Klarna CEO Targets $10 Million Per Employee in AI Push

ACQ2: Building a Disruptive Payments Company (with Klarna CEO Sebastian Siemiatkowski) (Audio) — Acquired

Acquired

Aggressive AI integration allows fintech firms to shrink headcount through natural attrition while driving revenue per employee toward historic highs, leaving legacy banking institutions unable to compete.

AI-assisted summary of ACQ2: Building a Disruptive Payments Company (with Klarna CEO Sebastian Siemiatkowski) (Audio) — original source. Check the original for full context.

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## Background Published on YouTube by the channel Acquired on March 13, 2025, this video features an episode originally released on June 24, 2024. The page description outlines a highly honest and thoughtful business strategy discussion detailing how Klarna navigated the rapid rise of buy-now-pay-later over 19 years and how its CEO leverages an aggressive AI strategy for cost reduction and product innovation.

## TL;DR In this episode, Klarna co-founder and CEO Sebastian Siemiatkowski breaks down the fundamentals of the global payments value chain and recounts the company's evolution from a scrappy Swedish open-invoice factoring startup into a global financial heavyweight. He outlines how Klarna successfully pivoted to a consumer-focused digital financial assistant strategy after realizing it couldn't out-execute back-end payment processors like Adyen and Stripe. Finally, Siemiatkowski details Klarna's aggressive, Elon Musk-inspired cost-consciousness and its revolutionary deployment of AI, which has already taken over two-thirds of its customer service operations and paved the way for hyper-efficient, ultra-lean 'Tiger' companies.

## Atmosphere & style The discussion possesses a deeply engaging, intellectually stimulating, and transparent tone, moving far beyond a standard corporate interview into a high-level masterclass for business strategy nerds. Siemiatkowski brings a refreshing, candid humility to the conversation, openly laughing at his past brashness as a 'brat kid' and acknowledging Klarna's historical missteps in copying predatory banking tricks. The narrative dynamic with the hosts feels collaborative and collegial, capturing an emotional arc that spans the high-stakes pressure of sudden valuation drops to an electric, forward-looking excitement about the imminent, AI-driven disruption of traditional banking.

## Key takeaways - [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=0s) The global payments value chain consists of three foundational components: the issuing banks, the networks (Visa/Mastercard) that govern financial standards, and the acquiring payment service providers (PSPs) that partner with merchants. - [02:24](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=144s) Klarna was founded out of an insight that early e-commerce merchants in Sweden desperately needed a secure payment methodology that mitigated consumer distrust of inputting debit card information online. - [05:33](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=333s) The 'buy now, pay later' concept mirrors historical mail-order catalog 'bill me' options, tapping into the psychology that consumers prefer inspecting goods before paying. - [11:10](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=670s) Klarna achieved day-one positive cash flow and capital efficiency by delaying merchant payouts for three weeks, taking on default risk while essentially utilizing merchant float to fund early scaling without massive external credit lines. - [16:46](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=1006s) Klarna's expansion into the UK and US was catalyzed by a massive, overlooked macroeconomic shift after the 2007 financial crisis: millennial and Gen Z consumers dramatically favored debit cards over traditional credit cards. - [20:54](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=1254s) A key target demographic for BNPL is 'self-aware avoiders'—high-earning consumers who consciously reject traditional credit card mechanics, minimum monthly balances, and predatory interest loops. - [20:54](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=1254s) Traditional banks suffer from the Innovator's Dilemma, as adopting clear, interest-free pay-in-4 installment plans would cannibalize their highly profitable revolving credit portfolios that rely on high interest rates. - [29:32](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=1772s) To exploit the consumer data loop, traditional banking models historically eliminated the choice between debit and credit at points of sale, artificially inflating monthly statements to force consumers to revolve debt. - [35:55](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=2155s) Following an aggressive back-end market push by competitors like Adyen and Stripe, Klarna executed a critical strategic pivot in 2015 away from merchant checkout dominance to winning the direct consumer relationship. - [39:35](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=2375s) The ultimate goal for modern financial platforms is to operate as automated, proactive digital financial assistants that autonomously optimize consumer balances, lower interest rates, and eliminate excess banking fees. - [43:35](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=2615s) Klarna maintains a unique structural advantage over legacy four-party networks by possessing granular, SKU-level product data due to its history as an open-invoice processor, which it surfaces directly inside its consumer app. - [49:35](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=2975s) To establish rapid scale in the competitive US market against Afterpay, Klarna deployed a 'browser hack' that enabled consumers to use virtual Klarna-backed cards at non-integrated merchants, instantly unlocking massive transaction volume and consumer downloads. - [01:02:45](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=3765s) While expanding into the US cost roughly $1 billion in annualized cash burn at its low point, the investment was structurally justified by the sheer size of the multi-trillion dollar financial services market landscape. - [01:06:44](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=4004s) Inspired by Elon Musk's extreme cost consciousness, Klarna's operational philosophy shifted toward aggressively bending the corporate cost curve downward while maintaining upward revenue momentum. - [01:08:50](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=4130s) Klarna is avoiding mass layoffs by freezing recruitment and letting natural annual attrition shrink the workforce, while using AI to restructure internal operational workflows and eliminate role duplication. - [01:08:50](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=4130s) Implementing an AI customer support assistant allowed Klarna to instantly absorb two-thirds of all global customer service inquiries while maintaining customer satisfaction scores on par with human agents. - [01:15:26](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=4526s) AI adoption is paving the way for ultra-lean, hyper-efficient 'Tiger' companies that will drastically elevate traditional corporate revenue-per-employee benchmarks. - [01:16:33](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=4593s) While top tech firms like Apple or Netflix produce around $2 million in revenue per employee, optimized AI-native or AI-adaptive companies are projected to hit unprecedented baselines of $5 million to $10 million per employee. - [01:18:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=4680s) Legacy banking institutions face severe structural disadvantages due to slow decision-making and archaic technology stacks, triggering a massive operational revival for agile digital fintech players.

## Detailed walkthrough ### [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=0s) The Payments Landscape and the Klarna Story

The episode kicks off with a deeper dive into the global payments landscape, following up on a previous episode focused on Visa. The hosts are joined by Sebastian Siemiatkowski, the co-founder and CEO of Klarna, a brand recognized globally as a heavyweight in the "buy now, pay later" (BNPL) space, though it harbors ambitions to command a much broader presence across the entire payment ecosystem. Klarna was founded 19 years ago in Stockholm, Sweden—drawing an immediate parallel to fellow Swedish tech giant Spotify—and has grown to serve 150 million global consumers while powering 2 million payments a day.

When asked to provide a high-level, five-minute overview of the payments value chain for a listener base full of tech "geeks," Siemiatkowski breaks the landscape down into three foundational components: the issuing side, the networks, and the acquiring side. The issuing side consists of the banks that provide consumers with cards linked to a line of credit or a positive balance. The networks, dominated by Visa and MasterCard, set the global financial standards, handle brand recognition to ensure card acceptance, and govern the actual exchange of financial information and transactional settling. Finally, the acquiring side features payment service providers (PSPs) that partner directly with merchants to enable payment acceptance, supplying physical terminals for brick-and-mortar stores or managing the checkout and cashier experience for e-commerce websites. Siemiatkowski notes that numerous specialized companies circulate around this core structure to provide fraud recognition or underwriting, and even e-commerce platforms like Shopify have effectively morphed into large-scale fintech operations.

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[02:24](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=144s) The Foundering Insight: From Telemarketing to E-Commerce

Siemiatkowski rewinds nearly two decades to explain the initial spark that led to the creation of Klarna. Always harboring a dream to start a business, he grew up inspired by Swedish icons like Ikea founder Ingvar Kamprad and read Richard Branson's book about the Virgin Group at age 14. After two years at the Stockholm School of Economics and a flying-free sabatical year traveling around the world, he returned home jobless in the wake of the dot-com bubble crash. Unable to secure a job at a traditional accounting firm like PwC, he desperately took a position as a sales guy at an account receivables factoring and collections company—the last place he ever imagined working. Drawing on his teenage experience working extra hours as a telemarketer "trying to sell a subscription to a magazine," his new job required him to open physical telephone catalogs and cold-call midsize Swedish businesses to pitch factoring services.

The company he worked for was bizarrely named "Acme," an intentional nod to the dummy corporation Microsoft used in all its presentations, which the founders mistakenly believed amounted to free advertising. Cold-calling was incredibly tough in 2003; traditional accounting ladies at midsize firms were intensely loyal to their existing providers and unbothered by a promise to save $1,000 in fees. However, Siemiatkowski struck a unique pain point when he began calling early e-commerce entrepreneurs. In a pre-Amazon Sweden, these scrappy founders had discovered they could buy incredibly cheap Google AdWords for terms like "cat food" and instantly attract flocks of customers to their websites. These early digital storefronts were in desperate need of a reliable payment methodology.

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[05:33](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=333s) The Birth of Buy Now, Pay Later in Sweden

During this early era of internet commerce, Visa and MasterCard card payments were the default standard, but mail-order catalog businesses had long relied on a "bill me" option. The old catalog companies understood that selling at a distance required a different psychological approach than brick-and-mortar shopping, where a customer can physically touch a product before parting with their money. Offering an open invoice gave the consumer the security of inspecting the goods—ensuring the cat food was healthy and as advertised—before paying. This security was vital in Sweden, where consumers predominantly held debit cards rather than credit cards, viewing credit as a dangerous "lender of last resort." Inputting a debit card number online was seen as a massive risk that exposed a consumer's entire hard-earned salary account balance to an unknown merchant.

Recognizing that successful mail-order companies migrating to the web were thriving by offering an "open invoice payment method," Siemiatkowski realized Acme was far too unserious of a company to develop his ideas. He returned to his university's incubator to launch the concept himself. Alongside his high school friend Niklas and a university friend, they set out in late autumn. By December, they secured a business angel investor who injected cash and introduced them to engineers. Working in their spare time over four months, the engineers built a minimum viable product (MVP) capable of processing and underwriting transactions.

- **Initial Angel Investment:** The founders asked for \$40,000, but the angel insisted on giving \$60,000 in exchange for a 10% stake in the company. - **Capital Efficiency:** Klarna only spent \$30,000 of that initial funding before hitting profitability roughly six months into operations. - **Total Capital Raised to Date:** Approximately \$4 billion.

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[11:10](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=670s) The Golden Goose: Achieving Positive Cash Flow Through Factoring

A recurring question from early skeptics was how a tiny startup could possibly fund the massive capital reserves required to purchase invoices from merchants and wait for consumers to pay. From a traditional financial perspective, a factoring business requires massive credit lines or deep equity capital to bridge the float. However, Klarna uncovered a contrarian entrepreneurial insight: early online merchants were surprisingly poor at managing or understanding cash flow. They weren't looking for a cash flow solution; they were terrified of consumer default risk and the administrative nightmare of collections. Some merchants had attempted to print and mail invoices themselves—much like a local residential electrician would—but panicked over the prospect of hiring collection agencies or handling customer support.

Klarna cleverly structured a business model that solved these exact fears while turning the traditional financial paradigm on its head. They took on 100% of the customer default risk and managed the entire administration, but they stipulated that they would not pay the merchant until three weeks after the transaction occurred. Because many consumers paid their invoices instantaneously or well before the due date, Klarna created a factoring model that generated a highly positive cash flow from day one.

- **The Float Advantage:** Merchants essentially funded Klarna's rapid scale during its first few years, rendering external funding rounds unnecessary until much later. - **Tiered Pricing:** If a merchant explicitly demanded immediate cash, Klarna simply charged them a higher transaction fee, keeping the system profitable. - **The Evolution of the Phrase:** Siemiatkowski notes that they operated for over a decade simply providing open invoices before the industry adopted the generalized "buy now, pay later" terminology around 2015, which initially frustrated him as he watched clone companies gain traction under the new label.

[15:06](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=906s) Coining "Buy Now Pay Later" and Early Geographic Expansion

The speaker reflects with relief on discovering the true origins of the phrase "buy now pay later." While there was some anxiety that a competitor like Afterpay had coined the ubiquitous term, a dive into the archives revealed that the *Financial Times* actually used "buy now pay later" in a headline describing Klarna back in 2013 or 2014, shortly before Afterpay launched. This discovery brought peace of mind from a "pure prestige perspective." This space naturally favored local players who tailored their products to regional needs before global scaling took over—resulting in a landscape of distinct Australian, Swedish, and American providers racing to expand outward.

When Klarna first launched in Sweden, its subsequent steps seemed humorous in retrospect. The company initially expanded into Norway and Finland—markets of just about 4 million people each. This move was largely dictated by merchant demand, as Swedish e-commerce businesses were already active in those neighboring Nordic countries. Klarna's next major breakthrough occurred in Germany and the Netherlands, chosen specifically because those regions possessed a deeply rooted tradition of *Rechnung* (invoice buying), which aligned perfectly with the core BNPL concept.

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[16:46](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=1006s) The Accidental British Conquest and the Rise of Debit

For a long time, Klarna's leadership was convinced that breaking into the US and UK markets was impossible because credit card penetration was so high. Between 2010 and 2015, the company focused instead on competing with Stripe and Adyen in the Payment Service Provider (PSP) space and trying to make the complex, multi-jurisdictional regulatory landscape of Germany work. When a small team was finally sent to the UK in 2015 to test the waters, they returned enthusiastic about a massive short-term BNPL opportunity. The speaker initially rejected the idea outright, telling the team it was a "terrible idea" and ordering them to focus strictly on high-ticket financing for expensive items like mattresses and home electronics—the approach Affirm was taking. Furthermore, the speaker explicitly forbade them from targeting massive fashion whales right away.

The UK team completely ignored these directives. Six to twelve months later, during a business review, they admitted they were still pursuing large fashion retailers. Despite receiving another stern warning that it was a "horrible idea," the team returned three months later having signed ASOS. The launch was a "smashing success." This independent thinking exposed a massive macroeconomic shift that Klarna's leadership had missed, but Afterpay had noticed in Australia: while credit card usage had doubled over a decade, debit card usage had grown tenfold. A new generation of consumers either could not access or completely distrusted credit cards. Ultimately, it wasn't Klarna that figured out the Anglo-American markets; rather, a shifting demographic and the fallout of the 2007 financial crisis turned the US and UK markets into versions of the Swedish market, primed for unstructured, digital debit transactions.

- **Credit vs. Debit Growth:** Between 2007–2008 and 2018, credit card usage grew 2x, whereas debit card usage grew 10x. - **The ASOS Milestone:** The signing of the massive fashion retailer ASOS served as the proof-of-concept that unlocked the UK market for Klarna. - **Macroeconomic Drivers:** Tougher credit underwriting restrictions and a ban on aggressive campus credit card promotions after 2007 left a massive online shopping demographic without traditional credit options.

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[20:54](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=1254s) The "Self-Aware Avoiders" and the Innovator's Dilemma

The speaker highlights a profound May 2014 McKinsey report titled *"New Frontiers in Credit Card Segmentation: Tapping Unmet Consumer Needs,"* published five years before BNPL exploded in the US. The report identified a massive, overlooked segment making up roughly 20% of the US population, dubbed "self-aware avoiders." These were high-earning, high-spending individuals who consciously rejected credit cards because they hated the industry's predatory tactics—such as dangling massive credit limits, burying consumers in debt, and encouraging minimum monthly payments to maximize revolving interest. While the banking industry remained pathologically obsessed with "reward seekers," these avoiders actively desired simple fees, transparent terms, structural protection against missing payments, and a clear payoff horizon for major purchases.

This dynamic highlights a classic case of Clayton Christensen's "low-end disruption" and the Innovator's Dilemma. Traditional banks make extraordinary margins running credit portfolios with 30% revolving interest rates. To an incumbent bank executive, offering an interest-free "pay-in-4" installment plan sounds financially unappealing because it generates significantly less revenue per user. Even though the BNPL model is fundamentally better for consumers and keeps them out of systemic debt, banks are structurally paralyzed from adopting it because doing so would cannibalize their highly profitable revolving fee streams. Klarna and Afterpay had a pure upside advantage because they carried no legacy portfolios to protect.

- **The McKinsey Segment:** "Self-Aware Avoiders" constituted an estimated 20% of the US market in 2014, defined by high median annual household incomes but an absolute aversion to traditional credit mechanics. - **The Core Desires of Avoiders:** Simple and transparent fees, explicit payoff horizons per major purchase, and "swipe-to-installment" functionality.

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[26:38](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=1598s) Copying Predatory Banking Tricks—And Unlearning Them

The speaker candidly confesses that Klarna did not start out with perfect corporate social responsibility. When Klarna first introduced revolving credit and high-ticket financing in Sweden around 2007, they analyzed competing banks to see how they made money. They discovered clever, highly profitable "tricks." A classic banking tactic involved offering a "12 months interest-free" plan, but sending a monthly statement featuring two options: a higher payment that preserved the 0% interest, and a lower minimum payment. If a consumer accidentally or out of financial strain paid the lower amount, the entire balance automatically shifted into a 36-month revolving account bearing 20% interest.

"Oh okay, that's how you make business in the banking world. Awesome, let's do it," the speaker recalls thinking at the time. Klarna copied these exact tactics and made a tremendous amount of money. However, over the years, the leadership team began to self-reflect, questioning if consumers truly understood what they were signing up for and whether these practices were healthy. Klarna ultimately reversed course, systematically stripping out these legacy banking mechanisms. The speaker notes that back in the 1990s and 2000s, profit maximization was the sole driving force in corporate culture, and if a tactic was legal and drove interest revenue, it was deployed without a single thought for consumer financial health.

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[29:32](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=1772s) How Banks Engineered the Death of the Debit/Credit Choice

To illustrate how banks intentionally nudged consumers into debt, the speaker shares an anecdote from working at Burger King at 15 years old. In those days, swiping a card required the user to manually select "Press 1 for Debit, Press 2 for Credit" directly on the point-of-sale terminal. This choice made perfect sense: everyday purchases like fast food could be cleared immediately via debit, while large, significant purchases could be intentionally placed on credit.

The banks systematically removed this choice from card terminals. Today, swiping a credit card automatically puts every single transaction—from a low-cost Burger King meal to weekly groceries at Walmart—directly onto a single monthly revolving statement. Banks engineered this change because mixing daily consumption with large expenses balloons the final monthly statement. If a consumer's monthly bill was kept to $500 by paying for food with debit, they could easily afford to pay it off in full. By inflating the bill to $1,000 by consolidating all spending onto credit, the banks dramatically increased the likelihood that the consumer would be unable to pay the full balance, forcing them to revolve and trigger highly lucrative interest charges.

<FollowUp label="Would you like to explore how Klarna restructured its business model to move away from these banking tactics?" query="How did Klarna structurally change its revenue model and product design when it decided to remove the traditional revolving credit tactics used by banks?"/>

[31:17](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=1877s) Reintroducing Balance: Debit vs. Credit

The traditional credit card model functions in a heavily incentivized loop designed to maximize consumer interest and revolving debt. Because revolving balances drive the massive profits that fund lucrative cashback and rewards programs, financial institutions are naturally discouraged from steering customers toward immediate payments. Klarna is intentionally disrupting this loop by reintroducing clear choices at checkout. Their objective is to offer an elegant balance of "pay now" and "pay later" solutions, effectively reviving spending models that are fundamentally healthier for long-term credit management.

Currently, the global layout of Klarna's transaction volume reflects a meaningful shift toward immediate payments, though regional differences remain stark. Within the next one to two years, Klarna aims for its presence on any merchant website to universally signal the availability of both credit and debit options.

- Globally, debit transactions already comprise approximately 35% of Klarna's total volume. - The United States market remains predominantly credit-driven for Klarna. - The long-term target for online transaction volume is a balanced 50/50 split between debit and credit. - For physical, in-store environments, Klarna anticipates a future proportion of roughly 80% debit and 20% credit.

[32:47](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=1967s) The Failed Dream of Klarna Checkout

The physical footprint of Klarna has become highly visible, with large-scale marketing campaigns blanketing major retail hubs, such as the Stonestown Galleria mall in San Francisco. This extensive in-store presence often surprises consumers who traditionally associate the company with online e-commerce. Historically, Klarna attempted to conquer the merchant processing space under an ambitious strategy to "close the loop." Around 2009 and 2010, the company launched *Klarna Checkout*, a product designed to serve simultaneously as the merchant acquirer, the payment service provider (PSP), and the issuer, allowing businesses to accept everything from Visa and Mastercard to localized payment options.

During this era, a young, 30-year-old Sebastian Siemiatkowski confidently pitched this product to his board as a direct threat to emerging payment players. Recognizing that engineers were the ones actually integrating platforms, Klarna aimed to compete aggressively with the Collison brothers at Stripe by building developer-friendly APIs. Siemiatkowski even personally approached Peter van der Does, the co-founder of Adyen—which at the time was smaller than Klarna in revenue and headcount—and brashly told him, "Peter, you have to sell your business to me because I'm going to run you over." Looking back with a laugh, Siemiatkowski notes that van der Does viewed him as a "brat kid," and it ultimately took several years of mending fences for them to become good friends.

- *Klarna Checkout* achieved massive localized success, processing over 50% of all online transactions in the Nordic region for a period. - The company struggled to scale the checkout product internationally, falling behind the rapid feature deployment of competitors. - A critical execution gap formed by 2013, highlighted by Adyen adding dozens of Asian payment methods while Klarna's checkout integrations remained stagnant for two years.

[35:55](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=2155s) The 2015 Strategic Pivot to the Consumer

The absolute breaking point for Klarna's merchant platform strategy came in 2015 when Adyen successfully signed Spotify. Watching their fiercest competitor lock down a high-profile client right in Klarna's own Swedish backyard was a clear wake-up call. The executive team realized they were being out-executed on the broad PSP front. They faced a stark choice: pretend to be a secondary version of Stripe or Adyen and engineer an exit to a larger firm—similar to how Swedish payment processor Bambora was acquired by Ingenico—or completely pivot their core business model.

Choosing to pivot, Klarna shifted its primary focus away from competing for back-end merchant dominance and instead doubled down on winning the consumer relationship. This strategic transition was further complicated by the simultaneous departure of Klarna's second co-founder, leaving Siemiatkowski to build a fresh leadership team. Abandoning the practice of hiring outside executives, he promoted high-performing junior managers from within the ten-year-old company. Gathered around a blank white paper, this new management team set out to map the long-term evolution of digital financial services.

- Shopify's aggressive push into its own ecosystem effectively blocked Klarna's primary entry point to smaller U.S. merchants. - Silicon Valley companies like Fast attempted similar checkout-focused models with high visibility but varying degrees of long-term success. - Today, former rivals Adyen and Stripe have transformed into Klarna's largest distributors, embedding Klarna directly into their networks rather than competing on direct merchant integrations.

[39:35](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=2375s) The Rise of the Digital Financial Assistant

The core thesis developed by Klarna’s new leadership team centered on the inevitability of automated financial management, drawing a direct parallel to the steady, logical trajectory of self-driving cars. They envisioned a future where a proactive, digital financial assistant handles the tedious, opaque tasks historically managed by traditional wealth managers or banks. This software layer will autonomously scan a user's accounts, negotiate lower interest rates, detect overpayments on recurring expenses like mortgages, and seamlessly execute bank switches with a simple, one-word confirmation from the consumer.

While traditional banks once held the localized trust required to act as financial advisers, they ultimately leveraged that trust to maximize institutional profits rather than consumer well-being. The introduction of hyper-personalized, automated advisory software represents an incredibly disruptive force that threatens to dismantle the historical structural inefficiencies of the banking industry.

- Banking institutions have historically enjoyed massive "excess profits" because moving between banks is deliberately high-friction and confusing for consumers. - Winning the digital assistant race requires an operator with massive global scale, as volume dictates the viability of running cross-border financial AI. - Deep consumer data trust is the primary prerequisite; an assistant can only provide high-value, cost-saving recommendations if it maintains an uninhibited view of a consumer's transactions.

[43:35](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=2615s) Weaponizing SKU-Level Data

Klarna possesses a massive structural advantage over traditional payment processing giants: native access to itemized, SKU-level data. Because Klarna originated as an open-invoice business, the company was legally and operationally required to generate detailed, line-item invoices from day one. When a consumer makes a purchase via Klarna at a merchant like H&M, the platform does not merely register a generic dollar amount and a merchant ID; it captures the precise product name, sweater color, and garment size, even rendering rich item imagery directly inside the customer app.

Retrofitted data transmission remains a monumental challenge for legacy financial networks. Built on half-century-old foundations, standard credit card rails were never designed to carry massive payloads of granular product information. While networks like Visa and Mastercard attempted to introduce "Level 3" data parameters in the 1990s to capture deeper commercial transaction info, the rigid architecture of a four-party payment network created a massive bottleneck.

- Four-party payment networks (Visa/Mastercard) stall out because any data update requires thousands of independent issuing banks to simultaneously redesign their consumer apps to display it. - Three-party closed-loop networks (Klarna, American Express, PayPal) can instantly ingest merchant data and surface it directly to the end user. - Securing this deep data requires an immense amount of personal outreach; Sebastian Siemiatkowski spent hundreds of hours in direct negotiations convincing top retail CEOs at brands like Macy’s, Sephora, and H&M to trust Klarna with their raw SKU feeds.

The Three-Front Battle for Global Scale

The strategic roadmap for Klarna required building a recognizable consumer brand, hence the "smooth" marketing aesthetic and iconic pink color palette. The competitive landscape was divided into three clear categories: big tech giants (Apple, Amazon, Google), nimble fintech challengers (Revolut, Chime, Nubank), and traditional banking incumbents (Goldman Sachs' Marcus). In order to win, Klarna had to move and innovate faster than these entities. Looking forward, the ultimate goal remains for three or four large global players to emerge as comprehensive digital financial assistants for their customers.

The "Good to Great" Philosophy and Klarna Everywhere

Drawing inspiration from Jim Collins' management book *Good to Great*, specifically the tenet "don't bet on a single technology," Klarna sought to solve a major consumer limitation: the inability to use Klarna at non-integrated points of sale. To combat this, they introduced a physical card to allow usage everywhere, accepting the tradeoff of losing granular SKU-level data on those transactions. This created internal app complexities, such as explaining to consumers why purchase images appeared for some transactions but not others, but the trade-off was necessary to expand market reach.

Missing the First Wave in the US Market

Klarna initially missed out on the early US market momentum. Out of nowhere, Nick Molnar and his team from the Australian competitor Afterpay arrived in the US, signed a massive RFP with Urban Outfitters, and gathered rapid traction. While Affirm had been operating for years on high-ticket items (like $1,000 boosted boards), Afterpay pioneered the "paying for a $10 t-shirt" low-ticket BNPL model. Coming to the US in the summer of 2019, Klarna realized they were on the verge of missing a critical opportunity to establish scale in the world's largest market. They reacted frantically, getting their own "Pay in 4" product live in the US market within just two to three months.

