Gamers Nexus Rebuts LG Denial as Tests Show TV Geolocation Harvesting

Gamers Nexus

Packet captures and contract analysis reveal LG smart TVs actively harvest HDMI audio and Wi-Fi geolocation while contractual terms strip user privacy to facilitate advertising and warrantless police disclosures.

AI-assisted summary of LG Says We're Fake News — original source. Check the original for full context.

Source published: 2026-09-12

Key ideas

LG issued a blanket denial calling Gamers Nexus's investigation untrue without providing counter-evidence, while quietly altering PR statements to scrub references to storing ambient audio and admitting to local network scanning. (0:00)
Technical captures by researcher U-Turn revealed LG's Alfonso ACR binary fingerprints active HDMI audio streams at roughly 20 packets per minute and passively scans ambient Wi-Fi BSSIDs to calculate precise geographic coordinates. (24:11)
Independent cybersecurity audits revealed that webOS previously allowed applications to route external traffic through residential consumer networks as proxy nodes, while unpatched vulnerabilities exposed over 91,000 TVs to root compromise on Shodan. (19:51)
A legal review of LG's terms of service confirms LG retains dominant property rights over on-screen content, shifts statutory liability for tracking minors onto the device owner, and permits telemetry handoffs to law enforcement without judicial warrants. (29:57)

Detailed notes

## Background Published by tech investigative channel Gamers Nexus on YouTube on September 12, 2026, this video responds to LG's public denial of their previous deep-dive into smart TV Automatic Content Recognition (ACR) surveillance, adware, and security vulnerabilities. Host Steve Burke and the team deconstruct LG's evidence-free "fake news" defense, present fresh technical findings on HDMI tracking and Wi-Fi geolocation harvesting, and consult attorney Vincent Agosta to analyze the legal reality of LG's terms of service.

## TL;DR Steve Burke dismantles LG's formal statement denying Gamers Nexus's prior investigative reporting on smart TV data harvesting, noting that LG offered zero counter-evidence while quietly altering its PR claims regarding ambient microphone recording and network scanning. Backed by new packet captures from security researcher U-Turn, the report demonstrates that LG TVs continuously capture HDMI audio fingerprints and scan ambient Wi-Fi BSSIDs to pinpoint user residential coordinates down to the nearest intersection. Consulting attorney Vincent Agosta, Gamers Nexus explores how LG legally "owns the glass" through a complex bundle of rights that monitor on-screen activity, transfer minor-consent liability onto consumers, and allow telemetry to be turned over to law enforcement without judicial warrants. The investigation concludes by criticizing pervasive dark patterns and the engineered extinction of offline "dumb" appliances, urging viewers to advocate for legislative digital privacy protections.

## Atmosphere & style Acerbic, forensic, and fiercely principled, the program crackles with Gamers Nexus's trademark dry wit, relentless fact-checking, and sharp satirical analogies—such as comparing LG's routine network probes to an immortal vampire doctor demanding blood. The dynamic shifts seamlessly between Burke's indignant, evidence-heavy takedown of corporate PR spin and attorney Vincent Agosta's measured, clinical dissection of a towering stack of EULAs and privacy policies. Watching it feels like sitting in an investigative war room, blending technical packet analysis with serious legal alarm over the systemic erosion of consumer property rights in the modern living room.

## Bulletin - [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ToP9xfLDSME&t=0s) LG issued a blanket denial calling Gamers Nexus's investigation untrue without providing counter-evidence, while quietly altering PR statements to scrub references to storing ambient audio and admitting to local network scanning. - [24:11](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ToP9xfLDSME&t=1451s) Technical captures by researcher U-Turn revealed LG's Alfonso ACR binary fingerprints active HDMI audio streams at roughly 20 packets per minute and passively scans ambient Wi-Fi BSSIDs to calculate precise geographic coordinates. - [19:51](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ToP9xfLDSME&t=1191s) Independent cybersecurity audits revealed that webOS previously allowed applications to route external traffic through residential consumer networks as proxy nodes, while unpatched vulnerabilities exposed over 91,000 TVs to root compromise on Shodan. - [29:57](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ToP9xfLDSME&t=1797s) A legal review of LG's terms of service confirms LG retains dominant property rights over on-screen content, shifts statutory liability for tracking minors onto the device owner, and permits telemetry handoffs to law enforcement without judicial warrants.

## Key takeaways - [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ToP9xfLDSME&t=0s) LG responded to Gamers Nexus with a blanket denial to third-party outlets, avoiding direct communication while presenting no factual evidence to dispute logged telemetry data. - [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ToP9xfLDSME&t=0s) LG quietly altered public PR statements on microphone privacy, shifting from claiming it does not 'store' ambient audio to claiming it does not 'transmit' it after remote hardware exploits were demonstrated. - [03:42](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ToP9xfLDSME&t=222s) LG Ad Solutions DSP partner DeepIntent demonstrates deterministic Connected TV attribution, tracking viewers from television ad impressions to mobile retargeting and physical pharmacy prescription fills. - [06:41](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ToP9xfLDSME&t=401s) webOS employs multiple dark patterns, including defaulting to 'Select All' on terms agreements, leaking telemetry packets upon opting out, and resetting tracking identifiers across legacy firmware updates. - [11:46](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ToP9xfLDSME&t=706s) LG defended local network scanning as standard industry behavior, a justification Steve Burke compared to a predatory corporate surveillance dragnet mapping home hardware without engineering necessity. - [12:51](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ToP9xfLDSME&t=771s) LG's ACR terms specify that declining consent merely halts data usage for advertising, leaving open the retention and internal utilization of viewing telemetry. - [19:51](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ToP9xfLDSME&t=1191s) Documented webOS vulnerabilities exposed over 91,000 internet-facing TVs to remote root execution, while prior ecosystem flaws allowed apps to turn living room displays into residential proxy nodes. - [22:37](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ToP9xfLDSME&t=1357s) LG's credibility regarding user consent is contradicted by its push of McAfee adware and third-party software to Windows PC users via monitor driver updates. - [24:11](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ToP9xfLDSME&t=1451s) Network proxy captures revealed Alfonso ACR active on HDMI inputs, logging timestamps, acoustic fingerprints, connected hardware IDs, and physical coordinates derived from Wi-Fi access point BSSIDs. - [29:57](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ToP9xfLDSME&t=1797s) Attorney Vincent Agosta explains that under property law's 'bundle of sticks' doctrine, LG legally retains the rights to observe, monetize, and deliver injected advertising across the physical display panel. - [31:41](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ToP9xfLDSME&t=1901s) Users face a web of nested, transitive agreements that incorporate third-party data partners like Alfonso and Nuance, while LG reserves unilateral rights to update terms without affirmative notification. - [34:40](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ToP9xfLDSME&t=2080s) Sections 10 and 11 of LG's terms legally shift responsibility onto the purchaser to obtain privacy consent for all guests, while treating minor data as adult data to offload regulatory liability. - [36:58](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ToP9xfLDSME&t=2218s) LG's contractual right to investigate 'illegal activities' creates an expansive dragnet enabling monitoring of user playback for pirated media, age-verification workarounds, or localized legal violations. - [39:39](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ToP9xfLDSME&t=2379s) Under the third-party doctrine, telemetry voluntarily shared under LG's terms forfeits Fourth Amendment protections, enabling LG to share living room data during informal regulatory and criminal inquiries without a warrant. - [44:26](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ToP9xfLDSME&t=2666s) Because non-smart 'dumb' TVs have been largely eliminated from the market, individual consumer opt-outs are structurally ineffective, making legislative data privacy reform necessary.

## Detailed walkthrough ### [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ToP9xfLDSME&t=0s) WE STILL OWN THE GLASS

LG responded to the Gamers Nexus investigation into smart TV data harvesting and security vulnerabilities, issuing a blanket denial to various third-party outlets—while pointedly avoiding contacting Gamers Nexus directly. LG’s public response declared plainly: "The claims made in the recently published video are not true."

Gamers Nexus host Steve Burke directly challenges this defense, enumerating hard facts and logs established in their reporting: - Executive leadership ties: LG Ad Solutions president Serge Matta previously settled an SEC fraud case and was barred from serving as an officer or director of a public company for ten years, yet now leads the division managing consumer telemetry. - Empirical packet logging: Network captures proved telemetry was being exfiltrated from the smart TV to LG ad servers, occurring even when the TV was operating as an unconfigured "dumb" monitor connected via HDMI to a laptop. - Shifting PR language on microphone data: A month prior, LG claimed its TVs do not "collect, record, or store ambient conversations." Following Gamers Nexus's video showing how TV hardware could capture ambient room audio, LG altered its script to state it does not "collect, record, or transmit ambient conversations." The word "store" was scrubbed from the statement entirely.

```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Evolution of LG Ambient Audio Statements accDescr: Visual flowchart comparing the change in PR statements from LG regarding ambient audio collection. subgraph S1["LG Initial Statement"] A["'Do not collect, record, or STORE ambient conversations'"] end subgraph S2["GN Deep Dive Published"] B["GN demonstrates remote exploits & local storage possibilities"] end subgraph S3["LG Revised Statement"] C["'Do not collect, record, or TRANSMIT ambient conversations'"] D["'Store' silently removed; changed framing to 'your home'"] end A --> B --> C C -.-> D ```

LG further altered its marketing tone. While ad sales presentations to enterprise partners boasted about dominating "the LG household" or monetizing the "advertiser's living room," the consumer PR statement retreated to claiming deference to "your home." Burke also replays footage of an LG ad executive's slip of the tongue: *"owning the glass and owning—working with the consumer,"* which Burke frames as a Freudian admission of how the company truly views its customers.

To settle whether consumers or manufacturers maintain ownership rights over the display, Gamers Nexus retained attorney Vincent Agosta. Evaluating LG's extensive terms of service, Agosta concludes that, in practical legal terms, LG retains the dominant rights: while a buyer physically possesses the hardware and can "throw a brick through it," LG maintains the unilateral contractual authority to observe, record, monetize, and broker whatever passes across the panel.

---

[03:42](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ToP9xfLDSME&t=222s) Microphones, ACR, and Pharmaceuticals

Burke pivots to Automatic Content Recognition (ACR) and Connected TV (CTV) advertising, exploring how LG and its demand-side platform partners monetize viewers. Clips from DeepIntent, an exclusive healthcare DSP partner for LG Ad Solutions, outline the granular targeting applied directly to households:

```mermaid flowchart LR accTitle: DeepIntent CTV Patient Ad Attribution Pipeline accDescr: Pipeline mapping LG Connected TV viewership data to real-world patient clinical conversions. subgraph Ingestion["Identity & Tracking"] TV["LG CTV Household Viewing"] ID["Cross-Device Identity Graph"] end subgraph Retargeting["Ad Sequencing"] Mob["Mobile Retargeting Session"] Rx["Patient Visits Doctor"] end subgraph Attribution["Conversion"] Script["Pharmacy Script Filled"] Stop["Deterministic Ad Spend Stops"] end

TV --> ID ID --> Mob Mob --> Rx Rx --> Script Script --> Stop ```

- DeepIntent boasts that CTV drives twice as many new brand prescription ad acquisitions compared to online video (OV) alone. - Tracking does not rely on traditional web click-through rates. Instead, impressions are delivered at a household level, retargeted to individual mobile devices within the same network, and tracked deterministically directly to offline clinical conversions. - DeepIntent tracks the patient journey from exposure to an ad on the TV screen straight to an actual pharmacy fill. Once a doctor prescribes the medication and the patient fills the script, the platform identifies the completion of the clinical journey and ceases ad spend against that individual.

Burke emphasizes the deeply invasive implication: consumer smart TVs serve as the top-of-funnel intake for an advertising panopticon that cross-references residential viewing behavior with real-world prescription health records.

Addressing LG’s pushback regarding internal microphones—wherein LG claimed that its far-field "Hi, LG" feature requires manual activation before any audio listening begins—Burke and Wendell from Level1Techs dismiss the claim. They argue that LG's response deliberately conflates intended out-of-the-box software routines with hardware capability. Because unpatched remote code execution vulnerabilities exist on the platform, an attacker who compromises the display controls the hardware layer entirely. As Wendell jokes, once an exploit takes over the panel, the wake word could just as easily be changed to "gaslighting."

---

[06:41](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ToP9xfLDSME&t=401s) Dark Patterns Smackdown

Burke turns to LG's official defense on user choice, in which the company asserted that it rejects deceptive designs and dark patterns. Burke details an extensive catalog of dark patterns identified across LG's webOS: - Excessive agreement prompts: Opening an application prompts up to six separate terms agreements despite only two being mandatory to run the software, with the interface highlighting "Select All" by default. Another prompt displays four agreements where only three are required, similarly defaulting the focus on "Select All." - Opt-out leakage: Security research by Mr. Bra demonstrated that when a user actively opts out of telemetry and revokes consent in firmware, the operating system still transmits a final telemetry packet back to LG's servers. - Retroactive tracking on legacy hardware: Updating four-year-old TVs that previously had tracking disabled instantly generates new, unconsented advertising IDs and tracking cookies without prompting the viewer for fresh terms. - Misleading cookie limits: The default "off" state on tracking cookie toggles does not disable cookies; rather, it disables the *capping limit*, which causes the television to serve more cookies rather than fewer. - Euphemistic terminology: LG previously cloaked its ACR surveillance agreement under the benign name "Viewing Information Agreement." - Deceptive layout choices: The "Do Not Sell My Personal Information" switch is buried several layers deep within system menus, configured so the "off" switch aligns visually with the "Hide" text, tricking users into believing protection is active.

