Draghi Overstates Transatlantic Productivity Gap, Leusder Says

勒斯德称德拉吉夸大了跨大西洋生产率差距 欧洲与美国表面上的生产率分化源于美国科技平减指数统计核算及欧洲主动选择休闲，而非经济失败，但这掩盖了欧洲面临的真正威胁：受补贴的中国工业竞争。 多米尼克·勒斯德（Dominik Leusder）指出，宣称欧洲经济停滞的流行论调（包括德拉吉报告中的核心结论）很大程度上基于统计失真，例如美国激进的享乐主义科技平减指数、极端的收入不平等以及臃肿的美国医疗支出。事实上，欧洲较低的总劳动工时反映的是高劳动生产率被转化为有价值的休闲，而非劳动力市场功能失调。然而，尽管欧洲并不需要前沿人工智能模型来维持其生活水平，其实体经济却面临来自中国在核心制造业和汽车领域工业竞争的生存威胁。受制于体制惰性、讲求共识的决策机制以及过时的新自由主义正统观念，欧洲政策制定者面临防御举措迟缓且被稀释的风险，难以应对迅速推进的外国重商主义。 马里奥·德拉吉（Mario Draghi）的竞争力报告依赖于存在缺陷的统计比较：相比欧洲的核算惯例，美国在科技领域采用的激进享乐质量调整使美国实际GDP年增长率被人为推高了0.2%至0.3%。 (15:00) 按每小时购买力平价（PPP）计算，美国相较于西欧的生产率优势完全由收入前10%的人群拉动，而美国底层50%的人群落后于除葡萄牙外所有西欧国家的同等群体。 (20:00) 美国居民消费指标严重受到私人医疗支出的扭曲，与OECD基准相比，每年过度消耗了1.7万亿至1.9万亿美元，却未带来更好的健康结果。 (23:41) 欧洲严重的经济危机并非源于在前沿人工智能发展上落后于美国，而是来自传统和高科技制造业的“第二次中国冲击”，受补贴的中国出口正在积极取代德国工业领军企业。 (40:00) 包括拟议中的《工业加速器法案》在内的欧盟防御性反制措施面临严重延误和制度碎片化，使欧洲工业暴露在中国迅速的报复性实体清单和不对称贸易压力之下。 (50:00)

Mainstream narratives of European economic decline rely on misleading statistical deflators and narrow output measures that ignore welfare and leisure, according to economist Dominik Leusder. The continent's genuine existential threat stems not from lagging behind the United States in frontier tech, but from an industrial export shock driven by China. Statistical Distortions in Transatlantic Comparisons (7:54) Alarmist narratives—such as the Mario Draghi Competitiveness Report and commentary from Jamie Dimon citing a drop in EU GDP from roughly 90% of US levels to 70%—rely on flawed methodology. Draghi's comparison uses fixed-price benchmarks and extrapolates them using national account growth rates. This approach bakes in transatlantic accounting divergences: the US Bureau of Economic Analysis applies aggressive hedonic quality adjustments to tech hardware and software, converting nominal tech spending into higher measured real growth by 0.2% to 0.3% annually. Over decades, compounding this adjustment creates an artificial statistical wedge that exaggerates real output divergence. Distributional Realities, Consumption, and Leisure (20:00) When evaluated on current-price purchasing power parity (PPP) per hour worked, the aggregate US lead is concentrated entirely in the top decile. Stripping out the richest 10% erases the US advantage against Germany and the Nordic economies, while the bottom 50% of US earners trail peers in every Western European nation except Portugal. Furthermore, Actual Individual Consumption (AIC) metrics adjust for non-cash public services like education and healthcare. In contrast, the US spends $1.7 trillion to $1.9 trillion more annually on healthcare than its wealth level would predict, absorbing 5% more of total GDP due to administrative overhead and high unit prices rather than higher utilization, leaving roughly 27 million uninsured. The Real Battlefield: Industrial Manufacturing (40:00) While media coverage focuses on generative AI, European enterprises can adequately run workflows using near-frontier models like France's Mistral AI rather than frontier US foundation models. The authentic economic crisis is localized in core manufacturing, particularly in Germany. During the initial China shock, Germany prospered by exporting capital goods to support Chinese expansion. In the current 'second China shock,' Chinese manufacturers have ascended the value chain into intermediate goods, green tech, and autos. Confronted with a domestic real estate downturn, China has leaned into subsidized net exports, depressing export prices and eroding German chemical and automotive markets. German firms have increasingly masked this shock through labor hoarding rather than structural adaptation. European Governance Paralysis and Asymmetric Escalation (45:00) European institutions have responded sluggishly, constrained by what historian Adam Tooze characterized as devotion to neoliberal non-intervention. Policymakers resisted confronting Chinese mercantilism partly because the issue had been championed by Donald Trump. When Brussels acts, internal structural fractures—such as French protectionism versus German export-lobby concerns—stall initiatives. The proposed Industrial Accelerator Act, containing local-content 'Buy European' rules, faces delays into 2027. This ponderous consensus-building contrasts with Beijing's agile retaliatory apparatus, which placed European firms on sanctions lists within 24 hours of EU actions against entities aiding the Russian war effort. Leusder anticipates the EU will likely settle for watered-down compromises rather than decisive industrial defense. Europe's high-leisure social model succeeded under a benign era of open globalization and low defense expenditures. If subsidized foreign competition strips away the industrial tax base that funds these welfare systems, and EU governance cannot mount a coherent trade response, sustaining that standard of living will become difficult.

## Background 该音频节目由彭博社（Bloomberg）于2026年10月8日发布在播客平台。节目简介指出，在德拉吉报告发布两年后，各界普遍认为欧洲正在全面落后，但经济学家兼政策分析师多米尼克·勒伊斯德（Dominik Leusder）指出该报告可能严重误判了欧洲问题的真实规模；节目围绕欧洲衰退论是否准确、欧洲是否需要前沿AI模型、如何衡量闲暇与生产率的价值，以及中欧复杂的贸易竞争关系展开深入探讨。 ## TL;DR 节目核心拆解了德拉吉报告及华尔街领袖所宣扬的“欧洲经济全面衰退”叙事，指出欧美名义GDP差距主要源于美元汇率波动、美国激进的“享乐价格调整”（Hedonic Pricing）统计幻觉，以及美国家庭在医疗寻租上的巨额过度支出。多米尼克·勒伊斯德指出，若剔除美国前10%顶层富豪的拉动并计入欧洲完备的公共服务与闲暇价值，欧洲普通阶层的实际物质福利并未落后，盲目砸钱追赶前沿AI模型也非必要之举。然而，欧洲真正的生存危机在于以德国为核心的实体制造业正遭到中国高端制造外溢与产能出口的猛烈挤压，化工和汽车等支柱产业量价齐跌。雪上加霜的是，欧洲政策界长期死守新自由主义开放教条、因党派偏见迟迟不愿直面贸易现实，并深陷布鲁塞尔27国互相制约的“联合决策陷阱”，导致产业防御措施迟缓且力度羸弱。 ## Atmosphere & style 对谈整体洋溢着智性交锋的敏锐与反思批判的锐度，彭博终端弹出宝马裁员快讯的开场巧合更为整场对话增添了极强的现实戏剧感。主持人乔·维森塔尔与特蕾西·阿洛韦的互动轻松幽默且针针见血，与勒伊斯德严密沉稳、直击底层统计逻辑的硬核宏观剖析相得益彰。讨论从前期打破数据神话、探讨“美酒午餐与闲暇价值”的从容松弛，逐步转向直面德国去工业化与布鲁塞尔政策瘫痪的冷峻现实，生动呈现出一种兼具学术推演乐趣与地缘危机压迫感的复杂听感体验。 ## Bulletin - `10:00` 德拉吉报告中“欧洲每工时生产率自 1995 年跌至美国 70% 至 85%”的核心结论存在严重统计口径偏差：固定基期 PPP 外推与美国激进的享乐质量调整（Hedonic Quality Adjustment）人为放大了美国的实际 GDP 读数。 - `20:00` 若改用实际个人消费（AIC）并剔除顶层 10% 群体，美国普通家庭每工时物质福利并未显著领先西欧，且美国底层 50% 人口的实际境况落后于除葡萄牙外的几乎所有欧洲国家。 - `25:00` 美国庞大的医疗寻租体系每年产生 1.7 万亿至 1.9 万亿美元的超额支出，GDP 占比高出欧洲 5 个百分点，却在人均预期寿命和关键健康产出上表现落后。 - `42:47` 德国制造业正遭遇深层危机：德国传统化工出口量价齐跌，企业被迫“囤积劳动力”，同时面临中国依托制造业补贴和低价出口抢占第三国及双边市场的猛烈挤压。 - `47:30` 欧盟应对外部冲击的《工业加速器法案》因 27 国“联合决策陷阱”进展缓慢，且欧洲升级贸易对抗的政治意愿远超自身承受对等报复的实际韧性。 ## Key takeaways - `00:00` 逆向视角认为欧洲面对劳动力短缺和高成本劣势，最有动力利用 AI 提升单位工时产出，宝马计划裁减五分之一管理层职位即是传统企业降本增效的体现。 - `05:00` 欧洲的科技核心诉求应是保障“技术主权”而非盲目竞逐前沿大模型，像 Mistral 这样的次前沿模型已足以为欧洲企业赋能，尽管其仍受制于算力短缺和对外部开源权重的依赖。 - `05:00` 主流舆论将总量产出或生产商规模直接等同于社会福利，忽视了欧洲在公共医疗、闲暇保障和整体社会安全网方面的真实生活水平。 - `10:00` 德拉吉报告对生产率断崖式下滑的诊断存在方法学缺陷，缺乏充分的实证数据证明欧洲生产率经历了如此剧烈的系统性崩溃。 - `15:00` 跨期名义 GDP 对比被强美元汇率周期扭曲，同时忽视了欧洲工时缩短是社会主动将生产率红利置换为闲暇的制度性选择。 - `20:00` 美国经济分析局（BEA）采用的享乐价格调整将计算机性能提升折算为物价暴跌，年均虚增美国约 0.2% 至 0.3% 的实际增长率，通过复利效应人为拉大了欧美差距。 - `25:00` 美国的高消费数据在很大程度上被高昂的非贸易品价格所扭曲，其根源是医疗等行业的监管俘获与寻租网络，而非健康的巴拉萨-萨缪尔森生产率外溢效应。 - `30:00` 在宏观经济学中劳动的本质是负效用、闲暇的时间价值大于零；欧洲通过缩短工时提升了整体综合效用，不能简单将休假文化贬低为“自我欺骗”。 - `37:05` 欧洲当下最严峻的外部竞争并非来自美国的前沿软件，而是依然维系高度开放的欧盟市场直面中国在高端制造业和货物贸易上的直接交锋。 - `40:00` 中德贸易格局从互补转为剧烈竞争：中国工业体系向高端跃升并大量吸收德国工业技术，叠加国内房地产泡沫破裂后的出口依赖，对德国实体工业造成严重冲击。 - `42:47` 德国化工行业名义就业降幅温和掩盖了招工难导致的“劳动力囤积”，实物贸易量数据显示德国正全面失守核心海外客户市场。 - `45:00` 欧洲长期受制于“新自由主义教条”以及对特朗普关税政策的党派偏见，导致政策界迟迟未能正视并反制全球贸易环境的重商主义剧变。 - `47:30` 欧盟跨政府决策架构深陷“联合决策陷阱”，各成员国利益分歧与否决权机制导致保护主义反制措施行动迟缓且力度被大幅稀释。 - `50:00` 中欧磋商收效甚微，中国快速且高度制度化的对等实体清单反制能力，令缺乏承受韧性的欧盟在贸易博弈中处于明显被动状态。 - `55:00` 欧洲高福利与闲暇模式深层依赖实体工业巨头的造血能力；若制造业支柱被掏空，欧洲赖以自豪的闲暇社会模式将面临难以为继的系统性风险。 ## Detailed walkthrough ### `00:00` 录制背景与宝马裁员新闻的巧合 节目开场，主持人 Joe Weisenthal 与 Tracy Allaway 提到，在许多关于全球宏观经济、国际贸易或人工智能（AI）的讨论中，欧洲似乎总是处于劣势，普遍被认为成了“拿到最糟糕一手牌”的落后者。然而 Tracy 提出了一种逆向视角：如果一个人真正看好 AI 提升全要素生产率的潜力，那么逻辑上就必须看好欧洲。因为放眼全球，可能没有任何一个地区比欧洲更有动力去压榨出“每工时多一盎司的产出”（output per work hour），以抵消劳动力短缺和高成本劣势。因此，如果 AI 的生产力红利能够广泛扩散到各国产业中，欧洲理应是最具吸引力的试验场。 就在 Tracy 刚说完这句话的瞬间，彭博终端机突然弹出了醒目的红色快讯头条：“宝马（BMW）计划借助人工智能削减五分之一的管理层职位”。这极其戏剧性且精准地呼应了他们的开场白。Joe 笑着表示这一巧合简直不可思议：一方面，欧洲的老牌工业巨头确实在试图利用 AI 变得更加精简、消除管理冗余；但另一方面，这也引发了更深层的忧虑——仅仅借助 AI 适度裁员，真的能够让深陷高成本泥潭的欧洲传统车企抵挡住中国电动车企业的猛烈竞争吗？ ### `05:00` 欧洲的生存危机感与关于竞争力的叙事偏差 除了汽车产业的生存压力，欧洲面对国际竞争对手（特别是中国）的焦虑正在迅速升温。本期节目录制于 9 月 30 日，当时欧盟正酝酿对中国新能源产品采取更多反制措施。Joe 回忆道，就在五到十年前，德国化工与汽车制造业等工业支柱还处于巅峰状态；而如今，从特朗普第一任期、拜登时期的《通胀削减法案》（IRA）引发欧欧摩擦，再到如今针对中国制造业外溢效应的普遍恐慌，原本属于美国的贸易对抗叙事已完全扩散至欧洲，且演变成了关乎自身工业存亡的真实危机感。 为了深入剖析这些争议，本期邀请了经济学者、政策分析师、伦敦政治经济学院（LSE）前研究员以及 Substack 专栏《Leusder of Last Resort》的作者 Dominik Leusder。针对“AI 是否会拯救欧洲”的问题，Dominik 给出了审慎且务实的评估：欧洲在过去几十年中即便从未主导前沿科技创新，但欧洲消费者与企业依然享受了技术红利带来的更低物价与服务成本。在当前的 AI 浪潮中，欧洲短时间内几乎不可能开发出前沿基模型（frontier model），实际上欧洲也“不应该盲目去卷前沿模型”。欧洲的真正优先级应当是技术主权（tech sovereignty）——避免在底层技术栈上彻底受制于美国或中国，同时聚焦于满足欧洲本土企业的实际商业需求。现实中，像 Mistral 这样的“次前沿模型”（near-frontier models）已经完全能满足绝大多数欧洲企业的业务流程，但 Mistral 由于缺乏本土算力支撑，在模型微调与架构上大量依赖中国开源模型的底层权重，这也暴露了欧洲深层的供应链与算力依赖软肋。 谈及欧洲无处不在的“衰退焦虑”，尤其是马里奥·德拉吉（Mario Draghi）于 2024 年底发布的《欧洲竞争力报告》（Draghi Report），以及摩根大通 CEO 杰米·戴蒙（Jamie Dimon）等华尔街领袖常挂在嘴边的论调（即“十到十五年前欧洲 GDP 相当于美国的 90%，如今已缩水至约 70%，因此欧洲彻底输了”），Dominik 明确指出这些流行叙事存在根本性误区： - **生产商中心主义视角的局限**：主流叙事将“竞争力”单纯等同于总量产出或头部企业的生产规模，并错误地将这种指标与未来的社会总体福利（welfare）划上等号。 - **福利评估维度的忽视**：欧洲社会的整体福利、闲暇时间、公共服务与生活质量并未简单跟随名义 GDP 差距的扩大而崩塌；以美国式的绝对产出规模来丈量欧洲经济的健康程度，在逻辑上存在严重扭曲。 ### `10:00` 德拉吉报告的悲观叙事：欧洲生产率真在断崖式下滑吗？ 欧洲经济正在陷入相对衰落的共识几乎无处不在。2024 年底，由前欧洲央行行长、欧元区危机时期的关键人物马里奥·德拉吉（Mario Draghi）牵头撰写的重磅竞争力报告正式发布。德拉吉的核心论点直截了当且极具警示意味：如果以每小时劳动生产率（即每小时 GDP）来衡量，欧洲若无法跟上美国的步伐，其物质生活水平相较于美国势必持续缩水，欧洲引以为傲的社会福利模式最终也将难以为继。德拉吉开出的药方赢得了广泛赞同，包括打破欧盟内部贸易、资本与信贷的壁垒，大幅提振与美国相比严重不足的资本投资，并全力扭转欧洲在高科技行业、尤其是人工智能（AI）热潮中的掉队局面。 