Carlson Adds Netflix, Uber and S&P Global as Panic Clips Valuations

恐慌压低估值之际，Carlson加仓Netflix、Uber与S&P Global 市场对人工智能和自动驾驶竞争的过度反应，导致Netflix、Uber和S&P Global的股价与其不断扩大的底层盈利能力脱节。 Joseph Carlson详细剖析了近期将5,000美元资金配置到三家股价受挫的复合增长型企业的操作：Netflix、Uber和S&P Global。他回应了围绕Netflix参与度指标的普遍看空论调、Waymo给Uber带来的自动驾驶竞争风险，以及生成式AI颠覆担忧给S&P Global带来的压力。相比之下，Carlson解释了为何因基本面业务萎缩而回避Nike，并因CEO大规模内部抛售及管理层不可预测性而避开FICO。在节目最后，他支持Tom Lee关于企业盈利加速增长的乐观宏观立场，并将Apple评为“本周败笔”，因其借隐私之名限制智能体AI，以保护其App Store的“收费站”地位免受颠覆。 Joseph Carlson将5,000美元配置到三家受挫的优质复合增长企业：Netflix 2,000美元、Uber 2,000美元、S&P Global 1,000美元，他认为市场的抛售过度，与底层业务基本面脱节。 (0:00) 尽管Netflix的内生调整后每股收益（EPS）增长达24%，且各地区收入均实现两位数扩张，但其远期市盈率仅约为18.5倍。 (5:54) Uber下跌30%至69美元，带来了具有吸引力的17倍远期市盈率和5%–6%的常态化自由现金流收益率，且其每周2.97亿次的行程量远超Waymo的50万次行程。 (17:42) Carlson明确回避Nike，原因是其营收和利润持续萎缩；鉴于其CEO大规模抛售公司股票，他对FICO同样保持观望。 (24:13) Apple被评为“本周败笔”，因其借隐私之名限制Mac端AI智能体，这是一种防御性举措，旨在防止其毛利率高达76%的服务业务“收费站”被去中介化。 (29:12)

Joseph Carlson deployed $5,000 across Netflix, Uber, and S&P Global, arguing that steep market sell-offs have created attractive valuations for high-quality compounders with enduring competitive moats. Conversely, he avoided Nike due to fundamental contraction and FICO over executive insider selling, while designating Apple his 'Fail of the Week' for restricting third-party AI agents to defend its App Store monopoly. Capitalizing on the Valuation Disconnect in Netflix (1:31) Carlson added $2,000 to Netflix after a 50% drawdown from its 2025 peak of $122 down to around $67, leaving shares at roughly 18.4 to 18.5 times forward earnings. He argues that engagement concerns misunderstand operational changes: total platform viewership grew 2%, while average per-account watch time fell because password-sharing crackdowns split households and international expansion prioritized regions with culturally lower TV usage. Additionally, live programming accounts for 1% of viewing hours on 5% of content spend, yet drives outsized customer acquisition and retention. Financially, revenue grew over 10% across all four operating regions—with Latin America and Asia-Pacific expanding near 18%—producing $11 billion in trailing free cash flow. Adjusting for a one-time Warner Bros legal payout, organic EPS grew 24%. Meanwhile, legacy rivals like Warner Bros. Discovery carry an estimated $80 billion to $90 billion in net debt, forcing them to monetize catalogs by licensing premier films directly to Netflix. Carlson also rejects claims that Netflix requires dumbed-down scripts, citing Ben Affleck's account of complete creative autonomy. Sizing Uber and S&P Global Against Narrative Fears (17:42) Carlson allocated $2,000 to Uber as a 30% year-to-date drop brought shares to $69, reflecting a 17 forward P/E and a 5% to 6% normalized free cash flow yield. He contends autonomous vehicle competition from Alphabet's Waymo, Zoox, and Tesla is over-discounted: Waymo provides roughly 500,000 weekly trips compared to Uber's 297 million—a 595-fold gap widening in absolute terms—while Uber remains profitable and growing in San Francisco. His third purchase added $1,000 to S&P Global, which fell 24% year-to-date amid software disruption concerns sparked by Anthropic's financial plug-in. Carlson notes that Market Intelligence represents roughly 30% of revenue and generates lower margins than the Ratings and Indices segments; even if it collapsed entirely, S&P Global would trade at approximately 25 times forward earnings. Moreover, an unavoidable wall of corporate debt maturities ensures ongoing ratings demand, while ETF assets tracking S&P indices rose from $3 trillion in 2023 to roughly $6 trillion. Passing on Turnaround Traps: Nike and FICO (24:13) Carlson contrasts his buys with avoided names, rejecting Nike as a deteriorating turnaround candidate. Nike has posted a negative 36% total return over the past decade, as revenue dropped from $51 billion to $45 billion alongside five consecutive years of falling net income and EPS. Carlson argues Nike's multiple remains uncomfortably high because its fundamentals are shrinking while younger shoppers shift from Air Jordans to rival footwear brands. He also bypassed Fair Isaac Corporation (FICO). Despite its entrenched credit scoring monopoly and strong operating margins, Carlson argues management endangered its moat with aggressive price hikes. Furthermore, CEO William J. Lansing's persistent insider selling—liquidating shares between $1,500 and $2,000 in blocks exceeding $50 million, surpassing the compensation sold by Nvidia's CEO over three years—creates unpredictability and signals potential leadership turnover within twelve months. Market Upside and Apple's App Store Threat (27:42) Regarding market sentiment, Carlson cites Fundstrat's Tom Lee, who projects the S&P 500 will close higher. Lee notes third-quarter earnings growth is tracking near 30%, and consensus 2027 EPS revisions have risen over 20% since January while the index gained less, effectively contracting market valuation multiples. Domestic energy net-export status further stabilizes corporate earnings. In his 'Fail of the Week,' Carlson criticizes Apple's tightening of Mac system controls against third-party AI agents under the guise of privacy. He views this as a defense of Apple's high-margin Services unit, which yields approximately 76% gross margins versus 39% for hardware. Agentic tools like Meta's Muse connect directly to partners like Shopify, Expedia, and PayPal, bypassing Apple's in-app payment rails. Carlson doubts Apple can easily duplicate its historical playbook of declaring third-party workflows unsafe to monopolize agent capabilities. Carlson's turnaround strategy hinges on separating narrative-driven price compressions in growing cash generators like Netflix, Uber, and S&P Global from genuine business decay at Nike and governance risks at FICO. Whether platform gatekeepers like Apple can defend transaction tollbooths against agentic AI remains an unresolved structural question.

## Background 本期视频由知名个人投资频道 Joseph Carlson After Hours 于 2026 年 10 月 5 日发布在 YouTube 平台上。视频简介指出，主持人介绍了自己逆势买入的三只困境反转股（Netflix、Uber 和 S&P Global），分享了对 Nike、FICO 等股票的观察，并分析了 Tom Lee 对美股的看多观点以及苹果因限制 AI Agent 权限而成为本周败笔的原因。 ## TL;DR 主持人分享了自己动用 5,000 美元逆势抄底三家优质企业（Netflix、Uber 和 S&P Global）的核心逻辑，强调这些公司虽然遭遇估值下杀和市场误解，但长期护城河与现金流增长依然强劲。与此同时，他剖析了为何继续避开收入全面萎缩的 Nike，并指出 FICO 存在管理层高位套现和确定性不足的高风险。节目随后引用 Fundstrat 分析师 Tom Lee 的观点驳斥了当前市场的过度悲观，最后将苹果评为“本周败笔”，直指其表面以隐私安全为由收紧 Mac 权限，实则是为了防范 AI Agent 绕过其高利润率的 App Store“苹果税”收费站模式。 ## Atmosphere & style 整期节目展现出一种沉稳理性、抽丝剥茧的长期价值投资风格，主持人像一位经验丰富的财务分析师，用翔实的财报数据和常识逐个拆解市场上的流行叙事与恐慌情绪。叙事推进中既有面对持仓利润回撤时的坦然与笃定，也有在揭露媒体断章取义、以及苹果借“隐私安全”之名行垄断之实时的犀利与讽刺。收听过程带给观众极强的反共识思辨感，在宏观噪音与情绪波动的市场中营造出一种专注企业本质、不急不躁的冷静氛围。 ## Bulletin - [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lDJ3befNmS8&t=0s) 主持人在近期市场回调中斥资 5,000 美元逆势加仓三只反转股，包括 Netflix（2,000 美元）、Uber（2,000 美元）与标普全球 S&P Global（1,000 美元）。 - [05:20](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lDJ3befNmS8&t=320s) Netflix 股价较峰值腰斩至约 67 美元，但剔除华纳相关一次性赔付后其实际 EPS 增速达 24%，远期 P/E 仅约 18.5 倍，展现出被低估的自由现金流与内容聚合优势。 - [17:42](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lDJ3befNmS8&t=1062s) Uber 年内大跌 30% 至 69 美元，远期 P/E 压缩至 17 倍；其单周 2.97 亿次的庞大单量是竞争对手 Waymo（50 万次）的 595 倍，Robotaxi 颠覆论已被过度计入定价。 - [27:42](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lDJ3befNmS8&t=1662s) Fundstrat 的 Tom Lee 坚定看多标普 500 指数，指出 Q3 盈利增速预计逼近 30%，2027 年 EPS 预期调升幅度超越指数涨幅，市场悲观情绪明显过虑。 - [29:11](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lDJ3befNmS8&t=1751s) 本周“失败之举”归属苹果公司：其表面以安全和隐私为由收紧 Mac 权限限制 AI Agent，实则因 Meta Muse 等代理绕开 App Store 支付、危及毛利率达 76% 的服务业务生态。 ## Key takeaways - [01:31](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lDJ3befNmS8&t=91s) 坚持以 20 至 30 年为维度的“复利机器”投资逻辑，选择具备自主提价能力、强自由现金流与稳固护城河的优质企业逆势加仓。 - [03:52](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lDJ3befNmS8&t=232s) Netflix 平均观看时长下滑并非遭遇参与度危机，而是由于打击密码共享扩充了独立账户分母，以及海外电视观看习惯较短的区域占比提升所致。 - [03:52](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lDJ3befNmS8&t=232s) Netflix 现场直播与赛事虽仅占预算 5% 与总时长 1%，但具备极其显著的下游拉新与提高留存效益。 - [05:20](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lDJ3befNmS8&t=320s) 受华纳一次性赔付扰动影响，Netflix 原始财报 EPS 增速仅为 5.8% 至 6%，但正常化后真实有机增速达 24%，对应 18.5 倍远期市盈率极具性价比。 - [08:52](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lDJ3befNmS8&t=532s) 传统好莱坞制片厂深陷高额净负债泥潭（如华纳净负债达 800-900 亿美元），被迫将顶级 IP 内容授权给财务状况最健康的 Netflix，促使后者成为内容聚合赢家。 - [12:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lDJ3befNmS8&t=720s) 本·阿弗莱克澄清马特·达蒙所谓的“剧情重复三遍”谣言，批评媒体断章取义，并证实 Netflix 给予导演充分的创作自由而非粗暴干涉。 - [17:42](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lDJ3befNmS8&t=1062s) Uber 核心基本面未受实质损害，调整后自由现金流收益率达 5% 至 6%，市场对 Robotaxi 的颠覆恐惧导致其估值被过度压制。 - [21:18](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lDJ3befNmS8&t=1278s) 标普全球 S&P Global 虽受“SaaS 启示录”与高利率担忧影响年内下跌 24%，但债券到期墙展期需求强劲且被动指数 ETF 规模翻倍，长期护城河稳固。 - [24:13](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lDJ3befNmS8&t=1453s) 坚决回避陷入全面收缩的 Nike，其营收自 510 亿滑落至 450 亿美元，面临核心资产老化与竞品蚕食的“双杀陷阱”，不属于高胜率反转标的。 - [26:03](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lDJ3befNmS8&t=1563s) FICO 评分系统在金融借贷体系中粘性极强，但因管理层过度提价引发监管审查，且 CEO 在历史高位大举抛售股票套现，存在较大确定性风险因而保持观望。 - [27:42](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lDJ3befNmS8&t=1662s) Tom Lee 认为市场估值乘数实际因 EPS 预期的大幅上修而更加便宜，叠加能源出口带来的经济韧性，美股年底前有望进一步走高。 - [29:11](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lDJ3befNmS8&t=1751s) 苹果对 Mac 实施“完整磁盘访问权限”严格限制，本质是抵御第三方 AI Agent 整合跨平台生态并绕过 30% 苹果税，试图重演过往打压对手的垄断通道策略。 ## Detailed walkthrough ### [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lDJ3befNmS8&t=0s) 逆势布局：5,000 美元买入三只“反转股”与本期看点 主持人刚刚斥资 5,000 美元买入了三只股票。这三家公司无一例外都是极高品质的优秀企业，但它们的股价近期却在持续下挫，甚至全部陷入了大幅回撤之中。这正是投资者通常所说的“反转题材”（turnaround plays）——在股价深跌时买入，寄希望于未来基本面与市场情绪的全面扭转。