日本旅游是天堂,定居是地狱!梁文道这句话,点醒了多少人!#日本 #移民 #圆桌派 #梁文道 #经济 #认知

日本旅游是天堂,定居是地狱!梁文道这句话,点醒了多少人!#日本 #移民 #圆桌派 #梁文道 #经济 #认知 — 纪实万象

纪实万象

AI-assisted summary of 日本旅游是天堂,定居是地狱!梁文道这句话,点醒了多少人!#日本 #移民 #圆桌派 #梁文道 #经济 #认知 — original source. Check the original for full context.

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Key ideas

  • 丸山真男指出日本缺乏内生思想传统基轴,外来思潮多被作为实用零件拼装,导致战前战后通过“禀议制”与“一亿总忏悔”使具体政治责任彻底蒸发。 (2:07)
  • 通过对比李小牧在歌舞伎町的务实妥协与创业者茅侃侃因大院“面子文化”死撑而自杀的悲剧,嘉宾提出真正的逆商(AQ)不仅是硬扛,更在于划定底线、适度退让与认清自身局限。 (45:06)
  • 日本社会的整洁神话始于1964年东京奥运会前的政府动员,其高度文明礼貌本质上源于严密的社区邻里“他律”与同侪压力,而非单纯自觉的自律。 (74:59)
  • “旅游是天堂,定居是地狱”的根源在于日本社会的双重性:表面优雅精致,深层则是“建前”与“本音”的严重脱节、不可逾越的“暧昧”高墙以及严苛的身体交往边界。 (93:23)

Detailed notes

## Background 本期内容由YouTube频道“纪实万象”于2026年9月22日发布。页面简介显示,节目汇编了《圆桌派》与《锵锵行天下》未播出的精彩素材,由窦文涛携手梁文道、许子东、周轶君、马未都、蒋方舟等各界嘉宾,以围桌漫谈的形式海阔天空地探讨人性、社会、历史文化与当下认知。

## TL;DR 节目围绕日本文化的底层逻辑、创业困境与逆商、以及定居与旅日的现实隔阂展开了深度交锋。前段借丸山真男与伊藤博文立宪的学术视角,剖析了日本思想史上“缺乏内生主轴”、机制责任蒸发与“一亿总忏悔”的特质;中段借李小牧在新宿歌舞伎町的搏杀与青年创业者茅侃侃的陨落,探讨了老北京“面子”文化、湖南人“霸得蛮”的韧劲与逆商的真正底线;后段则从千利休草庵茶室、谷崎润一郎《阴翳礼赞》与严格垃圾分类入手,揭示出日本精致整洁表象之下的“他律”压抑、物我合一的职业信仰以及融入当地社会所面临的“暧昧”高墙。

## Atmosphere & style 对谈整体兼具知识分子的深邃思辨与江湖市井的快意坦荡,语调随性松弛却屡屡直击本质。窦文涛在主持中穿针引线,既有与许子东、周轶君对文化现象与生死逆境的机锋博弈,也有李小牧讲述黑帮绑架与净身出户时的惊心动魄;席间在深沉叹惋创业者悲剧与笑谈中日文化微观摩擦之间自然流转,给听众带来一种既通透冷峻又极富市井温情的夜谈质感。

## Bulletin - [02:07](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ArieQmHqFvk&t=127s) 丸山真男指出日本缺乏内生思想传统基轴,外来思潮多被作为实用零件拼装,导致战前战后通过“禀议制”与“一亿总忏悔”使具体政治责任彻底蒸发。 - [45:06](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ArieQmHqFvk&t=2706s) 通过对比李小牧在歌舞伎町的务实妥协与创业者茅侃侃因大院“面子文化”死撑而自杀的悲剧,嘉宾提出真正的逆商(AQ)不仅是硬扛,更在于划定底线、适度退让与认清自身局限。 - [01:14:59](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ArieQmHqFvk&t=4499s) 日本社会的整洁神话始于1964年东京奥运会前的政府动员,其高度文明礼貌本质上源于严密的社区邻里“他律”与同侪压力,而非单纯自觉的自律。 - [01:33:23](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ArieQmHqFvk&t=5603s) “旅游是天堂,定居是地狱”的根源在于日本社会的双重性:表面优雅精致,深层则是“建前”与“本音”的严重脱节、不可逾越的“暧昧”高墙以及严苛的身体交往边界。

## Key takeaways - [02:07](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ArieQmHqFvk&t=127s) 丸山真男在《日本的思想》中提出日本是一个“缺乏思想的传统结构”的国家,外来思想未曾内化为自主基轴,危机时刻知识界往往瞬间退回对天皇的无条件顺从。 - [06:56](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ArieQmHqFvk&t=416s) 日本对待外来哲学呈现“零件式”拼装特质,并盲目将达尔文进化论的时间先后等同于价值高低,顺理成章走向福泽谕吉主张的“脱亚入欧”与对外扩张。 - [13:21](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ArieQmHqFvk&t=801s) 战后日本推行“一亿总忏悔”口号,丸山真男将其比作墨鱼喷墨脱身,通过将战争罪责均匀均摊给全体国民,最终导致层级责任被模糊,形成“无人负责”的局面。 - [19:54](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ArieQmHqFvk&t=1194s) 日本基层的“禀议制”施政使决策主体隐形,加上神道教如“白绢”般缺乏严格教义与道德戒律,导致权力结构与行政问责机制在连带惩戒中彻底蒸发。 - [28:14](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ArieQmHqFvk&t=1694s) 李小牧凭借六次协议离婚净身出户和黑道博弈生存展现极高心理韧性;席间指出面对生活挫败应培养“钝感力”,避免因主观放大危机而陷入绝境。 - [45:06](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ArieQmHqFvk&t=2706s) 创业明星茅侃侃的自杀折射出老北京“大院子弟”文化对尊严与庇护者角色的致命执念,宁可负债抵押也不愿示弱,缺乏商业博弈中的妥协机制。 - [47:59](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ArieQmHqFvk&t=2879s) 逆商(AQ)的核心不在于盲目逞强,而在于确立物质与心理的生存底线,并具备像杜月笙烧借条或鲁迅“躲进小楼”那样与自身局限和解、敢于退让的能力。 - [01:00:25](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ArieQmHqFvk&t=3625s) 李小牧在新宿歌舞伎町面对外来帮派抢地盘时,以放弃一条街保全两条街的策略化解危机,印证了湖南人“霸得蛮、耐得烦”且不被虚名绑架的务实生存智慧。 - [01:14:59](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ArieQmHqFvk&t=4499s) 日本公共秩序的高素质很大程度来自“他律”与对“给他人添麻烦”的集体恐惧,这种严密的监视系统压抑了个性,导致部分人在海外容易走向放纵的另一极端。 - [01:18:24](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ArieQmHqFvk&t=4704s) 日本引以为傲的垃圾分类与整洁环境并非古已有之,而是1963年为迎接东京奥运会发起的城市清洁运动产物,依靠邻里“朝阳群众”式的互相监督得以维系。 - [01:25:12](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ArieQmHqFvk&t=5112s) 千利休以粗陶与低矮入口草庵创立“侘茶”美学,迫使所有访客屈身爬入以卸下身份傲慢;日本擅长借格式化的礼仪构建敬畏,但过度规训也催生了极致的虚伪。 - [01:29:21](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ArieQmHqFvk&t=5361s) 日本人在“建前”(客套话)与“本音”(真心话)之间构筑了深厚鸿沟,其高度发达的文学、艺术与隐秘亚文化本质上是疏导社会高压与幽暗欲望的排污渠道。 - [01:30:37](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ArieQmHqFvk&t=5437s) 神道教“万物有灵”理念渗透于日本匠人精神中,如陶艺大师与陶土对话、车主向旧车鞠躬致谢,反映出人与物之间独特的精神羁绊与敬畏心。 - [01:35:53](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ArieQmHqFvk&t=5753s) 定居日本的最大障碍在于社会的“暧昧”属性与难以跨越的心理距离,例如中日儿童在肢体接触表达友善上的文化差异,极易在严守身体边界的日式环境中被误解为排挤霸凌。

## Detailed walkthrough ### [00:01](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ArieQmHqFvk&t=1s) 日本的思想“急转弯”与吃牛肉的明治维新

回顾二战后的日本,整个国家及其知识分子群体经历了一场极其剧烈的思想转向。战前满腔狂热、死心塌地拥护军国主义意识形态的人们,在战败后几乎是一夜之间,立刻全面倒向了民主与和平的拥趸。这种调头之迅猛,不仅彻底震撼了当时的驻日美军占领当局,也让全世界目瞪口呆,唯独日本人自己觉得理所当然、毫不吃惊。实际上,纵观历史便能发现,日本一贯如此:他们虽然有着根深蒂固的自家规矩和传统,可一旦下定决心抛弃旧物去拥抱新生事物,其行动速度比世上任何国家都要快。

这一点在明治维新时期表现得尤为淋漓尽致。与中国晚清举步维艰的洋务运动(自强运动)相比,日本在明治维新号角吹响后,举国上下展开了雷厉风行的全盘西化。当时很多新开张的老字号商铺,无论是卖肉的还是卖罐头的,往往冠以“文明堂”或“维新堂”之类的名号,以此标榜自家的货品全是最时髦的西方新产物。

最典型的例子莫过于吃牛肉。如今举世闻名的“日本和牛”被奉为顶级美味,但在明治维新之前,普通的日本平民根本不吃兽肉。千百年来,他们日常食用的肉类仅限于鱼肉,顶多偶尔吃点鸡肉;至于牛肉、猪肉和羊肉,统统被斥为“野兽之肉”。这些“兽肉”在过去只有生病滋补时才偶尔破例食用,在承平日常里,吃兽肉被视为极为下流、野蛮和不洁的行为。然而明治天皇一道旨意颁布,号召臣民放开吃肉,原因极其直白:西方人之所以体魄强健、精力充沛,全是因为他们吃兽肉;大日本帝国若要迎头赶上,就必须像西方人那样大口吃肉。从那一天起,日本举国上下近乎着魔般钻研起如何养牛、烹肉,最终培育出了举世瞩目的和牛品种。

- **战后极速转向**:从狂热军国主义无缝切换到彻底拥抱民主和平,令盟军惊愕,国民自身却处之泰然。 - **文明开化的招牌**:明治时代店铺热衷冠名“文明堂”“维新堂”等,以彰显所售为新潮洋货。 - **和牛的历史逆转**:传统日本视兽肉为不洁的病患偏方,明治天皇提倡“食肉强身”效仿西方后,日本才开启了肉牛饲养与食肉文化。

---

[02:07](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ArieQmHqFvk&t=127s) 丸山真男的拷问:为何日本没有“思想的传统结构”?

这构成了一个巨大的谜团:一方面,日本人能以惊人的速度全盘接受新鲜事物;另一方面,他们又给外界留下了极其保守、传统文化保留极佳的印象,甚至在许多人眼中,日本对古老文化的留存比中国还要完善。更奇特的是,每逢危机时刻或重大历史关头,日本知识界往往又会瞬间倒退回最古老的传统中去。例如在走向军国主义之前,大批日本知识分子曾笃信过民主、自由乃至马克思主义,然而战火一触即发之际,众人忽然幡然省悟似地惊呼:“哎呀,我们日本自古是有天皇的,一切听天皇的准没错!”顷刻间,原本现代化的思想立场荡然无存。

战后日本最具影响力的政治思想家丸山真男在其名著《日本的思想》中,用了一个精妙的比喻来形容这种现象:这就像一个人在遭遇突如其来的极度惊吓或恐怖时,脱口而出的绝不是后天习得的典雅官话,而是早已不用了的陈旧乡音方言。丸山真男作为20世纪亚洲具有国际声誉的思想泰斗,在二战期间以极为罕见的学术气节抵制了军国主义的狂澜。虽然他在战争行将结束前作为适龄男子被强行征召入伍,但幸运的是入伍不足一月战争便告终结。战后,他立即投身于对日本思想史的深刻反思:过去这几十年里,国家究竟犯了什么病?那些曾经满腹经纶、拥有独立政见的朋友与学者,为什么能在顷刻间倒向法西斯狂潮,又能在战后若无其事地重新大谈和平与民主?

丸山真男在《日本的思想》中给出了一个惊世骇俗的论断:**日本是一个“缺乏思想的传统结构”的国家**。这部作品源自一次讲座记录,篇幅极短,薄薄一册,字数甚至不如寻常长篇论文,但它却极其晦涩难读,曾长年高居日本畅销书榜首,并频繁被用作日本顶尖大学入学考试的试题。

为了阐明何谓“思想的传统结构”,丸山真男将日本与中国进行了对比:

```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Comparison of Chinese and Japanese Ideological Traditions accDescr: Diagram contrasting China's continuous structural intellectual tradition with Japan's non-structural, component-style absorption of ideas.

subgraph China ["中国:具有连续基轴与传统的思想结构"] C1["先秦孔孟儒学"] --> C2["汉代董仲舒经学"] C2 --> C3["唐宋理学与中世纪演进"] C3 --> C4["明代心学与清代考据学"] C4 --> C5["构筑出稳定的正统与反传统参照系"] end

subgraph Japan ["日本:缺乏自生传统框架的吸收模式"] J1["缺乏自生思想主干骨架"] --> J2["儒学与佛教皆为外来客体"] J2 --> J3["外来思潮零摩擦、成套引入"] J3 --> J4["思想如同模块零件,互不冲突并置共存"] end ```

在中国历史的长河中,儒家思想构成了一条清晰、延绵演进的谱系:从先秦的孔孟,到西汉董仲舒独尊儒术,历经唐代、宋明理学与心学的演变,再到清代汉学考据的复兴。整个过程始终存在一个坚实稳定的主轴作为坐标系。在这个参照系之下,任何新学说的产生都会与既有“传统”形成交锋,构成“传统”与“反传统”的张力,文明因而拥有自我消化、冲突辩论与辨识方向的厚重结构。

然而反观日本,丸山真男直言:日本根本没有这种自生的思想传统。即便日本历史上长期受到儒家与佛教的熏染,但它们始终属于“外来借用品”,从来没有在日本本土内化为如同儒学在中国那样具有绝对权威与自主演化能力的思想基石。

---

[06:56](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ArieQmHqFvk&t=416s) 超敏感与迟钝的并存:零件式的思想拼装与“脱亚入欧”

正因为缺乏内生性的传统思想结构,外来文化与全新思潮在日本落地时几乎遇不到任何深层的思想阻力。在正常情况下,一个拥有深厚文化传统的国家面对外来冲击时,必然会产生抗拒与阵痛,需要漫长的时间去冲突、碰撞、反思并最终消化吸收。但日本由于思想地基的“真空”,使其在明治维新后展现出了无与伦比的求知欲,以及全世界绝无仅有的思维转向速度。

然而,丸山真男尖锐地指出,这种极度狂热的吸收传统,反而导致现代日本知识界丧失了对未知的真正敬畏与探索欲。在面对新思潮时,日本知识分子呈现出一种匪夷所思的病态特质:**“超敏感”与“迟钝”高度杂糅**。他们最初对新思想表现出极度敏锐的好奇心,蜂拥而上;但一旦引入,随即轻率地宣称“哦,这没什么大不了的,我们已经彻底搞懂了”。丸山真男对比指出: - 在欧美思想界,即便关于民主、自由这些已经诞生并探讨了数个世纪的基本概念,学者们至今仍在直面其最深刻的根基与漏洞,进行反复的质疑与求索; - 而在战后的日本,仅仅过去短短几年,知识界便敷衍了事地单方面宣布:我们已经把民主的精髓全盘吃透、完全掌握了。

由于缺乏高度自觉、严密系统的思想框架,日本对待一切外来思潮的方式就像对待机械“零件”: 1. **零阻力拼装**:欧洲数百年历史中衍生出的错综复杂的哲学体系、政治流派,在明治初期被一股脑毫无门槛地全部塞进日本,每种理论都配备了专职专家进行研究。 2. **时空同构并存**:不同的、乃至逻辑上互相冲突的理论与传统,在缺乏主干的日本思想空间里竟然能够完全相安无事、和平共处,毫不在意它们在历史时间线上的先后与矛盾。 3. **“最新即最优”的进化论崇拜**:这些被成套搬入的思想并非被一视同仁。引入了达尔文的进化论后,日本知识界便将“时间上的新旧”直接作为价值高低的裁判标准,而非考量该理论本身的逻辑自洽性或是否适合日本本土。

这种“时间进化论”催生了荒诞的思想逻辑:在明治初年,启蒙知识分子疾呼日本积弱是因为不懂西方的人权观念,必须大力提倡天赋人权;然而没过多久,另一批人便嘲讽道:“在欧洲大谈人权早已经过时了,现在欧洲最顶端、最先进的主流是帝国主义!”于是,追求帝国主义被视作更前沿的象征。日本思想界不再去深究自由或人权在道德与哲学上是否合理,仅仅因为帝国主义在时间轴上“更新”,便认定其必然更优越。正是这种将“新”直接等同于“好”的思维定势,在政治上顺理成章地将整个国家推向了福泽谕吉所主张的极端信条——“脱亚入欧”:既然亚洲陈腐落后、停滞挨打,而欧洲先进强盛,那么日本就必须全面抛弃亚洲,斩断与落后邻邦的纽带,彻底步入列强的行列。

[10:30](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ArieQmHqFvk&t=630s) Japanese Pragmatism, Imperialist Evolution, and Motoori Norinaga's Critique of Confucianism

During the Meiji era, Japanese thinkers and leaders operated under a profound sense of insular vulnerability: recognizing that their island nation had nowhere to turn geographically, they determined that Japan had to transform itself into a "Europe within Asia" and forcefully join the ranks of European imperialist powers. This was not driven by an internal moral conviction that colonial subjugation was intrinsically virtuous. Instead, they observed that Western powers were technologically and institutionally advanced, and that the natural trajectory of advanced modern states was external expansion. To avoid being left behind, Japan felt compelled to follow suit. Intellectual currents and state policies were viewed almost like biological organisms subject to evolutionary laws: whatever was newer and more advanced was inherently adopted.

Underneath this evolutionary mindset lies a defining characteristic of Japanese intellectual history: an intense, overriding pragmatism. In his classic work *Japanese Thought* (*Nihon no Shisō*), political theorist and historian Masao Maruyama illustrates this trait by examining the Edo period under the Tokugawa shogunate. Although Tokugawa Ieyasu instituted neo-Confucianism as the dominant ruling ideology to maintain social order, the celebrated mid-Edo nativist (*Kokugaku*) scholar Motoori Norinaga mounted a devastating critique of Confucian thought. Norinaga did not challenge Confucianism from within its own metaphysical framework; rather, he attacked its foundational claim that the Chinese ruler possessed the "Mandate of Heaven." Norinaga argued that this concept was nothing more than an elaborate deception—a political pretext invented by new regimes to legitimize usurpation and pacify the public after overthrowing a dynasty.

Maruyama notes that Norinaga’s critique bore a striking resemblance to Marxist critiques of ideology, demystifying philosophical systems by exposing their practical and political functions. For Japan, the adoption of foreign doctrines was strictly instrumental: Confucianism had been embraced in China because it was useful for ruling, and Japan should evaluate it by the exact same criterion. If Confucianism proved effective for governance, the shogunate should use it; if not, they could discard it in favor of Buddhism or any other system. What mattered above all was whether an idea aligned with current administrative realities and popular sentiment.

- **Instrumentalism over Dogma**: Japanese intellectual history consistently prioritizes practical utility over metaphysical orthodoxy; doctrines are assessed by whether they meet immediate governance needs. - **Motoori Norinaga's Deconstruction**: Viewed Confucian ethics and the "Mandate of Heaven" as mere ideological tools engineered to legitimize regime change rather than absolute cosmic truths. - **Masao Maruyama’s Perspective**: In *Japanese Thought*, Maruyama highlights how this lack of a self-conscious, rigid philosophical anchor made Japanese society exceptionally receptive to new foreign imports while discarding obsolete ones without ideological sentimentality.

---

[13:21](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ArieQmHqFvk&t=801s) Pragmatic Shifts and the Murky Waters of "The Repentance of 100 Million"

Because Japanese thought lacked a stubborn, transcendent ideological core, the country could rapidly absorb outside concepts while easily abandoning older customs. Whatever met the immediate demands of the political environment naturally took root. When the United States defeated Japan in World War II, the Japanese establishment recognized that American military and material supremacy were tied to democracy; consequently, Japan embraced democratic institutions almost overnight. There was no deep theoretical reluctance or sentimental attachment to the imperialist rhetoric of yesterday—the transition was swift and pragmatic because democracy fulfilled the urgent demands of the postwar reality.

This pragmatic plasticity, however, carried severe ethical consequences. In the immediate aftermath of defeat, the Japanese government introduced the grand slogan "the repentance of 100 million" (*Ichioku Sōzange*), calling upon the entire population to share collective penance for leading the nation into a catastrophic war. Masao Maruyama delivered a scathing assessment of this slogan, comparing it to an octopus evading danger by squirting a thick cloud of ink into the water so it can slip away undetected into the darkness.

Maruyama argued that by framing the catastrophe as a collective fault shared equally by all 100 million Japanese citizens, the state effectively ensured that "no one needed to repent and no one was responsible." Distributing guilt homogeneously across the entire collective dissolved genuine accountability. It bypassed the essential task of disentangling the hierarchy of culpability: the specific legal and political responsibilities of military planners, the constitutional role of the Emperor, and the civil complicity of the common populace were flattened into an ambiguous, indistinct fog.

```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: The Mechanism of Collective Evasion accDescr: Diagram illustrating how the postwar slogan Ichioku Sozange obscured individual accountability by dispersing guilt across the entire collective.

subgraph Dispersal ["Postwar Slogan: 'Repentance of 100 Million'"] A["Collective Guilt Slogan<br/>(Ichioku Sōzange)"] -->|"Disperses Guilt"| B["Ambiguous National Responsibility"] end

subgraph Concealment ["Maruyama's 'Octopus Ink' Effect"] B --> C["Military Leadership Evades Culpability"] B --> D["Emperor's Decision-Making Shielded"] B --> E["Civilian Complicity Left Unexamined"] end

subgraph Result ["Outcome"] C & D & E --> F["Total Dissolution of Accountability<br/>('No one repents, no one is responsible')"] end ```

---

[15:30](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ArieQmHqFvk&t=930s) Ito Hirobumi and the Search for a Constitutional Bedrock

To locate the origin of this structural ambiguity, Maruyama traced the problem back to the Meiji era and the drafting of the Meiji Constitution. Hirobumi Ito, the primary architect of the constitution, understood that modern constitutionalism could not function purely as dry statutory text; it required an underlying spiritual foundation. In Western nations, constitutional orders were supported by deep historical and cultural traditions: Britain's unwritten constitution had evolved over centuries since Magna Carta through continuous negotiation and power-sharing between feudal monarchs and the aristocracy, while the United States Constitution was anchored in natural rights theory, backed by Christian intellectual traditions.

When Ito examined Japan's indigenous and adapted traditions to find an equivalent moral compass, he encountered a vacuum: - **Confucianism**, which had served as the administrative backbone of Tokugawa society, had lost its prestige and institutional effectiveness after the fall of the shogunate. - **Buddhism**, despite having flourished as an intellectual and political pillar during the Nara and Heian periods, had fallen into institutional decline and was deemed inadequate to anchor a modern constitutional state.

Searching for a viable axis, Ito turned to the imperial institution itself. Unlike the royal dynasties of Europe and China, which had repeatedly fallen and been replaced, the Japanese imperial lineage claimed an unbroken succession throughout history (*bansei ikkei*). Ito posited that the eternal Emperor was the sole foundation capable of sustaining the Japanese state polity (*kokutai*). The imperial house would serve not merely as a secular constitutional monarchy, but as the transcendent spiritual core of the modern Japanese nation.

---

[17:28](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ArieQmHqFvk&t=1048s) Shinto as a "Blank Scroll" and the Structural Blur of Imperial Authority

Elevating the Emperor to a role comparable to Christianity in the West required an explicit religious matrix, which Ito and the Meiji reformers found in Shinto. Masao Maruyama argued, however, that Shinto was ill-equipped to provide a coherent normative standard. The idea of the Emperor as a living deity (*arahitogami*) descended directly from the Sun Goddess Amaterasu was largely an ideological invention forged during the Meiji Restoration and carried through the Taisho and Showa periods.

At its theological core, Shinto is an animistic tradition centered around the *yaoyorozu no kami*—the "eight million gods"—without codified doctrines or clear dogma. A sacred rope (*shimenawa*) tied around an ancient tree creates a boundary (*kekkai*) that instantly designates that tree as a deity to be revered; a dramatic sea wave crashing on the shore can likewise be worshiped as divine. Deities appear and dissolve into nature and deep time, leaving worshipers without a clearly defined, transcendent moral object. Consequently, scholars often describe the Shinto intellectual tradition as a "blank scroll": it possesses no rigid internal dogmas, allowing any imported ideology or political imperative to be inscribed upon it without friction, and accommodating contradictions without offering fixed intellectual coordinates.

When the Meiji Constitution erected the national polity on this vague foundation, the entire power structure inherited the same conceptual blur: - Under the Meiji Constitution, national sovereignty resided strictly in the person of the Emperor rather than the people, yet in daily practice the monarch was not an absolute ruler who personally managed the state. - Governance was carried out through an intricate web of ministers, military officials, and bureaucratic organs acting in the Emperor’s name. - Because the constitutional boundary between the Emperor's supreme prerogative and the administrative autonomy of the ministers was never clearly defined, ultimate authority was claimed to rest entirely with the Emperor, while practical operational accountability vanished into institutional ambiguity.