The Ultimate Entrepreneurial Challenge: Faking the Win

Despite having a richer product and more historical features than Afterpay, Klarna faced the classic corporate dilemma: "you don't get fired for choosing IBM." US e-commerce chiefs chose Afterpay simply because they were perceived as the market leader. To shift this perception, Klarna engineered a "browser hack" within their app. The Klarna app incorporated an internal web browser enabling users to shop at any retailer—even non-partners like Amazon. The app dynamically generated a one-time virtual Visa card and auto-filled it at checkout. This approach allowed Klarna to secure the coveted SKU-level data via the browser interface and flip the sales pitch to merchants using a single App Annie download chart showing they had more consumer downloads than Afterpay.

- The Klarna browser generates over $10 billion in transaction volume. - The success of the browser strategy ultimately helped Klarna sign major US merchants like Sephora and Macy's.

Acquired Sponsor: Vanta

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Training for the Champions League Final of Corporate Pressure

Reflecting on Klarna's 19-year journey as a private company—navigating shifting business models, massive funding rounds, valuation volatility, and intense corporate governance "succession drama"—the speaker shares insights on managing extreme psychological pressure. Rather than letting desperation or confusion paralyze him, he adopts the mindset of an elite athlete, comparing the corporate struggle to Zlatan Ibrahimović playing in a Champions League final or cyclists enduring the Tour de France. When under massive stress, he pumps Queen's "Under Pressure" at maximum volume in his car to lean into the moment, viewing intense challenges as a hard-earned privilege.

- Klarna was officially recognized as Europe's most valuable fintech when its valuation peaked at $50 billion. - The speaker notes that when valuations grow faster than revenue and profit, a market correction is inevitable.

[01:01:46](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=3706s) The Whiplash of Startup Volatility

The conversation highlights the jarring reality of running a high-stakes startup, contrasting a glamorous, high-profile lifestyle with sudden market downturns. The speaker recalls a surreal 24-hour window where they had dinner with Boris Johnson and immediately flew to a private conference attended by Elon Musk and Kim Kardashian. During this moment, they found themselves wondering, "is this what life is going to be like now?" The answer arrived brutally just three months later: the market shifted, Klarna's valuation dropped to $6.5 billion, fundraising became nearly impossible, and newspapers were actively writing about their apparent failure, openly questioning if their next product would even work.

Despite the intense stress of the situation, the speaker notes a strange, re-energizing upside to the chaos, stating, "it's obviously horrible to some degree but it's also like wow I'm living again." They admit that while they didn't plan for or want the crisis—and perhaps could have avoided it with smarter planning—being backed into a corner forces an entrepreneur to simply wake up, face reality, and make the best of the situation on the ground.

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[01:02:45](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=3765s) Capital Efficiency and the Trillion-Dollar Market

Addressing a question about whether their aggressive decisions and subsequent board friction were simply the most forward-looking choices possible at the time, the speaker sets the record straight regarding Klarna's historical finances. They emphasize a fact frequently overlooked by the media: Klarna was consistently profitable every single year up until 2019. While they still raised capital during those early years, it was strictly to grow and support their balance sheet, not to stay afloat. The speaker points out that the media often fails to separate primary fundraising from secondary transactions, masking the reality that Klarna was actually one of Sequoia’s most capital-efficient investments for its first decade.

The financial dynamic shifted dramatically when Klarna decided to go "all in" on a rapid expansion into the United States and other new territories. This aggressive push led to heavy investing and a steep cash burn, reaching a low point where their worst single EBITDA month was negative $150 million—representing an annualized burn rate of roughly $1 billion.

- **The Dilution Paradox:** Despite a $1 billion annual burn, investors were aggressively cheering the company on, granting them a peak valuation of $50 billion. At that scale, a $1 billion loss represented a mere 2% annual dilution, which the speaker argues is incredibly low for an opportunity of that magnitude. - **The Total Addressable Market:** The speaker justifies the massive scale of investment by pointing out that payments and financial services represent a trillion-dollar opportunity. They note it is "not unthinkable" that a top player in this space could eventually be worth hundreds of billions or even a trillion dollars, drawing a direct parallel to the scale of Visa.

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[01:04:46](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=3886s) Strategic Regrets and Playing the Game on the Field

Reflecting on past choices with the benefit of hindsight, the speaker acknowledges that not every decision was perfectly sane. While they express zero regret over their aggressive marketing investments and rapid market expansion, they openly regret the speed and scale of their internal hiring, admitting, "we expanded too fast in hiring, we should have been a little bit more careful about that."

The conversation then pivots to a famous tech adage from investor Bill Gurley: "you got to play the game on the field." The speaker agrees completely, noting that during their peak growth years, their rival Afterpay was playing an incredibly aggressive game, forcing Klarna to match their pace or risk losing cultural and operational relevance entirely. This intense competitive landscape drove a rapid escalation in Klarna's valuation over just a few years.

- **Valuation Timeline:** - **2016/2017:** Valued at $2 billion. - **2019:** Reached $5 billion when Dragoneer backed them, believing Klarna had a real shot in the US market despite the fact that "Afterpay was kicking our ass." - **2020:** Hit $10 billion after Silver Lake invested, observing that Klarna was not just competing but actively outperforming Afterpay. - **2021:** Climbed to $30 billion (and eventually $50 billion) as investors realized the company was far ahead of the curve.

> "I still look at the fact of like the company's soon going to do over $3 billion worth of Revenue and it's this size after 20 years... I think it's an okay achievement."

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[01:06:44](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=4004s) The Elon Musk Philosophy: Extreme Cost Consciousness

Turning toward the future, the host steers the conversation toward artificial intelligence and its immediate, practical applications inside Klarna. The speaker explains that their current operational philosophy was heavily inspired by Walter Isaacson's biography of Elon Musk. While the speaker has always found Musk's ability to simultaneously build electric cars and rockets mind-blowing and inspirational, reading the book revealed a completely different trait: "he's a freaking cheap bastard like he is so cost conscious."

The speaker recounts a specific anecdote from the book detailing how NASA spent $3 million on an air conditioning unit for a rocket, while Musk’s team went to Home Depot, bought a unit for $5,000, and found that it worked just as well. This relentless, cross-the-board cost focus yields highly profitable companies with massive revenue growth, even in deep tech sectors like SpaceX. This realization completely reframed the ultimate operational challenge for Klarna: engineering a business model where the revenue line goes up while the cost curve simultaneously bends downward.

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[01:08:50](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=4130s) Deploying AI to Build a Leaner Organization

The speaker identifies AI as the primary enabler for shrinking costs while growing revenue. Currently employing around 4,000 people, Klarna is actively avoiding the pain and low morale associated with standard corporate layoffs. Instead, they are leveraging natural tech attrition—which typically sits around 20% per year as employees hit five-year tenures—to thoughtfully downsize. By freezing almost all non-engineering recruitment since late 2023, the company is shrinking naturally by 20% annually while using AI to restructure workflows and eliminate internal duplication.

The most publicized success of this strategy has taken place within their customer service operations. Beyond their internal staff, Klarna traditionally relied on 2,000 to 3,000 external customer service agents provided by third-party suppliers. By injecting AI directly into customer support, they achieved a massive operational breakthrough.

- **The Customer Satisfaction Milestone:** The first major breakthrough occurred when customer satisfaction scores for AI interactions landed completely on par with human agents. This marked a massive shift away from the universally hated, rigid IVR ("press one for this, press two for that") systems and frustratingly basic online chatbots of the past. - **The Two-Thirds Drop:** Upon launching the feature globally, the AI instantly took over two-thirds (66%) of all customer service errands, leaving only one-third for human agents to resolve.

The speaker notes that because their third-party customer service vendors are massive global operations employing over a million people collectively, the 700 full-time agents Klarna no longer required were simply redeployed to other corporate clients, resulting in zero immediate job losses. However, the speaker stresses that they deliberately chose to share these metrics with the public and politicians to spark a serious conversation about the long-term societal and economic implications of AI, noting that future implementations across other companies will eventually impact net employment.

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[01:15:26](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=4526s) The Rise of "Tiger" Companies

The host points out that for the past decade, early-stage founders in Silicon Valley have romanticized small, ultra-lean teams—pointing to rare anomalies like Instagram or WhatsApp, which scaled to massive user bases with only a handful of employees before being acquired by Facebook and scaled traditionally. While that dream was largely a myth for a long time due to the sheer operational complexity of scaling a business, both speakers agree that AI is suddenly making the ultra-lean, high-output company a tangible reality. The speaker concludes by introducing their core thesis on the matter, coining the term "Tigers" to describe an emerging class of companies. These organizations are deeply embedding AI into the core of their operations from day one, entirely reimagining how value is created.

[01:16:33](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=4593s) The Rise of "Tiger" Companies and the $10 Million Metric

The landscape of corporate productivity is on the verge of a dramatic shift driven by AI adoption. Forward-thinking companies are radically reshaping how they work, ship code, and launch product features. There is a palpable sense of excitement around tech leaders like Brian Chesky at Airbnb, who are openly sharing their aggressive AI integrations. This structural transformation will allow agile companies to accelerate far ahead of their respective industries. The key operational metric to watch is revenue per employee, which is poised to reach heights that are historically unprecedented.

To put this shift into perspective, historical and current corporate benchmarks highlight just how massive this leap will be. Traditionally, older, less efficient companies operate at lower baselines, but top-tier modern tech giants have pushed the envelope much further. The speaker envisions a near future where elite, AI-accelerated companies leave current giants in the dust, drastically improving both the quality and overall pace of software development. While the timeline for true Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) remains an open question, the short-term reality over the next 6 to 12 months is going to be "revolutionizing."

* **Klarna's Evolution:** Historically operated at roughly $0.6 million in revenue per employee; it has now climbed to nearly $1 million. * **Current Tech Benchmarks:** Apple and Netflix lead the pack, sitting at approximately $2 million in revenue per employee. * **Financial Services Benchmarks:** Goldman Sachs operates at roughly $1 million per employee, while Visa sits slightly higher at about $1.1 million. * **The Future "Tiger" Target:** Highly optimized AI-native or AI-adaptive companies are expected to eventually hit $5 million to $10 million in revenue per employee.

[01:18:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=4680s) The FinTech Revival and the Champions League Ahead

The massive gap in operational efficiency creates a stark, almost irreconcilable reality for legacy institutions. When considering how a traditional bank could possibly compete with these hyper-efficient organizations, the speaker admits, "I just don't understand how that's going to work... I can't compute." Traditional players are severely bogged down by slow decision-making processes and ancient technology stacks, making it incredibly difficult to adapt. This friction paves the way for a massive, imminent revival of the fintech sector, with early signs already popping up across global markets.

A wave of momentum is building behind several key fintech players. Digital banks and platforms like Nubank, Monzo, and Revolut are performing phenomenally well, alongside companies like Dave, which rebounded beautifully after facing heavy initial criticism. This wave of disruption will not be isolated to finance; similar patterns of hyper-acceleration will replicate across multiple sectors, creating an environment that is equal parts exciting and challenging. Reflecting on his own journey and the massive transformation left to play out, the speaker concludes with a sports analogy, noting that "maybe I haven't played that Champions League final yet, still ahead of us."

The conversation wraps up on a high, collegial note. The hosts express admiration for the unexpected macro-insights, joking that while they anticipated a standard chat about the payments industry, this closing segment opened up an entirely new chapter. They coin and credit the term "tiger" companies as a much tighter, better descriptor for this new corporate breed than the overused "unicorns." Given the breakneck pace of AI, they joke about inviting him back not in 6 to 12 months, but perhaps in just "two or three weeks" to see how the landscape has shifted.

## Notable quotes > [32:47](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=1967s) Peter, you have to sell your business to me because I'm going to run you over. — Sebastian Siemiatkowski

> [26:38](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=1598s) Oh okay, that's how you make business in the banking world. Awesome, let's do it — Sebastian Siemiatkowski

> [01:01:46](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=3706s) is this what life is going to be like now? — Sebastian Siemiatkowski

> [01:01:46](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=3706s) it's obviously horrible to some degree but it's also like wow I'm living again. — Sebastian Siemiatkowski

> [01:04:46](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=3886s) we expanded too fast in hiring, we should have been a little bit more careful about that. — Sebastian Siemiatkowski

> [01:04:46](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=3886s) Afterpay was kicking our ass. — Sebastian Siemiatkowski

> [01:04:46](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=3886s) I still look at the fact of like the company's soon going to do over $3 billion worth of Revenue and it's this size after 20 years... I think it's an okay achievement. — Sebastian Siemiatkowski

> [01:06:44](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=4004s) he's a freaking cheap bastard like he is so cost conscious. — Sebastian Siemiatkowski

> [01:18:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=4680s) I just don't understand how that's going to work... I can't compute. — Sebastian Siemiatkowski

> [01:18:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=4680s) maybe I haven't played that Champions League final yet, still ahead of us. — Sebastian Siemiatkowski

## Mentioned Klarna, Sebastian Siemiatkowski, Visa, MasterCard, Spotify, Shopify, Ingvar Kamprad, Ikea, Richard Branson, Virgin Group, Stockholm School of Economics, PwC, Acme, Google AdWords, Amazon, Niklas, Afterpay, Stripe, Adyen, Affirm, ASOS, McKinsey, Clayton Christensen, Burger King, Walmart, Klarna Checkout, Collison brothers, Peter van der Does, Bambora, Ingenico, Apple, Google, Revolut, Chime, Nubank, Goldman Sachs' Marcus, Jim Collins, Good to Great, Nick Molnar, Urban Outfitters, App Annie, Vanta, Jeff Bezos, Zlatan Ibrahimović, Queen, Boris Johnson, Elon Musk, Kim Kardashian, Sequoia, EBITDA, Dragoneer, Silver Lake, Bill Gurley, Walter Isaacson, SpaceX, NASA, Home Depot, Instagram, WhatsApp, Facebook, Brian Chesky, Airbnb, Netflix, Goldman Sachs, Monzo, Dave

[Source](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4)

中文简报

Klarna推进AI应用,目标实现人均创收1000万美元 积极整合AI使金融科技公司能够通过自然减员精简人员编制,同时推动人均创收走向历史新高,令传统银行机构难以竞争。 在本期内容中,Klarna联合创始人兼首席执行官Sebastian Siemiatkowski剖析了全球支付价值链的基本逻辑,并回顾了公司如何从一家瑞典的未清发票保理初创企业,一步步演变为全球金融巨头。他概述了Klarna在意识到自身无法在后端支付处理执行力上胜过Adyen和Stripe后,如何成功转型为以消费者为中心的数字金融助手战略。最后,Siemiatkowski详细介绍了Klarna受埃隆·马斯克(Elon Musk)启发所形成的极度成本意识,以及其革命性的AI部署——目前AI已接管其三分之二的客户服务运营,并为打造超高效、极致精简的“老虎”型企业铺平了道路。 全球支付价值链由三个基础组成部分构成:发卡行、管理金融标准的卡组织网络(Visa/Mastercard),以及与商户合作的收单支付服务提供商(PSP)。 (0:00) Klarna的创立源于一项深刻洞察:瑞典早期的电商商户迫切需要一种安全的支付方式,以消除消费者在网上输入借记卡信息时的不信任感。 (2:24) “先买后付”(BNPL)概念类似于历史上邮购目录中的“开账单后付款”选项,切中了消费者倾向于验货后再付款的心理。 (5:33) Klarna从创立首日起便实现了正向现金流和资金效率,其方式是将商户结算款推迟三周发放,在承担违约风险的同时,本质上利用商户浮存金为早期扩张提供资金,而无需庞大的外部信贷额度。 (11:10) 2007年金融危机后一个被忽视的巨大宏观经济转变为Klarna进军英国和美国市场提供了契机:千禧一代和Z世代消费者明显更青睐借记卡而非传统信用卡。 (16:46)

Reading summary

Klarna co-founder and CEO Sebastian Siemiatkowski argues that structural misalignments in traditional banking opened the door for disruptive payment models, while internal adoption of artificial intelligence is now radically altering operational efficiency across the fintech landscape. Capital-Efficient Invoicing and Cash-Flow Inversion (5:33) Klarna originated in Sweden by adapting mail-order open invoices to early e-commerce, offering buyers the ability to inspect products before paying. This appealed to Swedish shoppers who used debit cards and feared exposing their bank balances online. While skeptics assumed financing unpaid merchant invoices would require massive equity or lines of credit, Klarna took on default risk and administrative tasks while stipulating that merchants would not be paid until three weeks post-transaction. Because many shoppers settled accounts early, the arrangement generated positive cash flow from inception. Incumbent Vulnerability and the Rise of Debit (16:46) Klarna's expansion revealed a structural shift away from traditional revolving debt. Traditional card issuers relied heavily on high-margin, 30% revolving interest rates and tactics that nudged users into continuous borrowing, such as eliminating debit-or-credit choices at point-of-sale terminals. Following the 2007–2008 financial crisis, US and UK debit usage grew tenfold compared to a doubling in credit card volume, leaving an emerging segment of "self-aware avoiders" averse to revolving debt. Incumbent banks faced an innovator's dilemma: offering transparent, interest-free installment plans would cannibalize their lucrative revolving fee streams, leaving Klarna and its peers unencumbered room to scale. Pivoting from Infrastructure to Consumer Brand (35:55) Klarna initially sought to dominate the merchant processing ecosystem via Klarna Checkout, aiming to combine issuer, payment service provider, and acquirer functions. However, international scaling stalled, and competitors like Adyen outpaced Klarna, culminating in Adyen winning Spotify in Sweden in 2015. Rather than selling out or remaining a secondary payment gateway, Klarna shifted focus toward winning direct consumer relationships. Former rivals Adyen and Stripe subsequently became Klarna's largest distribution partners, while Klarna focused on capturing SKU-level transactional data unavailable on legacy four-party card rails. Market Corrections and Operational Restructuring (61:46) After operating profitably every year through 2019, Klarna pursued aggressive US expansion that led to annualized burn rates approaching $1 billion and an eventual market correction that compressed its valuation from a $50 billion peak to $6.5 billion. Siemiatkowski acknowledged excessive hiring as a misstep during that expansion phase. To reverse cost curves while maintaining revenue projected to exceed $3 billion, the company implemented a non-engineering hiring freeze and turned to natural annual tech attrition of roughly 20% to downsize internal headcount without mass layoffs. Automation and the Tiger Company Thesis (68:50) Siemiatkowski targets radical efficiency gains through AI deployment, inspired by extreme operational cost-consciousness. In customer operations, an internal rollout allowed AI to handle two-thirds of customer service volume at satisfaction levels matching human agents, allowing third-party contractors to redeploy 700 customer service workers. Klarna's revenue per employee has risen from roughly $600,000 to nearly $1 million. Siemiatkowski projects that an emerging class of AI-native "tiger" companies will challenge legacy banks by achieving $5 million to $10 million in revenue per employee. While Siemiatkowski views fintech's efficiency acceleration as inevitable, the broader societal impact of large-scale corporate AI adoption on net employment remains an open policy and economic question.

精炼阅读摘要

Klarna联合创始人兼首席执行官Sebastian Siemiatkowski阐述了该公司如何从瑞典早期的电商逆向保理商,演进为全球先买后付(BNPL)巨头;他认为,传统银行受制于高息循环贷的“创新者窘境”,而深度结合人工智能的精炼型金融科技企业将在人效与服务体验上颠覆传统金融体系。 逆向保理机制与自造血现金流 (11:10) Klarna创立于近20年前的瑞典。当时电商初期商户极度缺乏信任机制,且瑞典消费者普遍使用借记卡,对在网络输入卡号和信贷消费存有高度戒心。Siemiatkowski早年在催收保理公司的电话推销经历让他发现,早期电商商户并不擅长管理现金流,且对坏账风险和催收琐事极为恐惧。针对这一痛点,Klarna颠覆了传统保理逻辑,向商户承诺承担100%的消费者违约风险,但将结算周期设为交易发生后三周。由于大量消费者在发票到期前或收到商品后即快速结清,商户实际上为Klarna提供了规模扩张所需的沉淀资金(Float)。 这套独特的商业结构使Klarna在极度缺乏外部资金的情况下保持了罕见的正向现金流。在初始天使轮融资中,投资人以6万美元换取10%股权,而Klarna仅消耗了其中的3万美元便在运营约六个月时实现盈利。Siemiatkowski澄清,在2019年开启激进的全球扩张之前,Klarna在长达十余年的时间里每年均保持盈利,早期融资主要用于充实资产负债表而非弥补经营亏损。 借记卡浪潮与银行的创新者窘境 (20:54) Klarna早期曾认定英美市场因信用卡普及度极高而难以渗透。然而,其英国团队违背管理层专注大额分期的指令,强行签下时尚零售商ASOS并大获成功。这一事件揭示了后金融危机时代的宏观转变:在2007年至2018年间,借记卡使用量增长了10倍,而信用卡使用量仅翻倍,年轻一代因监管收紧和反感高额债务而主动疏远信用卡。麦肯锡2014年的一份报告将这部分人群定义为“自觉规避者”(Self-Aware Avoiders),占当时美国人口约20%,其特征为高收入、高消费,但极度厌恶传统银行诱导借款人支付最低还款以收取高达30%循环利息的掠夺性手段。 这构成了经典的“创新者窘境”。传统银行的商业模式高度依赖循环利息带来的暴利,并以此支撑丰厚的积分返现计划;向消费者提供透明且免息的四期分期还款(Pay-in-4)虽然有利于用户财务健康,但会直接侵蚀银行最赚钱的利息池。Siemiatkowski坦承,Klarna在2007年涉足分期信贷时也曾效仿过银行诱导最低还款的伎俩并赚取巨利,但管理层随后反思并主动剥离了此类设计,转向更加健康的借记与分期平衡模式。 放弃通道内耗并押注SKU数据壁垒 (35:55) 在2010年前后,Klarna曾推出集收单、支付服务提供商(PSP)和发卡于一体的Klarna Checkout,试图在底层管道上直接与Stripe和Adyen竞争。然而,随着2013年至2015年间本地化支付方式迭代落后,以及本土大客户Spotify被Adyen签走,Klarna管理层意识到自身在纯工程通道领域落后,决议彻底转型——放弃纯B端商户网关定位,转向全力争夺C端消费者关系,反将Adyen和Stripe变为自身分销渠道。 转型消费者品牌后,Klarna的核心竞争优势在于原生的单品级(SKU-level)数据。由于起步于发票业务,Klarna必须记录商品品名、尺码、颜色及图片。相比之下,Visa和MasterCard等四方支付网络受制于数千家发卡行的系统协同瓶颈,长期无法有效传递三级数据(Level 3);而Klarna这类三方闭环网络能直接在应用内呈现详尽账单。进军美国市场面临Afterpay先发壁垒时,Klarna还在应用内构建了内置浏览器技术,动态生成一次性虚拟Visa卡,绕过未合作商家的接入限制完成分期,借此实现超百亿美元的交易规模并反推大型商户合作。 估值震荡与AI重塑高人效企业 (68:50) 在美国市场的白热化竞争中,Klarna估值一度攀升至500亿美元的峰值,但在随后的科技股退潮期剧烈缩水至65亿美元,最艰难时的单月EBITDA亏损曾达1.5亿美元(折合年化约10亿美元烧钱率)。Siemiatkowski反思认为,激进的市场营销是必要的防守与进攻,但过度且迅速的内部人员扩张是重大失误。经历市场震荡后,公司借鉴了Elon Musk在SpaceX和特斯拉推行的极致成本控制理念,转向依靠人工智能技术压缩运营支出,同时拉升收入曲线。 Klarna目前拥有约4000名员工,自2023年末起冻结了非工程类岗位的招聘,借助每年约20%的科技行业自然离职率缩减编制。在客户服务领域,引入的AI客服系统上线后迅速承接了66%的咨询工单,且客户满意度与人工持平,使外部供应商减少了700名外包客服的投入。Siemiatkowski由此提出“老虎型公司”(Tiger Companies)概念,预测在AI驱动下,未来顶尖企业的员工人均创收将从当前科技巨头的约200万美元大幅跨越至500万乃至1000万美元(Klarna已从人均60万美元提升至近100万美元),彻底拉开与效率低下的传统银行的差距。 Siemiatkowski强调,支付与金融服务属于万亿美元级别的庞大市场,头部玩家未来有望达到数千亿甚至万亿美元市值。尽管估值剧烈波动与组织调整带来了严峻的心理考验,但他认为向全自动化“数字财务助手”演进的大方向不可逆转,传统金融机构若无法克服笨重的组织架构与技术债务,将在新一轮AI与金融科技的复兴浪潮中失去竞争力。

