Taliban Emir Outmaneuvers Moderates to Cement Curbs on Afghan Women

The Economist

Supreme Leader Hibatullah Akhundzada maintains absolute control over Afghanistan by deploying a dedicated Kandahar security force to suppress internal Taliban dissent against his bans on female education and employment.

AI-assisted summary of What’s life like as a woman under the Taliban? | The Economist — original source. Check the original for full context.

Source published: 2026-08-14

Key ideas

Five years into Taliban rule, women and girls face sweeping repression, with secondary education barred and only an estimated 10% of girls receiving schooling through informal religious madrasas. (0:00)
Supreme Leader Hibatullah Akhundzada governs via escalating unilateral decrees from Kandahar, including a measure effectively legalizing child marriage by defining a girl's silence as legal consent. (3:44)
A deep internal divide exists between moderate Taliban officials in Kabul and Akhundzada's Kandahar faction, though the emir maintains dominance through a dedicated, IRGC-style military force. (5:27)

Detailed notes

## Background Published by The Economist on YouTube on August 14, 2026, this video features South Asia bureau chief Tom Sasse discussing his 1,000-kilometer road trip across Afghanistan alongside editor-in-chief Zanny Minton Beddoes and expert panelists. According to the description, the program examines life for women and girls five years into Taliban rule, highlighting bans on education beyond age 11–12, exclusion from public life, and the effective legalization of child marriage.

## TL;DR Five years after the Taliban's return to power, Afghan women and girls face an intensely repressive environment marked by strict dress codes, mass workplace purges, and bans on secondary education that leave only an estimated 10% accessing formal classes through private madrasas. Supreme Leader Hibatullah Akhundzada continues to govern from Kandahar through an escalating series of decrees—including provisions where a girl's silence constitutes consent for marriage—overriding widespread internal dissent among rank-and-file Talibs and Kabul administrators. Despite quiet opposition within the regime and heartbreak among ambitious young women, Akhundzada secures his absolute authority through an elite, loyal security force akin to Iran's IRGC, leaving little hope for near-term reform.

## Atmosphere & style The presentation carries an analytical, somber, and deeply unsettling tone, contrasting sober journalistic reporting with heart-wrenching firsthand accounts. It captures the palpable dread and quiet courage within clandestine Kabul classrooms, where articulate teenage girls reflect on their shattered ambitions of becoming doctors and lawyers. The emotional arc moves from the quiet despair of daily life under crushing decrees to a chilling structural explanation of how a reclusive cleric enforces absolute, unyielding control across the nation.

## Bulletin - [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=foNQymBqnDA&t=0s) Five years into Taliban rule, women and girls face sweeping repression, with secondary education barred and only an estimated 10% of girls receiving schooling through informal religious madrasas. - [03:44](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=foNQymBqnDA&t=224s) Supreme Leader Hibatullah Akhundzada governs via escalating unilateral decrees from Kandahar, including a measure effectively legalizing child marriage by defining a girl's silence as legal consent. - [05:27](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=foNQymBqnDA&t=327s) A deep internal divide exists between moderate Taliban officials in Kabul and Akhundzada's Kandahar faction, though the emir maintains dominance through a dedicated, IRGC-style military force.

## Key takeaways - [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=foNQymBqnDA&t=0s) Women in Afghanistan are required to obscure their faces in public, often resorting to surgical masks alongside traditional niqabs to meet modesty mandates. - [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=foNQymBqnDA&t=0s) Women have been systematically purged from higher education and public life, with female university faculty removed and private-sector employment growing precarious. - [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=foNQymBqnDA&t=0s) The nationwide ban on girls' secondary education remains deeply unpopular across Afghan society, leaving approximately 90% of adolescent girls without schooling. - [01:31](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=foNQymBqnDA&t=91s) Internal reporting indicates that a majority of rank-and-file Talibs privately oppose the ban on girls' education but lack the power to challenge the emir's authority. - [02:27](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=foNQymBqnDA&t=147s) Private religious madrasas have become the only available avenue for secondary learning, though tuition costs exclude the majority of families. - [02:27](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=foNQymBqnDA&t=147s) Students in clandestine institutions express intense despair, recognizing that their credentials will likely not lead to professional employment as doctors or lawyers. - [03:44](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=foNQymBqnDA&t=224s) Emir Hibatullah Akhundzada rules through a ratchet of hardline decrees that progressively strip female autonomy rather than through standard legislative procedures. - [03:44](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=foNQymBqnDA&t=224s) A recent decree effectively legalizes child marriage by codifying the principle that a girl's silence constitutes legal consent. - [04:35](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=foNQymBqnDA&t=275s) True executive power resides in Kandahar rather than the ministries in Kabul, with Akhundzada operating as a reclusive cleric who avoids public appearances. - [05:27](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=foNQymBqnDA&t=327s) Akhundzada has created a specialized, well-compensated military force with shared Kandahari ties, operating similarly to Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to secure his power. - [05:27](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=foNQymBqnDA&t=327s) Over five years of internal debate, Akhundzada has defeated internal Taliban dissenters by exiling or intimidating vocal critics into silence.

