Why Russia is building its own version of Starlink | The Economist

The Economist

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Source published: 2026-09-18

Key ideas

Russia is developing its own low-Earth orbit satellite constellation to rival Starlink, which Kyiv officials warn could become functionally operational within several months to a year. (0:00)
Moscow has begun testing drone 'motherships' using modified Shahed drones to carry FPV drones past air defenses, fitting a pattern where Russia scales experimental concepts to mass manufacturing within three to six months. (1:12)
Russian casualties are estimated at roughly 40,000 killed and wounded per month, yet territorial gains over the past year have netted only around 100 square kilometers. (2:30)
Officials in Kyiv dismiss recent diplomatic overtures and energy ceasefire rumors, concluding that no serious peace talks will occur before the end of winter as Moscow seeks to exploit freezing temperatures. (5:03)

Detailed notes

## Background Published by The Economist on YouTube, this briefing features deputy editor Edward Carr and a panel of expert correspondents freshly returned from Ukraine. The program examines Russia's ongoing development of a Starlink equivalent, the emergence of drone 'motherships' over Kyiv, and why leaders in Ukraine expect no substantive peace negotiations prior to winter.

## TL;DR Russia is aggressively narrowing Ukraine's technological edge by developing its own satellite constellation and scaling experimental drone motherships designed to bypass air defenses. While Russia incurs staggering casualty rates exceeding 40,000 personnel per month for minimal territorial progress, Vladimir Putin remains determined to wage a prolonged war of attrition backed by demographic and industrial weight. Meanwhile, Ukrainian defenses sustain a dynamic equilibrium despite targeted psychological drone strikes against civilians. Ultimately, observers in Kyiv dismiss recent diplomatic overtures and peace rumors, anticipating that Moscow will attempt to maximize infrastructural devastation through the freezing winter before entertaining serious talks.

## Atmosphere & style The panel maintains a sober, measured, and deeply analytical tone characteristic of frontline journalistic debriefs. Informed by recent firsthand reporting across Ukraine, the speakers deliver chilling details—such as drone 'safari tactics' and catastrophic casualty counts—with clinical precision. The exchange feels grounded and unsentimental, cutting through diplomatic peace speculation to present an unvarnished assessment of grinding attrition.

## Bulletin - [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HUo9lj1NUQ4&t=0s) Russia is developing its own low-Earth orbit satellite constellation to rival Starlink, which Kyiv officials warn could become functionally operational within several months to a year. - [01:12](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HUo9lj1NUQ4&t=72s) Moscow has begun testing drone 'motherships' using modified Shahed drones to carry FPV drones past air defenses, fitting a pattern where Russia scales experimental concepts to mass manufacturing within three to six months. - [02:30](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HUo9lj1NUQ4&t=150s) Russian casualties are estimated at roughly 40,000 killed and wounded per month, yet territorial gains over the past year have netted only around 100 square kilometers. - [05:03](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HUo9lj1NUQ4&t=303s) Officials in Kyiv dismiss recent diplomatic overtures and energy ceasefire rumors, concluding that no serious peace talks will occur before the end of winter as Moscow seeks to exploit freezing temperatures.