在今天的节目中，除了详细剖析这三只正在大举买入的反转标的之外，还会梳理几只虽然股价同样在下跌、但目前仍选择坚决回避的观望股票。 本期节目还涵盖了宏观市场与科技动态：Fundstrat 的 Tom Lee 依旧坚定看多美股，并指出当下许多投资者的恐慌与悲观情绪纯属“毫无必要的过虑”，他给出了标普 500 指数为何能在年底前进一步收高的核心论据。而在本周的“失败之举”（Fail of the Week）环节中，苹果公司（Apple）成为了焦点——苹果正在进一步收紧 Mac 系统的控制权，声称这是为了保护用户免受 AI Agent（人工智能代理）的潜在侵害；但这实际上是苹果屡试不爽的老套路，往往表面上打着“安全、隐私与保护”的旗号，背后却暗藏着维护自身生态控制权的其他利益考量。 ### [01:31](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lDJ3befNmS8&t=91s) 第一只买入标的：逆势加仓 Netflix 与“滚雪球”投资理念 在这次买入的 5,000 美元中，第一笔资金流向了 Netflix（奈飞），主持人直接追加了 2,000 美元。在阐述今天买入的具体逻辑之前，首先要审视当前的持仓背景。主持人的核心投资目标，是建立并积累那些极高品质公司的庞大持仓，买入后便可以放心地让它们在未来的 20 到 30 年间持续为自己创造价值。这类资产被称为“复利机器”（compounding machines）——它们能够持续扩大盈利、迭代产品，并凭借不断提升的产品力实现提价；用户规模不断增长，且整体扩张伴随着惊人的盈利能力与宽阔的护城河。 投资 Netflix 绝不是为了赌下一个季度的财报好坏，这种短期波动根本不在分析考量之内；真正的视角是放眼未来 10 到 20 年，评估哪些公司能够为股东带来海量的自由现金流，并具备巨大的全球扩张空间。目前，主持人在 Netflix 上的持仓总值已经达到约 88,000 美元，是投资组合中的第八大重仓股（仅次于微软），占到了整个组合权重的 6%，处于极高的大幅超配（overweight）状态。 然而，这笔投资近期的账面浮盈经历了一轮大幅缩水：此前收益最高曾达到约 40,000 美元，而目前已回落至 16,000 美元左右。今天在当前价位买入 Netflix，实际上是高于平均持仓成本的“向上加仓”（buying above cost basis）。这意味着加仓操作会拉高整体持仓成本，如果股价进一步探底，甚至可能会面临由盈转亏（in the red）的风险。但主持人强调，这是一个完全值得承担的风险，因为如今的 Netflix 是一家具备极佳确定性且估值极具吸引力的顶级标的，而市场上绝大多数投资者正被自身的认知偏差所蒙蔽，做出了非常拙劣的分析与判断。 ### [03:52](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lDJ3befNmS8&t=232s) 市场对 Netflix 增长与参与度的巨大误解 许多投资者目前对 Netflix 抱有一种根深蒂固的悲观偏见，认为这家公司面临着流媒体行业极其白热化的激烈竞争，甚至在 YouTube 以及华纳兄弟探索与派拉蒙（Warner Bros. Discovery / Paramount）等巨头联盟的围剿下“举步维艰、勉强生存”，甚至频繁有言论大肆渲染其面临严重的“用户参与度危机”（engagement problem）。 针对外界对用户观看时长下降的质疑，管理层在访谈中给出了明确澄清：整体收视率在全平台范围内实际上仍增长了 2%。导致每个订阅用户平均观看时长指标下滑的核心原因在于两点： 1. **密码共享打击（Password Crackdown）**：此前多个家庭或个人共用一个账号时，单一账号累计的观看时长极高；而在推行账号合规化、打击借用密码后，每个独立付费账号的使用时长自然会出现统计上的分流与稀释。 2. **新兴市场的观看习惯**：Netflix 目前增长最快的区域，往往是那些人均电视观看时间本就较短的海外地区。因此，这是由于全球用户人口结构构成（demographic mix）和不同地区的观看习惯差异所致，根本不是平台本身失去了吸引力或遭遇了参与度危机。 此外，市场对 Netflix 观看时长指标的理解十分片面。以直播赛事与现场活动（live events）为例：Netflix 在此类内容上的预算仅占总制作预算的 5%，而它带来的观看时长在总体中仅占 1%。如果单从“单位观看时长成本”这一指标来看，直播活动似乎是极不划算的浪费资金；但管理层非常清楚，这类高品质的现象级直播活动具备极强的“下游放大效应”（downstream effects）——它们能够大规模拉动新用户增长并极大地巩固老用户留存率。观众即使观看时长不如长篇剧集，但满意度极高。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Netflix 增长驱动力与误解拆解 accDescr: 展现市场关于观看时长下滑的表面担忧与管理层揭示的真实底层逻辑之间的对比 subgraph Bear["市场悲观论调 (Bear Thesis)"] B1["平均单账号观看时长下滑"] B2["流媒体巨头竞争白热化"] B3["直播内容投资产出比低"] end subgraph Reality["底层实际情况 (Business Reality)"] R1["打击密码共享导致账号基数激增，分母扩大"] R2["全球化扩张：亚太、拉美等低电视时长地区占比提升"] R3["直播活动占预算5%、占时长1%，但拉新与留存效益极高"] end Bear -.->|"认知偏差修正"| Reality Reality --> Outcome["整体收视率逆势增长2%，飞轮持续运转"] ``` ### [05:20](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lDJ3befNmS8&t=320s) 暴跌背后的强劲基本面：全地域扩张与被低估的 EPS 增速 从盘面表现来看，Netflix 正在经历一场堪称惨烈的估值杀跌，市场甚至已经按照“夕阳公司”的剧本来对其进行定价。Netflix 股价年初至今下跌了 26%，过去一年跌幅更是高达 42%；股价从 2025 年高点的 111 至 122 美元一路腰斩，目前仅在 67 美元附近徘徊，跌幅逼近 50%。 然而，只要回归基本面，就会发现这一暴跌与公司的实际业绩形成了极其割裂的反差： - **全球四大业务区域全线两位数增长**：无论是美国与加拿大（UCAN）、欧洲/中东/非洲（EMEA）、拉丁美洲（LATAM）还是亚太地区（APAC），所有区域的营收增速全部维持在 10% 以上。其中，在市场空白空间更为广阔的拉美和亚太地区，营收增速更是高达 18%。 - **充沛的自由现金流**：过去 12 个月（TTM）自由现金流高达 110 亿美元。 - **关于营收放缓的真实成因**：空头紧咬的所谓“营收降速”（从 15%~16% 的中双位数放缓至 11%~12% 左右）并非结构性衰退，而是因为前期叠加了密码共享整治与大范围提价等超常规刺激，目前基数效应正常化，公司依然依靠源源不断的新增订阅用户维持着强劲的有机增长。 更关键的误读在于每股收益（EPS）的增长表现。如果在选股工具上直接查看原始财务数据，会显示其每股收益增速仅为 5.8% 到 6% 左右。这一数字之所以极低，是因为受到了涉及华纳兄弟（Warner Bros）一次性赔偿款的会计扰动。一旦将这笔非经常性赔付剔除、对 EPS 进行正常化（normalize）调整，Netflix 的有机真实 EPS 增速高达 24%。对于一家拥有深厚护城河、极高全球壁垒和百亿美元级自由现金流的成熟巨头而言，24% 的盈利增速甚至超过了 Visa 和 Mastercard，展现出极强的经营杠杆（operating leverage）。 在估值方面，Netflix 对应未来 12 个月（NTM）的预测市盈率仅为 18.42 倍至 18.5 倍左右（该前瞻指标不受一次性非经常收益干扰，是真实估值的精准反映）。面对这样一家以每年 24% 速度扩张利润的超级白马股，市场却因担忧好莱坞传统巨头合并（如华纳兄弟探索与派拉蒙联手宣发拥有《泰坦尼克号》《盗梦空间》《蝙蝠侠》《超人》等顶级 IP 库的宣传片）而给予其仅 18.5 倍市盈率的估值折价，这恰恰创造了不可多得的击球点。 - **核心财务与持仓数据速览**： - 本次加仓金额：2,000 美元 - 组合内持仓总规模：约 88,000 美元（占投资组合 6%，排位第八） - 股价走势：年内下跌 26%，近一年下跌 42%，自高点约 122 美元跌至 67 美元（跌幅近半） - 各大区营收表现：全区营收增速均高于 10%，拉美与亚太地区增速达 18% - 现金流实力：过去 12 个月自由现金流达到 110 亿美元 - 调整后 EPS 增长率：剔除华纳相关非经常项后实际增长 24%（报告原始增速为 5.8%） - 远期估值倍数：NTM 预测市盈率（Forward P/E）仅为 18.42x - 18.5x ### [08:52](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lDJ3befNmS8&t=532s) 传统媒体的巨额债务与 Netflix 的聚合优势 传统好莱坞制片厂在宣传片（sizzle reel）中展示了大量令人惊叹的经典资产，这往往会让 Netflix 的投资者感到焦虑，怀疑 Netflix 是否有能力与之竞争。然而，只要穿透表象就会发现，派拉蒙（Paramount）宣传的所谓“娱乐高山”，现实中却是一座“债务高山”。更重要的是，这些宣传片中展示的作品有近半数出自早已不再与派拉蒙或华纳兄弟（Warner Bros. Discovery）合作的导演之手。片花里充斥着克里斯托弗·诺兰（Christopher Nolan）的配乐、《盗梦空间》（*Inception*）以及诺兰执导的《蝙蝠侠》（*Batman*）三部曲等影片，但诺兰本人早已离开这两家片厂。历史内容库虽然具有观赏价值，但其商业价值无法与持续不断产出的全新热门内容相提并论，观众真正买账的是源源不断的新片单。 从财务定位来看，Netflix 目前处于全球所有媒体公司中最强劲的财务状况。相比之下，华纳兄弟探索公司（Warner Bros. Discovery）背负着高达 800 亿至 900 亿美元的净负债。这种沉重的债务枷锁迫使其必须穷尽一切变现手段以偿还巨债，而最直接的变现方式就是将旗下最顶级的优质内容授权给 Netflix。不仅是华纳兄弟，迪士尼（Disney）近期也与 Netflix 达成了大规模授权协议，将其最优质的内容分发给 Netflix。Netflix 实际上正在成为整个好莱坞优质影视资产的汇聚中心。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 传统片厂债务压力与内容流向 accDescr: 展示华纳与迪士尼因债务及变现需求将内容授权给Netflix的逻辑流程 subgraph DebtPressure["传统媒体财务困境"] WBD["华纳兄弟探索 (WBD)<br/>800亿-900亿美元净负债"] DIS["迪士尼 (Disney)<br/>流媒体盈利与变现压力"] end subgraph Monetization["变现与授权驱动"] Licensing["必须快速变现以偿还债务<br/>对外授权顶级IP内容"] end subgraph Aggregator["内容聚合赢家"] NFLX["Netflix<br/>全球最强财务资产负债表<br/>聚合竞争对手核心内容"] end WBD --> Licensing DIS --> Licensing Licensing --> NFLX ``` - 华纳兄弟探索公司净负债规模高达 800 亿至 900 亿美元。 - 派拉蒙与华纳片花高度依赖克里斯托弗·诺兰（*Inception*、《蝙蝠侠》）等已解约导演的历史库存。 - 迪士尼已向 Netflix 开放顶级内容授权，传统巨头正被迫从直接竞争转向内容供给。 --- ### [10:35](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lDJ3befNmS8&t=635s) “三遍复述剧情”谣言：马特·达蒙言论引发的误解 外界对 Netflix 长期存在一种偏见，抨击其内容充斥着公式化、缺乏原创性的流水线作品。一种广为流传的批评声称：Netflix 会强制制作团队在电视剧或电影台词中反复复述剧情，目的是让那些一边看剧一边刷手机的观众不至于看不懂，这让 Netflix 被贴上了“廉价快餐式内容”的标签。 这种负面舆论的发酵在很大程度上源于马特·达蒙（Matt Damon）此前的一段言论。马特·达蒙与本·阿弗莱克（Ben Affleck）一同做客《乔·罗根体验》（*The Joe Rogan Experience*）播客时，达蒙提到 Netflix 要求电影在对白中把情节复述三到四遍，以照顾看手机的观众。该剪辑片段迅速被各大媒体截取，并在 Reddit、X（原 Twitter）等各大社交平台上疯狂裂变传播，被外界当成了 Netflix 干预创作者、粗制滥造的铁证。然而，这一言论的原始语境与真实意图遭到了媒体的严重歪曲。 - 社交媒体指责 Netflix 制作“无需动脑的廉价内容”，声称其剧本强制加入重复剧情说明。 - 该谣言由马特·达蒙在 Joe Rogan 播客上的片段切片引发，随后在各大平台病毒式发酵。 --- ### [12:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lDJ3befNmS8&t=720s) 本·阿弗莱克澄清真相与媒体的断章取义 针对这一舆论风波，本·阿弗莱克在后续访谈中出面还原了当时的真相。他解释称，他和达蒙做客播客是为了宣传他们合作的 Netflix 电影，原本的意图是去“辟谣”并打破外界对于 Netflix 的偏见。公众普遍误以为观众只在客厅漫不经心地看电视，平台便会要求导演用直白对白灌输情节；但阿弗莱克反驳指出，像《混沌少年》（*Adolescence*）或《驯鹿宝贝》（*Baby Reindeer*）这类作品，拥有极具艺术感、漫长而复杂的长镜头，观众如果不全程集中精力根本无法理解其内涵。他们上播客本意是想说明自身在 Netflix 的实际创作体验完全与这种刻板印象相反。 然而，媒体为了博取眼球，断章取义地摘抄了达蒙的一句引言，大肆渲染“马特·达蒙痛批 Netflix 强迫创作者在前五分钟交代全部情节”。阿弗莱克对此感到荒谬至极：“我在这部电影里既是主演又是导演，即便那是真的，难道我会跑到 Joe Rogan 的播客上抱怨‘他们逼我加入这些低俗直白的内容’吗？这在逻辑上根本说不通。”随后，达蒙和阿弗莱克亲自联系了撰写该报道的记者，明确告知“这完全背离了我们的本意”，并希望对方刊登更正报道。令人啼笑皆非的是，记者的回复却是“我们觉得更正后就没什么新闻价值了（not really a story there）”，断然拒绝纠正虚假叙事。 - 阿弗莱克举例《混沌少年》与《驯鹿宝贝》的长镜头与复杂叙事，证明 Netflix 绝未强加剧情交代规则。 - 达蒙与阿弗莱克亲自致电记者要求纠正报道，媒体因更正内容缺乏话题爆点而予以拒绝。 --- ### [15:43](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lDJ3befNmS8&t=943s) 传统片厂“愚蠢意见”对比与 Netflix 的投资逻辑 阿弗莱克进一步揭示了影视行业的创作现实：电影史上充斥着来自制片厂高层的愚蠢干预，这种“愚蠢的片厂修改意见（idiotic studio notes）”早在 Netflix 诞生前就已存在了几十年。好莱坞向来充斥着外行高管强行给出毁掉电影的错误意见，等到电影逆势大卖后，高管又在首映礼上厚着脸皮上前握手庆功的传统。阿弗莱克分享了一则史蒂芬·斯皮尔伯格（Steven Spielberg）的逸事：斯皮尔伯格在监制某部电影时收到了制片厂极其离谱的修改意见，斯皮尔伯格亲自回复高管：“这个笑话太精彩了，把我们全剧组都逗乐了，请继续多发点！” 但在 Netflix，创作环境截然不同。阿弗莱克直言 Netflix 根本没有给他提过任何干预性意见，反而对他们说：“我们信任你们，把赌注押在你们身上，放手去拍你们想拍的电影吧。”这种绝对的创作自由甚至让阿弗莱克开玩笑表示希望平台能多承担一点责任：“如果电影搞砸了，我们算共同承担对吧？平台却回答说：‘不，那全是你自己的责任。’” 这彻底击碎了外界关于 Netflix 压制艺术创作的刻板印象。Netflix 完全有能力且正在持续产出世界级的顶级内容与爆款剧集。回归到投资基本面： - Netflix 股价已从历史高点回落约 50%。 - 当前远期市盈率（Forward P/E）仅为 18 倍左右。 - 自由现金流持续强劲喷涌。 - 全球各大核心运营区域的营收增长率均保持在 10% 以上。 ### [17:42](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lDJ3befNmS8&t=1062s) 第二笔买入：抄底暴跌 30% 的 Uber 很多人看到收入增速放缓（Deceleration）就视其为洪水猛兽，但对于几个季度的增速放缓，不必过度恐慌，拉长周期看优秀企业依旧会是赢家。当天早晨买入的第二只标的是 Uber，共投入了 2,000 美元。Uber 目前股价回落到 69 美元附近，年内累计跌幅已达 30%。此前其股价一度触及 100 美元左右，而在这期间公司基本面并没有发生实质性恶化，真正发生实质改变的只有它的股价。即使在 100 美元的高位，Uber 也算不上昂贵；而在 69 美元附近，其远期市盈率（Forward P/E）仅为 17 倍，若剔除保险浮存金（insurance float）的影响进行正常化处理，其自由现金流收益率（FCF Yield）大约在 5% 到 6% 之间。这对于一家规模化、高盈利的企业而言是极其低估的估值。 市场之所以给出如此悲观的折价，是因为投资者深切担忧其面临颠覆性风险（disruption risk），并没有把它当作一家高增长、高盈利且具备规模效应的企业来看待。市场最大的担忧来自于自动驾驶出租车（Robotaxi）网络的竞争威胁，主要竞争对手包括： - **Alphabet / Google (Waymo)**：目前最成熟、落地最普及、经过最充分验证的全自动驾驶出租车网络； - **Amazon (Zoox)**：正在拉斯维加斯等地展开测试运营，但规模仍较小且偏实验性质； - **Tesla (Cybercab)**：坚持纯视觉（vision-only）路线，并在全球部分城市加速推进落地。 这种 Robotaxi 崛起的叙事给 Uber 带来了巨大的不确定性，而这份不确定性已被充分计入股价中。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Robotaxi 竞争格局与 Uber 规模对比 accDescr: 展示 Waymo、Zoox、Tesla 带来的颠覆担忧与 Uber 庞大实际订单规模的对比。 subgraph Disruption ["市场担忧的颠覆者威胁"] W["Waymo (Google)<br/>最成熟商业化网络<br/>周单量: 50万单"] Z["Zoox (Amazon)<br/>拉斯维加斯小规模试点"] T["Cybercab (Tesla)<br/>纯视觉路线推进中"] end subgraph CoreMoat ["Uber 核心壁垒"] U["Uber 网络效应<br/>周单量: 2.97亿单<br/>(规模约为 Waymo 的 595 倍)"] end Disruption -.->|"引发估值下杀<br/>年内跌幅 30%"| U ``` ### [19:53](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lDJ3befNmS8&t=1193s) 数据击碎叙事：Uber 的网络效应与护城河 市场认为自动驾驶车辆会蚕食 Uber 的经济效益，但现实中的数据差距令人震撼。仅看周订单量（weekly rides），Uber 单周完成 2.97 亿次行程，而最领先的 Waymo 单周仅有 50 万次行程，Uber 的规模是 Waymo 的整整 595 倍。不仅体量悬殊，而且 Uber 订单总量的增长速度仍然远快于 Waymo，两者的绝对差距在每个季度甚至还在进一步拉大。 即使在 Waymo 深耕多年、无人车技术最适配的“大本营”旧金山，Uber 依然保持着盈利与业务增长。旧金山这类地形和路况天然适合 Robotaxi 优化运营，相比之下对 Uber 并不占优，但 Uber 依然表现强劲。短期内市场叙事可能瞬息万变（"narratives can change on a dime"），但可以高确定性预见的是，Uber 的营收和利润在长期内仍将保持相对快速的增长。在当前仅 17 倍远期市盈率的估值下，绝大部分颠覆风险已经被市场过度定价了。 - **核心数据对比**：Uber 周订单量达 2.97 亿次，Waymo 约为 50 万次，倍数差距高达 595 倍。 - **估值水平**：股价自 100 美元高点回调 30% 至 69 美元，远期市盈率仅 17 倍，正常化自由现金流收益率达 5%~6%。 --- ### [21:18](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lDJ3befNmS8&t=1278s) 第三笔买入：逆势加仓 S&P Global 第三笔买入是在当天早晨加仓了 1,000 美元的标准普尔全球（S&P Global）。由于此前已经建立了 11.4 万美元的重仓底仓，因此这次只是小额追加。随着近期股价持续走低，原本丰厚的持仓浮盈已大幅缩水至仅剩 7,000 美元左右，几乎濒临盈亏平衡线。S&P Global 年内累计下跌达 24%，彻底沦为一只困境反转标的（turnaround play），市场定价仿佛公司内部出现了致命缺陷。 本次下挫的核心驱动力有两个： 1. **所谓的“SaaS 启示录”（SaaS Apocalypse）与 AI 颠覆论**：Anthropic 推出了具备金融分析能力的 Claude 插件后，彭博社等媒体大肆渲染其对传统金融数据终端的冲击，恐慌情绪蔓延，投资者蜂拥抛售。 2. **利率环境的压制**：市场逻辑认为高利率将抑制债券发行和金融市场活动，从而打击标普评级（Ratings）与指数（Indices）部门的收费能力。 