Ukraine Drone Unit Beats NATO in Drills, Warns West on Defense Lag

The Economist

Western militaries risk catastrophic deterrence failure against Russia because peacetime procurement cannot match the six-month innovation cycles of cheap, autonomous drone warfare.

AI-assisted summary of Inside an elite Ukrainian drone unit: a special report | The Economist — original source. Check the original for full context.

Source published: 2026-09-23

Key ideas

The frontline kill zone in Ukraine has expanded to 30–40 kilometers wide, forcing forces subterranean and turning any vehicle movement within 7 km of the front into an immediate target for hunting FPV drones. (10:13)
Ukrainian drone forces have abandoned NATO's standard TRL 9 procurement cycle for a 'TRL 7+' model, deploying systems that are merely battle-ready to counter an adversary electronic warfare environment that shifts every six months. (8:17)
Ukraine's 412th Nemesis Brigade operates like a venture-backed tech startup, coordinating operations through an esports-like command center and scoring verified strikes on a competitive inter-brigade leaderboard. (1:54)
Frontline drone density is scaling rapidly from hundreds toward thousands, driving an architectural shift toward jet-powered motherships, autonomous swarms, and AI coordination designed for deep-strike terror against civilian centers. (14:15)

Detailed notes

## Background Published by The Economist on YouTube on September 23, 2026, this special report follows editor-in-chief Zanny Minton Beddoes as she gains exclusive access inside an elite Ukrainian drone unit, the Nemesis Brigade. According to the description, the dispatch investigates how the unit operates at the heart of Ukraine's war machine, keeping pace with relentless innovation cycles while offering sharp advice and warnings to Western militaries.

## TL;DR Zanny Minton Beddoes reports from the command bunker of Ukraine's 412th Nemesis Brigade, an unmanned systems unit established by civilian tech founders and former prime minister Oleksiy Honcharuk that runs on agile startup principles and rapid technological iteration. Operating within an expanded 30-to-40-kilometer kill zone where ground movement is lethal, the brigade scores verified strikes on a gamified leaderboard and deploys cheap, rapidly adapted 'TRL 7+' hardware to counter evolving Russian countermeasures. Unit commanders outline how modern warfare has shifted toward autonomous swarms and state-sponsored civilian terror, warning that complacent Western militaries are severely underprepared for the scale and velocity of software-defined combat.

## Atmosphere & style The reporting carries an urgent, dystopian, and sobering mood, contrasting the detached, esports-like glow of command monitors with the brutal reality of loitering drones hunting individuals through city streets. Beddoes conducts sharp, incisive interviews against a constant backdrop of active frontline danger, made visceral when an incoming Russian Shahed drone is intercepted nearby during the visit. The narrative arc moves from technical awe to deep psychological disquiet, capturing the clinical routine of remote-controlled killing alongside a commander's stark observation that losing the ability to feel fear is a fatal symptom of exhaustion.

## Bulletin - [10:13](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W6dsLthcvzU&t=613s) The frontline kill zone in Ukraine has expanded to 30–40 kilometers wide, forcing forces subterranean and turning any vehicle movement within 7 km of the front into an immediate target for hunting FPV drones. - [08:17](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W6dsLthcvzU&t=497s) Ukrainian drone forces have abandoned NATO's standard TRL 9 procurement cycle for a 'TRL 7+' model, deploying systems that are merely battle-ready to counter an adversary electronic warfare environment that shifts every six months. - [01:54](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W6dsLthcvzU&t=114s) Ukraine's 412th Nemesis Brigade operates like a venture-backed tech startup, coordinating operations through an esports-like command center and scoring verified strikes on a competitive inter-brigade leaderboard. - [14:15](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W6dsLthcvzU&t=855s) Frontline drone density is scaling rapidly from hundreds toward thousands, driving an architectural shift toward jet-powered motherships, autonomous swarms, and AI coordination designed for deep-strike terror against civilian centers.

## Key takeaways - [00:01](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W6dsLthcvzU&t=1s) The Nemesis Brigade (the 412th Brigade of Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces) was created by civilian tech professionals and relies on flat management, radical transparency, and internal R&D over legacy military hierarchy. - [01:54](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W6dsLthcvzU&t=114s) Nemesis coordinates operations inside an esports-like command room, tracking confirmed strikes on an 'e-point' leaderboard that requires video verification from observation drones to score points. - [04:13](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W6dsLthcvzU&t=253s) Commercial dual-use hardware integrated with agile private-sector management and venture-capital backing has repeatedly outmatched costly legacy military systems in lethality and adaptability. - [08:17](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W6dsLthcvzU&t=497s) Wartime innovation requires accepting a compressed 'TRL 7+' standard; waiting for battle-tested TRL 9 hardware is obsolete because countermeasures alter the aerial combat landscape every three to six months. - [10:13](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W6dsLthcvzU&t=613s) The operational kill zone has expanded to a depth of 30 to 40 kilometers, rendering surface transit lethal and compelling frontline forces to live entirely subterranean. - [13:01](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W6dsLthcvzU&t=781s) Nemesis demonstrated decisive tactical advantages over NATO units in joint exercises, exposing significant Western institutional vulnerabilities to agile, software-defined warfare. - [14:15](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W6dsLthcvzU&t=855s) Modern battlefield economics have inverted to favor high-volume, low-cost attritional systems used to execute targeted terror rather than traditional high-cost platforms. - [14:15](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W6dsLthcvzU&t=855s) Drone proliferation is rapidly exceeding manual human control limits, transitioning operations toward AI-coordinated swarms and jet-powered carrier motherships operating deep behind front lines. - [18:38](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W6dsLthcvzU&t=1118s) Western militaries should establish autonomous unmanned systems branches led by unconventional thinkers unconstrained by legacy procurement bottlenecks. - [18:38](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W6dsLthcvzU&t=1118s) National territorial defense doctrine must transition from storing small arms to integrating society-wide drone production, technical talent, and civilian logistics networks. - [18:38](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W6dsLthcvzU&t=1118s) Long-range autonomous systems have eliminated geographic safety, ensuring European capitals are within immediate reach of modern distributed strikes. - [21:02](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W6dsLthcvzU&t=1262s) Peacetime European inertia and slow procurement weaken conventional deterrence, inviting sub-threshold Russian incursions and calculated tests of NATO's Article 5. - [24:50](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W6dsLthcvzU&t=1490s) Operating strike drones via displays detaches human emotion into a gamified routine, though commanders treat the loss of fear as a critical warning sign of psychological exhaustion requiring rest.

