US military drawdown leaves Middle East to competing regional powers

The Economist

America's retreat from the Middle East creates no empty vacuum because entrenched local forces and proxy networks are already positioned to compete for regional hegemony.

AI-assisted summary of Did America ever have a plan for the Middle East? | The Economist — original source. Check the original for full context.

Source published: 2026-09-26

Key ideas

US strategic engagement in the Middle East has lacked a unifying doctrine since the George W. Bush administration, leaving Washington in a purely reactive crisis-management mode since the 2011 Arab Spring. (0:00)
Even as US troops draw down across Syria, Iraq, and the Gulf, American influence is shifting from military presence toward economic sanctions to project power at lower cost. (2:34)
Leadership succession inside Iran remains opaque following the unpublicized appointment of Mojtaba Khamenei, complicating diplomatic settlements as rival factions debate whether to escalate or negotiate with Donald Trump. (4:18)
Gulf monarchies face strategic dilemmas under any war outcome: a strong Iran forces uncomfortable bilateral compromises over trade routes, while regime collapse threatens state implosion and refugee flows. (6:03)
Analysts caution that an empty Middle Eastern power vacuum after a US drawdown is an illusion, as resilient regional networks and groups like Hezbollah rapidly reorganize to contest hegemony. (8:16)

Detailed notes

## Background Published by The Economist on YouTube on September 26, 2026, this panel discussion examines America's shifting presence in the Middle East amid troop drawdowns in Syria, Iraq, and the Gulf. According to the video description, the publication's top editors explore why Washington has lacked a coherent regional strategy for decades and assess whether the United States will step back following the war with Iran.

## TL;DR The panel explores the historical roots of America's deep entanglement in the Middle East, noting that Washington has lacked a coherent strategy since George W. Bush and has operated purely reactively since 2011. While the United States is scaling back its direct military presence, it continues to project influence through powerful economic sanctions rather than full disengagement. Meanwhile, Iran faces internal leadership uncertainty following the appointment of Mojtaba Khamenei, forcing Gulf states to weigh the dangers of a resurgent Tehran against the catastrophic instability of an Iranian state collapse. Ultimately, the editors challenge the notion of a regional power vacuum, concluding that resilient local forces and proxy networks like Hezbollah remain firmly entrenched to contest any space left behind.

## Atmosphere & style The discussion maintains a measured, cerebral, and incisive tone typical of high-level geopolitical journalism. Rather than dramatic confrontation, the dynamic between the host and editors is collaborative and probing, punctuated by thoughtful pushbacks against conventional Western foreign policy assumptions. It feels like an insider editorial debrief that strips away official rhetoric to soberly evaluate structural incentives, regional agency, and hard strategic limits.

## Bulletin - [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qcr74T0rzws&t=0s) US strategic engagement in the Middle East has lacked a unifying doctrine since the George W. Bush administration, leaving Washington in a purely reactive crisis-management mode since the 2011 Arab Spring. - [02:34](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qcr74T0rzws&t=154s) Even as US troops draw down across Syria, Iraq, and the Gulf, American influence is shifting from military presence toward economic sanctions to project power at lower cost. - [04:18](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qcr74T0rzws&t=258s) Leadership succession inside Iran remains opaque following the unpublicized appointment of Mojtaba Khamenei, complicating diplomatic settlements as rival factions debate whether to escalate or negotiate with Donald Trump. - [06:03](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qcr74T0rzws&t=363s) Gulf monarchies face strategic dilemmas under any war outcome: a strong Iran forces uncomfortable bilateral compromises over trade routes, while regime collapse threatens state implosion and refugee flows. - [08:16](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qcr74T0rzws&t=496s) Analysts caution that an empty Middle Eastern power vacuum after a US drawdown is an illusion, as resilient regional networks and groups like Hezbollah rapidly reorganize to contest hegemony.