[19:54](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ArieQmHqFvk&t=1194s) The Deliberative System and the Toranomon Incident: How Accountability Vanished

The political architecture of prewar Japan operated through what was known as the "deliberative system" (ringisei). Rather than originating directly from autocratic decree, government policies were drafted and refined by ministers and bureaucrats, who then submitted them upward seeking the Emperor’s formal approval and sanction. This created a profound structural paradox: on paper, every major state action appeared to emanate directly from the sacred will of the Emperor, even when he had little personal input. Step by step, the apparatus simultaneously claimed these decisions represented the collective will of the entire populace—analogous to how one might imagine every resident of Beijing's Chaoyang District being entirely of one mind in backing a national directive. In this Japanese framework, a policy was both divinely decreed from the top and passionately desired from the bottom. Consequently, the actual author of any policy remained invisible, producing a total void of clear accountability.

```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Structure of Prewar Japanese Governance and Diffuse Accountability accDescr: Diagram showing how decisions circulated between the Emperor, bureaucracy, and village communities to dissolve accountability.

subgraph StateApparatus["State Power & Governance"] EMP["The Emperor<br/>(Living God / Sacred Will)"] BUR["Ministers & Bureaucrats<br/>(Drafts Policies via Deliberative System)"] end

subgraph SocietalBase["Grassroots Social Control"] VIL["Village Communities<br/>(Mutual Surveillance & Social Pressure)"] POP["The Populace<br/>(Silent Conformity to 'Reality')"] end

BUR -->|"Submits for Approval"| EMP EMP -->|"Apparent Divine Decree"| BUR BUR -->|"Framed as Collective Will"| VIL VIL -->|"Enforces Conformity on"| POP POP -.->|"Diffuses Blame Upward & Outward"| StateApparatus ```

To illustrate how pathologically this diffusion of responsibility functioned in real life, Liang Wendao highlights the observations of Emil Lederer, a German professor who taught at the University of Tokyo in the 1920s. In his book *Japan in Transition*, Lederer documented his utter bewilderment following the late-1923 Toranomon Incident, in which a young radical named Daisuke Namba fired a pistol at Crown Prince Hirohito (the future Showa Emperor). Lederer was not primarily shocked by the assassination attempt itself, but by the surreal, boundless chain of collective punishment and guilt that unfolded immediately afterward:

- **The Cabinet:** The entire cabinet of Prime Minister Yamamoto Gonnohyoe felt morally compelled to resign en masse. - **Law Enforcement:** A sweep of officials, from the Superintendent General of the Metropolitan Police down to ordinary beat officers on the street, were stripped of their posts—despite Lederer observing they had had no physical ability to intercept the shooter. - **The Culprit's Family:** Namba's father was forced to surrender his seat in the House of Representatives, placed himself under house arrest, and lived in total social ostracization. - **The Hometown:** In Namba’s ancestral village, residents abruptly canceled all traditional New Year festivities and entered an official communal period of mourning. - **The School System:** The principal and teachers of the elementary school Namba had attended years earlier resigned their careers in disgrace simply because they had once taught a child who later grew up to commit a crime against the Crown.

To Lederer, this infinite broadening of culpability, backed by an unspoken societal consensus that viewed such self-flagellation as completely normal, appeared utterly bizarre. Yet as Masao Maruyama argued, when collective responsibility is spread so thin that everyone even tangentially connected must pay penance, the true outcome is that nobody takes concrete political responsibility. Blame is simply atomized until it evaporates.

---

[22:50](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ArieQmHqFvk&t=1370s) The Village Community and the Deification of Institutions

To uncover why accountability vanished so thoroughly, one must look beneath the Emperor and the central government to the foundational bedrock of Japanese society: the "village community." Historically, Japanese rural life operated like an organic, self-policing neighborhood committee. Government administrators did not need to install an intrusive police presence because villagers monitored one another continuously. If a stranger walked down a path, the entire village took note; if a household suffered a minor domestic scandal or stepped out of line, the community applied immediate, stifling social pressure to pull them back into conformity. While this served as a stabilizing mechanism in pre-modern agrarian life, its fusion with modern nationalism and militarism produced something terrifying. Ordinary citizens on their neighborhood streets lived in paralyzing dread of saying a single word critical of the state or contrary to the sacred "national polity" (kokutai), because dissent was instantly treated as the supreme crime of national treason.

This terror was compounded by the fact that the "national polity" was so amorphous and ill-defined that no one could strictly articulate what violated it. The standard was anchored in the traditional Japanese intellectual reflex to conform to immediate reality: whatever exists is accepted as rational and useful. The flip side of this pragmatic mindset is that ordinary people felt bound to submit silently to whatever state power placed in front of them. If the military-dominated reality demanded that the state be the absolute center of spiritual and daily life, society complied; if the state commanded an invasion of China or the conquest of Korea, people marched. Going against existing reality or its institutional apparatus was deemed inherently wrongful.

This dynamic led Masao Maruyama to his vital critique: Japan's persistent tendency toward the "deification of institutions," an intellectual worship closely mirroring Karl Marx's concept of commodity fetishism:

- **Institutions as Human Tools:** Human theories, ideas, and governance systems are fundamentally tools—like a ruler measuring reality. There is always a gap between an abstract system and messy real life, and because systems are artificial, human-made constructs, they must remain open to critique, adaptation, and change as historical demands evolve. - **Institutions as Divine Decrees:** Prewar Japan inverted this logic, treating prevailing institutions not as flawed, improvable human inventions, but as sacred fixtures to be accepted unconditionally. Because the Meiji Constitution was promulgated directly in the name of the Emperor—a living deity—the laws and bureaucratic structures derived from it were viewed as divine handiwork. - **The Elimination of Dissent:** Once a social system is elevated to a god-given order, the capacity for internal reflection, popular dissent, or rebellion collapses entirely.

Maruyama’s concise, essayistic masterpiece *Japanese Thought* was not mere ivory-tower intellectual history. Written in the immediate postwar era, it was the most agonizing, profound attempt by Japan’s greatest contemporary political philosopher to answer the root existential question: how had modern Japan ideologically steered itself into catastrophe?

---

[28:14](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ArieQmHqFvk&t=1694s) Street-Level Survival in Kabukicho: Li Xiaomu’s Brushes with Death, Gangs, and Six Divorces

The conversation shifts abruptly from postwar intellectual theory to raw, street-level reality as Dou Wentao turns to guest Li Xiaomu, marveling at his colorful life in Tokyo's notorious red-light district, Kabukicho. While scholars debate institutional psychology, Xiaomu’s understanding of Japan was forged in a brutal underworld crucible. When he first arrived in Kabukicho, he found himself navigating between legitimate society and ruthless syndicates, surviving multiple kidnappings carried out by both Japanese gangs and Chinese criminal outfits who tried to muscle him out of the district. When he later chose to run for local political office in Shinjuku, Japanese right-wing extremists trailed him with loudspeakers, screaming at him to "go back where you came from."

Beyond underworld violence and political vitriol, Xiaomu survived two horrific car accidents where the vehicles were entirely crumpled into write-offs. When Dou Wentao asks in disbelief whether it was his car or the other driver's that was destroyed, Xiaomu explains that the cars were completely totaled, insurance payouts were issued, yet miraculously he walked away without a single scratch on his body. Facing death so intimately reshaped his entire perspective: compared to surviving kidnappings and fatal wrecks, ordinary life crises fail to register as traumatic.

``` LI XIAOMU'S RESET CYCLE ┌──────────────────────┐ ┌─────────────────────────┐ ┌───────────────────────────┐ │ Kabukicho Crucible │ ───> │ Total Financial Reset │ ───> │ Unshakable Resilience │ │ • Gang kidnappings │ │ • 6 mutual divorces │ │ • Face shows zero wear │ │ • Right-wing attacks │ │ • All assets forfeited │ │ • Starts from absolute 0 │ │ • 2 near-fatal wrecks│ │ • "Spiritual renunciation"│ │ • Survives street & state │ └──────────────────────┘ └─────────────────────────┘ └───────────────────────────┘ ```

Nowhere is this nonchalance clearer than in his domestic history: Xiaomu casually shrugs off having been divorced six times, invoking the classical Chinese idiom, "Once you've seen the vast sea, nothing else looks like water." He explains the harsh reality of Japanese divorce law:

- **Contested Divorces in Court:** If a marriage ends in a legal court battle in Japan, the husband is typically ruined financially; the legal framework almost invariably awards the family assets and child custody to the wife, leading to the Japanese saying that average men simply "cannot afford" to get divorced. - **The Mutual Agreement Route:** Xiaomu avoided protracted legal warfare by concluding every divorce through mutual consent, finalizing each split in a single day. - **The Complete Financial Reset:** The catch was that each mutual settlement required him to walk away with nothing—a total forfeit of his assets and savings, leaving him empty-handed. He jokingly refers to these moments as entering a state of complete "spiritual renunciation" (净身出户). Each divorce required him to reset his life back to zero and rebuild from scratch.

Dou Wentao sits back, scrutinizing Xiaomu's face across the table with genuine awe. Dou observes that despite knowing the lurid stories from Xiaomu’s past—arriving alone in Japan, braving the cutthroat intersection of the yakuza and migrant crime, weathering right-wing harassment, facing deadly wrecks, and enduring six financial wipes—Xiaomu’s face shows virtually zero traces of hardship, trauma, or aging. His psychological resilience is, as the table concludes, completely off the charts.

[29:59](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ArieQmHqFvk&t=1799s) 绑架经历与周轶君的跨国婚姻设想

窦文涛回顾起一段惊险经历:当事人曾两次遭遇绑架,两次都险些丢了性命。窦文涛坦言,如果换作是自己经历了那种生死劫难,事后第一反应肯定是立刻远走高飞,离那个是非之地越远越好。然而对方的韧性非同寻常,被绑架后的第二天晚上,他就一身西装革履地重新站在原地,“你想赶我走?我偏不走”。这种硬碰硬的做派让歹徒都暗自嘀咕此人绝非善茬,不得不认栽退避。

由此谈及应对危机的心理承受力,窦文涛转而向周轶君提问。他打趣道,绝非要诅咒轶君,毕竟她的跨国婚姻一直被视作东西方结合的成功典范,但假设轶君遇到类似“小木”那样的婚变绝境,如今又有孩子在身边,她会如何应对?

周轶君给出了格外通透从容的回答。她坦承那样的日子固然痛苦,但婚姻并非人生来就自带的属性,这种后天构建的关系打破重组并非不可逾越之难。她将这种情感波澜比作“春来发几枝”般的自然代谢,无论外界如何围堵,生命的“春色”终究关不住,不必执意去跟既定规律逆流死磕。

---

[31:24](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ArieQmHqFvk&t=1884s) 男女出轨的社会惩罚与心理机制差异

许子东借由之前一期关于出轨话题的讨论展开分析。他指出,现行社会对女性出轨的惩罚远比男性苛刻。同一种背叛行为,如果出轨的是男方,往往更容易被妻子原谅并重修旧好;而一旦女方出轨,这段关系几乎不可挽回。这种根深蒂固的不公潜藏在世俗观念中,常被大众视若无睹。

窦文涛表示赞同,但补充强调男女在出轨动因上存在本质差异: - **男性的随意性**:男性的出轨对象往往不需要比原配优秀,甚至外貌、才华全面不如妻子,男人依然可能出于动物性的本能或新鲜感出轨;事后痛哭流涕地忏悔“谁都比不上你”,往往只是宣泄情绪或敷衍之辞。 - **女性的指向性**:女性出轨通常抱有“找寻下家”的决绝心理,其出轨对象在健康、外貌、财力或性格修养中,至少要在某一方面明显优于现任;这是一种做好破局准备的严肃权衡。

窦文涛进一步剖析了两性情史在道德评判上的巨大倾斜:一个男人若交往过十任女友,只要不四处炫耀,在社会评价甚至新伴侣眼中反倒可能成为富有魅力的佐证;但若换作一名条件极佳的女性,一旦坦陈自己交过七八个甚至更多前任,男方心里便极难承受。这种惩罚机制的落差,折射出深层的两性不平等。

```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 男女出轨心理与社会反应差异 accDescr: 对比男女在出轨动因、择偶标准及社会容忍度上的根本区别

subgraph Male["男性出轨"] M1["动因:随机冲动 / 寻求新鲜感"] --> M2["对象:无需优于妻子,甚至全面逊色"] M2 --> M3["事后态度:痛哭忏悔 / 视作逢场作戏"] M3 --> M4["社会代价:较低 / 较易获得妻子宽恕"] end

subgraph Female["女性出轨"] F1["动因:情感转移 / 寻找更好归宿"] --> F2["对象:在财富/性格/外貌上至少有一项优于现任"] F2 --> F3["事后态度:抱持破裂重组的觉悟"] F3 --> F4["社会代价:极高 / 婚姻几乎必然走向终结"] end ```

---

[34:57](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ArieQmHqFvk&t=2097s) 逆商的性别分野与“钝感力”

话题随后切回“逆商”(AQ)。许子东指出,男女面临的核心逆境存在明显的性别分野: - **男性的逆境轴心是事业**:涉及政治、经济、学术与社会地位。一旦事业归零、血本无归乃至负债累累,对男人而言无异于毁灭性的灭顶之灾。 - **女性的逆境轴心多在情感**:即便女性在职场中打破天花板、取得极高成就,一旦私人情感或家庭生活陷入僵局,世俗眼光以及女性自身的内心投射,仍极易将其判定为“全盘皆输”。

窦文涛观察到,有些女性年过五十之后会进入超越性别束缚的新境界,无论心智还是行事作风都变得无比强大与通达,不再被狭隘的情感得失所绑架。

周轶君则反思自己人生并未遇过真正的“大逆境”。在她看来,真正的逆境犹如孤身伫立在万丈悬崖边缘,四周漆黑一片,明知救命的梯子可能就在脚边却根本看不见,陷入一种前路断绝的绝对无助。窦文涛打趣说,这或许正是日本人所推崇的“钝感力”——许多所谓的绝境并非纯客观存在,而是高度主观的心理放大。在日本,有些年轻人因为被课长训斥一顿就走上绝路,将日常挫折视作滔天逆境;而内心钝感的人,往往能无形化解致命的心理压迫。

---

[38:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ArieQmHqFvk&t=2280s) 亲情软肋与难以言说的真正逆境

针对嘉宾在面对婚变时看似平静的反应,众人调侃其究竟是逆商高还是单纯在“折腾自己”,甚至打趣他清瘦的身板仿佛已经分不清悲喜。

该嘉宾澄清自己并非无动于衷,而是曾被狠狠戳中软肋落泪。当时在卧室床边,前妻向他讲起儿子的两件事: 1. **餐桌上的迁就**:儿子得知父亲今晚要回家吃饭,自己便宁可一口肉都不碰,特意去买刺身或整条鱼,只因为他牢牢记得“爸爸不吃肉,只吃鱼”。 2. **睡前的听话**:前一天晚上,儿子洗漱完毕钻进被窝吃零食,父亲随口叮嘱了一句“吃完东西要刷牙”,孩子便记在心头,特意从床上爬起来重新开门去刷牙。

母亲以此向他控诉:“你儿子这么在乎你,把你当偶像,如今这个家却成了这个样子。”这番将孩子作为情感筹码的陈词,当场击溃了他的防线,泪水止不住地滑落。但即便心痛至极,他经过冷静自省,依然认定以自己的秉性,协议离婚才是对彼此最负责的交代,只能全力顺从对方的选择。

窦文涛顺势探寻许子东心目中属于自己的真正逆境究竟为何。许子东慨叹,真正的逆境往往深埋心底、不可名状,根本无法在镜头前轻易宣诸于口。网络上的口诛笔伐在大家看来不过是寻常风波,而那些关乎家庭与更深层次的剧痛,往往才是真正沉默且沉重的考验。

[40:08](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ArieQmHqFvk&t=2408s) The Tragic Fall of Mao Kankan: Myth and Reality of a Post-80s Entrepreneur

The conversation shifts from generational endurance to the modern concept of the "adversity quotient" (AQ), which the panel notes is primarily discussed in relation to today's youth. To ground the discussion, the host brings up a striking photograph from January of that year depicting Mao Kankan, the famed young entrepreneur whose suicide by charcoal burning ignited widespread public grief and debate. In his early thirties, Mao Kankan—author of the popular book *Work Like You're in Love*—had once stood at the pinnacle of cultural visibility. Back in the mid-2000s, media outlets and national broadcasts on CCTV celebrated him alongside peers like Li Xiang and Gao Ran as the "Four Rising Stars of Post-80s Entrepreneurship," framing them as the vanguard of a new generation. While his former peers went on to achieve stable commercial success, Mao Kankan's venture, Wanjia Esports (万家电竞), eventually bled dry of capital. Even as bankruptcy loomed, he relentlessly projected relentless optimism to his team, rallying his developers with promises that they would pull through.

```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: The Anatomy of Mao Kankan's Tragic Collapse accDescr: Diagram showing how external startup pressures, compound culture, and concealed debts culminated in Mao Kankan's suicide. subgraph External["External Persona & Cultural Code"] A["Beijing 'Ye' Mentality<br/>Military Compound Code"] --> B["'Rain-in-Time' Persona<br/>Protector of Friends & Staff"] B --> C["Unwavering Optimism<br/>'Funding is on the way'"] end subgraph Hidden["Hidden Reality & Financial Crisis"] D["Wanjia Esports Capital Depleted"] --> E["Mortgaged Personal Assets<br/>Car, Home & Mother's House"] E --> F["Took Sole Legal Liability<br/>Shielding Business Partner"] end subgraph Outcome["The Tragic Denouement"] C -.->|"Masks"| E F --> G["Meticulous Farewell<br/>Charcoal Burning Suicide"] G --> H["Respecting the Ending<br/>Mr. Six Fatalism"] end ```

The tragedy lay in the staggering divide between his public cheerfulness and his private reality. Only after his death did the public discover that he had secretly mortgaged his car, his own apartment, and even his mother’s home just to scrape together payroll for his employees. His close personal circle was furious with the mainstream media for lazily branding him as a fragile failure who simply "could not handle defeat." In truth, Mao Kankan had been methodically orchestrating his departure for months. He had abruptly insisted on breaking up with his girlfriend long before, withholding the real reason to keep her uninvolved in his impending financial ruin. In his final weeks, he seemed completely at peace, organizing social gatherings, drinking, and singing KTV with friends—gatherings that were, unbeknownst to them, his quiet, orderly way of saying goodbye. He purchased five bags of charcoal, carefully sealed the windows and doors of his apartment with weather stripping, and ended his life. The panel reflects that superficial commentary attributed his demise strictly to business failure, completely missing the unfathomable psychological weight he carried alone.

- **The Post-80s Icon**: Mao Kankan became nationally famous in 2006 as one of the four poster-children of young Chinese tech entrepreneurship. - **Wanjia Esports**: Mao Kankan's final gaming venture, which suffered an insurmountable cash-flow freeze following shareholder disputes. - **Hidden Sacrifices**: To keep the company afloat without alarming his team, he personally assumed massive debts and liquidated his family's properties. - **Calculated Farewell**: Far from an impulsive act, he pre-arranged his departure months in advance, including ending his relationship and sealing his home with five bags of charcoal.

---

[42:49](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ArieQmHqFvk&t=2569s) Depression, the Burden of Dignity, and Generational Shifts on Mortality

The speakers delve deeper into the underlying causes that media coverage glossed over, pointing out that Mao Kankan had explicitly documented his struggle with severe clinical depression in his early writings. Yet, those who loved him instinctively resisted attributing his death to mental illness because they remembered him as an extraordinarily warm, upright, and dignified figure. He maintained his self-respect and pride at all costs. Just before his death, he adamantly pushed his business partner to change the company’s legal representative solely to his own name. When his partner questioned the move—pointing out that the business was buried in debt and asking if Mao Kankan was intentionally shouldering the entire liability alone—Mao Kankan offered various practical excuses but refused to back down. In reality, he wanted to legally absorb every single burden so his partner could walk away clean.

Mao Kankan had often remarked that his personality was fundamentally unsuited for the ruthless world of business because he possessed an excessive, paralyzing sense of personal responsibility toward everyone around him. Death, the panel surmises, may have appeared to him as the only definitive exit where that crushing weight of obligation would finally dissolve. This prompts a broader reflection on how modern youth navigate pressure. While older generations often criticize young people for being brittle and "falling apart at the slightest issue," the panel counters that today’s youth simply have more choices and alternative paths to make a living; they refuse to endure mistreatment from a boss because they can simply walk away. Furthermore, their relationship with mortality has shifted away from traditional stigmas of shame, though the speakers stress that romanticizing suicide remains dangerous and wrong.

- **Underlying Depression**: Mao Kankan had battled chronic, severe depression for years, a fact acknowledged in his memoirs but often sidelined by friends who wished to remember his vibrant dignity. - **Assumption of Liability**: By transferring the legal representative (*faren*) status to himself during the insolvency process, he deliberately walled off his business partner from financial and legal ruin. - **The Entrepreneurial Mismatch**: His inability to detach emotionally, treat employees transactionally, or offload burdens made him temperamentally ill-suited for startup capitalism.

---

[45:06](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ArieQmHqFvk&t=2706s) The Beijing "Ye" Mentality: Military Compounds and the "Rain-in-Time" Persona

Analyzing his background, the panel links Mao Kankan’s behavioral code to his upbringing as a Beijing military compound child (*dayuan zidi*), drawing direct cultural parallels to figures like Wang Shuo and collector Ma Weidu. Discussing regional archetypes—contrasting Shandong, Shanghai, and Beijing men—a speaker highlights that an authentic old Beijing man strives above all else to be a *"Ye"* (爷, a proud gentleman or master). Being a *"Ye"* means possessing a near-pathological refusal to admit vulnerability or say "I can't handle this." In this light, Mao Kankan behaved precisely like Song Jiang, the "Rain-in-Time" from *Water Margin*: whenever a peer was in trouble, he would appear to solve it, constantly assuring everyone, "Don't worry, it'll work, I've secured more funding, we'll go public soon."

He kept up this protective facade until the very end, hiding the collapse until representatives from the parent company physically arrived to order the staff to disband. He lived by the chivalric inversion of Cao Cao’s famous adage: "I only allow the world to wrong me; I cannot wrong the world" (宁可天下人负我,休叫我负天下人). This code bears resemblance to the traditional Japanese notion that death cleanses all debts, but with a distinctly northern, face-conscious twist. The Beijing gentleman takes total pride in being the umbrella for everyone else: "Whatever problems arise, I'll shoulder them. I'll never let you carry the burden." When the accumulated weight of millions in debt made that posture impossible to sustain in life, he chose an absolute exit: "A legend in life, a myth in death."

| Cultural Dimension | The Beijing *"Ye"* / Compound Archetype | The Pragmatic Mercantile Archetype | |:--- |:--- |:--- | | **Response to Adversity** | Refusal to show weakness; claims absolute capability (*"I can handle it"*). | Practical negotiation, risk mitigation, and calculated retreat. | | **Social Obligation** | The "Rain-in-Time" (宋江) complex; shielding peers and absorbing all liabilities. | Contractual limits; sharing or dividing liabilities among stakeholders. | | **Conflict Resolution** | Grand dramatic showdown; ritualistic defense of personal honor (*Mr. Six*). | Sitting down to strike a deal; avoiding unnecessary loss of life or capital. | | **Core Moral Creed** | "I only allow the world to wrong me; I cannot wrong the world." | Survival, compromise, and mutual preservation. |

---

[47:59](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ArieQmHqFvk&t=2879s) The Ritual of *Mr. Six*, Jianghu Pride, and Redefining the Adversity Quotient

While firmly stating that suicide must never be celebrated or encouraged, the speakers invoke Lu Xun’s classic defense of the deceased—urging the living never to throw stones at or mock those who take their own lives. In his final social media post, Mao Kankan wrote that he "respected the ending" (尊重大结局). This ritualistic acceptance of tragedy evokes Feng Xiaogang’s film *Mr. Six* (《老炮儿》), particularly the climactic, fatalistic solo march across the frozen lake. From a pragmatic, southern perspective—such as that of Shanghai—such grand, self-destructive showdowns seem completely baffling: "Why not just sit down and talk it out? Why risk your life fighting someone? It's not worth it at all." But to the northern gentleman steeped in compound *jianghu* codes, the aesthetic ritual of the ending matters more than mere survival.

Mao Kankan lived this chivalric persona compulsively. Friends recounted that if an acquaintance casually mentioned that a young woman had returned from abroad wanting to break into PR or advertising, Mao Kankan would immediately organize and pay for a massive banquet the following evening, inviting every major industry head he knew to launch her career, even though he barely knew her himself. That grand generosity was what he lived for. Even when he was secretly drowning in debt and looking for capital to cover his workers' salaries, his intense personal pride forbade him from begging or showing desperation.

This tragic dynamic leads the panel to redefine the "adversity quotient" (AQ). Typically, people believe AQ is merely about endurance, grit, and stubbornly battling forward—qualities Mao Kankan exhibited to an extreme fault. However, true AQ possesses a crucial second dimension: knowing when to compromise, yield, and retreat. While IQ and EQ are tools for managing interactions with others, AQ is ultimately an internal war with oneself. Mastering it requires learning how to make peace with failure rather than demanding an impossible, fatal perfection from one's own pride.

- **Respecting the Ending**: Mao Kankan's parting words echoed the theatrical, honorable fatalism of Beijing's *Mr. Six* cultural tradition. - **The Jianghu Instinct**: His impulse to host industry banquets for near-strangers highlighted an identity built entirely on being a beneficent patron. - **The Dual Nature of AQ**: True adversity quotient is not just relentless resistance, but the wisdom of strategic retreat and accepting personal limitation.

[50:41](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ArieQmHqFvk&t=3041s) Thick Skin vs. Beijing Dignity: Hunanese Resilience and the Tragedy of Mao Kankan

Li Xiaomu reflects candidly on the necessity of shedding one's pride to survive in an unforgiving environment. Looking back at his early years in Japan, he openly describes himself as "a shameless person" who willingly cast aside vanity during his first three years in Tokyo just to stay alive, noting that while he abandoned his pride, he never crossed the line into breaking the law. For him, survival and gaining true respect as an ordinary person require self-mockery, the humility to admit mistakes, and the courage to apologize when things go wrong, whereas "caring too much about pride is the issue."

