Fidelity's Timmer Backs 60/20/20 Model as Tech Crowds Out Treasuries

富达投资Timmer支持60/20/20配置模型，称科技巨头债务正挤出美债 企业AI发债激增叠加股债正相关性削弱了传统平衡投资组合，促使投资者需配置20%的大宗商品和另类资产以防范财政压力。 Jurrien Timmer做客节目剖析华尔街惯例，解释了为何标普500指数的历年年度目标价往往脱离实际，以及5%的收益率如何通过估值倍数压缩引发隐性回调。讨论探讨了大型科技云服务商（hyperscaler）巨额借贷引发的“反向挤出效应”，并将当今极端的市场集中度与1973年及1998至2000年互联网泡沫时期进行了对比。此外，Timmer还解释了黄金脱离实际收益率并转向跟随全球货币供应量走势的原因，梳理了比特币日趋成熟的周期，并介绍了一种包含非相关另类资产的60/20/20投资组合模型，以应对股债正相关的市场环境。 自新冠疫情以来，美国国债规模已激增约17万亿美元，与此同时外国央行等非经济型买家纷纷退场，迫使经济型买家在消化超大规模国债发行的同时，还需吸收来自云服务巨头沉重发行的企业债。 (18:14) 在10年期美债收益率突破5%的背景下，市场广度急剧恶化，仅有25%的标普500成分股处于50日移动均线上方，市场正在通过估值倍数压缩而非主要指数大幅暴跌来完成隐性回调。 (24:33) 黄金已与实际收益率的历史反向联动脱钩，转而充当全球M2货币供应量的风向标；与此同时，比特币减半周期所伴随的回撤幅度逐渐收窄，波动性日趋成熟。 (48:41) 鉴于股票与债券的正相关性，Jurrien Timmer建议以60/20/20投资组合取代传统的60/40模型，即将资产配置于股票、固定收益以及大宗商品、管理期货、黄金和比特币等非相关另类资产中。 (60:00)

Jurrien Timmer, Director of Global Macro at Fidelity Investments, argues that ballooning sovereign debt and the retreat of price-insensitive bond buyers are forcing a structural regime shift where equity valuations de-rate against higher capital costs. Consequently, portfolio construction must adapt by moving beyond the traditional 60/40 model toward cash-flow-generative equities and uncorrelated alternatives. Fiscal Debt Expansion and Reverse Crowding Out (18:14) Since the onset of the pandemic, the United States has added roughly $17 trillion to its national debt. Timmer highlights that non-economic buyers—including commercial banks, the Bank of Japan, and the People's Bank of China—have largely retreated, leaving the Treasury reliant on yield-sensitive economic buyers who demand real compensation as sovereign borrowing rates approach nominal GDP growth. This pressure is compounded by tech hyperscalers, which issued debt and equity amid a broader corporate fundraising wave of $3.6 trillion over twelve months. Hyperscaler bond issuance accounted for approximately 14% of net new Treasury borrowing, effectively crowding out government paper because investors prefer corporate debt backed by high data-center capital returns. Stealth Corrections and Historical Valuation Precedents (24:33) While headline equity indices have remained buoyant on strong earnings, a hidden de-rating has swept beneath the surface, with only 25% of S&P 500 components trading above their 50-day moving average. Timmer compares this to Alan Greenspan's 1994 tightening cycle, when the headline index traded sideways while over two-thirds of components dropped 20% or more. Unlike the 2000 dot-com peak, where tech forward price-to-earnings multiples reached 70x without cash flows, modern tech multiples trade between 20x and 30x. However, concentration remains historically elevated: the top five companies match the aggregate market cap of the bottom 434, and on a five-year cyclically adjusted P/E basis, market valuations remain stretched near late-1990s levels. Liquidity Driving Gold and Bitcoin Maturation (48:41) Traditional macro relationships have decoupled as real bond yields rose. Historically moving inversely to TIPS yields, gold doubled after 2022 rather than collapsing toward $1,000, instead tracking global M2 liquidity growth toward $120 trillion alongside foreign central bank accumulation. Following an overshoot to $5,600 and a pullback toward $4,000 driven by geopolitical reserve liquidations, Timmer calculates gold's fundamental fair value at $5,000 and rising. Meanwhile, Bitcoin's post-halving advance to $126,000 and mild subsequent winter suggest a maturing asset class that displays shallower drawdowns under power-law tracking, continuing to find structural support against gold. Rethinking the 60/40 Portfolio for Sticky Yields (60:00) The classic 60/40 stock-and-bond allocation delivered about a 9% annualized return with 9% volatility from the late 1990s until COVID, relying on a negative correlation between equities and fixed income. With the cost of capital elevated and stock-bond correlations turning positive, bonds alone can no longer serve as an adequate 40% hedge. Timmer advocates a 60/20/20 framework: allocating 60% to dividend-growing, high-payout equities, 20% to fixed income (such as 10-year Treasuries and short-duration TIPS), and 20% to genuinely uncorrelated alternatives including commodities, trend-following managed futures, syndicated loans, gold, and Bitcoin. Timmer leaves unresolved whether sovereign policymakers can successfully orchestrate financial repression—such as eliminating interest on excess reserves to force banks back into Treasuries—without reigniting sticky 3% to 4% inflation. If tech infrastructure CapEx fails to yield sustainable returns and artificial intelligence productivity gains do not outpace the growing debt burden, broader equity multiples face further compression.

## Background 本期内容由 YouTube 财经频道 The Compound 于 2026 年 10 月 10 日发布。节目由 Downtown Josh Brown 和 Michael Batnick 共同主持，特邀富达投资（Fidelity Investments）全球宏观总监 Jurrien Timmer 作客，深度探讨了标普 500 目标价的局限、17 万亿美元美债与反向挤出效应、AI 盈利泡沫之辩、黄金与比特币前景，以及 60/20/20 投资组合框架与互联网泡沫的历史镜像。 ## TL;DR 节目围绕当前宏观经济与资本市场的结构性演变展开。Jurrien Timmer 深入拆解了高利率与财政赤字对美债供需的重塑，指出超大规模云厂商的大举借贷引发了罕见的“反向挤出效应”，并对比了当下的市场隐性调整与 1994 年加息周期及 1998 年互联网泡沫的异同。同时，嘉宾详细分析了英伟达与苹果等高现金流巨头为何成为新型防御资产，破除了 AI 导致短期就业崩溃的末日论，并提倡将传统 60/40 组合迭代为纳入 TIPS、大宗商品等不相关资产的 60/20/20 策略。 ## Atmosphere & style 整场对话在轻松风趣的美式播客基调与严肃硬核的华尔街宏观研判之间自如切换。主持人和嘉宾频繁抛出关于极限运动、火人节大厨经历以及彼得·林奇幕后趣事的幽默包袱，现场甚至夹杂了消防警报鸣响与赠送便携厨刀的逗趣插曲；但在切入对数图表、折现模型和主权债务危机时，又展现出穿越数轮周期的老将所独有的深邃与克制，让观众在密集的笑声与高信息密度的专业推演中获得极大启发。 ## Detailed walkthrough ### [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r1AsyhNNOno&t=0s) 极限挑战与体能狂人：从5.5小时平板支撑到七大洲马拉松 节目在一场关于“人类体能极限”的闲聊中开场。主持人感叹如今人们为了挑战自我简直毫无上限——最近刚有一位61岁的老妇人完成了长达5个半小时的平板支撑。紧接着，现场分享了另一个硬核家属的故事：一位主持人的妻子在完全没有系统训练的情况下，参加了在法国尼斯举办的Ironman 70.3世界铁人三项锦标赛。比赛的规定关门时间是8小时30分，而她硬是在8小时15分内完赛。大家惊叹之余询问她为何不训练，得到的回答是“平时工作太忙没空练，而且她纯粹觉得好玩，压根没打算拿奖牌”。更有趣的是，多年前她在家里装了一个空荡荡的奖杯陈列柜，撂下狠话要把柜子填满，如今那个陈列柜果然摆满了各式奖杯。 这种超乎常人的毅力引出了更不可思议的挑战：席间有人提到自己的表亲正在尝试“七天内在七大洲跑完七场马拉松”（World Marathon Challenge）。大家忍不住调侃这种非人折磨：“每天跑完一场全马，一觉醒来飞到下一个大洲接着跑？洲与洲之间到底怎么赶路，游过去吗？”嘉宾们笑称，无论是极限运动还是投资，这世界上总有一群精力过剩的“狂人”。 - 61岁女性创下连续平板支撑5.5小时的惊人纪录。 - 法国尼斯Ironman 70.3半程铁人三项赛：限时8小时30分钟，零训练参赛以8小时15分钟极限压线完赛。 - “七天七大洲七场马拉松”极限挑战成为全场热议的体能奇观。 --- ### [01:30](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r1AsyhNNOno&t=90s) 富达国际全球路演：亚洲主权基金为何全在打听黄金？ 短暂寒暄后，富达投资（Fidelity Investments）全球宏观总监尤里安·蒂默（Jurrien Timmer）正式登场。他解释自己此前缺席活动是因为当时正跟随富达的姊妹机构富达国际（Fidelity International）在欧洲进行疯狂的机构路演。蒂默分享了自己的出差“壮举”：今年他仅凭一只随身登机箱，就完成了横跨亚太地区长达三周的高密度访问，足迹遍及首尔、韩国国民年金公团（NPS）所在的南部城市全州、东京、北京、上海、台北以及香港。 由于富达国际在海外专注于机构与批发业务，凭借富达品牌的巨大声誉，蒂默得以直接与各大主权实体高层对话，包括中国人民银行（PBOC）以及中国投资有限责任公司（CIC）等主权财富基金。蒂默透露，在拜访这些重量级机构时，对方无一例外都在急切地询问同一个问题：“黄金到底怎么回事？当下的黄金市场在发生什么？”蒂默对此深刻分析道，对于美国投资者来说，美元是全球储备货币，黄金只是一种可有可无的“奢侈品”或边缘资产，就像比特币一样，买不买全凭喜好；但对于这些没有储备货币特权的海外央行和主权基金而言，黄金的战略配置直接关乎生死存亡（existential）。 - 蒂默出差三周横跨亚太7大主要城市，全程仅靠一只登机箱轻装出行。 - 拜访机构包括韩国国民年金公团（NPS）、中国人民银行（PBOC）及中国投资有限责任公司（CIC）等顶级主权机构。 - 全球央行与主权基金将黄金视为对冲美元体系的“生存级”资产，而美国本土往往仅将其视为选配的另类投资。 --- ### [03:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r1AsyhNNOno&t=180s) 与彼得·林奇同台：幕后准备与富达的“场边教练”岁月 乔什·布朗（Josh Brown）随后回忆起他近期与传奇投资大师彼得·林奇（Peter Lynch）共同主持富达活动的高光经历。林奇生性低调，极少公开露面或录制播客，但思维依旧无比敏锐。布朗爆料了一段准备会上的趣事：当时线上会议有富达各部门的十来个人在线，林奇一进会议室就开始眉飞色舞地大讲各种投资段子、疯狂抛梗。布朗当时在Slack工作群里吓得给同事发私信直呼：“我的天，他是不是以为我们现在就已经正式开录播客了？”事后布朗才反应过来，这位投资传奇实际上是在用幽默给年轻后辈“热身”，向布朗展示自己不仅完全跟得上节奏，而且准备好敞开畅聊了。 等到在波士顿美术馆（MFA）正式登台前，林奇在后台还傲娇地表示“要不是为了富达的客户，我才懒得出来做这种事”。然而一走上舞台，林奇瞬间全场控场，妙语连珠，把台下逗得前仰后合。蒂默接话道，在富达的历史上，除了他自己之外，唯一常年代表富达出镜电视节目的就是彼得·林奇（林奇早年曾是路易斯·鲁凯瑟主持的《华尔街周刊》常客）。蒂默透露，林奇1990年卸任麦哲伦基金后并未真正与富达断绝联系，但退居二线后做电视节目需要有人提供数据支持。蒂默早年正是林奇的“场边数据教练”，负责在转播席为在台前的林奇源源不断地输送最新的市场宏观数据。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Peter Lynch and Jurrien Timmer Collaboration accDescr: 展现尤里安·蒂默从幕后数据教练转变为台前宏观分析师，与彼得·林奇之间的传承关系 subgraph EarlyDays["早年合作模式 (1990年代)"] A["尤里安·蒂默<br/>(后方展台/数据教练)"] -->|"整理提供最新宏观与市场数据"| B["彼得·林奇<br/>(台前主力嘉宾/《华尔街周刊》)"] end subgraph PresentDay["当下传承模式 (2020年代)"] C["尤里安·蒂默<br/>(全球宏观总监/台前电视评论员)"] D["彼得·林奇<br/>(富达终身传奇/精选客户活动)"] end EarlyDays -.->|"经验传承与角色演进"| PresentDay ``` --- ### [05:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r1AsyhNNOno&t=300s) 市场永远不变：彼得·林奇的智慧与富达的“常青藤”传奇 针对外界质疑“彼得·林奇1990年就退休了，他对如今的市场还能懂多少”的论调，布朗和蒂默给予了坚决反驳。布朗直言，只要认真读过投资经典就会明白，市场的底层人性与运行周期从未改变；更何况林奇在过去的40年里始终在极高层级上管理慈善基金与家族资本，他的视野远超普通分析师。尽管林奇在后台坦白“自己既不持有科技股，也完全不懂当下的AI风口”，但正因为他早已亲历过数轮技术造富与泡沫破裂的完整周期，他口中的商业本质比单纯追踪短期AI概念股深刻得多。 