## Detailed walkthrough
### [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zn1c4RI2Hfw&t=0s) The Urge to Go West: From Ah Cheng to the Study Abroad Wave
Dou Wentao opens the conversation by questioning why so many prominent Chinese cultural figures—including writer Ah Cheng, novelist Wang Shuo, and painter Chen Danqing—all left China to live in the United States around the same time during the early Reform and Opening-up era. In the first three decades of the People’s Republic, the cultural and ideological gaze was directed toward the Soviet Union, even if actual travel there was virtually impossible. After the opening of China, that collective fascination pivoted entirely toward America. When asked what drew him across the Pacific, Chen Danqing recalls that his motivation was disarmingly simple: he just wanted to see original Western masterworks in person. At that time, leisure tourism was completely out of the question, international flights to the United States departed perhaps once a week, and going abroad was synonymous with the grueling, highly competitive wave of overseas study.
Dou Wentao reflects on his own limited exposure to the United States, having visited only twice as a tourist, but notes that the recent American presidential election revealed deep underlying tensions. He brings up a prior episode featuring Professor Rao Yi, whose impassioned defense of "political correctness" sparked an immediate controversy online. Dou recalls that Rao seemed almost possessed with indignation, railing against Chinese immigrants who supported Donald Trump:
> "You guys are voting for Trump, you idiots! You don't understand at all. He's a man who wants to kick the Chinese out, yet Chinese people are still so happy for him."
While Rao conceded there was nothing inherently wrong with conservative or Republican politics, he argued it was self-defeating for an ethnic minority to back a figure whose rhetoric targeted them directly. This provocation leads Dou to question whether the United States is in genuine decline, recalling how Chinese families historically weighed sending their children to the United Kingdom versus the United States, while immigration data as late as 2014 still placed America as the undisputed top destination for Chinese emigrants.
---
[01:30](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zn1c4RI2Hfw&t=90s) Thirty-Four Years of American Shift: From Reagan's Glory to Post-9/11 Malaise
Chen Danqing offers an eyewitness perspective spanning thirty-four years of American social and political life, dating back to Ronald Reagan's election. When Reagan took office, the country was emerging from the trauma of the Vietnam War, internal economic chaos, and the peak of the civil rights movements, pivoting sharply toward conservatism in tandem with Margaret Thatcher's United Kingdom. Reagan’s presidency set the stage for the end of the Cold War, and shortly after George H. W. Bush took office, the Soviet Union collapsed in 1990, ushering in an era of unilateral American primacy.
Danqing recalls living through recurring economic cycles and structural market adjustments that became central battlegrounds in subsequent presidential elections. However, the defining inflection point was the unexpected shock of September 11, 2001. After 9/11, national priorities abruptly shifted toward counter-terrorism and foreign intervention. While the United States projected unilateral power overseas, critical domestic concerns were repeatedly deferred and neglected. Having observed this entire trajectory firsthand, Danqing traces a line from the self-confident, prosperous Reagan era to the current backlog of unresolved domestic crises and foreign entanglements.
```mermaid
flowchart TD
accTitle: Evolution of Modern American Political Landscape
accDescr: Timeline of American domestic and foreign shifts from the Reagan era through the post-9/11 era.
subgraph ColdWar["End of Cold War Era"]
A["Reagan Era (1980s)<br/>Return to Conservatism & Economic Reset"]
B["Bush Administration (1990)<br/>Collapse of the Soviet Union"]
A --> B
end
subgraph Unilateral["Unilateral Era"]
C["1990s Cultural & Economic Boom<br/>Clinton Era Artistic High Point"]
B --> C
end
subgraph Shift["Post-9/11 Realignment"]
D["September 11 Attacks<br/>Counter-Terrorism & Overseas Wars"]
E["Domestic Neglect & Polarization<br/>Shattered Consensus & Social Strife"]
C --> D
D --> E
end
```
---
[03:42](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zn1c4RI2Hfw&t=222s) The Fractured Diaspora: Elite Sorrow, Grassroots Trumpism, and Generational Gaps
Xu Zidong observes that the recent election created unprecedented divisions among the Chinese diaspora in the United States, fracturing communities and social circles into opposing factions. Chinese residents who have assimilated into mainstream elite circles—such as academia, high culture, and white-collar institutions—showed unyielding opposition to Donald Trump and expressed visible grief and despair when he secured victory. In stark contrast, ordinary working-class and newer first-generation immigrants openly rallied for him, pooling resources and spending significant sums of money to charter campaign flights and organize ground rallies.
The conversation touches upon sociological research into the Chinese-American demographic, distinguishing between three distinct groups:
- **First generation (new immigrants):** Adults who emigrated directly from China and often maintain strong ties to native cultural perspectives.
- **1.5 generation:** Individuals who moved to the United States as young children, growing up bilingual and bicultural.
- **Second generation:** Those born and fully raised on American soil.
Xu highlights a compelling statistic from diaspora demographic studies: the 1.5 generation consistently reports the highest per capita income among all three tiers, successfully bridging the cultural literacy of the West with the intense educational discipline of their immigrant parents.
---
[05:22](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zn1c4RI2Hfw&t=322s) Liu Sola on 1990s New York, the Collapse of the Buffer, and Street Racism
Composer and writer Liu Sola shares her personal experience living in New York during the Clinton presidency in the 1990s on an artist contract. She describes the mid-to-late 1990s as the absolute peak of contemporary American artistic vitality, carrying forward the counter-cultural momentum that had been building since the 1960s hippie movement. New York teemed with innovative thinkers, musicians, and creators. Following the 9/11 attacks, however, that vibrant energy receded, leaving behind a pervasive cultural and economic desolation that made creative risk-taking far more difficult.
Sola reflects that while small-time immigrant artists like herself were largely insulated in the 1990s, the United States was already deeply embroiled in foreign military actions across the Balkans, the Middle East, and Africa. What held the domestic fabric together was the prevailing ethos of "political correctness." Sola emphasizes that, far from being an empty slogan, political correctness served as an indispensable civil buffer. It enforced an unwritten code of mutual respect, ensuring that diverse ethnic groups shared an equal, protected public space. With that consensus dismantled in the current political climate, that vital buffer has broken down, leaving minorities vulnerable.
Dou Wentao notes that immediately following the election, disturbing public incidents began surfacing, with Asian Americans harassed on public streets and told:
> "F*** you, Chinese, go back to your own country."
He points out that hostility has manifested in extreme private actions, such as individuals traveling to the Mexican border to build sections of the border wall independently or offering private donations of millions of dollars before federal funds are even appropriated.
---
[08:08](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zn1c4RI2Hfw&t=488s) "A Native of Beijing in New York," New Oriental, and the Disenchantment of the American Dream
Dou Wentao poses a broader cultural question: has the longstanding "Chinese American Dream" finally shattered? He recalls the intense aura surrounding America in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when cultural luminaries left China one after another. For Dou's generation, their window into that reality was the 1993 television series *A Native of Beijing in New York*, starring Jiang Wen, which immortalized the city as simultaneously "a heaven and a hell."
The panel reviews an excerpt from Peter Chan’s film *American Dreams in China* (loosely based on Yu Minhong and the founding of the New Oriental English training school). The scene depicts an intense classroom debate between an English teacher and an ambitious student:
- **The Teacher's Cynicism:** The teacher insists that racial discrimination in America is permanent and systemic, arguing that if a white person sees three Black men enter an elevator, they will step out before the doors close. He warns that despite Chinese immigrants being diligent and clever, locals will merely accuse them of stealing domestic jobs.
- **The Student's Idealism:** The student counters that the teacher’s pessimism is merely drawn from books, insisting that "time is the only standard to judge the truth here" and that the American Dream represents the only system on Earth where every individual enjoys equal opportunity to chase their aspirations.
Reflecting on the clip, the speakers observe that neither extreme is entirely accurate. The Chinese idealization of the United States has roots stretching back to World War II, when American forces aided China against Japanese aggression and temporarily stationed troops there, cementing an enduring national myth that was later magnified during the Reform era.
[10:17](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zn1c4RI2Hfw&t=617s) Generational Timing, Economic Cycles, and the Immigrant Experience
The discussion begins with a reflection on how the image of America has loomed large across generations in China, particularly during the three decades following the Reform and Opening-up. As millions of Chinese emigrated to the United States, debates emerged regarding the distinctions between "first generation" and "1.5 generation" immigrants (those who arrived as young children). However, one speaker pushes back against this rigid labeling, arguing that an immigrant's fortunes depend far less on generational categorization than on the economic cycle of the United States when they arrive. Hitting a booming economy offers abundant jobs and a bright future, whereas arriving during an economic downturn leaves newcomers stranded, regardless of their background or whether they settle in immigrant hubs like California or New York.
```mermaid
flowchart TD
accTitle: Immigrant Experience and Economic Cycles
accDescr: Flowchart illustrating how macroeconomic timing and generational arrivals shape immigrant outcomes and anti-immigrant sentiment.
subgraph MacroTiming["Macroeconomic Timing"]
A["Immigrant Arrival"] --> B{"U.S. Economic Stage"}
B -->|"Boom Period"| C["Abundant Jobs & Upward Mobility"]
B -->|"Recession / Stagnation"| D["Diminished Wages & Dim Outlook"]
end
subgraph SocialTension["Social & Political Dynamics"]
E["Established Immigrants & Locals"] -->|"Economic Anxiety"| F["Anti-Immigrant Rhetoric ('Go Back')"]
F --> G["Pushback Against New & Undocumented Arrivals"]
end
D -.->|"Fuels"| SocialTension
```
To illustrate that this dynamic affects all immigrant communities rather than just the Chinese, a speaker shares a personal anecdote from two years prior when his younger brother had a son. While waiting in the hospital maternity ward, he struck up a conversation with an elderly Italian immigrant. The Italian man was himself a "1.5 generation" immigrant who had arrived as a boy, his child was second-generation, and that child was now having a baby. The elderly man expressed deep, genuine worry, explaining at length that the solid wages, stable careers, and abundant opportunities his generation enjoyed would never be available to his grandchildren's generation.
The panel observes that the current climate of racism, Trump-era rhetoric, and xenophobic demands that immigrants "go back" are not brand-new phenomena created by the internet. Historically, earlier waves of immigrants have routinely allied with native-born locals to pull up the ladder behind them, targeting newer arrivals and undocumented immigrants.
- Over the 30 years following Reform and Opening-up, Chinese immigration surged dramatically, creating pronounced generational cohorts.
- Immigrant outcomes are heavily dictated by the specific U.S. state (primarily New York and California) and the timing of national economic cycles.
- Generational downward mobility is an anxiety shared across older European immigrant communities, such as Italian-Americans, not just recent Asian arrivals.
---
[12:10](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zn1c4RI2Hfw&t=730s) "National Destiny" and the Infrastructure Contrast: Old Empires vs. The Latecomer
The conversation pivots to the broader concept of "national destiny" (国运) and how perceptions of power have shifted. One speaker candidly admits his longstanding tendency to "admire foreign things," yet notes that overseas Chinese have become visibly more patriotic and confident as China's global standing has risen. Recalling his initial visits to the United States, he remembers being shocked to find that American locations of well-known international hotel brands were rundown and dated compared to their pristine, brand-new counterparts in China. Driving across the vast American expanse, he was struck by how much of the country felt like a desolate "wilderness," where highways outside of mega-cities like New York were lined with dilapidated metal shacks.
The panel frames this contrast through the lens of developmental timing. Western nations are "old empires" whose foundational infrastructure was built decades or even a century ago. Britain was constructing its underground transit network during the late Qing Dynasty; New York was opening subway lines around the time of the 1911 Xinhai Revolution; and the U.S. built out its interstate highways and international airports during the 1970s while China was in the throes of the Cultural Revolution. China, by contrast, is a latecomer whose modern takeoff occurred over the last 20 to 30 years through its "second modernization." Latecomers naturally possess newer, flashier hardware.
One speaker recounts visiting Europe during the U.S. presidential election. Arriving in Paris, he felt the city had degraded significantly compared to ten years prior, noting with some humor that certain areas now felt chaotic and crowded, resembling the environs outside the Beijing railway station. The consensus is that the West hasn't necessarily collapsed overnight; rather, China's rapid transformation has completely recalibrated travelers' expectations.
---
[13:49](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zn1c4RI2Hfw&t=829s) Human-Scale Convenience vs. Dazzling Scale: From Berlin Airport to Beijing Nightlife
The speakers delve into specific everyday comparisons between European and Chinese urban environments, focusing on the stark differences in airport and nightlife design. One guest recounts a recent departure from Berlin: after clearing security, he eagerly looked around for a sprawling duty-free shopping mall, only to find nothing more than a lone boarding gate and a tiny convenience store. "This is Berlin?" he asked in disbelief. A similar dynamic emerged when local European friends took them to popular nightclubs; the speaker looked at the modest venue and jokingly wondered, "Is this a nightclub in Huairou?" He points out that Beijing's mega-clubs now boast world-class lighting, sound systems, and lavish interiors that far outstrip European venues, with the only real difference being the patrons inside and the Western music being played.
```mermaid
flowchart LR
accTitle: Infrastructure Philosophy: West vs. China
accDescr: Diagram comparing the legacy human-scale model of European infrastructure with the modern mega-scale model of China.
subgraph WestModel["Legacy Western Infrastructure (e.g., Berlin)"]
W1["Human-Scale / Compact"] --> W2["Fast Transit to City Center"]
W2 --> W3["Minimalist Amenities & Aged Hardware"]
W3 --> W4["Rooted Lifestyle Security"]
end
However, another panelist mounts an immediate defense of European infrastructure. He argues that older facilities like Berlin's airport are actually fantastic precisely because of their compact, human-centric scale. Instead of traversing cavernous terminals, passengers step off the plane, immediately clear the gate, and find themselves right inside the city without having to drive or sit on an express train for hours.
The speakers acknowledge that their changing perceptions reflect an evolving mindset. Earlier in their travels, they generously interpreted peeling paint and aged architecture as "European charm" and deep historical culture, contrasting it favorably with China’s "nouveau-riche" fixation on glitz. Today, however, that romantic veneer has worn off, leaving many Western facilities looking merely worn-out, neglected, and outdated.
- Western infrastructure timelines: British subways date back to the late Qing period; New York subways to the 1910s; U.S. interstates and airports to the 1970s (40–50 years old).
- Chinese airports, commercial hubs, and nightlife venues represent cutting-edge modern hardware, creating a striking visual contrast with legacy European hubs.
- Compact European airports trade commercial grandeur for practical speed and immediate proximity to downtown city centers.
---
[16:03](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zn1c4RI2Hfw&t=963s) The Dilemma of Progress: Systemic Security, Cultural Sensitivity, and Hyper-Efficiency
The panel examines why aging, "worn-out" Western societies can still offer an underlying psychological comfort that ultra-modern China often lacks. A panelist suggests that the physical age of Western cities is anchored in a long-standing, predictable social system and a lifestyle refined over generations. While Chinese youth today enjoy peerless material abundance and futuristic cities, they frequently suffer from an acute sense of insecurity, anxiety, and instability because the underlying societal systems are still evolving at breakneck speed.
This triggers a frank exchange about public discourse and nationalism. One speaker admits he feels hesitant to openly praise foreign systems or express admiration for human-centric European airports in Berlin, the Netherlands, or Brussels:
> "Nationalism. We like to hear that we are the best... I just don't dare to. There are many things I don't dare to say anymore."
He explains that popular discourse has been reduced to a crude binary of "new versus old," where China automatically wins on hardware. On a personal level, he insists he actively dislikes Beijing Capital Airport's massive Terminal 3, preferring the older, smaller Terminal 2 or even the original Terminal 1 from the early Reform and Opening-up era, instructing travel bookers: "Do not book Terminal 3." What an individual values—grandeur and novelty versus human-scale convenience—is ultimately subjective.
To illustrate how hardware shapes perceptions, a speaker shares a story about a Chinese couple in Vancouver whose second-generation, Canada-born child visited Shanghai. Expecting the child to appreciate North American suburban life, the parents were stunned when the child was completely dazzled by Shanghai’s futuristic skyscrapers, returning with the firm conviction that China was immensely more powerful and prosperous than Canada. This represents an astonishing reversal from thirty years ago, when visitors from Hong Kong and Taiwan visited mainland China only to complain about dim, dingy airports and the lack of hot water for showers.