## Key takeaways - [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HUo9lj1NUQ4&t=0s) Russia is building an indigenous low-Earth orbit satellite network, threatening to eliminate Ukraine's asymmetric communications and targeting advantage if operational within the year. - [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HUo9lj1NUQ4&t=0s) Geographic usage restrictions imposed on Starlink prevent Ukrainian forces from using the network over Russian territory to strike missile launch sites at the source. - [01:12](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HUo9lj1NUQ4&t=72s) Russian forces have begun deploying experimental drone motherships—modified Shahed platforms carrying FPV drones deep into Ukrainian territory to bypass urban air defenses. - [01:12](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HUo9lj1NUQ4&t=72s) Moscow consistently copies and scales low-cost battlefield innovations, moving from experimental prototypes to industrial mass production in three to six months. - [01:12](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HUo9lj1NUQ4&t=72s) Frontline Russian units have escalated psychological terror through 'Safari tactics,' systematically hunting civilian vehicles with FPV drones to force evacuations. - [02:30](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HUo9lj1NUQ4&t=150s) The ground war remains in a 'dynamic equilibrium,' with Russia gaining only about 100 square kilometers over the past year—roughly the surface area of Paris. - [02:30](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HUo9lj1NUQ4&t=150s) Russian attritional losses stand at around 40,000 casualties per month, exceeding the Soviet Union's total losses across the entire decade-long Afghan War every 30 days. - [03:53](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HUo9lj1NUQ4&t=233s) Vladimir Putin views the conflict as a classic war of attrition that Russia can win by leveraging advantages in manpower, materiel, and financial reserves. - [03:53](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HUo9lj1NUQ4&t=233s) The Kremlin relies on covert recruitment channels rather than formal conscription decrees to replace front-line assault troops dispatched on high-fatality missions. - [05:03](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HUo9lj1NUQ4&t=303s) Informal diplomatic outreach involving figures such as Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff regarding an energy ceasefire is not viewed by Kyiv leadership as a serious path to peace. - [05:03](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HUo9lj1NUQ4&t=303s) Substantive negotiations are improbable before the end of winter, as Russia maintains strong incentives to inflict maximal infrastructure damage throughout the freezing months.

## Detailed walkthrough ### [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HUo9lj1NUQ4&t=0s) Russia’s Starlink Equivalent and the Drone Innovation Race

Russia is actively developing its own low-Earth orbit satellite network to match Ukraine’s use of Starlink. While the project remains in an early, nascent phase—having launched only a few dozen satellites and not yet operating reliably—interlocutors in Kyiv repeatedly warned *The Economist*’s correspondents that a functional equivalent could be operational within several months to a year. Such an advancement would represent a severe, negative game-changer for Ukraine, providing Russian forces with pervasive satellite coverage to track and target Ukrainian positions in real time.

At the same time, an asymmetric restriction handcuffs Ukrainian operations: while Starlink underpins Ukraine’s battlefield communications, Elon Musk has prohibited its use over Russian territory. This prevents Ukrainian forces from striking missile launch sites inside Russia—robbing them of the ability to "hit the archer, not the arrow." The situation raises the pressing question of whether political pressure could push Musk and Starlink to lift these geographic restrictions, especially given Russia’s intensifying and overt use of ballistic missiles against civilian targets. The broader conflict has turned into an unrelenting technological sprint of rapid innovation on both sides.

[01:12](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HUo9lj1NUQ4&t=72s) Drone Motherships and 'Safari Tactics'

The speed of Russian technological adaptation was underscored when Kyiv encountered its first FPV (first-person view) drone "mothership." The attack featured an experimental mothership platform—a converted Shahed drone acting as a carrier—designed to ferry smaller, harder-to-intercept FPV drones deep into Ukrainian airspace before releasing them past city air defenses. While this initial strike was experimental, Russia exhibits a reliable pattern of revealing a new capability and scaling it into mass production within three to six months. Whether through fiber-optic-guided drones or jet-powered drones, Moscow repeatedly reverse-engineers Ukrainian innovations and identifies the tactical "sweet spot in modern war of very, very cheap, very hard to intercept weapons."

