UK Defence Chief Says US Shield Holds as Hegseth Reviews NATO Posture

The Economist

Air Chief Marshal Sir Richard Knighton argues that Washington will maintain its extended nuclear guarantee and European footprint because forward bases remain indispensable for protecting the American homeland and projecting global power.

AI-assisted summary of NATO 3.0: Will America defend Europe against Russia? | The Economist — original source. Check the original for full context.

Source published: 2026-10-08

Key ideas

The United States is undertaking a comprehensive force-posture review under Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth as part of 'NATO 3.0', signaling that European allies must assume far greater conventional defense responsibility. (0:00)
Allied base access and overflight sovereignty have become critical friction points following European hesitation during US strikes against Iran, though the UK ultimately permitted staging from RAF Fairford and Diego Garcia. (2:50)
Britain's Chief of the Defence Staff reported that Washington has provided firm reassurances that America's extended nuclear umbrella over Europe remains intact. (4:49)
France has initiated discussions with frontline allies like Finland to explore an expanded European dimension for its sovereign nuclear deterrent alongside the transatlantic alliance. (4:49)

Detailed notes

## Background Published on YouTube by The Economist on October 8, 2026, this video features Inside Defence host Shashank Joshi interviewing Britain's Chief of the Defence Staff, Air Chief Marshal Sir Richard Knighton, in Washington. The program explores whether Europe can rely on American defense commitments amid an ongoing US force-posture review, friction over base access during the Iran war, and concerns over the NATO nuclear umbrella.

## TL;DR Addressing the strategic rebalancing dubbed 'NATO 3.0', Sir Richard Knighton argues that US forces stationed in Europe serve direct American homeland defense and global power projection rather than mere charity. The conversation confronts recent friction over allied base access and overflight rights during the Iran war, balancing Washington's operational demands against European sovereign legal constraints. Sir Richard downplays fears of US disengagement, noting that the long-standing shift toward the Indo-Pacific has been gradual and rational. He concludes by confirming that Washington has provided firm, unambiguous reassurances regarding its extended nuclear umbrella, working in concert with British and French deterrence to deter Russian aggression.

## Atmosphere & style The discussion maintains a cool, analytical, and diplomatically poised tone, contrasting pressing geopolitical anxieties with steady military professionalism. Shashank Joshi presses with sharp, direct questions on sovereignty disputes and transatlantic reliability, while Sir Richard responds with measured, pragmatic reassurance. The exchange feels intimate yet strategic, trading alarmist headlines for sober institutional perspective on allied defense.

## Bulletin - [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=htFXw5Dw3Qk&t=0s) The United States is undertaking a comprehensive force-posture review under Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth as part of 'NATO 3.0', signaling that European allies must assume far greater conventional defense responsibility. - [02:50](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=htFXw5Dw3Qk&t=170s) Allied base access and overflight sovereignty have become critical friction points following European hesitation during US strikes against Iran, though the UK ultimately permitted staging from RAF Fairford and Diego Garcia. - [04:49](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=htFXw5Dw3Qk&t=289s) Britain's Chief of the Defence Staff reported that Washington has provided firm reassurances that America's extended nuclear umbrella over Europe remains intact. - [04:49](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=htFXw5Dw3Qk&t=289s) France has initiated discussions with frontline allies like Finland to explore an expanded European dimension for its sovereign nuclear deterrent alongside the transatlantic alliance.

