Builder Inventory Surge Flags Looming US Recession, Gerli Warns

The Housing Market Is Completely F*d - Stay Away From These States! | Reventure Consulting — The Iced Coffee Hour

The Iced Coffee Hour

Homebuilder supply exceeding nine months alongside crisis-era sales volume has historically never occurred without an ensuing recession, setting up localized 30% price drops across overbuilt Sunbelt markets.

AI-assisted summary of The Housing Market Is Completely F*d - Stay Away From These States! | Reventure Consulting — original source. Check the original for full context.

Source published:

Key ideas

  • US housing affordability has deteriorated significantly, with the median monthly mortgage payment of roughly $2,800 consuming 40% of gross median household earnings against a traditional 25% guideline. (3:28)
  • The national market is experiencing sharp geographic bifurcation, as Sunbelt markets like Austin and Florida drop 15% to 30% amid oversupply, while legacy Northeast and Midwest markets like Syracuse and Chicago hit record price highs. (5:00)
  • New home builder supply has climbed above 9 months of inventory, a condition that has historically never occurred alongside depressed transaction volumes without a subsequent recession. (10:00)
  • The projected $46 trillion wealth transfer will not automatically sustain elevated prices, as Charles Schwab data shows approximately 70% of inherited homes are liquidated by heirs rather than retained. (40:00)

Detailed notes

## Background Published on YouTube on October 11, 2026, by The Iced Coffee Hour (hosted by Graham Stephan and Jack Selby), this episode features Nick Gerli, founder of Reventure Consulting. According to the page description, the discussion explores severe disruptions in the housing market, highlights regions and states at risk, and details real estate analytics alongside promotional resources for the Reventure app and business sponsors.

## TL;DR Reventure Consulting founder Nick Gerli joins Graham Stephan and Jack Selby to unpack an unprecedentedly bifurcated US housing market, where oversupplied Sunbelt boomtowns face steep price cuts while inventory-starved Rust Belt and Northeast hubs hit new nominal highs. Gerli explains how near-record mortgage-to-income ratios and locked-in 3% mortgage rates have frozen transaction volume to levels unseen since the Great Financial Crisis. The discussion details the shifting behavior of institutional landlords, the impending liquidation of boomer-owned homes, and Nick's tactical framework for submitting aggressive lowball bids on stale inventory. The episode concludes by contrasting long-term buy-versus-rent cash flow dynamics and examining how social media algorithms feed consumer materialism.

## Atmosphere & style The dialogue feels like an analytical, behind-the-scenes strategy session, contrasting Nick Gerli's quantitative 'Moneyball' macro-skepticism with Graham Stephan's grounded perspective as a veteran landlord and real estate investor. The mood is sober, pragmatic, and refreshingly devoid of traditional industry hype, systematically puncturing relentlessly bullish real estate narratives with granular underwriting data. Despite the serious economic warnings regarding affordability and regional gluts, the rapport remains casual, conversational, and energetic, culminating in candid personal exchanges about screen time, algorithmic dopamine loops, and creator economics.

## Bulletin - [03:28](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=208s) US housing affordability has deteriorated significantly, with the median monthly mortgage payment of roughly $2,800 consuming 40% of gross median household earnings against a traditional 25% guideline. - [05:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=300s) The national market is experiencing sharp geographic bifurcation, as Sunbelt markets like Austin and Florida drop 15% to 30% amid oversupply, while legacy Northeast and Midwest markets like Syracuse and Chicago hit record price highs. - [10:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=600s) New home builder supply has climbed above 9 months of inventory, a condition that has historically never occurred alongside depressed transaction volumes without a subsequent recession. - [40:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=2400s) The projected $46 trillion wealth transfer will not automatically sustain elevated prices, as Charles Schwab data shows approximately 70% of inherited homes are liquidated by heirs rather than retained.

## Key takeaways - [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=0s) Existing home sales have dropped to approximately 4 million annualized transactions, mirroring activity levels seen during the depths of the 2008 Great Financial Crisis. - [05:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=300s) Sunbelt boomtowns are pivoting into buyer's markets due to builder oversupply and investor pullbacks, whereas post-2008 builder neglect in the Northeast and Midwest has left northern inventory severely constrained. - [10:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=600s) Builder inventory exceeding 9 months of supply alongside historically depressed demand represents a reliable macro indicator for an impending US recession. - [16:46](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=1006s) The nationwide 3% mortgage lock-in effect freezes up to $38 trillion in equity, resulting in a 40% premium to own versus rent and paralyzing normal resale inventory. - [31:50](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=1910s) Single-family rental cap rates averaging 4.8% fail to justify operational risk when matched against risk-free Treasury yields and escalating eviction and maintenance expenses. - [40:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=2400s) Demographic imbalances in retiree hubs like Naples, Florida create liquidation risks, as the ratio of young renters to seniors over 75 falls below the capacity needed to absorb inherited inventory. - [47:38](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=2858s) Inflation-adjusted Case-Shiller data demonstrates that real US home prices stayed flat for 110 consecutive years (1890–2000), decoupling radically only in 2006 and post-2020. - [51:16](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=3076s) Institutional Wall Street buyers slashed acquisitions by 50% to 70% as mortgage rates outpaced cap rates, while proposed federal rules aim to cap corporate ownership at 350 existing homes. - [58:18](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=3498s) Current regional real estate corrections are concentrated and localized, exemplified by Austin absorbing a 27% peak-to-trough drop without a surge in unemployment. - [01:03:15](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=3795s) Aggressive lowball bidding strategies succeed by targeting properties lingering on the market past six months with multiple prior reductions and pre-framing listing agents before making written offers. - [01:10:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=4200s) At current elevated mortgage rates and prices, buyers require a 12- to 15-year holding horizon to break even against renting, compared to roughly 7 years during the 3% rate era. - [01:55:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=6900s) Forward-looking real estate price projections are determined by three core underlying variables: inventory supply, days on market, and active transaction velocity.

## Detailed walkthrough ### [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=0s) The Disconnect Between Wall Street and the Housing Market

The episode opens with Nick Gerli sounding the alarm on a hidden divergence between financial markets and everyday economic reality. While the stock market continues to project robust health, warning signs are flashing across multiple corners of real estate. New home construction is declining while costs remain elevated, and existing home sales have dropped to roughly 4 million annualized transactions—a level reminiscent of the 2008–2009 Great Financial Crisis. At the same time, the divide between what American home buyers earn and what they need to make to qualify for a home has reached an unprecedented peak.

Nick emphasizes that the housing market has fractured into a deeply bifurcated landscape: while some regional markets are actively plunging by 15%, 20%, or even 25%, others continue pushing upward. For anyone preparing to buy, sell, or invest, understanding hyper-local data has become vital before executing what is almost certainly the biggest financial decision of their life.

- Existing home sales are hovering near 4 million, matching levels seen during the depths of the 2008–2009 recession. - Certain markets are experiencing price corrections ranging from 15% to 25%, while others hit new nominal highs. - The income gap required to afford an entry-level home is wider than at any prior point in modern history.

---

[01:25](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=85s) The "Real Estate Mafia" and Unlocking Granular Data

When Graham Stephan asks why everyday consumers seem unaware of this data, Nick explains that the numbers are not technically hidden or classified. Platforms like Zillow and Realtor.com produce granular datasets tracking home prices, inventory, and days on market down to the zip code level. However, Nick argues that mainstream industry players have a structural disincentive to share the reality with the public. He describes this as a "real estate mafia"—a loose cabal of real estate agents, institutional owners, and industry lobbyists whose commissions and equity depend entirely on projecting relentless price appreciation and stoking FOMO ("fear of missing out") among prospective buyers.

Nick established his platform, Reventure Consulting, to extract this publicly accessible data, build forecasting models, and present unbiased regional realities directly to consumers. His methodology stems from an academic background in economics at Siena College and the London School of Economics, followed by eight years of institutional commercial real estate underwriting. Working for a private equity fund providing mortgages on multifamily apartment complexes and commercial office buildings, Nick traveled the country funding deals across major hubs like Las Vegas, Phoenix, Houston, Atlanta, and Florida. By the mid-2010s, he pivoted that quantitative underwriting approach toward residential housing.

```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Real Estate Information Flow vs Reventure Model accDescr: Comparison of how traditional industry narratives distort housing data versus how quantitative direct-to-consumer analysis functions.

subgraph Traditional["Traditional Real Estate Narrative"] A["Raw Data\n(Zillow, Realtor.com, MLS)"] --> B["Mainstream Real Estate Industry\n('Real Estate Mafia' / Agents)"] B --> C["FOMO Narrative\n('Prices Only Go Up')"] C --> D["Uninformed Consumer"] end

subgraph Reventure["Quantitative Direct Model"] E["Zip-Code Level Metrics\n(Inventory, Cuts, DOM)"] --> F["Reventure Analytical Models\n(Affordability & Forecasts)"] F --> G["Informed Home Buyer / Investor"] end ```

---

[03:28](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=208s) Who Should Actually Buy a House in Today's Market?

Addressing the central question of who should enter the market today, Nick cuts straight to core household fundamentals: can the buyer realistically afford the property? In the wake of the pandemic price run-up and the Federal Reserve's aggressive interest rate hiking cycle, affordability has broken down completely for median earners. The typical monthly mortgage payment in the United States—incorporating principal, interest, property taxes, and homeowners insurance—now sits at roughly $2,800. Against a median household income of approximately $85,000, that payment absorbs nearly 40% of gross earnings.

Nick points out that traditional underwriting wisdom recommends keeping housing costs at or below 25% of gross income. Spending 40% leaves families dangerously vulnerable to income shocks, inflation, and unexpected maintenance expenses. Even for high-earning households with ample capital who can technically afford today's payments, Nick warns against the risk of "catching a falling knife." Walking through Florida neighborhoods, he routinely encounters single-family properties selling at $100,000 to $150,000 below their 2023–2024 purchase prices. While cheaper price tags improve accessibility, buyers face the persistent risk of values drifting significantly lower after closing.

- **Typical US Monthly Mortgage Payment:** ~$2,800/month (including taxes and insurance). - **Median US Household Income:** ~$85,000/year. - **Housing Cost Burden:** ~40% of median household income (versus the prudent 25% guideline). - **Observed Recent Price Drops:** Upward of $100,000–$150,000 reductions from 2023–2024 peaks in parts of Florida.

---

[05:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=300s) The Regional Split: Sunbelt Slowdown vs. Rust Belt Squeeze

When asked whether priced-out young Americans have reason for optimism, Nick explains that the answer is entirely geographic. In the pandemic boomtowns of the Sunbelt—spanning parts of Florida, Texas, and Nevada—market power has swung decisively back toward purchasers. In Las Vegas, home prices have registered modest year-over-year declines of roughly 3%, inventory is accumulating, and active listings frequently show price cuts between $50,000 and $100,000 from recent peak sales. Builders overbuilt tract homes, institutional investors flooded the market, and migration inflows from high-tax states like California and New York, while still occurring, have normalized compared to the frenzied peak of 2021. Furthermore, many investors who bought in bulk are now liquidating inventory, creating a legitimate buyer's market.

Paradoxically, the most competitive, cutthroat seller's markets in the country are now found in legacy Rust Belt and Northeast metros, led by cities such as Syracuse, Hartford, Buffalo, and Chicago. Syracuse, New York, currently ranks number one in the nation for home value appreciation. Nick highlights two structural reasons for this phenomenon: 1. **The Construction Deficit:** Following the 2008 housing crash, homebuilders completely abandoned the Northeast and Midwest to concentrate capital in the Sunbelt. As a result, these legacy markets have virtually zero incoming supply to absorb organic demand. 2. **Reverse Migration:** A measurable segment of remote workers and transplants who fled northern metros for southern hubs during the 2010s and pandemic era are now returning home to cities like Chicago, putting additional pressure on an already starved housing inventory.

---

[07:30](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=450s) Boots-on-the-Ground Surprises: Florida, Austin, and Philadelphia

Nick describes his day-to-day work as an unconventional mix of statistical modeling and physical field reconnaissance. He regularly flies across the country, walking individual neighborhood streets to cross-reference data points against real-life conditions. Over the past three months, the sheer magnitude of price reductions across Florida has been the most striking discovery. Having relocated to St. Petersburg two years prior to track the onset of the downturn, he notes that properties once purchased for $500,000 are now clearing at $400,000—a reality conventional industry pundits claimed was impossible in this cycle.

Even more severe is Austin, Texas, the undisputed epicenter of the pandemic boom. Nick lived in Austin during 2020 and 2021, witnessing the bubble form in real time. Today, Austin home prices have plummeted 30% market-wide from their peak, while multifamily and residential rents have tumbled roughly 20%.

On the opposite side of the spectrum, Nick was surprised by the intense resilience of legacy northeastern cities like Philadelphia, where buyer competition remains fierce despite negative headlines about municipal challenges. Graham pushes back, noting that everyone he speaks with in California is actively looking to move to Florida, Texas, or Nevada to escape high state income taxes. Nick clarifies that out-of-state migration has not stopped; rather, the net volume has diminished, and a distinct bifurcation has opened up between the high-end luxury tier—where wealthy Californians still pay cash—and the broader median market, which has hit an absolute wall of affordability.

- **Austin, Texas Peak-to-Trough Decline:** Home values down 30% market-wide; market rents down 20%. - **Florida Price Adjustments:** Widespread six-figure price reductions on suburban single-family homes (e.g., $500,000 down to $400,000). - **Zero-Income-Tax Migration Destinations:** Nevada, Texas, Florida, and Tennessee remain primary targets, but demand is increasingly concentrated in top-tier luxury rather than entry-level brackets.

[10:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=600s) The Sunbelt Migration Cycle and Housing Demand Warnings

The conversation delves into the stark drop-off in migration out of states like California into secondary markets like Las Vegas. While California professionals earning $200,000 W-2 incomes previously flooded the Nevada market, that segment of buyers has fallen precipitously, leaving Las Vegas home sales below 2008–2009 Great Financial Crisis levels. Despite the drop in standard buyer demand, luxury developments featuring $5 million to $20 million penthouses and condos continue to trade. Nick Gerli notes that if California passes a proposed wealth tax, billionaires and centi-millionaires will inevitably flee to zero-income-tax states, sustaining the ultra-luxury tier. However, for ordinary buyers, this migration wave has collapsed—a pattern that mirrors historic real estate boom-and-bust cycles. Florida's historical migration data shows an identical surge in 2005–2006 followed by a steep drop, a prolonged recovery, another massive peak in 2022, and a subsequent sharp contraction.

```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Housing Demand Cycle vs Macro Economy accDescr: Diagram illustrating builder oversupply, declining sales volume, and their macroeconomic implications.

subgraph LeadingIndicators["Housing Sector Flashing Signals"] A["Existing Home Sales: ~4M Annualized (2008-09 Levels)"] B["Home Builder Inventory: >9 Months Supply (Normal: 5-6)"] C["Selective Price Drops in Sunbelt Markets"] end

subgraph MacroEconomy["Current Macro Divergence"] D["Unemployment at ~4%"] E["Stock Market Booming"] F["Housing Represents ~15% of US GDP"] end

subgraph Question["Potential Outcomes"] G["Recession Transmission to Labor Market"] H["Isolated Overbuilding Anomaly"] end

LeadingIndicators --> F F -.-> G MacroEconomy -.-> H ```

Housing accounts for approximately 15% of U.S. GDP across its direct and ancillary sectors, making the current divergence between real estate metrics and the broader economy deeply concerning. Existing home sales have slowed to roughly 4 million annualized transactions according to the National Association of Realtors (NAR)—a trough comparable to the worst stretch of the 2008 financial crash. At the same time, new home inventory has surged past 9 months of supply, well above the historical benchmark of 5 to 6 months. In historical terms, supply exceeding 9 months has only occurred alongside economic recessions. Even though the official unemployment rate remains low at 4% and the stock market continues to set highs, these housing indicators may reflect the financial strain the typical American is experiencing ahead of broader labor market weakness.

- Existing home sales sit at roughly 4 million annualized units, matching the volume seen during the 2008–2009 housing crash. - Home builder supply exceeds 9 months, compared to the healthy equilibrium range of 5 to 6 months. - Graham questions whether the supply spike is simply builders overbuilding in select areas; Nick acknowledges localized overbuilding (such as a townhome he saw drop from $485,000 to $435,000 in a year), but notes that historically, demand this weak paired with builder inventory this high has never occurred without a subsequent recession.

---

[13:30](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=810s) Nick's Investment Playbook: Dry Powder and Deep Discounts

When asked how individual listeners can put this macroeconomic data to work, Nick shares his personal portfolio posture. He maintains a highly defensive allocation, parking capital primarily in cash, short-term Treasuries, and short-term Treasury index funds yielding 4% to 5%. This conservative approach provides yield while preserving optionality to jump on distressed assets when sellers capitulate.

Nick highlights a personal real estate acquisition in Atlanta earlier in the year that demonstrated how sharp discounts are already showing up in Sunbelt markets. He secured a property for $330,000 that had previously sold for roughly $490,000 in 2023, and originally traded as new construction for $440,000 back in 2021. By holding capital in cash equivalents, he was able to purchase the asset at a $110,000 discount below its 2021 pre-bubble peak price. While these discounts are not yet the nationwide norm, aggressive lowball offers are yielding results where builder supply has oversaturated the market.

---

[15:30](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=930s) Sponsor: Northwest Registered Agent

Jack Selby introduces the episode sponsor, Northwest Registered Agent, pointing out that while renting might make sense for residential housing, owning a distinct corporate footprint online is critical when launching a company. Many potential clients immediately dismiss proposals originating from generic free email providers without a dedicated domain. Northwest Registered Agent offers a suite of free business formation tools—including a domain name, a live website, professional business email accounts, and a dedicated business phone line—with zero requirement to purchase products or register an LLC.

---

[16:46](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=1006s) The Rent vs. Buy Spread and the 3% Mortgage Lock-in Effect

The hosts discuss the core question of why everyday Americans still aspire to buy homes when renting is mathematically far superior in the current market. Nick affirms that the emotional drive toward homeownership remains universal: roughly 80% to 90% of Americans desire the stability, space, and family security that a permanent home provides. However, the current financial math makes little sense for first-time buyers. The median mortgage payment on a newly purchased home—incorporating property taxes and homeowners insurance—hovers around $2,800 per month, compared to a median market rent of roughly $1,900 per month. Paying a 40% premium just to service a mortgage makes buyers hesitant to "mortgage their future" or become house-poor.

```mermaid flowchart LR accTitle: The Mortgage Lock-In Effect accDescr: Visual comparison of mortgage payments at 3% versus 6.5% interest rates explaining seller hesitation.

subgraph ExistingOwner["Existing Homeowner Position"] A["Existing Mortgage: 3.0%"] B["Current Payment: $2,600 - $2,700/mo"] end

subgraph NewPurchase["Replacement Purchase at Market Rates"] C["New Mortgage: 6.5%"] D["Replacement Payment: ~$4,400/mo"] end

ExistingOwner -->|"Listing Resistance"| E["Refusal to cut prices to market clears"] NewPurchase -->|"Financial Penalty"| E ```

Despite mortgage rates jumping dramatically since 2021, nationwide prices have not experienced a complete collapse for two distinct reasons:

1. **Depressed Resale Inventory:** Nationwide resale inventory stands at roughly 1.1 million homes, which is only now creeping back to the pre-pandemic normal of 1.2 million listings. By comparison, during the 2008 crash, resale listings spiked past 3 million homes, which triggered the 25% nationwide price plunge. 2. **The "Rate Lock-in" Seller Psychology:** Homeowners with legacy 3% or 4% fixed-rate mortgages are reluctant to sell. An owner whose current monthly payment is $2,600 to $2,700 realizes that buying the same equivalent house today at a 6.5% interest rate would drive their payment up to $4,400 a month. Even if a home's actual market value is $700,000, sellers anchor to past peak comps and list for $770,000, refusing to offer meaningful price reductions because staying put remains far cheaper.

[20:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=1200s) The Present Value Trap and Market Stalemate

The discussion breaks down the hidden mathematics freezing the housing market: the present value of ultra-low mortgage rates. If a homeowner has 25 years remaining on a 3% mortgage, they might have around $300,000 in remaining interest to pay. Buying that exact same property at a 6.5% interest rate would balloon the total interest bill to roughly $800,000. That half-million-dollar gap creates an enormous financial incentive to stay put. One host recalls calculating a home upgrade on his $600,000 property: keeping every variable identical aside from moving from his locked-in 2.8% rate to current rates of 6.2% to 6.5% would increase his monthly payment by more than 80%, potentially doubling his housing outlay.

This dynamic creates an unprecedented psychological and valuation standoff between buyers and sellers:

```mermaid flowchart LR accTitle: Housing Market Valuation Stalemate accDescr: Diagram illustrating the gap between buyer perception and seller valuation due to interest rates. subgraph SellerSide["Seller Perspective"] A["Locked-in 2.8% to 3% Mortgage"] --> B["Values home at $800k - $900k<br/>(Includes rate discount value)"] end subgraph BuyerSide["Buyer Perspective"] C["Current 6.5%+ Rates"] --> D["Can only afford $2,500/mo<br/>(Demands $150k price cut to $450k)"] end B -.->|"Severe Pricing Gap / Gridlock"| D ```

Because of this friction, the Federal Reserve's prolonged era of monetary easing and rock-bottom rates has created a multi-year home sale depression. Rather than adjusting cleanly, transaction volume has stalled as buyers with genuine affordability constraints clash with sellers who have every rational reason to hold.

[22:18](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=1338s) Diverging Markets: Sunbelt Correction vs. Legacy Brain Hubs

The pain is not distributed evenly across the United States. Sunbelt boomtowns that saw parabolic increases during the pandemic are now undergoing sharp corrections: - **Austin, Texas:** Down 27% from its peak over the last four years. - **Cape Coral / Fort Myers, Florida:** Down roughly 16%. - **Phoenix, Arizona and Denver, Colorado:** Down around 10%. - **Las Vegas, Nevada:** Down about 5% from its peak.

In stark contrast, legacy urban centers and their affluent suburban pockets are experiencing an unexpected resurgence. The wealthy suburbs ringing Chicago and New York City are seeing roughly 10% year-over-year appreciation. While the hosts express surprise that high-tax metro areas are flourishing—especially in light of political rhetoric around taxing the ultra-wealthy, such as proposals targeting billionaire Ken Griffin's pied-à-terre holdings—the structural fundamentals tell a different story.

New York's attempt to deter wealthy absentee owners via a pied-à-terre tax on expensive second and third homes was projected to flood the market with inventory, but Manhattan listings are currently sitting at 10-year lows. Manhattan condo prices dropped nearly 20% post-pandemic, dipping back toward 2005 levels and leaving the city fundamentally undervalued.

Simultaneously, a powerful "agglomeration force" is reversing the pandemic-era exodus. With the rise of artificial intelligence, tech and finance workers who previously relocated to the Sunbelt face the realization that remote positions are the most vulnerable to automation and displacement. The imperative to be in premier brain hubs has turned San Francisco County into one of the nation's most competitive markets: - Inventory in San Francisco is down 40%. - Home values in the county are up nearly 15% year-over-year.

While Nick notes caution regarding the lack of accompanying job growth, the current cycle clearly favors legacy centers over the Sunbelt, which must bottom out and become affordable again before the next migration wave returns.

[25:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=1500s) First-Time Buyers, Affordability, and the Social Fabric of Homeownership

When evaluating whether first-time buyers are completely locked out, the answer hinges entirely on geography. In a market like Nashville, housing inventory sits at a 15-year record high while demand hovers near 15-year lows. For buyers there, it is an opportune moment to aggressively make low offers. In Chicago or New York, however, first-time buyers remain essentially frozen out. On a national level, wage growth sits near 3.2% year-over-year while a median mortgage payment requires roughly 40% of typical income, making everyday house hunters feel wholly excluded from the market regardless of local price concessions.

The conversation turns to the broader cultural and economic question: does widespread homeownership matter for the social fabric of the country? - **The Financial Case for Renting:** During the 2010s, purchasing real estate was historically profitable because mortgage payments were frequently lower than prevailing rents and new market interest rates were lower than existing rates. Today, with ownership costing dramatically more than renting, a disciplined individual can often build wealth faster by renting and deploying their savings into alternative liquid investments. - **The Civic and Social Case for Ownership:** Drawing on observations from figures like Adam Carolla, the hosts note that owning property anchors individuals to their community. Renters with no financial stake in the local economy often feel alienated, whereas property owners have skin in the game, motivating them to maintain their neighborhoods, participate civically, and work toward communal stability.

Nick contrasts the American ethos with European regulatory extremes, pointing to Berlin, Germany, where homeownership hovers at just 15%. In Berlin, tenant protections are so expansive that renters hold near-owner status: leases frequently lack fixed termination dates, allowing tenants to stay indefinitely at regulated rates. As a result, small mom-and-pop landlords have vanished, leaving the rental stock dominated by massive institutional operators capable of financing endless legal battles. The group observes that certain progressive U.S. jurisdictions, such as Santa Monica, California, are nudging their local rental landscapes closer to this restrictive model.

[30:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=1800s) Sponsor Break: Blossom and NetSuite

Graham Stephan and Jack Selby highlight their partnership with Blossom, an investor-centric social media platform where users can verify portfolios and track real-time gains and losses rather than relying on unverified claims. Both hosts share their public holdings on the platform to determine who is truly the superior investor, though Graham playfully claims the answer is already obvious. The hosts point out that fellow creator Caleb Hammer currently holds a higher follower count on the app—a standing they jokingly deem unacceptable as they rally viewers to follow their profiles and help them edge ahead.

Transitioning from portfolio tracking to enterprise operations, the discussion pivots to NetSuite. The cloud enterprise resource planning suite, trusted by over 44,000 businesses, embeds AI agents directly into standard workflows to answer operational questions in plain English and handle routine reporting tasks. For business owners generating seven figures or more, NetSuite offers a free strategic guide titled *Aligning for the Agentic Era: How AI is Changing Everyday Work*, outlining tactical shifts required to integrate autonomous AI tools across corporate organizations.

[31:50](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=1910s) The Landlord Trap: California Regulations and 4.8% Cap Rates

Returning to the housing market, the conversation turns to tenant-protection legislation in cities like Santa Monica and Los Angeles, and whether restrictive local policies risk driving down American homeownership nationwide. Nick Gerli observes that California jurisdictions operate under the moral assumption that they are helping renters by imposing extreme eviction barriers. In practice, however, requiring a landlord to spend up to $50,000 or wait endless months to remove a non-paying resident restricts housing supply and drives up rents for honest tenants who can actually afford to pay. Graham notes that this environment leaves middle-class landlords completely defenseless; only billionaires and large institutional entities with full-time salaried legal teams can survive prolonged "cash for keys" negotiations and navigate bureaucratic red tape.

Because of these conditions, Nick explicitly advises everyday mom-and-pop investors against buying rental properties to scale a portfolio right now. Even outside tenant-hostile states like California or New York, the underlying financial fundamentals have broken down. Across the United States, the average cap rate (net operating income divided by purchase price) for a single-family home sits at approximately 4.8%. With the risk-free 10-year US Treasury yield floating at or above that benchmark, an investor takes on all the operational risk, maintenance liabilities, and potential eviction costs of physical real estate for a yield lower than government debt.

When Graham challenges this calculation by suggesting that landlords often factor in an additional 2% to 5% in annual price appreciation—pushing expected total returns into the 7% to 10% range—Nick pushes back. While that playbook generated massive wealth throughout the early 2000s and 2010s, home prices today are stretched to historic extremes relative to local incomes and market rents. Because prices cannot decouple from wage fundamentals over the long run, Nick warns that anyone building a discounted cash flow (DCF) model today should realistically project negative appreciation over the first several years of ownership.

- **US Single-Family Cap Rate:** Currently averaging around 4.8%, dipping below the yield of a risk-free 10-year US Treasury bond. - **Eviction Overhead in California:** Evicting a non-paying tenant often runs upwards of $50,000 in direct legal fees and lost rent. - **The DCF Reality:** Modeling 2% to 5% baseline appreciation ignores that price-to-income and price-to-rent ratios are already at unsustainable cyclical highs.

[35:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=2100s) The Luxury Illusion and the Need for "Moneyball" Housing Analytics

Addressing the bifurcated market where luxury homes move fast while starter homes stall, Nick explains that the top 1% distort public perception without fixing underlying market weakness. In regions like Miami and Las Vegas, overall transaction volumes have plunged, and standard inventory has experienced price corrections. Yet headlines remain dominated by corporate relocations from firms like Palantir and mega-mansions purchased by Jeff Bezos or Mark Zuckerberg. When an ultra-luxury condo initially listed at $10 million flips for $12 million a few years later, local realtors and media outlets seize on the sale to manufacture an illusion of broad market strength.

This narrative whiplash leaves everyday buyers paralyzed by contradictory information. Nick recounts seeing Realtor.com report the "biggest decline in list prices since 2017" in the exact same month that Redfin ran a headline proclaiming the "biggest surge in sale prices in four years." The confusion stems from national aggregations masking local realities; what actually matters is hyper-local inventory, pending sales, and demand within a buyer's exact ZIP code.

Nick argues that residential real estate remains decades behind Wall Street when it comes to sophisticated analytics. While individual stocks are scrutinized by dozens of equity research analysts using quantitative forecasting tools, home buyers preparing to commit $250,000 to over $1 million are left guessing. Drawing a parallel to Michael Lewis's *Moneyball*, where Billy Beane and the Oakland Athletics used sabermetrics to outmaneuver high-payroll teams relying on gut-feeling scouts, Nick shares that his core mission with Reventure Consulting is to bring institutional-grade predictive data to everyday buyers, sellers, and agents.

```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Real Estate Analytical Evolution accDescr: Diagram illustrating the shift from subjective realtor narratives to hyper-local predictive data modeling.

subgraph Legacy["Traditional Market Method"] A["National Media Headlines"] --> B["Bifurcated Luxury Outliers<br>(Bezos / Zuckerberg Sales)"] B --> C["Subjective Realtor Gut Feelings"] end

subgraph Modern["Institutional 'Moneyball' Approach"] D["ZIP-Code Level Inventory"] --> E["DCF & Cap Rate Fundamentals"] E --> F["Reventure Predictive Data Models"] end

Legacy -.->|"Decouples from reality"| G["Confused Buyers & Speculation"] Modern -->|"Replaces intuition"| H["Objective Buying & Selling Decisions"] ```

[38:31](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=2311s) The Great Wealth Transfer: Will Boomer Inheritances Save Prices?

Graham raises the popular macroeconomic defense that millennial buyers will soon be rescued by the estimated $46 trillion wealth transfer projected to take place through 2048, suggesting this massive influx of inherited capital will prevent home values from crashing. Nick counters that this theory only examines cash and completely ignores the other half of the ledger: the physical real estate assets that must be liquidated.

Citing data from Freddie Mac, Nick highlights that approximately 9.2 million Baby Boomers will age out of homeownership by 2035. Historically, adults aged 55 to 64 constituted a steady 8% to 9% of the total US population throughout the 1950s, 60s, 70s, 80s, and 90s. That share spiked dramatically during the mid-2000s and continued climbing until 2020 as the giant Boomer demographic entered its peak second-home and retirement-buying window. Now, that cohort is shrinking as Boomers cross into the 75-and-older bracket at an unprecedented rate in American history. As this generation passes on or transitions into assisted living, an enormous wave of existing housing stock will be inherited and put up for sale by heirs, unleashing a structural surge in inventory that could overwhelm demand.

- **Projected Wealth Transfer:** An estimated $46 trillion moving down to millennials between now and 2048. - **Boomer Housing Divestment:** Freddie Mac projects 9.2 million Baby Boomers will age out of homeownership by 2035. - **Demographic Shift:** The 55–64 age bracket has peaked and is now contracting, while the 75+ population is hitting an all-time high in the United States.

[40:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=2400s) The Great Wealth Transfer and the Aging Homeowner Dilemma

The conversation dives into the mechanics of the baby boomer wealth transfer and whether it will ultimately help or hurt real estate. According to Charles Schwab data, roughly 70% of inherited homes end up being sold rather than kept. While this transfer will inject substantial capital into millennial pockets and create marginal buyers, it will simultaneously unleash a massive wave of housing inventory onto the market. When asked whether this dynamic simply cancels itself out—since inheriting buyers will likely redeploy that cash into home purchases, trade up to a nicer home, or plow $200,000 into major Home Depot renovations—Nick points out a severe demographic imbalance that complicates the equation.

```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Aging Homeowner vs Buyer Pipeline accDescr: Flowchart illustrating the demographic imbalance between aging homeowners and younger replacement renters.

subgraph Demographics ["Demographic Imbalance"] A["75+ Homeowners Aging Out"] -->|"70% Inherited Homes Sold"| B["Surplus Housing Inventory"] C["25-44 Year-Old Renters"] -->|"Decreasing Buyer Ratio"| D["Margin Buyers"] end

subgraph Markets ["Regional Divergence"] B & D --> E["Retirement Havens (e.g., Naples, FL)<br/>Ratio < 1: Oversupply Collapse"] B & D --> F["Young Tech Hubs (e.g., Austin, Denver)<br/>Buyer Demand Absorbs Supply"] end ```

To illustrate this, Nick highlights a new demographic metric added to the Reventure app comparing the population of homeowners aged 75 and older against renters aged 25 to 44. The ratio between these two cohorts is plummeting across the country. In retirement-heavy areas like Florida, the ratio of 25-to-44-year-old renters to 75-and-older owners is projected to drop below 1.0 within the next couple of years. This reveals an acute geographical disparity: markets like Naples, Florida, lack an incoming pipeline of younger millennial buyers willing or able to absorb homes vacated by aging boomers. In contrast, younger demographic hubs like Austin, Texas, or Denver, Colorado, are far better positioned to absorb that incoming supply.

- **70% of inherited properties** are liquidated rather than retained by heirs (per Charles Schwab data). - **Florida demographic shift:** Within five years, Florida will likely have more homeowners aged 75+ than renters aged 25 to 44.

[42:01](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=2521s) Interest Rate Lock-In and the $35 Trillion Equity Trap

Turning to mortgage affordability, the hosts debate what interest rate would be required to finally break the gridlock and unlock locked-in housing inventory. Nick estimates mortgage rates would need to decline to near 5% before existing homeowners holding 3% to 4% pandemic mortgages would find it financially viable to trade up. However, macroeconomic conditions are moving in the wrong direction; benchmark mortgage rates have surged past 7% amid a global bond market sell-off, making a meaningful rate reduction improbable barring a full-blown economic recession.

Over a 135-year historical horizon, the average U.S. mortgage rate sits at 6.2%, and 1990s rates routinely hovered around 8%. The ultra-low 3% rates of the 2010s and pandemic era were historical anomalies unlikely to return. The underlying crisis is not historically anomalous borrowing costs, but wildly inflated home prices. Nationally, the housing market sits at roughly $50 trillion in value against only $15 trillion in total mortgage debt, leaving homeowners with approximately $35 trillion in trapped paper equity. Because cash-out refinances and transaction volumes are frozen at multi-year lows, homeowners are largely reduced to "refreshing their Zestimate" and reminiscing about what neighbors sold for four years ago, leaving price declines as the only structural path back to equilibrium.

- **135-year historical average U.S. mortgage rate:** 6.2%. - **Total U.S. housing valuation:** ~$50 trillion. - **Mortgage debt vs. equity:** ~$15 trillion in debt vs. ~$35 trillion to $38 trillion in home equity.

[44:03](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=2643s) The AI Economy and San Francisco's Disconnected Boom

The hosts debate whether rapid advancements in artificial intelligence could trigger deflation, widespread corporate layoffs, and forced Federal Reserve rate cuts. While some expected a deflationary recession in 2022 or 2023, the U.S. economy has gone approximately 17 years without an organic, non-manufactured downturn (viewing the 2020 pandemic as an artificial shock quickly backstopped by unprecedented stimulus). Meanwhile, heavyweight tech companies like NVIDIA and prominent venture funds continue pouring billions into data centers, hardware, and frontier AI startups.

This concentrated capital deployment has produced a striking geographical divergence across West Coast real estate: - **San Francisco County:** Experiencing an aggressive, isolated rebound with property values up roughly 15% year-over-year, driven by surging AI startup funding, plunging inventory, and rebounding sales volume. - **Santa Clara & Alameda Counties (Silicon Valley & Oakland):** Flat to declining year-over-year home values despite immediate proximity to San Francisco. - **Broader Tech Metros (Seattle, Austin, Denver):** Housing contractions and softening valuations across the board.

Nick floats the hypothesis that San Francisco's frontier AI labs are siphoning capital and generating tools that eliminate traditional tech jobs in secondary tech hubs. Graham pushes back, arguing that San Francisco is simply supply-constrained; strict zoning laws, insurmountable building obstacles, and intense geographic concentration around elite enclaves like Atherton mean that globally sourced venture windfalls pour into a fixed stock of luxury real estate where high-net-worth buyers do not care about overpaying by several million dollars.

[47:38](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=2858s) Historical Rate Hikes vs. The Case-Shiller Bubble

Graham raises a historical counterintuitive finding: when tracking housing returns across past interest rate hiking and cutting cycles against inflation, real estate almost never depreciates when mortgage rates rise. Out of every rate-hiking cycle in modern history, home values dropped in only one instance (around 1991). In fact, housing drops historically coincide with *rate cuts*, because central banks slash rates only in response to deteriorating conditions—such as spiking unemployment, bankruptcies, and economic recessions. Conversely, rates are hiked when inflation is elevated and the labor market is booming, both of which provide fundamental tailwinds for real estate appreciation.