Beyond strategic strikes, Russian forces have escalated psychological terror through frontline practices dubbed "Safari tactics." Near frontline settlements, Russian drone pilots deliberately hunt civilian vehicles with FPV drones, circulating video footage of the strikes online. The correspondents note that this deliberate terror introduces deep friction into daily life: if mothership drones and Safari tactics were to spread to the streets of the capital, few residents would be willing to keep their children in the city.

```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Russian Drone Innovation and Deployment Cycle accDescr: Flowchart illustrating how Russia identifies Ukrainian innovations, adapts them into cheap weapons, and deploys them en masse within months.

subgraph Adapt ["Adaptation Phase"] A["Ukrainian Innovation"] --> B["Russian Reverse-Engineering"] B --> C["Identify 'Sweet Spot':<br/>Cheap & Hard to Intercept"] end

subgraph Scale ["Scaling & Deployment"] C --> D["Experimental Field Trial<br/>(e.g., Shahed FPV Mothership)"] D -->|"3 to 6 Month Lag"| E["Mass Industrial Production<br/>(Fiber Optics & Jet Drones)"] E --> F["Operational Deployment:<br/>Kyiv Strikes & 'Safari Tactics'"] end ```

- **Mothership Mechanism**: Large carrier drones (such as modified Shaheds) transport clusters of small FPV drones to bypass long-range air defense rings and penetrate urban centers. - **Safari Tactics**: Drone operators actively pursue civilian automobiles near front-line settlements to sow panic, degrade morale, and force civilian evacuations. - **Production Lag**: Russia typically transitions an experimental drone concept into mass manufacturing within 90 to 180 days.

[02:30](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HUo9lj1NUQ4&t=150s) Frontline Stalemate and the Human Cost of Russian Gains

Despite intense Russian pressure, the frontline displays surprising defensive resilience. Ground gains over the past year have amounted to a net Russian acquisition of approximately 100 square kilometers—a territory comparable merely to the area of Paris inside the Boulevard Périphérique ring road. Within a country the size of Ukraine, this is practically negligible. Analysts describe the situation not as a static stalemate, but as a "dynamic equilibrium," with Ukrainian units developing tactics that allow them to seize localized parcels of ground and maintain tactical initiative.

Yet the sheer human cost Russia is willing to sustain for these marginal gains is staggering. Russian casualty estimates stand at roughly 40,000 dead and wounded per month. That rate means Moscow is losing more personnel every single month than the entire Soviet Union lost across a decade of war in Afghanistan, with Russia's total casualties in Ukraine already outstripping total American combat losses in the Second World War.

[03:53](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HUo9lj1NUQ4&t=233s) Attrition, Mobilization, and Putin's Calculation

Despite catastrophic casualty rates, there is little expectation that the staggering body count will compel the Kremlin to alter its military trajectory. Vladimir Putin continues to secure manpower for front-line assaults, dispatching soldiers with inferior equipment on what are essentially "one-way trips." Although monthly recruitment figures are beginning to lag behind combined casualty totals, Putin maintains the ability to enlist replacements. Further mobilization remains under active consideration and can be implemented covertly without the political disruption of an open decree.

Inside the Kremlin, the war is viewed through the lens of a classic war of attrition that Russia expects to win. Armed with deep reserves of personnel, material, and financial resources—the "three components of war"—Putin appears confident. Bolstered by stockpiles of ballistic missiles and jet drones, the Russian leadership believes its demographic weight and tolerance for loss will eventually outlast Ukrainian resistance and Western support.

- **Casualty Benchmark**: Russian casualties exceed 40,000 per month, surpassing total Soviet losses in Afghanistan (1979–1989) on a monthly basis. - **Strategic Triad**: The Russian war effort relies on holding advantages across the three essential axes: "men, material and money." - **Mobilization Levers**: Rather than risking public backlash with overt conscription drives, Moscow relies on covert and semi-covert recruitment channels to sustain attritional wave attacks.