然而，经济学家兼政策分析师多米尼克·勒伊斯德（Dominik Leusder）指出，支撑德拉吉整套警示逻辑的核心数据基础其实存在严重硬伤。德拉吉报告中最抓人眼球的论据在于：自 1995 年美国科技繁荣拉开序幕以来，按购买力平价（PPP）计算的欧洲对美每小时 GDP 比例，已经从最初的 90% 以上暴跌至当下的 70% 至 85%（具体取决于统计口径）。这一断崖式下跌的趋势线被普遍视为欧洲经济不可逆转衰败的铁证。但勒伊斯德认为，即便承认欧洲近年来的实际经济增长不及美国，也绝没有充分的实证数据能够证明欧洲的生产率水平真的经历了如此陡峭的滑坡。 - **德拉吉报告核心诉求**：清除欧盟内部商品、资本与信贷流动的制度障碍；弥补欧洲与美国之间巨大的资本投资缺口；在由技术和 AI 主导的新经济增长周期中抢占阵地。 - **核心论据与争议**：报告以 1995 年为分水岭，认定欧洲相对美国的劳动生产率比率从 90% 多跌至 70%~85%，并以此论证欧洲经济正在步入系统性恶化通道。 --- ### `15:00` 汇率、工时与享乐定价：欧美 GDP 对比背后的统计幻觉 面对华尔街巨头如杰米·戴蒙（Jamie Dimon）以及网络舆论频繁引用的“欧洲经济体量相对美国大幅缩水”论调，勒伊斯德系统拆解了跨国宏观经济对比中极其容易被误读的技术陷阱。首先，单纯拿基于市场汇率的名义美元 GDP 进行跨期对比毫无实质意义，因为这反映的主要是美元汇率周期的周期性升值与波动，而非实体经济的真实产出能力。其次，必须剥离工作时间的制度性差异——欧洲人工作总时长较少并非因为失业，而是欧洲社会在劳动参与率保持稳定的前提下，主动通过政治与立法手段选择将一部分生产率红利用于换取休闲时间；而美国对法定工时没有任何硬性上限。 更为致命的数据扭曲发生在这类研究对购买力平价（PPP）指标的错误调用上。世界银行构建的国际元 PPP 本意是用于跨期跨国平抑价格水平差异，但德拉吉报告却采取了一种业内公认存在重大缺陷的做法：将价格固定在某一个基期年份（如 2010 年不变国际美元），随后直接套用欧美各国国民经济核算体系中公布的“实际 GDP 增速”进行逐年外推。这一算法直接放大了欧美统计机构在通胀平减方法上的巨大分歧——美国经济分析局（BEA）在科技与 IT 领域极其激进地采用“享乐价格调整”（Hedonic Quality Adjustment），而欧洲则相对传统。 勒伊斯德举了一个切近的例子：如果他手头正在使用的 MacBook 电脑在硬件性能翻倍的情况下名义售价保持不变，美国统计局便会认定该产品的质量调整后价格大幅暴跌，进而将这笔完全相同的名义消费支出核算为庞大的“实际 GDP”增长；反观欧洲，同样的硬件消费在统计上却无法换来同等规模的实际增长读数。当德拉吉报告用两套底色完全不同的实际增速去外推固定基期的 PPP 时，便在图表上机械地制造出一条“欧洲生产率相对美国急剧落后”的统计幻觉。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 欧美实际GDP计算差异流程图 accDescr: 展示名义科技支出如何通过不同的质量调整方法导致美欧实际GDP测算出现统计幻觉 subgraph US["美国统计局 (BEA)"] A1["名义科技支出 (如电脑/电子设备)"] --> B1["激进的享乐质量调整 (Hedonic Adjustment)"] B1 --> C1["折算物价大幅下降"] C1 --> D1["核算出的'实际GDP增速'被大幅放大"] end subgraph EU["欧洲统计机构"] A2["同等名义科技支出"] --> B2["传统/保守的物价平减方式"] B2 --> C2["折算物价降幅温和"] C2 --> D2["核算出的'实际GDP增速'读数平缓"] end subgraph Extrapolation["德拉吉报告的方法学陷阱"] D1 & D2 --> E["锁定2010年固定基期PPP"] E --> F["直接代入欧美官方公布的实际增速进行逐年跨期外推"] F --> G["图表上被动呈现欧洲劳动生产率断崖式下行的假象"] end ``` - **名义汇率失真**：杰米·戴蒙等人引用的欧美名义 GDP 占比变化，实质上大量混杂了强美元周期的汇率估值效应，与真实产能脱节。 - **工时差异的本质**：欧洲的人均工作时长缩短属于社会福利取向的制度选择，并非就业率不足；若不剔除工时影响，单纯计算人均总量就会系统性低估欧洲劳动生产效率。 - **基期外推缺陷**：德拉吉报告使用 2010 年固定国际美元并以各国官方实际增速进行时间序列外推，未能采用反映欧美真实相对通胀率的动态平减方法。 - **享乐价格调整（Hedonic Pricing）的放大效应**：美国统计机构将计算机算力、内存等性能提升视作物价下降，使得相同名义的科技支出在美国自动转化为更高的实际 GDP 增长率，从而人为拉大了欧美两者之间的数据鸿沟。 ### `20:00` 统计平减指数的偏差与美欧财富分配的真实图景 针对美欧之间的经济差距，多项研究表明，仅仅是信息通信技术部门平减指数（Deflator）计算方式的激进程度差异，就可能导致美国每年虚增约 0.2% 至 0.3% 的实际增长率。这种统计口径上的微小差异经过逐年复合累积，便在欧盟与美国之间撕开了一条巨大的账面差距鸿沟。这一鸿沟在很大程度上纯属统计方法使然，而非底层经济生产率的真实分野。围绕这一议题，保罗·克鲁格曼（Paul Krugman）等学者与欧洲经济学家展开了激烈交锋，焦点在于欧洲是否应该推行激进改革以向美国看齐——包括放宽劳工监管、削减福利开支，并全力鼓励科技初创企业的大额投资与支出。 针对特蕾西（Tracy Alloway）提出的“政治抉择与比较口径不匹配”问题——即美国在政治上倾向于延长工时，而欧洲则选择将生产率提升转化为闲暇时光（例如午餐时多喝一杯葡萄酒），多米尼克·勒斯德（Dominik Leusder）指出，无论是德拉吉报告（Draghi Report）还是其他学者所包装出的“欧洲衰退”这一所谓确凿的经验事实（Stylized fact），在严谨的经济数据层面根本立不住脚。如果采用基于当期价格的购买力平价（PPP）来对比 2024 年美欧每小时工时的 GDP 水平，美国确实略微领先于西欧整体水平；然而，一旦剔除收入分配顶层的 10%，美国的这一微弱优势便荡然无存。数据清晰地显示，美国是一个极度偏向顶层的社会：其底层 50% 人口的实际境况，比除葡萄牙之外的任何一个欧洲国家都要差得多。 为了更客观地衡量民众的真实物质福利，勒斯德主张采用“实际个人消费”（Actual Individual Consumption, AIC）而非极易失真且统计口径不一的收入指标。实际个人消费涵盖了实物福利，能够将欧洲庞大的福利国家体系、健全的社会保障以及免费或低价公共医疗等公共品供给完整计入在内，从而在统计上剔除美欧因政治制度选择不同而造成的扭曲。如果将这一指标再按工作时长进行平减调整，美国所谓的领先地位立刻变得“平平无奇”（unremarkable）。 - 统计口径平减差异：ICT 部门平减指数的统计差异每年可能带来 0.2% 到 0.3% 的增长偏差，长期复利效应放大了美国的相对表现。 - 顶层拉动效应：排除收入最高的 10% 群体后，美国在人均每工时产出上对西欧发达经济体的领先优势完全消失。 - 底层境况悬殊：根据经购买力平价与工时调整后的分配数据，美国底层 50% 人口的物质福利水准落后于绝大多数欧洲国家。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 美欧经济与福利衡量指标对比 accDescr: 对比传统 GDP 增长率与考虑闲暇及公共品供给后的实际个人消费指标差异 subgraph 传统宏观视角["宏观账面视角（被扭曲）"] A["名义增长与激进平减指数"] --> B["账面实际 GDP 差距扩大"] B --> C["形成'欧洲落后/衰败'叙事"] end subgraph 真实福利视角["底层分配与真实福利视角"] D["实际个人消费 (AIC)"] --> E["计入公共医疗与实物福利"] E --> F["扣除工作时长调整"] F --> G["剔除前 10% 顶层群体"] G --> H["美欧普通阶层水平相当<br/>美国底层 50% 明显更弱"] end ``` --- ### `25:00` 医疗黑洞与寻租经济：美国家庭消费虚高的根源 当深入剖析美国的消费数据时，一个极其畸形的结构性扭曲浮出水面——那就是医疗卫生支出。美国是主要发达经济体中唯一缺乏全民公立医保体系的国家。尽管阿罗（Kenneth Arrow）等美国经济学家早在数十年前就证明，单纯依赖精算或私人商业保险在医疗领域注定失效，并必然导致天价成本与服务供给匮乏，但美国至今仍深陷其中。美国医疗支出占 GDP 的比重比绝大多数欧洲国家高出至少 5 个百分点；若根据一个国家的富裕程度建立消费回归模型，美国实际的医疗消费比按其收入水平预测的标准高出了惊人的 50%。 这笔“多余支出”每年在宏观上达到 1.7 万亿至 1.9 万亿美元之巨。勒斯德引用普林斯顿大学著名卫生经济学家乌韦·赖因哈特（Uwe Reinhardt）的经典论断指出，美欧医疗差距的核心在于“价格，完全是因为价格”（It's the prices, stupid）：美国每单位医疗服务的标价高得离谱，但医疗服务利用率却相当糟糕，若考察预期寿命与主要手术死亡率等关键指标，美国的实际产出反而更差。这种由医院集团、商业保险巨头、医药行业协会及庞大行政层层截留利润构成的政治经济寻租网络，让顶层 10% 到 20% 的群体赚得盆满钵满，却给广大民众造成沉重灾难，约 2700 万无保险人群更是面临着天文数字般的自费负担。 针对某些经济学家提出“高昂的非贸易品价格反映了科技部门生产率外溢导致的高工资套利（巴拉萨-萨缪尔森效应）”这一观点，勒斯德予以坚决反驳。他强调，大量实证证据表明，美国非贸易品领域的极高物价并非健康的劳动要素竞争结果，而是赤裸裸的寻租行为（Rent seeking）和监管俘获（Regulatory capture）的产物。乔（Joe Weisenthal）对此感叹道，考虑到美国的医疗与医保体制是如此荒谬沉重的“信天翁”（Albatross），美国其他经济部门在背负着如此巨大的内部寻租包袱下依然能维持运转，反而更令人感到不可思议。 - 医疗支出残差巨额超标：美国每年在医疗上的支出比同等收入水平国家的预期值高出 1.7 万亿至 1.9 万亿美元。 - GDP 占比悬殊：美国医疗支出占 GDP 比例比多数欧洲国家至少高出 5 个百分点，但人均预期寿命等产出指标显著落后。 - 寻租与监管俘获：高达 2700 万的无医保人口与巨额自费账单，构成了非贸易品服务业顶层寻租和中间商抽成机制的直接代价。 ### `30:00` 闲暇是经济福利还是“自我欺骗”？ 主持人引发了一场经典辩论：美国商界领袖（例如杰米·戴蒙这类典型人物）常常抨击欧洲人必须戒掉“喝着红酒吃漫长午餐”的习惯、延长工作时长；而像多米尼克·勒斯德（Dominik Leusder）这类经济学家则反驳称，欧洲人的实际单位生产率即便不能完全超越、也已经非常接近美国，他们只是理性地将高生产率转化为了闲暇时间与生活品质。但主持人提出了尖锐的质疑：这种说法会不会只是一种“精英阶层的借口（cope）”？媒体与金融圈的人接触到的多是 8 月能休长假的高管和精英人脉，普通欧洲中产阶级是否真的普遍享有比美国同行多得多的闲暇？ 多米尼克解释道，虽然数据存在需要注意的附带条件（asterisks）——例如在西班牙和意大利，存在大量未被官方总体数据统计到的非正式工作时间（informal hours），但经过调整后的测算显示，这并不会从根本上颠覆欧洲经济主体的整体图景。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: European Productivity and Leisure Dynamics accDescr: A flowchart depicting the relationship between productivity, working hours, and economic utility in Europe. subgraph CoreMech["基础经济学机制 (Econ 101)"] direction TB A["高时薪与单位生产率提升"] -->|"替代效应与闲暇偏好"| B["年均工作时长显著下降"] B -->|"边际效用递减减少"| A end subgraph Welfare["真实经济福利结果"] direction TB B --> C["闲暇效用价值 > 0 (劳动作为负效用)"] C --> D["按综合福利计算：西欧整体富裕程度极具竞争力"] end CoreMech --> Welfare ``` - **工作时长的实质减少**：在西北欧、低地国家（比荷卢）及北欧等较富裕地区，人们的平均工作时长的确大幅低于美国，且就业率并未因此崩溃；这排除了“人们找不到工作或因边际回报递减而放弃就业的劳动力市场失灵”假说。 - **替代效应与因果机制**：参与德拉吉报告（Draghi report）长期生产率数据编制的学者们指出，生产率的提高促使工作时间缩短，而工作时长的缩短反过来又强化了单位时间的产出效率。 - **宏观经济学基础（Econ 101）**：劳动在经济学上本身是一种负效用（disutility），闲暇的时间价值必然大于零。若将闲暇弃之不顾，就违背了基本宏观原理。从综合福利来看，西欧在总量上的实际富裕程度甚至可能略优于美国，尽管过去六七年相对优势有所收窄。 - **内部区域差异与类比**：欧洲内部的失衡极为严重（例如意大利南部过去 20 年在绝对意义上持续萎缩贫困，是 G7 经济体中罕见的长期停滞案例）。但多米尼克认为，将欧盟作为一个整体同美国对比时，不能用内部差距去否定整体，就像外界不会因为加利福尼亚州的增长长期甩开密歇根州，就断定整个美国经济陷入衰退一样。 ### `37:05` 地缘政治变局下的欧洲竞争力与产业现实 话题随后转向新现实下的地缘政治与产业安全压力：过去欧洲或许可以安然享受不站在前沿技术浪潮最前端的生活，但在全球供应链面临掐脖子瓶颈（chokepoints）、欧洲本土安全危机重燃的当下，重建国防工业、保障资源安全与推进再工业化是否要求欧洲必须重新在乎“相对技术优势”与“前沿前沿大模型”的发展？ 多米尼克赞同相对竞争地位的重要性，认为欧洲在特定行业的技术落后确实会传导至长期的就业结构与生产率前景。但关于欧美之间的竞争叙事，讨论的“球门标杆”经常被随意挪动：当数据显示购买力平价（PPP）或实际经济增长并未落后时，反驳者便改口宣称“欧洲正在将未来拱手让人，将彻底错过技术红利”。 - **制造与商品贸易的真正底盘**：尽管美国在科技平台与制药领域拥有结构性优势，但欧盟在高端制造业和货物进出口方面仍具有极强的基本盘。 - **全球开放度的对比**：与持续筑起关税壁垒的美国不同，欧盟目前仍是全球维持高度开放的最大经济板块，未全面实行惩罚性关税。 - **关键竞争对手的转移**：由于这一开放特征，欧洲当下最严峻的竞争压力和战略挑战并非直接来自美国，而是来自与中国在制造业与进出口市场上的全面交锋。 ### `40:00` 制造业新现实：从“中国红利”到德国工业的剧烈受挫 虽然生成式人工智能的前沿大模型占据了当下的资本支出头条，但欧洲企业完全可以依靠次前沿模型来满足绝大多数实际需求；欧洲真正的命脉和竞争死穴，依然在于传统及高科技制造业。这些产业在欧洲工业增加值中占据庞大比重，尤其对于作为欧洲经济引擎的德国而言更是如此。然而眼下，德国正在经历一场堪称“无序倒退”的工业就业危机。 回顾历史，最初的“第一次中国冲击”对德国实际上是重大利好：中国推进工业化，渴求先进的高端制造机械与装备，德国顺理成章地成为最大受益者。然而如今攻守之势彻底逆转。中国不仅坚守着制造业中低端环节，更全力向产业链高端攀升。更关键的是，无论通过合法还是非正规渠道，流入中国的知识产权中占比最大的正是德国技术。雪上加霜的是，中国在房地产泡沫破裂后面临国内通缩与出口价格下行压力，转而进一步强化了对制造业的庞大补贴网络。在内需受限、零工经济吸纳大量劳动力的背景下，中国经济增长极度依赖净出口，这一现状也直接转化为对中欧工业核心区的猛烈冲击。 - **净出口依赖度**：学者布拉德·塞策（Brad Setzer）的实证测算显示，中国GDP增长中依赖净出口拉动的比例可能已超过一半。 - **德国制造业双重打击**：自2021年中国产业政策剧烈转向以来，德国制造业岗位流失严重，这一转折点恰与欧洲自身灾难性的能源危机完全重叠。 - **知识产权外流**：欧洲流向中国的工业IP中，德国占据了绝大多数份额。 --- ### `42:47` 隐性危机与劳动力囤积：化工巨头的表面平静 表面上的就业统计数据实际上掩盖了这场冲击的真实惨烈程度。以德国工业“皇冠上的明珠”——化学工业为例，在德国五大核心制造门类中，化工行业直面能源危机高企与中国产能过剩的双重夹击，但其纸面上的就业岗位降幅反而是最温和的。这种看似稳定的表象，背后实则是严重扭曲的劳动力市场。由于极度缺乏合格的技术工人，化工企业即便开工不足也在拼命“囤积劳动力”（labor hoarding），生怕裁员后无法再招到人。 然而从贸易实物量来看，底层危机已经彻底暴露。虽然由于缺乏适宜的价格平减指数，外界很难直接获取中国出口的实际物理体量数据，但跨国贸易动态呈现出极为惊险的结构性分化： ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 中德化工出口与贸易流向分化机制 accDescr: 展示能源成本冲击与中国产能输出对德国传统化工市场的挤压路径 subgraph CostShock["外部成本与内需冲击"] Energy["欧洲能源危机<br/>生产成本暴涨"] Subsidy["中国产能补贴<br/>内需不足转战出口"] end subgraph TradeShift["贸易格局分化"] ChinaExp["中国化工出口：<br/>贸易额受压，出口体量剧增"] GerExp["德国化工出口：<br/>贸易额与出口体量全面暴跌"] end subgraph GlobalMarket["第三国与双边市场"] ThirdParty["德国传统核心出口目的地<br/>（遭中国高性价比产品替代）"] Bilateral["中欧双边贸易：<br/>欧洲对华出口萎缩，自华进口暴增"] end Energy --> GerExp Subsidy --> ChinaExp ChinaExp -->|"抢占市场份额"| ThirdParty GerExp -.->|"出口份额失守"| ThirdParty ChinaExp --> Bilateral ``` - **贸易额与实物量背离**：中德两国的化工出口名义总额均呈显著下降趋势，但背后原因截然不同——德国是量价齐跌，而中国则是在出口单价走低的同时，向全球倾泻了体量剧增的化工实物产品。 - **传统出口目的地失守**：在德国以往的核心海外客户市场中，来自中国的化工产品大幅替代了德国本土供给；与此同时，中国对德国和欧洲化工产品的进口断崖式下滑，自中国输入欧洲的品类却在持续激增。 --- ### `45:00` 全员“纳瓦罗化”与欧洲的新自由主义教条 全球贸易理念与十年前相比发生了颠覆性的位移。若将当下的贸易部长对话与2016年甚至2017年进行对比，反差尤为刺眼。在特朗普入主白宫早期，彼得·纳瓦罗（Peter Navarro）及其合著的《致命中国》（*Death by China*）被建制派精英普遍视为边缘异端、彻头彻尾的怪人；而到了今天，无论欧美，整个政策界在底色上仿佛都变成了纳瓦罗主义者，区别仅在于建制派会用更加体面、专业的外交与经济学术语重新包装这一叙事。 欧洲对这一现实的觉醒尤为迟缓。一方面，正因为这一反思最初是由特朗普阵营强行推开的政治议题，反而让许多欧洲精英在党派偏见下对其避之不及，导致中国在2010年代末和2020年代加速转向重商主义的实证证据在很长一段时间内被选择性无视。另一方面，欧洲自身在贸易思维上深深陷入过去。正如历史学家亚当·图兹（Adam Tooze）的尖锐评价，欧洲人在贸易观念上堪称“新自由主义的塔利班”，死抱绝对开放与自由贸易教条不放，这种顽固偏执严重拖延了任何实质性反制举措的出台。 - **共识推手的努力**：布拉德·塞策与桑德·托多瓦（Sander Tordoir）等学者在过去18个月里几乎是凭借一己之力，在德国及欧洲打破了“国际贸易依然存在平坦竞技场”的幻想。 - **极右翼的政治收割**：面对无序的去工业化，德国地方选举中极右翼势力势如破竹，执政联盟选情惨淡。极右翼策略性地将工业衰退归咎于执政党的无能以及激进的绿色能源转型，掩盖了更具破坏性的外部贸易冲击，从而成功攫取了受损选民的基本盘。 --- ### `47:30` 迟缓的应对与布鲁塞尔的“联合决策陷阱” 面对汹涌的工业危机，欧洲并非完全无动于衷，但其决策体系的低效让所有反制措施显得疲软而拖沓。目前欧盟应对中国贸易冲击的核心法案是《工业加速器法案》（Industrial Accelerator Act）。该法案早在年初便已提出，但经历了漫长的审查流程，预估最快也要到次年中期才能落地推行，这本身就赤裸裸地暴露了欧洲体制的时间跨度与全球产业竞争节奏的严重脱节。 更深层的阻碍在于欧洲体制特有的政治内耗。与行动敏捷的美国或高度集权的中国完全不同，欧洲深陷典型的“联合决策陷阱”（Joint Decision Trap）： - **阵营割裂**：以法国为代表的阵营倾向于推行更直接的产业保护主义，而以德国为代表的一方起初则抱持强烈怀疑态度。