Coca-Cola Guards $300 Billion Drink Empire with Hidden Bottler Moat

可口可乐以隐秘装瓶商护城河守卫3000亿美元饮料帝国 该公司之所以能维持其全球主导规模，是因为一份1899年定价失误的历史性合同锁定了去中心化的独立装瓶网络，从而构成了其终极进入壁垒。 本期节目按时间顺序深入剖析了Coca-Cola长达140年的发展史，从Dr. John Pemberton最初研发专利药的起源，到在Robert Woodruff和Roberto Goizueta等领导者的带领下演变为价值数千亿美元的全球帝国。节目分析了Charlie Munger关于规模经济的思想实验、独立特许装瓶体系机缘巧合下的精妙之处，以及可乐大战中激烈的营销博弈（包括1985年New Coke的决策失误）。此外，节目还重点探讨了现代战略转型，包括Warren Buffett的巨额投资、Diet Coke和Coke Zero的研发推出、产品组合的精简，以及与McDonald's和Monster Energy等实体的合作。 查理·芒格曾提出一个著名的商业思维实验：设想在1880年代以200万美元起步，通过锁定全球商标、结合糖与咖啡因的普遍口味以及建立与“快乐”的巴甫洛夫式联想，打造一个价值2万亿美元的无酒精饮料帝国。 (0:00) 约翰·彭伯顿最初研制出含有古柯叶提取物和非洲可拉果的“法国古柯酒”，但在1885年亚特兰大颁布禁酒令后被迫转型，研发出非酒精类的可口可乐原浆以开拓大众日常消费市场。 (13:44) 合伙人弗兰克·罗宾逊不仅构想出Coca-Cola这一名称并手绘了经典的斯宾塞体标志，还首创了美国商业史上第一张制造商促销优惠券，通过药房汽水机柜台的免费试饮大幅拉动客流与复购。 (24:21) 1899年，阿萨·坎德勒以象征性的1美元签署了永久固定价格的瓶装独家授权，该协议催生了去中心化的“可口可乐系统”，让总公司免除重资产建厂成本，迅速借助独立装瓶商网络渗透全美。 (39:49) 在1905年美国联邦商标法出台后，可口可乐发起激进的法律维权，在十余年间依法关停了7000多家仿冒汽水品牌，确立了其不可替代的“正宗”品牌地位。 (52:40)

Ben Gilbert and David Rosenthal argue that Coca-Cola built a global beverage empire by combining a high-margin concentrate model with outsourced capital infrastructure and cultural marketing, though modern health shifts and category competition now constrain its historical growth trajectory. The Asset-Light Coca-Cola System (39:49) Coca-Cola’s financial profile rests on the division between the central brand company and its independent bottling network. In 1899, Asa Candler sold the exclusive bottling rights for a token fee of $1 and a fixed syrup price of $1 per gallon with no inflation adjustments. While the fixed pricing constraint initially threatened profitability, it forced the parent company to scale production rapidly to outpace inflation through volume efficiencies. This bifurcated structure—later protected by a 1980 federal antitrust exemption allowing exclusive geographic territories—permitted Coca-Cola to expand nationwide and internationally without funding capital-intensive plants and distribution fleets directly. In the modern business, the core company captures 27% ($47 billion) of the overall system's $175 billion in revenue using only 10% of its total workforce, generating gross margins near 60% across 200 bottling partners and 950 facilities. Lifestyle Advertising and Cultural Ubiquity (72:05) Rather than relying strictly on the beverage's physical properties, the company pioneered lifestyle advertising that tied the product directly to American identity. In the early 1920s, under corporate leadership by Robert Woodruff and creative direction from D'Arcy ad executive Archie Lee, Coca-Cola introduced campaigns such as 'Thirst knows no season' and shortened copy like 'Refresh yourself.' In 1931, the company commissioned artist Haddon Sundblom to paint Santa Claus in Coca-Cola red, standardizing the modern, jolly, human-sized visual image across national magazines and roadside billboards. During World War II, Woodruff promised that American troops anywhere could purchase a bottle for five cents, deploying 64 portable plants worldwide alongside military logistics via civilian 'technical observer' status. Later iterations, such as McCann-Erickson's 1971 'Hilltop' ad, aligned the brand with global unity and counterculture themes. The Pepsi Rivalry and Core Formula Vulnerabilities (117:21) Intense competition with Pepsi revealed key vulnerabilities in Coca-Cola’s branding and operational assumptions. Secret internal taste tests conducted by McCann-Erickson in the late 1950s indicated that consumers blind-tested preferred the sweeter taste of Pepsi, a finding Woodruff ordered suppressed. Pepsi weaponized this dynamic in 1975 with the grassroots Pepsi Challenge, eroding Coke's market share while Coke faced internal leadership gridlock under an aging Woodruff and an impaired CEO. In response, incoming CEO Roberto Goizueta launched Diet Coke in 1982 to massive commercial success, but subsequently introduced 'New Coke' in April 1985 to counter the sweeter profile. Although 200,000 blind taste tests backed the new formulation, market research failed to test consumer reaction to entirely replacing the original drink. Following public backlash, leadership reinstated the original recipe as 'Coca-Cola Classic' 79 days later, turning a major execution misstep into an opportunistic renegotiation leverage point with bottlers. Modern Diversification, Sugar Headwinds, and Valuation Limits The hosts note that Coca-Cola's contemporary business model faces structural constraints from changing consumer habits and health scrutiny over sugar, given that a single standard can contains 39 grams of sugar. To transition toward a 'total beverage company,' Coca-Cola pared down its portfolio from over 500 brands around 2020 to roughly 200, maintaining 30 lines generating over $1 billion each. However, acquisitions such as Glaceau ($4 billion) and Body Armor ($5 billion) have struggled to displace dominant category leaders like Gatorade, with the company's largest volume drivers remaining internal extensions like Coke Zero, launched in 2005. Post-1998 revenue growth has slowed to an annual rate of 3% to 4%, and Coca-Cola’s share of the broader US soft drink market declined from 60% in 1948 to 21%. Consequently, while the company maintains a $300 billion valuation and distributes 2.2 billion beverage servings daily, the hosts observe it remains far short of Charlie Munger’s historical thought-experiment target of a $2 trillion enterprise. The hosts emphasize that the secret formula itself is largely a mythologized asset compared to the true cornered resource: the exclusive, legally insulated distribution agreements held by its global bottlers. Whether Coca-Cola can break out of its 3% to 4% growth plateau without sacrificing its core, high-margin syrup economics remains an ongoing strategic dilemma for modern management.

在商业播客《Acquired》关于可口可乐（Coca-Cola）的专题分析中，主播 Ben Gilbert 与 David Rosenthal 指出，这家市值约3000亿美元的饮料帝国的真正护城河并非神秘化学配方，而是其极高资本效率的轻资产特许经营系统与开创性的生活方式品牌营销；但伴随含糖饮料的健康质疑以及品类多元化扩张的迟缓，其已由全球化的高速增长奇迹转变为增长乏力的成熟防守型现金流企业。 特许经营系统与分销壁垒 (48:08) 1899年，Asa Candler 以象征性的1美元出让独家装瓶权，意外奠定了现代“可口可乐系统”（Coca-Cola System）的组织根基。该模式形成了极致的分工结构：母公司仅负责生产高毛利的浓缩糖浆并主导全球品牌营销，而将建厂、灌装、仓储和车队配送等高资产投入完全剥离给独立的本地装瓶商。尽管初期的固定价格合同带来了通胀挑战，但它倒逼可口可乐通过极限扩大规模来降低固定成本，形成了类似 Visa 的去中心化网络效应。 节目主播分析认为，外界常津津乐道的“秘密配方”在商业上其实是一个障眼法，即使配方被窃取，竞争对手也无法合法使用其品牌或以同等规模生产。可口可乐真正的独占资源在于其遍布全球的独立装瓶商网络，以及美国国会在1980年通过反垄断法案豁免赋予其的独家排他性地理管辖权。如今，母公司仅凭全系统约10%的员工便创造了470亿美元收入（占全系统1750亿美元收入的27%），并享有高达60%的毛利率。 生活方式营销与文化符号建构 (72:05) 可口可乐的营销演进重塑了现代快消品的品牌认知逻辑。从1887年 Frank Robinson 首创可兑换免费饮料的印刷优惠券并设计斯宾塞体（Spencerian script）标识，到20世纪20年代 Robert Woodruff 与 D'Arcy 广告公司开创“生活方式广告”，可口可乐率先将碳酸糖水与无形的情感价值紧密挂钩。广告不再冗长介绍产品成分，而是用“清凉一刻”（Refresh yourself）等简短口号将可乐与快乐、友谊和浪漫相联结，使其逐步成为“美式生活”的代名词。 这种文化符号的构建在随后的几十年中被推向极致：1931年艺术家 Haddon Sundblom 绘制的红色经典形象彻底标准化了现代圣诞老人的视觉认知；二战期间，Woodruff 承诺以5美分向全球任何美军士兵提供可乐，并让员工以平民技术观察员身份随军在全球部署了64座便携装瓶厂，将爱国情怀与基础设施扩张融为一体；1971年麦肯广告（McCann-Erickson）推出的“山顶”（Hilltop）广告则成功吸纳反主流文化共鸣。此外，自1955年与 Ray Kroc 达成握手协议起，可口可乐为麦当劳定制不锈钢罐冷链运输与专用吸管，建立了长达数十年无需正式招标的战略盟友体系。 百事竞争与新可乐危机始末 (143:20) 20世纪70年代，百事可乐（Pepsi）在达拉斯发起草根盲测“百事挑战”（Pepsi Challenge），借助便携式家用摄像机拍摄真实消费者的偏好，迅速抢占市场份额。事实上，麦肯广告早在20世纪50年代的内部盲测中就发现消费者在口感上更偏爱偏甜的百事，但 Woodruff 当时下令雪藏该数据。面对百事的蚕食，可口可乐管理层因 Woodruff 的高龄和时任 CEO Paul Austin 罹患阿尔茨海默病而陷入近十年的决策瘫痪，直至1980年 Roberto Goizueta 接任 CEO 才打破僵局。 Goizueta 于1982年主导推出了公司现代史上最成功的新品无糖可乐（Diet Coke），但随后在1985年推出了灾难性的“新可口可乐”（New Coke）。主播指出，管理层在进行了20万次盲测后犯下了致命的市场研究盲区——从未询问消费者是否接受新口味“彻底取代”原配方。面对全国性的抵制浪潮，公司在79天后宣布恢复原配方并更名为“经典可口可乐”（Coca-Cola Classic）。这起危机被主播评价为“决策极其愚蠢，但后续公关与合同重组极其精明”，因为新旧品牌的拆分使公司获得了重新谈判装瓶商条款的法律杠杆。股价大跌随后促成沃伦·巴菲特在1988至1994年间建仓约13亿美元，尽管目前该笔投资总回报率（IRR约10%）略逊于标普500指数同期的平均表现。 健康原罪与现代增长瓶颈 (205:56) 随着公众健康意识觉醒，单罐含39克糖的可口可乐面临着深刻的结构性困境。在不承认核心产品对健康有害的前提下，管理层陷入了转型难题。数据显示，可口可乐在美国软饮料市场的整体份额已从1948年的60%萎缩至约21%（百事约为10%）。在 Goizueta 于1998年去世后的20多年里，公司年均复合增长率仅为3%至4%，表现较为疲软，目前约3000亿美元的市值几乎不可能在2036年创立150周年时实现查理·芒格设想的2万亿美元假想目标。 与百事公司通过收购菲多利（Frito-Lay）成功切入零食领域、凭借佳得乐掌控60%以上运动饮料市场的多元化战略不同，可口可乐在新饮料品类（如纯净水 Dasani、以50亿美元高价收购的 Body Armor）上的反应屡屡表现出“迟缓跟进”的滞后特征。主播指出，尽管公司曾尝试孵化500多个品牌并最终精简至约200个，但近二十年来最成功的增量依然来自核心碳酸产品线的内生延伸（如2005年推出的零度可乐 Coke Zero），其多元化未能真正摆脱对核心汽水引擎的路径依赖。 可口可乐的历史证明了特许经营网络、高毛利浓缩液模式与超级品牌心智所能创造的商业奇迹。然而播客讨论留下的未解悬念在于，面对全球消费习惯的永久性健康转向，这一依赖含糖产品沉淀的庞大分销机器，未来究竟能否仅靠无糖产品线的内部改良与防御性收购，维系其作为全球顶级现金流印钞机的特权地位。