Detailed notes — zh

## Background 本期节目由知名商业播客《Acquired》于 2025 年 3 月 13 日发布在 YouTube 平台(音频原版于 2024 年 6 月上线)。节目由主播 Ben Gilbert 和 David Rosenthal 对话瑞典金融科技巨头 Klarna 的联合创始人兼 CEO 塞巴斯蒂安·谢米亚特科夫斯基(Sebastian Siemiatkowski),围绕其创业 19 年来的逆境突围、支付产业格局演化、先买后付(BNPL)的崛起,以及当下颠覆性的 AI 降本增效战略展开深度对谈。 ## TL;DR 节目全面复盘了 Klarna 从 3 万美元启动资金、依靠正向保理现金流盈利,逐步成长为服务全球 1.5 亿消费者的支付巨无霸的完整历程。塞巴斯蒂安坦诚回顾了公司曾试图抗衡 Stripe 与 Adyen 做全链路收单的战略失误,以及随后转向 C 端消费者品牌、凭借“内置浏览器+虚拟卡”成功突围美国市场的商业战役。面对 500 亿美元估值缩水至 65 亿美元的高压周期,他分享了顶级运动员般的抗压心智,并重点阐述了 Klarna 当前激进的 AI 落地实践——通过智能客服接管三分之二工单与自然减员,将企业重塑为高人均创收的“老虎型”(Tigers)公司,以迎接 Fintech 全面复兴的巅峰对决。 ## Atmosphere & style 整场对话兼具商业硬核推演与罕见的创始人心理自白,语调真诚、坦率且充满极客思辨。塞巴斯蒂安毫不避讳谈及早期的盲目狂妄、与 Afterpay 的贴身肉搏以及身处估值暴跌暴风眼时的脆弱与挣扎;随后通过《Under Pressure》和欧冠决赛的生动比喻,将气氛推向充满竞技张力的情绪高潮。主播与嘉宾之间配合默契、笑声不断,在深挖底层支付架构逻辑的同时,更让听众切实感受到一位历经 19 年惊涛骇浪的掌舵者在面对 AI 巨浪时的清醒、冷峻与前瞻雄心。 ## Bulletin - [01:10:52](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=4252s) Klarna 通过上线生成式 AI 智能客服,两小时内接管了原本需要 2,000 至 3,000 名外包人员处理的 2/3 工作量,且客户满意度评分与人类客服持平。 - [01:06:44](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=4004s) 公司推行招聘冻结配合约 20% 的年均自然离职率实现平滑降本,规避主动裁员,并提出未来深度融合 AI 的“老虎”(Tigers)型企业人均创收有望冲刺 500 万至 1,000 万美元。 - [52:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=3120s) 面对美国市场 Afterpay 的先发制人,Klarna 通过 App 内置浏览器自动生成一次性虚拟 Visa 卡,既实现全网电商分期又捕获了底层 SKU 级数据,目前该功能年交易额已超 100 亿美元。 - [10:38](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=638s) Klarna 早期利用中小电商无力处理坏账与琐务的痛点,采取延后 3 周向商户打款但消费者提前还款的时间差,仅花费 3 万美元即实现闪电盈利并打破保理负现金流魔咒。 ## Key takeaways - [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=0s) 现代支付生态由发卡侧(Issuing)、清算网络(Networks)与收单侧(Acquiring)三大核心支柱组成,Klarna 在此生态中重构了消费者信任。 - [05:05](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=305s) “先买后付”(BNPL)的底层诉求最初不是借贷消费,而是在缺乏实体触感的远距离电商交易中,为习惯借记卡的消费者建立货到付款的安全信任感。 - [09:14](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=554s) Klarna 早期仅花掉 3 万美元天使投资就实现盈利,依靠承担商户违约风险换取延后 3 周结算,结合买家提前付款构建出正向现金流循环。 - [28:07](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=1687s) 传统银行长期依赖 20%-30% 年化的循环利息和“最低还款额”陷阱获取超额利润,形成了通过让部分用户陷入高息债务来补贴高返现的负向飞轮。 - [20:54](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=1254s) 美国次贷危机后年轻一代演变为极度厌恶传统信用卡潜规则的“清醒规避者”(Self-aware avoiders),借记卡大繁荣为无息分期产品提供了绝佳红利。 - [35:36](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=2136s) 2015 年在收单业务面临 Adyen 和 Stripe 碾压、核心伙伴 Spotify 倒戈且 Shopify 筑墙后,Klarna 果断放弃商户结账台竞争,全面转向消费者端品牌。 - [43:36](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=2616s) Klarna 与传统信用卡网络最大的壁垒差异在于原生掌握单品颗粒度的 SKU 级明细数据,这是老旧的四方卡组织网络因历史技术包袱与利益冲突无法推行的优势。 - [52:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=3120s) 面对 Afterpay 在美国商户端建立的“IBM 效应”,Klarna 凭借内置浏览器与一次性虚拟卡技术实现“在全网任何地方都能用”,成功反超竞品并签下梅西百货与丝芙兰。 - [59:15](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=3555s) 创始人 Siemiatkowski 借鉴伊布拉希莫维奇与欧冠决赛的心态应对 500 亿估值跌至 65 亿的资本过山车,学会在车里大放《Under Pressure》以享受极限高压。 - [01:02:45](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=3765s) 在 500 亿美元高估值时期,Klarna 每年近 10 亿美元的年化烧钱率对股东股权的实际稀释率仅为 2%,以此博取下一个 Visa 级别的全球市场在当时具备自洽逻辑。 - [01:06:44](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=4004s) 受马斯克极致成本控制理念启发,Klarna 追求“营收曲线上升、成本曲线向下”,通过冻结招聘借助 20% 年自然流失率实现低痛苦度的组织减员。 - [01:10:52](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=4252s) AI 客服上线后在评分持平人类客服的前提下直接缩减 2/3 的人工工单量,不仅大幅降本,也为全社会未来面临的自动化技术性失业敲响了警钟。 - [01:15:26](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=4526s) 未来的企业将告别庞大团队组织,以 AI 为底层架构的“老虎”(Tigers)型企业将向 500 万至 1,000 万美元的人均创收发起冲击,推动 Fintech 赛道全面复兴。 ## Detailed walkthrough ### [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=0s) 播客开场与支付生态全景图(30,000 英尺视角) 节目由 Acquired 主持人拉开序幕。继去年底对 Visa 的深度剖析后,本期节目邀请到了瑞典支付巨头 Klarna 的联合创始人兼 CEO 塞巴斯蒂安·谢米亚特科夫斯基(Sebastian Siemiatkowski),共同深入探讨全球支付版图的演进。作为一家 19 年前在斯德哥尔摩创立的金融科技公司(与主播们的好友 Spotify 几乎诞生成长在同一时期),Klarna 最广为人知的身份是“先买后付”(Buy Now, Pay Later,简称 BNPL)领域的开创者与领军者。如今,该公司在全球范围内拥有 1.5 亿消费者用户,每天处理的支付交易量高达 200 万笔,并具备在更大范围的支付领域重塑游戏规则的雄心。 主持人首先抛出了一个既像送分题又极具挑战性的宏观问题:“如果站在 3 万英尺的高空俯瞰,怎样在 5 分钟内向大家勾勒出支付体系的运转机制,以及产业链条中的核心参与者?”塞巴斯蒂安笑着回应,鉴于收听这档播客的大多是商业与技术极客,他倾向于从底层框架切入——最清晰的理解方式是将现代支付生态划分为三大核心支柱:发卡侧(Issuing)、清算网络(Networks)以及收单侧(Acquiring): - **发卡方(Issuers)**:通常是向消费者发放借记卡或信用卡的银行,负责为持卡人提供信贷额度或对接账户中的活期存款余额。 - **清算网络(Card Networks)**:以 Visa 和 Mastercard 为代表。它们不仅建立了全球互信的品牌认知(让用户确信只要贴有该标识的地方就能刷卡),更制定了金融信息交换、交易授权、清算与资金结算的技术标准。 - **收单方与支付服务提供商(Acquirers & PSPs)**:直接对接并赋能商户,既包括为线下实体零售店铺设 POS 终端刷卡机的机构,也包括为线上电商网站提供结账页面(Checkouts)与收银收单集成服务的公司。 - **周边生态服务商**:在三大主体周围还围绕着大量专业化企业,涵盖欺诈识别、授信风控与核保(Underwriting),以及像 Shopify 这样在极高程度上兼具金融科技属性的电商 SaaS 平台。 ```mermaid flowchart LR accTitle: 现代支付产业链核心架构 accDescr: 展示消费者、发卡行、卡组织网络、收单与PSP及最终商户之间的资金与信息流 subgraph ConsumerSide["消费者侧 (Issuing)"] Consumer["消费者"] Issuer["发卡行 (Issuing Bank)<br/>提供信用额度 / 账户余额"] Consumer -->|"持卡消费"| Issuer end subgraph Networks["网络路由 (Networks)"] CardNet["卡组织网络<br/>Visa / Mastercard<br/>清算、结算与标准制定"] end subgraph MerchantSide["商户侧 (Acquiring)"] Acquirer["收单行 / PSP<br/>POS终端 / 线上收银台"] Merchant["商户 / 电商平台"] Acquirer -->|"资金结算"| Merchant end Issuer <-->|"授权与结算"| CardNet CardNet <-->|"交易路由"| Acquirer ``` --- ### [02:24](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=144s) 电话推销与“Acme”经历:在废墟中发现电商萌芽 回溯到 19 年前创办 Klarna 的起点,塞巴斯蒂安坦言自己自幼就怀揣创业梦想。14 岁那年,他阅读了理查德·布兰森(Richard Branson)关于维珍集团的传记,深受震撼,同时他也将瑞典本土商业传奇——宜家(IKEA)创始人英格瓦·坎普拉德(Ingvar Kamprad)视为偶像。早年他脑子里冒出过无数商业想法,但大部分最终都仅仅停留在一张张草稿纸上。 在斯德哥尔摩经济学院(Stockholm School of Economics)读了两年商科后,塞巴斯蒂安休学了一整年,展开了一场“不搭乘任何飞机环游世界”的硬核冒险。然而,当他风尘仆仆结束旅程回到瑞典时,恰逢互联网泡沫破灭后的经济低谷期,他身无分文且急需一份工作。当时像他这样具有商科背景的毕业生通常会去普华永道(PwC)等四大会计师事务所,但他四处碰壁、求职无门,最终只能屈就于一家应收账款保理与催收公司做底层电话销售——这是他以前最无法想象的工作。不过,塞巴斯蒂安在 17、18 岁时曾做过晚间电话营销兼职,挨家挨户打电话推销杂志订阅,这练就了他面对冷板凳和无情拒绝时的厚脸皮。 在这家名为“Acme”的公司里,塞巴斯蒂安的日常就是翻开厚厚的企业黄页电话簿,一家接一家打冷电话(Cold Call):“请问贵公司遇到客户欠账不付,或者需要针对应收账款做保理借款时,目前使用的是哪家供应商?您是否愿意考虑换成我们?” - **荒诞的滑稽公司名**:塞巴斯蒂安打趣道,这家公司之所以起名叫“Acme”,是因为管理层觉得微软在所有 Office 教程和演示文档里都把虚构的测试公司叫做 Acme,他们天真地认为“微软每次演示都是在帮我们做免费广告”。 - **艰难的传统市场推销**:2003 年的市场极其封闭冷清。当塞巴斯蒂安给瑞典某家传统中型企业的财务主管大妈打电话时,对方往往冷淡地回绝:“小伙子,这家合作机构我已经用了 20 年了。就算你们每笔能帮我省下 1,000 美元手续费,我也压根不在乎。我只信任老伙伴。” 就在传统行业到处碰壁之时,塞巴斯蒂安意外拨通了几家早期电子商务公司的电话。当时亚马逊尚未进入瑞典,但有一批嗅觉敏锐的早期极客创业者发现,通过 Google AdWords 能以极低成本买下冷门长尾词(例如“猫粮”),然后迅速将大批猫粮销往全国。然而,这些初露头角的电商网站在收单环节普遍面临着严重的卡点。 --- ### [05:05](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=305s) BNPL 的本质洞察:从邮购目录到瑞典借记卡时代的“信任机制” 当时瑞典电商主流的在线支付方式与今天类似,依然是 Visa 和 Mastercard 的刷卡支付。但塞巴斯蒂安敏锐地注意到了一个深层的用户心理障碍。传统邮购目录(Mail Order Catalog)时代,商家早就采用过一种“收到账单后再付款”(Bill Me Later)的记账方式。这种机制在美国乃至全球邮购业盛行已久,其背后的商业心理学非常直接: 线下购物时,顾客可以亲眼目睹、亲手触摸并试穿试用商品,确认心仪之后才掏钱付款;然而远距离销售(Distance Selling)剥夺了这种确定性。如果允许顾客先收到包裹、拆盒检查确认满意之后再结账,订单转化率就会大幅飙升。塞巴斯蒂安强调,**“先买后付”在诞生之初的核心诉求从来不是“借贷消费”,而是一种为消费者构筑的安全感与信任基石**。 这一洞察在当年的瑞典尤为关键: - **借记卡占绝对主导的心理防御**:虽然许多瑞典人手头拥有信用卡,但普遍视其为容易陷入高利贷陷阱的危险品,只将信用卡作为“最后的紧急贷款渠道”(Lender of last resort)。人们日常消费几乎全部使用直接关联工资账户的借记卡(Debit Card)。 - **早期网络交易的安全恐慌**:在互联网蛮荒期,消费者极度抗拒在一个从未听说过的陌生小型电商网站上,直接敲入自己的借记卡卡号——因为那意味着将自己赖以生存的工资存款账户暴露给未知风险,万一付了钱猫粮没寄到,或者对方卷款跑路,资金根本没有保障。 “先发货,让你收到猫粮并确认这确实是健康无误的优质猫粮后,再走账单付款”的模式瞬间化解了用户的顾虑。当时一些从传统邮购转型线上的成功企业,已经在网上延续了所谓的“公开账单发票支付”(Open Invoice),而这正是后来演化为 BNPL 的雏形。 塞巴斯蒂安恍然大悟:为什么所有的电商网站不能像老牌邮购公司那样,标配这种先货后款的信任工具?由于他当时所就职的“Acme”公司理念陈旧、缺乏远见,根本不可能承载这种创新,他决定重返校园。 --- ### [07:48](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=468s) 迅速验证的 PMF:孵化器、天使投资与最初的 MVP 回到斯德哥尔摩经济学院后,塞巴斯蒂安立刻盯上了学校附属的创业孵化器,决定将这套颠覆线上结账体验的方案落地为一家真正的创业公司。当主持人感慨很多明星创业公司在找到核心业务前往往要在迷宫里跌跌撞撞摸索好几年、而 Klarna 竟然在第一天就锁定了 19 年后的核心支柱时,塞巴斯蒂安坦言,Klarna 寻找产品市场契合点(Product-Market Fit, PMF)的过程出奇地顺畅与迅速: - **早期三人团队**:塞巴斯蒂安拉来了两位好友组建铁三角,一位是高中挚友尼克拉斯(Niklas Adalberth),另一位是大学结识的维克托(Victor Jacobsson)。 - **闪电般的融资与开发节奏**:团队大约在 10 月至 11 月确立方向并进驻孵化器;到了当年 12 月,他们就成功敲定了一位女性天使投资人。 - **MVP 快速成型**:这位天使投资人不仅注入了启动资金,更带来了关键的技术工程师资源。工程团队在极短时间内开发出了第一代最小可行性产品(MVP),系统初步具备了处理交易流水、后台核保与即时授信风控的基础能力。尽管瑞典当时只是一个仅有 1000 万人口的小市场,但这种“消除消费者在线支付疑虑”的全新价值主张,立刻在商户端与买家端展现出了惊人的业务牵引力。 ### [09:14](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=554s) 天使轮融资与闪电盈利:用3万美元撬动正向循环 Klarna 的初期系统搭建效率惊人。兼职的技术团队利用全职工作之余的闲暇时间,从1月到4月仅耗时4个月便完成了初步开发。团队随后向天使投资人寻求资金支持,原本只申请40,000美元以达到收支平衡,但该投资人坚持给他们60,000美元换取10%的股份,并直言:“不,你们会需要60,000美元的。” 回看如今已累计融资约40亿美元的规模,早期的数据显得极其耐人寻味:Klarna 在实际仅花掉30,000美元时就实现了盈利。上线约6个月后交易量便迅速起飞,公司随即进入自我造血阶段,并在此后数年间持续保持盈利,直到很久之后才开启更大规模的外部融资。 当时的业务模型展现出立竿见影的“双边吸引力”: - **商户端**:订单转化率与销售额直接提升,商户切身感受到被赋能。 - **消费者端**:相比直接输入借记卡卡号,这种先拿货的方式给予了巨大的安全感。 然而,这也局限在体量较小的瑞典市场。Sebastian 直言,由于起点在瑞典而非美国,Klarna 没能在那时迅速成为 PayPal 那样的巨头;但对于初创公司而言,在本土的爆火为日后奠定了坚实的基础。 --- ### [10:38](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=638s) 破解保理模式的“负现金流魔咒” 对于这种“先买后付”在早期是否存在垫资浮存(Float)和现金流压力的问题,Sebastian 给出了一个极具创业者视角的逆向逻辑。从本质上看,Klarna 的底层逻辑是**保理业务**(Factoring)——承保商户的应收账款(Accounts Receivable),买断这些资产,然后等待消费者还款。金融行业人士普遍的质疑是:“垫资买断应收账款需要海量现金,钱从哪里来?” 但深入了解早期的中小电商商户后,Sebastian 发现了被主流金融界忽略的两个关键痛点: 1. **违约坏账风险**:小商户最害怕消费者赖账不还。 2. **繁重的行政管理成本**:商户虽然也可以自己打印纸质账单随箱寄送,但后续的对账、催收外包、客服咨询等管理琐事让他们不胜其烦。 出人意料的是,这些小商户自身往往缺乏对现金流价值的精细化理解,**他们并不迫切需要即时到账的现金流解决方案**。Klarna 抓住这一认知差,重构了保理机制:由 Klarna 承担全部未付款风险并包揽所有行政与催收琐事,但条件是**在交易发生3周之后才向商户结算打款**。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Klarna 早期正向现金流保理机制 accDescr: 展示消费者、Klarna 与商户之间错配的还款与结算时点,形成正向现金流循环。 subgraph ConsumerFlow["消费者端 Consumer"] C["消费者下单购买"] -->|"快速还款(早于到期日)"| K["Klarna 平台"] end subgraph KlarnaAdmin["Klarna 承担的价值"] K -->|"1. 兜底未付款坏账风险<br/>2. 承包全部行政与催收琐事"| M["电商商户 Merchant"] end subgraph MerchantFlow["商户资金端 Merchant"] K -.->|"延迟 3 周才结算货款<br/>(提供免费垫资浮存)"| M end ``` 这种机制创造了一个近乎奇迹的“正向现金流保理模式”: - **商户在替平台垫资**:接受延后结算的商户实际上为 Klarna 前几年的规模扩张提供了无息资金池;若商户强烈要求即时结算,Klarna 则加收更高的服务费。 - **消费者提前还款**:相当一部分消费者在账单到期前甚至刚收到货就立刻付清了款项。 两股现金流相互对冲甚至出现顺差,使得 Klarna 像早期的 Visa 一样,在未大量动用自身股本或银行信贷额度的情况下,凭借商户与消费者的资金错配完成了早期的低成本规模化扩张。 --- ### [14:40](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=880s) BNPL 名词溯源与早期的跨国拓荒 关于“Buy Now, Pay Later”(BNPL)这个名词的来源,Sebastian 分享了一段有趣的往事。在相当长的时间里,他对澳大利亚的 Afterpay 感到耿耿于怀,认为对方不仅是 Klarna 的“克隆体”,还抢先确立了 BNPL 这一品类代名词。直到后来他翻阅历史报道,发现早在2013或2015年 Afterpay 问世前,《金融时报》(Financial Times)在报道 Klarna 时就已使用过“Buy Now Pay Later”作为标题,这让他在争夺这一品类的历史声誉上释怀了不少。 在随后的国际扩张路线中,由于支付业务具有极强的本土属性与地域壁垒,早期竞争更像是一场区域割据: - **北欧市场(挪威与芬兰)**:紧随瑞典之后试水,虽然单市场只有约400万人口,但这主要是顺应瑞典跨国电商商户的自然诉求。 - **核心大陆市场(德国与荷兰)**:德国拥有根深蒂固的账单支付传统(Rechnung,即凭账单延后付款),天然契合“先买后付”,成为 Klarna 重点攻克的大本营。 --- ### [16:46](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=1006s) 英美战略误判:小额 BNPL 还是大额分期? 在2010至2015年间,Klarna 的精力被两件大事完全牵扯: 1. **应对基础设施挑战**:重构底层系统以适应多国不同的监管与法律框架,艰难打通德国等欧洲多国市场。 2. **涉足支付处理与收单赛道**:作为支付服务提供商(PSP),与正处在崛起期的 Stripe 以及 Adyen 展开正面交锋。 当时 Sebastian 对英美市场的判断存在严重的战略定势:他认为英美两国的信用卡渗透率已经极其成熟、高度普及,消费者根本不需要小额的账单延付产品。 大约在2014至2015年前后,Klarna 派遣了一支精干的小团队试水英国市场。不久后,前线团队兴奋地向总部反馈:“我们在英国看到了小额先买后付产品的巨大空缺和机遇!”而 Sebastian 当时的第一反应却是直接泼冷水: > “不,那是绝对是个糟糕透顶的主意。我们进军英美的唯一出路,就是去做大额分期融资(High-Ticket Financing)——就像 Affirm 走的那种路径,去切床垫、大家电和消费电子产品,绝不能做小额商品。” 这一最初的认知偏差,也揭开了 Klarna 后来在英语系信用卡大国艰难摸索与激烈路线博弈的序幕。 ### [18:27](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=1107s) 英国团队的“抗命”与敲开 ASOS 的大门 Klarna 进军英国市场时,内部曾发生过一次戏剧性的策略冲突。当时英国团队提出想直接切入大型时尚零售商,并在第一天就拿下业界“巨鲸”。创始人 Sebastian Siemiatkowski 对此极其反对,甚至对团队下了硬性指令:“不准这么干,这主意糟透了。”在 Klarna 以往的经验里,扩张路线永远是从长尾的小商户做起,再逐步渗透中型商户,从未有过一开始就直奔巨头的先例。 令人意想不到的是,英国团队完全把 CEO 的警告当成了耳旁风。大约六到十二个月后的业务复盘会议上,团队再次提起他们还在推进针对大型时尚零售商的先买后付(BNPL)方案,Sebastian 再次严厉重申“绝对不要碰”。然而仅仅三个月后,英国团队就带回了一份震撼的战报:他们成功签约了英国顶尖的快时尚电商巨头 ASOS,并在上线后大获全胜。Sebastian 坦言,这展现了拥有一支独立思考团队的幸运之处,英国团队敏锐地捕捉到了他当时未曾预见、而几乎同一时期澳大利亚的 Afterpay 也洞察到的行业巨变——在 1978 年到 2018 年间,信用卡业务规模翻了一倍,而借记卡(Debit cards)的使用量却暴增了十倍。 ```mermaid flowchart LR accTitle: UK Market Pivot Flowchart accDescr: 展现了 Klarna 英国团队违背创始人从中小商户起步的传统指令,直接攻克 ASOS 并促成模式突破的过程 subgraph Strategy["扩张策略博弈"] A["创始人传统打法<br/>从小商户向中型渗透"] -.->|"严令禁止"| B["英国团队独立研判<br/>直攻大型时尚零售巨鲸"] end subgraph Outcome["业务破局"] B --> C["成功签约 ASOS"] C --> D["先买后付业务大获成功"] end ``` ### [19:50](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=1190s) 顺风而行:不是 Klarna 改造了美国,而是美国变成了瑞典 回顾进军美国市场的历程,Sebastian 指出了一个颠覆常规认知的商业现象:并不是 Klarna 破解了美国市场的密码,而是美国市场本身的演变倒向了瑞典模式。在传统观念中,美国是一个高度成熟的信用卡社会;但实际上,2007 年次贷危机的冲击、大学校园内信用卡推销的严格限制、发卡机构风控审核的收紧,催生了本土借记卡业务的空前大繁荣。 面对这批全新成长起来的数字消费者,未渗透的数字支付增量几乎全部流向了借记卡用户。年轻一代消费者要么没有资质申请高门槛的信用卡,要么对高额信贷产生天然抵触。这意味着,并不是现有的信用卡存量用户突然转向借记卡,而是在全新的未开发市场中凭空出现了一个庞大的用户群体,其支付偏好恰好与 Klarna 当年在瑞典起步时面对的用户画像完美重合。 - **借记卡 vs 信用卡增速**:1978 年至 2018 年间,信用卡规模增长约 2 倍,借记卡规模则暴增近 10 倍。 - **环境驱动要素**:2007 年金融危机、监管对大学校园信用卡营销的限制,以及更为苛刻的信贷审批制度,合力推动了借记卡红利。 - **核心市场特征**:新一代年轻网购人群没有或不愿使用传统信用卡,孕育了对无息分期和延后付款等新型工具的刚需。 ### [20:54](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=1254s) 麦肯锡十年前的神预言:“清醒规避者”与克里斯坦森式低端颠覆 关于这一消费心理的底层转移,Sebastian 引用了麦肯锡在 2014 年 5 月发布的一份极具前瞻性的研究报告——《信用卡客群细分的新前沿:挖掘未被满足的消费者需求》(New Frontiers in credit card segmentation: tapping unmet consumer needs)。报告在 BNPL 概念席卷美国的大约五年前,就精准刻画了一群被称为“清醒规避者”(Self-aware avoiders)的客户群体。这部分人占美国总人口的约 20%,具备相当高的家庭年收入中位数和强劲的消费力,却由于目睹 2007 年父母陷入债务泥潭或自身的负面经历,极度厌恶传统信用卡的潜规则与掠夺性套路(如过高的额度诱惑、引导用户仅偿还最低还款额以滚动累积高息贷款等)。 信用卡巨头长期笃信所有消费者都只在乎积分和返现(Reward Seekers),但“清醒规避者”的核心诉求截然不同:他们渴望清晰透明的费率、杜绝触发隐性罚息的机制、每一笔大额支出的明确偿清周期,以及将单笔交易直接拆分为分期贷款的能力。麦肯锡在五年前其实就已经将 BNPL 的产品原型描绘得清清楚楚。传统发卡行由于沉浸在高达 30% 利息的循环利息(Revolving balance)利润中,陷入了典型的克里斯坦森“创新者的窘境”:面对一个更透明、借贷总额更少、单客利润更薄的新模式,既得利益者根本缺乏自我革命的动力。 | 对比维度 | 传统信用卡模式 (发卡银行) | 先买后付模式 (Klarna / Afterpay) | |:--- |:--- |:--- | | **主要盈利逻辑** | 30% 左右的高息循环贷、逾期罚息及隐性条款 | 向商户收取交易分成、透明的小额分期 | | **还款引导方式** | 诱导支付“最低还款额”,最大化计息本金 | 结构化拆分(如 Pay in 4),固定周期内偿清 | | **核心客群心态** | 积分返现追逐者(Reward Seekers) | 清醒规避者(Self-aware avoiders,占人口约 20%) | | **机构转型障碍** | 严重依赖现有高毛利循环贷款,面临创新者窘境 | 无沉重包袱,业务增量即纯收益 | ### [26:38](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=1598s) 重构信贷规则:从银行的陷阱到透明化支付 在回答节目主播关于 BNPL 是否本质上也是一种更受约束的信用借贷时,Sebastian 给予了肯定回答,并进一步剖析了传统银行在信贷设计上的“陷阱”。Klarna 最早起步时仅提供纯粹的延后付款服务(即 15 至 30 天内付清);运营两年后,公司开始涉足大额商品(如家用电器)的分期融资业务。 在调研瑞典本地银行的借贷产品时,Klarna 团队看清了传统金融机构诱导用户过度负债的常规把戏。最经典的一套策略就是所谓的“12 个月免息贷款”:银行在后续寄出的账单上故意设计多个还款选项,除了保证免息的较高还款额之外,还会赫然列出一个诱人的“最低还款额”。一旦防备心不强的消费者选择了较低的还款金额,免息协议就会瞬间作废,整笔贷款立即掉入高息循环借贷的深渊。Sebastian 强调,Klarna 打造的系统从根本上剥离了这种剥削性机制,通过提供透明、固定的结构化支付方案,让消费者在消费时对未来的财务边界一目了然。 ### [28:07](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=1687s) 传统银行业的“利息陷阱”与 Klarna 的早期反思 在谈及消费信贷的设计时,Sebastian Siemiatkowski 坦诚回顾了银行业长期以来惯用的盈利套路:当消费者选择最低还款额时,往往并不完全明白这意味着自己已经被转入了一笔长达 36 个月、年化利率高达 20% 的循环借贷账户中。在现实生活中,人们常常因为“这个月手头有点紧”或者仅仅是不小心选错了支付金额,就被拖入高息泥潭。Klarna 在创业初期也曾照单全收,当时团队的想法非常单纯:“原来银行业就是这么赚钱的啊,太棒了,我们也这么干!”确实,这套模式带来了极为丰厚的利润。 然而几年之后,团队内部开始产生深刻的道德自省:用户真的明白自己的操作吗?他们真的心甘情愿支付如此高昂的利息吗?这种商业模式健康吗?Sebastian 推荐了 Netflix 纪录片系列《流行解密》(Explained)中的“信用卡”一集,片中详尽拆解了过去几十年银行用过的所有手段。他指出,上世纪八九十年代的商业环境几乎没有“企业社会责任”(CSR)的概念,核心驱动力就是利润最大化——只要合法且能让消费者支付更多利息,银行就会毫不犹豫地推行。意识到这种机制的不健康后,Klarna 决定主动打破这种潜规则,逐步剔除这些诱导高息的手段,重构自身的产品逻辑。 - 银行常见套路:利用最低还款额将用户悄悄转入长达 36 个月、年利率约 20% 的循环信贷。 - 历史观念转变:上世纪末银行业以合规范围内的利润最大化为唯一标准,缺乏对消费者长期财务健康的考量。 - Klarna 的自我革新:逐步放弃传统银行榨取高额循环利息的灰色策略,转向透明健康的还款模式。 --- ### [29:35](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=1775s) 汉堡王打工记:从“按 1 借记,按 2 贷记”到良性支付闭环 Sebastian 用自己在 15 岁时在汉堡王(Burger King)打工的经历做了一个生动的类比。在那时的刷卡机上,屏幕总会显示“按 1 为借记卡(Debit),按 2 为信用卡(Credit)”。在日常生活中,绝大多数像吃快餐这样的小额日常开销本就该走借记卡直接扣款,只有少数大额消费才需要用到信用额度(除非偶遇发薪日前一天囊中羞涩借用 24 小时)。但后来,银行悄然取消了这项选择,所有消费一律合并进每月的信用卡账单。 银行这么做的底层逻辑非常直接:如果每笔消费都可以选择走借记,消费者每月的信用卡账单可能只有 500 美元,大多数人都有能力全额还清;但把全月的买菜、快餐全部堆进账单后,总额变成了 1000 美元,用户发生无法全额还款而产生“循环借贷”(Revolving)的概率就会飙升。循环利息是银行最核心的摇钱树,利息赚得越多,银行就越有资本提供丰厚的返现(Cashback)与积分奖励,以此吸引更多信用卡新客。这个机制本质上就是建立在让一部分消费者承担沉重利息的负向循环之上的。Klarna 如今正试图重新带回这一逻辑,让“Pay Now”(即时借记)与“Pay Later”(延后信贷)并存。目前借记业务已占 Klarna 全球交易量的 35% 左右(在欧洲占比较大,美国仍以信贷为主),其长期目标是实现线上 50/50,线下门店内借记占 80%、信贷占 20% 的健康结构。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 传统信用卡飞轮与 Klarna 模式对比 accDescr: 展示传统银行通过取消借贷选择推高循环利息的飞轮机制,以及 Klarna 提供分流选择的良性模型。 subgraph BankLoop["传统银行业的负向飞轮"] B1["取消借记/信贷选择<br/>所有日常消费计入账单"] --> B2["月度账单金额虚高"] B2 --> B3["用户全额还款困难<br/>触发循环利息 (Revolving)"] B3 --> B4["银行赚取暴利"] B4 --> B5["提供高额返现与奖励吸客"] B5 --> B1 end subgraph KlarnaModel["Klarna 的健康消费设计"] K1["明确拆分:Pay Now (借记) 与 Pay Later (分期)"] K1 --> K2["小额高频走借记,大额计划走信贷"] K2 --> K3["降低盲目负债风险,还款更可控"] K3 --> K4["目标形态:线上 50/50,线下 80% 借记 / 20% 信贷"] end ``` - 传统卡组织飞轮:日常消费全额入账 → 账单膨胀 → 产生循环借贷利息 → 补贴高额返现拉新。 - Klarna 现状:借记业务(Pay Now)占全球总交易量的约 35%,欧洲市场占比较高。 - 长期结构愿景:线上交易借贷各占 50%;线下门店场景借记占 80%、分期信贷占 20%。 --- ### [32:47](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=1967s) 雄心勃勃的“全闭环”梦:叫板 Adyen 与 Stripe 针对主持人提到旧金山 Stonestown 购物中心全场铺满 Klarna 线下广告的疑惑,Sebastian 顺势揭开了一段险些将公司带入死胡同的扩张历史。大约在 2009 至 2010 年间,Klarna 在先买后付领域取得了巨大成功,于是萌生了一个宏大野心:打造支付“全闭环”(Close the loop),兼任商户收单机构(PSP/Acquirer)与发卡端(Issuer),推出统一支付结账台产品“Klarna Checkout”,直接与当时的 Stripe 和 Adyen 竞争。 在向董事会汇报竞争格局时,Sebastian 曾点名指出两个极其危险的对手:一个是爱尔兰的 Collison 兄弟(Stripe 创始人),他们敏锐抓住了“开发者才是支付集成决策者”的痛点,打造了极致的 API;另一个则是荷兰的老牌支付高手 Pieter van der Does(Adyen 创始人)。当时 Klarna 在人员规模和营收上都大于 Adyen,年仅 30 岁的 Sebastian 甚至狂妄地亲自跑去阿姆斯特丹找 40 岁的 Pieter 谈判,当面放话:“Pieter,你必须把公司卖给我,因为我马上就要碾轧你了!”Pieter 看着这个不知天高地厚的年轻人只觉得荒唐好笑。这段不知天高地厚的小插曲让 Sebastian 后来花了好几年时间才修补好与 Pieter 的关系。更讽刺的是,许多听了 Sebastian 这场竞争分析的投资人(包括红杉资本 Sequoia)转头就重仓投资了 Stripe 和 Adyen。事实证明,Klarna Checkout 虽然在北欧本土横扫千军(一度吃下当地超 50% 的电商交易份额),但在国际化拓展上却完全被对手抛在身后。 - 闭环设想(2009–2010):推出 Klarna Checkout 整合所有本地支付手段与先买后付,兼做收单与发卡。 - 遭遇劲敌:Stripe 凭借以开发者为中心的 API 迅猛崛起,Adyen 凭借深厚行业经验实现全球扩张。 - 盲目自信的轶事:Sebastian 曾亲自前往荷兰要求 Adyen 创始人 Pieter van der Does 把公司卖给 Klarna,反被视作狂妄后生。 - 北欧战果 vs. 全球瓶颈:Klarna Checkout 曾占领北欧线上交易总额的 50% 以上,但在全球化执行力上严重落后于 Stripe 和 Adyen。 --- ### [35:36](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=2136s) 2015 绝境抉择:Spotify 倒戈、Shopify 筑墙与全面 C 端转向 到了 2013 年前后,执行力的鸿沟彻底显现。Adyen 官宣一次性接入了亚洲的 50 种本地支付方式,而 Sebastian 震惊地发现自己的工程师团队在过去两年里竟然连一种新的支付方式都没接进去。2015 年,致命一击降临:Adyen 拿下了总部同样位于斯德哥尔摩的流媒体巨头 Spotify。看着自己最强大的死对头在自己的“后院”抢走了最亲密的本土巨头伙伴,Klarna 被逼到了命运的十字路口。 摆在面前的只有两条路:第一条路是当一个“差不多版的 Adyen 或 Stripe”,像瑞典收单机构 Bambora 卖给 Ingenico 那样套现离场;第二条路则是彻底战略转型。与此同时,进军美国市场的路径也被堵死——当时 Klarna 切入结账台原本指望从长尾小商家切入再向上渗透,但 Shopify 决定做自己的结账系统与 Fintech 闭环,直接关闭了这扇大门。既然在商户基础设施端已经无法超越 Adyen 和 Stripe,Klarna 在 2015 年果断决定将重心调转 180 度:放弃成为单纯的底层商户结账网关,全面发力消费者端(To-C),将 Klarna 打造成一个深受终端消费者喜爱与信任的超级品牌和消费平台。 - 关键差距拉大:2013 年 Adyen 迅速铺设亚洲多国支付通道,而 Klarna 在支付拓展方面停滞近两年。 - 致命打击(2015):邻居兼核心盟友 Spotify 选择 Adyen 作为全球支付处理商,彻底打破了 Klarna 的收单全牌照幻想。 - 美国长尾通道受阻:Shopify 建立自主生态闭环结账工具,直接封死了独立结账台自下而上渗透中小商家的路径。 - 战略大调头:拒绝做二流收单网关等待被收购,全面从 B 端商户基础设施转向以消费者为核心的产品体验与品牌建设。 ### [37:30](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=2250s) 结账业务断舍离:从竞争转向与 Stripe、Adyen 结盟 回顾支付行业的发展,不少初创公司都曾试图攻克一键结账(Checkout)这一难题——例如美国备受瞩目的初创公司 Fast 以及其他类似玩家,但这条路极其艰难。Klarna 很快清醒地意识到,公司必须从这块业务中撤退。如今,像 Adyen 和 Stripe 这样的巨头反而成为了 Klarna 最大的分销伙伴。支付格局发生了彻底的逆转:Klarna 现在绝大多数业务都是通过这类收单机构(Acquirers)和支付服务商(PSPs)集成的,由它们向各类商户主动推广并提供 Klarna 产品。在当下的商业生态中,商户直接与 Klarna 进行底层直连反倒变得相当罕见。 主持人指出,这种分销模式彻底解放了 Klarna,使其不再需要组建一支庞大无比的直销铁军。Sebastian 对此深表赞同:传统商户收单业务最大的痛点就在于必须在每一个地理区域都派驻“地面部队”(boots on the ground),这也是历史上只有传统银行才能吃下这块蛋糕的根本原因。过去 Klarna 坚持做全套结账系统(Checkout)时,实际上是在部分业务上与 Stripe、Adyen 直接竞争,这造成了极大的生态阻力。为了换取这些平台级伙伴的深度信任与战略渠道支持,Klarna 做出明确承诺,果断砍掉并淡出该产品线,将战略重心全面转向面向消费者的产品线(Consumer Product Line)。 --- ### [38:48](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=2328s) 2015年的白板时刻:重组管理层与构想“数字金融助理” 2015 年是 Klarna 商业演进史上的关键转折点。当时“后付款”(Buy Now, Pay Later)在北欧本土运行良好,但团队当时并未预见到英美市场潜藏的庞大先买后付机遇。Klarna 在 2015 年曾向美国市场发起过最后一次推广结账系统的尝试,结果反响平平、收效甚微,整个团队一时陷入了“接下来该何去何从”的迷茫。恰逢此时,公司的第二位联合创始人离职,管理层出现真空。Sebastian 借此机会确立了自己的一条关键用人准则:**坚决不在外部空降高管,而是从内部提拔**。鉴于公司当时已创业 10 年,他挑选了一批最优秀的初中级经理人晋升至最高管理层。 新班子成立后,众人面对一块空白的白板重新规划未来。他们抛出了一个最核心的终极命题:“金融服务的未来究竟会变成什么样?”得出的结论与自动驾驶汽车的演进非常相似——没人确切知道它究竟何时会全面落地,但技术的演进方向是确定无疑的: - 未来的某一天,用户清晨醒来,属于自己的**数字化金融助理(Digital Financial Assistant)**会发来通知:“嘿,Ben,我昨晚彻查了你名下的房贷账单,发现你一直在支付过高的利息。我昨夜已经代表你与另一家银行重新谈下了一个更划算的利率。你每个月可以省下 10 美元房贷,现在只需点击一下‘同意’,剩下的换行手续和资金划转全部由我自动搞定。” - 软件与人工智能的爆发式演进,让这种原本看似遥不可及的科幻场景以远超预期的速度逼近现实。 --- ### [41:15](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=2475s) 银行业超额利润的终结与 Klarna 的破局路径 这一趋势对 Klarna 提出了新的灵魂拷问:如果未来的金融世界被这样的全自动金融助理所主导,Klarna 应该站在哪里?答案显而易见——“我们必须成为那个为你服务的数字金融助理”。