The segment concludes by examining the dizzying rise of domestic service efficiency. While China was once synonymous with bureaucratic inertia and sluggish service, it has transformed into a hyper-efficient society where anything can be delivered to one's doorstep in minutes—a level of convenience that outstrips even Hong Kong or Western capitals. Yet this efficiency carries a poignant human cost. A speaker recounts ordering food delivery in Beijing and clicking the app's "urge delivery" button when his meal was slightly delayed. When the delivery driver finally arrived at his door out of breath, the worker apologized profusely and repeatedly: "I'm so sorry, there was a traffic jam, I tried my best, I was rushing as hard as I could." The speaker was left feeling deeply conflicted by a hyper-efficient system that exacts such intense pressure from everyday workers.
[37:44](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zn1c4RI2Hfw&t=2264s) "Slash Youth" vs. Moonlighting: Survival Instinct or Personal Pursuit?
The dialogue begins with reflections on culture and social decorum, noting how living within an unfamiliar language environment and community overseas provides a point of comparison that reshapes a person's demeanor—returning children often seem noticeably well-mannered. Yet this observation prompts a broader social question: no matter how rapidly an economy expands or how tall skyscrapers grow, personal refinement seems harder to cultivate than material wealth. The speakers contrast this with China in the 1980s, an era when the public's hunger to improve personal income was completely unstoppable. Back then, "moonlighting" (走穴 / 搞副业) became the defining buzzword of the decade. Because state-run workplaces and *danwei* strictly forbade outside work, employees had to find side income secretly on the sly—a practice akin to the Hong Kong notion of taking on part-time shifts.
This historical hustle mirrors today’s gig economy, where office workers clock off from their day jobs only to jump straight onto electric motorbikes to deliver takeout and parcels late into the night. This contrast highlights two fundamentally different realities: one driven by basic survival, and the other by personal fulfillment. The panel unpacks how modern buzzwords like "slash youth" (斜杠青年) have become blurred with mundane side hustles, moonlighting, job-hopping, and boundary-crossing. While a true "slash" lifestyle is romanticized as earning a living through diverse personal passions and operating across distinct social and professional circles, for countless working-class people, working multiple jobs is merely a grueling requirement to make ends meet.
- In the 1980s, unauthorized side jobs were heavily restricted by work units, forcing workers to moonlight covertly to improve household finances.
- In Hong Kong terminology, taking on ad-hoc side hustles is commonly termed "part-time" or freelance work (*chao saan* / 炒散).
- The discussion draws a clear line between necessity-driven secondary labor (such as office workers doing food delivery at night) and authentic "slash" identity driven by self-actualization.
[40:07](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zn1c4RI2Hfw&t=2407s) The Fragmentation of Crossover Startups and the Art of "Always Giving Up"
Reflecting on personal entrepreneurial ventures, one of the speakers recalls the exhausting, fractured reality of running a startup. Far from feeling like an empowered, multifaceted "slashie," the daily experience felt like being ripped between parallel universes. In running an independent publishing house, the daytime was consumed by the grit of practical commerce: dealing with print shop bosses, coordinating with factory laborers, and forcing oneself to master technical minutiae like ink viscosity and paper weights. Only late at night could the speaker retreat into writing and literature—a stark psychological shift from corporate survival to creative solitude.
```mermaid
flowchart TD
accTitle: The Slash Lifestyle vs Real Startup Fragmentation
accDescr: Contrasts romanticized multihyphenate identity with the reality of entrepreneurial trade-offs and letting go.
subgraph Romanticized["The Romanticized 'Slash'"]
A["Single Individual"] --> B["Pursuing Multiple Passions"]
B --> C["Creative Balance & Broad Circles"]
end
subgraph Reality["The Entrepreneurial Reality"]
D["Daytime: Business Grind"] --> E["Printing, Ink, Supply Chains"]
F["Nighttime: Solitary Craft"] --> G["Writing & Literature"]
E -.->|"Parallel Universes"| G
H["The Hardest Decision"] --> I["Refusing a Predictable Path"]
I --> J["Letting Go / Giving Up ('舍弃')"]
end
```
This leads to a sharper philosophical definition of the "slash" identity: it cannot simply mean having a collection of experiences. Rather, it requires the conscious determination to refuse a singular, specialized, predictable corporate trajectory. An individual might build a publishing venture that could comfortably carry them through their thirties and forties, yet choose to walk away simply because success along a single track feels "not enough." As the speakers observe, when people are young, they assume the hardest task in life is making a choice—choosing a career, a role model, or a book. With age, however, it becomes clear that the hardest part of life is not choosing, but giving up (舍弃) and intentionally letting go of secure achievements. This prompts mutual laughter around a self-deprecating motto from earlier broadcasting days: while motivational posters urged people to "Never give up," the host had placed a cynical question mark after it and scribbled "Always give up."
- Running a boutique publishing business required operating across two disconnected worlds: blue-collar printing factories by day, and solitary literary composition by night.
- True multihyphenate identity is framed not by dabbling, but by possessing the courage and financial agency to walk away from an established, predictable career path.
- The panel concludes that the defining struggle of maturity shifts from the difficulty of *making choices* to the emotional burden of *giving things up*.
[42:40](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zn1c4RI2Hfw&t=2560s) Grassroots Business Wisdom: Tao Huabi's Guerilla Pragmatism and Xu Xiaoping
The conversation shifts into a seminar on the raw temperament of Chinese entrepreneurship, highlighting a stark reality of human nature: "When you are weak and small, you have many enemies; when you are powerful, you have many friends." This dynamic is epitomized by Tao Huabi, the unlettered founder of Lao Gan Ma (老干妈) chili sauce. When she first launched her business, she faced relentless intimidation and bullying from local thugs. Instead of capitulating, she fought back with feral ferocity, famously declaring: "I’m going to fight it out. Even if I face a bandit, I will fight you to the end. If you want to kill me, I want to kill you too."
The speaker points out that Tao Huabi's operating philosophy would never find a place in elite Western MBA textbooks or Harvard Business School case studies, yet authentic Chinese entrepreneurs were forged precisely through this unvarnished, bloody struggle. Western theory routinely fails to capture the visceral realities of China's economic ascent. This contrast is illustrated by ZhenFund founder Xu Xiaoping:
- Xu Xiaoping openly cited Tao Huabi as the entrepreneur he revered most across China.
- While Xu could easily arrange meetings in Shenzhen with tech giants like Ren Zhengfei of Huawei—even giving lectures on Huawei's campus—he was repeatedly rebuffed by Tao Huabi.
- Xu only reconciled his bruised ego after discovering that Tao Huabi consistently refused audiences with provincial governors and municipal mayors; she agreed to meet only grassroots village chiefs and individuals capable of directly solving immediate production or supply problems.
Tao Huabi rejected lofty corporate rhetoric and theoretical posturing, living out Goethe's famous maxim (frequently cited by Engels): theory is perpetually gray, but the tree of practical life remains ever green.
[44:22](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zn1c4RI2Hfw&t=2662s) The Shenzhen Miracle: From Luohu Hillside to Surpassing Hong Kong
The discussion turns to the sheer speed of China's economic transformation, using Shenzhen as the supreme benchmark. In 1980, Shenzhen was little more than a string of rural fishing hamlets administered under Bao'an County; today, it stands as an unprecedented miracle in global urban development. A pivotal moment in this trajectory occurred during Deng Xiaoping’s 1992 Southern Tour (*Nanxun*). Upon arriving in Shenzhen, Deng stood atop a hillside at the Luohu checkpoint, gazing out across the border at Hong Kong through a cold drizzle. Guangdong provincial officials later recalled standing beside him in absolute silence, none daring to step forward to hold an umbrella over the aging leader for fear of interrupting his thoughts. For five or six minutes, Deng stared fixedly into the mist at the Hong Kong skyline.
Deng's cherished wish was to set foot on Hong Kong soil after its historic handover in July 1997, a milestone he missed by only months when he passed away in February 1997. Yet Shenzhen’s subsequent explosion repaid Deng’s expectations on a staggering scale:
- At the outset of reform, Shenzhen's total economic output stood at approximately 1/500th of Hong Kong's.
- By 2018, Shenzhen's GDP officially overtook Hong Kong's economy.
- In strategic national planning, the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area evolved from having Hong Kong as its sole core engine to a dual-engine architecture anchored by Shenzhen, with Beijing designating Shenzhen as a global benchmark for innovation and competitiveness.
- The speaker critiques regional protectionism, citing how the Hong Kong-Zhuhai-Macao Bridge was constructed without a direct link to Shenzhen out of competitive fear, arguing that attempting to sideline Shenzhen is entirely futile given its momentum.
This transformation fulfills a prophetic statement made in 1977 by Xi Zhongxun, then First Secretary of Guangdong. When confronted with the rampant waves of mainlanders risking their lives to flee across the border into British Hong Kong (*taogang chao* / 逃港潮), Xi asserted: "We must build our mainland better, so they come running to our side." What seemed unimaginable in the late 1970s has materialized into a reality where mainland economic dynamism draws cross-border traffic in reverse.
[47:18](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zn1c4RI2Hfw&t=2838s) Huawei in the "No-Man's Land" and Modern China's Two-Century Arc
The narrative turns to technological sovereignty and the high-stakes position of Chinese tech pioneers, specifically Huawei. Citing industry metrics, the speaker notes that Huawei's foundational telecommunications infrastructure surpassed American competitors like Cisco by roughly three years, and European rivals like Ericsson and Nokia by around five years. Yet this very dominance introduces a terrifying strategic vulnerability: Huawei has officially ventured into what company leadership terms a "no-man's land" (*wu ren qu* / 无人区).
```mermaid
flowchart LR
accTitle: The Catch-Up Phase vs The No-Mans Land Dilemma
accDescr: Shows the shift from following industry benchmarks to navigating uncharted territory alone.
subgraph Past["The Catch-Up Era"]
A["Western Industry Leaders"] -->|"Set the Pace & Standards"| B["Huawei Follows Track"]
end
subgraph Present["The 'No-Man's Land' Era"]
C["Huawei Out in Front"] -->|"No Map / No Track"| D["Uncharted Frontier"]
E["Global Competitors"] -->|"Following Behind"| C
end
```
In the catch-up era, the path forward was straightforward: Chinese firms simply sprinted behind established foreign benchmarks. Now, with no one ahead to set the pace or clear the trail, and with competitors trailing behind, Huawei faces the profound existential crisis of having to invent the future and chart its own course without a map.
The speaker frames this industrial milestone within China's grand historical macro-cycle spanning two centuries:
1. **The Century of National Salvation (1840–1949):** A hundred-year struggle against collapse sparked by the First Opium War, where pioneering Southern leaders led successive movements to preserve the nation—Lin Zexu's opium destruction at Humen, Hong Xiuquan's Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, Zeng Guofan's Self-Strengthening Movement, Kang Youwei's Hundred Days' Reform, Sun Yat-sen's 1911 Xinhai Revolution, and Mao Zedong's New Democratic Revolution.
2. **The Century of Rejuvenation (1949–Present):** A hundred-year phase dedicated to modernization, technological frontier leadership, and national revitalization, where progress is forged not through theoretical cynicism, but through the hard labor, sweat, and entrepreneurial breakthroughs currently playing out on the front lines.
[48:16](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zn1c4RI2Hfw&t=2896s) Two Centuries of Transformation: Salvation to Rejuvenation
The overarching historical trajectory of modern China is framed by two distinct century-long missions. For the first century leading up to 1949, the entire driving force of the Chinese people was distilled into three words: "Save China" (救亡图存). While that national salvation mission was initiated across generations before the Communist Party, it was the founding of New China in 1949 that brought that century of struggle to a close and launched the next century-long endeavor: developing China and achieving national rejuvenation, spanning from 1949 to 2049. Both centuries were defined by extreme hardship and the sacrifices of multiple generations, but today those efforts have produced unprecedented global shifts.
```mermaid
flowchart LR
accTitle: China's Economic Ascent Timeline
accDescr: Progression of China surpassing major global economies based on the Denver University model.
subgraph S1["Initial Rise"]
Y1971["1971: Top 16"] --> Y1990s["Late 1990s: Canada & Brazil"]
end
subgraph S2["Overtaking Europe"]
Y1998["1998: Surpasses Italy (Top 5)"] --> Y2000["2000: Surpasses France (Top 4)"]
Y2000 --> Y2004["2004: Surpasses Germany (Top 3)"]
end
subgraph S3["Global Tier"]
Y2010["2010: Surpasses Japan (No. 2)"] --> Y2028["2028 Projection: Surpasses US"]
Y2028 --> Y2049["2049 Projection: $48T vs $27T"]
end
S1 --> S2
S2 --> S3
```
To illustrate this rise, the speaker presents a long-term global economic growth model developed by the University of Denver using World Bank data, mapping economic performance from 1960 all the way to 2099. In the 1960s, China was entirely absent from the upper ranks, failing to even place among the top six economies. By 1971, China finally entered the top 16. Following the launch of reform and opening up, alongside seismic geopolitical shifts like the dissolution of the Soviet Union, China accelerated dramatically, systematically leapfrogging established powers in a way Western observers perceived as "cutting in line" and ignoring the established queue of global hierarchy:
- **1990s**: Overtook Canada to enter the global top ten, followed by surpassing Brazil into the top seven and the United Kingdom into the top six.
- **1998**: Surpassed Italy to enter the top five.
- **2000**: Surpassed France to enter the top four.
- **2004**: Surpassed Germany to claim the number three spot.
- **2010**: Surpassed Japan to become the second-largest economy in the world.
---
[50:20](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zn1c4RI2Hfw&t=3020s) Economic Trajectories, American Anxiety, and the Value of an Opponent
Addressing contemporary geopolitical friction, the speaker dismisses claims that the United States was provoked merely by Chinese promotional films like *Amazing China* or domestic industrial policies like *Made in China 2025*. What truly alarmed Washington was the unyielding, quantifiable speed of China's growth—figures derived not from Chinese propaganda, but from American institutional models. Based on real historical data through 2017 and predictive simulations factoring in demographic talent, resources, and structural capacity through 2099, the model projects China surpassing the United States around 2028, fulfilling key milestones set during the 18th and 19th National Congresses.
Looking out to the centennial of the People's Republic of China in 2049, the model projects China's economic output to reach approximately $48 trillion compared to the United States' $27 trillion—a projected lead exceeding $20 trillion. Over the same long horizon, the projection shows the United States falling behind China while being forced to confront a rapidly ascending India from behind.
Reflecting on this geopolitical rivalry, the speaker offers a philosophical conclusion: "Small success requires friends. Great success requires an opponent." Achieving ordinary progress requires cooperative partners, but true national rejuvenation requires a formidable rival. External pressure prevents complacency, exposes institutional shortcomings, forces rapid self-correction, and serves as an indispensable catalyst for growth:
- External hostility serves as a forcing function, compelling China to examine internal weaknesses and build resilient countermeasures.
- Living through this era of dramatic shifts in the balance of power makes the current generation both eyewitnesses and active builders of a once-in-a-century transformation.
- The United States, by treating China as an adversary, has inadvertently accelerated China's trajectory into a rival it cannot easily overcome.
---
[53:05](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zn1c4RI2Hfw&t=3185s) Student Q&A: National Sensitivity and the 'Sick Man of East Asia'
The lecture transitions into an interactive question-and-answer session with an energized student audience. A student steps forward, deeply stirred by the lecture's theme of transitioning "from the Sick Man of East Asia to National Rejuvenation." The student recounts a personal anecdote from a summer academic research trip abroad: while working in a laboratory alongside an Italian peer, the Italian playfully teased him during an experiment, calling him "weak."
To the Italian student, the comment was a throwaway joke about physical exertion. To the Chinese student, however, the word "weak" immediately triggered associations with the historic, humiliating label "Sick Man of East Asia" (东亚病夫). Angered, the student lashed out: "I am better than you, because you are a stupid Italian." The Italian colleague was visibly bewildered, hurt, and bewildered, having had no malicious historical intent.
Reflecting on the confrontation, the student poses a dual dilemma to General Jin:
- Why do many Westerners still cling to deep-seated condescending stereotypes about Chinese people?
- Are modern Chinese youth suffering from historical hypersensitivity, prone to overreacting defensively to casual banter?