[05:03](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HUo9lj1NUQ4&t=303s) Peace Rumors, the Trump Factor, and the Winter Horizon

Diplomatic speculation surfaced when Jared Kushner and real estate developer Steve Witkoff visited Kyiv, coinciding with remarks by Donald Trump floating the possibility of a mutual "energy ceasefire." Observers noted that Trump has been particularly keen on halting Ukrainian long-range strikes against Russian oil and diesel refineries. However, officials and observers on the ground in Kyiv did not take these proposals seriously; while Ukrainian leaders welcomed the visit by Kushner and Witkoff, no one in the capital viewed the encounter as a herald of "peace in our time."

Zanny Minton Beddoes notes that while political posturing around negotiations may intensify in the window following the Russian State Duma elections and leading into the U.S. midterm elections, any prospect of a genuine peace agreement remains far off. Having spent a week interviewing figures across Ukraine, the panel concludes that no substantive negotiations will occur before the end of winter. Putin remains convinced that he can inflict immense physical and infrastructural suffering on Ukraine during the freezing winter months, leaving Moscow with zero incentive to freeze the conflict or enter serious negotiations before then.

## Notable quotes > [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HUo9lj1NUQ4&t=0s) hit the archer, not the arrow

> [01:12](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HUo9lj1NUQ4&t=72s) mothership

> [01:12](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HUo9lj1NUQ4&t=72s) sweet spot in modern war of very, very cheap, very hard to intercept weapons

> [01:12](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HUo9lj1NUQ4&t=72s) Safari tactics

> [02:30](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HUo9lj1NUQ4&t=150s) dynamic equilibrium

> [03:53](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HUo9lj1NUQ4&t=233s) one-way trips

> [03:53](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HUo9lj1NUQ4&t=233s) three components of war

> [03:53](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HUo9lj1NUQ4&t=233s) men, material and money

> [05:03](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HUo9lj1NUQ4&t=303s) energy ceasefire

> [05:03](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HUo9lj1NUQ4&t=303s) peace in our time

## Mentioned Donald Trump, Edward Carr, Elon Musk, Jared Kushner, Shahed drone, Starlink, Steve Witkoff, The Economist, Vladimir Putin, Zanny Minton Beddoes

## Video description Russia is building its own equivalent of Starlink—and it could be game-changing for the war in Ukraine. Drone “motherships” are appearing over Kyiv. Edward Carr, The Economist’s deputy editor, and a panel of our expert journalists just back from Ukraine discuss where the war goes next, and why nobody in Kyiv expects a serious peace deal before winter.

#Ukraine #Russia #Putin #Drones #Starlink

00:00 - Russia’s own version of Starlink 01:12 - Drones terrorise Ukraine’s cities 02:30 - The state of the front line 03:17 - The cost of Russia’s gains 05:03 - Is a peace deal close?

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[Source](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HUo9lj1NUQ4)

中文简报

俄罗斯为何打造自身版“星链” | 《经济学人》俄罗斯正通过研发自主卫星星座以及扩大旨在绕透防空系统的试验性无人机“母机”规模，全力缩小与乌克兰的技术差距。尽管俄罗斯每月承受超过4万人的惊人伤亡却仅换来微小的领土推进，但弗拉基米尔·普京仍决心依托人口与工业体量打一场长期的消耗战。与此同时，尽管面临针对平民的心理战无人机袭击，乌克兰防线仍维持着动态平衡。基辅观察人士最终对近期的外交示好与和平传言不予理会，预计莫斯科将在严冬期间尽力最大化破坏基础设施，之后才会考虑开展实质性谈判。俄罗斯正在研发能与Starlink抗衡的自主低轨卫星星座，基辅官员警告称，该系统可能在数月至一年内投入实际运行。 (0:00) 莫斯科已开始测试利用改装的Shahed无人机搭载FPV无人机以突破防空系统的无人机“母机”，这符合俄罗斯在三至六个月内将试验概念推向大规模量产的模式。 (1:12) 据估计俄罗斯每月伤亡约4万人，但在过去一年中其领土推进净增仅约100平方公里。 (2:30) 基辅官员驳斥了近期的外交接触与能源停火传言，认定在冬季结束前不会举行实质性和平谈判，因为莫斯科正试图利用严寒气温做文章。 (5:03)

Reading summary