在播客中,Sebastian 打趣道,如果真能帮你省下房贷,用户哪怕只是给个 1 美元小费作为感谢,商业闭环都能成立;主持人 Ben 随即笑着接话:“要是真能帮我拿到更便宜的房贷,我愿意付的可远不止 1 美元!”传统银行最初的本质其实就是个人的财务顾问,承诺替客户管理储蓄、理财投资、打理复杂的财务问题;然而一旦传统银行赢得了储户的绝对信任,便开始利用信息不对称追求自身利益最大化,甚至站在消费者的对立面。 数字金融助理的崛起将成为银行业最具破坏性的颠覆力量。它的普及意味着**传统银行业长期依靠信息不透明所赚取的超额暴利(excess profits)将彻底终结**。以往用户之所以长期忍受高昂费率而不换银行,纯粹是因为转行流程繁琐劝退、成本高昂且无法确定新银行是否有价值。当 AI 与软件消除换行摩擦后,整个银行业将被重塑。 为了在这场终局战役中胜出,成为最顶尖的数字金融助理,Klarna 梳理出了两大制胜王牌: 1. **全球化网络而非本土化深耕(Global over Local)**:这本质上是一场规模与体量的较量。触达的市场越多、服务的消费者规模越大,系统运转的边际效率就越高,因此全球分销网络的扩张至关重要。 2. **底层数据资产(Data)**:用户对平台的信任程度以及分享的交易与财务数据越多,系统能为其量身定制的避坑与增值建议就越精准,帮用户省下的时间与金钱也越可观。 ```mermaid flowchart LR accTitle: 数字金融助理颠覆传统银行模式 accDescr: 对比传统银行因用户迁移摩擦赚取超额利润与未来 AI 助理自动寻找最优解的流转对比 subgraph Traditional["传统银行模式(信息不对称)"] T_Bank["传统商业银行"] -->|"繁琐手续 / 惰性"| Lock["用户被高利率锁定"] Lock --> Excess["银行攫取超额暴利"] end subgraph Future["Klarna 数字金融助理愿景"] AI["AI 数字金融助理"] -->|"夜间自动全网比价"| Match["谈妥更优贷款/金融方案"] Match -->|"一键授权 / 无缝换行"| User["消费者享受实际节省"] end ``` --- ### [43:36](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=2616s) 降维打击的王牌:SKU 级数据与三方闭环网络壁垒 在剖析数据护城河时,Sebastian 指出,Klarna 拥有一张真正拉开其与整个行业差距、甚至**比“先买后付”(BNPL)本身重要得多得多**的王牌——**SKU 级明细数据(SKU-level data)**。 由于 Klarna 最早是从提供开放式发票(Open Invoice)业务起步的,在诞生第一天就必须给买家出具详细的电子账单发票。这意味着,Klarna 在交易链路一开始就必须拿到每一个单品的颗粒度数据。相比之下: - 当用户在传统的 Visa 或 Mastercard 信用卡网络刷卡时,银行和卡组织只能看到总交易金额与商户名称。 - 而在 Klarna 的系统里,每一笔在 H&M 的消费都清晰记录着:你买了一件什么颜色、什么尺码的特定毛衣,今天甚至可以直接在 Klarna App 内调出所购商品的真实渲染图。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 四方网络与三方闭环网络的数据链条对比 accDescr: 展示传统信用卡四方网络在传递单品明细数据时的断层,以及 Klarna 三方网络对单品数据的无缝呈现 subgraph FourParty["传统四方网络 (Visa/Mastercard)"] direction TB M1["商户 (Merchant)"] -->|"Level 3 数据割裂"| A1["收单行 (Acquirer)"] A1 --> C1["卡组织 (Scheme)"] C1 -->|"受制于发卡行改造成本"| I1["发卡行/银行 App"] I1 -.->|"信息断层:仅显示商户名与金额"| U1["消费者 (Consumer)"] end subgraph ThreeParty["Klarna 闭环网络 (三方模式)"] direction TB M2["商户 (如 H&M / Sephora)"] ===>|"全量 SKU 级数据 (商品/颜色/尺寸/图片)"| K["Klarna 统一引擎"] K ===>|"即时可视化价值呈现"| U2["Klarna App 消费者终端"] end ``` 针对 SKU 级数据,对谈双方展开了极具深度的底层技术与商业逻辑拆解: - **信用卡网络的历史技术包袱**:目前的信用卡网络诞生于 50 多年前,当时物理网络的带宽根本无法承载这般庞大的单品数据流。时至今日,卡组织网络想要整体升级改造以全面兼容 SKU 数据,工程量无异于空中换引擎。 - **四方网络的“创新死结”(Catch-22)**:Visa 和万事达卡早在 1990 年代就尝试过推行包含单品明细的“Level 3 数据”,但惨遭失败。四方网络(商户、收单行、卡组织、发卡行)各怀利益算盘、推进行动极其迟缓;即便商户肯提供单品数据,卡组织也根本无法调动成千上万家银行去集体更新各家的手机银行 App 来做前端可视化。 - **三方闭环网络的天然敏捷性**:正如美国运通(American Express)、PayPal 或 Klarna 这类掌控全链路的闭环体系,只要商户交出 SKU 数据,平台就能在一毫秒内直接在自研消费端产品中直观呈现其价值。 - **顶级零售巨头的商业信任门槛**:这也是 Visa 难以推行的一大心理关口。Sebastian 坦言,自己曾亲自耗费海量时间奔走于梅西百货(Macy's)、丝芙兰(Sephora)、H&M 等美国零售业顶尖 CEO 之间,反复消除顾虑,说服他们在获得消费者授权的前提下,把底层的单品交易数据托付给 Klarna,以此为零售商与消费者双向创造真实增量价值。 ### [46:29](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=2789s) 数字化金融助手的未来与三大阵营的博弈 随着 Klarna 坚定地转向消费者端,打造辨识度极高的品牌——标志性的粉色视觉与强调极致流畅的“Smoooth”理念——成为了公司的核心战略。Sebastian Siemiatkowski 分析,Klarna 未来将直面三大阵营的严峻竞争: 1. **大型科技巨头(Big Tech)**:如 Apple、Amazon、Google 等,拥有庞大的生态壁垒与天然的流量入口; 2. **金融科技新贵(Fintech)**:如 Revolut、Chime、Nubank 等,产品迭代速度极快且极具颠覆性; 3. **传统金融机构(Incumbents)**:如 Goldman Sachs 及其推出的 Marcus,坐拥雄厚的资本底蕴与牌照网络。 在这场多方角逐中,初创企业唯一的生存法则就是“更快、更好、更敏锐”。Siemiatkowski 深信,经过激烈的洗牌与重塑,全球最终只会剩下三到四家超级巨头,真正成为消费者的“全天候数字金融助理(Digital Financial Assistant)”,而占据这一生态生态位的商业价值不可估量。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 消费金融与支付赛道的三大竞争阵营 accDescr: 展示了科技巨头、金融科技新贵以及传统银行三大竞争阵营,最终共同争夺数字金融助手地位的格局。 subgraph Competitors["三大竞争阵营"] A["科技巨头<br/>(Apple, Amazon, Google)"] B["金融科技新贵<br/>(Revolut, Chime, Nubank)"] C["传统金融机构<br/>(Goldman Sachs Marcus 等)"] end Target["终局之争:数字金融助手<br/>(全球仅剩 3-4 家顶级玩家)"] A --> Target B --> Target C --> Target ``` --- ### [47:34](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=2854s) 不押注单一技术:实体卡、SKU 级数据与“随处可用” 谈及实体店落地(如 Stonestown 等零售场景),Siemiatkowski 坦言自己平时对泛泛而谈的管理书籍并不感冒,但吉姆·柯林斯在《从优秀到卓越》(Good to Great)中的一个核心洞察深深启发了他:**切勿押注于单一技术(Don't bet on a single technology)**。 在传统路径下,Klarna 打造了一个拥有商品 SKU 级(单品细颗粒度)数据的第三方支付网络,其缺陷非常致命:消费者只能在完成深度接口集成的商家处使用 Klarna。为了突破网络效应不足的桎梏,团队决定尝试一条更困难却更有想象力的道路——采用多元化的技术载体,比如发行实体或虚拟卡。虽然走卡组织通道会失去获取 SKU 级商品数据的优势,甚至需要向用户解释“为什么 App 里有些订单有商品配图,有些却没有”,但它却赋予了 Klarna 一项无与伦比的核心能力:**让用户在任何地方都能使用 Klarna 消费**。这一技术路径的拓展,在随后进入美国市场的战役中发挥了决定性作用。 --- ### [48:49](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=2929s) 痛失 Urban Outfitters 与遭遇 Afterpay 的正面冲击 2019 年夏天,Klarna 正式发力美国市场,却瞬间遭遇当头棒喝。彼时,来自澳大利亚的联合创始人 Nick Molnar 带领 Afterpay 团队突袭美国,一举拿下了 Urban Outfitters 的独家合作,声势大振。其实 Klarna 也参与了 Urban Outfitters 的招标(RFP),但由于临场参会团队匹配不当,遗憾错失良机。 主持人和 Sebastian 一同复盘了当时买现在付(BNPL)的竞争版图: - 早期的 **Affirm** 主打大额消费(High Ticket),例如分期购买 1,000 美元的 Boosted Boards 电动滑板,对于小额高频场景反应较慢; - **Afterpay** 携 Urban Outfitters 一战成名,开创了买 10 美元 T 恤也可以分 4 期免息还款(Pay in 4)的日常小额消费心智。 美国是全球规模最大的市场,如果不在这里站稳脚跟,Klarna 的全球宏图与 AI 愿景将沦为空中楼阁。面对 Afterpay 的先发制人,Klarna 内部感到极度焦虑与挫败,随即火速行动,仅用两到三个月就赶制并上线了针对美国市场的“Pay in 4”分期产品。 --- ### [50:44](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=3044s) 逆境中的经典困局:“没有人会因为选择 IBM 而被开除” 产品虽然神速上线,但 Klarna 很快撞上了商户端拓展的铜墙铁壁。尽管 Klarna 耕耘分期支付的历史远比 Afterpay 悠久,产品功能更丰富、系统成熟度更高,但美国各大品牌的电商高管们却陷入了经典的防御心理——“没有人会因为选择 IBM 而被解雇(Nobody gets fired for choosing IBM)”。 在当时商户的心智中,Afterpay 已经确立了先发领先者的地位。品牌电商负责人哪怕认可 Klarna 方案的优越性,也不愿承担站错队的职业风险,更倾向于跟风选择所谓的市场第一。对 Siemiatkowski 而言,不同于在欧洲跟反应迟缓的传统银行竞争,在美国面对的是 Nick 及其团队这样打法凶悍、行动敏捷、同样具有极高企业家野心的初创创始人。这场高水准的商业对决让他压力倍增,同时也倍感刺激。 --- ### [52:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=3120s) 破局“赢家心智”:App 内置浏览器与万能虚拟卡策略 在商户端商务谈判中,客户只认赢家。起初,Klarna 试图在 PPT 上罗列欧洲签约的国际大牌来撑门面,但 Afterpay 的销售团队立刻反制,教导商家反问:“这些品牌里到底有几个在美国本土开通了?”谎言被戳穿后,局面更加被动。Klarna 迫切需要回答一个终极商业课题:**当你在现实中尚未成为赢家时,如何构建出“你才是最终赢家”的确定性认知?** 团队果断转变战术——既然在 B 端商户整合上短期难以翻盘,那就绕过商户,直接从 C 端消费者侧降维打击。他们推出了内置于 Klarna App 的专属浏览器: ```mermaid flowchart LR accTitle: Klarna App 内置浏览器与虚拟卡支付流程 accDescr: 展示用户通过 Klarna App 内置浏览器访问未集成商户网站,并自动生成一次性虚拟 Visa 卡完成分期结账的逻辑。 A["用户在 Klarna App<br/>打开内置浏览器"] --> B["访问任意电商平台<br/>(如 Amazon 等未集成商家)"] B --> C["Klarna 自动生成<br/>一次性虚拟 Visa 卡"] C --> D["自动填充卡号结账<br/>享受 Pay in 4 分期"] D --> E["应用层截获数据<br/>获取完整 SKU 商品详情"] ``` 1. **突破场景限制**:即使像 Amazon 这类根本没有集成 Klarna 的平台,用户通过 Klarna 浏览器结账时,系统会自动生成一张一次性虚拟 Visa 卡(One-time Card)并一键填入支付页面; 2. **掌控底层数据**:由于结账行为发生在 Klarna 掌控的浏览器环境内,不仅完美实现了“Pay in 4”体验,还能直接从网页底层 DOM 中捕获到完整的 SKU 级商品数据与配图; 3. **重构商业叙事**:在跟新商户谈判时,Klarna 彻底弃用了商户 Logo 墙,转而只亮出一张 App Annie(现 Data.ai)的应用下载量榜单: > “使用 Afterpay,消费者只能在集成了他们的极少数网站付款;而下载 Klarna,消费者能在全美所有电商网站买单。你们猜消费者最终会选择谁?” 数据证明了一切——Klarna 的 App 下载量大幅超越 Afterpay。这一招不仅让消费者获得了“在任何地方都能用 Klarna”的极致体验,更彻底撼动了商户的心理防线。随后,Klarna 顺理成章签下 Sephora、Macy's 等重量级零售标杆,成功在北美市场扭转战局。如今,仅通过该内置浏览器产生的年交易额就已超过 100 亿美元。 ### [55:46](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=3346s) 赞助商插播:Vanta 与“让啤酒更好喝”的专注法则 节目开篇插播了赞助商 Vanta 的介绍。主持人 Ben 和 David 提到了在《Acquired》中反复被引用的杰夫·贝佐斯(Jeff Bezos)经典名言:一家公司应该只把时间和精力放在“真正能让你的啤酒更好喝”的事情上,也就是能切实为产品与客户带来实质性提升的核心业务,而将其余无关核心体验的工作外包出去。尽管合规与供应商信任对企业至关重要,是促成商业合作与营收增长的刚需门槛,但它本身并不会给产品增添任何独特的风味。 Vanta 为企业解决了这一难题:告别散乱的电子表格、碎片化工具以及为了满足安全和合规要求而进行的繁琐人工审核。它通过单一的软件操作界面,利用 API 直连公司的各项服务,节省了大量工时。如今 Vanta 还融入了 AI 功能,支持接入超过 300 种外部工具,并允许客户与内部系统构建私有集成。更关键的是,原本静态的安全审核转变为实时监控,客户可以随时向合作伙伴展示最新状态,增强信任。无论初创团队还是大型企业,都可以像全球 7,000 多家客户一样借此实现合规自动化。 --- ### [57:19](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=3439s) 19 年创业长跑:直面索伦之眼的审视与董事会治理风波 回到正题,Ben 指出收听这期节目的有很多创业者,而 Sebastian Siemiatkowski 的创业历程堪称波澜壮阔——Klarna 创立 19 年至今仍是一家非上市公司,历经了多次商业模式转型、多轮管理层更迭,并在市场狂热期以惊人估值从顶尖投资机构手中募集了巨额资金;随后估值经历剧烈缩水,就在几个月前,公司还因董事会层面的高管继任与治理风波登上各大媒体头条。媒体每天连篇累牍更新两次最新战况,Sebastian 仿佛在整整一周里直接置身于“索伦之眼”(Sauron's eye)的聚焦烘烤之下。被问及在经历如此多疯狂章节后对创始人有什么建议时,Sebastian 坦言很难给出普适的大道理,但他谈到了自己内心面对危机时发生的深刻蜕变。 他十分谦逊地承认,自己和公司经历了一轮又一轮惊心动魄的过山车,既有辉煌的高光,也有世人皆知或不为人知的巨大挫折。他发自肺腑地表示,今天每当遭遇极端挑战时,他同样会感到绝望、想哭,会觉得“天哪,这太难了,太不公平了”,脑海里充满了困惑与挣扎,不知道究竟该如何破局。这种脆弱的情感反应是任何心智健全的人在绝境中都会经历的正常反应,他从来没有失去过这些情绪。 --- ### [59:15](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=3555s) 顶级竞技心态:像伊布踢欧冠决赛一样享受“高压时刻” 但在这些情绪之外,Sebastian 在漫长岁月中逐渐孕育出了一种全新的心理状态——“这正是我日复一日训练的目的”(This is what I trained for)。他常常会联想到瑞典传奇足球运动员兹拉坦·伊布拉希莫维奇(Zlatan Ibrahimović)——不仅是世界顶尖前锋,而且恰好来自瑞典并与 Sebastian 同一天出生。对于站在金字塔尖的球员来说,毕生梦想就是打进欧洲冠军联赛(Champions League)的决赛。那绝不是一场轻松的球赛,现场充满难以承受的心理重压,客场球迷的震天倒彩,甚至可能是职业生涯的终极巅峰,“但难道你宁愿不踢这场决赛吗?” 正因如此,当巨大的压力扑面而来时,Sebastian 形成了一个独特的习惯:他会钻进车里,把皇后乐队(Queen)的经典名曲《Under Pressure》音量调到最大,然后全心沉浸并享受那个当下的感觉。他会告诉自己:“这就是我 20 年磨一剑为之训练的时刻,现在轮到我上场看看能不能把这个危局解开了。”他可能会失败,但这就是竞技与商业的残酷本质。他提到 Netflix 拍摄的环法自行车赛纪录片,各个车队拼死训练,但终点冲线后,地球依然照样转动,第二天太阳照常升起。体育界的人深谙这一点,而创始人同样需要明白,既然自己梦寐以求来到这样高强度的战场,就应当珍惜能够被挑战到“汗流浃背”的特权。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 创始人应对极限危机的心理演变过程 accDescr: 展示从最初的自然绝望反应到顶级竞技心智模式的转变过程。 subgraph Natural["本能情绪反应"] A["遭遇重大危机与舆论围剿"] --> B["感到绝望、委屈与困惑<br/>(常人皆有的情感体验)"] end subgraph MentalShift["心智重塑与竞技视角"] B --> C["类比欧冠决赛体验<br/>(伊布法则:这正是训练的意义)"] C --> D["在车中放满《Under Pressure》音乐<br/>接纳并享受压力峰值"] end subgraph Action["直面挑战与结果接纳"] D --> E["调动 20 年经验全力破局"] E --> F["胜败坦然:无论结局如何<br/>次日太阳照常升起"] end ``` --- ### [01:01:25](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=3685s) 从唐宁街晚宴到“下一个 WeWork”:500 亿与 65 亿的荒诞反差 Sebastian 笑着回忆起 Klarna 估值登顶时的荒诞戏剧感。当时 Klarna 官方估值达到 500 亿美元,被冠以“欧洲最有价值金融科技公司”的称号。即便他心里清楚,当估值增速远远甩开收入与利润增长时,市场回调终究会发生,但身处暴风眼中心时依然恍如梦境:前一天他受邀走进唐宁街 10 号与时任英国首相鲍里斯·约翰逊(Boris Johnson)共进晚餐,第二天便搭乘飞机赶赴一场极其私密的闭门会议,与埃隆·马斯克(Elon Musk)、金·卡戴珊(Kim Kardashian)同场交流。那一刻他甚至在想:“难道以后的生活就是这样了吗?” 仅仅三个月后,全球科技资产暴跌,Klarna 的估值直接缩水至 65 亿美元。公司融资举步维艰,各大主流媒体纷纷倒戈,头版头条都在痛陈他们的溃败,甚至公开质疑 Klarna 是否会沦为“下一个 WeWork”。这种从神坛跌入泥潭的经历固然极为难熬,但 Sebastian 坦言,这反而让他产生了一种强烈的清醒感:“哇,我又活过来了,这才是真实的人生,绝非虚妄的泡影。”面对这样的现实,无论此前是否可以通过更聪明的决策来避免,一旦身处局中,唯一的选择就是硬着头皮全力以赴。 --- ### [01:02:45](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=3765s) 资本效率与战略豪赌:10 亿美金年亏损背后的稀释逻辑 针对 Ben 提出的“面对当时的环境,创始人是否只能做当时看似最前瞻的抉择”这一问题,Sebastian 表示从某种程度上确实如此,因为外界往往忽略了 Klarna 发展史上的基本财务事实: - **长达十余年的持续盈利**:在 2019 年之前,Klarna 实际上每年都在盈利。公司之所以融钱,是为了支撑快速扩张的资产负债表(Balance Sheet),需要充足的权益资本(Equity)来作为放贷与业务垫付的资本金支撑。 - **老股转让造成的资本误解**:早期媒体频繁报道的“巨额融资”,多数是老股转让(Secondary transactions)而非进入公司账上的新股增发(Primary)。在红杉资本(Sequoia Capital)投资的前十年里,Klarna 一直是其投资组合中资本效率最高的企业之一。 - **孤注一掷进军美国市场**:当公司下定决心全面押注美国市场并加速开拓全球新版图时,Klarna 开启了激进投资周期。在经营亏损最严重的月份,Klarna 单月 EBITDA 亏损高达 1.5 亿美元,折合成年化烧钱率(Burn rate)接近 10 亿美元。 - **500 亿美元估值下的稀释算术**:在当时资本狂欢的环境下,投资人全力支持这一激进扩张策略,并给出了 500 亿美元的超高估值。按此估值计算,每年 10 亿美元的巨额亏损对现有股东的股权稀释率(Dilution)仅仅只有 **2%**。对于争夺万亿美元级潜力的全球支付与金融市场而言,用 2% 的年度稀释代价去博取成为下一个 Visa 级别的行业巨头,在当时的战略推演中具有完全自洽的商业逻辑。 ### [01:04:38](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=3878s) 资本盛宴的反思与美国战场的博弈 回顾过去的疯狂周期,Sebastian Siemiatkowski 坦言,站在当下的视角来看,那时的估值与扩张在某种程度上虽然符合当时的大环境逻辑,但作为一个心智健全的人,复盘时依然会自问:每个决策都足够理智吗?有没有哪些决策本可以做得更好?他明确表示,对于绝大部分的市场推广与扩张投入,自己毫无悔意;唯一真正让他后悔的是**招聘节奏失控**,公司的雇员规模扩张得实在太快了,本应当保持更多谨慎。 主持人援引风险投资家 Bill Gurley 的名言指出,创业就是“打眼前场地上的球(play the game on the field)”——当时竞争对手 Afterpay 在赛场上全力狂奔,Klarna 要么选择跟进正面硬碰,要么就只能被时代边缘化、失去行业话语权。Sebastian 对此深表赞同,并生动梳理了 Klarna 估值一路飙升背后的叙事演进: - 2016 至 2017 年间,Klarna 的估值大约在 20 亿美元; - 到了 2019 年,估值跳涨至 50 亿美元,因为 Dragoneer 坚信 Klarna 在美国市场有一席之地,即便当时 Afterpay 正在美国市场“把我们打得落花流水(kicking our ass)”; - 仅仅一年后,Silver Lake 领投将其估值推高至 100 亿美元,投资逻辑变成了 Klarna 不仅站稳了脚跟,表现甚至开始反超 Afterpay; - 再过一年,估值直接攀升至 300 亿美元,投资者深信 Klarna 已经大幅领跑赛道,业务表现极其抢眼。 Sebastian 感叹,事后诸葛亮总是容易的,但在瞬息万变的当时,每个人都只是在极力做出最有利于局面的抉择。经过 20 年的拼搏,Klarna 年营收即将突破 30 亿美元,依然是一笔极其了不起的商业成就,历史上的局部失误并不能抹杀长期的成功。 --- ### [01:06:44](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=4004s) 向马斯克看齐:成本控制与自然减员策略 话题转向当下 Klarna 最引人瞩目的战略核心:人工智能与效率革命。谈及这一转型的灵感,Sebastian 提到了自己阅读埃隆·马斯克(Elon Musk)传记的感触。过去他仰望马斯克,觉得一个人能同时造电动车、造火箭简直不可思议;但读完书后,给他留下最深印记的并非天才光环,而是马斯克本质上是个“极端精打细算的抠门鬼(freaking cheap bastard)”。整本书几乎贯穿着他对成本的极致死磕——比如 NASA 造火箭需要一个耗资 300 万美元的空调机组,而马斯克的团队直接跑去 Home Depot 花 5,000 美元买了一台,效果完全一样。最近有人向 Sebastian 展示了 SpaceX 的财务数据,高营收增长的同时竟然实现了扎扎实实的盈利,这给 Sebastian 带来了极大的震撼。 Klarna 早期经历过稳健盈利期,后来为了抢占市场转入由 VC 资金驱动的亏损扩张阶段。如今,Sebastian 认为商业世界终极的成就感莫过于:**营收曲线持续向上,而成本曲线持续向下**。AI 正是撬动这一奇迹的核心杠杆。 但在削减成本的过程中,Klarna 极力避免重蹈粗暴裁员的覆辙。Sebastian 坦言,裁员是职业生涯中最痛苦、最艰难、最令人难过的经历,他发誓如果可以,此生绝不想再经历一次。为此,Klarna 巧妙利用了科技行业的人才流动规律: - Klarna 现有全职员工约 4,000 人; - 科技行业员工的平均在职周期通常为 5 年,意味着每年有约 20% 的自然离职率(attrition rate); - Klarna 从 2023 年 8、9、10 月开始全面冻结招聘(仅在工程端保留极少量技术岗),这意味着在不进行任何裁员的前提下,公司规模每年会自然缩减约 20%; - 在人员精简的同时,借助 AI 重构组织架构,推动员工在彼此的工作成果上复用与协作,坚决消灭重复造轮子和低效手工劳动。 ```mermaid flowchart LR accTitle: 自然减员与效率提升机制 accDescr: 展示Klarna如何通过冻结招聘和自然流失减少人员,并借助AI实现降本增效 subgraph Headcount["组织规模控制"] direction TB A["现有全职员工 4,000 人"] --> B["全面冻结招聘<br/>(仅工程端少量补强)"] B --> C["年均自然流失率 ~20%<br/>(平均司龄约5年)"] C --> D["平滑降本,规避主动裁员痛苦"] end subgraph Enablement["AI 驱动效能"] direction TB E["重构组织与协作机制"] --> F["打破内部重复建设"] F --> G["借助 AI 自动化日常琐务"] G --> H["营收持续攀升,成本曲线下压"] end Headcount -.-> Enablement ``` --- ### [01:10:52](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=4252s) 智能客服质变:颠覆性的“2/3 工作量接管” 在所有落地的人工智能实验中,Klarna 在客服领域的成效引起了全球科技界的巨大轰动。在 4,000 名正式员工之外,Klarna 长期依赖第三方外包供应商,雇用了大约 2,000 至 3,000 名外部客服专员来处理庞杂的日常用户问询。 Sebastian 强调,技术从来都是一种通缩力量,本质就是放大单一个体创造经济价值的能力。过去通过优化 App 界面、增设自助功能来减少用户来电,既能降低客服支出,也符合用户不想麻烦人工客服的真实心理诉求。但这一次,生成式 AI 直接下场处理客服工单,带来了两次彻底颠覆团队认知的质变: 1. **满意度追平人类(CSAT on par)**:过去几十年,无论是让人抓狂的电话语音树(“按1办理这个,按2办理那个”),还是回答逻辑混乱、不知所云的早期网页 Chatbot,用户体验都极度糟糕。而当 Klarna 构建的新模型驱动的 AI 客服上线后,**用户对 AI 的满意度评分居然与人类客服专员持平**,团队意识到真正的拐点到来了。 2. **两小时内削减 2/3 人工工单**:在确认满意度无损后,Klarna 决定全量铺开该 AI 客服功能。Sebastian 惊叹道,在他创办这家公司的整个职业生涯中,从未见过任何单一产品功能的发布能产生如此立竿见影的颠覆性冲击——“我们只是按下一个按钮,人类专员需要处理的工作量瞬间消失了整整三分之二(2/3)”。三分之二的事务被 AI 彻底接管,仅剩最后三分之一最复杂的疑难问题留给人类客服解决。 ### [01:13:38](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=4418s) AI 落地现实与对就业市场的深远影响 谈及 AI 取代人工客服所引发的舆论与社会关注,Sebastian 澄清了具体的人力运作机制。Klarna 并非直接解雇了 700 名员工,而是长期合作的第三方外包客服公司——这些服务商旗下雇佣的员工总数超过百万。因此,Klarna 减少 700 名全职客服人员的需求,在短期内仅意味着外包供应商将这部分人力调配至其他客户的项目中。由于行业内客户业务量一直存在周期性波动,因此短期内并没有人真正失去饭碗。从商业角度看,Klarna 实现了客服成本的大幅压缩并显著提升了客户满意度。 然而,Klarna 选择主动公开这组数据,是出于强烈的社会责任感。Sebastian 指出,如果所有企业都开始效仿并复制这种做法,未来外包公司将无法再轻易将富余人力转移给其他客户,这最终会对就业市场产生实质性的冲击。当下的 AI 市场充斥着精美的 Demo、原型演示以及各种肤浅的玩具应用——比如让人用 ChatGPT 代写邮件,结果改来改去花的时间比自己直接手写还要多——很少有企业像 Klarna 一样,将 AI 深度落地在如此庞大的业务规模中并取得显著成果。他们希望借此敲响警钟,促使政界和全社会认真思考 AI 普及所带来的深远社会治理挑战。 - **外包生态缓冲**:第三方客服外包机构体量超百万员工,短期内通过跨客户转派吸收了 700 个人力缺口。 - **走出 Demo 阶段**:科技圈长期缺乏在大规模核心业务场景中成功量化产出的 AI 案例,Klarna 是少数交出实际成果的企业。 - **社会警示意图**:主动披露真实指标旨在敦促政策制定者尽早制定应对技术性失业的长期策略。 --- ### [01:15:26](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=4526s) “老虎”公司崛起:人均创收与组织架构重塑 硅谷创业者过去十年中常常怀抱一个浪漫的幻想:成立一家像 Instagram 早期那样只有 13 个人、永远不需要庞大团队、免于管理复杂度的精简公司。除了 WhatsApp 和 Instagram 这两个被 Facebook 收购后迅速扩充至成百上千人的特例之外,这种想法在过去几乎是不切实际的空想。但如今,随着 AI 能力的爆发,极简团队撬动巨额价值的逻辑第一次有了变成现实的可能。 Sebastian 由此提出了他关于未来企业格局的“老虎”(Tigers)理论:在未来的 6 到 12 个月内,市场将清晰地分辨出一批将 AI 深度植入企业骨髓的新型公司。这些公司从底层重构编写代码、交付产品功能和组织协作的模式,从而在各自垂直领域拉开巨大的领跑优势。伴随这种演进,企业的“人均创收”(Revenue per Employee)将被推向前所未有的高度。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Revenue per Employee Comparison accDescr: A comparison chart showing how employee productivity evolves across traditional banks, tech giants, and AI-native Tiger companies. subgraph Legacy["传统机构与基准"] A["传统银行 / Visa / Goldman Sachs<br>约 $1M - $1.1M / 人"] B["Klarna 早期基准<br>约 $0.6M / 人"] end subgraph Giants["现有科技巨头"] C["Klarna 现阶段<br>接近 $1.0M / 人"] D["Apple / Netflix<br>约 $2.0M / 人"] end subgraph Tigers["未来 AI 驱动企业(Tigers)"] E["新一代组织形态<br>可达 $5M - $10M / 人"] end B --> C A -.-> E D -.-> E ``` - **人均创收跨越**:传统金融巨头如高盛(Goldman Sachs)和 Visa 的人均创收在 100 万至 110 万美元左右;Apple 和 Netflix 约为 200 万美元;只有少数传统油气垄断型老牌企业能达到六七百万美元。 - **Tigers 的新标准**:深度结合 AI 的先锋科技企业在未来将向每位员工创造 500 万至 1,000 万美元营收的全新水平发起冲击。 - **行业代表动向**:Airbnb CEO Brian Chesky 正在推动的组织再造被视作行业典型,Klarna 同样在全力向这一阵营看齐。 --- ### [01:17:46](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=4666s) Fintech 全面复兴与欧冠决赛的前景展望 在 Sebastian 看来,不论通用人工智能(AGI)何时实现,仅仅依托现有 AI 技术的深化应用,就足以在 6 到 12 个月内彻底拉开企业间的身位差距。传统老牌银行面对这股浪潮几乎毫无招架之力——其笨重的决策流程、迟缓的迭代周期以及陈旧落后的技术栈,使其在计算如何应对新型竞争时“逻辑根本无法跑通”(I can't compute)。这预示着金融科技领域正迎来一场前所未有的大复兴(Revival of Fintech)。 Sebastian 兴奋地列举了一系列正展现出强劲复苏与突围势头的同行:从拉美的 NuBank、英国的 Monzo 和 Revolut,到曾备受争议但如今表现抢眼的 Dave。Fintech 正在以惊人的软件研发速度与服务迭代质量颠覆旧格局。回顾 Klarna 的 19 年创业长跑,Sebastian 感慨道,商业的巅峰对决还远未结束,“也许我还没踢上真正的欧冠决赛,属于我们的巅峰战役依然还在前方”。 两位主持人对此深表赞同,调侃称原本以为本期节目只是一场关于支付行业的常规商业深度拆解,没想到在最后阶段引爆了如此颠覆性的未来篇章。他们笑称与其等 6 到 12 个月后再请 Sebastian 来复盘,按照如今 AI 进化的加速度,恐怕两三周之后就得重新开麦对谈。主持人由衷盛赞了用以替代“独角兽”(Unicorns)的“老虎”(Tigers)这一精辟概念,并以此为本期长谈画上了兼具前瞻性与激情的句号。 ## Notable quotes > [09:14](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=554s) 不,你们会需要60,000美元的。 — 天使投资人 > [16:46](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=1006s) 不,那是绝对是个糟糕透顶的主意。我们进军英美的唯一出路,就是去做大额分期融资——就像 Affirm 走的那种路径,去切床垫、大家电和消费电子产品,绝不能做小额商品。 — Sebastian Siemiatkowski > [28:07](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=1687s) 原来银行业就是这么赚钱的啊,太棒了,我们也这么干! — Sebastian Siemiatkowski > [32:47](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=1967s) Pieter,你必须把公司卖给我,因为我马上就要碾轧你了! — Sebastian Siemiatkowski > [38:48](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=2328s) 嘿,Ben,我昨晚彻查了你名下的房贷账单,发现你一直在支付过高的利息。我昨夜已经代表你与另一家银行重新谈下了一个更划算的利率。你每个月可以省下 10 美元房贷,现在只需点击一下‘同意’,剩下的换行手续和资金划转全部由我自动搞定。 — Sebastian Siemiatkowski > [50:44](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=3044s) 没有人会因为选择 IBM 而被解雇 — Sebastian Siemiatkowski > [52:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=3120s) 使用 Afterpay,消费者只能在集成了他们的极少数网站付款;而下载 Klarna,消费者能在全美所有电商网站买单。你们猜消费者最终会选择谁? — Sebastian Siemiatkowski > [59:15](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=3555s) 这就是我 20 年磨一剑为之训练的时刻,现在轮到我上场看看能不能把这个危局解开了。 — Sebastian Siemiatkowski > [01:01:25](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=3685s) 难道以后的生活就是这样了吗? — Sebastian Siemiatkowski > [01:06:44](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=4004s) 营收曲线持续向上,而成本曲线持续向下 — Sebastian Siemiatkowski > [01:10:52](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=4252s) 我们只是按下一个按钮,人类专员需要处理的工作量瞬间消失了整整三分之二 — Sebastian Siemiatkowski > [01:17:46](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4&t=4666s) 也许我还没踢上真正的欧冠决赛,属于我们的巅峰战役依然还在前方 — Sebastian Siemiatkowski ## Mentioned Klarna, Sebastian Siemiatkowski, Niklas Adalberth, Victor Jacobsson, Visa, Mastercard, Shopify, Stripe, Adyen, Spotify, Afterpay, Affirm, ASOS, Pieter van der Does, Collison 兄弟, Nick Molnar, Brian Chesky, Elon Musk, Zlatan Ibrahimović, Richard Branson, Ingvar Kamprad, Boris Johnson, Kim Kardashian, Bill Gurley, Vanta, Amazon, Google, Apple, Netflix, Revolut, Chime, Nubank, Monzo, Dave, Goldman Sachs, Sequoia Capital, Silver Lake, Dragoneer, Urban Outfitters, Sephora, Macy's, H&M ## Video description (Episode originally released June 24, 2024) The tenacity required to build Klarna over the last 19 years is astonishing. Despite several headwinds and changes in the payments landscape since founding, Klarna is used today by 150 million consumers globally, processing two million payments a day. Founder and CEO Sebastian Siemiatkowski joins us for one of the most honest and thoughtful discussions we’ve ever had on the show. If you’re a business strategy nerd, it’s a great case study in how to leverage the strengths you have as a startup vs. incumbents, and how to compete against other startups in your space. In Klarna's case: the rapid rise of buy-now-pay-later. Sebastian also takes us into the logic of his aggressive AI strategy for cost reduction, product experience, and payments innovation. *More Acquired:* - Get email updates https://www.acquired.fm/email and vote on future episodes! - Join the Slack http://acquired.fm/slack - Check out the latest swag in the ACQ Merch Store https://www.acquired.fm/store! _Note: Acquired hosts and guests may hold assets discussed in this episode. This podcast is not investment advice, and is intended for informational and entertainment purposes only. You should do your own research and make your own independent decisions when considering any financial transactions._ [Source](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUtQ6PAsBV4)