---
[54:27](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zn1c4RI2Hfw&t=3267s) The 2008 Pentagon Delegation Incident: Dignity, Reciprocity, and Inner Strength
Responding to the student's dilemma, General Jin emphasizes that in cross-cultural and diplomatic engagements, one must vigilantly avoid two opposite extremes: being overly hypersensitive on one hand, and being completely insensitive or spineless on the other. True dignity is neither petty emotional outbursts nor passive submission; it is grounded, reciprocal boundary-setting. To illustrate this, Jin recounts a high-stakes protocol clash from 2008, when he accompanied the General serving as President of the PLA National Defense University (NDU) on an official military delegation visit to the United States.
```mermaid
flowchart TD
accTitle: Protocol Incident and Reciprocal Resolution
accDescr: Escalation and resolution of the 2008 Chinese military delegation security incident in the US.
subgraph Dispute["Protocol Breach"]
A["TSA subjects PLA General delegation to SSSS search & window isolation"]
B["US Attachés claim DHS and DoD are 'separate systems'"]
A --> B
end
subgraph Pushback["Diplomatic Counter-pressure"]
C["Jin Yinan threatens reciprocal 'separate system' airport checks for US generals in China"]
D["US naval attaché offers 2 token gifts; Jin rejects them demanding formal institutional report"]
B --> C
C --> D
end
subgraph Resolution["Formal Apology"]
E["One month later: Bilateral Defense Working Meeting in Beijing"]
F["US Assistant Secretary of Defense opens session with formal state apology"]
D --> E
E --> F
end
```
Upon attempting to board their domestic flights, the PLA General and his delegation were stripped of diplomatic courtesy by airport security:
- Delegates were forced to remove their belts and submit to exhaustive, aggressive luggage searches.
- Their boarding passes were stamped with "four A's" (the SSSS selectee designation), isolating every Chinese officer in window seats next to American passengers, barring them from sitting together.
- Because the NDU President did not speak fluent English, Jin attempted to sit beside him to assist with communication, but security officials barked: "No, you must sit in the back."
Furious, Jin sought out the accompanying U.S. Naval and Air Force Attachés, who had actively avoided eye contact and tried to hide. Confronting them directly, Jin demanded how a delegation of senior foreign generals could be treated with such indignity. The attachés deflected blame, claiming the Department of Homeland Security operated entirely independently of the Department of Defense. Jin countered immediately: "Our airport security and our military are also two separate systems. We will also treat your generals with the same 'separate system' treatment when they visit China in the future." Alarmed by the prospect of American flag officers being publicly searched at Chinese airports, the attachés promised to escalate the complaint.
The following morning, the assistant naval attaché arrived with two small presentation boxes, hoping to sweep the dispute under the rug: "This one is for General Wang, and this is for you. Two small gifts, please let it go." Jin flatly rejected the gifts:
- "First, we represent six people. If you're giving gifts, you should give six. Giving two is meant for whom?"
- "Second, we expect a formal response, not just ending it with gifts." Jin demanded that the protest be officially recorded with the Pentagon.
The stand bore fruit. One month later, during a formal China-U.S. defense ministry working meeting in Beijing regarding maritime conflict avoidance mechanisms, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense immediately interrupted the planned agenda to make a statement: "The U.S. side would like to formally apologize to China regarding the incident one month ago involving the President of the National Defense University; our handling was inappropriate, and we formally apologize. We guarantee that similar issues will not happen again in the future."
Jin concludes that rights are neither granted as charity nor won by childish insults. When faced with slights, one should not lose emotional control or shout insults like calling an opponent "stupid," but rather demand respect through measured, reciprocal strength: "If you treat me this way, I will treat you that way—an eye for an eye." Even when national power is still developing, matching the other side with equal inner confidence and institutional resolve is what commands genuine respect on the world stage.
[57:50](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zn1c4RI2Hfw&t=3470s) Aerospace Dreams, Visa Roadblocks, and Robot-Assisted Dental Implants
Following up on a student’s reflection about confidence and self-defense, Jin Yinan takes a question from Lu Haoyi, an aerospace engineering sophomore. Lu explains that he had hoped to pursue his studies at Purdue University—the American alma mater of China’s "Two Bombs, One Satellite" pioneers Deng Jiaxian and Liang Sili—but was thwarted by visa restrictions under the tense international climate. Lu asks whether, in this geopolitical environment, young scholars should remain in China or continue seeking opportunities to study abroad to advance the nation’s aerospace capabilities.
In response, Jin Yinan offers an unexpected medical analogy from his personal life. Having recently needed a dental implant—which he jokes is essentially "getting a third set of teeth in your life"—he found the waitlists in Beijing unbearably long and traveled instead to the Fourth Military Medical University in Xi'an. The university president reflected on the evolution of Chinese dentistry: thirty or forty years ago, the country lagged decades behind global standards. Today, however, the institution performs robot-assisted dental implants. Foreign peers initially dismissed the achievement as fake because no one else had automated the process. International skepticism finally melted after a 2017 BBC feature and a subsequent report in *The New York Times*. Because the oral cavity is narrow and forcing patients to hold their mouths open is painful, robotic probes can navigate the space with immense precision. Jin points out that the Fourth Military Medical University reached this frontier precisely because of relentless international exchange with leaders like Sweden (the pioneer of implants), the United States, and Japan. He strongly urges students never to shut their doors, emphasizing that China must stay connected to the cutting edge and absorb foreign expertise to fuel domestic growth.
- **Lu Haoyi's Dilemma**: Sophomore studying aerospace engineering, blocked by U.S. visa restrictions from attending Purdue University (alma mater of Deng Jiaxian and Liang Sili).
- **The Xi'an Dental Breakthrough**: The Fourth Military Medical University developed autonomous robot-assisted dental implants, authenticated globally after coverage by the BBC in 2017 and *The New York Times*.
- **The Core Lesson**: Progress comes from "exchange and opening up." Jin urges students: "Get close to the cutting edge whenever possible. Learn as much as you can, fully exert Chinese learning, and make full use of it."
---
[01:00:16](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zn1c4RI2Hfw&t=3616s) Immigration, Diaspora, and the Jewish Example of Spiritual Cohesion
A student raises the contentious subject of emigration, asking whether the popular domestic accusation that "once you emigrate, you are no longer patriotic" holds water. The student notes that overseas Chinese frequently mobilize spontaneous protests and relief donations whenever the motherland faces natural disasters or geopolitical criticism. Jin Yinan rejects the blanket stigma against immigrants, arguing that ordinary citizens should have complete freedom to move if they have the desire and the means.
Jin reinterprets emigration not as a dispersal or weakening of the nation, but as expanding China's global presence: "Wouldn't it be great if there were Chinese people everywhere?" To illustrate how identity transcends physical borders, he points to the Jewish people. Exiled from their ancestral lands in the 1st and 2nd centuries and scattered across the globe for 1,800 years, the Jewish diaspora suffered the murder of six million people during the Holocaust. Despite lacking a sovereign state for millennia, their collective self-esteem and cultural coherence remained intact, culminating in the eventual rebirth of Israel. Jin asserts that as long as overseas Chinese remember their heritage and speak of their homeland, physical relocation does not sever their connection, expressing his hope that the Chinese nation maintains the same unbreakable spiritual cohesion across the globe.
---
[01:01:58](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zn1c4RI2Hfw&t=3718s) Cyber Sovereignty, Warfighting Spirit, and Lu Xun’s Friction
The Q&A rapidly moves through modern military theory and human agency. When asked about the role of online public opinion in warfare, Jin references two core tenets articulated by President Xi Jinping: without networkization there is no modernization, and without cybersecurity there is no national security. He emphasizes that personal liberty in cyberspace cannot be limitless; whenever individual freedom crosses the line into infringing upon others, it must be regulated and restrained.
Next, a student asks whether collective ideological willpower can still triumph in modern technological and information warfare, evoking the Chinese experience during the Korean War. Jin explains that while automated war machines have reduced the raw physical labor and brute-force bravery once demanded of soldiers, the human spirit cannot be made obsolete. A formidable military requires the seamless combination of high-tech modernization and unyielding mettle. Addressing another student on cultivating personal resilience in an era of material comfort, Jin cites Lu Xun’s maxim: "Dissatisfaction is the wheel of progress." He warns that comfortable, unchallenged environments breed stagnation, noting that because humans typically utilize only 12% to 13% of their brain capacity, young people must actively pursue intense intellectual collisions and friction to trigger their adrenaline and unlock their potential.
---
[01:03:42](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zn1c4RI2Hfw&t=3822s) The Pragmatism of Foreign Aid and Battlefield Proving Grounds
A student questions the necessity of China’s ongoing foreign aid to Third World nations, particularly when Western powers adopt self-centered "America First" stances and domestic critics complain about outbound capital. Jin dispels common internet and social media rumors regarding the sheer scale of Chinese aid, clarifying that China does not simply scatter money indiscriminately. Much of today's aid involves strategic conditions, sovereign loans, and repayments with interest.
To demonstrate how aid serves concrete national interests, Jin points to military aid provided to Pakistan. China delivered Z-10 attack helicopters to Pakistan free of charge for practical combat use. Because domestic Chinese forces did not have an active combat theater, Pakistani forces deployed the helicopters against ground targets and counter-terrorist operations, exposing critical operational flaws under battlefield stress. Pakistani feedback allowed Chinese engineers to immediately modify and upgrade the aircraft. Similarly, the deployment of the JF-17 Thunder fighter jet by the Pakistan Air Force—culminating in the reported shoot-down of an Indian MiG-21—turned the aircraft and its manufacturer, Chengdu Aircraft Industry Group, into an international commercial success, generating lucrative export interest from countries like Egypt. Jin concludes that Chinese aid is a calculated instrument of mutual benefit rather than reckless financial patronage.
```mermaid
flowchart TD
accTitle: Tactical and Commercial Loop of Chinese Military Aid
accDescr: Flowchart showing how military equipment aid to partner nations leads to battlefield testing, iterative engineering improvements, and global export deals.
subgraph Deployment ["1. Aid Deployment"]
A["Supply Military Hardware<br/>(e.g., Z-10 Helicopters, JF-17)"] --> B["Active Combat Operating Environment<br/>(e.g., Pakistan Counter-Terror Operations)"]
end
subgraph Feedback ["2. Iteration Loop"]
B --> C["Identify Flaws & Operational Defects Under Fire"]
C --> D["Direct Technical Feedback to Chinese Defense Engineers"]
D --> E["Rapid Modification & Hardware Upgrades"]
end
subgraph Commercial ["3. Strategic & Commercial Return"]
E --> F["Combat-Proven Track Record<br/>(e.g., JF-17 Shoots Down MiG-21)"]
F --> G["Enhanced Global Reputation<br/>(Chengdu Aircraft Industry Group)"]
G --> H["Increased International Arms Exports<br/>(e.g., Inquiries from Egypt & Others)"]
end
```
---
[01:05:38](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zn1c4RI2Hfw&t=3938s) Individual Liberation in Corporate Culture: Richard Yu and Ren Zhengfei
Addressing a question on whether the older generation’s ethos of self-sacrifice and collectivism clashes with modern youth’s quest for individuality and self-actualization, Jin argues that the pursuit of thought liberation is a universal human trait across all generations. To make his point, he recounts the rise of Richard Yu (Yu Chengdong), head of Huawei's Consumer Business Group.
Early in his career, Yu's headstrong mentor warned him: "Yu, your personality is not suited for government agencies. It's not suited for traditional enterprises either; you won't succeed there, so just stay in university and teach." Burdened with a fiercely individualistic "I am the only one who matters" temperament, Yu seemed unsuited for bureaucratic institutions until he walked into Huawei. Yu immediately fell in love with Huawei on his very first day: upon entering the office, he spotted a female employee doing a handstand in the corner and a young man lounging with his legs crossed, feet propped up higher than the desk. Seeing this unfiltered environment, Yu knew he had found his home. Jin explains that Yu flourished because Huawei's founder, Ren Zhengfei, tolerated his eccentricities. Even when Yu presented radical product ideas without exhaustive feasibility studies or concrete supporting data, Ren backed him unconditionally, telling him: "Old Yu, if you have an idea, I'll fund it."
[01:07:11](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zn1c4RI2Hfw&t=4031s) Intuition Over Bureaucracy: Cultivating Individuality and Innovation
Reflecting on how exceptional talent thrives under the right leadership, the speaker shares a telling anecdote about Yu [Yu Chengdong] and the environment that enabled his success. Yu admitted that what he loved most was receiving the mandate to simply take an idea and see if he could make it work. By his own admission, Yu’s creative process does not fit into traditional corporate molds: "I just have ideas; I can't produce a feasibility analysis or a 1-2-3-4-5 step-by-step plan. I just estimate it will work, and I have to feel my way across the river." Instead of forcing him to conform to rigid corporate rituals, his boss gave him the freedom and trust to test his hunches in real-time, letting him navigate uncharted waters through practical trial and error.
Drawing a broader lesson for modern society and corporate culture, the speaker argues that the genuine expression and release of individual personality remains one of the most powerful assets available. Rather than suppressing personal quirks, instincts, and bold impulses to fit bureaucratic expectations, the key challenge facing young people today is learning how to effectively harness and channel that distinct individuality into meaningful action.
- **Instinct over paperwork:** Yu's breakthrough style relied on intuitive judgment and rapid execution rather than exhaustive, predetermined five-step feasibility reports.
- **Managerial trust:** True innovation depends on leaders who grant leeway for talent to "feel their way across the river" rather than micro-managing the journey.
- **Advice for youth:** Young professionals should focus on channeling and releasing their unique personal drive constructively, as genuine personality is an indispensable asset that should not be suppressed.
## Notable quotes
> [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zn1c4RI2Hfw&t=0s) You guys are voting for Trump, you idiots! You don't understand at all. He's a man who wants to kick the Chinese out, yet Chinese people are still so happy for him. — 饶毅
> [42:40](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zn1c4RI2Hfw&t=2560s) I’m going to fight it out. Even if I face a bandit, I will fight you to the end. If you want to kill me, I want to kill you too. — 陶华碧
> [44:22](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zn1c4RI2Hfw&t=2662s) We must build our mainland better, so they come running to our side. — 习仲勋
> [50:20](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zn1c4RI2Hfw&t=3020s) Small success requires friends. Great success requires an opponent. — 金一南
> [54:27](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zn1c4RI2Hfw&t=3267s) Our airport security and our military are also two separate systems. We will also treat your generals with the same 'separate system' treatment when they visit China in the future. — 金一南
> [54:27](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zn1c4RI2Hfw&t=3267s) If you treat me this way, I will treat you that way—an eye for an eye. — 金一南
> [57:50](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zn1c4RI2Hfw&t=3470s) Get close to the cutting edge whenever possible. Learn as much as you can, fully exert Chinese learning, and make full use of it. — 金一南
> [01:01:58](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zn1c4RI2Hfw&t=3718s) Dissatisfaction is the wheel of progress. — 鲁迅
> [01:05:38](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zn1c4RI2Hfw&t=3938s) Old Yu, if you have an idea, I'll fund it. — 任正非
> [01:07:11](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zn1c4RI2Hfw&t=4031s) I just have ideas; I can't produce a feasibility analysis or a 1-2-3-4-5 step-by-step plan. I just estimate it will work, and I have to feel my way across the river. — 余承东
[0:00] 饶毅: You guys are voting for Trump, you idiots! You don't understand at all. He's a man who wants to kick the Chinese out, yet Chinese people are still so happy for him.
[19:34] 能不能再点一下那个催单键把它取消掉？
[34:54] 陈丹青: 我投降
[42:40] 陶华碧: I’m going to fight it out. Even if I face a bandit, I will fight you to the end. If you want to kill me, I want to kill you too.
[44:22] 习仲勋: We must build our mainland better, so they come running to our side.
[50:20] 金一南: Small success requires friends. Great success requires an opponent.
[54:27] 金一南: Our airport security and our military are also two separate systems. We will also treat your generals with the same 'separate system' treatment when they visit China in the future.
[54:27] 金一南: If you treat me this way, I will treat you that way—an eye for an eye.
[57:50] 金一南: Get close to the cutting edge whenever possible. Learn as much as you can, fully exert Chinese learning, and make full use of it.