Burke mocks LG's pretense of being a consumer-first company, joking that LG's software contains so much darkness it predates the Big Bang, before referencing a historic Korean catchphrase spoofing their mobile UI controversies.

---

[08:21](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ToP9xfLDSME&t=501s) WE NEED YOUR SUPPORT

Burke steps away from the breakdown to highlight the community funding model sustaining Gamers Nexus's independent investigations. The video is self-sponsored via their custom campaign on store.gamersnexus.net, which blew past its initial targets: - Data Dragnet merchandise: The run includes a cyberpunk skeleton t-shirt with a metallic foil UI dystopian spine/ribcage graphic. - Archival physical media: GN created custom Blu-ray disc sets of the LG investigation, featuring custom 3D-printed metallic red media cases fabricated in-house, duplicated and printed directly in the Gamers Nexus workshop, along with a bundled USB key to act as a physical "dead man's switch" against potential DMCA takedowns. - Support tiers: Top supporter packages include an interactive live-streamed Q&A session with Steve Burke and inclusion in the end-of-year Disappointment Tour video credits.

Burke explains that the proceeds are actively poured into procuring fleets of consumer TVs from multiple major brands, spending thousands of dollars to evaluate broader cross-industry data harvesting. He then transitions directly back into technical analysis, teasing brand-new vulnerabilities uncovered by security researcher U-Turn, including active audio fingerprinting.

[09:49](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ToP9xfLDSME&t=589s) Setting the Stage and LG's Blanket Denial

Gamers Nexus prepares to dive into new testing showing how completely unmodified, non-rooted LG smart TVs running native factory software can be used to extract precise geolocation data. Alongside this technical analysis, Steve Burke introduces a legal breakdown of LG's user agreements and terms of service with attorney Vincent Agosta to decode the dense corporate legalese for ordinary consumers. Following the explosion of the initial investigative report across enthusiast communities and mainstream media, LG issued a direct public statement. To LG's credit, the company explicitly named the Gamers Nexus YouTube channel in its rebuttal, eliminating any opportunity for corporate PR to later claim their statements merely addressed generic media speculation.

LG opened its formal response with an outright dismissal: *"This is to provide LG's position regarding the claims recently raised by the Gamers Nexus YouTube channel. The claims made in the recently published video are not true."* Steve immediately points out the glaring self-contradiction in LG's defense. Just paragraphs later, LG's own statement explicitly states: *"LG TVs feature the ability to scan for and connect to nearby devices on the same network."* That network surveillance capability was one of the central technical demonstrations Gamers Nexus proved in their initial video. Rather than addressing the empirical proof-of-concept tests, packet captures, and live demonstrations published by Gamers Nexus, LG—a multinational corporation with over 75,000 employees and tens of billions in revenue—opted for a flat, evidence-free "fake news" denial without presenting a single counter-fact.

[11:46](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ToP9xfLDSME&t=706s) Network Scanning and the Vampire Doctor Defense

To justify its smart TVs probing local home networks, LG asserted that scanning for nearby hardware is *"a standard function commonly provided by smart TVs and smart home devices."* Steve shreds this rationalization with a cutting analogy: telling consumers not to worry because routine network scanning is normal is like saying, *"Don't worry, your doctor needs blood for routine tests"*—a completely factual statement, except in this case, your doctor is an immortal vampire feeding on the blood of the innocent. Quoting Level1Techs' Wendell, Steve underscores that an LG television has no legitimate engineering need to map an entire home network, send collected telemetry to remote servers, or pinpoint an owner's precise geographic location merely to stream a video file off a local computer.

LG's fallback argument boils down to the playground defense that "everyone else does it," which refutes none of the privacy risks. The device-discovery mechanisms baked into the television are far more aggressive than passive handshakes for casting protocols like Google Chromecast. Steve frames this corporate finger-pointing as the classic Spider-Man pointing meme, except starring LG, Samsung, and Vizio all pointing fingers at each other. Furthermore, Gamers Nexus teases upcoming investigative data demonstrating that these native scanning routines collect information detailed enough to identify the major street intersections immediately outside a user's private residence.

[12:51](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ToP9xfLDSME&t=771s) Slippery ACR Phrasing and Fourth Amendment Workarounds

When addressing Automatic Content Recognition (ACR), LG claimed the technology operates strictly on an opt-in basis for personalized recommendations and ads, insisting that if a consumer declines, *"ACR data is not used for advertising purposes."* Steve highlights the deliberate corporate sleight of hand in this phrasing: LG does not state that ACR data is not collected or stored—only that it is not used specifically for *advertising*. That leaves the door wide open for LG to harvest, retain, and leverage viewing telemetry for other internal operations or third-party exchanges. Moreover, while LG representatives previously boasted on camera that their ACR was an essential *"double opt-in experience,"* the word "double" was quietly erased from LG's official response following Gamers Nexus's scrutiny.

```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Data Request Paths and Fourth Amendment Implications accDescr: Flowchart contrasting judicial warrants against regulatory inquiries under LG terms of service.

subgraph LegalCompulsion ["Judicial Compulsion"] Warrant["Search Warrant, Subpoena, or Court Order"] Judge["Judicial Oversight Required"] Warrant --> Judge end

subgraph VoluntarySharing ["Voluntary Corporate Cooperation"] Inquiry["Agency Inquiry, Regulatory Request, or Police Contact"] Terms["LG Terms: Comply with Applicable Law & Inquiries"] Inquiry --> Terms end

TVData["User ACR & Telemetry Data (Voluntarily Shared with LG)"] TVData --> Warrant TVData --> Terms Terms --> Gov["Turned Over to Law Enforcement without 4th Amendment Protection"] ```

Even more alarming is how this data repository interacts with the legal system. LG's legal agreements stipulate that user data can be shared in connection with official inquiries and requests regarding suspected criminal activity. As attorney Vincent Agosta explains, there is a massive legal chasm between complying with judicial orders and answering informal government inquiries:

- **Judicial Compulsion:** Standard legal protections like warrants, subpoenas, and court orders require judicial sign-off and trigger Fourth Amendment protections. - **Informal Inquiries:** LG's policy commits to complying with broad federal, state, or local civil, regulatory, and criminal *inquiries* or *requests*, which do not require a judge or probable cause. - **Third-Party Doctrine:** Because consumers technically agreed to upload their telemetry to LG's servers, the data is legally considered voluntarily disclosed to a third party, forfeiting traditional constitutional privacy protections and allowing LG to freely hand records over to law enforcement without a warrant.

Steve notes that this surveillance pipeline does not depend on hypothetical software exploits; it is a first-party, factory-designed pipeline where harvested user data feeds directly into LG Ad Solutions, enabling cross-device advertising campaigns.

[16:12](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ToP9xfLDSME&t=972s) Voice Privacy, Standby Mode, and "Proactive Security"

Despite LG opening its defense by proclaiming a commitment to *"transparency and a secure user experience,"* the company's lengthy response completely avoided mentioning the severe security flaws and unpatched CVEs Gamers Nexus highlighted. Several of the vulnerabilities demonstrated on the TVs have had public, off-the-shelf exploits floating around the internet for years, yet LG failed to explain how or if these security holes are being patched.

Turning to voice surveillance, LG stated: *"We ensure that your LG TV does not collect, record, or transmit ambient conversations in your home unless voice functionality has been intentionally activated by the user."* Steve identifies multiple flaws in this corporate promise: - **Misplaced Agency:** LG claims the *television itself* ensures this, which is technically impossible to guarantee given that unpatched security exploits and malware can manipulate local hardware routines. - **Moving Goalposts:** LG previously denied recording ambient home audio outright, but now qualifies that ambient collection can occur once voice services are enabled—precisely mirroring the conditions Gamers Nexus originally demonstrated. - **Standby Mode Vulnerabilities:** LG claimed that while in standby mode, far-field microphones only process wake-words locally and promptly purge unmatching audio. However, LG provides users zero diagnostic tools or local logging to verify that the microphone hardware is adhering to those parameters.

Steve reiterates how LG Ad Solutions boasts about its ability to bridge data from the television to secondary household electronics, specifically targeting mobile phones so advertisers can track users well beyond the living room. Finally, Steve mocks LG's claim that *"data security is a top priority"* and that they partner with independent researchers for *"timely security updates."* He describes the assertion as comically ironic—hinting that behind the scenes, the reality is so absurdly contradictory that he cannot share full details yet without compromising the privacy of affected individuals who reached out.

[19:51](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ToP9xfLDSME&t=1191s) Residential Proxies and Documented WebOS Vulnerabilities

Steve Burke points out that while LG claims to run a proactive and continuous security program, public history tells a very different story. A glaring example comes from findings published by cybersecurity firm Spur, which revealed that LG's webOS allowed nearly half of all applications in its ecosystem to proxy network traffic directly through residential consumer networks. In practical terms, this enabled third parties—ranging from application developers and ad publishers to potential malicious actors who purchased abandoned or expired apps—to route arbitrary internet traffic straight through a customer's living room TV. By serving as an unwitting residential proxy node, the consumer's home IP address and local network could be leveraged to carry out external web activity, leaving the TV owner holding the bag if illicit or criminal traffic routed through their connection were ever investigated by law enforcement or internet service providers. Steve argues that a vulnerability of this scale, persisting for as long as it did before LG was publicly pressured into patching it, could only occur through outright negligence.

LG's track record is further underscored by independent audits from Bitdefender, which uncovered severe, unauthenticated remote execution flaws in webOS. Bitdefender noted that these vulnerabilities allowed security researchers to gain root access to the TV after completely bypassing the local authorization checks. Although the vulnerable service was supposedly meant for local area network (LAN) access only, scans conducted on the Shodan search engine revealed over 91,000 Internet-connected LG TVs actively exposing the vulnerable port directly to the public web.

- **CVE-2023-6317:** Bypasses authorization mechanisms to allow attackers to create unauthorized extra user accounts on the TV. - **CVE-2023-6318:** Exploits an internal service to elevate unauthorized user access to full root privileges. - **CVE-2023-6319:** Executes operating system command injection by manipulating an internal lyrics-display library. - **CVE-2023-6320:** Injects arbitrary commands into authenticated API endpoints by manipulating internal software parameters. - **SecurityWeek (2025):** Published an investigation titled *"No patch for flaw exposing hundreds of LG cameras to remote hacking,"* demonstrating persistent hardware-level oversights.

Steve stresses that while LG will inevitably argue that these older exploits have since been patched, fixing bugs only after external researchers expose them is the bare minimum: "LG, the first step to improving is admitting that you have a problem, not just saying 'we have proactive security' and ignoring it."

---

[22:37](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ToP9xfLDSME&t=1357s) The Fallacy of Consent and LG's Adware Record

Gamers Nexus turns to LG's formal statement where the company asserted: *"Full control over data and terms. LG Electronics is committed to providing transparency and rejecting deceptive practices, dark patterns, ensuring users can choose their own preferred privacy and consent options directly through their TV settings."*

Steve immediately dismisses this PR claim as laughable, arguing that LG has zero credibility when lecturing consumers on consent and transparency. Just roughly a month prior, Gamers Nexus caught LG forcefully pushing unwanted third-party software—specifically the LG Monitor app bundled alongside McAfee adware—onto Windows desktop PCs via Windows Update simply because users had an LG computer monitor plugged into their graphics card. Microsoft itself had to step in and sanction LG for abusing Windows driver update pipelines to distribute commercial bloatware. Steve notes the tangled web of industry partnerships, pointing out that Microsoft also owns Nuance Communications, one of the primary third-party speech engines utilized across LG's voice recognition features.

Steve delivers a blunt assessment of LG's corporate posture: "Get the fuck out of here. LG has a massive credibility problem when it comes to believing them about consent on anything after what we exposed last month." Rather than offering a good-faith rebuttal, LG's response relies on evasive rhetoric, carefully dancing around the specific technical terminology GN documented, offering broad corporate platitudes, and ignoring every piece of evidence that proves inconvenient to their bottom line.

---

[24:11](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ToP9xfLDSME&t=1451s) New Telemetry Findings: HDMI Audio Fingerprinting and Geolocation Tracking

Gamers Nexus previews fresh findings from security researcher U-Turn, who configured an inline man-in-the-middle network proxy to capture the raw traffic traversing an LG Smart TV's network interface. The captured packets demonstrate an alarming depth of surveillance being fed into Alfonso, the automated content recognition (ACR) and advertising technology subsidiary owned and operated directly under LG Ad Solutions.

Even when the television was restricted exclusively to an external HDMI video input, the TV continuously transmitted invasive telemetry payloads. The exfiltrated data packet included the television's unique hardware Device ID, internal lookup identifiers, the exact metropolitan city and state, precise latitude and longitude coordinates, the street name of the nearest major road, local time zone, and zip code data. U-Turn's technical notes highlight how uncomfortably granular this tracking is: the audio fingerprinting binary continuously links HDMI content telemetry with physical geographic location data that appears to be calculated by passively scanning surrounding Wi-Fi networks.