## Key takeaways - [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=htFXw5Dw3Qk&t=0s) Under the concept of 'NATO 3.0', the United States expects European allies to take primary responsibility for conventional continental defense. - [01:06](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=htFXw5Dw3Qk&t=66s) US forward-deployed forces in Europe serve three distinct strategic functions: direct US homeland security, NATO collective defense, and global power projection. - [01:06](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=htFXw5Dw3Qk&t=66s) Europe continues to act as an essential forward bulwark safeguarding the Atlantic approaches to the American mainland. - [01:06](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=htFXw5Dw3Qk&t=66s) The United Kingdom has assumed command of NATO's Joint Force Command Norfolk, placing British leadership in charge of northern European and North Atlantic maritime security. - [01:06](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=htFXw5Dw3Qk&t=66s) Current US force recalibrations reflect a sustained strategic shift dating back to the Obama administration's initial pivot toward the Indo-Pacific. - [02:50](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=htFXw5Dw3Qk&t=170s) Unfettered access, basing rights, and overflight permissions have emerged as a central operational demand in the Pentagon's posture review. - [02:50](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=htFXw5Dw3Qk&t=170s) Tensions flared during the Iran conflict when European partners initially balked at allowing their sovereign bases to be used for offensive kinetic strikes. - [02:50](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=htFXw5Dw3Qk&t=170s) Host European nations operate under independent international legal obligations, requiring sovereign approval before US offensive strikes can stage from their territory. - [02:50](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=htFXw5Dw3Qk&t=170s) Bilateral operating arrangements for US military bases in the UK and continental Europe still depend on legal frameworks established in the late 1940s. - [04:49](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=htFXw5Dw3Qk&t=289s) Despite conventional burden-sharing shifts, American officials have reiterated firm commitments to maintaining extended nuclear deterrence for European allies. - [04:49](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=htFXw5Dw3Qk&t=289s) French President Emmanuel Macron is actively pursuing an expanded European role for France's independent nuclear arsenal, engaging frontline states such as Finland. - [04:49](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=htFXw5Dw3Qk&t=289s) Allied deterrence against Russia relies on projecting a united front among the distinct nuclear deterrents of the United States, Britain, and France.

## Detailed walkthrough ### [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=htFXw5Dw3Qk&t=0s) NATO 3.0 and the US Force-Posture Review