## Detailed walkthrough ### [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=foNQymBqnDA&t=0s) The Everyday Restrictions on Afghan Women and Girls

Life for women in Afghanistan under the Taliban has become an intensely restrictive reality. On public streets, the shift is stark and visible: women are required to dress in deeply conservative attire with their faces obscured. While some wear a traditional niqab, many have adopted COVID-style surgical masks as a practical means of complying with the regime's modesty mandates. Women have also been systematically pushed out of public life, higher education, and the formal workforce. One university professor recounted that his entire department had been systematically cleared of female colleagues. While some women still manage to work discreetly within the private sector, doing so has grown increasingly precarious and difficult.

The ban on girls attending public secondary schools remains the most controversial and widely felt restriction within Afghan society. The policy is deeply unpopular across the population. Because transparent administrative data does not exist, obtaining verifiable figures is difficult, but estimates from people on the ground suggest that only about 10% of Afghan girls are currently receiving any formal secondary education. That small minority relies on an informal, privately run network of religious madrasas. For the vast majority of women and girls, the atmosphere is utterly bleak, leaving them with little optimism for the future.

[01:31](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=foNQymBqnDA&t=91s) Internal Fractures and Inside a Clandestine Kabul Madrasa

The hardline stance on female education is not universally celebrated within the Taliban itself. While Supreme Leader Hibatullah Akhundzada and his ultra-conservative Kandahar faction are intent on shuttering women and girls out of public life, other factions within the movement privately favor reopening schools. Based on accounts gathered on the ground, a majority of rank-and-file Talibs actually oppose the emir’s school ban, yet they find themselves powerless to overturn his orders, leaving private madrasas as an imperfect, underground workaround.

Visiting one such girls' madrasa in Kabul revealed the palpable fear and courage surrounding female education. Staff and students were intensely anxious about the presence of a foreign journalist, requiring strict anonymity to safeguard the site:

- **Secretive operation:** Staff operated under extreme tension to avoid drawing scrutiny or closure by Taliban authorities. - **Economic barriers:** Students expressed gratitude for their classes, but lamented that most of their friends could not afford tuition, while acknowledging that their hard-won credentials might never lead to recognized employment. - **Unexpected fluency:** The students, aged around 16 and 17, immediately dispelled the need for an interpreter by conversing in articulate, fluent English. - **Shattered ambitions:** Several teenagers spoke openly about their lost dreams of becoming doctors and lawyers. One student recalled how her parents kept assuring her that by the time she finished her studies, conditions would improve; she concluded despairingly, "I don't think everything will be okay. I don't have any hope for the future."

[03:44](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=foNQymBqnDA&t=224s) The Ratchet of Decrees and De Facto Child Marriage