```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: LG Smart TV Telemetry and ACR Pipeline accDescr: Flowchart illustrating how an LG TV extracts HDMI audio, scans Wi-Fi BSSIDs, and packages the data into packets sent to Alfonso servers.

subgraph Inputs ["TV Hardware & Inputs"] A["External Device via HDMI\n(Console, PC, Streaming Box)"] B["Ambient Wi-Fi Environment\n(Nearby Routers & APs)"] end

subgraph WebOS ["LG webOS Internals"] C["HDMI Channel Sniffing\n(Audio Stream + SPD / CEC IDs)"] D["Wi-Fi Scanning Binary\n(Captures BSSID & Signal Strength)"] E["Alfonso ACR Binary\n(Creates Audio Fingerprints)"] end

subgraph Exfiltration ["Data Exfiltration"] F["Telemetry Payload\n- Unique Device ID\n- Timestamps (ts_start, ts_end)\n- Audio Fingerprints (20 pkts/min)\n- Lat/Long & Closest Major Street"] G["Alfonso / LG Ad Solutions Servers\n(alfonso.tv endpoint)"] end

A --> C B --> D C --> E D --> F E --> F F --> G ```

U-Turn’s analysis uncovered specific mechanisms driving this continuous surveillance: - **Aggressive HDMI Audio Fingerprinting:** As long as active audio plays over HDMI, the ACR binary fires a burst of five telemetry messages roughly once per second, pauses for approximately 10 seconds, and repeats, totaling around 20 packets per minute. - **Hardware Metadata Harvesting:** Transmitted payloads bundle acoustic fingerprints alongside HDMI hardware identity strings harvested directly through Source Product Description (SPD) info-frames and Consumer Electronics Control (CEC) protocols. - **Wi-Fi BSSID Geolocation Harvesting:** On initial boot, the TV queries an `alfonso.tv` URL to retrieve a device configuration profile containing instructions such as `enable Wi-Fi scan`, `location accuracy`, and `location poll interval`. The ACR binary scans the MAC addresses (BSSIDs) and signal strengths of neighboring wireless access points to derive near-pinpoint physical coordinates. - **Variable Fingerprint Windows:** The JSON telemetry includes fluctuating `ts_start` and `ts_end` timestamp values, which researchers are mapping to understand how LG tallies the exact duration a user watches specific media.

Steve explains that BSSID databases are publicly searchable across the internet; pairing an access point's BSSID with its signal strength allows third parties to locate a household down to an exact physical address. Ironically, when GN mapped the public Wi-Fi space surrounding the corporate office of LG Ad Solutions, the surrounding neighborhood networks were fully visible—yet LG's own headquarters building was the sole facility with its BSSIDs systematically suppressed from public mapping databases. LG appears keenly aware of the sensitivity of BSSID geolocational mapping for its own corporate facilities while continuing to harvest it from living rooms.

---

[28:25](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ToP9xfLDSME&t=1705s) Forced Firmware Updates and Community Backlash

The video notes that immediately following the release of the initial Gamers Nexus investigation, GN's studio LG G3 OLED TV suddenly initiated an unexpected, unprompted firmware update. The television began downloading software packages silently in the background without user consent, presenting a prompt stating the update was necessary for "enhanced security" that could only be stopped by manually diving through layers of deep system menus. Steve notes the bitter irony: while LG's public response insisted their products maintained absolute transparency and suffered from zero disclosed security flaws, their engineering team was frantically force-pushing unannounced patches behind the scenes.

Steve highlights that frustration across the broader user community has reached a boiling point, citing multiple public user reports: - One network administrator documented their LG TV becoming the single most blocked host on their network via AdGuard within just 12 hours of connection, describing the TV's telemetry queries as completely "relentless." - Another owner reported that an automated webOS update crippled system navigation speeds, turning basic TV functionality sluggish. - Other consumers expressed deep regret over mandatory webOS 26 upgrades after LG stripped away established features, such as the ability to route audio through a mobile device, while rendering their high-end OLED displays agonizingly slow to navigate.

[29:22](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ToP9xfLDSME&t=1762s) Mystery EULA Updates on Offline TVs

Steve highlights user reports that raise puzzling questions about how LG manages its legal terms and firmware. One user noted seeing the ghosted outline of a mouse cursor burned into their screen, while another asked how their LG G3 OLED—which had never been connected to Wi-Fi—could somehow pop up a prompt notifying them that a new End User License Agreement (EULA) update was available.

Steve's best hypothesis is that LG might be shipping timebombed updates preloaded in firmware. GamersNexus discovered that some of their brand-new test TVs shipped containing agreements dating back to 2017, even though far newer agreements were already active at the time of manufacture. If a TV already knows out of the box that a newer update is pending on a specific trigger date, it raises awkward questions about why LG would intentionally present an outdated agreement to the buyer during initial setup in the first place.

[29:57](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ToP9xfLDSME&t=1797s) Does LG "Own the Glass"? The Legal Bundle of Sticks

Turning to the legal reality of what consumers actually agree to, Steve brings on attorney Vincent Agosta. Dropping a massive stack of printed terms onto the table, Steve jokingly asks Agosta about his reading speed and whether he can help read through the mountain of paper. Steve then confronts him with the central corporate mantra repeated across multiple marketing and industry presentations by LG Ad Solutions staff: *"We own the glass."* He asks bluntly: legally speaking, do they?

Agosta answers that the short answer is yes. In law, property ownership is not a binary condition where a person exercises complete physical dominion to the exclusion of everyone else. Instead, property law conceives of ownership as a "bundle of sticks," where each stick represents an individual legal right—such as the right to possess, use, modify, sell, or profit from an object. These rights are not exclusive, meaning multiple parties can hold different sticks from the same bundle.

While a consumer buys the right to physically place the TV in their living room or throw a brick through the panel, the technology enables LG to retain an entirely new classification of rights that would have seemed unthinkable ten or twenty years ago. LG retains the legal sticks granting them the right to monitor whatever is displayed on the screen, control the advertisements pushed to it, record the content, and monetize or sell that data downstream.

```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: The Legal Bundle of Rights in Smart TV Ownership accDescr: Diagram illustrating how property rights are split between the consumer and the manufacturer. subgraph Bundle["The Property Rights 'Bundle of Sticks'"] direction TB subgraph Consumer["Consumer Rights"] C1["Physical Possession"] C2["Basic Device Operation"] C3["Physical Modification / Destruction"] end subgraph LG["LG Retained Rights"] L1["Monitor On-Screen Content"] L2["Serve Injected Screen Ads"] L3["Log Behavioral Telemetry"] L4["Monetize & Sell Viewing Data"] end end ```

[31:41](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ToP9xfLDSME&t=1901s) Granular Data Harvesting and Nested Agreements

Agosta explains that the sheer physical intimacy of the surveillance spelled out in the agreement would give consumers serious pause if they actually understood its implications. LG's terms explicitly outline monitoring on-screen behavior down to observing whether a user pauses a show and logging the exact duration of that pause—details that previously would have required an observer physically sitting next to you on your living room couch. Furthermore, this monitoring is not limited to native LG Channels. If an owner plugs in an external device or uses the Smart TV to display a personal family reunion photo album, all of that media source data is swept into LG's tracking, which the company openly states in the contract.

When Steve asks whether a typical layperson could realistically comprehend the contracts, Agosta calls it "functionally impossible" due to several compounding structural traps:

- **Nested and Conflicting Documents:** Users are subjected to an interconnected maze of legal notices, privacy policies, terms of service, and device-specific agreements from LG alone, where certain clauses supersede others without clear demarcations. - **Transitive Third-Party Agreements:** By agreeing to LG's contracts, the consumer transitively adopts the privacy policies and terms of service of third-party partners like Alfonso and Nuance Communications, as well as their downstream buyers. Alfonso alone lists roughly 18 identified data partners, each with their own complex policies. - **Indeterminate Versioning:** LG explicitly reserves the right to alter terms at will, with or without notifying the consumer. This forces the user into an impossible recursive cycle of constantly re-checking documents to see if terms have changed and attempting to opt out after the fact.

[34:40](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ToP9xfLDSME&t=2080s) Third-Party Consent, Minors, and Shifting Liability

Examining the actual text, Agosta points to clauses governing consent that place extraordinary burdens on the TV owner. Under Section 11, the purchaser is not merely granting permission for their own data to be collected; they are legally asserting that they have obtained full consent on behalf of any other person who uses the television. This includes family members, visiting friends, or—in a commercial environment like a doctor's office or restaurant—clients, employees, and patrons.

This responsibility becomes particularly alarming under Section 10, which addresses data originating from minors. The privacy policy explicitly warns: > "when users of all age interact with LG smart media services certain persistent identifiers may be automatically collected"

Because LG cannot discern whether an adult or a child is operating the television, the policy states that LG: > "may not be able to know whether information was collected from a child under 18 and treats this information as if it were provided by an adult."

LG effectively passes the buck to the consumer. If an owner knows the device will be used by multiple people, the policy dictates: > "if you know that this device will be used by more than one person you represent that you have obtained consent from all others who will use this smart media product to this privacy policy and are providing consent on their behalf"

Agosta explains that if an aggrieved party or minor later disputes the non-consensual harvesting and recording of their data, LG's legal structure shifts that liability entirely onto the consumer who originally clicked through the setup screens.

[36:58](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ToP9xfLDSME&t=2218s) Investigating "Illegal Activities" and Broad Enforcement Purview

Agosta directs attention to Section 3 of LG's privacy policy, which outlines how the harvested data may be used. The agreement states that LG uses collected data for: > "preventing, detecting, and investigating illegal activities such as breaching our terms of use and fraud"

The key legal vulnerability lies in the phrase *"such as"*. Breaching the terms of use or committing fraud are merely non-exhaustive examples, granting LG expansive leeway to investigate suspected illicit behavior on the user's screen. Because the language covers the *investigation* and *detection* of potential illegality, LG does not need prior proof of a crime before monitoring; the monitoring itself is the tool of discovery.

Steve and Agosta explore what fall under these sweeping terms: - **Unlicensed or Pirated Content:** Playing downloaded or illegally obtained media files through the television falls squarely within the scope of detecting illegal activity. - **Age-Verification Circumvention:** With various US states mandating age verification and ID checks for adult websites—and future legislative pushes targeting online forums and video games—any attempt to bypass these restrictions via the TV's browser or connected hardware could be flagged under this clause. - **Authoritarian Foreign Regimes:** In countries with restrictive speech, press, or internet censorship laws, LG's broad enforcement provisions could be leveraged by authorities to police and suppress user conduct on the screen.

The phrasing creates a dragnet where LG reserves the right to scrutinize user behavior to determine whether an unlawful act might have occurred, far exceeding what any consumer expects when turning on a television.

[39:39](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ToP9xfLDSME&t=2379s) Constitutional Rights and Law Enforcement Data Sharing

Steve Burke and lawyer Vincent Agosta examine the intersection between changing legal standards and user rights under LG's terms of service. Steve raises the question of constitutional protections: in the United States, citizens are afforded Fourth Amendment rights protecting against unreasonable searches and seizures, typically requiring law enforcement to obtain a judicial warrant before seizing private personal information. He asks whether consumers retain those same constitutional shields when government agencies bypass the individual and seek data held by a private third party like a smart TV manufacturer.

```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Government Data Access Paths accDescr: Comparison between judicial compulsion requiring warrants and voluntary compliance with regulatory requests under LG terms.

subgraph DirectCompulsion["Compelled Legal Process"] Warrant["Warrant / Subpoena / Court Order"] -->|"Judicially Mandated"| LG_Compel["LG Required to Disclose"] end

subgraph VoluntaryInquiry["Informal & Regulatory Inquiries"] Request["Inquiry / Investigation / Request"] -->|"No Warrant Required"| LG_Voluntary["LG Voluntarily Complies"] end

LG_Voluntary --> Loss["Third-Party Doctrine: User Data No Longer Legally Private"] LG_Compel --> Loss ```

Agosta gives a blunt response: "The short answer is no." While private corporations maintain certain rights, the specific drafting of LG's agreement creates two distinct tiers of government cooperation. In one clause, LG states it will use customer information to "respond to the legal process such as a search warrant, subpoena, summons, or court order." In a second, broader clause, LG commits to comply with any "applicable federal, state, or local law, regulation, civil, criminal, or regulatory inquiry, investigation, legal process, or enforceable government request."

Agosta underscores that the phrasing makes a critical legal distinction: - The first provision covers judicially compelled mechanisms—subpoenas, warrants, and formal court orders that require judicial oversight and probable cause. - The second provision explicitly encompasses informal investigations, inquiries, and regulatory requests that carry no warrant requirement whatsoever. - Because consumers "voluntarily shared" their living room activities, voice snippets, and viewing telemetry with LG under the contract, the legal system generally views that data as no longer private under the third-party doctrine, allowing LG to turn it over without legal friction.

---

[41:59](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ToP9xfLDSME&t=2519s) The Rhetorical Shell Game and Conflicting Agreements

Beyond the alarming substance of data harvesting, Agosta identifies a deeper rhetorical problem: the staggering sheer volume of text and intentional ambiguity surrounding which contract actually governs the consumer. Users are faced with multiple, overlapping layers of terms—account-level user agreements, software privacy policies, and device-level hardware agreements. While account terms state that device-specific terms predominate, attempting to verify the authoritative text plunges the user into a circular trap.