[61:58] 鲁迅: Dissatisfaction is the wheel of progress.
[65:38] 任正非: Old Yu, if you have an idea, I'll fund it.
[67:11] 余承东: I just have ideas; I can't produce a feasibility analysis or a 1-2-3-4-5 step-by-step plan. I just estimate it will work, and I have to feel my way across the river.
Original transcript
[0:00] You were so popular and famous, but why
[0:02] did everyone, including Mr. A-Cheng and
[0:04] even Wang Shuo, go to the U.S. to live
[0:07] for a while? Why did you all head to
[0:09] the U.S. at roughly the same time?
[0:11] In China's first 30 years, people
[0:12] looked toward the Soviet Union, even if
[0:14] few could actually go there.
[0:16] After the Reform and Opening-up, people
[0:17] headed to the U.S. I really don't know
[0:19] how things turned out that way.
[0:20] What were you thinking at the time?
[0:22] My reason was simple: I just wanted to
[0:23] see the original works, very simple.
[0:25] Couldn't you just go as a tourist to
[0:26] see the original works?
[0:27] Back then, where would you even find
[0:29] tourism? Flights to the U.S. were rare,
[0:32] maybe once a week. Back then, it was
[0:35] all about the wave of studying abroad.
[0:38] Regarding my impression of the U.S. now
[0:40] —I've only been there twice as a
[0:42] tourist—but I'm starting to feel...
[0:45] Because of this election, I seem to
[0:48] have realized something. You see, a
[0:51] professor named Rao came on our show a
[0:54] while ago, and it practically exploded.
[0:57] It was mainly because his way of
[1:00] speaking was so... "politically correct
[1:03] ," right?
[1:03] At first, many people scolded him for
[1:06] speaking that way, hmm.
[1:07] But as the host, I started to
[1:09] understand him a bit. He was
[1:11] practically possessed, saying things
[1:13] like, "You guys are voting for
[1:15] Trump, you idiots! You don't understand
[1:17] at all. He's a man who wants to kick
[1:19] the Chinese out, yet Chinese people are
[1:21] still so happy for him." That group of
[1:23] people—because there’s nothing
[1:25] wrong with supporting the Republican
[1:26] Party, but you can't support a racist
[1:28] who opposes you. That is the problem
[1:30] with that group of Chinese. I'm just
[1:33] wondering, is the U.S. in decline? I
[1:36] feel that whenever we ask this question
[1:39] online, people used to ask whether
[1:41] their kids should study in the UK or
[1:43] the U.S. You've lived in both places,
[1:45] so it’s like asking, should we send
[1:48] the kids to study in the UK or the U.S.
[1:50] ?
[1:51] Even now, they say the U.S. still holds
[1:54] the largest stock of Chinese immigrants
[1:56] .
[1:57] Right.
[1:59] And according to a survey around 2014,
[2:01] the main destination for Chinese
[2:04] wishing to immigrate......was also the
[2:06] United States. Hmm.
[2:10] But do you think the U.S. is not doing
[2:12] so well right now?
[2:14] Yes, I believe so. I've watched the
[2:17] whole process. Look back 34 years ago
[2:20] when Reagan took office, it was a new
[2:22] era. The Vietnam War was over, the
[2:24] economy was in chaos, domestic civil
[2:26] rights movements had passed, and it
[2:28] returned to conservatism. At the same
[2:30] time, there was Thatcher in the UK, and
[2:32] especially during his tenure, the Cold
[2:34] War was nearly coming to an end. Once
[2:36] he paved the way, as soon as Bush took
[2:38] office, the events of 1990 happened.
[2:40] The Soviet Union was gone, just like
[2:43] that. It was completely different from
[2:46] today, but it was immediately followed
[2:48] by economic adjustments. I've been
[2:50] through several economic adjustments,
[2:52] I’ve forgotten them, but they talked
[2:54] about these adjustments openly, saying
[2:56] we’re entering an adjustment, which
[2:57] you could see in the market, and it
[2:59] immediately became a topic in every
[3:01] election.
[3:02] Then, most importantly, 9/11 happened
[3:04] unexpectedly after the turn of the new
[3:06] century. A new factor emerged; the Cold
[3:09] War was gone, and a unilateral world
[3:12] appeared. After 9/11, the focus shifted
[3:15] to counter-terrorism. So domestic
[3:17] issues were constantly sidelined;
[3:19] that’s why I witnessed everything
[3:21] from what they considered the glorious
[3:23] Reagan era to the heap of domestic and
[3:25] foreign problems we have today.
[3:27] So,
[3:29] No, but the election process itself,
[3:31] with all the commotion and arguments,
[3:33] and all the dramatic twists and turns,
[3:35] it’s like that every single time. So,
[3:38] I didn't use to care about elections; I
[3:40] didn't watch the programs.
[3:42] Then Xu, why do you feel you care this
[3:45] time?
[3:46] Well, it's everywhere online, and in my
[3:48] social circles, I have different
[3:50] Chinese friends living in the U.S.
[3:52] Their attitudes seem quite different.
[3:55] It feels like the Chinese people there
[3:56] are all at each other's throats.
[3:57] They are not the same. Those with
[4:00] relatively higher social status, for
[4:02] instance, those Chinese in the U.S. who
[4:04] have entered elite circles, hmm,
[4:07] they are absolutely dead set against
[4:10] Trump, refusing to support him at all,
[4:12] and even after he won, they showed
[4:15] looks of deep sorrow, which is so
[4:17] different from...
[4:21] It's completely different from the way
[4:23] ordinary Chinese people living there
[4:26] react. Completely different. This time,
[4:30] it seems the Chinese community actually
[4:33] organized things like planes and groups
[4:35] to go campaign, which must have cost a
[4:38] lot of money.
[4:40] And this time, I saw some surveys, and
[4:43] I learned a concept about Chinese in
[4:45] America, called the first generation,
[4:48] or what should we call it? Let's call
[4:51] them new immigrants, that's the first
[4:53] generation, but there is also another,
[4:55] called the 1.5 generation. What is the
[4:58] 1.5 generation? It refers to those who
[5:00] came to the U.S. as children; that’s
[5:02] the 1.5 generation, while the second
[5:03] generation are those who were born and
[5:05] raised in the U.S.
[5:06] And when looking at how they are doing,
[5:08] it turns out that the 1.5 generation
[5:10] has the highest per capita income.
[5:12] Hmm.
[5:13] It is the highest. Well, are you asking
[5:16] whether Chinese people are doing well
[5:18] or not in the U.S. now? Sola, do you
[5:20] have any insight? He
[5:23] Since I was there strictly under
[5:25] contract to pursue music, I didn't
[5:27] think much beyond that. But I lived
[5:29] through the Clinton era, and I know
[5:31] that, for example, in New York in the
[5:33] 90s, an incredible amount happened in
[5:36] the arts—like you asked, whether
[5:38] America was "finished," it was during
[5:40] the 90s.
[5:41] From 1993 onwards, the American art
[5:44] scene was at its most active. It’s
[5:47] like, from the hippie movement in the
[5:50] 60s all the way to the 90s, things kept
[5:52] rising and evolving, with all sorts of
[5:55] interesting people still around. But
[5:57] after 9/11, it suddenly felt like
[5:59] things took a downturn; it started to
[6:02] feel increasingly desolate because it
[6:05] became very hard for many things to
[6:07] happen. Plus, there's the issue of the
[6:09] wars the U.S. is involved in—the ones
[6:11] they started themselves, and all kinds
[6:13] of others. But honestly, when we were
[6:17] in the U.S. in the 90s, we were just
[6:20] small-time artists, or just small
[6:22] immigrants, so we didn't really know
[6:24] that wars were already breaking out
[6:27] everywhere—even back in the 90s. We
[6:31] were too far removed; we only saw the
[6:34] art and such, but in reality, at that
[6:36] time, with the wars in Serbia, the
[6:38] Middle East, and Africa, the U.S. was
[6:41] already involved in wars everywhere. So
[6:43] , I actually think perhaps the U.S. has
[6:46] been like this for many years—as
[6:48] Danqing said, it never really stopped.
[6:50] But there was a certain public
[6:52] sentiment back then, when we were there
[6:54] , because of what everyone now calls "
[6:56] political correctness"; no matter what,
[6:58] there was that political correctness
[7:00] acting as a buffer, so people of all
[7:02] ethnic groups there—even if things
[7:04] were chaotic outside—
[7:06] In that country, when all ethnic groups
[7:09] were together, you still had a sense of
[7:11] equality, because everyone knew they
[7:13] had to maintain that equal space. So,
[7:17] it is deeply saddening that this space
[7:19] for equality has finally been broken.
[7:22] And now, with people talking about
[7:24] things like a "Cultural Revolution," I
[7:27] think that's definitely a different
[7:29] matter entirely, but the sense of fear
[7:31] —
[7:31] But ever since Trump was elected,
[7:33] I’ve seen reports over the last
[7:34] couple of days about Chinese people
[7:36] actually being stopped on the street by
[7:38] people shouting, "F***you, Chinese, go
[7:40] back to your own country," as if
[7:41] they've gained some kind of authority.
[7:43] And you know what? A lot of people are
[7:46] actually doing it. Many people are now
[7:47] literally heading to the Mexican border
[7:49] to build the wall themselves, even
[7:50] before Trump has allocated the funds.
[7:52] Lots of Americans are saying, "I'll
[7:53] donate $ 5 million myself to build this
[7:56] wall and keep them out." So what I mean
[7:58] is, we’ve always had this particular
[8:00] fantasy about this number-one
[8:02] superpower. I think we could discuss a
[8:05] topic: Has the Chinese American Dream
[8:07] been shattered?
[8:08] Hmm.
[8:10] For me, back when you guys were all
[8:12] heading to America, we were just
[8:14] watching you. You were all major stars
[8:16] back home, and one by one, you left. To
[8:19] America. And do you remember that time,
[8:21] Jiang Wen? That TV series they filmed,
[8:24] "A Native of Beijing in New York," that
[8:26] was my window into that world. Growing
[8:28] up, I imagined that New York was
[8:30] simultaneously a heaven and a hell;
[8:32] I’ve always held onto that image.
[8:34] It's a myth, a total myth.
[8:37] I'll show you a clip from a film—
[8:39] it’s actually about New Oriental and
[8:42] the story of Minhong and his team. But
[8:45] in this English classroom scene, you
[8:47] can see how different Chinese people
[8:49] imagined America back then. Take a look
[8:52] .
[8:52] Racial discrimination in America will
[8:55] never disappear. If a white person sees
[8:59] three Black men enter an elevator, they
[9:01] will jump out the moment before the
[9:03] doors close. In the eyes of white
[9:06] people, Black people will always be
[9:08] seen as a lazy, ignorant, and barbaric
[9:11] race. So, surely Chinese people in
[9:13] America must be considered smart and
[9:15] hardworking, right? But they say the
[9:17] Chinese are stealing jobs from the
[9:20] locals. Teacher, have you ever been to
[9:23] America? You must have learned about
[9:26] America from books, right?
[9:27] That’s right, Teacher.
[9:29] Time is the only standard to judge the
[9:31] truth here.
[9:31] Where are you two from?
[9:33] The so-called American Dream is that,
[9:34] in the face of dreams, everyone has an
[9:36] equal opportunity. It's the only place
[9:38] in the world where that's possible.
[9:40] You are both still too young and naive.
[9:43] Teacher, I will definitely go to
[9:46] America to find out for myself. That's
[9:52] the clip. How do you feel after
[9:54] watching it?
[9:55] Neither side is entirely right. I think
[9:58] the American myth definitely exists for
[10:01] China because, since the Reform and
[10:03] Opening-up, everyone in China suddenly
[10:05] developed this fantasy about America, a
[10:07] myth that actually started around the
[10:09] time of World War II. During World War
[10:11] II, they helped China defeat the
[10:13] Japanese and occupied parts of the
[10:15] country for a time. So, from the
[10:17] previous generation down to ours, the
[10:19] image of America has always been there;
[10:20] it's just that after the reform and
[10:22] opening up, we were finally able to go,
[10:24] and in just 30 years, there were
[10:26] suddenly so many Chinese in America,
[10:28] leading to the "1.5 generation" and "
[10:29] first generation" issues you mentioned.
[10:31] Well, going back to what I said earlier
[10:34] , it doesn't have much to do with being
[10:36] 1.5 or first generation; it’s about
[10:38] what stage of America's national
[10:40] development each generation happened to
[10:42] encounter. If you hit a good economy,
[10:45] you get a good job and a bright future;
[10:47] if not, you're out of luck.
[10:49] Or which state the child happens to be
[10:51] in.
[10:51] And the reasons specific to that state.
[10:54] For Chinese people, it's mostly New
[10:56] York and California. It’s not just
[10:58] the Chinese; all immigrants are like
[11:00] this. We always focus on our own group,
[11:02] but actually, all immigrants are in the
[11:04] same situation. What is it? It’s
[11:06] simple. The year before last, my
[11:08] younger brother had a son, and I went
[11:09] to the hospital to wait for the birth.
[11:11] There, I was sitting next to an elderly
[11:14] Italian immigrant. He himself was a "
[11:16] 1.5 generation"—he came to the U.S.
[11:18] when he was young—and his child was
[11:20] second generation, and that second
[11:22] generation was already having children.
[11:24] He told me with great concern that the
[11:27] wages and job opportunities our
[11:29] generation had would never be available
[11:31] to his generation again, and he gave me
[11:34] many reasons why. But this wasn't the
[11:36] first time I'd heard that. So.
[11:39] And there's another issue, which is the
[11:41] racism you mentioned, people telling
[11:43] the Chinese to "go back." The various
[11:45] attitudes toward immigrants, like the
[11:47] messages revealed in Trump's rhetoric.
[11:49] It’s been happening since I went
[11:51] there. Those who arrive earlier always
[11:53] join the locals in wanting to deal with
[11:56] later immigrants and illegal immigrants
[11:58] ; it has always been like this.
[11:59] It has always been this way. So, our
[12:02] discussions about the U.S. seem like a
[12:04] new problem because of the internet and
[12:06] the growing number of Chinese there,
[12:08] but it's all an old problem. It’s
[12:10] always existed. But do you think there
[12:13] is such a thing as "national destiny"?
[12:16] Right, because I, you know, I admire
[12:18] foreign things, right? That's me, but
[12:20] lately, I've gradually felt that, just
[12:22] a couple of years ago, I heard that
[12:24] overseas Chinese are the most patriotic
[12:26] . As China grows stronger, you can
[12:27] clearly see that they are becoming less
[12:29] discouraged. I didn't really feel it at
[12:32] first, but I remember my first time in
[12:35] the U.S., I said, wow, why is this
[12:38] hotel of the same brand so run-down? In
[12:41] China, right, the same brand of hotel
[12:44] is brand new, you know? And then, as I
[12:46] traveled around the U.S., driving
[12:48] everywhere, I thought, this is a
[12:50] wilderness of a country. Honestly,
[12:52] except for a few major cities like New
[12:55] York, the roads are filled with these
[12:57] dilapidated metal shacks, a profound
[12:59] sense of desolation.
[13:00] An old industrial nation with old
[13:02] highways, old airports, and old train
[13:05] stations. In China now, we have all new
[13:08] airports. China is a latecomer; it only
[13:10] took off after its second modernization
[13:13] . Latecomers are always newer than old
[13:16] empires. However, for instance, when I
[13:18] found out about the U.S. election
[13:20] results, I was in Europe. This time I
[13:23] went, let's say I went to Paris
[13:25] recently, and I felt Paris was quite
[13:27] different from when I visited ten years
[13:30] ago; it’s a bit like the Beijing
[13:32] railway station, you know? There was
[13:34] even this one guy, who you could tell
[13:36] was an immigrant.
[13:37] It’s not so much that the West has
[13:39] changed, but that China has changed;
[13:40] primarily, China has changed. You see,
[13:43] China has become incredible. If you
[13:45] just compare airports, all the airports
[13:47] in China now are brand new.