## Key takeaways - [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qcr74T0rzws&t=0s) Historical US entanglement in the Middle East was driven by the Carter Doctrine's focus on securing Gulf oil flows and a deep ideological attachment to Israel. - [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qcr74T0rzws&t=0s) Unlike the reconstruction of post-WWII Europe, the US and its Middle Eastern partners have never pursued a shared ideological project such as building liberal democracy. - [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qcr74T0rzws&t=0s) Regional states actively invited US entrenchment, with Gulf monarchies deliberately outsourcing external defense under an 'oil for security' arrangement. - [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qcr74T0rzws&t=0s) Since George W. Bush's failed democratization agenda, every successive US administration has operated without an overarching strategy, responding reactively to crises since 2011. - [02:34](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qcr74T0rzws&t=154s) America's transition from an oil importer to a major energy exporter has turned Gulf producers into competitors, though Washington retains a vital interest in global energy stability and defending Israel. - [02:34](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qcr74T0rzws&t=154s) A reduction in US troop levels in Syria, Iraq, and the Gulf represents an instrument shift toward economic sanctions rather than an outright withdrawal from regional influence. - [04:18](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qcr74T0rzws&t=258s) The disappearance of the supreme leader as Iran's ultimate arbiter leaves the regime reconfiguring in secret, with successor Mojtaba Khamenei remaining completely out of public view. - [04:18](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qcr74T0rzws&t=258s) While Iranian factions agree on suppressing internal dissent, they remain divided between escalating military pressure for leverage and attempting immediate talks with Donald Trump. - [06:03](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qcr74T0rzws&t=363s) A resilient post-war Iran capable of threatening the Strait of Hormuz would compel Gulf states to pursue pragmatic, direct economic arrangements with Tehran. - [06:03](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qcr74T0rzws&t=363s) The total collapse or severe weakening of the Iranian regime represents an alternative crisis for Gulf neighbors, threatening refugee flows and non-state militia proliferation similar to Syria and Iraq. - [06:03](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qcr74T0rzws&t=363s) Despite sustained military attrition from Israeli strikes, a strong post-war Iran would almost certainly seek to rearm and reconstitute Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Iraqi militias. - [08:16](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qcr74T0rzws&t=496s) Western assumptions of an emerging power vacuum overlook the institutional resilience of Iranian power structures and proxies, which quickly reassert control after decapitation strikes. - [08:16](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qcr74T0rzws&t=496s) Even after heavy degradation, Hezbollah retains superior power relative to the Lebanese government and remains entrenched rather than leaving an open space for external powers.

## Detailed walkthrough ### [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qcr74T0rzws&t=0s) Why America Became Entangled in the Middle East Without a Coherent Plan

The discussion opens with a fundamental question: what is it about the Middle East that has kept the United States so deeply involved for so long? Greg points first to oil, tracing Washington's commitment back to the Carter Doctrine and the strategic imperative to guarantee the free flow of oil out of the Persian Gulf. Alongside energy sits Israel—not merely political pressure from the Israeli government, but a deep "sentimental ideological attachment" shared by many American politicians and citizens, which Greg argues has had a "distorting effect on American policy in the region." Yet despite this deep entanglement, America has lacked a coherent Middle East strategy for decades. George W. Bush was the last president to possess an overarching concept—attempting to bring democracy to the region—and while "it wasn't a good policy" and "it didn't work," it was at least a unifying idea. Since 2011 and the outbreak of the Arab Spring, every American president has been purely reactive: crises erupt, Washington feels compelled to intervene, and no one can articulate what broader goal those interventions are meant to achieve.

Building on Greg's briefing from that week, the host highlights how strangely disconnected this makes American engagement compared to post-Second World War Europe. In the Middle East, the United States and its regional partners do not share a common ideological project, such as building liberal democracy, that they are working together to realize. Another panelist wonders aloud whether America's role is partly a "historical accident." After the First World War, Britain and France carved up parts of the Middle East for themselves rather than honoring their wartime promises to grant independence to Arab countries that had fought alongside them. When the Suez Crisis made it clear that Britain and France no longer had the wherewithal to manage the region, the United States effectively inherited the burden—raising the counterfactual question of whether the entire history of the Middle East would look completely different had Arab nations actually been granted independence in the 1920s.

Greg pushes back slightly to insist on giving the countries of the region their own agency in this history. America became heavily entrenched in the Gulf in large part because the Gulf states wanted it there: they were glad to outsource their external defense to Washington and strike an "oil for security bargain." Another speaker adds that Israel, too, has consistently welcomed American involvement and support. As the panel concludes, once a state begins to outsource its security to an external superpower, "it's very, very hard to take it back."