蒂默介绍，富达有着在波士顿美术馆为资深员工举办整年周岁周年庆典（如入职15、20、25年）的传统，富达掌门人阿比盖尔·约翰逊（Abby Johnson）与林奇都会出席。蒂默自己在富达已经工作了31年，正在朝35年迈进。然而，富达司龄最长的在职传奇人物当属布鲁斯·约翰斯通（Bruce Johnstone）。约翰斯通已在富达供职整整61年，当年他与林奇是同班入职的同侪，林奇掌舵麦哲伦成长基金，而约翰斯通则执掌富达的价值型基金（Fidelity Equity-Income Fund）。蒂默笑称自己曾对约翰斯通说“我快追上你了，我已经31年了”，而现年80多岁依然每天来上班的约翰斯通淡定回应：“你永远也别想追上我。” - 彼得·林奇与布鲁斯·约翰斯通早年构成富达旗下的“双子星”，分别执掌成长（麦哲伦基金）与价值风格基金。 - 布鲁斯·约翰斯通在富达任职达61年之久，为公司目前最资深的在任员工。 - 尤里安·蒂默在富达任职31年；富达在波士顿美术馆（MFA）定期为资深员工举办里程碑式庆祝。 --- ### [07:30](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r1AsyhNNOno&t=450s) 探访富达传奇“图表室”：内德·约翰逊的纯粹信号与对数尺度执念 话题随后转向富达波士顿总部最富盛名的圣地——“图表室”（The Chart Room）。布朗和迈克尔·巴特尼克（Michael Batnick）近期受邀参观了这间传奇办公室。蒂默回忆起自己1995年初加入富达的经历：他当时通过了整整12轮严苛面试，最后一轮正是由富达掌门人爱德华·“内德”·约翰逊三世（Ned Johnson）亲自把关。内德对图表室有着极端的控制欲，对进入该部门的分析师拥有一票否决权，两人在终面中坐下来畅聊市场，让蒂默终生难忘。 图表室既是一座档案博物馆，也是富达顶尖经理人的研究实验室。虽然像执掌富达逆向投资基金（Contrafund）的传奇经理人威廉·达诺夫（Will Danoff）这样的大佬如今已经不再需要亲自去图表室闲逛（任何重要图表都会直接送到他的案头），但图表室依然保留着富达的技术分析血统。图表室四面墙壁挂满了数米长的大型精细手绘图表，房间配有博物馆级别的精准照明。其中核心的中轴图表甚至是一张可以追溯到1789年的美股每日行情图。 内德·约翰逊对图表展示有着近乎偏执的要求：第一，他极其反感将技术指标与基本面数据混在同一张图表上，他坚信技术分析的信号必须保持“绝对纯粹”，绝不能被其他学科污染，不同维度的信息应由不同的专家提供并结合；第二，所有走势图必须强制采用等比例的“对数尺度”（Log Scale），因为在普通线性尺度下，纳斯达克在2000年暴跌80%的宏大历史与道琼斯指数的横盘表现完全无法进行真实的视觉对比，唯有对数坐标才能客观呈现复利变化与极端行情的真实波幅。 ```mermaid flowchart LR accTitle: Ned Johnson's Chart Room Design Principles accDescr: 内德·约翰逊图表室的两大核心原则：信号纯粹性与对数尺度展示 subgraph ChartRoom["富达传奇图表室核心原则"] direction TB subgraph Principle1["原则一：信号纯度 (Signal Purity)"] A["技术分析 (Technicals)"] -.->|严禁交叉污染| B["基本面数据 (Fundamentals)"] C["保持技术指标纯粹性<br/>跨领域融合由PM独立完成"] end subgraph Principle2["原则二：视觉真实 (Visual Accuracy)"] D["全图强制采用等比对数刻度 (Log Scale)"] E["杜绝线性坐标失真<br/>真实对比历史周期级别涨跌幅"] end end ``` ### [10:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r1AsyhNNOno&t=600s) 富达传奇“图表室”与波士顿总部的新旧传承 谈及富达投资（Fidelity Investments）的历史底蕴，尤里安·蒂默（Jurrien Timmer）动情地回忆起富达已故前掌门人内德·约翰逊（Ned Johnson）对图表分析的痴迷。内德在世时，哪怕正在参加严肃的董事会，也会像个嘴馋的小孩溜进糖果店一样，悄悄溜出来直奔富达大名鼎鼎的“图表室”（Chart Room），一呆就是两个小时。在那个时代，图表室的墙上挂着宽达30至40英尺、从地板直通天花板的巨幅图表。蒂默感慨，这种视觉冲击力是任何小电脑屏幕都无法替代的，置身其中“就像站在伦勃朗的名画《夜巡》面前一样”。内德会伸出手指，顺着标普500指数的走势一路向左滑动，比对历史走势并推演当下的拐点。 在电子化之前，图表室里陈列着数百个翻转面板，涵盖所有行业及富达标志性的“选择性基金”（Select Funds，即富达在ETF诞生前的行业主题基金雏形）。内德随时会说一句“咱们来看看黄金”或某特定板块，分析师们便飞快地翻动图表面板展开讨论。如今时代虽已全面电子化，但富达庞大的技术分析团队依然继承了这套基因，一旦市场出现值得警惕的异动，便会第一时间推送给投资组合经理。主持人乔希·布朗（Josh Brown）与迈克尔·巴特尼克（Michael Batnick）对此深有感触，两人曾受邀走访富达波士顿总部，并结识了量化市场策略总监丹妮斯·奇斯霍姆（Denise Chisholm）。乔希笑称，当时做完节目两人面面相觑，惊叹于富达在波士顿到底还“藏”了多少这种深藏不露的顶尖高手。 此外，两人还聊到美洲金融博物馆（Museum of American Finance）从纽约迁址至富达位于波士顿联邦码头（Commonwealth Pier）的新总部园区一事。蒂默透露自己虽然经常出入新大楼办事，但至今还没来得及好好参观博物馆。原因在于富达目前要求员工每周回办公室工作五天，新园区工位爆满，他所在的宏观团队目前仍留守在老楼办公。乔希随即打趣道，下次去波士顿一定陪蒂默去新馆逛逛，亲自当向导。 --- ### [13:50](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r1AsyhNNOno&t=830s) 宏观大佬重返演播室：华尔街年末目标价的荒谬逻辑 节目正式引出本期重磅嘉宾——富达投资全球宏观总监尤里安·蒂默。乔希感叹，作为财经主播，自己的收件箱每天都被华尔街各大投行铺天盖地的研报和图表淹没，但蒂默每周更新的宏观图表集是他绝对不会错过的少数“必读之作”。蒂默自1995年起便在富达担任技术研究分析师并管理过全球策略基金，2005年起统领富达全球资产配置团队的宏观策略，是穿越数轮牛熊周期的市场老将。 访谈一开场，乔希便抛出了一个极具调侃意味的经典问题：“你对标普500指数的年末目标点位是多少？”蒂默听罢直言不讳地指出，预测具体点位的年末目标价是“华尔街策略师做过的最愚蠢的事情之一”。他深刻剖析了为什么点位预测在投资逻辑上完全站不住脚： ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 股票价格形成机制与DCF估值框架 accDescr: 图表展示了由盈利预测与估值倍数共同决定股票价格的贴现现金流逻辑，说明价格只是副产品。 subgraph Fundamentals ["底层基本面变量"] A["企业盈利周期与持久度"] B["资本成本 (Cost of Capital)"] C["股权风险溢价 (ERP)"] D["股东回报 (分红与回购)"] end subgraph Valuation ["估值与现金流折现"] E["合理市盈率倍数 (如 20x)"] F["未来现金流折现模型 (DCF)"] end subgraph Output ["最终结果"] G["股票当前价格 (价格仅是副产品/残差)"] end A --> E B --> E C --> E D --> E A --> F E --> F F --> G ``` 蒂默强调，投资的核心在于研判未来1年、5年甚至10年的预期总回报率，并厘清其中多少来自资本利得、多少来自股息收益。市场上绝大多数人本末倒置，过分紧盯价格点位，而“价格不过是企业盈利与估值倍数共同作用下的副产品（residual）”。正确的投研框架应当是先推演盈利周期的持续性、资本成本、股权风险溢价以及股东回报比例，得出市场合理的估值倍数（如20倍PE），再通过折现现金流模型（DCF）测算出资产的现值。 乔希则从卖方投行的现实生存法则替华尔街辩护：投行派策略师拜访大型机构客户或录制财经电视时，投资经理需要一个极度简化的“代码”来判断投行到底看多还是看空、看多的力度有多大，所谓“标普8000点”往往只是这种看涨情绪的代名词。更何况美股历史上60%到70%的时间都在上涨，做“死多头”即便错了也只是偶发，而做“死空头”则是在对抗大数概率。蒂默对此表示理解，但指出富达的合规纪律严禁分析师给出此类短期点位预测。每当在电视直播中被问及目标价或政治敏感问题时，蒂默的经典挡箭牌是：“我在这一行干了41年，而我能干这么久的原因，就是我从不回答这类问题。” - **华尔街目标价痛点**：以12个月为维度的机械点位预测忽略了久期匹配与股息收益。 - **估值核心三要素**：盈利预测、折现率（资本成本 + 股权风险溢价）以及资本分配回报率。 - **市场统计规律**：美股年化上涨概率在60%~70%之间，使得顺势唱多成为投行策略师职业风险最低的选择。 --- ### [17:40](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r1AsyhNNOno&t=1060s) 疫情后17万亿美元巨额美债：非经济买家的退场与财政风险重估 话题切入蒂默刚刚发布的10月宏观图表报告。蒂默每周日都会把所有全球宏观数据完整复盘并发布最新研报，始终保持对前沿动态的敏锐捕捉。第一张引发全场警惕的图表展示了自新冠疫情爆发以来美国国家债务的暴增体量——新增国债总额已逼近令人咋舌的17万亿美元。更致命的隐患在于，市场上传统的“非经济买家”（Non-economic Buyers）正在全线消失。 蒂默详细厘清了国债市场上两类买家的本质区别： | 买家类型 | 核心驱动动机 | 典型机构代表 | 当前行为特征 | |:--- |:--- |:--- |:--- | | **非经济买家** (Non-economic Buyers) | 不以利率高低为导向，出于外汇储备管理、国际贸易结算或严格法规监管要求强制配置 | 全球央行（如中国央行、日本央行）、受央行监管与风险预算严格约束的欧洲大型商业银行 | 正在大幅减持或离场（如中日抛售美债），商业银行买盘乏力 | | **经济买家** (Economic Buyers) | 纯粹以收益率为导向，极度在乎票面利率、通胀补偿与相对风险溢价 | 私募基金、养老金、散户投资者、宏观资管经理 | 只有在无风险利率极具吸引力（要求更高风险补偿）时才进场承接 | 蒂默指出，当巨量国债缺乏非经济买家的刚性消化，且国债收益率（名义借贷成本）开始接近甚至超过经济潜在名义增长率（即市场常说的 $r > g$ 临界点）时，资本市场就会不可避免地开始为“财政主权风险”进行重新定价。 这种主权债务可持续性危机已经在全球范围内蔓延： - **法国**已成为欧洲的“典型反面教材”（Exhibit A）：其名义经济增速停滞，根本无法依靠经济扩张来稀释沉重的债务利息，财政可持续性警报大作。 - **中国**则呈现完全相反的极端状态：由于国内市场普遍缺乏风险偏好，资金大规模涌向国债避险，推低主债收益率。 - **美国**尚未陷入不可逆的债务危机泥潭。蒂默分析指出，华盛顿执政当局当前最重要的经济政策重心，就是试图依靠全要素生产率的爆发（这也正是两党全力押注并强力支持人工智能 AI 浪潮的核心动机之一），让经济增速跑赢债务滚存速度。然而，在非经济买家退场、只能仰仗精打细算的经济买家兜底的当下，美债收益率的易上难下正成为牵动全球风险资产神经的最大灰犀牛。 ### [20:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r1AsyhNNOno&t=1200s) 反向挤出效应：超大规模云厂商如何重塑债市格局 随着美债供需缺口不断扩大，终局究竟如何令人深思。当前名义 10 年期美债收益率达到 5.3%，实际利率接近 2.9%。这一剧烈的债券走势背后，既有财政风险的定价，也有实际经济增长以及抵押贷款凸度（Mortgage Convexity）等技术性因素的交织推动。在录制现场，背景声中突然响起了消防演习的报警声，几位主持人开起玩笑，说这只是消防演习而非真火灾，嘉宾 Jurrien Timmer 更是打趣道："我去过火人节（Burning Man），对这种闪烁的警报灯早就习惯了。" ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Reverse Crowding Out Dynamic accDescr: Diagram illustrating how corporate hyperscalers squeeze out government debt issuance via massive CapEx borrowing. subgraph DebtIssuance["资本市场供给"] USG["美国财政部国债发行<br/>（新增赤字规模庞大）"] Hyperscaler["科技巨头与超大规模厂商<br/>（发行企业债与股票筹资）"] end subgraph CapitalAllocation["市场吸纳与反向挤出"] ReverseCrowd["反向挤出效应 (Reverse Crowding Out)<br/>企业凭借 30%-40% 投资回报率争夺资本<br/>企业债占净新增美债比例达 14%"] end subgraph MarketImpact["宏观利率结果"] YieldSpike["美债收益率承压走高<br/>（10年期破 5% / 实际利率逼近 3%）"] end USG --> ReverseCrowd Hyperscaler --> ReverseCrowd ReverseCrowd --> YieldSpike ``` 话题随后转向了 22V Research 的图表数据：超大规模云计算厂商（Hyperscalers）发行的债券规模，已经占到了净新增国债借款的 14%。通常教科书里的“挤出效应（Crowding Out）”是政府过度借贷挤压企业融资空间，而当下发生的却是罕见的“反向挤出效应（Reverse Crowding Out）”——实力雄厚的私营巨头正凭借更高的收益率和优良的资质，把政府债券挤到一边。投资者面临着丰富的资产选择：虽然微软等巨头提供的利差并不巨大，但其资质极其稳固，甚至比政府信用更受青睐。 - 超大规模云厂商今年计划借贷约 5000 亿美元，模型测算明年还将继续借贷 5000 亿美元。 - 根据美联储资金流量（Flow of Funds）数据，企业部门正在同步通过债券和股票双向融资；由于资本开支激增取代了股票回购，加上新股上市活跃，过去 12 个月内企业筹集的新资本高达约 3.6 万亿美元。 - 当前这种巨量资本并未演变为典型的“互联网泡沫”破裂局面。AI 爆发以来科技板块估值并未脱缰：科技板块市盈率一度从约 21 倍微降至 20 倍，估值之所以被压低，是因为底层企业盈利正在以惊人的速度井喷式爆发。 - 资本市场对收益率的饥渴程度极高：派拉蒙（Paramount）此前计划发债融资 520 亿美元，其信用资质远无法与微软相提并论，却吸引了高达 1500 亿美元的认购资金涌入。 - 日本股市成为全球最火热的市场之一，其核心逻辑并非直接制造先进半导体，而是在设备与材料端向全球 AI 供应链输送关键产能。 --- ### [24:33](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r1AsyhNNOno&t=1473s) 油价上行、5% 收益率与市场的“隐性回调” 入夏以来，美股曾迎来令人振奋的“普涨行情（Broadening Trade）”，小盘股、中盘股和价值股纷纷发力，各板块均有大量股票创下 52 周新高。然而，一旦 WTI 原油突破每桶 80 美元、10 年期美债收益率冲破 5%，这场盛宴便戛然而止，市场重回极端分化。Josh Brown 抛出核心问题：若想在年底前看到那些被打压的板块走出补涨行情，其催化剂究竟是什么？大家一致认为，唯一的解法是美债收益率停止攀升，同时高企的油价压力有所缓解。 Jurrien Timmer 从跨资产相关性做出了解释：原油价格与标普 500 指数呈现约 50% 的负相关，而标普 500 与长期国债价格呈约 50% 的正相关，这本质上是“同一笔交易”——油价推高粘性通胀预期，油轮运费暴涨十倍等供应链瓶颈依然存在。过去十几年职业生涯所习惯的“全球储蓄过剩（Savings Glut）”和“长期停滞（Secular Stagnation）”时代已经成为历史镜像，高利率常态正在回归。 - **期限溢价（Term Premium）与实际利率重估**：期限溢价已重返 90 个基点；实际利率从五年前的负 200 个基点飙升至如今的接近正 300 个基点。 - **无风险回报吸引力**：买入 5 年期通胀保值国债（TIPS）并持有至到期，投资者可锁定约 2.6% 的实际收益率，外加未来预计至少 3% 的通胀补偿，无风险资产的回报变得极具吸引力。 - **隐性回调（Stealth Correction）与 1994 年类比**：尽管指数表面看似抗跌，但市场内部正在经历类似 1994 年和 2022 年的剧烈调整。全市场仅有约 25% 的股票位于 50 日均线之上，仅 46% 的股票位于 200 日均线之上。 - **美联储模型（Fed Model）的估值引力**：若 10 年期收益率触及 6%，按照美联储资产折现模型，标普 500 的合理市盈率将对应压缩至 16 倍，意味着估值端有约 20% 的回调压力。 - **1987 年行情的警示**：当无风险国债收益率高达 5.3% 甚至更高时，如果股市选择视而不见，最终可能重演 1987 年的风险集中定价；但目前市场并非盲目无视，市盈率其实已在承压回调。 - **盈利顶点与资产分化**：当前约 35% 的高企盈利增速让投资者对“盈利见顶”保持警惕。具有深厚资产负债表与充沛现金流的“七巨头（Mag-7）”等长久期资产，与受美联储加息重创的高负债周期股之间，正在形成一道无法逾越的鸿沟。 ### [30:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r1AsyhNNOno&t=1800s) 水面下的隐形回调与 1994 年加息剧本 资本成本上升，在其他条件不变的情况下，市盈率（P/E）必然下降。但在现实中，其他条件从来不会保持不变。Jurrien Timmer 指出，2022 年市场没有足够的盈利增长来对冲估值压缩，因而导致了全面下挫；而在当下的周期中，企业盈利的强劲表现完全能够抵消部分压力，这也就是标普 500 指数自 6 月初以来几乎在原地踏步的原因。 然而，在风平浪静的指数表象之下，行业与板块内部正在发生一场“水面下的隐形回调（sub rosa correction）”。