Rather than ruling through standard legislative processes, Emir Hibatullah Akhundzada governs through an escalating sequence of hardline decrees that function like a ratchet, progressively stripping away female autonomy:

```mermaid flowchart LR accTitle: The Ratchet Mechanism of Taliban Decrees accDescr: Diagram illustrating how supreme decrees issued from Kandahar strip female freedoms and leave moderates powerless. subgraph Kandahar["Kandahar (The Emir)"] A["Hibatullah's Hardline Decrees"] end subgraph Restrictions["Societal Impact"] B["Secondary Education Ban"] C["Purging of Workplaces"] D["Child Marriage Law<br/>('Silence is Consent')"] end subgraph Reaction["Response"] E["Western Outrage"] F["Moderate Talibs Silenced"] end A --> B A --> C A --> D D --> E D --> F ```

Among the most damaging recent measures is a decree effectively legalizing child marriage. The law establishes the deeply troubling principle that a girl's silence constitutes legal consent to marriage. While each decree ignites predictable international outrage in the West, moderate elements within the Taliban administration feel entirely incapable of arresting this continuous erosion of rights.

[04:35](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=foNQymBqnDA&t=275s) The Reclusive Emir in Kandahar

The concentration of executive power in Afghanistan is centered not in the formal ministries of Kabul, but in the southern stronghold of Kandahar. Hibatullah Akhundzada operates as an elusive, reclusive figure who stays confined within a network of heavily secured compounds. He never visits Kabul, rarely appears before the broader public, and has virtually no authenticated recent photographs in circulation.

Unlike previous Taliban leaders who established credibility on the battlefield or moved among tribal communities, Akhundzada is purely a religious cleric. His directives supersede the administrative apparatus in Kabul because he maintains sufficient backing from hardline factions to enforce unquestioning compliance. His detachment from daily life in Afghanistan leaves him isolated from the realities of the country he nominally heads, yet his word remains absolute law.

[05:27](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=foNQymBqnDA&t=327s) The Kabul-Kandahar Rift and the Five-Year Horizon

The deepening rift between the administrative leadership in Kabul and the ideological circle in Kandahar represents the central fault line in Afghan politics over the coming five years. Despite widespread private dissatisfaction among senior officials, Akhundzada has consistently outmaneuvered internal dissent through several specific mechanisms:

- **Dedicated security apparatus:** Akhundzada has formed a specialized, well-compensated military force recruited largely from Kandahar, bound to him through shared ethnic and social ties, functioning much like Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). - **Suppression of debate:** Across five years of continuous internal debate regarding girls' education, the emir has triumphed in every confrontation, either forcing vocal internal critics into exile or silencing them into compliance. - **Sustainability doubts:** While widespread resentment persists across Afghan society and within the ranks of the Taliban itself, Akhundzada's monopolization of armed force and religious authority leaves him firmly in command of Afghanistan's immediate future.

## Notable quotes > It’s been five years since Taliban rule descended on Afghanistan.

> The regime is one of the world’s most repressive for women and girls: girls are barred from education beyond the age of 11-12; women are banned from most jobs and public life, and the Taliban have passed a law which has, in effect, legalized child marriage.

> [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=foNQymBqnDA&t=0s) What’s life like as a woman under the Taliban?

> [01:31](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=foNQymBqnDA&t=91s) The secret Taliban divide about women’s rights

> [02:27](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=foNQymBqnDA&t=147s) What Tom heard on his visit to a madrassa

> [02:27](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=foNQymBqnDA&t=147s) I don't think everything will be okay. I don't have any hope for the future. — Afghan student

> [03:44](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=foNQymBqnDA&t=224s) The new laws making life worse for women in Afghanistan

> [04:35](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=foNQymBqnDA&t=275s) Who is Hibatullah Akhundzada and how strong is his grip on power?

> [05:27](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=foNQymBqnDA&t=327s) When will things get better for Afghan women and girls?