The panel connects Xiaomu’s raw survival instinct to the iconic Hunanese cultural ethos: *"Ba De Man"* (霸得蛮—relentless grit) and *"Nai De Fan"* (耐得烦—boundless patience). This stubborn resilience, echoing Zeng Guofan’s famous spirit of *lǚ bài lǚ zhàn* (屡败屡战, fighting on despite repeated defeats) and *yù cuò yù yǒng* (愈挫愈勇, growing braver with each setback), reflects a remarkably high adversity quotient. In sharp contrast, the hosts observe how traditional old Beijing gentlemen (*lǎo Běijīng yémen*) operate under a completely different psychological code: they prioritize face and dignity above all else, fiercely adhering to the principle that one cannot be humiliated or disgraced, preferring death over living in a way they consider submissive or degraded.

This cultural contrast frames the tragic fate of entrepreneur Mao Kankan. The panel analyzes how Mao’s tragedy stemmed from good intentions coupled with an inability to bend: he genuinely wanted to help his partners and team, took on immense burdens, but drastically overestimated his own capacity. When his resources collapsed and he could no longer shoulder the obligations or face the indignity of defeat, he felt his only way out was to end his own life rather than compromise his sense of self.

- **Hunanese Survival Tenets**: Characterized by *"Ba De Man"* (stubborn determination to endure) and *"Nai De Fan"* (tolerance for hardship and tedious struggle). - **Adversity Quotient**: Embracing Zeng Guofan’s philosophy of persistent battle (*lǚ zhàn*) and advancing even when knocked down. - **The Dignity Dilemma**: Old Beijing cultural pride views loss of dignity as worse than death, directly opposing the "thick-skinned" flexibility required in modern entrepreneurship.

---

[53:03](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ArieQmHqFvk&t=3183s) Living for Dignity: The Trap of Social Roles, Marlon Brando, and Du Yuesheng's IOUs

```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: The Trap of Social Roles and Dignity accDescr: Diagram illustrating how individuals become trapped in external expectations of benevolence and power, leading to financial or psychological ruin.

subgraph External_Role ["The Social Role / Facade"] A["Assumes 'Boss' or 'Protector' Persona"] --> B["Compulsion to Provide & Rescue: 'I am the CEO, so I must help you'"] end

subgraph Internal_Reality ["The Hidden Deficit"] C["Dwindling Financial & Mental Resources"] --> D["Refusal to Beg or Lower Dignity"] end

subgraph Outcomes ["Ultimate Resolution"] B --> E["Role Entrapment"] D --> E E --> F["Du Yuesheng: Burns IOUs to preserve autonomy"] E --> G["Marlon Brando: Dies in heavy debt behind celebrity facade"] E --> H["Mao Kankan: Tragic self-destruction when incapable of coping"] end ```

The conversation broadens into a philosophical inquiry into why people live. While most chase money, status, or family welfare, the panel examines a distinct archetype: the individual who lives purely for the aura of personal dignity and chivalry. This is personified by the underworld boss or generous benefactor who dies dirt-poor because they spent their entire life answering every plea with, "You don't have money? Here, take it," and insisted on resolving everyone's crises. Mao Kankan displayed this exact trait during his earlier career at GTV: after pouring immense effort into building up the business, he walked away over a clash of values, accepting a mere tens of thousands of yuan rather than demanding the millions legally owed to him.

This behavior highlights the perilous trap of "social roles." When high-profile figures step into an elevated position, they often feel compelled to play the part regardless of reality. The panel cites Hollywood icon Marlon Brando, who passed away leaving behind mountains of debt because he spent decades maintaining a lavish facade, skipping the Oscars, and playing the untouchable benefactor while secretly insolvent. In entrepreneurship, someone who is excessively soft-hearted—"so kind that he couldn't even bring himself to kill a bird"—lacks the ruthless pragmatism needed to advance and retreat.

The panel compares this posture to Shanghai tycoon Du Yuesheng during his impoverished final years in Hong Kong. Despite holding a bundle of IOUs worth dozens of gold bars from people he had aided, Du ordered his family to burn every single note on his deathbed. His rationale was not merely to put on a show, but to uphold an internal moral universe: he refused to leave debts that would burden his descendants or torment his debtors. In Du’s constructed reality, he was solely the giver and protector—never someone who would bow down and beg.

- **Mao Kankan at GTV**: Walked away from millions in potential equity/compensation with only a modest payout after his creative vision diverged. - **Marlon Brando Analogy**: Highlighting how prominent figures become locked into their social roles, sustaining lavish generosity until death reveals deep bankruptcy. - **Du Yuesheng's Final Act**: Burning stacks of IOUs before dying in Hong Kong, refusing to allow anyone to feel indebted or to force his heirs into the role of debt collectors.

---

[58:28](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ArieQmHqFvk&t=3508s) Zen Endurance and the Street Jungle: Li Xiaomu Cornered by the Northeast Gang

Connecting these extreme psychological demands to Buddhist philosophy, the panel discusses the Zen concept of "adversity as training" (*nì jìng xiū*) and the perfection of patience (*kṣānti-pāramitā* / 忍辱波罗蜜). In Zen practice, true endurance means cultivating an immovable mind that remains unshaken under humiliation or hardship, symbolized by the shock of the monastic "stick and shout" (*bàng hē*).

Dou Wentao turns the question back to street reality, asking Li Xiaomu if he ever encountered a desperate moment where he felt "there was no tomorrow." Xiaomu confirms that such moments were terrifyingly real. He recounts a critical turning point that occurred after spending a decade grinding in Tokyo's Kabukicho, when he had finally secured control over three key commercial streets for his nightlife guiding business—operating independently as his own self-styled "Hunan gang" within legal boundaries.

His hard-won territory was suddenly threatened when members of the rival "Northeast gang" (*Dōngběi bāng*) showed up to take over his turf. They cornered Xiaomu inside a local coffee shop, attempting to absorb his operation by issuing a brazen ultimatum: "Starting tomorrow, your staff belongs to us. Go find your own customers." Recognizing the imminent danger before walking in, Xiaomu preemptively called both the police and trusted allies, alerting them to his exact location. He stresses that if law enforcement had not stepped in, his livelihood—and his very survival on the streets—would have vanished overnight.

- **The Perfection of Patience**: Enduring humiliation until the mind becomes wholly unshakeable, treating adversity as rigorous spiritual cultivation. - **Kabukicho Turf Battle**: Li Xiaomu had secured three streets through ten years of work before being targeted by the rival Northeast gang. - **The Coffee Shop Ambush**: Confronted with an extortionate demand to surrender his staff and territory, Xiaomu relied on rapid tactical thinking by contacting the police and friends before entering the trap.

[01:00:25](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ArieQmHqFvk&t=3625s) Concessions, Boundaries, and the Reality of Adversity Quotient

Reflecting on a high-stakes turf conflict, a speaker recalls facing a situation that might have driven others to suicide: a territory painstakingly built over more than a decade was seized within a single month. Instead of fleeing under the traditional maxim that "a wise man does not stand beneath a tottering wall" (君子不立于危墙之下), the speaker chose to stand their ground, believing this space was fundamentally their life's work. Rather than escalating into mutual destruction, a pragmatic bottom line was drawn. Recognizing that the newcomers were merely trying to make a living, the speaker ceded one street, retained two streets, and successfully defused the conflict through measured compromise. Remarkably, those initial adversaries eventually became close friends who meet for drinks whenever they are in Beijing.

```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Conflict Resolution through Pragmatic Concession accDescr: Diagram illustrating how establishing a bottom line and making targeted concessions transformed turf adversaries into long-term friends.

subgraph ConflictStage["Territory Dispute"] A["Ten years of established territory threatened"] --> B["Refuse to flee; hold bottom line"] end

subgraph ResolutionStage["Strategic Compromise"] B --> C["Cede one street to allow opponents a living"] C --> D["Retain two core streets"] end

subgraph OutcomeStage["Reconciliation"] D --> E["Conflict permanently resolved"] E --> F["Former rivals become drinking buddies in Beijing"] end ```

This experience prompts a deeper critique of the popular psychological buzzword "adversity quotient" (AQ / 逆商). The speakers argue that AQ is fundamentally an unscientific label; an individual's response to crisis is governed not by an innate mathematical quotient, but by personal character, core values, and baseline priorities. Dou Wentao shares his own internal calculus when confronting crisis: his immediate thought is whether his standard of living will collapse, jokingly pegging his absolute survival benchmark to the United Nations poverty line of two US dollars a day. He confesses that his greatest source of existential suffering is a chronic compulsion to imagine the absolute worst-case scenario. Identifying strongly with the symptoms of obsessive-compulsive disorder, he notes how his mind magnifies minuscule probabilities to terrifying extremes—constantly worrying whether a stray brick will fall from the sky, or diagnosing a brief, mild fever via the internet as the imminent onset of a myocardial infarction, keeping him awake in agony all night.

- **Turf Settlement:** Preserved two streets out of three by conceding one to rivals, transforming competitors into long-term personal friends. - **Deconstructing "AQ":** Adversity response stems from what an individual values most, rather than an abstract mental metric. - **Worst-Case Fixation:** Dou Wentao likens his catastrophizing to clinical OCD, where micro-probabilities—from falling bricks to heart attacks inferred from minor fevers—consume waking thought.

---

[01:03:14](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ArieQmHqFvk&t=3794s) The Glass Dome and Lu Xun’s "Small Tower" Strategy

The discussion shifts to the true nature of psychological resilience (韧性), defining it through two distinct tolerance thresholds. The first is practical: evaluating how much a catastrophe will genuinely harm one's capacity to live well—whether it means losing a livelihood or ending up homeless—and determining if that baseline damage is survivable. The second threshold is ideological: determining how much pressure one can endure before being coerced into abandoning deeply held convictions to perform acts one despises. While maintaining material security comes first, having a clear non-negotiable floor allows one to endure external turmoil without losing personal integrity.

Dou Wentao contrasts his method of coping with others' proactive confrontation, invoking Lu Xun's famous lines from *Self-Mockery* (自嘲): "Tattered hat covering my face as I walk through the busy street, / A leaking boat carrying wine drifting midstream" (破帽遮颜过闹市,漏船载酒泛中流). He describes this posture as an intentional, self-protective ostrich policy—letting onlookers laugh at his disheveled appearance while he retreats into his private sanctuary: "Hiding in my small tower, unified in my own world" (躲进小楼成一统). When the hosts playfully tease him about whether this "small tower" refers to his real estate in Hong Kong, Dou emphasizes that everyone requires a measure of "Ah Q spirit" (阿Q精神) to survive life's inevitable setbacks.

The conversation turns to Chinese high jumper Zhu Jianhua (朱建华), who shouldered the crushing weight of national expectations at the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games. After failing to capture the gold medal, Zhu faced harsh nationwide criticism and public backlash. A mentor gave Zhu a profound psychological metaphor to survive the storm: imagine living inside a transparent glass dome, where one can look out and observe the surrounding world, but remain entirely deaf to the toxic noise outside.

---

[01:06:40](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ArieQmHqFvk&t=4000s) Modern Trends, Journalistic Standards, and Accepting the Ordinary

The hosts observe that retreating into a private "glass dome" has become an increasingly rare luxury in the modern world. Referencing the historical drama *The Crown*, Zhou Yijun notes how even Queen Elizabeth II was forced to adapt to changing media landscapes, reluctantly performing like an actress before television cameras with a staged Christmas smile that vanished the second the lights turned off. In contemporary journalism, the pressure to conform is equally intense. Zhou laments the shift from traditional professional validation—where a story was judged by peer respect, personal craftsmanship, and enduring, classic values—to an era dominated entirely by internet traffic and viral click-through rates. She admits that she cannot simply "grit her teeth" and produce 100,000-view clickbait articles because algorithmic media operates on an entirely foreign linguistic and conceptual system.

Professor Xu Zidong points out that adapting to such pressures depends heavily on professional positioning. Entrepreneurs and corporate managers carry extensive structural responsibilities that prevent them from ignoring market trends, whereas academics and teachers enjoy the autonomy to define their own niches and reject demands outside their comfort zones. True stress resistance, Xu argues, comes from aligning one's career with one's genuine capabilities and knowing how to say "no," rather than reflexively agreeing to everything until one is crushed under unmanageable burdens.

Dou Wentao connects this to the distorted societal narratives surrounding Generation Z, such as viral social media reports hyping sixteen-year-old influencers who claim to have made tens of millions, while mocking salaried, middle-aged workers. In truth, stable societies rely on a broad, grounded middle class earning dependable incomes. Endorsing a poignant observation by Japanese filmmaker and comedian Takeshi Kitano (北野武), Dou concludes that society must stop compelling ordinary families to push their children into becoming rare geniuses, recognizing that living a modest, balanced life within one's means is an achievement in itself.

- **Queen Elizabeth II & *The Crown*:** Symbol of institutional figures forced to perform for mass media, maintaining an unnatural public facade. - **Erosion of Classic Journalism:** The transition from peer-evaluated professional depth to algorithmic engagement and click rates. - **The Power of Refusal:** Professor Xu highlights that AQ depends on recognizing capacity limits and exercising the freedom to decline unsustainable demands. - **Takeshi Kitano's Insight:** Rejecting the societal mania for raising prodigies; embracing ordinary, middle-class stability as healthy and essential.

[01:09:18](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ArieQmHqFvk&t=4158s) The Reality of Genius vs. Ordinary Ambition and Extreme Risk-Taking

The conversation opens on the distinction between true prodigies and everyday people. A true musical or artistic genius—one in a million—cannot be suppressed; even if their parents forbid them from practicing an instrument, their innate destiny will drive them to find a path regardless. However, for the vast majority of ordinary people, it is far safer and wiser to set modest, grounded boundaries. The speaker notes that when advising students or raising their own children, the golden rule should always be: live strictly within your means, do not spend money you do not possess, and never chase an unearned reputation.

```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: The Spectrum of Human Capacity and Risk Tolerance accDescr: Diagram contrasting true geniuses and extreme risk-takers with ordinary individuals who maintain grounded boundaries.

subgraph Outliers["Exceptional Outliers"] A["Innate Geniuses<br/>(One in a million destiny)"] B["High-Rolling Tycoons<br/>(Thrive in mortal danger & debt)"] end

subgraph Ordinary["The Stable Majority"] C["Grounded Individuals<br/>(Live within means & capacity)"] D["Clear Psychological Limits<br/>(Can bear 100k debt, not 1M)"] end

B -.->|"99 out of 100 collapse"| D A -.->|"Unreachable for most"| C C -->|"Foundation of a stable society"| D ```

Contrasting this pragmatic restraint with the rarefied world of big business, the speaker observes that prominent entrepreneurs operate on an entirely different psychological plane, repeatedly finding "fortune in the midst of danger." These tycoons routinely brush against disaster without flinching: - One boss recounted casually looking out of an airplane window, realizing an engine was on fire, yet remaining unperturbed before making a safe emergency landing. - Another corporate magnate flying by helicopter from Macau to Hong Kong stared out as the engine cut out mid-flight over Hong Kong, surviving without panic. - A third individual survived an actual helicopter crash on the Hong Kong–Macau route, strolled directly into a Macau casino afterward, pulled a slot machine, hit the triple-seven jackpot, and won a fortune.

The speaker highlights that the astronomical financing risks and high-stakes wagers these figures take on would cause "99 out of 100 people" to psychologically collapse. Surviving and functioning under such crushing pressure is described as a rare, almost terrifying "human art."

---

[01:11:30](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ArieQmHqFvk&t=4290s) Cultivating Failure Resilience in Children and Everyday Lessons

Contemplating these extreme mindsets leads directly to parenting and childhood development. The speaker admits to being terrified of children harboring an obsessive need to win at all costs—an instinct that sparks envy whenever peers succeed. To counteract this fragility, the speakers discuss deliberately training kids to endure defeat through simple tabletop games like checkers or Ludo. Rather than letting children win every round to protect their feelings, parents should manipulate the odds so the child wins perhaps only one out of five games. This gentle exposure teaches them that losing today is normal, tempering their emotional reactivity over time.

Another speaker shares an anecdote about teaching their child the game of Go. When defeated at home, the child would burst into tears, yet offering intentional handicaps felt hollow and patronizing. To instill genuine grit, the parent sent the child to Japan to study Go under the son of Go master Nie Weiping (Kong Lingwen), where the unfamiliar environment and discipline prevented the child from daring to cry.

The discussion turns to how poorly modern adults handle defeat, illustrated by a sobering personal tragedy: - The speaker admits feeling sour and frustrated merely losing digital bridge matches against computer algorithms. - A close bridge partner recently passed away from a sudden cerebral hemorrhage/stroke. - Upon asking the deceased's widow about his final hours, the speaker learned he had been playing bridge alone on the Xinrui Bridge platform, suffered an infuriating loss, and suffered the fatal stroke just hours later.

This serves as a stark self-rebuke: if a person cannot handle losing a digital card game to an algorithm, what business do they have competing in high-stakes reality? Referencing public figures like Mao Kai and "Xiao Mu"—noted admiringly for enduring six divorces without breaking—the speaker argues that true resilience requires knowing one's baseline. Most people are ordinary citizens who form the stabilizing bedrock of society precisely because they calculate worst-case scenarios, know they could handle a 100,000 debt but would crumble under a million, and refrain from overextending themselves.

---

[01:14:59](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ArieQmHqFvk&t=4499s) Investment Illusions, Self-Awareness, and the Pressure Cooker of Japanese Society

The conversation pivots to the temptations of outside capital. The speaker reflects on how top investment bankers and wealthy acquaintances frequently offered them tens of millions in funding, pitching it under the guise of friendship and backing an attractive personal "IP." The speaker came to realize the harsh reality of venture capital: nobody hands out tens of millions purely out of personal fondness without demanding returns and exerting control. Believing otherwise is pure delusion; accepting capital without a foolproof commercial plan is akin to selling oneself into servitude. The table erupts into self-deprecating banter about jokingly listing oneself for sale on Weibo and WeChat for 50 million—open to RMB, Japanese Yen, or even obsolete Italian Lira—like a piece of "cured meat."

From individual restraint, the dialogue shifts to the cultural psychology of Japan, where a speaker lived for a year: - Japanese public manners are driven not by autonomous "self-discipline" (自律), but by intense "other-discipline" (他律)—a pervasive terror of standing out, looking odd, or inconveniencing the collective. - Because social inertia and peer surveillance are suffocatingly rigid, Japanese avant-garde artists often act far more extreme, reckless, and unabashedly "shameless" than Western peers just to punch through the societal pressure cooker. - This suppression creates a dual persona: orderly at home, yet prone to releasing inhibitions once abroad.

The speaker shares firsthand encounters at Shanghai Pudong Airport illustrating this behavioral shift: - Seeing a Japanese traveler brazenly yelling on his phone in a public lounge, the speaker confronted him in Japanese, asking if he dared make phone calls like that in Japan—prompting the traveler to instantly flee in embarrassment. - In another incident, a Japanese traveler aggressively berated a young airport clerk for touching his passport. The speaker stepped in to reprimand the man in Japanese, pointing out the absurdity of demanding a boarding pass while forbidding the staff from inspecting the necessary travel documents.

[01:18:24](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ArieQmHqFvk&t=4704s) The Myth of Inherent Order: From the 1964 Olympics to Shanghai's Trash Sorting

Dou Wentao opens with a reflection on human behavior abroad, remarking that when people leave their home environment, they often cast off inhibitions and behave in ways completely unrecognizable from how they act at home. Turning to Japan, he observes a striking paradox: while deep-seated, bitter historical sentiments toward Japan remain widespread in China, official tourism bureau figures reveal an astonishing surge in Chinese visitors, reaching 870,000. Listening to Jiang Fangzhou, Dou points out that people reflexively take Japan’s immaculate cleanliness and social order for granted, imagining it was always this way. In reality, just several decades ago, the country was messy and disorderly.

Dou draws an immediate parallel to the intense garbage sorting campaign unfolding across Shanghai, where residents are routinely confronted at bins by volunteers asking the philosophical-sounding question, "What kind of trash are you?" ("Are you calling me trash?"). Shanghai's pilot program signals a nationwide shift where sorting will inevitably become a universal civic obligation. Japan's transformation followed a nearly identical trajectory. Rather than an ancient cultural trait, Japan's strict hygiene and waste-sorting apparatus was deliberately launched in 1963 as an urgent civic revolution to clean up filthy urban streets ahead of the 1964 Tokyo Olympics. Dou then turns to the panel, asking whether they knew how to navigate Japan's complex waste classification rules when they first arrived.

- **Tourism Surge:** Chinese tourist arrivals in Japan hit 870,000, underscoring the divergence between deep historical resentment and consumer travel preferences. - **Historical Milestone:** Japan’s nationwide cleanliness initiative was not spontaneous; it was instituted in 1963 by the government to clean up chaotic, dirty streets before the 1964 Tokyo Olympics. - **Domestic Parallel:** Shanghai's pioneering classification model illustrates how structured civic sanitation is systematically introduced to an initially unprepared public.

---

[01:19:39](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ArieQmHqFvk&t=4779s) The Neighborhood "Chaoyang Aunties" and the Art of Japanese Bulky Waste

Jiang Fangzhou admits that when she first lived in Japan, the sorting rules were so bewildering and tedious that she wrote an entire article about the struggle. Frustrated by the sorting protocol, she once tossed everything together into a single garbage bag. However, Japan possesses its own formidable counterpart to Beijing’s vigilant "Chaoyang Aunties"—hyper-observant neighborhood women who monitor the collection points. The very morning after she dumped the mixed trash, she opened her front door to find the entire rejected bag placed squarely on her doorstep.

The panel notes that public campaigns in China often overlook the tangible upsides of meticulous waste classification. In Japan, designated bulky waste (*sodai gomi*) collection points proved to be an invaluable resource. When international students arrived in the 1980s, they would frequently spot discarded television sets on the street and eagerly haul them home, only to discover they would not turn on. Seasoned peers quickly explained the unspoken code: if the power cord had been snipped off, the appliance was irreparably broken; if the plug remained intact, the previous owner had merely upgraded to a newer model, leaving a perfectly functional device behind. Whole generations of foreign students furnished their homes entirely from scavenged neighborhood cast-offs. Jiang Fangzhou shares that while living in Tokyo on a foundation grant, her apartment building had a shared waste room where residents deposited clean clothes, tableware, and books they no longer needed. She frequently scavenged useful items and dropped off books she had finished, while her mother managed to salvage a complete, spotless collection of children's textbooks spanning ages one through seven for future grandchildren. The table banters about whether she had to resort to scavenging to survive in Tokyo.

Beyond interpersonal vigilance, the guests emphasize that Japan’s cleanliness relies on immense economic investment and structural engineering. The trash rooms in Japanese residential complexes are equipped with dedicated hand-washing sinks, industrial deodorizers, and specialized air filtration systems. Many apartment entrances even provide designated foot-washing stations for pets returning from outdoor walks, keeping dirt from ever entering common indoor spaces.

```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Japanese Bulky Waste Classification Flow accDescr: Flowchart showing how discarded electrical appliances are vetted and reused based on the power cord condition.