## Detailed walkthrough ### [00:01](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W6dsLthcvzU&t=1s) A Dystopian Glimpse into the Future of War

Zanny Minton Beddoes, Editor-in-Chief of *The Economist*, describes spending a week under intense Russian bombardment in Ukraine. Russian forces have escalated strikes on civilian targets, sending ballistic missiles and drone barrages into warehouses, petrol stations, and city centers in Kyiv and towns closer to the contact lines. Just two months prior, Ukrainian operations appeared to have the upper hand with deep strikes into Russian territory, but Russia retaliated viciously. Beddoes underscores a chilling dimension of this modern battlefield: small first-person-view (FPV) drones are now actively hunting human targets in urban streets, tracking and pursuing civilians.

What emerges from this environment is a style of warfare defined by cheap autonomous systems, massive real-time data collection, and an unforgiving speed of technological adaptation. It presents a grim, dystopian landscape that Beddoes warns many Western military leaders and institutions are alarmingly ill-prepared to confront. To see this transition directly, *The Economist* gained exclusive access as the first foreign journalists allowed inside the command post of the Nemesis Brigade, positioned close to the frontline. Officially designated the 412th Brigade of Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces, Nemesis began as a battalion founded by tech-minded civilians in 2023. Governed by a flat organizational hierarchy and operating more like a fast-moving Silicon Valley software startup than a legacy military unit, the brigade is overseen by private-sector alumni such as its deputy commander, Pavlo.

---

[01:54](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W6dsLthcvzU&t=114s) Inside the Battle Room: Gamified Warfare and the Leaderboard

Inside the brigade's command center, soldiers sit huddled before walls of high-resolution computer monitors, orchestrating strikes in a setting that looks uncannily like an esports arena or a competitive gaming tournament. Pavlo explains that this room is the operational heart of Nemesis, coordinating pilots, duty officers, and real-time intelligence feeds streamed from their own reconnaissance craft and allied unmanned units. This data pipeline feeds directly into a centralized "e-point" tracking architecture, where every strike across Ukraine's unmanned units is cataloged and scored.

```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Unmanned Systems Strike Tracking Workflow accDescr: Flow diagram showing how drone operations are executed, verified by video, and scored on a competitive brigade leaderboard.

subgraph Recon ["1. Target Identification"] A["Reconnaissance Drones"] --> B["Live Video Feeds"] end

subgraph BattleRoom ["2. Command & Execution"] B --> C["Pilots & Duty Officers"] C --> D["FPV Drone Strike"] end

subgraph Scoring ["3. Verification & Points"] D --> E["Battle Damage Video Confirmation"] E --> F["e-Point System Leaderboard"] end ```

The e-point system operates as a competitive leaderboard across various unmanned systems brigades: - Every enemy asset carries a set point value based on strategic importance (e.g., Russian combat aircraft, infantry units, main battle tanks, and artillery systems). - To register a score, every single strike must be unequivocally confirmed through video footage recorded by accompanying observation drones. - The resulting scores establish unit ratings, fostering an intense, productive competition between brigades to maximize battlefield attrition.

Pavlo stresses that the entire operation rests on processing enormous volumes of field telemetry, intelligence feeds, and mission logs. Rather than relying on traditional military doctrine, Nemesis maintains its own internal Research and Development (R&D) wing to design, test, and deploy novel payloads, airframes, and electronic countermeasures. In this operational theater, the half-life of an advantage is fleeting: the fundamental conditions of aerial combat change at least once every six months.

---

[04:13](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W6dsLthcvzU&t=253s) The Startup Ethos: Oleksiy Honcharuk and "Common Sense Territory"

The roots of the Nemesis Brigade lie in an unconventional origin story detailed by co-founder Oleksiy Honcharuk, who previously served as Ukraine’s youngest prime minister under President Volodymyr Zelenskyy before the full-scale Russian invasion. Honcharuk reflects that in a modern existential war, it is not simply standing armies that fight, but entire societies. In this conflict, commercial, dual-use technologies have frequently proved far more lethal and cost-effective than standard legacy military hardware. Recognizing that systems originally built without military intent can outmatch expensive defense-procurement items, Honcharuk and a cohort of civilian tech professionals formed a bespoke battalion in late 2023 built on agile management principles.

Honcharuk describes their guiding institutional philosophy as "common sense territory"—importing private-sector efficiencies, radical transparency, and flat organizational communication directly into combat operations: - **Radical Honesty:** Personnel are mandated to report failures and ground-truth realities directly, uninhibited by military rank or hierarchy. - **Results-Oriented Focus:** Success is measured strictly by measurable battlefield output and target destruction rather than adherence to bureaucratic protocol or excuses. - **Unrestricted Creativity:** Team members are encouraged to experiment with novel technical tactics and unconventional engineering solutions to keep pace with rapid enemy adaptations.

Realizing that institutional agility within a military unit was insufficient without industrial scale, Honcharuk helped establish a London-based venture investment vehicle to channel international venture capital into Ukrainian defense engineering. This initiative helped spawn Ukraine's first defense-tech unicorn, UForce, which interfaces directly with the Nemesis Brigade to field combat innovations without waiting for conventional procurement pipelines.

---

[08:17](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W6dsLthcvzU&t=497s) Compressing Technology Readiness Levels (TRLs) Under Fire

Honcharuk explains how the frontline has shattered Western assumptions regarding Technology Readiness Levels (TRL), the standard 1-to-9 metric where TRL 1 represents early conceptualization and TRL 9 denotes fully mature, battle-tested hardware deployed at massive scale. Conventional defense apparatuses in NATO states almost exclusively procure TRL 9 systems, with occasional exceptions at TRL 8. In wartime Ukraine, however, waiting for a system to achieve TRL 9 is effectively suicidal.

Instead, Ukrainian operations run almost entirely on what Honcharuk characterizes as a "TRL 7+" standard: hardware and software that are simply "good enough for battle." Because battlefield dynamics shift within weeks, a system that functions flawlessly today will likely be rendered obsolete by adversary electronic warfare within three months. Honcharuk points to the Turkish Bayraktar TB2 strike drone as the quintessential example: - In the initial months of the 2022 invasion, the Bayraktar played a pivotal role, famously blunting Russian armored columns outside Kyiv. - As Russian layered air defense, radar nets, and dense electronic warfare systems adapted, the Bayraktar largely vanished from frontline offensive operations. - The system did not become intrinsically flawed; rather, the operational environment shifted so dramatically that its large, slower profile became too vulnerable.

---

[10:13](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W6dsLthcvzU&t=613s) The Expanding Kill Zone and Daily Life Under Drones

Pavlo explains that the task of striking targets has grown progressively harder as the battlefield has cleared of visible movement. Russian troops, acutely aware that hundreds of reconnaissance eyes blanket the sky, rarely move in open terrain. Combatants on both sides have retreated subterranean, burrowing into deep trench systems, tree lines, and camouflaged dugouts. The resulting lethal buffer—the frontline "kill zone"—now stretches 30 to 40 kilometers wide, an expanse where almost nothing moves above ground without facing immediate strike risks.

The prospect of FPV drones roaming deeper into civilian metropolitan areas like Kyiv remains a terrifying possibility. While Pavlo hopes cities far behind the line will avoid constant FPV terror, Russia is continually expanding its long-range communication networks, repeaters, and autonomous guidance algorithms.

---

[13:01](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W6dsLthcvzU&t=781s) Confronting Western Military Complacency

Beddoes notes that when soldiers from the Nemesis Brigade participated in joint military exercises alongside NATO forces, the Ukrainian unit completely dominated the mock engagements using their agile drone doctrines. When asked whether this performance proves Western armed forces are dangerously behind the realities of contemporary industrial warfare, Honcharuk characterizes it as a high-stakes question facing Western military elites.

Honcharuk observes that Western defense strategy remains fractured by divergent viewpoints. Many strategic leaders in NATO capitals comfort themselves with the belief that their existing deterrence tools, deep air power, and overall strategic weight are sufficient to dissuade or absorb aggression. However, Honcharuk warns that while Western strategic deterrence may be intact on paper, relying on legacy platforms and slow-moving industrial cycles creates massive vulnerabilities against modern, software-defined warfare that iterates on a weekly basis.

[14:15](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W6dsLthcvzU&t=855s) The Era of Cheap Mass and State-Sponsored Terror

The economics of modern conflict have fundamentally inverted: future wars will not be decided by exorbitant, cutting-edge hardware, but by immense volumes of cheap, attritional systems. In Ukraine, the invader behaves fundamentally "like a terrorist but with the scale of the government." Russian forces systematically utilize small FPV drones to hunt civilians in Ukrainian cities—not due to mistaken identification or targeting confusion, but simply "because they can." The primary objective is no longer merely to defeat an opposing military, but to inflict horrific, coercive terror directly against ordinary citizens.