这场调整呈现出极其惊人的规律性：跌幅完全是严格按照对利率的敏感度从大到小依次展开，逻辑上完全理性。这就好比全市场的基金经理不约而同、各自独立地做出了同一个资产配置决定——削减利率敏感型头寸，转向配置长久期的优质科技资产，最终在宏观汇总层面表现为板块间极其悬殊的涨跌分化。 这一幕让人联想到 1994 年艾伦·格林斯潘（Alan Greenspan）主导的紧缩周期。当时美联储在议息会议之间搞“突击加息”，使资本成本翻倍，引发了历史上最惨烈的债券熊市之一。在格林斯潘强力干预利率的一年里，标普 500 指数两次遭遇 10% 的回调，整体横盘震荡，但内部早已千疮百孔——当时超过三分之二的成分股跌幅超过 20%。由于市值加权权重偏向大盘股，加上底层企业盈利强劲，表面上完全看不出破损。然而，一旦格林斯潘将这只施压的手从债券市场上移开，股市随即迎来了历史级的井喷行情。如果地缘政治风险平息、债券市场发出警报解除信号，当前市场完全有可能重现类似的大突破。 - **1994 年历史对比**：美联储出人意料地加息使资本成本翻倍，超过三分之二的标普成分股跌幅超 20%，但指数基本横盘，为后来的爆发式行情蓄力。 - **当前市场表现**：标普 500 指数自 6 月初以来窄幅震荡，表面风平浪静，但板块内部回撤与利率敏感度严格正相关。 --- ### [32:21](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r1AsyhNNOno&t=1941s) OpenAI 营收疑云与等权重指数的暴力反弹 市场的风向在节目录制当天出现了微妙变化。《金融时报》（Financial Times）披露 OpenAI 的实际营收低于此前市场传言，这一消息迅速重创了高度依赖生成式 AI 故事的科技板块，甲骨文（Oracle）盘中暴跌逾 5%，并连带英伟达、AMD 以及微软等科技巨头全线受挫。与此同时，长端美债（30 年期国债收益率）出现了数周以来难得一见的显著反转走势。 技术面指标随即亮起信号。Michael Batnick 指出，标普 500 等权重指数与市值加权指数的比值此前被压缩到了极点——权重巨头勉强扛住指数，而底层普通股票被“暴揍”。这种橡皮筋被拉到极限的结构在当天触发了暴力均值回归，等权重相对市值加权的单日涨幅达到 1%，创下 7 月以来的最佳单日相对表现。 ```mermaid flowchart LR accTitle: Tech Correction and Rotation Dynamics accDescr: OpenAI 营收不及预期引发科技股回调，并驱动资金向非科技股轮动的传导过程。 subgraph Catalyst["外部催化"] A["FT 报道 OpenAI 营收不及预期"] B["30年期美债收益率显著反转"] end subgraph MarketReaction["市场连锁反应"] C["科技权重股重挫<br/>(Oracle / NVDA / MSFT)"] D["等权重指数 vs 市值加权<br/>单日暴涨 1%"] end subgraph RotationPath["板块轮动路径"] E["资金从 AI 科技板块流出"] F["非科技股 (S&P Ex-Tech) 补涨迎长牛"] end Catalyst --> MarketReaction MarketReaction --> RotationPath ``` 针对市场上普遍担忧的“市场广度（Market Breadth）恶化将拖垮大盘”的论调，Duality Research 提出了完全相反的技术观点：历史数据显示，市场广度走弱本身并不致命，每当科技股领跌时，市场整体往往短暂动荡，但在过去五年中，非科技类成分股（S&P 500 Ex-Tech）最终都会补涨跟上。若长端利率和能源价格稍有回落，资金自发从过于拥挤的科技股向其余板块轮动，第四季度极有可能迎来非科技股的凶猛逼空行情。 - **高盛主题篮子**：高盛推出的“AI 篮子”与“非 AI 篮子（Ex-AI basket）”呈现完全的负相关，反映出同一指数内两极分化的极致博弈。 - **“七巨头”（Magnificent 7）超额收益**：过去一段时间内，科技七巨头跑赢等权重指数达 1800 个基点。 - **Josh Brown 的幽默插曲**：Josh 调侃高盛报告里的“HALO 股票”（Heavy Assets, Low Obsolescence，即重资产、低淘汰率传统企业）概念是抄袭了他在年初提出的词汇，打趣道高盛拿这个来包装其反向 AI 交易主题。 --- ### [35:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r1AsyhNNOno&t=2100s) 极端市场集中度：前五大巨头顶半边天 市场的内部失衡很大程度上源自美股空前的集中度。Michael Batnick 分享了一组令人咋舌的纵向对比数据： - 2018 年 7 月：标普 500 指数的前 5 大重仓股市值合计，相当于指数排名后 282 家公司的总和。 - 当下：前 5 大重仓股的市值合计，已经等同于排名后 434 家公司的总和（即第 67 位至第 500 位公司的市值总和）。 通过历史曲线追踪“前 5 大市值等同于后 X 家公司”的指标，当前曲线呈现出近乎垂直的爆炸式抬升，创下了美股历史的绝对极值。针对这一现象是否预示着周期见顶，Jurrien Timmer 深入剖析了美股历史上的集中度周期。当前标普 500 指数在本轮周期性牛市中累计上涨约 125%，统计特征与 1973 年和 1999 年的顶部极为相似。但与互联网泡沫时期的纯概念炒作不同，当前的巨头企业不仅拥有极深的竞争护城河，许多还是实际意义上的“国家冠军企业”。 | 历史时期 | 市场集中特征 | 核心标的与现象 | 最终结局与估值分化 | |:--- |:--- |:--- |:--- | | **1960 年代末至 70 年代初** | “漂亮 50”（Nifty 50）极致抱团 | IBM、施乐（Xerox）、高乐氏（Clorox）等高品质蓝筹 | 1973–1974 熊市大跌 48%；公司盈利完全达标，但高通胀引发严酷估值杀跌，前 50 强 P/E 达到后 450 家的 2 倍 | | **1990 年代末** | 互联网与通信硬件泡沫 | 思科（Cisco）、微软（Microsoft）、英特尔（Intel） | 1998 年长期资本管理公司（LTCM）事件后开启最后疯狂，前 50 强 P/E 从 20 倍飙升至 40 倍，其余股票保持在 20 倍不变 | | **当前周期** | 科技与 AI 软硬件巨头垄断 | 微软、苹果、英伟达等“七巨头” | 前 10 大股票占指数 40%，前 50 大占 60%；但估值溢价远未达历史极端，七巨头市盈率仅比大盘其余部分溢价约 30% | Timmer 回顾了富达投资（Fidelity）老掌门人内德·约翰逊（Ned Johnson）在富达研讨室里传授的历史教训：1968 年带有“Tronix”后缀的狂热概念股崩盘后（当时著名的富达基金经理蔡至勇 Jerry Tsai 曾是那一代的“木头姐”Cathie Wood），零售散户在 1970 年衰退中被血洗出局；机构投资者转向追逐绝对安全的盈利资产，造就了“漂亮 50”。反观当前，虽然“七巨头”在指数中权重占比高达约 35%，但估值并未像 1973 年或 1999 年那样出现翻倍式的脱节溢价，当前的集中度更多由扎实的盈利增长支撑，而非单纯的估值泡沫。 ### [40:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r1AsyhNNOno&t=2400s) AI盈利泡沫争论：估值陷阱、周期性与不确定的资本回报率 市场上的看空者最近出现了一个明显的叙事转向：他们不再把当下的行情比作 1999 年那种 S&P 500 达到 50 倍、纳斯达克高达 100 倍市盈率的极端估值泡沫，而是将其定性为“盈利泡沫（earnings bubble）”。他们的逻辑在于，这根本不需要荒谬的高估值加持，本质上是全球数据中心 CapEx（资本支出）带来的需求前置。看空者断言，一旦这些公司开始出现业绩不及预期，在分析师疯狂大幅下调预期之前，它们就再也无法达标；即便估值只有 21 倍，整个估值回调到 14 倍并伴随盈利下滑的过程也将极其痛苦，这就是空头眼中的“超额盈利（over-earning）”陷阱。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: AI投资回购与回报不确定性流向 accDescr: 展示过去巨头以回购提供确定回报，与现在大举投入ROI未知的CapEx之间的转变及其对市场利率溢价的影响 subgraph Past ["过去模式：确定性回报"] A["高自由现金流"] --> B["每赚1美元返还90美分"] B --> C["股息与股票回购"] C --> D["确定性已知回报<br/>(市场给予溢价)"] end subgraph Present ["现在模式：未知ROI与资本竞争"] E["现金流倾斜"] --> F["AI/数据中心巨额CapEx"] F --> G["ROI未知且回报周期漫长"] G --> H["资本需求急剧增加"] end H --> I["市场风险溢价上升 / 美债收益率走高"] ``` 然而，对于盈利是否见顶，Jurrien Timmer 表达了更为细致的看法。半导体行业的盈利同比激增 178%，这显然无法持续。半导体指数有着非常清晰的 40 个月盈利周期，当前刚好处于理应见顶回落的阶段，硬说“这次不同了、周期变永续”通常没有好下场。但现实是，为 CapEx 扩建提供核心硬件的企业订单极度饱和，甚至顶着长达 5 年的积压订单（5-year backlogs），因此业绩在短期内很难暴跌。比起盈利突然崩塌，Jurrien 更担忧两点： - **资本需求过剩与未知 ROI**：科技巨头（Magnificent 7 / 超大规模云厂商）过去是现金奶牛，每赚 1 美元就会通过股息尤其是股票回购返还 0.90 美元给股东。纯粹主义者可能会称赞它们现在把所有现金流投入 CapEx 是用于再投资，但回购提供的是确定的已知回报（“双鸟在林不如一鸟在手”），而 AI 资本支出的投资回报率（ROI）至今未知，市场往往会为确定性买单。 - **美联储预期不确定性与期限溢价**：Kevin Warsh 倾向于像当年的格林斯潘（Alan Greenspan）那样保持模糊与不可预测。虽然不给市场“喂饭”、恢复价格发现机制在理论上值得赞赏，但这会减少确定性，导致投资者要求更高的期限溢价，在客观上推高了美债收益率。 --- ### [43:30](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r1AsyhNNOno&t=2610s) 苹果与英伟达：高利率时代的“新型防御型资产” 在利率持续上升的宏观环境下，传统的防御型板块表现极其糟糕。公用事业（Utilities）成了年内表现最差的板块之一，房地产信托（REITs）和必需消费品（Staples）也同样惨淡，三者彼此垫底。这背后的核心原因在于，过去 15 年里，这些板块一直被股票投资组合当作“债券替代品（bond proxies）”。一旦无风险收益率大幅攀升，它们的吸引力便荡然无存。 面对不确定性，资金并没有流向传统防御板块，而是把英伟达（Nvidia）和苹果（Apple）当成了当下的“防御型交易（defensive trade）”。这并非指它们本质上是防御股，而是资金在避险情绪下的默认选择： - **规模与流动性极高**：资金可以瞬间大额建仓或撤离。 - **确定性的业绩兑现能力**：即便英伟达和苹果的估值倍数可能存在争议，但市场坚信它们的盈利绝不会缺席。当投资者对房屋建筑商（home builders）或生物科技板块感到不安时，最稳妥的反应往往就是“多买点苹果”。 近期的微软（Microsoft）和 Meta 也重回这一行列。这些科技巨头具备惊人的自由现金流增长，对美联储的加息政策几乎完全免疫——它们并不依赖借贷生存；即便哪天决定砍掉 CapEx，其股价甚至可能直接暴涨。然而，这种“美联储免疫力”仅限于触碰 AI、拥有顶尖资产负债表的高质量巨头。对于杠杆率高、资产负债表脆弱、面临 2027 或 2028 年债务到期高峰（maturity wall）的边缘信贷主体而言，高收益利差与 CCC 级债券的承压正在显现，这也正是导致市场广度（breadth）持续恶化的根源。 --- ### [45:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r1AsyhNNOno&t=2700s) 债务临界点之辩与黄金定价逻辑的范式转移 巨头们对高利率满不在乎，但普通经济体却无法置身事外。普通购房者正面对 7% 以上的房贷利率，边缘企业与政府更是面临重压。法国当前的局势就是一个警示：缺乏经济增长、债务高企，且政治乱象频发，导致其国债收益率暴涨，远超本国经济的“潜在增长限速（speed limit）”。 经济摆脱债务的关键在于**经济增速必须跑赢债务融资成本**（正如斯科特·贝森特/Scott Bessent 等人所阐述的策略）。然而，美国也正在向危险边界逼近： - 剔除 2021 年基数效应后，按 5 年复合增长率（CAGR）看，美国潜在实际 GDP 增速正下滑至 2.5% 左右，而实际收益率（real yield）已达 2.8%。除非 AI 带来爆发性的生产力提升将潜在增速拉升到 3% 至 4%，否则缺口将持续施压。 - 潜在名义 GDP 增速目前在 6% 左右，而 10 年期美债收益率正位于 5.3% 附近。虽然名义增速尚未被彻底反超，但利差正在急剧收窄。财政部试图通过将脱售国债（off-the-run Treasuries）买入额从 40 亿微调至 60 亿美元来进行口头干预（jawboning），这在庞大的债务海洋面前不过是杯水车薪。 ```mermaid flowchart LR accTitle: 黄金定价逻辑在2022年的范式转移 accDescr: 展示黄金在2022年前后定价驱动因素的变化，从与实际利率反向绑定转变为跟随全球M2与央行购债 subgraph Before2022 ["2022年之前：实际利率驱动"] direction TB R1["实际TIPS收益率 (倒置)"] --> G1["金价走势 (完全同步)"] end subgraph Break ["2022年范式转移"] direction TB B1["若按实际利率推算<br/>金价应跌至 1000 美元"] -.-> B2["实际情况：<br/>金价暴涨翻倍"] end subgraph After2022 ["2022年之后：全球流动性驱动"] direction TB L1["全球 M2 (约120万亿美元)<br/>年增 7%-9%"] --> G2["金价走势 (流动性映射)"] L2["全球央行持续买入"] --> G2 end ``` 这种宏观担忧本该大幅提振黄金，但黄金的表现却呈现出一种全新的机制。在 2022 年之前，黄金的定价模型极其简单：它几乎是实际 TIPS 收益率倒置图的精准翻版。然而在 2022 年，这一规律彻底失效——按照实际利率的模型测算，金价当时理应暴跌至 1000 美元，但它不仅没跌，反而翻倍暴涨。如今黄金的实质锚定物已经转移：它成为了**全球流动性（全球 M2）增长的代理指标**。目前全球 M2 规模约为 120 万亿美元，且正以 7% 到 9% 的速度扩张，加之各国央行的持续购入，共同支撑了黄金牛市。Jurrien 在亚太地区与各国央行交流时，他们最关心的三个核心问题正是：AI 是繁荣还是泡沫、美联储政策与美元走势、以及“黄金到底出了什么状况，为何不再按常理出牌”。随着金价暴涨，大批短期跟风投机者（tourists）也纷纷涌入追涨。 ### [50:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r1AsyhNNOno&t=3000s) 黄金与比特币的宏观定价：减半周期、储备资产与成熟资产的“温和寒冬” 尤里安·蒂默（Jurrien Timmer）详细梳理了黄金与比特币之间错综复杂的资金轮动。在比特币经历四年一次的减半周期并创下阶段性高点之后，投机资金开始撤出加密货币转向黄金，一度将金价推高至接近 5,600 美元。但在蒂默基于全球货币供应量（Global Money Supply）构建的宏观模型中，黄金的合理公允价值不应超过 4,800 美元，显然当时已被极度超买。随后伊朗地缘冲突爆发，黄金市场风云突变：作为主权储备资产，当海湾阿拉伯国家合作委员会（GCC）成员国因石油出口受阻而需要筹集流动性时，它们唯一的选择就是抛售储备资产变现。在这个阶段，黄金与美国国债出现了罕见的高度正相关抛售，金价从高位直接下挫至 4,039 美元附近。目前金价回升至 4,200 美元左右，蒂默认为恐慌性抛售最严峻的时刻已经过去，结合全球货币供应量的增长趋势，5,000 美元才是当前合理的基准中枢，且未来仍将持续上移。 与此同时，蒂默指出比特币已经走完了一轮完整的“温和寒冬”（Mild Winter）。如果将时间轴和价格同时置于对数坐标系（Log Scale）下，基于幂律（Power Law）形成的比特币走势呈现出极为对称的调和波动模式（Harmonic Pattern）。回顾 2025 年的高点，虽然它未达到模型测算的“在 150 周内冲上 150,000 美元”，而是止步于“在 140 周内达到 126,000 美元”，但 126,000 美元依然刷新了历史纪录。从趋势线来看，比特币作为一种逐渐步入成熟期的资产，其“寒冬”的周期长度和回调幅度都在不断收敛，也就是所谓的“涨幅不再动辄暴涨冲天，跌幅也随之大幅缩水”（"Moon less and swoon less"）。 蒂默分享了他个人的买入策略：在确定寒冬规律后，他将 60,000 美元锁定为入场抄底点。今年早些时候比特币曾短暂下探至 58,000 美元，但当时他判断“虽然价格合适，但时间窗口不对”，因为典型的比特币寒冬通常需要经历 9 到 12 个月的震荡筑底期；直到一两个月前价格依然在 60,000 美元附近反复夯实，时间跨度完全吻合，随后币价强势突破 80,000 美元完成右侧确认。当以黄金对比特币进行计价时，其相对比率展现出非常优美的技术形态。蒂默预期黄金与比特币未来都将继续走高，而比特币的涨幅将更为可观。尽管当前加密市场仍缺乏明确的叙事主线，但他提醒大家：“当资产在没有任何明确叙事驱动下开始上涨时，你必须高度警惕，因为背后往往正酝酿着某些尚未被大众察觉的重大变化。” - **黄金估值模型**：全球货币供应量对应的理论上限为 4,800 美元，超买冲高至 5,600 美元后因地缘抛售跌至 4,039 美元，当前合理目标价看至 5,000 美元。 - **比特币幂律周期**：历史高点在 140 周录得 126,000 美元（模型预测为 150 周/150,000 美元）；本轮寒冬底部在 58,000–60,000 美元区间完成长达 9–12 个月的充分蓄势。 --- ### [52:32](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r1AsyhNNOno&t=3152s) AI 就业末日论落空：劳动力基准重构与美联储的“虚惊一场” 迈克尔·巴特尼克（Michael Batnick）与约什·布朗（Josh Brown）将话题转向实体经济与人工智能。