A["Oversized Bulky Waste Station (Sodai Gomi)"] --> B{"Inspect Appliance Power Cord"} B -->|"Cord Intact"| C["Upgraded by Owner / Fully Functional"] B -->|"Cord Snipped Off"| D["Irreparably Broken / Discarded"] C --> E["Salvaged by International Students / Furnishes Apartment"] D --> F["Recycled / Processed by Municipal Waste"] ```

---

[01:21:49](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ArieQmHqFvk&t=4909s) Tanizaki's Resistance: *In Praise of Shadows* and the Clash with Western Hygiene

Dou Wentao points out that during Japan's initial post-war economic boom, Japanese tourists traveling abroad had a reputation for being loud, intrusive, and disorderly—drawing uncanny parallels to early Chinese tour groups today. Discussing cultural touchstones, Dou references a well-known cultural triad recommended for grasping Japan: literature begins with Jun'ichiro Tanizaki's essay *In Praise of Shadows* (*Inei Rai San*), cinema with Shohei Imamura's *The Ballad of Narayama*, and photography with Nobuyoshi Araki.

```mermaid flowchart LR accTitle: Cultural Pillars of Traditional Japanese Aesthetics accDescr: Chart categorizing the three canonical cultural figures and works introduced to understand Japanese aesthetic extremes.

subgraph Literature["Literature"] T["Jun'ichiro Tanizaki"] --- B1["'In Praise of Shadows'"] end subgraph Cinema["Cinema"] I["Shohei Imamura"] --- B2["'The Ballad of Narayama'"] end subgraph Photography["Photography"] A["Nobuyoshi Araki"] --- B3["Sensory & Extreme Aesthetics"] end ```

Writing in the 1920s and 1930s as Japan rapidly industrialized and Westernized, Tanizaki served as a fierce cultural contrarian. He lampooned the newly imported Western porcelain bathroom tiles, comparing them unfavorably to traditional Japanese wooden latrines. Built in secluded, shadowy corners of gardens, with raw wood surfaces open to the smells of nature and the rustle of leaves, traditional Japanese outhouses represented a meditative retreat, fostering what Tanizaki termed a form of "toilet worship." Tanizaki extended this aesthetic resistance to dental hygiene, lamenting how modern Japanese men and women were obsessed with acquiring uniform, blindingly white, straightened teeth. To him, rows of bleached white teeth looked like sterile Western bathroom tiles devoid of human warmth. Instead, he argued that tobacco-stained teeth, crooked bites, and yellowish complexions possessed an organic, textured beauty.

Tanizaki also recalled a Japanese delegation that visited Northeast China during the warlord era of Zhang Xueliang. While the travelers complained that the toilets aboard China's premier trains were filthy, Tanizaki turned the observation on its head, wondering whether Western hygiene had stripped away a certain unhurried "laziness," leisure, and natural beauty inherent to Eastern life. The panel notes that figures like Tanizaki, Araki, and the world of *The Ballad of Narayama* represent a realm of "perverted beauty" taken to its absolute extreme, which often leads uninitiated outside observers to write off Japanese culture as bizarre or degenerate.

- **Jun'ichiro Tanizaki's Critique:** In *In Praise of Shadows*, Tanizaki resisted Western modernism, arguing that sterile white bathroom tiles and bleached teeth destroyed traditional Japanese atmospheres rooted in natural textures, dim light, and organic aging. - **Zhang Xueliang Era Observation:** Tanizaki contrasted strict Western hygiene standards with a philosophical defense of human "laziness" and leisurely living after hearing accounts of unhygienic trains in Northeast China. - **Extreme Aesthetics:** The panel highlights that the artistic lineage connecting Tanizaki, Araki, and *The Ballad of Narayama* operates on radical, uncompromising extremes, often misinterpreted from the outside as cultural deviance.

---

[01:25:12](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ArieQmHqFvk&t=5112s) From Daily Micro-Comforts to Sen no Rikyu's Minimalist Tea Ceremony

The conversation pivots to the stark contrast between preconceptions and firsthand experience. Ma Weidu and Dou Wentao note that they have encountered numerous people who vehemently cursed Japan without ever having set foot in the country. Yet, when persuaded to visit, their perspectives shifted completely within a trip or two. Rather than focusing on sensationalized cultural tropes, visitors are consistently won over by the minute, effortless comforts of daily Japanese life: public restrooms that remain impeccably clean anywhere you go, and an atmosphere so pristine that visitors feel self-conscious about making a mess and reflexively return items to their exact places.

Dou connects this obsessive focus on the present physical environment to deeper philosophical underpinnings. Traditional Japanese thought centers on the immediate reality rather than an afterlife, captured by the Zen tea philosophy of *ichi-go ichi-e* ("one time, one meeting")—the understanding that every encounter is unrepeatable and must be treated with absolute sincerity. This aesthetic was crystallized by the 16th-century tea master Sen no Rikyu. While serving the regent Toyotomi Hideyoshi, Rikyu clashed with Hideyoshi's preference for ostentatious, golden, and politically dominant displays. Rikyu championed an uncompromising minimalism (*wabi-cha*), stripping tea rooms down to raw mud walls, tiny entrances, and modest utensils. Although Toyotomi Hideyoshi eventually ordered Sen no Rikyu to commit ritual suicide (*seppuku*), Rikyu's minimalist ethos triumphed historically, laying the aesthetic foundation for modern Japan's restrained, hyper-detailed culture.

[01:27:13](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ArieQmHqFvk&t=5233s) 逼仄茶室与碎石小道:仪式感构筑的敬畏与“虚伪”

嘉宾们聊起千利休式的草庵茶室,空间极小,仅有一叠半或两叠榻榻米大,进门的“躙口”矮得跟桌子差不多高,人必须像狗一样低头爬进去。屋内立着一根老木头柱子,挂着一幅极简的字画,而最特别的是那面土墙,看起来就像中国农村老家烧柴火的土灶台,黑黢黢、带着烟熏火燎的陈旧感,却又保留着泥土本身的肌理。一位嘉宾分享道,台湾有位财力雄厚的茶商朋友,曾执意找日本团队百分之百复刻这样一间茶室,但最后不得不放弃,因为即使是日本顶尖的施工团队也坦言,无论如何也做不出千利休当年那种自然沉淀的烟熏泥墙质感,“怎么看都不对味”。

茶室内的光线极度克制,全凭午后斜射进来的微弱天光。随着时间推移、光影角度变幻,跪坐其中的客人能感受到一种幽暗深邃的幽玄之美,茶师也会应景讲解光线投射在不同物件上的妙处。这种低矮窄小的入口设计是极其刻意的:在古代,日本武士在奔赴沙场前必须入茶室饮茶,而必须俯身爬入的规则,意味着剥离所有的世俗身份、傲慢与执念,从而在心中油然升起敬畏之感。这种敬畏机制同样体现在日本的神社中——参拜前必经的碎石铺路(玉砂利),脚踩上去沙沙作响,无形中提醒人已迈出凡俗世界、踏入神圣领域。日本文化极其擅长将一切事物流程化、仪式化与格式化,通过层层规矩唤起个体的敬畏与专注。然而,这种近乎苛刻的规矩也引发了席间的质疑:如果一个人在社会中永远无法表达真实的自我,必须靠这一套套程序包裹,这难道不就是一种极致的“虚伪”吗?

```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 茶室与神社的仪式化心理机制 accDescr: 展示茶室躙口与神社碎石小道如何通过外在空间规约促成内在心态转换

subgraph Space ["空间物理规约"] A["逼仄的躙口 (矮门)"] B["神社参道碎石 (玉砂利)"] end

subgraph Ego ["身体与心理行为"] C["俯身屈膝爬行"] D["放慢脚步、聆听碎石声"] end

subgraph State ["精神境界达成"] E["卸除世俗身份与自我执念"] F["跨越凡俗界限,进入神圣与肃穆"] end

A --> C --> E B --> D --> F ```

---

[01:29:21](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ArieQmHqFvk&t=5361s) 压抑的社会与欲望的排污渠:从九鬼周造到太宰治

针对这种“虚伪”与压抑,嘉宾指出,试图通过日常聊天来真正理解日本人往往是徒劳的,因为对方展现的客套话与你渴望探究的内心想法完全不在同一个波长上(即“建前”与“本音”的脱节)。要看懂日本社会的内核,必须去读日本文人的著作,比如写出《“粹”的构造》的九鬼周造,他将深埋在心底的隐秘心理剖析得淋漓尽致;或是像太宰治那样,在文学中放肆宣泄寻死的冲动与同五位女性的殉情纠葛。

在外界眼中,日本文化常被冠以优雅、精致的美名,但其最底层的社会功能,实则是一个承载巨大心理压力的“欲望排污渠”。正因为外部社会规范极其严密苛刻,内心那些不可对人言、无法见光的欲望与压抑,才被迫催生出独特的文学、艺术与亚文化作为排泄出口。日本社会的欲望绝非清心寡欲,而是拥有一套极其发达且隐秘的欲望疏导与排放系统。

- **文化观察**:与日本人日常沟通难以触及真实内核,必须借助其文学作品探知压抑机制。 - **代表文人**:九鬼周造剖析深层审美与心理,太宰治展现自毁冲动与精神危机。 - **文化本质**:精致仪式感的背面,是一座用于承载和排解高度社会压抑的“欲望下水道”。

---

[01:30:37](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ArieQmHqFvk&t=5437s) 备前烧与万物有灵:与陶土对话的“人间国宝”

话题转向日本手工艺中的极致专注与神道教的“万物有灵”观念。一位嘉宾讲述了自己在日本定制九只茶壶的经历:其中一道工序被称为“藻挂”(绯襷工艺),需要将晒干的海藻缠绕在素坯茶壶上入窑二次烧制,烧成后表面会留下如星空般斑驳的红褐色火纹。操刀的是一位年逾七旬的泰斗级大师。海藻本是寻常之物,旁人完全可以代为出海打捞,但这位七十多岁的老人无论工期多紧,都必须亲自去海边采集海草;晾干后,他也绝不让学徒代劳,而是亲自在模具上像筑鸟巢一样,一圈圈将草严丝合缝地捆扎上去。整套流程不假外手,完全是一场孤身一人与物、与自我内心的对话。这与国内某些工作室学徒做完全部工序、大师最后仅盖个印章的名义作坊形成了鲜明反差。

马未都接着分享了在冈山县采访一位陶艺“人间国宝”的见闻。这位国宝大师坦言,从最初揉捏泥土那一刻起,他就必须与手中的陶土保持情感连结:“从我抓起泥巴开始,我就跟它说话;它进窑的时候,我守在窑外说:‘我等着你呢,你一会儿要漂亮地出来啊’;出窑之后,我又对它说:‘谢谢你,受了这么大的罪,谢谢你今天陪着我。’”

这种与造物共情的执念弥漫在日本社会的方方面面: - **二手车告别**:日本人卖旧车时,常会对着老车深鞠一躬,说一声“辛苦你了,陪了我这么多年,今天送你走了”;嘉宾打趣道,相比之下国内卖二手车往往先想着“调表”掩盖里程。 - **唐代木作遗风**:正如唐代匠人修缮大木作屋顶,选材大师会逐一敲击抚摸木料,通过与木头对话,挑选出那根“心甘情愿成为屋顶一部分”的木材。 - **东方物我合一**:手艺人将无生命的器物视作具备灵性的存在,劳作过程即是“懂生命”的过程。

---

[01:33:23](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ArieQmHqFvk&t=5603s) 帧率级的自我修行与无法融入的“暧昧”高墙

这种近乎宗教般的执念,被一位从事视频剪辑的嘉宾引申到现代创作中。他提到自己与剪辑师常为一个镜头熬夜逐帧微调,剪辑师坦言:“咱们熬夜调的这些细节,至少有百分之五十是观众完全感知不到的。”明知观众看不出来,为何还要死磕?唯一的解释就是“信仰”——如果不做到这个标准,自己这关就过不去,会觉得“对不起自己”。在日本社会,这种向内苛求的职业信仰随处可见。

谈及宗教信仰,嘉宾提到了著名天主教作家远藤周作及其代表作《沉默》。远藤周作在书中悲观地认为,日本犹如一片同化一切的“沼泽”,西方基督教的种子在这里根本无法扎根,日本人关注现世、缺乏死后救赎观的民族性排斥了外来一神教。但也有嘉宾反驳道,历史上基督教在九州岛等地曾发展迅猛,江户幕府之所以残酷血腥地铲除天主教,并非单纯因为文化排斥,而是因为其动摇了幕府统治的政治根基、带有推翻政权的现实威胁。

最后,嘉宾们剖析了在日生活最令人感到隔阂的致命缺陷——“暧昧”。在日本生活多年的人往往会发现: 1. **真实意图不可捉摸**:永远摸不清日本人哪句话是真话、最终的底牌到底是什么。 2. **难以逾越的心理安全距离**:无论相处多久、关系表面上多么要好,中间永远横亘着一层无法突破的客气与距离,外人永远无法进入他们的核心圈子。 3. **官僚推诿的现实遭遇**:一位嘉宾举例称,曾有华人孩子在日本学校遭遇霸凌,家长多次沟通却连校方的正式面谈都约不上,学校态度极其暧昧推诿,最后家长不得不求助在日华人媒体介入维权。

[01:35:53](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ArieQmHqFvk&t=5753s) Cultural Boundaries and Misunderstood Bullying in Japanese Schools

A speaker recounts an interaction with a Japanese schoolteacher following an incident that occurred when reporters were invited to observe the school. The teacher approached the narrator to take accountability, admitting that the school had mismanaged the visit and felt genuinely remorseful about how things transpired. Offering a formal resolution, the teacher noted, "I'll take you to the principal in a bit, and the principal will apologize to you." However, the teacher also offered a deeper, nuanced insight into the social friction observed among the students, pointing out a fundamental behavioral gap between children from the two countries: "You Chinese kids are different from Japanese kids. Once Chinese kids decide they are good friends, they stick together—do you understand what I mean?"

The teacher explained that Chinese children naturally express warmth and intimacy through constant physical contact, behaving as if they are "thick as thieves" by hugging, linking arms, and holding onto one another. In stark contrast, Japanese children are socialized from early childhood to maintain strict personal space and avoid bodily contact altogether. In Japan, physical touch is practically non-existent in casual public life unless children are actively fighting; people simply do not walk down the street arm-in-arm or hugging each other. In China, by comparison, best friends routinely display this type of physical affection.