- **Drivers of US involvement:** Ensuring the flow of oil under the Carter Doctrine, ideological and sentimental attachment to Israel, inherited post-colonial responsibilities after the Suez Crisis, and active invitations from Gulf states and Israel. - **Last overarching US doctrine:** George W. Bush's failed democratization agenda, followed since the 2011 Arab Spring by purely reactive crisis management.

---

[02:34](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qcr74T0rzws&t=154s) Is America Really Withdrawing from the Region?

Turning to the present trajectory of American power, the panel examines how the underlying economics of oil have shifted since the 1970s and 1980s. Back then, the United States was an oil importer that desperately needed Middle Eastern supply; today, America has abundant domestic production, exports its own energy, and in that respect views the Gulf as "something of a competitor." Even so, Washington retains a strategic interest in controlling global energy supplies and guaranteeing Israel's security—which by extension requires defending Israel against its primary foe, Iran.

On the surface, the military drawdown is unmistakable: the United States has pulled out of Syria, is pulling out of Iraq, and is thinning its forces in the Gulf. Yet the speaker calls for a "reality check" about what withdrawal actually means in practice. Rather than abandoning intervention altogether, Washington may simply be concluding that military force is not its most effective instrument and that it can get "far more bang with its buck" through economic tools. American sanctions continue to exert a massive impact across the Middle East, meaning that even as the US military withdraws and lifts its traditional security umbrella, American policy is still directly shaping the lives of millions of people across the region.

---

[04:18](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qcr74T0rzws&t=258s) Iran's Opaque Succession and Internal Power Struggle

To understand what fills the space left by a shifting American posture, the host asks Nick to assess the stability of Iran's regime and whether it is likely to emerge from the war powerful and ambitious. Nick describes this as "the hardest question to answer at the moment" because the Iranian system is actively reconfiguring itself in the dark. In the past, observers could listen to the supreme leader's speeches, gauge his thinking, and watch him act as the "supreme arbiter" playing rival domestic factions off against one another. Today, that supreme arbiter is gone, and the status of his son and successor, Mojtaba Khamenei, remains a mystery: despite being nominated and appointed in March, nearly six months have passed and "we haven't seen him, we haven't heard from him."

This leadership opacity directly complicates any prospect of a diplomatic settlement. An ongoing struggle for power inside Iran means that the question of "who owns this deal" is critical to the country's political future. While Iran's competing factions do not see eye to eye on everything, Nick notes that they likely all agree on suppressing internal dissent. Where they diverge is on how to handle Washington:

- **Escalation for leverage:** Ratcheting up pressure to negotiate from a stronger position. - **Immediate negotiation:** Trying to strike a deal now by taking Donald Trump at his word—even though his word has proved unreliable in the past.

Until the succession question inside Iran is genuinely settled, Nick warns, there may simply be no one with the authority to sign off on a deal.

---

[06:03](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qcr74T0rzws&t=363s) How Gulf States and Iranian Proxies Respond to the Post-War Balance

The host asks Greg to walk through how the Gulf states adjust their strategic calculus depending on whether Iran emerges from the war strong or weak. Greg explains that no matter how the war ends, the outcome creates deep anxieties for the Gulf monarchies—the only difference is whether those risks are short-term or long-term. If Iran remains strong and retains the ability to control or threaten the Strait of Hormuz, the Gulf states view that as a major danger; regardless of what happens between Washington and Tehran, Gulf capitals would eventually feel compelled to cut their own deals directly with Iran just to get goods flowing and their economies moving again. Conversely, if Iran is badly weakened or the regime collapses altogether, it removes the immediate state threat but introduces the nightmare of state implosion. A failed state in Iran—mirroring the chaos seen in Syria or Iraq—would unleash non-state actors and massive refugee flows across the region.