回顾 2024 年市场上铺天盖地的研报，不少宏观分析师（如 Citrini Research 发布的末日预警报告）曾言之凿凿地预测，AI 将在 2026 或 2027 年引发灾难性的大规模失业潮。然而现实情况是，市场上所谓的就业数据走弱，在全美 3.5 亿人口的宏观体量下，区区 5 万或 10 万人的增减分歧根本只是“四舍五入的统计误差”（Rounding error）。 蒂默对此作出了深度的人口结构剖析：评估就业数据必须进行劳动力总量的常态化调整。当前美国面临着移民流入收紧与婴儿潮一代（Baby Boomers）集中退休的双重冲击，这导致美国劳动力市场的每月“收支平衡新增就业人数”（Break-even rate）已经从过去的 7 万至 10 万人断崖式下跌到目前的仅约 3 万人左右。因此，表面上看起来走软的新增就业数字，相对于一个增长速度大幅放缓的劳动力池而言，实际上依然稳健，经济并未出现实质性走弱。 蒂默进一步揭示了货币政策背后的戏剧性反转：正是 2024 至 2025 年间对 AI 摧毁就业的过度恐慌，直接诱导美联储在 2025 年实施了三次“预防性降息”（Insurance cuts）。当时美联储观察到通胀逐步贴近 2% 的目标，又极度担忧 AI 引发结构性通缩与失业潮，因此急于降息以构筑安全缓冲。然而随后的发展证明这完全是一场虚惊：一方面地缘冲突推高了二次通胀风险，另一方面劳动力市场根本没有崩溃，整体经济甚至持续过热运行。因此，当前美联储的政策转向不应被视为新一轮从紧的“加息紧缩周期”，本质上只是美联储在收回当初本不该实施的三次预防性降息，对过激的宽松进行技术性纠偏。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 美联储预防性降息纠偏逻辑 accDescr: 展示美联储如何因过度担忧 AI 通缩而错误降息，最终被迫收回流动性的全过程。 subgraph FedMistake["2025年 美联储政策误判"] A["担忧 AI 引发就业崩溃与通缩"] --> B["通胀短期回落至近 2%"] B --> C["实施 3 次预防性降息提供缓冲"] end subgraph RealityCheck["宏观现实检验"] D["劳动力收支平衡线降至约 3 万人/月<br/>(移民减少 + 婴儿潮退休)"] E["地缘局势推高再通胀风险"] C --> D C --> E end subgraph PolicyReversal["政策纠偏"] D & E --> F["劳动力市场韧性充足 + 经济过热"] F --> G["美联储收回降息（Uncut）<br/>回归实际中性利率"] end ``` --- ### [55:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r1AsyhNNOno&t=3300s) 火人节省下5000美元：AI 的实际渗透、铁路类比与电车S曲线的坍塌 谈及为何大规模失业预言迟迟没有兑现，蒂默认为这主要是市场误判了技术扩散的路径，且严重低估了新生产力创造全新产业的潜能。就像 1999 年互联网泡沫破裂时大家都在为 Pets.com 的倒闭扼腕叹息，当时没有任何人能预见二十年后人们会依赖 Uber 随时随地叫车出行——Uber 的诞生纯粹是底层互联网高度连接后衍生出的次生红利。目前 AI 正作为一种让个体“变得更聪明”的工具潜移默化地融入日常。 蒂默幽默地分享了自己的亲身经历：作为火人节（Burning Man）一个美食营地（Food Camp）的负责人，他需要为营地起草涉及免责声明、人身伤害与责任划分的法律协议。按照传统流程，这需要雇佣专业律师在几轮草稿修改之间反复拉扯，动辄花费数千美元。而蒂默直接使用 ChatGPT 进行了多轮精细化迭代（Iteration），独立完成了 99% 的文本工作，最后仅将成稿交给外部律师做最终把关审核，轻轻松松省下了 5,000 美元的律师费。约什·布朗随即打趣道：“你意识到自己刚才这一顿操作解雇了多少个初级律师吗？” 这一现象引申出了技术颠覆速度的宏观隐忧： - **历史周期的吸纳速度**：过去的工业革命（如全美铁路网或跨州高速公路系统）耗费了整整一代人的时间去建造，其对传统交通业（如马车）的冲击是缓慢释放的，被颠覆的劳动力拥有足够充裕的时间被新兴产业吸纳消化。 - **AI 时代的极限压缩**：AI 模型的演进与部署速度超越了以往任何人类基础设施，这种超高速迭代甚至让前沿科技公司的掌舵者们都感到坐立不安，它极有可能因过度迅猛而对部分行业产生剧烈的阵痛式破坏。 - **S 曲线的失败案例**：蒂默结合自己对数百年技术 S 曲线的研究指出，并非所有技术都能完整走完生命周期。历史上最典型的“S 曲线猝死案”是城市有轨电车（Trolley carts）：有轨电车刚完成大规模基建，汽车与内燃机技术便以极快的速度横空出世，瞬间将电车挤出历史舞台，使其未及充分变现便宣告崩塌，如今仅在旧金山等地作为旅游观光项目留存。 --- ### [58:15](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r1AsyhNNOno&t=3495s) 债务螺旋、金融压抑与非经济买家：Bessent 与 Warsh 的潜在对策 对话最后聚焦于美国财政的终局博弈：国债发行规模与赤字积累速度已经彻底脱离了经济潜在增长率的支撑，而市场上纯粹出于流动性配置目的的“非经济买家”（Non-economic buyers）早已消耗殆尽。面对这一人人皆知却难以解决的死局，蒂默提出了核心疑问：金融压抑（Financial Repression）是否会卷土重来？在过去的量化宽松（QE）与零利率政策（ZIRP）时期，宏观环境面临的是通缩压力；但在当前通胀常态化维持在 3% 到 4% 的高位平台期，央行如何能在不引发恶性通胀失控的前提下实施金融压抑，在实操上是一道前所未有的难题。 欧洲的现状已经敲响了警钟。以法国为例，其正滑入经典的“债务螺旋”（Debt spiral）：由于经济几乎零增长，其国债再融资成本正以肉眼可见的速度从 2% 跃升至 3%、4% 乃至 5%，滚雪球般的利息支出正在迅速吞噬财政预算，最终只能寄希望于欧洲央行（ECB）入场救火。然而欧洲由于财政政策割裂于各个主权国家之间，协调机制极其脆弱。 而在美国，蒂默指出未来的政策破局点很可能落在财政部提名人选斯科特·贝森特（Scott Bessent）与潜在美联储高层凯文·沃什（Kevin Warsh）的联手协调上。他们拥有成熟的政策工具箱来强制商业银行充当那个缺失的“非经济买家”： - 政策制定者只需调整监管规则，例如取消或大幅降低美联储向商业银行支付的超额准备金利率（Interest on Excess Reserves / IORB）。 - 一旦超额储备失去高息收益，美国商业银行系统为了维持资产端的收益率，将不得不被动消化数以万亿计的美国国债，从而人为压低政府发债的融资成本，完成隐性的金融压抑转嫁。 ### [01:00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r1AsyhNNOno&t=3600s) 60/40 范式失效与 60/20/20 投资组合的兴起 随着美国国债发行规模庞大，财政部倾向于“多发短期国库券（T-bills）、少发长期国债（bonds）”来控制久期与成本。然而，Jurrien Timmer 警告称，这种策略如果没有美联储的默许与配合，很快就会触及上限。一旦短债供给过载推高 T-bill 利率，就会打破回购利率与国债收益率之间的平衡，重演 2019 年迫使美联储降息的隔夜回购流动性危机。当资金成本居高不下或难以下行时，资本市场面临着全新的游戏规则。面对这种宏观格局，Timmer 过去四年来一直在极力推销他所谓的“60/20/20”投资框架。 过去几十年里，投资者普遍遵循传统的 60/40 资产配置（60% 标普 500 指数，40% 彭博美国综合债券指数）。从 1990 年代末到疫情前，60/40 组合在 2.5% 的温和通胀环境下，创造了约 9% 的年复合增长率（CAGR），而年化波动率也仅为 9%，堪称完美契合现代投资组合理论中的“有效前沿甜蜜点”。然而，这个神话的核心前提是“股债负相关”——即股市遭遇震荡走低时，债券能作为安全垫提供反向保护。但在资本成本系统性抬升、无风险利率具备极强竞争力的当下，股债相关性已转为正值。如今的现实往往是“债券收益率上行反过来引发了股市震荡”。 尽管 10 年期美债本身具备不错的非对称风险收益比（若收益率下行 100 个基点，获得 5% 票息加上 6% 的久期资本利得，合计赚 11%；若收益率上行 100 个基点，5% 票息扣除 6% 久期损失，仅亏损 1%），但 Timmer 认为投资者不应再把整整 40% 的权重锁在传统长久期固定收益中。他主张将这 40% 的固定收益仓位拆分为两半：20% 保留给核心债券，另外 20% 配置与传统股债完全不相关的另类资产。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 传统 60/40 与新兴 60/20/20 投资组合架构演变 accDescr: 对比传统 60/40 配置与在股债正相关环境下诞生的 60/20/20 资产配置方案 subgraph Traditional["传统 60/40 组合（依赖负相关性）"] T_Stock["60% 股票（标普 500 等）"] T_Bond["40% 核心综合债券（彭博综合债）"] T_Stock -.->|"通胀抬头导致负相关失效\n股债同时下挫"| T_Bond end subgraph Modern["Timmer 提倡的 60/20/20 组合"] M_Stock["60% 股票资产"] M_CoreBond["20% 核心债券\n（提供票息与久期保护）"] subgraph Alternatives["20% 真正低相关/负相关资产池"] TIPS["短中期 TIPS\n（约 2.5 久期 + 2.5% 实际利率）"] Loans["杠杆贷款\n（浮动利率/无久期风险）"] Comm["大宗商品现货 / 黄金"] MF["管理期货 CTA\n（多商品 / 空债券）"] BTC["比特币 & 标普剔除 AI 股票"] end M_Stock --- M_CoreBond M_Stock --- Alternatives end ``` - **短中期通胀保值债券（TIPS）**：久期大约仅为 2.5 年，同时锁定了约 2.5% 的真实利率（real rate），被 Timmer 视为当下锁定无风险真实收益的绝佳“甜蜜点”。 - **杠杆贷款与银团贷款**：具有高收益债的收益特征，但属于浮动利率，完全规避了传统固收面临的利率久期冲击。 - **另类不相关资产**：彭博大宗商品现货指数（BCOM）在与股票、债券构成的四象限分析中，处于唯一的双重负相关象限；管理期货（Managed Futures）通常做多商品、做空债券，同样提供了出色的危机防守属性；黄金、比特币以及标普 500 剔除 AI 权重的个股，同样扮演着分散风险的关键角色。 --- ### [01:03:45](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r1AsyhNNOno&t=3825s) 极端波动下的相关性风险与欧股银行的意外逆袭 针对这 20% 的分散化资产池，Josh Brown 提出了尖锐的质疑：当股债共振的系统性冲击真正来临时，这些原本看似不相关的资产，会不会“相关性在一瞬间全部收敛为 1”？比如比特币，随时可能在两秒钟内重新变回纳斯达克高贝塔（Beta）附庸。Timmer 坦言这种风险确实存在，但他强调多元化是基于长周期的概率分布，而非单一维度的避险开关。 Timmer 顺势分享了一个极具讽刺意味却表现惊人的标的——欧洲银行股。在过去十几年中，欧洲银行业被长期的负利率政策与严格监管死死压制，被视作全球资本市场“最无聊的角落”；然而进入正常利率周期后，欧洲银行的净息差与收益大幅暴增，股东派息率（payout ratio）高达 88%。从近两年的低点算起，欧洲银行股的累计超额表现一度追平了由英伟达引领的 AI 板块。这证明在不同资产类别中，寻找被宏观逻辑压制后反转的高分红资产，能够提供意想不到的阿尔法。 不过，Timmer 强调投资者的核心担忧在于未来市场环境的变化：2009 年开启的这轮长期世俗牛市（secular bull market）中，标普 500 过去十年年化名义回报高达 15% 至 18%，扣除通胀后的真实年化回报率仍有 11%。这种历史罕见的超级回报，本质上是在超前透支大盘“贝塔”。展望未来，来自大盘科技成长股的指数级爆发力必然边际递减，市场将步入一个更低回报的低贝塔时代。在这种周期中，靠高派息、股息持续增长和股票回购的“剪息票式股票（coupon-clipping equities）”将成为核心收益支柱——尽管“一年稳稳赚现金流，远不如过去一年猛赚 20% 那样性感”。 --- ### [01:06:10](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r1AsyhNNOno&t=3970s) 历史重演？1995-2000 互联网泡沫与当今 AI 周期的惊人镜像 节目的高潮聚焦于一张极具视觉冲击力的走势对比图：1995 年至 2000 年的互联网泡沫，与 2022 年至今的生成式 AI 浪潮的走势拟合。Josh Brown 观察到，当年互联网从 1995 年启动到 1999 年见顶整整狂奔了四年，正好与自己入行的那段岁月重叠；而如今从 2022 年底 ChatGPT 横空出世算起，AI 驱动的本轮行情也已持续数年，令人不得不警惕市场在进入后半程时是否会迎来一次剧烈的出清。 Timmer 展现出资深宏观分析师的冷静，他首先给出了警示：“价格形态比对仅供娱乐消遣，因为它们在失效之前看起来总是有效的（price analogs are for entertainment purposes only because they work until they don't）。”但抛开宿命论，两轮技术与金融周期的微观演进节奏展现出了令人难以置信的历史镜像： ```mermaid flowchart LR accTitle: 1994-2000 互联网周期与 2022-2026+ AI 周期节奏比对 accDescr: 对比两轮科技革命在紧缩周期、突破点、首轮危机与终极暴涨阶段的对应关系 subgraph DotCom["互联网周期（1994 - 2000）"] direction TB DC1["1994年 格林斯潘加息周期\n（隐性熊市 / 杀估值）"] --> DC2["1995年 网景（Netscape）上市\n（意识觉醒，标普飙升 38%）"] DC2 --> DC3["1998年 长期资本管理（LTCM）危机\n（市场重挫 22%，联储妥协降息）"] DC3 --> DC4["1998-2000年 终极融涨（Melt-up）\n思科供应商融资，估值完全脱轨"] end subgraph AICycle["当前 AI 周期（2022 - 至今）"] direction TB AI1["2022年 鲍威尔加息周期\n（盈利稳定，但资金成本推高压制估值）"] --> AI2["2022年底 ChatGPT 正式发布\n（颠覆性技术奇点，随后单边暴涨）"] AI2 --> AI3["阶段性宏观风暴与回调\n（关税/流动性恐慌，联储政策转向）"] AI3 --> AI4["生态闭环演进\n英伟达生态反向投资，迈向成熟期"] end DotCom -.->|"历史韵脚相似\n幅度与时长高度契合"| AICycle ``` 在 1995 年启动的前夕，1994 年格林斯潘主持了激进的加息周期，技术分析派将其称为“隐性熊市”——企业盈利虽然尚可，但资本成本飙升严重压制了市盈率（P/E）。这与 2022 年由于美联储暴力加息导致纳指暴跌的逻辑如出一辙。随后在 1995 年，加息刹车，网景（Netscape）横空上市引爆大众对互联网的无限遐想，标普单年飙升约 38%；这一时刻精准映射了 2022 年底 ChatGPT 的问世，开启了随后的单边牛市。行至 1998 年，与互联网无关的长期资本管理公司（LTCM）倒闭引发了约 22% 的深度回撤，美联储随后妥协并连续降息三次，彻底点燃了 1998 至 2000 年那场毫无基本面支撑、龙头估值翻倍的史诗级“融涨（melt-up）”；期间思科（Cisco）通过供应商融资（vendor financing）向客户借钱买自己网络设备的狂热，与当今英伟达投资 AI 生态客户的闭环结构高度相似。 然而，Timmer 指出了一个最关键的定海神针：**估值水位完全不同**。在 2000 年泡沫顶峰，标普科技板块的市盈率一度触及惊人的 70 倍，而当前核心科技股的市盈率仅在 20 多倍到 30 倍附近，拥有实打实的自由现金流与盈利支撑。最后，Timmer 辩证地讨论了估值工具的矛盾性： - 如果看**未来 12 个月预期市盈率（Forward P/E）**，随着科技巨头盈利爆发，估值倍数正在“像石头一样飞速下坠（falling like a stone）”； - 如果看**过去 12 个月静态市盈率（Trailing P/E）**，其下行幅度则较为缓慢，更像是一颗“小石子在滑落（falling like a pebble）”； - 但如果换用长周期**席勒 5 年周期调整市盈率（5-year CAPE）**，当下的估值水位却处于历史最高峰，且与 2000 年顶峰时的水平几乎重合。究竟哪种度量更能反映真实的资产泡沫，正是当下多空双方激烈博弈的核心所在。 ### [01:10:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r1AsyhNNOno&t=4200s) 估值指标的罗夏墨迹测验与现场赠礼 Jurrien Timmer 在总结估值讨论时指出，哪怕去看所谓的 5 年期 CAPE（周期调整市盈率），这个时间窗口也会把 2021 年的新冠疫情异常期包含在内，因此需要极度谨慎地看待这些指标。这也再次证明了估值指标的迷人之处——任何人都能从同一组数据中推导出截然相反的结论，“就像情人眼里出西施一样，估值本质上就是一种罗夏墨迹测验（Rorschach test）”。 Josh Brown 和 Michael Batnick 盛赞 Jurrien 是观众最喜爱的常驻嘉宾之一，无论主持人和听众都能从他庞大而严谨的研究成果中汲取大量干货。为了表达谢意，主持人团队在现场拿出了一个包装精美的神秘礼物，并要求 Jurrien 必须当场拆开。Jurrien 开玩笑说，在节目录制现场收礼，下播后可能会接到富达投资（Fidelity）合规部门打来的审查电话；Josh 随即打趣回应道，自己曾在证券经纪行业摸爬滚打多年，深知合规红线在哪，里面绝不是金条之类出格的东西，况且行业规则更严格限制的是反向受贿（受访嘉宾向投顾送礼）。 ### [01:10:20](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r1AsyhNNOno&t=4220s) 火人节的大厨经历与神秘礼物揭晓 在 Jurrien 拆包装的过程中，话题自然转到了他每年固定参加的火人节（Burning Man）。