Source quotes

[9:14] 天使投资人: 不,你们会需要60,000美元的。 [16:46] Sebastian Siemiatkowski: 不,那是绝对是个糟糕透顶的主意。我们进军英美的唯一出路,就是去做大额分期融资——就像 Affirm 走的那种路径,去切床垫、大家电和消费电子产品,绝不能做小额商品。 [28:07] Sebastian Siemiatkowski: 原来银行业就是这么赚钱的啊,太棒了,我们也这么干! [32:47] Sebastian Siemiatkowski: Pieter,你必须把公司卖给我,因为我马上就要碾轧你了! [38:48] Sebastian Siemiatkowski: 嘿,Ben,我昨晚彻查了你名下的房贷账单,发现你一直在支付过高的利息。我昨夜已经代表你与另一家银行重新谈下了一个更划算的利率。你每个月可以省下 10 美元房贷,现在只需点击一下‘同意’,剩下的换行手续和资金划转全部由我自动搞定。 [50:44] Sebastian Siemiatkowski: 没有人会因为选择 IBM 而被解雇 [52:00] Sebastian Siemiatkowski: 使用 Afterpay,消费者只能在集成了他们的极少数网站付款;而下载 Klarna,消费者能在全美所有电商网站买单。你们猜消费者最终会选择谁? [59:15] Sebastian Siemiatkowski: 这就是我 20 年磨一剑为之训练的时刻,现在轮到我上场看看能不能把这个危局解开了。 [61:25] Sebastian Siemiatkowski: 难道以后的生活就是这样了吗? [66:44] Sebastian Siemiatkowski: 营收曲线持续向上,而成本曲线持续向下 [70:52] Sebastian Siemiatkowski: 我们只是按下一个按钮,人类专员需要处理的工作量瞬间消失了整整三分之二 [77:46] Sebastian Siemiatkowski: 也许我还没踢上真正的欧冠决赛,属于我们的巅峰战役依然还在前方

Source quotes

[32:47] Sebastian Siemiatkowski: Peter, you have to sell your business to me because I'm going to run you over. [26:38] Sebastian Siemiatkowski: Oh okay, that's how you make business in the banking world. Awesome, let's do it [61:46] Sebastian Siemiatkowski: is this what life is going to be like now? [61:46] Sebastian Siemiatkowski: it's obviously horrible to some degree but it's also like wow I'm living again. [64:46] Sebastian Siemiatkowski: we expanded too fast in hiring, we should have been a little bit more careful about that. [64:46] Sebastian Siemiatkowski: Afterpay was kicking our ass. [64:46] Sebastian Siemiatkowski: I still look at the fact of like the company's soon going to do over $3 billion worth of Revenue and it's this size after 20 years... I think it's an okay achievement. [66:44] Sebastian Siemiatkowski: he's a freaking cheap bastard like he is so cost conscious. [78:00] Sebastian Siemiatkowski: I just don't understand how that's going to work... I can't compute. [78:00] Sebastian Siemiatkowski: maybe I haven't played that Champions League final yet, still ahead of us.