The host then turns to Josie to ask how worried observers should be about a strong Iran rebuilding and rearming the regional militias that caused so much turmoil before the war. Josie emphasizes that Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Iraqi militias have been central not only to the current conflict, but to all the wars fought over the past three years and earlier. Tehran has funneled vast sums of money and weaponry into this network to project power across the Middle East and manage its confrontation with Israel. Although these groups have been battered—both through Israeli strikes on Hezbollah and through the attrition of prolonged fighting—Josie argues that a strong Iran would undoubtedly seek to rebuild them, especially if it perceives an American withdrawal as a vacuum and an opportunity to reassert regional dominance.

```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Post-War Iran Scenarios and Regional Consequences accDescr: Diagram showing how either a strong post-war Iran or a collapsed Iran creates distinct strategic risks for Gulf states and regional proxy networks.

subgraph Outcomes["Post-War Trajectory of Iran"] Strong["Strong Iran"] Weak["Weakened or Collapsed Iran"] end

subgraph GulfImpact["Gulf States' Calculus"] Strait["Maintains threat over Strait of Hormuz"] Deal["Gulf forced to cut direct economic deals with Tehran"] Implosion["Regime implodes into a failed state (like Syria or Iraq)"] Spillover["Short-term threat removed, but brings refugee flows and non-state actors"] end

subgraph ProxyImpact["Regional Proxy Network"] Rearm["Rebuilds Hezbollah, Houthis, and Iraqi militias to exploit US drawdown"] end

Strong --> Strait Strait --> Deal Strong --> Rearm Weak --> Implosion Implosion --> Spillover ```

---

[08:16](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qcr74T0rzws&t=496s) The Illusion of a Power Vacuum

In the final segment, Ancho challenges the recurring use of the word "vacuum" altogether. Drawing on Nick's reporting and analysis from inside Iran, he argues that the unmistakable lesson of the current conflict is that "there is no vacuum in the region." Whenever Israel and the United States believe they have decapitated Iran's leadership, the regime rapidly reasserts itself and continues suppressing internal dissent—even if it is weakened, and even if the individuals at the very top are no longer the same people who held power just a few months ago.

He points out that the exact same resilience applies to Iran's regional proxies. Israel harbored the illusion that it had destroyed Hezbollah at the end of 2004 [2024]; yet while Hezbollah has certainly been weakened, it remains stronger than the Lebanese government and fully capable of holding its own when its back is against the wall. Western policymakers often assume that if America steps back, an empty power vacuum will open up. In reality, entrenched local and regional forces are already in place, waiting to fill that space immediately and compete for the hegemony that America once held—"or at least we thought America had in the past."

## Notable quotes > [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qcr74T0rzws&t=0s) sentimental ideological attachment — Greg

> [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qcr74T0rzws&t=0s) distorting effect on American policy in the region — Greg

> [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qcr74T0rzws&t=0s) it wasn't a good policy — Greg

> [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qcr74T0rzws&t=0s) it's very, very hard to take it back

> [02:34](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qcr74T0rzws&t=154s) something of a competitor

> [02:34](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qcr74T0rzws&t=154s) far more bang with its buck

> [04:18](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qcr74T0rzws&t=258s) the hardest question to answer at the moment — Nick

> [04:18](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qcr74T0rzws&t=258s) we haven't seen him, we haven't heard from him — Nick

> [04:18](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qcr74T0rzws&t=258s) who owns this deal — Nick

> [08:16](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qcr74T0rzws&t=496s) there is no vacuum in the region — Ancho

> [08:16](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qcr74T0rzws&t=496s) or at least we thought America had in the past — Ancho