## Background 本节目由知名商业播客 Acquired（Ben Gilbert 与 David Rosenthal 主持）于 2025 年 11 月 24 日发布在 YouTube 平台。节目长达近 4 小时，详尽回顾了可口可乐公司从 19 世纪末的专利药糖水，演进为全球规模经济奇迹与文化符号的百年完整商业史与战略脉络。 ## TL;DR 节目围绕查理·芒格关于“打造 2 万亿美元饮料帝国”的思想实验展开，系统复盘了可口可乐从彭伯顿博士发明配方、坎德勒商业化，到罗伯特·伍德拉夫确立生活方式广告与全球化特许装瓶网络的传奇历程。全片深入剖析了二战军供红利、麦当劳战略联盟、百事挑战引发的可乐战争，以及 1985 年“新可乐”（New Coke）公关灾难与经典配方王者归来的历史细节。随后，节目进一步探讨了戈伊苏埃塔时代的资本运作、巴菲特入局、现代全品类饮料转型悖论，并借助商业七力模型（7 Powers）解构了其规模经济与排他性装瓶商网络筑起的坚固护城河。 ## Atmosphere & style 整期节目洋溢着 Acquired 标志性的深度叙事魅力与风趣幽默的对谈氛围，两位主播如数家珍般将厚重的百年商业档案串联成扣人心弦的商战史诗。从药房调酒台的偶然碰撞到跨国资本博弈，叙事节奏跌宕起伏，既有对“新可乐”公关灾难与乔布斯“糖水之问”的犀利戏谑，亦有对商业系统底层经济学与芒格思想实验的敬畏沉思。听众仿佛置身于一场兼具学术严谨度与炉边夜话般松弛感的商业复盘盛宴，在冰镇气泡与文化符号的交织中领略商业帝国的本质。 ## Bulletin - [03:22:47](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=12167s) 可口可乐系统年总流水达1,750亿美元，母公司凭借仅占全系统10%的7万名员工，斩获470亿美元营收与106亿美元净利润，净利润率维持在23%左右，毛利率常年保持在60%上下。 - [39:49](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=2389s) 特许装瓶模式源于1899年一份1美元象征性且无期限限制的意外合同，可口可乐借此以零重资产投入撬动了覆盖全球200多家独立装瓶商与950个灌装厂的排他性开放分销网络。 - [01:41:11](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=6071s) 二战期间可口可乐争取到美军战时白糖无限配给与“技术观察员”身份，在前线运送64座便携装瓶厂并派发50至100亿瓶可乐，完成商业史上最大规模的免费品尝计划，为海外扩张提前铺垫了25年。 - [02:48:22](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=10102s) 1985年“新可乐（New Coke）”因忽略消费者对品牌的情感依附酿成公关灾难，上市仅79天即宣布原配方以Coca-Cola Classic之名回归，反而重置了不利的装瓶合同并激活了更强的品牌狂热。 ## Key takeaways - [02:14](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=134s) 可口可乐的底层商业飞轮由生理奖赏（糖、咖啡因与气泡刺激）、随处可及的平价渠道渗透以及巴甫洛夫式的心理情感绑定共同驱动。 - [05:52](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=352s) 19世纪后期的专利药热潮奠定了现代快消品牌与全国性大众营销的雏形，可口可乐最初便是作为缓解吗啡成瘾与神经衰弱的无酒精药水诞生。 - [24:21](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=1461s) 弗兰克·罗宾逊不仅命名了Coca-Cola并手绘出流线型商标，还发明了商业史上首张优惠券，通过药房超80%的高毛利分成机制迅速激活了渠道裂变。 - [42:40](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=2560s) 1899年的1美元装瓶合同虽然存在无期限供货的法律漏洞，却倒逼可口可乐构建起专注浓缩液与营销的超轻资产“类Visa”开放特许网络。 - [57:42](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=3462s) 1915年诞生的经典佐治亚绿弧形瓶（Mae West）拥有黑暗中可辨识的极高辨识度，并在1951年被罕见授予永久包装商标，成为品牌护城河的核心资产。 - [01:19:14](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=4754s) 罗伯特·伍德拉夫与达西广告联手开创“生活方式广告”，通过哈顿·珊布的插画重新定义了红袍白胡子的现代圣诞老人，彻底攻占冬季饮品市场并打破季节性消费限制。 - [01:33:56](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=5636s) 百事可乐在大萧条期间通过12盎司回收啤酒瓶实施“花同样的钱买双倍容量”的反向定位，成功撕开了可口可乐因专有设备与高端品牌包袱无法跟进的细分缺口。 - [02:04:29](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=7469s) 麦当劳自1955年起与可口可乐维系长达数十年的非书面口头协议，享有全管路深度预冷、微调更高糖浆比例等定制特权，成为可口可乐稳守餐饮现打渠道基本盘的关键盟友。 - [02:16:10](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=8170s) 1975年发起的“百事挑战”利用百事口感更甜偏柠檬香、在单口盲测更占优势的特性，在超市渠道实现份额逆袭，倒逼可口可乐在1982年打破圣牛禁忌推出极高利润的健怡可乐（Diet Coke）。 - [02:55:22](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=10522s) 新可乐危机证明可口可乐不仅是功能性碳酸饮料，更承载着公众集体记忆与精神寄托；唐·基奥以名言“我们既没有那么蠢，也没有那么聪明”顺势迎回经典配方化险为夷。 - [02:59:31](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=10771s) 沃伦·巴菲特自1988年起斥资13亿美元建仓可口可乐，看重其经历管理层折腾后依然坚不可摧的护城河，累计贡献约120亿美元股息且分红成本收益率高达60%至80%。 - [03:08:47](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=11327s) 进入后郭思达时代，面对全美肥胖危机与含糖软饮放缓，可口可乐在品类多元化扩张中错失全资收购Monster能量饮料与佳得乐的良机，转型面临高毛利核心大单品依赖与健康风险的双重悖论。 - [03:33:22](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=12802s) 在7 Powers商业模型下，可口可乐最本质的竞争优势并非被神话的绝密配方，而是其庞大出货量摊销成本的规模经济，以及遍布全球、具备独家排他法律壁垒的特许装瓶商分销网络。 ## Detailed walkthrough ### [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=0s) 糖水、万亿帝国与查理·芒格的思想实验 节目在一场充满戏剧性的调侃中开场。Ben Gilbert 感叹道，他们居然要为一个本质上完全由“糖浆、糖和水”构成的生意做一期长达四个小时的播客——仅仅是这三样原料的组合，竟然支撑起了一家市值超过 3000 亿美元的商业帝国。David Rosenthal 随即用史蒂夫·乔布斯当年招揽约翰·斯卡利时的传世名言予以回应：“你是想卖一辈子糖水，还是想跟我一起改变世界？” 在宣布 Acquired 2025 年秋季季正式回归后，Ben 抛出了投资大师查理·芒格（Charlie Munger）一个著名的商业思想实验：假设回到 19 世纪 80 年代，给你 200 万美元的初始启动资金，要求从零开始打造一家最终市值达到 2 万亿美元的企业。这意味着投资者要追逐高达 100 万倍的回报，达成芒格口中所谓的“合力效应（Lollapalooza）大爆发”。不仅如此，芒格还给出了极其严苛的附加限制条件： 1. 它必须是一家非酒精饮料企业； 2. 在漫长的发展过程中，必须持续向股东派发数十亿美元计的真金白银股息。 面对这个看似天方夜谭的设想，David 半开玩笑地反问：“那我第一步是不是得问问，配方里允不允许掺入现在被列为毒品的成分？”事实证明，这不仅切实可行，而且正是可口可乐日后风靡全球的关键契机之一。要实现这种规模的财富创造，产品绝不能是平庸无奇的大宗通用商品，必须建立起一个受到强力商标保护的知名品牌；同时，其口味必须具备跨越文化和国界的普遍普适性。所幸的是，人类每天必须摄入大量水分才能维持生命，这为饮料构筑了一个近乎无限广阔的基础市场。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 芒格两万亿美元饮料帝国思想实验核心框架 accDescr: 展示从200万美元初始资本到2万亿美元帝国的战略要素与约束条件 subgraph Constraints["核心约束与目标"] C1["初始资金：200 万美元"] C2["目标市值：2 万亿美元（100万倍）"] C3["赛道限制：非酒精饮料"] C4["现金流要求：持续分红数百亿美元"] end subgraph ProductPillars["终极产品组合"] P1["强力商标与全球普适风味"] P2["生理奖赏：热量、二氧化碳与神经兴奋剂"] P3["永不更改的核心秘密配方"] end subgraph BusinessModel["轻资产飞轮"] B1["无死角无缝分销（The Real Thing）"] B2["巴甫洛夫式情感联结（快乐/生活方式）"] B3["利用特许瓶装商资本实现全球扩张"] end Constraints --> ProductPillars ProductPillars --> BusinessModel ``` ### [02:14](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=134s) 打造两万亿饮料帝国的商业配方 如何把一瓶水做成终极上瘾的印钞机？节目拆解了这套精密的商业心智闭环： - **生理层面的极致奖赏**：饮料不能只是简单地解渴，而要经过极度精密的设计，使其在任何气候条件下都能提供无与伦比的清凉刺激感。它需要注入足够的热量提供即时能量，调配出诱人的风味、口感与香气，并且必须加入咖啡因、糖（以及早期的微量可卡因）等能够刺激神经中枢的成分，使用户产生难以戒断的生理愉悦。 - **无处不在的低价渗透**：为了防止竞争对手搭便车，正牌产品（"The Real Thing"）必须做到在任何时间、任何地点，只要消费者一伸手、一开口就能以极其低廉的价格买到。通过织密“随时随地（Always）”的渠道网络，彻底消灭任何竞争真空，让消费者根本没有理由选择替代品。 - **巴甫洛夫式的情感广告轰炸**：绝大多数人在日常生活中并不会无时无刻不在琢磨饮料。因此，品牌必须砸下天量营销预算，把饮料强行锚定在人们最向往的美好事物上——家庭温情、美好生活、体坛偶像、俊男靓女、圣诞节乃至纯粹的“快乐”本身，建立起条件反射般的心理印记。 - **极致的轻资产运营**：庞大沉重的装瓶工厂和复杂的物流配送如果全靠自己投钱，资本回报率将被彻底拖垮。因此，必须设计出一套绝妙的特许分销机制，撬动外部合作者的资本和雇员来分担基础设施建设，而总部只需依靠为数不多的几个核心浓缩液工厂供应全球，牢牢掌控品牌与配方主权。 - **致命的黄金铁律**：在任何情况下，绝不能擅自更改配方与风味——这也是日后可口可乐险些跌入万劫不复深渊的经典商战教训。 纵观其 140 年的历史，可口可乐正是近乎完美地践行了这套策略体系。它的根系发端于美国内战的血雨腥风，伴随着内燃机与汽车文明普及、大萧条的苦难、两次世界大战的枪炮声一路狂飙，又在 20 世纪 70 年代毫无违和感地融入了嬉皮士反叛浪潮，再到 80 年代与百事可乐展开刀刀见血的“两乐可乐大战”。这不仅是一家公司的传记，更是美国商业文明如何向全球扩张并重塑人类消费文化的缩影。 ### [05:52](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=352s) 战后创伤、万灵丹与美国消费主义的萌芽 可口可乐诞生的温床，深植于南北战争结束后重获统一的美国社会土壤中。正如马克·彭德格拉斯特（Mark Pendergrast）在权威著作《为了上帝、国家和可口可乐》（*For God, Country, and Coca-Cola*）中所写的那样：“可口可乐始终是美国最美好与最糟糕一面的象征，它是美国历史的微观缩影。可口可乐与这个国家一同成长，既被时代塑造，又深刻塑造了时代。它不仅改变了大众的消费习惯，还重塑了人们对待闲暇、工作、广告、两性、家庭生活乃至爱国主义的观念。” 如果要探究战后商业的孵化器，除了标准石油所代表的真正石油工业外，另一个畸形繁荣的行业则是兜售“蛇油”（Snake Oil）的江湖郎中，即所谓的“专利药”（Patent Medicines）行业。在这一产业诞生之前，全美乃至全世界根本不存在跨区域的全国性大众消费品牌。当时有的只是横贯东西的铁路网和重工业托拉斯，所有消费品都停留在作坊式的本地流通状态，市场上没有现代意义上的包装消费品（CPG）公司，没有连锁超市，没有汽车制造厂，也没有加油站，更不存在现代广告代理公司。正是专利药这颗原始的“晶种”，催生了日后的现代消费帝国。 - **早期的虚假神话**：在南北战争前，约翰·D·洛克菲勒的父亲就是一个四处流窜的蛇油小贩。这些自制药水宣称包治百病，从恶心、消化不良、头痛，到癌症、肺结核、颅骨骨折、瘫痪乃至阳痿，完全没有任何科学研究与临床数据支撑。 - **内战遗留的剧痛与成瘾**：残酷的南北战争带来了成千上万伤残退伍军人。巨大的长期肉体痛苦，促使这批军人广泛依赖吗啡镇痛，从而在战后大面积患上所谓的“陆军病”（Army Disease）——即严重的终身吗啡成瘾。 - **资本与广告的合流**：面对千家万户深重的身心创伤与镇痛需求，具有商业嗅觉的江湖商贩们敏锐地抓住了商机，迅速将家庭熬制的药水工业化、标准化规模生产。为了设立进入壁垒，他们刻意将产品包装为神秘的“专利药”（尽管绝大部分并未获得任何官方专利）。为了在全国范围内争夺成瘾患者与普通大众的心智，专利药厂商率先开始在战后蓬勃发展的报刊杂志上大规模投放版面广告，直接催生了早期的现代美国广告业。 ### [10:22](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=622s) 专利药的商业奇迹：从廉价提取物到现代消费品牌 专利药之所以能成为奠定现代大众传媒与广告业商业模式的温床，其根本原因在于极其诱人的经济模型——正如查理·芒格在那个著名的思想实验中所揭示的，专利药的原料本质上全是大宗商品。树叶、坚果提取物以及水，这些随处可见且极其廉价的原料能够被大批量采购，随后通过简单的加工转化为成品。由于其体积小、重量轻且易于运输，早期的专利药厂商迅速建立起规模效应，并打造出了美国最早的一批全国性知名品牌。 听众可能会以为专利药只是泛黄的历史尘埃，但事实上，今天货架上琳琅满目的日常消费品中，有相当一部分都脱胎于当年的专利药。其中一些至今仍保留着健康或医疗用途，例如鲁登氏（Luden's）润喉糖、息可舒薄荷膏（Vicks VapoRub）、凡士林（Vaseline）以及李施德林（Listerine）漱口水。而另一些曾经的“灵丹妙药”则早已褪去医药光环，摇身一变成为大众食品饮料：全麦饼干（Graham crackers）最初是作为节制欲望、调理身体的药物发明的；“既不含葡萄也不含坚果”的葡萄坚果麦片（Grape-Nuts）起家也是药膳；调酒中制作古典鸡尾酒（Old Fashioned）必不可少的安哥斯图拉苦精（Angostura bitters），早年更是地地道道的肠胃药。甚至连大名鼎鼎的胡椒博士（Dr Pepper）的诞生时间也早于可口可乐，同样源自那个药剂师在大铜锅里调配秘方的时代。 - **源自专利药的现代健康与个护产品**：Luden's 润喉糖、Vicks VapoRub、Vaseline（凡士林）、Listerine（李施德林）。 - **完成“去医药化”的食品与调味品**：Graham crackers（全麦饼干）、Grape-Nuts 麦片、Angostura 苦精。 - **碳酸饮料的药房渊源**：Dr Pepper 与可口可乐（Coca-Cola）皆诞生于 19 世纪末的专利药狂潮之中。 --- ### [12:13](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=733s) 约翰·彭伯顿博士与 1880 年代的可卡因狂热 可口可乐的诞生，始于约翰·彭伯顿博士（Dr. John Pemberton）那段充满创伤的过往。作为一名参加过美国内战的南部邦联退伍军人，彭伯顿在战场上不仅被马刀刺伤，还曾中弹身负重伤。为了抑制常年剧烈的肉体疼痛，他和其他无数老兵一样，不幸患上了所谓的“军队病”（Army disease）——即对吗啡产生了严重的药物依赖并抱憾终身。战后彭伯顿移居亚特兰大，在这个蓬勃发展的专利药消费新浪潮中寻找商业机会，更迫切的是为了拯救自己。他开始四处寻觅能够替代吗啡、治愈自己毒瘾的新药物。正是在 1880 年代中期，他撞上了一种横扫全美、号称包治百病（包括治愈吗啡成瘾）的“奇迹神药”——可卡因（Cocaine）。 在 1880 年代的美国，可卡因的流行程度堪比后来 1980 年代的狂潮，但不同之处在于，当年的可卡因不仅完全合法，甚至得到了社会各界的公开推崇与鼓励。当时既没有美国食品药品监督管理局（FDA）来判定其非法，社会大众也没有意识到其可怕的成瘾机制与致命副作用，人们对待可卡因的态度几乎就如同今天对待咖啡因一样习以为常。可卡因顺理成章地成为了市场上最炙手可热的专利药成分，甚至可以说是当时各类神药配方中“唯一真正能产生立竿见影生理反应的成分”。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 彭伯顿研发可口可乐的历史脉络 accDescr: 展示彭伯顿从战伤成瘾到受到法国马里亚尼酒启发，再因禁酒令转向研发无酒精软饮的演变过程。 subgraph Trauma["创伤与成瘾"] A["内战刀枪创伤"] --> B["身患'军队病'<br/>(长期依赖吗啡)"] end subgraph Inspiration["灵感来源"] B --> C["寻找吗啡替代物"] C --> D["邂逅1880年代全美合法推崇的<br/>'奇迹神药'：可卡因"] D --> E["模仿法国波尔多爆款<br/>Vin Mariani (古柯葡萄酒)"] end subgraph Innovation["产品迭代"] E --> F["添加高浓度非洲可乐果咖啡因<br/>推出'彭伯顿法国古柯葡萄酒'"] F --> G["1885年亚特兰大实施禁酒令"] G --> H["剥离酒精、保留提神功效<br/>1886年调制出最初的可口可乐糖浆"] end ``` --- ### [13:49](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=829s) 法国马里亚尼酒的启发与“法国古柯葡萄酒”的诞生 彼时全美最顶级的可卡因摄入载体，并非粉末或药丸，而是一款来自法国波尔多的进口高档货——马里亚尼酒（Vin Mariani）。这是一种将古柯叶成分融入波尔多葡萄酒中的强化酒，被主持人们打趣为“那个时代所能想象出的最极端的 Four Loko”。这款跨大西洋产品的背书名单堪称人类近代史上的奇观：发明家托马斯·爱迪生、西部传奇人物布法罗·比尔·科迪（Buffalo Bill Cody）、美国第 25 任总统威廉·麦金莱、英国维多利亚女王，甚至还有梵蒂冈连续三任教皇都公开为马里亚尼酒背书并盛赞其神奇功效。 商业嗅觉敏锐的彭伯顿在亚特兰大目睹了马里亚尼酒的巨大商业成功，立刻萌生了“借鉴并超越它”的想法。为了压倒竞争对手，彭伯顿想出了一记猛招：在可卡因的基础上再注入大量咖啡因。他没有选择普通的咖啡豆，而是特意挑选了产自西非的“可乐果”（Kola nuts，这是“Cola”一词历史上首次进入美国日常词汇）。尽管可乐果极其苦涩，但其咖啡因浓度远超普通咖啡豆，彭伯顿正是看中了这种强劲的刺激感。他随之推出了自己的改良版本——“彭伯顿法国古柯葡萄酒”（Pemberton's French Wine Coca）。 这款融合了古柯叶可卡因与可乐果咖啡因的烈性混合药酒在市场上大放异彩，就连身患癌症的美国前总统、联邦军总司令尤利西斯·S·格兰特（Ulysses S. Grant）临终前也成为了它的拥趸。彭伯顿在亚特兰大及周边地区迅速卖出了数千瓶。由于葡萄酒自带天然防腐属性，能在常温下稳定保存数月，因此在 1880 年代封装技术极其原始、无法保存碳酸汽水的情况下，以葡萄酒为载体使得彭伯顿的产品得以顺利装瓶走入千家万户。 --- ### [16:40](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=1000s) 亚特兰大禁酒令与 1886 年绝密配方的诞生 然而好景不长，派对在 1885 年秋天戛然而止。亚特兰大成为美国首批推行禁酒令的大城市之一，彻底变为不准售卖任何酒精饮料的“禁酒之城”（dry town）。彭伯顿畅销的“法国古柯葡萄酒”一夜之间被宣判了死刑。面临绝境的他必须争分夺秒，赶在破产之前剥离掉酒精，研发出一款“软饮”（Soft drink）——这正是现代“软饮料”一词的真正词源，意指不含“硬酒精”（Hard liquor）的无酒精饮料。 根据专门查阅过可口可乐全部内部绝密档案的商业传记《秘密配方》（*Secret Formula*）记载，彭伯顿在此刻彻底觉醒了他的“资本家本能”。他退后一步重新审视整个商业版图： 1. **打破传统专利药的局限**：传统专利药每瓶售价高达 75 美分甚至 1 美元，购买人群狭窄，往往只有饱受严重病痛或身染毒瘾的人在迫不得已时才会掏钱。 2. **捕捉新时代的社交红利**：此时距离内战结束已过去整整 20 年，新一代没有“军队病”创伤的年轻消费者正在崛起；当时的社区药房冷饮柜台（Soda fountain）正是那个时代的“星巴克”，是大众聚会聊天的核心第三空间。 3. **5 美分高毛利随时畅饮**：既然植物提取物成本微乎其微，为何不做一款定价仅为 5 美分、毛利极高、人人随时随地都能买得起的“日常社交小犒赏”？ 彭伯顿立刻将产品定位从治病的“药”转向了任何时刻都能带来提神快感的“清凉提神饮料”（anytime refreshment）。为了打造这一饮品，他在地下室疯狂试验了整整 6 个月。值得一提的是，最初配方中的咖啡因含量足足是现代可口可乐的 4 倍，即便剥离掉可卡因，它也绝对称得上一款超强劲的“能量饮料”。然而，纯天然的可乐果种子极其苦涩难咽，此前靠红酒的浓郁风味尚可掩饰，如今要做成清凉爽口的汽水糖浆则必须彻底解决口感问题。令人惊叹的是，早在 1886 年，彭伯顿就找到了现代化工的解法：德国著名制药先驱默克公司（Merck）当时已经掌握了从可乐果中工业提取纯咖啡因的技术，彭伯顿索性直接从默克采购了高纯度合成咖啡因粉末。换言之，可口可乐配方中象征性的可乐果原液只占微不足道的极少比例，其强劲的提神功能从一开始就建立在默克的纯提取咖啡因之上。 经过无数次尝试，彭伯顿终于在 1886 年 4 月敲定了这一传世配方。《秘密配方》生动地还原了当时的制作场景：在暗无天日的地下室里，彭伯顿在一个 40 加仑的大铜锅里注满清水，在明火上加热至沸腾。他手持长长的木桨在锅中剧烈搅拌，倒入海量白糖以中和古柯叶与可乐果残留的强烈苦味，并融化了默克的咖啡因粉；接着，他倒进焦糖调色剂，赋予了糖浆标志性的深暗波特酒色；为了平衡糖分的甜腻并赋予饮品独特的酸甜爽口感，他按比例加入了新鲜青柠汁、柠檬酸以及磷酸；待基础混合液冷却后，彭伯顿迎来了最复杂的风味调配阶段——他陆续混入了香草精、香橙花露（elixir of orange）以及从多种水果、草本和树木中提取的烈性挥发油，包括柠檬油、肉豆蔻油、香菜油（芫荽油）、苦橙花油（Neroli，常用于高档香水）；而其中最为异域风情的原料，当属俗称“中国肉桂”的肉桂皮油（Oil of Cassia）。在这口沸腾的大锅中，世界上第一批可口可乐原液糖浆悄然成型。 ### [21:01](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=1261s) 配方中的“神秘猛料”与命名背后的绝妙讽刺 约翰·彭伯顿博士（Dr. John Pemberton）在调配这款新型软饮料糖浆时，加入了古柯叶的流浸膏以及来自亚洲热带地区的成分。