```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Evolution of Russia's Drone Threat Architecture accDescr: Russian deep-strike tactics evolving from early Shahed drones to swarm motherships hunting civilian populations.

subgraph Stage1["Initial Long-Range Strikes"] A["Standard Shahed-136 Drones"] --> B["Ukrainian Interceptor Drones Respond"] end

subgraph Stage2["High-Speed Evolution"] B --> C["Jet-Engine Shaheds Deployed"] C --> D["Ukrainian Countermeasures Adapt"] end

subgraph Stage3["Emerging Swarm Dystopia"] D --> E["Mothership Platforms / Jet Carriers"] E --> F["Autonomous FPV Swarms Released"] F --> G["'Wild Hunt' Attacks on Urban Civilians"] end ```

The scale of front-line drone deployment has surged from dozens two years ago to hundreds today, rapidly approaching thousands. At such density, human operators can no longer control each airframe individually; warfare is pivoting toward autonomous, AI-driven coordination where a single operator manages groups or swarms. The deep-strike threat in Ukraine began with Shahed loitering munitions, and when Ukrainian air defenses adapted with drone interceptors, Russia responded with jet-powered Shaheds. The inevitable next stage—already taking shape—involves jet platforms acting as motherships, carrying swarms of small FPV drones deep into urban areas to unleash automated "wild hunts" against the populace. This dynamic exposes Moscow's true imperial ambitions: they are willing to obliterate entire cities with glide bombs and mass terror because the objective is not regional liberation, but securing geopolitical dominance at the world stage through brutality.

- Front-line drone operational density has grown from dozens to hundreds, rapidly scaling into the thousands. - Russia's deployment of Shahed drones has shifted from propeller-driven models to jet-engine variants, moving toward swarm-dispensing carrier platforms. - Strategic intent focuses on civilian terror rather than conventional military defeat, demonstrating that front-line armies may ironically be safer than non-combatants in home cities.

---

[18:38](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W6dsLthcvzU&t=1118s) Three Lessons for Western Defense Ministers