Because of this profound divergence in cultural conditioning, misunderstandings easily arise. When a Chinese child instinctively moves in for a hug and is abruptly pushed away by a Japanese peer, the rejected child often takes it personally, suspecting they are being ostracized due to their poor Japanese language ability. What feels like targeted bullying or cruel exclusion to the Chinese child is, in reality, nothing more than an unbridgeable cultural divide over bodily boundaries.

```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Cultural Misunderstanding in Childhood Socialization accDescr: Flowchart illustrating how differing cultural norms regarding physical touch lead to perceived bullying. subgraph ChineseNorms["Chinese Social Norms"] A["Close friendship expressed via touch"] B["Hugging & holding hands ('thick as thieves')"] end subgraph JapaneseNorms["Japanese Social Norms"] C["Taught early to avoid physical contact"] D["Physical space maintained; no casual touch"] end subgraph Conflict["Cross-Cultural Interaction"] E["Chinese child initiates hug"] F["Japanese child instinctively pushes away"] G["Misinterpreted as rejection or bullying"] end

A --> B C --> D B --> E D --> F E --> F F --> G ```

- **Japanese school etiquette:** The administration adhered strictly to institutional responsibility, with the teacher offering an immediate apology and an audience with the principal to make formal amends. - **Physical boundary norms:** In Japanese public spaces and schoolyards, walking arm-in-arm or casual hugging is virtually absent, with physical contact reserved almost entirely for fighting. - **Root cause of perceived bullying:** Pushing away an affectionate embrace is an instinctive Japanese boundary response, yet Chinese children frequently misread this rejection as linguistic inadequacy or deliberate social alienation.

## Video description 💡订阅我们,换个视角看懂万象: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCwiWVn-hZq3_zuOk570kyGA

简介:《圆桌派》节目以圆桌为名,旨在体现圆桌席上人人平等,每期由窦文涛携手三位嘉宾,还原在生活中发生在圆桌旁、海阔天空的精彩聊天。延续真实不“装”的窦式主持风格,立足网络,放眼世间,神侃包罗万象的话题,嬉笑言谈中彼此迸发出智慧火花。 《锵锵行天下》第三季江南烟雨,一路如一副徐徐铺开的画卷。访名山,赏奇石,寻妙缘。窦文涛与老友们浸润在江南的诗情画意中。数十天的路程,在十三集的正片中难以完整展现,有太多的行程与内容难以取舍,所以借由本次《锵锵拾遗》,再次将未播出的素材进行汇编拾遗,将此次江南之行的更多精彩内容奉献给观众,让观众重温江南烟雨中的谈笑风生。 主持人:窦文涛 嘉宾:陈坤 / 周迅 / 蒋方舟 / 王晶 / 梁文道 / 马家辉 / 周轶君 / 武志红 / 马未都 / 张亚东 / 严歌苓 / 汪海林 / 金宇澄 / 李玫瑾

【圆桌派 窦文涛】人性 · 社会 · 认知:https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLYxKs_Kmt18U 【鸿观·宋鸿兵】金融 · 权力 · 逻辑:https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLcTh2pbxeb-o 【观复嘟嘟 马未都】历史 · 收藏 · 人生:https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLOBX8CQ3IYr0 【第一人称复数 周轶君】青年 · 女性 · 世界:https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLE0SKDns16wY 【风马牛书房 冯仑】财富 · 经济 · 规律:https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLBtYaSLkGpag 【百家新说 尹烨】科技 · 生命 · 未来:https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLIUyn5AuyYUo 【众生 蔡永康】人物 · 命运 · 社会观察:https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLIOgZ1dPF0JA 【锵锵行天下 窦文涛】世界 · 文明 · 思想:https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLIJzYJ5gZ-HA

#中国未来 #中国社会 #植物 #生态 #大自然 #经济 #推荐 #热门 #经济 #圆桌派 #纪实 #时间 #历史 #文化 #聊天 #新闻 #心理健康 #中美关系 #科技 #经济 #金融 #香港 #台湾 #hongkong #taiwan #民生 #纪实 #纪录片 #窦文涛 #周轶君 #马未都 #许子东 #尹烨 #圆桌派第七季 #圆桌派 #中国经济 #中国内卷 #中国危机 #地方债 #新能源车 #光伏 #经济危机 #中国房地产 #中美竞争 #科技创新 #制度决定一切 #民营经济 #企业家精神 #AI时代

[Source](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ArieQmHqFvk)

中文简报

梁文道:日本旅游是天堂,定居是地狱 节目围绕日本文化的底层逻辑、创业困境与逆商,以及定居与旅日的现实隔阂展开了深度交锋。前段借丸山真男与伊藤博文立宪的学术视角,剖析了日本思想史上“缺乏内生主轴”、机制责任蒸发与“一亿总忏悔”的特质;中段借李小牧在新宿歌舞伎町的搏杀与青年创业者茅侃侃的陨落,探讨了老北京“面子”文化、湖南人“霸得蛮”的韧劲与逆商的真正底线;后段则从千利休草庵茶室、谷崎润一郎《阴翳礼赞》与严格垃圾分类入手,揭示出日本精致整洁表象之下的“他律”压抑、物我合一的职业信仰以及融入当地社会所面临的“暧昧”高墙。 丸山真男指出日本缺乏内生思想传统基轴,外来思潮多被作为实用零件拼装,导致战前战后通过“禀议制”与“一亿总忏悔”使具体政治责任彻底蒸发。 (2:07) 通过对比李小牧在歌舞伎町的务实妥协与创业者茅侃侃因大院“面子文化”死撑而自杀的悲剧,嘉宾提出真正的逆商(AQ)不仅是硬扛,更在于划定底线、适度退让与认清自身局限。 (45:06) 日本社会的整洁神话始于1964年东京奥运会前的政府动员,其高度文明礼貌本质上源于严密的社区邻里“他律”与同侪压力,而非单纯自觉的自律。 (74:59) “旅游是天堂,定居是地狱”的根源在于日本社会的双重性:表面优雅精致,深层则是“建前”与“本音”的严重脱节、不可逾越的“暧昧”高墙以及严苛的身体交往边界。 (93:23)

Reading summary

节目围绕日本思想史、社会控制机制及其对个体心理的影响展开,援引思想家丸山真男的理论指出日本缺乏内生的思想传统结构,进而形成实用主义至上、责任主体消解与严苛的他律秩序;对谈结合旅日经历与抗挫力案例,阐明了在看似洁净优雅的社会表面下,外来者难以突破的“暧昧”高墙与个体在尊严与生存之间的博弈。 缺乏基轴的思想传统与责任的消解 (2:07) 战后日本从狂热军国主义极速倒向民主和平,以及明治维新时期通过天皇旨意推翻千年禁忌普及食肉文化,体现出惊人的转向速度。节目引用政治思想家丸山真男在《日本的思想》中的论断,指出日本是一个“缺乏思想传统结构”的国家。与中国儒学拥有从孔孟、董仲舒到宋明理学这样连续递进的基轴坐标系不同,日本将儒学、佛教及西方近代观念均视作外来客体,以“最新即最优”的进化论视角像拼装机械零件般成套引入,导致相互矛盾的思潮能在同一空间相安无事,却从未形成具有自省与碰撞能力的本土思想地基。 这种缺乏超越性核心的实用主义带来了深刻的伦理后果。丸山真男批评战后日本政府提出的“一亿总忏悔”口号如同章鱼喷墨,通过将罪责均摊给全员来达到无人受罚、无人负责的目的。追溯其制度根源,明治宪法虽将万世一系的天皇确立为主权核心,但作为其精神底座的神道教缺乏严密教义,宛如一张任由现实政治涂抹的“空白卷轴”。在权力运作中,通过官僚自下而上呈报的“禀议制”与基层村落共同体的紧密互监,国家意志既被表述为神圣天意又被包装为全民共识,导致重大决策的实际制定者隐形,体制内的具体责任彻底瓦解。 “他律”支撑的社会秩序与欲望排泄机制 (74:59) 外界常赞叹日本街道的洁净与民众的守序,但嘉宾指出这种秩序实则是强烈的“他律”产物。日本精细的垃圾分类与严苛的环境卫生并非自古皆然,而是始于1963年为筹备1964年东京奥运会而发起的自上而下的整治运动;日常生活中则依赖社区邻里(如街区妇女)的高度监视网络来维持执行,一旦违规便会遭遇孤立与压力。 这种对违规和出格的恐惧催生出极度格式化的仪式感。从千利休草庵茶室必须屈膝俯身爬入的“躙口”、神社前通过沙沙声提醒跨越凡俗的碎石参道,到备前烧大师采海藻与陶土对话的专注,日本文化通过严密规矩唤起个体的敬畏。然而嘉宾指出,这种仪式化也导致了“建前(表面客套)”与“本音(内心真实)”的深度脱节。在严密压抑的社会规范之下,无法公开展露的隐秘欲望被迫转向文学(如九鬼周造的美学剖析、太宰治的自毁与殉情书写)与特色亚文化,构成了发达但封闭的“欲望排污渠”。 “暧昧”屏障与难以融入的交往边界 (93:23) 谈及跨文化生活体验,嘉宾们指出短期旅游的便利舒适往往无法转化为定居时的归属感,核心阻碍在于日本社会的“暧昧”特性。在实际交往中,外人极难辨识日本人的真实底牌,无论表面维持多么得体的礼貌,彼此间始终横亘着一层无法跨越的心理安全距离,外来者几乎无法真正进入其核心社交圈;当面对制度纠纷(如华人子女在校遭遇欺凌)时,校方与官方机构往往采取暧昧推诿的姿态,难以建立有效的直接沟通。 文化习俗上的深层差异进一步加剧了隔阂。以校园人际交往为例,中国儿童习惯通过肢体接触、拥抱或挽手表达亲密,而日本社会自幼培养严格的身体边界感,在公共空间极力回避肢体接触,非冲突状态下的触碰极为罕见。这种对个人空间与交往规则的认知错位,极易在日常生活中演变为误解与摩擦,构成了旅居者难以逾越的无形高墙。 逆商的文化对照:生存韧性与尊严包袱 (40:08) 从社会适应延伸到个体的逆境商数(AQ),嘉宾们对比了不同的生存策略。李小牧回忆在东京歌舞伎町面对黑帮绑架与地盘争夺的生存经历,表明在严酷环境下活下去需要打破虚荣包袱,通过划分底线、出让部分利益实现务实妥协;窦文涛则引述鲁迅“破帽遮颜过闹市,躲进小楼成一统”的隐喻,指出普通人在面对外界压力时,保有适度的钝感力与自我防卫的退守空间至关重要。 与之形成鲜明对照的是青年创业者茅侃侃自杀的悲剧。嘉宾分析其性格带有典型的老北京大院“爷”的心理特征,奉行“及时雨”式扶危济困的面子文化与道义担当,在企业破产边缘仍强撑乐观、私自将公司法定代表人变更至自己名下以求一人承担债务。这种“宁可天下人负我,休叫我负天下人”的角色执念,使其在面临巨额债务与心理抑郁时无法放下身段向外界示弱或求助,最终在社会角色的道德重压下走向了极端绝路。 本期节目通过思想史与现实经历的双重审视揭示出,日本社会的精密运转依赖于深层的他律监控、模糊的权责结构与严格的心理边界。旅游体验中的整洁宜人与定居生活中的压抑疏离,本质上是同一种社会文化机理的两面;而在高压环境下,能否解构外部赋予的尊严枷锁并保持务实的生存韧性,构成了衡量个体抗挫力的关键命题。

Original transcript

[0:01] We have talked a lot about Japan before [0:04] . After the war, the entire nation and [0:07] the intellectuals, who originally [0:09] embraced ideologies with great passion, [0:12] quickly shifted to fully advocating for [0:14] democracy and peace. This transition [0:17] was so rapid that it shocked the [0:19] occupying American authorities and the [0:21] entire world; only the Japanese [0:23] themselves were not shocked. Why is [0:25] that? When you look at it, you can [0:27] realize from this that Japan has [0:29] actually always been this way. They [0:31] have their own set of ways and [0:33] traditions, but once they decide to [0:35] abandon them to embrace something new, [0:37] they do it faster than anyone else, [0:39] like the Meiji Restoration, which we [0:41] often compare to our late Qing [0:43] dynasty's Self-Strengthening Movement. [0:45] Once the Meiji Restoration began, the [0:47] whole country rapidly Westernized. Many [0:50] old Japanese shops founded during the [0:52] Meiji era, whether selling meat or [0:55] canned goods, liked to call themselves [0:57] "Civilization Stores" or "Restoration [0:59] Stores," indicating that everything [1:02] they sold was a new product. Let’s [1:04] use an example to make it clearer, for [1:06] instance, beef. Today, people say [1:09] Japanese Wagyu is amazing, right? Wagyu [1:11] is so impressive and world-renowned, [1:13] but you must know that before the Meiji [1:16] Restoration, ordinary Japanese people [1:18] did not eat meat, including beef. The [1:20] meat they originally ate was fish, and [1:23] at most some chicken; all other meats [1:25] like beef, pork, and mutton were called [1:28] "wild meat," and what was this wild [1:30] meat for? It was only eaten when [1:32] someone was ill; under normal [1:34] circumstances, they felt it was vulgar [1:36] and barbaric to eat these things. But [1:39] then came the Meiji Restoration. The [1:41] Emperor said that from now on, everyone [1:43] should eat plenty of meat and enjoy it. [1:45] Why? Because Westerners eat meat. [1:48] Westerners eat meat; look at how strong [1:50] and energetic they are! We Japanese [1:52] must do the same from now on. From that [1:55] moment on, Japan began to desperately [1:57] study how to eat and raise cattle, [1:59] eventually developing Wagyu. This is [2:02] why Japan is able to accept and embrace [2:04] new things so quickly. This is a [2:07] mystery, but what is the other side of [2:10] this mystery? It is why the Japanese [2:12] often give people the impression that [2:14] they are very traditional and [2:16] conservative. Today we say the Japanese [2:18] seem to have preserved their [2:20] traditional culture exceptionally well, [2:22] even better than we have in China, and [2:25] yet, whenever something new emerges or [2:27] they face an emergency, they [2:29] immediately revert to their old ways. [2:31] For example, before Japan turned toward [2:34] militarism, there were many [2:36] intellectuals. They might have [2:38] originally believed in democracy, [2:41] freedom, or Marxism. But once the war [2:43] was about to break out, they [2:45] immediately remembered, "Oh, Japan has [2:47] always had an Emperor, and whatever the [2:49] Emperor says is final." In an instant, [2:51] they reverted to that past state. The [2:54] book we are introducing today, " [2:56] Japanese Ideology," written by Masao [2:58] Maruyama, says this is like what? It's [3:01] like when a person encounters a state [3:03] of great terror or sudden shock, and [3:06] they suddenly blurt out a long-unused [3:09] dialect from the past. Why does this [3:13] happen? This is one of the themes we [3:16] will explore in today's book. Maruyama [3:19] was one of the most influential and [3:21] prominent political thinkers in 20 [3:23] th-century Japan, and also one of the [3:26] most important thinkers in all of Asia [3:28] with an international standing. He was [3:30] born in the 20th century, and during [3:33] World War II, he managed to maintain [3:35] his intellectual integrity in a rare [3:37] and remarkable way, refusing to follow [3:39] militarism. However, at that time, all [3:42] men of a certain age had to be drafted [3:45] into the military, so he was also [3:47] conscripted. But he had been in the [3:51] army for less than a month when the war [3:53] ended, fortunately for him. Afterward, [3:56] he quickly threw himself into the study [3:59] of Japanese thought, starting to wonder [4:01] what had happened over these past [4:03] decades and what had gone wrong in our [4:05] country. Then, from within that, he saw [4:08] Japan as it was back then. Do you [4:10] remember in other episodes we discussed [4:13] how Japanese intellectuals could make [4:15] such a turn? How could people who [4:17] originally had their own ideas and [4:20] political stances suddenly embrace an [4:22] ideology completely? But after the war, [4:25] Maruyama witnessed everyone suddenly [4:27] returning to their old ways, as if [4:29] nothing had happened for decades. What [4:32] was really going on? In his book " [4:35] Japanese Ideology," Masao Maruyama [4:37] brings up a very important point. He [4:39] says that Japan is a country without a [4:41] structural tradition of thought. Sounds [4:44] hard to understand, right? In fact, [4:46] although this book was originally a [4:49] record of a lecture, it is a very, very [4:52] short essay. Don't be fooled by how [4:54] thin this book is; the text itself is [4:56] even thinner. Yet, this text is often [4:59] featured in entrance exams for many [5:01] Japanese universities, highly regarded [5:03] by everyone. It was once a bestseller, [5:05] but it is actually exceptionally [5:07] difficult to read—likely one of the [5:10] most obscure little books we've covered [5:12] since starting this show. In it, he [5:14] discusses what it means for Japan to [5:16] lack its own intellectual tradition or [5:19] structure. He uses China as a point of [5:21] comparison, for instance, noting that [5:23] we have our Confucian tradition. This [5:25] Confucian tradition keeps evolving, [5:27] doesn't it? You have Confucius and [5:29] Mencius from the pre-Qin era. Then [5:31] comes Dong Zhongshu in the Han Dynasty. [5:33] Later, in the Tang Dynasty and the [5:36] Middle Ages, it takes on a new look; by [5:38] the Song Dynasty, there is [5:40] Neo-Confucianism, and by the [5:41] mid-to-late Ming, the "Learning of the [5:44] Mind" emerges, only to return to Han [5:46] studies in the Qing. Throughout this [5:48] entire process, there is a consistent [5:51] tradition that persists, and within [5:53] this tradition, you can recognize it [5:55] serves as a point of reference. We can [5:57] call this "tradition," and something [5:59] new that emerges as "anti-tradition." [6:01] This anti-tradition is interesting [6:03] precisely because it must differ from [6:05] the tradition, while the tradition [6:07] itself also has its own framework. [6:09] Under these circumstances, a nation's [6:11] thought is considered to have a [6:13] direction and a traditional structure, [6:16] but what about Japan? What does he say [6:18] is Japan's tradition? His answer is: [6:21] none. How can there be none? Doesn't [6:24] Japan also have the influence of [6:26] Confucianism and Buddhism? Yes, but [6:27] those are foreign ideas, and even if [6:29] they formed a tradition, they never [6:31] functioned as the kind of tradition our [6:33] Confucianism does in China. Therefore, [6:36] anything new comes in very easily and [6:39] immediately, but why? Because unlike [6:42] China, whenever a new foreign idea [6:45] arrives, we first struggle with it [6:47] because we aren't used to it; we have [6:50] our tradition, and we need time for [6:52] conflict and digestion. But Japan lacks [6:56] this. Without this, what kind of [6:59] situation occurs? After the Meiji [7:02] Restoration? Their insatiable curiosity [7:06] for knowledge and the speed of their [7:08] mental shifting are truly world-class, [7:10] which is a key factor in Japan’s [7:13] rapid modernization. Due to the [7:17] tradition of absorbing foreign cultures [7:19] , within the modern intellectual class, [7:21] their sense for the unknown seems to [7:24] have been completely lost in terms of [7:26] thought. At first, curiosity is [7:28] displayed, but then they immediately [7:31] say, "Oh, it's not that, is it?" [7:33] Hypersensitivity and dullness are [7:36] combined in such an illogical way. For [7:39] example, in intellectual circles in [7:42] Europe or the U.S., fundamental [7:44] concepts of democracy and its [7:46] foundations, which have centuries of [7:48] history, are still repeatedly [7:50] questioned and explored directly. But [7:54] in Japan, just a few years after the [7:56] war, they perfunctorily claimed that [7:59] democracy was already fully understood; [8:02] the stark contrast between these two [8:04] situations is truly astonishing. As we [8:08] have just read, because Japan lacks a [8:11] very self-aware, highly systematic [8:13] intellectual tradition. Therefore, they [8:18] accept new things very easily without [8:20] resistance, and these new things also [8:23] arrive casually, brought in as sets [8:25] like parts; meanwhile, their own past [8:28] things are also brought out and [8:30] recalled like parts. Thus, they can [8:35] coexist perfectly in the same space [8:37] without any concern for sequence on a [8:40] timeline; this is why, at the start of [8:42] the Meiji Restoration, Japan suddenly [8:45] imported all the various intellectual [8:47] traditions that Europe had developed [8:49] over hundreds of years. There was no [8:54] difficulty or hurdle in importing them, [8:57] and for every intellectual tradition, [8:59] school of thought, or theory, there [9:01] were experts to study it; but that does [9:04] not mean they considered everything [9:06] equal. How did they rank them? For [9:10] instance, after they accepted [9:11] evolutionary theory, they used a set of [9:13] evolutionary criteria to evaluate [9:15] various intellectual traditions— [9:17] specifically, which of the imported [9:19] traditions were superior. Take an [9:21] example. At first, many people would [9:23] advocate: Why is our Japan falling [9:25] behind? It's because in the past, we [9:27] never talked about human rights. So, if [9:28] we are to talk about human rights, how [9:30] should we go about it? Let's learn from [9:32] the West; there have been many human [9:34] rights ideas since the Enlightenment— [9:36] how should we go about introducing them [9:38] ? We must advocate for this. But soon, [9:40] others would say that is wrong. Talking [9:43] about human rights is outdated in [9:44] Europe; everyone there is now talking [9:46] about imperialism, and imperialism is [9:48] clearly more advanced. They do not [9:50] judge whether human rights or [9:52] liberalism are good or bad from within [9:54] the theory itself. They look entirely [9:56] at whether, in terms of time, it has [9:59] passed; for example, why must the [10:01] newest thing necessarily be the best? [10:03] It is not judged on whether it is [10:05] logically good, nor whether it is [10:07] suitable for Japan, but entirely on the [10:10] idea that newer must be better. And [10:12] since Japan's intellectual circles [10:14] accepted this line of thinking, it was [10:16] very easy to reach a political [10:17] conclusion. What is this conclusion? As [10:20] we know, Meiji-era Japan advocated " [10:22] leaving Asia and entering Europe." Asia [10:24] is failing; it is bullied and stagnant. [10:26] Europe is advanced, so we must learn [10:28] from Europe and break away from Asia. [10:30] Although this island nation has nowhere [10:32] to go, we must make our entire country [10:35] a Europe within Asia and join the ranks [10:37] of European imperialism. Later on, they [10:39] gradually realized that the West was [10:42] not just more advanced; after becoming [10:45] advanced, they inevitably had to take [10:47] the next step and "go out." So, Japan [10:50] must now do the same, or else we will [10:53] be left behind. If you ask, was there [10:55] an internal logical judgment that made [10:57] this step inevitable? Is being a [10:59] colonial empire a good thing? They [11:02] didn't care about that. What did they [11:04] care about? They cared about the fact [11:06] that this is something more advanced [11:08] and newer. Just as organisms evolve, [11:10] ideas and doctrines evolve as well. [11:13] Coming back to this, we can see a [11:15] hidden consciousness within it. What is [11:17] that consciousness? It’s not just [11:20] that the new is better than the old; [11:22] they also feel the new is more [11:23] practical. This brings us to a very [11:25] important facet of Japanese thought: [11:28] being practical. On this point, [11:30] Maruyama Masao specifically highlighted [11:32] an example. We must realize that this [11:34] is a very small book containing many [11:37] ideas. It touches on much of [11:38] intellectual history, but each point is [11:41] brief. Because of the limited length, [11:43] each point actually triggers a lot of [11:45] reflection. For instance, he mentions a [11:47] very important thinker from the mid-Edo [11:49] period, during the Tokugawa shogunate, [11:51] named Motoori Norinaga. What is Motoori [11:54] Norinaga most famous for? It is his [11:56] criticism of Confucianism. We know the [11:58] Edo period, established by Tokugawa [12:00] Ieyasu, used Confucianism to govern the [12:02] country, yet Motoori Norinaga [12:03] criticized Confucianism. How did he [12:05] criticize Confucianism? He did not [12:07] criticize it from within its own theory [12:09] . Where did he say the problem with [12:11] Confucianism lay? Confucian claims [12:12] about the Emperor having a "Mandate of [12:14] Heaven" were all deceptive. It was [12:16] nothing more than a regime that, after [12:18] overthrowing an old dynasty, needed to [12:21] establish its own legitimacy and [12:23] deceive the common people by using the [12:25] "Mandate of Heaven." Maruyama Masao [12:27] believes this viewpoint is somewhat [12:30] similar to Marx. Marxist criticism [12:32] likes to trace all doctrines back to [12:35] their ideological origins. But here in [12:37] Japan, they had this perspective [12:39] because of reality—saying that the [12:42] Confucian system was just "useful." So, [12:44] China adopted it for use. And in Japan, [12:47] what was his argument? We should also [12:49] see if Confucianism is beneficial for [12:51] governing; if it is, we use it, if not, [12:53] then let's use Buddhism. Isn't Buddhism [12:55] useful? Switching to something else is [12:57] fine too. So it is always about how to [13:00] adapt to reality. This is a very [13:03] important aspect of Japanese thought. [13:06] The ideologies and ideas they pursue [13:08] depend on whether they meet practical [13:10] needs; whatever is most needed in [13:12] reality is surely the best, and [13:14] whatever aligns with the current [13:16] sentiments of the people and political [13:19] needs is surely the most applicable. [13:21] Under these circumstances, you can see [13:23] that this country's thought lacks a [13:25] tenacious or self-conscious tradition. [13:28] New things and old things can be mixed [13:30] together, so new things are easily [13:31] accepted, and old things are easily [13:33] discarded. So what determines whether [13:35] to use something or whether something [13:38] becomes popular? It is whether it meets [13:40] current needs. -ism. The Americans [13:46] defeated us because they talk about [13:48] democracy, so now that they are talking [13:50] to us about democracy, we should [13:51] quickly become democratic; this fits [13:53] current needs. There is no [13:55] sentimentality involved; this is [13:57] Japanese thought. We must know that in [14:00] the post-war era, the Japanese [14:02] government once put forward a slogan [14:04] that sounded beautiful and resonant, [14:07] called "the repentance of 100 million." [14:09] The "repentance" likely referred to the [14:11] 100 million Japanese citizens at the [14:13] time; it said all 100 million of us [14:15] must repent together for how we [14:17] committed such a historical error and [14:19] fought a war that shouldn't have been [14:21] fought. However, many people at the [14:23] time didn't buy into this "repentance [14:25] of 100 million." For instance, the [14:28] author of the book we are introducing [14:30] today, "Japanese Thought," Maruyama [14:32] Masao, described this "repentance of [14:34] 100 million" as what exactly? It's like [14:37] an octopus: when it encounters danger [14:39] or an enemy, it quickly squirts ink, [14:41] then takes advantage of the darkness in [14:43] the water to escape. Why did he [14:45] describe the "repentance of 100 million [14:48] " this way? It's because he felt the " [14:50] repentance of 100 million" was a [14:51] statement made superficially to appease [14:53] people, but in reality, it meant that [14:55] no one needed to repent and no one was [14:57] responsible. Since this responsibility [14:59] belonged to the whole nation, where did [15:01] the responsibility ultimately lie? Or [15:03] rather, you need to explain clearly, [15:05] why does the whole nation have this [15:07] responsibility? You must clarify this, [15:09] and then we can distinguish the [15:11] attribution of this responsibility [15:12] clearly. For example, the military [15:14] leaders at the time had their [15:15] responsibilities, the Emperor had the [15:17] Emperor's responsibilities, and the [15:18] common people had their own [15:19] responsibilities. The responsibilities [15:21] borne by individuals should be [15:22] different, but this kind of discussion [15:24] has never taken place, or at least it [15:26] has never happened in a systematic and [15:28] large-scale way. So, he traced it back [15:30] to a source. That source leads us to [15:33] the writing of the Japanese [15:34] Constitution. When discussing Japan’s [15:37] constitutionalism, their renowned [15:39] statesman, Hirobumi Ito—whom we [15:41] Chinese are all familiar with—once [15:43] made a brilliant remark. What did he [15:45] say? He said that now our Empire of [15:47] Japan is also to establish a [15:48] constitution, a Meiji Constitution. [15:50] This constitutionalism must have a [15:52] foundation. This foundation is a [15:54] spiritual one. For instance, in Western [15:57] countries like the UK, the constitution [15:59] has evolved since the Magna Carta. It [16:01] is the result of generations of [16:03] accumulation; it did not just appear [16:06] overnight. It incorporates the feudal [16:08] system of England at the time, [16:09] detailing how the various nobles and [16:11] the king divided power, negotiated, and [16:14] compromised. Their constitution was [16:16] written on this foundation. Even taking [16:18] the U.S. Constitution, which was [16:20] written from scratch, it still has an [16:23] ideological basis. That basis is the [16:25] idea of natural rights, and behind that [16:28] idea of natural rights lies an even [16:30] deeper tradition of Christian thought, [16:32] right? Now, the problem arises: we in [16:34] Japan are going to write a constitution [16:36] , but what does Japan have? He went [16:38] through the list: there is Confucianism [16:40] . But Confucianism, it seems, became [16:42] less effective after the fall of the [16:44] Tokugawa Shogunate. There is Buddhism, [16:47] but Buddhism, having been so prominent [16:49] in the Heian and Nara periods, seemed [16:51] to have declined by then and could not [16:53] serve as a foundation for the nation. [16:55] Searching high and low, he couldn't [16:57] find anything, until finally, he found [16:58] something. What was it? It was the [17:01] Emperor. The Emperor is unique among [17:03] all royal families in the world. We [17:05] know that the Japanese imperial family [17:07] has the longest history of any royal [17:09] house. Regardless of how the regime [17:11] changed—one shogun replacing another [17:12] —the Emperor remained the same. So he [17:14] said, "Our Emperor is of an unbroken [17:16] line for eternity; this is where the [17:18] Japanese national polity resides." We [17:20] have actually discussed this national [17:23] polity and its core in previous [17:25] episodes, so now let’s delve deeper [17:27] into it. This involves the fact that [17:29] the Emperor is not just a royal figure, [17:32] not just a symbol of the nation. If he [17:34] were to fulfill the role that Christian [17:36] civilization played in the U.S. or the [17:38] feudal spirit played in the U.K., he [17:40] would need a spiritual foundation, a [17:43] religious background. What was this [17:45] spiritual foundation and religious [17:46] background? He said it was, of course, [17:49] Shintoism. But then, Maruyama Masao [17:51] criticized this, asking: "What exactly [17:54] is Shintoism?" In fact, it was only [17:56] after the Meiji Restoration that Japan [17:58] began to emphasize that the Emperor was [18:01] a descendant of the Sun Goddess, [18:02] Amaterasu. He was gradually elevated as [18:05] if he were the supreme god, a living [18:07] deity—this was true for both the [18:09] Emperor Taisho and the Emperor Meiji. [18:12] But in reality, Shinto is a religion [18:14] that cannot even clearly define its own [18:17] nature. Theoretically speaking, Shinto [18:19] has 8 million deities; they claim there [18:22] are 8 million gods. If you travel in [18:24] Japan, you might see a tree in a forest [18:26] with a rope around it, which is called [18:28] a*kekkai*(barrier). If you bow to that [18:30] tree, then that tree is also considered [18:32] a god at that moment. There might be a [18:34] wave at the seaside, crashing against [18:36] the shore; you think, "Oh, what a [18:37] beautiful wave," and bow to it—that, [18:39] too, is a god. Anything can be a god; [18:41] everything is a Shinto god. Sometimes, [18:44] even when you worship these Shinto [18:46] deities, you realize you don't even [18:48] know what the object of your worship is [18:50] . It’s hard to say for sure; it has [18:52] long since vanished into the vastness [18:55] of time and space. Therefore, the [18:57] Shinto cultural tradition is often [18:59] described as a blank scroll—anything [19:01] you write on it is correct, and [19:03] anything you throw into it is accepted. [19:05] This extends to what we discussed in [19:07] the previous episode: the Japanese [19:09] intellectual tradition is one without [19:12] coordinates. Under these circumstances, [19:14] when you worship the Emperor and place [19:17] him upon such a foundation, it all [19:19] becomes a blur. If you adopt this as [19:21] the national polity and worship such a [19:23] country, then that country itself is [19:25] just as vague. Who exactly is in charge [19:28] of this country? If it were truly a [19:30] constitutional monarchy like in the UK, [19:32] the Emperor should not interfere in [19:33] anything. However, the constitution [19:35] stated quite clearly that national [19:36] sovereignty did not reside with the [19:38] people, but in the hands of the Emperor [19:39] . But in practice, was he truly the one [19:41] deciding everything? No, there was a [19:43] government and ministers beneath him. [19:45] How was the division of labor handled [19:46] between them? It was unclear. [19:48] Consequently, the final conclusion was [19:50] that the Emperor held ultimate [19:52] authority and decided everything, while [19:54] the ministers provided their input, [19:56] hoping for his approval—this was [19:58] known as the "deliberative system." [20:00] Under this structure, any decision made [20:02] by the government appeared to come from [20:04] the Emperor, though it might not have [20:06] been his at all. Meanwhile, the [20:08] political structure, step by step, [20:10] would claim it was the collective will [20:12] of the entire nation. When it comes to [20:14] a collective will—for instance, if [20:16] the public in our Chaoyang District [20:18] were of one mind in supporting a [20:20] national policy—if we translate this [20:22] into the Japanese context, the policy [20:24] is both decreed by the Emperor and [20:26] wanted by the common people. So, whose [20:29] policy is it, really? And so, a [20:32] situation of unclear accountability [20:34] emerged; let’s take a look at this [20:36] passage. He cites a professor who [20:40] taught in Japan in the 1920s. Emil [20:47] Lederer, who taught at the University [20:49] of Tokyo, recorded two events that [20:52] shocked him during his time in Japan in [20:54] his book*Japan in Transition*. One was [20:58] the incident in late 1923 where Daisuke [21:01] Namba shot at the Crown Prince, [21:03] commonly