然而仔细拆解其业务结构就会发现市场的过度反应： - 极易受 AI 冲击的市场情报业务（Market Intelligence）约占公司营收的 30%，但该业务的利润率远低于核心的债券评级和指数部门。即使极度悲观地假设该部门利润归零（这在现实中绝不可能发生），标普的整体远期市盈率也仅在 25 倍左右，拥有极深的护城河。 - 利率虽高，但企业存在巨额的存量债务到期墙（debt maturity wall），为了展期（renew）必须持续发债，评级需求不可或缺。 - 被动投资趋势势不可挡：追踪其指数的 ETF 资产管理规模（AUM）已从 2023 年的 3 万亿美元狂飙至约 6 万亿美元，长期飞轮依然稳固。 --- ### [24:13](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lDJ3befNmS8&t=1453s) 坚决避开的标的：陷入全面收缩的 Nike 在审视各种超跌股票时，Nike 是一只每次研究后都会坚决放弃的公司。Nike 正在滑向类似迪士尼的困境：坐拥顶级的历史品牌与资产，却始终无法理顺经营将其良好变现。在过去整整 10 年里，Nike 的股票累计下跌了 36%，为股东带来了整整十年的负收益。 通常买入困境反转股的逻辑是“股价下跌但利润持续增长”，使得估值日益便宜；但 Nike 却是典型的“双杀陷阱”——股价下跌的同时，收入与净利润在以更快速度恶化，导致估值乘数居高不下： - **营收全面萎缩**：总营收从峰值的 510 亿美元一路滑落至 450 亿美元，陷入彻底的收缩周期； - **净利与 EPS 走低**：过去 5 年间净利润与每股收益整体呈下行趋势； - **品牌护城河褪色**：年轻一代消费者对迈克尔·乔丹（Michael Jordan）和 Air Jordan 缺乏老一辈的情怀共鸣，新客群更热衷于尝试 On 昂跑、Hoka 等竞品，大量市场份额拱手让人。 对比 S&P Global、Netflix 或 Uber，Nike 的市盈率反而更高，没有任何理由选择一家在全面危机中负增长的高估值消费品。 --- ### [26:03](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lDJ3befNmS8&t=1563s) 另一只观察中的标的：深陷管理层自毁的 FICO 另一只近两周被密切关注的超跌股是信用评分巨头 FICO。FICO 遭遇的股价崩盘令人扼腕且完全是“自作自受（self-inflicted）”：管理层为了追求短期的提价与利润暴增，不惜牺牲并动摇了自身近乎垄断的长期特许经营权与护城河。 不过管理层的提价恶果与监管风险大多已经被当前的股价消化。与收入利润双双滑坡的 Nike 完全不同，FICO 的底层基本面依然极为强悍：利润率极高、营收仍在扩张，且其评分系统在全美金融借贷体系中具备极深的嵌入度（embedded product）。它与 Nike 展现出了截然不同的反转底色。 ### [26:38](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lDJ3befNmS8&t=1598s) FICO：优秀企业背后的巨大管理层与确定性风险 对于 FICO（费埃哲公司），尽管它看起来更具吸引力也更有趣，但目前仍处于观望状态，决定不建仓买入。核心原因在于其未来的不确定性太大，缺乏足够的可预测性——这家公司的走向存在太多可能性。 其中一个核心风险在于高管层：公司 CEO 在未来一年内有相当大的概率会被解雇或离职。回顾过去三年的交易记录，首席执行官 William J. Lansing 通过出售 FICO 股票赚取了巨额财富，频繁进行抛售操作。翻阅其内部交易记录，可以看到他一次又一次地在高位减持，卖出价格高达每股 1,000 美元、1,500 美元乃至 2,000 美元，多笔交易规模均在 5,000 万美元以上。甚至有报告指出，过去三年中他在基于股票的薪酬（SBC）套现总额上，已经超过了英伟达（NVIDIA）的 CEO 黄仁勋。管理层一路推高价格、拉升股价，随后在历史高位大举套现离场，因此未来一年内管理层发生重大震荡完全在预料之中。 ### [27:42](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lDJ3befNmS8&t=1662s) Tom Lee 访谈：市场过度悲观与盈利驱动逻辑 针对整体市场走势，Fundstrat 的 Tom Lee 在早间访谈中阐述了为何他坚信美股今年将收高的底层逻辑。Tom Lee 指出，市场正处于一个前所未有的阶段，因为企业盈利增长正在全面加速。尽管很多人难以置信，但第三季度的盈利增长预计将接近 30%。与此同时，从年初至今，市场对 2027 年的每股收益（EPS）预期修正幅度已超过 20%，而同期标普 500 指数的涨幅甚至还不到 20%。这意味着市场的估值倍数（Multiple）实际上是不升反降的——如果有人在年初觉得市场昂贵，现在的市场实际上比当时更便宜。此外，由于美国是能源出口国，高油价在客观上反而在强化美国经济。因此，当前市场存在"过度的悲观情绪"（excessive pessimism），不仅盈利可见度极高，而且预示通胀放缓的科技股和加密货币等板块也在重新确立领涨地位。 这一观点非常令人信服。长期来看，驱动股价的核心动力正是企业的营收增长与盈利增长，因为营收的扩张直接带动了利润率和每股收益的提升。从各大核心权重股的表现来看，它们的营收、EPS 以及营业利润率都在同步增长。随着整个大盘的底层盈利能力持续上行，股价终究会顺理成章地跟进上涨。 - 标普 500 指数 Q3 盈利增速预计逼近 30%。 - 2027 年 EPS 预期较年初上调超过 20%，高于指数实际涨幅，带动估值乘数实质性收缩。 ### [29:11](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lDJ3befNmS8&t=1751s) 本周败笔：Apple 收紧 Mac 权限防范 AI Agent 的背后真相 本周的“败笔”（Fail of the Week）不得不聚焦苹果公司（Apple）。虽然作为一个自购大量苹果设备并从其股票中获利颇丰的“果粉”，但从商业底层逻辑来看，苹果近期的举措意图极其明显。 新闻头条显示，苹果宣布将收紧 Mac 的数据控制权限以防范 AI Agent（人工智能代理）。苹果计划为 Mac 用户引入全新的隐私控制措施，对授予第三方软件（包括各类 AI 代理）广泛数据访问权限的风险发出警告。根据苹果的声明，任何希望授予应用“完整磁盘访问权限”（Full Disk Access）的用户，未来都必须经过极其明确的手续确认，官方宣称此举是为了让用户在充分了解风险的前提下做出明智决策。将一个具备完全控制能力的 AI 代理接入整台计算机，确实存在不可忽视的隐私和安全隐患，苹果在安全层面的警告看似合情合理。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 苹果应用生态收费模式受 AI Agent 冲击示意图 accDescr: 展示用户传统通过 App Store 产生交易让苹果抽取服务费，与通过 AI Agent 绕过苹果生态闭环的对比。 subgraph Traditional["传统苹果收费通道 (Toll Booth)"] U1["用户"] --> App["App Store 原生应用"] App --> IAP["应用内购买 (IAP)"] IAP -->|"抽取最高 30% 苹果税"| Rev["服务业务收入 (毛利率 76%)"] end subgraph Agentic["新型 AI Agent 生态 (以 Muse 为例)"] U2["用户"] --> Agent["AI Agent (如 Meta Muse)"] Agent --> Connectors["外部连接生态 (Shopify / Expedia / PayPal)"] Connectors --> Bypass["自主完成交易与调度"] Bypass -.->|"完全绕开苹果底层支付"| Disruption["苹果无法获得任何抽成"] end ``` 然而，隐藏在安全外衣之下的，是苹果对其商业核心命脉受到威胁的巨大焦虑： 1. **“收费站”商业模式的本质**：苹果是全球最赚钱的游戏公司（利润超过 Rockstar 等老牌游戏巨头），其核心盈利引擎就是 App Store。作为数字经济的“收费站”，任何应用内微交易都必须缴纳高昂的“苹果税”。 2. **畸高利润率的服务业务**：苹果的硬件产品业务（iPhone、Mac、iPad、可穿戴设备等）毛利率约为 39%，表现已然优异；但包含 App Store 在内的服务业务毛利率高达 76%。这种数字渠道的垄断暴利是苹果极力守护的基本盘。 3. **AI 代理对苹果税的降维打击**：随着 Meta 的 Muse 等 Agentic 系统迅速蹿红并超越 ChatGPT 登顶 App Store 下载榜，用户正在 Mac 和手机上授予这些系统连接各类外部机构和应用的能力。当用户指令 Muse 在线采购、调度外部服务或在 Agent 体系内运行轻量级交互时，所有登录凭证、账户调度、支付路径与商业交易全部在 AI 代理内部完成，完全绕过了苹果的应用内购买系统。 4. **华尔街投行的预警**：美银（Bank of America）已向苹果投资者发出预警。分析师指出，一旦 AI Agent 代替用户打开独立 App，控制该代理的一方将彻底垄断以往流向操作系统、搜索引擎和应用商店的“路由经济利益”（routing economics）。Meta 与 Shopify、Expedia、PayPal 的结盟正是这种权力转移的前哨。 5. **苹果一贯的公关与商业套路**：苹果往往将隐私和安全当成打压对手商业模式的工具。当外部涌现出苹果无法抽成的商业生态时，苹果便会将其定性为“不安全”、“侵犯隐私”并加以封锁；直到苹果研发出属于自己的官方集成方案后，再重新包装成“尊重隐私、绝对安全”的唯一标准通道。但在 Agent 时代，苹果试图继续垄断流量入口的如意算盘恐怕难以像过去那样轻松奏效。 ### [35:40](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lDJ3befNmS8&t=2140s) 本周失败案例总结与节目尾声 约瑟夫（Joseph Carlson）对本周的“每周失败案例”（Fail of the Week）做出了最后总结。由于苹果无法再像以往那样轻松维系原有的商业模式与经济效益（economics），面对 AI 智能体（AI Agents）带来的潜在颠覆与挑战显得极为被动，因此苹果被评选为本周的失败案例。 在给出这一结论后，约瑟夫为本期播客画上了句号。他向观众表达了感谢与道别，表示希望大家喜欢本期关于抄底三大逆境反转股以及市场分析的内容，并与大家相约在下一期节目中再见。 - 苹果因难以维持以往强势的商业经济模式，正式成为本期的“每周失败案例”（Fail of the Week）。 - 节目在对观众的致谢与告别声中圆满结束。 ## Notable quotes > [01:31](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lDJ3befNmS8&t=91s) buying above cost basis — Joseph Carlson > [01:31](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lDJ3befNmS8&t=91s) in the red — Joseph Carlson > [12:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lDJ3befNmS8&t=720s) not really a story there — 报道记者 > [15:43](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lDJ3befNmS8&t=943s) idiotic studio notes — Ben Affleck > [15:43](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lDJ3befNmS8&t=943s) 这个笑话太精彩了，把我们全剧组都逗乐了，请继续多发点！ — Steven Spielberg > [15:43](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lDJ3befNmS8&t=943s) 我们信任你们，把赌注押在你们身上，放手去拍你们想拍的电影吧。 — Netflix > [19:53](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lDJ3befNmS8&t=1193s) narratives can change on a dime — Joseph Carlson > [21:18](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lDJ3befNmS8&t=1278s) SaaS Apocalypse — Joseph Carlson > [27:42](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lDJ3befNmS8&t=1662s) excessive pessimism — Tom Lee > [29:11](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lDJ3befNmS8&t=1751s) Fail of the Week — Joseph Carlson ## Mentioned Joseph Carlson, Netflix, Uber, S&P Global, Nike, FICO, Tom Lee, Fundstrat, Apple, YouTube, Warner Bros. Discovery, Paramount, Christopher Nolan, Matt Damon, Ben Affleck, The Joe Rogan Experience, Steven Spielberg, Waymo, Zoox, Tesla, Anthropic, Claude, Bloomberg, William J. Lansing, NVIDIA, Jensen Huang, Meta, Muse, Bank of America, Shopify, Expedia, PayPal ## Video description Join Qualtrim, the stock analysis platform I built and use, and join over 13,000 other paying members: https://www.qualtrim.com/ 0:00 I Bought 3 Turnaround Stocks 1:31 Netflix — Buying More After the Selloff 6:37 Netflix’s Growth Is Being Misunderstood 10:35 The Netflix “Low-Quality Content” Criticism 17:53 Uber — Buying the 30%+ Drop 21:18 S&P Global — My Third Purchase 24:13 Nike — Why I’m Still Avoiding It 26:03 FICO — Great Business, Major Risk 27:42 Tom Lee Says Investors Are Too Pessimistic 29:12 Fail of the Week: Apple vs. AI Agents -Disclaimer Some of the links below are affiliate links, I can earn money from them at no cost to you. This content is not a solicitation, is not endorsed by M1, and was not reviewed by M1; the opinions expressed are solely those of the authors and do not reflect M1's views. Information presented is accurate as of the video posting date; for the most up-to-date information, please refer to m1.com. Before making any investment decisions, consult your personal investment, legal, and tax advisors, as this content is for informational purposes only and not intended as investment recommendations. ▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀ Join Here: https://www.qualtrim.com/ 📚 My favorite Investing Books: https://amzn.to/3KwyIhG 📷 All the tech I use to record videos: https://www.amazon.com/shop/josephcarlson/list/2L5YMP4DFYA8O?ref_=cm_sw_r_cp_ud_aipsflist_aipsfjosephcarlson_FAKKKMYKF486ZR6H2DSQ 🚀 Growth Portfolio: https://click.linksynergy.com/deeplink?id=5mNcifgFllM&mid=50362&murl=https://dashboard.m1.com/share?token=39d17ae6-4a4a-3fc4-bb15-d86abe3fbb67 💵 Dividend Portfolio: https://click.linksynergy.com/deeplink?id=5mNcifgFllM&mid=50362&murl=https://dashboard.m1.com/share?token=3b283352-1bff-31d9-8576-f5770c2bfdfd SOCIAL MEDIA ▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀ 🎥 More free content: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCbta0n8i6Rljh0obO7HzG9A 🐦 I post random thoughts on Twitter too: https://twitter.com/joecarlsonshow DISCLAIMER ▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀ I am not a professional investor and have never claimed to be. I'm an amateur investor sharing my experience of what I've learned, where I have had success, and where I've had failures. I share my thoughts on investing and performance with transparency. My approach and goal to investing is to buy high-quality long-term investments in world-class businesses that I call "compounders". I view my investments as businesses, not as stocks. Before creating content on YouTube full time I worked as a senior-level programmer for 8 years. Over the years as a programmer, I compounded my knowledge of development. I take the same iterative learning approach to my study of investing. I study investing as a craft in the continual pursuit of being better. I will make mistakes in investment decisions from time to time. Results are not guaranteed. Please do not blindly follow me into any investments, and make sure your portfolio and investments are built around your specific income, risk tolerance, personality, timeline, and overall circumstances. [Source](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lDJ3befNmS8)

[1:31] Joseph Carlson: buying above cost basis [1:31] Joseph Carlson: in the red [12:00] 报道记者: not really a story there [15:43] Ben Affleck: idiotic studio notes [15:43] Steven Spielberg: 这个笑话太精彩了，把我们全剧组都逗乐了，请继续多发点！ [15:43] Netflix: 我们信任你们，把赌注押在你们身上，放手去拍你们想拍的电影吧。 [19:53] Joseph Carlson: narratives can change on a dime [21:18] Joseph Carlson: SaaS Apocalypse [27:42] Tom Lee: excessive pessimism [29:11] Joseph Carlson: Fail of the Week