德国本土根深蒂固的外向型出口利益集团极其保守，极度抗拒任何可能招致贸易报复的限制性举措，甚至德国工会内部对此也充满分歧。 - **否决权瘫痪机制**：在欧盟跨政府的层面上，27个各怀心思、彼此提防的成员国各自握有不同议题的否决权。无论是在要求全体一致同意的环节，还是在特定多数表决程序中，无休止的协商博弈与利益妥协最终催生出的只能是妥协度极高、成效极为有限的次优政策产物。 ### `50:00` 欧盟政策的迟缓与中欧贸易博弈的失衡 多米尼克·洛伊斯德（Dominik Leusder）指出，欧洲的政策响应机制往往陷入“行动过迟且力度过小”（too little too late）的困境。面对紧迫的外部挑战，欧洲各机构的决策不仅迟缓而功能失调，而且最终出台的往往是屈从于“最低共同利益标准”（lowest common denominator）的妥协产物。虽然提议中的《工业加速法案》（Industrial Accelerator Act）包含“购买欧洲货”（Buy European）条款，试图通过量身定制的门槛限制进口，从而保护德国乃至整个欧洲的汽车市场（尤其是将靶子对准唯一能够越过这些竞争门槛的中国制造业），但中国方面立刻做出了强硬反击。中国不仅直接向欧盟委员会提出申诉，还详细阐述了自己的立场，反问欧盟：“你们在干什么？我们国内的产能利用率对于一个仍处于增长期且正在向内需驱动转型的经济体而言是完全正常的。”洛伊斯德认为，这在某种程度上算是一种承认，即中国高层确实意识到了国内的宏观失衡并视其为切实的问题，但这种向内需的结构性转型本身就面临巨大的政治经济学阻力。 在解决分歧的外交渠道方面，中欧之间设有“贸易与投资磋商机制”（Trade and Investment Consultation Mechanism），由欧盟贸易专员与中国对口官员直接牵头。尽管原本期望能在近期取得突破（如 10 月初在北京举行的会议），但最终几乎没有形成实质性成果，仅在稀土供应方面获得了一些含糊其辞的保证，这让欧洲方面相当失望；而法德两国关于监测这些宏观失衡的联合动议同样收效甚微。更棘手的问题还在于汇率机制——正如布拉德·塞策（Brad Setser）与沙辛·瓦莱（Shahin Vallée）所撰文指出的，中国除了推行积极的产业政策外，还在极力遏制人民币升值，这种汇率偏好进一步加剧了中欧之间的贸易失衡。虽然欧洲内部正慢慢讨论应对人民币汇率问题的措施，但洛伊斯德极其担忧：从战略层面来看，欧洲升级贸易对抗的意愿，远远超出了自身承受中国报复的实际韧性。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 中欧贸易博弈互动流程图 accDescr: 展现欧盟行动、中国反应以及预期的未来走向 subgraph 欧盟困境 A["决策机制迟缓<br/>低效妥协产物"] --> B["推行保护政策<br/>(工业加速法案/制裁)"] end subgraph 中国反制 B --> C["制度化、快速、全面报复<br/>(对等实体清单反制)"] end subgraph 预期结局 C --> D{"未来可能走向"} D -->|"极可能基线"| E["欧盟妥协接纳微小让步<br/>无法改变工业外移趋势"] D -->|"最坏情形"| F["全面爆发贸易战"] end ``` 事实证明，中国的报复机制高度制度化、反应迅速且打击范围极为广泛。例如，7 月底欧盟刚将几家涉嫌支持俄罗斯的中国实体列入制裁清单，中国次日就针锋相对地将一系列欧洲核心工业巨头列入了相应的实体清单中，而欧洲根本不具备这种精准而强硬的对抗能力。洛伊斯德预测了两种未来走向： - **基线情景（相对乐观的妥协）**：欧盟最终在次年出台某种半生不熟的措施，迫于对出口增长的依赖以及欧洲作为唯一完全开放大市场的地位，中国可能会给予某种象征性的让步。然而，这种微小的让步根本无法扭转欧洲工业活动外移的大趋势；但受制于内部 27 国无法达成更强硬的共识，欧盟最终只能无奈接受。 - **最恶劣情景**：双方反制措施失控，演变为全面的“全面贸易战”（full-blown trade war）。 主持人乔·维森塔尔（Joe Weisenthal）总结道，关于欧洲内部这 27 个“彼此看不顺眼”、各自利益与中欧截然不同的成员国政府，还能展开无限深度的讨论，但多米尼克对欧洲经济竞争力的剖析提供了一个极具全局视角的框架。 ### `55:00` 闲暇的价值、硅谷的狂热与新自由主义的黄昏 在嘉宾离线后，特蕾西·阿洛韦（Tracy Alloway）和乔·维森塔尔就讨论的核心观点展开了复盘。特蕾西特别赞赏多米尼克在节目中展现出的真实复杂性与细微层次（nuance），尤其是那句点睛之笔——**“我休闲的价值大于零”（the value of my leisure is above zero）**。乔也对此深表赞同，认为一旦将“闲暇是有价值的”作为经济分析的前提，欧洲与美国的经济决策差异就呈现出完全不同的意义：追求极高的生产力和积累财富，其终极目的不就是为了享受生活、享受漫长且佐餐美酒的午餐吗？如果连休闲的价值都被彻底抹杀，经济增长的意义何在？ 借由这一对比，特蕾西调侃起即将被海量 IPO 变现资金淹没的旧金山与硅谷科技圈。她好奇这些一夜暴富的科技新贵到底会把钱花在哪里：“除了买大豪宅或买辆豪车，他们到底消费什么？难道就是拿着这笔巨款，继续熬夜到凌晨三点，在 ChatGPT 上搞‘氛围编码’（vibe coding）或者疯狂工作？”乔笑称这简直需要被命名为一个新的经济学悖论——大家明明赚了前所未有的钱，却到处炫耀自己比以往任何时候工作得都更卖力。 不过，两位主持人也深刻反思了这种价值观背后的时代脆弱性： - **历史背景的红利**：欧洲能够建立起“闲暇价值大于零”的高福利制度，是建立在新自由主义全盛时期和全球贸易绝对收益的特定历史窗口期内的。主持人甚至搬出了经济历史学家亚当·图兹（Adam Tooze）的名言，戏谑欧洲央行（ECB）曾经是“新自由主义的塔利班”（the Taliban of neoliberalism）。 - **去工业化的地缘危机**：当国际地缘政治剧变、开放贸易体系遭到侵蚀时，欧洲的核心工业支柱面临被掏空的巨大风险。欧洲的社会福利体系归根结底依赖于其庞大的实体工业巨头；如果这些企业在全球竞争中被击溃，休闲模式也将无以为继。 - **意识形态盲区**：乔犀利地指出，未来的历史书可能会记录下极其讽刺的一章——欧洲的核心工业巨头之所以被开放贸易彻底冲垮，很大程度上是因为欧洲主流政界极度抗拒承认这种竞争压力的存在，仅仅因为唐纳德·特朗普（Donald Trump）是第一个在公开场合大肆宣扬这种贸易对抗的人。出于对与特朗普站在同一立场的强烈心理排斥，欧洲决策层长期拒绝直面残酷的贸易现实，最终坐失良机。特蕾西也感叹，这种关于欧洲战略盲区的反思，其体量“足以写成一整本书，而不仅仅是一个章节”。 ## Notable quotes > `00:00` 宝马（BMW）计划借助人工智能削减五分之一的管理层职位 — Joe Weisenthal > `05:00` 十到十五年前欧洲 GDP 相当于美国的 90%，如今已缩水至约 70%，因此欧洲彻底输了 — Jamie Dimon > `25:00` 价格，完全是因为价格 — Uwe Reinhardt > `30:00` 喝着红酒吃漫长午餐 — Jamie Dimon > `45:00` 新自由主义的塔利班 — Adam Tooze > `50:00` 你们在干什么？我们国内的产能利用率对于一个仍处于增长期且正在向内需驱动转型的经济体而言是完全正常的。 — 中国官方代表 > `55:00` 我休闲的价值大于零 — Dominik Leusder > `55:00` 除了买大豪宅或买辆豪车，他们到底消费什么？难道就是拿着这笔巨款，继续熬夜到凌晨三点，在 ChatGPT 上搞‘氛围编码’（vibe coding）或者疯狂工作？ — Tracy Alloway ## Mentioned BMW, Joe Weisenthal, Tracy Allaway, Dominik Leusder, Leusder of Last Resort, Mario Draghi, Jamie Dimon, Mistral, Paul Krugman, Kenneth Arrow, Uwe Reinhardt, Brad Setser, Peter Navarro, Death by China, Adam Tooze, Sander Tordoir, Industrial Accelerator Act, Shahin Vallée, Donald Trump, ChatGPT, BEA ## Video description <p data-renderer-start-pos="127">In so many conversations, there's a widespread view that Europe is falling behind. Or it's in trouble. It has been two years since the publication of the Draghi report and the problems the report identified about European competitiveness are far from solved: Demographic challenges, rising energy costs, and a lagging tech sector still cast a shadow over Europe. But according to the economist and policy analyst Dominik Leusder (who also writes the Leusder of Last Resort Substack) the Draghi report might have mismeasured the true scale of Europe's issues, and he asks if the popular narrative of European decline is an accurate one. We also speak about whether Europe needs a frontier AI model, why long, wine-soaked lunches are not a good way to measure productivity, and the state of Europe's vexed relationship with China as a trade partner and competitor.</p> <p data-renderer-start-pos="991">Read more:<br><a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-10-07/eu-prepares-import-cap-on-chinese-hybrid-cars-to-balance-trade?utm_medium=referral&utm_source=podcast&utm_campaign=odd_lots&utm_content=article" data-renderer-mark="true" data-is-router-link="false" data-testid="link-with-safety">EU Plans Import Cap on Chinese Hybrid Cars to Protect Sector</a><br><a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-10-07/alibaba-s-joe-tsai-says-open-source-is-europe-s-best-shot-at-ai?utm_medium=referral&utm_source=podcast&utm_campaign=odd_lots&utm_content=article" data-renderer-mark="true" data-is-router-link="false" data-testid="link-with-safety">Alibaba&rsquo;s Joe Tsai Says Open Source Is Europe&rsquo;s Best Shot at AI</a></p> <p data-renderer-start-pos="1128">Only <a href="http://bloomberg.com/" data-testid="inline-card-resolved-view">Bloomberg - Business News, Stock Markets, Finance, Breaking & World News</a> subscribers can get the Odd Lots newsletter in their inbox each week, plus unlimited access to the site and app. Subscribe at&nbsp; <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/subscriptions/oddlots?in_source=oddlotspodcast" data-renderer-mark="true" data-is-router-link="false" data-testid="link-with-safety">bloomberg.com/subscriptions/oddlots</a></p> <p data-renderer-start-pos="1300"><a href="http://bloomberg.com/subscriptions/oddlots" data-renderer-mark="true" data-is-router-link="false" data-testid="link-with-safety">Subscribe to the Odd Lots Newsletter</a><br><strong data-renderer-mark="true">Join the conversation:</strong> <a href="https://discord.gg/oddlots" data-renderer-mark="true" data-is-router-link="false" data-testid="link-with-safety">discord.gg/oddlots</a></p><p>See <a href="https://omnystudio.com/listener">omnystudio.com/listener</a> for privacy information.</p> [Source](https://podtrac.com/pts/redirect.mp3/tracking.swap.fm/track/UVBrz8bN8aM2Xe47PEPu/traffic.omny.fm/d/clips/e73c998e-6e60-432f-8610-ae210140c5b1/8a94442e-5a74-4fa2-8b8d-ae27003a8d6b/201de292-b347-44a2-8ad4-b4dc016defab/audio.mp3?in_playlist=982f5071-765c-403d-969d-ae27003a8d83)

[0:00] Joe Weisenthal: 宝马（BMW）计划借助人工智能削减五分之一的管理层职位 [5:00] Jamie Dimon: 十到十五年前欧洲 GDP 相当于美国的 90%，如今已缩水至约 70%，因此欧洲彻底输了 [25:00] Uwe Reinhardt: 价格，完全是因为价格 [30:00] Jamie Dimon: 喝着红酒吃漫长午餐 [45:00] Adam Tooze: 新自由主义的塔利班 [50:00] 中国官方代表: 你们在干什么？我们国内的产能利用率对于一个仍处于增长期且正在向内需驱动转型的经济体而言是完全正常的。 [55:00] Dominik Leusder: 我休闲的价值大于零 [55:00] Tracy Alloway: 除了买大豪宅或买辆豪车，他们到底消费什么？难道就是拿着这笔巨款，继续熬夜到凌晨三点，在 ChatGPT 上搞‘氛围编码’（vibe coding）或者疯狂工作？

[2:08] Joe Weisenthal: getting the short end of the stick [6:04] Joe Weisenthal: Leusder of Last Resort [55:00] Joe Weisenthal: the value of my leisure is above zero [45:00] Adam Tooze: Taliban of neoliberalism [40:00] Dominik Leusder: disorderly decline in industrial employment [45:00] Peter Navarro: Death by China [50:00] Dominik Leusder: Buy European [50:00] Dominik Leusder: too little, too late [55:00] Joe Weisenthal: vibe coding

[0:00] There are some market stories where you want every detail. Joe and I have made quite a few podcasts on that basis, but sometimes you've only got 10 minutes and just want to know what's moving markets fast. That's the Barclays Brief podcast. Every week, experts from Barclays Markets and Research get you up to speed on what's happening and what to watch next. Concise, focused, and brief. Search Barclays Brief wherever you get your podcasts. Some people treat ChatGPT like some kind Thank you. projects. Get started at ChachiPT.com by selecting work mode available on plus and pro plans. If you listen to financial news, you know a lot of time is spent thinking about what's next. the next opportunity, the next investment. The next move. But sometimes what matters most is being ready for what you never saw coming. For more than 75 years, Cincinnati Insurance has worked with independent agents to help protect businesses, homes, valuables, and more. Because planning for the future isn't only about knowing what's next. It's about making sure you're ready for what you can't predict. Let Cincinnati Insurance make your bad day better. Find an independent agent at CINFIN.com. Hey, Odd Lots listeners, the Odd Lots tour continues and our next stop is in Chicago. That's right. Joe and I will be at the City Winery Chicago on October 15th for a live Odd Lots recording. Tickets are on sale now at Bloomberg.com forward slash Odd Lots. And of course, a special thank you to Barclays for supporting Odd Lots Live. So that's October 15th at City Winery in Chicago. Get your tickets now. Bloomberg Audio Studios. Podcasts, radio, news. Music