known as the Toranomon [21:06] Incident. What shocked him wasn't so [21:10] much the fanatic's actions, but what [21:13] followed. The cabinet resigned, and a [21:17] series of officials from the Police [21:19] Commissioner down to street officers [21:21] were dismissed, even though the author [21:24] emphasized they were in no position to [21:26] stop the crime. That wasn't all; the [21:30] culprit’s father was forced to resign [21:33] as a member of the House of [21:34] Representatives and was ostracized, [21:36] confined to his home. People in his [21:39] hometown even canceled New Year [21:40] celebrations and entered a period of [21:42] mourning. Even the principal and the [21:45] teachers of the elementary school the [21:47] culprit had attended resigned, simply [21:49] because they had once taught such a [21:51] criminal. This boundless way of [21:55] assuming responsibility, along with the [21:58] invisible social pressure that viewed [22:00] this as natural, appeared completely [22:02] bizarre to this German professor. As [22:07] the text we just read shows, he was [22:09] actually talking about a famous event [22:11] from that time called the "Toranomon [22:14] Incident." The Toranomon Incident [22:17] refers to a man who rushed at Hirohito, [22:20] who was the Crown Prince at the time, [22:22] attempting to cause chaos, sabotage, or [22:25] murder the future Emperor, but the [22:27] attempt failed. When it came to [22:31] assigning blame, the responsibility was [22:34] spread infinitely; everyone even [22:36] remotely connected had to be held [22:38] accountable. When everyone has to take [22:41] such responsibility, what does it [22:43] actually mean? It means that, in the [22:45] end, no one has to take responsibility, [22:47] or rather, that responsibility is very [22:49] unclear. How could such a situation [22:51] come to be? Beyond the ambiguity of the [22:54] "national polity" mentioned by Masao [22:56] Maruyama, I mentioned a key point [22:58] earlier—I wonder if anyone noticed— [23:00] which is that Japan...In its governance [23:02] , this country has an Emperor and a [23:04] central government, but what does it [23:07] rely on underneath? It relies on [23:09] countless village communities. These [23:11] so-called village communities mean that [23:13] every household acted as if there were [23:15] a natural neighborhood committee; [23:17] without the government needing to [23:19] organize them, the people in each [23:20] village would supervise one another. [23:22] This was originally a very typical [23:24] characteristic of pre-modern society: [23:26] if a stranger entered a village, the [23:28] whole village would know and keep an [23:29] eye on them. And within the village, if [23:31] any family had a minor scandal or [23:33] someone did something bad, the whole [23:35] village would know. At this point, [23:36] there is social pressure, and that [23:38] pressure keeps watch on you so you [23:40] can't go too far. But when your entire [23:42] country is under such a system—for [23:44] example, with an Emperor at the top— [23:46] and the country begins to turn into a [23:48] nationalist or even militarist state, [23:50] such a village community can become [23:52] terrifying. This leads to what we have [23:55] mentioned before: ordinary people in [23:57] their own neighborhoods or on their [23:59] streets wouldn't dare make a move. They [24:01] wouldn't dare say anything the state [24:03] disapproved of, or anything considered [24:05] harmful to the "national polity," [24:07] because otherwise you were opposing the [24:09] state, and opposing the state was [24:10] considered a supreme act of treason. [24:12] Now, speaking of this "national polity, [24:14] " we just said it is very vague. Since [24:17] it is so vague that no one can define [24:19] it, how can you even say what [24:20] constitutes opposing it? This is [24:22] interesting and quite simple. It [24:25] connects back to what we said in the [24:27] first episode about this book: Japanese [24:29] intellectual tradition has a tendency [24:31] to conform to reality. Whatever is [24:33] useful in reality is accepted. So, what [24:36] is the flip side of this way of [24:38] thinking and this attitude? It is that [24:40] we, the ordinary people, must silently [24:43] submit to whatever exists in reality. [24:45] Whatever is real is rational. If our [24:48] country today is militaristic, we must [24:50] take the state as our center; all our [24:52] religions must revolve around the state [24:55] , and people's lives must also revolve [24:57] around the state or the Emperor. At [24:59] such a time, everyone must listen to [25:01] the state. If it tells me to go fight [25:03] in China, I go to China; if it tells me [25:05] to conquer Korea, I go to Korea. Under [25:07] these circumstances, this is reality. [25:10] Therefore, as long as you go against [25:12] what is real, including its [25:14] institutions, you are in the wrong. [25:16] Following this point, Maruyama Masao [25:18] drew another conclusion. What is this [25:21] conclusion? He believed that Japan has [25:23] a tendency to deify its institutions. [25:26] That also sounds quite complex. You [25:28] have all read a bit of Marxism, right? [25:30] Do you know what "commodity fetishism" [25:33] is? It’s somewhat like that; it’s [25:35] turning the entire system into a cult [25:37] and worshipping it. What were human [25:40] institutions and thoughts originally? [25:42] They were things designed to adapt to [25:45] and summarize reality. For example, we [25:47] might invent a social theory, but this [25:50] theory cannot replace reality, nor can [25:53] it possibly cover reality or encompass [25:55] all the intricate details within it; so [25:58] what exactly is it? It is a bit like [26:00] taking a ruler to measure our reality; [26:02] there is always a gap between it and [26:05] reality, but through this gap, we are [26:07] actually able to gain some grasp of [26:09] reality. In other words, theories, or [26:12] concepts for that matter, are merely [26:15] tools we use to grasp reality; they are [26:17] not reality itself. Likewise, systems [26:20] are similar; different societies and [26:23] different cultures require different [26:25] systems, because these systems are [26:27] designed to adapt to reality. Systems [26:31] themselves are man-made; since they are [26:33] man-made, they should be changeable, [26:35] and indeed need to change, because [26:38] reality is always evolving and always [26:40] presenting us with new demands and new [26:43] challenges. Yet, Japan has a tendency [26:46] to treat existing systems as things [26:48] that everyone should accept [26:50] unconditionally. It is as if they have [26:53] forgotten that it is a man-made product [26:55] , assuming instead that it has existed [26:58] inherently like something created by a [27:00] god; and indeed, in the past when they [27:02] worshipped the Emperor, you could say [27:05] this system was truly god-made—why? [27:07] Because the nation’s fundamental law, [27:09] the Constitution, was promulgated in [27:10] the name of the Emperor, and what was [27:12] the Emperor? He was a god, so if the [27:14] fundamental constitution was [27:15] promulgated by a god, couldn't the [27:17] systems designed based on this [27:19] constitution be considered god-made? [27:21] Things created by a god should be [27:23] worshipped and accepted by everyone; [27:25] under such circumstances, how could one [27:27] possibly rebel, how could one reflect, [27:29] and how could one disagree with [27:31] everything the country was doing at the [27:34] time? Therefore, we can finally draw a [27:36] conclusion: in this short, essay-like [27:39] book on Japanese thought, Masao [27:41] Maruyama, a master of Japanese thought [27:43] of his generation, provides a [27:45] generalized overview of Japanese [27:48] intellectual history. But this [27:52] interpretation was actually proposed [27:54] against the backdrop of postwar Japan, [27:57] intended to answer—from the roots of [27:59] thought—why Japan arrived at where it [28:01] was today; and this answer is the most [28:04] profound, deepest, and most [28:05] thought-provoking answer that the [28:07] intellectuals of that generation in the [28:10] Japanese academic world could offer. [28:14] You can't keep dwelling on this. Like [28:16] me, I’ve been in Gukuding for so many [28:19] years, right? When I first arrived, I [28:20] was kidnapped by the Japanese, [28:22] kidnapped by my own countrymen, and [28:23] even targeted by Japanese thugs and [28:25] Chinese thugs who wanted to drive me [28:26] out of Gukuding. I've been through it [28:28] all, including being scolded when [28:30] running for office and being told to " [28:31] go back where you came from" by [28:33] Japanese right-wingers; you have to [28:34] endure these things. Including two [28:36] brushes with death, where cars hit me [28:38] and were totaled—the insurance paid [28:40] out, but I didn't die. Oh, the car was [28:42] a total loss, but you were completely [28:44] fine? [28:45] Not a scratch. [28:46] Was it your car or theirs? Right. [28:49] So I mean, after you’ve faced death, [28:51] these other things really become... [28:54] Six divorces? That’s nothing. As they [28:57] say, "Once you've seen the vast sea, [28:59] nothing else looks like water." Because [29:01] Japanese law is like that, but ours [29:03] were mutual agreements, so it was over [29:05] in a day. If you go to court, all your [29:07] assets and everything you have go to [29:09] her, and she’ll definitely get [29:10] custody of the kids. [29:12] Men in Japan can't afford to get [29:13] divorced, but for me, it was just like [29:15] a spiritual renunciation. That's true. [29:17] Oh, so the assets are gone? [29:19] Yeah, they're gone, all gone. [29:21] Time to start over from scratch, right? [29:23] Right, back to zero, starting from the [29:25] beginning. [29:25] Actually, that's how it is every time I [29:27] get divorced in Japan. Oh, Xiao Mu, I [29:29] should really look at you closely. This [29:31] is the first time I've done a show with [29:33] you at such close range. I knew a lot [29:35] about your past experiences, but [29:37] you’re the type of person who doesn't [29:39] seem to show any wear and tear from [29:41] disasters or hardships on your face. [29:44] His resilience must be off the charts. [29:47] Right? Back then, he went to Japan all [29:50] by himself, navigating a place where [29:52] the underworld and legitimate society [29:54] mix, and now he's actually running for [29:56] a seat in Japan. He was even kidnapped, [29:59] right? [29:59] Kidnapped twice, that's right. [30:01] Yeah. [30:02] And almost died both times. [30:04] I'll be honest, if I had gone through [30:07] what he did... [30:08] After experiences like that, my choice [30:10] would probably be to just leave that [30:12] place and get as far away as possible. [30:14] I wouldn't. When I was kidnapped. The [30:17] very next night, I was back there in a [30:19] suit and tie, standing my ground. You [30:21] want to chase me away? I'm not leaving. [30:24] In the end, they just thought, "This [30:26] guy is not someone to be messed with." [30:28] You see, he’s just remarkably [30:30] resilient. [30:31] Hey, Yijun, I’m not trying to jinx [30:33] you—your marriage is a wonderful [30:35] example of a successful East-West union [30:38] . [30:38] But if you were to encounter a [30:40] situation like Xiao Mu’s, especially [30:43] now that you have children...How do you [30:45] think you would handle it? [30:50] I think there are definitely more [30:52] painful days, but I don't believe that [30:55] marriage is something you're born with, [30:57] this relationship, so I don't think [31:00] it's that difficult to reorganize, so I [31:02] always feel this thing is like that [31:05] feeling of "spring arrives to grow a [31:07] few branches," it's just about. [31:11] Spring arrives to grow a few branches, [31:13] It's like they say, "spring colors [31:15] cannot be contained," you're still [31:17] insisting on going against the flow. [31:18] Aren't you quite sentimental? Aren't we [31:20] just making a theoretical assumption? [31:22] Assumption, just an assumption. [31:24] You had an episode about cheating, I [31:25] watched it. [31:26] Oh. [31:27] Do you know how I felt when I watched [31:30] it? [31:30] I was thinking, if everyone had the [31:32] same feeling as me, this original [31:35] production would be a success. And what [31:38] was my feeling? It was like, you tell [31:42] me, Teacher, it's like this and that. [31:46] No, no, actually I think that episode [31:49] of yours focused more on women cheating [31:52] . Actually, I feel that in our society, [31:55] it's harder for a woman to cheat than [31:57] for a man. [31:58] Mm. [31:59] Compared to men, the requirements are [32:01] higher and the cost is greater. The [32:05] punishment is harsher; what I mean is [32:08] that for the same act of cheating, a [32:10] man is more likely to be forgiven by a [32:13] woman, while for a woman, it's much [32:15] harder to save the relationship. [32:18] Mm. [32:19] This, this is the unfairness of this [32:22] world, this society, yet people don't [32:24] see this unfairness. [32:25] I agree, but I also want to tell you, [32:27] Professor Xu, that this situation is [32:29] changing. But there is a fundamental [32:33] difference between women cheating and [32:36] men cheating; of course, my observation [32:38] might be one-sided, correct me if I'm [32:40] wrong, a man doesn't need his affair [32:43] partner to be better than his current [32:45] wife. [32:50] No, men are just like that, you meet [32:52] someone, think carefully, she's neither [32:55] prettier than you, [32:57] Nor more talented than you, right? She [33:00] has nothing, but he still goes ahead [33:03] and cheats anyway, yes, yes. [33:05] But conversely, if a woman wants to [33:08] cheat, basically the affair partner has [33:11] to be, compared to her current man, [33:13] relatively better in at least one [33:16] aspect, right? Better than him. [33:19] Even if it's just better physically. [33:21] Yes, even if it's better health, looks, [33:24] finances, or temperament. [33:26] In short, she has to feel that way, [33:28] therefore, when a woman cheats, [33:30] It's a bit, how should I put it, as we [33:33] say in common parlance, [33:35] It means looking for the next option; [33:38] once a woman cheats, it's not just for [33:41] fun. This is, if they want to break up [33:44] with me, I have to be able to handle it [33:46] . So they will think about it in a [33:48] harder way; when a boyfriend thinks [33:50] this way, when a man cheats and comes [33:53] back to repent, he might shed tears [33:55] sincerely, he might genuinely feel that [33:57] nothing is as good as you, but it’s [34:00] just a lot of noise. Your question [34:02] looks like it's about personal habits [34:04] and attitudes, but it actually implies [34:07] a very deep unfairness: the punishment [34:09] for a woman cheating is extremely high. [34:12] Hmm. [34:13] The punishment mechanism is huge. For a [34:16] man, it's simple: when two people start [34:18] dating, if this man has had ten [34:20] girlfriends before, it’s not a [34:21] negative for him. As long as he doesn't [34:23] bring it up to show off, it's fine. Hmm [34:26] . [34:26] For the woman, even if he had those [34:28] past experiences and it wasn't great [34:30] because of that, if he says, "But now I [34:32] treat you the best," the woman will [34:33] forgive him, and she might even think [34:35] ... "Look how charming he is! He was [34:37] with others before, but now he's with [34:39] me." If you flip the game and look at [34:41] it the other way: even the best woman [34:43] comes to you and lists her exes—one, [34:45] two, three, four, five, six, seven, [34:47] eight—don't even count to ten. Hmm. [34:49] If you count to thirty, the man [34:50] wouldn't be able to handle it. [34:52] And that's not even getting into the [34:53] details. This is a very, very deep kind [34:56] of inequality. [34:57] But are we talking about cheating or [34:59] adversity quotient? Adversity quotient. [35:01] Weren't you saying that cheating has [35:03] become a major test of adversity? Then [35:05] tell me about other adversities, like [35:07] not being able to get rich. [35:08] What else is considered adversity? I... [35:11] There are still many adversities in [35:12] one's career. I have to bring up gender [35:14] inequality again: for men, it might be [35:16] in their careers—and this includes [35:18] politics, economics, and academia. [35:20] Hmm. [35:21] For women, generally speaking, the [35:22] greatest adversity is in relationships. [35:25] Can we agree on this? [35:26] Basically agree, basically agree. Let [35:29] me think...yes. The girls around me, [35:32] because of the society we live in now, [35:33] like the inequality you mentioned—but [35:36] there is another kind of equality, [35:37] where girls go out to work and compete. [35:39] Of course, there’s still a glass [35:41] ceiling, but in many cases, they can do [35:43] quite well, and that counts as equality [35:46] . But no matter how high you climb, if [35:48] there are problems in your personal [35:50] life, it just... [35:51] She feels like a failure, a total [35:53] failure, but men, relatively speaking [35:56] ... [35:56] For men, relatively speaking, if their [35:59] career, you know, drops to zero, [36:02] it's a huge disaster for them, yeah, [36:05] right? Not earning a single cent, or [36:08] even falling into debt—that's a [36:09] disaster. [36:10] Right? [36:11] It's just that women might experience [36:13] more self-negation in emotional areas, [36:15] while men's self-negation is more [36:17] career-focused. Don't think that just [36:19] because a woman has money, she'll feel [36:22] like she's won; she might still see it [36:24] as a failure. [36:25] At a certain age, I've heard that some [36:28] women, especially after hitting 50, if [36:30] they've done well, they just stop [36:32] caring about all that. I think they've [36:35] entered another stage where gender no [36:37] longer matters. [36:38] They can do everything a man can do. I [36:40] really meet some women now who I feel [36:43] have surpassed the mindset of most [36:45] women in our society; they are just [36:48] very strong. [36:49] Or, you could say, they've become [36:51] indifferent, they've moved past it. [36:53] Right, but I personally haven't [36:56] experienced any major adversity. I mean [36:58] , when I was young, I might have had [37:00] some difficulties because of where I [37:02] was, but they don't really count as [37:04] adversity. Because what is adversity? I [37:07] think it's standing on a cliff, [37:08] surrounded by darkness, not knowing if [37:10] there's a path ahead—the ladder might [37:12] be right below, but you can't see it; [37:13] it's that kind of hopelessness, not [37:15] knowing how to move forward. [37:16] Maybe it's your—the Japanese have a [37:18] term for this, "insensitivity." [37:20] Yeah. You're just insensitive, you [37:23] understand? Actually, sometimes people [37:26] think their desperation is objective. [37:29] But it's subjective, you know? Some [37:32] people might think, "Oh, if Teacher Xu [37:34] doesn't look happy today, I'm in [37:37] adversity." That's right, I'm in [37:39] adversity. Really? No, for instance, [37:43] last time I went to Japan, I heard [37:45] people say that some young Japanese [37:47] people just can't take it—they get [37:50] scolded by their section chief and [37:52] commit suicide. Right. [37:54] That's adversity. So, what do you call [37:58] that? [37:58] Oh, I see. [38:00] Hey, Teacher Xu, can you tell us what [38:02] kind of adversity you've had? Like, on [38:05] the verge of suicide? [38:07] We were just talking about that. [38:09] What kind of adversity is that? Isn't [38:12] that just a lack of resilience? What [38:14] you call his situation isn't adversity [38:16] quotient; it's just pure torment. [38:17] Exactly, he's just tormenting himself. [38:20] Everyone says [38:21] Look at how thin he is; his frame is [38:22] really fragile. [38:23] He can't even tell whether he's happy [38:25] or sad anymore. [38:26] You know? Yes. [38:28] I actually cried; I really, truly felt [38:30] sad, yes. [38:31] Because of the child. No, it's because [38:33] his mother gave an example. I was [38:36] sitting on the bed when she told me [38:38] this, and she said, "Do you know how [38:40] much your son loves you?" If he knows [38:42] you're coming home for dinner tonight, [38:44] he'd rather not eat any meat. He knows [38:47] I don't eat meat, only fish, so he'd [38:49] buy sashimi or a whole fish. She said, [38:52] "This is what your son does for you." [38:54] Also, she immediately gave another [38:56] example: last night you criticized him [38:57] for not brushing his teeth before bed, [38:59] because he'd already showered and was [39:01] in bed eating something. After he [39:03] finished, you told him, "Brush your [39:04] teeth after you eat," even though he [39:06] was already in bed. Because of my words [39:08] , he remembered; he opened the door and [39:10] came back out to brush his teeth. He [39:11] cares about you so much, you are his [39:13] role model, yet look at how things are [39:15] today. [39:15] See, when a mother divorces, she uses [39:17] the son as leverage. [39:18] Yes, it really hit me; since I was [39:20] wearing glasses, she might not have [39:21] seen, but tears really fell. Um, so for [39:23] you to say I never felt sad, that's [39:25] impossible; I certainly did. But you [39:27] still didn't think about trying to save [39:29] it. [39:29] But I was completely listening to her; [39:32] whatever she wanted to do, so I... [39:34] The premise for this is that he [39:36] seriously analyzed his own nature. [39:38] 20 minutes. [39:39] 20 minutes long. [39:41] The most responsible attitude for [39:42] someone like me is to get a divorce. [39:44] Right, you can only listen to her. [39:46] We haven't talked about your adversity, [39:48] Mr. Xu, do you have any? What do you [39:49] consider your own adversity? [39:51] That's hard to say; sometimes real [39:53] adversity is just impossible to talk [39:55] about. You just can't put it into words [39:57] . [39:57] For example, being attacked online. [39:59] Does that count? [40:01] That doesn't count. [40:02] That's just part of daily life. [40:04] What about family? [40:06] Let's not talk about the older [40:08] generation; they've likely been through [40:10] enough and are tough enough. I'd say [40:12] this concept of adversity quotient is [40:14] mostly about young people nowadays. For [40:17] instance, back in January of this year, [40:19] let me show you a photo; look at this [40:21] young man's photo, you remember it, [40:24] right? It became a hot topic for a [40:27] while, Mao Kan. [40:29] This Mao Kan, "work like you're falling [40:32] in love." It was just at this time, at [40:35] thirty-something, just past thirty, [40:37] that he chose to take his own life by [40:40] burning charcoal. Burning charcoal [40:43] means suicide, but why did his suicide [40:46] cause such a stir? Most people talk [40:48] about his entrepreneurship, back then [40:50] there were four post-80s generation [40:52] entrepreneurs. They were labeled by you [40:54] media people as the four rising stars [40:56] of entrepreneurship, representing the [40:58] hope of the post-80s generation, and [41:00] they even got famous on CCTV, you know? [41:02] But those people now, you could say, [41:04] have had pretty good entrepreneurial [41:06] success. Only he, with this thing he [41:09] was running, some esports game called [41:11] Wanjia Esports, eventually ran out of [41:13] money, yet he still optimistically [41:16] encouraged his staff to keep developing [41:18] the game, saying we can definitely make [41:21] it, we definitely can, right? Only [41:23] after he committed suicide did people [41:26] discover he had mortgaged his own car, [41:29] his house, and even his mother's house [41:32] just to pay his employees; in reality, [41:35] it had been failing for a long time. [41:39] And yet, this kid remained optimistic, [41:41] but in the end, he committed suicide by [41:44] burning charcoal, which is why his [41:46] close friends really hated the media [41:49] portraying him as a failure who [41:51] couldn't handle defeat. Later, people [41:55] realized that while he seemed [41:57] optimistic to everyone, he had actually [41:59] prepared long ago; he wanted to break [42:01] up with his girlfriend months earlier, [42:04] and she didn't understand why, but he [42:06] insisted on breaking up, and people [42:08] guessed he already knew back then that [42:11] his funds were essentially in debt. But [42:13] I always feel that no one was really [42:15] able to step into the depths of his [42:17] heart. In his final period, he seemed [42:19] to have everything arranged perfectly; [42:21] he spent all his time eating, drinking, [42:23] and singing with everyone, but nobody [42:24] knew he was actually saying goodbye, he [42:26] was very well prepared. And this method [42:28] of suicide, he bought five bags of [42:30] charcoal and sealed the doors and [42:31] windows of his home with weather [42:32] stripping and so on. So, I think he had [42:34] been planning this for a long time. [42:36] Sometimes we look at it simply, as if [42:38] it were just because of his business [42:40] troubles or something, but we haven't [42:42] actually experienced what was in the [42:43] depths of his heart. I always feel that [42:46] none of the reports have touched upon [42:48] what that thing really was. [42:49] For instance, there are a few things [42:52] for us to examine; for example, in the [42:54] book I just mentioned from his early [42:56] years, he actually wrote that he had [42:58] suffered from severe depression. Well, [43:01] that is clearly a factor, isn't it? But [43:04] I have found that the friends who loved [43:06] him do not want to think in that [43:08] direction. You know, it is quite [43:11] interesting; everyone had a very good [43:14] impression of him. He was a real [43:18] stand-up guy, always smiling and [43:20] laughing with his friends—in other [43:23] words, he always kept his dignity. What [43:26] do I mean by this kind of dignity? For [43:29] example, right before he committed [43:31] suicide, he urged a business partner to [43:33] change the legal representative of the [43:36] company to him. The partner asked, "Why [43:39] ? There are debts now. Does that mean [43:42] you are going to take on all these [43:43] debts?" He gave many reasons, but he [43:46] was absolutely insistent on doing it. [43:48] In reality, his intention was to help [43:50] his friend offload the burden. He [43:52] wanted to take it all on himself. [43:54] And this child—no, I can't call him a [43:57] child anymore, this young man in his [43:59] thirties—has always been this way. He [44:02] was a legendary figure in the startup [44:05] scene, always feeling that he couldn't [44:07] let his friends or employees down. That [44:09] is just the kind of person he was. Yes, [44:12] he even said himself that his [44:13] personality wasn't really suited for [44:15] starting a business. Why? He shouldered [44:18] too much responsibility himself, to the [44:20] point where—I am just guessing—he [44:22] might have felt that death was perhaps [44:24] the best way out. Because after that, [44:26] all these burdens of responsibility [44:28] would simply vanish for him. [44:30] So you encounter some trouble, and then [44:32] he goes and commits suicide. [44:33] Right, so looking at it from the other [44:34] side, we often ask: what is wrong with [44:36] today’s young people? They struggle [44:38] to cope and fall apart at the slightest [44:40] issue. But I actually think it is [44:42] because they have more choices. For [44:43] instance, if a boss scolds you, you [44:45] just quit—you don't put up with it. [44:48] That is because they have more options [44:50] and more ways to make a living. Even [44:52] their understanding of death is [44:53] different from ours; we used to think [44:55] it was a shameful or undignified thing, [44:58] but their interpretation is different [45:00] now. Of course, I am not encouraging it [45:02] ; I am just saying their perspective [45:04] cannot be measured by our old values. [45:06] Regarding this, I have read detailed [45:09] reports about him. I don't know [45:12] anything beyond those reports, but [45:14] based solely on what I have seen in [45:16] these accounts of his life, I have a [45:19] theory. Of course, my conjecture [45:22] shouldn't be taken as fact, but you [45:25] know it makes me associate—we can [45:27] only say we're associating, using this [45:30] topic to elaborate. This kid, although [45:33] he's a post-80s generation, he's a [45:35] child from a military compound, [45:37] specifically a Beijing military [45:39] compound. You know, this immediately [45:42] reminds me of Ma Weidu, Wang Shuo, and [45:44] that group—the children of those [45:47] military compounds. I'm friends with [45:50] many of them. One of them was chatting [45:53] with me a while ago, and I found it [45:55] quite funny. We were talking about men [45:59] from different regions—Shandong men, [46:02] Shanghai men, and so on—and finally, [46:05] we got to the Beijing men, the old [46:07] Beijingers. He said one thing: Beijing [46:10] men are "Ye." He said, look at who, [46:13] look at Ma Weidu, look at Ma. [46:15] Master, Master Ma. [46:17] What does this "Ye" actually mean? It [46:21] means rarely admitting that you can't [46:23] handle something. And then, it’s just [46:26] like this Ma Kan described in the [46:28] report. He is simply a "Rain-in-Time," [46:31] like Song Jiang from Shandong in the [46:33] old stories. When brothers are in [46:35] trouble. He shows up, and he conveys to [46:38] you—regardless of whether it's doable [46:40] or not—that he can always pull in [46:43] investments. "Don't worry, it'll work, [46:45] I've secured more funding, we'll go [46:48] public, it'll be great soon." He always [46:50] ...he never says it's not working, even [46:52] when everyone finds out later that it [46:54] had been failing for a long time, you [46:56] know? But not until the very last [46:59] moment. Until the parent company sent [47:01] representatives to tell his employees [47:04] to disperse, he still hadn't told [47:06] anyone, even selling his own house and [47:08] car to pay their wages. Prioritizing [47:11] face. [47:12] You know what I mean? It just makes me [47:14] think, could this be that specific type [47:16] of "Beijing