[1:31] Joseph Carlson: compounding machines [8:52] Joseph Carlson: mountain of debt [10:35] Ben Affleck: utterly contrary to that [13:06] Joseph Carlson: didn't really feel like there was a story there [13:06] Steven Spielberg: That was a great one. You had us all breaking up. Keep them coming. [13:06] Joseph Carlson: We bet on you. We believe in you. You want to make this movie, go ahead [17:42] Joseph Carlson: the big bad word [21:18] Joseph Carlson: SaaS apocalypse [21:18] Joseph Carlson: wall of debt [29:12] Joseph Carlson: Fail of the Week

[0:00] I just spent $5,000 buying three stocks. [0:02] And each of these companies is high [0:04] quality. They're great businesses, but [0:06] the stock price continues to go down. In [0:08] fact, all three of these are in massive [0:10] dips. They are what we consider [0:12] turnaround plays. You're hoping that [0:14] you'll buy it now and things will turn [0:16] around. So, I'll be going over the three [0:18] companies that I chose to buy, these [0:19] turnaround plays that I'm jumping into, [0:21] as well as some other ones. I'll be [0:23] looking at some other ones that I'm [0:24] avoiding, stocks that are going down [0:26] that I'm not buying quite yet. So, we [0:28] have a number of companies that we'll be [0:29] looking at today. Plus, we have some [0:31] news to get to. We also have Tom Lee, [0:33] who is of course bullish on the market, [0:34] but he says investors are a little bit [0:36] scared right now unnecessarily. So, [0:38] we'll be looking at his arguments of why [0:39] he thinks the S&P 500 will end higher [0:41] this year. And of course, we have the [0:43] fail of the week, which in this case, I [0:44] have to highlight Apple. Apple is now [0:46] tightening the controls on the Mac, [0:48] saying that they're going to protect [0:49] users against AI agents. This is the [0:52] playbook Apple has run many times. They [0:54] say it's in the name of security and [0:55] safety and protection when there's [0:57] really some other considerations going [0:59] on. So, we'll be going over more of that [1:00] in the fail of the week. So, overall, we [1:02] have a massive episode to get into. [1:04] Let's go ahead and jump in. If you [1:05] haven't tried out Qualrim, now's the [1:06] time. You can try it out risk-free with [1:08] a free trial. It comes with a stock [1:10] analysis platform, exclusive content, [1:13] access to a massive Discord community [1:14] that is moderated, and there's tons of [1:17] active investors on it, as well as you [1:18] get access to the iOS app, which works [1:20] really, really well. I know because I [1:22] built it myself and we have an Android [1:24] one coming out soon. So, lots of things [1:27] going on. Try it out if you haven't. [1:28] Qualrram.com. Now, like I said, I bought [1:30] three different companies. The first one [1:32] was Netflix. I bought another $2,000 of [1:34] this stock. Before we go into my [1:36] reasoning for buying Netflix today, I [1:39] first want to take a look at my position [1:40] to show you what I already own of this [1:42] company because I already have a [1:43] substantial position in Netflix. So, if [1:46] we turn over to the portfolio here, the [1:48] goal behind my portfolio is to [1:50] accumulate large positions in incredibly [1:53] high-quality companies where I can [1:55] basically buy into them once and then [1:57] just watch them work for me for the next [1:59] 20 or 30 years. These are what I call [2:01] compounding machines. They're companies [2:03] that continue to grow earnings, they [2:05] grow their products, they can raise [2:06] prices because their products get [2:08] better, they get more users, and they [2:10] grow and they grow and they do so very [2:12] profitably. There are also companies [2:14] overall that I think have very strong [2:16] moes because you don't want to make [2:18] money for a short period of time. You [2:20] want to make money for a long duration [2:22] of time. So, I'm looking at the long [2:23] game with each of these positions. And [2:25] Netflix really does embody the [2:27] characteristics that I'm looking for. It [2:29] is a company that is a long-term play. [2:31] I'm not buying Netflix because I think [2:33] the next quarter will be good or bad. [2:35] That's really not part of my analysis. [2:36] I'm looking over the next 10 or 20 years [2:39] to see which companies will generate [2:40] enormous amounts of cash for the [2:42] shareholder. Which ones have global [2:44] opportunities to grow much bigger. Now, [2:46] my position in Netflix is already an [2:49] $88,000 position. So, it is massive. [2:52] It's a big one. It's position number [2:54] eight, right behind Microsoft, and it's [2:56] 6% of my portfolio. So, I have a huge [2:59] overweing in Netflix already. My gains [3:02] on this company, however, have not been [3:04] amazing. It's actually gone down a bit, [3:07] and we'll get to that in a minute. But [3:08] it's gone down because Netflix is in a [3:10] massive dip. See, at one point in time, [3:12] this was about $40,000 in gains. Now, [3:15] we're at 16,000. And I continue to buy [3:17] it even above my cost basis. Buying more [3:20] Netflix today actually raises my cost [3:22] basis on the company. It makes it so [3:24] that I'm more at risk of going in the [3:27] red on Netflix if this company continues [3:29] to go down. So, that's the bad thing. [3:31] When I buy Netflix today, I'm buying it [3:34] above my average cost. I'm raising my [3:35] risk of going into the red, but that's a [3:37] risk that I think is worth taking [3:39] because Netflix today is a great company [3:42] I believe at a very good deal. And part [3:44] of my thesis on this is I think that [3:46] Netflix is one of these companies that [3:48] the biases in investors cause them to do [3:50] poor analysis on. Let's go ahead and [3:52] take a couple examples. First of all, [3:55] when we look at Netflix, the impression [3:56] that many investors have is this [3:58] company's facing so much competition, it [4:00] can barely grow. It's barely trying to [4:02] survive against YouTube, against [4:05] Paramount or Warner Bros or whatever it [4:07] is now, this massive company that [4:09] they're facing against. How can Netflix [4:11] compete? A lot of people have spoke [4:13] about the doom of Netflix, about how [4:15] there's massive engagement problems. [4:17] Management went into an interview and [4:19] said they don't have an engagement [4:20] problem. They said that viewership is up [4:22] 2% across the board. The reason the [4:25] average viewership per subscriber went [4:27] down is because they implemented [4:29] password crackdowns. So the average [4:31] watch time of course will go down. They [4:32] also mentioned that they're growing in [4:34] regions of the world where people don't [4:36] watch as much TV. So that's more of a [4:38] demographic mix and viewing habits per [4:40] category rather than a problem with [4:42] engagement. Management also noted that [4:44] the watchtime concern for Netflix is [4:46] misunderstood. For example, they spend [4:48] 5% of their budget on live events and [4:50] that only makes up for 1% of engagement. [4:53] So when you're just looking at watch [4:55] time, live events would be a waste of [4:57] money. Why even do it at all? But [4:59] Netflix does it because they know that [5:00] the live events have a lot of downstream [5:02] effects. They gain new customers. They [5:04] help with retention. People really like [5:06] the live events even if they don't watch [5:08] them for as long. It's quality TV. So, [5:10] they're pushing into things that don't [5:12] help out that watchtime metric, but it [5:14] makes the customer still happier with [5:16] Netflix. And when we look at the [5:17] fundamentals, it really paints this out. [5:20] For example, a lot of people have the [5:21] impression that Netflix is like a dying [5:23] company. If you look at what's going on [5:25] right now, it's almost being priced that [5:28] way. Netflix's stock price continues to [5:30] go down. It's down 26% this year. In the [5:34] past year, it's down 42%. [5:37] So, the stock price was at $111 going up [5:41] to 120. You can see that it spiked up [5:43] back in 2025, [5:45] $122. [5:47] Now, Netflix trades at $67. So, we have [5:51] the stock price dropping 50%. What's [5:54] gone wrong with this company? Well, when [5:55] we look at the fundamentals, here's what [5:57] we see. The revenue by region is growing [6:00] everywhere. Literally everywhere that [6:02] they operate in, they have four [6:03] different regions. We have the US and [6:04] Canada. We have Europe. We have parts of [6:07] Africa. We have Latin America. We have [6:08] Asia Pacific. We have everywhere across [6:11] the globe. And they're growing [6:12] everywhere. In fact, of course, they're [6:14] growing more in areas outside of the US [6:16] and Canada faster because, well, there's [6:18] just a lot more white space to grow [6:19] into. A lot of these areas like Latin [6:22] America and Asia Pacific are growing [6:23] 18%. Every single region is growing [6:26] above 10%. Netflix is growing that [6:28] revenue while growing their free cash [6:30] flow substantially. They have 11 billion [6:33] in trailing free cash flow. Their [6:35] earnings per share also growing [6:36] substantially. In fact, one of the bare [6:38] cases for Netflix right now, something [6:40] that is sour investors is this talk of [6:42] deceleration. Now, while it's true that [6:44] they have some level of deceleration in [6:46] the revenue, we have to give context [6:48] here. The revenue is slowing down from [6:51] the mid teens, maybe 15 16% to probably [6:54] around 11 to 12%. So there's some [6:56] deceleration there, but that is not [6:58] because of real structural reasons. [7:00] What's going on with Netflix is they're [7:02] simply overlapping massive revenue [7:04] drivers. Things like the password [7:06] crackdown. They just came off price [7:08] hikes. They did a lot of things that [7:10] drive revenue and now it's slowing down [7:11] a little bit, but they're still growing [7:13] organically, adding on more subscribers. [7:16] See, this is not the story of a business [7:17] that is struggling. Netflix continues to [7:20] grow between 11 to 15% revenue and their [7:23] earnings per share grow much faster. In [7:25] fact, another thing that investors [7:26] should pay attention to right here on [7:28] Qualrum, it says 6% earnings per share [7:30] growth. The reason that it says it's [7:32] only growing 6% is because that is with [7:34] the Warner Brothers payout. See, with [7:36] the reported numbers, they're only [7:38] growing 5.8%. When you normalize out the [7:40] EPS of that onetime payout on an organic [7:43] basis, they're growing by 24%. 