## Mentioned The Economist, Taliban, Afghanistan, Tom Sasse, Zanny Minton Beddoes, Hibatullah Akhundzada, Kabul, Kandahar, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)

## Video description It’s been five years since Taliban rule descended on Afghanistan. The regime is one of the world’s most repressive for women and girls: girls are barred from education beyond the age of 11-12; women are banned from most jobs and public life, and the Taliban have passed a law which has, in effect, legalized child marriage.

Tom Sasse, The Economist’s South Asia bureau chief, has just returned from a 1,000km road trip inside Afghanistan. He joins Zanny Minton Beddoes, editor-in-chief, and a panel of expert journalists to discuss what the country is like today and whether there’s any hope that life for women and girls will improve any time soon.

#afghanistan #taliban

00:00 - What’s life like as a woman under the Taliban? 01:31 - The secret Taliban divide about women’s rights 02:27 - What Tom heard on his visit to a madrassa 03:44 - The new laws making life worse for women in Afghanistan 04:35 - Who is Hibatullah Akhundzada and how strong is his grip on power? 05:27 - When will things get better for Afghan women and girls?

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[Source](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=foNQymBqnDA)

中文简报

塔利班最高领导人压制温和派，巩固对阿富汗女性的限制最高领导人希巴图拉·阿洪扎达通过部署坎大哈专属安保部队，镇压塔利班内部对其关于女性教育和就业禁令的异议，维持对阿富汗的绝对控制。在塔利班重新掌权五年后，阿富汗妇女和女童面临极其压抑的环境，其特征是严格的着装要求、大规模的职场清洗以及对中等教育的禁令，导致估计仅有10%的女童能通过私立宗教学校接受正规课程。最高领导人希巴图拉·阿洪扎达继续在坎大哈通过不断升级的一系列法令进行统治——包括规定女童的沉默构成结婚同意的条款——无视塔利班普通成员和喀布尔管理人员中普遍存在的内部异议。尽管政权内部存在暗中反对，有抱负的年轻女性也深感心碎，但阿洪扎达通过一支类似于伊朗伊斯兰革命卫队（IRGC）的忠诚精锐安保部队巩固了自己的绝对权威，使得短期内的改革希望微乎其微。在塔利班执政五年之际，妇女和女童面临全面压制，中等教育被禁止，估计仅有10%的女童通过非正规宗教学校接受教育。 (0:00) 最高领导人希巴图拉·阿洪扎达从坎大哈通过不断升级的单方面法令进行统治，包括一项将女童的沉默定义为法定同意、从而实际上使童婚合法化的措施。 (3:44) 喀布尔的温和派塔利班官员与阿洪扎达的坎大哈派系之间存在深刻的内部裂痕，但该埃米尔通过一支专门的、类似IRGC的军事力量维持着主导地位。 (5:27)

Reading summary

According to reporting by The Economist, Afghan women are facing a systematic erasure from public life driven by Supreme Leader Hibatullah Akhundzada's hardline decrees, which persist despite deep societal resentment and quiet opposition from within the Taliban itself. Everyday Restrictions and the Secondary School Ban (0:00) Daily life for Afghan women has been severely curtailed through enforced dress codes and systemic purges from society. In public spaces, women must keep their faces covered, with many adopting surgical masks alongside traditional niqabs to meet modesty rules. Women have been excluded from higher education and the formal workforce, exemplified by university faculties being systematically cleared of female staff. While some discreet work continues in the private sector, it remains fraught with risk. The prohibition against girls attending public secondary schools represents the regime's most widely resented policy. In the absence of official administrative transparency, estimates from observers on the ground indicate that only about 10% of Afghan girls receive secondary schooling. This small group depends entirely on an informal network of privately run religious madrasas, leaving the vast majority without viable educational prospects. Clandestine Madrasas and Lost Aspirations (1:31) Beneath the blanket prohibition, clandestine madrasas in Kabul operate under heavy tension and fear of discovery. Staff and students require anonymity to avoid crackdowns from authorities. Furthermore, economic realities exclude many girls whose families cannot afford tuition, and enrolled students recognize that their coursework offers no pathway to accredited degrees or recognized employment. Inside one such school, teenage girls around 16 and 17 years old displayed fluent English while mourning their lost ambitions of becoming doctors or lawyers. Despite assurances from their parents that political conditions will eventually shift, students described a pervasive sense of hopelessness and a bleak outlook for their personal futures. Governance by Ratchet and Child Marriage Decrees (3:44) Rather than governing through traditional legislative institutions, Emir Hibatullah Akhundzada implements policy through an escalating sequence of supreme decrees. This governance operates like a ratchet, methodically tightening societal constraints and stripping away female autonomy without offering avenues for domestic redress. Among the most severe directives is a decree effectively legalizing child marriage by establishing that a girl's silence constitutes legal consent. While such measures regularly trigger condemnation from Western governments, moderate factions within the Taliban administration describe themselves as powerless to halt the continuous erosion of basic protections. The Kandahar Stronghold and Internal Suppression (4:35) Ultimate authority in Afghanistan is concentrated in Kandahar rather than the formal ministries in Kabul. Akhundzada functions as an isolated religious cleric who lives in fortified compounds, avoids public visits to Kabul, and rules with near-absolute authority despite being completely