Hello and welcome to another episode of the Odd Lots podcast. I'm Joe Weisenthal. And I'm Tracy Allaway. Tracy, I think a comment that you've made a few times over the episodes is like, no, no, no, it's not. It's like we have these conversations and then usually or frequently, whether we're talking about trade or AI or anything, there's usually, oh, and it seems like Europe is getting the short end of the stick here. Or it seems like it's all going to end up being kind of bad for Europe. Well... Yes, I would say that I'm sure I have in the past. However, what I would say is if you are bullish on AI and its ability to boost productivity across the board, in my mind, you have to be bullish on Europe because there is no region out there, perhaps more motivated than Europe to try to eke out every extra ounce of output per work hour. should be very, very interested in AI. And if you think those gains are going to be like widely spread through businesses in other countries, you know, think about Europe. Did you purposely just say this as did you see the red headline that just hit as you were talking? No, it's so surreal. So we just got a red headline the moment you were saying that BMW targets shedding a fifth of manager roles with the help of AI. I don't think that could be more perfect because, A, this is of big industrial behemoths in Europe that in theory... Like you're like, I remember we've talked about this for years, actually. You know, if AI is going to diffuse across the economy, suddenly maybe these companies can be more lean, et cetera. But then this also gets to two things. OK, what does that mean about jobs themselves? And then also it's like, OK, maybe they can modestly trim some of their management layers with the help of AI. But can that actually make these European car companies competitive with the Chinese companies? Yeah. That still seems like a tall order at the trajectory. But it's very funny that you said that the second that that headline crossed the terminal. Plugged into the zeitgeist, I guess. One other thing I would say, speaking about the zeitgeist, and since you mentioned China, we are recording this on September 30th. And Europe seems to be gearing up to take some sort of action against China in order to boost their competitiveness against it. We're not entirely sure just yet what that's going to look like, but people are definitely talking about it. There's like this very deep concern about all of the industrial behemoths, the German chemical companies, the German automakers. [5:00] et cetera. And like, you know, five, 10 years ago, they were like riding high. And then suddenly in a few years, people are talking about potentially existential risk to them and so forth. And it's sort of wild to me, you know, thinking back to how much the mood has changed from, say, the first Trump administration and even the Biden administration, when, you know, the idea of like, you know, there was the European anger at the Inflation Reduction Act and so forth. And, Just this this concern that the trade issue that was sort of really catalyzed by the U.S. and Trump a decade ago is now just sort of it's becoming just very mainstream. Well, you use the word diffuse the benefits of AI. And I think, you know, the idea of having to compete seriously against China and take actual steps to do so has diffused across many places in the world. Very well put. All right. Well, I'm very excited to say we do have the perfect guest, someone who's writing I've mired for a long time and who has interesting takes. All these things, including debates about European economic productivity, whether they're falling behind, et cetera, nuanced positions on various trade questions. We're going to be speaking with Dominic Loyster, economist, policy analyst, former researcher at LSE and author of The Loyster of Last Resort Substack. So, Dominic, thank you so much for coming on OddLots. Thanks for having me. So AI is going to be great for Europe, right? their lunch breaks and their vacations in August. I mean, you know, if you look at how Europe has done in the last few decades of the booming tech sector elsewhere, despite never having been the major innovator itself, maybe very early before the 90s, Europe may have contributed some of the foundational research that, of course, American companies are very good at extending and the less with lower prices for tech goods and services. And that's despite the fact that US tech companies have pretty decently entrenched modes in Europe, legally entrenched ones. And I think with AI, it's going to be much the same. That's my impression, at least. I think it's probably true that Europe will not be able to create a frontier model anytime soon. I think it's a good case that it shouldn't try to do so and that it should instead, um, focus on this issue of sovereignty, of not being dependent on either the US or China for its tech stack, which it currently is very much, and on... Um, Focusing on whatever actually suits the business needs of most European corporates. My impression talking with people who are in this field or who regulate AI at the European level, in their opinion, they're So near frontier models like Mistral are totally fine for the vast majority of business needs of most European firms. And the interesting fact, of course, that the fact that Mistral is launching models with a Chinese chassis, so basically with the weights of a Chinese model, because Europe doesn't have the compute to actually train their own weights, raises all sorts of other dependency issues, I suppose. the AI race. So if Europe has gained from a lot of technological developments in recent years, why all the hand-wringing over competitiveness? And when you see something like Draghi's Competitiveness Report, which I think came out, what, 2022, 2023? Oh, 24, late 24. It shows you how much has happened since then. But when something like that comes out, like, what is the basis for the existential angst, I guess? Yeah, I mean, in a way, that was the last sort of, it was one strand of a set of arguments that was pretty much quite similar. They're all about, you know, in relative terms, Europe is falling behind and it's losing a competitiveness race versus the US. Jamie Dimon has been making these remarks frequently He came to Europe last year and a couple of events this year as well and said, you're losing because... European GDP was 90% of the US 10, 15 years ago. Now it's 70%, and this is not good. Now, there are a couple of reasons to assume that it doesn't really matter if that were true, because as I said, you know, You have to put that. It's a very producer-centric view of competitiveness. and also of welfare, because the debate is kind of relating competitiveness to future welfare, saying if you're going to fall behind on competitiveness, and we define competitiveness by... output or output. [10:00] per hour, in other words, labor productivity, your living standards are going to go down in material terms relative to the US, and you're not going to be able to maintain your social model. That's, I think, the main part of the Draghi report. My understanding that this is, I think there's a different case for why Europe may not be doing well economically in its own terms. But even if you accept that this sort of relative decline is relevant, I think there's a problem with... the data so that the draga report was published in november 2024 i believe was commissioned by the european commission It's obviously authored by the hero of the year crisis, former ECB president, President Draghi, who's also a distinguished economist in its own right. It argues a lot of things that I think I agree with and that many other people would agree with, that Europe has to... you know, remove internal barriers to trade and the movement of capital and credits. It has to try to get capital investment up. It's very, very low compared to the US in particular. And it's falling behind in the tech sector in particular. So Draghi, this is obviously written well into the AI boom. Draghi is emphasizing the tech sector as the main driver of the really is. And I think that the centerpiece of the report is this notion that the productivity ratio, so GDP per hour in PPP terms, has gone from 90-something percent to 70 or 85 percent, depending how you measure it, since 1995, when the tech boom in the US begins. And that implies a downward trend, a very sharply downward trend, and that it will continue if Europe doesn't do And I think that's where the problem lies, because I don't think there's really enough evidence to actually suggest that's true, really, even if you accept that Europe might have not been enough grown as much as the US in recent years. There are some market stories where you want every detail. Joe and I have made quite a few podcasts on that basis, but sometimes you've only got 10 minutes and just want to know what's moving markets fast. That's the Barclays Brief podcast. Every week, experts from Barclays Markets and Research get you up to speed on what's happening and what to watch next. Concise, focused, and brief. Search Barclays Brief wherever you get your podcasts. Some people treat ChatGPT like some kind to get