On its website, LG's legal notice warns that agreements published online may not apply to a specific customer's hardware, stating explicitly: "Legal documents applicable to your smart TV may be different from those listed here as it depends on the model of the TV and current version of the software. You can find the legal documents specifically applicable to your smart TV on the TV itself."

This creates an unresolvable contractual maze: - The website defers authority to the software version installed on the physical TV screen. - Both the physical device terms and online terms incorporate unilateral "savings clauses," reserving LG's right to update and alter contractual rules at any moment without affirmative renegotiation. - The consumer is trapped in a perpetual verification loop, forced to cross-check remote displays against shifting web text to decipher what rights they have surrendered. - Under traditional common-law contract theory, the legal fiction persists that consumers make a calculated choice to read every word before consenting, ignoring what Agosta characterizes as a modern "death by a thousand cuts."

---

[44:26](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ToP9xfLDSME&t=2666s) Legislative Solutions and the Disappearing Dumb Appliance

Steve and Vincent discuss the structural failure of relying strictly on contract law to protect individuals. Agosta argues that because common-law contract frameworks simply assume consent once an agreement is accepted, resolving this asymmetry requires legislative intervention rather than consumer-level legal maneuvering. Companies already standardize practices to mirror the most restrictive, punitive regional regulations purely out of operational and economic efficiency.

Steve observes that while purists argue dissatisfied consumers can simply opt out and refuse to buy smart TVs, market realities make that impossible. The consumer electronics market presents a rapidly "narrowing funnel of options," where dumb appliances are aggressively phased out in favor of connected, ad-supported devices. Agosta warns that unless lawmakers intervene, these intrusive tracking contracts will inevitably dominate every category of household consumer goods, from kitchen appliances to environmental controls. Steve issues a direct call to action, urging viewers who have the time and capacity to research their elected representatives and lobby for comprehensive digital privacy and consumer protection laws.

---

[46:05](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ToP9xfLDSME&t=2765s) Conclusion and Supporting the Data Dragnet Investigation

Steve concludes the video by thanking Vincent Agosta for wading through hundreds of pages of dense legal boilerplates across multiple days. He delivers a blistering verdict on LG's official statement, calling it "honestly one of the worst responses from a company I've ever read" and describing its total lack of evidentiary rebuttal as almost comedic in its ineptitude.

Steve transitions to funding and the continuation of Gamers Nexus's investigative reporting: - He reveals that the team has recently purchased a massive haul of competing television sets to expand their testing suite—prompting a delivery driver to remark, "Wow, you guys must really like TVs," to which the GN crew responded, "Oh, you don't know the half of it." - Continued reporting on smart hardware telemetry relies directly on backer support via Store.GamersNexus.net and their Data Dragnet fundraiser campaign. - Merchandise supporting the investigation includes limited foil shirts (the GN Wireframe Polygon Shards shirt with a back rainfall pattern, and a cyberpunk skeleton shirt featuring a spine back-print and a technical UI rib cage graphic). - Additional campaign rewards include inductor dice kits bundled with a paintable 3D-printed goblin miniature, as well as GN glassware such as the "Microscope" and "LG Evil" pint and tasting glasses. - Viewers are encouraged to watch part one of the smart TV investigation, support GN on Patreon, and subscribe for subsequent hardware privacy deep dives.

## Notable quotes > [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ToP9xfLDSME&t=0s) The claims made in the recently published video are not true. — LG Electronics

> [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ToP9xfLDSME&t=0s) owning the glass and owning—working with the consumer — LG Ad Solutions Executive

> [09:49](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ToP9xfLDSME&t=589s) This is to provide LG's position regarding the claims recently raised by the Gamers Nexus YouTube channel. The claims made in the recently published video are not true. — LG Electronics

> [09:49](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ToP9xfLDSME&t=589s) LG TVs feature the ability to scan for and connect to nearby devices on the same network. — LG Electronics

> [11:46](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ToP9xfLDSME&t=706s) a standard function commonly provided by smart TVs and smart home devices. — LG Electronics

> [11:46](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ToP9xfLDSME&t=706s) Don't worry, your doctor needs blood for routine tests — Steve Burke

> [16:12](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ToP9xfLDSME&t=972s) We ensure that your LG TV does not collect, record, or transmit ambient conversations in your home unless voice functionality has been intentionally activated by the user. — LG Electronics

> [19:51](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ToP9xfLDSME&t=1191s) LG, the first step to improving is admitting that you have a problem, not just saying 'we have proactive security' and ignoring it. — Steve Burke

> [22:37](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ToP9xfLDSME&t=1357s) Get the fuck out of here. LG has a massive credibility problem when it comes to believing them about consent on anything after what we exposed last month. — Steve Burke

> [34:40](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ToP9xfLDSME&t=2080s) when users of all age interact with LG smart media services certain persistent identifiers may be automatically collected — LG Electronics Terms

> [34:40](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ToP9xfLDSME&t=2080s) may not be able to know whether information was collected from a child under 18 and treats this information as if it were provided by an adult. — LG Electronics Terms

> [34:40](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ToP9xfLDSME&t=2080s) if you know that this device will be used by more than one person you represent that you have obtained consent from all others who will use this smart media product to this privacy policy and are providing consent on their behalf — LG Electronics Terms

> [36:58](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ToP9xfLDSME&t=2218s) preventing, detecting, and investigating illegal activities such as breaching our terms of use and fraud — LG Electronics Terms

> [41:59](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ToP9xfLDSME&t=2519s) Legal documents applicable to your smart TV may be different from those listed here as it depends on the model of the TV and current version of the software. You can find the legal documents specifically applicable to your smart TV on the TV itself. — LG Electronics Terms

> [46:05](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ToP9xfLDSME&t=2765s) honestly one of the worst responses from a company I've ever read — Steve Burke

## Mentioned Gamers Nexus, Steve Burke, Vincent Agosta, LG, LG Electronics, LG Ad Solutions, Serge Matta, DeepIntent, Level1Techs, Wendell, Mr. Bra, U-Turn, Samsung, Vizio, Spur, Bitdefender, SecurityWeek, McAfee, Microsoft, Nuance Communications, Alfonso, AdGuard, Google Chromecast, Shodan

## Video description SUPPORT US in our DATA DRAGNET series: https://store.gamersnexus.net/data-dragnet LG has responded to our deep-dive investigation revealing the depths of LG Smart TV ACR data harvesting functionality, LG's claims to "owning the glass," and LG Smart TV security vulnerabilities and exploits. When LG responded to GamersNexus, it called our report untrue and, essentially, claimed the "fake news" defense. We believe the company failed to present a single point of evidence to counter our findings. In this video, we dismantle LG's response and bring in lawyer Vincent Agosta to analyze their terms so that consumers understand what they're agreeing to.

WATCH THE FULL REPORT on the Spy TVs: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6IFVTcM28KA WATCH OUR COVERAGE OF LG's ADWARE: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q9uefFYe6bM

The best way to support our work is through our store: https://store.gamersnexus.net/

Like our content? Please consider becoming our Patron to support us: http://www.patreon.com/gamersnexus

TIMESTAMPS

00:00 - WE STILL OWN THE GLASS 03:42 - Microphones, ACR, and Pharmaceuticals 06:41 - Dark Patterns Smackdown 08:21 - WE NEED YOUR SUPPORT 09:39 - A Lot to Talk About 10:46 - Dismantling LG's Response 16:12 - LG Takes Security Super Seriously 22:37 - GTFO 24:11 - NEW FINDINGS and GEOLOCATION 29:57 - LAWYER: Does LG Own the Glass? 31:41 - LAWYER: Data Harvesting 34:40 - LAWYER: Consent and Minors Near the TV 36:58 - LAWYER: Sharing Your Data with Law Enforcement 41:59 - LAWYER: The Burden of Reading the Terms 44:26 - LAWYER: Policy Needs to Change 46:05 - Conclusion

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Steve Burke: Writing, Host, Editing Vitalii Makhnovets: Editing, Camera Tim Phetdara: Editing Andrew Coleman: Editing

[Source](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ToP9xfLDSME)

中文简报

测试显示LG电视采集地理位置，Gamers Nexus反驳LG否认声明数据包捕获与合同分析揭示LG智能电视积极采集HDMI音频与Wi-Fi地理位置，同时通过合同条款剥夺用户隐私，以便利广告推送及在无需搜查令的情况下向警方披露信息。 Steve Burke对LG否认Gamers Nexus此前关于智能电视数据采集调查报道的官方声明进行了驳斥，指出LG未提供任何反驳证据，却悄悄修改了其关于环境麦克风录音和网络扫描的公关说法。在安全研究员U-Turn提供的新数据包捕获结果支持下，该报道证实LG电视会持续捕获HDMI音频指纹，并扫描周围的Wi-Fi BSSID，从而将用户居住坐标精确锁定至最近的十字路口。通过咨询律师Vincent Agosta，Gamers Nexus探讨了LG如何通过一系列复杂的权利从法律层面“拥有屏幕”，以此监控屏幕活动、将未成年人同意的法律责任转嫁给消费者，并允许在无需司法搜查令的情况下将遥测数据移交给执法部门。该调查最后批评了普遍存在的暗黑模式以及人为淘汰离线“非智能”家电的做法，呼吁观众倡导立法层面的数字隐私保护。 LG发表了全面否认声明，称Gamers Nexus的调查不实，但未提供反驳证据，同时悄悄修改公关声明，删除了有关存储环境音频的内容，并承认存在本地网络扫描行为。 (0:00) 研究员U-Turn的技术抓包显示，LG的Alfonso ACR二进制文件以每分钟约20个数据包的频率对活跃的HDMI音频流提取指纹，并被动扫描周围的Wi-Fi BSSID以计算精确的地理坐标。 (24:11) 独立网络安全审计显示，webOS此前允许应用程序将外部流量通过居民消费级网络作为代理节点进行路由，而未修补的漏洞导致Shodan上有超过91,000台电视面临Root权限沦陷风险。 (19:51) 对LG服务条款的法律审查证实，LG保留了对屏幕内容的主导财产权，将跟踪未成年人的法定责任转嫁给设备所有者，并允许在无需司法搜查令的情况下将遥测数据移交给执法部门。 (29:57)

Reading summary

Gamers Nexus challenges LG Electronics' blanket denial of smart TV data-harvesting practices, presenting empirical packet captures, security vulnerability disclosures, and legal contract reviews. The reporting contends that despite corporate assurances of user privacy, LG’s webOS ecosystem continuously tracks viewing behavior and leverages restrictive terms of service to monetize consumer data. Corporate Denials and Documented Security Flaws (0:00) LG issued a public denial claiming that Gamers Nexus’s investigative findings were entirely false, while simultaneously acknowledging in the same statement that its smart TVs scan local networks for nearby devices. Gamers Nexus notes that LG quietly altered its public stance regarding ambient audio, changing its initial claim that TVs do not "collect, record, or store ambient conversations" to stating they do not "collect, record, or transmit" them—removing the word "store" entirely while qualifying that collection can occur once voice functionality is enabled. While LG asserted that data security is a proactive priority, Gamers Nexus cited independent cybersecurity audits demonstrating ongoing platform risks. Findings from Bitdefender revealed unauthenticated remote execution flaws (CVE-2023-6317 through CVE-2023-6320) that allowed root access bypasses, leaving more than 91,000 internet-connected LG TVs exposed on the Shodan search engine. Additionally, research from Spur showed webOS historically allowed applications to route residential proxy traffic directly through consumer living rooms. Hardware Telemetry and Granular Commercial Attribution (24:11) Network packet analysis by security researcher U-Turn revealed that unmodified LG smart TVs actively transmit telemetry payloads even when restricted to an external HDMI video input. Through Alfonso, an automated content recognition (ACR) binary operated by LG Ad Solutions, the TV generates and transmits approximately 20 audio fingerprint packets per minute. The exfiltrated JSON payloads combine HDMI hardware metadata with physical geolocation data—including latitude, longitude, and nearby street intersections—derived from scanning neighboring Wi-Fi BSSIDs and signal strengths. These intake mechanisms feed directly into targeted demand-side advertising platforms. Promotional materials from DeepIntent, an exclusive healthcare DSP partner for LG Ad Solutions, claim Connected TV impressions generate twice as many new brand prescription acquisitions as standard online video. DeepIntent maps household viewing behavior to secondary mobile devices on the network, tracking ad impressions directly to doctor visits and filled pharmacy prescriptions before deterministically ceasing campaign spend. Interface Dark Patterns and Forced Consent (6:41) Gamers Nexus details how webOS uses deceptive interface designs to steer consumers into broad surveillance agreements. Application prompts frequently present up to six terms agreements simultaneously—despite only two being mandatory—while defaulting user focus onto a "Select All" button. Opt-out integrity is also compromised: security testing by researcher Mr. Bra revealed that revoking tracking consent in firmware still triggers an outgoing telemetry transmission back to LG servers. Other documented interface manipulations include misleading cookie settings, where turning the tracking cookie toggle "off" merely removes the frequency-capping limit rather than disabling cookies, resulting in higher cookie volume. Firmware updates pushed to older displays have also been documented automatically generating new advertising identifiers and tracking cookies without re-prompting the user. Contractual Dominion and Fourth Amendment Circumvention (29:57) Analyzing LG's legal agreements, attorney Vincent Agosta explains that under property law's "bundle of sticks" doctrine, consumers physically hold the hardware, but LG contractually reserves the right to monitor, log, and monetize whatever passes across the display. The terms force primary purchasers to legally represent that they have obtained consent from every guest, household member, or minor using the screen, effectively shifting corporate liability for non-consensual tracking entirely onto the buyer. Furthermore, Agosta warns that LG's terms weaken traditional constitutional protections. While judicial warrants require probable cause and judicial oversight, LG’s agreements also commit to complying with informal civil, criminal, or regulatory inquiries. Because consumers contractually agree to transmit telemetry to LG servers, the legal third-party doctrine treats this information as voluntarily shared, allowing corporate data stores to be handed over to law enforcement without Fourth Amendment warrant protections. Gamers Nexus and Agosta conclude that the consumer electronics market is systematically phasing out non-connected appliances, leaving buyers with few alternatives to data-harvesting hardware. Because contract law presumes affirmative consent once click-through agreements are accepted, they argue that individual opt-outs cannot resolve structural surveillance without targeted legislative privacy reform.