Shashank Joshi introduces the interview against the backdrop of an alliance undergoing fundamental rebalancing—a shift the Americans have dubbed "NATO 3.0", under which European allies are expected to shoulder far greater responsibility. With a major US force-posture review underway under Secretary Pete Hegseth, Joshi presses Britain's Chief of the Defence Staff, Air Chief Marshal Sir Richard Knighton, on whether European allies actually have clarity on American intentions if a major conflict were to erupt by 2028 or 2029, or whether core US military commitments remain essentially up in the air.

```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Triad of US Force Roles in Europe accDescr: Diagram illustrating the three distinct strategic roles performed by US European Command assets. subgraph EUCOM["US European Command (USEUCOM)"] A["Forward-Deployed US Forces"] end subgraph Roles["Core Strategic Missions"] B["Direct US Security in Europe"] C["NATO Collective Defense"] D["Global US Force Projection"] end A --> B A --> C A --> D ```

Sir Richard downplays fears of American abandonment, citing recent detailed discussions with Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and Commander of US European Command, General Alexus Grynkewich. As Grynkewich emphasizes, American forces deployed across the European theater do not exist solely as a philanthropic contribution to NATO; they fulfill three interrelated strategic functions: safeguarding direct US security interests on the continent, underpinning the NATO alliance, and acting as an indispensable forward springboard for projecting US power across the rest of the globe. From Sir Richard's perspective, Washington fully understands that Europe remains a critical theater for homeland defense, acting in effect as a forward bulwark guarding the eastern flank and Atlantic approaches to the American mainland.

Sir Richard also highlights that the American recalibration is neither sudden nor erratic, but rather the continuation of a long-term strategic trajectory dating back through Barack Obama's "tilt to the Indo-Pacific". He expresses confidence in the military leadership’s ability to inject "calm, rational advice" into political decision-making, while acknowledging that Washington faces genuine, complex trade-offs in its global integrator role.

- General Alexus Grynkewich serves simultaneously as NATO's SACEUR and the head of US European Command (USEUCOM), giving him a central voice in the Pentagon's posture review. - Sir Richard noted his visit to Washington coincided with a major milestone: a British commander taking charge of NATO's Joint Force Command Norfolk, placing the UK in command of northern Europe and North Atlantic maritime security directly guarding the US eastern approaches.

---

[02:50](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=htFXw5Dw3Qk&t=170s) Base Access, Overflight Rights, and Sovereignty Friction

Joshi turns to one of the most contentious friction points in transatlantic relations: how freely the United States can actually use its military installations on European territory. Burden-sharing disputes have simmered for decades—dating back through Defense Secretary Robert Gates and President Obama—but recent geopolitical events have strained access, overflight permissions, and sovereignty. During the Iran war, several European capitals initially balked at allowing their sovereign bases to be used for offensive kinetic strikes against Iran. While the United Kingdom ultimately permitted US strike operations to stage from RAF Fairford and the Indian Ocean facility at Diego Garcia, parallel disputes—such as US wrangling with Denmark over Greenland—illustrate Washington’s growing demand for unfettered operational access across partner soil.

Sir Richard confirms that access, basing, and overflight privileges form an explicit component of the Pentagon's posture review, as highlighted in Secretary Hegseth's speech at the NATO ministerial meeting in Ankara. He acknowledges the friction honestly, noting that while the basic legal mechanisms and bilateral precedents have been consistent since the late 1940s, it is completely understandable that a US administration that has poured billions into overseas bases expects guaranteed operational utility when crises strike. However, host nations retain independent obligations under international law, meaning European governments must exercise sovereign legal judgment before approving offensive missions launched from their soil. Despite these tensions, Sir Richard remains confident that allied diplomacy will find a pragmatic compromise without severing operational trust.

- European hesitancy during the Iran strikes created acute friction over US operations launched from allied soil before London permitted staging out of RAF Fairford and Diego Garcia. - Bilateral operating procedures and sovereignty arrangements governing American facilities in the UK and continental Europe date back to post-World War II frameworks established in the late 1940s.

---

[04:49](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=htFXw5Dw3Qk&t=289s) Extended Nuclear Deterrence and the Allied Umbrella