work done. ChatGPT work is a new way of working in ChatGPT that can take action across your apps and files, stay with a project for hours if needed, and turn a goal into finished work. It's designed to help you move from a chaotic starting point to a reviewable first version. So all the source materials, briefs, and scattered information that you have to grind through to turn into something useful can just become something useful. Put ChatGPT to work on your projects. Get started at ChachiBT.com by selecting work mode available on plus and pro plans. Rich is knowing what counts. Let's find your rich together. Edward Jones, member SIPC. The world of business is constantly evolving. Every day, new challenges, new opportunities, new ways of working. Comcast Business keeps you totally in step with secure AI-backed networking built to power the way modern business gets things done today in more than 100 countries around the world. That's some serious muscle. Business powers over 90% of the Fortune 500 and millions of small businesses. Behind it all, network engineers, cybersecurity specialists, support teams, thousands of experts answering your call at 2 a.m. like it's 2 p.m. Always on, always ready. That's a lot of coffee. One partner powering how business gets done for companies of every size all around the globe. Thank you. Well, why don't you explain what you see as the issue with the data then, the core disagreement? So, OK, total GDP and, you know, dollar. [15:00] terms was at 90 percent. Now it's at 75 or 80 percent. That sounds like decline. It sounds like, quote, falling behind, unquote. That sounds alarming. I can understand why Draghi wouldn't like to see that trend. Why? What's the other spin on the same numbers or why do you think that's not the complete story? So I think you can definitely make, I mean, there's a fundamental difficulty with technology Comparing economies. If you think that's important to organize your policy efforts around, you might want to compare yourself to your peer economies. And you can do that statically. So every given year, you can compare yourself as a ratio. So what is the US's share of global GDP? What is Europe's share of global GDP? But the specific statements that people make, including Jamie Dimon, everyone else, Draghi, you're also quite online, so you know that this is a constant theme online as well, is there's a trend. There's a level trend over time. And the problem is that because economies are very different, because they measure economic activity quite differently, we can't actually say anything about levels over time. So just to... Mm-hmm. to get to the actual source of the beef, which is the PVP adjustment of the GDP figures. You can't obviously just look at nominal GDP and exchange rate, at market exchange rates, like Diamond does, for instance, because all you're measuring is how the dollar has fluctuated over time, right? It doesn't do with real output or anything. So you need to control for these exchange rate fluctuations. You need control for things like the differences in working hours between the US and Europe, which are institutional, they're political choices about how you want to utilize labor inputs, how you want to trade productivity gains for leisure time. The US doesn't have any statutory limitations on working hours, and Europe has consistently decided to work but has remained employed at the same rates, basically. So this is totally a choice to try to work less. And if you If you adjust for working hours and if you adjust for the relative price levels, which is what purchasing power parity should do. So in other words, what does a French... Um... Euro. how many French euros do you need to buy a dollar worth of consumption, basically? Yeah. You... these are constructed by the World Bank and now you have a comparison that allows you to compare price levels across time, in theory at least. The problem is with the Draghi measure, which is a A frighteningly common measure, but I think it's well documented to be the wrong measure. It does so by fixing prices at a given year. So basically, it's measured in the Drago Report in 2010 dollars. So PPPs are expressed as in international dollars, which is a synthetic currency that has the same purchasing power as the U.S. dollar. of these ratios that are consistent with each other. But if you fix prices a certain year, you have to use something to extrapolate between these different benchmarks and the Dragy measure uses the real growth measures that the national accounts produce in the US and the European countries. What happens as a result is that you get this upward trend So that shows a decline over time that you don't see in PPP measures that don't use the national account real growth rate, but they use relative inflation ratios. So how is the inflation rates compared to the US inflation rates in Europe? And the problem is that we calculate those real rates differently. offices for economic analysis is that they adjust prices, particularly in the tech sector, this is why this is very relevant for Draghi's particular argument, much more aggressively for improvements in quality. So if the computer that I'm currently on, a MacBook, for instance, sells at the same or a similar nominal price, even though the specs are much better, that's Um. That's measured as a decline in the quality adjusted price. So the same amount of nominal spending on tax services or goods shows up as more real growth in the US than in the EU because – Applying that [20:00] deflator more aggressively means that the inflation in that sector is lower, so real growth is higher. And that might amount, we don't know exactly how much of these, but amount to 0.2 or 0.3% annually, according to some studies. But over time, if you It compounds every year, and that creates this wedge between the EU and the US. And that is, at least in theory, to a large part, simply these method differences rather than actual economic underlying productivity growth. And that's, I think, the main issue. And then from there on, I think the... The other issue is, well, should we then look at... the economy in purchasing power terms at all, or should we look at it purely in real growth terms? And that's a whole different discussion altogether. That's, I think, where the discussion has been going between Paul Krugman and some European economists who are sort of trying to argue between each other over whether we should reform and become a bit more like the US, which would result in, you know, loosening labor regulations, cutting welfare spending, and of course, making it easier for tech startups. and so on to spend and invest in everything. Wait, can you say a little bit more about political choices here? Because it does strike me when we make these comparisons that it often feels very apples to oranges. And if, as you say, the U.S. is choosing... basically to work more and European countries are choosing to use productivity gains so that they can, you know, go enjoy an extra glass of wine to redeploy that cliche or whatever at lunchtime, then then it might make sense to focus on on real growth and output for the U.S. and something else for Europe. So how do you, I guess, incorporate political economy differences when it comes into these when it comes to these different stats? Do you think PPPs are more reliable than RealQuilth measures. for measuring the relative performance over time. And it really depends on whether you think these differences in deflators between countries are actually that severe and why they actually occur. But you can, of course, And we end up, by the way, with the notion that we don't have a good measure to compare trends over time. So whatever your judgment call is, the that sort of robust, the thing that's presented as a robust stylized fact in the Drago report, but also by Diamond and other people, is simply no such thing. It's not established by any sort of solid economic data. What we can do is we can use PPPs in current prices to compare level snapshots. So we can say, in the year 2024, what is GDP per hour? Purchasing power adjusted. in the EU and in the US. That comparison, I think, puts the US slightly above the Western European aggregates. I also show that if you actually then exclude the top 10% of the income distribution, that advantage goes away entirely. So the U.S. is slightly richer in aggregates, but not, at least on this measure, but not quite as at the level of Germany and some of the sort of lower countries, Nordic countries. But it's very top heavy. And indeed, the bottom half is actually significantly worse off than any single European country, but for Portugal. Now, we can say, well, this is the most offensible output measure in my view, comparatively. But we can say, well, maybe people care about income, money in the bank and money. Maybe politically we're so different that people don't care about leisure time that much and people are fine with living in a more top-heavy society. How much money do the U.S. individuals and households actually have? Because, I mean, consumption is a large part of what we could define as material well-being, right? So I think it makes sense to look at... um, Consumption, in