Source quotes

[0:00] LG Electronics: The claims made in the recently published video are not true. [0:00] LG Ad Solutions Executive: owning the glass and owning—working with the consumer [9:49] LG Electronics: This is to provide LG's position regarding the claims recently raised by the Gamers Nexus YouTube channel. The claims made in the recently published video are not true. [9:49] LG Electronics: LG TVs feature the ability to scan for and connect to nearby devices on the same network. [11:46] LG Electronics: a standard function commonly provided by smart TVs and smart home devices. [11:46] Steve Burke: Don't worry, your doctor needs blood for routine tests [16:12] LG Electronics: We ensure that your LG TV does not collect, record, or transmit ambient conversations in your home unless voice functionality has been intentionally activated by the user. [19:51] Steve Burke: LG, the first step to improving is admitting that you have a problem, not just saying 'we have proactive security' and ignoring it. [22:37] Steve Burke: Get the fuck out of here. LG has a massive credibility problem when it comes to believing them about consent on anything after what we exposed last month. [34:40] LG Electronics Terms: when users of all age interact with LG smart media services certain persistent identifiers may be automatically collected [34:40] LG Electronics Terms: may not be able to know whether information was collected from a child under 18 and treats this information as if it were provided by an adult. [34:40] LG Electronics Terms: if you know that this device will be used by more than one person you represent that you have obtained consent from all others who will use this smart media product to this privacy policy and are providing consent on their behalf [36:58] LG Electronics Terms: preventing, detecting, and investigating illegal activities such as breaching our terms of use and fraud [41:59] LG Electronics Terms: Legal documents applicable to your smart TV may be different from those listed here as it depends on the model of the TV and current version of the software. You can find the legal documents specifically applicable to your smart TV on the TV itself. [46:05] Steve Burke: honestly one of the worst responses from a company I've ever read