## Mentioned The Economist, George W. Bush, Donald Trump, Mojtaba Khamenei, Carter Doctrine, Hezbollah, Houthis, Greg, Nick, Josie, Ancho

## Video description America has pulled out of Syria, is withdrawing from Iraq and is thinning its presence in the Gulf. Our top editors ask why America has been so entangled in the region for so long, why Washington has not had a coherent approach to the Middle East for decades and whether it will step back after the war with Iran.

#America #MiddleEast #Iran #Trump #Israel

00:00 - Why has America been so involved in the Middle East? 02:34 - Is America really withdrawing? 04:18 - How stable is Iran’s regime? 06:03 - Who could fill the vacuum?

Watch the full show: bit.ly/4hK4f0G Sign up to the Insider newsletter: https://econ.st/4nOyzIb

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[Source](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qcr74T0rzws)

中文简报

美军缩减兵力，中东留待地区势力竞逐美国从中东后撤并未留下纯粹的权力真空，因为根深蒂固的本土势力和代理人网络早已就位，准备争夺地区霸权。讨论嘉宾探讨了美国深陷中东的历史根源，指出自小布什政府以来，华盛顿一直缺乏连贯的战略，自2011年起更是完全处于被动反应状态。尽管美国正在缩减直接军事存在，但它并未完全脱离，而是继续通过强有力的经济制裁来投射影响力。与此同时，在莫杰塔巴·哈梅内伊获任命后，伊朗面临内部领导层的不确定性，这迫使海湾国家在德黑兰东山再起的危险与伊朗国家崩溃引发的灾难性动荡之间做出权衡。最终，编辑们对“地区权力真空”的说法提出质疑，总结认为富有韧性的本土势力和真主党等代理人网络依然盘根错节，足以争夺留下的任何空间。自小布什政府以来，美国在中东的战略介入一直缺乏统一的指导方针，导致华盛顿自2011年“阿拉伯之春”以来完全处于被动的危机管理模式。 (0:00) 尽管美军在叙利亚、伊拉克和海湾地区缩减兵力，美国的影响力正从军事存在转向经济制裁，以更低的成本投射力量。 (2:34) 在莫杰塔巴·哈梅内伊未经公开宣布获任命后，伊朗内部的领导层交接依然不明朗；由于对立派系就升级局势还是与唐纳德·特朗普谈判争论不休，外交解决变得更加复杂。 (4:18) 无论战争结局如何，海湾君主国都面临战略困境：强大的伊朗会迫使它们在贸易路线上做出令人不安的双边妥协，而政权垮台则可能引发国家内爆和难民潮。 (6:03) 分析人士警告称，认为美军缩减兵力后中东会出现空白权力真空的想法只是一种错觉，因为富有韧性的地区网络和真主党等组织会迅速重组以争夺霸权。 (8:16)

Reading summary

Panelists argue that the United States has spent decades deeply entangled in the Middle East without a coherent overarching strategy, shifting from military commitments to economic pressure while remaining trapped in reactive crisis management. Even as Washington draws down its armed forces, entrenched local regimes and resilient proxy networks immediately contest the regional balance, dispelling the notion that an American withdrawal creates a true power vacuum. Entanglement Without an Overarching Strategy (0:00) United States policy in the Middle East originated around the Carter Doctrine's guarantee of Gulf oil flows, inherited European post-colonial responsibilities following the Suez Crisis, and a deep, sentimental ideological attachment to Israel. Panelist Greg notes that regional states exercised significant agency in this entrenchment, with Gulf monarchies willingly outsourcing their external security in an 'oil for security bargain.' However, the panel observes that the US has lacked a unifying regional doctrine since George W. Bush's failed push for democracy, operating since the 2011 Arab Spring primarily as a reactive crisis manager without shared ideological projects among its partners. Shifting from Military Force to Economic Leverage (2:34) While the United States was historically an oil importer reliant on Middle Eastern reserves, domestic production has transformed it into an energy exporter that now views the Gulf partly as an economic competitor. Even so, Washington maintains strategic imperatives around global energy flows and the defense of Israel against Iran. The resulting drawdown of US forces across Syria, Iraq, and the Gulf does not signify a total abandonment of intervention. Instead, panelists argue that Washington is pursuing leverage through economic instruments rather than armed forces. Pervasive US sanctions continue to shape daily life and political outcomes across the region, functioning as a lower-cost substitute for the traditional military umbrella. Tehran's Opaque Succession and Paralyzed Diplomacy (4:18) Assessing Iran's post-war trajectory, panelist Nick highlights deep uncertainty within Tehran's political structure following the loss of its long-standing supreme arbiter. Although Mojtaba Khamenei was appointed in March to succeed his father, he has remained unseen and unheard for nearly six months, leaving rival domestic factions locked in an opaque internal power struggle. This leadership void directly hinders potential diplomacy with the United States. While Iranian factions share an interest in crushing domestic dissent, they remain divided over whether to escalate pressure for negotiating leverage or attempt an immediate deal with Donald Trump. According to Nick, diplomatic progress remains stalled until an authoritative figure emerges with the recognized standing to sign and own an agreement. Regional