众所周知，Jurrien 在火人节的营地里一直担任大厨，为大批营员准备伙食。谈到今年的参会体验，Jurrien 兴奋地表示今年是历年来最顺利、最轻松的一次。他自嘲在营地里充当的是“赶猫人首领（chief cat herder）兼乐队总指挥”。今年的营地一共有 100 号人，甚至还吸引来了一支专门记录美食文化的加拿大电视摄制组，因此他们的火人节营地未来还会登上加拿大的电视节目。 尽管沙漠中下了一点雨，但营员们对此早已习以为常，完全没有引发混乱，整场活动没有任何狗血抓马剧情。营地今年为比以往更多的参展艺术家提供了丰盛的美食，反响极其热烈。拆开包装后，礼物终于揭开面纱——这是一套来自高端厨具品牌威廉姆斯-索诺玛（Williams-Sonoma）的便携式旅行主厨刀具包。Josh 调侃道，虽然 Jurrien 家里肯定不缺刀，但这套专业便携刀具正是为他在下一届火人节上掌勺量身定制的；而且巧合的是，Williams-Sonoma 这只股票目前本身也正处于大牛市行情之中。Jurrien 看到礼物后喜出望外，非常开心地收下了这份大礼。 - 营地规模与亮点：今年营地接待了 100 名成员，包含一支加拿大电视台纪录片拍摄团队，并为创纪录数量的火人节艺术家供应了餐食。 - 礼物细节：来自 Williams-Sonoma 的专业便携旅行刀具组。 ### [01:12:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r1AsyhNNOno&t=4320s) 结语与跟踪 Jurrien Timmer 研究成果的渠道 对谈进入尾声，Josh 和 Michael 感谢 Jurrien 的倾囊相授。Josh 开玩笑说，未来或许连 Michael 也会被说服去体验一次火人节，Michael 则立刻笑着坚决否认：“我可不去，绝对不去，但别人可以去。” 随后，主持人询问了观众获取 Jurrien 宏观研究报告和见解的最佳途径。Jurrien 详细介绍了自己的常规发布节奏： - 每周一播客：他每周一会录制一期 30 分钟的音频/视频播客，由富达在加拿大的姊妹机构制作并发布在 YouTube 上，里面包含他所有的图表分析。 - 周末宏观报告：每个周末他都会花大量时间“极客式（nerd out）钻研”，并在周日完成报告的起草。在经过公司合规部门周一的审核放行后，完整报告通常会在周二早晨准时发布在 LinkedIn 上。 - 跨平台同步：LinkedIn 上的报告链接会同步分享到 X（前 Twitter）平台，方便各个平台的专业投资者与散户读者跟踪其第一手全球宏观洞察。 ## Notable quotes > [01:30](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r1AsyhNNOno&t=90s) 黄金到底怎么回事？当下的黄金市场在发生什么？ — 海外央行与主权基金代表 > [03:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r1AsyhNNOno&t=180s) 要不是为了富达的客户，我才懒得出来做这种事。 — 彼得·林奇（Peter Lynch） > [05:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r1AsyhNNOno&t=300s) 你永远也别想追上我。 — 布鲁斯·约翰斯通（Bruce Johnstone） > [13:50](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r1AsyhNNOno&t=830s) 我在这一行干了41年，而我能干这么久的原因，就是我从不回答这类问题。 — 尤里安·蒂默（Jurrien Timmer） > [13:50](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r1AsyhNNOno&t=830s) 价格不过是企业盈利与估值倍数共同作用下的副产品（residual）。 — 尤里安·蒂默（Jurrien Timmer） > [20:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r1AsyhNNOno&t=1200s) 我去过火人节（Burning Man），对这种闪烁的警报灯早就习惯了。 — 尤里安·蒂默（Jurrien Timmer） > [50:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r1AsyhNNOno&t=3000s) 涨幅不再动辄暴涨冲天，跌幅也随之大幅缩水（Moon less and swoon less）。 — 尤里安·蒂默（Jurrien Timmer） > [50:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r1AsyhNNOno&t=3000s) 当资产在没有任何明确叙事驱动下开始上涨时，你必须高度警惕，因为背后往往正酝酿着某些尚未被大众察觉的重大变化。 — 尤里安·蒂默（Jurrien Timmer） > [55:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r1AsyhNNOno&t=3300s) 你意识到自己刚才这一顿操作解雇了多少个初级律师吗？ — 乔什·布朗（Josh Brown） > [01:06:10](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r1AsyhNNOno&t=3970s) 价格形态比对仅供娱乐消遣，因为它们在失效之前看起来总是有效的（price analogs are for entertainment purposes only because they work until they don't）。 — 尤里安·蒂默（Jurrien Timmer） > [01:10:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r1AsyhNNOno&t=4200s) 就像情人眼里出西施一样，估值本质上就是一种罗夏墨迹测验（Rorschach test）。 — 尤里安·蒂默（Jurrien Timmer） ## Mentioned Josh Brown, Michael Batnick, Jurrien Timmer, Peter Lynch, Bruce Johnstone, Ned Johnson, Abby Johnson, Will Danoff, Denise Chisholm, Kevin Warsh, Scott Bessent, Alan Greenspan, Cathie Wood, Jerry Tsai, Fidelity Investments, Fidelity International, National Pension Service (NPS), People's Bank of China (PBOC), China Investment Corporation (CIC), Museum of Fine Arts Boston, Museum of American Finance, 22V Research, Goldman Sachs, Duality Research, Citrini Research, OpenAI, Oracle, Nvidia, Apple, Microsoft, Meta, AMD, Paramount, Uber, Williams-Sonoma, S&P 500, Nasdaq, Burning Man, Ironman 70.3, Financial Times ## Video description On episode 263 of The Compound and Friends, ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Downtown Josh Brown⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ and ⁠Michael Batnick⁠ are joined by ⁠Jurrien Timmer⁠, Director of Global Macro at Fidelity Investments, to discuss: Why year-end S&P 500 price targets miss the point, the $17 trillion rise in the national debt and the missing buyers of Treasuries, hyperscaler borrowing and reverse crowding out, 5% bond yields and the stealth correction underneath the market, record market concentration, whether AI is an earnings bubble, Kevin Warsh's Fed, why Nvidia and Apple have become the new defensive trade, going on with gold and Bitcoin, why the predicted AI job losses haven't shown up, the 60/20/20 portfolio, and whether today's AI bull market is following the dot-com playbook. This episode is sponsored by DBMF. To learn more about the world’s largest managed futures ETF visit ⁠https://www.dbmf.com/TCF ►00:00 - Cold Open ►13:50 - Intro - Jurrien Timmer on Price Targets ►18:14 - $17 Trillion of New Debt and No Buyers ►20:46 - Hyperscaler Bonds & Reverse Crowding Out ►24:33 - Oil, 5% Yields & the Stealth Correction ►32:21 - OpenAI Revenue Shock & Market Breadth ►39:57 - Is AI an Earnings Bubble? ►43:30 - Nvidia & Apple: The New Defensive Trade? ►48:41 - Gold & Bitcoin Outlook ►52:32 - AI and Jobs: Where Are the Layoffs? ►1:00:36 - The 60/20/20 Portfolio ►1:06:10 - Dot-Com vs. AI: The 1998 Analog ►1:10:20 - Burning Man and a Surprise 👕 Check out The Compound shop: https://www.idontshop.com 🎙️Listen to our podcasts: TCAF: https://podcasts.thecompoundnews.com/show/TCAF/ Animal Spirits: https://podcasts.thecompoundnews.com/show/animalspirits/ Ask The Compound: https://podcasts.thecompoundnews.com/show/ATC/ The Compound Newsletter: https://www.thecompoundnews.com/subscribe Linkedin: https://www.linkedin.com/company/the-compound-media/ Instagram: https://instagram.com/thecompoundnews Twitter: https://twitter.com/thecompoundnews Tik Tok: https://www.tiktok.com/@thecompoundnews Investing involves the risk of loss. This podcast is for informational purposes only and should not be or regarded as personalized investment advice or relied upon for investment decisions. Josh Brown and Michael Batnick are employees of Ritholtz Wealth Management and may maintain positions in the securities discussed in this video. All opinions expressed by them are solely their own opinion and do not reflect the opinion of Ritholtz Wealth Management. See our disclosures here: https://ritholtzwealth.com/podcast-youtube-disclosures/ The Compound Media, Incorporated, an affiliate of Ritholtz Wealth Management, receives payment from various entities for advertisements in affiliated podcasts, blogs and emails. Inclusion of such advertisements does not constitute or imply endorsement, sponsorship or recommendation thereof, or any affiliation therewith, by the Content Creator or by Ritholtz Wealth Management or any of its employees. For additional advertisement disclaimers see here https://ritholtzwealth.com/advertising-disclaimers. #thecompound #investing #stockmarket #stocks [Source](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r1AsyhNNOno)

[1:30] 海外央行与主权基金代表: 黄金到底怎么回事？当下的黄金市场在发生什么？ [3:00] 彼得·林奇（Peter Lynch）: 要不是为了富达的客户，我才懒得出来做这种事。 [5:00] 布鲁斯·约翰斯通（Bruce Johnstone）: 你永远也别想追上我。 [13:50] 尤里安·蒂默（Jurrien Timmer）: 我在这一行干了41年，而我能干这么久的原因，就是我从不回答这类问题。 [13:50] 尤里安·蒂默（Jurrien Timmer）: 价格不过是企业盈利与估值倍数共同作用下的副产品（residual）。 [20:00] 尤里安·蒂默（Jurrien Timmer）: 我去过火人节（Burning Man），对这种闪烁的警报灯早就习惯了。 [50:00] 尤里安·蒂默（Jurrien Timmer）: 涨幅不再动辄暴涨冲天，跌幅也随之大幅缩水（Moon less and swoon less）。 [50:00] 尤里安·蒂默（Jurrien Timmer）: 当资产在没有任何明确叙事驱动下开始上涨时，你必须高度警惕，因为背后往往正酝酿着某些尚未被大众察觉的重大变化。 [55:00] 乔什·布朗（Josh Brown）: 你意识到自己刚才这一顿操作解雇了多少个初级律师吗？ [66:10] 尤里安·蒂默（Jurrien Timmer）: 价格形态比对仅供娱乐消遣，因为它们在失效之前看起来总是有效的（price analogs are for entertainment purposes only because they work until they don't）。 [70:00] 尤里安·蒂默（Jurrien Timmer）: 就像情人眼里出西施一样，估值本质上就是一种罗夏墨迹测验（Rorschach test）。

[0:00] Jurrien Timmer: What's going on with gold? [13:50] Jurrien Timmer: one of the silliest things Wall Street strategists do. [13:50] Jurrien Timmer: Price is just a byproduct of earnings and valuation. [13:50] Jurrien Timmer: I've been in the business 41 years, and the reason for that is that I don't answer questions like that. [50:00] Jurrien Timmer: it's going to moon less and it's going to swoon less. [60:00] Jurrien Timmer: on the sweet spot of the efficient frontier. [62:45] Jurrien Timmer: coupon-clipping equities that have high payout ratios, good payout growth, and good dividends [66:10] Jurrien Timmer: price analogs are for entertainment purposes only because they work until they don't [70:00] Jurrien Timmer: you can come up with any conclusion. It's like beauty is in the eye of the beholder. It's a Rorschach test.