When asked by Zanny Minton Beddoes what three concrete steps Western European defense ministers should implement to prepare for this terrifying operational environment, the Ukrainian commander outlines an urgent, unconventional doctrine:

```mermaid flowchart LR accTitle: Three Urgent Imperatives for Western Defense accDescr: Recommendations for Western defense ministers covering organizational doctrine, societal mobilization, and spatial awareness.

P1["1. Dedicated Unmanned Forces"] -->|"Select creative innovators"| D1["Establish new military culture"] P2["2. Whole-of-Nation Mobilization"] -->|"Engage local commerce & defense"| D2["Drones for Territorial Units, not shotguns"] P3["3. Redefine the Battlespace"] -->|"Discard geographic safety assumptions"| D3["Prepare home capitals for instant war"] ```

1. **Establish Dedicated Unmanned Systems Forces:** Western militaries must create separate drone branches led by an open-minded, unorthodox culture. Defense chiefs should actively seek out "the most craziest people" in their ranks and empower them to innovate without bureaucratic friction. 2. **Engage Society and Industry in the Innovation Cycle:** High-tech asymmetric warfare is no longer an exclusive domain reserved for elite special forces. It must become the primary responsibility of territorial defense and society at large. Instead of storing away shotguns or machine guns in basement armories, territorial defense units require pre-configured drones, technical integration, and concrete mission assignments. If total war breaks out, the entire nation fights—from local tech manufacturers down to commercial logistics and pizza delivery networks. 3. **Acknowledge That the Traditional Battlespace Is Dead:** The illusion of safety far from the front line has collapsed. Two years ago, Kyiv felt relatively secure, but long-range capabilities have permanently erased geographic insulation. European capitals such as Warsaw or Berlin can find the battlefield brought directly to their doorsteps within hours, requiring immediate reaction speeds that peacetime bureaucracies are wholly unequipped to handle.

---

[21:02](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W6dsLthcvzU&t=1262s) European Complacency, Border Testing, and Failed Deterrence

Eastern European and Baltic nations situated closest to the Russian border display a far sharper sense of urgency because they intimately understand the nature of the adversary. Yet the broader Western alliance is moving far too sluggishly to integrate the hard-won battlefield insights Ukraine has paid for in blood. Although Ukrainian troops regularly participate in joint NATO exercises and share real-time operational data with Western defense specialists, Europe still suffers from the peacetime inertia that plagued pre-war Ukraine.

This institutional complacency fosters a dangerous perception of vulnerability. The supreme goal of military readiness is deterrence—"the best war is a prevented war"—yet Europe currently projects weakness. If Vladimir Putin calculates that European forces are unprepared, he may be tempted to escalate aggressively beyond merely probing NATO's Article 5 with isolated Shahed incursions into Romania, the Baltic states, or Finland. Moscow could seize a border town or execute a lethal strike on Western civilians, calculating that NATO would never risk nuclear escalation over a local, sub-threshold provocation. Without an immediate, overwhelming counterstrike, each unchallenged probe will inevitably lead to the next step of Russian expansion.

- Pre-war military procurement cycles in Europe remain far too slow to keep pace with the realities of asymmetric drone warfare. - Russia continues to test Article 5 boundaries through intermittent drone incursions and regional border provocations. - A failure of conventional deterrence invites incremental aggression, relying on the calculation that the West will not respond to limited civilian attacks with nuclear options.

---

[24:50](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W6dsLthcvzU&t=1490s) The Psychological Toll of Screen-Based Killing

For the operators of the Nemesis unit, the daily reality of drone warfare involves executing precision strikes against Russian troops from control consoles. When asked about the psychological burden of killing enemies repeatedly through a display, the commander reflects that the experience fundamentally detaches human emotion:

> "When you killed once is problem. When it kills once or twice, it's problem. Destroy military techniques many, many, many times, it's like your job... these people who killing enemy by the screen, by the control pattern screen, it's like a not real emotion, not so emotional when they could kill them in real life."

However, this clinical, gamified distance does not eliminate genuine physical danger. Even during the reporting visit, an incoming Russian Shahed drone was brought down in close proximity to the team. When asked whether a battlefield commander ever experiences genuine fear, he answers without hesitation that fear is an essential survival mechanism:

> "Of course. It's like very bad when you do not feel scary. It's absolutely not good, and you do not feel the scary, you need to rest. It's like a big trouble when me or somebody from our guys don't feel scary."

- The cognitive dissonance of piloting weaponized drones via screens turns high-volume killing into a detached, technical routine. - Operators operate under persistent physical risk, regularly contending with incoming counter-battery fire and loitering munitions. - Inability to feel fear is treated within the unit as a critical symptom of combat exhaustion requiring immediate withdrawal and rest.

## Notable quotes > [24:50](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W6dsLthcvzU&t=1490s) When you killed once is problem. When it kills once or twice, it's problem. Destroy military techniques many, many, many times, it's like your job... these people who killing enemy by the screen, by the control pattern screen, it's like a not real emotion, not so emotional when they could kill them in real life. — Commander

> [24:50](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W6dsLthcvzU&t=1490s) Of course. It's like very bad when you do not feel scary. It's absolutely not good, and you do not feel the scary, you need to rest. It's like a big trouble when me or somebody from our guys don't feel scary. — Commander

> [04:13](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W6dsLthcvzU&t=253s) common sense territory — Oleksiy Honcharuk

> [08:17](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W6dsLthcvzU&t=497s) good enough for battle — Oleksiy Honcharuk

> [14:15](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W6dsLthcvzU&t=855s) like a terrorist but with the scale of the government

> [14:15](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W6dsLthcvzU&t=855s) because they can

> [18:38](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W6dsLthcvzU&t=1118s) the most craziest people — Commander

> [21:02](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W6dsLthcvzU&t=1262s) the best war is a prevented war