Repercussions and the Myth of Vacuums (8:16) The post-war balance presents a dilemma for Gulf monarchies: a strong Iran maintaining threats against the Strait of Hormuz would force Gulf capitals to seek bilateral accommodation, whereas an Iranian state collapse would trigger refugee crises and unchecked non-state violence akin to Syria and Iraq. Panelist Josie adds that a dominant Iran would inevitably move to rearm strained regional proxies like Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Iraqi militias to project regional influence. Panelist Ancho cautions that Western assumptions about a resulting 'power vacuum' misread the region. Entrenched local actors consistently reorganize to fill any perceived void. Despite sustained Israeli strikes, Iran's regime continues to suppress dissent, and weakened proxies such as Hezbollah retain enough local strength to outmatch formal domestic institutions, demonstrating that local actors swiftly compete for influence whenever external powers retreat. The discussion underscores that whether Washington deploys military troops or relies on economic sanctions, its reactive posture leaves regional dynamics to be determined by local succession struggles and proxy networks rather than an overarching American blueprint.

Source quotes

[0:00] Greg: sentimental ideological attachment [0:00] Greg: distorting effect on American policy in the region [0:00] Greg: it wasn't a good policy [0:00] it's very, very hard to take it back [2:34] something of a competitor [2:34] far more bang with its buck [4:18] Nick: the hardest question to answer at the moment [4:18] Nick: we haven't seen him, we haven't heard from him [4:18] Nick: who owns this deal [8:16] Ancho: there is no vacuum in the region [8:16] Ancho: or at least we thought America had in the past

Original transcript

[0:00] What is it about this region that's [0:01] meant America's had to be so involved [0:03] for so long? [0:04] >> Some of it is oil. [0:06] Obviously, some of it is is going back [0:07] to the Carter Doctrine trying to ensure [0:09] the flow of oil out of the Middle East. [0:11] Some of it is Israel, not just pressure [0:13] from Israel, but the sort of sentimental [0:16] ideological attachment that many [0:18] American politicians, many Americans [0:20] have to Israel. I think that's certainly [0:22] had a distorting effect on American [0:25] policy in the region, but I would also [0:26] say it's been decades since America [0:29] really had a coherent Middle East [0:31] policy. George W. Bush had one [0:33] trying to bring democracy to the region. [0:35] It wasn't a a good policy. It didn't [0:36] work, but there was an overarching idea. [0:39] I would say every president going back [0:40] to 2011 has just been reactive since the [0:44] start of the Arab Spring. Things happen [0:45] in the Middle East. America needs to do [0:47] something about them and and so America [0:49] intervenes, but what is the broader [0:51] policy or the broader goal that America [0:53] is trying to achieve? No one really had [0:54] an answer. [0:55] >> And what what's quite weird about this [0:57] which you point out in your briefing [0:58] this week, Greg, is that it's not It's [1:00] not that America and the Middle East or [1:03] particular countries in the Middle East [1:04] share an ideological viewpoint that [1:07] America is trying to sort of [1:09] bring into place. It's not like Europe [1:11] post the Second World War. It's, you [1:13] know, the the kind of liberal democracy, [1:15] the ideas that [1:16] America claimed to be trying to bring in [1:18] various of its interventions. It's not [1:20] something that they're sort of working [1:21] together on it. A really oddly [1:23] disconnected policy. [1:24] >> I find myself wondering if it's not [1:26] partly a sort of historical accident. I [1:28] mean, it so happens that France and [1:30] Britain grabbed bits of the Middle East [1:34] after the First World War rather than [1:36] probably, you know, honoring their [1:38] promise to to give Arab countries [1:41] independence as a reward for having [1:43] fought alongside them. [1:44] And then [1:46] after Suez, it was clear that Britain [1:48] and France really didn't have the [1:49] wherewithal to to manage this. And sort [1:52] of America kind of inherited it. I mean, [1:54] I wonder if if even after in 1920s, [1:56] actually, they'd got independence, [1:58] whether the whole history of the region [1:59] would