[13:49] That's right, just this time, I flew
[13:51] back from that Berlin airport. I was
[13:54] thinking, after going through security
[13:57] and getting inside, I'd go to the
[13:59] duty-free shop to buy something. Once I
[14:02] got in,
[14:03] there was just the boarding gate, not
[14:04] even a duty-free shop, just a small
[14:06] convenience store. I said, this is
[14:08] Berlin? And then in London or wherever,
[14:11] I saw the same thing. Let me tell you,
[14:13] take these nightclubs, for example. Our
[14:15] local friends took us out, and after we
[14:17] went, I said, is this a nightclub in
[14:20] Huairou? You can't help it, right? Hey,
[14:22] they asked, where are the best
[14:24] nightclubs in the world now? Beijing.
[14:26] They say they are world-class, the
[14:28] lighting and everything, mm.
[14:30] The only difference is probably the
[14:32] people inside.
[14:33] I actually think that Berlin airport is
[14:35] great; it's an old airport, after all.
[14:37] You get off the plane and you're
[14:39] already in the city; it's so convenient
[14:40] , really.
[14:41] And don't you think it’s super fast
[14:43] to get in? You don’t have to drive or
[14:45] take a train for ages to get to the
[14:48] center. That’s why I think that
[14:50] Berlin airport is great; as soon as you
[14:52] arrive, you’ve basically entered the
[14:54] city. It just doesn't have all that
[14:57] complexity.
[14:57] During my last two trips to the West,
[15:00] even someone like me who tends to
[15:01] admire things abroad has started to
[15:03] feel differently. Before, I thought
[15:05] this was just European charm—that
[15:07] they had so much culture, unlike our
[15:10] own nouveau-riche ways. But now, some
[15:12] places just feel worn out and
[15:14] dilapidated. Including the service
[15:16] industry. For instance, in the past, we
[15:18] felt that China’s service sector
[15:19] wasn’t up to par, right? We assumed
[15:21] the West was better, but now I’ve
[15:22] realized that while Beijing has traffic
[15:24] jams and its own inconveniences, you
[15:26] can just stay home. You make a call,
[15:27] and they deliver everything—even in
[15:29] Hong Kong they don't have this—you
[15:30] just make a call and it’s at your
[15:32] door. It’s just, it’s just amazing.
[15:35] They are old empires, after all. Think
[15:37] about it: Britain already had a subway
[15:38] system back during China’s late Qing
[15:40] Dynasty. And by the time of the Xinhai
[15:42] Revolution, New York already had its
[15:44] subway. While China was going through
[15:46] the Cultural Revolution, they had
[15:47] already built their international
[15:49] airports and highways. Think about the
[15:51] timeline—that was the 70s, which is
[15:53] 40 or 50 years ago now. So naturally,
[15:56] things are going to be old, worn, and
[15:58] outdated. China has risen over these
[16:00] past 30 years, mainly in the last 20.
[16:02] But that sense of being old and worn
[16:04] out actually provides a kind of, a kind
[16:06] of security. Just now we skipped over
[16:08] the point about young people. You say
[16:10] our youth have everything today, it
[16:12] seems they have it all, but why do they
[16:14] feel less secure than the young people
[16:16] over there? It’s because that sense
[16:18] of being "old and worn" comes with a
[16:20] system, a way of life—a lifestyle
[16:22] that has been sustained over a long
[16:24] period, which gives you a certain
[16:25] feeling.
[16:26] I don’t really dare to agree with him
[16:28] on this topic. Why?
[16:30] Nationalism. We like to hear that we
[16:32] are the best.
[16:33] I wasn’t talking about nationalism, I
[16:35] was talking about the foreign side.
[16:37] Of course, I think the airports in
[16:38] Berlin, the Netherlands, and Brussels
[16:40] are all excellent—very human-centric
[16:41] airports.
[16:42] But I don't really dare to say such
[16:44] things now.
[16:44] Why?
[16:45] We can only compare the old with the
[16:47] new. If we are talking about what's new
[16:49] , China is the newest. Why wouldn't you
[16:50] dare to say the Berlin airport is good?
[16:52] I just don’t dare to. There are many
[16:54] things I don't dare to say anymore. You
[16:55] can talk about Terminal 2 or Terminal
[16:57] 3. When I fly, I prefer arriving at
[16:59] Terminal 2.
[17:00] Mhm.
[17:01] It's more convenient to pick people up.
[17:03] Mhm. Mhm.
[17:04] I even like Terminal 1 more, the very
[17:06] first airport from the early days of
[17:08] Reform and Opening-up.
[17:10] That is my favorite airport. I tell
[17:12] everyone who books my tickets: do not
[17:15] book Terminal 3.
[17:16] But this is just a kind of, what you
[17:18] consider to be "good" actually depends
[17:20] on your own values, but
[17:21] it’s an endless debate. Your, your
[17:25] values.
[17:26] For instance, I once went to Vancouver,
[17:28] and I found the people in Canada quite
[17:30] interesting.
[17:31] A couple in Vancouver told me, their
[17:33] child was second-generation and born
[17:35] there, but once the child went back to
[17:38] Shanghai, well,
[17:39] wow, they felt that China is the one
[17:41] that's truly prosperous. Fine, we try
[17:44] to tell them, I say European towns
[17:46] don’t build skyscrapers, they’re
[17:48] all little old houses, quaint and old,
[17:50] how charming, but in the children's
[17:52] eyes, Shanghai is just dazzling.
[17:54] Right.
[17:55] They really feel that my motherland is
[17:57] much more powerful than where I am now.
[17:58] They really do have that feeling. Yes,
[18:00] exactly. China is changing too fast,
[18:03] extremely fast. Just 30 years ago, all
[18:05] my friends from Taiwan and Hong Kong I
[18:07] met in New York wanted to visit the
[18:09] mainland, but after coming, they
[18:11] couldn't stand it—the airport was dim
[18:13] , there was no hot water for showers,
[18:15] things like that. We never imagined
[18:17] back then that Chinese streets would be
[18:20] filled with cars and traffic jams.
[18:22] Totally unthinkable, twenty years ago
[18:24] you couldn't even imagine it. Look, let
[18:27] me give you an example, and I used to
[18:30] say that for hardware,
[18:32] we’ve surpassed them, but now for
[18:34] software, like if you take the same
[18:36] kind of bar, the decor is far worse
[18:39] than in Beijing, but the only
[18:40] difference is the people inside and the
[18:42] music they play is Western.
[18:44] As I said just now, it's the details.
[18:46] This, this, this spirit.
[18:48] It’s not just about the music being
[18:50] Western, it's the details, the details.
[18:52] Just the details.
[18:53] But now I feel that China’s, for
[18:55] instance, this kind of service, you
[18:57] gradually start to feel that, whereas
[18:59] in the past, China was synonymous with
[19:01] low efficiency. But now I feel
[19:03] China’s efficiency is incredibly high
[19:05] , and this level of efficiency makes me
[19:08] feel a bit, well, you know, yesterday,
[19:10] usually in Beijing, I order food
[19:12] delivery.
[19:12] Ah, that, ordering a meal, getting it
[19:15] delivered.
[19:16] You know there’s that "urge delivery"
[19:18] button? Because it hadn't arrived yet.
[19:20] I, I, I clicked on that "urge delivery"
[19:22] option.
[19:23] Uh-huh. As it turned out, the delivery
[19:25] guy arrived at my door, handed it to me
[19:27] , and apologized intensely, saying "I'm
[19:29] so sorry, there was a traffic jam, I
[19:30] tried my best, I was rushing as hard as
[19:32] I could." I told him, "It's fine, it's
[19:34] fine, go on," and I felt so bad for him
[19:36] .
[19:36] A young man in his twenties. Wasn't he,
[19:39] wasn't there...
[19:40] Crying?
[19:41] I was in tears, I said, I said why, I
[19:42] said I'm not blaming you,
[19:44] He has to frame it as the system, maybe
[19:45] . No, seriously, delivery guy, can you,
[19:47] can you just click that "urge" button
[19:49] again to cancel it? What did I do? He
[19:51] said it costs me 300 yuan, he said
[19:53] because you urged me like that, 200 or
[19:55] 300. My goodness, the meal I ordered
[19:57] only cost a few dozen yuan, yeah,
[19:58] exactly.
[19:59] I just, I just feel, like, you say this
[20:00] is how the service industry can't do
[20:02] well, but doesn't this also reveal a
[20:03] kind of...
[20:04] Very interesting, very terrifying, yeah
[20:06] .
[20:06] Very wicked, forcing people into a kind
[20:08] of early-stage capitalism,
[20:09] This whip-cracking pace, right.
[20:11] Right. Tell me, Xu, if you could go
[20:15] back to the era they were in, would you
[20:17] want to go to America?
[20:19] Everyone nowadays...
[20:21] I, from the very beginning, never had
[20:24] that, never had the desire to go to
[20:26] America, or to live abroad, that kind
[20:28] of...
[20:28] That kind of inclination.
[20:31] Uh, visiting is fine, I think I'm still
[20:33] a conservative person; I haven't
[20:35] actually been to many countries, but
[20:38] the ones I like, I'll go back to
[20:40] several times. Yeah, exploring
[20:42] something brand new, I'd be scared. Ah,
[20:45] then you say, with people now flocking
[20:48] to study in the US, sending their
[20:50] children abroad, is this still a good
[20:52] approach? Is it definitely still good
[20:55] for the child?
[20:56] You, you have children in the US.
[20:59] I think, I think it is good. I don't
[21:02] care if you think this should or
[21:04] shouldn't be said, I think it's good to
[21:06] study abroad. Because our schoolwork
[21:09] here, to be honest, is extremely heavy,
[21:12] but the teaching lacks detail, that's
[21:14] the reality. From what I understand,
[21:16] right, so, there's, it's missing, it's
[21:19] missing a lot of things, and our kind
[21:21] of, our...Our teaching information is
[21:23] scarce, the information isn't fast, and
[21:25] then, teachers are relatively
[21:27] conservative, and because teachers are
[21:29] conservative, they put a lot of
[21:31] pressure on students, like you must
[21:33] seem to be completing things on the
[21:35] surface.
[21:35] Right, and then you don't actually
[21:37] learn the material. Because to really
[21:39] learn something, first of all, in the
[21:40] end, you won't even want to learn
[21:41] anymore, you'll actually feel sick,
[21:43] like you're going to throw up. Kids end
[21:44] up having a rebellious mentality if
[21:46] they keep studying like this, and the
[21:48] pressure is too great, it affects the
[21:50] children's health. I think because for
[21:52] children to grow, they need a, a
[21:54] healthy environment, a happy
[21:56] environment; the process of learning
[21:58] should be a happy one, so I think the
[22:00] current teaching methods here in China
[22:03] have major problems. And, and the
[22:05] research topics available are really
[22:07] too few; in universities, the specific
[22:09] research subjects are just too limited.
[22:12] Okay, so the next question is sending
[22:14] kids to study in the U.S., and now
[22:16] people still think that after finishing
[22:18] their studies, they should stay in the
[22:21] U.S. to live. Is this still a good path
[22:24] ?
[22:24] This has nothing to do with the U.S.;
[22:26] it’s about China’s mentality.
[22:29] It’s that on one hand, we keep trying
[22:31] to talk down the U.S., and it’s
[22:33] getting to the point where it sounds
[22:35] like it’s actually falling; on the
[22:37] other hand, this never really stopped.
[22:39] Currently, the number of Chinese
[22:41] students in the U.S. is the highest.
[22:43] More than 30 years ago when I went, it
[22:46] wasn't as high as Taiwan, nor as high
[22:48] as other countries, but 30 years later,
[22:50] China is at the top, and this trend
[22:52] won't stop.
[22:53] It’s that you guys go down
[22:55] There’s a reason why so many parents
[22:57] are willing to send them. Now they all
[22:59] pay their own way, hanging out in cafes
[23:02] and eating good food; it’s different
[23:04] from our generation of international
[23:06] students. They don't earn money, but
[23:08] they spend it. But look at this, why I
[23:12] met a kid in Germany this time who was
[23:15] born there, as his parents moved to
[23:17] Germany, so he grew up in Germany.
[23:19] What he is thinking now is that he is
[23:21] planning, he said, "I'm planning to go
[23:22] back to Beijing."
[23:23] Mmh.
[23:24] I asked why? He said this Europe is too
[23:27] boring, at least for a kid.
[23:29] Never mind Chinese kids, even
[23:30] Westerners now want to come to China to
[23:32] make a living; this situation is
[23:33] becoming more common.
[23:34] I think, I think after finishing their
[23:36] studies, they will come back to work.
[23:37] It started a long time ago. Yesterday,
[23:40] while accompanying my father from
[23:42] Gubeikou Water Town, I passed through
[23:44] Miyun County—it’s already a big
[23:46] city. It turns out the kindergarten
[23:48] teacher for the driver's child is from
[23:51] Canada. Just a kindergarten teacher in
[23:52] Miyun County—of course, it’s a
[23:54] high-end kindergarten—is already
[23:56] taught by a foreigner; there are even
[23:57] more foreign schools in Beijing. I have
[23:59] met many foreigners who have come to
[24:01] China to make a living. Their caliber
[24:04] isn't low either; China is already a
[24:06] place with great prospects. China just
[24:08] hasn't opened up its immigration policy
[24:10] , so the situation has changed a long
[24:12] time ago. Then, for example, if you
[24:14] were asked to go back to live in the
[24:15] U.S. now, would you still be interested
[24:17] ?
[24:17] I’d still be interested, I’d be
[24:19] willing. Like he said, it’s a very
[24:22] humane society, very quiet. Speaking of
[24:25] which, after this Trump election, do
[24:28] you still think it’s very reasonable?
[24:31] The long-term form a society has taken
[24:34] won't see major changes. It’s a
[24:36] situation above a certain baseline;
[24:38] there won't be major changes. But
[24:40] national policies will certainly change
[24:42] , the economy will change, the war
[24:43] situation, and the political landscape
[24:45] —all these will surely see major
[24:47] changes, yet they won't be too drastic.
[24:48] Every term, they promise, "When I take
[24:51] office, I will do this or that." But
[24:52] the changes are never that big. There
[24:55] are greater forces shaping America,
[24:56] whether it’s being talked down or
[24:58] whatever else, through and through. I
[25:00] don’t quite understand this, but
[25:02] speaking of national destiny, do you
[25:05] feel that America is slowly beginning
[25:07] to contract? Maybe we should just focus
[25:09] on living our own lives and stop being
[25:11] so moralistic or interfering in others
[25:13] 'affairs, and then slowly, our economy
[25:15] ...
[25:16] He said that long ago.
[25:17] It’s just that China's economy is
[25:19] clearly on the verge of overtaking
[25:21] theirs to become the largest economy.
[25:23] Surpassing the UK and catching up to
[25:24] the US, at least in terms of GDP.
[25:26] There shouldn't be a need to surpass
[25:28] them. Yes, and what does this mean?
[25:32] It means a major world event.
[25:35] It means China’s influence is growing
[25:37] .
[25:38] Yes, indeed.
[25:39] Right?
[25:40] It's actually not about how the
[25:42] American Dream is doing, but that the
[25:44] Chinese Dream is slowly being realized.
[25:46] At the very least, having a status in
[25:48] the world—that has been realized.
[25:50] It has already been initially realized.
[25:52] Then what would you say the American
[25:54] Dream is?
[25:54] The American Dream is actually a bit
[25:56] outdated; it’s the idea that anyone
[25:59] penniless or without background could
[26:01] go to America and live a good,
[26:03] dignified life. That dream is actually
[26:05] still true today, but isn't what Trump
[26:08] is saying that this no longer works?
[26:10] Yes, he has allowed too many people to
[26:12] realize the American Dream. Once
[26:14] realized, it becomes like the bus
[26:15] theory: everyone wants to squeeze on,
[26:17] but those who are already on prefer
[26:19] that no one else gets on. It’s always
[26:21] been like this. America is just the
[26:23] largest space, and it has already
[26:25] accommodated too many people. They’ve
[26:27] long talked about deporting immigrants,
[26:30] starting from the Reagan era, which
[26:31] caused panic among immigrants who
[26:33] thought the policy meant they couldn't
[26:35] stay or work anymore and would be
[26:37] deported. But I only saw more and more
[26:40] people coming. Even in the 90s, I
[26:42] opened the paper and the headline was
[26:44] about the "Golden Venture" running
[26:46] aground off Long Island. Over 300
[26:48] Chinese illegal immigrants jumped into
[26:50] the freezing water. The immigration
[26:52] bureau rescued them immediately,
[26:54] everyone got a blanket, they were
[26:56] spread out on the shore, and then
[26:58] handled according to their immigration
[27:00] laws—very humane, yet very strict. It
[27:02] depends; if you have relatives who call
[27:04] , they can come and get you. If not,
[27:06] you’re detained. While detained, you
[27:09] can play cards, draw, play ping-pong,
[27:11] or anything like that, while waiting
[27:13] for the immigration office to process
[27:14] your case. It’s always like that; for
[27:17] any illegal or criminal behavior, they
[27:19] enter the legal process immediately. In
[27:21] reality, many people who come out know
[27:23] how to draw or make little crafts, and
[27:25] of course, they would rather not go
[27:27] back, as being inside isn't good.