一个多世纪后的今天，人们已无法精确还原最初那批糖浆里究竟含有多少可卡因。但在当时的配方中，微量可卡因搭配上相当于当今可口可乐四倍剂量的咖啡因与高浓度糖分，让这杯药水成了一款极具刺激性的“高能提神饮料”。根据多方文献测算，在投产最初的十年里，喝下大约四到五杯可口可乐所摄入的可卡因总量，大概相当于当今吸食一整条线可卡因的分量。 主播们打趣道，如果真一次性灌下四五杯那时的可乐，你不仅摄入了等同于一条可卡因的剂量，还瞬间干掉了相当于如今整整十六罐可乐的咖啡因与巨量糖分。在这种夸张的搭配下，糖和咖啡因带来的剧烈生理冲击可能远比可卡因更让人亢奋，但无论如何，喝完绝对会让人极度上头。尽管可卡因在短短几年后就几乎被完全剔除，但它却奠定了这款饮料半个世纪以来的招牌名称。 彭伯顿的商业合伙人弗兰克·罗宾逊（Frank Robinson）想出了一个既直白又极具韵律感的完美名字——“Coca-Cola”（可口可乐）。这其中充满了一种历史的黑色幽默：这款饮料之所以叫 Coca-Cola，是因为古柯叶（Coca）和可拉果（Cola）。然而配方中的咖啡因很快变成了单独提取物，仅含有微不可察的一小滴可拉果提取液；而可卡因也迅速被几乎完全剔除。于是在接下来的140年里，这款名震全球的饮料既没有多少“古柯”，也没有多少“可拉”。 --- ### [22:49](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=1369s) 药房苏打冷饮柜与“气泡香槟”的偶然碰撞 确定了产品后，两人开始着手将其推向亚特兰大各地的药房苏打冷饮柜（Soda Fountain）。在当时的时代背景下，由于缺乏现代灌装保鲜技术，非酒精类饮品无法像酒类那样凭借天然酒精防腐长期存放，人们想要喝到水和牛奶之外的现制新鲜饮品，唯一的去处就是药房。彼时的药房大量售卖液体制剂的专利药品，同时还引入了被视作健康补品的矿泉水与碳酸水。久而久之，这些药房柜台逐渐演变为大众日常社交的核心场所。 可口可乐之所以能成为带有气泡的爽口饮料，源于一次决定性的偶然。彭伯顿将熬制好的一桶浓稠深色糖浆带到街角的一家药房，药房的掌柜在调制时，没有选择像普通药水那样掺入纯净水，而是主动选择了碳酸水与糖浆勾兑。正是这灵光一闪的决定，赋予了可乐如香槟般细腻丰沛的翻腾气泡。如果当时选择了无气泡的静止饮品路线，它大概率会像当年成百上千种早已被遗忘的专利药水一样，迅速湮灭在历史尘埃中。 --- ### [24:21](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=1461s) 弗兰克·罗宾逊的天才手迹与商业史上的第一张优惠券 走向市场的可口可乐迅速赢得了消费者的狂热喜爱。它兼具双重属性：既具备当时宣传中可卡因与咖啡因带来的所谓“提神药效”，又拥有极其美妙可口的味觉享受。1887年，作为彭伯顿合伙人（表面上也是其账房先生）的弗兰克·罗宾逊再次展现了惊人的天赋——他亲手用当时流行的斯宾塞体（Spencerian script）书写了流线型的“Coca-Cola”标识。这一经典字标历经近一百四十年的岁月冲刷，除了细节上的微调，几乎原封不动地沿用至今。 更为天才的是罗宾逊构想的营销与分销策略。由于初创团队缺乏雄厚的资本，无法像老牌专利药厂商那样在报刊上大肆投放昂贵的印刷广告，罗宾逊决定另辟蹊径：他们印制了一批可兑换免费可口可乐的饮品券，直接按照亚特兰大城市名录上的地址挨家挨户邮寄。与此同时，他们还将兑换券大量分发给走南闯北的非竞争性流动推销员，让他们在跑业务时顺手发放给客户。 这张诞生于1888年前后、外观酷似微型美元纸币的兑换券，被公认为商业史上第一张由制造商发售、可在零售端直接兑现的消费优惠券（Manufacturer's coupon）。这项机制对日后可口可乐的爆发式裂变起到了奠基性的作用。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 优惠券飞轮驱动可口可乐全价值链增长 accDescr: 展示免费兑换券如何将消费者、药房零售商以及巡回推销员的利益完全对齐并推动可口可乐快速扩张 subgraph GrowthLoop ["优惠券增长飞轮"] Coupon["发放免费品尝券<br/>(按地址邮寄 / 业务员派送)"] Consumer["消费者零门槛进店兑换<br/>(体验高糖+咖啡因极佳口感)"] Store["苏打冷饮柜客流量暴增<br/>(形成复购，享受惊人高毛利)"] Flywheel["可乐糖浆出货量激增<br/>(飞轮自运转带动全渠道扩张)"] Coupon --> Consumer Consumer --> Store Store --> Flywheel Flywheel --> Coupon end ``` 这种营销机制彻底理顺了整个产业链中每个角色的利益激励： - **终端消费者**：毫无门槛地免费喝到一杯前所未有的提神美味冷饮，迅速建立味觉与心理依赖。 - **药房苏打冷饮柜**：免费兑换券为门店带来了前所未有的汹涌客流。更关键的是其惊人的暴利空间——可口可乐以每加仑约1.30美元的价格向药房供应浓缩糖浆，1加仑糖浆可稀释勾兑出128杯可乐，药房以每杯5美分零售，单加仑即可斩获6.40美元的营业额。扣除仅1.30美元的原料成本，零售毛利率极其丰厚。 - **流动推销员**：免费获得了一款极具吸引力的优质赠品，可以用它作为顺水人情取悦客户，极大促进了自身主营业务的开展。 --- ### [29:08](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=1748s) 彭伯顿暗度陈仓与坎德勒的2300美元抄底 可口可乐推向市场仅一年半左右，创始人内部就出现了剧变。发明了配方后的彭伯顿长期缠绵病榻且饱受吗啡成瘾折磨，感觉自己大限将至。他在没有告知合伙人弗兰克·罗宾逊的情况下，背地里悄悄将可口可乐配方的权益切碎、低价倒卖给了多个不同买家，引发了一场混乱而错综复杂的产权危机。 罗宾逊察觉这一背叛后，紧急联络了亚特兰大本地富有远见的精明商人阿萨·坎德勒（Asa Candler）。罗宾逊力邀坎德勒入局，由坎德勒出面收拾烂摊子，逐一收回并整合散落各处的股权与配方所有权。1891年，坎德勒完成了对所有分散权益的彻底收购，总计仅仅耗费了约2,300美元，堪称商业史上最不可思议的抄底交易之一。1892年，在罗宾逊的全力辅佐下，坎德勒正式组建并注册了现代意义上的可口可乐公司（The Coca-Cola Company）。 在此期间，即便没有成熟职业经理人打理、产权深陷官司泥潭，这款具备极致产品力的饮品依然展现出了惊人的自发爆炸式增长： - **1887年（上市首年）**：彭伯顿与罗宾逊售出600加仑糖浆，相当于约7.5万杯可口可乐。 - **1889年（上市两年后）**：糖浆销量翻了两番，突破2,000加仑。 - **1890年（上市三年后）**：糖浆出货量飙升至近10,000加仑，在完全缺乏专业化运营体系的前提下，三年内实现了超过10倍的野蛮生长。 ### [31:54](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=1914s) 1892年的印钞机：惊人的利润率与首年财务账本 可口可乐从公司正式成立的第一天起，就是一头不可思议的现金流怪兽。1892年是可口可乐公司（The Coca-Cola Company）正式运营的第一年，留存至今的账本详尽记录了他们当时惊人的暴利程度：全年用于原材料和生产运营的总成本刚刚超过 20,000 美元，而这笔支出几乎已经打包了公司的所有日常开销。当时整家公司满打满算只有大约三名员工，包括创始人阿萨·坎德勒（Asa Candler）本人。此外，他们还拿出了刚刚超过 10,000 美元砸向广告投放。 在这样的成本结构下，他们第一年总共售出了 35,360 加仑可乐糖浆，平均批发价为每加仑 1.30 美元，带来 46,000 美元的营收和高达 12,000 美元的净利润。作为对比，1892年美国全国家庭的平均年收入仅为大约 500 美元。换言之，可口可乐仅凭三个人的团队，首年创造的人均利润就达到了普通美国家庭收入的八倍。 更夸张的是终端市场的零售总值。可口可乐公司当时仅仅出售浓缩糖浆，各地的汽水机药房（Soda Fountain）以每杯 5 美分的价格将糖浆兑上碳酸水卖给顾客，折合每加仑零售额高达 6.40 美元。这意味着在 1892 年，可口可乐在消费市场上的终端零售总额已接近 25 万美元。全产业链终端创造了 25 万美元销售额，而可口可乐公司的原料、制造和全部广告支出加起来不过 3 万美元出头——仅仅占终端零售额的十分之一左右。在如此厚重的利润垫下，整个生态体系中的每一个环节都能分到极为丰厚的利润。 - **1892年公司总支出**：约 20,000 美元生产及运营成本 + 约 10,000 美元广告费用。 - **1892年糖浆销量**：35,360 加仑，批发均价 1.30 美元/加仑。 - **财务表现**：公司营收 46,000 美元，净利润 12,000 美元；全社会终端零售额接近 250,000 美元。 - **人均产出对比**：当时美国家庭平均年收入约 500 美元，可口可乐团队仅 3 人，人均创造利润为社会平均家庭收入的 8 倍。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 1892年可口可乐糖浆与零售价值链流转图 accDescr: 展示从原材料与广告投入到可口可乐公司批发，再到药房汽水机端零售放大的资金与产品流转过程。 subgraph CostSide["可口可乐公司成本投入"] A["原材料与生产运营: ~$20,000"] B["广告营销费用: ~$10,000"] end subgraph CompanyOutput["公司端批发与利润"] C["浓缩糖浆 35,360 加仑<br/>出厂批发价: $1.30/加仑"] D["公司营收: $46,000<br/>净利润: $12,000"] end subgraph RetailEnd["药房汽水机终端"] E["调兑碳酸水按杯销售<br/>折合零售额: $6.40/加仑"] F["全社会零售总额: ~$250,000<br/>药房坐享超80%零售毛利"] end CostSide --> C C --> D C --> E E --> F ``` ### [33:55](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=2035s) 占领视觉：药房免费招牌与早期的铺天盖地式营销 手握极其丰厚的利润空间，可口可乐在接下来的几年里开启了激进的广告扩张。不过，那时的广告形式与今天人们熟悉的情感叙事截然不同——它属于纯粹的“内在属性广告”（Intrinsic Advertising），核心仍是在向公众推介这是一款兼具提神与社交功能的非酒精饮料，同时还带着挥之不去的专利特药印记。当时典型的广告文案十分写实甚至有些滑稽：“可口可乐是理想的益脑滋补品，专治头痛与神经衰弱，让悲伤者开怀，令体弱者强健。”这种带有神药色彩的宣传，虽然距离日后“清爽一刻”（The Pause That Refreshes）的生活方式营销还很遥远，但在渠道触达和终端物料的铺陈上，弗兰克·罗宾逊（Frank Robinson）与坎德勒已经走在了时代前列。 他们对户外广告和销售终端（POS）的视觉占领近乎狂热。罗宾逊设计的可口可乐手写体商标开始铺满亚特兰大乃至全美的大街小巷：油布挂旗、建筑外墙彩绘、大型户外广告牌、有轨电车站，以及送进每家药房的展示海报。他们很快意识到光发海报还不够，进而推出了印有醒目红白 Logo 的日历、收纳展示柜、托盘、专用玻璃杯和挂钟。从 1894 年起，可口可乐在全美乡村各处的农仓侧壁和建筑墙面上累计手绘了超过两万幅大型壁画广告，视觉冲击力极强。 他们还将丰厚的利润空间转化成对分销渠道的绝对掌控：为全美的药房免费定制门头大招牌。可口可乐主动找上药房老板，提出由公司负责出资、设计、制作并免费送货上门，打造一块气派体面的大招牌。招牌上会用大号字体标出药房的名字，而在同样显眼的位置并列印上巨大的可口可乐 Logo。这让数以千计的药房在外观上看起来如同可口可乐的“官方专卖店”。药房老板对此趋之若鹜，因为他们无需任何资本开支就能翻新门面，而且卖可口可乐能赚取超过 80% 的超高零售毛利，自然愿意把可口可乐当作全店第一主推单品。 - **实物衍生品渗透**：截至 1898 年，公司每年对外分发的品牌促销衍生品（日历、杯托、挂钟等）突破 100 万件。 - **乡村壁画攻势**：自 1894 年起，在乡村农仓和外墙绘制了多达 20,000 面巨型彩绘广告。 - **渠道赋能模式**：为南方及全国数千家药房免费制作带有药房与可口可乐双 Logo 的大型招牌，形成零资本支出的“准特许加盟”网络。 ### [36:50](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=2210s) 从“治头痛的神药”到“美味与畅爽”：全民饮品的诞生 轻量、紧凑且易于常温保存的浓缩糖浆，配合免费赠饮券的病毒式打法，构成了可口可乐无往不利的全国扩张策略。药房汽水机只需要一台碳酸水喷头和几加仑糖浆就能开卖。到 1895 年，全美每一个州和领地的汽水吧里，都至少有一处在销售可口可乐。同年，可口可乐公司正式获得了标志性手写体商标的注册保护，并开始在宣传物料中率先引入体育明星与知名名人的代言合作，同时在所有可见角落将“每杯仅需5美分”的价格标签牢牢焊死在公众认知中。 在这个过程中，可口可乐的品牌定位迎来了脱胎换骨的演变，而这在很大程度上要归功于弗兰克·罗宾逊的商业敏锐度。罗宾逊开始有意识地剔除“治偏头痛、缓解神经衰弱”等传统专利药式的陈词滥调，转而全力主打日后名扬天下的核心口号——“美味与畅爽”（Delicious and Refreshing）。正如罗宾逊后来在《为了上帝、国家与可口可乐》（*For God, Country, and Coca-Cola*）一书中所言：“我们发现自己过去只在向极少数人做广告，也就是那些需要‘益脑滋补剂’的病人，而我们真正应该面向的是广大人民群众。” 这成为可口可乐历史上最关键的品牌跃迁之一。罗宾逊直觉性地意识到，绝对不能让品牌与“头痛”、“神经衰弱”等负面痛苦产生心理锚定，而必须与“美味”、“畅爽”、“社交快乐”和“友谊”等普遍且美好的正面情绪彻底绑定。可口可乐不属于某个患病的小众群体，它属于所有人。极具讽刺意味的是，虽然广告文案正在竭尽全力将品牌包装成一种无可置疑的人间美好，但饮料配方里尚未剔除的可卡因成分依然存在；不过随着全社会反可卡因情绪的悄然蔓延，管理层也已清醒地察觉到，必须尽快想办法将这种具有法律与社会风险的成分逐步剔除出配方。 - **全国网络成型**：到 1895 年，可口可乐已覆盖美国所有州及领地的汽水吧零售网络。 - **商标确权**：1895 年，经典的手写体“Coca-Cola”官方商标正式获准注册。 - **品牌范式转移**：从针对病患个体的“神经益脑药”，转变为面向大众消费者的“美味与畅爽”（Delicious and Refreshing），确立了全人群渗透的大众消费品定位。 ### [39:49](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=2389s) 1美元的装瓶权交易：历史上最荒唐也最伟大的协议 1899年，在解决可卡因配方遗留问题之前，阿萨·坎德勒做出了一个在商业史上既称得上“最愚蠢”、又阴差阳错促成了“最伟大”扩张的商业决定：他几乎免费送出了可口可乐全美的装瓶与销售特许权。 1899年7月，两名来自田纳西州查塔努加（Chattanooga）的年轻律师——本杰明·托马斯（Benjamin Thomas）与约瑟夫·怀特黑德（Joseph Whitehead）找到坎德勒，提出希望获得可口可乐的装瓶代理权。他们坚信当时工业装瓶和密封技术已经成熟，能够把提前调兑好的碳酸可乐封装在玻璃瓶内，不仅不会漏气变质，开启后依然能保持原汁原味的碳酸口感与清爽体验。然而，早年曾亲自尝试装瓶却遭遇过炸瓶、漏气和口味变质的坎德勒对此抱有极深的成见与怀疑，对装瓶业务极其排斥。 面对坎德勒的冷淡，托马斯和怀特黑德拿出了一个令坎德勒无法拒绝的“零风险”提案：装瓶环节所需的所有重资产设备、玻璃瓶采购、物流及销售亏损全由他们自负盈亏；他们像普通药房一样按批发价向坎德勒购买糖浆；一旦装瓶品质达不到坎德勒的标准，坎德勒可以随时吊销许可。坎德勒心想自己稳赚不赔，便顺水推舟决定“让这两个毛头小伙子去折腾”。 1899年7月，双方正式签署了一份堪称匪夷所思的合约： 1. **象征性对价**：两名代理商仅需支付 1 美元的象征性合同对价（坎德勒甚至从未去催讨过这 1 美元硬币）。 2. **大宗批发特惠价**：可口可乐公司同意以每加仑 1.00 美元的超低大客户优惠价向他们供应糖浆（甚至低于向普通药房收取的 1.30 美元标准批发价）。 3. **独家可转让全美特许权**：托马斯与怀特黑德获得了在除极少数例外外的整个美国境内，独家灌装、销售瓶装可口可乐的排他性、可转让权利，且终端零售价同样锚定在每瓶 5 美分。 这笔交易在日后给可口可乐公司套上了沉重的价格枷锁，但它实质上发明了可口可乐第二项跨时代的商业模式创新——装瓶加盟特许体系（Bottling Franchising）。两名创始人虽然拿下了全国专营权，但很快就发现装瓶是一门比汽水机沉重得多的重资产硬仗，因为每一瓶可乐都面临着一项汽水机无需承担的沉重额外成本：玻璃瓶本身。 - **交易核心人物**：可口可乐总裁阿萨·坎德勒 vs 来自查塔努加的本杰明·托马斯与约瑟夫·怀特黑德。 - **签约时间**：1899 年 7 月。 - **合同核心条款**： - 合同转让名义标价：1 美元（未实际收取）。 - 糖浆供应价：1.00 美元/加仑（较药房批发价再优惠近 25%）。 - 授权范围：全美独家、可转让的瓶装可口可乐制造与分销权，终端定价 5 美分/瓶。 - **产业模式分野**：轻资产的浓缩液厂商与重资本、背负包材及运输成本的区域装瓶厂正式分道扬镳。 ### [42:40](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=2560s) 一纸合约的致命漏洞与商业神来之笔 这纸在查塔努加（Chattanooga）律师本杰明·托马斯（Benjamin Thomas）与约瑟夫·怀特黑德（Joseph Whitehead）和阿萨·坎德勒（Asa Candler）之间签署的装瓶合约，条款其实极其简单且充满限制：托马斯和怀特黑德必须独家使用可口可乐的原浆，绝不可在产品中使用任何替代品或竞争对手的原浆；他们绝对不准染指冷饮柜汽水机（Soda Fountain）渠道，该渠道仍由可口可乐总公司直接供应；若在授权区域内无法提供足够的装瓶可乐以满足市场需求，合同将自动作废；可口可乐公司则负责产品的所有广告需求，并牢牢掌控所有广告控制权。 然而，这份合约最令人目瞪口呆的地方在于它的疏漏：**它竟然没有任何期限限制（无到期日，近乎永久生效）**，而且通篇找不到任何关于“每加仑 1 美元原浆价格未来可以根据通胀或成本进行调整”的条款。这意味着只要装瓶商持续满足市场需求且不违约，可口可乐公司就有法律义务以每加仑 1 美元的固定价格无休止地向其供应原浆，而终端零售价也被心照不宣地固定在每瓶 5 美分。正如节目中所调侃的：“既然写在纸上了，那就这么定了吧。” 表面上看，这桩交易漏洞百出，但换个角度审视，它也是一记商业神作： - **零资本投入极限扩张**：可口可乐总公司以完全不消耗自身资本（Capital-free）、不进行固定资产投资的方式，直接切入了装瓶业务并在全美迅速扩张规模。 - **广告边际成本递减**：可口可乐唯一需要承担的是广告宣传，但总公司当时已经在为冷饮柜业务大举铺设全国广告；他们不需要制作任何不同的广告，只是在同样的谷仓侧面刷漆、竖起同样的招牌，就直接把同一份广告支出分摊到了瓶装这一全新的触达场景上。 - **极端的人效杠杆**：在 1900 年前后，可口可乐总部总共只有大约 20 名员工。他们凭借极小的前台和极高利润率的原浆配方，借助外部装瓶商获得了不可思议的业务杠杆。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 可口可乐装瓶特许体系架构 accDescr: 展示可口可乐总公司、一级母装瓶商与基层子装瓶商之间的特许授权与原浆流转结构 subgraph Parent["核心品牌方"] HQ["可口可乐总公司 (The Coca-Cola Co.)<br/>掌控IP、配方原浆生产与全国广告投放<br/>仅约20名员工的轻资产核心"] end subgraph Tollbooth["一级母装瓶商 (Parent Bottlers)"] TW["托马斯 & 怀特黑德两家独立公司<br/>坐收转手溢价的特许权抽成者 (Toll Booth)"] end subgraph Network["基层装瓶商网络 (Child/First-Line Bottlers)"] B1["本地装瓶厂 A (杂货店/小摊/酒馆)"] B2["本地装瓶厂 B (重资产: 产线、洗瓶、回收)"] B3["本地装瓶厂 C (成为当地城镇首富家族)"] end HQ -->|"以 $1/加仑 固定价供应原浆"| TW TW -->|"层层转授特许经营权与加价原浆"| B1 TW -->|"层层转授特许经营权与加价原浆"| B2 TW -->|"层层转授特许经营权与加价原浆"| B3 ``` --- ### [44:38](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=2678s) “母装瓶商”与寻租特许帝国的裂变 托马斯和怀特黑德回到田纳西州查塔努加后，创办了可口可乐装瓶公司（Coca-Cola Bottling Company），开始把瓶装可乐卖给他们口中所谓的“杂货店、小摊点和酒馆（groceries, stands, and saloons）”——这些零售终端正是现代便利店、加油站和超市货架的雏形。但创业初期，这两位原本并不熟络的合伙人很快爆发了激烈冲突，决定分道扬镳。幸运的是，当年的合同允许权利转让（Assignable），于是两人把美国版图一分为二，各自成立独立公司，将特许经营权分别划归自己名下。 