:42] competition, but also like the Trumpian [57:45] onslaught of tariffs, the geopolitical [57:48] rivalry they're currently embroiled in, [57:50] European elites are simply not coming up [57:53] with an answer at all. I mean there are [57:54] a couple of plans that are floating [57:56] around, but it's not as if there's an [57:57] articulated plan. And for that you need [58:00] some kind of institutional [58:01] infrastructure to basically unite these [58:03] different factions and make it sure that [58:05] Europe relaunches itself into the 2020s. [58:09] But but it's strange because you're put [58:11] into a position, particularly as someone [58:13] like me coming from the left, where you [58:15] kind of have to help elites save [58:17] themselves. I say like please get your [58:19] act together and find some kind of organ [58:21] that can coordinate between all the [58:23] different factions of you. [58:25] And I mean pointing out elite failure in [58:27] itself is not a policy, but that's [58:29] mostly what what let's say commentary on [58:31] European politics has become in the last [58:32] 10 years. [58:33] >> One of the ways you're telling the story [58:35] is you have mass politics, and that goes [58:37] to the sort of more [58:40] post-politics, [58:42] like the calmer political period of the [58:43] '90s, you know, your Bill Clintons, your [58:45] Tony Blairs. Not everything is [58:47] political, we're at the end of history. [58:50] Everybody can calm down now, communism [58:51] is fallen. [58:53] That then gives way to the period after [58:55] the financial crisis, you know, [58:57] anti-politics, [58:59] Occupy Wall Street, the key party [59:01] political movements are rising, but that [59:02] fundamentally hate the idea of political [59:04] institutions that are not trying to in [59:08] ways that are kind of traditionally [59:09] recognizable to take them over, even [59:11] build power in the way we normally think [59:12] about it. And then you get [59:13] hyper-politics. [59:14] And one way of thinking about [59:16] hyper-politics as a period [59:21] is that it's actually just fundamentally [59:23] destructive, [59:25] but necessarily so. That that [59:27] institutional story we're telling now [59:30] is one in which [59:33] culture, institutions, bureaucracies had [59:35] ossified. [59:37] And is Donald Trump a good answer? No, [59:39] he's not a good answer. But he [59:40] demonstrated that somebody with more [59:42] planning could do something like Doge [59:44] and maybe do it in a way that is [59:46] constructive. That many things that had [59:48] become ideologically rigid from how we [59:51] think about trade to immigration to [59:52] China to much more [59:54] is now opened up. You see a kind of rise [59:57] on the left in American politics with [59:59] the DSA and Mom Danni and others in that [60:01] cohort. [60:02] And there is a dynamism to it. [60:06] And I think the question is whether or [60:07] not [60:08] this kind of just ends up in destruction [60:11] and nihilism because nothing can gain [60:12] power for long enough to build something [60:15] that is new and enduring [60:17] or it's actually in a Darwinian sense to [60:20] go back to the metaphor you used [60:21] earlier, this is a kind of necessary [60:23] byproduct of revitalization. Right? You [60:26] know, for Canada, for Europe, for others [60:28] that [60:29] what was there is breaking down [60:32] and it is we're in a messy interregnum. [60:34] Everybody loves quoting the [60:35] misquotations of Gramsci here, you know, [60:38] a time of monsters. [60:41] Do you [60:42] come down on one side or another of [60:43] this? [60:44] That that we're going through a [60:45] cleansing fire versus we're just going [60:47] through a fire? [60:48] >> Well, I mean, the problem with the time [60:49] of monsters quote is that it's [60:51] describing a pre-revolutionary [60:52] situation. That was the age which [60:54] Gramsci himself was living through in [60:56] Italy. I don't think we're in that. I [60:58] don't think we're in a [60:58] pre-pre-revolutionary [61:00] state. I do think we need to be honest [61:02] about this particularly from the left. I [61:05] do think there is something to be said [61:06] about the revitalization [61:08] story you're indicating. In that Trump [61:11] at least has the refreshing effect of [61:14] clarifying or forcing choice. He's ended [61:18] some notion of the TINA dogma or the [61:20] there is no alternative dogma, namely [61:22] that you choose between [61:24] Pepsi and Coca-Cola at the election [61:26] booth and in the end it's it's basically [61:28] the same product with a couple of [61:29] tweaks. I think he has finished off that [61:32] perception or that world of politics. At [61:35] the same time, you can very clearly see [61:37] that the increase in election turnout in [61:39] the US is also a function of the fact [61:42] that voters see choice. And if you want [61:44] to shoot Donald Trump before the [61:46] election, that means you very clearly [61:47] see choice because you want to eliminate [61:49] one side of [61:52] the choice matrix that's presented to [61:53] you. In Germany now, there's an election [61:54] in Saxony where they're guessing that [61:57] there's been a doubling of voter turnout [61:59] from 2006. Let's say from 44% to 77%. I [62:03] don't think that's a crisis of [62:04] democracy. I think there there's an [62:06] economic crisis in Europe, but democracy [62:08] is is doing better and there's a [62:10] beautiful phrase about political [62:11] literacy, [62:13] namely the sense that people have that [62:16] the factors in their social lives, [62:18] whether it's their rent, the state of [62:19] their roads, the price of the product, [62:21] are partially