24% [7:46] earnings per share growth for a company [7:48] this well established with this big of a [7:50] moat with this much cash flow is the the [7:53] numbers of a premium top tier company. [7:56] That is incredibly fast growth. That's [7:57] faster than companies like Visa or [7:59] Mastercard. Netflix is a moderate to [8:00] fast growing revenue company with a lot [8:02] of operating leverage leading to massive [8:05] earnings growth. Right now Netflix [8:06] trades at an 18.42 42 next 12 months PE [8:10] ratio. So you're paying an 18.5 multiple [8:13] on the company and that's with it being [8:14] normalized because the payout that it [8:16] received doesn't affect the forward PE [8:19] ratio. So that number is the true [8:21] multiple you're paying for Netflix [8:23] today. An earnings growth company [8:25] growing at 24% per year. It has a [8:27] relatively wide moat if you believe that [8:29] Netflix can withstand the competition [8:31] from the Warner Brothers Paramount [8:33] merger. Now, a lot of people look at the [8:35] Warner Brothers Paramount merger and [8:37] they look at these these videos they're [8:39] posting and it seems like, wow, how [8:41] could you ever compete against that? In [8:43] fact, David Ellison posted on Twitter a [8:45] video showing like Titanic and it shows [8:48] Inception and it shows Batman and it [8:50] shows Superman. It shows all these [8:52] incredible assets that they own. And as [8:55] a Netflix investor, you're sitting there [8:56] going, "Oh, this is this is bad. This [8:59] doesn't look good at all. How can [9:00] Netflix compete against that?" If you [9:03] look at it for a second here, let's [9:05] ignore the mountain of debt that makes [9:07] up Paramount. They say it's a mountain [9:09] of entertainment. It is a mountain of [9:10] debt is what that company is right now. [9:13] But about half that sizzle reel of what [9:15] they showed are from directors that are [9:17] no longer even working with Paramount or [9:19] Warner Bros. Don't work with either of [9:21] those companies. For example, it has [9:23] Nolan's music. It has Inception. It has [9:27] Batman. Nolan's Batman. It has movies [9:29] all throughout it that are Nolan's [9:31] films. He's not working with either of [9:33] those studios anymore. So, they're [9:35] showing historical stuff, which is fine, [9:37] but we know that the historical library [9:39] does not have the same value as [9:40] routinely created content. Their news [9:42] slate is what people are interested in. [9:44] And in terms of Netflix's positioning, [9:46] Netflix is in the strongest financial [9:48] position of any media company in the [9:50] world. You look at Warner Brothers [9:51] Discovery, and that company is going to [9:53] have 80 to90 billion of net debt. A [9:57] mountain of debt. This will force them [9:58] to monetize in every way that they can [10:01] to license a lot of their best content [10:03] onto Netflix. So, as Netflix [10:05] shareholders and Netflix viewers, you're [10:07] going to be viewing a lot of that [10:08] content onto Netflix's service. Now, we [10:11] don't know how they're going to break it [10:12] up, but we know that they're going to. [10:14] Simply put, they have to in order to [10:16] service their massive debt. If they want [10:17] any chance of paying it down, they need [10:19] to make money quickly. We even have [10:21] Disney. They've done the same thing. [10:23] They've recently done a massive deal [10:25] with Netflix to put some of their best [10:26] content onto Netflix. So Disney's doing [10:30] this. They're going to be aggregating [10:31] Disney's content. And we know that [10:33] Warner Brothers Discovery is going to do [10:34] the same thing. Then you have a lot of [10:36] the talk about Netflix. A lot of the [10:39] people that kind of bash the company as [10:41] coming out with unoriginal boilerplate [10:44] content. Things like having to restate [10:47] the plot multiple times throughout the [10:48] TV series or the show, which isn't [10:51] really accurate. This is the type of [10:53] thing that's been used to bash Netflix [10:54] for some time, that it has lowquality [10:56] content. Content where Netflix tells the [10:59] producers that they have to restate the [11:01] plot multiple times so that people that [11:03] are on their phones understand what's [11:04] going on because they're obviously not [11:06] paying attention to the show, giving the [11:08] impression that Netflix is full of cheap [11:10] disposable content. And this actually [11:13] got started in part and even embellished [11:15] by Matt Damon. Matt Damon and Ben [11:17] Affleck went on an interview with Joe [11:19] Rogan. And as part of that, Matt Damon [11:21] talked about he says Netflix wants [11:23] movies to restate the plot three or four [11:26] times in the dialogue because viewers [11:28] are on their phones while they're [11:30] watching. Now, this is something that [11:32] was picked up by the media. This clip [11:35] was posted everywhere, all across [11:37] Reddit, all across X, all across every [11:40] social media that Netflix was telling [11:42] directors to do this. Now, the other [11:44] person that was in that interview with [11:45] Matt Damon and Joe Rogan was Ben [11:47] Affleck. And Ben Affleck went on [11:49] recently to explain what Matt Damon was [11:52] actually saying, what the point of what [11:53] he was saying actually was. And he also [11:55] tells how he tried to have the media [11:56] correct this story because this story [11:59] got it wrong. Let's go ahead and take a [12:00] listen to what Ben Affleck says here. [12:02] >> There's a lot of attention when you and [12:03] Matt went on Joe Rogan's podcast earlier [12:05] this year and Matt made those comments [12:07] about sort of the Netflix movie they [12:09] want you to regurgitate the plot three [12:10] times and isn't this horrible and blah [12:12] blah blah blah. I'm I'm just curious, [12:14] has Netflix asked you to do that? like [12:16] what is the reality of this is a very [12:19] interesting um case study and a [12:22] phenomenon that I've found recurrent in [12:25] my life and it sort of relates to the [12:27] truth in the story. Matt Damon and I [12:30] went on Joe Rogan to promote our Netflix [12:32] movie in the context of having that [12:33] discussion with Joe Rogan. What we were [12:36] saying was there's this perception right [12:38] like this how do you feel being on [12:39] Netflix? It's great. is this perception [12:41] that like oh people are in their living [12:42] room and you have to do this and they [12:43] tell you that you have to do you know [12:45] tell the audience the plot and I said [12:47] right but even if you look at baby [12:49] reindeer or adolescence where they have [12:50] these long shots falling down there [12:52] that's clearly not true we went on there [12:55] to debunk this notion and explain to [12:58] people why in fact our experience was [13:00] utterly contrary to that and yet [13:04] somebody went ahead and did a [13:05] >> now I went and actually watched that Joe [13:07] Rogan clip again where Matt Damon talks [13:09] about Netflix telling people to do that [13:11] stuff. And Ben Affleck makes it clear [13:13] that they don't really do that. And he [13:15] even gave examples. He says, [13:17] "Adolescence is not a movie where the [13:19] the Netflix team said, "Hey, you have to [13:21] give the plot up in the first uh 10 [13:23] seconds." Nobody knows what's going on [13:25] in that movie. It's it's incredibly uh [13:27] sad and original. There's long shots [13:29] where you don't understand what's going [13:30] on unless you're paying attention to it. [13:32] It basically debunks everything that [13:34] they are claiming there. So Ben Affleck [13:36] is trying to give examples of why that's [13:38] not the case, but the media still ran [13:40] with it because the media loves running [13:42] with these type of things. We saw [13:44] article after article about how Netflix [13:46] is bossing these people around. He [13:47] actually tried to contact the media to [13:50] get it corrected and they didn't want to [13:52] correct it. [13:53] >> Pull quote and it got picked up once and [13:55] it was Matt Damon says