分家之后，两人各自琢磨开来：自己亲自投资买地建厂、购置复杂的装瓶流水线、采购笨重的玻璃瓶，还得承担将空瓶回收、清洗、再利用等一系列繁重脏乱的脏活累活，不仅前期资本开支沉重，且毛利率极低、运营极为繁琐复杂。他们意识到手里的合同既然可以转让，那为什么不继续向下层层转让？ 两位创始人随即转型为类似“收费站”的终极寻租者（Rent Seekers）： - 他们把自己这两家公司演变为**“母装瓶商（Parent Bottlers）”**，自身几乎不从事具体的物理装瓶工作，而是把手头的全美各区域切分成无数微型子区域，二次转包给全国各地的本土小企业家。 - 真正承担实际生产脏活累活的底层企业家被称为**“第一线装瓶商（First-line Bottlers）”**或实际装瓶商。这些遍布各地的装瓶厂与亚特兰大的可口可乐总公司没有任何直接合同关系，只对所属的母装瓶商负责。 - 尽管母装瓶商像设立了过路收费站一样，在原浆转手流入实际装瓶厂的过程中“剪优惠券”抽成，但他们在前期的招商拓展中扮演了至关重要的推手角色：10 年内他们在全美物色、培训并扶植了超过 400 家本地装瓶厂；到 1925 年，这一数字飙升到了 1,200 家。 --- ### [48:08](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=2888s) 可口可乐系统：类 Visa 式网络扩张与现代商业神话 装瓶体系的爆发给可口可乐带来了全美范围的第二波“闪电式扩张（Blitzscaling）”。过去，冷饮柜汽水机只能出现在规模足以设立专柜的大城镇里，广大广袤的农村和偏远腹地根本无从触及；而有了瓶装，可乐不仅走入了乡村和小卖部，更打破了消费场景，人们可以把可乐带回家里、餐馆或任何户外场所饮用。短短数年之内，全美男女老少几乎无人不晓可口可乐，而总公司为此甚至“不需要动一根手指头”。 主持人将这种模式与 Visa 和运通（AmEx）的对比相提并论： - **开放网络 vs. 闭环体系**：如果当年坎德勒选择像美国运通那样的封闭闭环（Closed-loop），由总公司自己一个市场一个市场去投资重资产建厂，可口可乐绝不可能在极短时间内达到统领全美并征服全球的规模。可口可乐采取的是类似 Visa 的“网络的网络（Network of Networks）”模式，以轻资产总部撬动了庞大的生态系统。 - **“可口可乐系统（The Coca-Cola System）”的诞生**：可口可乐开始将总公司与所有独立装瓶商构成的总和统称为系统。总公司享受极高的毛利率、优异的资本回报率（ROIC），将全部精力集中在原浆配方和市场营销等核心差异化环节，将无差异化的重资产操作剥离给外部。 - **劳力士模式的控制力与双赢造富**：就像劳力士牢牢管控授权经销商（Authorized Dealers）的零售门店标准一样，可口可乐虽然不拥有装瓶厂，却可以在合同中强势定规——要求配送卡车必须漆成特定深浅的红色、车身必须以严格标准印制 Logo、流水线出产的每一瓶汽水都必须符合总公司苛刻的规格。装瓶商心甘情愿接受约束，因为这是特许印钞权，各地可口可乐装瓶商几乎无一例外跃升为当地城镇首屈一指的显赫豪门富贾。 随着装瓶网络以惊人速度横扫全美，巨额的财富效应迅速引来了无数眼红的跟风者与模仿者，形形色色的仿冒可乐和竞争对手开始如雨后春笋般涌现，试图复制可口可乐建立起来的这套分销奇迹。 ### [52:40](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=3160s) 仿冒品泛滥与联邦商标法维权 到了 20 世纪初，随着可口可乐特许装瓶模式的推广，各地山寨竞争对手如雨后春笋般涌现。市场上充斥着大量山寨可乐品牌，如 Afri-Cola、Charcola、Caroca、Coca-Nola、Fig Cola、King Cola、Standard Cola 等数不胜数的仿冒饮品。主持人指出，在可口可乐诞生之前，“可乐（Cola）”这种棕色、带有特殊调味的碳酸饮料根本就不算一个既有品类。可口可乐公司始终坚称，自己并不是某种“可乐”大类下的“可卡（Coca）”变体；“Coca-Cola”是一个不可分割的专有名词，指代其包含神秘核心成分“Merchandise 7X”的绝密配方。可口可乐是独一无二的独创概念（$N \text{ of } 1$），市面上本不该有其他所谓的“可乐”存在。 1905 年，美国国会通过《联邦商标法》（Federal Trademark Act），将商标保护上升至联邦法律层面。在此之前，商标保护主要依靠各州法案（此前可口可乐的斯宾塞字体商标可能仅在佐治亚州注册）。可口可乐成为该法案最早的一批注册受益者，其法务部门随即发起席卷全美的法律诉讼攻势，坚决主张“Cola”并非通用商品分类词，他人不得使用“XX-Cola”搭便车。在接下来的 15 至 20 年间（直至 20 世纪 20 年代中叶），可口可乐法律团队凭借极度强硬的手段起诉并取缔了超过 7000 个仿冒可乐品牌。这场战役确立了可口可乐未来品牌建设的核心支柱：“只有可口可乐才是真正正宗的（The Real Thing）”，其余所有产品皆为不应存在的拙劣模仿者。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Coca-Cola Trademark Defense and Legal Precedent accDescr: Flowchart illustrating how the 1905 Federal Trademark Act and the 1920 Supreme Court ruling legally fortified Coca-Cola's brand dominance against thousands of copycats. subgraph Imitators["市场仿冒浪潮 (1900s)"] A["涌现 7000+ 山寨可乐品牌<br/>(Afri-Cola, Fig Cola, Caroca 等)"] end subgraph LegalShield["法律武器与诉讼战"] B["1905 年《联邦商标法》出台"] C["法务总监 Harold Hirsch 主导全美维权"] end subgraph JudicialPrecedent["最高法院判决 (1920)"] D["诉 Koke Co. 案"] E["裁定：Coca-Cola 已超越描述性词汇<br/>成为指代单一来源的专属品牌"] end A --> B B --> C C --> D D --> E ``` ### [54:43](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=3283s) “去可卡因化”的古柯叶与 1920 年最高法院里程碑裁决 伴随诉讼浪潮，一场极具代表性的诉讼最终打到了美国最高法院——1920 年著名的“可口可乐公司诉 Koke 公司案”（Coca-Cola Co. v. Koke Co. of America）。当时，被告 Koke 公司半开玩笑地辩称：既然可口可乐公司自身官方并不承认“Coke”这一简称，那他人自然可以使用；更关键的是，被告指控可口可乐涉嫌虚假宣传，因为早在 1905 年前后，饮料中原有的可卡因成分便已被彻底剔除，古柯（Coca）成分微乎其微，因此“Coca-Cola”这一名称本身名不副实，根本不具备受保护的商标资格。 对此，主持人详细剖析了可口可乐处理古柯叶的奇特历史渊源： - **脱毒专利与独家渠道**：1903 年，可口可乐与新泽西州梅伍德的 Schaefer Alkaloid Works（即后来的 Stepan Company）达成合作。该公司研发出从古柯叶中萃取去除可卡因的工艺，并将去可卡因化的古柯叶风味原料独家供应给可口可乐。 - **联邦特批豁免权**：Schaefer 公司获得了美国缉毒局（DEA）及联邦政府的特殊豁免，成为全美唯一获准合法进口含毒古柯叶的商业实体。 - **胡佛政府监管模式**：在联邦特工现场监督销毁提取出的副产物可卡因的前提下，该工厂在本土完成加工。去毒后的古柯叶提取物依然是可口可乐配方中不可或缺的灵魂风味，这项原料壁垒也构成了仿冒者无法逾越的护城河。 在 1920 年的判决中，最高法院驳回了 Koke 公司的诉求，做出了载入史册的标志性判决。法院裁定，“Coca-Cola”已经超越了由古柯树或可乐果构成的字面描述性名词，蜕变为一个纯粹的超级品牌。判决书留下了广为流传的名言：“Coca-Cola 意味着来自单一来源、为大众所熟知的单一实体事物（Coca-Cola means a single thing coming from a single source and well known to the community）。”至此，可口可乐在司法前线彻底确立了其品牌无与伦比的合法性垄断地位。 ### [57:42](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=3462s) 弧形瓶的诞生与 99% 识别度的包装商标 除了法庭维权，可口可乐狙击仿冒者的第二条决定性战线落在了包装瓶本身。可口可乐总部虽不直接从事装瓶业务，但对整个体系具有绝对控制力。为让消费者能够一眼认出正品，公司决定推动各装瓶厂共同出资，开发一款独一无二的专利专用瓶。1912 年，可口可乐装瓶商协会开始讨论包装统一方案；1915 年 4 月，协会受托人正式投票通过研发专属瓶型的决议。 在装瓶商大会上，负责全美仿冒侵权诉讼的法务总监哈罗德·希尔施（Harold Hirsch）发表了极富感染力的演讲，动员装瓶商不要计较眼前更换模具的资本开支： > “我们并非仅为今日建设可口可乐，我们是在为千秋万代建设可口可乐。我们的夙愿是让可口可乐成为永久的国家饮料……在推出这个瓶子时，母公司实际上是在确立属于你们自己的权利。” 随后，公司向全美 10 家玻璃制造商发布了一份言简意赅却影响深远的设计需求书（Design Brief）： > “我们要设计出一款极其独特的瓶子，即使在黑暗中仅凭手感摸索，或是摔碎在地上仅看碎片，也能一眼辨认出来。” ```mermaid flowchart LR accTitle: Evolution of the Coca-Cola Contour Bottle accDescr: Process showing the inception, design confusion, and legal protection of the famous Coca-Cola contour bottle from 1915 to 1951. A["设计需求书<br/>(黑暗中可摸出/碎在地上可辨认)"] --> B["印第安纳州 Root Glass 中标<br/>(误将可可荚 Cocoa 当作古柯叶 Coca 提取灵感)"] B --> C["1916 年投产<br/>Georgia Green 经典弧形瓶<br/>(昵称 Mae West 瓶)"] C --> D["持续专利保护<br/>(1915 年至 1951 年)"] D --> E["1951 年获批稀有包装商标<br/>(1949 年调研：全美识别度超 99%)"] ``` 最终，印第安纳州特雷霍特的鲁特玻璃公司（Root Glass Company）中标，设计出举世闻名的“弧形瓶”（Contour Bottle）。该瓶身采用“佐治亚绿”（Georgia Green）玻璃，由于曲线凹凸有致、宛如女星梅·韦斯特（Mae West）的身段，也被民间形象地称为“Mae West 瓶”。有趣的是，设计师在翻阅字典时产生误解，误将可可豆夹（Cocoa pod）当成了古柯树（Coca plant），依照可可豆荚饱满圆润的棱纹凹槽绘制了草图。虽然最初版本过于圆胖，在生产线上容易倾倒，随后被修改得更修长实用，但这一源自误解的经典造型完美契合了设计要求。 1915 年弧形瓶专利正式获批，为保密起见，初版专利文件甚至未提及可口可乐的字样。可口可乐法务团队通过多次细节改良与专利接力，将设计专利保护期一路续期至 1951 年。在专利即将到期之际，公司出示了 1949 年的一份全美市场调研数据——全美超过 99% 的民众仅凭瓶身剪影轮廓就能认出可口可乐。凭借这项压倒性的事实证据，美国专利局破例批准将瓶身外观直接注册为商业商标（Trademark），使得这一工业包装在法律上成为了可口可乐品牌不可磨灭的永久资产。 ### [01:03:20](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=3800s) 摆脱包袱与阿萨·坎德勒隐退 到了1916年左右，标志性的经典弧形瓶（Contour Bottle）已经让消费者只要看一眼就能脱口而出：“这是一瓶可口可乐！”在这个庞大的可口可乐特许经销与装瓶体系中，每一个环节都在大发横财，而位于体系顶端的可口可乐公司更是赚得盆满钵满。此时的可口可乐终于卸下了背负多年的几大历史包袱：可卡因成分早已被彻底剔除；商标权保卫战初见成效；经典的独特瓶身确立了视觉壁垒。此外，他们还成功应付了联邦监管机构——针对当时视咖啡因如洪水猛兽的官员，可口可乐主动将配方中的咖啡因含量削减了三分之二甚至四分之三。 出人意料的是，大幅减少咖啡因并未动摇消费者的狂热。这不仅没有削弱可口可乐“美味、提神”（delicious and refreshing）的核心体验，反而让可口可乐摇身一变，成为老少咸宜、更加健康有益的国民饮料；消除了药物属性与过度兴奋的副作用后，人们反而能在日常生活中毫无心理负担地痛饮更多。阿萨·坎德勒（Asa Candler）此时已成为亚特兰大首屈一指的名流。在一众市民的拥戴劝说下，他在1916年出马竞选并成功当选亚特兰大市长。当选后，坎德勒正式从可口可乐退休，并将名下的公司股票全部平分给了自己的子女们。 ### [01:04:57](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=3897s) 1919年财团收购与秘方首次文字化 坎德勒家族二代掌权后不久，内部便因股权处置产生了分歧。1919年，亚特兰大当地著名的投资银行家欧内斯特·伍德拉夫（Ernest Woodruff）牵头组建了一个庞大的投资者财团，以2500万美元的天价全资买下了可口可乐公司。这笔交易在本质上也等同于可口可乐的首次公开募股（IPO），股票开始在投资者财团与二级市场之间流通，尽管这家日进斗金的企业根本不需要通过上市来筹集营运资金。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 1919年收购与秘方担保抵押流程 accDescr: 展示欧内斯特·伍德拉夫财团从坎德勒家族收购可口可乐并质押秘方的过程 subgraph Acquisition ["1919年收购交易"] A["坎德勒家族分得股份<br/>内部意见分歧"] --> B["欧内斯特·伍德拉夫组建投资财团<br/>出资 2500 万美元发起收购"] B --> C["可口可乐实质完成 IPO<br/>股票公开交易"] end subgraph Collateral ["秘方文字化与抵押"] B --> D["向纽约担保信托银行<br/>申请巨额过桥贷款"] D --> E["首次将口耳相传的秘方落于纸面<br/>（Merchandise 7X）"] E --> F["秘方锁入纽约金库质押长达6年"] end ``` 在1919年，2500万美元是一笔天文数字，伍德拉夫的财团需要通过复杂的金融杠杆运作。为此，他们向纽约担保信托银行（Guaranty Trust Company of New York）申请了大额贷款。作为贷款的核心抵押品，银行要求提供可口可乐的真实配方——这直接打破了公司几十年来秘方绝不落于纸面的铁律。在此之前，阿萨·坎德勒创立的保密体系近乎偏执： - 所有原料包裹进入公司前，外包装标签都会被撕下或刮掉，存放在封闭的密室中； - 坎德勒亲自监督儿子霍华德·坎德勒（Howard Candler），强记各种带有刺激性气味的果蔬精油和原料的色泽、气味，以及货架入库顺序； - 霍华德必须在父亲注视下默记超级绝密调味剂“7X号商品”（Merchandise No. 7X）的精确配比和搅拌工序，直到熟烂于心； - 在任何时代，世界上都只有两个人脑内记有完整配方，且两人被严格禁止同乘一架飞机或一趟列车。 可口可乐刻意放弃申请专利，因为专利具有保护期限，一旦到期配方就会公开；而作为商业秘密（Trade Secret），只要保密得当就可以永久独占。为了完成这笔杠杆收购，那份唯一的纸质手写秘方在纽约担保信托银行的保险库里静静躺了整整六年作为担保。 - **收购金额**：1919年由欧内斯特·伍德拉夫财团出资2500万美元买下坎德勒家族股份。 - **秘方神话**：即使日后《为了上帝、国家与可口可乐》（*For God, Country, and Coca-Cola*）等书籍声称复刻并刊载了原始配方，官方也始终坚决否认。 ### [01:08:22](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=4102s) 罗伯特·伍德拉夫入主与“老板”时代的开启 作为投资银行家，欧内斯特·伍德拉夫并不热衷于实际经营饮料工厂，公司便在原有管理团队手中维系运转。然而欧内斯特对当年那份永久性特许装瓶合同（The $1 Bottling Deal）极为不满，痛斥两大总装瓶商坐地收租、无所作为。他试图通过法律诉讼废除合同，结果却在法庭上败诉，这让他倍感挫败。到了1923年，心灰意冷的欧内斯特决定另聘一位总裁来全盘接手。在董事会的极力敦促下，他不得不将目光投向了与自己关系紧张甚至格格不入的儿子——罗伯特·伍德拉夫（Robert Woodruff）。 当时年仅33岁的罗伯特早已脱离了父亲的控制与阴影。他在俄亥俄州克利夫兰的怀特汽车公司（White Motor Company，全美顶尖的大卡车制造巨头）凭借过人能力崭露头角，晋升为副总裁，是1920年代美国商界炙手可热的超级商业明星。他与棒球巨星泰·柯布（Ty Cobb）是结伴打猎的挚友，甚至差点被新泽西标准石油公司（Standard Oil of New Jersey，即今日的埃克森美孚 ExxonMobil）挖去当接班CEO。当年财团收购可口可乐时，罗伯特其实也是早期出资人之一。 欧内斯特最初向罗伯特开出的总裁年薪甚至不到他在怀特汽车的一半，遭到了罗伯特的果断拒绝。在随后的谈判中，罗伯特提出了不可动摇的入职先决条件：“父亲，你必须彻底交出权力，完全退出日常管理。这家公司将由我全权掌控。”1923年，罗伯特·伍德拉夫正式出任可口可乐总裁，成为当时全美最年轻的大企业一把手。这位日后被尊称为“老板”（The Boss）的传奇统帅，此后以总裁身份执掌可口可乐32年，随后又作为董事会主席统治了30年，直至1985年以95岁高龄去世——今天人们所认识的可口可乐，完完全全是罗伯特·伍德拉夫一手塑造的作品。 ### [01:12:05](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=4325s) 阿奇·李与“生活方式广告”的诞生 伍德拉夫上任后迅速采取的第一项关键举措，就是与公司的核心广告代理商——圣路易斯的达西广告公司（D'Arcy Advertising Agency）及其传奇创意主管阿奇·李（Archie Lee）建立紧密联盟。阿奇·李在1922年圣诞节就曾为可口可乐打造了轰动一时的经典口号“口渴不分季节”（Thirst knows no season）。在这之前，可口可乐一直被视为乔治亚州炎炎夏日用来消暑解渴的地方性冷饮，冬天往往是销售断崖期。阿奇·李成功打破了这个天花板，帮助可口可乐顺理成章地向寒冬乃至圣诞假日消费场景渗透。 以此为契机，伍德拉夫与阿奇·李携手掀起了一场现代广告史上的革命：开创“生活方式广告”（Lifestyle Advertising）。早在劳力士（Rolex）在五六十年代将手表与精英探险生活绑定之前的整整三十年，可口可乐就在1920年代率先参透了这一真谛。他们彻底告别了传统广告罗列成分、宣扬功能性功效的刻板模式，转而通过美轮美奂的艺术画作和情感叙事，让可口可乐与人类的情感、闲暇时光、快乐以及美好生活体验产生牢不可破的心智连接。 ### [01:13:40](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=4420s) 从产品功能到生活方式：Archie Lee 的极简标语革命 广告学中存在着从“内在广告”（强调产品成分与功效）向“外在广告”（Extrinsic Advertising）的范式转移。外在广告完全脱离了产品本身的物理属性，它所兜售的是一种你一旦与品牌产生联结便能获得的生活方式。对于可口可乐而言，它不再仅仅是由可口可乐公司生产的、具有独特风味的碳酸含糖软饮料；它变成了幸福本身，变成了友谊、浪漫，以及让你与所爱之人紧密相依的情感纽带。在主持人的欢笑与感叹中，可口可乐不仅等同于夏日、节庆与圣诞，更成为了“美国”的代名词——无论你身处美国本土还是世界的任何角落，可口可乐即是美利坚文化符号。 在这场品牌蜕变中，新掌门人罗伯特·伍德拉夫（Robert Woodruff）与达西广告公司（D'Arcy Advertising Company）的传奇广告大师阿奇·李（Archie Lee）联手缔造了一连串商业奇迹。阿奇·李做出了极其激进的大胆决断：剥离以往广告中所有冗长繁复的说明性文字，仅仅保留一句极其简短的核心标语。回顾20年代之前的平面广告，页面上往往塞满了密密麻麻的文字叙述，而1923年伍德拉夫执掌公司时推出的全新宣传口号直截了当——“Coca-Cola, always delightful”（可口可乐，永远怡人），短短四个词就是全部的宣传企划。次年（1924年），李进一步将表达提炼为两个词的终极极简指令：“Refresh yourself”（焕发活力/清爽一下）。 这项精简理念在数年后的1929年迎来了广告史上的全垒打与集大成之作：“The pause that refreshes”（带来清爽的暂停）。这句标语不仅成为那个时代最为成功的商业营销案，更精准切中了现代生活的普世痛点：每个人在奔波忙碌的日常中都需要片刻停歇，而可口可乐恰恰就是你在停歇时应当享受的奖赏。更微妙的历史背景在于，该广告恰逢1929年华尔街股灾与大萧条前夕问世。