Original transcript

[0:00] hello acquired listeners today we are [0:03] doing a deeper dive into the payments [0:06] landscape after our Visa episode late [0:08] last year and to do that and learn more [0:11] about his company Clara we are joined by [0:14] Sebastian shamia kovski the co-founder [0:17] and CEO of Clara now that is a name that [0:20] many of you probably recognize they are [0:21] best known as a buy now pay later [0:23] company with ambition to play a broader [0:25] role in the payments landscape they were [0:27] founded 19 years ago in Stockholm not [0:30] too different than our friends of the [0:31] show at Spotify and by now have 150 [0:35] million consumers globally using the [0:37] service empowering 2 million payments a [0:39] day but we will get into Clara [0:42] specifically later on first welcome [0:44] Sebastian thank you for having me it's [0:46] great to be here so I want to ask you in [0:48] some ways a crazy softball question in [0:50] other ways an impossible question to [0:52] answer and that is starting at the [0:53] 30,000 foot view if someone asked you [0:56] hey can I have a highle overview of how [0:58] payments works and who are the major [1:00] players in the value chain you know in 5 [1:02] minutes or so how would you respond to [1:04] that yeah well considering that I hope [1:07] there's a lot of geeks on this call or [1:09] on this listening to this podcast I [1:10] would probably in this case start a [1:12] little bit differently well I would say [1:13] usually look I think the easiest way to [1:15] think about it is the issuing and [1:16] acquiring side and the networks right so [1:19] the issuing side would be the bank [1:20] giving you your credit card that [1:22] provides you and that card has an access [1:25] to a credit line or positive balance [1:28] then you have the networks in between [1:29] Visa Master Card that kind of sets the [1:31] standards and both the brand recognition [1:33] to us that you know that this card will [1:35] be accepted in these places but also the [1:38] standards for how that exchange of [1:39] financial information and payments and [1:41] the settling of that transaction [1:42] actually happens and then finally [1:44] obviously you have the acquir and the [1:46] PSPs which basically are the ones [1:49] partnering up with IMM merchants and [1:50] helping them enable the acceptance of [1:52] payments providing the terminals if it's [1:54] a physical store or providing the [1:56] checkouts and the you know cashier [1:58] experience if it's online [2:00] and then you have a number of companies [2:02] that kind of circulate in this industry [2:04] whether it's people helping with [2:05] recognizing fraud or helping with [2:07] underwriting or you know different for [2:09] example e-commerce platforms that may [2:12] also offer we know Shopify is a fintech [2:14] company to a large degree as an example [2:15] so for so there will be a lot of people [2:17] that are a little bit of both but in [2:19] general I think that acquiring Network [2:20] issuing side explains a lot of it and [2:24] you founded Clara 19 years ago wind all [2:28] the way back what was the sight that you [2:30] had where you said I should attack and [2:32] start in this very particular corner of [2:36] payments yeah so not to make that too [2:38] lengthy but for whatever reason I've [2:40] always had this like dream of starting a [2:42] company I was inspired by the founder of [2:44] Ikea that's Swedish in vakad and I read [2:47] Richard Branson's book about Virgin when [2:49] I was like 14 years old and I thought it [2:50] was a fantastic story and stuff so I've [2:52] had a lot of different business ideas [2:54] that I obviously myself thought were [2:56] awesome each one of them but most of [2:58] them stayed as a draft on a piece of [3:00] paper I happened to spend two years in [3:04] Stockholm School of Economics which is a [3:05] business school and I did a sabatical [3:08] year which took me around the world [3:09] without flying which was an exciting [3:11] Adventure coming back I was out of jobs [3:14] and I was just desperately looking for a [3:15] job and this was a low economy because [3:17] the it.com bubble had just burst so I [3:21] tried to kind of go to PWC or these kind [3:23] of places that somebody with an [3:25] economical background should work at but [3:27] I didn't get in job I found myself [3:29] getting a job at a account receivables [3:34] factoring SL collection company which [3:37] was kind of the last place in the world [3:39] I ever imagined myself working as a [3:41] sales guy and I had a lot of experience [3:43] from me being kind of a younger 17 18 [3:46] years old I used to work extra as a as a [3:49] telemarketing guy who would you know [3:50] call you and bother you in the evenings [3:52] trying to sell a subscription to a [3:54] magazine or something like that and so I [3:57] got this job and my job was basically to [3:59] open the at that point there was still [4:01] telephone cataloges right like these [4:03] cataloges of of businesses and I would [4:05] call them and say hey when somebody [4:08] doesn't pay your invoices or when you [4:11] need factoring so you want to borrow [4:13] against your account receivables who are [4:15] you using currently and would you [4:16] consider using the company that I work [4:18] for and the funny thing is the company I [4:20] was working for was called Acme [4:23] Acme and it was a really stupid idea why [4:25] they use that name but they said like [4:26] that's the dummy company that Microsoft [4:28] uses in all of their presentations [4:30] right so they said this is free [4:32] advertising for us every time they use [4:34] this dummy company it's like advertising [4:36] for us didn't sound like a great idea [4:38] but I mean basically I was just picking [4:41] up the phone call and I was calling all [4:42] these businesses and this happened to be [4:45] 03 when it was difficult right you would [4:47] call this lady in Accounting in some [4:49] midsize Swedish company and she would [4:52] say look I've used this other company [4:53] for 20 years and I don't really care and [4:56] maybe you can save me $1,000 in fees but [4:58] I don't care like I've been using them [5:00] and I trust them and so forth right so [5:02] it was difficult however I happened to [5:05] call a few e-commerce companies because [5:08] at that point time you know Amazon [5:09] didn't exist in Sweden so there was [5:11] these early entrepreneurs that had found [5:13] that you could buy Google AdWords really [5:15] cheaply for like cat food and you could [5:17] start shipping a lot of cat food right [5:19] like it was actually quite easy back [5:21] then right you just buy an ADW that [5:22] nobody else was buying and suddenly [5:24] you'd had all these customers flocking [5:25] at your website and they were in need of [5:29] of some payments methodology right and [5:33] what happened there was the prevalent [5:36] form of payment online then was just [5:38] like it is today was visa and MasterCard [5:41] there was card payments however [5:44] traditionally in mail order catalog mail [5:47] order businesses had provided a bill [5:49] meat option which is true in the US as [5:51] well right and so the catalog companies [5:54] had already figured out that if you [5:56] would provide credit when you sold [5:59] something at a distance meaning you know [6:01] it's different when you go into the [6:03] store you see the product you touch and [6:05] feel it and it's like this is what I'm [6:06] buying and then you pay for it but in a [6:09] distance selling where you would order [6:10] something from a catalog the experience [6:13] of being able to say please ship this [6:14] product to me first it allow me to touch [6:17] and feel it before I pay for it so buy [6:20] now pay later made a lot of sense it's [6:22] not about credit for borrowing money it [6:25] was to provide safety and Trust to the [6:28] consumer that like I can and feel this [6:30] thing before I part with my money you [6:33] have to remember this is in a country [6:34] called Sweden where most people had [6:37] debit cards and not credit cards right [6:39] so in the I was going to ask what was [6:40] the payment landscape in in Sweden like [6:42] at that point so actually a lot of [6:44] people had credit cards but they didn't [6:45] like using them because they thought [6:47] they were dangerous and they would get [6:48] in depth and stuff so people really use [6:50] them as a lost you know lender of loster [6:52] Sword yeah exactly that's pretty smart [6:54] so they mostly were using the debit [6:56] money so to them go online and buy [6:58] something in these early days was risky [6:59] undertaking like I'm punching in my [7:02] credit card number or my debit card [7:03] number which gives somebody else access [7:05] to my positive balance on my salary [7:07] account and then I'm shipping money to [7:10] this small e-commerce business I've [7:11] never heard the name of to get my cat [7:13] food at potentially cheap price so the [7:17] ability to be able to say hey could I [7:19] first order that stuff get the cat food [7:21] inspect it and say yeah it's healthy cat [7:23] food is what's it advertised to be and [7:25] then pay for it made a lot of sense [7:27] right so that just you know made me [7:30] thinking like wow why aren't these [7:31] e-commerce companies doing what the mail [7:33] order companies used to do and we're [7:35] still doing because there were quite [7:37] successful mail loader companies that [7:38] were just migrating to the internet and [7:40] they were actually doing it and they're [7:41] offering what we referred to as an open [7:44] invoice payment method back then which [7:45] then merged into buy now pay later but [7:48] it was basically that ability so I had [7:50] this idea the company I was working for [7:53] considering the name of it as you heard [7:54] Acme was not the most serious company in [7:57] the world so I kind of figured out this [7:59] was not going to be the place where I [8:00] was going to be able to develop these [8:02] ideas and then it happened to be so I [8:05] went back to school to University and [8:08] they had an incubator and I came with [8:10] the idea there like hey maybe this is [8:12] something that I should start a company [8:13] doing actually so that was kind of the [8:15] background it really was the initial [8:17] founding Insight that is the core [8:18] product today of people for individual [8:21] purchases will want to pay later even [8:23] after they transact correct a lot of [8:26] companies do a lot of winding around in [8:28] the woods before figuring out the core [8:30] product I'm sure it took some time to [8:32] get traction but like the initial idea [8:34] was the thing with Market fit well [8:36] actually I don't want to sound like that [8:38] but it didn't take that much time to [8:40] find traction so what was interesting [8:42] here and again you have to remember this [8:43] is in a small country of Sweden with 10 [8:45] million inhabitants but we had this idea [8:48] we went to the incubator I found my two [8:50] friends that you know I knew one of them [8:52] from high school Nicholas and the other [8:53] one I met in [8:55] University we decided to go down this [8:58] route around October October November we [9:00] found a business angel investor that [9:03] invested in December and she brought [9:05] some Engineers the engineers built the [9:09] first MVP of our system to process these [9:11] transactions and underwrite the [9:13] transactions and you know all of these [9:14] things from about January to April took [9:17] them about four months and they did it [9:18] in their spare time because they still [9:20] had full-time jobs we asked our business [9:23] Angel to give us [9:25] $40,000 she gave us $60,000 for 10% of [9:29] the company and we said at that point in [9:31] time look we only need 40,000 to come to [9:33] profitability and she's like no no no [9:35] you're going to need [9:36] 60 different era different era how much [9:39] money have you raised to date just to [9:40] get that out there uh a lot uh a lot um [9:43] a little bit more I think it's $4 [9:44] billion or something but the point is [9:46] what's interesting is we spent $30,000 [9:50] before we became profitable so we were [9:52] about 6 months into it and the [9:54] transaction started [9:56] running and we very quickly became [9:59] profitable actually and it was only in [10:02] many years later that we started raising [10:04] you know bigger rounds of Investments [10:06] and we were profitable for the first few [10:08] years of the business because the [10:10] business model was very effective the [10:12] merchants loved it because they saw an [10:14] increase in sales right you're enabling [10:16] transactions yeah yeah exactly so you [10:17] know and consumers loved it because they [10:19] felt much more secure of using this over [10:22] using the debit card so it really kicked [10:25] off now it was in a small market right [10:26] which is why we didn't become PayPal at [10:28] that point of time it would have been [10:30] very different if you would have like [10:31] stricken gold like that in the US with [10:34] something right but here in Sweden it [10:36] became extremely successful very quickly [10:38] to the consumer trust element were you [10:42] holding the payment information yourself [10:44] was that part of the value proposition [10:46] of like oh you don't have to give the [10:47] cap food company your payment [10:48] information this is a centralized place [10:51] where you know you can trust us and will [10:53] wear the secure platform yeah I mean it [10:56] has become that more and more but the [10:58] merchants always wanted to [10:59] understand who is their customer and [11:01] what are they buying and so forth so we [11:03] made sure to build a system in such a [11:04] way that the merchant had full access to [11:06] it as well with the consent of the [11:08] consumer and how in those early days I'm [11:10] sure it sort of evolved over time but [11:12] obviously if the benefit is pay later [11:14] there's a sort of a concept of float you [11:16] said you quickly got to profitability [11:18] who was sort of floating the the money [11:20] in the meantime yeah and this is the [11:22] funny part right which is and I think [11:24] only truly nerds like yourself will be [11:26] able to appreciate this fully but the [11:28] funny thing is that what we're basically [11:30] describing here is a factoring idea [11:32] right because [11:33] basically we are underwriting an account [11:36] receivables and then we're acquiring [11:37] those accounting receivables from the [11:39] merchant we figured out because everyone [11:42] was asking the same question how are you [11:43] going to fund this because you need a [11:44] lot of cash right you need to buy these [11:45] invoices and then wait or these account [11:48] receivables and you need to wait for [11:49] them to be paid by the consumer but we [11:51] figured out which is a typical to me [11:53] like entrepreneur conclusion is that [11:55] like yes if you worked in the finance [11:56] industry you would be like of course [11:58] that's necessary [11:59] but if you're an entrepreneur and you [12:01] talk to these online Merchants back then [12:04] they were like you know what I'm not [12:07] interested in a cash flow solution they [12:09] themselves were actually sorry to say so [12:10] but so many times fairly poor at [12:13] understanding the importance of cash [12:14] flow so what ended up happening is we [12:16] went to these smaller e-commerce [12:18] businesses and said look the thing you [12:20] want to avoid is the risk we'll take on [12:22] the risk of the customer not paying CU [12:24] that was one thing that they were very [12:25] worried about the second thing that the [12:27] merchant was very worried about was the [12:29] Administration if I do this myself [12:31] because some of them could have done it [12:32] themselves they could say like hey I'm [12:33] just going to print an invoice and then [12:36] ask the customer to I mean like an [12:37] electrician would come to your house [12:38] right and will give you a bill and say [12:40] pay me for my work right they could do [12:42] that but they were also worried about [12:43] the administration what if I need to [12:44] collect this money and get a collecting [12:46] agency and like oh my God and customer [12:48] service and all these things those were [12:50] the two primary concerns not the cash [12:52] flow so we ended up constructing a [12:54] business model we say we'll buy these [12:56] account receivables from you we'll take [12:58] the risk we'll do to all the admin but [13:01] we won't pay you until 3 weeks later so [13:04] we ended actually creating a funny a [13:07] facturing model business model that [13:08] actually had a positive cash [13:10] flow [13:11] amazing our Merchants were basically [13:14] funding us for the first few years some [13:17] Merchants obviously recognize and say [13:18] look I need the money instantly I need [13:19] it faster and then we would say well [13:21] then we need to charge you a higher fee [13:24] and we had enough Merchants that [13:25] accepted to get delayed on their payment [13:29] payments and in combination with the [13:31] fact a lot of consumers paid not at due [13:34] date but much earlier right they would [13:35] just pay instantaneously so those two [13:38] cash flows we managed to balance it was [13:40] actually quite some time before we [13:42] started having cash flow issues you sort [13:44] of had the Golden Goose of being able to [13:46] scale with customer funds without [13:49] actually going out and and raising [13:50] additional Capital which most people [13:52] would think is impossible for a [13:53] factoring business whose theoretically [13:56] entire value proposition is fronting [13:58] money what you need to get from some [13:59] facility or you know maybe you dip into [14:01] your Equity Capital to do that but [14:03] you're right it's a very entrepreneurial [14:05] Insight of actually the customers are [14:07] not obsessed with cash flow they [14:09] confront the money effectively and will [14:11] handle the risk in the administration [14:12] yes and that's exactly it right so that [14:14] was was funny about it and you know and [14:16] it worked over the years as we became [14:18] more I don't know like hopefully [14:20] trustable you know we started having [14:22] Banks fund this and we found different [14:24] ways of solving this but initially [14:25] that's actually how we solved it it's [14:27] almost sort of Visa like in a way I [14:29] guess you were taking the risk in a way [14:30] that Visa wasn't but you're a network [14:32] you know you're not actually the [14:34] financial provider in those early days [14:36] exactly exactly when was the first time [14:40] you heard the phrase buy now pay later [14:42] because I will say I think I heard it in [14:44] probably 2015 or something and if you [14:47] had started the company over a decade [14:50] before that it had to be one of these [14:51] scenarios where you thought you were [14:53] operating in one space then your space [14:55] got named by somebody else and you had a [14:57] choice whether to adopt the generalized [14:59] name or not great question so for a long [15:01] period of time I was very angry with the [15:04] fact that in my opinion what was a clone [15:06] of CLA in Australia called off to pay [15:10] had also then created the buy now pay [15:12] later term but then fortunately for me I [15:16] found that Financial Times had written [15:18] an article about CLA back in like 15 13 [15:22] or 15 before after to pay was launched [15:25] where they actually titled it buy now [15:27] pay later so so that kind of made me at [15:30] ease that I think it was Financial Times [15:33] that coined the the term so now I feel a [15:35] little bit more happy from a from a pure [15:38] Prestige [15:40] perspective bringing up after pay brings [15:42] up this sort of interesting point that [15:44] this space lends itself well to [15:48] companies that serve geographies and [15:49] their specific needs so you sort of [15:52] could have before everyone was at global [15:55] scale an Australian provider a Swedish [15:57] provider a US Prov figh and then I [16:00] imagine the race was just sort of on to [16:01] figure out well how do we serve the [16:02] needs of those other markets in addition [16:04] to our own you're totally right so what [16:07] happened in our case was we launched [16:09] this in Sweden it worked then as being [16:12] Swedish you know funny enough now when I [16:14] look back at it but like the first next [16:16] Market was like Norway and Finland which [16:19] are like 4 million people you know [16:20] whatever but that's like partially [16:21] driven by Merchants Demand right because [16:23] a lot of Swedish e-commerce Merchants [16:25] were active in Norway and Finnish market [16:27] and so it kind of the skin I Ian [16:29] countries the next big market for us was [16:31] Germany and Netherlands and the reason [16:33] we chose those markets was because there [16:35] was a strong tradition of what in [16:39] Germany is referred to as re which is [16:41] basically invoice or buy now pay later [16:44] in those markets and for a long period [16:46] of time we were like how are we going to [16:48] break into this us and UK Market because [16:51] in our opinion we looked at it and we [16:53] said credit card are so prevalent [16:55] there's no need there's no need for our [16:57] product in those markets and that was my [17:01] conclusion and it made us continuously [17:04] like think about like okay but how are [17:05] we actually going to do it the funny [17:07] thing was that we eventually decided to [17:10] kind of dip our toes into the UK Market [17:13] that was basically I think around maybe [17:15] it was pretty late like 15 [17:17] 145 we used most of like between 2010 [17:21] and 15 we used for two things I can come [17:24] back one we tried to compete with stripe [17:26] and addan on the acquiring and PSP side [17:28] we can come back to that later but the [17:30] other part was uh payment service [17:32] provider right so as one of those and [17:35] then the other part what we spent 10 to [17:38] 15 on a lot was to get Germany to work [17:41] because we had at that point of time [17:43] four or five markets and it was really [17:45] difficult for us to kind of rebuild our [17:47] systems and rebuild everything that we [17:49] were doing so it would actually be able [17:51] to operate in multiple jurisdictions [17:52] with different regulatory requirements [17:54] etc etc so but in 15 when we had a small [17:58] team we put them in in the UK and we [17:59] said hey let's go and try to get [18:02] something going in the UK and then the [18:04] team came back and said you know what we [18:06] think there's a huge opportunity for [18:08] this product which gives you an [18:09] opportunity to buy now pay later and I [18:12] said no that's a terrible idea the only [18:14] option we have is to go into high ticket [18:17] financing so more the approach that a [18:19] firm has had I mean basically going at [18:21] like the mattresses and the home [18:23] electronics and kind of do that and not [18:26] go for like small ticket items or [18:27] fashion or whatever and I said to the [18:29] team so you're not allowed to do that [18:31] and secondly the team had an idea they [18:33] were going to go to like one of the [18:34] biggest fashion retailers and try to [18:36] nail a big whale from day one and I was [18:39] like we've never done it like that we [18:41] always go to the small merchants and [18:42] then the mediumsized merchants Etc and I [18:44] was actually quite tough on the team I [18:45] was like that's a really bad idea you're [18:47] not allowed to do it and they fully [18:49] ignored me right they just ignored me [18:51] entirely right so six 12 months later I [18:53] had another business review meeting with [18:55] them and they were like okay so we're [18:56] trying to do this buy now pay later to [18:57] Lodge f retail I was like I told you [19:00] you're not allowed to do that that's a [19:02] horrible idea and like please don't do [19:05] it and then 3 months later it came we've [19:07] signed Asos and we're going live with [19:09] buy now later and it's been a smashing [19:11] success right so it's kind of funny you [19:13] always want to attribute you know in [19:15] that case actually it was very fortunate [19:16] we had a very independent thinking team [19:18] in the UK who recognized something that [19:21] I had not recognized and that then also [19:23] off to pay had recognized in Australia [19:26] which was that credit cards had been [19:28] growing growing 2x between you know 78 [19:31] and [19:32] 18 but debit cards have been growing 10x [19:35] and that there was this new generation [19:37] of card users that simply did not have [19:40] access to credit cards or didn't like to [19:41] use credit cards and to them the [19:44] traditional business model of clana the [19:46] very basic idea that we had when we [19:47] started in Sweden so the funny thing it [19:50] wasn't CLA that figured the us out it [19:52] was the US market that became the [19:54] Swedish market and that was what opened [19:57] up for the US for CL right which is kind [19:59] of opposite to what you would usually [20:01] expect to happen it wasn't us like it [20:03] just happened to be that the demographic [20:05] and the 2007 Financial crises the [20:07] changes to credit cards promotions in [20:11] campuses and you know tougher [20:13] restrictions on underwriting and all [20:14] these things created this massive boom [20:17] in debit and then that meant that there [20:19] was suddenly a new online Shopper that [20:23] had a need for our products that didn't [20:26] exist when we started clown Sweden you [20:29] it's fascinating so it's not that like [20:31] credit card users switched to become [20:33] debit card users it's that the market [20:35] for unpenetrated digital payments ended [20:38] up mostly acre to debit card users which [20:41] changed your characterization of oh the [20:43] US market has mostly credit cards too [20:46] well all these new people that in what [20:47] was previously sort of a latent [20:49] unexplored Market are now you know [20:51] primed to be the type of customer that [20:53] we have here in [20:54] Sweden exactly the thing is that what I [20:58] really found interesting in all of this [21:00] is that like we have occasionally work [21:02] with McKenzie they do some things that [21:05] is very high level and I find of less [21:06] value and they sometimes do really great [21:08] things so I have both fantastic things [21:10] to say about McKenzie and sometimes I'm [21:12] somewhat of a criticism but with that [21:15] said McKinzie published a report and [21:18] this was a fantastic report that it was [21:20] actually published in May [21:23] 2014 so long before the buy now pay [21:25] later thing and it's called New [21:27] Frontiers in credit card segmentation [21:30] tapping unmet consumer needs right [21:34] remember these are a few years before [21:35] Bop like about 5 years before bopat [21:37] became a thing in the US and in that [21:40] report McKinzie says there is a group [21:44] that credit cards are not catering to [21:46] and they call them self-aware [21:49] avoiders this is a group of people in [21:52] the US who have had poor experience with [21:54] credit cards they don't like the [21:55] practices of credit cards the way the [21:57] credit cards promote [21:59] over in depthness by you know giving you [22:00] a credit limit that's very very big and [22:02] you think you have that money and can [22:03] spend it the way they always ask you [22:06] every month to pay a smaller amount and [22:07] pay the lowest possible amount so that [22:09] you revolve and build up a balance like [22:11] all these tactics and practices that [22:13] credit cards have [22:14] applied that a proportion of the [22:17] population in the US have simply you [22:20] know not liked or they seen their [22:21] parents get in financial depth in 2007 [22:24] and couldn't get out of it all these [22:25] things that was a group and the [22:27] interesting thing is a group of fairly [22:29] High median annual household incomes [22:31] they are spending quite a lot but they [22:34] were McKinzie estimated that group to be [22:36] about 20% of the US population that they [22:39] called self-aware avoiders and when you [22:41] look at the features that they promote [22:44] like what are the features that are most [22:45] important is it like the whole credit [22:47] card industry has been over obsessed [22:49] with the idea that everyone is a reward [22:51] Seeker there are reward Seekers out [22:53] there and it matters a lot to them but [22:56] it's not the whole population right so [22:58] instead of talking about rewards as the [23:00] most important benefits the self-aware [23:02] at voiders want simple and transparent [23:04] fees rates and terms right they want [23:08] avoidance of mishaps that trigger [23:10] fees payoff Horizon for each major [23:14] purchase and swipe to installment loan [23:17] mcken is basically describing bopat 5 [23:19] years ahead of it time right mckeny we [23:21] an entrepreneurial organization they [23:23] could have you know started CLA in the [23:25] US yes and even I read this report and [23:28] didn't fully grasp the potential of it [23:31] back then but the point is that there [23:33] were these indications that the markets [23:35] were changing the needs of consumers [23:36] were changing opening up for a different [23:38] form of credit that would be more [23:40] attractive not to necessarily everyone [23:43] yeah I mean I guess this is one of the [23:45] downsides of the Visa Mastercard system [23:48] in that it was we explored on that [23:50] episode visa and mastercard's business [23:53] model is in many ways very very similar [23:55] to yours but their partners are the [23:57] banks and the banks business model is [24:00] banking they lend money they make money [24:02] on lending money and so that's [24:04] underlying that whole system for sure [24:07] and that's the point if you look at how [24:09] much money a credit card issuer is [24:12] making as much as they may look in the [24:14] papers and say oh there's a new [24:16] generation of users that won't buy now [24:18] pay later is it attractive if I'm doing [24:20] revolving at like 30% interest rate and [24:24] I'm running my credit card portfolio at [24:26] this bank is it attractive to offer for [24:29] pay in for interest free installments [24:31] like you know that doesn't sound [24:32] attractive like I'm not going to make [24:34] more money doing that right so it is a [24:37] model that actually makes less money of [24:39] its users which means that it's better [24:41] for consumers and it's a model that [24:43] means that people borrow less so it has [24:46] that Advantage for the consumer but [24:48] that's not necessarily an advantage for [24:51] the bank itself with the credit card [24:53] provider today right now my point is [24:55] only to say that you still make money [24:57] with this model [24:58] is just that you make less money and [25:01] it's easier for a company like CLA [25:02] that's never or actually we have done [25:04] some revolving as well but like if you [25:06] take even off the pay an example who [25:07] never had revolving it's easier because [25:10] you only have upside you don't have the [25:12] downside right if you have this massive [25:13] portfolio of people that are paying you [25:16] tremendous amount of revolving fees and [25:17] stuff like that then it's very hard to [25:19] take a decision that you're going to [25:21] change into a business model that's [25:22] simply there's a major innovators [25:24] dilemma aspect to this yes yes is this [25:26] sort of the Christensen idea of low-end [25:28] disruption there's a new market that [25:30] wants a different product that product [25:32] is not as financially interesting to [25:35] incumbents and therefore there's this [25:37] opportunity created to create a lower [25:39] margin sort of quote unquote worse in [25:42] many ways product to this new set of [25:44] consumers yeah I think that's a big [25:47] piece of it I think that like if you [25:48] look at the also the criticism and the [25:53] challenge that a company like clana gets [25:55] I think part of it is as we provide [25:58] credit there's always the discussion of [26:00] credit and the issues associated with it [26:03] but there's definitely a part of that [26:05] criticism that is pushed by Banks and [26:09] other incumbents that are seeing a major [26:12] threat to their existing Revenue lines [26:15] like if this model becomes more [26:16] prevalent and if consumers I feel very [26:18] confident that in the coming years we're [26:20] going to see that people that use these [26:22] models are actually better off they get [26:24] less in depth they pay less in fees than [26:26] people using credit cards and eventually [26:28] when that becomes more and more [26:30] confirmed as the truth that will create [26:33] a tremendous pressure on these [26:35] incumbents models right so is it fair to [26:38] say that using Clara or a bmpl system [26:42] you're essentially signing up to a more [26:45] structured credit or payment plan versus [26:49] you know a credit card all of the [26:51] financial responsibility is on the card [26:53] holder the financial