be completely different. [2:01] >> also let's give the countries of the [2:02] region a bit of agency in this. Why was [2:05] America so involved in the Gulf in [2:06] particular? Because Gulf states wanted [2:08] it to be, because they were happy to [2:10] outsource their security to the United [2:12] States and and make this oil for [2:13] security bargain with the US. So, it [2:16] wasn't totally the Americans that did [2:18] this. It was also a number of of Arab [2:20] countries that encouraged this. [2:22] >> And obviously Israel has welcomed in [2:23] many cases America's involvement and [2:26] support in the Middle East. [2:26] >> So, in other words, once once you start [2:28] to kind of outsource your security, it's [2:31] very, very hard to take it back. [2:33] >> Yeah. [2:34] >> And as you said, oil, you know, was was [2:36] critical at, you know, back in the 1970s [2:40] and '80s, America was a an oil importer. [2:43] It desperately needed this region. [2:45] Um [2:45] it doesn't need it because it has its [2:47] own its own supplies and can indeed [2:49] export. And if anything, the Gulf is [2:51] something of a [2:52] of a competitor in that respect. But I [2:54] still think it's the case that [2:56] um America does have an interest in [2:58] controlling the world's sort of energy [3:00] supply. It still [3:02] does have an interest in the security of [3:05] Israel. And if you're trying to secure [3:06] Israel, you need to to defend it against [3:08] its foes, and its primary foe is Iran. [3:11] So, I [3:13] I while I think we're we're very much [3:15] seeing a [3:16] a trajectory of [3:18] American withdrawal. It's pulled out of [3:20] Syria. It's pulling out of [3:23] Iraq. It's drawing down in the Gulf. I [3:26] do also think we need to have a reality [3:27] check, and it may be that America is [3:30] deciding that actually its military is [3:32] not the best form of intervention. It [3:34] can get far more [3:35] bang with its buck than it than and [3:38] indeed sort of sanctions are still [3:40] having a huge huge effect on on the [3:42] region. So, just [3:44] while that military withdrawal, while [3:46] the lifting of the security umbrella, I [3:48] think is true, it's still affecting the [3:51] lives of, you know, millions of of of [3:54] people across across the region. [3:56] >> Well, you talk about Iran. Let's look at [3:59] that and how the outcome of the war [4:03] affects [4:05] the way that the vacuum is is filled and [4:08] and as you say the in a sense the the [4:10] pressure on America to continue [4:12] intervening even if it doesn't have this [4:14] overarching role. [4:16] Nick, [4:18] tell me a little bit about where you [4:20] think the regime is, how stable it is, [4:23] and how likely it is that at the end of [4:24] this war it will emerge powerful and [4:27] ambitious. [4:28] >> It is the hardest question to answer at [4:30] the moment because we [4:32] this is still [4:33] a regime which is reconfiguring itself. [4:35] It's still, you know, in the past we [4:37] would hear the supreme leader speak, we [4:39] would know his what he was thinking, how [4:41] he was playing off one faction in Iran [4:44] against the other, how he in so many [4:45] respects was the supreme arbiter, and we [4:48] don't have that supreme arbiter at the [4:49] moment. We don't [4:51] know what the state of the supreme of [4:53] his son the [4:54] and successor of the supreme leader [4:55] Mojtaba Khamenei is. We haven't seen [4:58] him, we haven't heard from him. He was [5:00] nominated and in in appointed in in [5:03] March and you know, what are we almost 6 [5:05] months on and we still haven't seen him. [5:08] And so I think it's still the case that [5:10] one of the problems [5:12] over trying to secure a deal is that [5:14] there is [5:15] still something of a struggle for power [5:17] inside Iran and who owns this deal is [5:20] going to be [5:21] really critical to to the future of [5:23] Iran. So and we know there are different [5:26] factions, we know that [5:28] they don't all see eye to eye, they [5:29] probably all agree on [5:31] the suppression of internal dissent, but [5:34] how they're going to [5:36] negotiate with America, whether they're [5:38] going to do that through escalation to [5:40] secure more leverage, or whether they're [5:41] going to try and [5:43] take Trump at his word which has proved [5:46] proved um [5:48] unreliable in the past and try and do a [5:50] deal