在整个30年代经济崩溃、民生维艰的残酷现实中，只需花费区区五美分，就能买到一份逃离日常阴霾的平价轻奢享受，这种心灵慰藉让这句标语在美国大众心中引发了前所未有的强烈共鸣。 ### [01:16:28](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=4588s) 美式田园风光与 D'Arcy 广告诫律 标语的精简只是品牌重塑的一半，阿奇·李与伍德拉夫在视觉图像体系上的重构同样石破天惊。李大举延揽当时全美最顶尖的商业插画艺术家，为可口可乐量身绘制充满诗意的“美式田园生活图卷”（Americana Tableau）。他们直接聘请了美国传奇插画大师诺曼·洛克威尔（Norman Rockwell）、N.C. 韦思（N.C. Wyeth）以及哈顿·珊布（Haddon Sundblom），共同勾勒出公众心中最纯粹、最田园牧歌式的理想美国家庭画卷。与此同时，他们还签约了顶尖运动员与好莱坞巨星（如加里·格兰特 Cary Grant、珍·哈露 Jean Harlow），将品牌形象与健康、阳光、体魄健全牢牢捆绑在一起。 阿奇·李曾生动阐述插画视觉在广告中的核心作用：“画面中的意念必须像枪弹一样瞬间击中受众，迫使他们由衷赞叹‘这主意真绝！’不仅如此，他们脑海中必须牢牢记住，画面中那带来清凉畅快、美妙宜人的东西正是可口可乐。”为了捍卫品牌资产的绝对纯洁性，李与达西广告公司为可口可乐账户制定了一系列不可违背的“广告戒律”： - **品牌名称绝不可折行**：注册商标“Coca-Cola”必须永远完整处于同一行，严禁断开分行排版。 - **经典圆标标准字样**：圆形标识牌上必须始终附带“Delicious and Refreshing”（美味且清爽）的字样。 - **禁用非人称代词“It”**：绝不能用冰冷的无生命代词“It”来指代可口可乐，它的名字就是“Coca-Cola”。 - **严禁过度人格化**：不得将可口可乐作为主体发出日常拟人邀约（例如不得写“Coca-Cola invites you to lunch”），因为可口可乐作为一种图腾符号，其地位超然于这等世俗动作之上。 与视觉革命同步爆发的还有户外广告牌的普及。截至1930年，全美公路上行驶的汽车已达到2,900万辆，巨大而醒目的路边广告牌成为向驾驶者宣导可口可乐生活方式的绝佳阵地。伍德拉夫及其心腹副手们在商界四处宣称，伍德拉夫毕生的核心野心，就是让可口可乐成为“美国最纯正的美式存在”（the most American thing in America）。 ```mermaid flowchart LR accTitle: Coca-Cola Lifestyle Advertising Model accDescr: Flowchart showing how minimalist slogans and Americana visual imagery combine to build Coca-Cola's emotional brand identity. subgraph Slogans["极简标语体系"] S1["1923: Always delightful"] S2["1924: Refresh yourself"] S3["1929: The pause that refreshes"] end subgraph Visuals["视觉与媒介革命"] V1["顶级艺术家合作<br/>(Rockwell, Sundblom)"] V2["2900万机动车时代的<br/>公路广告牌巨幕"] V3["达西广告戒律<br/>(规范排版与品牌图腾)"] end subgraph BrandIdentity["品牌情感图腾"] B["超越饮料属性:<br/>幸福、浪漫、美利坚象征"] end Slogans --> B Visuals --> B ``` ### [01:19:14](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=4754s) 重新定义圣诞老人：商业广告史上的终极杰作 如果要评选人类商业史上最伟大的外在生活方式广告案例，1931年可口可乐对“圣诞老人”（Santa Claus）形象的重塑与符号绑定无疑独占鳌头。可口可乐通过铺天盖地的营销，不仅将圣诞老人与自身牢牢捆绑，甚至从根本上定义并标准化了现代世俗社会眼中的圣诞老人样貌。 节目中澄清了常见的都市传言：可口可乐并未凭空“发明”圣诞老人。圣尼古拉的传说由来已久，著名诗歌《圣诞前夕》（'Twas the Night Before Christmas）早在1823年就已发表，托马斯·纳斯特（Thomas Nast）等著名插画家此前也绘制过流传甚广的圣诞老人。然而在1931年之前，圣诞老人更偏向于一个矮小瘦削、类似精灵精怪的形象，穿着打扮各异，颜色甚至涵盖绿色、黄色与蓝色，从未形成全球通行的视觉标准。 1931年，可口可乐委托插画大师哈顿·珊布为品牌量身绘制圣诞广告插画。出于对赞助商色彩的绝对忠诚，珊布做出了一个改变流行文化的决定：既然是可口可乐的广告，他要让圣诞老人的长袍染上最鲜艳浓郁的“可口可乐红”；而为了能在画卷中展示尽可能大面积的红白双色，他索性将圣诞老人塑造成了一位身材魁梧、大腹便便、红光满面、慈眉善目的白胡子快乐巨人。珊布的这套可口可乐圣诞插画自1931年起在《星期六晚邮报》（Saturday Evening Post）全彩刊登，并在此后整整延续了33年（直至1964年）。 当时正值彩色印刷技术在平民大众杂志上初具规模的时代，电视尚未诞生。此前的大众从未在大规模彩色媒体上见过如此栩栩如生的视觉形象。可口可乐开动了其庞大的工业级视觉分发机器，通过全国性的杂志彩页、公路巨幅广告牌、零售终端海报将这位红袍大胡子老人印刻在每一个美国人的视网膜上。尽管竞争对手百事可乐也曾尝试过绘制圣诞老人，但可口可乐以压倒性的文化势能彻底独占了这一节日象征。值得玩味的是，画师珊布笔下的另两张全美家喻户晓的商业面孔，正是桂格燕麦的代言绅士（Quaker Oats man，讽刺的是桂格日后被百事收购）以及杰迈玛阿姨（Aunt Jemima）。 ### [01:22:54](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=4974s) 告别“夏日饮品”与奥运首秀（1928） 圣诞老人战役的胜利为可口可乐带来了革命性的战略回报：它彻底打破了饮料销售的季节性魔咒。在诞生之初，可口可乐只是亚特兰大炎炎夏日里用于消暑解渴的冷饮，冬季往往是销售寒冬。然而通过将可口可乐红与冬日壁炉、圣诞狂欢深度绑定，可口可乐最终完成了向“全年无休”消费习惯的跃迁——时至今日，一年当中可口可乐销量最高的时间段恰恰就是岁末年终的假日季。 与此同时，伍德拉夫还在全球重大公共活动营销上迈出了开创性的一步。1928年阿姆斯特丹奥运会上，可口可乐正式成为奥运赞助商，这一举措早于可口可乐日后对世博会、世界杯等全球顶级舞台的全面布局。在那个奥运会商业赞助几乎是一片空白的年代，可口可乐的大胆介入使之成为奥运会历史上合作时间最长的赞助商；而到了2028年洛杉矶奥运会，可口可乐与奥运会的世纪盟约将整整跨越100周年。在品牌形象与宏大舞台已然铸就的背景下，伍德拉夫在执掌公司的前十年中，开始将目光投向了另一个关乎帝国存亡的核心基石：产品的全面标准化。 ### [01:24:05](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=5045s) 配方冻结与绝密配方的金库神话 在 1920 年前后，罗伯特·伍德拉夫（Robert Woodruff）做出了一项对公司影响极其深远的决断：可口可乐自此停止修改配方。从那时起一直到 1985 年（正是伍德拉夫去世的那一年），整整 65 年间，可口可乐的原版配方未曾改动过分毫。伍德拉夫的核心理念是绝对的“标准化”——配方、营销与包装都必须整齐划一。他坚信，无论顾客身在何处，只要伸手拿出一瓶可乐，其握持的手感、入口的口感乃至入口时的冰镇温度，都必须完全一致。 为了在象征层面贯彻这种神圣感与标准化，伍德拉夫还完成了一项极具仪式感的举动：可口可乐偿还了纽约银行的贷款，赎回了那份独一无二、至高无上的绝密配方手稿，并将其转存入亚特兰大当地的信托公司银行（Trust Company Bank，即后来的 SunTrust）。这份配方在银行金库里平静地躺了整整 86 年。直到 2011 年，可口可乐大张旗鼓地举办盛大巡游，将配方从银行转移到亚特兰大的“可口可乐世界”（World of Coca-Cola）展览馆中。公司意识到，几十年来他们不断向公众灌输“我们拥有绝密配方”的概念，但随着世代更迭，公众的神秘感正在淡化；将配方移至供游客瞻仰的专属金库，正是为了向年轻一代重新强化这一根深蒂固的品牌传奇：可口可乐拥有世上最神秘、最值得全力守护的独家秘方。 - **配方冻结周期**：约 1920 年至 1985 年，长达 65 年保持同一配方不变。 - **配方保管地点**：1920 年代移入亚特兰大 Trust Company Bank（SunTrust 前身），存放 86 年后，于 2011 年迁入亚特兰大“可口可乐世界”金库。 --- ### [01:26:03](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=5163s) 统计部门、加油站冰柜与早期渠道扩张 掌舵初期，伍德拉夫设立了公司历史上第一个统计部门，开创性地利用定量数据来分析市场与消费者行为。研究表明，可口可乐在当时几乎已经渗透了美国所有的男女老少，仅靠人口自然增长已无法支撑企业的长远野心。公司必须寻找新途径，让现有的可乐饮用者在日常生活中更频繁地喝到可口可乐。伍德拉夫联想到自己加盟可口可乐前的职业经历——他曾任职于怀特汽车公司（White Motor Company），当时还正被新泽西标准石油（Standard Oil of New Jersey）积极招揽。于是他灵光一闪，敏锐地意识到下一个增长风口正是蓬勃兴起的加油站。 为了让顾客在加油站随时能喝到严格保持在华氏 34 度（约摄氏 1.1 度）的冰镇可乐，可口可乐外包设计并制造了专用冰柜。仅仅在推行的第一年，他们就在全美加油站铺设了 32,000 台带有醒目招牌（如“此处售卖可口可乐”、“请饮可口可乐”或“永远清凉爽口”）的专用冰柜。这种冰柜成了 1937 年可口可乐开创投币式自动售货机的直接雏形。加油站老板对这一合作欣喜若狂：一方面，巨大的招牌为油站吸引了客流；另一方面，软饮料的零售利润空间极高，油站老板在可乐上赚到的利润甚至远超本身沦为纯大宗商品的汽油利润。正如两位主持人笑称：“你卖汽油不赚钱，赚钱的是便利店业务，而这正是从可乐开始的。” - **设立统计部门**：开启早期的定量市场调研与消费者数据分析。 - **加油站渠道**：第一年即在全美加油站安装 32,000 台专用冰柜。 - **零售利润倒挂**：由于成品汽油高度同质化、价格竞争激烈，加油站依靠销售高毛利的可口可乐获得了比卖油更丰厚的利润。 - **售货机先驱**：1937 年，可口可乐在此基础上率先推出了投币式自动售卖机。 --- ### [01:28:23](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=5303s) 装瓶厂整合、全球扩张与规模经济护城河 伴随标准化策略的推进，伍德拉夫开始大刀阔斧地重塑与装瓶商的关系。当时全美分布着约 1,200 家独立的装瓶厂，品质参差不齐。起初伍德拉夫试图以强硬施压的方式迫使不规范的装瓶厂达标，但他很快意识到与其浪费时间费力劝说，不如直接出资收购。自 1920 年代起，可口可乐打破惯例，主动收购经营不善或不合格的装瓶厂，通过注入资金与严苛品控整顿完毕后，再溢价转售给合格的当地企业家。与此同时，伍德拉夫发现这套装瓶特许经营模式极易复制，于是在 20 至 30 年代将触角延伸至欧洲和南美洲，以同样的“当地资本、本地经营、全力推销”架构建立起跨国装瓶网络。 在商业模式上，早年与装瓶商签订的“每加仑糖浆恒定 1 美元”的无限期供货条款，在通货膨胀下面临严峻的利润挤压。面对无法提价的死局，可口可乐被逼出了一条唯一的生存路径：通过疯狂扩大生产规模，摊薄所有固定成本，依靠无与伦比的规模经济碾压通胀。同时，合同严格规定终端零售价必须锁定为 5 美分一瓶。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 可口可乐规模经济与定价压制循环 accDescr: 展示可口可乐在固定成本与5美分定价约束下，如何凭借规模经济形成市场统治力。 subgraph ScaleAdvantage ["规模经济驱动机制"] A["加仑糖浆恒定1美元<br/>终端零售锁定5美分"] --> B["无法提价对抗通货膨胀"] B --> C["疯狂扩大规模与渠道网络<br/>摊薄固定制造成本"] C --> D["单位生产成本大幅降低"] end subgraph MarketImpact ["压制竞争对手"] D --> E["大萧条时期维持5美分盈利"] E --> F["小型竞争对手规模不足<br/>面临通胀与亏损两难"] F --> G["中小竞品被大量清洗出局"] end ScaleAdvantage --> MarketImpact ``` 当大萧条来临时，这套机制展现出了惊人的统治力。通胀与萧条让规模较小、成本高昂的竞争对手不得不提高售价，但家喻户晓、品质更优的可口可乐却依然能以 5 美分的超低价维持盈利。可口可乐拥有极为强大的“潜在定价权”，却战略性地按兵不动，用压倒性的成本优势把几乎所有竞品逼入绝境。 --- ### [01:32:39](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=5559s) 宿敌百事可乐的登场与潜在破局点 在商标诉讼、专利弧形瓶和极限制造成本的三重重压下，市场上的中小模仿者几乎被可口可乐全面横扫，唯独百事可乐（Pepsi）存活了下来。百事可乐的历史同样悠久，早在 1894 年便已创立，但在漫长的岁月里它只是众多挣扎求生的小品牌之一。在陷入经营困境的年月里，百事可乐甚至曾先后三次试图将全部业务打包出售给可口可乐，但每一次都被可口可乐历任管理层断然回绝。 直到大萧条爆发，百事可乐的命运才迎来了历史性转折。尽管可口可乐依靠 5 美分的定价比所有竞争对手都便宜且更具知名度，但它严密的体系中其实暗藏了一个未曾预料的死角——那个著名的“梅·韦斯特”（Mae West）弧形经典玻璃瓶，容量其实只有 6.5 盎司。这个看似牢不可破的包装规格，意外地为濒临绝境的百事可乐留出了一线翻盘的契机。 - **百事三次求购无门**：百事可乐曾先后 3 次主动寻求被可口可乐收购，均遭拒绝。 - **大萧条转折点**：大萧条成为改变百事命运的关键历史机遇。 - **可口可乐的包装盲点**：经典弧形瓶规格固定在 6.5 盎司（约 192 毫升），在萧条时期留下了“单位容量性价比”的竞争缝隙。 ### [01:33:56](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=5636s) 12 盎司啤酒瓶的绝地反击：百事可乐教科书式的“反向定位” 可口可乐经典的弧线玻璃瓶（Contour Bottle）容量其实只有 6.5 盎司（约 192 毫升）。在今天看来，这比市面上常见的 7.5 盎司迷你易拉罐还要小。即便当时一瓶只要 5 美分（a nickel），能喝到的液体也少得可怜。1934 年的大萧条期间，经历了两三次破产重组、换过好几茬东家的百事可乐（Pepsi-Cola）再次处于生死存亡的边缘。为了活下去，百事走出了一步破釜沉舟的险棋：收购市场上大量廉价的 12 盎司回收啤酒瓶，灌装上百事可乐，同样只卖 5 美分。 这招堪称天才之作，其奥秘在于饮料行业的单位经济模型（Unit Economics）。在饮料生产的成本结构中，真正的开销只有两样：包装瓶和白糖，而水和其余原料成本几乎可以忽略不计。无论是 6 盎司、12 盎司还是日后的 64 盎司，多装几盎司糖水并不会真正蚕食利润率。通过直接使用回收啤酒瓶，百事大幅削减了瓶装固定成本，同时将容量直接翻倍，在大萧条时期向囊中羞涩的消费者抛出了一个无法抗拒的价值主张：“花同样的钱，买双倍的可乐”。 这也是商业史上教科书级别的“反向定位”（Counterpositioning）。可口可乐对此根本无法反击——因为可口可乐与其遍布全国的灌装厂网络刚刚为 6.5 盎司弧线瓶投入了海量的专用资本与知识产权，根本不可能轻易更换设备；更重要的是，可口可乐绝不能跟进打容量价格战来贬损自己的高端品牌形象。百事可乐借此狠狠重创了可口可乐的垄断地位。虽然这种“廉价大碗”的定位让百事在随后近八十年里都背负着“品质不如可乐、纯靠低价促销”的品牌包袱，但在 1934 年，能让消费者在大萧条中活下去的实惠压倒了一切。 ```mermaid flowchart LR accTitle: 百事可乐反向定位机制 accDescr: 展示百事可乐如何利用廉价啤酒瓶与单位经济学在大萧条时期反向克制可口可乐 subgraph Pepsi["百事可乐的险棋"] A["采购低价回收啤酒瓶<br/>(12 盎司容量)"] --> B["边际糖水成本极低"] B --> C["同样售价 5 美分<br/>容量直接翻倍"] end subgraph Impasse["可口可乐的困境"] D["沉没资产锁定<br/>(专用 6.5 盎司瓶与设备)"] E["品牌溢价顾虑<br/>(不能自我降格打价格战)"] end C -->|反向定位重击| D C -->|蚕食大众市场| E ``` ### [01:37:35](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=5855s) 商标诉讼反噬与秘密和解：百事拿下“Cola”合法地位 在容量上无法抗衡的可口可乐，拔出了法务武器，以侵犯商标权为由将百事可乐告上法庭，声称自己拥有“Cola”一词的独占商标权，任何竞品都不得使用。然而在诉讼过程中，百事可乐时任总裁沃尔特·麦克（Walter Mack）意外查出了一桩惊天丑闻：可口可乐此前曾通过非法的私下贿赂和恐吓手段，直接花钱买通了另一家竞争对手的老板，迫使其关门停业以避免对簿公堂。 拿到致命把柄的麦克立刻将这份贿赂证据提交给了法庭。得知消息的可口可乐掌舵人罗伯特·伍德拉夫（Robert Woodruff）立刻态度大变，亲自赶赴纽约与麦克密会。伍德拉夫以一副“我是个有教养的南方绅士、这纯属误会”的姿态，主动提出全面和解：只要撤回指控，可口可乐不仅撤诉，还允许百事可乐合法使用“Cola”这个词。甚至在此之后，伍德拉夫还试图通过老朋友关系给麦克提供一份掌管怀特汽车公司（White Motor Company）的高薪美差，企图以此利诱麦克离开百事，但麦克果断回绝：“绝不可能，我要留守百事，多谢你解决了商标官司。” 这场和解彻底摧毁了可口可乐在法律层面宣称独占“Cola”词权的先例，可口可乐的总法律顾问甚至因此愤而辞职。但从务实角度来看，伍德拉夫为公司止了血。经此一役，百事可乐成为了可口可乐历史上第一个真正合法的全国性正牌对手。到 1941 年 8 月，非可口可乐阵营在全美软饮市场的份额迅速蹿升至 14%，其中绝大部分正是百事可乐。可口可乐原本接近 100% 的铁板垄断，终于被撕开了一道无法愈合的裂口。 - **市场份额变动**：在百事反击之前，可乐市场基本是可口可乐 100% 独霸；到 1941 年 8 月，其他可乐品牌（以百事为主）已夺下 14% 的全美软饮料市场份额。 - **高管变动与和解代价**：伍德拉夫放弃追究“Cola”商标的独占权，导致公司总法律顾问辞职抗议，但换取了贿赂丑闻不被公开审理。 ### [01:41:11](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=6071s) 二战降临：军用豁免权与可乐的战时特权 正当百事可乐在本土蚕食市场份额时，一场改变世界格局的历史事件将可口可乐推向了全新的高度——第二次世界大战。在 1941 年底美国正式参战前，伍德拉夫虽然已在 20 和 30 年代向海外布设了一些灌装业务，但整体体量仍然很小。然而，当时已有 55 年历史的可口可乐，早已融入美国文化的血液，成为美式生活方式的无可替代的图腾。 美国军方和政府敏锐地意识到，可口可乐是战争中最强大的精神武器之一。它不仅能慰藉远赴欧亚战场的大兵们的思乡之情、维持部队士气，更是美式繁荣与价值观最完美的文化大使。军方采购官员在一封信件中直言不讳地写道：“极少有人意识到可口可乐在建立和维护军事人员士气方面所起的巨大作用……就我们看来，可口可乐应当被列为前线将士不可或缺的士气保障物资。” 这种极高的国家地位立刻在战时物资分配中转化为了惊人的商业特权。太平洋战争爆发后，美国政府对白糖实行了极其严格的战时配给制（Sugar Rationing）。可口可乐积极游说，成功争取到了军用物资豁免权。更为夸张的是政策落地的执行尺度：任何灌装厂只要其供货网络中涵盖了军事基地附近的零售商，无论其是否同时向普通平民销售，都可以全额获得无配给限制的白糖供应。这使得美国大片地区的平民在整个二战期间依然能喝到配方毫无缩水的全糖可口可乐。百事可乐等竞品曾就此向政府发起激烈抗议，怒斥官方不该以单一品牌作为特批标准，但军方与政府的裁决毫不动摇，可口可乐由此开启了软饮史上规模最大的一场全球战略扩张。 ### [01:44:03](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=6243s) 二战中的“技术观察员”与五美分承诺 在二战的硝烟中，可口可乐迎来了品牌历史上最重大的战略转折点。当时军队将领（即后来的艾森豪威尔总统）本身就是铁杆的可乐拥趸，美国军方因此授予可口可乐员工官方的“技术观察员”（Technical Observer）身份。这意味着可口可乐的人员能够直接参与全球美军的后勤供应链与基础设施建设，地位等同于军方工程技术人员。伴随盟军在全球战场的每一次推进，可口可乐紧随其后就地搭建装瓶厂和生产线，全方位保障前线士兵的冷饮供应。与此同时，公司开足宣传马力，将战火中递送可乐的一幕幕真实画面详细记录下来，转化为极具震撼力的爱国主义品牌广告。 1941年，可口可乐掌舵人罗伯特·伍德拉夫（Robert Woodruff）向全军立下庄严承诺：无论美国大兵身在何处参战，公司都会确保他们能喝到一瓶可口可乐，而且售价永远维持在五美分。这一举措赢得了前线官兵近乎狂热的感激之情。