The discussion concludes on the ultimate guarantor of European territorial integrity: nuclear deterrence. While conventional forces undergo rebalancing, European security remains structurally dependent on the American strategic nuclear arsenal. In response to whether Washington's nuclear umbrella remains solid amid geopolitical changes, Sir Richard gives an unambiguous assessment: American officials have been "incredibly reassuring" in both classified bilateral exchanges and public statements about their steadfast determination to maintain NATO’s extended nuclear guarantee.

At the same time, shifting transatlantic dynamics have prompted European powers to explore supplementary sovereign deterrence frameworks. French President Emmanuel Macron has actively advocated an expanded European dimension to France's independent deterrent, holding preliminary discussions with frontline partners like Finland. Sir Richard remarks that while the tactical mechanics of extended European deterrence are still being worked out, the fundamental strategic calculus must remain unmistakable to Moscow: Russia must understand that the United States, Britain, and France stand aligned as distinct nuclear powers that will decisively retaliate if an adversary launches an attack against allied territory.

## Notable quotes > [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=htFXw5Dw3Qk&t=0s) NATO 3.0 — Shashank Joshi

> [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=htFXw5Dw3Qk&t=0s) tilt to the Indo-Pacific — Sir Richard Knighton

> [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=htFXw5Dw3Qk&t=0s) calm, rational advice — Sir Richard Knighton

> [04:49](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=htFXw5Dw3Qk&t=289s) incredibly reassuring — Sir Richard Knighton

## Mentioned Shashank Joshi, Sir Richard Knighton, Pete Hegseth, Alexus Grynkewich, Barack Obama, Robert Gates, Emmanuel Macron, NATO, The Economist, US European Command (USEUCOM), Joint Force Command Norfolk, RAF Fairford, Diego Garcia, Greenland, Denmark, Finland, France, United Kingdom, United States, Russia, Iran

## Video description America is reviewing where it keeps its forces, at a delicate moment for NATO. Shashank Joshi, host of Inside Defence, sits down with Sir Richard Knighton, Britain’s Chief of the Defence Staff, in Washington to ask what Europe can bank on from America if war breaks out in the next few years. Sir Richard says he is confident America sees Europe as critical to its own security. He also discusses the friction over American use of European bases during the Iran war, and says America has given strong reassurances that it will keep providing its nuclear umbrella.

#NATO #Europe #America #Trump #War

00:00 - America's force-posture review 01:06 - Why Europe still matters to America 03:01 - Can America use Europe’s bases freely? 05:00 - Europe's nuclear umbrella

Watch the full show: bit.ly/4rRRd4V Sign up to the Insider newsletter: https://econ.st/4nOyzIb

Subscribe to The Economist: https://www.economist.com/subscribe Download our app: https://www.economist.com/get-the-app

Follow The Economist on Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/theeconomist/ Follow The Economist on Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/TheEconomist Follow The Economist on X: https://x.com/TheEconomist

[Source](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=htFXw5Dw3Qk)

中文简报

英国防务长官称海格塞斯审查北约态势之际美国保护伞依然稳固空军上将理查德·奈顿爵士（Sir Richard Knighton）认为，华盛顿将维持其延伸核保证和在欧军事存在，因为前沿基地对于保护美国本土和投射全球力量依然不可或缺。在谈及被称为“北约3.0”的战略再平衡时，理查德·奈顿爵士指出，驻欧美军是为了直接服务于美国本土防御和全球力量投射，绝非单纯的慈善之举。讨论直面了伊朗战争期间盟国在基地使用权和领空过境权方面近期的摩擦，权衡了华盛顿的作战需求与欧洲的主权法律限制。理查德爵士淡化了对美国抽身脱离的担忧，指出向印太地区的长期战略转移一直以来都是渐进且理性的。他最后确认，华盛顿方面已就其延伸核保护伞提供了坚定且明确的保证，并将与英法两国的威慑力量协同合作，以遏制俄罗斯的侵略。作为“北约3.0”的一部分，美国在国防部长皮特·海格塞斯（Pete Hegseth）领导下正进行全面的军力态势审查，这表明欧洲盟友必须承担起大得多的常规防御责任。 (0:00) 在美国打击伊朗期间欧洲国家出现犹豫后，盟国基地使用权和领空过境主权成为关键摩擦点，不过英国最终允许美军从费尔福德皇家空军基地（RAF Fairford）和迪戈加西亚岛（Diego Garcia）实施军事行动。 (2:50) 英国国防参谋长表示，华盛顿已给出坚定保证，确认美国对欧洲的延伸核保护伞依然完好无损。 (4:49) 法国已开始与芬兰等前沿盟国展开讨论，探讨在跨大西洋联盟之外为其主权核威慑力量拓展欧洲维度的可能性。 (4:49)

Reading summary

Amid Washington's "NATO 3.0" force-posture review, Britain's Chief of the Defence Staff, Air Chief Marshal Sir Richard Knighton, argues that the United States will maintain its commitment to European defense because forward deployments directly protect the American mainland and enable global power projection. Strategic Logic of US European Deployments (0:00) Sir Richard Knighton downplays concerns that the United States intends to withdraw from Europe, characterizing the Pentagon's posture review under Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth as an evolution of a strategic rebalancing that dates back to the Obama administration's tilt to the Indo-Pacific. Drawing on assessments from General Alexus Grynkewich—who serves jointly as NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe and commander of US European Command—Knighton argues that forward-stationed US forces are not philanthropic. Instead, they execute three interdependent strategic roles: securing American regional interests, providing the backbone for NATO collective defense, and serving as an