detached from the daily realities of the broader population. Over a five-year horizon, the rift between Kabul-based administrators and the Kandahar hardline circle stands as the regime's primary fault line. Even though ground reports indicate a majority of rank-and-file Talibs favor reopening girls' schools, Akhundzada has prevailed in every confrontation. He enforces control through a dedicated military force drawn from Kandahar—comparable in role to Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps—silencing or exiling internal dissenters to preserve his monopoly over state power. Although public discontent and fractures within the Taliban remain widespread, the Emir's control over military force and religious legitimacy leaves him firmly entrenched, leaving open the question of whether such unbending rule can remain sustainable over the coming years.

Source quotes

It’s been five years since Taliban rule descended on Afghanistan. The regime is one of the world’s most repressive for women and girls: girls are barred from education beyond the age of 11-12; women are banned from most jobs and public life, and the Taliban have passed a law which has, in effect, legalized child marriage. [0:00] What’s life like as a woman under the Taliban? [1:31] The secret Taliban divide about women’s rights [2:27] What Tom heard on his visit to a madrassa [2:27] Afghan student: I don't think everything will be okay. I don't have any hope for the future. [3:44] The new laws making life worse for women in Afghanistan [4:35] Who is Hibatullah Akhundzada and how strong is his grip on power? [5:27] When will things get better for Afghan women and girls?

Original transcript

[0:00] Give us a sense of what it is like right [0:01] now to be a woman in Afghanistan. [0:03] >> It's pretty restrictive picture. On the [0:06] streets is one of the most visible [0:07] areas. You'll see that [0:09] a lot of women most women are dressed [0:12] very conservatively with their faces [0:14] covered. That's one of the requirements [0:16] of the Taliban and you actually see [0:17] quite a lot of women wearing a COVID [0:19] style mask if they're not wearing the [0:22] the niqab they're wearing a COVID style [0:24] mask which covers their face and that [0:25] shows they're complying. Not absolutely [0:28] everyone but but most women you see are [0:30] doing that. Of course they've been [0:33] massively restricted from workplaces and [0:36] from universities. I spoke to one [0:39] professor who said his entire department [0:41] had been cleared out of women. [0:44] You do see some come across some women [0:46] working pretty discreetly in the private [0:48] sector but that's become much more [0:50] difficult and then of course the really [0:52] big and and controversial one inside [0:55] Afghanistan is schooling and the Taliban [0:58] have implemented this policy of banning [1:00] girls from attending public secondary [1:03] schools. That's hugely unpopular inside [1:05] Afghanistan. So it's very hard to get [1:08] robust numbers but people I asked [1:10] thought that perhaps only 10% of girls [1:13] are now getting any kind of formal [1:15] secondary education and the way that's [1:17] happening is that some of them are [1:18] allowed to go to these privately run [1:21] madrasas. [1:22] But it's is a pretty difficult situation [1:24] and a lot of the girls and women I was [1:26] speaking to they say it's pretty bleak [1:28] and that they're not optimistic about [1:30] the future. [1:31] >> One thing Tom that struck me is that you [1:33] you you said in your piece that this is [1:36] extremely unpopular obviously amongst [1:38] the population at large but also amongst [1:41] many Taliban. Can you can you just kind [1:42] of tell us what you found out there? [1:44] >> Yes, so this was one of the the main [1:47] questions I was asking people and [1:49] you know, there are some members of the [1:52] Taliban like Hibatullah Akhundzada the [1:54] emir who's based in Kandahar and he's [1:56] really on the the ultra-conservative [1:58] wing, and he has enforced this policy, [2:01] and they're quite happy to see women and [2:03] girls, you know, really shut out of most [2:05] aspects of society. [2:07] But there are others within the group, [2:09] other factions, who really want girls to [2:11] be able to go to school, and that's [2:12] probably from from most of the people I [2:14] spoke to, a majority of Talibs uh [2:17] believe that, and and and they oppose [2:19] what the emir has done, but there's not [2:21] really much they can do about it, um [2:23] apart from this this very imperfect [2:26] workaround of madrasas. It was one of [2:28] the most striking experiences I had to [2:31] visit this madrasa [2:33] uh in Kabul. Everyone was very, very [2:34] nervous about me being there. We had to [2:36] be very careful about not naming or [2:38] identifying it. The girls were sort of [2:40] delighted