While Russia accelerates its technological adaptation—developing a low-Earth orbit satellite network and advanced drone carrier systems—the Kremlin remains committed to an attritional strategy, absorbing catastrophic casualties in pursuit of incremental frontline gains. Satellite Communications and Operational Asymmetries (0:00) Russia is developing its own low-Earth orbit satellite constellation to counter Ukraine's reliance on Starlink. Although the program is in an early stage with only several dozen satellites in orbit and inconsistent functionality, interlocutors in Kyiv warned correspondents from The Economist that an operational system could be deployed within several months to a year. If realized, pervasive satellite coverage would allow Russian forces to identify and strike Ukrainian positions in real time. Simultaneously, Ukrainian forces face geographic operational limits imposed by Starlink. Elon Musk has restricted Starlink usage over Russian territory, preventing Ukraine from targeting missile launch sites within Russia—restricting their ability to 'hit the archer, not the arrow.' This operational constraint persists even as Russia intensifies ballistic missile strikes against Ukrainian civilian centers. Drone Carrier Innovation and Frontline Safari Tactics (1:12) The technological sprint between both militaries is highlighted by Russia's deployment of an experimental first-person view (FPV) drone 'mothership' in Kyiv. By using a converted Shahed drone as a carrier platform, Russian forces can ferry smaller FPV drones past long-range air defenses and release them directly into urban environments. The source notes that Moscow routinely reverse-engineers Ukrainian concepts, transitioning experimental models—such as fiber-optic-guided and jet-powered drones—into mass manufacturing within three to six months. In frontline settlements, Russian drone operators have escalated psychological warfare through what observers term 'Safari tactics.' Operators actively hunt civilian passenger vehicles with FPV drones and post footage online. Analysts caution that if carrier motherships and Safari tactics expand into Kyiv, the resulting disruption and terror would severely threaten civilian life in the capital. Frontline Equilibrium and Russian Attrition Economics (2:30) Despite sustained Russian pressure, territorial progress has been marginal. Over the past year, net Russian gains totaled approximately 100 square kilometers—an area roughly equivalent to Paris within the Boulevard Périphérique ring road. Rather than a static stalemate, analysts characterize the front line as a 'dynamic equilibrium,' where Ukrainian forces retain the localized initiative to retake ground. However, these marginal territorial gains have come at an immense human cost. Russian casualty estimates reach approximately 40,000 killed and wounded per month, exceeding the Soviet Union's total losses across the ten-year Afghan war on a monthly basis and surpassing total American combat casualties in World War II. Despite monthly recruitment beginning to fall behind casualty rates, Vladimir Putin continues to replenish assault units via covert mobilization, relying on Russia's demographic scale, material reserves, and financial resources to sustain a long war of attrition. Diplomatic Posturing and Dim Winter Peace Prospects (5:03) Recent diplomatic overtures, including a visit to Kyiv by Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff alongside Donald Trump's proposals for an 'energy ceasefire,' were met with skepticism by Ukrainian officials. Although Trump has favored halting Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil and diesel refineries, leaders in Kyiv did not treat the meetings as a credible path toward immediate peace. According to The Economist's Zanny Minton Beddoes, substantive peace negotiations remain improbable before the end of winter. Moscow retains little incentive to pause hostilities or freeze the conflict while the Kremlin anticipates that freezing temperatures will compound the impact of its strikes against Ukrainian infrastructure. With substantive diplomatic talks unlikely prior to the end of winter, the conflict hinges on whether Russia can successfully convert rapid drone prototyping and domestic satellite systems into decisive operational leverage before its severe attritional losses become unsustainable.

Source quotes