[27:29] I have personally met people like that,
[27:30] and some are very regretful, saying, "I
[27:31] already had a car and a company back in
[27:33] Fujian," but mostly people back home
[27:34] would criticize you, saying, "How can
[27:35] you be doing so poorly that you still
[27:37] haven't gone abroad?"
[27:37] Every family has to send someone out.
[27:40] Every family must have someone go
[27:41] abroad, so many Chinese people don't
[27:42] leave due to poverty or having no
[27:44] options, but for the sake of face. Once
[27:45] they go and discover America isn't like
[27:47] that, this process had already begun;
[27:49] it didn't just start today. What do you
[27:51] say, Xu Lai?
[27:52] Hmm.
[27:53] I have a friend who went to the U.S.
[27:55] and visited some old friends—some
[27:57] even worked in government agencies back
[28:00] then and had become directors—because
[28:02] the standard of living and all aspects
[28:04] of life between China and the U.S. were
[28:06] quite different back then. Now China
[28:09] has gradually risen, so the gap between
[28:11] them isn't as large. So I asked him,
[28:14] what was his biggest takeaway? He said
[28:16] the biggest takeaway is that those who
[28:18] went to the U.S. back then are actually
[28:20] the most disillusioned.
[28:21] Right. It’s because they never
[28:23] imagined China would develop like this;
[28:25] the people who were originally worse
[28:27] off than them, or about the same, have
[28:30] now attained high positions or become
[28:32] major bosses. They haven't achieved
[28:34] what they wanted in their America.
[28:36] Exactly.
[28:37] They are most disillusioned by this
[28:39] situation, and after coming back,
[28:40] they’ve lost their window of
[28:41] opportunity. Yes.
[28:43] With age and other factors, they no
[28:44] longer have those opportunities, so
[28:45] their mindset is particularly...
[28:47] They just didn't anticipate this kind
[28:48] of disparity.
[28:49] Exactly, it’s all leveled out.
[28:51] Their former classmates stayed put,
[28:52] right? While I’ve been struggling in
[28:54] the U.S. for 20 years.
[28:55] They gave up a lot of things back then.
[28:58] Right.
[28:58] They gave up their existing social
[29:00] status and all their established
[29:02] backgrounds.
[29:02] So, for the Chinese American dream, you
[29:05] want to succeed in the U.S.,
[29:06] Right?
[29:07] Hmm.
[29:09] This process started even earlier in
[29:11] Taiwan. In the 80s, I saw many people
[29:13] from Taiwan sighing, saying, "My
[29:15] college classmate is now the boss of
[29:17] such-and-such company in Taiwan; look
[29:19] at their annual salary and income."
[29:21] Because Taiwan was still under martial
[29:23] law at that time, everyone felt
[29:25] insecure and wanted to leave. Those who
[29:27] could make it to the U.S. were the best
[29:29] of the best, but they soon found they
[29:30] could only open a restaurant, or
[29:32] perhaps not even that, while their
[29:33] classmates back home had already struck
[29:35] it rich. Since Taiwan's economy was
[29:36] taking off, the mainland is just going
[29:38] through the same process a step later
[29:40] —ten to twenty years behind—but on
[29:42] a much larger scale. My most
[29:43] interesting memory from thirty years
[29:44] ago, before I went abroad, is that
[29:46] whenever an overseas Chinese or someone
[29:48] from outside visited, we would all
[29:49] gather in the evening and ask, "Tell us
[29:51] , what is it like out there?" I say
[29:52] that now, my main task every time I go
[29:54] back is just to have a meal with a
[29:56] table full of people. Everyone asks, "
[29:58] What's the mainland like now? How's
[30:00] Beijing?" You ask if the overseas
[30:02] Chinese still look down on their
[30:04] motherland?
[30:05] No, no, there’s another very
[30:07] important factor—the internet is very
[30:09] , very important. If I’m recognized
[30:11] abroad, ten out of ten people say they
[30:13] saw me on "Behind the Headlines."
[30:15] Right, right, right.
[30:16] Ever since "Behind the Headlines" went
[30:18] online and could be viewed by overseas
[30:19] Chinese, you have no idea how many
[30:21] viewers you have out there, regardless
[30:22] of their political stance.
[30:23] Yes, yes.
[30:25] Everyone knows you, they know your show
[30:27] . For many people overseas, my overseas
[30:29] life is quite active, but there’s one
[30:31] point you mentioned that I also find
[30:33] quite interesting, which is—
[30:34] You look at China, just as I said
[30:36] before, everything makes me feel like
[30:38] it’s getting stronger than them in
[30:40] every aspect. But even so, you always
[30:42] get the sense that there are things
[30:44] that make you feel particularly
[30:45] distressed. For example, I saw that
[30:47] delivery guy crying. And that day, I
[30:49] was thinking about how you talk about
[30:51] being reasonable. In America, no matter
[30:53] what, they are reasonable. But in China
[30:55] , many times development happens
[30:57] without being reasonable. For instance,
[30:59] there’s this guy named Jia Jinlong
[31:01] recently.
[31:02] It’s just in our Shijiazhuang, a
[31:05] village called Beigaoying. Okay. The
[31:08] Party Secretary who came, the village
[31:10] chief, was very capable. He really
[31:12] changed the appearance of the village,
[31:14] turning it urban. Now, when you go to
[31:17] Beigaoying Village, it’s no different
[31:19] from a district in our major city of
[31:21] Shijiazhuang. Because of the relocation
[31:23] —they tore down your old house and
[31:25] built you a new one.
[31:27] But a dispute arose during this process
[31:29] , and there was a young man named Jia
[31:31] Jinlong. It’s not necessarily that he
[31:34] was in the right, but a dispute
[31:35] occurred and he said, "I’m staying in
[31:37] my old house, I’m not moving, I even
[31:39] want to get married here."
[31:40] In the end, his old house was bulldozed
[31:43] .
[31:43] Hmm.
[31:44] It was demolished.
[31:46] After that, his fiancée refused to
[31:48] marry him, so Jia Jinlong went and
[31:50] bought a shotgun. Hmm.
[31:52] Then one day, the unit secretary,
[31:54] after giving a speech to the whole
[31:56] village,
[31:56] walked off the stage, and he shot him
[31:58] in the back of the head.
[31:59] He was killed. Just recently, the
[32:02] Supreme Court approved the death
[32:04] sentence. Some legal experts argued he
[32:06] didn't necessarily deserve death,
[32:08] saying "spare his life under the blade"
[32:10] because he was a victim of forced
[32:12] demolition, but in the end, the
[32:14] execution was carried out. I just feel,
[32:17] look,
[32:18] our landscape has changed,
[32:20] hey, it has even more high-rises than
[32:22] the US. But behind this, there seem to
[32:25] be things that I find truly terrifying.
[32:27] It’s not to say that anyone is
[32:29] definitely right.
[32:30] There are too many, yeah. It’s just
[32:34] that I think it comes back to what we
[32:36] were saying about what Chinese people
[32:38] worry about—whether I'm working here
[32:40] or what I'm doing—I think it’s
[32:42] still the underlying ideology of life.
[32:46] It’s that I must go out and succeed,
[32:49] I must become someone abroad, I must
[32:51] buy a house, I must buy a car. We carry
[32:54] so many of these values with us that
[32:57] it’s just exhausting. But these kids
[32:59] later on, like the second generation,
[33:02] they don’t have that feeling. They
[33:04] don’t think they have to make money
[33:06] to buy a house or car; they just want
[33:08] to enjoy life, which is more natural.
[33:10] For example, I met a mother who told me
[33:13] , and this is about music too, she said
[33:16] , "My son just likes being a DJ, what
[33:18] should I do?" Because he's second
[33:20] generation, born in the US, he has no
[33:22] interest in good things like studying
[33:24] law, or becoming a lawyer, or anything
[33:26] like that; he just wants to DJ. What
[33:28] should be done? How, how to deal with
[33:31] it? She asked if I could talk to him,
[33:33] so I agreed to talk. I said, I told the
[33:36] kid, "First of all, do you feel like
[33:38] your feet hurt every night?" Because
[33:40] DJing makes your feet hurt at night;
[33:42] it's because your body's vibration
[33:43] frequency is too high. I said, "Aren't
[33:45] you afraid?" Because you're very young,
[33:48] only in your 20s. He said, "I am, ma'am
[33:50] , my feet do hurt." I said you will
[33:52] have pain, and your body will feel
[33:54] tired, because this vibration frequency
[33:56] is too high. If you don't realize that
[33:58] this is—because that high vibration
[34:00] frequency is affecting your body, right
[34:02] ? If you feel it's fine, he says I'm
[34:04] fine, I enjoy it. I feel that every—
[34:06] my feet ache, the acupuncture points,
[34:08] just like he said, but I enjoy it. If I
[34:10] don't live like this, I don't think I
[34:12] can live at all. I said, then go ahead
[34:14] and do it. This very thing, I’m
[34:16] telling you, is the key: if your body
[34:18] isn't afraid, then just do it. Now this
[34:20] kid is a very successful DJ in the U.S
[34:22] .;he makes his way by DJing in clubs.
[34:25] This is the path for the second
[34:26] generation of Chinese kids, they have
[34:29] their own concepts.
[34:30] Many families have this.
[34:32] Older people are always talking about,
[34:34] "Oh, should we compare our earnings to
[34:36] those back home? We put so much
[34:37] pressure on ourselves." But kids today
[34:40] don't think that way; the second
[34:42] generation doesn't think that way
[34:44] anymore. Honestly, I hope the kids in
[34:46] China today can also grow up like this,
[34:49] just doing what they want to do and
[34:51] being incredibly relaxed. Well, you
[34:54] know, for example, we collected
[34:55] questions online this time, and someone
[34:57] asked Teacher Chen a question, saying:
[34:59] "I want to ask Teacher Danqing,
[35:01] you’ve been saying for years that
[35:03] America is good, and that China’s
[35:05] education system has problems, that
[35:07] children are being stifled, and so on."
[35:09] He said, "But look, everyone who went
[35:11] abroad to study is coming back now,
[35:13] right?""The whole world is watching our
[35:15] China versus the U.S., American
[35:17] imperialism. Look at the mess with
[35:18] Trump now; it feels like American
[35:20] imperialism is on the verge of a civil
[35:21] war, right? Hmm?" Hmm, what is there to
[35:24] say now?
[35:25] I surrender, hmm.
[35:26] I understand now. So that’s what
[35:28] it’s all about after all this time.
[35:30] That’s why I said he wouldn't dare
[35:31] say it, he didn't dare speak. I never
[35:32] understood why, but now I understand.
[35:34] I won't argue these points; I don't
[35:36] want to argue.
[35:36] Well.
[35:37] You go to school in the UK, at the
[35:39] moment, going to the UK.
[35:41] Surrender, hmm.
[35:43] This means you have nothing left to say
[35:45] . I don't want to argue this point. If
[35:47] you insist on arguing, I surrender. OK,
[35:50] if that’s how you feel, then that’s
[35:52] what you believe. It’s like you
[35:54] should let me hold my own view. I feel
[35:56] it’s this way, so I say it, and if
[35:58] you think it’s not, you say your
[36:00] piece too. Then let me ask you this
[36:02] question: if it were your child right
[36:04] now, at the point where you have to
[36:06] decide whether to go abroad for studies
[36:09] , at this current historical stage,
[36:11] this historical juncture,
[36:13] Would you still let him go to school in
[36:15] the U.S., or even settle down in the
[36:17] U.S.?
[36:17] Yes, I think I would. No, whether he
[36:20] settles down or not is his own business
[36:22] , his own choice. But I believe I would
[36:24] be no different than 30 years ago, like
[36:26] , okay, if you want to go abroad, then
[36:28] go. I encourage kids today to go out if
[36:30] they can, but I don't encourage them to
[36:32] stay, nor is there a need to encourage
[36:33] them to come back. China is better off
[36:35] now, different from our time, at least
[36:37] in terms of material life.
[36:38] Looking at this development now,
[36:39] internationalization is a fundamental
[36:41] requirement.
[36:42] I think
[36:43] It is a fundamental requirement. Yes,
[36:45] and I think if we look at it this way,
[36:46] let's keep things simpler. If you have
[36:48] a child in Henan, the mother definitely
[36:50] wants them to go to school in Beijing.
[36:52] Henan or the Netherlands?
[36:53] Henan.
[36:54] Henan.
[36:56] A child in Henan wants to come to
[36:57] Beijing for school, just like someone
[36:59] in a small county, say in a rural area
[37:01] of northern Shaanxi, wants to go to
[37:03] Yan'an for school because they feel
[37:05] they’ve reached a bigger place.
[37:07] People born in Yan'an might want to go
[37:09] to Guangzhou for school. Perhaps every
[37:11] parent simply hopes their child goes to
[37:13] a bigger place. It’s actually that
[37:16] simple. I don't think you need to force
[37:18] parents to send their kids abroad or
[37:20] anywhere else. It’s just that a child
[37:22] leaving your side to go to school is
[37:24] definitely better than staying by your
[37:26] side, because they have an independent
[37:27] ...An independent environment to grow
[37:29] in, where they learn to handle their
[37:31] own surroundings. Actually, you could
[37:33] go to school in England, or if England
[37:35] is too expensive, go to Scotland.
[37:37] Scotland is cheaper, and I’ve seen a
[37:39] child who returned from Scotland who
[37:40] was exceptionally well-mannered and
[37:42] great. It’s mainly because they
[37:44] entered another community, another
[37:45] group, and experienced a different
[37:47] sense of language—didn't we just talk
[37:49] about language? That sense of language
[37:51] gives them a point of comparison for
[37:53] themselves. So when the child comes
[37:54] back, when they return, they truly are
[37:56] a different kid—they are just so
[37:58] well-mannered.
[37:59] I hear you.
[38:00] I think that's how it is.
[38:02] It means that no matter how developed
[38:04] our economy is, or how beautiful the
[38:06] buildings are, a person's manners still
[38:09] seem to need to be cultivated abroad. I
[38:13] remember that time, look, it was the
[38:16] 1980s, the last century. You know, the
[38:19] people's efforts to improve their own
[38:22] income—did you notice? It was
[38:24] unstoppable. I remember it was very
[38:27] common at that time, so much so that "
[38:29] moonlighting" became a buzzword of the
[38:31] era. In my impression, everyone around
[38:33] me was doing it, and because some of it
[38:35] wasn't allowed by their workplaces, it
[38:37] had to be done on the sly. It’s
[38:39] basically finding an additional source
[38:41] of income. Is that what you’d call "
[38:43] part-time" in Hong Kong? Exactly.
[38:46] I’ve heard of many office workers who
[38:49] , right after getting off work, rush to
[38:52] go where? They rush to work as couriers
[38:55] ,
[38:55] riding motorbikes to deliver food and
[38:58] whatnot, all just to earn a little
[39:00] extra. I can immediately see two
[39:03] concepts here: one high-standard and
[39:05] one low-standard. You have to ask, is
[39:09] this "slash youth" phenomenon born out
[39:12] of a necessity to survive,
[39:14] or is it a personal pursuit?
[39:16] Right, so I think "slash youth" might
[39:19] be confused with a few other terms,
[39:21] like moonlighting, side jobs, changing
[39:24] careers, or crossing boundaries. They
[39:27] all seem related to being a "slash,"
[39:29] but they might have fundamental
[39:31] differences. For example, are you
[39:36] actually earning your living through
[39:38] different interests, or are you facing
[39:40] different client bases, social circles,
[39:43] and professional fields? I think that
[39:48] might be something we need to define.
[39:51] Have you ever tried starting a business
[39:53] or something?