Young Master," you [47:18] understand? "I only allow the world to [47:21] wrong me; I cannot wrong the world." So [47:24] I think his suicide is, to some extent, [47:26] a bit like what you said about the [47:28] Japanese, though the reasons are [47:30] different—that is to say. [47:31] Death resolves all debts. [47:34] It's just that these Beijing masters [47:36] are obsessed with face and dignity; [47:38] I’ll take care of everything. [47:40] Whatever problems arise, I'll shoulder [47:42] them. I'll never let you be troubled; [47:44] rest assured, I'll never let you carry [47:45] the burden. But in the end, when the [47:47] pressure becomes too much to bear. What [47:49] else is there to do? Owed so much debt, [47:51] right? What could he do? Just end it [47:54] all. [47:54] A legend in life, a myth in death. [47:59] First, you're right; this shouldn't be [48:01] encouraged, right? This is absolutely [48:04] wrong. Of course, it’s a tragedy, but [48:07] secondly, it brings to mind what Lu Xun [48:10] said after Lin Yutang passed away: [48:12] never mock those who commit suicide. [48:15] I think, looking at his final words [48:18] where he says he respects the ending, [48:20] to him, this ending feels a bit like [48:23] that old Feng Xiaogang movie—what was [48:26] it? Yes, the one about Beijing—that [48:29] final showdown seemed completely [48:31] pointless to me. [48:32] From the perspective of us Shanghainese [48:35] , why not just sit down and talk it out [48:37] ? Why risk your life fighting someone? [48:40] It’s not worth it at all, but to them [48:43] , it’s what had to be done. [48:45] The ritual in this ending. [48:47] I’ve met many of these "Beijing [48:49] gentlemen," and you’ll find it quite [48:52] interesting; even people like him, they [48:54] rarely admit to you that they can't go [48:57] on. You know? They always project that [49:00] they are capable. "I can," it’s a [49:03] very interesting psychological profile, [49:06] but he genuinely wants to help everyone [49:09] . His persona is that of a "gentleman." [49:16] Yes, for example, didn't the report [49:18] mention that if a girl returned to [49:20] Beijing from abroad wanting to get into [49:22] PR or advertising, he’d just be told [49:24] once, and even if he wasn't that close [49:27] to her, the very next day he’d host a [49:29] dinner and invite everyone in the [49:31] industry who could help her? You know, [49:36] there’s a certain kind of Beijing [49:38] gentleman. [49:39] That’s what they live for. [49:41] But from another angle, it’s about [49:43] loyalty. [49:44] The "Jianghu" spirit. [49:46] It’s that "I can help you" attitude. [49:48] As I read the report carefully, what [49:51] popped into my mind is that these types [49:53] of refined individuals are actually [49:55] very prideful—they care about their [49:58] image and their dignity. Even when you [50:02] see him asking others to invest or to [50:04] help fill the gaps in his payroll, he [50:07] never speaks in a way that’s beneath [50:09] his dignity. He wouldn’t say, "Oh, [50:13] please help me." He wouldn't. [50:15] This concept of "adversity quotient" is [50:18] interesting. Usually, we think that in [50:20] adversity, we should persist and [50:21] struggle, and look—he was actually [50:23] struggling the whole time, wasn't he? [50:25] Actually, adversity quotient might have [50:27] another layer, which is knowing when to [50:28] retreat. [50:29] Right. [50:30] That is a kind of wisdom in adversity. [50:32] Adversity quotient is about oneself. [50:34] Emotional and intellectual quotients [50:36] are for dealing with others, right? I [50:37] think AQ, this adversity quotient, is [50:39] about fighting with yourself. How to [50:41] handle yourself, once you're in a [50:43] situation, knowing when to cast aside [50:45] your pride. Just someone thick-skinned, [50:48] honestly, I am. I had no pride during [50:50] my three years in Japan, but I didn't [50:53] break any laws. I did it just to [50:55] survive, and didn't I make it out? And [50:59] the things I wrote were all [51:01] self-deprecating and self-mocking; I [51:03] think you need to be able to set aside [51:05] your pride to earn respect, because we [51:08] are all just ordinary, average people, [51:10] right? You'll definitely have times [51:13] when you don't do well, and when you [51:15] don't, you must admit your mistakes and [51:17] apologize bravely; I think caring too [51:20] much about pride is the issue. [51:21] Mm, too much. [51:23] I am a shameless person, I don't want [51:25] pride, and that's how I am today. So [51:28] you see, this Xiao Mu reminds me of a [51:30] saying from Hunan people, what is it? [51:33] Ba De Man. [51:34] Ba De Man. [51:35] Nai De Fan. [51:37] Nai De Fan, you see, he just sticks to [51:40] it to the very end, and even his [51:42] behavior is actually a bit... [51:44] Hunan people sometimes have this [51:46] quality, at least some of them. [51:47] Yu Cuo Yu Yong. [51:49] Lu Zhan. [51:51] You see, that's what you call adversity [51:54] quotient—the more you are in [51:56] adversity, the braver you become; Zeng [51:59] Guofan also talked about "Lu Zhan" back [52:01] then. [52:03] It’s really different; for some old [52:05] Beijing guys, you'll find—let me go [52:08] deeper—that they simply cannot be [52:11] humiliated, you know? They cannot be [52:14] disgraced, right? They actually want [52:16] that dignity. [52:18] It’s not the same; the old-timers are [52:20] different, they wouldn't want to live [52:21] on if it meant living like a dog, in [52:23] their eyes. [52:24] Right. But Xiao Mu, he definitely [52:27] wanted to survive back then; no matter [52:29] how badly he was beaten, he'd be back [52:31] the next day. I don't think Mao is in [52:34] that situation. [52:35] Is he? Your analysis just now makes a [52:38] lot of sense; he initially [52:39] overestimated his own capabilities. But [52:42] his intent to help others was truly out [52:44] of kindness. He didn't end up [52:46] abandoning them; he helped them deal [52:48] with many things, and then he lost his [52:49] own ability, so what could he do in the [52:51] end? I’ll just end it all and be done [52:53] with it. You know, this, this thing is [52:56] very interesting, I mean, at least [52:58] based on reports—I don't know the [53:00] person myself—I've observed a certain [53:03] type of person. For instance, we always [53:05] wonder what people are living for, [53:07] right? Sometimes people live for money, [53:10] or for fame, or for profit, or for [53:12] family; everyone has their own goals. [53:14] But the goal of one type of person is [53:17] quite interesting—what they live for. [53:19] Like, Xiao Mu, let me ask you, is there [53:22] such a type of person in this world? [53:25] Take a "gangland boss" for example. [53:28] When this gangland boss eventually dies [53:31] , you find out he was dirt poor. Yet he [53:34] lived for that "You don't have money? [53:37] Here, take it."" [53:38] You need my help? It's no problem, [53:40] absolutely not.""I'll help you, right?" [53:43] He lived for that image where [53:44] everywhere he goes he has dignity, and [53:46] he can handle anything—but in reality [53:48] , he has nothing at all. It's like this [53:51] Mao Kan, did he take the money? I don't [53:53] even know what he did it for. Like, he [53:56] once worked at some TV station, GT TV [53:59] or somewhere, and after doing a lot of [54:01] work for them, he found it didn't align [54:04] with what he wanted to do, so he [54:06] resigned. He could have easily asked [54:10] for millions based on his contributions [54:13] to that company. In the end, he just [54:15] took a few tens of thousands and left, [54:17] like it didn't matter, you know? His— [54:19] I just feel like there's a type of [54:21] person, what kind of tribe do they [54:23] belong to? I've thought about it and [54:25] realized I've seen this kind of "tough [54:27] on the outside, weak on the inside" [54:29] type in some of the old Beijing [54:30] gentlemen. That is, they have to [54:32] maintain this—of course, that’s [54:34] putting it negatively, but from a [54:35] kinder perspective, you could say this [54:37] kind of person... [54:38] It's a way of life, I think this way is [54:41] about living for dignity. [54:42] Right, and actually, because everyone, [54:44] I think people have a very positive [54:46] perception of this, because dignity is [54:47] becoming increasingly lost nowadays, so [54:49] people still think having dignity is a [54:51] good thing, yes. [54:52] So, so I think what you just said [54:54] actually has two sides; one part is [54:56] that, as you said, there's that element [54:58] of loyalty and righteousness. But the [55:01] other part is that they’ve gotten too [55:03] deep into this social role. You [55:05] understand? You don't actually have the [55:08] capability, but once you enter that [55:10] role, you have to act according to that [55:12] role. "I am the CEO, so I must help you [55:15] ," even if I'm actually broke, get it? [55:17] This doesn't just apply to individual [55:20] business people. Many big stars in [55:22] America, famous ones like Marlon Brando [55:25] . [55:25] After they passed away, they left [55:28] behind so much debt. You see, many [55:30] people are like this; when a big star [55:33] passes away, it turns out they had been [55:35] maintaining an image, a lifestyle, and [55:38] a facade all along. [55:39] But they were actually broke; once they [55:41] passed away, it was revealed they were [55:43] in debt. But why? It's not just out of [55:46] greed. It could be, as you said, that [55:49] many people ask for their help, they [55:51] have to act like a boss, they might [55:53] even skip the Oscars, and so on. Such [55:55] cases are not rare; there are many such [55:58] high-profile figures. They occupy high [56:00] social roles and get locked into them. [56:03] Many can actually sustain it, while [56:05] others perhaps lack the actual capacity [56:08] , but they keep pushing. So, I think [56:10] the tragedy lies in this—this [56:12] evaluation is quite interesting. You [56:15] mentioned Du Yuesheng just now, and I [56:17] find that very interesting. For [56:19] instance, some people said about this [56:21] person—Mao Kan—that he was too kind [56:23] , so kind that he couldn't even bring [56:26] himself to kill a bird. How could such [56:28] a person simultaneously be an [56:30] entrepreneur? You see, that's why many [56:32] people said he wasn't suited for [56:34] entrepreneurship at all. [56:35] Entrepreneurship requires someone like [56:37] Xiao Mu, right? Thick-skinned, [56:39] shameless—as you yourself put it. [56:40] Knowing when to advance and retreat. [56:42] Knowing when to advance, but unable to [56:44] retreat. [56:44] Like being able to push through [56:45] obstacles, right? Right, exactly. So, [56:48] look, I think if we analyze this very [56:51] subtly, this is one side of a person. [56:54] But on the other hand, you say this [56:56] person, he values his reputation. How [56:59] do we distinguish between these two? I [57:01] think of Du Yuesheng. Du Yuesheng, you [57:04] see, was actually incredibly poor in [57:06] his later years, extremely poor in Hong [57:09] Kong, yet he had a stack of IOUs at [57:11] home. All the people who borrowed money [57:13] from him in his lifetime—that was [57:16] worth many gold bars, dozens of them— [57:18] before he died, he had his family burn [57:20] them all. He said, "I don't want that [57:23] after I die...""... [57:24] you keep them, and after you burn them, [57:27] don't let others worry about this [57:29] matter anymore." So, you could say that [57:33] by doing this, maybe those who owed the [57:35] debt didn't even know. My point is that [57:38] it wasn't just about maintaining a [57:40] facade in front of others. [57:41] Hmm. [57:42] To some extent, this was his set of [57:44] values. [57:45] Hmm. [57:46] It was his set of values. For example [57:48] ... [57:48] That was my principle for living my [57:49] whole life. [57:50] Right, I won't cause trouble for others [57:52] . You might not even realize it, but [57:54] I’ve been following that principle [57:56] all along. As for people like this, you [57:58] asked what they are after. Beyond the [58:00] image and the status, I think what they [58:02] really crave is the feeling of creating [58:05] a world. Whether this world is big or [58:07] small, a single night’s venture or a [58:09] grand spectacle like Du Yuesheng’s, [58:11] it’s a world of their own making, and [58:13] within it, they are the masters. I am [58:15] the one who provides. How could I ever [58:18] lower my head to ask you for anything? [58:20] In this space, I am the master; this is [58:22] their final principle. It is something [58:24] they cannot lose. If one day I have to [58:26] come and ask you for something, what [58:28] would that make me? Speaking of that, I [58:29] read something by a Zen master the [58:31] other day while you were talking about [58:33] Buddhism, and he used the term " [58:35] adversity as training." He said that [58:36] much of Zen is actually about this [58:38] training. He pointed to the "perfection [58:40] of patience," which is exactly that— [58:42] how do you endure humiliation? He said [58:43] the highest state of endurance is [58:44] reaching the point where you can endure [58:46] no more. It’s a question of whether [58:47] you can truly endure or not. It means [58:49] that your state of mind remains [58:50] completely unmoved. No matter the [58:52] difficulty you face, you don't waver. [58:53] He said the "stick and shout" in Zen, [58:55] where you are struck with a staff, is [58:56] the best form of this training; it lets [58:57] you experience enlightenment in the [58:59] shortest time. [58:59] Hey, Xiaomu, regarding what he said, [59:01] have you encountered such desperate [59:03] situations in your life? [59:04] Quite a few, right? [59:06] Yes. [59:07] When did you feel like there was no [59:09] tomorrow? [59:09] Mm. [59:10] When was that? [59:12] Uh, it was probably after ten years of [59:14] hard work, when I had finally managed [59:16] to take hold of those few streets. And [59:18] then, effectively... [59:19] It became my territory. That part is [59:22] crucial. [59:22] So, which gang were they from? They? [59:25] I’m my own gang, it has nothing to do [59:27] with others. If you want to talk about [59:29] a gang, it’s a "Hunan gang" I started [59:31] myself, because I don't rely on anyone [59:32] else. Once I had taken that territory [59:35] and those three streets were mine, [59:36] suddenly, one day, the "Northeast gang" [59:39] showed up. They essentially held me [59:41] hostage in a coffee shop and said, " [59:43] Starting tomorrow..." This gang wasn't [59:45] necessarily illegal; they acted as [59:47] brokers and middlemen within the bounds [59:50] of the law. They wanted the business I [59:52] had established—there was that [59:54] competitive tension. And so they said, [59:56] "Starting tomorrow, your staff belongs [59:59] to us.""Go find your own customers." [60:01] And you have our people stationed on [60:03] those few streets. When I walked into [60:06] this shop, into this café, I knew [60:08] these people were making trouble. I [60:10] called the police and said, "I'm in [60:12] trouble, I'm heading to this location, [60:15] can you come over?" At that moment, I [60:17] felt it was very dangerous, which is [60:19] why I called the police and my friends. [60:21] If the police hadn't come, from the [60:23] next day on, my life—I might have—I [60:25] might have committed suicide, because [60:27] the territory I spent over a decade [60:29] establishing was taken away by them in [60:31] a single month, a single night, and I [60:33] felt terrible about it. Even though [60:34] they couldn't kill me, I felt like I [60:36] had nothing left. See, our ways of [60:38] thinking are different. If I ran into [60:41] something like this, I'd learn my [60:43] lesson. A wise man doesn't stand under [60:45] a tottering wall; if it's not working [60:46] out here, man, I'm leaving. No, I [60:48] insisted on staying there. I felt—I [60:51] felt like that was my world, what I [60:53] should be doing, but in reality, I [60:54] still established 30. Bottom line. I [60:57] didn't trouble anyone else, didn't hurt [61:00] anyone else. You're just trying to take [61:02] my place because you want to make a [61:03] living, but I can share one street with [61:05] you. Later, I actually did give them [61:07] one street. I was only left with two [61:09] streets, and that's how we resolved it; [61:11] I made certain concessions. [61:12] Yes, I definitely made concessions [61:14] because I wanted to hold my ground. As [61:15] a result, we've become good friends; [61:17] when we're in Beijing, we go out for [61:18] drinks. All the people who came to mess [61:20] with me originally became my friends. [61:21] That's just how it is. [61:23] So do you see? This issue of adversity [61:25] quotient is superficial. Actually, I've [61:28] now realized that the term "adversity [61:30] quotient" isn't scientific. The term " [61:32] adversity quotient" isn't scientific. [61:34] Why? Because a person's reaction after [61:37] encountering adversity actually has [61:39] nothing to do with this "quotient," but [61:41] rather has more to do with your values, [61:43] your character, or what you consider to [61:46] be most important. For example, [61:48] everyone encounters adversity. If I run [61:51] into some situation—I was thinking [61:53] about it myself last night—I asked [61:55] myself what I am, and I discovered that [61:58] the first thing I think about is [62:00] whether my standard of living will drop [62:02] . Honestly, I'm just trying to make a [62:05] living. Regardless of any desperate [62:07] situation I face, I, for instance, set [62:10] a UN poverty line, right? That is, two [62:12] US dollars a day. I mean, I will, and [62:15] what is my defining trait? I always [62:18] imagine the worst-case scenario for [62:20] everything, which is a major source of [62:23] my life's pain. Because before anything [62:27] happens, I think of the worst possible [62:30] outcome, so much so that when I saw [62:32] someone with OCD, and they said what [62:34] their doctor told them was a symptom of [62:37] OCD, I felt it fit me perfectly—what [62:40] is it called? It’s magnifying small [62:43] probabilities to the extreme. [62:45] Exactly the same. [62:47] This is exactly the same as them. [62:49] For example, it really is like " [62:50] worrying that the sky will fall." Like [62:52] saying, if I go out today, will a brick [62:54] fall on my head? The probability is [62:56] very low, but for an OCD patient, that [62:58] thought completely tortures them—what [63:00] if it actually happens? A couple of [63:02] days ago, I suddenly had a short fever, [63:04] and I immediately looked it up online. [63:06] It said it could be a sign of a [63:08] myocardial infarction, which kept me up [63:11] all night—just like that, always [63:13] thinking the worst. [63:14] Yes, that’s one side of me, but I [63:16] actually understand what you mean by [63:18] intelligence—it's about resilience. [63:20] Yes. [63:21] Actually, resilience—that summary is [63:24] very accurate. When people are under [63:26] pressure, it's what determines what is [63:28] right in your life. Well, ultimately, [63:31] there are two things that matter most: [63:33] one is how you live well, which is the [63:36] most important, so you think, "If this [63:39] thing happens, it's bad for me, right?" [63:41] How much will it damage my ability to [63:44] live well? How much damage will it do? [63:47] Will I lose this job? Will I...right? [63:50] Will I end up homeless? If I can handle [63:53] that damage, then I will adjust and [63:55] accept it. But there is a second aspect [63:58] , a second thing—many people believe [64:00] in something, and if someone asks you [64:03] to give up what you believe in and do [64:05] things you don't believe in at all, [64:08] that is also a threshold of tolerance. [64:11] You're right. [64:13] This is also a form of tolerance, and [64:15] this threshold of tolerance is the same [64:17] for me. I mean, of course I wouldn't [64:19] want to do things I’m unwilling to do [64:21] . If you force me to do things I don't [64:23] want to do, of course I won't do them. [64:25] But, I still weigh things first, like [64:27] whether my standard of living can be [64:29] maintained. [64:30] I can endure it, but it still comes [64:32] down to what we call "AQ"(adversity [64:35] quotient)—when you face a setback, [64:37] you're bound to feel upset, right? So, [64:40] what do you do when you're upset? I [64:43] first weigh whether or not this matter [64:45] will affect my life. Once I have a [64:49] bottom line, secondly, my method of [64:51] liberation is the opposite of Xiao Mu's [64:54] ; it can actually be summarized by a [64:56] line from Lu Xun, which is what? You [64:58] see, this poem by Lu Xun is very [65:00] interesting, "Tattered hat covering my [65:02] face as I walk through the busy street. [65:04] " [65:04] My hat is tattered, and in your eyes, I [65:07] must look quite ridiculous, right? I, I [65:09] am pathetic, I might be the butt of [65:11] your jokes, I might have messed up my [65:12] life quite badly. A tattered hat [65:14] covering one's face is actually an [65:15] ostrich policy, you know? I don't see [65:17] it, I don't see it, I don't see it, I [65:19] don't care about you all. It's just a [65:21] tattered hat covering my face, crossing [65:23] the leaking boat; who knows how many [65:25] days this boat will last? But we should [65:27] enjoy the wine we have today, right? [65:30] The leaking boat drifts in midstream, [65:32] and then, I hide in my small tower to [65:34] be at peace, I don't care, I'll just [65:36] get lost in my own world. [65:38] Is this small tower of yours the one in [65:41] Hong Kong, is it? Your small tower is [65:43] also quite... [65:44] So I say my first bottom line is [65:46] whether my small tower still exists; as [65:48] long as my small tower is there. [65:50] I have a small tower to hide in. Of [65:52] course, that's it; people need a bit of [65:55] Ah Q spirit, right? If people aren't [65:57] optimistic, you really can't go on [66:00] living; we only live once. [66:01] Because back then, you know, there was [66:03] a high jumper, I always remember, named [66:05] Zhu Jianhua, yes, he didn't clear the [66:07] final jump, that old... [66:08] That high jump ultimately ended in [66:10] failure, the whole country adored him, [66:11] and later the whole country... [66:13] The Los Angeles Olympics. Yes, later [66:16] everyone criticized him, the immense [66:18] psychological pressure he must have [66:20] endured. But I always remember he later [66:23] said, or someone said, that a teacher [66:25] told him, "You should imagine you are [66:28] living in a glass dome; you can see [66:31] everything outside, but just pretend [66:33] you can't hear them." [66:35] As long as they can't hurt you, it's [66:37] fine. [66:37] Just stay in this, live inside this [66:40] dome. [66:40] This is a luxury, because I was [66:42] recently binge-watching that show, *The [66:44] Crown*, about the Queen. Look, even the [66:46] Queen of England had to change herself [66:48] at that time, go on television, and [66:50] read lines. She said, "I, a Queen, am [66:52] treated like an actor, I have to go on [66:54] TV and smile for everyone." She smiles [66:57] at the camera, saying, "Merry Christmas [66:59] to everyone," but the moment the lights [67:01] go off, her face is just, well... [67:04] But one still has to keep up with the [67:06] times; our era is just like this. Take [67:08] me, a journalist; what we used to [67:10] believe in was that your reports, your [67:12] work, was considered good if your peers [67:14] thought so, if you yourself felt good [67:16] about it, or if it aligned with what we [67:18] call "classic" values. Now, it’s all [67:20] about click rates, right? Well, it's [67:22] not like I can just grit my teeth and [67:24] decide to chase after that. I really [67:26] don't have that skill. It's not a [67:28] matter of just gritting my teeth and [67:29] being able to write those viral pieces [67:30] with hundreds of thousands of views. [67:32] It's not. It's a different set of [67:34] language, an entirely different thing, [67:35] and at this point, the barrier is too [67:36] high. To chase that trend, you need [67:38] your own niche, you need something [67:39] truly remarkable. If you don't have it, [67:41] you'll be in a lot of pain. Keeping up [67:43] with the trends is universal; not doing [67:45] so is quite a luxury. Not necessarily a [67:48] luxury, it's a symbol. Uh, there are [67:50] some things, for example, if you're [67:52] doing business or being a boss. Your [67:55] responsibilities are greater. Then it's [67:57] not just a matter of your niche, hmm. [68:00] But those of us who teach have it a bit [68:01] better; you see, you can choose to do [68:03] certain things. [68:04] Right. [68:05] Meaning your responsibilities aren't as [68:07] heavy; you are within your own control. [68:09] Isn't that right? You see, this is [68:11] about everyone choosing their own niche [68:13] . I think this is very important. When [68:16] a person chooses a career, it's not [68:18] just about searching for lifelong [68:19] happiness or pursuing your beliefs, but [68:21] also about recognizing your own [68:23] capabilities. [68:24] Right. When you work within your [68:26] capabilities, your adversity quotient [68:27] is higher; your stress resistance [68:29] allows you to say no. Don't accept [68:30] everything, don't just say "everything [68:32] is OK," and everything... [68:33] Once you take on things you can't [68:35] handle, then... [68:36] Learn to refuse. Hey, what Professor Xu [68:39] just said was excellent. It made me [68:41] realize this issue: in recent years, [68:43] we've seen reports about Gen Z, like a [68:45] 16-year-old girl saying, "I've made [68:46] tens of millions, you middle-aged [68:48] people, you're just taking a salary, [68:50] what are you doing?" But in the end, [68:52] when you investigate, who actually made [68:54] it? How many are there? Most people, I [68:57] think, still just earn a stable income [68:59] and live a moderate life. The stability [69:02] of this society also depends on a large [69:05] middle class. Let me tell you why I say [69:08] this. Just like what Takeshi Kitano [69:10] said the other day, I agree with his [69:12] sentiment, which is... [69:13] You don't need to encourage your [69:15] children to become geniuses. [69:17] Hmm. [69:18] That kind of genius, one in a million, [69:21] a true genius, even if parents forbid [69:24] them from music, they'll find their own [69:26] way. [69:28] You can't hold back that kind of person [69:30] ; it's their destiny. You just can't [69:33] stop it. But most of us are just [69:36] ordinary people. I feel it's safer to [69:39] have modest goals. Like what I tell my [69:43] students, if it were my own child, [69:45] I’d tell them: don’t spend money [69:47] you don’t have, live within your [69:49] means. The same goes for fame—don’t [69:54] chase a reputation that isn’t yours. [69:56] Right. [69:57] In the end, you help them set some [69:59] aside. [70:00] No, it's not what you think. Take these [70:02] entrepreneurs, for instance—I know so [70:04] many of these big bosses, and I really [70:07] feel they aren't ordinary people. [70:09] Mm. [70:10] I observe them, and I often tell them, [70:13] "You find fortune in the midst of [70:16] danger." Just look at the person. I [70:20] mean, they always seem to end up in [70:23] certain places. For example, one once [70:26] told me, "I was flying that day, [70:28] looking out the window, and I thought, [70:31] why is the engine on fire?" Did he even [70:34] realize it? The engine caught fire, [70:37] they landed, and he was fine. [70:39] It was like, they took a helicopter—a [70:42] big boss taking a helicopter from Macau [70:44] to Hong Kong. Once he was over Hong [70:46] Kong, he looked out and thought, " [70:48] What's going on? The engine stopped." [70:50] Right, right. [70:52] Nothing bad happened, you see? [70:54] And look at the things they do. I told [70:57] him: "The kind of high-stakes risks and [71:00] financing you're doing,"" [71:01] 99 out of 100 people would have [71:04] collapsed."" [71:05] This is human art, this is truly human [71:08] art." I have met such people. There's [71:11] an element of luck involved, but what [71:13] we're discussing is the psychological [71:15] pressure, the mindset. I even met [71:17] someone whose helicopter crashed flying [71:19] from Hong Kong to Macau, and he was [71:21] fine. He went to a casino in Macau, [71:23] pulled a slot machine, hit 7-7-7, and [71:25] won a fortune. I don't know about [71:27] people like that, but anyway, that's [71:29] why, in how I raise my children, I'm [71:31] now terrified of them always wanting to [71:32] win. Actually, children have this [71:35] natural instinct. I don't know if [71:36] you've observed this, but when they see [71:38] their classmates or peers having [71:40] something good, they immediately get [71:41] jealous and wonder, "Why didn't I win?" [71:43] "Why am I not...?" [71:45] Later on, I realized a really simple [71:47] way to help my child learn to accept [71:49] failure. Since my child is young, the [71:51] simplest method is what? Play games [71:53] like checkers or Ludo with them. You [71:55] don't always have to play fairly to win [71:57] ; you just control the luck. [71:58] Exactly. You choose, and you find that [72:01] sometimes they can't win, and oh, [72:02] they're unhappy, really unhappy! Let [72:03] them win one out of five games, but [72:05] lose the others, so they realize, "Oh, [72:06] I lost today, but let's try again, [72:08] maybe I'll win." It slowly tempers [72:10] their temperament. Speaking of [72:11] children's education, it's a matter of [72:13] playing games. When I taught my child [72:15] to play Go, back when they were just [72:17] learning, I would always beat them. [72:18] They would cry, and if I let them win, [72:20] they wouldn't feel it was genuine. So, [72:22] I just sent them away to be taught by [72:25] Ye Ping's son, who was in Japan. [72:27] When they were away, they didn't dare [72:29] to cry. It helps them build resilience [72:30] from a young age—specifically, the [72:32] ability to handle failure. [72:33] I've noticed that many kids nowadays... [72:35] They can't stand losing. Right. [72:38] Sometimes when they play games by [72:39] themselves, [72:40] they cry by themselves and get angry at [72:42] themselves. You call that playing? [72:44] That’s exactly when I realized the [72:46] extent of my own talent. I play bridge [72:49] against a computer. [72:50] When I play against the computer and [72:52] lose, [72:53] I feel unhappy inside. [72:55] But recently, something happened to a [72:57] bridge partner of mine, a fellow player [73:00] . They passed away recently. It was a [73:03] stroke. [73:03] Brain... [73:04] Hemorrhage. I asked their wife what the [73:07] last thing they did was before they got [73:10] sick. They were playing bridge alone on [73:12] the Xinrui Bridge platform. [73:13] Oh, they were unhappy. [73:15] They lost a game, and a few hours later [73:18] , they had a stroke. [73:19] So now, even though I still play online [73:22] , I tell myself: "You, someone who gets [73:24] upset just from losing a game to a [73:27] computer,""what right do you have to [73:29] engage in real-world competition?" [73:31] Right? Get a grip on yourself. I think [73:35] the reason Mao Kai's case is so [73:37] attention-grabbing, aside from the [73:39] moral implications of his suicide or [73:41] the fact that he was a legend, is that [73:43] I think people also have a sense of [73:45] this being a cautionary tale. A sudden [73:47] success like that hides many unstable [73:49] factors, and because he couldn't find a [73:51] way out later, I think the public's [73:53] focus is justified. I just feel, as we [73:55] say in the Northeast, one should be a [73:57] down-to-earth person. A person has to [73:59] remain...for instance, I feel I’m [74:01] quite ordinary. I’m an ordinary [74:03] person, and my mental resilience is [74:05] that of an ordinary person, right? I [74:07] can handle a debt of 100,000, but I [74:09] can't handle a million. So you know, [74:11] one shouldn't try to take on a task if [74:13] one lacks the skills for it. People [74:15] like Xiao Mu are artists; I truly [74:17] admire his level of mental resilience. [74:20] Six divorces—if you can handle that, [74:22] you must have a certain measure of [74:25] yourself. I really feel that people [74:27] like us, aren't we the majority that [74:29] stabilizes society? Meaning, I don't [74:32] take unnecessary risks, and I find a [74:33] job that’s enough to support myself, [74:35] doing everything based on my ability. [74:37] Right, always think of the worst-case [74:39] scenario first. Can I handle it? If I [74:42] can, then do it. I just work hard to do [74:45] my best, that's enough. As for those [74:47] people, how should I put it, people [74:50] like Xiao Mu, I tell you, they don't [74:52] need anyone's encouragement. Heroes and [74:56] legends emerge from the real world. [74:59] Actually, I really feel now, you know, [75:01] I've been tempted these past few years. [75:03] I’m telling you, the people I know [75:06] are top-tier, people from investment [75:08] banks, and in the end, I’d ask them [75:10] if I could...everyone was offering me [75:12] money. [75:12] Giving me money, right? I mean, they [75:15] offered tens of millions, and I asked [75:18] if I could really take that money, [75:20] right? Could I actually take it? [75:22] They said, "Don't worry." Even if they [75:26] are your good friends, no one is going [75:29] to give you tens of millions to spend [75:31] however you like without expecting a [75:33] profit. You think too highly of [75:36] yourself, thinking, "Oh, I’m an IP!" [75:39] You're nothing. If they give you money, [75:42] is it really yours? [75:44] Right, if you don't generate profit for [75:46] them, they just give you money to spend [75:48] for fun? Keep dreaming, such things [75:50] don't exist in this world. Some people [75:52] say they are my buddies, saying [75:53] they’re truly sincere, and they’ll [75:55] give me this, they’ll invest in me, [75:56] just invest in me. He said don't think [75:59] about that. You don't have any friend [76:01] in the world, no matter how close, who [76:03] would give you 10 million and not want [76:04] anything in return, right? Are they a [76:07] fool? So I feel my example shows that [76:09] in the end, unless we truly have a [76:12] confident plan, we shouldn't accept [76:14] other people's investment, right? This [76:17] If you have the ability, go ahead and [76:20] do it. Like what I thought: can I just [76:22] take out a loan and spend it myself? [76:24] That's called being kept. Right, so [76:28] lately I'm also selling myself for 50 [76:30] million. Am I a solo act now? I said, [76:33] who wants you? You. [76:36] I can take RMB, or pay in other [76:38] currencies, or even Japanese Yen. I [76:40] posted it on Weibo and WeChat. [76:42] Are you selling yourself? [76:43] Selling this piece of cured meat? [76:45] Yes, yes, yes, selling meat. [76:47] Italian Lira works too, right. I've [76:49] also observed a characteristic of [76:51] Japanese society—I lived there for a [76:53] year, though I'm not sure if this is [76:54] accurate—but a Japanese friend of [76:56] mine told me that the strict rules you [76:58] see aren't self-discipline, but " [77:00] other-discipline." They are terrified [77:01] of being noticed, terrified of being [77:03] different, and terrified of [77:05] inconveniencing others. So, to break [77:07] free from this social inertia, you have [77:09] to be more than others—basically, you [77:11] have to be completely shameless and [77:12] reject all external constraints. That's [77:14] why the great Japanese artists we see [77:16] are often more avant-garde, more [77:18] pioneering, and more reckless than [77:19] artists from other countries. Because [77:21] their social inertia is so strong, if [77:23] they want to break out, they must... [77:25] They go to greater extremes. [77:27] They must be more extreme to stand out. [77:29] This is what we often say: Japanese [77:30] people at home and Japanese people [77:32] abroad are like two completely [77:33] different people. [77:33] How so? [77:35] For example, in Japan, when you make a [77:36] phone call, you must be quiet and [77:38] discreet, and you absolutely cannot [77:40] talk on the train. The other day at the [77:42] Shanghai Pudong Airport, I saw a [77:43] Japanese person sitting there, making a [77:45] very loud phone call. I went up to him [77:47] and asked in Japanese, "Do you make [77:48] phone calls like this back in Japan?" [77:50] As soon as he heard that, he [77:51] immediately stood up and walked away. [77:53] Yeah, he's just conforming to that [77:55] society. [77:55] Oh, and another thing: I was at [77:57] Shanghai Pudong Airport again, and a [77:58] Japanese person was holding his [78:00] passport and shouting at the young [78:02] clerk, saying, "You touched my passport [78:04] !" I went up and cursed them in [78:05] Japanese, saying, "You jerk, why won't [78:07] you check my passport?" [78:08] Say it in Japanese then. [78:10] How do you say it in Japanese? " [78:12] The road devil is here." Exactly! And [78:15] the other guy just laughed. You tell [78:17] him to get you your plane ticket; he [78:19] has to check your passport, right? They [78:21] get a bit carried away. Once they go [78:24] abroad, they let loose and act [78:26] completely different from how they do [78:28] at home. So, it's really interesting [78:30] when you talk about Japan. Look, on one [78:33] hand, we certainly understand why many [78:35] people in China have hard feelings [78:37] toward Japan, but on the other hand, [78:40] look at the tourism bureau's numbers: [78:42] Chinese tourists traveling to Japan [78:44] have increased at an incredible rate, [78:46] reaching 870,000. [78:48] But after listening to Professor Jiang, [78:50] I realized that we shouldn't assume [78:52] Japan has always been this clean and [78:55] orderly. It's just so fascinating. Just [78:58] a few decades ago, it wasn't like this [79:01] at all. Recently, hasn't everyone in [79:03] Shanghai been asking, "What kind of [79:05] trash are you?""Are you calling me [79:08] trash?" Let me tell you, we can foresee [79:11] that Shanghai is leading the way. [79:13] Starting from Shanghai, I'm afraid we [79:15] will all eventually have to learn how [79:17] to sort our trash. Mm. [79:19] But do you know that Japan wasn't like [79:21] this from the beginning? I heard a [79:23] timeline saying it was around the 1964 [79:26] Olympics. That's when things changed, [79:28] when the government started [79:29] implementing this system. It used to be [79:31] dirty and messy, too. In 1963, to [79:33] prepare for the '64 Tokyo Olympics, [79:35] they started this revolution. [79:36] When you first went to Japan, did you [79:38] know how to sort trash? [79:39] When I first went to Japan, I even [79:40] wrote an article about this very thing. [79:42] I knew how to do it, but it was a [79:44] hassle. You know, and what happens when [79:45] you find it troublesome and get annoyed [79:47] with sorting trash? You just throw it [79:48] all out together. But Japan has its own [79:50] version of the "Chaoyang Aunties." [79:51] The Japanese "Chaoyang Aunties." And [79:53] then, the next morning when you open [79:54] your door... [79:55] It’s all back. [79:56] It's back. [79:57] Sigh. But honestly, we haven't really [79:59] talked about the benefits of sorting. [80:01] Mm. I think we don't highlight the [80:03] benefits well in China. Sorting is [80:05] actually their greatest strength. For [80:07] example, they have a dedicated station [80:09] for bulky waste. When international [80:10] students first arrived in the 80s, [80:12] you’d see a TV set there, and you'd [80:13] be thrilled! You'd drag it home, but no [80:15] matter what you did, it wouldn't turn [80:17] on. Then you’d look at the back and [80:18] see there’s no power cord. [80:19] No plug. [80:21] Then someone tells you that if the [80:22] power cord is cut off, it means the [80:24] item is completely broken and unusable. [80:26] Mm. [80:27] And the ones with power cords still [80:28] attached, that's people upgrading, [80:30] these can still be used. [80:31] A lot of Japanese exchange students. [80:33] Many Japanese exchange students, when [80:35] they first arrived in Japan, furnished [80:37] their entire homes from this oversized [80:39] trash. [80:39] Just like that. [80:41] You too? Right, you were in Tokyo on a [80:44] foundation grant and you were still [80:46] dumpster diving? Yeah, because the [80:48] apartment I lived in had a trash room, [80:49] and in that room, there would be books, [80:51] clothes, bowls, things people didn't [80:53] want and just left there. [80:54] I’d just go and pick up a couple of [80:56] things when I had time, things that [80:57] were worth taking, and I’d leave the [80:58] books I didn't want there too. My mom [81:00] even picked out textbooks for my future [81:02] kids from that trash room, from age one [81:04] to seven, everything was kept really [81:06] clean. [81:06] So Ma Ye, you couldn't make it in Japan [81:08] , you were just picking up junk. Right, [81:11] the fact that they can classify trash [81:13] so meticulously reflects the national [81:15] spirit, because promoting this [81:17] worldwide is extremely difficult. [81:19] It's very difficult, because the costs [81:21] are high. Look at Japan, in the [81:23] apartment I lived in, what do you call [81:25] it, the trash room even had a sink. [81:28] After you drop off your trash, you have [81:29] to wash your hands there, not even [81:31] mentioning the sorting part. The key is [81:33] that the room has an odor-removal [81:35] system, you know, a deodorizer. In [81:37] their buildings, if you bring a pet [81:38] back, to avoid bringing in dirt, [81:40] there’s even a foot-washing station [81:42] for dogs and cats by the building [81:44] entrance. [81:44] Ah. [81:45] They have reached, they have reached [81:47] this level of precision. Yes, it's like [81:49] , look, let's talk about the situation. [81:51] Why do I say that? I say they were also [81:54] messy and dirty at first, including [81:56] when Japan's economy was just taking [81:58] off, we know that now; it was pretty [82:00] much like a few Chinese tour groups [82:02] today, quite annoying, just like that [82:04] everywhere. But look, now it seems like [82:06] they’ve become especially clean, [82:08] right? But I remember there’s a [82:10] saying, I don't know if it's correct, [82:12] but there is this idea that to get an [82:14] introduction to Japanese culture, for [82:16] literature, you should start with a [82:18] book called*In Praise of Shadows*. [82:20] By whom? [82:21] Jun'ichiro Tanizaki. [82:23] Jun'ichiro Tanizaki, and they say for [82:24] films it should be*The Ballad of [82:26] Narayama*, and for photography, [82:27] Nobuyoshi Araki. This saying isn't [82:29] necessarily right, but I'm just [82:31] mentioning*In Praise of Shadows*. [82:32] You see, it was probably around the [82:35] beginning of the last century, the [82:37] 1920s or 30s, when Japan was [82:38] industrializing and Westernizing. [82:41] Intellectuals generally love to play [82:43] devil's advocate. Jun'ichiro Tanizaki [82:46] was mocking things, even Western-style [82:49] bathroom tiles, comparing them [82:51] unfavorably to our Japanese toilets. [82:54] Our Japanese toilets were made of wood, [82:57] with direct access to the earth below; [83:00] using them was a kind of "toilet [83:02] worship." [83:04] Quite repulsed, he even went so far as [83:07] to talk about teeth. [83:10] He said that with the influx of Western [83:12] culture, every Japanese man and woman [83:15] wanted to have a set of perfectly [83:17] straight white teeth. He said, "I don't [83:20] find that beautiful; some elderly [83:23] Japanese people, the tobacco stains on [83:25] their teeth, including my own bad teeth [83:28] and yellowish complexion, I find them [83:31] to have a natural beauty." He was [83:34] resisting, playing devil's advocate, [83:36] saying, "Looking at all these white [83:38] teeth in Japan now reminds me of tiles [83:41] in European and American toilets, [83:43] lacking any character." Then he even [83:48] mentioned something quite funny, and [83:50] while there were elements of prejudice, [83:52] he said that among these Eastern [83:54] peoples—and as you said, why Japan [83:56] succeeded in implementing it, starting [83:59] from scratch—they carried it through. [84:03] He said only the Japanese were so [84:06] earnest; whatever you asked them to do, [84:08] they would do it very diligently. He [84:11] said that a while ago, a tour group [84:13] went to China, back when Zhang Xueliang [84:16] was in the Northeast, you know? They [84:18] took the best train in China, and they [84:21] said the toilets and everything were [84:23] extremely dirty. But even though he [84:28] said that, he had a change of heart, [84:30] thinking that compared to the Western [84:33] concept of hygiene, maybe there is [84:35] something in our so-called laziness? [84:40] A beauty, a sense of leisure in life. [84:43] From his thoughts, you can see that [84:45] when Japan began to accept Western [84:48] notions of hygiene, some intellectuals [84:50] of the old culture still reacted this [84:52] way. But the three people you just [84:54] mentioned are actually figures who [84:56] represent a "perverted beauty" in Japan [84:58] . These three individuals you mentioned [85:00] are all top-tier—one in literature, [85:02] one in film, and the other one. Things [85:04] like photography, it’s all truly [85:06] taken to the extreme. So, in the minds [85:08] of many of us who are uninformed, the [85:09] Japanese seem quite perverted, which is [85:11] why they look down on Japan. [85:12] Why is that? Is it because the work [85:14] pressure is too high? [85:15] Or is it cultural? Why do Chinese [85:18] people go to Japan? Whether you like [85:20] Japan or not, when you actually travel [85:22] there, it feels really good. I've met [85:25] many people like this. I won't name [85:27] names, these are well-known people, but [85:29] they would talk to me and express such [85:31] hatred for Japan. They would curse it [85:32] all day long, and later I asked, "Have [85:34] you ever been to Japan?" They said no. [85:37] I told them, "If you haven't been, [85:38] talking about it is pointless." I [85:40] suggested they go, and after they [85:42] visited a couple of times, they called [85:44] me up, saying, "I've just returned from [85:46] Japan and have a new perspective, let's [85:48] grab a meal." Their view of Japan had [85:50] completely shifted. You see, all those [85:53] hearsay stories and the perverted [85:55] things they claimed to have seen made [85:57] up their entire initial understanding [86:00] of Japan. When they actually went to [86:01] Japan, the benefits they gained were [86:03] not on that level at all; they were in [86:05] the most minute details of daily life. [86:07] For example, after using the restroom, [86:09] you feel very comfortable, right? It's [86:10] spotless, no matter where you are; [86:12] sometimes you even feel bad about [86:13] yourself, like, oh, you really [86:14] shouldn't... [86:15] Feel like you’re the one who is messy [86:17] . [86:17] Yes, exactly, you don't want to break [86:18] anything or mess anything up, you just [86:19] put everything back where it belongs. [86:21] Returning to this weekly family topic, [86:22] what are some other characteristics of [86:24] Japanese culture? It focuses on the [86:26] here and now, not the afterlife. It’s [86:28] all about this specific moment—* [86:30] ichi-go ichi-e*(one time, one meeting). [86:32] Once the gathering ends, it’s gone, [86:35] right? It’s strictly about the [86:37] present. You mentioned the Japanese tea [86:39] master, Sen no Rikyu, right? [86:41] As for Sen no Rikyu, I have visited [86:42] that incredibly famous tea room of his. [86:45] At the time, he was actually serving [86:47] Toyotomi Hideyoshi. In the end, he was [86:49] either killed or died—Sen no Rikyu [86:52] was forced to commit suicide, forced to [86:54] commit suicide. You know, Toyotomi [86:56] Hideyoshi belonged to the shogunate, so [86:59] he represented that extravagant, noble [87:02] style. But Sen no Rikyu himself [87:05] advocated for simplicity—his style of [87:08] tea was… [87:09] Minimalism. [87:10] Minimalism, exactly. It’s tiny, they [87:13] call it one-and-a-half or two mats, and [87:16] the door you enter through is only as [87:18] high as a table; you have to go in like [87:21] a dog. [87:22] Crawl in. [87:23] And then, well, there’s an old piece [87:25] of wood, a pillar in the middle, and a [87:27] very simple scroll hanging; but the [87:29] main thing is the wall. [87:31] That wall, I’m telling you, it’s [87:32] just like the kitchen stove back in our [87:34] countryside. [87:35] No, and it's not just an earthen wall [87:37] blackened by soot, it’s that kind of [87:39] dark, dingy look that still shows the [87:41] texture of the soil. Do you know why I [87:44] went? Because a friend of mine in [87:45] Taiwan, a tea dealer who is quite [87:47] wealthy. Insisted on recreating this [87:49] exactly like the one in Japan, with a [87:50] Japanese company. [87:51] Said he was determined to do it. [87:53] Hmm. [87:53] But do you know what? He told me. [87:56] It just doesn't feel right. [87:57] He can’t continue with this project. [87:59] Because he’s very particular, and [88:00] even the Japanese company admitted that [88:01] achieving that authentic soot-blackened [88:03] effect on those mud walls is impossible [88:04] . [88:04] No matter how he looks at it, it’s [88:06] not like Sen no Rikyu’s. [88:07] Right. [88:08] It’s just different. Don't [88:10] underestimate that, and as you said, [88:12] the afternoon sunlight. [88:14] Just a little bit comes in. [88:15] Right, it's basically dim lighting, it [88:17] ... [88:17] It's mostly kept dim, yes, and [88:19] depending on the angle of the time of [88:20] day, as you kneel there. [88:22] So the tea master will explain to you [88:23] when the light hits this, or when the [88:24] light hits that. [88:25] Yes, that sense of gloom and depth. [88:28] And all the tea rooms, that low door [88:30] you mentioned that forces you to duck, [88:32] it’s intentional; why is that? It’s [88:35] to make you feel a sense of awe when [88:37] you arrive; in the past, warriors had [88:39] to enter the tea room before going to [88:40] battle, why drink tea? When you have to [88:42] lower your head to enter, it means all [88:44] your ego and worldly attachments are [88:46] stripped away. [88:47] Hmm. [88:48] And so you feel awe. Look at Japanese [88:51] shrines, when you enter, there’s that [88:54] path of crushed gravel; isn't it to [88:56] signal that you are entering a new [88:58] realm, different from your mundane life [89:01] ? When you step on that gravel, you [89:03] naturally become solemn. So they [89:06] constantly make sure you feel a sense [89:08] of reverence in everything; this is a [89:11] characteristic of the Japanese people. [89:13] Everything is ritualized, procedural, [89:16] formatted, and designed to evoke your [89:18] sense of awe and dedication; this is [89:20] their specialty. [89:21] But let me ask one more thing. Hmm. [89:24] Isn't it hypocritical? If you cannot [89:27] express your true inner self in this [89:29] society, isn't that just hypocrisy? [89:31] Can’t you stop being so hypocritical? [89:34] Hmm. [89:35] Does society really demand that you be [89:37] this hypocritical? That’s why I was [89:39] telling Teacher Ma, when we talk about [89:41] Japan, if you want to understand [89:42] Japanese society, you won’t get [89:44] anywhere just by chatting with Japanese [89:46] people. What you want to hear and what [89:48] they say are simply on different [89:49] wavelengths. You see, to understand [89:51] Japanese society, you have to read [89:53] books written by Japanese people, like [89:55] those by Ichiro Kuki. He takes [89:57] everything repressed deep in his heart [89:59] and vents it out; he is able to write [90:01] it all down. Including Dazai Osamu, [90:03] right? With that desire to die, the [90:06] suicide pacts with five women—some he [90:08] attempted, some he caused—but [90:10] that’s just it, you only find this in [90:12] Japan. I always hear people talking [90:15] about the refined beauty of Japanese [90:17] culture and so on, but I actually think [90:19] the most important trait of Japanese [90:22] culture is that it provides a way to [90:24] express the things you can’t say or [90:26] vent. So, Japanese culture is a great [90:29] drainage ditch. A ditch to drain [90:32] desires. [90:32] A ditch; their desires are far from few [90:35] . Yes, it has a drainage system for [90:37] desires. Right, Teacher Jiang, because [90:40] you’ve stayed in Japan for a long [90:42] time, you can’t just call yourself [90:44] half-Japanese, but your understanding [90:46] of Japanese culture is certainly much [90:48] deeper than ours. [90:49] However, when we observe Japanese [90:51] culture, we sometimes encounter certain [90:53] things. For example, in my own [90:55] experience, I was in Japan to [90:57] commission a tea set, so I found some [90:58] master craftsmen and had a set of nine [91:00] pots made, and there was one incident [91:02] with a pot that left a deep impression [91:04] on me. The pot was made like this: [91:06] after firing it, like this teapot here, [91:08] there was a second process called " [91:10] hanging." [91:11] Hmm. [91:12] It involves drying seaweed, wrapping it [91:14] around the pot, and firing it again, [91:16] which creates a beautiful, starry glaze [91:19] on the surface. This craftsman was over [91:21] 70, a true master. But isn't seaweed [91:24] just seaweed? Couldn't you just find [91:27] someone to fish it out and dry it, then [91:28] wrap it on? But the old man insisted on [91:30] going to the beach himself to find this [91:32] grass, regardless of the time. We were [91:34] in a hurry, but if you don't finish [91:36] this step, nothing else can be done, [91:38] right? He could've asked someone to go [91:39] collect the grass, but at over 70, he [91:41] goes down to the shore to gather the [91:42] grass himself. After drying it out, you [91:44] find an assistant to help tie it onto [91:46] the mold. He ties the grass onto the [91:47] mold, looking just like a bird's nest; [91:49] it starts this size and grows bit by [91:51] bit as he ties it on. He has to tie it [91:54] himself. Once tied, he fires it; the [91:56] whole process isn't touched by anyone [91:57] else, it’s complete self-discipline, [91:59] a conversation with his inner self. [92:01] A conversation with the inner self. [92:03] This is incredible; no craftsman we [92:05] have in China can do this. Usually, [92:07] they let the apprentices do everything, [92:09] and the master just puts his seal on it [92:11] at the end. [92:12] Yeah. [92:13] Ma said we just interviewed a "Living [92:15] National Treasure" in Gangshan County [92:17] who works with pottery. He told me that [92:21] throughout the entire process, he and [92:23] the pottery he's creating must be [92:25] connected; from the moment I start with [92:28] the clay, I talk to it. I chat with it [92:31] just like that, including when it goes [92:33] into the kiln. I wait outside, saying, [92:35] "I'm waiting for you; you'll come out [92:37] beautifully soon." And when it comes [92:39] out, I thank it for enduring such [92:40] hardship, telling it, "Thank you for [92:42] being with me today." That’s the [92:44] feeling. [92:44] So, when he sells a used or old car, he [92:47] bows to it, thanking it for staying [92:50] with him for so many years, right? " [92:52] You've worked hard, and now I'm sending [92:55] you off." When we sell used cars, we [92:57] just roll back the odometer; we don't [93:00] dare face that, just setting the [93:02] mileage back first. It’s like back [93:04] then, the Tang Dynasty craftsmen [93:07] repairing those wooden roofs. They had [93:10] a specialist who chose the wood, and he [93:12] would talk to every piece to see if it [93:15] was suitable for the roof, making sure [93:17] to choose the right one, one that was [93:20] willing to become part of the roof. [93:23] This relates to Eastern culture, the [93:25] idea that everything has a spirit. [93:28] It's the belief that objects and people [93:31] are one; we usually talk about this in [93:34] more common terms, like "understanding [93:36] life." I’m not trying to brag, but I [93:40] also edit videos, and I had this [93:42] dilemma. The explanation I eventually [93:46] found was through talking to my editor; [93:48] he mentioned that the frame-by-frame [93:50] adjustments we do now...He said that 50 [93:53] %of the work we stay up late doing is [93:55] honestly an understatement. None of it [93:58] is actually perceptible to the audience [94:00] . [94:00] They can't feel it, they don't know. [94:02] So, can you tell me why that is? [94:04] In the end, after thinking it over, the [94:06] only way to explain it is through faith [94:08] . No, even if I don't do it, the [94:09] audience wouldn't be able to tell at [94:11] all. [94:11] But you have to say that this is a sort [94:14] of... [94:14] You can only attribute it to faith; if [94:16] you don't do it this way, you feel like [94:18] you’ve let yourself down. [94:19] Let yourself down. And I think in [94:21] Japanese society, these kinds of [94:23] beliefs are incredibly strong. Because [94:25] I’m a big fan of a Japanese writer [94:26] named Shusaku Endo; he’s a rare [94:28] Christian writer in Japan who writes [94:30] about religion. He talks about this, [94:32] and he has a very classic novel called [94:33] "Silence," which was later made into a [94:35] film. He basically says that [94:37] Christianity just couldn't take root in [94:39] Japan. Due to their inherent nature— [94:41] perhaps focusing on the present, not [94:43] believing in the afterlife, or whatever [94:44] it may be—they couldn't adopt other [94:46] religions, so his book "Silence" is [94:48] extremely pessimistic. Well, I know [94:50] that novel, but his argument isn't [94:52] quite right, because when Christianity [94:54] entered Japan, especially in Kyushu, it [94:57] was aimed directly at overthrowing the [94:59] government. It was aimed at [95:01] overthrowing the Shogunate, which is [95:02] why the Shogunate tried to eradicate it [95:05] . Zhao, having lived in Japan for so [95:06] many years, what do you think their [95:08] shortcomings are? The shortcoming is [95:10] that ambiguity we were talking about [95:11] earlier. It’s that you never know [95:13] which part of what they say is their [95:14] true intention. You know? You can never [95:17] really pin down their final thoughts. [95:19] And furthermore, you should never [95:20] expect to enter their inner circle. [95:22] Ultimately, you realize that no matter [95:24] how close you are, no matter how good [95:26] of a friend you are...There is always a [95:28] sense of distance, you know that. [95:30] So perhaps it is precisely this [95:32] attitude... [95:33] That’s why many of our countrymen [95:35] find them annoying, right? Let me give [95:37] you a very interesting example: a [95:39] Chinese parent came to me and said, " [95:41] Can you help me go to the school? They [95:44] won't grant me an interview; my child [95:46] is being bullied at this Japanese [95:48] school." After I finished at the school [95:51] , I went to help our Chinese media. [95:53] Afterward, the teacher told me that it [95:55] was their fault. They said they hadn't [95:57] managed things well and allowed us [95:59] reporters to come over, and they felt [96:01] bad about it. They said, "I'll take you [96:03] to the principal in a bit, and the [96:04] principal will apologize to you." They [96:06] added, "However, let me tell you [96:07] something; I have been observing this [96:09] situation.""You Chinese kids are [96:11] different from Japanese kids.""Once [96:12] Chinese kids decide they are good [96:14] friends, they stick together—do you [96:15] understand what I mean?" They hug and [96:17] hold each other, [96:18] thick as thieves. [96:20] Always hugging and holding on, [96:21] but Japanese children are taught from a [96:23] young age not to have physical contact. [96:25] Unless they are fighting, there is no [96:28] hand-holding or hugging. You won't see [96:30] that on the streets in Japan; you won't [96:33] see people arm-in-arm or hugging. In [96:35] China, you often see best friends doing [96:37] that; it's very common. Japan doesn't [96:40] have that; they lack physical contact. [96:42] So when a child goes to hug someone and [96:43] gets pushed away, they might think it's [96:45] because their language skills aren't [96:46] good enough. Doesn't it feel like [96:47] they're being bullied? This is just a [96:49] cultural difference.