Original transcript

[0:00] LG has responded to our investigation [0:02] and we think they're lying. Responding [0:05] to Gamers Nexus via literally anyone [0:07] except for Gamers Nexus, LG said, quote, [0:09] "The claims made in the recently [0:11] published video are not true." End [0:13] quote. Ah, got it. [0:16] Does that include um this [0:18] >> in the fact that we have the glass? We [0:20] own the glass. We own the TV. I guess [0:22] it's also false that we pointed out that [0:23] an LG ad solutions president, Serge [0:25] Mada, previously settled a case relating [0:27] to a fraudulent scheme and was barred by [0:29] the SEC from running a public company [0:30] for 10 years and now is part of the [0:32] leadership team in charge of your data. [0:34] I guess it was also false when we logged [0:35] data being exfiltrated from our TV and [0:37] going to LG ad servers and we produced [0:39] actual literal logs and evidence of it, [0:41] including when the TV was being used as [0:43] a dumb monitor and plugged into a laptop [0:45] with HDMI. One month ago, LG also [0:47] responded to our first video by saying, [0:49] quote, "LG Electronics reaffirms that LG [0:51] TVs do not collect, record, or store [0:54] ambient conversations." End quote. This [0:56] week, they responded to our new [0:58] investigation showing the possibility of [1:00] using the TVs to store ambient [1:02] conversations by saying, "Ahem quote, we [1:06] ensure that your LG TV does not collect, [1:09] record, or transmit ambient [1:12] conversations." End quote. Now, first of [1:14] all, LG cannot possibly ensure that its [1:17] TVs don't do these things considering [1:20] the gigantic gaping security holes that [1:25] they still haven't patched. [1:27] Secondly, did you catch it? Because they [1:30] made a pretty substantial but very [1:33] subtle change. The word store has been [1:36] quietly removed from the original [1:37] statement. Now, it's dropped that pesky [1:39] word store entirely. Wonder why they [1:42] would change such an important word with [1:43] such a firm technical meaning [1:47] immediately after we published two hours [1:49] worth of demonstrations. [1:52] But they also said that they don't do [1:53] that in quote your home end quote. Oh, [1:57] okay. Now it's your home. Just a week [2:00] ago it was the LG advertisers living [2:02] room that they were in pain rat for or [2:04] it was the LG household. [2:06] >> We know who's in the LG household. But [2:08] now, now that it's time for damage [2:10] control, the comes out and now [2:13] it's your home. That's right. But hey, [2:16] [music] at least this time they didn't [2:19] almost slip up with a gigantic Freudian [2:21] slip and say that they own the consumer. [2:24] >> Our advantage of being in a CTV [music] [2:26] environment and owning the glass and [2:28] owning working with the consumer to [2:30] >> Did you hear it? That one's pretty [2:31] amazing. Let's play it back again. Zoom [2:33] and enhance kind of like an LG TV can [2:35] do. owning [music] working with the [2:38] consumer. [2:39] >> We paid an attorney Vincent Dasha to go [2:42] through all of LG's agreements and these [2:45] hourly so it's very expensive to help us [2:47] understand the ownership question. Do [2:49] they own the glass? [2:50] >> So the the short answer is yes. The [2:54] rights that they retain [music] [2:55] >> directly implicate the glass of the [2:57] television. Now can you throw a brick [2:58] through it? Yes. But they have a right [3:00] [music] to observe what's on the screen, [3:02] to record it, to use it, to sell it, [3:04] etc. But there's no reason to just [3:06] connect the dots on what LG can do with [3:08] your data when they also just straight [3:10] up tell us in their agreements that you [3:13] have to read and their partners' [3:16] agreements [3:17] and their partners' partners' agreements [3:19] that you have to read in order to be [3:21] fully and adequately informed so you can [3:24] decide whether or not you consent to [3:26] what you do with their television. After [3:29] all, it is their glass. [3:32] >> We own the glass. We own the TV. We own [3:34] the glass. Owning the glass [3:36] >> and we're in a unique position because [3:38] we own the screen and we own the data [3:41] and we have our own content. [3:42] >> But of course, LG reserved one line to [3:44] say that it's providing better [3:46] advertising experiences with its [3:47] automatic content recognition and [3:49] targeted ads are big business with CTV. [3:52] Here are LG ad solutions exclusive [3:55] demandside platform partners, Deep [3:57] Intent to explain. Here at Deep Intent, [4:01] we're [music] turning TV awareness and [4:03] healthcare into real patient action. By [4:06] starting with identity, we see CTV drive [4:10] two times higher new brand prescriptions [4:12] than OV alone. We're extending these CTV [4:15] impressions on a household level. So for [4:17] an awareness spot, um we can suppress or [4:20] sequence into that next patient's mobile [4:22] session. When we look at CTV, I think [4:24] one of the things we always talk about [4:26] is there's no more click-through rate, [4:28] right? you're not seeing that as a as [4:30] the signal, that's essentially zero. [4:32] That's fine because what we're able to [4:34] do is map that back again to those [4:36] clinical conversions which are what our [4:37] pharma brands, patients, and ATPs are [4:39] expecting. Being able to correlate that [4:42] exposure to um an actual script or an [4:46] actual conversion. So having this be a [4:49] deterministic and not a modeled um [4:51] insight for our brands is really [4:53] something that's important. a group of [4:55] individuals exposed to advertisement [4:57] versus the the control groups. Are we [4:59] seeing changes in those behavior? And [5:02] since we have visibility into that [5:05] clinical patient journey, we're able [5:07] [music] to see those signals of change. [5:10] So once a script is filled, we stop [5:12] spending against the person. [5:13] >> Of course, our biggest question is how [5:15] do you know when a script is filled? [5:17] That's from LG Adartner Deep Intent. And [5:19] that's the part we think LG doesn't want [5:21] you thinking about. In LG's response to [5:23] us, they spent an awful lot of words [5:25] actually admitting behaviors we had [5:28] already described. And yet, they spent [5:30] almost no words at all talking about the [5:32] horrors of what can be accomplished with [5:34] ACR. Welcome to the advertising mega [5:37] corporate panopticon and our modern [5:39] surveillance system. LG says, quote, [5:41] "Farfield voice recognition. Hi, LG. [5:44] This feature must be manually activated [5:46] by the user before the TV begins [5:47] listening for the specific wake word." [5:49] End quote. False. LG overlooked the [5:51] mountain of data and evidence that we [5:53] provided, including the evidence of [5:55] remote code execution exploits when it [5:58] provided this statement. Or as Wendell [6:00] puts it, [6:01] >> so if what's implied there is that the [6:02] mic is only listening for the built-in [6:04] LG wake word, hi LG, [6:07] before it could listen and capture [6:09] audio, that's not necessarily true. It [6:11] depends on who owns the glass. I could [6:14] have the built-in mic action wake word [6:16] be gaslighting. [6:22] Who owns the glass? [6:38] >> [laughter] [6:41] >> LG said that, quote, "LG Electronics is [6:43] committed to providing transparency and [6:44] rejecting deceptive practices, [music] [6:46] parenthesis, dark patterns, ensuring [6:48] users can choose their preferred privacy [6:51] and consent options directly through [6:52] their TV settings." End quote. It sure [6:54] be a shame if there were any dark [6:56] patterns in the LG products. LG must [6:58] have forgotten to reject the dark [6:59] patterns when you try to use an app and [7:00] it jump scares you with six agreements [7:02] despite only needing to actually accept [7:03] two while highlighting select all by [7:05] default or when it pops up four [7:06] agreements, but you only need three with [7:08] select all highlighted by default again. [7:09] Or when you actively opt out of tracking [7:11] and withdraw your consent, Mr. Bra has [7:14] shown in firmware that LG can send one [7:15] final data packet to LG or when users [7:18] update a 4-year-old TV and [7:19] instantaneously receive an unconented [7:22] advertising ID and tracking cookies [7:23] despite having never agreed to any terms [7:25] on the TV or the off by default cookies [7:27] toggle misleading users into thinking [7:29] cookies are in fact actually off but [7:31] actually that's the capping limit for [7:32] advertising tracking cookies they turned [7:34] off by default meaning you actually get [7:35] more of them not fewer or when LG [7:38] previously called its agreement quote [7:39] viewing information agreement unquote [7:40] while actually being the ACR grid or [7:42] when LG hides do not sell my information [7:44] option deep within its menu and toggles [7:46] it off by default despite the off [7:48] position being towards the hide text [7:50] indicating it's on or in other words LG [7:52] has so many dark patterns that they may [7:54] actually be the origin of the universe [7:56] because in the beginning [clears throat] [7:57] there was only darkness and then in a [7:58] shiny flash the big bang twice I've told [8:01] LG about their voice txts and stats but [8:05] they've said natada [8:09] sai gambuk gal goble full cup. Whoa. [8:15] Where did that come from? I blacked out [8:17] for a second. I went back to 2012. [8:20] We brought you this video with our [8:22] Kickstarter styled fundraiser campaign [8:24] on store.gamersex.net. [8:25] And we're self-sponsored here. You all [8:27] have absolutely blown away our goal for [8:30] the data dragnet campaign. Our backer [8:32] kits include things like our foil [8:33] cyberpunk skeleton t-shirt with a UI [8:36] tech dystopian style rib cage design and [8:38] matching spine that goes all the way [8:40] down the back of the shirt. Some of the [8:41] kits also include our Blu-ray disc packs [8:43] of our LG Investigation with a custom [8:46] fully in-house 3D printed case and a [8:49] special red metallic coloring for the LG [8:51] deep dive specifically. It even includes [8:53] a USB drive just in case you need an [8:55] easier way to watch it and as sort of a [8:57] dead man switch for the DMCA. Also, [8:59] we're duplicating the discs in house and [9:01] even printing the labels on them in [9:03] house with our disc duplicator. So, this [9:06] is actually made here. We also have a [9:07] backer tier with a live streamed Q&A [9:10] session with me and a group of backers [9:12] if you [music] want to ask questions, [9:13] including your name in the credits for [9:14] that tier of the disappointment tour [9:16] video at the end of the year. It's been [9:18] incredible to see the funding support on [9:20] the Data Dragnet page. And we've already [9:22] started applying that money towards [9:24] buying even more TVs to investigate [9:26] alongside other things. And not just LG, [9:28] we've spent thousands and thousands of [9:30] dollars and have TVs showing up daily [9:32] right now for the next round. Thank you [9:34] sincerely for your support as we [9:36] continue to expand our coverage scope. [9:38] And now back to it. Let's dismantle's [9:40] response. We have a lot to talk about [9:41] today, including new information that we [9:43] hadn't previously published. So security [9:45] researcher U-Turn has provided some new [9:46] findings such as audio fingerprinting [9:49] and the ability to use that to get [9:51] potentially very precise geoloccation [9:53] data. So we'll go through that. That is [9:54] using unmodified, non-rooted, no [9:58] exploits native TV functionality. We'll [10:00] also have a full review of LG's [10:01] agreements and terms with a lawyer to [10:03] help dissect it and put it into sort of [10:05] lay people terms. And of course, we'll [10:07] talk about LG's response. Now, [10:09] the story blew up and got a lot of [10:11] attention, including a lot of mainstream [10:13] attention. Uh, so if you're following [10:15] the story and you want to understand the [10:17] possibilities of what smart TVs can do, [10:19] both broadly and specifically to LG TVs, [10:22] then we will link the original report [10:24] below. We would encourage you to watch [10:25] that one as the point of truth. To LG's [10:27] credit, its statement actually directly [10:30] names us, which is great because that [10:32] means LG can't weasle out of being [10:34] called out on some of the things they [10:36] said by pretending it was from media [10:38] reports because they named us. So, thank [10:40] you LG for making that part easy for us. [10:42] And let's start with the response to the [10:45] response. Quote, "This is to provide [10:47] LG's position regarding the claims [10:48] recently raised by the Gamers Nexus [10:50] YouTube channel. The claims made in the [10:52] recently published video are not true." [10:54] End quote. which is strange because LG [10:56] later says, quote, "LG TVs feature the [10:59] ability to scan for and connect to [11:01] nearby devices on the same network." End [11:03] quote. Right? [music] That's uh that's [11:06] what we said. So, which one is it, LG? [11:09] Are our claims not true, or, you know, [11:11] are they literally what we already said? [11:14] Likewise, our video contains [11:15] demonstrations and proofs of concept and [11:18] tests supporting the claims that we [11:20] made. LG is a multi-billion dollar [11:22] multinational corporation with they say [11:24] more than 75,000 employees. If our [11:27] claims are false as LG says, then we [11:29] welcome LG to publish evidence of them [11:32] being false to the public internet so [11:34] that people can see it. Instead, LG [11:37] resorted to the fake news response to [11:40] our video and went for denial without [11:43] any counter evidence whatsoever. LG also [11:46] said, quote, "This is a standard [11:47] function commonly provided by smart TVs [11:50] and smart home devices." End quote. [11:51] That's like saying, "Don't worry, your [11:53] doctor needs blood for routine tests." [11:56] That is a true statement, except your [11:59] doctor is in fact an immortal vampire [12:02] that feeds on the blood of the innocent. [12:04] To quote Wendell, quote, "LG does not [12:06] need to send the data it collects and [12:07] pinpoint your precise location to check [12:09] notes, play media files from a computer [12:11] on your network." End quote. Also, as [12:13] far as LG's defense basically being [12:15] everyone else does it, that's not a [12:17] defense. This line does not refute a [12:21] single point that we made about the [12:23] connected devices. It is far more [12:25] invasive than just looking for like a [12:28] chcast or something. If anything, their [12:31] own statement seems to be agreeing with [12:33] what we said while attempting to reframe [12:36] it as like fingerpointing. It's the It's [12:40] It's the Spider-Man meme all over again, [12:42] except this time it's LG, Samsung, and [12:46] Vizio. In fact, we have new data that [12:48] we'll look at in a moment, including [12:49] down to major streets near your house. [12:51] LG also says, quote, "The ACR, automatic [12:54] content recognition feature is provided [12:56] on an opt-in basis to deliver [12:58] personalized content recommendation, [13:00] services, and advertisements. If a user [13:02] does not consent to the applicable [13:04] optional agreement, ACR data is not used [13:07] for advertising purposes. End quote. Did [13:10] you catch it? It's the slippery [13:12] language. Again, the statement that if a [13:16] user does not consent to the applicable [13:18] optional agreement, ACR data is not used [13:21] for advertising purposes doesn't say ACR [13:24] data is not used. That's not what they [13:27] said. They said it's not used for [13:29] advertising purposes. That doesn't mean [13:32] they don't have it and it doesn't mean [13:33] they don't use it. Also, LG previously [13:36] called this a double optin. [13:38] >> Our ACR technology is a double opt-in um [13:42] experience for consumers and and we [13:44] believe that's extremely important. [13:46] [snorts] Um so that's the most important [13:48] thing to say. [13:49] >> Now LG is suddenly using non-specific [13:52] phrasing as just an opt-in. The double [13:55] has quietly slipped away after we [13:59] reported on it. The fact also does not [14:01] change that the ACR data could in theory [14:05] as covered by their contract be used in [14:08] connection with as defined inquiries and [14:11] with requests relating to for example [14:15] investigating possible crime. [14:18] That's not not a warrant, not a [14:20] subpoena. Those are also covered, but [14:22] that's you know the law. This is [14:24] inquiries and requests, separate from [14:26] warrants and subpoenas, not necessarily [14:28] even confirmed crime, but investigations [14:31] into the requests or the reports or the [14:34] inquiries. Here's what attorney Vincent [14:36] Augusta had to say about that and your [14:39] Fourth Amendment rights if you're in the [14:40] US. What does this mean for [14:42] constitutional rights? The privacy [14:43] policy uh talks specifically about that. [14:46] There's two statements. One says that [14:48] they'll use the information to quote [14:50] respond to the legal process such as a [14:52] search, warrant, subpoena, summon or [14:53] court order. But the second statement is [14:55] they will quote comply with any [14:57] applicable federal, state or local law, [14:59] regulation, civil, criminal or [15:00] regulatory inquiry. The key word [15:03] difference between these two is that the [15:05] first statement implies some sort of [15:08] judicial compelling uh action whereas [15:12] the second statement has to do with [15:14] inquiry, investigation, request. Mhm. [15:17] >> Uh those do not implicate [15:20] warrant requirements. And it seems as [15:23] though the distinction between these two [15:24] is that [15:25] >> LG is making it very clear that they [15:29] will not only comply with warrants, but [15:31] they will also potentially just share [15:32] the information, which since you have [15:34] voluntarily shared with them, [15:36] >> right, [15:36] >> is no longer considered private. [15:39] >> And to be clear, that's first party [15:40] language. That's first-party [15:41] functionality that doesn't require [15:42] exploits. It doesn't require [15:44] vulnerabilities. That's the capabilities [15:46] of the LG TV and the data harvesting, [15:50] the advertising, the data exchange, the [15:53] sale of data or the exchange, the [15:55] sharing of data