Nick concedes that the correlation is factually sound, but argues that current conditions break the historical mold because the market is sitting inside a historic bubble. Citing the Robert Shiller inflation-adjusted Case-Shiller Home Price Index—dating back to 1890—Nick emphasizes that for 110 consecutive years (from 1890 through 2000), real inflation-adjusted home prices in the United States were effectively flat. Even during severe inflationary spikes like the 1970s, housing values merely kept pace with overall inflation. The modern market has fundamentally broken away from this multi-century equilibrium: the only two eras in recorded U.S. history where real home prices radically decoupled from inflation were the 2006 subprime bubble and the current post-2020 market.

[50:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=3000s) Historical Bubble Metrics and Why 2024 Isn't 1981

Nick explains that home prices relative to inflation, household income, and rents have surged right back to the extreme peaks seen immediately before the mid-2000s subprime crash. In all of recorded U.S. history, valuation multiples at this altitude have never persisted without an eventual reckoning. Nick rejects the frequent real estate industry talking point that housing can remain immune to high interest rates simply because prices continued to rise during 1981 when mortgage rates peaked near 18%.

The economic realities of the late 1970s and early 1980s were fundamentally different: home prices back then were not sitting inside a valuation bubble, and workers experienced aggressive wage growth of 6% to 8% per year. That environment fostered a genuine inflationary psychology where buyers willingly stretched their finances because they anticipated a 10% raise around the corner. By contrast, modern workers are averaging modest 3% wage gains, giving them no structural insulation against skyrocketing borrowing costs. With affordability stretched past historic limits, Nick insists that current price levels are unprecedented and vulnerable.

- Fundamental affordability ratios (price-to-inflation, price-to-income, and price-to-rent) are matching or exceeding peak 2006 bubble levels. - Wage growth during the high-rate era of 1981 ran at 6% to 8% annually, compared to roughly 3% today. - "We're in an actual bubble this time when we really weren't in previous periods."

---

[51:16](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=3076s) Wall Street's Footprint: Invitation Homes and the 350-Home Rule

Jack asks how much institutional private equity buying up residential real estate has harmed housing affordability. Nick explains that institutional capital was aggressively incentivized by the federal government following the Great Financial Crisis to mop up distressed inventory, particularly in Sun Belt hubs like Las Vegas. Over the ensuing decade, institutional conglomerates such as Invitation Homes, American Homes 4 Rent, and Progress Residential snapped up close to one million single-family homes across the country.

```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Institutional Single-Family Rental Evolution accDescr: Diagram showing how Wall Street entered single-family rentals after 2008 and transitioned into Build-to-Rent.

subgraph Phase1["Post-2008 Acquisition"] A["Bank Distressed Portfolios"] -->|"70% Discount / $70k Per Door"| B["Institutional SF Rentals<br/>(1 Million Homes Bought)"] end

subgraph Phase2["Market Pressures & Legislation"] B -->|"Cap Rates Fall Below Mortgage Rates"| C["Purchases Plummet 50%-70%"] C -->|"Road to Housing Legislation"| D["350-Home Ownership Cap<br/>(Bans Existing Purchases 2027-2042)"] end

subgraph Phase3["Modern Strategy"] D -->|"Exempts New Construction"| E["Build-to-Rent (BTR) Communities<br/>(Wall Street as Homebuilder)"] end ```

While corporate landlords own just 2% to 3% of total single-family housing stock nationwide, Nick emphasizes that their presence is heavily clustered. In specific subdivisions across Las Vegas and Atlanta, corporate investors bought up as much as 50% of the neighborhood inventory, fundamentally warping local home prices and driving up rents faster than traditional mom-and-pop landlords. However, Nick notes that institutional buying ground to a halt roughly four years ago when mortgage rates surged above prevailing cap rates, slashing corporate purchase volume by 50% to 70%. Furthermore, new federal legislation (the "Road to Housing" bill) has established a 350-home ownership ceiling: starting in January 2027 through 2042, any entity directly or indirectly owning more than 350 homes is banned from acquiring additional existing housing stock and must submit an annual registry to HUD.

- Institutional landlords purchased nearly 1,000,000 single-family homes across the U.S. between 2012 and 2022. - National market share sits at 2% to 3%, but localized market share reaches 50% in select Atlanta and Las Vegas neighborhoods. - The 350-home federal threshold mandates HUD reporting and bans institutional acquisitions of existing single-family inventory from January 2027 through 2042.

---

[54:15](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=3255s) The Build-to-Rent Pivot: Performative Law or Legitimate Shield?

Graham pushes back against the narrative that institutional buyers are crowding out everyday families, branding the newly passed legislation as largely "performative." From Graham's perspective, private equity models do not pencil when bidding one-by-one against an owner-occupant for "Sally's home down the street." Instead, Wall Street's post-2008 expansion was fueled by buying deeply discounted, distressed bank packages of 300 or more non-performing homes at 70 cents on the dollar—properties that were never going to be listed on the retail MLS to begin with.

Nick concedes that while early acquisitions began with bulk bank sales at $70,000 per door, institutions did aggressively buy turnkey individual homes through the late 2010s. However, both agree that the new statutory ban explicitly excludes "build-to-rent" (BTR) developments. Consequently, institutional giants have pivoted into becoming construction developers themselves; American Homes 4 Rent, for example, is now a top-35 home builder in the nation. While Graham argues the law won't change retail dynamics, Nick views the ban as an essential guardrail that will prevent Wall Street funds from sweeping in to scoop up falling inventory during emerging market crashes, pointing to active price drops across Florida.

- Early institutional bulk deals after 2008 closed around 70 cents on the dollar, averaging approximately $70,000 per door in Las Vegas. - Build-to-rent (BTR) subdivisions remain completely exempt from the 350-home ownership ban. - American Homes 4 Rent has evolved into one of the top 35 largest homebuilders in the United States.

---

[56:45](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=3405s) The Floor Debate: Did Institutional Investors Save the Market?

Graham presents a contrarian defense of Wall Street's role in the housing cycle, arguing that institutional investors effectively set a floor that saved the entire market from free-falling after the 2008 collapse. When everyday buyers lacked the liquidity, financing, or confidence to buy, private capital absorbed massive inventory gluts. Without that institutional backstop, Graham contends home prices would have continued to drop, destroying the retirement equity of ordinary homeowners like "grandma and grandpa."

Graham warns that locking investors out of softening markets like Florida could trigger a compounding downward spiral. If home values crash and borrowers find themselves underwater with negative equity, homeowners cannot sell, relocate, or adjust their lives—freezing transaction activity entirely. While cheap homes benefit first-time buyers on paper, widespread negative equity paralyzes the broader economy because underwater owners are trapped in place.

- "In a way, a lot of these Wall Street investors saved the housing market from falling further because... if investors weren't there to stop the bleeding and to buy up this inventory, prices would keep falling." - Graham emphasizes that when homeowners fall underwater with zero equity, they refuse to list, grinding the market to a standstill.

---

[57:21](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=3441s) Sponsor: Shopify

Jack transitions from the discussion of reaching buyers in real estate to reaching customers in business, noting that building an online presence is vital ahead of Black Friday. Jack shares that prior to co-hosting the podcast with Graham, he personally launched five or six different Shopify storefronts, praising the platform's accessibility for non-technical entrepreneurs. He highlights Shopify's pre-built design themes and AI site builder, which allow business owners to deploy a professional e-commerce storefront without hiring outside web developers, directing listeners to launch their business at `shopify.com/ich`.

---

[58:18](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=3498s) Balance Sheets, Vegas Scar Tissue, and the Austin Test Case

Picking up the debate on falling prices and trapped homeowners, Nick acknowledges that his outlook is directly shaped by his allegiance to aspiring homebuyers. At 36 years old and having recently purchased a primary residence to settle down, his focus is on opening the door for the next generation rather than artificially shielding existing owners' peak valuations. At the same time, Nick concedes that uncontrolled systemic collapse is devastating, recalling the severe trauma of Las Vegas between 2007 and 2012, where home values plummeted 63%—cratering from $350,000 down to $140,000—and left a generational scar across the local populace.

However, Nick firmly refutes the idea that today's market conditions will reproduce an 08-style catastrophe. Modern consumer balance sheets are far more resilient, systemic mortgage debt is tightly managed, and predatory lending is absent. Instead of nationwide 60% crashes, Nick anticipates localized 30% corrections in overbuilt pandemic boomtowns. He cites Austin, Texas, as the ultimate real-world proof of concept: home prices in Austin have already plummeted 27% over a four-year correction, yet the city's unemployment rate sits comfortably at 3.6%. Austin absorbed a massive real estate repricing without triggering widespread economic ruin, illustrating that housing can correct to sane fundamentals without breaking the broader economy.

- Las Vegas home prices dropped 63% between 2007 and 2012, falling from $350,000 to roughly $140,000 per home. - Austin, Texas, has experienced a 27% peak-to-trough price decline over four years while maintaining a low unemployment rate of 3.6%. - Strong consumer balance sheets and lower overall mortgage debt distinguish the current cycle from the 2008 subprime crisis.

[01:00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=3600s) The Investor Exodus and Underwater Mortgages

Nick Gerli explains that today's housing market possesses a substantial financial cushion to absorb home price declines, primarily because consumer balance sheets are strong and banks hold far less systemic exposure than they did during the 2008 crash. With total homeowner equity sitting around $35 trillion, Gerli argues that giving some of that equity back to prospective buyers via price drops is the simplest and healthiest way for the market to normalize. He dismisses the idea that institutional Wall Street buyers are needed to rescue the market, framing their post-2020 single-family buying spree as an anomaly that should not be repeated.

While investors accounted for roughly 19% of residential home purchases with a median capital gain on resale of $196,000, those figures obscure an ongoing shakeout. Gerli estimates that across the hardest-hit metropolitan areas, roughly 10% to 15% of recent buyers are underwater on their mortgages, with pandemic boomtowns like Austin, Texas, seeing as many as 30% to 35% of recent purchases underwater due to steep price contractions. Despite these localized trouble spots, the broader market remains insulated because underwater owners represent a distinct minority.

At the same time, mom-and-pop and institutional investors have staged a dramatic retreat. Driven away by unfavorable math and higher borrowing costs, investor purchases nationwide have plunged 50% from their 2022 peak. In speculative markets like Las Vegas, investor purchases have collapsed by 70%, plummeting from approximately 3,300 purchases per quarter down to 1,200 according to Redfin. With real estate no longer generating easy cash flow, capital has rotated heavily into equities. Graham Stephan observes that this herd mentality toward stocks triggers his contrarian instincts: when an asset class falls completely out of favor, an overlooked buying opportunity often emerges.

- **Total homeowner equity:** $35 trillion nationwide provides a buffer against systemic foreclosures. - **Investor resale gains:** Median capital gain of $196,000 on resales, though largely reflecting earlier entry points. - **Underwater mortgages:** 10% to 15% in stressed markets; Austin, Texas reaches 30% to 35%. - **Drop in investor activity:** National investor purchases are down 50% from 2022 peak levels. - **Las Vegas collapse:** Investor acquisitions dropped 70%, from 3,300 per quarter to roughly 1,200.

---

[01:03:15](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=3795s) Contrarian Buying and Floyd Mayweather's $6.6 Million Mansion

Nick Gerli reflects on the psychological shift in real estate: during 2020 and 2021, real estate was culturally "cool," defined by viral trends of acquiring out-of-state short-term rentals and scaling Airbnb portfolios. Now that the hype has evaporated, Gerli advises prospective buyers in inventory-heavy markets—including Atlanta, Las Vegas, Dallas, Austin, Denver, and Seattle—not necessarily to buy aggressively, but to start "sniffing around" and submitting lowball offers well below list price. Calculating an objective mortgage payment and testing sellers with offers $100,000 to $150,000 below asking can uncover hidden distress.

Graham Stephan validates this principle by sharing a personal regret involving boxing champion Floyd Mayweather's luxury estate in Las Vegas. Mayweather listed his 12,000-square-foot custom mansion—situated on a cul-de-sac directly backing up to a premier golf course—at an ambitious $14 million. Over an extended period, the price was systematically slashed:

``` $14,000,000 ➔ $12,000,000 ➔ $10,000,000 ➔ $8,000,000 ➔ Sold for $6,600,000 ```

Stephan reveals that the property ultimately sold for $6.6 million. Looking back, Stephan admits he would gladly have paid $6.65 million for the estate. He had held off making an offer under the assumption that someone as wealthy as Mayweather would never accept such a steep discount. In reality, the transaction was burdened by title complications, questions over signing authority, and outstanding liens that had to be satisfied before closing. The buyer who prevailed did so by remaining patient and exploiting seller fatigue.

---

[01:05:23](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=3923s) Nick's Blueprint for Lowballing Sellers and Scoring Post-Crash Pricing

To help buyers capitalize on motivated sellers without burning bridges, Nick Gerli outlines the framework developed at Reventure Consulting. The strategy relies on filtering for sellers who are genuinely desperate to transact rather than homeowners merely "taking a flyer" on unrealistic prices. Gerli screens strictly for two baseline criteria: the listing must have been on the market for more than six months, and it must have undergone multiple price reductions.

```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Lowball Negotiation Strategy accDescr: Step-by-step process used by Nick Gerli to negotiate deep discounts on stale listings.

subgraph Phase1["1. Identify Distressed Listings"] A["Listing on market > 6 months"] --> B["Multiple price cuts logged"] end

subgraph Phase2["2. Build Credibility & Warm Up Agent"] B --> C["Tour home in person"] C --> D["Provide verified proof of funds"] D --> E["Ask listing agent:<br/>'Will seller entertain an offer<br/>substantially below list?'"] end

subgraph Phase3["3. Execute Negotiation"] E -->|"Agent confirms willingness"| F["Submit deep discount offer"] E -->|"Agent refuses"| G["Walk away without wasting time"] F --> H["Counter initial pushback with patience"] H --> I["Secure post-crash pricing"] end ```

Rather than submitting an unannounced lowball offer two hours after an initial tour—which reliably offends sellers—Gerli advocates establishing upfront credibility. A buyer should tour the property, present verified proof of funds, and speak directly to the listing agent with a polite pre-framing question: "I love the house. I'm interested in making an offer. It's going to be substantially below list price. Would you like me to still make the offer?" If the agent says no, no time is wasted; if they say yes, the seller's camp is primed.

Gerli illustrates this with his recent real estate purchase in Atlanta: - **Original list price:** $490,000 - **Seller's reduced price:** $415,000 (seller already taking a loss) - **Gerli's initial offer:** $315,000 - **Seller counter-offer:** $400,000 (rejected by Gerli, who stepped back and let the listing sit) - **Seller second reach-out:** $360,000 - **Gerli's final counter:** $330,000 (accepted)

By remaining patient and targeting the right profile, Gerli purchased the home $85,000 below its reduced asking price, locking in what he calls "post-crash pricing" ahead of broader market drops.

---

[01:07:53](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=4073s) Adjustable-Rate Mortgages, 7-Year Cycles, and Transient Housing Markets

The conversation turns to financing strategies when Jack Selby asks whether an adjustable-rate mortgage (ARM) makes sense in an uncertain rate climate. Gerli sheepishly confesses: "Cat's out the bag. I got an adjustable-rate mortgage." On his recent acquisition, Gerli opted for a 7/1 ARM fixed at 5.7% for the first seven years, compared to prevailing 30-year fixed rates of 6.1% to 6.2%.

Gerli admits to mixed feelings about the loan. While he secured a lower interest rate upfront, growing macroeconomic sentiment suggests interest rates may remain elevated or climb higher rather than reverting to historic lows, exposing him to long-term tail risk once the adjustment window arrives.

Stephan points out that the statistical average homeowner tenure is roughly seven years, making an ARM a defensible tactical play for buyers who intend to relocate or trade up before the fixed period resets. However, both agree that buying with an explicit short-term horizon can be risky and depends heavily on regional demographics:

| Market Type | Representative Cities | Ownership Dynamics & Behavior | |:--- |:--- |:--- | | **Transient Sunbelt Boomtowns** | Nashville, Tennessee; Austin, Texas | Highly mobile population; corporate relocations; heavy turnover where a striking share of active listings were purchased just two to four years prior (2022–2024). | | **Established Legacy Markets** | Chicago, Illinois; Upstate New York; Connecticut; New Jersey | Long-term owner-occupants; generational roots; lower listing turnover where buyers routinely hold properties for decades. |

[01:10:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=4200s) The Buy vs. Rent Equation and Breakeven Timelines

When asked how many years a buyer needs to stay in a property to make purchasing worthwhile, Nick Gerli explains that the answer is entirely market-dependent because the gap between owning and renting has diverged drastically. In places like California, the cost disparity is "literally insane": a home that rents for $4,000 a month would easily cost $9,000 a month to purchase with current mortgage rates, taxes, and insurance. Even in Las Vegas, Nick looked at a property commanding $2,800 a month to buy that was listed for rent just a year prior at $1,850. With renters pocketing immediate monthly savings, Nick argues buyers in inflated markets must hold onto a home for at least 15 years, relying on substantial long-term appreciation just to offset the transaction and carrying costs compared to renting. In markets like Florida, that holding period might be shorter, but the baseline requirement has stretched nationwide.

Graham Stephan concurs, pegging the realistic holding threshold at 12 to 15 years to avoid losing money relative to renting. He notes how drastically interest rates have rewritten this equation: back when mortgage rates sat at 3%, a buyer could justify a 7-year timeline; at 5.5% to 6%, it pushed to 10 years. Under current conditions, mortgage amortization is heavily front-loaded toward interest, meaning it takes 18 to 20 years before a monthly payment allocates more money toward the principal balance than toward interest. Without meaningful equity paydown in the early decade of a loan, buyers are gambling purely on price appreciation, which varies wildly by metro.

```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Buy vs Rent Amortization and Breakeven Shift accDescr: Flowchart illustrating how historical interest rate environments alter the breakeven horizon and equity accumulation.

subgraph Rates["Interest Rate Environment"] R1["3% Mortgage Rates (Past)"] R2["5.5% - 6.0% Rates (Transitional)"] R3["7%+ Mortgage Rates (Current)"] end

subgraph Horizon["Required Holding Horizon"] H1["~7 Years to Break Even"] H2["~10 Years to Break Even"] H3["12 to 15+ Years to Break Even"] end

subgraph Paydown["Equity Mechanics"] E1["Early principal paydown"] E2["Moderate front-loaded interest"] E3["Front-loaded interest: 18-20 yrs to tip principal > interest"] end

R1 --> H1 --> E1 R2 --> H2 --> E2 R3 --> H3 --> E3 ```

- In California, buying often costs $9,000/month compared to $4,000/month for an identical rental. - In Las Vegas, purchasing a single-family home ran $2,800/month versus $1,850/month to rent the identical house. - Current mortgage amortization structures require 18 to 20 years before the monthly payment contributes more to principal reduction than to interest charges.

---

[01:12:25](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=4345s) Why Graham Dumped His California Rental Portfolio

Asked what strategy actually works for real estate investors in today's climate, Nick quips that the only foolproof tactic is "running as fast as possible"—seeing a house, turning on your heels, walking out the door, and parking your capital into international index funds and municipal bonds. Jack Selby uses that transition to ask Graham about his high-profile decision to liquidate his California rental portfolio. Graham breaks down the cold math behind his exit: property values had appreciated so high that, once factoring out commissions, transfer taxes, and closing costs, he realized he could park the net proceeds into tax-free municipal bonds and generate higher, completely passive, risk-free yields than his physical rentals were producing.

Beyond the yield comparison, Graham was exhausted by California's mounting administrative and regulatory burdens. Rent control placed a hard ceiling on returns, while operational headaches began compounding. Graham describes annual insurance scares where carriers would send cancellation notices due to internal "errors," leaving a terrifying 48-to-72-hour coverage lapse where he had to pray an earthquake or fire wouldn't wipe out the property before a policy was reissued. Even with low property tax assessments locked in under Proposition 13—paying just $8,000 a year on a $1.3 million rental—he viewed the recurring checks as cash flow drains.

The tipping point came down to day-to-day property friction, such as mysterious $500 monthly water bills from the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power (LADWP) because utility contracts left the landlord footing the bill. While Graham tried to be conservative with water, tenants with zero incentive to conserve were taking marathon showers or running garden hoses in the summer heat. Rising electric bills added to the bleed, with tenants cranking air conditioners down to 60 degrees during Southern California heatwaves. Despite having great, polite tenants, the friction, escalating operating overhead, and regulatory ceilings made holding the portfolio a net negative.

- Graham concluded that tax-free municipal bonds yielded higher net returns than managing physical rental properties in California. - Property taxes on a $1.3 million home were roughly $8,000/year under grandfathered assessments, yet still eroded margins. - Regular insurance drops left multi-million dollar assets uninsured for 48 to 72 hours at a time while waiting for carrier reissues. - Monthly LADWP water bills regularly hit $500+ because utilities were covered by the owner rather than metered to tenants.

---

[01:15:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=4500s) The Hidden Money Pit: CapEx, House Hacking, and AC Scams

To achieve top dollar on his California liquidation, Graham spent $140,000 across three properties on renovations, touch-ups, and professional staging to trigger bidding wars over asking price. The sheer size of that prep bill illustrates what Graham and Jack identify as the blind spot for most homeowners: the brutal reality of capital expenditures (CapEx) outside principal, interest, taxes, and insurance (PITI). Jack shares the accounting breakdown for his personal house hack in Las Vegas, where he rents out four individual bedrooms. While on paper collecting roughly $30,000 to $35,000 in gross annual rent should have easily covered his living costs against a $2,500/month PITI payment, his total ownership expenses for the year totaled a staggering $60,000.

The $30,000+ budget deficit was devoured by high ongoing bills and endless repairs: $180/month for Wi-Fi, electricity surges, and water bills between $600 and $800 to keep the swimming pool topped off in the desert heat. On top of that, homeownership produced relentless annual surprises: - Replacing an HVAC air conditioning unit cost $13,000. - Pool replastering cost $8,000 the year prior. - A secondary AC unit and a blown pool pump cost several thousand dollars. - Irrigation leaks and a severed main water line cost $2,000 and $5,000, respectively.

Graham recounts a matching nightmare where a tenant paying $3,500 a month had their AC unit fail during their second week of occupancy, landing him an instant $10,000 bill. The conversation turns into an indictment of the HVAC industry, which Jack and Graham characterize as pure planned obsolescence. AC technicians have told them that 30-year-old legacy units were built to run forever, whereas modern manufacturers frequently phase out coolant and refrigerant standards every few years. When an older system leaks or runs out of phased-out Freon, technicians cannot simply recharge the gas; owners are forced to replace both the entire condenser unit and the matching indoor coil at catastrophic expense.

---

[01:17:30](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=4650s) Lake Mead, Vegas Water Myth, and the California Almond Debate

Turning to geographic risks, Jack and Graham address a constant question in their comment sections: Is Las Vegas unlivable long-term because Lake Mead and the Colorado River are drying up? Nick clarifies that the existential panic over Las Vegas running dry is largely an overblown talking point. Las Vegas is one of the most water-efficient municipalities in the world; nearly all indoor water used in sinks, showers, and toilets is treated, recycled, and returned directly back into Lake Mead. Residential consumption in Nevada accounts for a tiny sliver of the river's total allocation.

The real strain on the Colorado River basin stems from commercial agriculture—specifically California almond and alfalfa farming. Nick notes that the water required to produce a single almond is astronomical, calculated at approximately 1.1 gallons of water per nut. This triggers a comedic debate among the hosts about agricultural water subsidies and dietary preferences:

> "Why do people even eat almonds? They are the worst." > "Hold on, almonds are delicious." > "They're the worst-tasting nut, especially if they're unsalted. It boggles my mind people are still eating almonds in 2026."

While acknowledging that long-term southwestern water rights remain a major political issue, Nick emphasizes that blame should not be pinned on Las Vegas homeowners filling backyard swimming pools or taking 12-minute showers, but rather on industrial farming consuming massive volumes of cheap water across the border in California.

[01:20:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=4800s) Water Woes, Las Vegas Golf Courses, and the Squeeze on Landlords

The conversation opens with banter about water conservation, focusing on the sheer volume of water consumed by almond farming in California—estimated at 40 to 60 gallons per handful. The hosts joke about replacing almonds with oat milk before examining how arid destinations like Las Vegas are handling water scarcity. In Las Vegas, strict municipal regulations limit new swimming pools to 600 square feet, ban oversized decorative water features or massive waterfalls, and incentivize artificial turf over natural lawns. Even local golf courses are switching to specialized drought-resistant grasses or allowing their fairways to die off and go dormant during the summer months to save water before re-fertilizing them in the fall. Graham Stephan points out that while high-end private courses maintain pristine green fairways year-round, public golf courses across the Vegas desert turn completely brown under the summer heat.

```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Squeeze on Real Estate Landlords accDescr: A flowchart illustrating how rising expenses and operational hassle outpace rental growth, reducing investor returns.

subgraph Inflows ["Inflows"] R["Rental Income"] R -->|"Slow Growth"| S["Investor Profit Margins"] end

subgraph Outflows ["Outflows & Friction"] I["Generalized Inflation<br>(Property Taxes, Insurance, Utilities)"] H["Mental Hassle<br>(Tenant Evictions, Maintenance Calls)"] I -->|"Rising Costs"| S H -->|"Mental Overhead"| S end

S -->|"Compressed Returns"| C["Alternative Assets<br>(Small Business Acquisitions, Equities)"] ```

Reflecting on Graham and Jack Selby's rental property challenges, Nick Gerli notes that two constant pressures erode the appeal of being a residential landlord today: generalized inflation and operational hassle. Inflation has driven up property taxes, hazard insurance, utility bills, and basic maintenance, while the mental overhead of handling issues drains creative professionals who need focus for their primary careers. Nick argues that the fundamental dilemma facing the market is that rent growth has failed to keep pace with these inflated operating costs. When Nick asks whether doubling rental income would make the landlord headaches worthwhile, Jack acknowledges that doubled rents would easily justify hiring a property management firm to absorb the day-to-day burden.

Nick highlights that 10 years ago, high cap rates made entering real estate straightforward and lucrative, whereas today landlords find themselves squeezed on all sides. He mentions a friend based in Florida who acquired eight rental properties in Cleveland alongside holdings in Tampa; plagued by constant tenant evictions and compounding repair costs, that investor has shifted focus entirely toward small business acquisitions, even building an app to analyze small business buyouts where cash-flow yields remain far more attractive than residential rentals.

- Las Vegas restricts residential swimming pool surface areas to a maximum of 600 square feet. - Many Las Vegas golf courses use specialized turf that intentionally goes brown and dormant during peak summer heat to dramatically reduce water usage. - Rising expenses (taxes, insurance, utilities, maintenance) outpace rent growth, squeezing landlord net yields nationwide.

---

[01:22:48](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=4968s) Private Equity Underwriting: The Golden 2010s vs. Today's Reality

Jack pivots the discussion to Nick's former career underwriting commercial real estate acquisitions for private equity funds between 2011 and 2019. Jack questions the pervasive public perception that private equity firms effortlessly harvest 20% annualized returns year after year through financial engineering inaccessible to retail investors. Nick clarifies that outsized returns were indeed achievable in the immediate aftermath of the 2008 Great Financial Crisis, but they were a byproduct of cycle timing rather than institutional magic. During that post-crash window, his fund underwrote deals across hotels, office buildings, and multi-family apartments throughout major markets like Atlanta and Houston.

By originating first-lien mortgage debt on apartment complexes, his firm could secure 9% to 10% interest rates on senior debt, producing a 13% Internal Rate of Return (IRR) on debt investments and equity returns soaring up to 25%. Assets had plummeted so far below intrinsic value that substantial margin existed on every tier of the capital stack. However, Nick emphasizes that those returns are virtually impossible in the current macroeconomic environment. Today, private equity funds face a cost of capital of 5% to 6% on debt and 9% to 10% on equity, while prime commercial properties trade at compressed capitalization rates near 4.5%—creating negative or razor-thin leverage spreads that make strong institutional returns elusive.

- Nick underwrote commercial real estate (office, hotel, multi-family) for private equity from 2011 to 2019. - Post-crisis first-lien apartment debt in markets like Atlanta and Houston offered 9% to 10% coupon rates and roughly 13% IRRs. - Private equity equity returns during the mid-2010s recovery frequently reached 25%. - Contemporary deals face high capital costs (5–6% debt, 9–10% equity) against compressed 4.5% cap rates, eliminating easy margins.

---

[01:25:35](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=5135s) Graham's Bottom-Tick San Bernardino Deals: 17% Cash Yields

Graham illustrates the post-crisis buying frenzy with his own early investments in San Bernardino, California. Around 2011, he acquired single-family homes that had previously changed hands at the peak of the bubble in 2003 and 2004 for around $380,000. Following the crash, these foreclosed properties sat on the market at fractions of their peak value. Graham purchased one home for $59,500 (originally listed at $62,000), another for $72,000, and a third for $125,000—representing an 80%-plus plunge from peak pricing.

| Metric | San Bernardino Property Example | |:--- |:--- | | **Peak Sale Price (2003–2004)** | $380,000 | | **Graham's Purchase Price (2011)** | ~$70,000 ($59,500 – $72,000 range) | | **Square Footage** | ~1,800 sq ft | | **Price Per Square Foot** | ~$39 / sq ft | | **Initial Monthly Rent** | $1,150 / month | | **Gross Annual Rent** | ~$13,800 / year | | **Cash-on-Cash Return / Unlevered Yield** | ~16% – 17% | | **10-Year Treasury Yield (Context)** | ~3.0% – 3.5% |

Graham's target was a net 15% to 16% cash-on-cash return after budgeting for property taxes, insurance, and maintenance. On the $70,000 property, he invested modest renovation funds—installing flooring purchased from Home Depot for under $1 per square foot with the help of a contractor eager for work during the construction drought—and rented the house out for $1,150 per month. That produced roughly $13,800 in annual gross rent on a $70,000 cost basis: an unlevered yield of nearly 17%. Nick points out the stark contrast with broader financial markets at the time: the 10-year US Treasury yielded between 3.0% and 3.5%, meaning Graham was capturing a massive ~1,300 basis point spread above the risk-free rate on residential property. Graham notes his primary underwriting anchor was replacement cost: buying an 1,800-square-foot house for $70,000 worked out to under $40 per square foot, a price well below physical reconstruction costs.

- Graham purchased crashed San Bernardino properties in 2011 for $59,500, $72,000, and $125,000 after they had sold for $380,000 in 2004. - Renovation costs were minimized using sub-$1 per square foot flooring from Home Depot and hungry local labor. - Replacement cost logic convinced Graham that prices were at a generational floor: "It has to be worth at least what it costs to build, or the housing market is screwed forever and they will never build another home ever again."

---

[01:27:48](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=5268s) Cash vs. Leverage: Real Estate Returns vs. Index Funds

The hosts confront an ironic financial reality: despite securing a remarkable 16% to 17% cash yield on physical real estate at the bottom of the market, Graham's absolute net gains might have been matched or exceeded simply by buying and holding an S&P 500 index fund over the same period. Graham explains that because he was only 21 years old with no established credit history, no bank would issue him a mortgage. As a result, he was forced to buy all of those early properties entirely in all-cash.

Without mortgage leverage to amplify equity gains, and accounting for California state income taxes on the eventual capital gains, buying index funds in 2011 would have delivered comparable or superior returns with zero maintenance headaches. Graham emphasizes that real estate only creates truly asymmetric, runaway wealth when combined with prudent leverage. Had he possessed the credit profile to put $70,000 down on a $500,000 multi-family or single-family asset while capturing similar rental yield margins, the leveraged compounding would have far outstripped the stock market. Jack and Nick marvel at the fact that a 21-year-old with zero credit could purchase single-family homes for under $60,000, underscoring how dramatically structural affordability and market dynamics have transformed over the last decade.

- Graham purchased his early rental portfolio 100% in cash because he had no credit score or borrowing history at age 21. - Without mortgage leverage, purchasing real estate in cash in 2011 produced returns roughly equivalent to a passive S&P 500 index fund, especially after factoring in California income taxes upon liquidation. - The true wealth multiplier of real estate stems from conservative leverage: placing $70,000 down on a $500,000 asset yields vastly higher compounded equity than purchasing a single $70,000 home for cash. - After closing his initial deals in cash, Graham acquired a secured credit card to begin building the credit profile required for future leveraged real estate financing.

[01:30:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=5400s) Cash vs. Stocks: Shiller CAPE and the "This Time Is Different" Narrative

The conversation kicks off with some good-natured ribbing about Jack's personal trading strategy. Graham points out that Jack would have come out much further ahead simply buying and holding Robinhood shares instead of selling covered calls against them, especially after Robinhood's stock popped. Jack defends himself with a laugh, noting that he did not actually have any covered calls active when the stock surged—admitting that was pure luck—and notes they recently hosted Robinhood’s CEO on the show.

Shifting from missed stock trades to overarching investment philosophy, Jack presses Nick on his conservative asset allocation. Nick keeps an enormous cash pile parked in municipal bonds and cash equivalents while hunting for real estate deals. Jack challenges the opportunity cost of that strategy: while Nick waits on the sidelines for a real estate crash that might not materialize for another five years, the broader stock market could easily rip up 80%. He asks Nick whether it might have been better to simply park that capital in passive index funds forever.

Nick admits that his perspective is rooted in being an old-school real estate professional: "I'm a real estate guy, that's what I've always worked in... candidly, I don't really understand or trust the stock market." When he evaluates equities, he looks at metrics like the Shiller CAPE ratio—the cyclically adjusted price-to-earnings ratio measuring 10-year inflation-adjusted earnings against market capitalization—and sees an asset class pricing in astronomical future growth assumptions.

Graham pushes back, pointing out that forward price-to-earnings multiples on the "Magnificent Seven" tech giants are actually quite reasonable compared to earlier historical peaks. In Graham's view, investors can dig up a chart to validate virtually any bias: one metric shows the most overvalued market in history, while another indicates fair value if you only examine data after 2001, when globalization and the internet fundamentally rewired the economy.

Nick remains unconvinced by arguments asserting structural paradigm shifts, noting that he is inherently skeptical of "this time is different" rationalizations. He draws a direct parallel to living in Austin during 2020 and 2021: - When Tesla and Oracle relocated their corporate headquarters to Austin, locals dismissed Nick's warnings about absurd price-to-income ratios by claiming Austin was destined to become the next Silicon Valley—a thesis that eventually unraveled. - Nick references a book he recently purchased about the 1929 stock market crash and the onset of the Great Depression, which documents bankers in the late 1920s claiming that electrification, household dishwashers, washing machines, and unprecedented British capital inflows rendered historical valuation models obsolete. - He cites Mark Twain’s famous adage that "history doesn't repeat, it rhymes," pointing to Nashville, where realtors constantly cite Oracle building a new campus by 2030 to justify skyrocketing prices, even while housing demand is sitting at 15-year lows and inventory has spiked to 15-year highs.

Jack counters that even if someone had invested right at the market peak before 1931, historical returns prove that over a 15- to 20-year horizon, time in the market consistently beats sitting on the sidelines. Nick concedes that for an individual with a stable W-2 job looking to avoid rocking the boat, automatic index investing is great advice. However, as an entrepreneur running multiple businesses, a major YouTube channel, and a software company, he prefers extreme liquidity and keeping his powder dry to pounce on private real estate opportunities.

```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Cash vs Stock Market Opportunity Cost accDescr: Flowchart illustrating the debate between dollar-cost averaging in index funds versus holding cash for real estate corrections. subgraph MarketDebate["The Capital Allocation Dilemma"] A["Capital to Deploy"] --> B["Passive Index Funds (Jack/Graham)"] A --> C["Cash & Muni Bonds (Nick)"]

B --> B1["Historical precedent: Time in market beats timing"] B --> B2["Risk: S&P / Mag 7 could gain 80% over 5 years"]

C --> C1["High Shiller CAPE & elevated P/E multiples"] C --> C2["Skepticism of 'this time is different' corporate hype"] C --> C3["Preserves liquidity to buy discounted real estate"] end ```

---

[01:35:46](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=5746s) The Looming Demographic Cliff: Declining Birth Rates and School Enrollment

Jack pivots the discussion toward structural headwinds, asking Nick how much he worries about the nationwide collapse in birth rates, which have fallen approximately 35% since 1991. Nick identifies this as an existential, multifaceted risk that the housing market has barely begun to price in, arguing that declining demographic demand is already a primary driver behind sluggish buyer activity across the country.

According to Reventure's projections, the United States will hit a historic turning point by 2034: deaths will outpace births for the first time in American history. Nick emphasizes that having children is the single most powerful catalyst forcing households to purchase real estate:

> "What's the number one fundamental thing that would force someone to buy a house?... It's like, oh, you have a kid on the way. Oh, you have a second kid on the way. That increases the desire for the stability, the security, and the space that owning a home provides."

When family formation falls, entry-level and single-family demand erodes. Nick shares real-world data from living in St. Petersburg, Florida: - During his time in Pinellas County (encompassing St. Petersburg and Clearwater), he discovered that total public school enrollment had plunged by 7,000 to 8,000 students over the previous decade. - Graham jokingly interjects that Clearwater’s school numbers might be skewed because Scientology has essentially taken over the city and adherents do not send their children to traditional local public schools. - Nick counters that Pinellas County is home to nearly one million residents, making an enrollment loss of that scale a stark macro warning sign rather than an isolated quirk. - At the opposite end of the spectrum, the death rate is poised to climb sharply over the next 15 years as the demographic cohort aged 75 to 85 swells, unleashing unprecedented inventory as older generations pass away.