particular, what's called actual individual consumption, which I think is a better measure than income because income is hard to compare as well. It's measured differently, but also actual individual consumption includes in-kind benefits. It includes the income. the benefits of publicly provided healthcare and so on and so forth. So it should control for these political differences, Tracy, that you were hinting at. The fact that in Europe, there are sizable welfare states and larger protections and a great amount of public good provision. And If you adjust that for working out, [25:00] The US is pretty... Yeah. unremarkable and What you also have to do, Because of these political differences, you have to look at the way these consumption figures are distorted by some of the things that the US is completely unique in. I choose, I think, healthcare as an example in writing about this because it is quite unusual. It's the only advanced country that doesn't have a publicly funded system. despite it being very well established for many, many years by American economists that Actuarial insurance or private insurance doesn't work for healthcare for various reasons, and you end up with very high costs and poor provisions. And indeed, the US spends much more on healthcare, both as a It spends, I think, much more, 5% more at least as a share of GDP than most other European countries. It's a function of having this private system that costs a great deal and still doesn't provide the same kind of coverage or quality. It's... It's, I think, quite useful to look at empirically how healthcare spending actually compares to other OECD countries over time. and on healthcare, what their consumption implies, in other words. The level of consumption that you have, so how rich you are, in other words, predicts a certain amount of spending. But the U.S. residual, say the difference, is 50 percent higher. And in total, that results in around between 1.7 and around 1.9 trillion dollars a year that are spent in excess of what would happen, what you would expect of a country at that income level. And the difference is, I think this goes back to these political economy differences, the reason is. prices, really, and the fact which is well established by people like the, you know, Uwe Reinhardt, the great Princeton professor and health economist, that the US prices per unit of care are just much higher. And, you know, Utilization is very, very poor and outcomes are generally worse if you look at average life expectancy and mortality rate for certain procedures. This is part of this political economy which is more dominated by rent extraction and middlemen. So prices are high in the healthcare sector because you have... hospitals, insurers, these trade associations that can take a cut, administrative costs, and all these things which make a large part of the income distribution, the top 10 or 20% very wealthy, but create these enormous costs for much of the rest of the population, especially those uninsured, which I think 27 million by some accounting. have large out-of-pocket costs. And the headline is, well, Thank you. Some people object to using purchasing power parities to actually adjust for output figures and indeed income figures because they say, well, it's kind of hiding something that makes the That is actually a sign of strength. In other words, they assume that the reason why costs in the non-tradable sector like healthcare are very high is because, well, you have this very powerful productivity growth in the tech sector and elsewhere and very high incomes. And people are sort of wage arbitraging themselves into the non-tradable sector. And it's their high incomes that are inflating those prices in trade. Healthcare, legal services, education, whatever. That assumes that these prices are not a function of rent seeking, which unfortunately I think the preponderance of the evidence shows they are. You could tie either directly to rent extraction or some form of regulatory capture where, for instance, you know, a dealer has the rights to a particular locality or something like that. On some level, when I think about how crazy our health and health care system and health insurance system is, I'm even more impressed that the U.S. is by the rest of the U.S. economy that we have this sort of that we have this, you know, big. What's the. toppling ourselves. Yeah, the albatross are... [30:00] trots around our neck, healthcare, and still we do okay. It actually kind of makes me impressed. So, you know, let's go back to the cliche about the long lunches with wine, because I actually think this is, you know, it's a joke, but it's also real. So the diamonds of the world, et cetera, and they say, you got to stop with the long lunches and work hours. And then the Dominics of the world say, no, like we're just as productive or very close to as productive as you, and we enjoy life and we convert that leisure, that productivity into more leisure, which is point is, et cetera. But then the counter would be like, that's just cope. And I like in the sense that like, yeah, I know people who live a leisure life and stuff in Europe and they take nice long August vacations, et cetera. But I'm only getting access to an elite slice because I work in media and journalism and finance, and I don't really have a good look into like the broad European Like this thing, I know it from, you know, my elite contacts like you and elsewhere in Europe. But can we substantially say that the broad European middle class does, in fact, have, you know, substantially more leisure and time than their counterparts here? Yeah, I mean, there are some asterisks here. So especially in countries like Spain and Italy, there are a lot of informal hours that are not captured by the headline figures. There are adjusted series for that. But my own crunching with numbers says it doesn't make that much of a difference for the bulk of the European economy. the richer parts of the European economy, so the Central Europe, the low countries, the Nordic countries, they do work much, much less. And if indeed it meant that Europeans were employed at lower rates, it would be concerning. And it would probably point to the fact, oh, this is a labor market failure and people may not be able to work or they're not working because they're getting diminishing returns. co-authored the long-run productivity figures that go into the Draghi reports that show, well, actually... It's sort of a substitution effect where productivity is causing the hours to go down and hours going down is actually increasing productivity. So it's not really. There's no evidence to think that. So first of all, it is real. People do work less. And it's no reason to think that that's somehow a sign of dysfunction underlying it. I think I would also just say it's kind of econ 101. So labor is a disutility. And it's precisely that because leisure time, the value of leisure time is greater than nil. If you assume those, you're sort of countervening very basic macro principles. And there's good reason to suggest that Western Europe is probably more wealthy than the US in the aggregates, even if it has probably declined relatively over the last six, seven years. And I do think there's robust evidence to show that. But of course, internally, there are huge differences. So I think we should care that Europe in its own terms has been doing incredibly poorly over the last 10, 15 years. But that's due to policy choices, especially macro policy, which the US does comparatively very well. And of course, there are internal differences. We should care that the Italian South is extraordinarily poor. It has been declining in absolute terms, even when the entire economy has been stagnating for 20 years, unique in the G7 economies. But we shouldn't care, for instance, that Michigan... In the US, you wouldn't care that Michigan has been outgrown by California for 20 years, even if Michigan has been doing well and it's been diversifying its economy. And I think that is, I think, the main takeaway between when comparing the EU as an aggregate to the US. We have our own problems. The relative picture shouldn't matter that much, I don't think. We'll hear it anyway. Some people treat ChatGPT like some kind of smart search engine, and some use it to get work done. ChatGPT Work is a new way of working in ChatGPT that can take action across your apps and files, stay with a project for hours if needed, and turn a goal into finished work. It's designed to help you move from a chaotic starting point to a reviewable first version. So all the source materials, briefs and skates, [35:00] gathered information that you have to grind through to turn into something useful can just become something useful. Put ChatGPT to work on your most ambitious ideas and projects. Get started at ChatGPT.com by selecting work mode available on plus and pro plans. At Edward Jones, we believe rich is more than caring about the latest and greatest. 