to get some education, but [2:42] they said, you know, lots of our friends [2:44] can't afford this, and of course we're [2:46] not going to be able to do anything with [2:47] this uh education. So they've they've [2:50] really kind of made it very, very [2:51] difficult for girls to just exist and [2:54] pursue any kind of ambition. [2:56] >> Were they speaking to you in English, [2:58] the girls? [3:00] >> They all spoke perfect English. Uh I [3:02] actually started the So so they're all [3:04] about 16 or 17 years old. I started the [3:07] interview very sort of slowly, thinking [3:09] they would need my translator. They very [3:10] quickly corrected me and uh pointed out [3:13] that they could understand me perfectly. [3:15] Um you know, they were incredibly [3:17] articulate, very ambitious. One of them [3:19] had wanted to become a lawyer. Another [3:21] one had wanted to become a doctor. They [3:22] said that those dreams had had been [3:25] crushed. Uh one of them very movingly [3:27] actually said to me that her parents [3:29] kept telling her that by the time she [3:32] graduated everything would be okay, and [3:34] she said, "I don't think everything will [3:36] be okay." Uh she said, "I don't have any [3:38] hope for the future." [3:39] Um so you know you know, these are the [3:41] kind of girls that are being uh crushed [3:43] by by this regime. [3:44] >> Remind us the other things that have [3:45] happened this year, Tom, that are new [3:48] laws that are making it even worse for [3:50] women. [3:50] >> So Hibatullah, the Emir, he basically [3:53] functions by issuing these hardline [3:56] decrees and those have acted as a kind [3:58] of ratchet on women's and girls' [4:01] freedom. So, that's included areas like [4:02] education, work. The most recent one [4:04] you're referring to, Zanny, is they've [4:06] just passed a law which has in effect [4:08] legalized child marriage and it's worse [4:11] than that because they've actually said [4:12] that silence is basically consent [4:14] to a a girl becoming married. So, so you [4:17] know, they've gradually [4:18] issued these decrees which have [4:20] restricted [4:21] the freedoms and that process does not [4:24] really seem to be letting up at all. [4:26] Every time that he issues one of these [4:28] decrees, there's of course outrage in [4:30] the West, but the more moderate Taliban [4:32] factions don't really seem to be able to [4:34] do anything about it. [4:35] >> So, Chris, why don't they seem to be [4:36] able to do anything about it? Tell us [4:38] about this Emir sort of hold up in [4:39] Kandahar. [4:40] >> Well, well, that's exactly right. He is [4:41] holed up in Kandahar. He doesn't go to [4:43] Kabul. He never leaves one of a few [4:46] highly secure compounds that he seems to [4:48] move around. Nobody even sees pictures [4:50] of him. There there are very few, if [4:52] any, [4:53] genuinely well-attested recent [4:56] photographs of him. He just issues these [4:58] decrees and people fall into line [5:00] because he has enough Taliban behind him [5:03] to override the sort of administrative [5:05] structure of the state which still [5:07] resides in in Kabul. [5:09] He's He's extremely conservative. He has [5:12] always been a cleric. Unlike previous [5:14] Emirs, he hasn't had a background in [5:16] fighting or in sort of being among the [5:18] community. He's just been a a cleric and [5:22] he seems completely out of touch with [5:24] with [5:25] the country that he's nominally the head [5:26] of. [5:27] >> But, Steve, listening to this, it [5:29] strikes me as being such a change from [5:31] the sort of previous eras in Afghanistan [5:34] where there were kind of always [5:35] different factions fighting. Do you [5:36] think this Emir is going to be able to [5:39] sustain this kind of control even as he [5:41] gets more repressive? [5:44] >> I think that's the biggest question [5:45] looking out 5 years, there clearly is [5:49] dissatisfaction within the Taliban [5:51] leadership and the gap between the [5:54] leaders in Kabul and Kandahar is [5:56] something that many Afghans remark on. I [5:58] think there is there are real fractures, [6:00] but Hibatullah has managed to build up a [6:04] a kind of armed force around his agenda, [6:08] similar perhaps to the Revolutionary [6:10] Guards in Iran, that comes from [6:13] Kandahar, that is loyal to him for [6:16] um [6:17] you know, ethnic and social reasons as [6:19] well as being well paid. And right, you [6:22] know, right through the last 5 years of [6:24] debate about women's and girls' [6:26] education, for example, um [6:29] he has won every argument. And you know, [6:31] you he's forced people into exile and [6:33] he's silenced some of his internal [6:35] critics. Is that sustainable [6:38] given what Tom reports about how [6:40] widespread dissatisfaction is? I'm [6:42] doubtful, but right now he's in charge.