## Mentioned Zanny Minton Beddoes, The Economist, Nemesis Brigade, 412th Brigade of Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces, Pavlo, Oleksiy Honcharuk, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, UForce, Bayraktar TB2, Shahed-136, NATO, Vladimir Putin, Kyiv, Kramatorsk

## Video description What goes on inside an elite Ukrainian drone unit? How do its soldiers wage the battles of today while simultaneously building the weapons of tomorrow? Join Zanny Minton Beddoes, The Economist’s editor-in-chief, as she visits one of Ukraine’s most lethal drone units, the first foreign journalists to do so. She asks the people at the heart of the country’s war machine how it operates, what it takes to keep up with the relentless need to innovate and what advice—and warnings—they have for the West.

#ukraine #warinukraine #russia #drone #war

00:00:00 - Introduction 00:01:55 - Inside the unit’s battle room 00:04:09 - How Nemesis was started 00:08:17 - Ukraine’s rapid innovation cycle 00:13:01 - Is the West prepared for the new reality of war? 00:25:01 - The psychological toll on Ukraine’s soldiers

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[Source](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W6dsLthcvzU)

中文简报

乌克兰无人机部队演习击败北约，警告西方防务反应滞后西方军方可能面临对俄威慑的灾难性失效，原因是和平时期的采购流程无法匹配廉价自主无人机作战每六个月一次的技术迭代周期。 Zanny Minton Beddoes从乌克兰第412“涅墨西斯”旅的指挥掩体发回报道。这支无人系统部队由民间科技创业者和前总理Oleksiy Honcharuk组建，采用敏捷初创公司的运作模式与快速技术迭代机制。在地面移动极易招致致命打击、已扩大至30至40公里的杀伤区内，该旅在游戏化的排行榜上记录核实打击战果，并部署廉价且快速调整的“TRL 7+”硬件，以应对俄罗斯不断演变的电子对抗措施。部队指挥官指出，现代战争已转向自主机群和国家支持的针对平民的恐吓，并警告称，自满的西方军方严重低估了软件定义作战的规模和演进速度。乌克兰前线的杀伤区已扩大至30至40公里宽，迫使部队转入地下活动，并使前线7公里内的任何车辆移动都成为寻猎型FPV无人机的直接打击目标。 (10:13) 乌克兰无人机部队已放弃北约标准的TRL 9采购周期，转向“TRL 7+”模式，部署仅达战备可用状态的系统，以对抗对手每六个月就会演变一次的电子战环境。 (8:17) 乌克兰第412“涅墨西斯”旅像一家风险投资支持的科技初创公司一样运作，通过电竞风格的指挥中心协调行动，并在跨旅竞争排行榜上记录核实的战果得分。 (1:54) 前线无人机密度正从数百架迅速扩大到数千架，推动战术架构向喷气动力母机、自主机群以及旨在深入打击平民中心实施恐吓的AI协同系统转变。 (14:15)

Reading summary

Reporting from the frontline command post of Ukraine's 412th Nemesis Brigade, The Economist examines how civilian startup culture and cheap autonomous systems have transformed modern combat. The report argues that software-driven, rapid drone iteration and expanding kill zones have exposed critical institutional complacency across Western militaries. Startup Culture and Compressed Tech Cycles (4:13) Founded in late 2023 by civilian tech professionals and former Ukrainian prime minister Oleksiy Honcharuk, the Nemesis Brigade operates on agile private-sector principles termed "common sense territory." The unit minimizes military hierarchy to encourage radical transparency, maintains an internal research-and-development wing, and tracks strikes using a centralized "e-point" leaderboard that awards verified points for destroyed Russian assets. Supported by defense venture vehicles like UForce, the brigade fields commercial and dual-use technologies directly to combat operators. Honcharuk argues that the war has shattered Western reliance on Technology Readiness Level (TRL) 9 hardware, which takes years to develop and procure. Ukrainian forces operate instead on a "TRL 7+" standard—systems that are simply good enough for battle—because rapid electronic countermeasures render tactical advantages obsolete every few months. Honcharuk points to the Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drone as an example: instrumental during the initial defense of Kyiv in 2022, it largely vanished from offensive frontline operations once Russian layered air defense and electronic warfare adapted to its slower profile. The Widening Kill Zone and Urban Swarms (10:13) Tactical conditions on the frontline have created an expansive "kill zone" stretching 30 to 40 kilometers deep, forcing combatants entirely underground into fortified dugouts and tree lines. Pavlo, deputy commander of Nemesis, notes that open ground transit has become virtually impossible: rear medical vehicles that operated openly 7 kilometers from the front in 2022 are now hunted by first-person-view (FPV) drones, and soldiers in frontline hubs like Kramatorsk carry shotguns outdoors to shoot down loitering craft. The report emphasizes that modern attritional economics increasingly favor cheap mass, with Russian forces systematically directing FPV drones to hunt civilians in urban streets. Russian strike tactics have progressed from propeller-driven Shahed-136 loitering munitions to jet-powered variants, with commanders anticipating the next phase will feature jet carrier motherships dispensing coordinated autonomous FPV swarms deep into metropolitan centers to terrorize civilian populations. Western Complacency and Deterrence Deficits (18:38) After Nemesis personnel outmaneuvered NATO forces during joint training exercises, Ukrainian commanders warned that Western armed forces remain unprepared for fast-iterating, software-defined warfare. The brigade's leadership outlines three urgent recommendations for Western European defense ministers: establish dedicated unmanned commands led by unconventional innovators, engage society and commercial industry by equipping territorial defense forces with drones rather than small arms, and discard assumptions of geographic rear-area safety. Ukrainian officials warn that sluggish peacetime procurement in Europe erodes military deterrence against Russia. With Moscow already testing border airspace via intermittent drone incursions into Romania and the Baltics, commanders caution that Vladimir Putin may pursue sub-threshold land or civilian strikes, calculating that Western leaders would not risk nuclear escalation over localized provocations without immediate conventional counterstrike options. Psychological Disconnect in Screen-Based Warfare (24:50) Inside the Nemesis command bunker, operators orchestrate lethal strikes via computer monitors in an environment resembling an esports competition. A brigade commander reflects that killing targets through control screens fosters emotional detachment, turning repeated destruction into a routine, technical procedure devoid of the immediate emotional impact of real-world physical combat. This detachment does not eliminate physical peril, as drone crews frequently face counter-battery artillery and loitering munitions, including a Russian Shahed brought down near the unit during the reporting visit. The commander stresses that experiencing fear is an indispensable survival requirement; an operator who ceases to feel afraid is diagnosed with combat exhaustion and pulled from the line to rest. The Nemesis Brigade illustrates how agile civilian innovation can offset an adversary's conventional superiority, yet its advantages require continuous adaptation against adversary countermeasures. The unresolved question is whether Western defense establishments can overcome bureaucratic inertia and adapt their procurement doctrines before their strategic deterrence is tested directly.

Source quotes

[24:50] Commander: When you killed once is problem. When it kills once or twice, it's problem. Destroy military techniques many, many, many times, it's like your job... these people who killing enemy by the screen, by the control pattern screen, it's like a not real emotion, not so emotional when they could kill them in real life. [24:50] Commander: Of course. It's like very bad when you do not feel scary. It's absolutely not good, and you do not feel the scary, you need to rest. It's like a big trouble when me or somebody from our guys don't feel scary. [4:13] Oleksiy Honcharuk: common sense territory [8:17] Oleksiy Honcharuk: good enough for battle [14:15] like a terrorist but with the scale of the government [14:15] because they can [18:38] Commander: the most craziest people [21:02] the best war is a prevented war