---

[01:37:54](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=5874s) Reventure App Sponsorship & The Math Behind Population Projections

The episode cuts briefly to a mid-roll segment where Graham highlights the Reventure housing data platform. Graham walks through the application's capabilities, detailing how users can look up any state, metro area, or zip code to access deep forecasting metrics, price projections, and inventory numbers that go far beyond standard Zillow or Redfin listings. The hosts share an exclusive discount link offering 40% off ($160 in savings) on an annual subscription.

Returning to the demographic conversation, Graham questions whether society might be in the early stages of a cultural counter-trend. He observes anecdotally among his peer group that getting married younger, embracing traditional family dynamics, and having kids early seems to be gaining popularity again. He wonders whether shifting cultural tides—or perhaps changes in social media algorithms—are actively reviving family formation.

Nick expresses hope that Graham's observation proves true, but explains why hard mathematical demography casts doubt on a quick turnaround: - Reventure is actively developing 30-year zip-code-level population models based on long-term aging curves. - Total births in any society are governed by two independent variables: the actual fertility rate per woman within prime childbearing age brackets, and the raw headcount of women belonging to that cohort. - Even if cultural trends cause the fertility rate among 25- to 35-year-old women to tick upward, the total number of females entering that age bracket over the next decade is fundamentally constrained by historical birth numbers. - Data from the 2020 U.S. Census confirmed that the sheer size of these younger population cohorts has contracted dramatically, locking in lower total future births regardless of short-term cultural swings.

[01:40:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=6000s) Demographic Aging and the Birth-to-Death Ratio

The discussion opens with Nick Gerli analyzing the shifting demographic structure of the United States. The under-18 population across the nation is actively contracting, signaling an aging curve where there will be progressively fewer teenagers, fewer people in their twenties, and eventually fewer people in their thirties, while the cohorts in their seventies and eighties swell dramatically. Because that age cohort slowdown has already played out over the past twenty years, the next two decades are locked into having a smaller proportion of young adults relative to the overall population and the existing housing stock.

Graham Stephan suggests that part of this decline stems from cultural conditioning. Women of recent generations were encouraged throughout their twenties to prioritize their careers, focus on personal growth, live their lives, and avoid settling down or having children too early. As life expectancies climb and medical advancements emerge, many women feel comfortable delaying their first child until age 35 or 38. Nick confirms this shift is visible in the raw demographic data: in places like San Francisco, the fertility rate for women aged 35 to 50 is now actually higher than that for women aged 20 to 34. However, Nick emphasizes the biological math: waiting until mid-to-late thirties creates a natural cap on family size that prevents organic replacement levels from recovering.

```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Regional Organic Growth Comparison accDescr: Flowchart contrasting organic growth dynamics between high-ratio areas like Austin/Utah and low-ratio areas like Florida/Japan.

subgraph HighGrowth ["Organic Growth Markets"] UT["Provo, UT (>4:1) & Austin, TX (>2:1)"] --> HG_Out["Locked-in organic growth regardless of migration"] end

subgraph LowGrowth ["Organic Contraction Markets"] FL["Florida (<1.0) & Japan (Aging Precedent)"] --> LG_Out["Organic decline; heavily reliant on net migration"] end ```

Nick turns to one of his favorite indicators for real estate investing: the **birth-to-death ratio**, calculated by dividing total births by total deaths to measure organic population momentum:

- **Florida:** The birth-to-death ratio has dropped below 1.0 for the first time ever, meaning more people are dying in Florida than are being born. Twenty years ago, Florida sat at a 1.5 ratio (50% more births than deaths). - **Utah:** Averages over 2:1 statewide, with Provo, Utah exceeding a staggering 4:1 birth-to-death ratio. - **Austin, Texas:** Boasts a ratio greater than 2:1. - **Austin vs. Tampa Comparison:** While real estate investors frequently treat Austin, Texas, and Tampa, Florida, as equivalent Sunbelt growth plays, their demographic trajectories are opposites. Austin has organic internal expansion baked into its future for the next twenty years, whereas Tampa is structurally shrinking without inbound migration. - **The Japanese Warning:** Japan serves as the historical case study for extreme demographic aging coupled with strict limits on immigration. Between 1990 and 2010, nominal Japanese home prices plummeted 50%, and even 36 years after the 1990 peak, nominal prices remain 20% below their bubble highs. While the U.S. will not replicate that exact trajectory nationwide, certain localized markets face an identical mathematical trap.

---

[01:45:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=6300s) Pronatalist Stimulus and the Jordan Peterson Thesis

The hosts debate potential government interventions to fix plummeting birth rates, such as direct cash stimulus payments per child. Nick acknowledges the intuition behind incentivizing family creation, but warns that artificial government interventions inevitably generate unintended second- and third-order consequences—drawing a parallel to eviction moratoriums that sound compassionate but warp rental housing markets.

The group jokes about the bizarre incentives of paying cash at childbirth: - Jack Selby and Graham imagine parents treating cash payments like an extreme real-life version of *Cheaper by the Dozen*, joking about a nurse in the delivery room "whipping out the hundreds." - Graham points out the catastrophic budgetary risk: if a government offers parents $6,000 annually per kid and later cancels the program due to budget deficits, families with seven children are left stranded. - They contrast direct cash grants with existing tax policy like child tax credits, noting that untargeted payouts could incentivize having children purely as an income replacement strategy while unemployed.

Graham brings up an argument from Jordan Peterson: the idea that individuals should consider having children even before they feel fully ready, because the weight of parenthood forces people to grow up, focus, and mature. Jack pushes back with statistical nuance, arguing that having children too young—specifically below age 21 or 22—often places parents at a severe developmental disadvantage compared to their peers because time and capital are diverted away from career building, networking, and skill acquisition. While Graham and Nick counter that some Fortune 500 CEOs became young fathers early in life and credited that pressure with their relentless drive, the panel agrees that blaming finances is often used as a convenient excuse to delay adulthood.

---

[01:47:34](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=6454s) The Consumerist Trap, Social Media, and Confusing Needs vs. Wants

Nick lays out his theory that modern consumerism driven by social platforms like Instagram and TikTok is actively sabotaging family formation and societal cohesion:

1. **The Algorithmic Funnel:** Users are constantly served aspirational luxury items they do not need (such as designer handbags). 2. **The Secondary Pitch:** When viewers feel inadequate about not affording those items, the algorithm serves get-rich-quick courses, side hustles, and promises of becoming a self-made millionaire to fund the purchases. 3. **The Cultural Consequence:** Society morphs into hyper-individualism, where everyone is isolated on a relentless hunt for status and personal wealth to "keep up with the Joneses" in an arena that never existed before.

Graham highlights a Jerry Seinfeld observation lamenting how people became utterly obsessed with monetary status. In past eras, people respected someone simply because they were a skilled plumber or a good doctor who loved their craft; today, societal respect is tied almost entirely to annual income. Graham also connects this to financial auditor Caleb Hammer's content, noting how average consumers routinely confuse *wants* with *needs*—such as workers claiming they "need" an unaffordable, brand-new $70,000 truck for blue-collar jobs rather than driving a reliable, older vehicle.

Closing out the segment, Nick observes how creator analytics reveal just how aggressive social media engineering has become. Across the creator economy, algorithms demand capture within the first three seconds of a sixty-second reel, keeping users addicted to high-friction consumer dopamine loops that distort life priorities.

[01:50:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=6600s) The Slot Machine Algorithm and Trading Away Life for Screen Time

Nick breaks down the rigid formula demanded by short-form video algorithms, explaining that raw information matters far less than visual pacing. Performance relies on bright, high-contrast imagery, an urgent hook within the first two or three seconds, and delaying the core payoff until around twenty seconds in. Nick often structures his videos around a mystery—introducing a "Northwest former tech hub" undergoing a correction and building suspense before finally revealing the city. Delivering the punchline too early kills retention. Graham compares the entire system to a slot machine, designed so that every second or third swipe gives a variable dopamine hit while filtering through duds. Graham admits he has completely stopped opening TikTok and only scrolls Instagram Reels occasionally to send clips back and forth with Jack.

Jack offers a practical countermeasure: switching phone display settings to grayscale. Stripping away vibrant colors immediately renders TikTok, Reels, and Shorts unappealing and curbs addictive scrolling. The hosts agree that attention has become a ruthless modern currency. When users consume content passively, they are selling their attention and trading away their finite time. Graham keeps his social apps quarantined on a dedicated secondary work phone so he doesn't find himself doom-scrolling at 2:00 AM on his personal device.

```mermaid flowchart LR accTitle: The Social Media Attention Drain accDescr: Diagram contrasting how content algorithms hook users with the productive cost of mindless scrolling.

subgraph AlgoHooks ["The Retention Trap"] A["Bright, High-Contrast Visuals"] --> B["Urgent Statement (2-3s)"] B --> C["Delayed Payoff (20s mark)"] C --> D["Slot Machine Dopamine Loop"] end

subgraph LifeCost ["The Cost of Consumption"] D --> E["2 Hours Daily Scrolling"] E --> F["1 Month of Waking Life Lost Per Year"] F --> G["Lost Skills: Piano, Languages, Real Business"] end ```

The scale of lost time becomes staggering when quantified. Scrolling for two hours a day amounts to surrendering an entire month of waking life every single year (based on a twelve-to-thirteen-hour waking day). That wasted time could easily be diverted into mastering piano, learning improv, or developing world-class skills. While Graham jokingly defends brief five-minute bathroom check-ins or waiting two minutes for the microwave, Jack points out that minor micro-checks quickly snowball. Jack mentions that his partner, Macy, uses an app blocker requiring her to complete two to five minutes of Duolingo lessons before granting temporary access to Instagram or TikTok, sending her language learning score through the roof.

- **Screen Time by Age Group:** - **Ages 16–24:** 3+ hours daily (many reporting 4+ hours) - **Ages 25–34:** 2.5 to 3 hours daily - **Ages 35–44:** 2 to 2.5 hours daily - **Ages 45–54:** 1.5 to 2 hours daily - **Ages 55+:** Under 1.5 hours daily

[01:55:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=6900s) Social Media Intent, Market Perspective, and What If the Forecast Is Wrong?

Many people deceive themselves into believing their scrolling constitutes productive research. Jack compares social platforms to walking down Canal Street in New York City, where vendors aggressively hustle counterfeit watches and handbags; apps mask cheap stimulation behind the veneer of learning or keeping up with friends. The user's underlying brain state when compulsively picking up a phone is not a search for deep education, but a craving for immediate distraction. Nick points to user session data on the Reventure app: visitors arriving from X (Twitter) bounce after an average of twenty seconds, whereas visitors coming from long-form YouTube videos remain engaged for five full minutes.

Graham asks Nick if staring at negative housing metrics day in and day out ever makes him depressed. Nick responds that market data depends entirely on the lens of the viewer. For an existing homeowner, plunging sales and falling prices in places like Las Vegas look catastrophic. For an aspiring first-time buyer locked out by high prices, those same corrections represent relief and opportunity. To Nick, a scenario where homes stay permanently unaffordable and mortgage-payment-to-income ratios remain pinned at 40% is far more tragic than a 20% to 25% price crash.

When asked what happens if his thesis is wrong and home prices continue drifting upward, Nick concedes that his individual opinions are fallible. Because of that, he roots his analysis in empirical indicators rather than dogmatic beliefs. The Reventure app calculates one-year forward projections for every US zip code using hard local fundamentals: inventory levels, days on market, price cuts, and price appreciation momentum.

- **Local Market Divergence:** While Nick would personally welcome a national affordability correction, the numbers dictate the call. For example, Reventure's underlying data projects Chicago home prices will rise by approximately 6% over the coming year, warning local buyers that waiting will cost them. - **The Core Market Drivers:** The true direction of home prices filters out of emotional debate through three hard numbers: inventory levels, days on market, and active transaction velocity.

[01:58:18](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=7098s) Outro and Next Episode Teaser

As Nick pivots to ask Graham and Jack about the internal operations of *The Iced Coffee Hour*, the time commitment of running the show, and their broader YouTube strategies, Graham cuts in with an editorial voiceover note. Reviewing the footage in post-production, the hosts realized the conversation went completely off-topic into creator economics, algorithms, and YouTube channel operations for the remaining 45 minutes. Rather than diluting the real estate focus of the main release, they conclude the public episode here, reserving the extended creator discussion exclusively for channel members.

The episode finishes with a rapid-fire teaser for the upcoming episode centered on Bitcoin and macroeconomic policy. The guest argues that Bitcoin functions as a global insurance policy in times of worldwide chaos and will continue rising indefinitely because politicians will never stop printing money. The preview touches on whether meme coins damage market credibility, whether it is too late to buy, and the enduring mystery of who Satoshi Nakamoto might be.

## Notable quotes > [01:25](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=85s) real estate mafia — Nick Gerli

> [03:28](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=208s) catching a falling knife — Nick Gerli

> [16:46](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=1006s) mortgage their future — Nick Gerli

> [30:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=1800s) Aligning for the Agentic Era: How AI is Changing Everyday Work

> [50:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=3000s) We're in an actual bubble this time when we really weren't in previous periods. — Nick Gerli

> [56:45](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=3405s) In a way, a lot of these Wall Street investors saved the housing market from falling further because... if investors weren't there to stop the bleeding and to buy up this inventory, prices would keep falling. — Graham Stephan

> [01:07:53](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=4073s) Cat's out the bag. I got an adjustable-rate mortgage. — Nick Gerli

> [01:50:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=6600s) Northwest former tech hub — Nick Gerli

## Mentioned Adam Carolla, American Homes 4 Rent, Billy Beane, Bitcoin, Blossom, Caleb Hammer, Charles Schwab, Duolingo, Federal Reserve, Floyd Mayweather, Freddie Mac, Graham Stephan, HUD, Instagram, Invitation Homes, Jack Selby, Jeff Bezos, Jerry Seinfeld, Ken Griffin, London School of Economics, Macy, Mark Zuckerberg, National Association of Realtors (NAR), NetSuite, Nick Gerli, Northwest Registered Agent, NVIDIA, Oakland Athletics, Palantir, Progress Residential, Realtor.com, Redfin, Reventure App, Reventure Consulting, Robert Shiller, Satoshi Nakamoto, Shopify, Siena College, The Iced Coffee Hour, TikTok, X (Twitter), YouTube, Zillow

## Video description Northwest Registered Agent: Get the essential tools needed to start your business at https://www.northwestregisteredagent.com/free-identity-ich Blossom Social: See our investment portfolio's at https://getblossom.onelink.me/SOfu/ICH NetSuite: Get Our FREE Business Guide at https://netsuite.com/ICED Shopify: Stop waiting for permission to build something. Your next revenue stream starts free at https://shopify.com/ich

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00:00:00 - Intro 00:03:28 - Who Should Actually Buy a House? 00:11:17 - Is Housing Signaling a Recession? 00:15:30 - Sponsor: Northwest Registered Agent 00:16:46 - Why Home Prices Haven't Crashed 00:22:18 - How Screwed Are First-Time Buyers? 00:29:44 - Sponsor: Blossom 00:30:45 - Sponsor: NetSuite 00:31:50 - Is Being a Landlord Still Worth It? 00:38:31 - Will The $46 Trillion Inheritance Save Housing? 00:43:58 - Are We in a Housing Bubble? 00:51:16 - Is Wall Street Buying Up Your Neighborhood? 00:57:21 - Sponsor: Shopify 00:58:18 - How To Lowball a Seller And Win 01:07:53 - Should You Get an Adjustable Rate Mortgage? 01:12:25 - Why Graham Dumped His California Rentals 01:21:30 - Do Investors Really Make 20% Returns? 01:30:19 - Cash vs. Stocks: Who's Right? 01:37:54 - Sponsor: Reventure App 01:38:37 - The Birth Rate Problem Nobody Talks About 01:47:34 - Social Media Is a Slot Machine 01:54:46 - What If Nick Is Wrong? 01:59:23 - Next Episode Preview

*𝗖𝗢𝗡𝗡𝗘𝗖𝗧 𝗪𝗜𝗧𝗛 𝗨𝗦*

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[Source](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw)

中文简报

美国房地产市场深陷重度危机:远离这些高风险州!| Reventure Consulting Reventure Consulting创始人Nick Gerli指出,当前美国房地产市场正释放出与股市繁荣截然相反的衰退预警信号,展现出极端的区域分化与历史级的可负担性危机。随着成屋年化销售量跌至约400万套的历史低谷,且新建住宅库存升至9个月以上,此前受疫情驱动大幅上涨的阳光地带(如佛罗里达、得克萨斯州奥斯汀等)正因过度建设和迁徙降温而面临显著的价格回调与库存积压;与此同时,东北部及铁锈带城市因几乎无新增供应而维持卖方市场。在3%房贷利率锁定效应、租赁资本化率低于无风险美债收益率,以及顶级豪宅交易掩盖真实行情的背景下,普通购房者与个人房东面临较大的资产估值下行风险。 全美成屋年化销售量降至约400万套的低谷,与2008年金融危机时期相当,建商新房库存突破9个月供应量,且典型房贷月供已占家庭中位收入的近40%。 区域走势严重分化:过度建设与投机退潮导致奥斯汀自峰值下跌近30%,佛罗里达多地出现大幅降价,而东北部及铁锈带核心区域因几乎没有新建房供应而依然保持坚挺。 单户住宅平均租赁资本化率已降至约4.8%,低于10年期美国国债收益率,加之房贷利率锁定效应阻碍价格快速出清,散户投资面临资产估值尚未见底的风险。

Reading summary

Nick Gerli of Reventure Consulting argues that the U.S. housing market has entered an unsustainable affordability disconnect, where elevated mortgage rates, frozen transaction volumes, and regional oversupply signal an unavoidable price correction. The Affordability Disconnect and Rate Lock-in (3:28) National housing affordability has severely broken down as typical monthly mortgage payments reach roughly $2,800, consuming nearly 40% of the median household income of $85,000—far above traditional 25% underwriting standards. Existing home sales have dropped to roughly 4 million annualized units, matching depths seen during the 2008–2009 recession. Meanwhile, median mortgage payments run roughly 40% above median rents of $1,900, removing the standard financial incentive for first-time buyers to purchase. This gridlock is reinforced by existing homeowners holding 3% pandemic-era mortgages. Replacing an existing property at current 6.2% to 6.5% interest rates can inflate lifetime interest costs by $500,000 and surge monthly payments by over 80%. With $35 trillion in trapped home equity and borrowing rates unlikely to reach 5% without an economic recession, Gerli contends that falling home prices represent the only realistic path back to market equilibrium. Regional Bifurcation and Sharp Sunbelt Corrections (7:30) Rather than a uniform nationwide crash, Gerli identifies a deeply bifurcated housing landscape. Pandemic boomtowns across the Sunbelt are enduring sharp contractions following years of heavy builder construction and cooling out-of-state migration. In Austin, Texas, residential prices have dropped 27% to 30% from peak levels alongside a 20% drop in rents, leaving an estimated 30% to 35% of recent buyers underwater on their mortgages. Similar price discounts of $100,000 to $150,000 have surfaced across Florida, while Las Vegas sales volume has tumbled below 2008 financial crisis levels. Conversely, legacy Northeastern markets like Philadelphia have retained tight inventory and steady buyer competition, while San Francisco County has rebounded approximately 15% year-over-year on the back of concentrated artificial intelligence funding. Gerli cautions that national aggregate indices mask these localized realities, often aided by real estate marketing that highlights isolated multi-million-dollar luxury sales to project false market strength. Demographic Pressures and Future Inventory Surpluses (38:31) Long-term demographic trends present structural headwinds for housing demand. U.S. birth rates have dropped approximately 35% since 1991, with Reventure forecasting that domestic deaths will outpace births by 2034. Because family formation is the primary catalyst compelling households to purchase single-family homes, lower fertility directly undermines baseline demand for entry-level housing—a shift Gerli notes is already reflected in public school enrollment drops across counties like Pinellas, Florida. At the same time, aging demographics will soon unlock a large wave of secondary housing supply. Citing Freddie Mac projections, Gerli notes that roughly 9.2 million Baby Boomers will age out of homeownership by 2035. Rather than the projected $46 trillion millennial wealth transfer insulating prices, Gerli argues that the liquidation of inherited physical real estate will release an unprecedented wave of inventory onto the market, creating persistent supply-side pressure. Compressed Cap Rates and the Investor Exodus (31:50) The operational math for residential landlords has largely broken down for smaller investors. Average single-family capitalization rates nationwide sit around 4.8%, providing virtually no risk premium over 10-year U.S. Treasury yields while exposing owners to substantial capital expenditures, utility spikes, and maintenance costs. Private equity funds, which secured 13% to 25% returns acquiring distressed post-2008 bank portfolios at 70 cents on the dollar, now face higher borrowing costs and have pivoted away from retail purchases toward build-to-rent developments. Regulatory and administrative friction has accelerated this investor withdrawal. Host Graham Stephan detailed his decision to liquidate his California rental portfolio and reallocate proceeds into passive municipal bonds, citing rent control, volatile property insurance renewals, and eviction proceedings that can cost landlords up to $50,000 to navigate. Driven by these tightened margins, overall investor purchases nationwide have fallen between 50% and 70% from pandemic peaks. Gerli acknowledges that unexpected economic resilience or persistent inflation could allow nominal prices to stagnate rather than plunge outright. However, he maintains that historical ratios between home prices, incomes, and rents cannot remain detached from underlying economic fundamentals over the long term.