Netflix, you [13:58] know, makes you tell the plot in the [13:59] first five minutes. If you just stop and [14:01] think about it, I am in this movie. I'm [14:03] directing. Even if that were true, do [14:06] you think I would go on Joe Rogan and be [14:08] like, "They made me put all this obvious [14:11] like it doesn't even make sense, never [14:14] mind the fact that if you look back on [14:15] it." In fact, then we called a [14:18] journalist and said, "Hey, would you [14:20] mind running a story saying that was not [14:22] our intention?" I talked to him, Matt [14:23] talked to him, we thought they were [14:24] going to run it. I said, "What happened [14:25] to that story?" He was like, "Oh, he [14:26] didn't really feel like there was a [14:27] story there." I was like, [14:30] >> "So, after the media got it wrong, which [14:33] you can give them the benefit of the [14:34] doubt. What if they just misunderstood [14:35] it? They ran a story and uh it didn't [14:38] turn out to be what Matt Damon and Ben [14:41] Affleck were trying to say." But he says [14:43] that both of them contacted a journalist [14:46] that ran one of these stories. Both Ben [14:48] Affleck and Matt Damon telling them, [14:50] "Hey, that wasn't really our intention. [14:52] The story kind of gives things gives [14:54] viewers the wrong uh impression of [14:55] what's going on. could you say this is [14:58] what we actually meant by that? And they [15:00] go, "H, nah, nah. What? We don't want to [15:03] do that. There's not really a story [15:04] there." So, journalists are okay running [15:06] with something, giving you the wrong [15:08] impression, what somebody wasn't trying [15:10] to say at all, and then even when they [15:12] explicitly contact the journalist to [15:14] correct it, they still won't correct it [15:16] because the story, they think it's a [15:18] viral story, they think it's good, for [15:19] whatever reason, they don't want to [15:20] correct it. This is what we're dealing [15:22] with here. [15:24] >> Okay? And then it keeps on coming up. [15:26] This is how things get. And so here you [15:28] are an ethical established person in [15:31] this field and you have no way of [15:33] discriminating going on. [15:34] >> Well, in fairness, I actually listened [15:35] to the podcast episode because I did not [15:37] want to rely on just a clip. So before [15:39] this, I I did listen to the first. [15:41] >> So you must have had some suspicion that [15:43] this was the case. I struggle to see how [15:47] well one I don't think that Netflix is [15:49] telling a director of your stature this [15:52] is how you should make your movie. [15:54] There's sort of that is absolutely true. [15:56] They would never do that. I don't know [15:58] that they I've never met anyone who's [16:00] had an a note that idiotic and brazen. [16:03] I've heard a lot of idiotic studio [16:05] notes. Idiotic studio notes long predate [16:08] Netflix. This is a business with a long [16:10] history of executives telling you to do [16:12] the exact wrong thing that's going to [16:14] ruin your movie and later standing there [16:16] shaking your hand at the premiere when [16:18] it's a hit and you did exactly what they [16:20] wanted you not to do. So we have this I [16:23] mean there's a great story about Steven [16:24] Spielberg on a movie. I can't remember [16:26] what it was. He was producing it and [16:28] they got these notes from the studio and [16:30] the note was something that was so [16:31] outrageously bad and Steven said like [16:34] I'll handle this. And uh he he wrote [16:36] back to the guy like that was a great [16:38] one. You had us all breaking up. Keep [16:40] them coming. [16:43] I thought like but but that being said [16:45] there's absolutely no truth to that. And [16:48] of course like I wouldn't do it. And in [16:50] fact they didn't give me any notes or so [16:54] much so that I they were like listen we [16:56] bet on you. We believe in you. You want [16:57] to make this movie go ahead. It's like I [17:00] almost want a little more buy in. And [17:02] I'm like, "But if it doesn't work, we're [17:03] in this together, right?" It's like, [17:05] "No, it's going to be your fault." Um, [17:07] but okay. Like, I can take that. And And [17:10] >> not only did Netflix not boss around Ben [17:13] Affleck and Matt Damon, they literally [17:16] just told them, "We believe in you. Go [17:17] make your movie. Have fun." This is the [17:19] opposite impression of what people have [17:21] of Netflix. But you can see how all [17:22] these myths are being made. So, overall, [17:24] Netflix is a company that is capable of [17:26] making really good content. They've done [17:27] it before. I think they'll have more hit [17:29] series again. At the same point in time, [17:31] the stock is down 50% from its highs. [17:33] It's trading at an 18 Ford PE ratio. The [17:36] company's gushing cash day in day out, [17:38] and it's growing above 10% in every [17:40] region. There is going to be some [17:42] slowdown in revenue. People call this [17:44] deceleration, the big bad word, but I [17:46] don't look at companies and concerns [17:48] with a couple quarters of deceleration. [17:51] Over the long term, I believe this one's [17:52] going to be a winner. The second one [17:53] that I bought this morning was $2,000 of [17:56] Uber. Uber's currently at $69 and it's [17:59] going through a big sell-off like these [18:00] companies. It's down 30% year-to- date. [18:03] Uber got up to around $100 per share and [18:06] not too much has changed over that time [18:08] period. Really, the only thing that's [18:10] changed materially with Uber is the [18:13] stock price. It's just gone down 30%. [18:15] But even at $100 per share, Uber wasn't [18:18] all that expensive. For example, Uber [18:19] currently trades at a 17 Ford PE ratio. [18:22] If you normalize out some insurance [18:24] float, Uber's probably at around a 5 to [18:27] 6% free cash flow yield. These are very [18:29] cheap multiples for a company. These [18:32] type of companies are ones that [18:33] investors are genuinely concerned about. [18:35] They're being priced with a lot of [18:36] disruption risk. Uber is not being [18:38] priced as a fast growing, highly [18:40] profitable, scaled business. Yet, that's [18:42] what I believe it actually is. The [18:44] biggest concerns for Uber are obviously [18:46] Google and Tesla and Amazon. all the [18:50] companies creating competitive robo taxi [18:52] networks. For example, Google has Whimo, [18:54] which is by far the most proven, the [18:56] most mature, the most popular robo taxi [19:00] fully autonomous vehicle network. Then [19:02] you have Zuks by Amazon, which is [19:04] operating in Vegas. It's a much smaller [19:07] kind of experimental thing right now. [19:08] And then of course you have the Tesla [19:09] Cyber Cap, which is going the vision [19:11] only direction. They're scaling as well [19:13] in some cities across the world. So [19:15] obviously these concerns of growing [19:17] autonomous vehicles raise uncertainty [19:19] for Uber. That uncertainty is being [19:21] priced into the stock. So investors [19:23] today need to decide whether or not [19:24] those concerns are accurately priced in. [19:28] Whether Uber is going to be really [19:29] disrupted or its economics are going to [19:31] be diminished because of these [19:33] autonomous vehicles. And when I look at [19:35] it, I don't believe that's going to [19:36] happen to nearly the extent that's [19:38] currently being priced in. I believe [19:40] that Uber is going to grow and continue [19:42] to grow into a very economically [19:44] powerful company because network has [19:46] massive massive benefits and Uber is a [19:49] network that's so much bigger than even [19:51] the closest competitor that it's they're [19:53] not even close. For example, we can look [19:56] at it visually here because the numbers [19:57] don't really do it justice. Uber is 595 [20:00] times bigger than Whimo based on its [20:03] weekly rides. Whimo is doing 500,000. [20:05] Uber is doing 297 [20:08] million. The leap pair is so huge. [20:11] Again, 500k versus 297 million rides. [20:16] And even on top of that, it's not as [20:18] though Whimo is really catching up. [20:20] Uber's growing at a much faster pace [20:22] with its ride than Whimo. So, the [20:24] distance is actually getting bigger in [20:25] total trips between the two every single [20:27] quarter. Now, of course, a lot of these [20:30] autonomous vehicle networks are are [20:31] spinning up. You can say that they're [20:33] going to take more market share over [20:34] time and they'll try to. But even in [20:36] territories where they've been operating [20:38] for years, like San Francisco, Uber's [20:40] still profitable. It's still actually [20:42] growing. That's where Whimo already is [20:44] and has been since the beginning. So [20:47] there's areas where Whimo is already [20:48] very optimized for. There's cities that [20:50] are really good for it. San Francisco is [20:52] an example. Uber is actually a little [20:54] bit better suited for other cities. And [20:56] yet, even in that area that's less [20:58] optimal for Uber, more optimal for robo [21:01] taxis, Uber is still doing great. I [21:03] can't say what direction the stock is [21:05] going to go because narratives can [21:06] change on a dime. What I do believe is [21:08] that we can predictably say that Uber is [21:10] going to grow its earnings and its [21:12] revenue over time, and I believe that [21:13] it's going to grow relatively fast. At [21:15] this type of valuation, I think a lot of [21:17] the risk is