now. I think it is still very much [5:52] an open question. So, [5:54] until the question of succession in Iran [5:57] is resolved, it may be that we're not [5:59] going to see [6:00] anybody signing off on a deal. [6:03] >> Greg, tell me a little bit about how you [6:05] see the response of the Gulf states [6:08] changing according to how strongly they [6:11] gauge how strong they gauge Iran to be [6:13] after the war. A strong Iran means this, [6:16] a weak Iran means that. Just talk me [6:17] through that calculation. [6:19] >> Well, I mean, broadly you could say a a [6:21] strong Iran that is able to maintain a [6:24] control over the Strait of Hormuz [6:25] somehow is viewed as a bad thing by the [6:27] Gulf and and it would make them more [6:29] inclined to make deals regardless of [6:31] what happens between the US and Iran. At [6:33] some point, Gulf states may have to make [6:35] deals. [6:36] >> Make deals with Iran. [6:37] >> With Iran in order to get their [6:38] economies moving again, to get goods [6:40] moving. If Iran is badly weakened or or [6:43] if the regime were to collapse, I mean, [6:45] in in some ways that's a good thing for [6:46] the Gulf because it removes that threat. [6:49] In other things it in other ways it [6:50] creates a risk for the Gulf because if [6:52] Iran were to to implode, become a failed [6:55] state like we've seen in Syria or or [6:57] Iraq or elsewhere, that presents all [7:00] sorts of dangers, non-state actors, [7:01] refugee flows, things that would really [7:03] worry Gulf states. So, the the outcome [7:06] of the war, no matter what, it it raises [7:08] concerns for the Gulf. It's just a [7:10] question of are they short-term or [7:11] long-term? [7:12] >> Josie, how worried are you if a strong [7:14] Iran starts to rebuild and rearm all the [7:18] militias that um caused so much trouble [7:21] before the war? [7:22] >> We've seen Hezbollah, we've seen the [7:24] Houthis, we've seen um the militias in [7:26] Iraq. All of these have been an [7:28] important part not just in this war, but [7:30] obviously in all of the wars that have [7:32] been going on both of the last 3 years [7:34] and before that. Um [7:37] and Iran has channeled vast amounts of [7:39] money and weapons to these different [7:41] groups and they've been in a really [7:42] important part of it imposing its power [7:46] throughout the region, of its [7:48] relationship with Israel, [7:50] you know, and [7:52] although those militias have certainly [7:54] been weakened, whether through, [7:56] you know, the Israeli attacks on [7:58] Hezbollah, whether [7:59] because they have simply been fighting [8:01] for some time, I think a strong Iran [8:04] would absolutely want to reassert its [8:06] power in that way, particularly if it [8:08] sees America withdrawing being more of a [8:11] vacuum and more of an opportunity for a [8:13] regional power to assert itself. [8:16] >> Ancho? [8:17] >> I think you mentioned the word before [8:19] vacuum [8:20] and I think it's very clear what we're [8:23] seeing now, especially from in Iran and [8:25] from Nick's reporting and analysis of [8:27] the situation there, that there is no [8:29] vacuum in the region when Israel and [8:33] America think that they've decapitated [8:35] the leadership in Iran, very quickly [8:37] that leadership reasserts itself and and [8:40] is there and and is suppressing the [8:42] descent even if it's even if it's [8:44] weakened, even if it's not the same [8:46] people who were who were at the very top [8:49] just a few months ago. That that power, [8:51] that resilience is still there and there [8:53] is no vacuum. And the same is true I [8:54] think of some of Iran's proxies around [8:57] the region. Israel had this illusion [8:59] that it had destroyed Hezbollah at the [9:01] end of 2004. Yes, Hezbollah has been [9:03] weakened, but it's still stronger than [9:06] the Lebanese government, it's still [9:07] capable of holding its own when it's [9:10] when it's when it's back is against the [9:11] wall and we've seen that time and again [9:13] in this region. There isn't any vacuum. [9:15] They think America will leave and [9:17] there'll be some kind of power vacuum. [9:19] No, there won't be a vacuum. There'll be [9:21] there are forces [9:22] in place ready to to take [9:25] to fill that space and to compete for [9:28] that kind of hegemony that America had [9:30] or at least we thought America had in [9:32] the past.