[0:00] hit the archer, not the arrow [1:12] mothership [1:12] sweet spot in modern war of very, very cheap, very hard to intercept weapons [1:12] Safari tactics [2:30] dynamic equilibrium [3:53] one-way trips [3:53] three components of war [3:53] men, material and money [5:03] energy ceasefire [5:03] peace in our time

Original transcript

[0:00] Russia is developing its equivalent of [0:02] Starlink. It's nascent. It's launched, I [0:05] think, a few dozen satellites. It's not [0:06] working properly yet. But, you know, we [0:09] kept hearing again and again that within [0:11] a few months, probably up to a year, [0:13] they will have a sort of functioning [0:15] equivalent of Starlink. That will be a [0:18] game-changer for the negative for [0:19] Ukraine because it will mean that the [0:21] Russians will basically be able to have [0:23] complete ability to locate and hit [0:27] anything over Ukraine in the same way [0:29] that Starlink gives the Ukrainians that [0:30] capacity. On the other side, if the [0:33] Ukrainians could use Starlink over [0:35] Russian territory to hit missile [0:37] launchers, they could do, as Alex said, [0:39] they could hit the archer, not the [0:41] arrow. But, unfortunately, Elon Musk [0:43] refuses to allow that. So, one question [0:46] is whether [0:48] political pressure or any pressure can [0:50] be put upon uh [0:52] Musk and Starlink to enable that use. [0:55] And, you know, I think there is a [0:57] reasonably strong argument, which is [0:58] that Russia is hitting civilians using [1:00] ballistic missiles [1:01] you know, in in a very, very evident and [1:04] increasing way. And that for me, Ed, is [1:06] the kind of big picture of this. It's [1:08] It's a race of ever faster innovation on [1:11] both sides. [1:12] >> Yeah, I'm just on that point. So, just [1:14] you viewers might not know, but um [1:16] about 2 weeks ago, Ukraine Kiev saw its [1:19] first mothership with FPV drones. A [1:21] mothership is essentially bringing a [1:24] a big a big drone, which is bringing a [1:25] lot of smaller drones, which are a lot [1:26] harder to shoot down um for air defense. [1:29] So, it was a Shaka drone coming into to [1:31] Kiev. And then, essentially, the idea [1:33] was to release It was an experimental [1:35] version of this. But, what Russia tends [1:37] to do is show this, and then 3 months, 6 [1:40] months later, you see it in mass. [1:42] Uh whether it be with fiber optics or [1:44] with the jet drones, that their ability [1:46] to [1:47] um often take Ukrainian technology [1:51] and then find the sweet spot in modern [1:53] war of very, very cheap, very hard to [1:56] intercept weapons. It's been doing it [1:57] consistently and this is a sort of [1:59] harbinger a very worrying harbinger of [2:01] what might be in Kiev in a very very [2:03] short time. [2:04] >> It's a serious terror tactic and there's [2:05] this rather unpleasant vernacular doing [2:07] the rounds of called Safari tactics [2:09] where Russians have been using FPV [2:11] drones close to the front line, [2:12] particularly cities close to the front [2:14] line and showing images of these things [2:15] going after sub-civilian in a salute [2:18] cars and so so forth and it it comes [2:20] back to what we were saying earlier [2:21] about friction. That kind of terror, [2:23] who's going to keep leave their child in [2:24] the city if there are FPV drones, you [2:27] know, employing Safari tactics on the [2:29] streets of the capital? [2:30] >> Alex, is there is there scope for [2:32] Ukraine to put pressure on Russia by [2:35] changing the terms on the front line [2:37] line? [2:38] >> This is an area we can we can we can [2:41] draw more confidence certainly. Um and [2:43] they they have been holding the line [2:45] very ably, you know, even though yes, [2:47] over years you're talking, you know, [2:49] tens of kilometers. I think the net loss [2:50] gain this year is a 100 square [2:52] kilometers. I I understand that's [2:54] basically the [2:55] >> In a country of what sort of [2:56] >> Yeah, and that's equivalent of Paris [2:58] inside the peripherique ring road I I [2:59] researched the other day. So it's it's [3:01] nothing. [3:02] Um and actually a lot of commentators or [3:04] some commentators are now sort of [3:05] suggesting that that the Ukrainians are [3:07] on the front foot and developing the [3:08] kind of tactics which allows you to [3:10] seize at least small