responsibility is [26:55] still on the payer here but it's like [26:58] hey I know the terms up front it's [26:59] structured I can't get myself into a [27:02] situation like we've been talking about [27:03] Where My Revolver just gets out of [27:05] control so yes I want to make it clear [27:08] here as well that like when when we [27:09] started clown out to come back to the [27:11] early days the first model that we [27:12] offered was just the buy out pay lat so [27:14] you would buy something now and you [27:16] would pay within 15 to 30 days now after [27:20] about 2 years we did see the opportunity [27:23] to move into revolving and also [27:26] financing of higher ticket items such as [27:28] you know a home electronics device or [27:30] something like that when we did that we [27:32] looked at the competing banks in Sweden [27:34] and we looked at their business model [27:35] and we said like how are they actually [27:37] doing this like how does it work what [27:38] fees do they charge what are the revenue [27:40] lines you know how do they underwrite [27:42] and all these things and we concluded [27:44] that there were all these great tricks [27:46] that made a consumer pay much more so [27:48] like a classical trick would be hey sign [27:50] up for 12 months interest free and then [27:52] what you would do is you would send the [27:53] customer a bill for your monthly payment [27:57] on that 12 month interest free loan [27:59] where you would either pay a higher [28:01] amount which would keep the 0% interest [28:04] plan or you would pay a lower amount [28:07] that actually meant that you moved into [28:09] a 36 months revolving account with 20% [28:11] interest now obviously consumers are [28:14] going to say oh this month was tough and [28:17] they're not necessarily going to [28:18] understand fully the consequences so [28:20] some would even by mistake PID the lower [28:22] amount and would be moved to a higher [28:24] interest bearing plan and we were like [28:26] oh okay that's how you make business in [28:28] in the banking World awesome let's do it [28:30] let's copy these things and we did it [28:32] and you make a lot of money from doing [28:34] those things now it took us some years [28:37] to also start reflecting like but hey [28:39] did all of these consumers really [28:41] understand what they did did they want [28:43] to pay that high interest rates is it [28:46] healthy it took us some time to start [28:48] reflecting on this and then as we [28:50] started reflecting these we started [28:52] changing our business model and removing [28:53] some of these tactics that banks have [28:56] applied to Max maximize this and I think [28:59] that there's a a great episode on [29:00] Netflix called credit cards explained [29:03] where there's basically 30 minutes where [29:04] you just move through all of these [29:05] tactics that banks have applied in the [29:07] last decades it's a different generation [29:09] I think in in [29:11] 2090s there wasn't this corporate social [29:14] responsibility thinking there wasn't [29:16] that thing it was just like how do I [29:17] maximize profit right like that was the [29:19] driving force and if somebody came up [29:21] with a tactic that was legal and made [29:25] people pay more interest then you would [29:27] do it like wasn't that consideration is [29:29] this healthy does this make sense Etc to [29:32] the same degree right and I think what [29:33] we've been doing is we've been [29:35] challenging these things and I think a [29:36] great example of that to answer your [29:37] questions was when I used to work at [29:39] Burger King when I was 15 when you [29:43] swiped your card right the terminal in [29:47] in Burg king would say press one for [29:49] debit press two for credit now that made [29:52] a lot of sense because when you make [29:55] your everyday purchases only a few [29:57] transactions are relevant to put on [29:59] credit maybe it's a bigger purchase and [30:01] I want to put it on credit for that [30:02] purpose or you know something but like [30:04] your everyday spend at bur King probably [30:05] is a debit transaction hopefully right [30:07] but maybe you know I'm out of salary I'm [30:09] getting my salary my paycheck tomorrow [30:11] and I'm okay to take it on credit for 24 [30:13] hours these situations may vary in [30:15] people's lives but the point is there [30:17] was an option between One debit and two [30:19] credit everyone's like above 40 30 you [30:22] know remembers these things now the [30:25] banks removed that they removed it and [30:27] today you swipe a credit card and you [30:29] get everything on your monthly statement [30:31] everything your Burger King purchase you [30:33] know your Walmart food everything is on [30:35] that why because obviously as you had [30:38] that ability to click per transaction [30:41] your monthly statement was before when [30:45] you had one for debit and two for credit [30:47] the monthly statement would only be for [30:49] the full amount of what you put on [30:51] credit and if you had the option to put [30:53] on debit you would have a lower amount [30:56] so let's say if you had that option with [30:59] one for debit and two for credit maybe [31:00] your monthly credit card statement would [31:02] be $500 How likely are you to revolve [31:05] then where you much less likely to [31:06] revolve because you can actually afford [31:08] $500 but if you put your full [31:10] consumption of a month you had maybe [31:12] $1,000 and now suddenly you're going to [31:14] revolve so the banks remove these things [31:17] press one for debit and two for credit [31:19] because they simply saw that it drove [31:21] less revolving and less revolving means [31:23] less money and then means less ability [31:26] to offer cash back and rewards that then [31:30] is the main feature to drive in new [31:32] credit card customers so you got this [31:33] Loop where everything is [31:35] incentivize to basically get consumers [31:38] to pay maximum interest and maximum [31:40] revolving right and now what we're doing [31:43] with our Solutions is reintroducing [31:45] press one for debit press two for credit [31:47] so we have both pay now and pay later so [31:49] we're trying to kind of bring back a lot [31:51] of these ideas that used to exist that [31:53] were simply just more healthy from a [31:55] spending perspective and a credit [31:57] perspective oh yeah how does that [31:58] manifest in the Clara product today what [32:00] what does pay now look like I I think [32:03] people are quite familiar with the Clara [32:04] button to buy now pay later yeah so what [32:08] we're going towards is that we're not [32:10] there entirely yet but within one or two [32:11] years we hope that every time you see [32:14] clana on a merchant website it will mean [32:18] that you know that you have those two [32:19] options and already today debit for Clon [32:23] is about [32:24] 35% of our volume right so almost not [32:27] half but it's a third of our volume is [32:29] debit not in the US obviously where [32:31] we're predominantly only credit still [32:33] but in a lot of European countries the [32:35] debit side is quite meaningful and our [32:38] ambition is for it to be 50/50 online [32:41] and in store probably be 80% debit and [32:43] 20% credit or something which we think [32:45] is kind of the long-term healthy [32:47] proportion so the mall that I usually go [32:50] to that's just kind of closest to my [32:51] house in San Francisco is Stonestown [32:53] Mall the entire mall and it's huge is [32:57] basically covered in Clara banners and [32:59] for the last year or so that I've been [33:01] going there I've been like this is so [33:03] weird clarina I think I now pay later I [33:06] think online I think e-commerce like [33:08] what is Clara doing here tell us about [33:11] in store you know we've been trying to [33:13] approach in store in many different ways [33:16] so I think to come back to that original [33:18] thing like we started definitely with [33:20] the buy now pay later model I'll [33:22] actually put it in a different context [33:23] in [33:25] 910 we had this videly successful B [33:28] and we had this idea that we were going [33:30] to what you refer to in the industry [33:32] close the loop meaning that we would be [33:35] both the merchant [33:37] acquirer PSP and the issuer this was the [33:41] compete with stripe and Aden exactly so [33:43] we had this idea I was laugh about the [33:45] fact that we had this presentation I had [33:46] this presentation for my board back then [33:49] I said look we're going to launch a new [33:50] product called CLA checkout and the idea [33:52] is that checkout will allow online [33:54] Merchants to offer all the local payment [33:55] methods Visa Mastercard local payment [33:57] methods buy now pay later methods Etc [34:00] and we will you know do all the [34:02] acquisition and and all the processing [34:04] and everything for these merchants and [34:06] then I said look I think we have a few [34:07] competitors that look scary there's [34:10] these cism brothers in Ireland who [34:12] figured out the importance of great apis [34:14] and that actually most of the people [34:16] integrating payments are Engineers so [34:18] let's build a great product for [34:19] engineers and then there's these guys [34:22] who've done it before the Dutch guys who [34:25] you know really know this industry [34:28] and the funny thing with Peter at addan [34:31] was that at that point time CLA was a [34:33] bigger company than Adan you know in all [34:35] aspects organization revenue and so [34:37] forth so I went down to Peter and I said [34:39] look Peter you have to sell your [34:40] business to me because I'm going to run [34:41] you over and Peter just looked at me he [34:43] was like who's this brat kid coming in [34:46] you know I was like probably you know [34:48] whatever 30 and he was like 40 and he's [34:50] like who is this guy coming in and like [34:51] you know threading me so it took me a [34:53] few years to fix my relationships with [34:55] Peter after that now we're good friends [34:57] at least so that's good so we had an [34:59] idea that we were going to compete in [35:00] this I always laughed that if my [35:02] investors were listening to me in that [35:03] board call they would have said oh I [35:05] need to go and make an investment in [35:07] stripe in Adan which actually seoa did [35:09] many of them did right yeah exactly so I [35:11] was like I was very right the only [35:13] problem was that CLA did not deliver on [35:16] our thing right so we we got check it [35:18] out it became actually a very successful [35:20] product in the natics where for a period [35:22] of time we had more than 50% of all [35:25] online transactions in were process over [35:28] CLA checkout right so it's hugely [35:30] successful but we struggled to bring it [35:33] International and do it as well as strip [35:35] and Adan dud after about 5 years and I [35:38] remember like in [35:39] 2013 there was an announcement Adan did [35:42] like oh we we added 50 payment methodes [35:44] in Asia or something I send it to my [35:46] engineers and I was like guys we haven't [35:48] added a single payment method in two [35:50] years I can just look at the pace here [35:52] of execution and I can see where this is [35:54] going but in 15 it was the final blow [35:58] was when Adan signed Spotify and so [36:01] obviously Spotify being a neighbor of [36:02] ours is like right in your backyard [36:04] exactly right you're like okay here [36:06] comes your worst competitor in science [36:08] with your best friend and you're like [36:09] okay so it became a very critical point [36:12] of time for the company because we said [36:14] okay look it's clear that we're not [36:16] executing on the strategy as well as [36:17] they are and we have two options right [36:21] either we pretend to be almost Adan and [36:24] stripe and then we exit the company [36:25] because somebody wants to buy an almost [36:27] Adan or an almost stripe which for [36:30] example happened there was a bambora was [36:32] a company in Sweden that got acquired by [36:34] ingenico because they were an almost [36:36] addan so you can do that or we pivot [36:40] right and this was when we pivoted in [36:42] the direction that we're on right now so [36:45] in 15 we kind of changed the ambition [36:47] and we said look if we can't win on the [36:49] merchant side let's instead pivot and [36:52] try to win on the consumer side right [36:54] and let's become to be clear you you [36:56] were still doing well on the mer side [36:58] for the buy now pay later platform just [37:00] not the full umbrella checkout platform [37:02] exactly right the checkout really worked [37:04] in the nordics where we had good support [37:05] and good for it and the biggest [37:07] challenge was actually in the US market [37:09] was shopify's dominance right because [37:11] basically the only opportunity we saw [37:13] for checkout was to start with smaller [37:15] merchants and then kind of grow into [37:17] larger Merchants but Shopify decided [37:19] they wanted to do their own checkout and [37:21] there be their own ftech company and at [37:22] that point of time it became basically [37:24] it blocked kind of the only entry point [37:25] that we had into the market and so that [37:28] kind of was also like a revelation like [37:30] it's going to be very difficult right [37:31] and since then you've seen a a few [37:33] companies have been trying to do check [37:35] out there's been um that company in us I [37:38] forgot the name that that got quite a [37:39] lot of attention trying to do check so [37:41] there's been a few people that's been [37:42] fast as an example and a few others has [37:44] been trying to do something like that [37:45] but so it became clear to us that we [37:47] needed to move away and today you know [37:50] Adan and stripe are our biggest [37:52] Distributors it's really changed a lot [37:54] we actually mostly are integrated over [37:57] acquirers and PSPs like them who are [37:59] promoting and offering the CLA product [38:02] to Merchants it's actually not that [38:04] common today that a merchant has direct [38:06] integration with us anymore but it's [38:08] predominantly yes well that'll help not [38:10] require a gigantic Salesforce yeah [38:13] exactly that's like classically the [38:14] problem with Merchant acquiring is you [38:16] need to have boots on the ground and [38:17] every geography which is why you needed [38:20] Banks to do it exactly now so it became [38:23] problematic for us obviously with [38:24] checkout because we were partially [38:25] competing with strip padan so in order [38:28] to get those relationships and [38:30] Partnerships going we've made [38:32] commitments that we are you know moving [38:34] away from that part of our product line [38:36] right and move into the consumer product [38:38] line which is kind of been the direction [38:40] of the company ever since 15 yes we [38:42] haven't talked really about the consumer [38:43] products at all and that seems to be the [38:46] more recent evolution in the company so [38:48] what does that look like funny enough in [38:50] 15 so we were like okay the bopat thing [38:53] worked really well we didn't at that [38:55] point of time yet recognize there was an [38:56] opportunity in the the UK and us so we [39:00] were a little bit concerned we did a [39:01] last attempt in 15 to launch checkout in [39:03] the US with very limited success so [39:06] we're a little bit like what do we do it [39:08] happened to be that my second co-founder [39:10] was leaving at the same point of time so [39:11] I had a entirely new management team [39:13] come in which at that point of time I've [39:15] also learned that I don't want to hire [39:17] Executives from the outside i' rather [39:19] promote from the within and the company [39:20] had been around for 10 years so I took [39:22] some of our best Junior managers and [39:25] promoted them into my management team [39:27] and we basically sat down with a white [39:29] paper and we said okay where do we go [39:31] from here like we need to find a [39:33] different direction and actually the [39:35] conclusion was the following what's [39:36] going to happen with financial services [39:38] that was the big question we said okay [39:40] well we can say that we don't know it's [39:43] a bit like self-driving cars we don't [39:45] know when it will happen but eventually [39:47] what will happen is you will wake up in [39:51] the morning and your digital Financial [39:54] assistant will basically say hey B you [39:58] know I looked through your mortages this [40:00] night and I realized that you're [40:01] overpaying and I have negotiated a new [40:04] rate on your behalf with a separate bank [40:06] and the only thing you need to do in [40:07] order to save 10 bucks on your Mortage [40:09] every month is for you to say yes [40:10] because I'll do all the switching for [40:12] you and I'll just move you to a [40:13] different bank right eventually that's [40:16] going to happen I don't know how fast [40:17] it's going to go I don't know when these [40:19] things will become a reality but it's [40:21] very clear that directionally speaking [40:22] with the way software is developing and [40:24] obviously in the last year now with AI [40:26] coming along you're like okay that's [40:27] much closer than I thought it was going [40:29] to be the point is like it's like [40:30] self-driving cars I don't know when it [40:32] will happen but I know it will [40:33] eventually happen so the conclusion was [40:35] like okay so the future we're looking at [40:37] in financial services is that at some [40:40] point of time there will be this digital [40:41] Financial assistant that just does this [40:43] on your behalf right okay so then the [40:45] next question then is okay but where [40:47] does that leave us what do we do in that [40:49] world like what is clana in that world [40:52] well obviously you said like well the [40:55] best position to be in is I want to be [40:56] your digital fin assistant because maybe [40:58] if I did that for you Ben you give me a [40:59] dollar a tip for like hey thank you for [41:02] fixing that Mortage thing I give you a [41:03] dollar in tip right like you can get me [41:05] a cheaper mortgage I'll give you a lot [41:06] more than a dollar in a Ser I'm happy to [41:08] hear that I'm happy to hear that so the [41:10] point is that can I talk after this [41:12] episode exactly what this all means is [41:15] that eventually you'll have to be that [41:17] digital financial adviser right which in [41:19] a way is kind of what you would you know [41:22] think of as like what was the purpose of [41:24] a Traditional Bank man it was your [41:26] financial advisor would like hey I'm [41:28] going to take over you know I'm going to [41:30] take care of your finances of your [41:32] savings I'm going to make sure that they [41:33] grow I'm going to you know take over of [41:35] all the stuff that you don't understand [41:36] and don't have an interest in and I'll [41:38] just make sure that you're good off the [41:40] only problem is that once bank got that [41:42] trust from us as customers they took it [41:44] to their advantage and they started [41:46] finding all these ways to not [41:48] necessarily serve our best interest as [41:49] customers but at some point of time like [41:51] we just realized that okay that's [41:52] directionally where financial services [41:54] are going and it is going to be a very [41:58] very disruptive Force because for [42:01] example one of the things it means it [42:04] means the end of the excess profits that [42:07] we have seen in banking industry so in [42:09] banking industry we've always had excess [42:11] profits because people are not very [42:14] easily moving between Banks because they [42:16] find it hard and difficult to change and [42:19] they're not sure they're getting any [42:20] value a lot of these things will go [42:23] away and it's just going to look like a [42:25] very different industry than it does [42:26] today right and so we said well okay we [42:29] want to be that digital financial [42:30] adviser well then the next question is [42:32] how do you win that how do we make sure [42:34] that CLA is the best digital financial [42:37] advisor and we concluded we don't know [42:39] everything but we know a few things we [42:42] know that it is beneficial to be Global [42:45] over being local because this will be a [42:47] question of scale the more markets you [42:50] serve the more consumers you serve the [42:52] more likely you are to be able to [42:54] operate such a thing it's going to be [42:55] about volume a size going to be [42:57] important right so global distribution [42:59] was very critical so that's when we said [43:02] we have to really expand our network of [43:05] a number of countries that was like one [43:07] right the second thing is data the more [43:10] I understand more you Ben or you David [43:13] have the more you have trusted [43:15] me of data about yourselves about your [43:18] transactions about you know your [43:20] financial life the more likely and [43:22] capable I will be to be able to provide [43:24] you advice and services of value right [43:27] right because the better I understand [43:28] you as customers the more likely I'm [43:30] able to actually save you time save you [43:31] money you know do something that's of [43:33] value for you right so we then realized [43:36] that CLA had one very unique thing that [43:39] really sets us apart that to me is much [43:41] much much more critical and has been [43:43] much more at the core of what CLA is [43:46] than buy now pay later and that is skew [43:48] level data so whenever we started a [43:52] business because we started as an open [43:54] invoice business we needed to produce an [43:57] invoice at the very beginning of our [43:59] life as as a company that meant we [44:03] needed skew level details on every [44:05] purchase so as you know when you process [44:08] a transaction on Visa you don't get that [44:10] right you just get the amount and the [44:11] merchant name in our case we know [44:13] exactly at H&M you bought this sweater [44:16] of this colar of this size Etc right and [44:19] today we even show you images of the [44:20] items that you bought there's two really [44:22] interesting things here that are [44:23] simultaneously happening one is the [44:26] strategy thing that talking about when [44:27] you started with skew level data you [44:29] know it just lends itself better to well [44:32] great now we're going to have more data [44:33] the other thing is literally just [44:35] technology advancing we're 50 years past [44:37] the origin of credit card networks you [44:39] just couldn't actually run that much [44:41] data over the networks and now the [44:42] networks are what the networks are it's [44:44] I don't want to say impossible for [44:46] credit card networks to retrofit and and [44:48] get skew level data but like it's a hard [44:50] task to roll that out to the entire [44:52] network simultaneously is it very much [44:55] is and I I know that I'll let you keep [44:56] going but so like how wa how do you get [44:58] that data with the claric card now that [45:00] like some you [45:01] don't so no but you're right but but the [45:03] point is that like Visa mot tried this [45:05] in the '90s called level three right so [45:07] they had level three data they tried to [45:08] convince erss of it but it was very [45:11] difficult and this is again where a four [45:12] party network will suffer because a [45:15] third party Network like American [45:17] Express orlana or PayPal has the ability [45:20] to be close like if we get SKU level [45:23] from Merchant we can instantaneously [45:25] make sure that it's visible to the [45:26] consumer and the consumer can see the [45:27] value of it the problem with Visa [45:29] Mastercard is that even if Merchants [45:31] would share that data with them they [45:32] need the banks to change all of the [45:34] banking apps to start visualizing and [45:36] showing that data so you really get this [45:38] catch22 where it's so difficult to drive [45:41] Innovation when you have so many parties [45:43] involved each one with their own [45:44] self-interest their slowness in [45:46] adoptation etc etc it's one of the [45:48] reasons I think it's never worked the [45:49] other reason is trust right so the [45:53] amount of time I had to spend with the [45:55] top CEOs of us retailers to say hey [45:59] trust me with this information right [46:02] trust me with that if it's macis or [46:05] Sephora or H&M or you know whatever it [46:08] is I've spent so many hours like why [46:10] should you be comfortable with sharing [46:11] ski level with CLA right and how is that [46:14] going to benefit you as a merchant so [46:16] there's a lot of aspects to this but we [46:18] realize that this is something that when [46:21] you utilize in the right way with the [46:22] consent of the consumer it can actually [46:25] create tremendous value that's helpful [46:26] for right so so I think that was one and [46:29] then the other thing is you know we said [46:30] well look other people will figure out [46:32] we we we already said back then if we're [46:34] going to go down this consumer path and [46:35] we need to build a brand as well so the [46:37] whole smooth and the pink and all that [46:39] became very important for us but but [46:41] it's also like we just said look there's [46:42] going to be three parties that we're [46:43] going to compete with it's going to be [46:45] big Tech like apple is going to try [46:47] Amazon is going to try Google's going to [46:48] try to be in the space secondly there's [46:50] going to be fintech revolute chime new [46:54] bank whatever and then there's going to [46:56] be [46:57] the traditional Banks Goldman Sachs [46:59] doing Marcus or whatever right so it's [47:00] very clear to us that we be these three [47:02] categories of companies that will try to [47:03] Aspire to do similar things that we're [47:05] doing the only thing that we can try to [47:07] do is be faster better smarter move [47:09] faster you know innovate faster and try [47:12] to do this differently than the others [47:14] but eventually and I still very [47:15] committed to this I think in a few years [47:17] you will see out of all of this emerge [47:19] you know three or four really large [47:21] Global players in the space who are [47:24] basically being that digital Financial [47:25] assistant of customers and that would be [47:27] a very valuable position to have so that [47:30] is basically you know what we're trying [47:32] to do so how does this work with in [47:34] store at Stonestown I'm not a big fan of [47:37] management literature I think a lot of [47:38] it is very general and high level and of [47:41] low value but I read good to great and [47:44] there was one thing that I liked in good [47:45] to Great there's one of their [47:47] conclusions was don't bet on a single [47:51] technology and I really like that and [47:54] how we tried to introduce that CLA we [47:56] said look [47:57] it's fantastic if we can grow this third [47:59] party payments Network that has QQ level [48:01] data but it's also a problem for our [48:03] consumers that they're limited to using [48:06] CLA only where CLA has been integrated [48:09] at point of sale or at you know at the [48:11] merchant so can't we try an even more [48:15] difficult approach but also an [48:16] interesting approach which is that why [48:18] don't we enable it through multiple [48:21] different technological solutions like a [48:23] card is one way to allow you to use CLA [48:26] everywhere now you have the disadvantage [48:28] of not getting skew level on those [48:30] particular transactions and then you fac [48:32] with the complexity of explaining in the [48:35] CLA consumer app why do I see images of [48:37] my purchases on this one but not on that [48:39] one and so forth so you have other [48:41] complexity that arise from that but [48:43] there's a benefit to explore the concept [48:46] of using clana everywhere this was also [48:49] funny enough one of the most critical [48:52] aspects of the US because what ended up [48:56] happening is we missed out on the US [49:00] opportunity and suddenly out of nowhere [49:04] you know Nick and his team from [49:06] Australia came and signed Urban [49:09] Outfitters in the US and started [49:11] Gathering very significant [49:14] momentum was that the start Urban [49:16] Outfitters it was yeah I think Urban [49:18] Outfitters was like the big first and we [49:21] were part of that RFP and we just you [49:23] know we didn't have the right people in [49:24] that call and we just missed the [49:26] opportunity we could have won that RP [49:28] but that was the first one of like you [49:29] know I think of like a firm and the the [49:31] boosted boards you know I'm buying a [49:33] $1,000 skateboard the Urban Outfitter [49:35] afterpay that was the first like I'm [49:37] buying a $10 t-shirt yes exactly and I [49:40] think a firm at that point in time had [49:42] had you know a lot of years I mean a [49:43] firm was started a long time ago already [49:45] right but a firm was so focused on the [49:48] high ticket purchase items I think they [49:49] were very late to the game on the paying [49:51] for stuff and so they didn't really see [49:54] that and it took some time for them to [49:55] kind of also tried to go after this [49:58] opportunity and I remember very clearly [50:00] we came to the US in summer [50:02] 19 and we started seeing this traction [50:05] of off to pay and buop lator and we were [50:07] like [50:10] no that's pretty much it we're like no [50:13] we're going to miss out like finally [50:15] There's an opportunity for us to [50:16] actually establish ourselves because [50:17] again coming back to that AI Vision we [50:19] realized that like we have to make it in [50:20] the US there's no scale if you don't [50:23] make it in the largest market in the [50:24] world right there's just you're not [50:26] going to reach scale [50:27] so it was super frustrating to us and [50:29] then the other part was so we we picked [50:31] up and was like okay we got to do this [50:33] we got to do the pay for and we [50:35] basically got it live very quickly so it [50:37] took us two three months to get it to [50:40] Market in the US but then we had a big [50:44] problem which was that we started [50:45] talking to all these Merchant and we [50:47] showed them like because we've been [50:48] doing this much longer than afterpay we [50:49] had a much richer product much richer [50:51] features we had so many great things and [50:54] our brand and everything but we had had [50:56] a very difficult dilemma which was you [51:00] don't get fired for choosing IBM right [51:02] so at that point of time ofay was [51:04] already gaining [51:05] momentum and it was clear that like you [51:09] know if I was whatever let's say I'm a [51:11] you know chief officer of e-commerce at [51:14] some Big Brand in the US and I'm like [51:17] okay CLA had a nice presentation seems [51:19] to have an awesome product but the [51:22] others have already picked off the pce [51:23] so I don't want to get fired for [51:24] choosing the wrong you know provider I'm [51:27] going to go with a market leader in [51:28] their opinion right so that was a very [51:30] difficult situation for us like and I [51:31] thought it was like it's probably one of [51:33] the most difficult things I've ever done [51:34] as a founder and the CEO is like it's [51:36] one thing to come into a market and only [51:38] compete with incumbents and kind of [51:39] traditional players it's a very [51:41] fascinating interesting thing to come in [51:43] and compete with somebody like Nick and [51:45] his team who are themselves Founders [51:47] entrepreneurs super fast moving super [51:49] aggressive super smart it was just like [51:52] the most awesome challenge I've ever had [51:54] in this job like it was just so much fun [51:57] and then the block acquisition happens [52:00] yeah exactly that was a actually we [52:02] realized that nobody wants to go with [52:04] the second one everyone wants to work [52:07] with a winner right and so we asked [52:09] ourselves how could we create a [52:12] perception of winning without actually [52:14] winning that was like that was the [52:17] challenge that is the ultimate [52:19] entrepreneurs task if you figure that [52:21] out like please let me know exactly so [52:24] what we realized is that okay they were [52:26] head on the merchant side meaning that [52:27] every meeting they would bring a slide [52:30] with more Brands and logos on that we [52:31] could bring for the US market now we [52:33] could fake it a little bit and bring [52:35] some of our European brands that were [52:37] International to make it look better but [52:39] you know the off toay sales guys quickly [52:41] shut that down by training the merchants [52:43] to ask like how many of those actually [52:45] live in the US right and so that didn't [52:46] that worked only very shortly right so [52:49] we we were looking for like how do we [52:50] solve this and we concluded that we had [52:52] had this idea for quite some time and [52:54] the idea was our app you know the Clon [52:57] app it could function not only as a [52:59] transaction history just like your [53:01] banking app where you can see okay here [53:02] are my purchases and we had a nice [53:04] images of what you purchased but we