essential launchpad for global force projection. From London's perspective, Washington understands that Europe functions as an indispensable forward defense guarding the North Atlantic approaches to the American homeland. Knighton highlights that this transatlantic interdependence is operationalized through structural leadership roles, including a British commander taking charge of NATO's Joint Force Command Norfolk to secure North Atlantic maritime routes. Base Access and Sovereign Operational Friction (2:50) Longstanding burden-sharing debates are increasingly intertwined with friction over host-nation sovereignty and the operational freedom of US forces based in allied countries. Knighton confirms that base access, overflight permissions, and operational flexibility form an explicit focus of the Pentagon's posture review, as articulated by Secretary Hegseth at the NATO ministerial meeting in Ankara. This friction surfaced acutely during the Iran war, when several European nations initially hesitated to authorize offensive kinetic strikes launched from their sovereign territory, although the United Kingdom ultimately permitted US staging from RAF Fairford and Diego Garcia. Knighton acknowledges the American frustration, noting it is understandable that Washington expects reliable operational utility after investing billions in foreign military installations. However, he emphasizes that host nations operate under independent international legal obligations and must exercise sovereign judgment before approving combat operations from their territory. Despite parallel disputes—such as negotiations over Greenland with Denmark—Knighton predicts that pragmatic diplomacy will preserve operational trust under frameworks that have governed bilateral access since the late 1940s. Extended Nuclear Deterrence and Strategic Alignment (4:49) While conventional forces face restructuring to ensure European allies shoulder a larger share of regional defense, European territorial integrity remains fundamentally reliant on the American nuclear umbrella. Knighton describes recent US assurances regarding extended nuclear deterrence as "incredibly reassuring" across both classified and public discussions, asserting that Washington's strategic guarantee remains intact despite shifting political dynamics. At the same time, shifting transatlantic burdens have prompted European discussions regarding complementary deterrent architectures. French President Emmanuel Macron has promoted an expanded European role for France's sovereign nuclear forces, engaging frontline allies such as Finland in preliminary talks. Knighton observes that while the tactical mechanics of supplementary European deterrence models are still being determined, the core deterrent message to Moscow depends on demonstrating that the United States, Britain, and France remain aligned as three distinct nuclear powers ready to retaliate decisively against aggression. While British military leadership remains confident that US self-interest guarantees the core transatlantic alliance, the transition to "NATO 3.0" leaves an unresolved tension between European sovereign legal control over domestic military bases and Washington's demand for unrestricted operational access during out-of-area crises.

Source quotes

[0:00] Shashank Joshi: NATO 3.0 [0:00] Sir Richard Knighton: tilt to the Indo-Pacific [0:00] Sir Richard Knighton: calm, rational advice [4:49] Sir Richard Knighton: incredibly reassuring

Original transcript

[0:00] We're in a moment of rebalancing. The [0:03] Americans call it NATO 3.0, a new [0:07] arrangement in the alliance with [0:08] Europeans stepping up and doing more. It [0:10] seems that [0:12] we're at a very delicate phase of that [0:14] because this administration here has a [0:17] posture review underway. The question I [0:20] wanted to ask you, Rich, is at this [0:22] stage, do you feel you have clarity on [0:25] the US's intentions with its force [0:28] posture in Europe? Do you know what you [0:30] can bank on for the Americans to provide [0:33] if a conflict were to break out in 2028 [0:36] or 2029 or is this all still up in the [0:39] air and subject to debate? [0:41] >> So, the posture review as set out by [0:44] Secretary Hecksith is to to answer [0:46] exactly that question. But, I was [0:49] talking to SACEUR over the last few [0:51] days. [0:51] >> Supreme Allied Commander Europe, the top [0:53] military officer in NATO. [0:54] >> Alex Grynkewich and he has got a key [0:57] voice in that posture review because he [1:00] owns the forces in Europe as as well as [1:03] Supreme Allied Commander Europe is [1:05] Commander [1:06] European Command, part of one of the [1:08] COCOMs for the US. [1:10] And he talks about the forces in Europe [1:14] have three roles. They they have a role [1:17] which is about supporting US security in [1:20] Europe. They have a role in terms of [1:23] supporting NATO and they also have a [1:25] role in supporting US force projection [1:29] into the rest of the world. And so, [1:32] there's a broad perspective on what [1:34] those force elements in Europe are [1:36] responsible for rather than simply their [1:38] contribution to NATO. I'm confident that [1:42] the US [1:43] know that Europe is a critical theater [1:47] for their overall security as a nation. [1:51] We sometimes talk about Europe is [1:54] defending the eastern flank of an [1:56] eastern coast of America. Part of the [1:58] reason I'm here is that uh General Nick [2:00] Carter tomorrow takes over as [2:03] the first UK commander of Joint Forces [2:05] Command, Norfolk. So, a UK commander [2:08] responsible for the North Atlantic uh [2:11] and northern Europe. And that's a really [2:13] big deal and it that is providing [2:15] security for the US. The posture review [2:18] is the current set of a process by which [2:21] the American will consider that. But, I [2:23] think it's important we recognize that [2:25] this shift in focus for for the US has [2:28] been coming for some time. Barack Obama [2:30] talked about [2:31] the tilt through the Indo-Pacific. So, [2:34] this is this is part of that ongoing [2:36] process and and I have every confidence [2:38] in the military leadership offering um [2:42] calm, rational advice into a process for [2:45] for decision-making. But, the challenges [2:47] for the US as a global integrator are [2:49] real. [2:50] >> So, I think one of the contentious [2:53] elements in the US's approach to this. [2:56] And and you point out the question of [2:58] uh the the the burden relative burden [3:00] for Europe and the US goes back a long [3:01] way to Obama, to Bob Gates, the Defense [3:03] Secretary before that uh more than 15 [3:06] years ago. But, the contentious element, [3:08] perhaps more so now, is also the [3:10] question of how the US may use its bases [3:12] in Europe. Uh rights of overflight, [3:15] rights of access. This obviously came to [3:18] a head in the Iran war where initially [3:21] many European countries were quite [3:22] hesitant to allow their soil to be used [3:24] for attacks on Iran. Eventually, the [3:26] United Kingdom agreed that the US could [3:28] use RAF Fairford, they could use Diego [3:30] Garcia uh in the Indian Ocean. Um but, [3:33] we see again perhaps in the wrangling [3:35] between the US and Denmark and the deal [3:37] they've reached over Greenland. This is [3:39] a really delicate question. The [3:41] Americans want Europe to give them [3:44] unfettered and open and free access to [3:46] their bases for their operations, [3:48] whether that is bombing Iran or [3:50] something else. [3:51] How has that discussion looked to you? [3:53] Is there going to be more of a sense of [3:55] granting of greater access to the [3:56] Americans as part of these talks? [3:59] >> So, I understand that as part of the [4:01] posture review, the question of access, [4:03] basing, and overflights, and the use of [4:05] bases in Europe will be considered. [4:07] Secretary of War said that in his speech [4:11] at the the NATO conference in Ankara. [4:14] The situation and the process and and [4:17] precedents are the same now as they have [4:20] been since the the late 1940s. But, [4:23] you're right, it did it did it was a [4:24] source of friction. And [4:27] you can understand the US that is [4:29] invested in these bases and invested in [4:32] these relationships wants to be able to [4:34] rely on on on their ability to use it. [4:37] But equally, [4:39] nation states have responsibilities [4:42] under international law to make [4:44] judgments around how they use. And I'm [4:46] I'm confident that we'll be able to find [4:48] a way through this. [4:49] >> Um I I want a word on nuclear and the [4:52] nuclear relationship [4:54] because you know, this is still one area [4:57] where NATO relies on the US arsenal. And [5:00] I wonder if you could give us a sense of [5:02] what signals you've received from your [5:04] American counterparts on the way nuclear [5:06] deterrence plays a role in the alliance, [5:09] the commitment to that, and how they [5:11] plan to signal this. And I ask in part [5:13] because we've also seen a lot of [5:15] activity from the UK, but also France in [5:20] perhaps trying to signal more of a [5:22] European nuclear deterrence effort as [5:24] well. In recent weeks, we've seen the [5:26] French talk to other countries in Europe [5:28] including perhaps the Finns about [5:31] providing more of a French umbrella over [5:32] Europe. So, what does that nuclear [5:34] discussion in Europe look like at the [5:35] minute? [5:36] >> So, the Americans both privately and [5:38] publicly have been incredibly reassuring [5:41] about their willingness to continue to [5:43] provide that nuclear umbrella. [5:46] The French position [5:48] is based on President Macron's recent [5:50] speech and this idea of extended [5:54] nuclear deterrence. The details of that [5:56] are still being evolved and worked out. [5:59] And ultimately, what Russia needs to [6:01] know is that UK [6:03] the US and France as nuclear powers will [6:07] act if Russia if attacked from [6:10] by a nuclear armed state like like [6:12] Russia. And I'll say I I I've had [6:14] privately and seen publicly [6:17] very strong reassurances from the US [6:19] about their nuclear posture and [6:20] position.