[0:00] There's no limit to what people will do physically you saw the 61 year old woman that just did a five and a half hour plank and What? 61 year old lady, five and a half hour plank. Well, like I said, my wife just did The World Championship Ironman 70.3 in Nice, France without training. That doesn't make sense. You get eight and a half hours to do what she did in eight hours and 15 minutes. Why without training? She was just already in shape for that? I could do 20 push-ups without stopping. Without – because she doesn't – she's too busy to train. And for her, this is like – it's just fun. Like it's not – she's not trying to meddle or anything. Oh, my God. But a number of years ago, She had this trophy case installed with no trophies. And she says, I'm going to fill this case up with trophies. And now it's full of trophies. That's that's that's determining. That's pretty awesome. I have a cousin who is doing or attempting to do. A marathon. Seven marathons in seven days on seven continents. Do you know about this? Seven marathons. So that's like an extra super different marathon. Seven days on seven different continents. You run a marathon and wake up the next day and run a marathon? Yeah. How do you get from one to the other? You've gone there? You swam. You swam. Wow. That one I haven't heard. People are maniacs. It's good to be back. We're so happy to see you. I was in Europe the last time with the Peter Lynch thing, so I unfortunately missed it. I was one of our crazy... institutional road shows that Fidelity International does, our sister organization. This year, I did three weeks throughout all of Asia Pacific on one carry-on, but last year, it was a big Europe trip. How many cities three weeks? I did Seoul, And then the southern... City where the National Pension Fund is, then Tokyo, then Beijing, Shanghai, Taipei, Hong Kong. Does Fidelity have clients in all these places? Oh, yeah. I met with all the central banks. They have mandates with the governments in these places? So Fidelity International is – institutional and wholesale so it's not like the US where you buy a mutual fund. And being the Fidelity brand, we have access. I mean I was at the PVOC. I was at CIC, the big sovereign wealth fund, all asking about gold. What's going on with gold? Gold in this day and age. Because they don't have a reserve currency. For us, it's a luxury. Like who cares, right? It's a size show. It's like Bitcoin. You play or you don't. But for them, it's existential. That Fidelity event I did with Peter Lynch was definitely like a career highlight. Nice. Like guys like you and I, we're always talking. We're always, he doesn't do a lot of that. And, uh, He was razor sharp. And I think so. I think at first we did a prep call. And as you can imagine, it's fidelity. So there's 10 people on the call. So this is a true story. So, We're talking. He he has no idea. It's a podcast. I don't. And then all of a sudden, he starts telling stories – And I slapped – I forget who I was slacking with, somebody on my side. I was like, Holy shit, he thinks this is the podcast. Like I was worried because he was like – He was great. He was reffing. He was making jokes. And I'm like, I think he thinks we're recording this. The podcast, it turns out I'm an idiot. What he was doing was, was warming me up. Like, hey, I can have fun. I know the types of things that you want to ask me. He was showing me that he's into it, which was really cool. So, um... We get on stage... He was kind of like backstage. He was kind of like, I would only do this for Fidelity clients. He's like, that's that's pretty much it. So I thought like, all right, he kind of like got dragged into this, but he warmed up. And by the end, the audience was laughing at everything he was saying. Like, so can I tell you, he took the room over. Peter Lynch was the only person other than me who ever did TV for Fidelity. He was on- Is that true? He was on- well, for the 99%. He was on Louis Rukeyser Wall Street Week. Then he retired, but nobody who's a big shareholder at Fidelity ever really retires. I think they just kind of keep you on. He's still not really retired, but he was retired enough that when he did TV, he needed to be coached a little bit so i was his coach so that's how i started so i so he was the guy down in the field and i'm the guy in the booth feeding him the stats amazing and ironically now i'm him i'm no one's ever him but like now i do the tv but i was like you know hey i'd like he's like yurion fill me in like you know what are the latest stats and this and that so somebody said to me He hasn't He retired in 1990 What is he [5:00] What does he know about the market? Have you ever read a book? About... The market, it's always the same. That's number one. Number two, this guy just spent 40 years doing philanthropy at like the highest imaginable levels. You think he has less to say than you do? You know, like it was one of those things where you realize because he's like, I don't own any tech stocks. Yeah. And... I'm not involved in the AI stuff. But his stories were so much more important than that. What a loser. Well, because all the stuff that we're going through now with AI stocks. It's just a time and a place. He's already been through all of that. I thought it was magical. Shout out to Fidelity for letting us do that. That was so cool. I think... the venue was really amazing too, was the, Was it the Boston Museum of Fine Art? Yep, MFA. You've been there, I would imagine? All our – Our anniversary events are there. So if you hit a round number anniversary, like 15, 20, 25, we do an event at the MFA and Peter's there, Abby's there and it's nice. What's your next round number? How many years? I'm at 31, so I got to wait a few years until I get to 35. And Bruce Johnstone, who is our I think our oldest kind of active employee. He's at 61 and he sits close by. I've known him for 61 years at Fidelity. Holy cow. He was in the same class. Oh, he was there. I met him. Yeah. So same class as Peter Lynch, like in terms of when they were there. I'm like, Bruce, I'm catching up to you. I'm at 31. He says, he'll never catch up to me. So he was backstage sitting with Peter and me. Yeah. You remember that? You came backstage. I didn't meet that guy. The other older gentleman that was sitting in the chair was that's Bruce. Yeah. Um. I was going to say – So when Peter ran Magellan, Bruce ran like our value fund. Yes. So they were kind of like duos in that sense, but in different style boxes. I was going to say the other thing that happened that week is they invited Michael and I into the chart room. which we had only ever heard about. It's pretty epic. Yeah. And it's kind of a shadow of its former self in a way because life has moved on and Will Danoff knows that anything that is worth seeing, someone's going to show to him. He doesn't need to go meander to the chart room. But I was hired to work in the chart room by Ned Johnson himself. If you're a PM, fine, you go through the thing. But if you're working in his chart room, he he he vetoes whoever comes through so my last out of like 12 interviews back in 1990 early 95 was with net johnson and we just talked about the markets and it was like the most amazing experience ever but So a lot of those charts I created – And, you know, we were always have a favorite. It's like having a favorite child. I'm a big fan, as you probably know from my work, to incorporate different disciplines. So I'm not... exclusively a technical analyst. I'm not exclusively a macro fundamental. And so, I'd like to tell stories. So if there are different indicators, both technical, fundamental, whatever, that really give the narrative of what we need to think about, then to me, that's that's a great chart. Although there is something to be said for keeping the technicals and the fundamentals separate. And Ned always insisted on that because he wants the signal to be pure and not to be, you know, infected by other disciplines, because. That's going to come from someone else. Oh, it's interesting. Yeah. What was the purpose? What did they tell you when you went to work there in the chart room? What was the purpose that they explained to you? This is why we're keeping... So for people that don't know what we're talking about, In the Fidelity headquarters, there's a room with walls inside of the room and every wall is plastered with these massive – charts. Some of them are highly detailed. Some of them are like a zoom out. But I mean there's eight-foot-long charts in there, right? Yeah. So what did they tell you you were supposed to be doing? It's both like a museum, an archive, a lab, kind of the centerfold chart for lack of a better word is a daily chart. I think it goes back to like 1789 or something. And Ned was very precise about displaying information. So the lights are museum lights. But everything would be on an equivalent log scale so that when you look at the NASDAQ in 2000 versus the Dow and the Dow goes flat, the NASDAQ goes down, whatever it was, 80%. on a linear scale you can't do. you know we [10:00] Always on standby. OK, Mr. Johnson is in the building. be ready to go and spend two hours with him in the chart room, which is what he would do. He would be, he'd have to go to like a board meeting, but he would like sneak out like a kid and go to his candy store, which is the chart room. And, you know, we would look at, the S&P or whatever today. And he would just take his finger and kind of go to the left and say, okay, last time. Bye. Well, it brings us back to this date in time and on a chart that's 30, 40 feet wide and floor-to-ceiling high. 30 or 40 feet wide, right? Way bigger than 8 feet. You can't do that on a screen. You have to do that as if you're standing in front of Rembrandt's night watch. And so that was… So that's the appeal. In older versions of the chart room, we had hundreds of flip panels with like every sector, every select fund, which was our sort of our pre-ETF sector funds. And he would be like, let's take a look at gold or let's take a look at this and we're flipping through charts. And it's – that's what it was. But times have evolved. Everything is electronic. data that we have a team of technical analysts. And if there's something worth seeing, they will make sure the portfolio manager sees it. We met one of our favorite now recurring guests on the Compounded Friends, Denise Chisholm, when we were up there and we did a session with her. Yeah, she's great. Yeah. Yeah. I remember we looked at each other like, how many people like this does Fidelity have hiding up here in Boston? Because we've never heard of her. And they're like, you should meet Denise Chisholm. And then she just crushed the show. So and then they moved the Museum of American Finance out of New York. I think Fidelity sponsored to have it moved to – It's at the pier, yeah. The pier is the new headquarters, which I saw. Commonwealth's pier, yeah. Okay. So what's the museum like up there? Is it cool? I have not seen it yet actually because we have two buildings and I'm still in the old building. um because we just don't have space because we're all back five days a week so we just don't have the space but um i've been meaning to go and look at it i'm there a fair amount but it's sort of in and out to do I'll go with you. I'll show you what everything is. Sounds good. This podcast is brought to you by DBMF. The world's largest managed futures ETF. Feel like the world's changing fast? Sure do. Imagine a strategy built to move when everyone else is standing still. Going long or short across global markets is a trend shift. DBMF is made to move differently. A single low-cost ETF offering genuine diversification, even when stocks and bonds move together. Discover why DBMF's liquid, uncorrelated, managed future strategy could be what your alt allocation is missing at www.dbmf.com slash TCF. DBMF made to move differently. The IMGP DBI Managed Future Strategy ETFs investment objectives, risk, charges, and expenses must be considered carefully before investing. The statutory and summary prospectuses contain this and other important information about the investment company. It may be obtained by visiting www.imgp.com. The fund is distributed by Alps Distributors, Inc. DBMF is the world's largest managed futures ETF as of July 31st, 2026. with 4.16 billion AUM. Oh, wow. 263. What a treat you guys are in for. Michael and I get research from all over Wall Street. Everybody sends us their stuff. My inbox is inundated with tables and charts You cannot even imagine the volume. There's only a few must-reads in there. I think you'd agree with this. Well, now you kind of have to. There's only a few must-reads in there that I never miss, and the work of Urien Timmer is one of those long-time listeners you guys have heard and seen him on the show before. We are so thrilled to have him back. Urien is Director of Global Macro at Fidelity Investments. where he is part of the firm's global asset allocation group. focusing on asset allocation and global macro strategy. He has held that role since 2005, having previously served as a technical research analyst and portfolio manager of the Fidelity Global Strategies Fund. Welcome back, my friend. Thank you. Great to be here. All right. Let's [15:00] What is your year-end S&P 500 target? Is this how... Michael, I keep saying it's the weirdest year. Yeah, but it's also one of the... I think it's one of the silliest things Wall Street strategists do. You don't like it? No. Do you understand why they have to do it though? Yeah, because they make headlines. They have to be on record. But – It's such an arbitrary thing. I want to know what the returns are going to be the next one, five, ten years, how much of that comes from price gains versus income. And also, one of my pet peeves is that people are so focused on price, but price is just a byproduct of earnings and valuation. So solve for earnings, solve for what? People are willing to pay for those earnings based on the longevity of the earnings cycle, the cost of capital, which of course is a big topic, the risk premium, how much of the earnings get paid, get returned to shareholders as dividends or buybacks. And then you get a sense of, okay, earnings are worth 20x. And then you get an earnings forecast and you put them together in a DCF model and out comes a price or a present value of future cash flows. And to me, that's what I solve for. Price is just a residual. point though like and you know this You get sent out from Morgan Stanley or from wherever, Bank of America, and you're sitting with institutions and professional asset managers and PMs, and they sort of want – Is the house view higher or lower? And if it's higher, how much higher? So it's almost like a shorthand. Like forget about the price target itself. Directionally, we think the market will go higher. And we're just saying S&P 8,000 just because we're saying. I mean it's fair. They have to do that. Of course, the market goes up 60%, 70% of the time, right? So you definitely always want to be on the upper side because if you're wrong, at least it doesn't happen very often. Perma bears is a really tough business because you're really fighting the odds, but I see why firms do it, but I'm not a believer. And when I get it – and, of course, I'm also not allowed to make predictions from our compliance. You're better off. So when I get questions like that, like on TV – or questions that are maybe a little bit politically loaded, my stock answer is, well, I've been in the business 41 years, and the reason for that is that I don't answer questions like that. I love it. Good for you. So I'm going to turn the mics off, though. Tell us what your target is. All right. Let's start. So you're… A lot of times when we're preparing the show, we have to load the doc up with the charts that we're looking at as conversation starters. But when we talk to you… You've already done the most amazing stuff so we can just work on what you're telling people. Your October deck came out today? Okay. It's always evolving. It's evolves every week because every single weekend I do a complete download of everything and then I publish on Sunday, you get the report. And so the material is always fresh, which is why it's always in my head, which is. All right. Here's something you put out on social media. Let's let's do chart one. Tell us what we're looking at here. This is the increase in the national debt since COVID, almost 17 trillion. And there are no non-economic buyers of that debt. So central banks aren't buying. Some are even selling like Japan, China. The commercial banks are not really buying. And so when that happens and when rates start to approach or exceed growth rates in the economy. The market starts pricing in fiscal risk, which is obviously what's happening here, but everywhere in the world except for China, where nobody wants to take any risk on anything, so they buy Chinese government bonds. But of course, France is sort of exhibit A right now because the economy in nominal terms is like you don't have the ability to outgrow it, then you have a problem. You have a debt sustainability problem. The US isn't there. And it's a priority, I think, of the administration in Washington to outgrow the debt. And that's why they're all proponents of AI in part. But it's an issue because there are economic buyers. Like I would be an economic buyer. Economic buyer is somebody that cares what the interest rate is. Non-economic buyer is somebody that's, they have like international trade issues and they need to have treasuries on hand. Yeah, it's reserves. It's like big banks in Europe that are strictly policed by the central banks in terms of their risk budget. So they they kind of have to buy it. So we don't really have any of those. And as that [20:00] gap keeps widening you wonder what the end game is and we know we're looking at 5.3 nominal 10-year treasuries and almost 2.9 real rates and you know it's not entirely because of fiscal risk it's also about growth and there's technical things about mortgage convexity and all this stuff um but it's you know the bond move is is a big one and that's that chart is part of the story i have a question about this do you think that, oh, are we about to get blasted? It's a fire drill. It's not an actual fire. No, I just meant by the noise. Yeah, Nicole, just stand there for the next hour. That's right. I go to Burning Man. I'm used to blinky lights. So, Daniel, can we talk chart six? Obviously, you can't take this out of the equation because it's a huge part of the story. hyperscalar bonds this is from 22v research hyperscalar bonds is a percentage of net new treasury borrowing It's a lot. It's 14%. Obviously, giving investors a lot of choice. there's a spread it's not a huge spread but whatever if you can get a spread at microsoft is money good how much lower do you think yields would be absent this particular part of the story? I think reverse crowding out is definitely one of the factors here. So it's fiscal risk. It's just real growth. What's reverse crowding out? We're crowding out the government with private debt. Historically, you read the economic books and crowding out is like governments are spending too much and it squeezes the corporate sector because there's too much supply of debt, but this is reverse crowding out. The hyperscalers are borrowing half a trillion this year, Our analysis suggests they're going to borrow another half a trillion next year. If you look at the Fed flow of funds data, the corporate sector alone, both bonds and now also equity, like the IPO thing has flipped right now. Companies are net issuers of equity because instead of buying back shares, they're spending it on CapEx and then other companies are going public. When you add those two up over the last 12 months, it's about $3.6 trillion of new capital that's being raised. And it's being absorbed pretty well. It's being absorbed so far so good. But, you know, we always wonder, like, when does the boom turn into a bubble? And we think about the Internet story. And I don't think we're in a bubble at all because earnings are exploding to such a degree that valuations are actually falling. And, you know, when the melt up started for AI, which I think was started in April 2025, after the tariff tantrum, the market went vertical. The PE on the tech sector was like 21 and today it's 20. So it's like the earnings are exploding. bubble when you're paying less for earnings. Totally. But that doesn't mean the story doesn't have an unhappy ending and that's not a prediction. But at what point does the market sort of choke on the fire hose of capital? Not yet. Not yet. And the irony is that the Fed is now raising rates, but the hyperscalers could care less where rates are because they go into the market, they borrow bonds and they'll make a 30, 40% return on that debt issuance because they're and there's insatiable demand. But it's not just the hyperscalers. I was talking to Josh about this the other day. Paramount, not exactly Microsoft in terms of their credit worthiness, raised $52 billion dollars And $150 billion worth of buying showed up. There is a lot of money sloshing around looking for returns. Yes, there is. And so, so far, it's OK. You know, the capacity is so constrained in terms of semiconductors, GPUs, other infrastructure. I mean, you look at Japan is one of the hottest markets because they are supplying the AI space, not with semiconductors, but equipment. So it's still going on. And, you know, the part of Japan is where the transistor was invented. Yes. Like, so it's sort of I want to double down, though, on a question Michael asked you. So if you had to quantify not in percentage terms, but maybe in a rank. uh of the cause of what we've seen happen this summer with rates you would not put reverse crowding out or corporate selling of bonds. at number one, you would probably put energy prices or no? I think it's a confluence of narratives. So fiscal risk definitely. Here's what I'm asking you. Maybe you'll answer it differently. I think what a lot of people are thinking is we had this really