在《为了上帝、国家与可口可乐》（*For God, Country, and Coca-Cola*）一书中，收录了大量士兵写给后方的真实家信：一位大兵在信中写道，可口可乐本就是美妙的饮料，但在一个几乎没有美国人涉足过的荒凉海岛上，它简直是“上帝赐予的恩典”，当这帮年轻人在这片被上帝遗忘的土地上看到可口可乐时，脸上绽放的灿烂笑容是他此生未见的；另一封家信更是直言不讳：“如果有人问我们究竟为何而战，我想至少有一半人会回答——为了能够买到一瓶可口可乐的权利。” ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 可口可乐二战全球供应链与采样体系 accDescr: 展示可口可乐在军方支持下建立战地装瓶厂并实现品牌全球化的过程 subgraph MilitarySupport ["军方合作与战略绑定"] A["艾森豪威尔与美军军方"] -->|"授予身份"| B["技术观察员地位<br/>(Technical Observer)"] C["罗伯特·伍德拉夫的承诺"] -->|"全球前线供应"| D["恒定5美分/瓶"] end subgraph FrontlineOperations ["战地生产与供应"] B & D --> E["部署64座可移动便携式装瓶厂"] E --> F["深入亚洲、欧洲与北非前线"] F --> G["分发50亿至100亿瓶可乐"] end subgraph GlobalImpact ["战后全球红利"] G --> H["史上最庞大的免费品尝计划"] H --> I["提前25年完成全球市场铺设"] H --> J["退伍老兵转化为终身忠诚用户"] end ``` ### [01:45:49](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=6349s) “史上最庞大的免费品尝计划”与芬达的诞生 从1941年到1945年间，可口可乐共向亚洲、欧洲及北非战区运送了64座可移动式便携装瓶厂，战时分发给军队的可乐总量保守估计超过50亿瓶，亦有估算认为高达100亿瓶。美国政府对此极力支持，因为在解放区留下的最完美的美国民主与自由象征，莫过于一瓶冰镇可口可乐。在可口可乐内部，这段战时运作被自豪地称为“世界商业史上最庞大的免费品尝计划（Sampling Program）”。公司测算，这场战争帮助可口可乐开拓了海外数十个国家和地区的全新市场，若在和平时期靠正常商务拓展，至少需要耗费25年时间以及数以亿计的资本投入。回国后的大批退伍老兵更是成了终身不换品牌的铁粉，可口可乐自此成为如苹果派一般不可动摇的美国文化图腾。到1950年，海外业务已经贡献了整整三分之一的可口可乐总利润；同年《时代》（*Time*）杂志的封面上，出现了一个拟人化的巨大可口可乐红色圆盘，正坐在地球身后微笑着给整个星球喂可乐，配图文字正是意味深长的“世界与朋友”（World and friend）。 这段全球扩张史中还隐藏着一段极具戏剧性的商业插曲——芬达（Fanta）的诞生。二战爆发前，可口可乐在纳粹德国拥有成熟的装瓶业务。战争爆发后，德国工厂与美国总部彻底失联，原浆原料全部断供。当地的德国装瓶厂管理者不甘坐以待毙，利用战时能够搜罗到的乳清、苹果酒渣等边角料拼凑替代配方，开发出一种口感相对劣质的果味汽水作为替代品维持运转，并将其命名为“Fanta”。这场因战争断供而被迫发起的自救行动，日后在1960年被可口可乐重新调制配方后引入美国本土，演化为风靡全球的果味汽水支柱品牌。而到了二战结束的1945年，可口可乐正式将民间的爱称“Coke”注册为官方商标，从此正式登堂入室写入各大宣传广告中。 - **战地装瓶厂数量**：1941至1945年间在海外建立并运转了64座便携式野战装瓶厂。 - **战时分发规模**：向全球盟军官兵分发了50亿至100亿瓶可口可乐。 - **海外利润占比**：战后仅五年（1950年），海外市场已占公司整体利润的33%。 - **时代周刊封面**：1950年以拟人化红色圆盘喂地球喝可乐的油画登上封面，标语为“World and friend”。 - **Fanta的起源**：二战德国工厂因母公司断供，使用替代原料研发而成的应急饮料，1960年正式进入美国。 - **Coke商标注册**：1945年正式获得“Coke”商标注册并全面启用。 ### [01:49:25](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=6565s) 百事可乐的逆袭者：阿尔弗雷德·斯蒂尔入局 二战结束后的可口可乐无论在品牌声望还是财务规模上都达到了全盛巅峰，将大萧条时期被百事可乐（Pepsi）蚕食的阵地全部夺回，甚至成为了冷战时期美国政府输出文化与影响力的非正式工具。相比之下，百事可乐在战后境遇凄惨，完全没有享受到军火供应链的顺风车，再次被逼至生死存亡的悬崖边缘。陷入绝境的百事在1940年代末完成了一次不可思议的挖角——从可口可乐阵营硬生生挖走了高级主管阿尔弗雷德·斯蒂尔（Alfred Steel）。在视忠诚为宗教的可口可乐内部，“投奔百事”无异于叛逃至劣质山寨货阵营（可口可乐内部公文甚至从不直呼“百事”，而只用冷冰冰的“模仿者”一词代指）。斯蒂尔早年在大都会顶级广告公司达西（D'Arcy）操盘广告，后来加入可口可乐内部任职；一到百事，他迅速发动管理层政变，将掌权20年的老掌门沃尔特·麦克（Walter Mack）扫地出门，自立为百事新总裁。 斯蒂尔是个不按常理出牌的特立独行之徒，其狂放不羁的管理哲学常常令人瞠目结舌。他有一句流传甚广的名言：“雇佣高管的全部诀窍，就是找一个原本优秀的好人，然后把他变成一个浑球（prick）。好人扛得住沿途的磨难与折腾；但如果这家伙一开始就是个浑球，半路上准会彻底崩溃瓦解。”谈到用户需求时他也毫无顾忌：“哪怕消费者想要的是装在山羊皮袋里的碳酸汗液，我都不在乎！如果是这样，会议室这一边的人立刻出去抓山羊，另一边的人给我原地拼命疯狂跑步出汗！”面对战后志得意满、躺在功劳簿上不愿打破现状的可口可乐，毫无历史包袱的斯蒂尔在战后三四十年里将百事打造成了一家极具进攻性的先锋企业，并立即拍板推行了两项在当时堪称离经叛道的战略变革： 1. **破天荒开拓非裔美国人消费市场**：延续并激进化了前任麦克开启的少数族裔策略。组建全非裔专业销售团队，专门攻坚非裔零售终端；聘用非裔明星拍摄针对非裔社群的定制广告。这在当时的美国消费品行业极具颠覆性，而身处南方亚特兰大传统腹地的可口可乐对此不仅毫无动作，掌门人伍德拉夫甚至一度公开资助支持种族隔离政策的南方政客（尽管伍德拉夫晚年联手亚特兰大市长威廉·哈茨菲尔德大力推动了去种族隔离进程，但在40年代仍带有浓厚守旧色彩）。 2. **率先押注战后低热量瘦身风潮**：敏锐捕捉到1950年代美国中产阶级对体型焦虑与减肥节食（Diet）的新苗头，反向将百事可乐包装成比可口可乐更轻盈的健康饮品，打出经典的“清爽解渴却不发胀”（refresh without filling）口号。尽管彼时的百事可乐实际上比可口可乐甜度更高、可能含有更多糖分，但在那个“脂肪为恶、糖分无罪”的早期营养认知时代，这一精准卡位让百事打出了一记漂亮的差异化攻坚战。 ### [01:54:20](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=6860s) 百事可乐的突袭：低糖概念、詹姆斯·迪恩与电视营销新纪元 百事可乐（Pepsi）在前可口可乐高管阿尔弗雷德·斯蒂尔（Alfred Steele）入主后，掀起了一场激进的变革。面对二战后消费观念的微妙变化，百事开始主打“轻盈”（Light）和低热量概念。尽管当时的主持人打趣道，1940与1950年代的消费者根本没有现代人关于“碳水化合物和糖直接等于卡路里”的严密认知，但百事可乐确实抢先一步打出了减糖营销牌。更重要的是，百事可乐全面拥抱了当时最具颠覆性的新型广告媒介——电视，并将其全力对准美国年轻一代。 一个令人震惊的历史细节是：好莱坞传奇影星詹姆斯·迪恩（James Dean）正是由百事可乐发掘的。他在1949或1950年接下的生平第一份商业表演工作，就是拍摄一部百事可乐电视广告。这开启了百事随后三十年、四十年乃至半个世纪的核心营销叙事——从后来的“百事一代”（Pepsi Generation）到“新一代的选择”（Choice of a New Generation）。 除了品牌层面的青年化与电视策略，斯蒂尔还将可口可乐式的卓越运营实践移植到了百事体系中。早期的百事装瓶业务极为松散，甚至直接用回收啤酒瓶来灌装12盎司可乐。斯蒂尔引入了严格的标准化管理与对独立装瓶商的紧密控制。这一整套组合拳取得了惊人的战果：百事在美国的市场份额从1950年代初的20%出头，一路飙升至1955年的35%，而这几乎完全是以蚕食可口可乐的领地为代价的。彼时的可口可乐不仅尚未拥抱电视、无视非裔美国人消费市场，甚至压根没考虑过无糖饮料，逐渐在公众心目中沦为“父母那一辈喝的传统苏打水”。 - **詹姆斯·迪恩的出道作**：1949/1950年百事可乐广告，奠定了百事长达数十年的“年轻新一代”品牌定位。 - **市场份额飙升**：百事在全美的市场份额从1950年代初的低20%区间跃升至1955年的35%。 - **运营全面规范化**：告别早年使用二手啤酒瓶灌装的历史，建立正规现代化的装瓶商管理体系。 --- ### [01:57:21](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=7041s) 可口可乐换帅麦肯广告：绝密的第一次盲测 面对百事的节节逼近，可口可乐掌舵人罗伯特·伍德拉夫（Robert Woodruff）在1950年代中期终于坐不住了。他做出了一个激进决定：结束与老牌广告公司达西（D'Arcy）数十年的合作（达西曾为可乐打造了圣诞老人形象及二战期间的一系列辉煌战役），全面转聘当时全美最顶级的广告代理商麦肯广告（McCann Erickson）。 麦肯接手后立即引入了科学的市场调研方法。令人意想不到的是，麦肯在1950年代末期自发进行了历史上第一次“可乐盲测”（Blind Taste Test）——比百事日后大张旗鼓搞的“百事挑战”（Pepsi Challenge）早了近二十年，连百事自己当时都蒙在鼓里。测试结果具有极高统计显著性：在盲品状态下，绝大多数消费者更偏好百事可乐较甜的口感。当麦肯高层兴冲冲地将这一“重磅发现”呈报给伍德拉夫时，伍德拉夫冷冷地下达了两条铁律：“永远不要将这个结果泄露给任何人，也永远不许再做这种测试。” 伍德拉夫选择将这项致命弱点彻底封存，而这一隐患直到数十年后的80年代才真正全面爆发。与此同时，麦肯迅速推进了一系列救亡图存的现代整合营销： ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 麦肯广告入局后的可口可乐三大改革 accDescr: 展现麦肯广告接手可口可乐后在媒介整合、多元文化营销及低糖赛道的三大核心举措。 subgraph Channel["1. 全渠道一体化 (One Sight, Sound and Sell)"] A["进军电视媒介<br/>(1955年赞助米老鼠俱乐部)"] --> B["统一所有渠道视听语言"] B --> C["经典广告歌上线:<br/>Things Go Better with Coke"] end subgraph Culture["2. 民权时代与非裔市场拓展"] D["打破种族隔阂"] --> E["签约非裔传奇球星<br/>(杰西·欧文斯 / 萨奇·佩吉)"] E --> F["赞助哈林环球旅行者篮球队"] end subgraph Diet["3. 试水无糖饮料市场"] G["低糖新需求兴起"] --> H["拒绝动用 Coca-Cola 旗舰金字招牌"] H --> I["1962年推出独立品牌 Tab 无糖汽水"] end ``` - **全面拥抱电视与全渠道营销**：1955年起赞助《米老鼠俱乐部》（Mickey Mouse Club），麦肯提出“视、听、销一体”（One Coca-Cola site, sound, and sell），统一电视、平面与零售端的口径，并在60年代初打造了家喻户晓的“有可口可乐相伴，事事更美好”（Things Go Better with Coke）战役。 - **拥抱民权运动与多元受众**：可口可乐一改过去对非裔市场的忽视，率先起用杰西·欧文斯（Jesse Owens）、萨奇·佩吉（Satchel Paige）以及威利·梅斯（Willie Mays, 1952年）等传奇黑人运动员，并赞助当时全美最火爆的哈林篮球队（Harlem Globetrotters）。 --- ### [02:00:46](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=7246s) 试水低糖赛道：Tab 汽水横空出世与诡异的时代广告 在麦肯的极力劝说下，伍德拉夫终于同意涉足低糖饮料，但可口可乐在品牌保护上极为顽固。1962年，公司正式推出了含糖替代品“Tab”，而不是直接叫“健怡可乐”（Diet Coke）。伍德拉夫给出的官方借口充满哲学神采：“如果上帝希望可口可乐里有糖精，祂一开始就会把它做成那样。”而背后的另一层行业传闻在于历史遗留的装瓶合约——据传母装瓶商托马斯公司（Thomas Company）拥有任何带有“Coca-Cola”字样的新产品每份抽取10美分版税的权利。可口可乐不愿在未经验证的“节食潮流”上押上积攒了80年的金字招牌。 与此同时，百事可乐已顺理成章推出了 Diet Pepsi 并在市场上大获成功。可口可乐的 Tab 随后展开了密集的广告攻势。节目主持人特别提及了当时一条令人啼笑皆非、带有浓重时代烙印的 Tab 复古电视广告：镜头中一名男子以一种略带诡异和窥探的目光打量着球场上身着网球裙的女球手，伴奏中欢快而诡异的洗脑歌声唱道：“保持让他无法忘怀的身段……Tab 的口感令人难忘，让你拥有他无法忘怀的体态……在他身边做个萦绕心头的人，你不想保持好身材吗？他希望你身材曼妙！” 这则广告展现出早在肥胖成为全美公共健康议题的40年前，饮料巨头就心知肚明全糖汽水对人体形态的负面影响。尽管广告立意在今天看来匪夷所思，Tab 依然迅速蹿升为全美乃至全球最畅销的无糖汽水，并一直统治该细分市场，直至20多年后真正的 Diet Coke 诞生。直到2020年可口可乐公司大刀阔斧将旗下品牌由600个精简至200个时，服役近60年的 Tab 才正式被送入历史。 而面对百事在1950至1960年代的凶猛攻势，可口可乐打出的另一张至关重要的王牌，便是与当时正在崭露头角的一家新型快餐连锁建立同盟——麦当劳（McDonald's）。 ### [02:04:29](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=7469s) 麦当劳与可口可乐：长达数十年的“握手之盟”与独家特权 现打苏打饮料（Fountain Soda）本只是可口可乐的一项日常业务，但其重要性却以惊人的速度飙升。时至今日，可口可乐的高管名单中甚至专门设立了一个全权负责麦当劳业务部门的高级主管职位——在可口可乐整部商业史上，从未有任何其他单一客户享受过这种专设部门的待遇。这一切的开端要追溯到 1955 年：雷·克罗克（Ray Kroc）在刚拿到麦当劳的全国扩张经营权时，首要任务就是为位于伊利诺伊州的首家新店寻找饮料供应商。他主动致电可口可乐，并与负责现打饮料部门的高管沃迪·普拉特（Waddy Pratt）当面进行了一次握手。正是这次简单的握手，奠定了两家巨头长达近四十年、完全没有任何书面合同约束的深度绑定关系。在其他餐饮连锁不断进行公开比选、压价招标的行业惯例下，麦当劳不仅从不对饮料供应公开竞标，更获得了可口可乐无可比拟的超规格特权待遇。 民间长期流传着“麦当劳的可乐比别处都好喝”的说法，而这并非消费者的心理错觉，背后确实存在大量严苛的工业与品控差异。普通餐饮店的可口可乐糖浆通常是以纸箱包裹的塑料袋形式运输，并由当地装瓶商代理配送；而送到麦当劳的可口可乐原浆，则是用定制的不锈钢恒温罐全程运送。麦当劳在店内不仅将水质进行深度预冷，且其制冷管道一直严密包裹延伸至分配阀门；更为特殊的是，为了抵消冰块融化对口感的稀释，麦当劳获准采用了略高于行业标准比例的糖浆配方——这在对配方比例有着严苛控管的可口可乐体系内几乎算得上是“不可思议的特例”。此外，麦当劳配备了口径更宽的专用吸管，以便让更多的可乐液体在瞬间覆盖舌尖的味蕾；加之其惊人的出杯流转量，使得后厨的糖浆始终保持极高的新鲜度，绝不会因陈置氧化而走味。 这两大标志性美国品牌的共生关系还延伸到了全球市场。尽管两者都被视为美国文化的象征，但可口可乐在国际化布局上足足比麦当劳早了近 60 年。当麦当劳向海外新兴市场扩张开店时，其团队常常直接驻扎在当地的可口可乐办事处，借助可口可乐数十年建立的深厚政商关系与分销网络快速立足。可口可乐内部更确立了一条铁律：全球销售团队向任何餐饮渠道出售糖浆的价格，都绝对不得低于麦当劳的采购价；即便面临因价格过高而将大单输给宿敌百事可乐的风险，也必须坚决捍卫麦当劳享有的全网最低单位结算价。 - **握手协议（Handshake Deal）**：1955 年由雷·克罗克与沃迪·普拉特敲定，连续维持数十年未签署正式框架合同。 - **不锈钢罐配送（Stainless Steel Tanks）**：区别于传统塑料袋包装（Bag-in-Box），最大限度避免风味受损。 - **冷链及出料优化**：全管路预冷，微调糖浆比例以应对融冰稀释，并标配特制宽口吸管。 - **全球扩张支点**：麦当劳借力可口可乐早了半个多世纪的海外网络，共享当地基础设施。 - **最惠待遇底线**：可口可乐严令禁止任何餐饮客户的糖浆进价低于麦当劳。 --- ### [02:08:53](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=7733s) 60 年代的并购与失策：菲多利之憾与铝罐普及 步入 1960 年代，饮料消费市场发生了一系列技术与版图剧变。1960 年，可口可乐在美国本土首次推出了 12 盎司铝制易拉罐装可乐，并顺势收购了果汁品牌美汁源（Minute Maid）。尽管这次收购是可口可乐数十年后全面进军非碳酸饮料的前奏，但在当时极其漫长的岁月里，美汁源几乎是这家苏打巨头旗下唯一的非碳酸饮品。 而在收购战略的另一端，可口可乐却犯下了一项足以改写竞争格局的重大失误。1965 年，百事公司与菲多利公司（Frito-Lay）正式合并为百事公司（PepsiCo）。鲜为人知的是，菲多利原本是亚特兰大本土起家的企业，可口可乐凭借地缘优势本是其最顺理成章的优先收购方，但可口可乐高层却亲自否决了这笔交易。几十年后的商业现实表明，菲多利的食品业务在商业模式上远胜传统含糖饮料：尽管其营收规模在母公司百事内部略逊于饮料板块，但菲多利贡献的净利润却足足是百事饮料业务的两倍之多。可口可乐当时的傲慢与近视，直接促成了宿敌百事坐拥极其强大的零食现金奶牛业务。 --- ### [02:10:13](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=7813s) 麦肯广告、“正宗货”（The Real Thing）与《广告狂人》终局 进入 1960 年代末，可口可乐与其代理商麦肯广告（McCann Erickson）的合作渐入佳境。麦肯广告在可口可乐体系中的角色，正如当年缔造可口可乐视觉神话的阿奇·李（Archie Lee）一样举足轻重。面对当时风起云涌的嬉皮士运动与反文化浪潮，麦肯广告敏锐地将青年一代对“真实质朴”的追求挪为己用。1968 年，他们操刀推出了名垂广告史的整合营销战役——“正宗货”（The Real Thing）。在当时高果糖玉米糖浆尚未普及、产品依然完全使用纯蔗糖的背景下，可口可乐借由这一口号，巧妙地将自身与“最纯正的美国符号”划上了等号。 ```mermaid flowchart LR accTitle: 麦肯广告灵感转化流程 accDescr: 展现从爱尔兰机场滞留到提出购买可乐概念的广告创意形成路径 subgraph S1["机场现实洞察"] A["爱尔兰航班延误滞留"] B["不同国籍乘客同饮可乐"] A --> B end subgraph S2["情感共鸣转化"] C["超越国界的连接符号"] D["餐巾纸草拟：I'd Like to Buy the World a Coke"] B --> C --> D end subgraph S3["影视工业制作"] E["获批10万美元创纪录预算"] F["多宝悬崖取景拍摄遭遇连续阴雨"] D --> E --> F end ``` 这一品牌叙事的巅峰，在 1971 年由经典商业广告《山巅》（Hilltop）推向了极致。美剧《广告狂人》（Mad Men）更在最终季大结局中，将该广告的创意构想戏说为男主角唐·德雷珀（Don Draper）在加州静修后的顿悟之作。事实上，麦肯广告从《广告狂人》第一季起就作为斯特林·库珀（Sterling Cooper）事务所的强大竞争对手贯穿全剧，而现实中麦肯广告之所以在麦迪逊大道拥有无可撼动的行业霸权，其核心底气正是牢牢握着可口可乐这一巨型客户。 《山巅》广告中那首红遍全球的歌曲《我想给世界买瓶可口可乐》（I'd Like to Buy the World a Coke），其诞生源于麦肯广告创意总监比尔·巴克（Bill Backer）的一次真实经历。他在爱尔兰香农机场遭遇航班延误，目睹原本因滞留而烦躁不安的各国旅客围坐在一起，就着可口可乐谈笑风生。巴克深受触动，在餐巾纸上疾书下可口可乐能够消弭国界与语言隔阂的核心理念。可口可乐广告部门随即批准了高达 10 万美元的天价制作预算——这在当时创下了电视商业广告的历史纪录。然而拍摄过程充满坎坷，摄制组为了表达大同理念，费尽周折挑选了代表世界各民族的 200 名年轻演员，奔赴英国多佛白崖（Cliffs of Dover）取景，却未料开机便撞上了英国海岸连续整整三天的狂风暴雨。 ### [02:14:03](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=8043s) 《山丘》广告的难产与意外的全球金曲 可口可乐与广告公司 McCann-Erickson 当时在拍摄这部宏大的广告时，遇到了令人难以置信的挫折。摄制组最初的拍摄预算完全被耗尽，为了躲避坏天气，他们心想：“哪里不会下雨？