amounts of terrain. [3:12] But you have not a stalemate so much as [3:15] you could describe it as a dynamic [3:16] equilibrium there. [3:17] >> Think think it's just worth spelling out [3:19] again what pain uh Russia is enduring to [3:22] get that very very minimal gain. So [3:24] 40,000 casualties a month is now the [3:27] estimated toll that Russia is suffering. [3:30] It's worth remembering that's more in [3:32] one month than the Soviet Union lost in [3:34] 10 years in Afghanistan every single [3:36] month. [3:37] >> Yes, and I've seen figures for the the [3:39] entire war greater losses than the US in [3:42] the Second World War for instance. So I [3:43] mean it is [3:44] it is a high level of killing, but um I [3:47] guess quest the question Ollie is is [3:49] whether that changes the the overall [3:51] terms of the war. [3:53] >> Um [3:53] >> I don't think so Uh because we've seen [3:56] many times before [3:58] if Putin can get the people to serve to [4:01] basically go to the front lines and and [4:03] and fight often with inferior equipment [4:05] and you know essentially on a on a [4:07] one-way one-way one-way trip. He's able [4:10] to find them and even now although of [4:11] course you know the recruitment is is [4:14] lagging behind the the the [4:17] the killed and and wounded counts. He's [4:19] still able to find them and I wouldn't [4:21] assume that that's going to change in [4:23] any any any short time. Now we've we've [4:24] been been talking about mobilization and [4:27] that's clearly in the works. He doesn't [4:29] necessarily have to do it openly. He can [4:30] do it secretly. There's a lot more [4:33] in Russia. There's a lot more resource [4:36] and you know in terms of we spoke about [4:38] it last time on the on the show. In [4:40] terms of the war of attrition Putin [4:41] thinks he's winning and I think I think [4:44] the message I think coming from you know [4:45] Kiev right now is that [4:47] Putin is is is is feeling quite [4:50] comfortable especially in the area of of [4:52] jet drones and and ballistic missiles [4:54] and he's he's able to um you know [4:58] to to bring home that advantage in in [5:00] men, material and money, the three three [5:02] components of war. [5:03] >> Thank you Ollie. Now even if Zanny that [5:06] doesn't mean that there's about to one [5:08] side's about to be defeated. There is an [5:09] another initiative going on here which [5:11] is another attempt to try and get some [5:14] sort of peace deal. And the day you [5:17] arrived in Kiev I I think Kushner and [5:20] Witkoff were pulling out. [5:23] What was the talk about whether [5:25] there is going to be any sort of peace [5:26] deal? I saw Trump last night tweeting [5:28] about some sort of energy ceasefire and [5:30] no one really knowing about it. What's [5:32] the talk? [5:32] >> So I think the honest assessment from [5:34] most people in Kiev was that nobody took [5:36] that terribly seriously. Um they were I [5:39] think delighted that that Steve Witkoff [5:41] and Jared Kushner actually came to Kiev [5:43] for the first time. Um [5:44] but it was not no one thought you know [5:46] this is peace in our time. [5:48] That said, I suspect I wouldn't be at [5:50] all surprised if there wasn't more talk [5:53] of of peace negotiations in the next few [5:55] weeks it it after the Russian Duma [5:58] election and before the midterms. It [6:00] would suit Donald Trump President Trump [6:02] to be able to say, you know, I'm doing [6:04] this there's progress. You could even [6:05] have talk about and I've I've heard [6:07] reports of it some sort of energy mutual [6:10] ceasefire. We're going to stop hitting [6:11] each other's energy targets. Remember [6:12] President Trump is desperate for the [6:14] Ukrainians to stop hitting refineries [6:16] and particularly diesel refineries. Um [6:19] but I really don't think after a week [6:21] there in in Ukraine that we are [6:24] going to see anything significant or [6:26] serious until after the winter. It seems [6:28] to me that given everything we've said, [6:30] you know, Vladimir Putin thinks he can [6:32] inflict so much pain on Ukraine over the [6:35] winter. Why on earth would he want to [6:38] stop doing something now? So I I don't [6:39] see anything in the future.