[39:54] I have tried starting a business. Right
[39:56] , do you ever feel like you're living
[39:58] in several parallel universes in a
[39:59] single day?
[40:00] When I was starting my business, I felt
[40:02] very fragmented. I didn't feel like a "
[40:04] slash" person at all.
[40:05] Could you elaborate on that?
[40:07] It’s like running a business during
[40:10] the day and writing at night. The
[40:13] people you have to deal with during the
[40:15] day are completely different from the
[40:17] people you interact with when you’re
[40:19] writing. For example, my startup was in
[40:23] publishing. I didn't just deal with
[40:27] authors, which is a circle I’m very
[40:29] familiar with—I don't think that’s
[40:31] a huge crossover. But I had to face the
[40:35] printing shop owners, the workers, and
[40:38] force myself to learn about ink and
[40:40] paper. For me, that turned into a huge
[40:44] challenge; it was a process of learning
[40:46] . No, I can define "slash youth," or "
[40:49] slash" itself, from a different
[40:52] perspective. Because we all want
[40:55] different experiences during our growth
[40:57] or development stages, defining a "
[41:00] slash" just by the pursuit of different
[41:02] experiences isn't enough. That’s the
[41:06] first point; so what is the second
[41:08] definition? You must refuse a fixed,
[41:11] specialized, single job. You need the
[41:14] will and determination to say no—that
[41:17] is what a "slashie" really is. For
[41:20] example, your publishing business could
[41:23] clearly thrive.
[41:24] You stay with it, moving forward
[41:27] through your 20s, 30s, and 40s. You see
[41:30] yourself becoming a very successful
[41:32] publisher, so you keep heading down
[41:34] that path. But at this point, you have
[41:37] to make a decision. I give it up, yes,
[41:40] I don't want it, but for what? What is
[41:43] it that I don't want it for? It’s not
[41:45] that it's bad, it’s just not enough.
[41:48] Not enough, it’s not enough, so
[41:50] I’ll go try other things. Having the
[41:52] will and the ability to make that
[41:55] choice is what being a "slashie" is. I
[41:57] often think that when I was younger, I
[42:00] felt the hardest part of life was
[42:02] choosing—we have to choose who to be,
[42:05] what job to have, what books to read.
[42:08] The older I get, the more I feel that
[42:10] the hardest part of life isn't choosing
[42:12] . It’s giving up, actually letting go
[42:14] of a certain part.
[42:15] So,
[42:16] Giving up is the hardest thing. So Jia
[42:18] Hui, we have a meeting of minds, right?
[42:21] It brings up a famous quote of mine
[42:23] from back then. At the time, there was
[42:25] a promotional card where every host had
[42:27] to write a line, and I wrote this. I
[42:30] said, "Never give up"—people usually
[42:32] talk about "never giving up"—but I
[42:34] added a question mark and followed it
[42:36] with "always give up."
[42:37] And my photo from that day is, well, "
[42:40] always give up" means when you are weak
[42:42] and small, you have many enemies. When
[42:45] you are weak and small, you have
[42:47] especially many enemies. Conversely,
[42:49] when you are powerful, you have many
[42:51] friends. Tao Huabi was so weak when she
[42:53] first started; too many people bullied
[42:55] her. Look at what Tao Huabi said: "
[42:57] I’m going to fight it out. Even if I
[42:59] face a bandit, I will fight you to the
[43:01] end. If you want to kill me, I want to
[43:03] kill you too." You have to fight to win
[43:05] ; if you don't fight, you lose. Tao
[43:08] Huabi's theories don't make it into our
[43:10] MBA programs. They won't make it into
[43:13] Harvard case studies, but Chinese
[43:15] entrepreneurs are truly and solidly
[43:17] forged through this kind of struggle.
[43:19] We weren't created according to Harvard
[43:21] or MBA case studies; look at how
[43:23] Chinese entrepreneurs grow. Xu Xiaoping
[43:26] says the person he admires most is Tao
[43:28] Huabi. Ren Zhengfei, no problem, he met
[43:30] him in Shenzhen, talked with him, even
[43:32] gave lectures at Huawei, everything is
[43:34] fine, but he just couldn't meet Tao
[43:36] Huabi. Xu Xiaoping eventually felt
[43:38] relieved about not meeting Tao Huabi,
[43:41] saying he was rejected, but later
[43:43] learned that she wouldn't even meet
[43:46] provincial governors or mayors, only
[43:48] village chiefs, and that finally
[43:51] balanced his mind. That’s how
[43:53] Taohuabi is. Don’t bring me all those
[43:56] vague, confusing things. I only meet
[43:58] whoever can solve problems for me. If
[44:00] not, then forget it, I won't see them.
[44:02] I don’t discuss theory. As I said,
[44:05] Engels internalized that theory is
[44:08] always gray, while practice is
[44:10] evergreen. China’s economic
[44:12] development and the entrepreneurial
[44:14] practices of Chinese businessmen are
[44:16] incredible; theory hasn’t caught up
[44:18] yet. Our theories must be combined with
[44:20] practice, otherwise, they are too far
[44:22] removed. In 1980, Shenzhen was just a
[44:25] small fishing village coming from
[44:27] Bao'an. Today it has become a miracle
[44:30] of world urban construction and
[44:32] economic development. This photo was
[44:35] taken during Comrade Xiaoping’s
[44:37] Southern Tour. In 1992, Comrade
[44:39] Xiaoping gave his Southern Tour talks.
[44:42] Finally, he arrived in Shenzhen and
[44:44] looked at Hong Kong from a hillside at
[44:46] the Luohu checkpoint. Comrade
[44:48] Xiaoping’s greatest wish was to step
[44:50] onto Hong Kong soil and take a look
[44:52] after its return. Guangdong provincial
[44:54] leaders recalled that when Comrade
[44:56] Xiaoping was looking at Hong Kong that
[44:58] day, he stood on the hillside. It was
[45:00] drizzling, and the Guangdong provincial
[45:03] leaders said that none of them dared to
[45:05] go up and hold an umbrella for Comrade
[45:07] Xiaoping. They were afraid of
[45:09] interrupting his thoughts. Comrade
[45:11] Xiaoping stood in the mist, staring
[45:13] blankly at Hong Kong for five or six
[45:16] minutes. Comrade Xiaoping’s greatest
[45:18] wish was to visit Hong Kong after its
[45:20] return. Later, there wasn't enough time
[45:22] . 1997, the return. Comrade Xiaoping
[45:26] passed away in February 1997. Today,
[45:29] Shenzhen’s development has repaid,
[45:31] fully repaid, Comrade Xiaoping’s
[45:34] expectations. Shenzhen’s total
[45:36] economic output was one-five-hundredth
[45:39] of Hong Kong’s. By 2018, Shenzhen’s
[45:43] total economy had surpassed it. It
[45:46] completely realized this speed of
[45:48] development. You see, the central
[45:52] government originally said the core
[45:54] engine of the Greater Bay Area was Hong
[45:57] Kong. Later, it became a dual-engine
[46:01] with Shenzhen. The central government
[46:03] hopes Shenzhen will surpass the Greater
[46:05] Bay Area in competitiveness, innovation
[46:07] , and influence, becoming a global
[46:08] benchmark city. Look at the Hong
[46:10] Kong-Zhuhai-Macao Bridge; it doesn’t
[46:12] connect to Shenzhen. They are afraid of
[46:14] Shenzhen surpassing them. But what can
[46:16] you do if you don't connect it? If you
[46:17] don't connect it, can you just cast
[46:19] Shenzhen aside? That still won't work.
[46:21] I think Shenzhen’s development fully
[46:23] uses its own reality to demonstrate the
[46:26] vitality, innovation, and life force of
[46:28] this city to the country and the whole
[46:31] world. In 1977, the then-Secretary of
[46:33] Guangdong, Secretary Zhongxun, said
[46:36] something in the face of the trend of
[46:38] fleeing to Hong Kong: "We must build
[46:41] our mainland better, so they come
[46:43] running to our side." Zhongxun can't
[46:45] see it now, but we are actually
[46:48] realizing "letting them come to our
[46:50] side" today. Just look, the future will
[46:54] be about this kind of competition.
[46:57] There is a saying on the internet: "
[46:59] Some Chinese people look down on their
[47:02] own nation and country." But it doesn't
[47:04] matter; China's future will not be
[47:07] created by them. The future is built
[47:09] through labor, sweat, entrepreneurship,
[47:12] and innovation. This is where we are in
[47:15] our entrepreneurship today, and the
[47:17] state of us core Chinese people. Words
[47:20] that people have said. We have entered
[47:23] a "no-man's land." Huawei's
[47:25] telecommunications technology is about
[47:27] three years ahead of the U.S.'s Cisco
[47:29] and about five years ahead of Ericsson
[47:31] and Nokia. An elder once said that
[47:33] today, Huawei faces a real danger
[47:35] because we have entered a "no-man's
[47:36] land." In the past, we followed others
[47:38] —where they ran, we ran. Today, there
[47:40] is no one in front of us, and they are
[47:42] following us. Where should we run? This
[47:44] is Huawei's true crisis. Look at how
[47:47] opportunity and crisis coexist for us
[47:49] today. We are ushering in a brand-new
[47:52] era. Our Chinese nation has spent a
[47:53] century in national salvation and a
[47:55] century in rejuvenation. For the first
[47:57] 100 years, from 1840 to 1949, many
[47:59] forward-thinking Chinese started their
[48:01] movements in Guangzhou, like Lin
[48:02] Zexu’s opium suppression. Hong
[48:04] Xiuquan’s Taiping Heavenly Kingdom.
[48:07] Zeng Guofan’s Self-Strengthening
[48:09] Movement. Kang Youwei’s Hundred Days'
[48:11] Reform, Sun Yat-sen’s Xinhai
[48:12] Revolution, and Mao Zedong’s New
[48:14] Democratic Revolution—all advanced
[48:16] Chinese people were driven by three
[48:18] words: "Save China," to rescue the
[48:20] nation's destiny. The mission of
[48:21] national salvation was not started by
[48:23] the Communist Party, but it was
[48:24] concluded by them. In 1949, New China
[48:26] was founded, marking the end of the
[48:28] salvation mission and the beginning of
[48:30] the next one. From 1949 to 2049:
[48:32] developing China. The first 100 years
[48:34] were for salvation. The next 100 years
[48:36] are for rejuvenation. The first 100
[48:38] years were full of hardships, and our
[48:40] next 100 years remain the same. But
[48:41] through the struggles and sacrifices of
[48:43] several generations, we have achieved
[48:45] extraordinary results today. Let us
[48:46] look at it from today's perspective.
[48:48] This is a model created by Denver
[48:50] University in the United States
[48:51] regarding global economic growth. From
[48:53] 1960 to 2099, global economic growth;
[48:56] Denver University built this model
[48:59] using World Bank data. Look at China.
[49:03] In the 1960s, we were not even in the
[49:06] picture—we weren't among the top six
[49:08] in the world. By 1971, we finally made
[49:12] it into the top 16. Then China began to
[49:15] constantly accelerate, constantly
[49:18] cutting in line. The world order was
[49:20] settled like this: the United States as
[49:22] the superpower in first place, Japan in
[49:24] second, and other European countries
[49:26] behind them. According to this ranking,
[49:28] China and Asia were ranked further back
[49:31] ; only Japan was ahead in Asia. Then,
[49:33] as China progressed through reform and
[49:35] opening up, it gradually rose. Finally,
[49:37] the major world order changed
[49:39] significantly with the dissolution of
[49:41] the Soviet Union and the emergence of
[49:43] Russia. Look closely at the others: not
[49:46] only are we accelerating, not only are
[49:48] we cutting in line, not only are we
[49:50] overtaking—we are entering the top
[49:52] ten in the world, surpassing Canada,
[49:54] and moving up. One by one, what they
[49:57] dislike most is that the Chinese people
[49:59] don't follow the order or the rules of
[50:01] the queue. Look, we surpassed Brazil to
[50:03] enter the top seven, surpassed the UK
[50:05] to enter the top six, and in 1998
[50:07] surpassed Italy to enter the top five.
[50:10] In 2000, we surpassed France to enter
[50:12] the top four. In 2004, we surpassed
[50:15] Germany to enter the top three. In 2010
[50:18] , we surpassed Japan to become second
[50:20] in the world. Some say we provoked the
[50:22] US by making "Amazing China," or by
[50:25] pursuing Made in China 2025. That's not
[50:27] it; what provoked them is China's
[50:29] development. These statistics all come
[50:32] from the US. Look at this speed of
[50:34] China's development—how could the
[50:36] Americans not be afraid? We must
[50:37] support, we must certainly support it.
[50:40] There are actual figures up to 2017; in
[50:43] 2017 we adopted actual figures. After
[50:45] 2017, there is a simulation, a virtual
[50:48] projection based on your resources,
[50:50] your talent, and your development
[50:52] prospects, creating a comprehensive
[50:55] plan. After 2017, there is a
[50:57] calculation and projection that goes
[50:59] all the way to 2099. In 2049, for the
[51:02] 100th anniversary of the founding of
[51:05] New China, which is the goal of the
[51:08] 18th and 19th Congresses—to realize
[51:11] the great national rejuvenation—we
[51:14] aim to surpass the US economy by 2028.
[51:18] And continue to widen the gap after
[51:20] surpassing them. Continue to widen the
[51:23] distance from the US. Making it larger
[51:26] and larger. Of course, in the end,
[51:28] everyone can see that the US will have
[51:30] to deal with India next, because India
[51:32] is catching up. It's not that we are
[51:34] chasing the US; the US won't be able to
[51:35] catch up with us, and India will catch
[51:37] up to the US, so they will have to
[51:38] handle India next. By 2049, our economy
[51:41] is projected to exceed the US by about
[51:43] 20 trillion dollars. You can all see it
[51:46] . This is by 2050, when we will have
[51:49] about 48 trillion, and the US 27
[51:51] trillion. Let me conclude with this.
[51:54] Small success requires friends. Great
[51:56] success requires an opponent. If we
[51:59] only wanted a small success. Just
[52:01] making small successes requires friends
[52:04] , but our national rejuvenation is a
[52:06] great success, which requires an
[52:08] opponent. By challenging us today and
[52:10] tomorrow, they keep us from slacking
[52:12] off, force us to examine our own faults
[52:14] , and make us correct them. They point
[52:16] out our problems, we fix them, and
[52:18] after fixing them we become stronger,
[52:21] so I think we really need such an
[52:23] opponent. They have provided very
[52:25] strong momentum for our development. I
[52:28] say this is a century of change, a
[52:31] dramatic evolution in the international
[52:34] balance of power. The Chinese nation is
[52:36] experiencing a historic journey of
[52:38] national rejuvenation. We are moving
[52:40] forward step by step. We are all
[52:42] witnesses and participants in this
[52:45] process, and this is our fortune. Of
[52:47] course, future generations may be even
[52:49] luckier, but where does our unique
[52:51] fortune lie? You are living in an era
[52:53] of great ups and downs for the Chinese
[52:54] nation. The US is forcing China into an
[52:56] opponent it may not be able to defeat.
[52:58] For a century, our Chinese nation has
[53:00] faced survival and destruction, rising
[53:01] and falling; Chinese people are
[53:03] inherited from the past and will be won
[53:04] by the future.
[53:05] I am truly surging with emotion right
[53:07] now; that has opened up a huge gap.
[53:09] There are many students on site who are
[53:12] very excited, and they have prepared
[53:13] many questions. Let's see what kind of
[53:16] sparks will fly between the students
[53:18] and Professor Jin. Is it necessary for
[53:25] us to continue maintaining this kind of
[53:27] foreign aid? General Jin, hello.
[53:34] Today's topic is "From Sick Man of East
[53:36] Asia to National Rejuvenation." The
[53:38] term "Sick Man of East Asia" reminds me
[53:40] of my summer research experience abroad
[53:42] this year. During my research, I was
[53:44] working on an experiment with an
[53:46] Italian friend when he made a joke,
[53:49] calling me "weak." We know that the
[53:51] word "weak" not only means lacking
[53:53] strength but also implies being frail.
[53:55] At that time, I immediately associated
[53:57] it with the insulting term "Sick Man of
[53:59] East Asia" and was very angry. I
[54:00] replied to him, "I am better than you,
[54:03] because you are a stupid Italian."