去罗马吧。”于是他们获得了高达 25 万美元的额外预算批准，全员飞往罗马郊外的山丘。然而荒唐的是，罗马竟然也下起了大雨。演员们在雨中被淋得狼狈不堪、毫无神采，导致最初拍摄的所有素材几乎全成了废片，根本无法使用。 陷入绝境的团队只能施展“事不过三”的韧性，开启了一场堪称搞笑的大拼凑。他们不得不走上罗马街头现找新演员，广告开场特写镜头里的那位标志性女主角，就是这样在罗马街头临时发掘的。为了完成制作，摄制组甚至是在两个完全不同的地点分别拍摄的——宏大的山丘全景与人物近景其实根本不在同一个地方。然而，这支东拼西凑的《山丘》（Hilltop）广告一经播出，却引发了空前的轰动与喜爱。那首广告歌不仅旋律极其洗脑，更直接引发了全美电台的“点歌风暴”，无数听众纷纷打电话给电台要求播放这首可口可乐的广告配乐。后来，乐队重新填词并录制了一首去掉了商业歌词的正式单曲《I'd Like to Teach the World to Sing (In Perfect Harmony)》，随即登顶音乐排行榜，成为全球超级畅销金曲。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 《山丘》广告制作与文化传播路径 accDescr: 描述可口可乐《山丘》广告经历多地雨水挫折后拍摄完成并演变成文化爆款的过程 subgraph S1["拍摄波折"] A["最初拍摄耗尽预算且遇雨"] --> B["转战罗马郊外追加至25万美元"] B --> C["罗马再次遭遇大雨导致素材报废"] C --> D["罗马街头临时物色新主角并在两地拼凑补拍"] end subgraph S2["文化爆款"] D --> E["《山丘》广告正式播出大获好评"] E --> F["电台被点播电话打爆"] F --> G["乐队重录无商业词版本成为全球畅销金曲"] end ``` 这种营销策略的巧妙之处，让两位主播不由得发出感慨与戏谑。广告中那句著名的旋律“我想给全世界买一瓶可口可乐，陪伴在它身旁，这就是正牌货”（"I'd like to buy the world a Coke and keep it company. That's the real thing."），画面里来自世界各地、不同肤色的青年男女相聚在山坡上其乐融融，散发着无比真挚而美好的情感力量。但这背后冷酷的事实却是：一家售卖糖水的巨头跨国公司，精准地借用了 1960 年代末至 70 年代初的反战与嬉皮士运动潮流，打造出了商业史上最成功、最打动人心的广告之一——这简直就是美剧《广告狂人》（Mad Men）大结局中唐·德雷珀（Don Draper）顿悟瞬间的现实写照。 - 罗马补拍获批预算高达 25 万美元（在 1970 年代初这笔广告制作费相当惊人）。 - 广告开场女主角是团队在罗马街头临时挑选的，镜头分别在两处不同地点拼贴完成。 - 广告插曲由 The New Seekers 等乐队录制成流行单曲《I'd Like to Teach the World to Sing》，成为全球多国音乐排行榜冠军。 --- ### [02:16:10](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=8170s) 现场“盲测”与百事可乐的甜味秘诀 进入 1970 年代中期，可口可乐的整体日子过得顺风顺水，然而到了 1975 年，一个被罗伯特·伍德拉夫（Robert Woodruff）和麦肯广告埋藏了整整二十年的“奇耻大辱”与至暗秘密终于彻底爆发——那便是席卷全美的“百事挑战”（The Pepsi Challenge）。在展开讲述这段商业大战之前，主播 David 甚至在节目现场拿出了百事可乐与经典可口可乐，当场给自己做了一次盲测对比。 ```mermaid flowchart LR accTitle: 百事可乐与可口可乐风味机制对比 accDescr: 对比百事可乐与可口可乐在配方风味与最佳饮用温度条件下的差异 subgraph Pepsi["百事可乐 (Pepsi)"] P1["更甜、带柠檬果香柑橘感"] P2["在单口盲测/较暖温度下更具味觉冲击力"] end subgraph Coke["可口可乐 (Coca-Cola)"] C1["更深沉的香草、肉桂香料味"] C2["冰镇至接近冰点时口感最佳，适合持续畅饮"] end ``` 针对两款可乐的味觉差异，主播们深入探讨了可乐背后的风味化学与物理状态。可口可乐团队一直坚称，百事在较高温度下具有天然优势，因为更高的甜度在较暖的温度下更讨好味蕾；而可口可乐则需要在刚好高于冰点的绝佳低温下，才能展现出其无与伦比的深沉风味。David 在现场对比品尝后发现，百事可乐带有一种鲜明的柠檬果香酸甜感（lemony zest），口感更甜更跳跃，并当场坦言：“单就这一下而言，我觉得百事确实更好喝一点。”虽然 David 平时喝健怡可乐（Diet Coke）更多，但即使在可口可乐的深度专题节目里，也不得不承认在经典的单口对比中，百事可乐在味觉上对大众具有极强的直觉吸引力。 - 评测温差效应：含糖量更高、带柑橘风味的饮品在较高温度下往往比风味内敛的配方更容易获得好感。 - 百事可乐口感明显偏甜，带有更突出的柠檬/柑橘酸甜果味；传统可口可乐的甜味则相对克制，香料与焦糖质感更重。 --- ### [02:18:04](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=8284s) 改变行业的首款塑料大瓶（PET 2升瓶）的诞生 “百事挑战”背后的关键推手在 1967 年悄然登场。当时一位刚从沃顿商学院毕业的年轻 MBA，在广告巨头 Interpublic Group（IPG，即麦肯广告的母公司）工作数年后跳槽加入了百事可乐。在阿尔弗雷德·斯蒂尔（Alfred Steele）改革之前，百事公司基本由凭借摸爬滚打成长起来的草莽派管理；这位年轻人的加入极为罕见，甚至可能是百事历史上引进的第一批正规名校 MBA 之一。 进入百事担任新产品开发总监后，他敏锐地捕捉到了 1960 年代末到 70 年代初美国消费环境的剧烈变迁：大型超级市场正在全美迅速普及，而软饮料市场中存在一个极大的未被满足的需求痛点——家庭日常饮用与聚会场景。当时消费者如果要在家里办聚会或供全家享用，只能辛辛苦苦搬运一整箱沉重、易碎的玻璃瓶，或是拆开无数个易拉罐。而对于汽水行业来说，生产饮料的边际成本根本不在于水和糖浆的体积多寡，把容量从 6 盎司放大到 64 盎司并不会增加多少物料成本。 为了制造这种 64 盎司（约 2 升）的派对大容量包装，这位主管最初意识到玻璃材料完全不可行——因为 64 盎司的玻璃瓶一旦装满汽水，将极其沉重且极易在运输和手持时摔碎。百事于是求助化工巨头杜邦（DuPont）。杜邦给出了一个跨时代的解决方案：他们刚研发出一种全新的塑料聚合物——聚对苯二甲酸乙二醇酯（PET）。PET 塑料轻巧、坚韧、成本极低，更重要的是，它可以以预成型胚体（preforms）的形式直接发往各地灌装厂，装瓶商只需通过空气加压将模具吹胀膨胀，随后灌装即可，无需重建昂贵的新生产线。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 2升PET塑料瓶诞生流程 accDescr: 百事可乐洞察家庭大容量需求并通过杜邦PET技术开创2升塑料瓶的历史 subgraph MarketInsight["市场痛点"] M1["大型超级市场全美崛起"] M2["多口之家与聚会缺乏大包装方案"] M3["多瓶玻璃包装过于沉重且易碎"] end subgraph DuPontTech["杜邦技术突破"] T1["聚对苯二甲酸乙二醇酯 (PET)"] T2["高强度、极轻、抗冲击且成本低廉"] T3["发运轻巧预成型胚体，装瓶厂就地吹瓶充气成型"] end subgraph Outcome["商业与生态结果"] M1 & M2 & M3 --> T1 T1 --> T2 --> T3 T3 --> R1["百事领先可口可乐三年半推出2升大瓶装"] R1 --> R2["引发全球饮料行业一次性塑料包装泛滥的环保危机"] end ``` 这种两升装 PET 塑料瓶的问世，让百事可乐在软饮料包装形态上建立起对可口可乐长达三年半的巨大领先优势，可口可乐直到三年半之后才仓促跟进推出同等规格的大包装。但这不仅是一场商业上的大捷，也客观上拉开了全球消费品深陷一次性塑料泥潭的序幕。两位主播在回顾这段商业神操作时也不无反思：可口可乐与百事日后稳坐全球海洋塑料垃圾污染企业榜前列，这场包装革命彻底重塑了供应链，也开启了不可逆的“塑料化”时代。 - 关键包装规格：64 盎司（约 1.89 升），即后来普及全球的 2 升（2-Liter）饮料规格。 - 材料技术：杜邦研发的 PET（Polyethylene Terephthalate）塑料，通过预成型胚体高压充气吹瓶成型。 - 竞争时间差：百事凭借该创新领先可口可乐三年半之久。 --- ### [02:23:20](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=8600s) 达拉斯的意外发现：点燃盲测风暴的引线 凭借 2 升大包装瓶取得的巨大成功，百事可乐时任首席执行官唐·肯德尔（Don Kendall）对这位年轻的 MBA 刮目相看，认为他通过了考验，决定将整个百事公司的营销大权全权托付给他，并向他下达了终极任务：“带领百事拉下可口可乐的王座。” 走马上任的这位营销主管在系统盘点全美各地的销售与市场状况时，目光落在了得克萨斯州达拉斯（Dallas）。他惊讶地发现，达拉斯当地的百事装瓶商及其合作的本地广告代理机构，竟然正在暗中搞一件不同寻常的新鲜事。而这个所谓的“新鲜尝试”，恰恰误打误撞地撞破了可口可乐与麦肯广告早在二十年前（1955年）就已经通过内部调研知晓、却被老掌门人罗伯特·伍德拉夫下令永远埋入地底的终极软肋。一场足以撼动整个消费品商业格局的盲测大风暴——“百事挑战”，就此破土而出。 - 百事公司最高决策层：CEO 唐·肯德尔（Don Kendall）任命该产品负责人掌管全美营销大权。 - 关键发源地：得克萨斯州达拉斯（Dallas）的百事本地装瓶厂及其广告代理团队。 - 核心冲突：装瓶厂无意中触碰到了可口可乐严密封锁了 20 年的盲测偏好秘密。 ### [02:24:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=8640s) 达拉斯的偶然发现与“百事挑战”的诞生 “百事挑战”（Pepsi Challenge）的诞生源于一次纯属偶然的市场调研。当时达拉斯的一家本地广告代理商正在为当地的 7-Eleven 便利店进行市场测试，因为 7-Eleven 当时正在销售自营的无牌通用可乐（generic cola）。代理商在测试中同时引入了可口可乐和百事可乐作为对照组，结果却意外发现：在盲测中，消费者竟然普遍偏好百事可乐而不是可口可乐。巧合的是，这家本地广告代理商同时也是达拉斯本地百事可乐装瓶商的代理，他们立即兴奋地跑去告诉装瓶商这个重大发现。 达拉斯的装瓶商随即决定在本地展开测试。他们在超市门口摆上一张折叠牌桌，用纸板挡住饮料瓶，分别倒出两杯没有标识的可乐让过往的消费者品尝，并询问：“你更喜欢哪一杯？”结果，统计学上显著比例的人群都选择了百事可乐。装瓶商将这一过程拍成广告在达拉斯本地电视台投放，瞬间引发强烈共鸣，达拉斯本地百事可乐的市场份额直接飙升了 14%。 ### [02:25:23](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=8723s) 家用摄像机与划时代的草根营销风暴 当百事可乐新任市场营销副总裁看到达拉斯的数据时，敏锐地意识到这是一个巨大的机会。但他坚定地认为不能采用可口可乐那种“大企业中心化”的做法——即通过大型广告公司搞一套统一视觉、统一声效、全国通用的宏大公司广告。百事挑战之所以能打动人心，核心在于它的“草根性”（grassroots）和真实性：它展现的是达拉斯本地普通人真实的盲测反应。 恰逢当时录像机（VCR）和早期家用便携摄像机（camcorder）刚刚推向市场，百事营销团队果断采购了大量家用摄像机和折叠牌桌，分发给全美各地的本地装瓶商。公司指导各地装瓶商：“去你们当地的商场、超市、海滩和消防站摆摊，用摄像机拍摄本地真人盲测的镜头，然后买下本地电视台的广告时段播出。”这成为了商业史上最成功的草根营销活动之一，甚至堪称第一部真正意义上的“真人秀广告”（reality television commercial）。反观可口可乐与代理商麦肯（McCann）高度依赖全国性宏大叙事的宣发架构，面对这种分散在全美各地的本地化攻势，完全无法组织起有效的防御。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 百事挑战的草根营销裂变机制 accDescr: 展现从达拉斯偶然发现盲测结果到全美装瓶商利用家用摄像机本地拍摄并投放广告的闭环过程。 subgraph Origin["发现阶段"] A["7-Eleven 通用可乐盲测调研"] --> B["发现消费者更偏好百事"] B --> C["达拉斯装瓶商拍摄本地真实盲测"] C --> D["达拉斯市场份额猛增 14%"] end subgraph Expansion["全国草根裂变"] D --> E["总部拒绝全国性统一公关广告"] E --> F["批量采购家用摄像机与折叠牌桌"] F --> G["分发至全美各地本地装瓶商"] G --> H["在商场/海滩拍摄本地真人盲测"] H --> I["投放本地电视台广告时段"] end ``` - **广告支出与市场逆转**：1977 年，百事可乐在广告上的支出历史上首次超过了可口可乐。 - **瓶装市场反超**：在超市及零售渠道的瓶装/罐装软饮市场份额上，百事可乐历史性地超越了可口可乐。 - **现调机护城河（Fountain Business）**：可口可乐依然保持着全美软饮料的总份额第一，这得益于其在餐饮现调机渠道（尤其是麦当劳等连锁巨头）坚不可摧的霸主地位。 - **百事进军餐饮业的副作用**：70 年代末，百事为了突破餐饮渠道收购了塔可钟（Taco Bell）、必胜客（Pizza Hut）和肯德基（KFC）。这反而成为可口可乐反击的武器——可口可乐向其他餐饮连锁游说称“百事拥有你们的竞争对手，买百事就是给对手送利润”，导致百事后来不得不将餐饮业务剥离为百胜餐饮集团（Yum! Brands）。 ### [02:29:48](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=8988s) 约翰·斯考利其人与乔布斯的“糖水之问” 一手策划并推动百事挑战席卷全美的年轻营销高管正是约翰·斯考利（John Sculley）。随着百事挑战名震商界，斯考利接到了猎头蜂拥而至的各类 CEO 职位邀请。斯考利深爱百事，也在此建立了辉煌的职业生涯，原本无意离开。直到 1983 年，一位年轻的科技创业者向他发出了无法拒绝的终极邀请——史蒂夫·乔布斯（Steve Jobs）当面对斯考利说出了那句著名的名言：“你是想后半辈子继续卖糖水，还是想跟我一起去改变世界？”（"Do you want to sell sugar water for the rest of your life or do you want to come with me and change the world?"）。 斯考利随后接受邀请，于 1983 年出任苹果电脑（Apple Computer）的 CEO。尽管大众普遍熟知的剧本是乔布斯后来被逐出苹果、苹果陷入混乱、斯考利被视作反派，但商业数据表明，在斯考利任内，苹果的营收从不足 10 亿美元一路增长到了他离职时的近 80 亿美元（节目中戏称他是“蒂姆·库克之前的蒂姆·库克”）。如今斯考利已 87 岁高龄，依然活跃在三家初创公司的董事会中，且是《Acquired》播客的忠实听众。 ### [02:32:03](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=9123s) 可口可乐的高层停滞与戈伊苏埃塔临危受命 百事挑战从 1975 年启动并持续蚕食市场，而可口可乐竟然整整拖延了十年，直到 1985 年才做出实质性的战略回应。这种不可思议的迟钝源于当时可口可乐公司内部严重的管理瘫痪： - **罗伯特·伍德拉夫的晚年专权**：可口可乐传奇掌门人罗伯特·伍德拉夫（Robert Woodruff）虽然退居董事会主席，但仍握有绝对最终裁决权。此时他已年近九旬，视力、听力和阅读能力严重衰退，极难沟通，同时对可口可乐该做什么、不该做什么有着根深蒂固的执念。 - **CEO 罹患阿尔茨海默病**：当时的首席执行官保罗·奥斯汀（J. Paul Austin）不幸患上了阿尔茨海默病，却依然留任 CEO 职位。老迈固执的伍德拉夫未能及时察觉异样，导致整个公司在 1970 年代后半期陷入全面决策瘫痪，没有任何重大战略能够推进。 混乱的局面最终在 1980 年 5 月迎来转机。董事会任命了一位名叫罗伯托·戈伊苏埃塔（Roberto Goizueta）的年轻化学工程师出任 CEO。戈伊苏埃塔是一名古巴移民，凭借扎实的技术实力一路晋升，35 岁时就已成为可口可乐技术研发部门的负责人。作为一名专注产品配方的化学工程师，他正是当时传说中全球仅有的两位知晓可口可乐绝密配方的人之一，可口可乐的反击序幕由此拉开。 ### [02:34:16](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=9256s) 高果糖玉米糖浆与 Roberto Goizueta 掌舵可口可乐 在正式接管公司大权之前，Roberto Goizueta 在可口可乐内部已经打赢了一场漂亮的胜仗：他主导了在美国市场用高果糖玉米糖浆（High Fructose Corn Syrup, HFCS）全面替代蔗糖的改革。自 1980 年起，可口可乐先用玉米糖浆替代了 50% 的糖，到 1984 年更是彻底实现了 100% 替换。由于当时蔗糖价格一路飞涨，而美国政府对玉米的农业补贴让高果糖玉米糖浆的成本极其低廉，在消费者接受且对健康无更恶劣影响的前提下，这在财务账面上成了一笔不折不扣的划算买卖。 然而，在可口可乐的 CEO 接班人之争中，Goizueta 最初其实是一匹“黑马”。当时外界和内部普遍看好的接班人是极具人脉与声望的传奇高管 Don Keough。当 Goizueta 最终出任 CEO 后，他展现了高超的领导艺术，立刻拉拢 Keough 说：“Don，你是我的黄金搭档，我们来组成团队一起管理这家公司。你当总裁兼 COO，负责公司外部的一切关系；我懂产品、懂内部战略，我们就是最强的二人组。” Goizueta 之所以能够击败热门人选胜出，核心原因在于他是可口可乐精神领袖 Robert Woodruff 的得意门生。正如《秘密配方》（*Secret Formula*）一书中所描述的，Goizueta 非常擅长“向上管理”，总是能让暮年的 Woodruff 感到被尊重、被悉心照顾且对公司动态了如指掌。 ### [02:35:39](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=9339s) 收购哥伦比亚影业、投行 Allen & Company 与巴菲特的宿命连接 Goizueta 和 Keough 搭班后展开了一连串大动作，其中早期最让人侧目的便是收购好莱坞老牌电影制片厂哥伦比亚影业（Columbia Pictures）。在 20 世纪 80 年代充斥着疯狂多元化并购的大背景下，买下一家电影公司表面上看荒谬至极——毕竟世界上几乎没有任何商业模式能媲美可口可乐核心的浓缩液特许经营模式（除非是 Visa 或顶尖软件公司）。然而，这笔交易在财务上不仅没有亏损，几年后卖给索尼（Sony）时甚至赚了一笔可观的收益，更重要的是，它为可口可乐带来了一张价值连城的政商关系网。 哥伦比亚影业的原主要股东是华尔街神秘而极具声望的精品投行 Allen & Company 的掌门人 Herb Allen Jr.。通过收购案，Herb Allen Jr. 受邀加入了可口可乐董事会，开启了两家公司延续至今的长久渊源（2000年代初接班的 Herb Allen III 至今仍是可口可乐董事）。正是因为这层关系，可口可乐的高管们开始受邀参加著名的 Allen & Company 太阳谷峰会（Sun Valley Conference），并在那里引发了一场改变商业史的奇妙连锁反应。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 可口可乐与巴菲特的结缘链路 accDescr: 展示可口可乐收购哥伦比亚影业后如何一步步与沃伦·巴菲特产生交集并完成品牌转化 subgraph MNA["资本运作与人脉网络"] A["可口可乐收购<br/>哥伦比亚影业"] --> B["结识 Herb Allen Jr.<br/>(Allen & Co.)"] B --> C["受邀参加<br/>太阳谷峰会 (Sun Valley)"] end subgraph RECONNECT["历史渊源重聚"] C --> D["Don Keough 与昔日奥马哈邻居<br/>沃伦·巴菲特 (Warren Buffett) 重逢"] end subgraph CONVERSION["产品与心智转化"] D --> E["巴菲特原为百事可乐拥趸<br/>(偏好樱桃风味)"] E --> F["Keough 推荐即将推出的<br/>樱桃可乐 (Cherry Coke)"] F --> G["巴菲特彻底倒戈为可乐死忠粉<br/>(日均 5 罐，为伯克希尔重仓埋下伏笔)"] end ``` ### [02:37:04](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=9424s) 太阳谷重逢、“阿甘式”巴菲特与“火腿三明治”典故 在太阳谷峰会上，Don Keough 重逢了年轻时在内布拉斯加州奥马哈法纳姆街（Farnum Street）居住时的老邻居——沃伦·巴菲特（Warren Buffett）。巴菲特的投资传奇常常带着一种宛如现实版《阿甘正传》（*Forrest Gump*）般的戏剧色彩：那些创造人类投资神话的伟大标的，往往来自“我家隔壁住的邻居”（Don Keough，大学毕业后在被可乐收购的咖啡公司工作），或是“老家开家具店的老太太”（内布拉斯加家具卖场的 B 夫人）。 