fun summer of a broadening trade. We had small caps, mid caps rising, value stocks working. We had stocks in every sector making 50 two week highs. That seems to have come to an end when WTI crude crossed 80 and the yield on the 10 year crossed 5%. All of a sudden the market got more selective again, which makes perfect sense. So now if the question is, how do we end the year? And people are thinking about [25:00] Well, what would be the catalyst? for a catch-up trade all those blown up sectors for the stocks to recover. In my mind, Well, the only real answer is... Yields at least stop going up and maybe we get a little bit of pressure from high oil prices down. That's the catalyst for the rebroadening. So I guess the reason I'm asking you that question is what do we need to look for to get some kind of inkling that that's possible? Yeah, so you hit the nail on the head because I look at correlations a lot. And so oil and the S&P are about 50% negatively correlated and the S&P and long-term government bonds are about 50% positively correlated. So it's all one trade. It's oil feeding into sticky inflation. We were just talking about buyers of bonds, but the whole savings glut era, the kind of the new normal, the secular stagnation, that's all in the rearview mirror. And it turns out that that really was the exception in history, not the rule, but it is the period that most of us grew up in career-wise. So clearly, that's a big part of it. tanker rates how they've gone up like tenfold so there are still real bottlenecks So I think that's probably the number one. Fiscal risk definitely is being repriced. The term premium is now at 90 basis points. Real rates have gone from minus 200 bips five years ago to now almost 300 bips. - Right, there's a real interest rate now in inflate, like adjusting for inflation, you actually are earning something. - What a concept. - And that is the fiscal risk. - If you buy a five year tips and you hold it to maturity, you're getting like 2.6% real, plus whatever the inflation is going to be over the next five years, which is probably my view is going to be at least 3%. I mean, those are good numbers, right? And so you don't want to overstay your welcome being short bonds. And they could easily go to six. And per the Fed model, a 6% bond yield is a 16 PE on the S&P. So that's 20% down. But again, not price, but PE. And then it's a question of to what degree is that offset by earnings, which are growing 30%, 40%. And so I see this as like an echo of 2022. And and we're having a sort of a stealth correction where, like like you just said, 25 percent. are of stocks are above their 50-day. As of last week, 46% was above their 200-day That is a 1994-like correction. In response to rates. Yeah, and a 2022. again it's it's the dcf math right if earnings are like in 2022 earnings were decelerating because they had boomed after covet but that was all base effect recovery so earnings growth was slowing and it ended up being eight percent in 2022 but the pe went down 33 because the cost of capital went from like zero to five and that's what's going to happen to pe's and especially now and this is the essence of the fed model that if the risk-free asset treasuries are competitively priced against risky assets, which they are at 5.3, their yield is higher than the S&P. If that yield goes up, the S&P has to listen. And if it ignores it, we get an 87, a 1987. Where it's ignored up until a point where it can no longer be ignored and all of that risk gets repriced in one day. It's ignoring it right now. Are you surprised? No, it's not because the PE is falling. So again, this is not about price. It's about valuation. rates went up, cost capital went up, Fed was tightening, bond yields went to 10%. Stock market was like, yeah, yeah, nothing to see here. And then it crashed. All right. So I said that it's not responding to what you said. No, it actually is. I'm looking at the price of the S&P and drawing the wrong conclusion. PE ratio. You're saying the PE is re-rating precisely because of screaming rates. It's re-rating because of screaming rates. It's re-rating because… Maybe peak earnings? Peak earnings growth. And we don't know for a peak earnings growth, but… Earnings growth is like 35%. Got to be getting close. Investors aren't that dumb. They're not going to keep bidding it up higher. Investors do not pay for peak earnings. And I think one of the key things we need to solve for, and I don't know if we can, is not the level of earnings growth, which of course is very high, but how durable that is. And then you have the separation between long-duration stocks like the MAG-7 and more cyclical stocks with weaker balance sheet. who do get hurt by Fed tightening and I think that's one of the delineations that we're going to be looking at. But again, it's present value of future cash flows, cost of [30:00] Capital goes up, PE goes down, all else being equal, which of course it never is, especially right now. And so in 2022, there was not enough earnings offset to keep the market from falling. It was a pretty chat GPT moment. And now there is enough earnings offset. And that's why the market since early June has really not gone anywhere. And underneath, the internals are pretty – I looked at this – the industry group and sector internals earlier this week. Somebody did a piece and – It just it occurs to me that most of the damage in the market, the sub Rosa correction that's happening. It's in order – of what's the most rate sensitive. It's almost monotonically in order. It's rational. It's completely rational. And the way I think about it is it looks as though every portfolio manager independently decided to, I want less exposure to rate sensitive and more exposure to long duration tech assets. And they all did that individually. And then the collective aggregated. um, manifestation of that is the leaders and laggards in Bicepter. And, you know, and it's worth, you know, of course, I'm a student of history, but 1994 is a cycle worth, uh, looking back at that was under Alan Greenspan. Of course, he, he doubled the cost of capital. We had at that point, I think the worst bond bear market in history. Well, he's surprised. He did it between meetings. It was a shock. It was a shock. And, you know, he was, uh, famously opaque. I think playbook. But the market just sat there. It had two drawdowns of 10%, and it basically did nothing for a year while the internals were kind of rotting, right? Like more than two-thirds of the stocks in the S&P were down more than 20%, but you didn't see it because it was kind of a cap-heavy market, and earnings were very strong, just like they are today. And as soon as he took his heavy hand off of the rate market, the market exploded. and stocks and and to your question earlier we we could see that right because if if somehow this iran thing gets settled and you know here we are like a month eight and still hasn't been but um and we're the market calls the all clear on the bond side we could get another big breakout i think that's going to happen i have a few pieces of evidence that i'd like to like to get your take on let's start with chart eight so this happened today i think today might be tweeted evidence of how leveraged the entire tech sector is to open AI ananthropic. An FT story about OpenAI's revenue being less than initially reported is sparring on more than a 5% drop in Oracle shares, exacerbating losses from Nvidia and AMD to Microsoft. So in conjunction with that, you have the 30-year making a pretty decent reversal, which we haven't seen that in weeks and weeks and weeks. And I know that you are... You respect technicals. Jump to chart 12A, please, Daniel. All right. We have a 12A and a 12B. So here we go. So look at on top first. This is the ratio of the equal weight to the S&P. And, and, This got very stretched very fast where the S&P was holding up and underneath the surface, the average stock is getting the shit kicked out of you. So it bottomed. here in October. of 2025. I come in November, it bottomed here in May 2026. And for whatever reason, not for whatever reason, the rubber band is getting stretched to the same levels And you have this monster reversal. The ratio is up 1% today. It's the best day of equal weight versus the S&P since July, while everybody is talking about it. Everybody has been focused on how weak the breath breakdown is. And Josh and I were looking at this chart. You like stories. I think this is a terrific one. Chart 10. So this comes from duality research. This is such an awesome chart you're in. The purple line is the S&P 500 technology index. And the green line is the rest of the market, S&P 500 X tech. And what Alex was saying is that everybody is focused on the wrong signal. They are worried about the breath breakdown, leading to further weakness in the index. And he's saying, no, no, no, the opposite has proven to be true. Every time tech breaks down, the rest of the market seems to wobble. Thank you. tech leading and the rest of the market selling off is not a bad thing because what has happened for the last five years is the rest of the market catches up eventually. And if we get interest rates coming down a little bit, Some energy prices coming in a little bit. and rotation away from the tech trade into the rest of the market, you could see a rip into the rest of the fourth quarter. And a piece of trivia, so Goldman has all these thematic equity baskets. So they have an AI basket and an XAI basket, and the two are negatively correlated to each other, which is pretty amazing because they're two halves of the same index. And the same applies to equal – like I track MAG7 to equal weight, So, [35:00] over the last, sorry, Max 7 has outperformed by 1,800 basis points. And so I- Would you like to hear a fun fact? Yes. Goldman stole that idea from me. when I coined the term Halo earlier this year. which is heavy assets, low obsolescence stocks. Oh, Oreos. What? I didn't invent Oreos. No, no, no. Goldman started saying halo, literally that phrase in their research, and then that gave rise to we should have a basket to show the anti-AI trade. They expressed it differently than I would have. But duly noted. I got one more thing for you. Yeah. This is going to knock your socks off. A lot of the breath... conversation that we're having. Yes, the breath sucks, to be clear. But a lot of what we're seeing that's looking really funky and bizarre, it's due to the concentration. So in 2018, I did a chart, a data point, where this is July 2018, so eight years ago. the top five stocks at the time, were equal to the bottom 282 companies in the index. Chart 11, please. today. Look at this, how wild this is. Today, the top five are equal to the bottom 434. It went from the bottom 282 in 2018 to the bottom 434 today, which is stock 67 to 500. And My favorite chart that we've done in a while is, Chart 12. So this is charting. that through time. So the top five equals the bottom X over time of stocks. Look at this explosion. It's on freaking believable. It's never been this high, obviously. Yes, I make it into the chart room. I mean, that's a good one. So we have versions of this. So we track. the top 10 stocks versus the bottom 490, the top 50 versus bottom 450. And I've done a lot of work on this, tracking this all the way back to the 60s, talking about the nifty 50 period in early 70s. Obviously, the dot-com period was a similar thing. So I've studied this in depth. And right now, we're in a cyclical bull market and a secular bull market. But cyclically, S&P is up about 125% And that's very similar stats to like 99 and 73. So is that a toppy then inherently? Um, It's really difficult because – The market is obviously very top-heavy, right? So top 50 stocks are 60% of the index. Top 10 stocks are 40%. Max 7 is like 35% or something like that. These regimes, like late 90s, it was like a Cape model, like reversal. um but throughout like 40s 50s 60s early 70s leaders that regime it was a top heavy market for decades right and and so these companies have huge modes there are some cases national champions so it's you can't play the mean reversion game other than the valuation side so in 73 so what happened was 68 this is a lesson from ned johnson in the chart room 68 we had the glamour stock with the word Tronix in it went to a 50p. Didn't build Cy Warcraft Fidelity? What? Jet... Was it Bill or Jerry? Jerry's side. Jerry's side. Yes, yes, he did. Yeah. Yeah. And so that happened. Well, he was like the Cathie Wood of his day. Yeah. Okay. But so late 60s. Then we had the recession 1970, the retail investing public got wiped out. And then early 70s, it was institutions running money, including Fidelity. And PMs just wanted safe quality, high quality stocks that were going to deliver earnings. And that was called the Nifty 50. They were brands. Yeah, it was like Clorox, IBM, Xerox. And the irony is that. All of those companies through that 48% bear market in 73, 74, they all delivered on their earnings. Their earnings didn't skip a beat, but they still got annihilated because valuations, right? Inflation will kill valuations and that's what happened. And at that extreme, the top 50 stocks were trading at 2x the PE of the bottom 450. Same thing happened in late 90s. From 1998, that LTCM moment, the melt-up started. From that point, the top 50 doubled their P.E. from 20 to 40, while the rest of the market stayed at 20. That was like Cisco, Microsoft, Intel. Yeah, and that was another bubble. And then you had this massive rotation, but it was in a down market. Now we never had a valuation extreme. 21. Well, yeah, 21, but that was for the whole market too. But even a year ago when the Mac 7 sort of lost its momentum, its PE was only about 30% more than the – Well, so can I ask you – [40:00] about this then that's what the people that have been bearish they've pivoted to they said no no no you have it all wrong You're thinking about 1999 and you're looking for an S&P at 50 times earnings and it's not. Thank you. and you're looking for a Nasdaq at 100 times earnings and it's not It's an earnings bubble. We don't need high valuations for this to be a bubble because actually what's happening is a pull forward in demand. Related to the CapEx data center CapEx and it's global. And all of a sudden one day these companies will start missing their earnings and they'll never hit their earnings again until the analysts furiously ratchet down their expectations. And that process, I don't care that you're 21 times earnings. It's going to hurt like hell and you'll be back at 14 times earnings and earnings will be falling. And that's I think their get out of jail free card. We're over earning. Is there any truth to that? Is there some? I think there's some truth to that. So semiconductor earnings are up 178% year over year. So that doesn't sound sustainable to me. No, it's a cyclical interest index. And so and of course, people are making the argument, well, it's no longer cyclical secular, but you know, it's different this time are not good words to live by. And the semiconductor index has a very clear 40 month earning cycle. And we're like, right? like the part where it should start to roll over and of course 178% is not sustainable but then we look at the companies you know I'm not going to mention names but the companies are that are in the you know, that are providing all the stuff to the to the capex build out you know it's so tight they cannot cannot keep up with demand so i think the earning story actually talking about five-year backlogs yeah exactly so i'm not worried about the earning story so much but what i worry about and you showed the that that plummet in the open ai um you know um anthropic I worry about two things. One is, again, too much demand for capital, unknown ROIs. And the Mac 7 is sort of part of this, or the hyperscalers is... They used to pay back – they're obviously cash cows. They have been for a long time. And they used to pay back $0.90 on the dollar in terms of the earnings that they make and give back to the – shareholders via dividends, but mostly buybacks. Now they're spending all their cashflow on CapEx and, you know, a purist would say that's good you're not supposed to be you know like like yeah you're not supposed to give the money back your company you should be investing it but those buybacks even if the return is lower it's like a known return. You know what you're getting as opposed to an unknown return in terms of the ROI on this CapEx. And so it's a bird in the hand, right? So the market will pay up for certainty. And that's actually another reason why bond yields are rising because Kevin Warsh wants to be like Greenspan and be more opaque and less predictable. And I think that's very wise and honorable. The market doesn't need its hand held because you lose price discovery, but It creates less certainty and that means a higher term premium because investors want to be paid for uncertainty. And so the irony is that in a way, he's driving up bond yields almost not deliberately, but it's a byproduct of this policy because investors will price in risk. And the risk is that nobody knows what Fed is going to do. I want to ask you about another market meme of the moment. And I'm part of this noise. But one of the things that I've been saying is – in a rising interest rate environment The traditional defensive sectors don't act like defense. Utilities are the worst sector of the year, I think. and real estate staples and staples the three of them are like neck and neck they all look awful yeah those are considered bond proxies right so those stocks have been used as bond substitutes and equity portfolios for 15 years now and reads as well right so what do people do when they get nervous I think they buy NVIDIA and Apple. And I'm not saying those are actually defensive stocks. I'm saying it is the defensive trade of the moment. Number one, they're huge. Number two, they're highly liquid. You can buy them like that. in size. Number three, we may not know what the right multiple is. In fact, I'm almost certain Apple's multiple is wrong and so is Nvidia's based on their growth rate. But that's a whole other conversation. But what we do know is the earnings are going to show up. You might not like the amount that people are paying for those earnings. I sort of feel like they've become – risk off would be the wrong – But I sort of think they've become almost the default. All right, you know what? I don't like how the home building stocks are acting. I don't love how the biotechs are acting. Let's just do a little bit more Apple. Yeah, no, I totally agree with that. [45:00] The Mag 7 and it's – Microsoft too lately. Meta is back. They are quality stocks. with and they generate a lot of free cash flow they are spending some some of them are spending it on on capex but they are immune to what the fed does yeah because their their cash flow growth is so big they don't need to really borrow money i mean they can uh and they are for the capex but if they decide we're not going to do capex their stocks actually will go to the moon a lot of the economy is immune to what the fed does which is such a bizarre state of affairs so what they So part of the corporate sector is immune. Anything that's touching AI is immune because the ROIs are so high. But if you're a weaker credit, more leverage, shitty balance sheet, and you're looking at a maturity wall in 2027 or 2028, and you look at high yield spreads are now moving higher, triple Cs are – so there are pockets of the economy that are sensitive to that. And that's why the breadth is not good. but the strong companies, the Mag7, other high quality companies with solid balance sheets and good cash flow growth are relatively immune. And that's actually fairly typical. Historically, it's quality that wins during periods of rough sledding. And so that's happening again. I guess I was thinking more in terms of the economy and consumer spending. So, yeah. So I'm glad you corrected me on that. So obviously – What the hyperscalers don't care about does not translate to a home buyer who's now looking at a seven handle on mortgages. or weaker corporate credits. And of course, the government doesn't like it, even though the government can kick the can down the road. But I think France is a very good lesson. I mean, the US is not France, but France has no growth. They have a lot of debt. They have obviously a lot of political shenanigans going on. Things seem to be going well there. Yeah, so and bond yields are exploding and they are well, well above – the speed limit of the economy. And, you know, it's like, who are the two people that wrote about the debt, the 90%? No, no, no. It was. There were these two people who wrote this famous book about debt. And so the key is you need to outgrow your debt. And I think Scott Besson has laid that out. And I think that's a very clear strategy. But the funding rate needs to be below the growth rate. That creates a crunch and we're seeing that in the bond market there. In the US, we're not there yet, but we're getting close, right? The real GDP growth, real, sorry, real potential GDP growth is now at two and a half percent. And starting to edge down because the base effects from 2021 are rolling off. If you look at a five-year CAGR and the real yield is at 2.8. Now, maybe that speed limit is too low because we're going to get this big AI productivity. And maybe that real rate is going to go to three or four. Then we're OK. Potential nominal GDP growth is running around six. And the 10 year is at 5.3. So we're not quite there. But it's getting close enough that you're starting to see the jaw boning. The whole silly thing about buying off the runs and going from four billion to six billion. It's like a drop in the ocean, right? I think our attempts to try to talk the market down and, you know, the market has the last word. Would you expect gold to be performing better given these fears or high real rates just putting a lid on it? Gold is a very interesting asset class that I've been trying to understand for a long time. And until 2022, the simple... Um, benchmark for gold was real rates. So you take the real tips yield, put it upside down, and it's exactly the price of gold. And not anymore. And in 2022, that narrative went upside down. Based on that metric, gold should have gone to 1000 in 2022. Instead, it doubled. And now it's a proxy on global liquidity growth, global M2, which is growing at about 7, 8, 9%. It's about 120 trillion and that now explains the price of gold as well as you know central bank buying and this is why when i was in asia talking to central banks around the asia pacific reason their three questions were ai boom or bubble uh what the fed's gonna do dollar you know kind of because they're central banks they invest in treasuries and the third was what the hell is going on with gold why is it not doing what it's supposed to and to me the short the short answer is that in 2025 Gold had a big run. As always happens, the tourists jump in, they start buying geos, [50:00] and this is after Bitcoin had just put in a four-year halving cycle peak. So the speculator said, goodbye, Bitcoin, hello, gold, and it brought gold up to like 5,600, and it never should have been more than gold. 4,800 based on my model of global money supply. And then Iran happened and all of a sudden gold is for sale because it's a reserve asset, right? If you're a GCC state and you can't sell your oil, you got to sell something. And then gold and treasuries became highly correlated because treasuries are also for sale in that environment. And so... So the combination of being overbought and all of a sudden this regime change happens, not go down to about 4039. It's at 42. I think that will pass. And based on global money supply, 5000 to me is the right number and rising. And I think now not to change subjects, but now that Bitcoin, in my view, has done a full winter, a mild winter. When you put both time and price on a log scale, it's like a beautiful harmonic picture based on the power law. And every wave up and down fits a harmonic pattern. And that peak in 2025, it was a little short of where it should have gone. It should have gone to 150 over 150 weeks, but it went to 126 over 140 weeks. 