[54:05] Seeing my reply, he could tell that I
[54:07] was angry. He was very confused and
[54:10] even felt a bit wronged, because he
[54:12] thought he was just making a joke. So I
[54:14] started thinking: on one hand, why do
[54:17] many foreigners still hold such
[54:19] deep-seated stereotypes about our
[54:21] people? On the other hand, are we
[54:23] Chinese perhaps overreacting and being
[54:25] too sensitive when it comes to similar
[54:27] issues?
[54:27] Well, this reminds me of an experience
[54:30] we had in the US. In this regard, we
[54:32] must avoid two extremes: being overly
[54:35] sensitive on one hand, and being overly
[54:37] insensitive on the other. We must avoid
[54:40] both. In 2008, I accompanied the
[54:42] President of our National Defense
[54:44] University, a General, on a visit to
[54:45] the US. Our President, a General, did
[54:47] not receive the courtesies he should
[54:49] have been given according to US
[54:50] protocol. They made us take off our
[54:51] belts during security checks. They
[54:53] opened all our luggage and searched
[54:55] through it very thoroughly. Our plane
[54:56] tickets were all marked with four A's.
[54:59] This meant that once any Chinese person
[55:00] boarded the plane, they were assigned a
[55:02] window seat. They ensured an American
[55:03] sat next to you; they absolutely would
[55:05] not let Chinese people sit together. If
[55:07] you needed anything, you had to climb
[55:08] over this American, so we were all
[55:09] stuck by the window. Our President, a
[55:11] General, didn't speak the language well
[55:13] . I sat next to him and was told, "No,
[55:15] you must sit in the back, you must sit
[55:17] in the back," that's how it was. Later,
[55:19] because of this kind of treatment, I
[55:22] sought out the U.S. Naval Attaché and
[55:24] Air Force Attaché who were
[55:26] accompanying our visit; they hid as
[55:28] soon as they saw us. I found them, and
[55:31] I expressed my serious protest. We are
[55:33] a delegation of generals; is this how
[55:35] you treat us? They explained to us that
[55:37] it was the U.S. Department of Homeland
[55:38] Security, which the Department of
[55:39] Defense couldn't control, claiming they
[55:40] were two separate systems. I said, "
[55:41] Fine, two systems!" I told them, "Our
[55:44] airport security and our military are
[55:45] also two separate systems. We will also
[55:47] treat your generals with the same '
[55:48] separate system' treatment when they
[55:49] visit China in the future." He said, "
[55:51] Oh, we need to report this issue up."
[55:54] The next day, the Naval Attaché
[55:56] assistant found me with two small gifts
[55:58] , saying, "This one is for General Wang
[56:00] , and this is for you. Two small gifts,
[56:03] please let it go." I said, "First, we
[56:05] represent six people. If you're giving
[56:07] gifts, you should give six. Giving two
[56:10] is meant for whom?" I said, "Second, we
[56:12] expect a formal response, not just
[56:13] ending it with gifts. I said we are
[56:15] going to report this formally when we
[56:17] return." Done. I hope you also
[56:19] officially report our opinions to your
[56:21] Ministry of Defense. He felt quite
[56:23] embarrassed and took the two gifts back
[56:25] . After we returned to Beijing, about a
[56:27] month later, there was a China-U.S.
[56:29] defense ministry working meeting. I
[56:32] attended it, where the U.S. Assistant
[56:34] Secretary of Defense was present. The
[56:36] meeting mainly focused on maritime
[56:38] conflict avoidance mechanisms. However,
[56:41] at the very beginning of the meeting,
[56:43] the U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense
[56:46] interrupted and said, "Let me address
[56:48] one issue first.""The U.S. side would
[56:50] like to formally apologize to China
[56:52] regarding the incident one month ago
[56:54] involving the President of the National
[56:56] Defense University; our handling was
[56:58] inappropriate, and we formally
[56:59] apologize.""We guarantee that similar
[57:01] issues will not happen again in the
[57:03] future." I said, you see, for this kind
[57:06] of situation, we must fight for our
[57:08] rights. Of course, there is no need to
[57:10] have a falling out to their face. If
[57:14] they say you are Chinese, you can
[57:16] respond with other words, but there is
[57:18] no need to show anger. We can joke
[57:21] around, but rights must be fought for;
[57:24] they are not just waited for. Of course
[57:27] , when we defend our rights, we show
[57:29] our strength. If you treat me this way,
[57:31] I will treat you that way—an eye for
[57:33] an eye. Only then can we show that the
[57:36] Chinese people also defend their own
[57:38] rights. Even if your national power is
[57:40] not as strong as theirs, if your inner
[57:42] strength is equal to theirs, you can
[57:44] effectively safeguard your own rights.
[57:45] I feel that today, as Chinese, we walk
[57:48] in the world with the nation providing
[57:50] us full support, so we as individuals
[57:52] shouldn't be overly...sensitive,
[57:54] assuming everyone looks down on us. On
[57:57] the other hand, if we find our rights
[57:59] being harmed, we also have the right to
[58:01] take up arms to defend them.
[58:03] Okay, thank you. Jin Yao. Hello,
[58:08] General. My name is Lu Haoyi, majoring
[58:11] in aerospace engineering. In my
[58:13] sophomore year, I wanted to apply to an
[58:15] American university, Purdue, the alma
[58:17] mater of our nation's "Two Bombs, One
[58:19] Satellite" heroes Deng Jiaxian and
[58:21] Liang Sili, but due to visa issues, I
[58:23] couldn't go as planned. So I would like
[58:25] to ask, in the current international
[58:27] climate, do you think we should choose
[58:29] to pursue further studies domestically,
[58:32] or go abroad to better contribute to
[58:34] our country's aerospace engineering?
[58:36] Thank you.
[58:37] All right. That's an interesting
[58:39] question, and I'd like to give a small
[58:41] example. I had some dental problems
[58:43] recently, needing an implant—implants
[58:44] are quite popular now, aren't they?
[58:46] It's like getting a third set of teeth
[58:48] in your life. The waitlist in Beijing
[58:50] was too long, so I had no choice but to
[58:51] go to Xi'an, to our Fourth Military
[58:53] Medical University, which is top-tier
[58:55] in the military and excellent. The
[58:56] president of the university told me
[58:58] about our dentistry. Thirty years ago.
[59:01] Thirty years ago, our dental technology
[59:03] in China, not to mention implants, was
[59:05] far behind. It was behind foreign
[59:07] countries by thirty or forty years, if
[59:09] not more. Now, it's actually ahead in
[59:11] some areas. He said, "Look at my
[59:13] university." Robot-assisted implants.
[59:16] He said foreign countries didn't
[59:18] believe it, saying the Chinese were
[59:19] faking it, because there were no
[59:20] robot-assisted implants anywhere else
[59:21] in the world. It wasn't until the BBC
[59:23] reported on the university's robots in
[59:25] 2017 and it was published in the New
[59:27] York Times that the world finally
[59:29] believed that the Chinese had created
[59:32] robot-assisted implants. The oral
[59:34] cavity is very small, and it hurts to
[59:36] keep your mouth wide open. With robots,
[59:38] you don't need to; a probe goes in and
[59:40] sees everything clearly. Robot-assisted
[59:43] implants ensure extremely high
[59:44] precision. Don't underestimate the
[59:46] Fourth Military Medical University.
[59:47] They have extensive student exchanges
[59:50] abroad. Sweden pioneered implants,
[59:52] while the US and Japan are leaders in
[59:54] dental technology. Today, we have
[59:56] caught up with them all. Why are we so
[59:59] ahead? Because of exchange and opening
[60:01] up. Therefore, we must never close our
[60:03] doors; we should go out whenever we can
[60:06] . Get close to the cutting edge
[60:07] whenever possible. Learn as much as you
[60:09] can, fully exert Chinese learning, and
[60:12] make full use of it. Only then can we
[60:14] achieve full growth.
[60:16] Thank you, General Jin. Hello, the
[60:21] previous student asked about studying
[60:24] abroad, so I would like to ask about
[60:26] immigration. There is a saying that
[60:28] once you emigrate, you are no longer
[60:30] patriotic. However, we have observed
[60:32] that when China faces controversy in
[60:34] the international community, or when it
[60:36] faces natural disasters, many overseas
[60:38] Chinese spontaneously organize protests
[60:41] and donations to support their homeland
[60:43] . I would like to ask, how do you view
[60:45] immigration? Are immigrants really
[60:48] unpatriotic? I don't think that's the
[60:50] case. For ordinary people, we cannot
[60:52] impose any restrictions on immigration;
[60:54] as long as they want to and have the
[60:56] means, they can move. Today we talk
[60:58] about having friends all over the world
[61:00] ; wouldn't it be great if there were
[61:02] Chinese people everywhere? Some see
[61:04] immigration as a sign of being
[61:05] scattered; I don't necessarily think so
[61:08] . Moving abroad doesn't mean you are
[61:09] just a loose end. If they speak of
[61:11] China and remember their country, then
[61:13] they aren't. For example, the best case
[61:16] in the world is the Jewish people. The
[61:18] Jews were not just immigrants; they had
[61:21] no homeland. From the 1st or 2nd
[61:24] century, they were driven out and
[61:26] scattered across the world for 1,800
[61:29] years. During World War II, six million
[61:31] Jews were killed in Europe, yet the
[61:33] cohesion of the Jewish people remained
[61:35] incredibly strong. You could say they
[61:37] were immigrants, scattered worldwide.
[61:39] But in the end, they rebuilt the state
[61:41] of Israel. Even without a homeland or a
[61:44] country, their collective self-esteem
[61:47] was preserved. I hope our Chinese
[61:49] nation can achieve this, that no matter
[61:51] where we are in the world, we can
[61:54] maintain this spiritual cohesion. That
[61:56] is my answer.
[61:58] We certainly can. Thank you, General
[62:01] Jin. General Jin, hello. What is the
[62:05] status of the online public opinion
[62:06] space in modern warfare?
[62:08] I think we should refer to two
[62:09] statements by President Xi. The first
[62:11] is that without networkization, there
[62:13] is no modernization. The second is that
[62:15] without cybersecurity, there is no
[62:17] national security. Freedom is not
[62:19] unlimited; freedom must not infringe
[62:21] upon others. When individual freedom
[62:23] expands without limit and causes harm
[62:25] to others, it must be constrained.
[62:27] Professor Jin, hello. Modern warfare is
[62:30] often information and technology
[62:32] warfare. I wonder if we can still use
[62:33] collective ideology and inner strength
[62:35] to overcome modern war, as we did in
[62:37] the Korean War?
[62:38] Modern war machines are becoming easier
[62:40] to operate, so the proportion of
[62:42] physical strength and bravery required
[62:44] is declining, but it cannot be replaced
[62:46] . The combination of our modernization
[62:48] with this spirit and mettle is what
[62:50] makes a complete army and a complete
[62:52] soldier. General Jin, hello. For
[62:55] contemporary Chinese students, how
[62:57] exactly does the spirit of struggle
[62:59] help us, and how should we cultivate
[63:01] and maintain a sense of fighting spirit
[63:03] ?
[63:03] As Lu Xun said, dissatisfaction is the
[63:06] wheel of progress. If college students
[63:08] feel that their environment is too
[63:10] comfortable and superior, lacking
[63:12] intense challenges, I think you need to
[63:14] seek out intense collisions and
[63:15] challenges; these are the only things
[63:17] that can fully stimulate a person's
[63:19] adrenaline. A person uses at most 12%to
[63:22] 13%of their brain in a lifetime. Why is
[63:26] that? It hasn't been stimulated. Jin.
[63:42] General, hello. Since the founding of
[63:45] our country, we have continuously
[63:47] provided aid to some Third World
[63:49] countries. Of course, our demeanor as a
[63:51] major power has won us much praise, but
[63:54] some capitalist countries pursue an "
[63:56] America First" policy. Do you think it
[63:59] is necessary for us to continue
[64:00] maintaining this kind of foreign aid?
[64:02] Uh, as for foreign aid, as a major
[64:04] power, it is actually essential. It is
[64:07] something we should have the style for.
[64:09] In fact, our aid is not as much as what
[64:10] is circulated on the internet or WeChat
[64:12] ; we don't have that much. Today, a
[64:14] large portion of our aid is actually...
[64:16] well, there are conditions. They all
[64:18] require repayment of principal and
[64:20] interest. Look at our Z-10 helicopters;
[64:23] we provided them as aid. What does
[64:27] providing them as aid mean? It means
[64:29] letting them use two units free of
[64:31] charge. Because weapons and equipment
[64:33] need to be used. We don't have the
[64:35] environment for it, but Pakistan does.
[64:37] Giving them two to use, you call that
[64:40] aid. They started attacking terrorists
[64:41] and hitting ground targets, then
[64:43] constantly identifying the problems
[64:44] with our helicopters. Once they were
[64:46] used, the flaws appeared. We needed to
[64:48] know these flaws, and I would fix them
[64:50] immediately. They would point out the
[64:52] problems, and I would fix them right
[64:53] away, modifying them based on the
[64:55] battlefield. You see, this aid plays a
[64:58] huge role. Including the JF-17 fighter
[65:00] jets we recently provided to Pakistan,
[65:03] didn't they shoot down India's MiG-21?
[65:05] The JF-17 fighter jet became very
[65:07] popular; that was the one we provided
[65:09] to Pakistan as aid. With the JF-17
[65:11] becoming popular, Chengdu Aircraft
[65:13] Industry also became popular. Our
[65:15] exports have increased, and now
[65:17] countries beyond Pakistan, like Egypt
[65:19] and several others, are very interested
[65:21] . In this regard, I think we will
[65:23] definitely not be like the United
[65:25] States, throwing money around
[65:27] everywhere. We certainly won't, but we
[65:29] will carry out this aid to achieve our
[65:31] own utility. That is my answer.
[65:34] Thank you, Professor Jin.
[65:38] Hello Professor. My question is that
[65:41] today's youth may pursue
[65:42] self-actualization and individual
[65:45] liberation more. Do you think the
[65:47] dedication and collectivism promoted by
[65:49] the older generation are still
[65:51] applicable to them?
[65:52] Actually, the older generation also
[65:53] pursued the liberation of thought,
[65:55] every one of them. They are all the
[65:57] same; the liberation of thought is an
[65:59] eternal human pursuit that has never
[66:00] changed. For example, look at Richard
[66:02] Yu at Huawei; he is exactly that kind
[66:05] of person. Today, he is a big shot at
[66:07] Huawei, the person in charge of
[66:09] consumer products. Yu said his mentor
[66:11] once told him, "Yu, your personality is
[66:13] not suited for government agencies.""
[66:16] It's not suited for traditional
[66:17] enterprises either; you won't succeed
[66:18] there, so just stay in university and
[66:20] teach." With his "I am the only one who
[66:22] matters" personality, he couldn't get
[66:23] along anywhere. He couldn't go anywhere
[66:25] else, so he ended up at Huawei. Yu said
[66:27] that on his very first day at Huawei,
[66:29] he fell in love with it. He walked into
[66:32] the office and saw a girl doing a
[66:34] handstand in the corner. There was also
[66:37] a boy sitting with his legs crossed,
[66:39] with his foot even higher than the desk
[66:42] . Isn't this exactly the kind of
[66:46] environment I wanted? He loved it so
[66:49] much. Then at Huawei, he met a boss
[66:52] like Ren Zhengfei, who was so great. Yu
[66:55] had endless ideas—level two, level
[66:58] three, so many new thoughts—but he
[67:01] couldn't provide a feasibility report.
[67:04] He couldn't provide a feasibility
[67:05] analysis or new data, but Ren Zhengfei
[67:07] just said, "I'll give you the money.
[67:09] Old Yu, if you have an idea, I'll fund
[67:11] it and see if you can make it work." Yu
[67:14] said this was exactly what he loved. I
[67:16] just have ideas; I can't produce a
[67:18] feasibility analysis or a 1-2-3-4-5
[67:19] step-by-step plan. I just estimate it
[67:21] will work, and I have to feel my way
[67:23] across the river. He said the boss let
[67:25] him feel his way across the river. I'm
[67:28] saying, look at today, the release of
[67:30] individual personality is still a great
[67:33] asset for us. How to release it
[67:35] effectively is something young people
[67:37] today should focus on; there is no need
[67:39] to suppress it.