currently priced in. Now, [21:19] next, we get into my third buy. I added [21:20] another $1,000 to this company. It's one [21:23] that I want to buy more, but I look at [21:24] it and I already have a big position. [21:26] It's S&P Global. I bought another $1,000 [21:29] this morning, which I I have a position [21:32] that's $114,000. So, I already own a lot [21:34] of it. I'm very bullish on the company. [21:36] And this one is like the rest of them [21:39] becoming a turnaround play. It is truly [21:41] being priced as though there's something [21:43] dramatically wrong with this stock. In [21:45] fact, my gains, which used to be a lot [21:47] more in this company, are now down to [21:48] only $7,000. So, we're we're just barely [21:52] in the green, barely teetering in the [21:54] green at this point. This is a $114,000 [21:57] position, 7K in gains, and it could go [21:59] away if the stock continues to trend [22:01] down. Let's go ahead and take a look at [22:02] its performance. If we go year-to date, [22:04] it's down 24%. [22:06] This is one of the ones that's part of [22:07] the SAS apocalypse. Anthropic came out [22:10] with a plugin that could do some things [22:11] with finance, and everybody rushed to [22:13] the keyboards to open up their brokerage [22:15] to sell S&P Global. Bloomberg said that [22:18] it could disrupt this company and that's [22:20] what happens in the market. The [22:21] narratives get priced in right away and [22:23] then investors get to see how the [22:24] fundamentals play out over the next [22:26] couple of years. But my bet is that this [22:29] got priced in a little too aggressively [22:31] and I think that it's not going to be [22:33] quite as bad for S&P Global as investors [22:35] are predicting. If we look at the [22:37] revenue by segment of S&P Global and we [22:40] look at the market intelligence [22:41] business, this is a huge huge portion of [22:45] the company's revenue. In fact, I would [22:47] say right now it's about uh 30%. If you [22:50] were to take this away, their earnings [22:52] don't go down 30%. Because this is a [22:54] lower margin portion of the company than [22:56] the ratings or even the indices. Those [22:59] are the very high margin, really, really [23:01] powerful parts of the company that [23:02] happen to be the widest mode. If market [23:04] intelligence went to zero, which it's [23:06] not, the company would still trade at a [23:08] 25 Ford PE around that neighborhood. So, [23:11] that's part of the pressure on S&P [23:13] Global stock price, the reason that it's [23:14] in a big dip. But there's also another [23:16] big factor which is interest rates. The [23:18] thought process is there's more lending, [23:20] there's more activity, there's more [23:22] financial activity, there's more indicy [23:24] activity. Whenever interest rates go [23:27] down, interest rates are going up, which [23:29] means that there's going to be less [23:30] activity. And companies like S&P Global [23:32] and Moody's will be able to monetize [23:34] this activity less. Although that is [23:37] technically true, at least in the short [23:38] term, I also think it's short-term [23:40] thinking. Interest rates going up does [23:42] not mean that people won't take out [23:43] debt. These companies have to take out [23:46] debt just to renew the amount that they [23:47] have. There's a big wall of it that's up [23:49] for renewal. They're going to renew it. [23:51] The ETF assets under management went [23:54] from $3 trillion in 2023. Now it's up to [23:57] around $6 trillion trillion. So more and [24:00] more money is being linked and under [24:02] index with S&P Global. So this is one [24:04] that even though the stock price is [24:05] going down, I think it's a good [24:06] turnaround play at this point. So those [24:08] are the three that I'm buying. Now for [24:09] some that I've considered, but right now [24:11] these are ones that I'm passing up on. [24:13] The first one's going to be Nike. This [24:15] is a stock that I've looked at and every [24:17] time that I look at this one, I decide [24:19] to pass on it. And part of the reason [24:21] why is because I believe it's turning [24:22] into a really difficult situation. A [24:24] company that's kind of like Disney that [24:26] has really good assets, really good [24:28] brand, but it never seems to pull [24:30] together and monetize it in a good way. [24:32] When we look at Nike, the the stock is [24:34] down 36% in the past 10 years. So, a [24:38] decade of negative returns. Now, the [24:40] worst part about Nike today is typically [24:42] when you're buying a turnaround, you're [24:44] buying a stock that's getting cheaper by [24:46] the day because the stock price is going [24:47] down and the earnings are growing. But [24:49] in the case of Nike, it's actually going [24:52] down in stock price and the valuation [24:54] staying somewhat expensive because the [24:56] earnings and the revenue are both going [24:58] down as well. For example, we look at [25:00] the revenue. This is what it looks like. [25:02] These aren't false numbers. This is [25:04] really what's going on. The revenue went [25:06] from $51 billion now down to 45. Nike is [25:09] in full-on contraction mode. While the [25:11] revenue is declining, you also have the [25:13] net income. This is going down as well. [25:15] You can see that it's jumped up at [25:16] certain times, but generally over the [25:18] past 5 years, the net income is going [25:20] down, which means the earnings per share [25:22] is going down. It's difficult for me to [25:24] want to buy a stock like Nike that is in [25:26] full-on crisis mode. They've given up a [25:28] lot of market share to very competent [25:30] competitors. The brand value of the Nike [25:33] logo and the Air Jordans is fading to a [25:36] new demographic that doesn't know Jordan [25:38] like the older demographic did. Jordan [25:40] doesn't have the same level of weight in [25:41] people's minds of of newer generations [25:43] and younger shoppers are more [25:45] experimental with the types of shoes [25:46] that they try out. So Nike is really in [25:49] a difficult spot here. The earnings per [25:51] share are going down and the stock is [25:52] still at a higher multiple trading [25:54] higher than many other alternatives like [25:56] S&P Global or Netflix or Uber. So in my [25:59] case, I much rather choose a company [26:00] that has a lower valuation and is [26:02] growing. The next turnaround play that [26:04] I've looked at over the past couple of [26:06] weeks is FICO. Now what's happened with [26:08] FICO I think is tragic and largely [26:11] unnecessary. A lot of this is [26:12] self-inflicted moves by management to [26:14] sacrifice and put their monopolistic [26:17] moat in jeopardy over short-term price [26:20] hikes and gains. Now they've made that [26:22] decision, so that's behind them. And the [26:24] stock price reflects a lot of that. So, [26:26] a lot of this bad news we've been [26:27] talking about with FICO is in the stock [26:29] today. And FICO, unlike Nike, does have [26:32] fantastic fundamentals. The margins are [26:34] super high. The revenue is growing, and [26:36] it still has a very embedded product. [26:38] So, this is one that I think is more [26:39] attractive. I think it's more [26:41] interesting. As of right now, I'm on the [26:43] fence on this one, but I'm still [26:45] deciding not to go into it. I believe [26:47] there's just too much uncertainty. It's [26:49] not predictable enough. When I look at [26:51] FICO, there's so many ways that this [26:53] company could go. First of all, I think [26:54] there's a fair chance that the CEO will [26:56] be let go over the next year. When we [26:58] look at the CEO of the company, he has [27:00] made a fortune selling FICO stock over [27:02] the past three years. He's been a seller [27:05] over and over again. You can look at so [27:07] many of these trades. Lancing William J, [27:09] that's the CEO. And as you just browse [27:11] over this, it's just multiple sales [27:14] after multiple sales. Uh he's selling at [27:16] prices of a,000,500, $2,000 per share. [27:19] Massive sales around $50 million or [27:22] more. In fact, there's some reports [27:24] showing that he's sold more than the [27:26] Nvidia CEO over the past three years in [27:28] total stockbased comp. So, he's made a [27:31] ton of money pushing prices up, jumping [27:34] the stock price of the stock, and then [27:36] selling out of it while it's at a high [27:38] price. So, I would not be surprised if [27:40] there's a big shakeup in management over [27:41] the next year. Now, moving on, we get to [27:43] an interview with Tom Lee this morning. [27:45] He comes out explaining why he believes [27:47] that the market will end higher this [27:48] year. Let's go ahead and listen. We are [27:50] in an unprecedented time because [27:52] earnings growth is accelerating. [27:54] Something that many people would find [27:56] hard to believe in their lifetime. But [27:58] even Q3 earnings are probably going to [28:00] come in at almost 30% growth. And PE [28:04] sorry EPS revisions from the start of [28:07] this year to now for 2027 earnings are [28:09] up more than 20%. And the S&P is not [28:13] even up 20%. So the the multiple [28:15] actually has come down. If someone is [28:17] thinking the market was expensive at the [28:19] start of the year, it's actually gotten [28:21] cheaper. Uh, and then I think that [28:23] ironically oil prices being high because [28:26] the US is an exporter is actually [28:28] strengthening the US economy. So I I I [28:31] know it's a very complex situation, but [28:32] to