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But now that there's renewed security concerns in the region, now and choke points in the global economy that actually, if you really want to re-industrialize, if you want to build some sort of resource security, if you want to build up your defense industry, that actually economic growth starts to matter and strategic tech development starts to matter in the same way. So, I mean, one thing out of, I mean, Just to make one other thing clear, economic growth matters. I mean, even advanced countries in the long term. Yeah, I realized as soon as I said that I shouldn't have said economic growth, but the idea of, I guess, relative gains start to matter. Yeah, I think they do matter. Yeah. Not necessarily on output, but obviously there are relative shifts in Europe's competitive position. that have a consequence for employment and long-term productivity prospects. And, you know, the U.S. is... Of course, it has a sectoral advantage in tech and other places, pharma, for instance, but Really, the EU is, I think, quite stronger in manufacturing, merchandise, trade. Unlike the US, it's the biggest economic block that's still open to the world economy because there haven't been real tariffs instituted so far. That, I think, opens up the question of how is Europe doing competitively with regard to China? We talked about AI. People in the Europe-US discussion have sort of shifted the goalposts a few times by saying, well, I can forget about PPPs, forget about real growth, then whatever, even if there hasn't been any decline, relatively speaking, so far, Europe is sort of renting the future and will miss out on the [40:00] the big... capital expenditure generating technology of the day, which is a generative AI, at least the frontier models, Again, I don't think that... the sort of near frontier models are really bad and that they can service most of the needs of European corporates. But I don't think that's There is a competitive race specifically in the area of AI, but I think that in legacy manufacturing sectors, and other high-tech manufacturing sectors, there is, of course, and it is still a large part of value added in industry. In Europe, particularly in countries like Germany, of course, which is the largest chunk of European GDP, and which is currently experiencing, I think it's fair to say, what looks like a disorderly decline in industrial employment. So the first China shock, so to say, was positive for Germany, but it was the provider of high-tech manufacturing goods for China, and it benefited from Chinese demand. Yeah. more than any other European country. This is flipped entirely. China has moved up in value chain while remaining in other parts of the manufacturing value chain. I should also mention that IP transfer, legal or otherwise, to China, is by far the greatest from Germany. And the fact that the industrial heartland of Central Europe still is declining at this rate because it's still exposed to China. China, I should also mention, is undergoing domestic inflation, particularly export price inflation after the housing bubble burst. It has intensified this network of subsidies for the manufacturing sector. It's experiencing its own dislocations domestically, like half of the economy, a third of the labor force works in the gig economy. So it's weakening domestically, demand for cars and other manufacturing products is going down or trending down. And it's become quite reliant on net exports for annual GDP growth. A friend of mine and a friend of the show, I think Brad Setzer, has done great work on sketching out the empirical position here, both in terms of what's going on in China domestically, so that more than half of GDP growth might depend on net exports, and on what the effects in Europe are. jobs in the manufacturing sector since 2021. Since we see that big shift in Chinese industrial policy, of course it coincides with the energy crisis. That hits Germany very hard too because this is a different discussion, but European energy policy is appalling for many reasons, and that has damaged its own economy. prospects quite a bit. But I should say that these employment figures are also actually understating the extent of the shock because if you look at the chemical industry you mentioned earlier joe which is one of the crown jewels of the german industrial sector Among the biggest big five sectors, employment has fallen the least there, even though it's most exposed to both the energy crisis and Chinese economy. a trade I looked into it myself. We don't have a Chinese trade number for volume. They don't publish the appropriate price indices, but it seems that trade values for chemical exports have been sharply down in both Germany and China, while trade volumes for chemicals have been sharply up from China and, of course, down from Germany. And it corresponds also to the main export destinations of Germany. China is exporting more to those destinations. So Germany is exporting less to them, whereas Chinese imports from Germany and Europe are sharply down. And exports to it are sharply up in many other sectors as well. And in that sector, employment has been studied, but only because the labor market is so dysfunctional. So because they're labor hoarding because they can't find qualified employees. So really, it's sort of masking the extent of all of this. China and what will happen, especially after the US, I think actually sought this confrontation with China over trade and I think quite thoroughly had to concede defeat last year. Let's talk about like, OK, I don't know if you just talk to random people. trade ministers in Europe today about [45:00] The global trade picture, maybe the degree, the optimal degree of openness, etc. What are they saying in September 26th? If that they, you know, versus what they would have been saying and say September 2016, or maybe or maybe maybe we should say September 27th or September 2017. Since by that point, Trump had already been the president and sharply sort of changed the global conversation appalling to Europe in many ways. But how have they all become either a little bit more Trumpist or who is the guy that wrote Death by China? The economist Peter Navarro. This is the thing that's crazy. So Peter Navarro years ago writes Death by China. And in 2016, everyone's like, oh, there's a crank. He can't be anywhere near the White House. And now I feel like everyone is a Navarroist on some level. death by China narrative. Maybe they put a little bit more spin on it to make it sound more more you know more professional, but it feels like in both Europe and the US, everyone has become a Navarroist. Yeah, I mean, I think you could actually even say that the fact that this door was opened by Trump and his advisors first, it became politically a bit unpalatable for other people. So the actual evidence... of the effects of China, the worsening of China's mercantilist turn in the late 2010s and 2020s, was ignored for a while because it was associated with a different political camp. To put it, yeah, that's one way to put it, yeah. I should add to that the Europeans are also... very much stuck in the past when it comes to thinking about trade. So the US policy sector is much more open to changes and ideas. But in Europe, another friend, and I think also a recent former guest on your show is Adam Tooze. The Europeans are the Taliban of neoliberalism, at least with regard to their attitudes towards trade. And that has certainly inflected their in actually doing something about this. A couple of my friends, Brad Setzer, whom you know, of course, and Sander Tordois, were, I think, almost single-handedly responsible for pushing that consensus over the last 18 months, at least in Germany and elsewhere, towards getting people to recognize that. This is a problem, by the way. No, you can't hang on. It's too late to hang on to visions of level playing fields in international trade. something before this gets out of control. And it's now showing to have real political consequences in Germany, electorally, with regard to these regional elections in which the far right is doing very, very well in these elections. And the incumbents are polling very poorly, because the far right has managed to frame the issue of industrial decline, not really around China, but around a failure of the incumbents and a failure of green policies and energy policy, which play a role, certainly. But there's evidence to believe that this is mostly driven by the external trade shock at the moment. So people are doing something now. You may not be surprised to know that nothing really has happened, though, despite there being a lot of noise. So the main... the core of the European efforts to counter Chinese trade. is the so-called Industrial Accelerator Act, which is proposed earlier this year. It's currently in review, and it might be implemented earlier, mid-next year. That shows you how long the timelines are in Europe as well. It's suffering from internal divisions, so there was the more protectionist camp around France, and the initially more skeptical around Germany, because Germany obviously is also... There's a lot of exporter... Um. interests in Germany that are opposed to any sort of trade restrictions, but they're quite conservative around these issues. There are also internal divisions like the labor unions in Germany also don't