Original transcript

[0:01] Russia is striking Kyiv with an intensity. And ballistic missiles hitting the Ukrainian. [0:05] Almost 250 Ukrainian petrol. Attack triggered an explosion at a warehouse [0:11] near Kyiv. To go to Ukraine is to glimpse into the future of war. My colleagues and [0:18] I spent a week there under increasing Russian bombardment. Two months ago, [0:24] Ukraine looked to be ahead, destroying targets deep inside Russia. Now Russia is escalating [0:30] viciously striking civilian infrastructure from petrol stations to warehouses in Kyiv [0:36] as well as cities closer to the front line. They are literally hunting with [0:42] the FPD drones with the small drones in a series hunting civilians. Hunted civilians. [0:52] This is a war dominated by drones, data, and a relentless cycle of innovation. [0:58] It's a warfare which looks increasingly dystopian, [1:01] increasingly dangerous, and for which many in the West seem alarmingly unprepared. [1:10] We saw this up close when we were the first foreign journalists to visit the command [1:14] headquarters of the Nemesis Brigade, not far from the front line. Obviously, [1:19] we aren't revealing any details that might identify the brigade's location. Nemesis, [1:25] officially the 412th Brigade of Ukraine's unmanned systems forces, is one of the country's elite [1:31] drone units. Founded as a battalion by a group of tech-focused civilians in 2023, it's become known [1:38] for its lethal effectiveness and innovative culture. It's run like a startup, data-driven [1:44] and with a flat structure, led by people from business like Pavlov, its deputy commander. [1:54] This is a battle room. Uh here is the uh battle groups uh pilots, intelligence and duties. Uh [2:04] these are all people with large monitors with with looks like they're playing video games. [2:10] Yeah. Yeah. This is the pilots and duties who uh watching uh online video from the drones [2:17] from our drones intelligence from another units uh intelligence drones. So this is the uh heart [2:23] of the our battle room our brigade. These are the people who are contributing to the e-oint system [2:31] that I saw in the brigade headquarters. I saw the screens where you had all of the different [2:36] unmanned systems brigades in a leaderboard which one was doing better. Explain to me [2:41] how that works. Every target which we uh strike uh have got some uh points some e points. So, [2:50] uh planes, uh Russian troops, Russian tanks, Russian artillery, every target, uh number of [2:59] points. So, uh the strike, uh should be confirmed by video and we get some points and the points is [3:06] like uh our rating. So, it's like a competition. Yeah, it's like it's it's like a good competition. [3:13] Everywhere there is data, everywhere there are screens, everywhere things are measured. data uh [3:18] is very important. Absolutely. Absolutely. Because uh uh in our brigade ines we uh work with a big [3:29] massive of uh data from crews from uh battlefield from intelligence from planning. So it's like [3:37] our base for do our job good. We're trying to be first unit which improve new technologies [3:47] uh new ideas and new uh drones, new payloads and uh we have got our R&D um R&D group uh which uh [4:00] testing and uh making some new technologies. Every half year at least the world change [4:13] The speed of this innovation cycle became clear to me when I sat down with Alexi Honcheruk. [4:18] He's one of those techfocused founders of the Nemesis Brigade, a man who before the [4:23] war had been President Zilinsk's first prime minister and the youngest in Ukraine's history. [4:30] Can you explain to me because I think for people outside Ukraine it is it is a bit peculiar that [4:36] civilians can decide they are going to found a battalion. How did you go about [4:41] it in Ukraine? Uh the story when the civilian people or people with the civilian background [4:47] become the military leaders. This is very usual because when the big war started not army but [4:53] nation fight. This is a war when the dual use products become more lethal than the weapons. [4:59] So something wasn't created to kill people is killing people way better than than a weapons. Uh [5:06] that's why the role and the logic of industry is different. Now the logic and uh the architecture [5:13] of many different military units looks different. It was obvious that innovations uh is something [5:19] which can allows us to resist and to survive. You're watching an interview from the economist. [5:25] To get early access to our upcoming interviews and watch others from our archive, subscribe to [5:30] The Economist by clicking the link above. That's why uh we created a group of people who decided [5:37] to with a civilian underground to decided to build a battalion uh with this new logic with this new [5:45] architecture in order to be efficient on the front line using the new technologies. So there was late [5:50] 2023 that was this battalion that is where we are now in the headquarters of it's now a brigade. [5:54] Yeah. What was the culture that you wanted to set up for that battalion? The first idea was [6:02] to create the we call it common sense territory. So it means that when you are building the culture [6:09] of the unit on something which is obviously working in the civilian sector like an efficiency, [6:16] transparency, openness for new ideas. We decided that our main values would be honesty first of all [6:24] because uh the culture when you are uh telling the truth openly no matter what position in the [6:31] organization you have uh creates a super important uh like basis uh for the culture. This that was [6:40] the first second was like resultoriented approach uh so to be focused on how to get a result not to [6:49] explain why you can't and the third one was like creativity not very usual for for uh for for the [6:57] army uh and the idea was based on assumption that the speed of changes it was already obvious in [7:05] the year of the war it was already obvious that the speed of the loop the speed of innovation [7:09] was would be crucial and we we believed that it would be it would be super important for a [7:17] military unit and we was right I think so that's really interesting you had KPIs you had a culture [7:22] of openness and transparency and all designed to foster speed of innovation the loop of innovations [7:29] uh requires not only the effective uh organization within the military unit but it requires uh uh [7:39] faster and faster and faster evolution of the technologies. uh for me it becomes obvious that [7:46] it's necessary to build a vehicle in order to work with the venture capital uh and in order to have [7:54] a better access for the partnerships with the big players and that's why I decided to build a London [8:01] based company in order to attract investments and to bring investments uh uh to Ukraine in order [8:08] to support all the incredible engineering teams and to gather them together uh to give um access [8:14] to the capital to give them bigger scale. The company Alexi co-founded, EU Force, is Ukraine's [8:21] first miltech unicorn. It works with the Nemesis Brigade and others to ensure a constant cycle of [8:28] innovation. How exactly do you make sure this innovation cycle is as fast as possible? to let [8:36] you better understanding how it works. I would mention that uh in Ukraine you almost don't