me I think there's excessive [28:34] pessimism because not only is the [28:36] earnings visibility good, but we're also [28:38] getting leadership from the stocks that [28:40] anticipate weaker inflation, which is [28:42] tech and, you know, crypto. I agree with [28:45] them. Overall, there's there's too many [28:47] people pessimistic right now. The [28:49] earnings of companies is what drives [28:50] their stock price over time. Revenue [28:52] growth and earnings growth because [28:54] revenue growth drives margins. It drives [28:56] earnings. So, when you have companies [28:58] growing their revenue, you have them [28:59] growing their earnings per share, you [29:00] have them growing their operating [29:02] margins. We see that in all of these big [29:04] companies. So, it makes sense if the EPS [29:07] of the stock market's going up that we [29:08] should have the stock price follow [29:10] eventually. Now, moving on, we get to [29:11] the fail of the week, which in this [29:13] case, I have to highlight Apple, a [29:15] company that I like. I'm an Apple [29:17] fanboy. I have a ton of their products. [29:18] I spent an enormous amount of money on [29:20] Apple, and I've made a lot of money [29:22] investing in the stock. But in this [29:24] case, I see very clearly, as someone [29:26] that has studied this company for some [29:28] time, what's going on here? Let's go [29:30] ahead and take a look at the headline. [29:32] Apple says that they're going to tighten [29:34] Mac data controls in order to guard [29:36] against AI agents. Apple said it plans [29:39] to introduce new privacy controls for [29:42] Mac users, warning of the growing risks [29:44] around granting broad data access to [29:47] thirdparty software, including [29:49] artificial intelligence agents. The [29:51] iPhone maker will introduce additional [29:53] controls to ensure that users who want [29:55] to grant the app full disk access can do [29:57] so with very explicit user action. They [30:00] said in a statement, quote, "We are [30:02] committed to ensuring that users clearly [30:04] understand these risks before granting [30:06] such access so they can make informed [30:08] decisions about their own data and [30:09] privacy." The company says, "So, Apple [30:12] is warning about legitimate concerns [30:14] here that when you have an AI agent [30:15] connect to your entire computer, [30:17] obviously there's some privacy concerns, [30:19] there's some security concerns. You [30:21] don't want to do that lightly. And if [30:23] you have anything really important that [30:24] an AI agent has access to, of course, [30:27] you're giving access to that [30:28] application." So, Apple, I think, is in [30:30] the right to be concerned about this or [30:32] to warn about this with privacy. But [30:35] there's also something going on here [30:36] that Apple knows about. Apple has a [30:39] business model of being the toll booth, [30:42] the company that owns the app store, the [30:44] most profitable platform in the world. [30:47] Did you know that Apple is the most [30:49] profitable gaming company in the world, [30:51] more profitable than Rockstar, more [30:53] profitable than any other any other [30:54] gaming company? Because Apple is the [30:56] toll booth in the app store. Everybody [30:59] that does microtransactions through that [31:01] app store pays the Apple tax. When you [31:04] look at that, it adds up to an enormous [31:06] amount of money. For example, one of my [31:08] early investment themes in Apple was [31:10] that they are going to monetize their [31:11] app store to a huge extent and the [31:13] margins of their services, primarily the [31:16] app store are way higher than the [31:17] margins of the rest of their business. [31:19] So, we look at their business overall. [31:21] You have the devices, the iPhone, uh you [31:24] have the Mac, the wearables, home [31:25] accessories, and the iPad. That makes up [31:27] the majority of it. this part here which [31:29] is the services portion of the business. [31:32] It's a smaller percentage of Apple but [31:34] makes up a disproportionately high [31:35] amount of their profits because when you [31:37] break down the actual margins between [31:39] the businesses the products which is [31:41] everything else has a gross margin of [31:43] 39%. It's still really good. So they [31:46] make a lot of money on their phones and [31:47] other devices but their services margin [31:50] is fantastic. Gross margins of 76%. [31:54] So Apple loves that digital margin. They [31:57] love being the toll booth. They love [31:59] collecting fees. Whenever there's a [32:00] transaction that goes through their app [32:02] store, that inapp payment system that [32:05] they developed, they try to get every [32:07] developer to use it. So, when you look [32:09] at what's going on here, people are [32:11] installing Agentic Systems onto the Macs [32:14] and onto their phones with their apps. [32:17] Right now, we have Muse as the new one [32:19] on the block. It is the top downloaded [32:21] app in the world in the app store. It's [32:23] dethroned ChateBT. Well, Muse is now [32:26] advertising that you have connectors [32:28] within Muse, like you can connect other [32:30] other things and institutions and [32:32] applications within Muse, different [32:34] experiences. And then Muse is also on [32:36] the Mac able to be installed and have [32:38] the full disk access and be able to do [32:41] things agentically. [32:42] Now, of course, there's security and [32:44] privacy concerns with that and those [32:46] aren't fake, but this also presents a [32:49] very unique risk to Apple. See, whenever [32:52] somebody downloads Muse, whenever they [32:54] do something through the agentic [32:56] commerce in Muse, Apple doesn't get its [32:58] cut. If I tell Muse to go out and buy [33:01] something online, it'll go out and [33:03] agentically do that and then Apple [33:05] doesn't get a dime from it. Same if I [33:07] actually make a game within the Muse [33:09] app, Apple doesn't make any money [33:11] through that game. Or if I have a [33:12] connector of a different game in it, [33:14] Apple doesn't make any money through [33:15] that. See, what Muse is doing is [33:17] creating a little economy underneath [33:20] Apple with their own app store, which [33:22] they're not able to monetize. And then [33:24] you have the same thing going on with [33:25] the Mac itself. Another opportunity [33:28] where Apple's missing out. They're not [33:30] getting their cut even though you're [33:32] doing things on their device. And Apple [33:34] likes getting a cut of things that are [33:36] done on their device. And this is [33:37] getting noticed by analysts as well. [33:39] Bank of America warns Apple investors [33:42] because of Meta's Muse. The concern [33:44] centers around who controls the [33:46] decisions once AI agents start making it [33:48] instead of users opening an app. This [33:51] analyst wrote that whoever owns the [33:53] agent collects the routing economics [33:54] that previously acred to the operating [33:57] system, search engine, and app store. He [33:59] points that Meta's Muse assistant and [34:01] its expanding list of commerce partners [34:03] including Shopify, Expedia, and PayPal [34:05] as early signs of how that model could [34:07] shift. This presents a much bigger risk [34:08] to Apple long term. Whoever owns the [34:11] Agenta capabilities is consolidating the [34:13] control of all the login, the [34:15] credentials, all the payments that go on [34:17] with every account, all the economics, [34:20] all the transactions. It becomes the hub [34:22] where everything flows no longer through [34:24] the Apple layer which Apple has [34:26] monetized. Their toll booth is being [34:28] disrupted before our eyes. Now, Apple is [34:31] of course on top of this. They think [34:32] about this type of stuff in depth and [34:35] Apple has always used safety to their [34:37] advantage. They've always used privacy [34:39] to their advantage. There's two things [34:41] that can be true at once. Apple [34:43] genuinely does care about privacy and [34:45] safety. And Apple also likes to use [34:47] privacy and safety as a feature and as a [34:49] way of restricting other forms of [34:52] economics to their benefit. And it's [34:54] clear how we could see this happen. Once [34:55] again, Apple starts by saying that these [34:57] agents are unsafe, that people shouldn't [34:59] trust them. They say that it's not the [35:01] Apple way. Uh they're they have privacy [35:03] violations. They get to know all of your [35:04] data, right? They they say that they're [35:06] really unsafe until Apple comes out with [35:08] its own solution. Once Apple has its own [35:11] integrated solution, they'll advertise [35:13] it as being the safe way, the one that [35:15] respects your privacy. It's all in-house [35:18] and they protect it in a way that the [35:19] competitors don't protect it. Apple has [35:21] routinely locked down and called unsafe [35:23] what other companies are doing when they [35:25] have no way of monetizing it. Then when [35:27] they are able to develop a way, they [35:29] have some few distinctions and then they [35:30] call their way of doing it safe, their [35:33] way of doing it privacy focused. In this [35:35] case, I don't believe it's going to work [35:36] the same. I think that Apple's really [35:38] going to struggle to consolidate the [35:40] economics like they have previously, and [35:42] that's why they are this week's fail of [35:44] the week. That's all for this episode. [35:45] Hope you enjoyed. See you in the next [35:46] one.