Detailed notes — zh

## Background 该视频由 YouTube 频道 The Iced Coffee Hour 于 2026 年 10 月 12 日发布。视频主持人为 Graham Stephan 和 Jack Selby,嘉宾为 Reventure Consulting 创始人 Nick Gerli。根据页面描述与章节设置,本期内容深入探讨了全美房地产市场的深度分化与可负担性危机、值得警惕的州与区域、婴儿潮一代的房产继承冲击,以及买房谈判与资产配置策略。 ## TL;DR 节目深入剖析了当前美国房地产市场的极端两极分化:成屋年化销售量跌至 2008 年金融海啸以来的历史冰点,阳光地带热点城市面临供应过剩与大幅降价,而铁锈地带和东北部老城却因极度缺乏供给而逆势坚挺。Nick Gerli 与主持人探讨了利率锁死效应对房屋流动的冰封、婴儿潮一代老龄化与人口出生率暴跌对长期住房需求的潜在冲击,以及高昂的持有维护成本如何逼退个人房东。最后,几位创作者还结合自身实操复盘了大幅砍价(Lowball)捡漏的心法,并反思了社交媒体算法对大众注意力与消费观念的操控。 ## Atmosphere & style 全场对话兼具硬核数据分析与生动的个人投资经历吐槽,气氛既专业严肃又充满黑色幽默。Nick 凭借严谨的数据模型和实地调研视角冷静戳破主流行业营造的繁荣叙事,而 Graham 和 Jack 则以亲身当房东踩坑的血泪史引发强烈共鸣,尤其在吐槽天价维修账单和加州杏仁农场耗水时笑料频出。整期对谈在宏观经济衰退隐忧与务实理财建言之间流畅切换,让读者在感受买房困局之沉重的同时,也能获得兼具操作性与通透感的信息增量。 ## Bulletin - [11:17](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=677s) 全美成屋年化销售量跌至约 400 万套,与 2008 年次贷危机低谷持平,而新房库存去化周期已突破 9 个月,历史上该指标破 9 往往紧随经济衰退。 - [22:18](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=1338s) 全美房地产市场呈现极端分化格局:阳光地带如德州奥斯汀房价从高点暴跌 27%、佛罗里达库存激增,而东北部雪城及芝加哥等缺乏新房供应的区域房价则逆势创新高。 - [31:50](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=1910s) 单户住宅平均租金资本化率(Cap Rate)降至约 4.8%,已低于无风险的 10 年期美债收益率,导致投资者全现金购房回报在长期完全跑输被动持有标普 500 指数基金。 - [01:38:37](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=5917s) 自 1991 年以来全美出生率下滑 35%,Reventure 模型预测到 2034 年美国死亡人数将首度反超出生人数,内生人口负增长将从根本上瓦解学区及老龄化板块的刚性购房需求。 ## Key takeaways - [03:28](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=208s) 全美典型房贷月供高达约 2,800 美元,占家庭中位数收入的近 40%,远超 25% 的健康理财红线,购房门槛收入与实际收入缺口创下历史极值。 - [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=0s) 主流房地产行业形成以经纪人与核心持有者为主的叙事利益同盟,刻意掩盖局部断崖式下跌与成交冻结的微观数据,借 FOMO 情绪诱导普通人接盘。 - [16:46](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=1006s) 全美二手挂牌库存(约 110 万套)远低于 2008 年危机时的 300 万套,叠加存量业主死守 3% 左右的历史超低利率产生锁定效应,导致全国均价尚未全面崩盘。 - [22:18](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=1338s) 加州及纽约远程办公潮出现逆转,AI 浪潮与岗位替代危机催生“集聚效应”,驱动核心技术与金融人才回流旧金山和曼哈顿等核心大都市。 - [31:50](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=1910s) 极端的租客保护法规(如高达 5 万美元的驱逐买断费)使中小散户房东承担过高法律坏账风险而离场,反将市场拱手让给拥有大型法务团队的机构资本并推高居住成本。 - [38:31](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=2311s) 婴儿潮一代将在 2035 年前面临 920 万人因老龄化离场,嘉信理财数据显示约 70% 继承房产会被抛售变现,老龄化重灾区面临接盘人口断层的供给冲击。 - [41:40](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=2500s) 拉长 135 年历史看,全美房贷利率均值为 6.2%,当下 7% 并非异常,罗伯特·席勒通胀调整后房屋价格指数揭示,真正的症结在于当前房价处于剔除通胀后的历史罕见泡沫区间。 - [51:16](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=3076s) 《住房之路法案》规定拥有超 350 套住宅的机构自 2027 年起被禁买二手存量房,华尔街资本因加息倒挂早已撤退 50% 至 70%,并全面转型为自建租赁(Build-to-Rent)。 - [01:03:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=3780s) 在库存激增的买方市场可采用“捡漏法则”:筛选挂牌超 6 个月且多次降价的房源,出示资金证明并提前试探卖方经纪人,敢于直接提交大幅砍价的报价单。 - [01:12:25](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=4345s) 高利率环境下房贷利息深度前置,买家需还款 18 至 20 年本金偿还比例才会超过利息,加上加州严苛的租管及频繁作废的保险,促使 Graham 清仓加州出租房并转投免税市政债券。 - [01:15:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=4500s) 房屋持有存在严重的隐形账单与折旧陷阱,由于计划性报废与冷媒标准更替,空调系统等硬件更换动辄超过万美元,极易全额吞噬租金净现金流。 - [01:25:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=5100s) 2010 年代初私募股权与全款投资人通过高利差取得超额回报的黄金窗口已彻底闭合;在无杠杆买入下,即使抓住房产 16% 净现金流的绝佳抄底窗口,长期总收益仍跑输标普 500 指数基金。 - [01:40:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=6000s) 人口出生死亡比成为衡量区域长期潜力的核心指标,犹他普罗沃(>4.0)与德州奥斯汀(>2.0)具备有机增长支撑,而佛罗里达(<1.0)则面临类似日本的长期需求空心化隐忧。 - [01:50:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=6600s) 社交媒体推荐算法通过明亮画质、前 3 秒制造悬念及间歇性强化机制打造出“老虎机”式的注意力黑洞,迫使大众陷入虚荣攀比与错位的消费主义,以借口掩饰对生育与责任的逃避。 ## Detailed walkthrough ### [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=0s) 房产市场隐忧与“房地产黑手党”的叙事遮蔽 节目开篇便抛出了一系列令人心惊的宏观与微观经济反差。Nick Gerli 指出,房产市场各个角落显露的疲软迹象表明,底层经济的真实健康状况远不如亮眼的股市所展示的那样乐观。全美成屋销售量(existing home sales)目前仅徘徊在 400 万套左右,这一数字几乎与 2008 至 2009 年近八十年最严重金融海啸期间的惨淡水平持平。与此同时,购房者所需收入与实际收入之间的缺口达到了历史最大值。Graham Stephan 随即向 Nick 提问,他在运营 Reventure 频道并追踪全美房产大数据时,挖掘到的数据究竟是别人看不到的独家秘密,还是被刻意隐瞒了? ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 房地产市场双轨分化与信息脱节 accDescr: 展示了公开微观数据被主流叙事掩盖,与各地区实际走势严重分化的关系。 subgraph S1["主流行业叙事 (Real Estate Mafia)"] A["营造只涨不跌预期与 FOMO 情绪"] --> B["忽视全美成屋销售仅400万套的历史低谷"] end subgraph S2["底层微观真实数据 (Zip Code 级别)"] C["阳光地带 (佛州/奥斯汀/维加斯)"] -->|"供给过剩/投资者离场"| D["降价 15%-30%,跌入买方市场"] E["铁锈地带/东北部 (雪城/哈特福德)"] -->|"严重缺乏新房供应"| F["房源短缺,极度紧俏的卖方市场"] end ``` Nick 直言,这套数据其实从未被加密或封锁,Zillow、Realtor.com 等平台均公开提供细化至邮政编码(Zip code)层面的房价变动、在售库存量以及挂牌天数。然而,整个主流房地产行业根本没有意愿将真实全貌告知大众。Nick 犀利地将其形容为一个“房地产黑手党”(Real Estate Mafia)——由房产经纪人与核心持有者构成的利益集团,刻意营造房价永远在涨的虚幻预期,利用消费者的错失恐惧(FOMO)诱导接盘: > “It's maybe a cabal of realtors and people who own real estate who want to create this perception that values are going to FOMO people into buying a house, even if it's not totally the right decision.” —— Nick Gerli Nick 介绍了自己的学术与职业履历:他毕业于锡耶纳学院(Siena College)与伦敦政治经济学院(LSE)经济学专业,随后在一家私募股权基金担任商业地产核保人(underwriter),负责全美各大都会区的公寓及办公楼抵押贷款审批长达八年。正是常年在拉斯维加斯、凤凰城、休斯顿、佛罗里达和亚特兰大实地调研交易的经历,让他摸透了全美房产市场的脉络,并在 2010 年代末转向挖掘住宅市场底层数据库,构建出独立的区域预测模型。 - 全美成屋年化销售量约 400 万套,倒退至 2008 年次贷危机冰点。 - 购房者门槛收入与家庭实际中位数收入的差距创下历史极值。 - 部分走弱区域房价已出现 15% 至 25% 的大幅下跌,而另一部分地区仍在创历史新高,市场极端分化。 --- ### [03:28](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=208s) 谁该买房与可负担性危机的严峻数学题 当 Graham 问及“究竟谁该买房,谁不该买房”时,Nick 强调核心标准只有一个:财务上是否真正负担得起。疫情期间全美房价经历了暴涨,紧接着美联储加息带动房贷利率飙升,直接击碎了普通家庭的购房预算。Nick 现场算了一笔账:在当前全美房贷利率与价格水平下,包含财产税与房屋保险在内的典型月供支出已攀升至每月约 2,800 美元;而全美家庭年收入中位数大约为 85,000 美元。这意味着买房人需要将自身税前总收入的近 40% 用于支付房贷,远远突破了传统个人理财中 25% 的健康安全红线。对于绝大多数中位数收入及普通收入群体而言,当前进场无异于财务冒险。 Nick 警告说,即便是手头相对宽裕的买家,在当前的断裂市场中也必须谨防“接飞刀”(catching a falling knife)。他在佛罗里达实地走访时,发现大量房源相比 2023 至 2024 年的高点挂牌价直接缩水了 10 万至 15 万美元。虽然价格回调改善了部分购买力,但下跌探底的过程远未结束。 > “The typical mortgage payment to buy a house in the U.S. on average, including taxes and insurance, is about $2,800 a month. The median income in the U.S. is about $85,000. Meaning if you take the $2,800 and annualize it and divide it by $85,000 income, it's roughly close to 40% of someone's income they would need to spend on their mortgage if they're buying.” —— Nick Gerli 针对感到绝望的年轻刚需群体,Nick 认为是否有希望完全取决于身处哪个地理区域。在佛罗里达,市场正在剧烈修正,待售库存大幅堆积,买家需求萎靡不振,已彻底沦为买方市场;在拉斯维加斯,房价同比微跌约 3%,挂牌价比前次成交价低 5 万至 10 万美元的案例比比皆是。过去几年由于建商过度开工建造、机构投资者大肆扫货炒作,如今投资者正在蜂拥离场挂牌变现,让疫情期间最炙手可热的阳光地带(Sunbelt)成为如今买方议价空间最大的区域。 | 区域类型 | 代表城市 | 市场供求现状 | 价格与租金趋势 | |:--- |:--- |:--- |:--- | | **阳光地带热点区 (Sunbelt)** | 佛罗里达各大都会区、奥斯汀、拉斯维加斯 | 大量新房与二手房挂牌,买方需求低迷,建商/投资者抛售 | 佛州频现6位数降价;奥斯汀全域从峰值跌30%,租金跌20% | | **东北部与铁锈地带 (Rust Belt)** | 纽约雪城 (Syracuse)、芝加哥、哈特福德、水牛城 | 过去十几年几乎无新建住宅,存量极度匮乏,人口微弱回流 | 价格逆势上涨,全美最狂热的卖方市场,雪城涨幅登顶 | --- ### [05:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=300s) 实地走访的震撼:奥斯汀腰斩与东北部反常坚挺 Graham 提到 Nick 目前的工作方式极具特色:常年自费飞往全美不同城市,亲自漫步在街头巷尾用肉眼考察楼盘与社区实况。谈及近三个月最令他震惊的见闻,Nick 指出首当其冲的是佛罗里达州资产缩水的惊人规模。他曾于两年前特意搬迁至佛州圣彼得斯堡(St. Petersburg)就近追踪下行周期的端倪,而近期重返佛州时,六位数级别的价格腰斩随处可见——原先以 50 万美元买入的房屋,短时间内便以 40 万美元甩卖,打破了市场上此前鼓吹的“本轮周期绝不会大跌”的断言。 同样剧烈退潮的还有得克萨斯州的奥斯汀。作为疫情红利的最大赢家,奥斯汀如今整个市场的房屋均价自最高点已暴跌 30%,租金中位数重挫 20%。与此同时,反常的一幕正在美国东北部上演:长期被大众舆论唱衰的费城、水牛城等地,现实中市场却火爆异常,纽约州雪城更是在全美房价涨幅榜中拔得头筹。 ```mermaid flowchart LR accTitle: 人口与资本迁移的动态延迟 accDescr: 说明加州高净值人群外流与普通中产回归老牌工业区的双轨迁移现象。 subgraph S1["高净值人群 (自由资本)"] A["加利福尼亚州 / 纽约高税区"] -->|"追逐零州税/豪宅溢价"| B["佛罗里达 / 德州 / 内华达"] end subgraph S2["普通家庭与青年刚需"] C["阳光地带生活成本与保险暴涨"] -->|"逆向迁徙 / 回流老家"| D["芝加哥 / 东北部 / 中西部老城"] end ``` 针对 Graham 提出的疑问——加州身边朋友仍旧在义无反顾地迁往拉斯维加斯、得州或佛州这几个免征州所得税的避风港,为什么实际走势却发生分化?Nick 剖析了其中的认知时滞(narrative lag)与阶层分层。房地产本身是极度迟钝的资产类别,调整周期通常以年计算,主流叙事往往滞后于数据现实半年至一年。虽然加利福尼亚高净值富豪携带数百万美元现金进军免税州豪宅的势头仍在持续,但普通中产阶层的大规模涌入潮早已降温,甚至开始出现由阳光地带向芝加哥、东北部老家倒流的反向迁徙趋势。 > “Someone bought a house for 500, it's now 400. You know, we were told that that's like not possible, we were told that in this cycle that wouldn't happen, and the scale of declines in Florida is getting really big.” —— Nick Gerli ### [10:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=600s) 人口迁移周期的逆转与区域楼市分化 加州高收入群体(年薪约 20 万美元的 W-2 雇员)迁往拉斯维加斯等低税率地区的热潮已经急剧降温。这一降温直接反映在拉斯维加斯的成交量上——目前的房屋销量甚至低于 2008 至 2009 年金融危机时期的低谷。然而,市场两极分化极其严重:500 万、1,000 万甚至 2,000 万美元的顶奢豪宅与豪华公寓项目依然有买家接盘。如果加州未来推行富豪税(wealth tax),亿万富翁和身家数亿的超级富豪仍会流向免征州所得税的地区;但对于普通工薪阶层的跨州迁移而言,这股风潮已经明显回落。 这种迁移潮符合房地产周期的固有规律。回顾历史,2000 年代中期(2005 至 2006 年)佛罗里达州也曾出现过大规模迁入浪潮,随后伴随着崩盘;之后市场逐步修复,并在 2022 年再度爆发剧烈的迁入高峰,随即再次骤降。这种世代交替般的周期循环极为稳定。阳光地带(Sunbelt)各市场未来终究会复苏,但就当前周期所处的阶段而言,呈现的是“人口迁入放缓、库存增加、可负担性恶化以及降价抛售”的组合特征。 ### [11:17](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=677s) 房地产弱势是否预示着经济衰退? 房地产产业链占美国国内生产总值(GDP)的 15% 左右,与宏观经济高度绑定。根据美国全国房地产经纪人协会(NAR)的数据,目前全美成屋年化销售量仅在 400 万套左右,与 2008 至 2009 年全美经历 80 年来最严重金融危机时的水平相当。尽管目前的房价跌幅尚未达到当年的惨烈程度,但终端需求已同样跌入冰点。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 房地产指标与宏观经济的背离 accDescr: 对比房地产市场呈现的衰退信号与当前强劲的宏观经济指标 subgraph HousingSignals["房地产衰退信号"] A["成屋年化销售约400万套<br/>(媲美2008-2009低谷)"] B["新房库存超过9个月<br/>(正常水平为5-6个月)"] end subgraph MacroEconomy["宏观经济现状"] C["失业率仅约4%"] D["美股持续走牛"] end subgraph Divergence["核心矛盾与隐忧"] E["建筑商大幅降价甩卖"] F["普通民众承受巨大压力<br/>未来或传导至劳动力市场"] end HousingSignals --> Divergence MacroEconomy -.->|"尚未显现衰退"| Divergence ``` 更为危险的信号来自建筑商(Builders)。市场上新房的月度供应量(计算公式为现有库存除以月销量)已超过 9 个月,而正常水平通常仅为 5 到 6 个月。在历史上,新房库存突破 9 个月只在经济衰退期出现过。尽管目前失业率维持在 4% 左右、美股行情火热,但建筑业供给严重过剩与销量崩塌并存的现状,让人不得不警惕:这是否正反映出普通美国家庭真实的财务压力,甚至预示着未来劳动力市场衰退的到来。 - 建筑商供应月数:已超过 9 个月(健康常态为 5 至 6 个月)。 - 全美二手房平均去化周期(含 20 年房龄老屋):目前维持在 4.8 个月左右。 - 佛罗里达与得克萨斯等重灾区:建筑商过度开发(overbuilt)现象尤为严重。 - 现场案例:某处联排别墅项目在 2025 年以 48.5 万美元售出,如今挂牌价跌至 43.5 万美元,短短一年内账面亏损 5 万美元。 - 历史规律:“Historically, when the builders overbuilt, there was always a recession that followed.”(历史上一旦建筑商过度建设,紧随其后的总是经济衰退。) ### [13:30](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=810s) 逆周期买入策略与 Atlanta 抄底实录 在当前的宏观与行业环境下,个人理财的最佳应对是保持极高的防御性,守住资产流动性。由于短期国债收益率稳定在 4% 到 5%(随着 10 年期美债收益率变动或美联储利率政策,甚至可能更高),投资者完全可以通过持有现金及跟踪短期美债的指数基金锁定理财回报,保留伺机而动的选择权。 这种“保留干火药(keep powder dry)”的策略让买家在面临恐慌抛售的市场中具备极强的议价权。Nick 分享了自己年初在亚特兰大(Atlanta)的捡漏经历: - 2021 年作为新房交付时售价:44 万美元; - 2023 年市场高点转手价:约 49 万美元; - 2024 年买入成交价:33 万美元。 相比 2023 年的高峰,该房源折价幅度达 16 万美元;即便对比 2021 年的新房原价,也拿下了 11 万美元的巨大折扣。这类极端低价交易虽然尚未在全美整体数据中普及,但在阳光地带的调整型市场中已经频繁上演。 ### [15:30](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=930s) 赞助商插播:Northwest Registered Agent 节目随后插入了 Northwest Registered Agent 的赞助内容。主持人和嘉宾探讨了建立线上商业信誉的重要性:如果创业者仅使用免费的 Gmail 邮箱且没有正规的企业官方网站,在寻求合作时往往会直接被否决。Northwest Registered Agent 提供免费的企业域名、网站、工作邮箱及专属商业电话线路服务,用户无需支付基础费用、无需购买捆绑套餐,甚至无需注册 LLC 即可使用,且用户对自己的域名和网站拥有完全的所有权。 ### [16:46](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=1006s) 买房痛点与房价未全面暴跌的深层原因 尽管从纯财务测算来看“租房比买房便宜得多”,但大约 80% 到 90% 的美国人骨子里依然渴望拥有一套属于自己的住房。拥有房产所带来的稳定性、生活空间以及心理安全感,是租房无法替代的,尤其对于组建家庭的群体而言更为明显。然而,当前的现实是买房在算术上完全算不过来: - 全美典型房贷月供(含本息、税费与保险):约 2,800 美元; - 典型月租金:约 1,900 美元; - 房贷月供比租金高出整整 40% 左右。 在利率与资产价格双高的情况下,普通人若硬着头皮进场,无异于抵押自己的未来,让自己沦为“房奴”(house poor)。 面对 2021 年以来房贷利率的大幅飙升,全美房价为何没有出现断崖式暴跌?Nick 总结了两个核心原因: 1. **全美二手挂牌库存(Resale Inventory)总量依然不足:** 目前全美二手房挂牌量约为 110 万套,疫情前水平为 120 万套左右,市场仅处于向疫情前均值缓慢恢复的阶段。而在 2008 至 2009 年次贷危机期间,全美二手房库存飙升至近 300 万套,才引发了全国层面 25% 的房价崩盘。除了部分供应井喷的局部市场出现明显下跌外,全美范围尚未形成足以击垮价格的过剩库存。 2. **低利率业主的心理防线与锚定效应(Lock-in Effect):** 坐拥 3% 至 4% 超低房贷利率的业主正在进行精密的心理算计。如果按照当前市场公允价,房子可能值 70 万美元,但他们往往会坚持挂牌 77 万美元(参考邻居几年前的高位成交价),并且坚决不愿降价。业主心里很清楚:按原本 3% 的利率,他们每月只需还款 2,600 至 2,700 美元;但如果在当前 6.5% 的利率环境下置换同一套房子,月供将暴涨至 4,400 美元。这种巨大的月供差距让他们缺乏任何降价出手的动力,形成了事实上的“惜售锁定”。 ### [20:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=1200s) 利率锁死与买卖双方的心理估值鸿沟 利率差异对房贷总成本的冲击极为惊人。Nick Gerli 给出了一个基于现值的计算模型:如果一笔房贷还剩 25 年、利率为 3%,在这段期限内需偿还的利息总额大约是 30 万美元;但如果以当下 6.5% 的利率去买同一套房,利息总额将飙升至 80 万美元。这意味着,仅仅因为拥有这笔超低利率贷款,不卖房本身就蕴含着数十万美元的巨大现值。Graham Stephan 随即附和,表示自己在考虑换房时也做过完全相同的测算。他当年以大约 60 万美元购入自己的房产,锁定了 2.8% 的极低房贷利率;经计算发现,哪怕房价一分不涨,仅仅因为当前利率升至 6.2% 到 6.3%(甚至更高),每月的还款额就会直接暴涨 80% 甚至翻倍。房价本身分文未变,但借贷成本的失控让多数普通人彻底失去了对基础住房的负担能力。 ```mermaid flowchart LR accTitle: 利率鸿沟下的买卖双方认知脱节 accDescr: 展示低利率卖家与高利率买家对同一套房产估值产生巨大认知分歧的机制。 subgraph Seller ["卖家视角 (锁定 2.8% 利率)"] S1["买入价: $600,000"] --> S2["叠加超低息贷款折现值"] S2 --> S3["心理预期心理价位: $800,000 - $900,000"] end subgraph Buyer ["买家视角 (面临 6.5% 利率)"] B1["月供承受上限: $2,500<br/>(无法承受 $4,400)"] --> B2["要求房屋降价 $150,000"] B2 --> B3["买方认可估值: $450,000"] end S3 <-->|"估值断层导致市场冻结"| B3 ``` 这种两极分化在买卖双方之间铸造了一道不可逾越的心智断层。Nick 剖析道,手握 2.8% 利率贷款的房东,在潜意识里会觉得自己那栋 60 万美元买来的房子实际价值高达 80 万至 90 万美元,因为这里包含了极低利率带来的现值红利;然而,面对从 3% 飙升到 6.5% 的房贷利率,潜在买家根本负担不起每月 4,400 美元的月供,其支付极限只有 2,500 美元。因此买家会要求卖家直接砍价 15 万美元,认定这栋房子充其量只值 45 万美元。Nick Gerli 总结道:“买家一方面面临着完全合理的支付能力硬约束,而卖家另一方面则有着完全合理的持有动机。”美联储此前长年大举印钞并将利率强行压制在极低水准,虽然催生了短期的房地产狂欢,但如今却将市场推入了一场长达四年、且仍看不到尽头的房屋交易萧条期。 ### [22:18](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=1338s) 区域分化:阳光地带退潮与传统脑力枢纽回暖 在全美范围内,房地产市场呈现出剧烈的极端分化。过去几年投机过热的阳光地带(Sunbelt)正在经历剧烈回调:奥斯汀(Austin)房价相较过去四年的高点重挫了 27%;佛罗里达州的开普科勒尔与迈尔斯堡区域(Cape Coral, Fort Myers)下跌约 16%;菲尼克斯(Phoenix)和丹佛(Denver)下跌约 10%;拉斯维加斯(Las Vegas)从峰值回落约 5%。反观此前沉寂的市场却意外领跑,芝加哥(Chicago)和纽约(New York)周边的高端富人郊区迎来爆发,年化涨幅甚至达到 10%。Graham 与搭档分享了近期造访芝加哥的惊艳体验,直言其市容整洁、河流环绕,宛如更加干净的纽约,对其豪宅行情的坚挺颇感意外。 纽约市此前推行了备受争议的“离岛公馆税”(pied-a-terre tax,对在曼哈顿购置高价值二套或三套房产的业主征收数万美元重税),原本市场预测该政策会逼迫富豪抛售房产并引发挂牌潮,但现实中曼哈顿的库存却跌至十年来的最低点。Nick 分析指出,曼哈顿公寓价格在疫情期间曾回落约 20%,价格一度倒退至 2005 年的水平,由于长达二十年未出现泡沫化暴涨,其估值本身就偏低。更深层的动力来自于 AI 浪潮引发的“集聚效应”(agglomeration force):疫情期间逃往各地的科技与金融远程办公者,如今面临着岗位可能被 AI 替代的生存危机,重新被吸引回纽约、旧金山(San Francisco)等核心“脑力枢纽”(brain hubs)。旧金山县(San Francisco County)的房价年化上涨近 15%,房屋库存暴跌 40%。虽然当地就业增长尚未完全恢复让 Nick 对反弹的成色存有疑虑,但他确信过去几年“逃离核心大都市”的叙事已然终结,人口正处于向老牌都会回流的五年周期之中。 - 奥斯汀房价较四年内高点累计跌幅达 27% - 佛罗里达州开普科勒尔/迈尔斯堡区域高点回落 16% - 菲尼克斯与丹佛高点回落约 10%,拉斯维加斯回落约 5% - 芝加哥与纽约部分富裕郊区年化涨幅达 10% - 旧金山县房价年化上涨近 15%,挂牌库存减少 40% ### [25:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=1500s) 首次购房者的生存境况与房屋所有权的社会纽带 当被问及普通首次购房者目前的处境有多糟糕时,Nick 强调这完全取决于所在区域。在纳什维尔(Nashville)这种供应量创 15 年新高、需求量跌至 15 年新低的市场,买家反而迎来了十年未见的议价窗口期,理应主动出击去大肆砍价;但若身处芝加哥或纽约,首次购房者则会被完全冻结在市场门外,不得不承受高昂溢价。然而在宏观层面,美国薪资年增长率仅为 3.2% 左右,利用房贷购房的月供支出已占据普通人收入的 40% 上下,即便部分阳光地带市场出现降价,大众依然感到遥不可及。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 柏林租赁模式与市场僵局 accDescr: 解释柏林极度偏向租客的政策如何导致普通房东退场及机构垄断。 A["极低自住率 (约 15%)"] --> B["严苛租客保护政策<br/>(无固定租期 / 租客可无限期居住)"] B --> C["中小个人房东无法承担维权与法律成本"] C --> D["个人资本彻底离场"] D --> E["唯有超大型机构资本能够生存<br/>(依赖法务团队维系规模化运作)"] ``` 关于“房屋所有权是否维系着美国社会结构纽带”的探讨引发了热烈共鸣。主持人提到喜剧演员 Adam Carolla 的观点:拥有属于自己的房产,会促使一个人更加努力工作、建立所有权自豪感,并深度融入和投资本地社区;相反,长年租房且对所在地的未来没有任何资产利益挂钩,正是许多当代年轻人感到前途渺茫与漂泊无依的根源。Nick 对此高度赞同,他回顾道,在 2010 年代次贷危机爆发后,市场利率远低于存量利率,买房月供实际上比租金更便宜,买房几乎是稳赚不赔的买卖;而现在的经济环境已彻底逆转。Nick 警告道,绝不能让社会滑向自住率仅剩 20% 的深渊,并以他刚考察过的德国柏林为例:柏林的住房自住率仅有 15%,当地租赁法律极端偏向租客,租约甚至没有固定期限限制,租客只要不想搬走就可以无限期住下去。Nick Gerli 指出:“所以到底是谁在柏林投资买房?很可能根本没人愿意投。我觉得只剩下那些具备超大规模的机构投资者了,或许只有他们才雇得起应对这些烂摊子所必需的律师团队。”如果美国部分地区(如加州圣莫尼卡等地)在监管限制上继续向这一方向狂奔,不仅会摧毁个人投资者的意愿,还会迫使民众将原本用于扎根现实资产的财富彻底分流到现金或国债等防御性金融产品中。 ### [30:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=1800s) 赞助商插播:Blossom 与 NetSuite 在进入正题之前,节目插播了两则赞助商内容。首先是投资类社交媒体应用 Blossom。Graham Stephan 和 Jack Selby 介绍道,该平台的一大特色是公开透明——用户可以展示自己真正持有的实盘投资组合,而不是随口吹嘘。Jack 和 Graham 均已将自己的真实资产组合同步到上面,谁亏谁赚一目了然。他们半开玩笑地以此来一决高下,并提到财经博主 Caleb Hammer 在该平台上的关注人数居然超过了他们,因此大声呼吁听众点击简介链接下载并关注他们,帮助他们“在粉丝数上反超 Caleb”。 随后 Graham 介绍了针对高营收企业的 ERP 管理工具 NetSuite。他指出,看单笔投资的盈亏相对简单,但厘清企业内部究竟哪个板块在盈利却复杂得多。NetSuite 服务超过 44,000 家企业,并将 AI 整合至各项日常管理工具与代理(AI agents)中。针对年营收达到七位数(百万美元)及以上的企业,NetSuite 提供了名为《Aligning for the Agentic Era》的免费 AI 转型指南。 --- ### [31:50](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=1910s) 租客保护政策的代价与房东面临的窘境 回到房产话题,针对某些地区超低的房屋自有率以及严苛的市政政策,嘉宾 Nick Gerli(Reventure Consulting 创始人)与主持人探讨了加利福尼亚州(尤其是洛杉矶和圣莫尼卡等地)的极端监管现状。Nick 指出,当地决策者初衷看似道德高尚,试图通过法律全面保护租客,例如设置极高的驱逐门槛——即使租客拒付房租,房东不仅极难将其驱逐,甚至往往需要支付高达 50,000 美元的“买断费(cash for keys)”或高昂的律师诉讼费才能收回房屋。Nick 强调,这种过度保护的政策反而产生了反噬效果: > “In reality, all that does is take away housing supply from people who can afford to pay the rent and who would pay the rent.” —— Nick Gerli Graham 与 Jack 进一步分析指出,这种环境实际上将普通中产阶级完全挤出了当地的投资市场。对于普通个体房东(Mom and Pop landlords)而言,一旦遇到一名“老赖”租客,高昂的诉讼成本与长达数月的租金损失足以让人破产;相反,唯有资金极其雄厚、拥有全职法务团队的亿万富翁或大型机构才能在繁冗的官僚审批与法律红线中周旋。 谈及当下是否适合购房,Nick 明确给出了分层判断: - **刚需首套房买家**:在特定估值合理、供给充足的市场中,仍能找到入场机会。 - **个体房东或试图扩张组合的投资者**:目前绝非入场良机。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 极端租客保护政策对市场的负面传导链 accDescr: 展示了从过于严苛的租客保护法律演变成普通房东退场、供给收紧并推高生活成本的因果链条。 subgraph Policy ["政策驱动"] A["推行极端租客保护政策<br/>(驱逐成本达5万美元/程序繁琐)"] end subgraph MarketImpact ["市场挤出效应"] B["中小散户房东无力承受法律与坏账风险"] C["仅剩带大型法务团队的超级富豪/机构能承受"] end subgraph Outcome ["最终结果"] D["优质合规房源供给锐减"] E["合规租客租房难度及整体居住成本上涨"] end A --> B A --> C B --> D C --> D D --> E ``` 在收益率(Cap Rate,资本化率)层面,全美单户住宅(Single-Family House)目前的平均 Cap Rate 仅约为 4.8%。考虑到持有、维护与管理房产所需耗费的大量心力,这一回报率甚至低于无风险的 10 年期美国国债收益率(10-Year Treasury Yield)。对于部分人提出“4.8% 的租金回报加上 2% 至 5% 的房屋年升值,整体年化能达到 7% 至 10%”的传统论调,Nick 驳斥道,那仅仅适用于 2000 年代初或 2010 年代的低估值周期。当前房价与居民收入及租金的比率已被严重拉高,支撑未来持续升值的基础并不存在。Nick 直言自己在构建现金流折现(DCF)模型时,针对大部分市场在最初几年甚至假设了“负升值(negative appreciation)”。 - 全美单户住宅平均租金资本化率(Cap Rate):约 4.8% - 洛杉矶驱逐非付租租客的潜在买断/法律成本:可高达 50,000 美元 - 收益对照:当前全美单户住宅租金回报率已低于 10 年期美债收益率 --- ### [35:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=2100s) 顶层 1% 买家制造的叙事幻觉与地产界的“魔球(Moneyball)”时刻 讨论转向当下高度分化的市场(Bifurcated Market)。主持人指出,超级富豪正全款现金横扫顶层豪宅,而普通大众所处的刚需市场却萎靡不振。Nick 解释说,前 1% 的超级富豪并没有从根本上改变整体房地产的基本面,但他们彻底扭曲了公众眼中的市场叙事。以佛罗里达州迈阿密为例,整体房屋成交量大幅下滑,普通住宅价格亦在调整,然而由于 Palantir 搬迁至此,以及 Jeff Bezos 和 Mark Zuckerberg 等顶级富豪高调置业,动辄将一套 1000 万美元的顶层公寓炒到 1200 万美元转手,媒体的大肆报道让当地中介得以借机宣扬“迈阿密楼市火爆”。 这种杂乱的宣传导致不同房产平台发布的数据自相矛盾。Nick 提到,仅仅在一个月前,Realtor.com 的大标题还是“挂牌价迎来 2017 年以来的最大跌幅”,而同一天 Redfin 的标题赫然写着“成交流水价创四年最大涨幅”,连行业专家面对此类信息都会感到混乱。因此,普通买家在做出一生中数十万乃至数百万美元的重大决策时,决不能依赖宏观标题,而必须精确看透自己所在邮政编码(Zip code)内的真实供求与预测。 Nick 认为,相比拥有海量分析师与技术指标的股市,房地产行业在数据分析上至少落后了二十年: > “I feel like housing is still in the early 2000s when it comes to analysis. And I think in the next 10 to 20 years, it's gonna be pretty normal for every single buyer and seller and realtor to just know, hey, here's the forecast for my zip code.” —— Nick Gerli 他引用经典棒球故事《魔球》(Moneyball)作比喻:2000 年代初,奥克兰运动家队总经理 Billy Beane 顶住传统球探凭直觉选人的偏见,率先引入棒球统计学(Sabermetrics),凭借全联盟垫底的薪资总额打出奇迹战绩,最终重塑了整个联盟的运作逻辑。Nick 创立 Reventure 的初衷,正是希望将这种量化数据分析带入仍处在“史前时代”的房地产市场。 --- ### [38:31](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=2311s) 46 万亿美元大继承与婴儿潮一代的离场浪潮 针对部分乐观人士提出的“千禧一代将在 2048 年前继承高达 46 万亿美元的财富,庞大的代际转移足以托住房价不坠”的观点,Nick 指出这只看到了硬币的一面。除了金钱的流转,更不可忽视的是伴随巨额遗产一同释放的庞大房产库存。 根据房地美(Freddie Mac)的测算,到 2035 年,将有约 920 万婴儿潮一代(Baby Boomers)因年老而退出住房市场。Nick 梳理了美国历史人口结构的变化:从 1950 年代至 1990 年代,全美 55 至 64 岁人口在总人口中的占比长期稳定在 8% 到 9% 左右;然而从 2000 年代中叶开始直至 2020 年,这一年龄层占比出现历史性飙升。这正是婴儿潮一代步入中晚期退休及购房换房的二十年。 而当前的人口拐点在于:55 至 64 岁群体的占比正在回落,整个婴儿潮群体正式向 75 岁以上的超高龄阶段迁徙。美国即将迎来前所未有的 75 岁以上人口爆发期,这意味着大批房产将因继承、变现或搬入养老看护机构而涌入市场,形成前所未见的代际房屋交割与供应冲击。 - 千禧一代预计至 2048 年继承的财富规模:约 46 万亿美元 - 房地美预估至 2035 年因老龄化退出房市的婴儿潮房主规模:920 万人 - 历史对比:全美 55 至 64 岁人口占比在 1950 至 1990 年代维持在 8%~9%,于 2000~2020 年间出现历史性暴增,现已进入 75 岁以上高龄阶段 ### [40:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=2400s) 婴儿潮一代的遗产继承与人口年龄结构失衡 讨论首先聚焦于婴儿潮一代(Baby Boomers)向千禧一代(Millennials)转移财富对房地产市场的真实影响。嘉信理财(Charles Schwab)的数据显示,大约 70% 继承下来的房产最终都会被出售。虽然财富继承确实会在边际上创造出一批有购买力的千禧一代买家,但房产继承抛售也意味着市场将迎来海量的新增房源供给。 Graham Stephan 提出疑问:既然继承房产的人将房屋变现拿到了钱,如果他们还没有房子,大概率会拿着这笔钱去买房;即使已有房产,也可能选择升级置换,或者至少花钱翻新现有住房——这甚至利好家得宝(Home Depot)这类家装零售商,因此供需关系难道不会相互抵消吗? Nick Gerli 随即指出,这种供需抵消在宏观和区域层面上并不成立。他在 Reventure App 中引入了一项新指标:**75 岁以上屋主人口与 25 至 44 岁租房者人口的比例**。75 岁以上的屋主终究会因老龄化而离场,而在边际上接盘的正是 25 至 44 岁的年轻租房群体。然而,全美这一比例正在急剧恶化: - 在佛罗里达州等地,75 岁以上屋主的增速远快于年轻租房人群。未来几年内,佛罗里达州的这一比值预计将跌破 1,意味着 75 岁以上屋主的人数将超过 25 至 44 岁的潜在年轻买家人数。 - 房产继承与老龄化的冲击具有强烈的区域分化属性。像佛罗里达州内珀斯(Naples, Florida)这样老年屋主扎堆的养老型市场,根本不可能有成群结队的千禧一代涌入接盘;相比之下,奥斯汀(Austin, Texas)或丹佛(Denver, Colorado)等年轻人口密集的市场,才更有可能消化这些供给。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 老龄化与继承房产的供需断层 accDescr: 展现老年屋主退场后,年轻租房者不足导致的区域性房产供需失衡 subgraph Aging["老龄人口退出市场"] A["75岁以上屋主老龄化离场"] --> B["约 70% 继承房产被挂牌抛售"] end subgraph Absorption["区域接盘能力分化"] B --> C{"年轻买家 (25-44岁) 是否充足?"} C -->|"老龄化市场 (如 Naples, FL)"| D["接盘人口不足:供过于求 / 价格承压"] C -->|"年轻科技市场 (如 Austin, Denver)"| E["年轻买家边际消化供给"] end ``` --- ### [41:40](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=2500s) 房贷利率的历史常态与房产净值的“纸面富贵” 针对市场究竟需要多低的房贷利率才能盘活流动性、解锁挂牌库存的疑问,Nick Gerli 坦言,利率可能需要接近 5%,才能让那些手握 3% 到 4% 极低锁定利率的现有屋主觉得卖房置换划算。但眼下的现实却是利率不降反升,全美 30 年期房贷利率再度突破 7%,全球债券市场也遭遇抛售潮,短期内除非发生经济衰退,否则根本看不到大幅降息的可能。 更重要的是,Nick Gerli 与 Graham Stephan 均认为,市场甚至可能永远见不到 3% 的超低利率了: - **历史利率常态**:拉长看全美 135 年的房贷利率走势,平均利率其实高达 6.2%,即便是 1990 年代,8% 的利率也十分普遍。疫情期间和 2010 年代出现的 3% 房贷利率是历史上前所未有的特例,因此当下的 7% 从长周期看并不异常。 - **高房价才是根本症结**:Nick Gerli 直言:“So if you look at long-term mortgage rates versus long-term prices, it's very clear prices are the problem. Prices are too high.”(如果你观察长期房贷利率与长期房价的对比,就会非常清楚问题出在价格上。房价太高了。) - **锁死的高额净值**:全美住宅房产总市值约 50 万亿美元,而房贷债务仅约 15 万亿美元,屋主坐拥高达约 35 万亿至 38 万亿美元的房屋净值(Equity)。然而屋主们既没有大举申请现金再融资(Cash-out refi),也没有挂牌卖房。Nick 调侃道,现在的屋主们整天无所事事,只是坐在那里不断刷新 Zillow 上的 Zestimate 估值,看着虚高的数字沾沾自喜,或者死抱着邻居四年前卖出的高价幻想不放,这种僵局最终唯有通过房价下跌才能打破。 --- ### [44:20](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=2660s) 衰退周期跳过?AI 热潮下的湾区与科技重镇分化 Graham Stephan 提出,如果人工智能(AI)带来极高的生产效率,引发全面通缩与失业率上升,美联储可能被迫大幅降息以刺激经济。Nick Gerli 对此表示,理论上完全可能,但这种通缩型衰退本该更早发生,眼下美国经济仿佛“跳过了周期”:自 2009 年大衰退结束以来的 17 年里,美国实际上并未经历一场真正的经济衰退(疫情引发的衰退更像是一场人工制造的短期冲击,随后伴随着天量印钞)。英伟达(NVIDIA)等芯片巨头四处并购、数据中心在各地疯狂动工,AI 狂潮仍在为经济续命。 然而,Nick Gerli 指出全美科技市场的房地产数据出现了一个极具启示性的反常分化: - **旧金山县(San Francisco County)**:房价同比暴涨 15%,库存急剧下降,成交量飙升。 - **其他科技市场全线熄火**:同属湾区的圣克拉拉县(Santa Clara County)和阿拉米达县(Alameda County / 奥克兰)房价同比下滑;西雅图(Seattle)、奥斯汀(Austin)、丹佛(Denver)等传统科技重镇的房价也普遍在下跌。 Nick 提出了一个运作理论:旧金山的前沿 AI 实验室(Frontier labs)研发出的工具,是否正在抢走其他科技城市的软件工程岗位,从而导致外围科技市场失业并引发房价下跌? 对此,Graham Stephan 反驳称 Nick“想得太复杂了”(“I think you're overthinking it”)。Graham 认为旧金山有其极其特殊的城市属性: 1. **供应极度受限**:当地对新建住房施加了严苛的限制,几乎不可能向市场投放新房源。 2. **全球资本虹吸**:阿瑟顿(Atherton)或旧金山最顶级的核心街区是极少数顶级富豪的必争之地。全球投向 AI 赛道的资金源源不断涌入这片狭窄的土地,这些新贵们根本不在乎多花几百万美元买下一套心仪的住宅。 Nick 承认旧金山在疫情暴跌后确实存在估值修复的空间,但他仍密切关注这种 AI 财富高度集中与外围科技市场收缩的脱节现象。 --- ### [47:30](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=2850s) 加息降息与房价的悖论:席勒指数揭示百年泡沫 Graham Stephan 分享了他近期视频中的一项历史统计:对比历次美联储加息与降息周期中房价的表现,在加息周期中,全美房价下跌的次数居然仅有一次(大约发生在 1991 年前后的周期)。 Graham 解释背后的经济逻辑: - **加息通常伴随经济强劲**:美联储往往在就业市场繁荣或通胀高企时加息,而强劲的经济与温和的通胀环境对房地产市场本身是重大利好。 - **降息往往伴随危机救市**:当失业率飙升、经济急转直下时,央行才会降息救市,而这种经济恶化、需求萎缩的大环境对楼市才是致命打击。因此,“加息导致房价暴跌、降息推动房价暴涨”在历史上往往是个伪命题。 Nick Gerli 赞同这一统计事实,但他严肃指出当前周期不可同日而语,关键在于**前几次加息周期所处的市场并非处在房地产泡沫之中**。Nick 明确提出:“Gentlemen! Two times in US history where real estate's been in a bubble relative to inflation and prices: right now and '06.”(先生们!美国历史上在剔除通胀后的房价维度上真正算得上泡沫的只有两次:一次是现在,另一次是 2006 年。) Nick 搬出了由耶鲁大学经济学家罗伯特·席勒(Robert Shiller)编制的**凯斯-席勒通胀调整后房屋价格指数(Case-Shiller Inflation Adjusted Home Price Index)**(数据可追溯至 1890 年): - **1890 年至 2000 年(长达 110 年)**:剔除通胀因素后,全美实际房价几乎没有任何实质性增长。即便在 1970 年代的高通胀时期,名义房价飞涨也仅仅是跟上了通货膨胀的步伐。 - **2000 年以后的突变**:历史规律在 2000 年代初被彻底打破,全美房价比相对通胀水平迎来了史无前例的暴涨,形成了 2006 年以及当前周期的巨大价格泡沫。 | 历史时期 | 经通胀调整后的实际房价表现 | 市场特征与驱动机制 | |:--- |:--- |:--- | | **1890年 – 2000年** | 长期近乎零增长(走势平缓) | 房价仅作为通胀的影子资产,涨幅严格匹配通胀水平,即使在 1970 年代大通胀期亦步亦趋 | | **2000年代初 – 2006年** | 呈现极端陡峭暴涨 | 首次脱离通胀基准,形成由次贷与过度杠杆驱动的历史级房地产大泡沫 | | **当前市场周期** | 再次冲上历史极值泡沫区间 | 房价与居民收入及通胀严重脱钩,成为美国历史上唯二的极端泡沫时期之一 | ### [50:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=3000s) 房价泡沫的历史对比与通胀预期差异 Nick Gerli 深入剖析了当下的房地产估值指标。他指出,扣除通货膨胀因素后的实际房价在 2000 年代中期创下历史纪录后经历了崩盘,但在 2010 年代末至疫情期间,经通胀调整后的房价再次回到了那个历史极端高点,这在美国历史上是从未长期维持过的。同样地,房价比收入(Price-to-Income)以及房价比租金(Price-to-Rent)也处于极不正常的水平。 很多人常常拿 1981 年房贷利率高达 18% 但房价依然上涨的历史来反驳当下的危机论调,但 Nick Gerli 明确驳斥了这种对比:1970 年代至 80 年代初的美国房价本身并未处于泡沫之中,而且当时的薪资每年增长 6% 至 8%,整个社会弥漫着真正的通胀心理——大家预期下一轮加薪幅度能达到 10%,因此即便眼下买不起也敢硬着头皮买房。反观当下,普通人的薪资涨幅仅在 3% 左右。 > “People are getting 3% raises right now. And so it is truly unique times. But when you look at that price to income, price to inflation, it says we're in a housing bubble. We've never seen this bubble persist before in US history.” —— Nick Gerli 高企的房贷利率成为了让普通人负担能力雪上加霜的混淆因素。Nick Gerli 强调,不能仅仅因为过去利率上升时房价未曾暴跌,就断定这次也不会跌;因为以往并不处于极端估值泡沫中,而这一次市场身处真正的泡沫之内。 --- ### [51:16](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=3076s) 华尔街机构对住宅市场的渗透与最新立法限制 谈及华尔街机构(Wall Street Investors)大举收购独栋住宅对住房负担能力的影响,Nick Gerli 指出,在 2010 年代初,联邦政府甚至出资援助机构投资者入场接盘,尤其是在拉斯维加斯这类重灾区。像 Invitation Homes、American Homes 4 Rent 以及 Progress Residential 这类大型机构,在过去十年间全美累计买下了近 100 万套独栋房屋。 在全国层面上,这些华尔街机构仅持有全美约 2% 至 3% 的住宅存量,因此不能把全国性房价高企全部归咎于他们;但在部分特定市场和社区,机构投资者是推高成本的核心元凶。例如在拉斯维加斯和亚特兰大,某些特定街区的机构持房比例甚至高达 50%。研究也表明,华尔街房东的涨租幅度通常高于散户房东(Mom and Pop Landlords)。然而,大约四年前随着利率飙升,资本化率(Cap Rate)被房贷利率倒挂,华尔街机构便迅速踩下刹车,大型机构的采购量骤减了 50% 到 70%。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 华尔街机构在美国住宅市场的演变历程 accDescr: 展示机构投资者从次贷危机抄底、特定街区集中持仓到利率倒挂撤资并转向自建租赁的过程 subgraph Phase1["2010年代初:抄底扩张"] A["政府支持资本入场抄底"] --> B["机构打包低价收购银行坏账资产<br/>(如每门7万美元)"] end subgraph Phase2["2010年代末-2020年代初:集中重仓"] B --> C["在特定城市重点扫货<br/>(亚特兰大/维加斯部分街区占比达50%)"] C --> D["全美累计买入近100万套独栋住宅"] end subgraph Phase3["加息周期与监管收紧"] D --> E["利率飙升超过回报率,机构采购骤减50%-70%"] E --> F["法案限制持有超350套机构继续买存量房"] F --> G["机构转型为住宅建筑商<br/>转向自建租赁(Build-to-Rent)"] end ``` 针对机构投资者的法律定义与监管也迎来了重大变动: - **《住房之路法案》(Road to Housing Bill)标准**:将“机构投资者”的门槛定在直接或间接拥有 350 套以上的房屋(低于公众预期的 1000 套门槛)。 - **采购禁令与年限**:拥有超过 350 套房产的机构,被禁止在二手存量市场(Existing Housing Stock)中继续收购住宅。 - **生效周期**:该法规将于 2027 年 1 月正式生效,有效期长达 15 年,持续至 2042 年。 - **申报义务**:达标机构必须每年向美国住房和城市发展部(HUD)递交资产清单。 --- ### [55:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=3300s) 机构禁令的实效之争:救市缓冲垫还是推手? 针对上述法案,Graham Stephan 持怀疑态度,认为该法规在很大程度上纯属“表演性质”(Performative)。Graham Stephan 辩解称,散户买家在日常看房时很少真正与华尔街机构正面竞价,因为机构算不过账;机构过去买的大多是银行原本就不会单套流入市场的坏账资产包(比如以 7 折价格打包处置的 300 套水下房屋)。如今,大型机构早就转向了“自建租赁”(Build-to-Rent)社区,并未占用二手房存量;这类法案只会加速这一趋势,促使机构变成大型建筑商(例如 American Homes 4 Rent 已经位列全美前 35 大房屋建筑商),这本身对增加供应是件好事。 两人随后就“华尔街机构离场究竟是利是弊”展开了激烈交锋: > “And if investors weren't there to stop the bleeding and to buy up this inventory, prices would keep falling and it's not like other people were going and buying.” —— Graham Stephan Graham Stephan 认为,在市场崩溃期,正是这些资本入场止血接盘,才避免了资产价格彻底跌穿底线。如果像佛罗里达州当前局部暴跌的区域失去机构托底,价格一路下探,会导致无数原本指望房屋净值安度晚年或计划搬迁的普通家庭沦为“负资产/水下房屋”(Underwater),从而冻结流动性。 - **存量房断崖风险**:没有机构资金垫底,挂牌量无人承接可能引发更长期的踩踏。 - **换房意愿锁死**:一旦业主房屋资产沦为负值,既无资金也无法置换,只能被套牢在原地。 --- ### [57:21](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=3441s) 赞助商插播:Shopify 线上建店平台 节目在此处插入了 Shopify 的赞助口播。主持人提到随着“黑色星期五”(Black Friday)购物旺季即将来临,实体零售商应当抓紧开辟线上销售渠道,以触达更广泛的买家群体。Jack Selby 分享称,在与 Graham Stephan 合作之前,自己就曾亲手搭建过五六个 Shopify 店铺,其平台预设的主题模板和 AI 建站工具让即使毫无技术背景的小白用户也能迅速打造专业的电商品牌门面。 --- ### [58:18](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=3498s) 视角的撕裂:刚需买家的利益 vs. 08年崩盘的创伤记忆 在广告结束后,Nick Gerli 对 Graham Stephan 的担忧做出了回应。他承认每个人的立场取决于其代表的利益群体:作为一个 36 岁、刚刚购置房产准备安顿下来的买家群体代言人,他的频道和数据自然更偏向于无房刚需人群,而非存量房业主的账面财富。 但 Nick Gerli 也赞同市场绝不能陷入全面的灾难。他回顾了拉斯维加斯在 2007 至 2012 年经历的惨烈浩劫: - **历史跌幅**:维加斯房价在危机中暴跌了整整 63%,一栋在 2007 年价值 35 万美元的独栋住宅,到 2012 年时被腰斩甚至跌至约 14 万美元。 - **群体心理创伤**:那场崩盘给整整一代当地居民留下了无法磨灭的心理阴影。 > “Prices in Vegas dropped 63% from '07 to 2012. A $350,000 house in '07 was worth like $140, which is hard to fathom, right? That is bad, right? And the market... was going to fall further if it weren't for some of those investors buying.” —— Nick Gerli 然而,Nick Gerli 明确表示当下的宏观基本面与 2008 年截然不同:如今消费者的资产负债表远比当年稳健,系统内的次级房贷杠杆也少得多,因此全美绝不会普遍出现整座城市重挫 65% 的极端情况。相反,回调幅度更有可能在 30% 左右。他列举了德克萨斯州奥斯汀(Austin)作为典型试验案例:奥斯汀在过去四年中房价已自高点回落了 27%,但当地失业率依然维持在 3.6% 的健康水平,并未爆发全面系统性的经济动荡,市场成功承受住了这轮剧烈估值修正。 ### [01:00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=3600s) 投资者大撤退与被冷落的房地产市场 Nick Gerli 认为,由于消费者资产负债表相对健康且银行风险敞口较小,很多房主完全有能力承受一定幅度的房价回调。如今房主总权益高达 35 万亿美元,即便让利一部分给买家,市场也能逐步回归健康。至于华尔街机构,他明确表示:“我认为房地产市场不再需要、也不希望它们回来继续买房。”Graham Stephan 拿出数据指出,2026 年投资客在住宅交易中仍占 19%,且二手转售的中位数资本收益达 19.6 万美元。但在最糟糕的地区,已有 10% 到 15% 的人处于负资产状态,奥斯汀(Austin)因跌幅惨烈,负资产比例可能高达 30% 至 35%。 总体而言,投资者群体已大举撤离:全美投资者购房量相较于 2022 年峰值砍掉了一半,拉斯维加斯更是暴跌 70%(从每季度 3,300 套骤降至 1,200 套左右)。眼下资金大量涌入股市,Graham 坦言,当所有人都在跟风炒股、地产不再受追捧时,逆向思维反而提示房地产可能蕴藏着机会。Nick 赞同房地产早已风光不再——2020 年人人都想跨州买房搞 Airbnb 扩张,如今这一热潮彻底熄灭。但他强调当前的核心策略:“现在不是买房的时机,但现在是出价的时机。”在亚特兰大、达拉斯、奥斯汀、丹佛、西雅图等高库存市场,买家应该理性测算、在纸面上算清按揭与收益,即便出价砍掉 15 万美元,也应当大胆去试探。 - 全美房主权益池约为 35 万亿美元,市场具备较强缓冲垫。 - 投资客在全美购房量从 2022 年峰值腰斩 50%,拉斯维加斯季度购房量从 3,300 套降至 1,200 套(降幅 70%)。 - 最惨市场中负资产率达 10%~15%,奥斯汀可能高达 30%~35%。 --- ### [01:03:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=3780s) 错失拳王豪宅与低价大砍单实操法则 对话切入拉斯维加斯的一处典型案例:拳王弗洛伊德·梅威瑟(Floyd Mayweather)位于高尔夫球场尽头路(cul-de-sac)的一栋 12,000 平方英尺定制豪宅挂牌出售。该房源挂牌价最初高达 1,400 万美元,一路接连降价至 1,200 万、1,000 万、800 万美元,最终仅以 660 万美元成交。Graham 对自己当初没去出个 650 万或 660 万美元深感懊悔,而他没出价的原因在于起初以为拳王家财万贯“根本不在乎卖不卖”。尽管该交易产权复杂、涉及抵押留置权(liens)及签署权限问题,买家等了很久,但这印证了“你不试就永远不知道卖家底线”的道理。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 筛选动机强烈的降价卖家流程 accDescr: 展示从房源挂牌条件筛选到多轮砍价成交的完整操作路径。 subgraph S1["筛选挂牌特征"] A["挂牌在售时长 > 6 个月"] --> B["存在多次连续降价记录"] end subgraph S2["前期铺垫与沟通"] B --> C["实地看房并出示资金证明 (POF)"] C --> D["直接询问卖家经纪人:愿意接受远低于市价的出价吗?"] end subgraph S3["谈判与成交"] D -->|"买家有兴趣"| E["提交极低首轮报价 (Lowball)"] E --> F["遭遇拒绝或还价后保持耐心"] F --> G["锁定'崩盘后折价'顺利拿下"] end ``` Nick 结合自己在亚特兰大的实战经验,分享了如何在当前市场淘到“崩盘后定价”(post-crash pricing)的系统化流程: 1. **筛选高动机卖家**:只看在售时长超过 6 个月、且经历过多次降价的房源,过滤掉那些可卖可不卖的试水卖家。 2. **建立买家信誉**:绝不要刚看完房两小时就随手甩出一个骨折价惹恼对方。先去现场看房,提供资金证明(Proof of Funds),塑造靠谱真实的买家形象。 3. **试探经纪人意向**:直接对卖方经纪人挑明:“我很喜欢这房子,但我出价会远低于挂牌价,你们愿意收这个报价吗?”以此提前打预防针。 4. **耐心的拉锯战**:以 Nick 在亚特兰大的房子为例,房源从 49 万降到 41.5 万美元;Nick 首次大砍单至 31.5 万美元被拒,卖家回价 40 万美元;Nick 选择晾在一边按兵不动;卖家撑不住主动找上门降到 36 万美元,最终 Nick 以 33 万美元成功捡漏。 --- ### [01:07:53](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=4073s) 浮动利率贷款(ARM)的豪赌与城市流动性 谈及融资方式,Nick 透露自己“把秘密抖落出来了”——他新买的房子办了 7 年期可调利率按揭(7-year Adjustable Rate Mortgage, ARM),锁定了 5.7% 的利率,而当时 30 年期固定利率大概在 6.1% 至 6.2%。虽然前期享受了利差优惠,但他坦承现在隐隐有些后悔,因为当前宏观舆论风向已变成“利率长期居高不下甚至继续上升”,7 年之后一旦重新定价,自己将面临敞口极大的尾部风险(tail risk)。 “如果是打算持有七年就转手卖掉,那或许打从一开始就不该买房。” Graham 与 Nick 就 ARM 的适用逻辑展开了探讨:虽然美国家庭平均持有房屋的时长恰好在 7 年左右,理论上可以在利率重置前卖房套现,但如果纯粹抱着短期转手的投机心态买入,本身就极具风险。此外,不同城市的流动性格局大相径庭。例如纳什维尔(Nashville)属于高周动性城市,市场上挂牌的房源仿佛全都是 2022 到 2024 年才买进来的,人们因工作调动搬进搬出极为频繁;而像芝加哥、纽约上州、康涅狄格或新泽西等地则截然不同,买家一旦安家往往会长年居住。持有周期与所在城市的属性,直接决定了杠杆工具的选择与买入逻辑。 ### [01:10:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=4200s) 买房还是租房?拉长的持有周期与投资困境 在探讨购房决策时,Nick Gerli 指出,究竟买房需要持有多少年才能回本完全取决于所在市场的特征。以加州为例,买房与租房之间的成本差异令人难以置信:一套租金为 4,000 美元的住宅,如果要买下来,每月持有成本可能高达 9,000 美元。因此在加州这种地方,租房反而在大幅省钱。即使在拉斯维加斯也是如此,Nick Gerli 提到自己当天刚看了一套房子,买下来的月供需要 2,800 美元,但同一套房子一年前挂牌招租只要 1,850 美元。在这种市场环境下,买房意味着必须在房产里住上非常久的时间,指望房价大幅上涨来抵消前期的高额支出,在加州这个周期可能长达 15 年,而在佛罗里达等其他地方或许会稍微短一些。 Graham Stephan 对此表示认同,并认为如今至少需要持有 12 到 15 年才不至于相比租房亏本。他回顾道,当房贷利率处于 3% 的极低水平时,他给出的持有建议是 7 年;当利率升至 5.5% 到 6% 时,他建议是 10 年;而在当前的高利率环境下,持有期必须更长,因为目前的按揭贷款还款结构严重前置了利息支出,买家甚至需要还贷 18 到 20 年,每月还款额中归还本金的部分才会超过利息。购房者前期几乎没有积累到任何资产净值,完全是在押注未来的房价升值,而未来十年到底能否升值仍充满未知。 当被问及在当下的房地产环境中还有什么投资策略能够真正奏效时,Nick Gerli 戏谑而严肃地回答: > “The only strategy that works that I have seen be really effective is you just see a house, and then you turn around and you walk out the door as fast as possible.”(“我见过的唯一真正有效的策略,就是只要看到一套房子,立刻转身用最快的速度逃出门去。”) Nick Gerli 建议投资者避开房产,将资金投入国际指数基金(International Index Funds)或免税市政债券(Municipal Bonds)。 - 在加州等高溢价市场,同一套房子的购房月供(约 9,000 美元)通常是租金(约 4,000 美元)的两倍以上。 - 在当前高利率环境下,房贷利息深度前置,通常需要还贷 18 至 20 年,每月还款额中用于偿还本金的份额才会超过利息。 --- ### [01:12:25](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=4345s) Graham 为什么清仓加州出租房:政策、账单与保险梦魇 Jack Selby 将话题引向 Graham Stephan 决定清算其加州房产投资组合的亲身经历。Graham Stephan 解释说,随着房价攀升到高位,他在核算替代方案后发现,扣除交易佣金、过户费用和税费后,将套现资金买入免税市政债券所获得的净回报,甚至超过了继续持有出租房的实际收益。更重要的是,加州日益严苛的租金管制(Rent Control)带来了巨大的长期隐患,而且政策环境毫无改善的迹象。 除了政策风险,管理房产所承受的琐碎压力也让 Graham Stephan 不堪其扰。他几乎每年都会遇到保险公司突然寄来保单取消通知书的情况。打电话过去询问,对方却轻描淡写地表示是系统出错,但需要 48 到 72 小时才能重新签发保单。这让他在长达数天的时间里提心吊胆,生怕名下房产遭遇火灾或地震,而且名下多套物业轮番出现这种状况。此外,尽管受加州税法限制,他一套价值 130 万美元的出租房每年地税仅约 8,000 美元,但这些不可避免的流出仍让人沮丧。 更让他崩溃的是洛杉矶水电局(LADWP)寄来的水费和电费账单。由于水费由房东承担,租客完全没有节约用水的意识,水费账单动辄高达 500 美元。夏天遭遇热浪时,租客甚至会将空调温度直接调到 60 华氏度(约 15.5 摄氏度),日夜不停地运转。Graham Stephan 无奈地表示: > “Listen, I had great tenants. Like really, really, really good tenants. I was lucky with all the tenants and I like them, but I don't like the bills. And so I looked at that and I said, it's time to sell.”(“听着,我的租客都很好,真的是非常非常好的租客。我很幸运遇到他们,我也喜欢他们,但我讨厌那些账单。因此我审视了这一切,对自己说,是时候卖掉了。”) 为了能以最高溢价快速脱手,Graham Stephan 在出售前投入了大量资金。他在三处房产上合计砸下约 14 万美元进行整修翻新和家居陈设(Staging),力求将房况做到极致,最终成功吸引了多个买家竞价并以远超挂牌价的价格成交。 --- ### [01:15:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=4500s) 隐藏成本与家电刺客:自住房与空调陷阱 Jack Selby 结合自己的经历指出,大众严重低估了除了本金、利息、税费和保险(PITI)之外的持有成本。去年,他在自己目前居住的拉斯维加斯住宅里把 4 间空房出租,原本以为租金收入能完全覆盖自住成本,但年底做账时却惊呆了:全年虽然收了 3 万多美元的租金,但整栋房子的运营开销居然高达 6 万美元。他的 PITI 每月大约是 2,500 美元,多出来的 3 万多美元全被各类杂费和不可预见的资本支出(CapEx)吞噬。除了每月 180 美元的宽带网络,由于院子里有游泳池,在干燥炎热的拉斯维加斯需要每隔几天就补一次水,导致夏天的单月水费曾飙升至 600 到 800 美元。 更沉重的负担来自毫无预警的维修和设备更换。拥有一套老房子就像踏入了无底洞: - 去年,Jack Selby 光是在更换空调系统上就花费了约 13,000 美元; - 前一年,泳池重新抹灰翻新花费了 8,000 美元,随后又换了一台空调外机; - 泳池水泵损坏维修花费数千美元; - 院内灌溉系统和主管道爆裂维修又分别耗费了数千和 5,000 美元。 许多人以为购买 30 年房龄的老房子能避开新房的溢价,却不知老房子的所有构件都处于老化报废的边缘。Graham Stephan 也深有体会,他曾遇到过一位每月支付 3,500 美元租金的新租客刚搬进去第二周,空调就彻底报废,维修直接花掉 10,000 美元。Graham Stephan 直言: > “Air conditioning is the biggest scam ever because it is planned obsolescence.”(“空调是彻头彻尾的惊天骗局,因为它纯粹就是计划性报废。”) 空调维修技师告诉他,最耐用的空调反而是那些 30 年前的老机器,几乎从不出故障。现在的厂家每隔几年就更换制冷剂(Coolant)标准,一旦老机型的冷媒停产或制冷剂变质,维修人员就会声称必须更换整台机组,甚至连室内的蒸发器盘管(Coil)也必须一并换掉,造成极高的更换成本。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 住宅真实持有成本漏斗 accDescr: 展示除了房贷本息外,各类隐形杂费与资本支出如何吞噬租金利润 subgraph Fixed["固定基础支出"] PITI["房贷本息、地税与基础保险 (PITI)"] end subgraph Ongoing["隐形日常消耗"] Bills["高额公用事业账单\n(水费、热浪期电费、千兆宽带)"] Pool["泳池维护与频繁补水耗损"] end subgraph CapEx["不可预测的折旧支出 (CapEx)"] HVAC["空调系统报废更换\n($10,000 - $13,000/台)"] Plumbing["泳池抹灰与主水管破裂维修\n($5,000 - $8,000)"] end Fixed --> Drain["租金收入被完全吞噬"] Ongoing --> Drain CapEx --> Drain ``` --- ### [01:18:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=4680s) 拉斯维加斯水荒迷局与加州杏仁农场争论 针对公众对拉斯维加斯水资源的担忧,Jack Selby 询问米德湖(Lake Mead)和科罗拉多河(Colorado River)干涸是否真会对拉斯维加斯的居民生活造成毁灭性冲击。他指出,很多人在评论区制造恐慌,但事实上拉斯维加斯市内绝大部分生活用水都接入了极其高效的污水回收系统(Reclaimed Water),居民在室内使用的水几乎能够百分之百回收净化后重新注入水系,因此居民洗 12 分钟的热水澡或在后院建泳池并不是导致水资源枯竭的主因。 Nick Gerli 和 Graham Stephan 指出,科罗拉多河流域真正的耗水巨兽是农业灌溉,特别是加州的杏仁农场。加州生产了全球绝大部分的杏仁,而这种经济作物对水资源有着极度夸张的消耗。据统计,平均生产一颗杏仁就需要消耗大约 1.1 加仑(约 4.16 升)的水。 众人随即展开了一场充满调侃的争论。Graham Stephan 对此深感不解,质疑为什么政府不对这些耗水巨大的杏仁农场加征资源税,甚至直言无法理解为什么人们还在吃杏仁: > “Why do people even eat almonds? They are the worst.”(“为什么大家还要吃杏仁?它们简直难吃透顶。”) Jack Selby 连忙反驳称杏仁其实非常美味,但 Graham Stephan 坚称不加盐的原味杏仁是所有坚果里口感最差的,对于进入 2026 年依然有那么多人热衷于吃杏仁感到匪夷所思。然而玩笑归玩笑,生产单颗杏仁消耗 1.1 加仑水的现实,确实赤裸裸地揭示了美国西南部水资源分配失衡的核心症结所在。 ### [01:20:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=4800s) 拉斯维加斯的节水措施与房东的双重重压:通胀与心力交瘁 三人先是从加州杏仁种植极其耗费水资源的荒谬现象展开吐槽。每吃一把仅能评出 3 分(满分 10 分)的杏仁,背后都要消耗四五十加仑乃至六十加仑的水。Graham Stephan 调侃哪怕明天全面禁止杏仁他也无所谓,毕竟他早就换喝燕麦奶了。话题随之切入拉斯维加斯为了节约用水推行的激进法规:私人泳池面积被严格限制在 600 平方英尺以内,住宅前院严禁修建大型喷泉或瀑布等水景,人造草坪(AstroTurf)正在全面取代真草。就连当地的高尔夫球场也换上了耗水量更低的新型草种,甚至在炎夏季节任由草皮自然枯黄死亡,待到几个月后再重新施肥让其复苏。Jack Selby 笑称难怪一到夏天去公共球场满眼都是枯黄的死草,而 Graham 则调侃只有去昂贵的私人球场才能见识到“草永远更绿”。 玩笑过后,Nick Gerli 敏锐地切回了刚才 Graham 和 Jack 分享的持有房产的困境,提炼出逼退房东的两个核心主题:全方位的通胀(物业税、保险费、水费、Wi-Fi 等硬性持有成本全面飙升)以及无休止的繁琐琐事(Hassle)。这种琐事尤其会吸干创作者的心力和时间。Nick 指出,当下整个市场最大的基本面死结在于:**租金上涨的幅度远远跟不上通胀带来的持有成本暴增与心力消耗**。他向两人抛出一个假设问题:如果各自名下出租屋的租金能直接翻倍,是否会改变他们“受够了当房东”的想法?Jack 坦言如果租金翻倍,他绝对会毫不犹豫地花钱雇佣专业物业管理团队代劳,哪怕有些管理公司收了钱依然会把琐碎麻烦转嫁给业主。 Nick 分析道,这再次印证了房价租金比失衡的严重性——不仅房价暴涨甩开租金,各项维持成本的涨幅更是把租金远远抛在身后,投资客与房东腹背受敌。十年前普通人进入房产投资赚钱相对容易,如今门槛与风险却完全不可同日而语。Nick 举了自己一位佛罗里达朋友的实例:这位朋友在克利夫兰持有八套房产并在坦帕也有投资,最近常给 Nick 转发 Graham 的视频,感叹自己深陷在克利夫兰四处驱逐租客、在坦帕疲于应付各种房屋报修的泥潭中。这位朋友最终决定彻底抽身,转而专注于收购现金流充沛的小企业,甚至开发了一款专门分析小企业并购的数据 App。当住宅投资不再划算,越来越多投资者的目光正被迫从小微地产转向实体小生意。 - 拉斯维加斯出台严格节水新规:私人住宅泳池上限 600 平方英尺,严限室外人造水景,鼓励改铺人造草皮。 - 房东退场两大推手:全面通胀(保险、税费、公用事业开销大幅攀升)与精力损耗(应对破损、驱逐租客及房屋维护)。 - 资金流向新动向:传统“买房出租”回报率收窄后,部分投资者转战小企业收购(Small Business Acquisition)寻找更高现金流机会。 --- ### [01:21:30](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=4890s) 私募股权基金的真实收益:从繁荣期的暴利到周期末期的微利 Jack 顺势引出了一个大众极度好奇的谜团:Nick 曾长期在私募股权基金(Private Equity)担任商业地产的承保(Underwriting)分析师,外界通常认为华尔街巨头能轻易拿到 20% 以上的年化复合回报率,在大水漫灌的“K 型复苏”中无情收割、让富人更富,而平民百姓却无法企及这种投资路径。针对这一观点,Nick 用自己 2011 年至 2019 年在 PE 行业亲历的一手数据拆解了真相。 Nick 表示,当时他们机构主要承保全美各地的酒店、办公楼和大型公寓楼。在走出 2008 年金融危机阴影的 2010 年代初至中叶,市场上确实存在着极其惊人的超额回报(Screaming returns)。因为资产价格跌到了谷底,市场存在巨大的套利空间。他们当时不仅做股权直投(Equity),更多是发放高息第一顺位按揭债权(First-lien Mortgage Debt),在亚特兰大和休斯敦等城市的公寓项目上收取 9% 到 10% 的抵押贷款利率,这类债权投资能做出高达 13% 的内部收益率(IRR);如果是股权类项目,甚至能录得 25% 的年化回报。 然而 Nick 一针见血地指出,那种惊人回报属于特定周期的产物,在当下几乎绝无可能复现:“如果你现在为一家私募股权基金工作并募集资金,如果是债权,资本成本要在 5% 到 6%;如果是股权,资本成本要达到 9% 到 10%。而这些物业的资本化率(Cap Rate)却只有区区 4.5%。”资本成本与资产收益率发生了严重的倒挂,投资机构不再拥有当年的利润垫。一切都取决于投资者切入周期的节点,而 2010 年代的抄底盛宴早已随着资产暴涨和低息环境的终结而彻底落幕。 > “如果你现在工作于一家私募股权基金去募资,如果是债权,其资本成本将在 5% 到 6%;如果是股权,将在 9% 到 10%。而这些物业的资本化率却只有 4.5%。” —— Nick Gerli --- ### [01:25:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=5100s) 2011 年的超级捡漏:买房赚现金流 vs. 标普指数基金的无情对照 听到 Nick 聊起 2010 年代的暴利周期,Graham 激起了强烈的共鸣,当场回顾了自己当年在加州圣贝纳迪诺(San Bernardino)疯狂捡漏的辉煌战绩。那些房子在 2003 至 2004 年房地产狂热时期的成交价高达 38 万美元,而在 2008 年危机崩盘后的 2011 年,挂牌价直接砸到了 6.2 万美元左右。年仅 21 岁、连个人信用评分(Credit Score)都还没有的 Graham 最终以 5.95 万美元抄底了第一套,随后又以 7.2 万美元和 12.5 万美元拿下了另外两套。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 圣贝纳迪诺房产投资回报模型 accDescr: 展示 Graham Stephan 早期房产抄底的成本、租金收益及当时宏观环境收益率对比 subgraph Asset ["圣贝纳迪诺房产标的 (1,800 平方英尺)"] P1["2004 年高位成交价: $380,000"] P2["2011 年抄底买入价: $70,000"] P1 -->|"崩盘暴跌超 80%"| P2 end subgraph Cashflow ["现金流与运营表现"] R1["月租金: $1,150 / 月"] R2["年毛租金: 约 $13,000 / 年"] CR["现金回报率 (Cash-on-Cash): 16% - 17%"] R1 --> R2 --> CR end subgraph Macro ["宏观无风险收益对比"] T10["当时 10 年期美债收益率: 3.0% - 3.5%"] SP500["同周期美股大盘指数走势 (全现金投资下总收益跑赢)"] end P2 --> R1 CR -.->|"利差高达 1300+ 个基点"| T10 ``` Graham 详细复盘了其中一套 7 万美元买入、1,800 平方英尺独栋住宅的惊人账本:买下后只需花极其低廉的成本在 Home Depot 采购每平方英尺不足 1 美元的地板并粉刷墙面;当时建筑工人因大萧条严重缺乏生计,感激任何微小活计并在一周之内全速完工。整套房屋以每月 1,150 美元轻松出租,折合年租金约 1.3 万美元,净现金对现金回报率(Cash-on-Cash Return / Cap Rate)稳稳高达 16% 到 17%。当时的 10 年期美国国债收益率仅在 3% 到 3.5% 左右,相当于买房能拿到高出国债 13 个百分点的利差。Graham 坚信这是个“不动脑子闭眼买”的买卖,因为 7 万美元买 1,800 尺的房子,单价甚至远远低于当时的物理建造成本,“除非房屋建造行业彻底绝迹,否则它必将均值回归”。 然而,令人震撼的计算结果接踵而至。Nick 追问道,即便在这一堪称教科书级的地产投资范例中,如果把全款买房的现金直接砸进标普 500 指数基金,最终收益是否其实完全持平?Graham 斩钉截铁地承认事实确实如此,甚至买股票赚得更多:“我当年是用全现金(All Cash)买下的这些房子。正因为我是全款买的,若在同一时刻把那笔现金投入股市,我能赚到更多的钱。” Graham 解释,在全款无杠杆的情况下,炒股的长期综合表现直接击败了 16% 现金流的房产,尤其是后来他搬离加州,还避免了数十年后变现房产所需缴纳的沉重加州州所得税。房地产真正能够拉开与股市差距的核心唯有“低成本按揭杠杆”——如果他当时有信用记录,能够用 7 万美元充当首付撬动一套 50 万美元的房产并享有同样的现金流表现,房产回报才会呈指数级碾压股市。可惜他当年年仅 21 岁,名下空空如也,连申请一张担保信用卡都是在买完这些房子之后才开始的。尽管三人感慨 21 岁毫无信用记录就能现金买房的时代一去不复返,但也客观证明了一个残酷的投资定律:失去杠杆魔力的实物地产,哪怕在最黄金的抄底历史窗口,其回报也未必能跑赢被动投资的股指大盘。 - 极端估值倒挂案例:加州圣贝纳迪诺独栋住宅自 2004 年的 380,000 美元跌落至 2011 年的 59,500 美元至 70,000 美元,跌幅逾 80%。 - 暴利现金流数据:70,000 美元成本对应 1,150 美元月租(年入约 13,000 美元),扣除运营成本后录得 16% 至 17% 现金回报率,远超当时约 3.5% 的 10 年期美债收益率。 - 资产配置对比启示:在全现金无杠杆买入的情形下,即使抓住了极端低估、回报率达 16% 的房产黄金期,长达十余年的最终收益率依旧跑输被动投资的美股宽基指数基金。 ### [01:30:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=5400s) 现金储备与股市投资的机会成本之争 节目在轻松的开场中继续,杰克(Jack Selby)调侃自己在 Robinhood 股价大涨时其实并未持有被买入看涨期权(Covered Calls),躲过了一劫。随后话题转向投资策略中的“机会成本”。格雷厄姆·斯蒂芬(Graham Stephan)指出,尼克·格利(Nick Gerli)坚持持有大比例的市政债券或现金等价物,这种“等待崩盘再抄底”的做法存在巨大风险:即使房市在 5 年后真的暴跌,但若美股在这期间暴涨 80%,死守现金去寻找佐治亚州的单宗房产交易是否会因小失大?不如直接定投指数基金并长期持有。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 投资资产观对比 accDescr: 对比 Nick 的房产与现金偏好与 Graham 的股市长期持有观 subgraph Nick ["Nick 的资产配置视角"] N1["偏好房地产实物资产"] N2["警惕高估值:席勒 CAPE 比率偏高"] N3["保持现金与弹药:等待周期底部"] end subgraph Graham ["Graham 的长线投资视角"] G1["标普 500 指数长期定投"] G2["全球化与互联网重塑了后2000年估值体系"] G3["时间在市场内远优于试图精准择时"] end N3 -->|"机会成本权衡"| G3 ``` 对此,尼克坦承自己在股票市场方面思想非常偏传统(“老派”): “我本质上是个房地产人,这一直是我工作的领域,所以我本能地会在房地产中寻找机会。未来我也想建立并逐步扩大自己的小规模物业投资组合;但坦白说,我并不真正理解或信任股市。” 他提到衡量美股估值的席勒市盈率(Shiller CAPE Ratio,以过去 10 年通胀调整后的盈利除以调整后的市值),认为美股目前的市盈率包含了过多关于未来增长的过高预设。格雷厄姆则反驳指出,科技“七巨头”(Magnificent Seven)的远期市盈率(Forward P/E)其实并未失控;如今在互联网上任何人都能找到支持自己观点的数据图表。格雷厄姆认为,互联网和全球化彻底改变了商业模式,拿如今的市场去和 1980 年代以前比较毫无意义,若仅观察 2000 年后的估值区间,美股的表现完全在合理范围内。 - **投资理念分歧**:尼克自认对股市了解有限,偏好实物资产与现金灵活性;格雷厄姆则强调指数投资的长期复利效应。 - **估值指标争论**:尼克警惕过高的席勒 CAPE 比率,格雷厄姆则指出 2000 年后全球化时代应采用新的前瞻性动态指标。 ### [01:32:45](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=5565s) “这次不一样”的历史叙事与奥斯汀、纳什维尔的泡沫教训 面对格雷厄姆的质疑,尼克表示自己并不是断言股市一定会崩溃,但他本能地对所有“这次不一样(This time is different)”的宏大叙事保持警惕。他回忆自己在 2020 年搬去得克萨斯州奥斯汀时的经历:2020 年甲骨文(Oracle)宣布将总部搬迁至奥斯汀,2021 年春季特斯拉(Tesla)也紧随其后。当时奥斯汀的房价收入比已完全脱离基本面,每当他发出预警,身边所有人都会用一句话反驳他:“可是特斯拉搬来了,甲骨文搬来了,奥斯汀就是下一个硅谷!”而事实证明,奥斯汀并没能撑起这种神话,如今正在经历剧烈回调。 尼克分享了安德鲁·罗斯·索尔金(Andrew Ross Sorkin)撰写的讲述 1929 年大崩盘前夕的新书《1929》。书中记载了当年银行家与投资者的狂热言论:当时的人们坚信电气化(洗衣机、洗碗机等家用电器普及)将带来前所未有的生产力飞跃,同时英国等海外资本大举涌入华尔街,因此旧时代的估值模型已全部失效。这种历史押韵在今天再次上演,例如甲骨文近期又宣布将总部从奥斯汀迁往田纳西州纳什维尔,当地所有房产中介都在宣扬“甲骨文要来了”。然而现实数据却是纳什维尔的住房需求跌至 15 年来最低,而待售库存却处于 15 年来最高。 格雷厄姆与杰克则强调,即便在 1929 年崩盘后的低谷(如 1931 年)买入并持有 15 至 20 年,投资者依然能获得极为丰厚的回报: “无论网上存在多少正反方理论,唯一被历史反复验证的真理是:你的资金越早进入市场,平均而言你的收益就越好。” 尼克赞同这种原则适用于拥有稳定 W-2 工资岗位且追求省心的普通投资者,但对于拥有多家企业、独立软件和媒体渠道的创业者而言,现金储备(保持“弹药充足”)所带来的灵活性和抄底自由度才是他最看重的价值。 ### [01:38:37](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=5917s) 生育率断崖与学区入学人数骤降对房市的冲击 谈话随后转向一个长期且被严重低估的宏观基本面危机——人口出生率的崩溃。自 1991 年以来,美国的出生率已下滑约 35%。尼克直言,这是对房地产市场和宏观经济具有多重打击的重大事件: “迫使一个人下定决心买房的最根本动力是什么?不是‘我手里的钱该怎么投资’,而是你迎来了第一个孩子,或者第二个孩子即将出生;这让人产生对拥有住房所带来的稳定感、安全感与物理空间的刚性需求。” 尼克预测,根据 Reventure Consulting 的测算模型,到 2034 年,美国每年的死亡人数将正式超过出生人数,这是美国历史上从未出现过的转折点,将彻底逆转住房的供需天平。他在 2024 年底至 2025 年底居住于佛罗里达州圣彼得斯堡期间,发现皮内拉斯县(Pinellas County,包含圣彼得斯堡和清水市 Clearwater)在过去 10 年间公立学校入学人数锐减了约 7,000 到 8,000 人。学区生源流失直接反映出买房家庭的萎缩,而未来 15 年内 75 岁至 85 岁老年人口的激增又将推高死亡率,导致房产被动抛售增加。 - **出生率断崖**:全美出生率自 1991 年以来下降了约 35%,导致刚性购房需求被抽离。 - **人口负增长拐点**:Reventure 预测 2034 年美国死亡人口将首次反超出生人口。 - **学区生源警报**:皮内拉斯县过去十年公立学校生源流失 7,000–8,000 人,是当地房价调整的先行指标。 ### [01:42:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=6120s) Reventure 数据工具与人口结构模型的局限 格雷厄姆在插话赞助时详细介绍了 Reventure 房产数据应用,该软件能够穿透全美任意邮政编码(Zip code)和区域,提供比传统商业中介及 Zillow、Redfin 更为详尽的价格走势与未来预测。回到讨论后,格雷厄姆提出异议,指出清水市的学区生源下降可能有其特殊原因——山达基教(Scientology)近年来在该区域势力庞大,其信徒通常不将子女送往常规公立学校。尼克承认当地确有特殊性,但提醒大家注意,皮内拉斯县拥有近百万人口,生源的滑落绝非个别社区的孤立现象。 格雷厄姆又从微观感受提出疑问,表示从自己的社交圈和算法推送来看,当下似乎出现了一种年轻人更早结婚、回归传统家庭分工并愿意提早生育的“文化回潮”。尼克对此表示期待,但从人口统计学给出了冷静的反驳。他解释称,新生儿总数取决于两个变量的乘积: 1. **适龄育龄女性的生育意愿与生育率**(这与文化潮流相关); 2. **处于该年龄组(如 25 岁至 35 岁)的女性绝对人口基数**。 即使文化上重新崇尚生育,如果 10 年后处于育龄阶段的女性总人口断崖式减少,新生儿总数依然不可避免地下滑。尼克指出,2020 年全美人口普查已经披露了育龄人口梯队的严重缩水,Reventure 目前正在基于这套老龄化趋势研发覆盖全美所有邮编区域的 30 年人口预测模型。无论文化趋势如何微调,庞大的代际人口规模缩减这一物理定律是难以在一朝一夕之间逆转的。 ### [01:40:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=6000s) 人口结构转变与断崖式下跌的出生率 三人探讨了美国人口结构正在经历的不可逆转变。美国的18岁以下未成年人口总量已经开始缩减,这意味着整体社会正在步入老龄化通道:未来几十年内,十几岁、二十岁和三十岁的年轻群体占比会越来越小,而七八十岁的老人比例则显著攀升。这种年龄层结构的错配会自然而然地拉低出生总数,即使未来的年轻人生育意愿有所回暖,过去20年已经形成的年龄组断层也意味着未来20年年轻劳动力将严重匮乏。 Graham Stephan 指出,在很多三十多岁的女性朋友身上,这种延迟生育的现象非常典型。在他们年轻时的文化语境中,女性被广泛灌输“先拼事业、专注自我、不要过早定居成家、生小孩会拖累人生”的观念。而如今跨入30岁门槛后,很多女性开始回心转意,加之现代医疗水平和预期寿命的提高,许多人觉得推迟到35甚至38岁再生第一胎并不成问题。Nick Gerli 赞同这一现实,并援引数据称,在部分高收入地区(例如旧金山),35至50岁女性的生育率甚至已经反超了20至34岁群体的生育率。但 Nick 随即指出了残酷的生理现实: > “如果一位女性等到35或36岁才生第一个孩子,她未来能生育的子女总数就会出现天然上限,而这种上限在过去并不存在,这就是为什么出生率下滑和人口增速放缓是不可避免的。” 这一结构性问题在各区域之间还呈现出严重的极化趋势,Nick 最看重的指标之一便是“出生死亡比”(Birth-to-Death Ratio,即用出生人口除以死亡人口所得的有机人口增长乘数): | 城市 / 区域 | 出生死亡比现状 | 长期人口与房产走向 | |:--- |:--- |:--- | | **佛罗里达州 (Florida)** | **< 1.0**(20年前约为 1.5) | 历史上首次死亡人口多于出生人口,内生人口负增长 | | **犹他州普罗沃 (Provo, UT)** | **> 4.0** | 极度年轻化,出生人口呈压倒性优势 | | **德州奥斯汀 (Austin, TX)** | **> 2.0** | 内生增长强劲,无论外来净迁移如何,人口底盘稳固 | | **佛州坦帕 (Tampa, FL)** | **显著偏低**(死亡多于出生) | 失去内生增长动能,长期需求高度脆弱 | Nick 以日本作为警示样本:从1990年到2010年,日本名义房价在整整20年间重挫了50%;时至今日,日本的名义房价依然比1990年的峰值低约20%。尽管美国拥有比日本更为开放的移民体系,不至于全面重蹈覆辙,但佛罗里达等出生死亡比倒挂的板块,其底层数学逻辑已经出现裂痕,投资者如果单纯对标奥斯汀与坦帕而忽视人口断层,将承担巨大的长期风险。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 人口断层传导机制 accDescr: 展示从年龄结构失衡与晚育趋势到不同区域房产长期分化的传导逻辑 subgraph Demographics ["宏观人口结构演变"] A["过去20年青年群组占比萎缩"] --> B["步入老龄化曲线 (70-80岁人口剧增)"] C["女性推迟育龄至35岁以上"] --> D["家庭总子女数遭遇生理硬上限"] end subgraph Metrics ["出生死亡比分化 (Birth-to-Death Ratio)"] B & D --> E{"区域内生动力断层"} E -->|"奥斯汀/犹他 (>2.0)"| F["内生锁定长期人口增长"] E -->|"佛罗里达整体 (<1.0)"| G["死亡多于出生 (内生缩水)"] end subgraph Impact ["房产市场终局预测"] F --> H["年轻购房需求与资产抗跌性稳固"] G --> I["面临类似日本的长期需求空心化风险"] end ``` --- ### [01:43:40](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=6220s) 政府生育补贴政策与生娃“倒逼成熟”的争议 谈及低生育率,三人探讨了政府出台“生娃发钱补贴”(例如每生一个孩子直接发放现金津贴)的可行性。Nick 认为从直觉上看,这就像交不起房租时不准房东驱逐租客一样,听起来合情合理,甚至能在财政上通过削减其他非核心项目的开支来补贴人口,但他极其担忧不可预见的次生与三生后果。 Graham 和 Jack 随即开起了玩笑,脑补了家庭餐桌上的离谱场景:小孩子好奇地问父母为什么自己会有那么多兄弟姐妹,母亲回答“因为每生一个政府每年给我们发6000美元”。如果真按每人补贴几千美元执行,很多人可能会像电影《儿女一堂》(Cheaper by the Dozen)那样狂生十几个;但一旦未来政府财政亏空突然取消该计划,那些生了七八个孩子的家庭就会陷入灭顶之灾。因此,针对抚养孩子的所得税减免(Tax Credits)通常比直接在产房数现金发钞票更为稳妥,也能避免无业人员单纯为了领福利而拼命超生的道德风险。 随后,Graham 提到了著名心理学家 Jordan Peterson(乔丹·皮特森)的一个激进观点:**即便你觉得自己还没准备好,也应该去生孩子,因为生孩子会逼着你快速成熟、扛起责任。** Graham 表示自己从没见过谁仅仅因为生了孩子就直接沦落到流落街头。但 Jack 对此提出了异议,认为这必须严格区分年龄段: - **21或22岁以前生子**:在这一阶段生育极具破坏性,年轻人的全部时间和精力被迫从搞钱、职业晋升和积累人脉中抽离,导致其在经济层面上长期落后于同龄人; - **心智相对成熟的阶段生子**:对一部分人而言,确实会成为“在背后狠狠踢上一脚”的催化剂,迫使他们拼命赚钱养家。Graham 还提到,许多 Fortune 500(财富500强)企业的超级 CEO 恰恰在20岁左右就早早当了父亲。 --- ### [01:47:34](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=6454s) 算法囚徒、虚荣攀比与错位的消费主义 Nick 抛出了自己的核心假说:当今年轻人挂在嘴边的“生不起、养不起”,很多时候只是一种逃避现实的借口(Cop-out)。他直言当前的 Instagram 和 TikTok 算法存在某种系统性的消费陷阱: > “我认为 Instagram 和 TikTok 背后存在某种合谋,目的就是为了让所有人彻底沦为极端的消费主义奴隶,把大家死死捆绑在手机屏幕前。” Nick 剖析了现代社交媒体针对人性的收割闭环:一位年轻女孩刷着算法推荐,看到了一款昂贵的名牌包——她原本根本不需要这个包,但在算法推送下疯狂产生了占有欲;紧接着,在她意识到自己存款不足时,算法下一秒便推送“买这门线上课程教你成为白手起家的百万富翁”;女孩为了买包而刷卡买课,不知不觉深陷其中。社交媒体将整个社会塑造成极度自私、高度个人主义的生态,每个人都在孤军奋战追求虚荣的优越感,被迫卷入与邻居攀比(Keeping up with the Joneses)的恶性怪圈。 Graham 深表赞同,并引用了单口喜剧大师 Jerry Seinfeld(杰瑞·宋飞)的经典观点:过去人们评价职业,无论你是水管工还是医生,只要你热爱自己的工作,大家都会觉得“那很酷”;而今天整个社会只盯着“你一年能赚多少钱”。这种畸形的文化导致大众彻底混淆了“需要”(Needs)与“想要”(Wants)。正如金融博主 Caleb Hammer 在他的财务审计节目中所揭示的,许多负债累累的普通人开着昂贵的大皮卡,嘴硬说这是“工作必需”,却拒绝换一辆能满足基本通勤的廉价二手旧车。 在讨论尾声,作为内容创作者的三人聊到了各大平台的流量留存与算法机制,Nick 感慨地提到自己在过去半年运营商业账号时发现的残酷现实:在 Instagram 如今极其严苛的推荐机制下,一条60秒的短视频(Reel)完全取决于前三秒能否瞬间钩住观众的眼球,否则就会立刻被算法丢进垃圾堆。 ### [01:50:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=6600s) 社交媒体的老虎机算法与注意力贩卖 Nick Gerli 深入剖析了短视频算法背后的残酷机制,指出视频的内容质量根本无法左右传播广度,画面的呈现方式才是决定因素。他分析数据后发现,平台要求画面必须明亮且具备高对比度;视频播放 2 到 3 秒内必须抛出某种具备紧迫感的声明,而且关键的核心包袱必须硬憋到 20 秒左右才能揭晓。比如他会先抛出“某个西北部的前科技重镇如今正经历房地产市场回调”,一步步拉高期待,最后才给出答案。若在前 3 到 4 秒就把底牌亮出来,数据就会一落千丈。Nick 尖锐地批评这种推荐机制:“我认为 Instagram 正在激励创作者制作把人死死钩住的内容,这到底是在干什么?这就是个老虎机。”主持人深有同感地补充道,平台算法就是精心设计的间歇性强化机制,每滑两三下就会随机掉落一个精准命中的爆点,即便中间夹杂几个烂视频,大脑依然会为了下一次刺激不断下滑。 针对泛滥的屏幕使用时间,Graham Stephan 与 Jack Selby 分享了各自的“戒断”手段。Graham 透露自己早已完全不打开 TikTok,刷 Instagram Reels 也仅仅是为了给 Jack 发几个搞笑片段,并推荐大家把手机屏幕调成黑白灰度模式,这会瞬间瓦解短视频对大脑的视觉诱惑。Nick 进而从经济学视角剖析注意力:“我听很多人说过,注意力是新型货币,我对此百分之百赞同。既然它是一种货币,就必然存在买方和卖方。如果你总是在出卖自己的注意力、丧失自己的注意力并拱手让给他人,那这会把你引向何方?”在社交媒体上,用户若不是作为制作者去变现流量,就是沦为被平台剥削时间与神经系统的消费者。Graham 更是干脆采用双手机策略,将 Instagram 等工作软件完全隔离在第二部工作机上,避免自己在凌晨两点无意识地瘫在床上无底线刷屏。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 社交媒体成瘾与注意力流失机制 accDescr: 展示算法如何通过视觉钩子锁定用户,迫使用户在无意识滑动中丧失时间与注意力货币。 subgraph 算法操控机制 A["高对比度明亮画面"] --> B["2-3秒建立紧迫感悬念"] B --> C["拖延至20秒释放核心信息"] C --> D["间歇性强化(老虎机式算法)"] end subgraph 现实后果 D --> E["无意识沉迷:每天滑动超2小时"] E --> F["每年损失折合整整1个月清醒生命"] F --> G["注意力货币遭廉价抛售"] end ``` - 每天无意识刷手机 2 小时,按每天 12 至 13 个小时的清醒时间折算,相当于每年从生命中硬生生剥离掉整整一个月的时间(占清醒寿命的十二分之一)。 - 主持人调侃省下的 2 小时本可用来练钢琴、学即兴表演或钻研硬核技能,甚至能培养出一个博学通才,但现实中多数人只是在等微波炉加热或上厕所的碎片时间里顺手点开,随后深陷其中。 - 手机防沉迷应用解决方案:Jack 提到伴侣 Macy 使用的手机限制软件,单次刷短视频超过 5 到 10 分钟就会被强制锁机,必须强制完成 2 到 5 分钟的 Duolingo(多邻国)语言学习才能解锁,倒逼其多邻国积分暴涨。 - 各年龄段日均社交媒体使用时长统计: - 16 至 24 岁:每日 3 小时以上(大量受访者报告达 4 小时以上) - 25 至 34 岁:每日 2.5 至 3 小时 - 35 至 44 岁:每日 2 至 2.5 小时 - 45 至 54 岁:每日 1.5 至 2 小时 - 55 岁以上:每日 1.5 小时以下 --- ### [01:55:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=6900s) 虚假的信息获取与数据源背后的用户心智 嘉宾们拆穿了许多人用“做调研”来掩盖手机成瘾的自我安慰。Graham 坦言虽然自己花很多时间在 X(原 Twitter)或 YouTube 上是出于内容研究,但绝大多数普通人声称自己“在做行业研究”其实是在自欺欺人,骨子里全是被恐惧感驱动或纯粹猎奇。Nick 将社交平台比作纽约市售卖假表、仿冒名牌包的运河街(Canal Street),平台上的各路商贩打着“增长见识”或“维系社交”的幌子扯着嗓子拉客,一旦停留超过五分钟,用户的灵魂与清醒意识就会被彻底吸走。人打开手机的那一刻,心理状态根本不是想去获取高价值知识,而纯粹是在搜刮低成本的即时多巴胺刺激来打发眼前的无聊。 这种用户心智的差异在实际商业转化数据上表现得淋漓尽致。Nick 拿出 Reventure 房产应用后台的跨平台留存数据作为佐证:从 X 平台点击跳转进来的用户平均停留时间仅有区区 20 秒,因为短文字平台培养的是极度浮躁、快进快出的浏览习惯;而从 YouTube 深度长视频引流过来的用户,在应用内的平均使用时长则高达整整 5 分钟。这清晰地表明了媒介形式如何塑造用户的注意力深度。 --- ### [01:56:46](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=7006s) 唱空房市的立场反思:若 Nick Gerli 全盘皆错会怎样? 面对主持人提问长期追踪如此多崩盘数据是否会导致情绪抑郁,Nick 给出了出人意料的回答:他的情感立场其实更贴近一位渴望上车的刚需首套房买家。在买家视角下,拉斯维加斯等地的房屋销量腰斩、挂牌估值下调非但不是灾难,反而是一线生机。Nick 直言:“对我而言,一个始终让人负担不起、房贷月供占收入比例死死卡在 40% 的房地产市场,才是一个悲惨得多的现实,远比房价暴跌 20% 到 25% 要令人沮丧得多。” 当被尖锐追问“如果你全盘皆错怎么办?如果 2026 年就是未来的价格底部,房价由此开启温和慢牛行情,你该如何自处?”时,Nick 坦承个人的主观观点永远具有局限性,自己绝不可能百发百中,这正是他将决策全面移交给数据模型的原因:“归根结底,我的个人观点是会犯错的,对吧?我并不总是对的。正因如此,我正努力把一切判断交还给数据。”Reventure App 为全美每一个邮政编码(ZIP Code)提供未来一年的前瞻预测模型,该模型完全锚定在基本面指标上: - 挂牌库存量(Inventory) - 房源在市天数(Days on Market) - 降价房源比例(Price Cuts) - 价格上涨动能(Appreciation of Momentum) 根据模型预测,全美市场分化极其严重。例如芝加哥地区的基本面数据显示,其房价在未来一年内预计将逆势上涨 6%;因此如果芝加哥的刚需买家选择硬等一年,购房成本很可能进一步攀升。Nick 坦言自己情感上确实期盼全美房价迎来一次系统性大跌以修复民生负担,但在现实预测中模型并未显示全国性的暴跌信号,一切必须依据去情绪化的真实买卖数据说话。 --- ### [01:59:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=7140s) 录音事故结语与下期比特币专访预告 正当 Nick 准备反客为主,深入探寻 Graham 和 Jack 运营播客与个人 YouTube 频道的商业模式、团队工时及未来矩阵规划时,节目画面突然切入 Graham 录制的事后说明片段。Graham 苦笑着向观众道歉,表示剪辑时发现后半程三人彻底聊嗨,整整 45 分钟都在大聊 YouTube 运营策略与算法黑话,完全脱离了房地产这一核心主题。因此本期公开正片在此戛然而止,后续近一小时关于自媒体商业内幕与算法逻辑的对谈被移至频道付费会员区。 在视频最后的下期高能预告中,镜头迅速切至关于加密资产与宏观货币体系的激烈交锋。嘉宾断言比特币是动荡世界的终极全球保险资产,并一针见血地给出了看多比特币的核心逻辑:“他们永远、永远都不会停止印钞。”针对未来世界的核心资产配置,嘉宾给出了明确结论:普通人唯有持有比特币与人工智能(AI)资产才能对抗政客无限印钞引发的财富稀释,并就当下热炒的 Meme 币生态以及神秘中本聪(Satoshi)的真实身份发出了震撼预告。 ## Notable quotes > [41:40](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=2500s) So if you look at long-term mortgage rates versus long-term prices, it's very clear prices are the problem. Prices are too high. — Nick Gerli > [11:17](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=677s) Historically, when the builders overbuilt, there was always a recession that followed. — Nick Gerli > [47:30](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=2850s) Gentlemen! Two times in US history where real estate's been in a bubble relative to inflation and prices: right now and '06. — Nick Gerli > [01:21:30](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=4890s) 如果你现在工作于一家私募股权基金去募资,如果是债权,其资本成本将在 5% 到 6%;如果是股权,将在 9% 到 10%。而这些物业的资本化率却只有 4.5%。 — Nick Gerli > [01:56:46](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw&t=7006s) 归根结底,我的个人观点是会犯错的,对吧?我并不总是对的。正因如此,我正努力把一切判断交还给数据。 — Nick Gerli ## Mentioned Nick Gerli, Graham Stephan, Jack Selby, Reventure Consulting, The Iced Coffee Hour, Zillow, Realtor.com, Redfin, Northwest Registered Agent, Blossom Social, NetSuite, Shopify, NAR, Freddie Mac, HUD, Case-Shiller Index, Robert Shiller, Invitation Homes, American Homes 4 Rent, Progress Residential, Floyd Mayweather, Caleb Hammer, Billy Beane, Moneyball, Oracle, Tesla, NVIDIA, Jeff Bezos, Mark Zuckerberg, Palantir, Andrew Ross Sorkin, Jordan Peterson, Jerry Seinfeld, Duolingo ## Video description Northwest Registered Agent: Get the essential tools needed to start your business at https://www.northwestregisteredagent.com/free-identity-ich Blossom Social: See our investment portfolio's at https://getblossom.onelink.me/SOfu/ICH NetSuite: Get Our FREE Business Guide at https://netsuite.com/ICED Shopify: Stop waiting for permission to build something. Your next revenue stream starts free at https://shopify.com/ich DOWNLOAD THE REVENTURE HOUSING DATA APP: https://reventure.app/affiliate/icedcoffee Follow @ReventureConsulting Here! 00:00:00 - Intro 00:03:28 - Who Should Actually Buy a House? 00:11:17 - Is Housing Signaling a Recession? 00:15:30 - Sponsor: Northwest Registered Agent 00:16:46 - Why Home Prices Haven't Crashed 00:22:18 - How Screwed Are First-Time Buyers? 00:29:44 - Sponsor: Blossom 00:30:45 - Sponsor: NetSuite 00:31:50 - Is Being a Landlord Still Worth It? 00:38:31 - Will The $46 Trillion Inheritance Save Housing? 00:43:58 - Are We in a Housing Bubble? 00:51:16 - Is Wall Street Buying Up Your Neighborhood? 00:57:21 - Sponsor: Shopify 00:58:18 - How To Lowball a Seller And Win 01:07:53 - Should You Get an Adjustable Rate Mortgage? 01:12:25 - Why Graham Dumped His California Rentals 01:21:30 - Do Investors Really Make 20% Returns? 01:30:19 - Cash vs. Stocks: Who's Right? 01:37:54 - Sponsor: Reventure App 01:38:37 - The Birth Rate Problem Nobody Talks About 01:47:34 - Social Media Is a Slot Machine 01:54:46 - What If Nick Is Wrong? 01:59:23 - Next Episode Preview *𝗖𝗢𝗡𝗡𝗘𝗖𝗧 𝗪𝗜𝗧𝗛 𝗨𝗦* 𝗜𝗚: https://www.instagram.com/icedcoffeehour 𝗝𝗔𝗖𝗞: https://www.instagram.com/jlsselby 𝗚𝗥𝗔𝗛𝗔𝗠: https://www.instagram.com/gpstephan 𝗖𝗹𝗶𝗽𝘀 𝗖𝗵𝗮𝗻𝗻𝗲𝗹: https://www.youtube.com/c/TheIcedCoffeeHourClips 𝗫.𝗰𝗼𝗺: https://x.com/TheICHpodcast 𝗧𝗶𝗸𝗧𝗼𝗸: https://www.tiktok.com/@theicedcoffeehour 𝗦𝗽𝗼𝘁𝗶𝗳𝘆: https://open.spotify.com/show/5c2uoXBQkOjIiCOf60jJj7 𝗔𝗽𝗽𝗹𝗲: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/the-iced-coffee-hour/id1515070058 For sponsorships or business inquiries reach out to: icedcoffeehourpartnerships@gmail.com Apply for The Index Membership: https://entertheindex.com/ For Podcast Inquiries, please DM @icedcoffeehour on Instagram! *Some of the links and other products that appear on this video are from companies which Graham Stephan & Jack Selby will earn an affiliate commission or referral bonus. Graham Stephan & Jack Selby are part of an affiliate network and receives compensation for sending traffic to partner sites. The content in this video is accurate as of the posting date. Some of the offers mentioned may no longer be available. [Source](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uuVdTYN5mw)