subject to political [62:24] decisions. Politics has an effect in my [62:26] life, it matters, and it can change [62:28] things. Hyperpolitics has entailed an [62:32] increase in political literacy to some [62:34] extent. Now, of course there's a lot of [62:36] nonsense and [62:38] let's say crazy theorizing going on [62:39] online. Hyperpolitics is [62:42] quite exhausting and it induces a [62:44] nostalgia for the '90s and 2000s, which [62:46] I cover in the book as well because [62:48] people simply don't want to talk about [62:50] woke with their uncle at the family [62:52] gathering, for example. But at the same [62:54] time, [62:55] I want to make this very clear. This [62:56] book is not rejecting or dismissing [63:00] hyper-politicization [63:01] as somehow reversible or even negative. [63:05] I think it is good that people care [63:07] about politics. Um I think we should [63:11] celebrate the end of post-politics. The [63:13] question is more where is hyperpolitics [63:15] going and can there be such a thing as [63:17] an institutional formula which extends [63:19] hyper politics beyond mere outrage? [63:22] >> I think that is a good place to end. So, [63:24] as our final question, what are three [63:25] books you recommend to the audience? [63:28] >> There are three books I chose which are [63:31] a bit miscellaneous in that they belong [63:33] to different genres. The first is The [63:35] Prophet by Isaac Deutscher, a Polish [63:39] historian who only learned English I [63:41] think in his early 30s and then wrote [63:44] one of the greatest biographies of the [63:45] 20th century. It's a three-part [63:47] biography of Leon Trotsky, the famous [63:51] Russian revolutionary. It's obviously [63:53] beloved by Trotskyists, so it has a [63:55] sectarian appeal. There's a lot of [63:57] neoconservatives [63:59] that were brought up on its diet. Even [64:01] Tony Blair is said to have read it, but [64:03] I read it when I was in my early 20s and [64:05] I've recently revisited it also in the [64:08] form of an audiobook and it is [64:09] completely enchanting. It is an absolute [64:12] masterpiece, not just a biography, but [64:14] also political history. It also captures [64:17] a moment in time that feels enormously [64:19] distant, but still very relevant and it [64:22] is a pleasure to listen to and read in [64:24] stylistic terms. So, even if you are a [64:28] instinctual or aggressive [64:29] anti-communist, I don't think you you [64:32] will you will not like this book. [64:35] The second book is Cheese by Willem [64:40] Elsschot, written in the 1930s. This is [64:43] something much more obscure. It's by a [64:46] Flemish or Belgian author and the story [64:49] of the book is relatively simple. It's [64:52] about a middle-aged man with a family [64:55] who wants to become rich as a merchant [64:57] and starts selling a product he hates [65:00] and never eats, namely cheese, and fails [65:03] at doing so. And that that's the whole [65:05] plot. And I think it is a beautiful [65:07] parable, particularly in the 21st [65:09] century, for a society in which buying [65:11] and selling things has become this [65:13] compulsive, almost obligatory habit, um [65:17] but we seem to be relatively indifferent [65:19] to the products we actually are buying [65:21] and selling. [65:22] The final one, and I'm not sure there is [65:25] already an English translation of this, [65:27] is Some Months from My Life by the [65:29] French writer Michel Houellebecq. So, a [65:31] novelist who also plays a very prominent [65:34] role in [65:35] the book Hyperpolitics. He appears as a [65:37] protagonist in in several chapters. It [65:40] is not a novel, but more of a personal [65:43] memoir of his, [65:45] in which he relates a couple of rather [65:47] chaotic months in his personal life, in [65:50] which he was asked to star in an erotic [65:52] movie, [65:54] um and in which he then [65:56] >> [laughter] [65:57] >> These things happen. [65:58] It And uh after which he meditates on [66:03] pre-questions of sexuality, cultural [66:05] wars, politics, but I mean, this might [66:08] be strange, but it's a profoundly moving [66:10] book. [66:11] >> You you you really take him as a a bit [66:13] of a prophet, to use the first book's [66:15] title, um [66:16] in there. I've always meant to read some [66:18] of his books, and I haven't. So, given [66:21] that maybe the translation of this isn't [66:22] out yet, if somebody want to start with [66:24] his fiction, and you sort of see him as [66:26] this like prophet uh figure, somebody [66:28] who understands the future before it [66:29] comes, even though his politics are [66:31] very, very different than yours, [66:33] what would be like the starting [66:36] book of his fiction you'd recommend? [66:39] >> So, his debut, which I think uh is [66:42] translated into English as Extension of [66:45] the Domain of Struggle, that is the best [66:47] place to start. If you go for later [66:50] works, I would recommend Serotonin, [66:54] which also gave him a Nostradamus-like [66:56] quality in France, because he seemed to [66:58] predict part of the yellow vest and [67:00] farmers protest that shook the country. [67:03] But once again, it's not just about his [67:05] apperceptions of the contemporary world [67:08] but also about [67:10] yes I think he's a novelist for a world [67:13] that has become less novelistic in some [67:15] cases even resistant to novelization and [67:18] I'm always impressed on how he's still [67:20] able to to give us a a rendition of a [67:23] world that somehow doesn't seem to [67:26] produce very [67:27] novel like characters. [67:29] >> Antonio, thank you very much. [67:31] >> Thank you so much. [music] [67:37] >> [music] [67:43] [music]