disagree on these things. And of course, the problem with European politics, as opposed to the US and particularly China, is that it has this terrible sort of joint decision trap where, you know, domestically there are these aggregation problems where you have internal coalitions and of course at the European intergovernmental level you have 27 countries that all sort of hate each other but all have different veto powers and you operate in a situation where you have to have sometimes you have to have unanimous voting or qualified majority voting and eventually you have a lot of consensus bargaining and you end up with very suboptimal policy [50:00] outcomes that are often too little too late. The policy responses are slow, dysfunctional, and even if they produce something, it regresses to the lowest common denominator. That Industrial Accelerator Act could have teeth in that it has these by Europe provisions. It has certain provisions that essentially as formulated only, not in name, but they only really Only China clears those hurdles in terms of what exports are, imports are actually allowed. That's the attempt to actually protect the German and the European auto market in particular. Some people say it doesn't have enough scope, but China, of course, has immediately... gone on the offensive on this matter, immediately filed a complaint with the European Commission, very interestingly actually outlining their own position, saying, "What are you doing Our capacity utilization rate domestically is normal for economies that are still growing and that are not adjusting to, you know, being driven by internal demand. So there's sort of a concession that these imbalances domestically in China are real and are seen as a real problem by Chinese authorities. And I do agree with that. And I also think that it's a political economy obstacle for Chinese policymakers to do something about this. To sort of Lower the temperature a bit. There's a separate mechanism in Europe called the trade and investment consultation mechanism. It's between the European trade chief and the, the corresponding minister in China. It's supposed to deliver, or was supposed to deliver something now-ish. So I think in early October, there's going to be a meeting in Beijing. Nothing concrete has come of it really, apart from some assurances around rare earths, which are quite vague and Europeans have been a bit unhappy about it. And there's some sort of Franco-German thing about monitoring these imbalances. Nothing much has happened. My worry is that either the Because there's a separate... part about the foreign exchange mechanism. So, it happened that Brad Satcher again and Shaheen Ville have written about is Really, a separate issue is that China, in addition to industrial policy, is also really resisting any appreciation of the Yuan. And that is further contributing to the imbalances. The Europeans are also slowly thinking about... countering China on... on revaluation. My fear is that they're, you know, strategically, they're their willingness to escalate might outrun their ability to actually Be resilient to Chinese responses. retaliations to whatever they end up doing. And the Chinese have shown that They're, unlike the very dysfunctional European process that I just outlined, their retaliation has been institutionalized, rapid, really unparalleled. extensive and increasingly comprehensive. So for instance, I think in late July, the commission, the Europeans placed a few more Chinese entities on the sanctions list because they were deemed to be supporting the Russian war effort. The day after the Chinese responded by immediately putting a whole bunch of major European industrial firms on the equivalent entity list that they have. And we don't have that kind of ability to respond. And I think a likely scenario is that The EU does something eventually next year that because of these problems in finding decisions, it will be too little. to actually do something about the situation, and that the Chinese will respond with some sort of concession. Yeah. Because I think it's clear that because indeed they are dependent on export growth and the EU is a very big market, the only big market open at the moment. But this concession will not be, it will not really change the momentum behind the shift in industrial activity. But the EU will accept it because it can't actually find a consensus at home for anything else than they propose. And that probably will not really change anything about this. And that's, I think, the best scenario. The worst scenario is a full-blown trade war. Dominic, we could go on for a very long time. We could talk a lot more about the 27 governments that all hate each other. and they have probably different perspectives than Central Europe and so forth. But that was a fantastic overview. Really appreciate you coming on. [55:00] lots and let's do it again sometime. Thanks so much for having me, guys. It was a pleasure. Tracy, I thought that was a really interesting conversation. You don't really get, I thought that, you know, cliche nuance, you know, actual nuance that like there is a lot of aspects of the conversation that are either misunderstood or something like that. I feel like I actually learned something in that conversation. I like the line, the value of my leisure is above zero. Mine certainly is. But once you start framing it that way, then like the set of economic choices that are being made start to look exceedingly different, right? No, I do. I totally think that. And that like, right, like if you actually take that idea seriously, then yes, that's really good. That's sort of the goal. We want to like have high productivity or we want to have wealth so that we can enjoy life. It's kind of crazy how that's like, what are we doing here? What's the point of all this? This brings me to a question I been asking everyone when we were out in L And I sure actually you going to San Francisco soon What exactly like there there going to be this huge wave of money hitting San Francisco thanks to all these IPOs that are being filed and just like general stock market buoyancy What is everyone doing with that money? Like I get that they buy nice houses and maybe a nice car. But other than that, like what is what's the consumption? But it's just like people who are in that are just going to they're not going to do anything with their money. They're just going to keep like staying up on Chachi BT vibe coding. I think it's still 3 a.m. or work. Yeah, I know. They just talk about, oh, I'm working more than ever. It's there's some sort of we need to coin a new paradox or something like that. But I do think one thing I will say is a lot of this depends on your world view. Yeah. Like your very deep, basic worldview. And I think there is you can argue that like, OK, Europe has come up with this social welfare system where leisure is valued above zero. All of that in an era of like absolute trade gains and in an era of neoliberalism. And I must say only Adam Tews could get away with. Yeah the ECB the Taliban of neoliberalism Yeah But now maybe things are changing and maybe priorities start to change too And that I think is like an actual real vulnerability for some of the arguments being made here Totally. And I think it's sort of like it'll be an interesting sort of chapter for the history books. Yeah. If if like, OK, there are these industrial giants in Europe that are core to wealth and the ability to have a welfare state, etc. And it turns out that they like sort of got obliterated by sort of open trade. And the reason they got obliterated is because everyone refused to recognize the competitive pressure because Donald Trump was the first person to really talk about it. And it was too much to stomach that to be on the same side of a sort of perspective as Donald Trump. And therefore, like that would be a, you know, that's that's a good that's a whole book. It's not just a chapter. It's a whole book. Trump was not the first person to talk about it. But yeah, OK, yeah, yeah. In a very serious way. He memefied it for sure. For sure. Yeah. All right. Shall we leave it there? Let's leave it there. This has been another episode of the All Thoughts podcast. I'm Tracey Allaway. You can follow me at Tracey Allaway And I Joe Weisenthal You can follow me at The Stalwart Follow our guest Dominic Loyster at New Left E Views Follow our producers Carmen Rodriguez at Carmen Armin Dashiell Bennett at Dashbot Kale Brooks at Kale Brooks and Kevin Lozano at Kevin Lloyd Lozano And for more OddLots content, check out our newsletter. You can find that at Bloomberg.com slash OddLots. And you can chat about all these topics 24-7 in our Discord, discord.gg slash OddLots. And if you enjoyed this conversation, if you like it when we talk about the nuances of Europe's economic decline, then please leave us a positive review on your favorite podcast platform. And remember, if you are a Bloomberg subscriber, you can listen to all of our episodes absolutely ad free. All you need to do is find the Bloomberg channel on Apple Podcasts and follow the instructions there. Thanks for listening. Thank you. 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