Source quotes

[41:40] Nick Gerli: So if you look at long-term mortgage rates versus long-term prices, it's very clear prices are the problem. Prices are too high. [11:17] Nick Gerli: Historically, when the builders overbuilt, there was always a recession that followed. [47:30] Nick Gerli: Gentlemen! Two times in US history where real estate's been in a bubble relative to inflation and prices: right now and '06. [81:30] Nick Gerli: 如果你现在工作于一家私募股权基金去募资,如果是债权,其资本成本将在 5% 到 6%;如果是股权,将在 9% 到 10%。而这些物业的资本化率却只有 4.5%。 [116:46] Nick Gerli: 归根结底,我的个人观点是会犯错的,对吧?我并不总是对的。正因如此,我正努力把一切判断交还给数据。

Source quotes

[1:25] Nick Gerli: real estate mafia [3:28] Nick Gerli: catching a falling knife [16:46] Nick Gerli: mortgage their future [30:00] Aligning for the Agentic Era: How AI is Changing Everyday Work [50:00] Nick Gerli: We're in an actual bubble this time when we really weren't in previous periods. [56:45] Graham Stephan: In a way, a lot of these Wall Street investors saved the housing market from falling further because... if investors weren't there to stop the bleeding and to buy up this inventory, prices would keep falling. [67:53] Nick Gerli: Cat's out the bag. I got an adjustable-rate mortgage. [110:00] Nick Gerli: Northwest former tech hub