that then happens to [15:59] relate to a purchase of advertising from [16:02] LG ad solutions. That remains to us far [16:04] more concerning even than the exploits [16:06] and the vulnerabilities in many cases [16:08] that we discussed. And LG doesn't ever [16:10] address the ACR other than that one [16:12] line. LG next said, quote, "At LG [16:14] Electronics, we're committed to [16:15] transparency and secure user [16:16] experience." End quote. And yet LG did [16:18] not once in this entire actually pretty [16:20] long response address our security [16:23] concerns. [16:25] There's not a single reference I'm [16:27] looking at now to how or if they are [16:30] patching the vulnerabilities that either [16:32] we discovered or security researchers [16:34] discovered and reported to them in some [16:36] cases in advance. And that's how [16:40] committed they are to it. In fact, [16:43] they're so committed to it that there [16:45] are years old options that are available [16:46] on the open internet that you can apply [16:48] to their TVs right now. LG also said, [16:51] quote, "Protecting voice privacy. We [16:53] ensure that your LG TV does not collect, [16:55] record, or transmit ambient [16:57] conversations in your home unless voice [16:59] functionality has been intentionally [17:00] activated by the user." End quote. First [17:02] of all, notice they didn't say LG, they [17:04] said LG TV. That already makes this an [17:06] incorrect statement because they cannot [17:09] possibly ensure that as we said in the [17:10] beginning and the technical capabilities [17:13] exist to do precisely those things. Also [17:17] notice how they are qualifying now the [17:19] phrase ambient conversations with [17:22] quoteun unless voice functionality has [17:23] been activated unquote which seems to [17:25] imply to us that prior statements about [17:27] not collecting ambient conversations [17:30] from what we could tell at all is now [17:32] invalid and that they can but only under [17:35] uh let me check my notes here the exact [17:38] conditions that we presented that they [17:40] claimed were false. [17:42] Good job LG. LG said, quote, "Standby [17:45] mode operation. When the TV is in [17:47] standby mode and appears to be turned [17:48] off, it only monitors for the wakeword. [17:50] If you have previously enabled the [17:52] farfield feature, if no wakeword is [17:54] detected, the audio used for wakeword [17:56] detection is processed locally on the [17:58] TV, promptly deleted, and is not [18:00] transmitted to LG servers." End quote. [18:02] Again, no acknowledgement whatsoever. [18:05] It's supposeding that a malware doesn't [18:07] exist. LG has not addressed that in a [18:10] single line in the response. And LG [18:12] likewise doesn't give you any tools to [18:14] know how or if your TVs are remaining in [18:17] spec. In fact, in our opinions, they [18:19] make it very difficult to audit what the [18:21] TV is doing without your knowledge. And [18:23] that's part of the problem. The [18:25] capabilities exist to do exactly what we [18:27] already described in the first video. LG [18:29] also says, quote, "Transparent and [18:31] useful connectivity. LG TVs can identify [18:33] compatible devices on the same network [18:34] to enable features such as [18:37] specific wording there. Device [18:39] connectivity, content sharing, or smart [18:41] home functionality. End quote. Right? [18:43] That's um what we said. So, and to [18:47] remind you what LG ad solutions said, [18:50] they talked about how they can pierce [18:52] from your TV to your secondary devices [18:55] with the knowledge, the data, the [18:58] information or whatever that they have [19:00] on you. That is a thing that they talk [19:01] about in their discussions about how [19:03] their advertising solutions work. They [19:05] specifically include mobile devices, [19:08] your phone, so that in my opinion LG can [19:11] stalk you from devices outside of your [19:14] TV. That is the extent to which this [19:17] type of harvesting can affect you. And [19:20] they very carefully kind of sidestepped [19:22] all of that. Notice also the such as [19:24] there. They're not saying limited to. LG [19:26] said quote proactive and continuous [19:28] security. data security is a top [19:30] priority for LG. We continuously monitor [19:32] our platform and partner with [19:34] independent security experts to identify [19:36] vulnerabilities and deliver timely [19:37] security updates. End quote. This one's [19:39] so comically ironic that I wish I could [19:42] share why, but um currently to protect [19:46] the information of the individuals [19:47] affected, I can't. [19:50] So, [19:51] check back later for more of that, I [19:54] guess. But we can use some other [19:56] examples that are public in addition to [19:59] literally the entire video we already [20:01] had. But you know, we can always add [20:02] more LG. LG is so proactive in its [20:06] security that it enabled and allowed the [20:07] existence of nearly half of all of the [20:10] apps in its webOS to proxy traffic [20:12] through residential networks. Meaning [20:14] that until it was caught and became a [20:16] whole big deal, companies or [20:17] individuals, including app developers, [20:19] could route internet traffic through the [20:21] home network of users. LG only fixed [20:24] this after it became a huge issue. So to [20:26] paint a clear picture for the lay people [20:27] in the audience, what this means is that [20:29] uh in situations of something like a [20:31] residential proxy, someone else, it [20:33] could be a first party, an attacker, it [20:35] could be an app developer, a publisher, [20:37] maybe something expired and someone else [20:38] got into it, it sold and changed hands, [20:40] whatever. Somebody can navigate through [20:43] you, your device, your IP address, your [20:45] network, any or all the above to then go [20:48] do stuff elsewhere on the internet. So, [20:51] uh, you become the proxy for them to do [20:54] stuff through you, which means that if [20:57] they are doing potentially illicit [20:59] activity, uh, and it's navigating [21:01] through you, then you now have some [21:04] concerns as to how that might be [21:06] perceived if it's ever investigated, for [21:09] example. Uh, and so this was a situation [21:12] that previously existed with LG that [21:15] Spur reported on. And as we stated [21:18] previously, our opinion is that the only [21:21] way that this can happen to the extent [21:23] it did with LG and for the period of [21:25] time it did is through negligence. In [21:27] other past examples of LG's proactive [21:29] and continuous security, Bit Defender [21:31] audited LG's webOS and said, quote, [21:33] "These vulnerabilities let us gain root [21:35] access on the TV after bypassing the [21:36] authorization mechanism. Although the [21:38] vulnerable service is intended for LAN [21:40] access only, Showdan, the search engine [21:42] for internet connected devices, [21:44] identified over 91,000 devices that [21:46] expose this service to the internet. End [21:48] quote. They also reported on the [21:49] following. CVE 2022 6317 attackers can [21:52] add extra users to the TV. CVE2023 6318 [21:55] attackers can elevate access. CVE 2022 [21:58] 6319 OS system command injection by [22:00] manipulating a lyrics function. CVE 2022 [22:03] 6320 inject authenticated commands by [22:05] manipulating API endpoint. And [22:07] separately in 2025, Security Week [22:08] published a post called quote, "No patch [22:10] for flaw exposing hundreds of LG cameras [22:12] to remote hacking." End quote. And here [22:14] we're only using past older examples in [22:17] addition to the ones we already showed. [22:18] And LG might point at some of those and [22:20] say that they fixed them. And to that [22:22] we'd say, "Yeah, do that here, too." [22:26] LG, the first step to improving is [22:30] admitting that you have a problem, not [22:34] just saying we have proactive security [22:36] and ignoring it. LG also said, quote, [22:38] "Full control over data and terms. LG [22:40] Electronics is committed to providing [22:42] transparency and rejecting deceptive [22:44] practices, dark patterns, ensuring users [22:46] can choose their own preferred privacy [22:48] and consent options directly through [22:50] their TV settings." End quote. Now, that [22:51] one we debunked thoroughly in the intro, [22:53] but also LG is in absolutely no position [22:57] to talk about consent after forcing LG [23:00] monitor app and McAfee ADWear onto [23:04] computers through Windows Update [23:06] previously, which we reported on [23:08] [laughter] like we know they [23:10] [clears throat] did because Microsoft [23:12] slapped them for it. Uh, and by the way, [23:14] Microsoft also owns Nuance, which is one [23:17] of the uh services that LG uses. We [23:20] talked about that in previous videos. [23:21] They're they're all kind of implicated [23:22] together. But the point is LG, you can't [23:25] talk about consent when like basically a [23:28] month ago you were forcefully installing [23:30] onto people's computers because [23:32] they have a three-year-old monitor that [23:34] they bought from you that's plugged into [23:36] a computer. Get the out of here. LG [23:40] has a massive credibility problem when [23:43] it comes to believing them about consent [23:46] on anything after what we [23:48] exposed last month. So, as far as LG's [23:51] response, it is my belief that their [23:53] response is manipulative. It is twisting [23:56] the narrative. It tries to slightly [23:58] dodge the specific language we used by [24:01] instead answering broadly and ignoring [24:04] anything that's even a little bit [24:06] inconvenient to address. That's what I [24:08] think. With that out of the way, let's [24:10] get into some of the other stuff. We're [24:11] not ready for the full part two yet, but [24:13] as a preview, we do have some new [24:15] findings to share. Security researcher [24:17] U-Turn, who worked with us for the first [24:18] piece, did further research with the [24:20] man-in-the-middle web in his TV's path. [24:22] I had to heavily redact this image from [24:24] him. This shows data being sent to [24:26] Alfonso, the service owned and operated [24:28] by LG as part of LG Ad Solutions. [24:32] Despite being connected via HDMI, the [24:34] data harvested included a device ID for [24:36] his TV, his location by ID, which we [24:39] think is a lookup, but also the city he [24:41] lives in within the US, the state he [24:43] lives in, his latitude and longitude, [24:46] the street name of the closest major [24:48] street, the time zone, the zip code, [24:50] among other information not shown here. [24:52] UT-turn wrote this to us about his [24:53] research on the LG smart TV. Quote, "The [24:55] audio fingerprinting is sending some [24:57] incredibly close geoloccation. Why? It [25:00] knows my geol location down to a nearby [25:02] major road, but has the zip code wrong [25:04] is beyond me. LG remotely stores device [25:06] ID linked location information likely [25:08] approximated from Wi-Fi scan data [25:10] collected from the device itself. [25:12] Additionally, while on HDMI input, LG [25:15] aggressively fingerprints the audio [25:17] coming across the HDMI channel, linking [25:19] it in telemetry with the affformentioned [25:21] device location, HDMI device identifiers [25:23] retrieved over SPD and CEC, as well as [25:26] the time stamp that the fingerprints [25:27] cover. U-Turn also said, quote, "Logs [25:29] from the device under test demonstrated [25:30] that the automatic content recognition [25:32] binary was sending the signal strength [25:34] of a nearby Wi-Fi BSSID to an Alfonso [25:37] server. Configuration information [25:39] retrieved by the TV for its device ID [25:41] included keys such as enable Wi-Fi scan, [25:43] location accuracy, location pole [25:46] interval, when location permitted. [25:48] Restarting the ACR binary caused the [25:50] device under test to retrieve location [25:52] information from an Alfonso server for [25:54] its device ID. for my test. He said this [25:56] was accurate within 5 miles, though I [25:59] assume that locations are pulled as [26:00] BSSID plus signal strength can provide [26:03] near pinpoint location data. While on [26:05] HDMI input, assuming no periods of [26:07] silence, the device under test sent 20 [26:10] packets per minute containing the device [26:12] ID, timestamps, audio fingerprint [26:14] payloads, and a copy of the [26:15] affforementioned user location data. End [26:17] quote. of this JSON result. U-turn [26:20] wrote, quote, I could see adding [26:21] location to audio fingerprinting being [26:23] helpful if you're attempting to [26:25] fingerprint broadcast television, but [26:27] having it granularly down to a street [26:29] name seems weird. I'm still [26:30] investigating where it's pulling this [26:32] information from to begin with. The [26:33] audio fingerprinting appears to only [26:35] fire while there is audio playing over a [26:37] connected device. When there is, it [26:39] appears to fire a burst of five messages [26:42] about once a second with a delay between [26:44] the last message of one burst and the [26:46] first message of the next being around [26:48] 10 seconds. The TS start and TS end [26:50] fields are wildly variable and future [26:52] work is going into using these to map [26:54] the amount of time a device is heard. He [26:56] also said quote, "Additionally, on [26:58] startup, the TV makes requests to [27:00] alfonso.tv TV and a URL and retrieves a [27:03] configuration for this device which [27:05] includes keys like enable Wi-Fi scan [27:07] location accuracy and as we mentioned [27:09] earlier that's then that quoted section [27:11] U-Turn also sent this showing query [27:13] parameters and this with just some of [27:15] the response body including the ACR.mpp3 [27:18] file from what we can tell the same [27:20] telemetry handles both the advertising [27:22] ID and Wi-Fi network information. If [27:25] you're not aware, the BSSIDs of things [27:28] like routers are widely available on the [27:31] internet. If you have someone's [27:33] information for potentially their SSID [27:35] with some tools or BSSID, it's very [27:38] likely you can find where they live. So, [27:41] with this information and with signal [27:43] strength, you'd get a pretty damn good [27:45] look at precisely where somebody is. For [27:47] example, this is the LG Ad Solutions [27:49] publicly listed office. Their address is [27:52] posted online by them. And in this [27:55] image, you can see the BSS IDs scanned [27:57] in the vicinity. This is just one of the [28:00] ways you could find someone's location [28:01] with a known BSS ID. What's interesting [28:03] is that if you check the LG headquarters [28:06] location, they're the only building in [28:08] their neighborhood where BSSIDs are not [28:11] publicly visible. I guess LG might know [28:14] that this information is sensitive that [28:16] they're collecting from everybody as it [28:18] seems they might be taking measures to [28:20] obscure the BSSID and Wi-Fi SSID names [28:23] from the internet. There's a lot more we [28:25] could talk about like the fact that we [28:27] today caught our LG G3 TV suddenly [28:29] trying to force a firmware update, [28:31] something we haven't seen before, [28:32] including downloading in the background [28:34] and without our consent, ironically [28:36] enough, unless we actively navigate the [28:38] options to halt the update. The update [28:41] notice says that it's for enhanced [28:42] security. It's interesting as we [28:45] received the forced push after our video [28:47] came out and LG didn't seem to note any [28:50] security issues in its statement despite [28:52] their earlier claims of transparency. Or [28:55] we could talk about how threads have [28:56] popped up all over the internet like [28:58] this user saying that his LG TV became [29:00] the top blocked domain after Adgard [29:02] isolation despite fewer than 12 hours on [29:03] the network calling the TV relentless. [29:06] Or this user who complained that a webOS [29:07] update caused his TV to become far [29:09] slower. or this user who regretted [29:11] updating to WebOS 26, stating quote, [29:13] "Several features were removed, [29:14] including using the mobile device as a [29:16] sound output." End quote. Or this user [29:18] who said, "We OS26 made his OLED become [29:20] incredibly slow. You can even see the [29:22] outline of the mouse cursor on it." Or [29:25] this user who asked how his LG G3 that's [29:28] not connected to Wi-Fi knows there's a [29:29] ULA update. If that's actually what's [29:31] happening for that one, our best guess [29:32] at that would be maybe a timebombed [29:35] update or something since LG ships with [29:36] a 2017 agreement for some of our TVs. [29:39] despite newer ones being available. So, [29:41] they might know there's an update [29:42] because it was available when the TV [29:44] shipped, which raises some questions as [29:46] to why they would show you an older one [29:49] seemingly intentionally. Anyway, let's [29:51] move on to our last part, a discussion [29:53] on the agreements that you're accepting [29:55] without reading with lawyer Vincent [29:57] August. [29:57] >> Vincent, I have a I have I brought you [29:59] here for a specific request. Um, [30:03] >> how what's your reading speed? [30:06] >> Oh, I don't know. Probably [30:07] >> can you help me read this? [30:09] >> [laughter] [30:11] >> Oh my gosh. [30:12] >> So, there are numerous videos of LG [30:14] Adolutions staff saying the phrase, "We [30:16] own the glass." [30:18] >> Do they own the glass? [30:19] >> So, the the short answer is yes. Um and [30:22] the reason is is because when you think [30:24] about property ownership from a legal [30:26] perspective, um it's not binary. It's [30:29] not that you exert dominion to the [30:31] exclusion of all others over something [30:33] physical. Uh it's fractured. And the way [30:35] we conceive of property ownership in the [30:37] law is by thinking of a bundle of [30:39] sticks. And each stick represents some [30:42] sort of right uh some sort of ownership [30:44] right that you have. And so those might [30:46] include things like the ability to [30:48] possess something, to use it, to modify [30:50] it, to sell it, to profit from it. [30:53] >> And they are not uh exclusive. So you [30:56] you can have some but not all. The [30:59] difference with LG here is that the type [31:03] and classification of rights that [31:05] they're retaining uh look very different [31:08] >> and specifically because the technology [31:10] enables it is that it's it's impossible [31:12] or improbable that you would have [31:16] thought that the right to monitor what's [31:18] on the screen control advertisements on [31:21] the screen that those kinds of things [31:24] would be uh possible 10 20 years ago. uh [31:28] but they are now and those are the kinds [31:30] of rights that are being reserved and so [31:33] you have you have the right to throw a [31:34] brick through it but they have a right [31:36] to observe what's on the screen to [31:38] record it to use it to sell it etc. [31:40] >> What's the substance of it? [31:41] >> There are certain things in the [31:42] agreement that I think may give a [31:46] consumer pause if they fully understood [31:49] the implications of it. Uh so for [31:51] example, one of the elements of the [31:55] agreement has to do with the observation [31:59] of what's physically on the screen [32:01] >> to a level of specificity where they [32:02] actually talk about in the agreement the [32:05] ability to determine whether or not [32:07] you've paused the show you're watching, [32:09] how long you've paused it for. [32:11] >> Uh things that would otherwise have [32:14] required only a few years ago for [32:16] someone to physically be sitting on your [32:18] couch watching television in your family [32:19] room. And I think that that the [32:22] implications of the physicality of it uh [32:24] may give people pause the other devices [32:26] that are connected uh the source of the [32:28] media. So it's not just that uh an LG [32:31] channel is being monitored. It's that if [32:33] you use your LG smart TV to display uh [32:36] an album for a family reunion. [32:38] >> All of that is implicated in the sharing [32:42] which they are quite open about [32:44] >> uh that you are sharing with them. And I [32:46] think that the implications may uh may [32:50] be more significant the longer someone [32:53] someone thinks about it. [32:54] >> Does it feel like something a lay person [32:56] could really understand? [32:57] >> I would say it's functionally [32:59] impossible. Uh and the reason being the [33:03] the volume of the text, [33:06] >> the nested agreements, there are [33:08] multiple agreements just from LG. [33:10] There's legal notices, privacy policies, [33:13] there's terms of service, there's [33:15] specific device agreements. Uh all of [33:18] which interact, some supersede others, [33:21] but there's frequent references to other [33:23] agreements. Is that by adopting these LG [33:26] agreements, you are also uh transitively [33:30] adopting the privacy policies and terms [33:32] of service of their partners. So [33:35] organizations such as Alfonso, such as [33:37] Nuance Communications. further down the [33:39] rabbit hole, you then have the [33:41] downstream purchasers of the data from [33:45] those companies. So, Alfonso, I believe, [33:48] has some 18 identified partners. Uh LG, [33:52] I'm sure, has direct partners. And so, [33:54] you would then need to read all of those [33:56] terms. [snorts] [33:58] >> Additionally, the versioning of the [34:00] terms specifically through LG [34:03] >> is indeterminate. So the terms are [34:06] subject to change from time to time. [34:08] They'll be updated. Maybe you'll be [34:10] notified, maybe you won't. You would [34:12] need to engage in this recursive process [34:14] of constantly going back to them to [34:16] making sure that they say the thing you [34:18] thought they did that you still agree to [34:21] opt out if you can when you decide not [34:24] to. [34:25] >> The purchase of this smart TV is not [34:30] it is not holistic. you're purchasing [34:32] certain rights about the TV regarding [34:35] the TV within that bundle. Uh but other [34:37] ones you are not. [34:38] >> What are some of the details of the [34:39] agreement if we start really getting [34:41] into like some of the specifics where if [34:44] you feel like people should be [34:46] particularly aware of certain terms? [34:48] >> Well, to speak to consent, there is some [34:50] somewhat disturbing language in the [34:52] agreement about the consent that you're [34:53] offering by signing the agreement. [34:55] Section 11 uh talks about not only [34:59] offering consent for yourself for this [35:01] data to be collected but also for uh the [35:04] other members of your family, your [35:05] friends that come over, anyone who uses [35:07] this television that you have purchased, [35:10] which in a commercial setting might [35:12] implicate partners, clients, uh other [35:16] individuals who are there, patrons of [35:18] your business, [35:19] >> right? Uh and then section 10 [35:22] specifically [35:23] talks about uh the recording of [35:26] information that originates from minors. [35:29] And so the quote from the privacy policy [35:32] is that quote when users of all age [35:34] interact with LG smart media services [35:36] certain persistent identifiers may be [35:37] automatically collected because LG [35:40] doesn't know who is providing the data. [35:43] They say that quote uh they may not be [35:46] able to know whether information was [35:47] collected from a child under 18 and [35:49] treats this information as if it were [35:50] provided by an adult. [35:52] >> Okay. [35:53] >> So the idea is is that because LG fairly [35:55] or unfairly, they're not going to be [35:57] able to determine where the information [35:59] is coming from. Implicitly you're [36:01] responsible for making sure that it's [36:03] not coming from a minor. And if it is, [36:06] then ostensibly you would need to [36:08] contact them to identify what data that [36:10] is if you wanted it to to remain [36:12] private. the quote it quote if you know [36:14] that this device will be used by more [36:16] than one person you represent that you [36:18] have obtained consent from all other [36:21] person all others excuse me who will use [36:24] this smart media product to this privacy [36:26] policy and are providing consent on [36:28] their behalf [36:29] >> what does that mean [snorts] for the [36:30] person expressing that they represent [36:32] they've obtained consent for people if [36:34] those people then have a dispute [36:36] >> they're adopting liability I mean that's [36:38] that's what it ends up being is that if [36:40] there is some sort of [36:42] >> issue [36:43] that would create liability for the [36:46] observation or recording or storing of [36:48] information. [36:50] That liability ostensibly because of of [36:52] sections 10 and 11 [36:54] >> would be placed on the consumer who made [36:58] this agreement. Another term that [37:01] has farreaching implications, the [37:03] agreement that you recognize LG will use [37:07] the information they collect for certain [37:09] things. And so this is in section three [37:10] of the privacy policy. It specifically [37:13] talks about quote preventing, detecting, [37:14] and investigating illegal activities [37:16] such as breaching our terms of use and [37:18] fraud. Now, on its face, the idea that [37:21] it's using the data it collects to [37:23] enforce its terms of use may not be as [37:26] appalling, but that is presented as only [37:28] one example and implies that there may [37:31] be other examples, [37:32] >> right? [37:32] >> Uh, and those could have very far [37:34] reaching consequences. You could talk [37:35] about localized identification laws uh [37:39] overseas in in other countries. This [37:41] could be used to enforce very [37:43] restrictive uh policies about [37:45] restricting free speech or press. Uh so [37:48] it could have a lot more of an impact [37:52] than what might otherwise be immediately [37:54] obvious. [37:55] >> Should you read that sentence one more [37:56] time? [37:57] >> Yeah. it quote preventing, detecting and [37:59] investigating illegal activities such as [38:01] breaching our terms of use and fraud [38:03] >> such as [38:04] >> so it does not necessarily imply that [38:06] there has been illegal activity. Simply [38:09] the it the process of investigating [38:12] whether or not something illegal has [38:14] happened is within the purview of the [38:16] actions they can take. I guess to throw [38:18] some some hypotheticals out there, some [38:20] examples, you know, of of if this might [38:23] or might not kind of fall under that. [38:25] But, um, plain media on the device that [38:31] may not have been legally obtained, [38:34] >> covered [38:35] >> seems perfectly within the bounds of of [38:37] this [38:38] >> pirated content, for example, could fall [38:40] within that. it it based off of the [38:42] language uh that is used here and how [38:44] broad it is I have no reason to think [38:47] that that wouldn't be covered. Just to [38:49] use a US example, um there are states in [38:53] the country where it is uh required to [38:57] provide some kind of ID verification to [38:59] access websites such as adult content, [39:01] but also going forward, you know, [39:03] there's plans in place to try and get [39:05] laws passed for ID requirements for [39:07] things like forums and certain video [39:09] games, stuff like that. So, [39:12] circumventing that process in some way, [39:14] I guess, possibly falling under this as [39:16] well. [39:17] >> Very reasonably, yes. Okay. I mean it it [39:18] is broad in an extraordinary way, [39:22] >> right? But I guess maybe to the point [39:24] you were making, all the examples I'm [39:25] giving are things that maybe by strict [39:28] written law are illegal, [39:31] but it sounds like this also allows for [39:33] the investigation of things that might [39:34] not yet be known to have been illegal. [39:37] Does that phrasing make sense? If you're [39:39] referring to the fact that the law [39:40] changes and that in the future something [39:42] could become illegal, right, that is not [39:44] currently, then yes, this term, similar [39:46] to the other malleable elements of these [39:49] of this agreement, [39:50] >> this the the function of this term could [39:53] change. The effect could change because [39:55] if the law changes, it would still fall [39:58] under the umbrella of investigating [40:00] illegal activity, [40:01] >> right? What does this mean for [40:02] constitutional rights? So you have you [40:04] have a right in the US at least where uh [40:09] if there's say a police investigation [40:11] into something [40:13] hopefully to get certain types of [40:15] information from you they need some kind [40:16] of warrant. [40:18] um [40:20] if they work with if if government [40:24] agencies work with a third party that is [40:27] private like a company such as TV [40:30] manufacturers, [40:32] >> are you still afforded those types of [40:34] rights? [40:35] >> The short answer is no. Okay. [40:37] >> Uh the the companies are afforded those [40:39] rights uh generally speaking, but the [40:43] language of this agreement uh talks [40:44] specifically about that and and there's [40:47] two statements. One says that they'll [40:49] use the information to uh quote respond [40:52] to the legal process such as a search, [40:54] warrant, subpoena, summon or court [40:55] order. But the second statement is they [40:58] will quote comply with any applicable [41:00] federal, state or local law, regulation, [41:02] civil, criminal or regulatory inquiry, [41:04] investigation, [41:05] >> legal process or enforceable government [41:07] request. The key word difference between [41:10] these two is that the the the first [41:13] statement implies some sort of judicial [41:16] compelling uh action, [41:19] >> right? [41:20] >> A warrant, a subpoena, a summons, [41:22] >> right? [41:22] >> Whereas the second statement has to do [41:25] with inquiry, investigation, request. [41:28] >> Uh those do not implicate [41:30] >> warrant requirements, right? And it [41:33] seems as though the distinction between [41:35] these two is that LG is [41:40] making it very clear that they will not [41:42] only comply with warrants but they will [41:44] also potentially just share the [41:45] information which since you have [41:47] voluntarily shared with them [41:49] >> right [41:49] >> is no longer considered private. [41:52] >> Do you have are there any other you know [41:53] kind of specific terms or anything [41:56] related to this you want to go through [41:57] further? Yeah, I think that it's it's an [42:00] interesting distinction between the the [42:03] substance. There are certainly [42:04] concerning elements about the substance, [42:06] but the clarity of and the incredible [42:09] specificity and detail of the [42:10] information that they're going to [42:11] collect and how they're going to use it, [42:13] >> uh is a little shocking, [42:17] but it feels as though some of the more [42:21] the more true problems with the [42:22] agreement occur at a rhetorical level. [42:24] It's the way in which these terms are [42:26] presented uh and the real world [42:29] situation beyond just the text on the [42:32] page. [42:33] >> Okay. The volume of it [42:36] >> certainly okay [42:36] >> the the incredible volume of text uh the [42:40] and to speak to your point the [42:41] versioning [42:42] >> is that you have multiple locations [42:45] where these documents either coexist or [42:48] exist in different forms. It's unclear [42:52] which agreements would apply. So there [42:55] are agreements for LG account, there are [42:57] agreements for the devices themselves, [43:00] and there's some language in the account [43:02] agreement that the device agreements [43:05] will predominate. Uh, but it's difficult [43:07] to tell which device agreement is [43:10] correct because the legal notice on the [43:12] website says that you need to go to the [43:15] device specifically for the most update [43:18] uh up-to-date agreement. And there's a [43:20] header here that says explicitly legal [43:22] documents applicable to your smart TV [43:24] may be different from those listed here [43:26] as it depends on the model of the TV and [43:28] current version of the software. You can [43:29] find the legal documents specifically [43:31] applicable to your smart TV on the TV [43:32] itself. [43:33] >> Mhm. So which [43:35] >> which one prevails? [43:36] >> It's a good question. Um [laughter] it's [43:39] it's unclear and and it's unclear for a [43:41] couple reasons. One is it's unclear [43:43] because there is repeatedly these [43:46] savings clauses in these agreements [43:48] about the ability to change or update [43:51] the agreements. In a real world example, [43:54] you're engaged in this circular process [43:56] of going from point to point verifying [43:59] that the terms that you think you're [44:00] agreeing to are the terms that control [44:03] and constantly monitoring for updates, [44:05] changes. The assumption that the law [44:08] makes is that you're going to read it or [44:10] you're not going to agree to it. Uh but [44:12] in the real world you have this death by [44:15] thousand cuts situation and that is not [44:18] a particularly relevant legal question [44:21] at least not from a common law contracts [44:23] perspective that is a policy implication [44:25] >> right how do you solve that [44:27] >> I think that the way you address that [44:28] issue is through policymak through [44:31] legislative acts and and you can see [44:34] that already individual jurisdictions [44:37] motivate companies from a purely [44:39] economic perspective I mean it makes [44:41] more sense economically to comply with [44:44] the most restrictive in a lot of these [44:47] situations. [44:48] >> It's the the the boring but important [44:50] answer of for that kind of change, it's [44:52] voting or it's understanding policy. [44:54] It's writing to representatives and [44:56] asking them to adopt or change policies. [45:00] Uh and now of course the the ultimate [45:02] kind of conclusion is well you don't [45:04] have to buy a smart TV at all which is [45:06] again a totally fair critique but you do [45:09] have this narrowing funnel of options [45:12] and at some point in time you have to [45:14] imagine that these types of agreements [45:17] will predominate other elements of [45:21] household appliances of consumer [45:22] electronic devices. That's why I think [45:24] it's very important to consider this [45:27] more on a policy level than on a legal [45:30] common law contract kind of concept. [45:32] >> That would be my call to action is uh [45:36] we've been talking about this with some [45:38] of the other content, but it is probably [45:42] time for people who um at least can [45:44] spare the time to to do it to start [45:46] looking into who your representatives [45:48] are and what you might ask them to try [45:50] and change for the better. So, um, well, [45:54] thank you, Vincent, for joining and, uh, [45:56] I'm sorry for for making you spend days [46:00] looking at these terms. [46:01] >> It's my pleasure. It's what I do. [46:03] >> Thank you. [laughter] [46:05] >> That's it for this one. That's our [46:06] response to LG's horrible response. That [46:09] was honestly one of the worst responses [46:12] from a company I've ever read. It was [46:13] kind of entertaining how bad it was. But [46:15] anyway, you can go to store.gamesac.net [46:17] to support us directly. If you want the [46:19] full context of this, check out our [46:20] first video, the full investigation. [46:22] We're still accepting backers, which we [46:24] need to continue funding the growth of [46:26] these projects, especially as we dive [46:28] into more TVs. I actually just bought a [46:30] massive amount of TVs. Actually, that [46:32] delivery driver said to us the other [46:33] day, "Wow, you guys must really like [46:36] TVs." To which we said, "Oh, you don't [46:39] know the half of it." So, anyway, that's [46:41] being made possible by you all on [46:42] store.net net from supporting us on our [46:45] data drag net campaign where you can get [46:47] different backer tiers where we include [46:48] things like our new foil shirts, the GN [46:50] wireframe polygon shards shirt with the [46:53] rainfall effect on the back or the foil [46:55] cyberpunk skeleton shirt that we have [46:57] with a spine down the back and then the [46:59] front having a rib cage outline with [47:01] user interface and cyberpunk style [47:02] elements. We also have our inductor dice [47:05] kits included with a 3D printed goblin [47:07] miniature that is paintable for you in [47:10] our backer packs, a couple of them. And [47:12] we've got our new Microsop glasses and [47:14] our new LG Evil glasses that are part of [47:17] the various backer tiers in our [47:19] Kickstarter style fundraiser campaign [47:21] that we're doing to continue working on [47:22] this. So, thank you for the support. [47:24] Head over to the store or [47:25] patreon.com/gamersac to help us out [47:27] directly. Subscribe for more. We'll see [47:29] you all next time.