126,000 of Bitcoin is still the high. And so at that point, based on trend lines and knowing that every winter gets smaller, I'm like, you know, 60K is a level that I'm going to buy. And it went to 58 and not to toot my own. Bitcoin winters are shrinking in length. Yeah, but so we hit 60. And depth. Yes. It's a maturing asset, right? So it's going to moon less and it's going to swoon less. And that's what maturing assets do. But when it hit 60 earlier this year, I'm like, the price is right, but the time is wrong because these winters last 9 to 12 months. And then as recently as maybe a month or two ago, it was still at 60. And I'm like, okay, now I'm really going to pay attention. And then it broke above 80. bottom and when you price bitcoin in terms of gold it's a really beautiful pattern so i think gold's i think bitcoin is gonna i think they're both gonna go up and bitcoin is gonna go up more even though we're still kind of looking for a narrative but as you know When things move without a narrative, you always have to pay attention because there's something going on. We just don't see it yet. On the economic side, If you go back and read some of the commentary in 2024, about what AI is going to mean for the economy, the predictions of job loss by 2026 or 2027, I mean, some of them, not everyone, some of them were cataclysmic. We haven't seen any of it. I know the jobs numbers are starting to disappoint to the downside somewhat, but in the scheme of, I don't know, 350 million people in the country and we're arguing about 50,000 or 100,000 jobs, it's not really relevant. It's a rounding error. Yeah. And also one thing to remember about the jobs data. is that we have no immigration and boomers are leaving the labor force. So what we call the break-even rate in the jobs is only like 30,000 where it used to be 70 or 100,000. So the weaker numbers, they're not really weak. They're measured against a labor force that is growing a lot less. And so you have to kind of normalize for that. But the fears, and who was the report that came out with the really disturbing issue? Dr. Justin Marchegiani: Citrini. The fears of wholesale or large-scale job losses I think is one of the reasons why the Fed took out these three insurance cuts in 2025. They saw inflation getting closer to two. Everyone is worried about AI eating the jobs. So they cut three times and it turned out to be a false alarm, A, because Iran pushed inflation back up, and B, the jobs market is fine. The economy is running pretty hot. You're saying the Fed was already worried about AI-driven disinflation in 2025. Yeah, that's why. a cushion. That's why the Fed cut and now they have to uncut. So I don't see this as a tightening cycle. I see it more as they should not have eased those last three times and they need to take them back. And that's what they're doing. That's it's as simple as that. Simple as that. Okay. Uh, It doesn't appear that mass job loss is on the horizon for Q4 or Q1 of 2027. Those predictions all ended up being either charitably extremely early or they just misunderstood the nature of what this technology really means. Which of those... Well, would you would you agree with more? I think it's a little bit of both. I think the risks are... were overstated and I think they probably still are because... new industries [55:00] are created when you have a technological innovation. We don't always see it. I mean, remember like in 1999 when we were all fretting about pets.com, nobody had any idea that someday we would all be Ubering everywhere, right? But that was a byproduct of the internet revolution because of the connectivity. And so I think AI is going to infiltrate every part of life, every part of the economy, but we don't even really know what it's going to look like. And so I think that that's the point where we are. I think so far it's a tool that makes people smarter, you know, like I'm best friends with ChatGPT now is like, Because I always have all these questions swirling in my head. And I got to wait until I go to the office to ask someone. Now I can just ask Jad G.P.T. I love that so much. You do too. And so I'll give you one example. I run a food camp at Burning Man and I wanted to – I need to do some legal work on, you know, like waivers and just, you know, kind of like liability, stuff like that. and, And normally, you know, you go to a lawyer. and they draft something that people have to sign and you go back and forth and it's going to cost x thousand dollars I did this and I did 99% of it with chat GPT iterating, right? Everything is an iteration. And then finally, I was happy with it. Then I gave it to a lawyer. Yeah. And I probably saved five grand doing that. And I think that's, to me, for the... typical person or business or enterprise, that is the promise of AI. So yes, does it require fewer bodies? Yes, of course. I was going to say, do you know how many lawyers you just fired? And one thing that is worth mentioning, it's not an original idea of mine, but Well, you think about other technological revolutions like the railroad system, right? Those took a long time to build or the highway system, all these networks. And it took a long time to feel the – the the the downstream effects because it takes so long right you build the railroads then you build economies around it and it takes like almost like a generation and so those things all created job losses but they happen so slowly that they just get reabsorbed and the one thing i do worry about is that ai is happening so fast to everything i think faster than anyone this is even railroad build it's so fast it makes people uncomfortable including the people running the actual frontier that it may be more disruptive for that reason. Well, no industry is immune. I mean, the railroads came for horses. Yeah. This is a lot different. Yeah. And speaking of horses, actually, it was trolley carts, not horses. But if you look, I've studied S-curves because we're in an S-curve right now. Bitcoin has been in an S-curve. So I studied S-curves going back like a couple hundred years. And the most spectacular failure of an S-curve were the trolleys. Because they came and then the cars came. It was too late already. And that was the end. So that was an S-curve that imploded. And sometimes that does happen. Because you have cities that kept the infrastructure, but almost like as a novelty. Like in San Francisco. The car came too quickly after the trolleys. And yes, in San Francisco, of course. Who doesn't like to go on the trolley? All right, so overall then, given like everything that you've said, we know that there's this debt limit out there. Like at a certain point, it will become apparent to everyone that there are no You call them non-economic buyers and the rate is outstripping our potential economic growth. All right. But everybody knows that, right? So that's like a thing that we just have to think about. I don't know that there's anything actionable about it per se. No, but when push comes to shove, like one thing that's on my mind and you just asked about gold – is at what point does financial repression come back or will it? I mean, when we had finance, so QE, zero bound, when we had that in the past, there was a deflation risk, not an inflation risk. So I don't know what that's going to look like at a period in a time when inflation is running at three to four percent. I don't know how that's going to be executed, but, You look at France, it's a debt spiral because their cost of funding is going from two to three to four to five and it's going to eat up their interest expense and they don't have the growth. So someone has to go and try to fix that, which would be the ECB. But of course, Europe is kind of a shit show anyway. And fiscally, of course, they're all different countries. and Besant and Warsh start to coordinate or they at least kind of the banks to be that non-economic buyer, which is actually pretty easy to do. You stop paying interest on excess reserves and [60:00] They're going to buy treasuries pretty quickly. And so you wonder what the end game is if there needs to be one. And, you know, best and serene doing this with sort of issue more bills, issue fewer bonds. But there are limits to how much you can do that with without the Fed being complicit, right? Because otherwise, they're going to push T-bills up. That's going to upset the repo rate, the T-bill ratio. You can have another repo problem like we had in 2019 that forced the Fed to cut rates. Those are the things I wonder about if the cost of capital keeps going up or at least doesn't come down. And then back to your earlier point about What do you buy when this stuff is happening? I've been pounding the table on what I call the 60-20-20 for the last four years. What the 60-20-20 is? So we all grew up in the 60-40 era, right? You buy 60% S&P, 40% Bloomberg Ag. which has become 80, 20 in recent years. And from the late 90s until COVID, That made you a 9% CAGR and against a 9% annualized vol when inflation was 2.5. Like what's not to like, right? That's on the sweet spot of the efficient frontier. But it's built on the premise that the 4D is negatively correlated to the 60, which it no longer is because when the cost of capital rises and the risk-free asset is competitive, the correlation goes to positive. And so bonds, I think they're attractive, right? The risk reward of owning 10 year treasuries is like, 11 to minus 1. If yields fall 100 basis points, you get your 5% coupon plus 6% in duration. And if they go up 100, you get your 5 minus 6, you lose 1. Those are pretty good. No brainer. Those are pretty good numbers, right? And it's driven by real rates, which is even better because you can lock in that real rate. So I like them for that reason. But not you don't like them enough for them to be. But not not 40. And so like I love short to intermediate term tips right now because they have a duration of like two and a half and they have a real rate of like two and a half. So it's like to me, that's like a sweet spot. Leveraged loans, you know, they're like high yield but floating rate. They're syndicated loans, no duration risk. Those are interesting. uh gold bitcoin commodities so these are the things that you would stuff into that other you want stuff that is uncorrelated because in the what the The world that many people know is that When the 60% wobbles, the stock market goes down, the bonds are there to bill you out. Now, it's the bonds that are causing the wobble in stocks. So you have a positive correlation. So you need to have stuff in there that doesn't move in relation. So I look a lot at correlations. And for instance, the BCOM spot index, commodity index. So if you have four quadrants of correlation to equities and to bonds, left quadrant where it is negatively correlated to everything else. Managed futures the same, probably because they all are long commodities. And short bonds. And short bonds. Again, short data tips. S&P XAI is like uncorrelated to everything. It's like, so there are so many places to go. And that's one of, that's a great thing compared to, you know, five years ago. Is there a danger though that if the wobble, is so... powerful in bonds and stocks. that components of that other 20 fall prey to it and the correlation snap to one. I'm thinking Bitcoin, like how fast could Bitcoin go back to being a NASDAQ proxy? It could happen in two seconds. uh it was yeah no for for some of them that is a risk and actually we're seeing this in the the european banks right now that's been one of my favorite sectors uh you you got a tremendous growth in the payout uh the payout ratio is 88 they've out until just a few weeks ago uh since april 2025 they outperformed the s p by as much as ai did which is wow which is incredible these are the most boring part of the world european banks but that's because they were they were for so long by negative rates and policy, and now positive yields are very good for banks. But so you do worry about that. But for me, the bigger worry is when... When this very diversified portfolio, and again, it's not investment advice, it doesn't have to be 60, 20, 20. That's just back of the envelope stuff. My worry is that. Will that perform in a high beta environment or a low beta environment? My guess is it's going to be in a lower beta. Beta meaning the market return. We're in a secular bull market since 2009. Many people disagree with me on the starting point, including Barry when he did my blue. [65:00] my podcast on Bloomberg. He loves debating that. Yeah, but to me, it's very annoying. And I can go for an hour about that. But but let's not next time. um but the the the the The return in the market's been about 17%, 18% just over the last 10 years. Unreal. Nominal returns, 15%. Real returns, 11%. Those are outsized returns, right? So we've been over-earning, back to your earlier point, beta for a long, long time. And, of course, that comes from the price gains, which comes from the large-cap growth story and now the AI story. not going to be terrible but they're going to be a lower beta than what we've seen over the last five years and I want to focus on the income side. I want to coupon clip equities that have high payout ratios and good payout growth and good dividends and buyback shares. But it's not going to be as sexy as earning 20% a year. Are you last thing I want to get to before we let you escape? I want to do this. I want to do this chart of... the internet 1995 to 2000 versus the AI, which you're dating from, I guess, the end of 2022. to 2026 it's uh 16 daniel I know the chart. All right. So... Without getting into every aspect of this and going back into PEs, just generally speaking, Um, Are you at all concerned by – I don't know if it's pattern matching or just the length that this has now been going on. I very specifically have memories of that 1995 to 99 run, which was four years. because that was how I started in the markets. And we're sort of knocking on that door. And I know it doesn't really actually mean anything, but a little bit like bull mark even secular bull markets that run on for a long time have resets during the course of that you just talked about a few of them like you at all worried that maybe 27 could be a hiccup year even if the ai boom goes on 20 years um yes um and not just because of this chart but just other analogs as well but with the caveat that price analogs are for entertainment purposes only because they work until they don't. But there is some parallel here, right? So 1995, so 94, obviously the rate cycle, Greenspan, Stealth bear market is generally how technicians refer to it. You can overlay that with 2022. which again earnings were fine but there was cost of capital increase lowered PEs Then the Fed stepped off the brakes. In 1995, the market went vertical, I think up 38%. And And Netscape went public that year. And that was the aha moment where everyone was like, oh, internet, you know. And so you had this massive boom until 1998. Then LTCM happened, like totally unrelated to the internet. You had a 22% decline. The Fed blinked, eased rates three times, and that's the melt-up. Then the melt-up faced hard, 98 to 2000. Mega-cap stocks doubled in valuation, and they did not have the earnings to back it up. and you had cisco vendor financing everybody else just like nvidia is doing today so april 2025 is that same moment market had gone 21 down so back up 2022 chat gpt's launched that was the oh my god you know right now we're years since then yeah and it's been straight up yeah and it went straight up until spring of 2025 the tariff tantrum happened 21 drawdown uh that ended fed blinked analog that I showed on the chart is 98 to 2025. And we've gone up exactly the same amount over the same length of time. It's crazy. Now and then. Yeah. But the But the opposite of that is the valuation, right? S&P Tech traded at a 70 PE in 2000 instead of 21 PE. That's the saving grace. Another analog, very different situations, but situational awareness and LTCM. But just to take that one point further, valuation is such a fascinating topic because even though the earnings are the earnings, a perma bearer can look at the same data as a perma bull and come up with opposite conclusions, right? So the next 12-month PE is falling like a stone. The last 12-month PE is falling not as a stone but as a pebble. But the five-year CAPE ratio is at an all-time high. So pick one to argue with. So in this chart, if I showed five-year CAPEs for the S&P then and now, they're identical. [70:00] what is a five-year cape, right? That includes 2021, which is COVID. So I caution to look at that, but it just shows you how fascinating valuation is, and you can come up with any conclusion. It's like beauty is in the eye of the beholder. It's a Rorschach test. We think you're fascinating. Thank you so much for being here. Can we give you a present? Yes. All right. You got to open it here, though, okay? Yeah. All right. Nicole, you're going to help? All right. This is for you. You can take the card with you. So we wanted to just recognize you as a fan favorite guest. And Michael and I love talking to you. We learn so much from... All the research that you put out and our audience always learns a lot from you as well. So we have a scissor or a knife. I got it. You got it. All right. All right. So we wanted to get you a little something. And why you're… Seeing that this is on the air, I might get a call for compliance, but… No, no. It's not gold bars. It's nothing outrageous. We know. I was in the brokerage industry for a long time. I'm well aware. Actually, it's the reverse. You can't give us a gift. I think it's the way it really works. Yes, that's right. All right. So we know you cook for an army of people when you do burn. By the way, how was this year's burn? It was great. Was it one of the good ones? It was one of the easy ones. So I'm the chief cat herder and orchestra conductor. Yes. And we had 100 people this year. Amazing. Including a Canadian TV crew that was there to document food culture. So we're actually going to be on Canadian TV at some point. But there was no drama. There was some rain, but we're kind of used to it now, so it doesn't phase us. We fed more artists than ever before. And it was great. That's super cool. I want you to bring this to the next burn. Do you know what it is? Oh, yes, I know what this is. I'm assuming you've got plenty of knives, but this is your travel knife set for your next burn from Williams-Sonoma, which is actually a stock in a bull market. Yes. I know you can't comment on the stock, but it looks pretty good right now. Let's see. You ready to rock with those or what? Oh, yeah. Yeah. Wow. We like. Thank you. All right. It's our pleasure. Thank you. Thank you for everything, Urien. You're the best. Thank you. Appreciate it. Someday Michael will come to a Burning Man. I know I know someone you can talk to. Yeah, I won't. I won't. But he might. All right. That's it for us this week, guys. Huge thanks to you and Timur. What's the best way for people to keep up with your research? I know you're active on LinkedIn. Is there a specific site at Fidelity they can subscribe to you? The easiest place is to find me. So every Monday I do a podcast, half-hour podcast. It's actually for our Canadian sister organization, but they put it out on YouTube. It's really good. All the charts are there. And then every Sunday I publish. I nerd out all weekend and I publish on Sunday. It's internal originally. Then it goes out after compliance looks at it. It goes on LinkedIn usually by Tuesday morning. It gets connected to X that way as well. Although the people on X complain, why is the wrong for them on LinkedIn? But it's a long story. But so everything is out there to consume. All right. Guys, follow Urien on X on LinkedIn. Get all his research. Thank you so much for being here. Ladies and gentlemen, thank you for watching. Thank you for listening. We'll see you soon. Bye. you .