Original transcript

[0:00] The weakness I see in the different corners of the housing market makes me think the underlying economy maybe is not as healthy as the stock market would suggest. New home construction, that's down, while the cost of those homes and most everything else these days is up. What does this tell you about the greater U.S. economy? Existing home sales are around 4 million. That's about what they were in 2008-2009 during the worst financial crash. in 80 years. The gap between what home buyers need to earn and what they actually make has never been wider. What out of everything that you've seen in the past three months is the most surprising thing? Someone bought a house for 500, it's now 400. You know, we were told that that's like not possible. Who should buy a house and who should not? So for the vast majority of people in the U.S., be very careful if you're buying. Property is fine, except it's pretty darn we're going to see entire markets go down 65%. I think we'll see entire markets go down. That would be insane. Yeah. Nick, thank you so much for coming on the Ice Coffee Hour. Great being here, Graham. So I really enjoy your videos. I think you make some really insightful observations about the real estate market, the economy. I watch almost all of your content and I have to say, I really enjoy it. I am curious though, for everyone watching, the data on the U.S. housing market. If you're looking to buy a house or sell a house, you need to understand the data on where prices are heading. And we have a very bifurcated market right now, where some areas are actually crashing and going down 15, 20, 25%. We have other areas are still going up. So if you're a home buyer or seller investor, you need to understand that data before you make the biggest financial decision of your life. And myself and my channel ReVenture, it's only people providing this data? Is this data other people are ignoring? Is it shielded for some reason? Explain that. Yeah, the data is actually not shielded. It's widely available. Companies like Zillow and Realtor.com provide home price data down to the zip code, inventory and days on market down to the zip code. But I think a lot of people in real estate don't have an interest in showing the truth. I kind of call it the real estate mafia. It's maybe a cabal of realtors and people who own real estate who want to create this perception that values are going FOMO people into buying a house, even if it's not totally the right decision. So I think there isn't really the interest in the mainstream real estate industry of providing this data to people. And five or six years ago, I learned where all this data was. So I found it, I made it available and then combined it to produce forecasts somewhere prices are going. And that's essentially changing the game, in my opinion, for the housing market. Do you have a background in this? Yes. So I have an economics degree from Siena College in the London School of Economics. And then I worked my first eight years in commercial real estate as an underwriter for a private equity fund that did mortgages on apartment buildings, offices around the US. So I got my start traveling all around the US, funding deals in places like Las Vegas and Phoenix and Houston and Florida and Atlanta. And I started learning the lay of the land of the US real estate market in 2010s. I started switching my focus to the residential housing market and found some data on the residential housing market that was widely available and started putting these models together. So really high level for everyone watching who should buy a house and who should not. Well, it really comes down to can you afford it? Right. And that's the main problem in today's market. Obviously, values boomed during the pandemic and then mortgage rates went up after the pandemic. So right now. The typical mortgage payment to buy a house in the U.S. on average, including taxes and insurance, is about $2,800 a month. The median income in the U.S. is about $85,000. Meaning if you take the $2,800 and annualize it and divide it by $85,000 income, it's roughly close to 40% of someone's income they would need to spend on their mortgage if they're buying. That's way too high. The conventional wisdom is like, what, 25%? You really don't want to spend much more than 25%. So for the vast majority of people in the U.S., who are at that median income or even above that median income, they just can't afford to buy in today's market. And so, you know, my advice to them would be very careful, be very careful if you're buying. Now. If you are someone who does have more money, you can buy in today's market, but you got to be careful not to catch a falling knife. I was just in Florida a couple of weeks ago, and I was finding houses in Florida that were down literally $100,000 to $150,000 in price from what people bought at in 2023 to 2024. Now that's good if you're a buyer today. It's more affordability. But where does that stop? Right. So if you buy today, Are we going to continue to see those values go down? So that's the thing you got to be careful of. So for young people who feel really discouraged about not being able to [5:00] buy a house or afford it, Is there hope in the future? I think it depends on where you live. In a place like Florida, there's definitely hope. That market is correcting. There's plenty of inventory for sale. The buyer demand is pretty low right now. It's a true buyer's market in Florida. It still feels expensive there. but it's getting better. A place like Vegas, where we are right now, that's also starting to get better. Values in Vegas are down about 3% year over year, not Huge by any means, but an improvement. There's a lot of supply on the market. I'm finding listings in Vegas down 50 to 100,000 from their previous sale price. Generally, if you're in the Sunbelt boom areas, that's where the there's the best buyers market right now is those Sunbelt boom areas that surge during the pandemic. They're all kind of going through a little bit of a slowdown. right? Those people from California, those people from New York, they might still be coming, but it's often not as much as it was in 2021 while the builders built all these homes and while the investors bought all these homes and often investors are now selling. So I would say the Sunbelt is the best place to buy in terms of like more affordability. Actually though, the area of the US where prices are going up the most and it's still like a crazy seller's market is like, like rust belt towns like syracuse new york is number one in home value growth why is that yeah syracuse hartford chicago buffalo these markets are actually where like it's the hardest time to buy and i think there's two reasons one they just don't build in the Midwest and Northeast. The builders after the last crash abandoned the Northeast and Midwest. Like there's almost no construction in those areas. So there just isn't that. new supply coming on the market that there is in Vegas or Nashville or Tampa. But at the same time, I think there's a little bit of a reverse migration trend, Not saying that those areas are like booming, but I think some people who maybe moved to the Sunbelt might be moving back home. You know, people who moved in the 2010s during the pandemic to, say, Nashville, maybe they're moving back to Chicago. I'm starting to just see more and more of that. And the data is starting to support that too. What I find interesting is that you described your job now as basically just flying to a bunch of different locations in the United States and just walking on streets and looking at real estate. Like with your own two eyes, like actually in the field. And that's all you do. You just fly from Florida. to chicago to las vegas to new york to like see with your own eyes what out of the past Everything you've seen in the past three months is the most surprising thing. I have to say the scale of the declines in Florida. So I actually moved to Florida about two years ago to start to cover the initial stages of that downturn in person. I moved to St. Petersburg and I could see it starting. But when I just visited there in the last couple of weeks, I was shocked at how much the values are dropping on certain listings, like six figure declines. Someone bought a house for 500. It's now 400. you know we were told that that's like not possible we were told that in this cycle that wouldn't happen and The scale of declines in Florida is getting really big. Another surprising thing is Austin, Texas. That's a market that was maybe the biggest pandemic boon town. I actually lived in Austin in 2020 and 2021. Not only do I fly around, I moved to all these cities as well. And. I saw that bubble in Austin. Austin now, values are down 30%. market-wide since the peak. rents are down 20%. So you do have some markets that actually have gotten a lot more affordable, way more than people think. But then I would also say the resilience of the Northeast. I was just in Philadelphia and that market's on fire. See, that doesn't make any sense because everyone says that like Philadelphia is now not a great place to live. And everyone says that everyone is moving to Florida and Austin. So that kind of goes counter. It is. So I almost think there's a lag. You know, it's like real estate. It's so slow. Yeah. As I'm sure, you know, like real estate is so slow and the way that the market moves is slow and the way the price is adjusted, at least on the downward side, is usually slow. And I think the narrative is slow to kind of get out there. And I think I mean, if I have to put my little tinfoil conspiracy hat on, you know, I think that real estate mafia I described before, like. I think they try to keep the narrative of like people in Florida, people moving to Texas, people moving to Tennessee because they need to pump up the local realtors. Yeah, but I'm seeing it firsthand. Like a lot of people in California are telling me like, hey, man, I'm thinking about moving. It's it's Vegas, Texas or Florida. And it seems like it's one of the three. They're going to pick one. And so they are actually moving there. Certainly. I mean, those are the three states plus Tennessee with no state income tax. Right. And that's the big thing in the big draw. It's not like it's now negative or not happening. It's that the scale is lower. And we were talking before, maybe there's a difference too between the luxury market, right? People coming from California with millions and millions of dollars [10:00] First, people coming from California with like a W-2 of 200 grand. I think the people coming from California to Vegas with a W-2 of 200 grand, that's fallen off precipitously. And you're seeing that in the home sales in Vegas. Vegas home sales are lower than 08-09 right now. But, You still have these crazy luxury condo projects with five to $10 million, $20 million price tags that are selling. And of course, if California does a wealth tax, Obviously, a lot of the billionaires certainly are going to leave and maybe the people with hundreds and millions are going to leave. And so I think at that higher end, yes, you're still going to see people move to those areas. no income tax states but i think for the normal like the normal person moving, that's dropped off considerably. And it's just, it's part of the migration cycle too. The housing market is like pretty predictable. In the mid-2000s, there was also a surge of this movement, right? And then there was a collapse. And it's funny, if you look at the Florida migration graph, it's crazy. Like you see this big spike in 05-06, and then you see this big drop, and then you see it recover, and then you see another big spike in 2022, and then you see a big drop. So it's just almost like a generational, like consistent thing. I'm not saying that these Sunbelt markets aren't eventually going to recover, they will. But just where we are in the cycle right now is lower migration, more supply, more affordability and price cuts happening in these I mean, you're an expert in real estate, but some of the viewers watching might be wondering, well, I'm not thinking about buying or selling real estate. I'm just kind of content with where I'm at right now. But we know that real estate and the greater U.S. economy are incredibly attached. So what does this tell you about the greater U.S. economy? It's a great question. So housing is about 15% of U.S. GDP when you add up all the individual components. So it does have a massive impact. What concerns me about the economy right now, Thank you. is the weakness in demand on housing. So existing home sales are around 4 million annualized right now according to the NAR. That's about what they were in 2008-2009, during the worst financial crash. in 80 years. So demand right now is comparable to that period. Now, prices haven't gone down as much as that period, but demand is. At the same time, builders are flashing these warnings that only happen during economic recessions. Builders supply on the market, is over nine months of supply. So months of supply is inventory divided by sales. Builder supplies over nine months. Normal is five to six. So build. That only happens in economic recessions. So you're seeing things that only happened in economic recessions, collapse in sales, builder supply through the roof that are happening now. But of course, we haven't seen a legitimate economic recession, the unemployment rate is still 4%, stock market is still booming. And so part of me wonders if housing and the weakness in demand and the weakness in the home building sector is kind of warning us maybe about like what the average American is feeling. And that I don't know. Maybe at some point we will have a labor market recession. Couldn't it just be, though, that builders overbuilt? Because when you look at average listings on the market, including... homes that were built like 20 years ago it's only about 4.8 months on the market sure so builders overbuilt Couldn't that just be an isolated thing by itself? It could be. I mean, certainly the builders overbuilt in Florida and Texas and maybe even here, right? I just came from a home building site here, a townhome development where they sold to someone for $485,000 in 2025. It's now listed for $4.35. $50,000 loss in a year. You are right. The builders did overbuild. And that doesn't necessarily prove that there's an economic recession coming. However, historically, it always aligned that there was an economic recession. Historically, when the builders overbuilt, there was always a recession that followed. Historically, when demand to buy homes fell this low, there was always a recession that followed. My question is, is this just like maybe the outlier economic cycle where we're not going to see those things predict into a recession or will it eventually happen? So then how should the average person watching right now use the information that you just said to improve their overall finances? It's a great question. I mean, I could just tell you what I'm doing. You know, I have a pretty conservative portfolio. I have mostly my exposure is cash and treasuries and kind of short term. index funds to track short-term treasuries. So four to 5% returns, maybe even higher with where the 10-year yield is going, right? Fed might hike rates. I like the idea for me of preserving my optionality, right? Where if I can earn four to 5%, on my money, and keep my powder dry. I'm looking at the opportunities that I can get into. I actually just purchased a real estate property earlier this year in Atlanta at a massive discount. It sold for around 490,000 in 2023. I bought it for 330,000. It sold for $440 in 2021 as a new build. [15:00] So I got it. at 110,000 discount to 2021 pricing. Those type of deals, are happening in real estate right now. It's not happening everywhere. It's not happening on average, but those are the type of things that are starting to happen in those Sunbelt markets. So for me, especially as my housing focus, I want to preserve my powder. and I want to make offers on properties that I think I can get amazing deals on. That's what I would do. Why is it important to own a house to begin with? Why not just tell people, hey, listen, renting is cheaper. You're better off just renting right now. Well, renting might make sense for a house, but if you're running a business, having your own address online is pretty important because people are going to look you up before they work with you. Yeah, you could be great at what you do, but if people can't find your business, they might never even give you a chance. Like a website and matching business email are basic things, Like we get pitches all of the time from Gmail addresses with no company website and we just pass because we can't tell who's behind them. And our partner Northwest Registered Agent gives you a domain, website, business email, and a dedicated business phone line for free. You don't even have to be a paying customer, purchase anything, or form an LLC. So you can get started without paying for those basics or giving out your personal number. And the best part is that your domain and website belong to you so you can move them elsewhere. Look, I'm going to be totally honest. Northwest just wants to help you get started and support you as you grow and keep you in independent, even if you never even buy anything from them, which is kind of crazy. They just want to help. So if you're putting in the work to build a business, make it easy for people to find you and feel comfortable reaching out. Get started for free at northwestregisteredagent.com slash ICH. It's northwestregisteredagent.com slash ICH, or again, you can click the link down below in the description to get started. I highly recommend it. And like I said, you don't even have to buy anything from them, which is crazy. That link just tell people, hey, listen, renting is cheaper. You're better off just renting right now. I think most people still have an internal desire to own a home. I think there are things about owning a home that confer a value that renting simply doesn't. stability. space, security, especially if someone say wants to raise a family or has a family, right? Like those things are valuable. And I think people like the idea of in the long run, just having a place that they can call their own. And I think something like 80 to 90% of Americans kind of agree with that statement. However, The math does not make sense right now. I mean, for the average person, $2,800 a month mortgage payment, including taxes and insurance. Typical rent is $1,900. So the typical mortgage is what, 40%? more than the typical rent. If I'm a first-time buyer, why would I buy? I wouldn't blame anyone for not buying in this market, given how high the prices are and where the mortgage rates are. But I think most people still in their heart, Want to own a home? They just want to do it at terms that are like, reasonable, right? Where I don't have to like literally mortgage my future. where I don't have to take on a payment that's like, making me feel uncomfortable, making me feel house poor. So I think people still want that. And I want that, too. right? Which is helping me why I bought that house. But I'm only going to buy if it's on the terms that I feel are reasonable. And if the property I feel like especially is a good value. If it's not, For me, what's the point? So one of the things that we've seen mortgage rates have increased substantially since 2021. Why haven't prices come down accordingly? two reasons. One is that the Resale Inventory, on a national basis is still not high enough. to bring down prices. So right now there's around 1.1 million resale listings. It was around 1.2 prior to the pandemic. So we're only like, Nationally, we're only back to getting close to back to pre-pandemic supply. In 08, 09... Resale inventory went to like 3 million. So when you get that level of resale inventory, you can get a 25% national price crash. We're not at that point yet. In some markets we are. like the ones I described, which is why values are dropping. But nationally, we just haven't seen enough supply. The reason is, second point, the owners with the 3% mortgage rates. or the 4% mortgage rates. They do a very interesting subtle calculation in their head when they think about selling their house. And they look at the market and they're saying like, oh, okay, maybe it's 700,000 to sell my house. based on the market. But they'll list it like, 770. Maybe they saw their neighbor. four years ago, get that price. And they'll be kind of hesitant to cut. because I, They look at their mortgage payments, Thank you. at the 3%. And they're like, oh, my payment on this is like only $2,600, $2,700. If I were to buy the same house today with a 6.5% rate, my payment would be $4,400. So they say to themselves, why would I actually sell this house? And there's almost like a, [20:00] Present Value Calculation Like if you have maybe 25 years left on your mortgage and you have a 3% rate, Maybe you have 300,000 of interest left in that hypothetical example. If you were to buy a 6.5% mortgage rate, you have $800,000 of interest. So there's just a huge present value to not selling your house because of that low mortgage rate. So I think that those two things in combination are kind of keeping the market from adjusting faster. than they would otherwise. That was the exact calculation that I ran when I was thinking about buying a new house. I bought my house for around $600,000. And I realized if I wanted to buy that exact same house at that exact same price, and the only different variable, was the interest rate, I would be paying like 80% more. 80% more because I got 2.8% and now it's like 6.2, 6.3%. Higher than that now. Then it would be more than 80%. That's crazy. I could be paying twice the amount per month just because of the rates. It has nothing to do with the home prices. So that. makes a lot of people not able to afford, you know, basics. Yeah, it also just doesn't make sense to sell. Yeah. What's fascinating is you think about what the seller is feeling and what the buyer is feeling. So the seller, if they bought for 600,000 with a 2.8% mortgage, In the back of their mind, they might actually think their house is worth $800,000 to $900,000. Because that's the present value of the mortgage rate discount. So, I think that's a good question. But think about the buyer. The buyer is saying, "Wait, rates went from 3 to 6.5. I can't afford a 4,400 payment. I can only afford 25. They're saying to the seller, you need to discount that house. 150. So the buyer thinks that house is worth $4.50. You might think that house is worth $800. Thank you. That gap, explains the housing market right now. You have buyers on one hand with a completely legitimate financial constraint on affording, and then you have sellers with a completely legitimate financial incentive to hold. And, you know, we can get a whole conversation of how messed up this is, how the Fed printing all that money and suppressing interest rates for that long kind of created this scenario. It created a short term boom in real estate. But now, We're in like a four-year home sale depression that might last longer due to the fact that so many people have these rates well below market. So where are home prices going down the most and going up the most? Yeah. Values are down the most in Austin. So they're down 27% over the last four years in Austin. They're down about 16% in Cape Coral, Florida, Cape Coral, Fort Myers. Places like Phoenix and Denver are down about 10. Vegas is down about 5 from peak. In terms of larger markets, Values are going up in places like Chicago. in New York. Those are two of the hottest markets right now, especially Wealthy suburbs outside Chicago and New York are on fire, talking like 10% year-over-year appreciation. we were just in chicago it was beautiful yeah first real time in the city of chicago for me i was impressed gorgeous oh my gosh to me it reminded me of new york yeah but like so clean and just nice the river running through oh my gosh it was beautiful yeah that being said it's extremely surprising still though that the property values are going up there, especially in New York, especially the luxury real estate. When you have the mayor saying, you know, Ken Griffin, who lives in this mega mansion for two days out of the year, I'm going to raise my taxes on you and all of the property that you own. And yet that is like that could be going on while simultaneously the property values are increasing. It's so funny because the mom Domi example in New York City is a really fascinating case study They did something called the pied-a-terre tax, which is now law. I can't quite remember the specifics, but it's like if you have a second or third home in Manhattan or New York City, it's worth over a certain amount of money. They're charging you an extra tax on that. And that extra tax can be tens of thousands of dollars per year, depending on the price. And their whole idea is like they want to get... those people to sell. or they want to get them to pay their fair share. Now, The predictions were that that was going to lead to a flood of supply. which is not happening. Manhattan inventory is at its lowest level in 10 years. Manhattan did correct during the pandemic. Condo prices in Manhattan went down about 20%. actually they were close to like oh five levels in manhattan after the pandemic so relatively we had manhattan is undervalued actually before momdami came in which is the main reason i think that market still is actually doing well is because it didn't really appreciate for 20 years Now there's almost like some economic forces bringing people back to the city. When you think about AI... like in what AI does to the economy. You think about all these people who like worked remote in tech and finance during the pandemic. There's still some of those jobs around. But now if you work remote in tech and finance, Your job might get replaced. [25:00] This by air. Right. So there's a kind of a glomerate was called an agglomeration force now with AI. I think bringing some people back to these tech and brain hubs like New York and San Francisco. Actually, San Francisco's market might be the hottest in the US. San Francisco County is up 15% year over year, close to that inventory is down 40% in San Francisco. Obviously, the AI boom, all the frontier labs are there. I do have some questions of how legitimate recovery is because we're not seeing the job growth yet in San Francisco. But. For sure, it's what I call the legacy brain hub markets. San Francisco, Chicago, New York, those are the hottest right now. And it speaks to how this old narrative of like the exodus, is over. from those areas it's actually an agglomeration force pulling people back and there's just also that migration cycle where for the next five years that's probably going to happen and then eventually the sunbelt you know, we'll have its boom again once it gets affordable enough. So out of 10, how screwed is the average person looking to get into real estate right now? I think looking to buy their first primary home. Okay. Because I think it depends on who you're talking about. If someone's looking to buy their first primary home and they're in a market like Nashville, which is a at a 15-year record in supply and a 15-year low in demand i actually think it's actually not bad like in a market like nashville i say Get out there and make offers right now because you can get a good deal. If you are in Chicago or New York, it is incredible. tough going. For at least several years, you're going to be frozen out of the market. It's going to be tough. You're going to have to overpay. So I think it really depends on where you are. If you are in these Sunbelt markets, I think there actually is a reason for optimism. Because for the first time in like a decade. things are shifting in your favor. With that said, it's still really expensive. you know and the wage growth is something like 3.2 percent year over year and it's about 40 percent of someone's income to buy a house with a mortgage so i think the average person when they hear me say that's probably saying rolling their eyes a little bit they're probably saying like oh okay nick like sure, there's more supply and some price cuts, but I still don't even feel like I'm in the ballgame. So I think a lot of people still feel that way. You know what's interesting is that You and Graham may have opposing viewpoints on this, but I'm curious to hear, what is your view of the importance of homeownership in terms of the fabric, like the social fabric of America? Like, do you think that it's actually important for the citizens of America to be invested in land, in the U.S. economy, in real estate? Graham would probably argue no. I'm leaning more towards yes. Adam Carolla made a great point when he was talking about homeownership. in the country that you are more likely to work harder, take pride of ownership. I agree with that. And maybe invest in locally too. Like in the city that you're in, you're a part of a community, makes you want to help out more, be a better citizen. I tend to agree when he said that because before he said that, I honestly thought it doesn't matter. If you rent, you're saving money. If you have the discipline to save the difference and just invest instead of paying the extra interest to the bank, it's probably better financially. But when he said that, I was like, oh, man, that makes sense. Why so many young people these days feel totally hopeless because they're renting. They have nothing invested in their area doing well. Yeah. I think you're right. I think it is important. Just one qualification, though, is totally timing, right? In the 2010s, it was cheaper to buy than rent. Like in the 2010s, after the 08 crash, the mortgage payment was lower than the rent. Think about that. and then the prevailing market interest rate was lower than people's existing interest rate. So it was just, it was a moneymaker. to buy houses always in the 2010s it's not that way anymore but to answer your question more directly i think for the like social fabric it is important you don't want an area with like 20% homeowners. Like I was just in Berlin in Germany a couple months ago filming over there. It's a 15% home ownership rate in Berlin. And they have a really messed up market where the renters there... almost have like rights of owners and if you're an investor or landlord like you There isn't even a lease term. Like, you have a tenant in Berlin, and, like, they can just... Stay as long as they want. They're not going to leave until they want to leave. So who's investing in Berlin? Probably nobody. That's a great question. I don't know. Who owns the house? I think it's only like these investors with like massive, massive scale who maybe can afford lawyers that they need to afford to be able to like handle that stuff. But, you know, maybe certain parts of the U.S. are starting to go in that direction a little bit like California. I was about to say that seems a lot like Santa Monica. Right. Yeah. So what's to prevent the US from eventually becoming something like that with a really low home ownership rate because they get so strict about certain policies. And if fewer people own homes, it makes you wonder, what are they investing in instead? Yeah, so Nick just told us that he puts most of his money right now in cash and treasuries, and since we ask a lot of our guests where they put their money, I think it's only fair that you get to see exactly where we put ours. [30:00] Do that now with our partner Blossom. It's basically social media, but for investors. You get to see what people actually own instead of just what they say they own. Yeah, so Jack and I both uploaded our own portfolio in there, and you could see exactly what we're invested in and whether or not we're up or down. So we can finally settle the debate of who is the better investor. We already know the answer to that, Jack. Anyways, Caleb Hammer is on there too, and right now he has more followers than us, which is completely unacceptable. We can't let this happen. for free using the link down below in the description. Again, it really helps us out. We have to at least catch up to them and then beat them by like one. And that one could be you right now. Follow us to see what we actually do with our money. Who is the better investor? And help us pass Caleb. Seeing whether an investment is up or down is one thing, but figuring out what's actually making money in your business could be a lot more complicated. Yeah, but imagine being able to ask that question in plain English. That's part of management suite trusted by over 44,000 companies and it has AI woven into every tool that you already rely on. It surfaces insights when you need them and puts AI agents to work on routine tasks and problems so you can get answers and spend less time doing everything yourself. Plus AI is changing how people and teams work together and knowing how to adapt is a big part of getting value from it. And if you're wondering what that could look like for your business, NetSuite has an expert created guide called Aligning for the Agentic Era, how AI is changing everyday work and right now, It's free. This explains how AI could reshape work across your entire organization and how to position your business to prosper from it. If your revenues are at least in the seven figures, go to NetSuite.com/iced. Get your free guide at NetSuite.com/iced. Again, that's NetSuite.com/iced. Again, NetSuite.com/iced. I was about to say that seems a lot like Santa Monica. Right. Yeah. What's to prevent the US from eventually becoming something like that with a really low home ownership rate because they get so strict about certain policies? I hope it doesn't. But maybe in a place like California, it will. In California, they think they're doing a good thing. They think they're doing the moral thing of like, oh, we want to protect the tenants. So we're going to have all these rules. You can't evict them if they're not paying rent or you have to spend $50,000 to evict them if they're not paying rent. Yep. But. In reality, all that does is take away housing supply from people who can afford to pay the rent and who would pay the rent. And so we're running a little A-B test, I think, in the US with local policies. And we'll see how LA does in the next 10 years. I don't think it's going to, happen all across the US. But I have a feeling it's probably not going to end up too well for them. Probably it's going to make just costs get more expensive. That is interesting because in LA, I feel like the only money that's moving there to invest in real estate is actually the people with a ton of money. Because if you're like a upper middle class person, you would be insane to try to go up against the system of California to do cash for keys, try to evict a tenant. But if you do have the economies of scale and you have lawyers on salaried lawyers and you're a billionaire, you could navigate the system and jump over the obstacles, navigate the red tape. But for the average person, you would get destroyed trying to invest in that area. 100%. Well, your question about what would you say to someone trying to buy right now? Well, I think if someone's a first-time buyer in certain markets, there's opportunity. I think if someone's trying to become like a mom and pop landlord or scale their investment portfolio, it is not a good time to do that. If you're in a place like New York, California, you got all the local laws, right? You got all the money you're going to need to pay to lawyers. You have that lost rent that you're going to have to deal with. But even if you're not in those markets, the returns just don't make sense. Right now, what's called the cap rate. which is you take the net income from the property and divide it by the price. It's just the return you get per year. The cap rate, is around 4.8% for a single-family house in the U.S. which is... now less than the 10-year treasury. So think about all the effort it takes to buy an investment property and run it and manage it and then maybe scale the portfolio. You can get a higher return by just buying a 10-year US loan. Yeah, but a lot of people say, well, I might make 4.8%, but that single family is probably going to appreciate another 2% to 5% a year. So even though it looks like I'm getting 4.8%, I'm actually getting maybe 7% to 10%. It depends on when you That is true. If you bought in the early 2000s or in the 2010s, that was certifiably true and you probably made better than that return. The problem is if you buy in this market, you're buying into an overvalued market where the prices relative to income and rent. are just way higher than they were. And if the prices are higher than income and rent, I would just challenge that person and say, well, how are they going to grow 2% to 5% [35:00] Santa Yerb is ultimately its rent and income, which determine where prices head in the long run. So I think we're just in an overvalued market right now. Dead. I wouldn't bank on 2% to 5%. I would bank, like, if I'm buying in most markets, I'm pro forma-ing. Like if I'm building my DCF model, right, I'm performing negative appreciation for the first couple of years. How much of this is fueled by the top 1%? Because we were talking about a very bifurcated market where the luxury buyers are on fire. They're coming in with cash deals. They're buying anything in sight, whereas the lower end or like the average of the house is really suffering. It's funny because like the top 1% they don't change the reality of the market. But they certainly seem to change the narrative. You know, like in Florida and Miami, home sales are way down. Not dissimilar from Vegas. They're kind of similar markets in a certain way. Home sales are way down. Prices have corrected a little bit. But the luxury buyer in Miami is still coming in. You got Palantir moving there. You got Jeff Bezos moving there. You got Zuckerberg moving there. And yeah, so like about condos price at 10 million, it might sell for 12 million two or three years later. And that grabs the headlines. That allows the local realtors to be like, hey, look at Miami, Jeff Bezos or Mark Zuckerberg just moved in and the luxury prices are going up. So I think it has more an effect on the narrative. And again, what I talked about before, why people need data. on the housing market is because these narratives are all all over the place and quite confusing Honestly, like I even sometimes get confused. Like I track different sources, you know, Redfin and Zillow and realtor.com. And if like the same story, they could have different headlines. like realtor.com one day might say biggest decline in list prices since 2017. And this literally happened a month ago. Redfin said, Biggest surge in sale prices in four years. And I'm like, How's that possible? Right? So, It's just so important for a buyer to understand their market. you know, what's happening in your zip code. Where's supply in your zip code? What's demand in your zip code? What's the forecast in your zip code? Because that's ultimately what matters. Like if you're going to spend 500,000 buying a house or 600,000 or over a million or even 250, that's a huge investment. The issue I see in real estate is it's so behind the curve. On analytics, Like when you compare it to stocks. It's crazy. Every stock has 10 analysts and multiple different technical analysis tools and fundamental analysis tools. But then where is that for housing? Like, why does every home buyer not know what the forecast in their zip code is? Shouldn't that be something every home buyer knows? Even if it's not a perfect forecast, shouldn't they kind of have some idea from an objective source? And do you guys ever read or watch Moneyball? It was about Billy being on the Oakland Athletics baseball team in the early 2000s. He was the first one to introduce sabermetrics and statistics into baseball and you kind of had this battle between the old school scouts who didn't want stats. They just wanted to go and watch the game and tell you who was good. And then the Oakland Athletics started bringing in statistics and they started winning. way above their payroll. They started winning even with like the lowest payroll in baseball. And now like every team uses statistics to analyze players. I feel like housing is still in the early 2000s when it comes to analysis. And I think in the next 10 to 20 years, it's gonna be pretty normal for every single buyer and seller and realtor to just know, hey, here's the forecast for my zip code. Here's the demand metrics. And ultimately, my mission with ReVenture is to make that happen. So no one's in the dark when they're making a buying or selling decision. So I'm curious, though, in terms of future values, it's said and estimated that millennials are going to inherit $46 trillion through 2048. Isn't that going to be enough just to keep prices from falling? Well, there's two sides to that coin, right? There's the money millennials are going to inherit, and then there's the houses that are it. Right, so Freddie Mac estimates that there's going to be 9.2 million. Baby boomers aging out by 2035. And the baby boomers were the biggest... Demographic population segment, right? Biggest generation. The number of 55 to 64 year olds in the U.S. was always around eight to nine percent of the population. 50s 60s 70s 80s 90s until the 2000s when the number of 55 to 64 started spiking in the mid-2000s and kept increasing through 2020. Why? Baby boomers. Those were the 20 years where baby boomers entered their early to mid retirement years. And I should say. retirement home buying years. But now what's happening is the number of 55 to 64 year olds is dropping. is the baby boomers are getting older and they're shifting more to 75 plus. And we're about to see a spike in the 75 plus population in the U.S. That's historic. It's never happened. So what you're going to see from that is baby boomers passing down their homes, to their kits, [40:00] Right? Data from Charles Schwab says about 70% of inherited homes get sold. So yes, baby boomers are going to transfer the wealth to the millennial buyers. There will be more buyers on the margins, millennials, because of that. At the same time, there's going to be way more housing supply on the market. Yeah, but don't you think that would cancel out? Because let's say they... get the house, 70% sell, now they got this money. What do they do with the money? Chances are they're going to go and buy a house if they don't already own a house. Yeah. That's a good question. I mean, if someone already owns a house, I don't know if they're going to buy a house. If someone's been renting for a while and They've been waiting. Yeah, they'll probably buy a house. But see, if they own a house... and they inherit a whole bunch of money, I guarantee they're not staying where they're at. I mean, if it's anything substantial, they're going to probably upgrade that house. And at worst, they're probably going to renovate their house, their existing home. So it might be good for places like Home Depot, because if you get 200 grand and it's like, oh, well, we could fix up our current house, you're probably going to do that. We actually just added a new metric to ReVenture app, which I think addresses actually the point you're making. owner population. Because... 75 plus owners will age out. Who's going to buy the homes on the margin? the 25 to 44 year old renters. Right. The trouble for the U.S. is that ratio is plummeting. The number of 75 plus owners is growing way faster than the number of 25 to 44 year old renters in places like Florida. It's going to go below one in the next couple of years, meaning Florida probably in the next five years is going to have more 75 plus owners than 25 to 44 year old renters. So I think it's also regional. Areas with older homeowner populations, I don't see who's going to come in to buy those homes. Right? Like if you're in Naples, Florida, Are we going to see millennials flock to Naples, Florida to buy up the homes that the boomers are aging out of? I don't think so. If we're in Austin, Texas, if we're in Denver, Colorado, where there's like a younger population predominantly. Maybe. I think that could happen. More likely that that supply is absorbed in younger markets. So where do interest rates need to be then to unlock the inventory in the market? And is there a chance that we're never going to see that? I'm starting to lean on the ladder. To answer the first question, since we probably need a mortgage rate closer to five. To... make the cost benefit for some of these owners with 3% to 4% rate work for them to sell. we're going the opposite direction right now. I think today, literally today, the mortgage rate just crossed 7% again. And it seems like there's a global bond market sell off. So in the short term, I'm, Hard to envision lower rates unless there's some type of recession, right? I'm starting to lean to like, we're just never going to see that again. If you actually look at like 135 year graph of mortgage rates in the U.S., The average rate is 6.2 percent. over 135 years. But it's not like... crazy, right? Even in the 90s, mortgage rates were 8%. So I have mixed feelings about the mortgage rate thing, because like, obviously, it's having a huge impact. Right? But then if you just zoom out, it's actually not that abnormal mortgage rate it's just abnormal compared to what it was in the 2010s and pandemic like that three percent thing had never happened before which is why I think it's probably never going to happen again. And really the problem is prices. So if you look at long-term mortgage rates versus long-term prices, it's very clear prices are the problem. Prices are too high. Homeowners are sitting on something like, let's say it's like $38 trillion in equity. I think total housing market's valued around 50 trillion in the US. There's like 15 million in mortgage debt, 35 trillion in equity. homeowners are sitting on. What are they doing with that equity? Well, they're not really cashing out refis. Refis are pretty low. They're not selling their house. Sales are low. I kind of feel like homeowners are just like sitting there like, refreshing their Zestimate. and are like, "Oh my gosh, my house is worth this," or like remembering what their neighbor sold it for four years ago. So I don't see any way this ends without prices dropping. What about the argument, though, that AI, is going to make things so efficient, prices are going to drop across the board, we're going to see a lot more unemployment, And because of deflation, the Fed's going to have the drop rates just to incentivize people to really participate in the economy. Could definitely happen. I would have thought that would have happened by now. Oh, it's still so early though. Yeah. It's almost like we skipped a cycle somehow. It felt like maybe in 2022-2023 it was going to happen, but then it didn't. And then... We actually haven't had like I don't know if you consider the pandemic a real recession. It was kind of like a manufactured recession with like then all this money printed we actually haven't had a real recession in the u.s since 2009. 17 years. kind of crazy like it's kind of a pretty long time but like obviously there's still some legs on the ai boom I mean, like look at what's going on in San Francisco real estate. You look at what these AI companies are doing. You look at what NVIDIA is doing. They're buying up other AI companies. [45:00] companies building data centers left and right or providing the chips for the data centers so there's obviously still some legs again I would have thought like a deflationary like recession would have happened already. It is interesting, though, to address the AI. I'm looking at the local housing markets in the Bay Area, and I think this is so interesting. San Francisco County, Booming. Price is up 15% year over year. Santa Clara County, price is going down alameda county oakland values down year over year almost every tech market in the U.S. values down. Seattle values down, Austin values down. Denver values down? except for San Francisco County. So I'm saying to myself, this is a little weird. right? Like, You have San Francisco County where it's like the seed of the AI boom, values are surging, but in every other tech market, values are dropping. It almost says to me that there's like Is AI taking away jobs from the other tech markets? and then putting the value of that surplus value in the frontier labs in san francisco and the ai startups i think you're overthinking it i think places like san francisco are so unique because they really prohibit building it's so difficult to Add any new inventory onto the market and the existing neighborhoods there, everyone wants to live in like these certain little pockets of San Francisco and Atherton. And there's so much money there that when all these people now, essentially, they sell off their wealth globally because anytime they're raising money, it's global. And so you have worldwide money flowing into a small little subset of an area and they could buy whatever they want. And they don't care if it's like a few million plus or minus to get the house that they want. Sure. That's what I think it is. You're definitely right. I would just say that why is that not happening in Santa Clara County? Right? Like, and obviously, there's not as many AI startups there, right? It's more in San Francisco. I would have just thought there'd be spillover. at this point but instead of spillover into other tech markets it seems to be like contraction. Obviously, you're right, though. San Francisco is unique. It did drop during the pandemic. We have it as undervalued right now, even with the recent increase. Again, kind of similar to New York. And inventory is way down, sales are way up. So it is a legitimate, totally legitimate recovery happening there. But I am curious to see what's going to happen in these other tech markets. I have this operating theory building that, The AI frontier labs are creating tools that are actually harming the other tech markets. because it's leading to job losses and that's leading to prices declining. But it's a whole other conversation about the impacts of AI. The other thing I want to mention, though, in terms of interest rates, I actually just did a video about this. where we looked at the historical returns every single time interest rates were raised and lowered when compared with inflation. Guess how many times the housing market went down when interest rates went up. None. 3-1. One time. 91. I believe it was, yeah, I don't know offhand. I'll put the chart on the screen here. But in most cases, real estate kept going up, even though interest rates went up. And it was more common for real estate to go down when interest rates went down. And the thinking behind this is that interest rates generally go up when the economy could support it, when the jobs market is strong or there's inflation. All of those things, a strong economy benefits housing, inflation benefits housing. So. higher interest rates are not the cause for real estate going down. Now on the other hand, interest rates are lowered When they need to save the economy, when unemployment rises, when inflation declines, all of those things hurt the housing market. So if anything, the higher interest rates go for the most, not always, but for the most part, the other conditions are good for housing. Oddly enough. It's true. That's factually accurate. And it speaks to how weird this time is right now. The counter I would give is that All those other scenarios didn't feature a housing bubble. Gentlemen! Two times in US history where real estate's been in a bubble relative to inflation and prices. right now in 06. How do you classify now as a bubble? How do we know it's a bubble? The Case-Shiller Inflation Adjusted Home Price Index. This data is available back to 1890. It started from Robert Shiller, an economist from Yale, who's kind of like the godfather of housing economics. And he initially started coming up with his housing price indices in the late 1980s, like well ahead of the curve. And he started looking at prices indexed for inflation. because you kind of have to index it for inflation to see is the growth driven by inflation Or is it driven by something else? And it's crazy. From 1890 to 2000, inflation-adjusted home prices didn't grow at all. meaning that Over the long term, home prices tracked inflation and that was it. So in the 1970s, when you had crazy inflation, home prices boomed. But Relative to inflation, it just kept pace with inflation. Something changed, though, in the early 2000s. For the first time ever, prices relative to inflation Skyrocket. [50:00] had never seen it before. And then there was the crash. And then starting in the late 2010s and the pandemic, prices relative to inflation are now back up at that level. We've never seen that persist ever. In US history, you also look at prices to income and prices to rent. It's the same situation. So that's why I think it's hard to say like, I know people always say this in how they like in the 1981, mortgage rates were 18% and home prices went up. Well, that's because home prices weren't in a bubble back then. And that's because wages were going up 6%, 7%, 8% a year in the 70s. So there was like this massive, true inflationary mindset in the 70s where people felt like their next raise was going to be 10%. So yeah, I'm going to buy a house even if I can't afford it. People are getting 3% raises right now. And so it is truly unique times. But when you look at that price to income, price to inflation, it says we're in a housing bubble. We've never seen this bubble persist before in US history. And the mortgage rates are this confounding factor that's making it even harder for affordability. But I wouldn't say that just because prices have never really dropped when rates went up that doesn say they won this time We in an actual bubble this time when we really weren in previous periods How much is Wall Street buying up residential real estate affecting the housing affordability? It was a huge impact in the 2010s. In fact, the US government actually helped give Wall Street money to buy up homes in the early 2010s, especially in markets like Vegas. Companies like Invitation Homes and American Homes for Rent and Progress Residential, they bought up close to a million homes in the US over 10 years. So undoubtedly, the Wall Street investors made the situation worse for affordability, and they made it particularly worse in certain cities. Vegas would be one. There's Wall Street investors all over this housing market. Atlanta would be another. In particular neighborhoods, these investors own 50% of the homes. So locally, it was a huge impact. Nationally, they only own like 2% to 3% of the housing stock. So it wouldn't be right to say that Wall Street investors are the reason national prices are high. It would be right to say though, that in certain markets, there are principal reason in certain neighborhoods. They're the main reason. Interestingly, they stopped buying four years ago. As soon as rates went up Wall Street exited the market The biggest Wall Street investors like their purchases got cut 50 60 70 So they kind of saw the writing on the wall That stuff I talked about before with the returns and the cap rates like the mortgage rate is now above like what they can make. So they're not really buying. And then they just got banned, which is kind of an interesting story. But I think they did have a really sizable impact in certain markets and making housing less affordable. There's also studies that say Wall Street landlords increased the rent more than mom and pop landlords as well. So what do you call Wall Street landlords? What is that defined as? So it's like several companies I think of, right? The ones I mentioned before. The U.S. government just defined it in the Road to Housing bill, which just passed. They defined it as owning more than 350 homes. So that's now the threshold where if you own more than 350 homes directly or indirectly, you are not allowed to buy more from the existing housing stock. That law goes into effect January 2027. It's for 15 years through 2042. So yeah, 350 houses. It was actually lower than I thought it would be. I think of corporate investors, maybe it's like 1,000 homes or more. But 350 homes is now the cutoff and these investors have to report to HUD each year So if someone owns more than 350 houses directly or indirectly they mandated starting in 2027 to provide a list Did you know that Yeah No I knew I called it performative because you tell me these numbers and I say from all of my research that they're buying built to rent communities. They're not necessarily going and picking Sally's home down the street and competing with the normal, you know, owner user. Like it never makes sense for a Wall Street investor to say, I'm going to compete with someone who's going to live there full time because the numbers never pencil out. They did. So from 2012 to 2022, they did buy up the existing homes. They did. But those were portfolios from banks who were never going to sell them individually. The banks would say, hey, we got 300 homes that are underwater and it's not worth our time to parse these out individually. You could buy them for 70 cents on the dollar. And so they bought those, but those were never meant to go on the market to begin with. Sure. Yeah, I mean they certainly did buy in bulk 2013 2014 after the last crash they got amazing deals, right? Some of these houses in Vegas they got like 70 grand per door They did continue to buy and scale the portfolio through the late 2010s early 2020s Especially in markets like Atlanta especially in markets like Vegas and Phoenix. I saw with my own eyes But I think your intuition is correct [55:00] Acts. that it's performative in one sense. Like, That law passing is not going to like, dramatically change anything. I don't think it's going to change a single thing. It is not going to matter. At all. That's where I would disagree. What I think that does is stop them from getting in. as the downturn no build to rent communities are excluded so if anything they could go and build their own community and rent out single family houses, which I think is good for the market. It essentially shifted their focus, right? If they had any remaining focus on the existing housing stock, It's now shifting to build to rent. They're almost turning into builders, right? American Homes for Rent is now like a top 35 home builder in the US. So yeah, some of these Wall Street landlords are going to have to become home builders to stay relevant, which is good to your point. But I'll just tell you what I'm seeing in Florida again. Like when I was there last week, there are houses that... crashing in price. those investors are now kind of locked out from buying up those homes that are crashing in price. So I think that's the one benefit, let's say, right? Is that if certain markets do go through an extended crash, in this cycle. And some are already. they're not going to just be, all these homes aren't just going to be scooped up. again but couldn't you say though that's negative for the entire market because what's going to happen people don't like to hear this but in a way a lot of these wall street investors saved the housing market from falling further because you have let's just say your grandma and grandpa their home is now worth 50 less and if investors weren't there to stop the bleeding and to buy up this inventory prices would keep falling and it's not like other people were going and buying i mean house if they had the means to buy a house, but they didn't. And prices kept falling and falling and falling. So if anything, you could argue it would hurt the broader market if they didn't come in and buy. And if they're not buying in Florida, what does that mean? Maybe prices keep falling and falling and falling. And you could argue, well, that's great for the average person because now they're able to go in and buy cheaper. But what does it say to everyone else who owns a home in the area? And they're banking on those values, at least staying somewhat stable to figure out what and if they feel comfortable moving and if they want to relocate. If you're underwater in a house and you don't have any money, you're not selling. You're staying put. So you could argue maybe that's worse for the market. And that's the problem. Without enough buyers, prices can keep falling. If you run a business, reaching buyers matters too, especially with Black Friday coming up. Exactly. And if you're only selling in person, now's a good time to get your store online so that people could shop wherever they are. And that's why we love our partner Shopify. Before Graham and I started working together, I set up probably five or six different Shopify stores. And if even I can figure it out and get some sales here and there, then you can too. I also kept going back to Shopify because it is literally the easiest way to create an online store and start actually selling product. And now their pre-built themes and AI site builder could help you create a professional storefront without having to hire someone to build your website. Plus, getting set up before Black Friday means you're ready for the extra online traffic when more people are shopping and actually ready to buy. So if you're ready to launch your business before Black Friday, That is shopify.com slash ICH. Go to shopify.com slash ICH today to hear your first. If you're underwater in a house and you don't have any money, you're not selling, you're staying put. So you could argue maybe that's worse for the market. Totally. Yeah. It totally depends on your perspective and like who you represent. Right. So like me and my channel and the data, I very staunchly like have the interests of home buyers in mind. Right. You know, I'm 36. Right. Like I just bought a house and I want to settle down I'm not thinking from the mindset of like what's best for the existing owners in terms of their value. However, You do bring up a good point. You don't want like full-scale calamity, right? Like, In Vegas, in '08 to 2012, it was horrible. I mean, this area is still scarred somewhat. Like you talk to people who are in Vegas back then, It scarred a generation of people being through that crash. Prices in Vegas dropped 63%. from 07 to 2012. A $350,000 house, In '07 was worth like $140. which is hard to fathom, right? That is bad, right? And the market did... was going to fall further if it weren't for some of those investors buying. I don't think this is the same. like period in that sense, like consumers have stronger balance sheets. We don't have as much mortgage debt in the economy. I don't think we're going to see entire