have [8:42] TRL9 products. So what means TL 9? TRL is like technological readiness level uh from one till 9. [8:51] Uh when nine is uh like super good, super tested with uh hundred thousands or maybe millions uh [9:01] uh devices and so forth. and 11 one is a prototype and technological readiness level [9:08] uh for a military grade products was usually nine very rare eight mhm in Ukraine you almost never [9:19] has this level of technological readiness level you always ready have good enough for a battle [9:28] level let's put it like that this is a seven plus level why because when you have some drone [9:34] and it's efficient and good today. It doesn't mean that in the 3 months it would be so efficient. Uh [9:40] the most obvious example is a bay car for example which like saved us first couple of months when [9:47] the war started. Now it's on the front line you will almost never find it. So it means that the [9:56] technology was super vital for us on the beginning now almost don't have a place on the battlefield [10:04] in Ukraine. So and and it's not because they are bad it's because the war is like changed a [10:10] lot. This new type of warfare means the balance of advantage can shift quickly. Your goal is to kill [10:20] the enemy, destroy their infrastructure, but to do so cheaply and efficiently. Has it become harder [10:28] to do that? Is it much harder to find Russian soldiers? Find Yeah, it's it's much harder today. [10:34] every every day harder and harder cuz they uh first of all uh not so lot Russian troops cuz [10:44] uh all units in uh Ukrainian armed forces tried to kill Russian troops. So it's not it's not easy to [10:55] find it and uh they know uh we look for them that they are hiding they also like yours underground [11:04] underground hiding hiding under covers uh under trees in the in the trees. So in this kill zone [11:12] which is what 30 40 kilometers soldiers on both sides are underground nothing moves [11:19] uh nothing moves without chances to be uh to be killed. Well, not not and and that will get [11:30] worse and worse or there will be more and more. Yeah. Yeah. Worse and worse, more and more drones [11:34] as the distance big and bigger and bigger, I mean kill zone bigger and bigger. Uh few two years ago [11:44] uh you told me you was at the uh field hospital Ukrainian armored forces 7 km from the front line. [11:52] Today 7 km even car uh will strike by FPV drones and we are beginning to see FPV drones in cities. [12:02] Is that going to be the next thing if there was an FPV drone? Good question. Uh enemy uh have [12:14] got technology for this techn. So will we see FP drone in K? I hope no. I remember my experience [12:24] uh at Donbas Kromatsk uh where all uh military people going to bring some coffee with a shotgun [12:34] cuz a lot of uh enemy FP drones. I hope we not have uh something same in KE. You have to have [12:43] a shotgun in case there's an FPG. This is a very horrific future. Yeah. Um Yeah. I I hope we will [12:50] will not happen. Do you do you feel that you are seeing the future of war? This is the new kind of [12:56] war. Yeah, absolutely. This is a new kind of war. As I listened to Pavlo and watched his soldiers [13:04] in action, I felt that I'd stumbled into a surreal dystopian future. A future that is hard to imagine [13:11] unless you've seen it up close. And a future that many Ukrainians believe Western armies are not [13:17] prepared for. The Nemesis Brigade took part in several exercises with NATO forces and trounced [13:24] them. Does that mean that they are way behind? Look, this is a $100 million question. Maybe even [13:31] more. Maybe 100. Probably more, I think. Right. I don't think that there is a general understanding, [13:36] general consensus uh in within the western military elites. I don't think so. I think [13:43] that this is a very a lot of very different ideas. Some of these ideas that okay, NATO is [13:51] still like safe enough and it's still a good tool to uh contain the potential aggression and they [13:59] think that they have enough strategic power that uh it will prevent the potential attempts. But I [14:08] don't think so. Why? because I think that the strategic power is still here, but it's super [14:15] expensive and the future potential conflict is not about the super expensive stuff. It's about a lot [14:22] of super cheap. And what's what is another lesson in Ukraine that the potential invader or potential [14:31] aggressor will act like a terrorist but with the scale of the government. And this is what's [14:39] uh what's super important to understand now. So if you'll see now what's going on in Ukraine, they [14:45] are literally hunting with the FPV drones with the small drones in the cities. Hunting civilians [14:51] hunted civilians uh with the cities. And it's not because they think that they are not civilians, [14:57] they are military. They are hunting the obviously civilian people. And uh it's not because Russia [15:05] it's used to be it it's not like they're crossing the red line. Uh I think that they are doing this [15:13] because they can and I think that when if we are thinking about the potential scenarios how Russia [15:21] would escalate and would go with razor stakes the stakes wouldn't be how that we will kill your [15:29] army. No, your army would would be potentially safer than your civilians. So the potentially they [15:38] would create a damage not to your army, they will potentially create a damage to your civilians. [15:44] Well, FPV drones in western capitals hitting civilians. They are acting and they will act [15:51] like a terrorists but with the governmental scale in the affordable mass concept. And we are not [15:57] very far from this. Frankly, we are not very far. I think the next year uh so if uh two years ago we [16:04] had dozens of drones uh I mean the concentration uh on the front line uh now we have like hundreds [16:12] and we very close to this thousand drones on that scale will require AI to coordinate them right [16:18] that cannot be done by human operator we are very close to the moment when technology will allow one [16:23] operator to coordinate a group of drones so it's not it's already exist but it's not exist existing [16:30] scale. Uh so we are very close to the moment when one human being would potentially orchestrate [16:38] uh the number of uh like drone operators and every this drone operator is controlling the group and [16:46] that's how the deep strike threat for Ukraine been involved. It was like a shahads. Mhm. And [16:54] when Ukraine found a way how to a good answer on the shahed with the interceptors at the next stage [17:02] uh was uh the shahed with the jet engine and it only a question of a time when Ukraine went [17:09] to find a good answer on the shahads with the jet engines. But the next step and we already see this [17:15] uh it would be a jet engine [ __ ] or different platforms which will bring a smaller drones or [17:21] swarms of smaller drones into the cities which will be like in a wild hunt mode will just hunt [17:29] the people and acting like a terrorist. Why? Because if they had an attempt, for example, [17:35] to liberate the Donbos or something like that, they would never destroy cities and clean the [17:41] territory literally with the aviation bombs, right? So, it's not about the territories. [17:46] They don't care. They don't care about people. They want just to sit around