had [53:07] this idea of creating a browser and [53:09] using virtual cards as a way for you to [53:12] shop with CLA where CLA was not [53:14] available right so we launched our [53:18] browser and the browser is part of our [53:21] app still and it basically allows you to [53:23] go to any website let's say you go to [53:24] Amazon as an example right now CLA [53:26] doesn't work with Amazon in the US but [53:28] what you can do in the app is you can as [53:30] a CLA user you can generate a one-time [53:34] Visa [53:35] card and then the app will basically [53:37] enter the card numbers into the Amazon [53:39] checkout as a consumer it feels like [53:42] thanks to using CLA browser you can now [53:44] shop with CLA on Amazon and you can pay [53:47] in for with CLA and you have the payment [53:48] methods and also because we control the [53:51] browser experience we can actually [53:51] collect skew level data out of that [53:53] transaction so it gave us this idea that [53:56] you know what but maybe we can't win [53:57] with off to pay on the merchant side but [53:59] we can win on the consumer side so [54:00] basically the pitch ended up being we [54:03] had one slide which was app Annie [54:05] downloads and we made sure to always [54:07] have more downloads of our app than off [54:10] to pay that was like look we have more [54:12] downloads than them of our app and the [54:14] reason for that is you know you go to [54:15] Urban Outfitters you use off toay but [54:18] then you can only use off toay at the [54:19] merchs that are integrated and even if [54:20] they've had some success and they have [54:22] some Merchants it's still limited claw [54:24] now you go to H&M you try CLA out on the [54:27] H&M website and then you can use CLA [54:29] everywhere on every online retailer in [54:32] the US who do you think the consumer [54:34] will choose and we just said the [54:36] consumer is choosing us right and we had [54:38] all the data to support this claim and [54:40] so then the merchants were like um maybe [54:42] I should go with this winner instead of [54:44] that winner right and so interesting and [54:46] by doing this sort of browser hack did [54:49] you then capture the skew data because [54:51] it was happening in your browser cool [54:53] yes so and the funny thing is like it [54:55] grew immensely it I mean yeah I you go [54:58] to cl.com still today and it's like oh [55:00] you can shop on cl.com right I mean we [55:02] do over 1010 billion worth of volume on [55:03] that browser right so it's a huge [55:05] business and so it actually became very [55:07] popular with the consumers as well you [55:09] know it was just interesting so that [55:10] kind of managed us to then we signed [55:12] Sephora you know we got eventually [55:14] Macy's and and so forth right so so that [55:16] started turning the tide towards CLA and [55:19] the US away from off the pay and not [55:21] entirely I mean they've been successful [55:22] as well but but the point is that like [55:24] at least it made a huge difference for [55:25] us [55:27] we want to thank our longtime friend of [55:30] the show vanta the leading trust [55:32] management platform vanta of course [55:35] automates your Security reviews and [55:37] compliance efforts so Frameworks like [55:39] sock 2 ISO 271 gdpr and hipa compliance [55:42] and monitoring vanta takes care of these [55:44] otherwise incredibly time and resource [55:46] trining efforts for your organization [55:48] and makes them fast and simple yep Fanta [55:51] is the perfect example of the quote that [55:52] we talk about all the time here on [55:54] acquired Jeff Bezos his idea a company [55:56] should only focus on what actually makes [55:59] your beer taste better I.E spend your [56:01] time and resources only on what's [56:03] actually going to move the needle for [56:05] your product and your customers and [56:07] Outsource everything else that doesn't [56:09] every company needs compliance and trust [56:10] with their vendors and customers it [56:12] plays a major role in enabling Revenue [56:14] because customers and partners demand it [56:16] but yet it adds zero flavor to your [56:18] actual product vanta takes care of all [56:20] of it for you no more spreadsheets no [56:21] fragmented tools no manual reviews to [56:23] Cobble together your security and [56:25] compliance requirements it is one single [56:28] software pane of glass that connects to [56:30] all of your services via apis and [56:32] eliminates countless hours of work for [56:34] your organization there are now ai [56:36] capabilities to make this even more [56:38] powerful and they even integrate with [56:40] over 300 external tools plus they let [56:42] customers build private Integrations [56:44] with their internal systems and perhaps [56:46] most importantly your Security reviews [56:48] are now real time instead of static so [56:50] you can monitor and share with your [56:51] customers and partners to give them [56:53] added confidence so whether you're a [56:55] startup or a large ENT entprise and your [56:56] company is ready to automate compliance [56:58] and streamline Security reviews like [57:00] vanta 7,000 customers around the globe [57:03] and go back to making your beer taste [57:04] better head on over to v.com Acquired [57:07] and just tell them that Ben and David [57:09] sent you and thanks to Friend of the [57:11] show Christina vanta CEO all acquired [57:13] listeners get $1,000 of free credit [57:17] v.com [57:19] acquired so we've got a lot of Founders [57:23] that listen to this show and you've had [57:25] an Epic Journey I mean you're still a [57:27] private company it's been 19 years [57:29] you've had multiple business models [57:30] multiple management teams you raised a [57:32] lot of money in the headiest of times [57:34] the the world has ever seen from the [57:37] headiest of players who were investing [57:39] at the time you had quite the valuation [57:41] now you have a different valuation you [57:43] were in the news quite a bit gez what a [57:46] couple months ago for board level [57:48] corporate governance stuff me totally [57:49] refer to the succession drama yeah the [57:52] succession drama that played out yes I [57:54] mean and and truly like new reporting [57:57] twice a day with here's the latest on [57:59] the situation you were in sauron's eye [58:01] for what a week there what advice do you [58:04] have for Founders maybe let's start [58:06] there with the succession drama and kind [58:08] of work backwards of in company building [58:10] you have these these crazy moments along [58:12] the way you've seen a lot of chapters [58:15] yeah I mean I don't know if there's any [58:17] good general advice that can be had from [58:19] that I think at least one thing that has [58:22] changed with me I'm not trying to say [58:23] look I I always try to be very humble [58:25] about the fact that like like I've gone [58:26] through a roller coaster with this [58:28] company there been tremendous success [58:30] and tremendous challenges that we faced [58:33] some of which is wellknown some of which [58:34] is well less wellknown but I think over [58:37] the years at least something that has [58:39] developed Within Me is the fact that [58:42] whatever challenge I'm faced with today [58:45] as much as I can be [58:47] very and I really want to say this from [58:49] the bottom my heart I can be desperate I [58:51] can feel I can cry I can feel oh my God [58:54] this is you know so difficult or so hard [58:56] or I can feel it's unfair or you know [58:59] whatever the emotions that you get into [59:01] and I can feel desperate and I can feel [59:02] confused and how the hell am I going to [59:04] solve this situation or what am I going [59:06] to do about this I obviously get all of [59:08] those emotions still and I've always [59:10] gotten and I think everyone else that is [59:12] saying does in such a situation I've [59:15] also over the years started breeding a [59:17] different emotional state and that is a [59:20] little bit of this is what I trained for [59:23] so I often think about like slatan [59:26] Ibrahimovic the best soccer player ever [59:27] in the world who happened to have come [59:29] from Sweden and be born on the same day [59:31] as I was if you are playing football at [59:34] that level your dream is to play the [59:37] Champions League final right like that's [59:39] the dream that's not an easy game that's [59:42] a freaking difficult game the pressure [59:45] the psychological pressure you know the [59:47] audience cheering against you if you're [59:49] on the wrong Arena you know like the [59:51] pressure this may be the peak of your [59:53] career you know all of these things [59:54] going on but at the same point of time [59:57] like would you rather not play that [60:00] final this is what I was trained for and [60:02] so to me what I've started to think more [60:05] commonly in these situations is like [60:07] whenever I feel under massive pressure I [60:10] take queen and I put on under pressure [60:12] in the car and I put it on maximum and I [60:15] just enjoy the moment I enjoy the [60:17] feeling of like you know what this is [60:20] what I've trained for this is my 20 [60:23] years of work has come to me now trying [60:26] to see if I can figure this situation [60:27] out and I may very well fail and that [60:30] unfortunately is the way it works right [60:32] like there was an amazing Netflix [60:33] documentary about you know everyone [60:35] who's participating in the tour to [60:37] France and all these different teams and [60:39] how hard they you know train for that [60:41] and so forth but there was also this [60:42] thing that like at some point of time [60:44] the race is over and you know the world [60:46] keeps spinning and there's a new day and [60:48] you know things work out I mean think [60:49] people in sports have much more [60:51] recognition of the fact that like you [60:52] know there is that huge final game and [60:54] then the next day the world's keep [60:56] spinning right and the same applies here [60:58] and I'm not saying that it makes it easy [60:59] because it's not it's really difficult [61:01] and I again as I said all the other [61:02] things are true but I've also come to [61:04] some degree to say like this is it you [61:06] know this is what I trained for I wanted [61:08] to be in these difficult situations I [61:10] want to see if I can Master this [61:11] situation if I can solve it if I can [61:13] resolve it in a good way so I to some [61:16] degree also started to cherish the fact [61:18] that I have the privilege of being [61:20] challenged to a level where it's sweaty [61:24] you know and I laugh about that a little [61:25] bit because at the peak of cla's [61:27] valuation when there was like you know [61:29] we were officially Europe's Most [61:31] Valuable fintech and the company was [61:32] worth $50 billion even though you know [61:35] at some point of time you're like hey [61:36] when valuations are growing faster than [61:37] revenue and profit then you have to [61:39] realize that you know at some point of [61:41] time they may be a correction in the [61:42] market but when I was there and I was [61:44] like invited to Downing Street to have [61:46] dinner with Boris Johnson and you know [61:48] and then I flew the next day to go and [61:50] see and a conference where Elon Musk was [61:52] there and Kim Kardashian and whatever a [61:54] very small private conference I was [61:55] thinking to s like is this what life is [61:57] going to be like now and then 3 months [61:59] later the company valuation is 6.5 [62:01] billion we can't raise money the [62:03] newspapers are writing about how we're a [62:06] failure and will the next Wii work and [62:08] it's obviously horrible to some degree [62:10] but it's also like wow I'm living again [62:13] this is not just like you know like it's [62:15] for real like you know so there's [62:17] something about that that just I'm not [62:19] saying I wanted it I don't say I planned [62:21] for it and obviously I maybe if I would [62:22] have been smart I could have avoided it [62:25] once you're in situation you just have [62:27] to you know make the best do you think [62:29] that's actually the case like let's take [62:31] the you know big valuation haircut in [62:33] order to raise the money you need at the [62:34] time or let's take the board Strife [62:36] recently like weren't you always just [62:38] doing the very best most forward looking [62:42] thing you could at the time I like how [62:43] could it have played out differently no [62:45] I think that's true to some degree to [62:49] some degree it's true because one of the [62:50] things for example that people tend to [62:52] forget right they like the company was [62:54] profitable up until 2009 19 we actually [62:56] made a profit every year now we still [62:58] raised some money because we were [63:00] growing a balance sheet and we needed [63:02] Equity support that balance sheet so you [63:04] were profitable in those years when you [63:06] were raising like hundreds of millions [63:07] of dollars yeah so actually it's a [63:10] little bit misquoted because media [63:13] hasn't separated between secondary [63:14] transactions and primary so a lot of the [63:17] initial announcements of CLA fundraising [63:20] was actually secondary transactions and [63:22] we weren't raising that so I think I was [63:23] Sea's most I hope I was or I've been [63:26] implied that I was one of se's most [63:29] Capital efficient Investments for the [63:31] first 10 years now then as we decided we [63:35] were going to go all in on the us and we [63:37] were going to expand much faster into [63:39] new markets and so forth at that point [63:40] in time we started investing heavily and [63:42] we reached the state where you know our [63:44] worst iita month was a negative $150 [63:48] million which basically on an annual [63:50] basis meant about a burn rate of a [63:52] billion dollars now that is obviously a [63:54] massive amount of money but to your [63:56] point Ben at that point of time [63:58] investors were cheering us on and giving [64:01] us a valuation of 50 billion which meant [64:04] that that actually billion dollars of [64:07] loss per year was a 2% dilution a 2% [64:10] dilution right per year right which is [64:13] very low 2% dilution is very low for [64:16] trying to achieve that big opportunity [64:18] and I think there is validity still to [64:21] the fact that we are operating in one of [64:23] the largest addressable markets in the [64:25] world payment and financial Industries [64:26] like a trillion dollar opportunity so [64:28] it's not like Unthinkable that a company [64:31] in this industry could be worth hundreds [64:33] of billions or even a trillion dollar [64:35] eventually like a Visa right yeah [64:38] exactly it's not it's not Unthinkable to [64:40] some degree it made sense quote unquote [64:42] right in the world with that said though [64:46] I still obviously as a healthy [64:48] individual as a healthy human you do [64:50] reflect back and you say was every [64:52] decision sayane could some of the [64:54] decisions been made different and I [64:56] think particularly in my opinion I [64:58] should have been more careful about [65:00] hiring most of the marketing spend uh [65:03] the investment we did in marketing and [65:04] Market expansion so forth that I don't [65:06] regret at all I feel that like we [65:10] expanded too fast in hiring we should [65:13] have been a little bit more careful [65:14] about that that I regret right so there [65:17] are regrets that I have I imagine also [65:19] there was a big element of you know the [65:22] sort of Bill Gurley saying of like you [65:25] got to play the game on the field right [65:26] like you've got [65:27] afterpay playing a game on the field [65:30] there and it's sort of like well you're [65:31] going to play that game or you're not [65:32] going to play that game and you're not [65:33] going to be relevant and that's exactly [65:35] it right and that was so clear to me I [65:38] mean a lot of our kind of peak valuation [65:40] went from like cuz we were I think in 16 [65:44] or 17 we had a $2 billion valuation in [65:47] 19 we got five because dragonir actually [65:50] believed that we had a chance in the US [65:52] even though off to pay was kicking our [65:53] ass then a year later we got a $10 [65:55] billion valuation because Silver Lake [65:57] said not only do you have a chance but [65:59] you actually seem to be outperforming [66:00] after pay and then you know a year later [66:02] we got a 30 billion dollar valuation [66:04] because investor says no you're actually [66:06] far ahead of the game and you're making [66:07] really really well on that right and [66:08] that was like the narrative that that [66:11] played into that I think to your point [66:12] like it's always easy with the benefit [66:15] of insight to say like yeah this and [66:16] that and so forth but to your point [66:18] you're trying to make the best out of [66:19] every situation you're trying to make [66:20] the best decisions that you can and I [66:23] still think if I look at the fact of [66:24] like the compan soon going to do over $3 [66:27] billion worth of Revenue and it's this [66:30] size after 20 years I think it's still a [66:32] fairly successful company I think it's [66:35] an okay achievement right so I I think [66:37] that like you you have to look at it [66:38] from a longer perspective it doesn't [66:40] mean that there wasn't mistakes that [66:41] were done along the way right what you [66:44] said a minute ago about hiring Ai and [66:47] the future I think we have to talk about [66:50] that before we wrap up you've set the [66:52] stage with AI as sort of the vision for [66:55] the industry for the future but like [66:57] it's also here now tell us about what [67:00] you're using AI for the stuff you've [67:03] been in the news for recently sure [67:06] actually it also partially relates to [67:09] the challenge that I said and you know [67:10] the Champions League stuff because I [67:13] read alen musk book and I read I didn't [67:14] read all of it but I read some parts of [67:16] it and there was one thing that stuck [67:18] with me actually which was that like [67:19] I've thought about Elon Musk [67:21] predominantly from the perspective like [67:23] it's amazing look he's building electric [67:24] cars Rockets like I just I can't even [67:27] compute how you can be active in all [67:29] these different areas and and create [67:31] these tremendously successful companies [67:33] like it's just mind-blowing to me like [67:34] it's so inspirational now then there [67:36] obviously has everyone he has his pros [67:38] and cons and his challenges just like [67:39] everyone else right anyways but the one [67:42] thing I truly reflected on reading that [67:43] book was the fact that he's a freaking [67:47] cheap bastard like he is so cost [67:50] conscious I mean do you think about it [67:53] like everything he talks about through [67:55] that book is cost yeah you know the NASA [67:58] when they build a rocket they have an [67:59] air conditioning unit that cost $3 [68:01] million and we went to Home Depot and [68:03] bought one for $5,000 and it worked as [68:06] well like there's all these things and [68:07] it's just and he doesn't do that on a [68:09] single occasion he does that cross the [68:11] board I saw recently some people [68:13] presented to me the numbers of [68:15] SpaceX it's a freaking profitable [68:18] company which high Revenue growth right [68:21] and it was just so impressive and I [68:24] thought to myself with CLA I've first [68:26] been part of growing this company with [68:27] others as a profitable company growing [68:30] first and then we made it into we [68:33] invested much more and we had our loss [68:34] making years and kind of you know really [68:36] being funded by VCS and investors and [68:39] now I just think that like the ultimate [68:41] challenge is a revenue line that goes up [68:44] and a cost curve that goes down that [68:46] must be the ultimate accomplishment if [68:48] you can accomplish those two things now [68:50] with that said AI is definitely an [68:53] enabler of that now at the same point of [68:57] time I want to be mindful I mean clana [68:58] currently has about 4,000 people part of [69:01] the cost reduction we can find is doing [69:04] more with less but at the same point of [69:07] time I think it's the most painful and [69:10] difficult and challenging and sad thing [69:12] to go through layoffs I think it's very [69:15] difficult I would rather never have to [69:17] do it again in my life if I could avoid [69:20] it but we do recognize the fact that as [69:24] every tech company we have a retention [69:26] rate where about 20% leave the company [69:28] every year because people in general [69:29] stay five years which is pretty typical [69:32] for Tech and so that basically means if [69:34] we stop recruiting the company will [69:37] shrink by 20% per year right and that's [69:41] kind of what we're managing towards [69:42] right now so we stopped recruiting in [69:43] August in September and uh September [69:47] October and since then we're not hiring [69:49] we're Hing a bit on the engineering side [69:51] still but in general we're trying to not [69:52] hire at all and we're reapplying in and [69:56] rethinking our organization and [69:57] structure as we go to kind of manage it [70:00] down and we're trying to do that in a [70:01] thoughtful way but it allows us to not [70:03] have to lay off right which we really [70:04] want to avoid and we're using AI in all [70:07] sorts of areas to figure out like how [70:09] can we do more with [70:10] less and it's fascinating because you do [70:14] realize that when you've been growing [70:16] this fast and you've been hiring at that [70:18] pace there's so much duplication [70:20] internally there's so many people doing [70:22] kind of similar things in slightly [70:23] different fashions [70:25] and if you can figure out a way where [70:28] you can have people contribute to each [70:30] other's work and build on top of each [70:32] other's work rather than constantly [70:34] Reinventing things from scratch or [70:37] redoing things or spending too much time [70:39] doing manual stuff then that obviously [70:42] would make for a much more successful [70:44] and inspiring and F fascinating company [70:47] and I think AI is extremely well [70:50] positioned to do that now and one of the [70:52] areas that's been the one that we have [70:53] been most publicized for [70:55] was as we started you know exploring [70:58] this within customer service and so [71:01] outside of the 4,000 people that clown [71:02] out employs directly we have in general [71:05] had about 2 3,000 agents that are [71:07] employed by customer service companies [71:09] that we hire as [71:11] suppliers and then they help us you know [71:13] with customer service errands and what [71:16] we realized was that there was an [71:19] opportunity obviously to become less [71:22] dependent on that and and introduce AI [71:24] into that mix now I think again to some [71:28] degree that's always what product [71:30] development has been about oh technology [71:32] is a deflationary force it improves the [71:34] productivity of an individual to make it [71:36] so any any individual human can create [71:39] the most economic value possible right [71:42] and I think in addition to that also if [71:44] we before AI tried to make our app [71:48] easier to understand or you know easier [71:51] to navigate or added features part of [71:53] the intent of that was was obviously [71:55] that less customers would feel that they [71:57] had to call us to resolve an error and [71:59] that they could solve it themselves and [72:01] that wasn't just because we wanted to [72:02] reduce cost of customer service but it [72:04] was also because consumers want that [72:05] like they don't want to necessarily call [72:07] customer service for everything they [72:08] want to be able to resolve it themselves [72:09] and just do it and have a simple app [72:11] right so to some degree a lot of product [72:13] improvements have already been [72:14] correlated to higher efficiency and less [72:16] errands right and so the only difference [72:19] this time around is when we started [72:21] applying AI to actually deal with [72:24] customers Serv erand directly as an [72:26] alternative to human [72:28] agents we had two major breakthroughs [72:30] like so one major breakthrough was when [72:33] suddenly the customer satisfaction of [72:35] the human who had interacted with AI [72:38] versus the human agent was on par like [72:42] that was a huge breakthrough because [72:43] we've had like you know everyone hates [72:45] these ivr systems like press one for [72:47] this press two for like nobody thinks [72:49] that's the better experience than a [72:50] human agent right like and the same is [72:51] like the chat Bots online like oh my God [72:53] you tried to ask a question it's like [72:54] some insane stupid answer and like so [72:56] we've all had these bad experiences so [72:59] when suddenly we could actually [73:00] construct a model that allowed us to [73:02] create an answer that the customer [73:04] satisfaction was on par that just was [73:07] mind-blowing to us and then when we saw [73:10] that we were like okay let's Now launch [73:12] this across the board and of all the [73:15] product features I've ever launched in [73:16] this company I've never seen anything [73:18] that we pushed a button and it removed [73:21] the number of errands that our humans [73:23] had to deal with by 2/3 so 2/3 were [73:27] taken over by the by the AI and then [73:29] one3 was left with our humans and so [73:32] that was a surprise to such a dramatic [73:34] effect on a single feature release and [73:36] then fortunately in this situation [73:38] because of the human aspect of this the [73:41] fact is that we have been using customer [73:43] service companies that you know in [73:44] combination employ probably over a [73:46] million people the fact that 700 [73:48] fulltime agents were less needed by CLA [73:51] now would in that case just mean that [73:53] these agents would now work for some [73:55] other clients of these huge customer [73:57] service companies but but these [73:58] companies employ a million people so [74:00] like not like you were laying off 700 [74:02] people no exactly and it's not like [74:03] those companies will have to lay them [74:04] off either because they will just deploy [74:06] them to I mean there's always been [74:07] fluctuations right like where different [74:09] clients of those customer service [74:10] companies will have this so so in the [74:12] short term there's no implication for [74:14] anyone's job right it's just an [74:16] implication that CLA has a lower cost of [74:18] customer service and a higher customer [74:20] satisfaction but obviously we also felt [74:22] obliged from a more kind of human [74:25] perspective we wanted to actually share [74:27] this because we said look obviously if [74:30] other companies start copying and doing [74:32] similar things there will be realtime [74:34] implications for those jobs like over [74:36] time it won't be any other client to [74:38] just shift over to right and we felt [74:40] that so far most of what we've seen in [74:42] AI has been more like beautiful demos [74:47] and beautiful prototypes and this and [74:48] that you know whatever and like hey I'm [74:50] going to have chyp write all my emails [74:52] and then you do that for a few times and [74:53] then you're like yeah but I didn't [74:54] really like this email so I'm going to [74:56] type it myself and they like ah it's not [74:57] really more time reworking the email [74:59] then yeah exactly right so like we [75:01] haven't seen that many like real life [75:03] business implementations that were of [75:05] that size that actually produced such [75:08] significant outcomes so we felt that we [75:10] wanted to share it with the world and [75:12] say look we've actually been able to do [75:13] this and this is the the outcomes and I [75:16] think over time to also encourage [75:18] politicians and Society to consider what [75:19] are the implications of this because it [75:22] will have eventually implications right [75:23] so yeah so that's been very fascinating [75:26] to follow obviously you know in Silicon [75:29] Valley at least early stage Founders [75:31] I've noticed for the last close to 10 [75:34] years especially people who worked at [75:37] bigger companies before they always have [75:40] this dream of like I'm going to start a [75:41] company I'm going to be like Instagram [75:43] I'm going to be 13 people I'm never [75:45] going to have a big team I'm never going [75:47] to scale I don't want the complexity I [75:49] don't want them man you know it's never [75:51] actually been true you know like you [75:54] never could do that and yoube with the [75:56] exception of WhatsApp WhatsApp I was [75:58] going to say Facebook bought both of [75:59] them yeah Facebook bought the two of [76:01] them that did it and then scale him up [76:03] to hundreds and thousands of right [76:05] exactly exactly but like now for the [76:08] first time like I hear that from [76:10] Founders and I'm like well that might be [76:12] true that might be true now or at least [76:14] it's a lot more true than it used to be [76:16] yes no I think that's true and I have [76:18] this thesis which I call Tigers which is [76:22] that within you know 6 to 12 months we [76:25] will start recognizing a few companies [76:27] that have really taken AI to the core of [76:30] what they do have really reimagined how [76:33] they work how they ship code how they [76:35] ship product features and I think that [76:37] what you will start seeing is those [76:39] companies accelerating ahead in specific [76:44] Industries you know I'm pretty excited [76:46] about what I see Brian at rbnb sharing [76:48] and what they're doing he might very [76:50] well do that in that industry there will [76:52] be others and I hope the clana will be [76:54] one of them and I think what you will [76:56] see is that these companies will produce [76:58] higher Revenue per employee than we have [77:00] seen historically ever right if you look [77:02] at a company like clana we used to [77:03] operate at maybe like $0.6 million per [77:06] Revenue per employee we're now at about [77:08] a million dollars almost a million [77:10] dollar in Revenue per employe apple and [77:12] Netflix are at $2 million it's only [77:15] really the old companies that operate at [77:17] like $67 million of Revenue per employee [77:19] so I think that but you will start [77:20] seeing these companies operating at like [77:22] $510 million per Revenue per employee [77:25] right Goldman Sachs is a million Visa [77:27] that you refer to is I think is 1.1 so [77:29] that is like the metric that I'm keeping [77:30] in the back of my head when it comes to [77:33] how this will evolve and I think those [77:36] companies will also be much faster at [77:37] getting new Services out there they will [77:40] improve the quality and the pace of [77:43] their software development then you can [77:46] like AGI and all that stuff whatever [77:48] when that happens who knows but like the [77:50] point is that like I think in in the in [77:51] the shorter terms in the 6 to 12 months [77:54] going to see some companies pick up the [77:55] pace and I think it's going to be [77:57] revolutionizing I I genuinely believe [77:59] this is going to be something very [78:00] different because if I am that [78:02] Traditional Bank as an example and I'm [78:04] trying to compete with this like I just [78:07] don't understand how that's going to [78:08] work like I just don't I can't compute [78:10] like how am I going to do that like with [78:11] the decision-making process and the [78:13] slowness and you know the the technology [78:16] Stacks that they sit on and like it's [78:17] just going to be very very difficult so [78:20] we're going to see a massive Revival of [78:22] fintech and I think you see the early [78:24] signs of it just look at what new bank [78:26] is doing you know even you know [78:27] companies like Dave that I was a big fan [78:29] of and then got highly criticized but [78:31] now seem to be doing quite well you see [78:33] monzo in the UK revolute is doing [78:36] fantastic I mean I think in 6 12 months [78:38] people will talk about the Revival of of [78:40] fintech as an example in that industry [78:42] but there will be other Industries as [78:43] well where you will see this happening [78:45] and so it's going to be a very exciting [78:47] and interesting and challenging so maybe [78:50] I haven't played that Champions League [78:51] final yet still ahead of us well [78:54] Sebastian we expected to have some good [78:56] discussion in the payments industry this [78:57] is a whole new chapter that you sort of [78:59] opened up at the end here and we'll have [79:00] to have you back on the show I don't [79:01] know in the next six 12 months or at the [79:03] AI Pace maybe in the next two or three [79:05] weeks yeah exactly yeah we got tiger I I [79:09] like that that's we we we'll credit you [79:10] with that term of uh it's much better [79:12] than unicorns yeah yeah yeah exactly [79:14] that'll be fun it would be interesting [79:16] to watch well thank you so much for [79:17] having me thanks Sebastian Sebastian [79:19] appreciate it and listeners we'll see [79:20] you next time we'll see you next time