markets go down 65%. I think we'll see entire markets go down 30%, like Austin is. Austin's a great test case. Austin's down 27% in four years. What's happened? Unemployment rates 3.6%. there actually hasn't been like this, like, full-scale let's just call it like economic calamity it just handled the correction and and I think [60:00] where the consumer balance sheets are, I actually think a lot of owners could handle the correction. And banks also have less exposure this time around. So I think the housing market has more cushion to absorb these declines. Like I said, homeowner equity is $35 trillion. Just give some of that back to buyers, right? Like it's pretty simple and the market will improve. So that's why I don't think we need Wall Street. I think it was like a one-off. I don't think we need or want them in the housing market again to buy. So build is a different discussion. Wall Street still makes up such a small percentage. I have it here in my notes that investors... This year in 2026 still make up 19% of home residential purchases. And the median investor capital gain on resale is currently $196,000. Now when did they buy? I guess is the question. But how many investors do you think or know are underwater on their purchase? Or how many people? So I think in the worst market right now, it's probably around like 10 to 15% of people are underwater on their mortgage. In Austin, it might be like 30, 35% of people are underwater on their purchase potentially, given how far values have fallen. So it's still a minority of the market. And that's why I actually think it's something that the market can handle. And you're right. Mom and pop investors still do buy some houses. right? A lot of them maybe look at it like a long-term investment. But overall, investor purchases are down 50% from peak in 2022. In Vegas, they're down 70%. So literally like in Vegas, the investor purchases were 3,300, I believe. Now they're like 1,200 per quarter, according to Redfin. So... It has been an investor exodus. And, I think it's going to be a while before investors come back. to the market. It's just the math just doesn't make sense. Where are they moving their money instead? i'm noticing the stock market personally it seems like everyone's going into stocks right yeah which Also worries me that when everyone is doing something, sometimes I think, well, maybe that's not the best choice if everyone else is doing it. So that gets me worried that like if they're not investing in real estate. Now I tend to think, oh, well, maybe that means there's actually an opportunity in real estate. I don't know. certainly right yeah like it's it's not cool real estate is not cool anymore Right. Like when I started my YouTube channel in 2020 and started putting together the data, real estate was so cool. Like everyone wanted to become like an Airbnb investor. Everyone wanted to like buy homes in different states and scale it. No, it's not cool anymore. And yeah, you're right. It is starting to teeter on like, it's so not cool that you wonder if like that's a signal of something and that's why i tell people who are in markets where there's actually a lot of supply i'm like Now's not the time to buy. But now is the time to make offers. right? Like, Figure out What? you would be willing to offer for that house. Objectively. Put it on paper. Do the mortgage payment out. Maybe look at it as an investment property just for fun and figure out what you would be willing to offer. And even if it's 150,000 below, Make the offer. you That's the stage we're in. right now. it's not time to buy but it's time to start sniffing around if you're in atlanta if you're in vegas if you're in dallas if you're in austin in denver in seattle it's time to start sniffing around in these markets because you would actually be surprised If you do that enough, What can happen? I am shocked, by the way. I really regret not making an offer on Floyd Mayweather's house. He had it listed here in Vegas at like $14 million. Wow. Dropped it to $12 million, dropped it to $10 million, dropped it to $8 million. And it sat there. And part of me is thinking, man, it's just, it was a big house. It was like 12,000 square feet. So you're saying it went from 14 to 8? Yeah. Do you remember what it sold for? 6.6. And I look at that and... I honestly think in hindsight, I'm like, I would have paid six, six fifty. I give them a little more money than what they got for twelve thousand square feet. This was like a custom build right on the golf course on basically a cul-de-sac street. Oh my gosh. That was the place to buy. Out of curiosity, was that recent? Recent. That was a recent sale. And my understanding with that is that They had quite a few issues with the house and title, There might have been issues of like, we don't know quite who has the authority to sign off on the house. So there might be an issue with title or there might be liens that have to be satisfied before we're able to issue a clean title. I don't think it was an easy transaction. And my understanding is that whoever bought it waited quite some time. So they had the patience. That was a great property. Out of curiosity, why didn't you make an offer? At the time, I... [65:00] didn't think it would sell for that. I, I, thought that like it's Floyd Mayweather and this is before it kind of came out that like hey maybe he doesn't have a lot of money I thought it's Floyd it's like he doesn't give a shit it's like if it doesn't sell it but sometimes like to your point You never know. You never know. And we actually developed like a little system at Reventure to help home buyers with this. And again, it goes back to the property I just purchased in Atlanta. It's like... Here are the markers of a seller that's willing to negotiate. It's one thing you got to do. You got to differentiate between the sellers that are just like, Taking a flyer? trying to get like this like price that and they're not that interested in selling right versus sellers are actually interested in transacting for me I only look at houses that have been on the market more than six months. is in this still very overvalued market, I know I'm not going to get a good deal if the house has been on the market for less than six months. I want to see also multiple price cuts. Those two signals are signals to me that the seller is like, at least somewhat wanting to sell the house. Right? And then if I see that, I do my own math on what I think it's worth. We have like a listing tool analyzer that helps people figure that out. And, Yeah. then make, an offer Sometimes that'll be a hundred thousand less 150,000 less. There's kind of almost like a system to it. I'm starting to develop. It's like you don't want to just come and make the offer immediately. This is you're going to piss them off potentially, right? It's more like you want to see the house. You want to show your proof of funds. You want to establish credibility. upfront. You don't want to just be this guy who's like, I see the house. And then like two hours later, low ball. Right. You want to establish credibility. You want to tell, you know, a legitimate story and, you know, You want to figure out what it's worth and you want to go to the agent, listing agent. And I would actually almost recommend people do this direct and just say, hey, I love the house. I'm interested in making an offer. It's going to be substantially below list price. Would you like me to still make the offer? This way it's like, You're preparing them? And they might say no. and at that point you just know it's a waste of time But you didn't have to like... go through making the offer. If they say yes, you know they're intrigued, then make the offer. And again, when I bought that place in Atlanta, I... you know, this is really fascinating. It was like 490. They cut the price to 415. So they're already taking a loss. I offer $315. They rejected it. and counted at 400. And I was like, No. And I just let it sit. And then they came back around at 360. I counted at 3:30. I got the property. And that's not to say you can easily do that, but that's to say that in this market where prices are starting to drop and there's a lot of supply and there's some more distressed sellers, if you can isolate the people and the sellers who fit the profile of being willing to transact, you could potentially get what I call post-crash pricing now. Does it make sense to get an adjustable rate mortgage? I mean, if rates are going to continue to go up, Probably not. Right, but in general, is that a potential thing that someone should explore? Cat's out the bag. I got an adjustable rate mortgage. You locked in for seven years. For seven. However, now, kind of regretting it because the tone of the conversation is that rates will not go back down. Yeah. Like the tone of the conversation is that they will stay the same or continue to go up. And now I'm like, well, I got 5.7%. I don't know what I could have gotten if I just did a fixed rate 30 year. Maybe like 6.1, 6.2. But who knows? I think seven years, impossible to predict. Yeah. So is it seven years before then it turns into an adjustable rate? Yes. So it's fixed for seven. Fixed for seven. And then it adjusts. But it will still be below the 30-year fixed in seven or six now, I suppose. So it'll trail that a little bit. So you're gaining. So basically, yeah, you gain up front and that you're going to be below market. And you just expose yourself to tail risk. I guess in some ways it's not a bad idea. The average homeowners in their home for seven years. right so like if you're the average homeowner who's going to end up selling right In seven years, you could potentially like... pocket that differential if you're buying to sell in seven years maybe you shouldn't be buying in the first place at least that's a good point too again depends on the market like in nashville It is shocking. Every house on the market, it seems like. was sold in 2022 to 2024. It's just wild. How many houses are on the market that sold four years ago? And something just has to do with the type of market it is. Nashville, super transient. People come in, they come out. right? They come in for a job. job moves them, right? Somewhere like Chicago is not that way, right? Usually people in Chicago are like, upstate New York or Connecticut or New Jersey, they buy their They're often there for a while. So if you're planning on holding to a home for X amount [70:00] of years if you were to buy what is that number I don't mean to cop out on this, but again, it totally depends on the market. Because in California, the cost to buy versus rent is... literally insane. Like the same house in California that you're renting for four grand would cost 9,000 a month to buy. So I would put that threshold much higher in California, because if I'm in California... I'm saving money renting. i really am saving money renting i'm saving money still renting in vegas i was just looking at a house today Cost to buy, $2,800. It was just on the market for rent a year ago, $1,850. Why would I buy a house for $2,800 a month when I can, it was literally just on the market for $1,850 in rent. So I'm doing that upfront math equation and I'm figuring out, okay, how much am I, in this market, how much more am I spending by buying? Thank you. And I think just in the majority of circumstances, that means that you need to stay in the house for a long time. To your original point, you need to stay in the house for a long time because you're going to need the value of that house to go up to make that worth it. And that might take in this market. 15 years. 15 years for places like California, maybe in other places like Florida, you would say a smaller amount. Yeah, exactly. What about you, Graham? I would say it's probably got to be... 15 years, maybe 12 years, just to make sure that you're not going to lose money on that sale compared to renting. And it really depends on the interest rate. When interest rates were at 3%, I would say seven years. Then when they were like five and a half, 6%, I told people like 10 years. Now I think it's got to be even higher because you're paying so much up front. Just to be having more of your mortgage payment go towards principal than interest, I think now is like 18 to 20 years. So you're front-loading all the interest on your mortgage. You're really gaining nothing. And so you're banking on appreciation. Are we going to see appreciation over the next decade? I think it really depends on the area. And so that's for someone looking to buy a primary residence. What about an investor of real estate? What strategies have you seen actually work in today's real estate environment? Running as fast as possible. The only strategy that works that I have seen be really effective is you just see a house, and then you turn around and you walk out the door as fast as possible. So just avoid it. Avoid it. That works 100% of the time. And put it in an index fund, international index funds and muni bonds. Well, at this point, I would like to ask Graham about his experience selling his portfolio in California because I feel like it's a very relevant topic for that question, right? What prompted you to liquidate and get out? Prices had risen to a level where I was looking at my alternatives and I was looking how much were these properties making? What is it worth? What would my net be after I sold, after commissions, closing costs, taxes? And I determined after selling, I could make just as much money in a tax-free muni bond, more in fact, than owning the property. And I saw the writing on the wall with a lot of my properties were under rent control. And I don't think it's going to get better. And so I see all the risks and the headwind with rent control, the hassles, the time, every single thing I had to think about. And I hate it. I had multiple times where I'd get a letter from my insurance. Your insurance is canceled. I'm calling them up and they go, oh, it's an error. But right now they canceled your policy. We have to reissue it. I said, when is that going to happen? about 48, 72 hours. And so I have to hope in the next 72 hours, my home doesn't burn down or there's an earthquake. And the amount of stress, and this has happened, by the way, almost once a year. And when you put this through multiple properties in LA, and there's an insurance lap. for a few days on something, I'm dealing with this multiple times a year and I have to be on top of it. And then I get the property tax bill. And I got really lucky that I have extremely low tax basis on these properties where my property tax bills on like a $1.3 million rental might have only been like eight grand a year. But I still see that. I'm like, there's eight grand gone. And you could say, well, yeah, it's baked into the rent and this and that. But I'm looking at it's just a waste. And then I get. a $500 water bill from LADWP. And I say, what are my tenants? Why are they wasting the water? Well, it's because they don't pay the water bill. I pay the water bill. And when you pay the water bill, I'm cognizant of how much water I'm using. Let's not flush the toilet 50 times. We don't need to take... That doesn't affect the water bill. Let's take too many baths. Maybe one cent per flood. Somebody... So what are they doing? Somebody is... I don't know what they were doing, but the fact is it's 12 hour showers, it's watering the lawn, it's hot outside, they just take a hose and just leave. I don't think. I fucking challenge in the backyard every day. It's just, it's something going on where I'm paying now. I'm paying now a high water bill and a high electric bill, too. [75:00] because electricity rates are going up, We've been having a heat wave here and I'm so glad I don't have to pay the electric bill for what's going on there. They'll run the AC 60 degrees. And listen, I had great tenants. Like really, really, really good tenants. I was lucky with all the tenants and I like them, but I don't like the bills. And so I looked at that and I said, it's time to sell. I don't want the stress. I don't want the hassle. I want to be done with it. And so we priced aggressively and I also made sure I spent so much money. I spent between three properties. I must have spent 140 grand between these properties, fixing them up and staging. I mean, I went to the nth degree to make these places look awesome so that when we come on the market, we get multiple offers sold over asking. People do not realize how expensive it is to actually own a home. All the things outside of principal interest, tax and insurance. Last year, I was doing all of my bookkeeping for the house that I live in right now, which I rent out four of the rooms at, which you would think would at least cover the cost of living there. It's four room rentals. Problem is, I collected about $30-some-thousand over that year in rent, and it cost me $60,000. Get out of here. My PITI was like... $2,500 a month. So where did all the additional 30 some thousand dollars go to, you know, Wi-Fi, which is 180 bucks a month. It goes to electricity. It goes to water because we have a pool and filling up the pool. You have to do that every few days in Vegas. I mean, the pool, we had a water bill that was like $600. I think I had an $800 water bill last year. Oh, by the way, for Vegas, that's a lot because LA, it's normal to get like a $500 water bill. by the way, with a reef aquarium and a pool is like 80 bucks a month. Really? I've had gas bills and like the hundreds of dollars. On top of all of that, every single year, you have a capital expenditure that you didn't expect to have. So last year, it was air conditioning. I spent like $13,000 on air conditioning. The year before that, I had my pool replastered. That was $8,000. I also had to do another AC unit. I had the pool pump go out. That was a couple thousand dollars. I had problems with irrigation. That was a couple thousand my mainline. That was 5,000. It's like I've owned the house for five years. The house was actually taken care of pretty well, but just in home ownership, especially if you have a pool and especially if you're in Vegas, things happen, especially if it's an older hope. People think they're saving money by buying a house that you're not paying the exorbitant prices of new builds. When in actuality, if it's a 30-year-old home, everything is expiring. Yeah, I got another one too. I had a tenant move in. They're paying about $3,500 a month. Moved in second week. The AC goes bust. And it was $10,000 to fix the air conditioning. Air conditioning is the biggest scam ever because it is planned obsolescence. The best AC units are the 30-year-old AC units. Those ones never go bad. And I was told this by my AC technician. And they change the fluid that they use, like the coolant that the air conditioners use every few years. And then say, oh, well, you have to buy the new unit because it uses the new fluid. And if you have the old unit and the fluid goes bad, like you just have to change the entire unit. crazy and if you change the the ac unit then you have to change the actual coil interesting it's it's absurd so i do have a question on the water in vegas i want to get to in a second because i see that in my comment section all the time oh like me's running it's not running out of water it's all the california almond farms that are using the water it's not vegas vegas uses so little water compared with the farms of california and everywhere else yeah myth and doesn't vegas that they use well water. So it's all reclaimed water. So they're really not pulling from anything. So is this whole thing about Lake Mead running dry, Colorado River running dry, and the impact on Vegas? I've seen this. Is this all kind of a fear point? I would say yes, but there is a water issue that will happen down the line. It's not because Las Vegas residents have a pool or they're taking 12-minute showers. It's not that. It's California almond farms that are pulling the majority of the water. Is it actually the almond farms? Yeah, oh my gosh. The amount of water it takes to create a single almond. is insane like when you look at how many gallons per almond So why do we not have like taxes on these almond farms? Maybe we should. Why do people even eat almonds? They are the worst. - Hold on, almonds are delicious. They're the worst tasting nut. Especially if they're unsalted. It boggles my mind people are still eating almonds in 2026. So it's 1.1 gallons of water Per almond. That's insane. [80:00] So every time you take a handful of almonds and put it in your mouth and get like a 3 out of 10 on the flavor scale, you're also contributing to lack of water. 60 gallons, 40 gallons of water. I think we could ban almonds tomorrow. I'd be okay with it. I just switched to oatmeal. But we know who wouldn't survive. The almond blooms. Yeah. Now, Las Vegas, though, is taking measures to conserve water in ways that they can. Like, pools right now are limited to 600 square feet. You could only have a certain amount of water features on your property, so you couldn't do, like, a huge, like, waterfall in front of your home. They're really going for... AstroTurf instead of Grass. The golf courses are now using a different type of grass that requires less water. Some golf courses are even letting the grass... How do you know all of this? Because I do so much research. Yeah. Golf courses plus almonds. Yes. That's the real problem. But it's not really the golf courses. But They're also using a new type of grass that they'll let die off so that they could then re-fertilize it a few months later and then have it grow back again to conserve water for a few months. Because when I'm looking at golf course... Frontage properties here in Vegas, the last thing you want is for your golf course, your view, your backyard. to go brown. It's completely, all the golf courses I at least go to, the public courses, are completely dead during the summer. Completely. Yeah, because you're going to the knot. Like no one's there or the grass is dead? The grass is brown. Well, the grass is always greener. At the private course. At the private course. Yeah. I've got it. One thing I was picking up on when you guys were talking about your experiences owning real estate is there's a couple of themes that kept popping up there. One was inflation. There's the costs of owning, whether it be property taxes, insurance, water, Wi-Fi, all that stuff. So it's just generalized inflation. right increasing your costs the other thing was Hassle. right and just like draining you mentally let's say right like especially if you're someone who's like a creative person you need for your job right and you're like having to worry about all this stuff so it's inflation and hassle And I think actually the big fundamental issue is that rent hasn't gone up enough to make up for the inflation on costs and hassle for investors to stay in the market. Like hypothetically, if for both of you, the rent was double. on your respective properties? Would it have changed your perspectives on, is this hassle worth it or no? I think it would for me. I mean, granted, I'm still living there, but let's just say I got double the amount of rent. Then I would just hire a property management group. Granted, I've also never worked with them. And I know sometimes they kind of pass the hassle onto you still, even after you pay them. But I would pay the money for a property management group. Yeah. So that just goes back to my thinking about the market, right? I was talking earlier price to rent ratios and how the prices have gone up way more than the rent. And it sounds like the costs of ownership have gone up more than the rent too. And I think that's squeezing landlords and I think that's squeezing investors. And it's taken 10 years ago, something that was very attainable. to get into real estate investment 10 years ago. and feel like I can make money, right? now it's not i have a friend he actually he lives in florida he owns about eight properties in cleveland and he owns a couple properties in florida and he's he was actually sending me your stuff graham he's like look at he was like look at this like what graham's saying is exactly what i'm feeling you know he feels the same way he's like oh yeah like i got into cleveland i heard that the returns were good but i have to evict tenants and left left and right and then he's dealing with issues on his property in tampa and He's now focusing actually on small businesses. He actually started an app where you can analyze small business acquisition. He thinks that that's where... more of the opportunity is so maybe that's like another thing you know people are starting to look into too is like hey if i'm not buying houses as investments maybe i'll buy small businesses One thing that I thought was actually really interesting, we didn't really tap into it, but you said that you were underwriting for private equity buying up commercial real estate. Yeah. What was the general return that private equity would get on commercial? Because a lot of the layman, like the average person, probably myself included, think that private equity can go in and then get 20% returns year over year, like the rich get richer, K-shaped economy, and the average person's screwed because they can't tap into this like, investing style that only wall street can do was that true like what what did you experience underwriting private equity commercial real estate deals yeah so we did like hotels office buildings apartment buildings around the u.s was kind of our main asset class and i worked there from about 2011 to 2019 so it was coming out of the last crash You could make screaming returns coming out of the last crash. And we actually did mortgage debt. Sometimes we did equity, but we actually did mortgage debt. The mortgage debt was often like sometimes 9%, 10% rates. on first lien mortgages on apartment properties in places like Atlanta and Houston. And because the prices had dropped so much, there was so much meat on the bone [85:00] for like return that yeah you on a on a mortgage you're we can make 13% IRR. On equity, we can make 25%. But that was in the 2010s. I don't know if that's possible now. I don't think it's possible now because if you raise money now, if you work for a private equity fund and you raise money, that cost of capital is going to be five, six percent of its debt. It's going to be nine, 10 percent of its equity. And then the cap rates for these properties are four and a half. So, A lot of it just has to do with where you are in the cycle. Again, coming out of the crash in the 2010s, there was so much opportunity in the mid-2010s. I mean, that's what I bought. And the properties that I bought back then, I'll never forget San Bernardino, they had sold... Like 2003, 2004 for like $380,000. And I picked them up one for $59,000, the other for $72,000, and then another for, I think it was $125,000. Sorry, what was the original price again? $380,000. It never dropped. It sold. Sorry, sold. Sold for $3.80. Sold for $3.80, 2004, then got relisted in 2011 for, I think it was like, $62,000 and I got it at like $59,500. So is that 70%? Something like that. But when I was looking at these, I was calculating the amount of rent I'd be able to receive versus the purchase price. And I had this whole system figured out where I wanted to make about a 15 to 16% cash on cash return after all of my expenses. buying these properties. That's what it was, but that was normal. Do you remember, so for the 70,000, it was like a house? House. For the $70,000 house, what would be the monthly rent? Do you remember back then? I rented initially at $1,150 a month. Wow. I put a little money into it but it was really just like paint floors and floors we got under a dollar a square foot at Home Depot. I remember the workers, I got a really great contractor and he Uh, was like desperate for like he was just grateful to be able to have any amount of work whatsoever because no one was doing anything and so he was like just and he knocked it out in a week because he was like just i want to churn out uh churn out projects such a great such a different environment yeah right but what i'm thinking about is just the math so 1100 a month is what like 13 000 a year roughly yeah on a 70 000 purchase so 13 000 times 70 divided by 70 000 that's what like a 16 17 Yeah, cash on cash return cap rate. What was the 10-year treasury back then? Like 3%? 3.5%? So the 10-year treasury was 3.5% and you were buying something that yielded 17%. But that's why I felt so confident buying these. Because I was looking at like how much per square foot for this house and it was 1,800 square feet for 70 grand. And I was like, you can't even build for anywhere close to that so my logic was that it has to be worth at least what it costs to build or the housing market is screwed forever and they will never build another home ever again which i knew was not the case so i felt like this makes so much sense like this is a no-brainer but even so after all the calculations that you did had you just thrown that money into an index fund instead of buying real estate wasn't it kind of the same yes yeah which is crazy like like the most perfect of worlds. Putting your money into real estate when you can get a 16% levered return, cash on cash return in real estate, it didn't even matter. So you could have just thrown it into an index. Here's the thing. So here's where the math stops mathing. I bought these properties cash. And because I bought them cash, I would have made more money putting that cash into the stock market at the exact same time. especially because I eventually left California. And at some point I wouldn't have to pay this California income tax on realized profits decades later. But had I put small down payments on these properties instead, and instead of getting, you know, this one property for 70 grand, I put 70,000 on a down payment to buy a $500,000 property, and I made that same return, then I would make so much more money in real estate. I just didn't have the credit at the time. So that was my, uh, my issue. The first thought was like, if you bought them in cash and then put like small like 50 60 000 mortgages on after i didn't have any credit i bought these i bought these properties i had nothing and so after i had bought them then i got my first secured credit card started building credit and i could have years later done it but i just how old were you when you bought those 21. that's crazy yeah but doesn't that speak to the opportunity that did exist back then right like if someone was 21 with no credit could actually like buy real estate. and that is just like like yeah but you can say that at any point you could you could say you know 10 years ago well you could have bought bitcoin you could be working at mcdonald's you know 10 bucks an hour and being that's exactly what you say to [90:00] instead of me selling covered calls on Robinhood. Jack, if you instead just bought the actual stock, you'd be at more. Which is true. You saw Robinhood popped? It popped, Jack. You would have been so better off. I actually didn't have any covered calls against Robinhood when it popped. Thank you very much. That was luck. You guys had the CEO of Robinhood on recently. Yeah, we did. He's great. I like him a lot. Speaking of, not the CEO of Robinhood, but speaking of investment opportunities and let's say missed opportunities, you say that you are very big on having a cash position. You have the muni bonds or cash equivalents. I agree with the idea that you can be right about a thesis that you would be better off instead of building up this cash position and waiting and waiting and waiting and waiting. Yes, the market could correct. Real estate could plummet and you can find plenty of opportunities then. but that could be five years from now and the stock market could be up 80 percent in five years is there any validity in your own personal case of like hey maybe instead of hunting this deal in georgia i could have just thrown the money into some index funds and held on forever potentially and maybe i'm just like old school kind of right i'm a real estate guy that's what i've always worked in right so my mind looks towards real estate and where I can find opportunity there. You know, in the future, I would like to have a small portfolio of properties, right? And grow that a little bit. But candidly, like really understand or trust the stock market. I'm probably kind of like... like an old person when it comes to that. And I look at things like the Shiller CAPE, like the CAPE ratio for the stock market. I don't know if you guys are familiar. It takes the 10-year... Inflation adjusted earnings devised by the inflation adjusted market cap. stock market looks pretty overvalued too when you look at some of those those metrics and so You know, it's two things. I don't really understand the stock market too well. And then I also just look at some metrics in the stock market, like price to earnings ratios. And I'm just like, There's a lot of future growth assumptions in there. Yeah, but forward PE on the max seven now is actually pretty low compared to what it was in the future. When you look at the market, it's really interesting because you could find a chart that reinforces whatever you want to believe. You could find a chart that says we're the most overvalued ever in history. Find another chart that says actually we're fairly well priced when you isolate the data. past 2001. Because arguably you could say that we can't compare ourselves with the 1980s when the internet and globalization has changed substantially. So that's really post-2000s. When you look at it post 2000, it's really not all that bad. So, you know, there's an argument for anything. Yeah. And again, I don't know as much about stocks, right? So. It's not my area of expertise, but I'm just always cautious about those like this time is different scenarios. And what that reminds me of a little bit is like when I lived in Austin in 2020. Oracle moved their headquarters to Austin. Tesla moved their headquarters to Austin in the spring of 2021. I start telling people, hey guys, the price to income ratio in Austin's housing market makes no sense. You know what people start telling me? Well, yeah, but Tesla just moved their headquarters here. Oracle just moved their headquarters here. Austin is the next Silicon Valley. Turns out it wasn't. Right. And so I'm just always skeptical when I hear narratives about like how it's different. And for these things that have changed, I actually just bought a book. very very fascinating it's called 1929 by andrew ross sorkin i don't know if you guys are familiar with him It's about the lead up to the 1929 bust. And the Great Depression. And he quotes bankers at the time and the things they were saying. it was like mirrors some of the things people are saying now like oh like electrification is going to change things forever right people have washing machines and dishwashers productivity is going to go through the roof so we can't look at old valuation models additionally the us became an international stock market back then people are like oh we have equities coming in from britain that's going to push prices up forever i think it's funny how sometimes Mark Twain said, history doesn't repeat, it rhymes. And I'm not saying that's going to happen. But I just am always skeptical of narratives. Like even in Nashville, right? Interestingly, Oracle. has now moved their headquarters to Nashville. from austin and they're supposedly going to build the campus by 2030. every realtor in nashville It's just like Oracle is going to move here. And I'm like, yeah, but like, demand is at the lowest level in 15 years and supplies at the highest level in 15 years and they're like well oracle is going to move here so there needs to be a balance right like between accepting that maybe you know certain things could have shifted but then still also like, training your eyes on the fundamentals, right? That's true, but also had you thrown your money into the stock market in 1931, you'd still be so much better off 15, 20, however many years in the future it may be. That... That rhymes. Every single time, the earlier your money is in the market, on average, the better off you are. And so I'm always thinking like, [95:00] And think of all these one-off scenarios, like Graham said, you could find any point online that would validate your theory or invalidate your theory. The only thing that has stayed true, regardless of theory, is that the earlier you put your money into the market, on average, the better you are. If someone wants to adopt that principle, I wouldn't debate it with them. And maybe they would do a little better in the long run. you know i think it depends on what you value personally for me i'm like i like having flexibility i like having liquidity You know, I'm a... multiple business owner, got a successful YouTube channel, successful app. I want to buy some investment properties, right? So for me, it's like, I would rather keep my powder dry, right? Someone else who maybe has a stable W-2 job, doesn't want to like, rock the boat too much in what they do, which is perfectly fine. That might be good advice. So I think it also depends on just where someone's at. How much does declining birth rate concern you? The birth rates are down about 35% since 1991. It's a huge deal. And it's a multifaceted huge deal for the housing market and the economy. I believe actually one of the reasons why we have such low buyer demand today is is starting to become demographic and by 2034 We're projecting at ReVenture there will be more deaths and births in the U.S. That's never happened before. That completely changes things, right? When you think about housing demand and supply. You know, what's the number one fundamental thing that would force someone to buy a house? Right? We're not talking like, what should I do with my money? You know, this or that. It's like, oh, you have a kid on the way. Oh, you have a second kid on the way. Right? That increases the desire for the stability. right the security in the space that owning a home provides so when you see declining birth rates and things like declining school enrollment These are massive red flags. So I lived in St. Petersburg, Florida for a year. late 2024 to late 2025. That market's correcting. One stat that blew my mind when I lived there was that the Pinellas County School Enrollment, which is St. Petersburg and Clearwater, was down something like 7,000 to 8,000 in the last 10 years. And I'm like, looking at that, I'm like, how is that more people not talking about that? If school enrollment's dropping 7,000, what does that mean for the local housing market? That means there's fewer and fewer families looking to buy. And so I think this declining birth rate, is a huge problem for demand. And the flip side of it is the increasing death rate. So slowly but surely, the deaths as a percentage of population are going to go up and they're about to go way up the next 15 years. This is 75 and 85 populations going to surge. So on Clearwater, my understanding there is because of Scientology really coming in and they don't send their kids to just like an average school. Scientologists have really taken over Clearwater. So that one, I think, is a Clearwater very specific. Potentially. But Pinellas County is a county with nearly a million people. It's incredible. The amount of data, the forecasts, the price projections, it's insane. You're able to type in any location, any zip code, any state. It gives you so much data. It's more data than I've ever seen on like Zillow or Redfin. And I would venture to say, by the way, that maybe it's more comprehensive than even talking to a real estate agent. Like it's nuts the level of detail that's in this. So we teamed up with Nick and he hooked you guys up. You save 160 bucks on the annual plan. That is 40% off. about buying selling or you just want to see what your area is doing go check it out it is crazy guys the link is down below in the description thank you so much and now back to the episode potentially but pinellas county is a county with nearly a million people i will say though and this might just be anecdotally I see a lot of people now having kids again. Like, out of nowhere, it seems like, So many people that I know are now having a kid. And I'm wondering if we're just swinging in the opposite direction where now it's like cool again to like get married younger and maybe take on a more traditional husband wife sort of dynamic, have a kid early. It just. Maybe I'm just getting feeds in my algorithm now, but it seems like it's... swinging back the other way. You could be right. I kind of hope so, right? Here's where I'm skeptical. And one thing we're actually working on right now on ReVenture is we're going to produce 30 year population forecasts for every zip code in the US, looking at these aging trends. And one thing we're noticing. births are a factor of two things one is the fertility rate of women right in certain age groups Which would... Kind of speak to what you're talking about. Like, is it becoming more trendy to have a kid or not? Right. But the other is the number of people in the age cohort. If you have fewer women between the ages of 25 to 35, 10 years from now, there's just going to be fewer births. and What was shocking in the 2020 census was that for the first time, I don't say ever, but in a long time, the [100:00] Under-18 population in the U.S. declined. So what's happening in America is we're entering an aging curve now where there's going to be fewer and fewer people. who are teenagers and who are in their 20s. eventually in their 30s. More and more people who are in their 70s and 80s. Thank you. that shift in age cohort will just naturally lead to lower births. You might be right though, maybe a trend picks up in the future and fertility increases, but that age cohort slowdown has already happened the last 20 years. So for the next 20 years, we're just going to see fewer people in their 20s. And then they're teens. than there were. the previous 20 years, especially as a percentage of the population and housing stock. See, part of me thinks the reason for that is simply because, A lot of people that I know, a lot of women in their 30s, were conditioned when I was younger that you have to go and you have to get a great career and you have to focus on yourself and you have to do you and you have to live your life. Don't settle. Don't have kids. It's going to slow you down. And now in their 30s, they're coming around to it. And maybe because life expectancies are increasing a little bit that they say, you know what, I could afford to basically wait until 35 to have my first kid or 38. It's not the end of the world. And maybe it's more delayed, but maybe AI will all live into our 90s and 100s. Well, it's true. What you're saying is actually true in the data that we're looking at on the fertility rates. In some counties, the 35 to 50 year old female fertility rate is higher. than the 20 to 34. Like in San Francisco, that's the case. So that's definitely happening. However, If a woman waits until 35 or 36 to have her first child, There's a natural cap on how many children she's going to have, right? Which wasn't a cap that occurred. in the past. So that's why this declining birth rate and slowing population growth is inevitable. Even if there is like and improvement. But of course... This is also regional. which is like my favorite thing to talk about. So we look at a metric called the birth to death ratio. It's kind of simple. Divide births by deaths. That's your organic population growth multiple. Florida is now below 1. Meaning more people are dying in Florida than being born. That's not good. I mean, right, like for economy, society, housing, that's just not good. Florida's birth to death ratio 20 years ago is 1.5. had 50% more birth and death. Now it's losing for the first time ever. But you go to Utah. It's over two to one. You get a Provo, Utah. It's over four to one. You go to Austin, Texas, it's over 2-1. Some people think, Like, just for an example. Austin, Texas versus Tampa, Florida. If a home buyer, a real estate investor might be like looking at those two cities and thinking they're equivalent in long-term housing appreciation, They're not. In Austin, there's two times more births and deaths. In Tampa, there's a lot of There's fewer births and deaths. Think about where that's going to put the population 20 years from now. Austin has locked in guaranteed growth regardless of what happens with migration. Tampa has guaranteed growth. population decline. Of course, we don't know for sure what's going to happen with migration. But when you just know those two things to start, you have like if you're a real estate investor or you want to buy where there's gonna be more demand and appreciation you're just like a massive head start if you also start looking at these demographic data because as the birth rate continues to slow and maybe it does stabilize right maybe even goes up a bit these demographic trends are going to continue to be really big in the country i think about japan Thank you. And I'm not saying we're Japan or going to be like Japan. But what happened in Japan is wild. Yeah, but they were really strict on immigration. For sure. That's a cultural thing too. But yeah, it's bad to have a declining population. It won't be as bad as Japan. Do you know how much nominal home prices dropped in Japan from 1990 to 2010? 50% over 20 years. Today in Japan, the nominal price is still 20% below 1990. 36 years later. That's not going to happen in the US, but I'm saying that that's a warning. Thank you. particularly for certain pockets of the U.S., of what could be coming when the math on births and deaths just no longer makes sense. What do you think if the government issues a stimulus for every child you have? Is that a good or a bad thing? That's one of the things that sounds good. Right? Just like allowing someone to stay in the, apartment sounds good when they can't pay their rent. I do wonder if there's some type of negative consequence that could come from that. But my first reaction is, look, this is a severe crisis. you know like and could we find some other thing we're incentivizing and cut that and put it towards incentivizing more births? Maybe. Of course, there will be some secondary and third consequence you're not even anticipating. That's so funny. I'm imagining a kid at the dinner table, a kid at the dinner table, mommy daddy why do I have so many brothers and sisters and she's like well because the government is paying us $6,000 a year if you could get let's say $3,000 [105:00] for having a kid this dude would have his own cheaper by the dog how like he would have so many kids can you adopt Don't they do that in the foster system? Don't they pay parents to take more foster kids? I don't know about that. My understanding to adopt a child is so rigorous. You really have to want a child. There must be some way to do it. There's something about a cash payment for having a kid that seems... At the hospital, like, whipping out the hundreds. Isn't that kind of what the idea of the government should be? Is that you incentivize and disincentivize certain behaviors. for you guys. Because imagine they do it. They start paying people like $6,000 a year and then they run out of money. You're like, hey, sorry guys, we're cutting this program. And everyone's like, bro, I just had seven children. What am I supposed to do? Maybe some type of tax incentive or something like that where it's like, Like, Increase the tax incentive? Yeah, like, I don't know, like your lower tax rates or something. So it's like Like imagine someone's unemployed. Right. And then like it's like I'm going to earn money by having more kids. But they but they already do that, though. Yeah, they already have that. Yeah. You know what I think is kind of interesting is... this is a Jordan Peterson idea that always kind of stuck with me. He said that you should have a kid even if you're not ready, because it will force you to get ready. It'll force you to mature. And I don't know of anybody who had a kid and just because they had a kid, they became homeless. Like, I don't know if that's like a real statistic. I know potentially could put you into some more financial hardship. But, Like that's not necessarily a bad thing. It depends on the age because having a kid, I think it's below the age of like 21, 22. You're significantly further behind your peers because your time and your resources go towards raising a child than making more money, advancing in your career, networking, like all of these things. So it does actually hinder you below a certain age. But some people say that having a kid was the thing that they needed to like kick them in the butt and then work harder and make more money. Yeah, but as a whole, I mean, if you just look at. For certain people, I bet, yeah, they have a kid at 16, they wind up running a Fortune 500 company. People should have kids at 16. I'm just saying. I'm sure some of them. When you look at... The top CEOs, some of them became like, dad's really early on. It's, it's surprising. Like you would think that, Oh, they had a kid at like 20. I think, and now they're running this huge company. Yeah. I think the point you might be trying to get at, it's like, it's a, it's a cop out a little bit. Like sometimes the financial excuse might be a cop out. Like I, I have a whole theory. If you want to hear my theory, guys. Let's hear it. I think Instagram and TikTok, I think there's some conspiracy going on to keep everyone just super consumer oriented. Oh, yeah. It's stuck to their phone. And it's not even controversial to say. But if you think about the second and third order effects of that, someone's their Instagram algorithm and they're looking at what's on there. Here's this handbag. And like, you don't need a handbag. right if you're a girl right but like maybe you You now want that hand back. But then you're like, oh, I don't have enough money. And then the next thing Instagram feeds you is like, oh, you can become a self-made millionaire. if you buy this course. And you're like, ah, I'm going to do that so I can afford the handbag. They're not consciously thinking these things, but I think that's what Instagram is doing to people. And if you play that out, it kind of makes society kind of like very individualistic. Everyone's on their own hunt for glory and making more money to keep up with the Joneses, where they didn't even have to keep up with the Joneses. That's 100% accurate. I remember also there's this Jerry Seinfeld clip that I thought was also really interesting. He was like, whatever happened to people, all of a sudden, everyone's obsessed with money. Like nowadays, it's like, you're a doctor and you make a lot of money. So that's really cool. Whereas back in the day, it was like, you're a plumber and you like what you do. Nice. Cool. You're a doctor and you like what you do. Nice. Cool. But now it's about how much money do you make? And like, this is just And I think you're right. It's attached to the consumerism culture where we've now mixed up needs and wants. And people think, wait, you're telling me I have to sell this truck because I can't afford it? Well, this is my work truck. It's like, well, yeah, you can have a crappy work truck too. I mean, like downgrade to maybe a cheaper car. That's something also you can observe from watching Caleb Hammer. It's like people think they need things that are actually just wants. And here's the other thing too. Like, you know, obviously you guys have multiple youtube channels i have a youtube channel i have an instagram I'm sure we all look at the analytics, right? In terms of like retention and all that kind of stuff. And like every creator is trying to figure out like how to make content that's more engaging. And I... The stuff I've now learned about Instagram in the last six months, even on my own Instagram business channel, is crazy. The first three seconds of a 60-second reel. [110:00] That determines everything about how many views it gets and how many people see it. And when I started looking at it and doing the data, I realized it's not even about like What I'm saying? It's just about the arrangement of the visuals. And all the visuals need to be bright, high contrast. And then two or three seconds in, you need some type of statement that's somewhat urgent. and you still need bright visuals, And then you can't reveal really what the video is about for my videos until like 20 seconds in. Like often I'm like talking about like this city, you know, this Northwest former tech hub is now going through a housing market correction and I build it up and build it up. And then 20 seconds in, there's the payoff. You can't give that payoff three or four seconds in. And my whole point with this is that, i think instagram is incentivizing creators to make content That keeps people hooked in a way that I, what is that doing? It's a slot machine. It's a slot machine. Like it's supposed to be like every second to third randomly is, is something that you're going to watch and engage with. And there's like a few bad ones. It's like, Oh, it hits me again. It's awful. It's really, I've, I've really stopped opening up TikTok at all on my phone and Instagram reels. I only scroll to send Jack a few reels. It's true. Yeah, to send me a few reels, as he said. Here's a challenge, guys. If you are upset with your screen time, which realistically 90 plus percent of you guys are, myself included, what really helps is changing my phone color to black and white. I love it. It makes reels, YouTube shorts, TikTok so much less attractive. On that, I've heard from a lot of people attention is the new currency. I 100% agree with that. And so it being a currency, there's a person that's buying and selling. And if you're constantly selling your attention, you're like losing your attention, giving it up to other people. Like where does that leave you? Like what's downstream from you losing your own attention? I think of it in the way of being like, are you a producer or consumer on social media? And if you're a consumer on social media, You're. Yeah, you're selling something. You're giving up something, right? You're selling your time. You're selling your time, your attention, whatever the algorithm is doing to people's brains. I just have a second phone. So I have Instagram and all those on my second phone for work. And I can't have it on my main phone. Because if I do, I'm just going to be like, scrolling on it at like 2 a.m. like what am i even doing you want to hear something crazy i saw this on twitter last night and it hit me If you scroll for two hours a day, or you're on your phone just mindlessly doing something for two hours a day, Every year, that's the equivalent of you losing a month of your life. A month from just two hours a day. Yeah, because you got like 13, 12, 13 waking hours. That's crazy. One twelfth. and when you look at the amount of time that people naturally just sit on the field scrolling it's about two hours imagine if instead of scrolling for two hours you played piano oh or like took up a skill you know you could be phenomenal at something if you just traded your time scrolling confidence you go to improv you do literally anything okay but you could be a savant here's the problem with that because i agree with you but sometimes you're just on the toilet and you want five minutes to kill. What do you do? Don't even act like you take five minutes on there. I'm in and out, Jack. I have 30 seconds. I'm efficient. There's no high water bill. I'm just saying. I'm just saying. Because sometimes it's like you're not scrolling because you're sitting there on a couch doing nothing. It's, hey, you know, I'm waiting for the microwave. to beep two minutes and I just want to kill two minutes. That's it. Now I'm scrolling. And there is a little bit of a reality that like if you're not plugged in at all to social media you do might you might miss something right like there is some positives to be garnered i i had this idea for like an app i'm sure it exists already but it's like there should be an app that It's like a harness on your Instagram. It exists. It exists. Okay. Like you can use it for maximum utility. And if like you're scrolling for too long, it can be like, hey, instead of doing this, why don't you message someone for like business purposes? Yeah. So Macy has this on her phone. It's really interesting. If she's on for more than like five or 10 minutes at a time, it blocks her out of Instagram or TikTok. And she has to do Duolingo. And she has to do like this whole thing of Duolingo for like two to five minutes before it allows her back on it. And then now her Duolingo score is like crazy. But that's the way around it. So I have it right here. Between ages 16 and 24, three plus hours daily on social media with many reporting four or more hours. 25 to 34. 2.5 to 3 hours daily, 35 to 44, 2 to 2.5, 45 to 54, 1.5 to 2, 55 plus, under one and a half hours daily. Yeah. It depends on what it is, though, because I do spend a lot of time on Twitter or X, a lot of it's research, or YouTube, and I'm just listening to it. A lot of it's research, but I think a lot of people kid themselves. Yeah. And they think that they're getting research in. Oh, I'm researching. [115:00] actuality it's like fear or it's something else yeah well it's the hook right it's the hook it might be research for two minutes Right. And then all of a sudden, like, It's a... I just think of it as a marketplace. It's like, imagine you were walking on canal street in New York city. Right. And like where they're selling all the watch, fake watches and handbags and stuff. And then it's just like, it's just like, That's social media. There's just vendors trying to pull you in. And it's in this mask of like, oh, you will learn something. You will... Keep up with a friend. it is for five minutes and then it becomes your soul to left and right then how important is the thing that they're pulling you out of you know like it's easy to trade that because you don't really value it because to a lot of people it's just kind of time right but then there could be something to that well you think about the headspace that people are in when they Myself, like included, when they open up their phone compulsively, right? Like the headspace is not often aligned with, I want to learn something. The headspace is aligned with like, I'm looking for some short-term stimulation. I just need to get myself through the next period of time so I would... I think that almost proves that it's not about keeping up with friends or doing research for the most part, because if you just think about the brain state. And we actually analyze this data. Like for Reventure app, we look at like how long people spend on our app when they come from different sources. When people come from X, they spend like, 20 seconds on the app. When they come from watching a long-form YouTube video, they spend five minutes. Right. And I think that's just like a good little analogy about like, what are people expecting when they're on X? X is great. I'm not criticizing it, but it's like, quick. Do you ever get depressed or sad just seeing so much negative data again depends on your perspective I've kind of had the, I've, I have the mindset of like an aspiring first time home buyer, where I look at a crash in sales in Las Vegas and values beginning to roll over is good. Right. So I, I would argue the negative data, If you're a first-time homebuyer, he's good. it's bad if you're an existing owner right so i think it depends on your perspective For me, the reality of a housing market that stays unaffordable, where the mortgage payment to income ratio stays at 40%, That's a much sadder. Reality. right, then home price is crashing 20, 25%. What if you are wrong? And what if home prices just keep going up from here, slowly? And you look back and you say, oh, man, I didn't realize 2026 was the cheapest we ended up seeing. Ultimately, you know, my opinion is fallible, right? Like I don't I'm not always right. So this is why I'm trying to like turn it over to data. Right. So we have a forecast on Reventure for every zip code on Reventure app in the U.S. one year forward. And that's based on the fundamentals in the market. Inventory, days on market, price cuts, appreciation of momentum. So I kind of feel like I'm not going to miss it because I'm going to see the data in the market before it happens, right? Like for instance, yeah, prices are going to go up 6% in Chicago over the next year. That's what our data is saying right now. So, you know, I would want a home buyer in Chicago to know that if you wait a year, yeah, it's going to be 6% more expensive next year. So, you know, I think it's about the data in your market. I am pulling for, not going to lie, I am pulling for a national home price crash, but right now we're not projecting that. We're But that's again why data is so important. The housing market's emotional. What's going to happen? Everyone has their own opinion. What's the actual numbers say? Inventory, days on market, home sales. that filters through the prices. Yeah, do you have any questions for us? Yeah, I mean, I would love to know about, you know, the operation you guys have with the podcast. and the respective YouTube channels. you know, how much time does that take, like running this podcast? Like, and what are your goals for it? Like in the future is and do you have like other ideas for more YouTube channels? Or is it like what you guys have now? is what it is. Hey, everybody. So we actually messed up. I'm watching this back in the edit, and we went really off topic. It has nothing to do with real estate at all for the next 45 minutes, so we're going to cap off the episode here. But if you want to see topics on YouTube, the algorithm, some of our business strategy, we'll keep it up for the channel members. So you guys can watch it. Just feel free to join. Otherwise, It's probably best we ended off here. Thank you so much for watching. And until next time. I think our net worth might go to zero today. Bitcoin is a resilient asset that is really serving as global insurance. And so anytime that there's chaos in the world, there's going to be people who run to Bitcoin. In one sentence, what is your strongest argument for Bitcoin? They will never ever stop printing money. There's two assets you need for the future we're headed towards: Bitcoin and AI. Is it too late to buy Bitcoin? Bitcoin is going to continue to go up for the rest of our lives because the politicians are going to print money for the rest of our lives. So do you think then meme coins are bad for the overall market? [120:00] If you were to take one guess at who Satoshi is, who would you say?