the like world [17:53] world table and rule the world. divide the world somehow to they want some political geopolitical [18:01] recognition that they are superpower and they have a super right to decide something and to [18:08] to to be in a special position at least in the region but Russia for for Russia they have a [18:14] way bigger global ambition I believe so that is an extraordinarily alarming prospect for for Kiev and [18:20] other Ukrainian cities in the short term jet heads with swarms of FPV drones attacked But then you [18:26] also described something truly alarming for West European cities too. Imagine you were talking to [18:33] the collected defense ministers of Western Europe. What are the top three things they should be doing [18:38] now to ensure that they are prepared for that? So my first uh advice would be definitely to create [18:45] unmanned system forces with a new culture with a focus on a new culture with the open-minded [18:50] people. will take the most craziest people from your uh army and deploy them to be responsible on [18:56] this. Uh second, I think that encourage your local producer, local industry to be a part of this like [19:04] innovative cycle. So to build a partnership with them because when the big war is coming, [19:10] uh as I already mentioned, nation fight. So means all your patriotic organization in a in a [19:17] in a city, all your territorial defense units, all your I don't know I I I I like example of like all [19:25] your pizza delivery companies. So I mean all your organizations would potentially help you fighting [19:31] with the enemy in your land. You're watching an interview from the Economist. To get early access [19:36] to our upcoming interviews and watch others from our archive, subscribe to the economist [19:41] by clicking the link above. So it means that understand that previously uh if these innovations [19:49] and high technologies was a privilege of special forces. Now it's a duty of territorial defense [19:54] units. means that your territorial defense units maybe don't need the shotgun or not uh don't need [20:02] a machine gun machine gun uh in a in a basement but need a like uh already equipped drone and [20:10] the a very good understanding what should what should he do and what part of the of the game [20:18] he should be involved if something would happens and third don't think that the battlefield exist [20:25] in a old understanding we discussed the situation in Kiev right that two years ago you feel safe uh [20:32] in Kiev now it's not so the same situation in Warso Berdine on I believe almost any [20:39] uh European capital now battlefield can come to your city like that so within hours and [20:47] the distance is not so big problem as it used to be so you can easily be be in a situation [20:54] when uh you will need to move way faster than it used to be. I think that's a really interesting [21:02] insight because when I hear you speak about your three priorities, I suspect the countries in NATO [21:09] closest to the Russians are much further ahead in thinking about this than others. I hope so. I was [21:16] going to ask you whether you would agree with that. I hope so. I like I think that they feel [21:22] urgency uh way better and I think that they understand the the the potential enemy way better [21:31] in this region. That's why they may be acting a little bit more active than the Western European [21:40] countries for example. Whether they understand what's what what's necessary to do I don't know [21:47] frankly. So, but Western Europe or NATO has a huge um potential jewel in this crown which is Ukraine [21:55] itself. Yeah, Ukraine can be the partner that can provide this expertise. You can help train. [22:02] You can be close partners. That is certainly what some in NATO would like to happen. Do you see that [22:09] happening fast enough? Uh definitely not. So, Ukraine is already a partner as far as I know. [22:16] So as you already mentioned the Ukrainian military unit participate in the military exercises. Uh a [22:22] lot of uh western military specialists are here. Uh so I think that uh Ukraine is transparent [22:30] enough and is giving back enough the speed of innovations in Ukraine before the war. It wasn't [22:38] so high. That's why I'm not surprised that in in the countries without a hot water on the territory [22:45] uh the speed is not high. They are capable to learn from our lessons because this lesson was [22:54] very painful and Ukraine paid a huge price for us. The best war is a prevented war, [22:59] right? Europe don't want to look like easy target. Don't want to look like easy target. [23:04] So the perception now is not is my perception now and the perception I hear now is that Europe is [23:12] not ready yet and this is a problem. So because even if they are ready they have [23:20] some super secret power and super secret very well trained forces say I don't know I don't [23:26] I don't think so but even if we will think like that the perception is wrong for them. I believe [23:32] that Putin think that in some next season he will have so big advantage uh over the European [23:44] forces that he will play he he could play he could potentially play uh way more aggressive [23:55] against Europe. not only testing the article 5 with the one shahad or a couple of thrones [24:02] in Romania or in on the Baltics uh or I don't know Finland something like that. So you can [24:09] just I don't know capture the um I don't know some small city on the border or you can do a [24:17] provocation killing civilian people. Nobody will respond with the nuclear weapon on this [24:25] like small episode right but uh what it means it means that without a good response a strong [24:32] response it would be a next step and then it would be a next step and then it would be the [24:36] next step so the perception is super important here and the perception now is super not good [24:42] for Europe it's hard to argue with that logic this may well be Europe's future but however much that [24:50] alarms me. The real lesson of my trip to Nemesis is that the dystopian drone [24:55] warfare that we may face tomorrow is already Ukraine's reality. These people when they [25:01] are killing Russians frequently, that's the mission. What does it do to their psychology? [25:10] I think it's like a when you killed once is problem. When it kills once or twice, [25:16] it's problem. I know kill or strike or destroy uh techniques uh military techniques many many many [25:23] times it's like your job do you think there will be psychological effects after the war on people [25:29] who have done this so uh I think the uh these people who killing enemy uh by the screen by the [25:39] control pattern screen it's like a um not real not not real emotion not not so emotional when [25:48] when they can could kill uh them in real life. So it's like uh not real emotion. Sometimes it [25:56] feels very close when we were coming here with you there was a shahed very close and you were [26:03] shot down. Do you ever feel naive asking this of a military commander but do you ever feel scared? [26:11] Do you feel worried about your own? Of course. Of course. But so it's like uh very bad when you [26:18] do not feel scary. It's it's abs absolutely not good and you uh do not feel the scary. You need [26:27] to rest. So it's like a big trouble when me or somebody is from our guys. Uh don't feel scary.