更绝的是，彼时的巴菲特在“百事挑战”（Pepsi Challenge）的潮流影响下其实是个百事可乐的忠实拥趸。巴菲特喝百事时最喜欢往里面加樱桃糖浆，Keough 敏锐地抓住了这一点，向巴菲特透露可口可乐即将研发推出“樱桃可乐”（Cherry Coke）。凭借这款新品，Keough 在巴菲特向可口可乐投入一分钱股票之前，就成功将这位投资巨鳄彻底策反为可口可乐的狂热粉丝，以至于后来巴菲特每天要雷打不动地喝下五罐樱桃可乐。 在某次太阳谷峰会的小组讨论上还发生过一段尴尬的插曲：比尔·盖茨（Bill Gates）与巴菲特、Goizueta、Keough 同台时，盖茨不小心说漏了嘴，当着 Goizueta 的面揭秘道：“沃伦以前老跟我说，可口可乐这种公司‘就算让一个火腿三明治来当 CEO 都能运转得很好’（could be run by a ham sandwich）。”这句话让自尊心极强的 Goizueta 当场极为难堪，据说此后再也没搭理过比尔·盖茨。 ### [02:39:49](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=9589s) 健怡可乐（Diet Coke）横空出世：无线电城音乐厅与统治级胜利 Goizueta 执政时期最为辉煌的战果，当属推出了人类饮料史上最成功的无糖低卡饮料——健怡可乐（Diet Coke）。在 1970 年代“百事挑战”的步步紧逼下，百事向全美宣称消费者盲测更喜欢偏甜、偏轻盈的口味。面对压力，可口可乐实验室长期在研发一种口味上更轻、更甜且能与百事正面硬刚的人工甜味剂配方。然而在 1982 年推向市场前，公司内部承受着巨大的心理包袱： 1. **品牌护城河风险**：可口可乐主品牌被 Woodruff 视为不可亵渎的“圣牛”，任何衍生都可能稀释其神圣性； 2. **同室操戈（Cannibalization）**：可口可乐旗下已有 1982 年全球销量第一的无糖饮料 Tab，推出同类竞品无异于左右互搏。 但管理层清醒地意识到低卡市场正在爆发，继续藏着可口可乐的金字招牌不放无异于作茧自缚，加上 1975 年可口可乐已收购了 Thomas Company，扫清了瓶装商对非传统可口可乐产品抽取每加仑 10 美分版税的合同历史遗留障碍，公司决定全力出击。1982 年 7 月，可口可乐包下了纽约无线电城音乐厅（Radio City Music Hall），伴随着著名的火箭女郎舞蹈团（The Rockettes）的激情歌舞，高调宣布健怡可乐诞生。 健怡可乐在市场上掀起了不可思议的狂潮： - **颠覆客群结构**：早期的低卡饮料 Tab 几乎清一色针对节食女性营销，而健怡可乐自诞生之初，男性饮用者比例就高达 30%。 - **光速登顶**：上市仅一年多（1983年底），健怡可乐便超越 Tab 成为全美第一的无糖饮料；到 1984 年，它更是直接跻身全美软饮料总销量第三名，仅次于经典可口可乐和百事可乐。 - **降本增效的典范**：由于使用的是人工甜味剂而非昂贵的糖原料，健怡可乐的生产成本大幅降低，毛利极高。 - **进攻型广告哲学**：告别了过去无糖饮料“为了少摄入热量而妥协口感”的抱歉姿态，健怡可乐打出“Just for the taste of it”（纯粹为了美味）的强势口号，将低卡好喝包装成无需妥协的全面胜利。 ### [02:44:39](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=9879s) 巨人自乱阵脚：Bill Cosby 对决 Michael Jackson 进入 20 世纪 80 年代初，尽管 Diet Coke（健怡可口可乐）取得了巨大的商业成功，但在 1982、1983、1984 年间，已经推行了近十年的“百事挑战”（Pepsi Challenge）依然把可口可乐打得节节败退。面对步步紧逼的百事可乐，可口可乐管理层开始陷入慌乱，并做出了一个极其反常的防御性决策：1982 年，可口可乐签下了当时家喻户晓的喜剧明星比尔·考斯比（Bill Cosby）作为主要代言人。 更不可思议的是广告内容。可口可乐在 1982 至 1984 年让考斯比拍摄的系列广告中，竟然指名道姓地直接回应“百事挑战”。在品牌历史上，可口可乐向来是独一无二的“N of 1”存在——在它自己的宇宙里根本没有竞争对手，它就是唯一的正宗。而如今，它竟然在自家广告里公开谈论百事，把对手摆在同等地位上较量。这被主播们评为“可口可乐能做出的最愚蠢的事情”，表明可口可乐已经在“大出血”。 百事可乐立刻乘胜追击，以极其典型的百事风格戏谑道：“哦？你们刚签了比尔·考斯比还在广告里聊百事挑战？那我们就签迈克尔·杰克逊（Michael Jackson）！”在当时，这两位名人都拥有全球顶尖的 Q Rating（Q 值，即衡量公众知名度与好感度的指标）。从 1975 年百事挑战发起，到 1985 年“新可乐”（New Coke）灾难爆发的整整十年间，百事可乐在美国的市场份额逐年稳步攀升，而可口可乐的份额则一年接着一年持续萎缩。 ```mermaid flowchart LR accTitle: 1975-1985 两乐竞争态势 accDescr: 百事挑战持续施压导致可口可乐被动反击并最终导致新可乐的诞生 subgraph Pepsi["百事可乐攻势"] P1["1975 百事挑战盲测"] --> P2["全美份额逐年上升"] P2 --> P3["签约迈克尔·杰克逊"] end subgraph Coke["可口可乐被动应对"] C1["全美份额持续下滑"] --> C2["签约比尔·考斯比并点名百事"] C2 --> C3["自毁'唯一正宗'神话"] end Pepsi --> Coke C3 --> Decision["1985 致命决策：换配方推出 New Coke"] ``` ### [02:47:04](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=10024s) 孤注一掷的逻辑死胡同：为何不能两款并存？ 面对长达十年的市场萎缩，历经 99 年配方不变、将自身符号与美国文化深度绑定的可口可乐，终于做出了被商业史公认极其愚蠢的决定——更改原有配方。然而替当年的管理层设身处地考虑，如果他们坚信失去市场份额的根源在于百事的口感更甜，想要推出一种全新口感去迎击，在当时的逻辑框架下，就必须进行“全量替换”。 许多后人不解：为什么不能保留原味可乐，同时推出一款新口味（例如叫 Coke 2）？ - **“唯一商品”的品牌心理**：在当时的管理层观念中，可口可乐代表着一个不可分割的整体，“可乐就是可乐”，市场上不可能同时存在两款正统可乐。 - **防止基本盘被瓜分**：最现实的商业恐慌在于，如果同时售卖两款可乐，消费者群体的投票会被分流割裂。一旦原有基本盘分化，百事可乐的单品销量就将正式超越可口可乐，登顶全美第一。对于始终自居第一、视百事为模仿者的可口可乐来说，拱手让出王座是绝对无法忍受的奇耻大辱。 ### [02:48:22](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=10102s) 伍德拉夫的告别与“新可乐”的密谋 1984 年圣诞节，可口可乐高管团队正式拍板：用全新研发的配方彻底取代销售了 99 年的原版可口可乐。这款新配方并非拍脑袋决定，他们进行了极其庞大的市场测试，共有多达 20 万名消费者参与了盲测。在测试中，新口味不仅大幅击败了百事可乐，甚至也以明显优势击败了原版可口可乐。 但在实施这项计划前，还有一个巨大的伦理门槛：时年 95 岁高龄的传奇领袖罗伯特·伍德拉夫（Robert Woodruff）依然在世。谁去向这位塑造了现代可口可乐商业帝国的教父开口？这个沉重的任务落在了首席执行官罗伯托·戈伊苏埃塔（Roberto Goizueta）肩上。 1985 年元旦，戈伊苏埃塔独自前往伍德拉夫家中。当时伍德拉夫已经病重，听力与表达能力都极度退化。房间里只有他们两人，事后据戈伊苏埃塔转述，伍德拉夫最终点头默许了更改配方的提议。然而充满戏剧性和历史巧合的是，就在会面后的第二天早晨，伍德拉夫便停止进食，几天后被送入医院，并于 1985 年 3 月 7 日逝世。他去世一个月后，新可乐才正式公之于世——在伍德拉夫活着的漫长岁月里，可口可乐的灵魂配方从未真正被触动过。 ### [02:49:58](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=10198s) 灾难性的发布会：“对手眨眼了” 伍德拉夫去世六周后的 4 月 19 日（周五），可口可乐向各大媒体发出邀请函，宣布将于下周二举行一场“公司近百年历史上最重大的进展”发布会。周末期间，这一惊天秘密泄露了。 百事可乐抓住了这个千载难逢的公关良机。周一早晨，百事在全美各大主要报纸上包下整版广告，赫然打出刺眼的头条：“对手眨眼了（The other guy just blinked）。”文案宣称：“在四目相对厮杀了 87 年之后，另一方终于眨了眼。”百事甚至宣布当天全公司带薪休假一天以示庆祝。 更致命的是，百事团队在周二发布会前积极接受各路媒体采访，向记者灌输质疑点：“你们应该去问问可口可乐，他们到底输得有多惨才被迫换配方？新口味是不是抄袭百事？”周二发布会上，尚未品尝过新可乐的记者们带着满腔进攻性蜂拥而至。可口可乐高管在台上极其被动： - 面对记者咄咄逼人的质问，总裁唐·基奥（Don Keough）甚至在台上脱口而出：“说实话，我现在想去干的事有很多，绝不想呆在这里。” - 记者询问如果新可乐成功，Diet Coke 是否也会更换新配方，戈伊苏埃塔硬邦邦地回答：“不会。而且我从不‘假设’它会成功，它‘就是’成功。” - 戈伊苏埃塔甚至宣称：“有人将这称为包装消费品行业史上最大胆的营销举措，但我们只管这叫有史以来最稳健的举动（the surest move ever made）。”基奥也附和道：“我一生中从未对某项决策像今天这样充满信心。” 然而在台下记者看来，高管们言辞闪烁、回避将产品与百事对比，现场显得手足无措，整场发布会彻底演变成一场公关灾难。 ### [02:52:47](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=10367s) 致命盲区：你偷走了整整一代人的童年 新可乐之所以引发空前灾难，根源在于可口可乐引以为傲的调研中存在一个致命的逻辑盲区：在对 20 万人进行的大规模口感测试中，**他们从未询问过受试者一个核心问题——如果这款新饮料将‘彻底取代’原版可口可乐，你会有什么感觉？** 多年后戈伊苏埃塔辩解称，人们无法对这种高度情绪化的问题给出客观数据，做这种测试毫无意义。然而，市场的实际反弹迅速以海啸之势吞没了可口可乐总部。亚特兰大每天收到数以千计的抗议信件和投诉电话： - 一封广为流传的情书式抗议信写道：“我最亲爱的可乐，你背叛了我。上周我们还像往常一样约会，但当我们接吻的那一刻，我就知道我们的爱已经终结……上周，我在你的双唇上尝到了背叛。你有了一种虚伪而甜腻的诱惑味道，你被金钱腐蚀了，背弃了自己的理想。” - 在佐治亚州的玛丽埃塔（Marietta），一名愤怒的妇女在超市里直接用雨伞殴打正在给货架摆放新可乐的配送司机，尖叫着大骂：“你这个混蛋！你把它给毁了！它尝起来像……” 可口可乐的管理层完全忽略了产品的精神属性。消费者喝的根本不是哪种糖水甜度更高，而是自己童年的回忆、几十年来习惯的陪伴，以及它所象征的“美国梦”。起初两个月（4月至7月），高管团队还以为这只是极少数极端消费者的喧嚣，试图咬牙硬扛；直到抗议浪潮愈演愈烈、丝毫没有退去的迹象，他们才震惊地意识到：全美民众是真的彻底愤怒了。 ### [02:55:22](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=10522s) 79天的绝地反击与“新可乐”的落幕 很多人回想起“新可乐”（New Coke）这场世纪公关惨剧，总下意识地以为这场混乱持续了两三年之久。然而事实令人难以置信：从新配方正式上市，到可口可乐宣布迎回老配方，中间其实仅仅隔了 79 天。 当管理层痛定思痛决定召回旧配方时，摆在面前的是一个极为现实且棘手的问题：这款重见天日的产品该叫什么？留在货架上的“新可乐”又该何去何从？此时，可口可乐的律师团队想出了一记令人拍案叫绝的商业阴谋：如果把新配方保留在市场上作为“官方可乐”（Official Coke），而将回归的老可乐命名为“经典可口可乐”（Coca-Cola Classic），公司就可以在法律层面向装瓶商主张——Coca-Cola Classic 实际上是一款“全新推出的产品”。借由此举，可口可乐成功获得了重新谈判原本极为不利的装瓶合同的筹码，以更有利的条款向装瓶商供应浓缩液。 1985 年 7 月 10 日，可口可乐正式召开新闻发布会，宣布老配方以“Coca-Cola Classic”的名字回归，而新配方则继续并存销售。在发布会上，总裁唐·基奥（Don Keough）留下了商业史上最著名的公关名言之一： > “批评者会说可口可乐犯了一次严重的营销失误；阴谋论者会说这一切都是我们自导自演的营销骗局。而事实是：我们既没有那么蠢，也没有那么聪明。”（"Some critics will say that Coca-Cola made a marketing mistake. Some cynic will say that we planned the whole thing. The truth is we are not that dumb and we are not that smart."） 更具讽刺意味的是，管理层原本满心以为，复活 Classic 只是为了安抚那些极其激进的少数反对派，公司只要小批量生产以平息民愤即可，大部分消费者终究会拥抱口感测试更出色的“新可乐”。然而现实却狠狠打了管理层的脸：大众消费者全线抛弃了新配方，集体狂奔回经典配方的怀抱；新可乐的市场份额瞬间雪崩，暴跌至可怜的 3%。这一幕彻底颠覆了高管们的认知，他们完全无法理解人们为何执意要选那个在双盲盲测中表现“更差”的产品。 但这出闹剧最终演变成了一场载入史册的意外胜利：短短一年之内，Coca-Cola Classic 的市场份额不仅迅速收复失地，甚至一举超越了这场危机爆发前的历史最高水平。没有任何一场精心策划的广告战役，能像这场危机一样让全美乃至全世界对可口可乐倾注如此巨大的情感关注。正如经典歌词所唱，“直到失去，你才懂得珍惜”（You don't know what you got till it's gone）。新可乐危机以毁灭的方式完成了对品牌的救赎，更彻底终结了“百事挑战”（Pepsi Challenge）对可口可乐长达数年的压制——可口可乐必须在形式上彻底“死”过一次，才能浴火重生。 - **Coke II 的漫长苟延**：新可乐在去掉“New Coke”的招牌后，被重新命名为“Coke II”继续在部分市场销售，直到 2002 年才被彻底废弃，足足苟延残喘了 17 年。 - **伯纳德·阿诺特（Bernard Arnault）式的神迹**：正如奢侈品巨头阿诺特的那句名言：“即便他输了，他也能赢。”（"Even when he loses, he wins."）这场管理层的昏招反倒铸就了品牌历史上最不可思议的超级神话。 ### [02:59:31](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=10771s) 巴菲特入局：被神话的经典投资与现实算盘 “新可乐”闹剧虽然在公关上迎来了喜剧般的逆转，但这场混乱依然重创了资本市场的信心，可口可乐的股价一度跌入谷底。就在此时，沃伦·巴菲特（Warren Buffett）正式登场。正是看到了可口可乐即便经历管理层如此荒唐的折腾却依然坚不可摧的品牌护城河，巴菲特坚定了“哪怕是一家由火腿三明治来管理也能赚钱的好公司”的信念。在 1988 年至 1994 年间，巴菲特斥资约 13 亿美元大举建仓可口可乐股票，并随后加入了可口可乐董事会。 这笔投资如今常被投资界奉为价值投资的无上典范，但如果用冷酷的财务数字去拆解这笔跨越 40 年的交易，其真实回报其实充满争议： - **股权价值增幅**：伯克希尔·哈撒韦（Berkshire Hathaway）如今持有可口可乐约 9.5% 的股权，市值约为 280 亿美元。相比于 13 亿美元的原始成本，账面增值了 22 至 23 倍，但这历经了 40 年的复利，换算为年化内部收益率（IRR）仅略高于 8%。 - **恐怖的分红现金流**：可口可乐目前每年向伯克希尔支付高达 8 亿至 10 亿美元的现金股息。以最初 13 亿美元的本金计算，每年的股息收益率（Dividend Yield on Cost）高达 60% 至 80%。40 年间，伯克希尔累计收到的股息总额高达约 120 亿美元。 - **总回报与大盘对比**：将 280 亿市值与 120 亿累计分红相加，13 亿美元的投资总共换来了约 400 亿美元的总回报，全周期年化 IRR 上升至约 10%。 - **令人咋舌的对照组**：在相同的 40 年时间跨度内，标普 500 指数（S&P 500）计入分红再投资的年化复合回报率约为 11%。换言之，巴菲特这笔举世闻名的可口可乐投资，在近半个世纪的长河中，实际跑输了标普 500 大盘。 - **机会成本反思**：如果巴菲特在 1988 至 1994 年间没有买入可口可乐，而是直接用这 13 亿美元回购伯克希尔·哈撒韦自身的股票，其回报率将远胜投资可口可乐。造成这种结果的主因在于，尽管可口可乐在巴菲特买入后的前十几年涨势凶猛，但在随后的近 20 年里，其收入与净利润的年化增长已经大幅放缓。 ### [03:02:57](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=10977s) 好莱坞巨鳄迈克尔·奥维茨的广告革命 除了巴菲特的重金下注，罗伯托·戈伊苏埃塔（Roberto Goizueta）与唐·基奥在 1980 年代初收购哥伦比亚影业（Columbia Pictures）的跨界尝试，还意外结出了一颗极具商业颠覆性的果实——他们借此结识了好莱坞第一权力中介、CAA（创新精英文化经纪有限公司）的掌舵人迈克尔·奥维茨（Michael Ovitz）。 当可口可乐最终决定将哥伦比亚影业转手卖给索尼公司时，奥维茨与 CAA 受聘担任该笔交易的正式顾问。在成功将 CAA 从一家传统的艺人包装经纪机构推向顶尖投行并购顾问的宝座后，野心勃勃的奥维茨并不打算止步，他转头将目光瞄准了广告业。奥维茨亲自找回顾瑟塔与基奥，抛出了一个惊世骇俗的提议：由 CAA 取代可口可乐长达数十年的传统广告代理巨头麦肯光明（McCann Erickson），全面接管可口可乐的广告业务。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: CAA颠覆传统广告模式示意图 accDescr: 对比麦肯光明的传统集权广告模式与奥维茨主导的CAA去中心化好莱坞创意模式 subgraph McCann["麦肯传统模式 (McCann Erickson)"] M1["单一创意总监"] --> M2["One Sight, One Sound, One Sell<br>大一统说教模式"] M2 --> M3["年产约 7 支大片级广告<br>单价高昂 / 渠道单一"] end subgraph CAA["奥维茨的 CAA 模式"] C1["CAA 海量好莱坞创意人才网络<br>(顶尖编剧、导演、演员)"] --> C2["去中心化创意众包<br>(按Brief征集30+前沿方案)"] C2 --> C3["针对有线电视碎片化定制<br>(体育台 ESPN / 情景喜剧 / 儿童频道)"] C3 --> C4["同等预算年产 40 支精准广告<br>统一于品牌总战略口号"] end ``` 奥维茨的推销说辞极其犀利且击中要害： - **传统大一统模式的落幕**：麦肯光明过去打造的“山顶广告”（Hilltop Ad）与“真理篇”（The Real Thing）固然伟大，但他们奉行的“统一视觉、统一声音、统一推销”（One sight, one sound, one sell）理念已经无法适应当下的媒体格局。百事挑战之所以能从草根层面狠狠击溃可口可乐，正是因为可口可乐的打法脱离了群众。 - **媒介碎片化的新现实**：美国家庭全家老小守在电视机前看《我爱露西》（*I Love Lucy*）的时代已经彻底终结。随着有线电视网络的崛起，ESPN 体育台、全天候情景喜剧台、专门的儿童频道百花齐放。面对不同圈层和受众，可口可乐绝不能只靠一两支包打天下的广告片，而必须拥有一整套适配不同受众圈层、不同季节排期的立体广告矩阵。 - **好莱坞顶尖创意的众包革命**：广告创意不应该由某一家代理商里的一两个创意总监闭门造车，而应该实现真正的“创意民主化”。CAA 坐拥全好莱坞最顶级的导演、编剧与演员资源，只要可口可乐下达一个创意简报（Creative Brief），CAA 就能从 30 多个完全不同的顶级创作者手中拿出 30 套精彩绝伦的方案。 - **颠覆性的性价比攻势**：奥维茨向可口可乐开出了一个无法拒绝的商业条件——以麦肯光明每年制作区区 7 支广告的相同成本预算，CAA 每年可以为可口可乐定制并交付多达 40 支高质量广告，且所有内容都将紧密统一在可口可乐全新的战略宣传口号之下。这一大胆尝试，由此开启了可口可乐广告史上最富创意活力的新篇章。 ### [03:05:33](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=11133s) 告别浪漫百年：CAA 与标志性“北极熊”广告 1992 年，好莱坞传奇经纪公司 CAA（Creative Artists Agency）在迈克尔·奥维茨（Michael Ovitz）的领导下一举拿下了可口可乐的广告代理权，打破了麦肯广告（McCann Erickson）长久以来的垄断地位。在 CAA 为可口可乐打造的诸多广告创意中，诞生了一个全新的圣诞节视觉符号——这次不再是传统的圣诞老人，而是一群憨态可掬、畅饮可乐的北极熊。虽然奥维茨本人并没有亲自绘制动画，但他凭借 CAA 庞大的人才网络成功挖掘并促成了这一经典形象的问世。 这一刻也象征着可口可乐叙事高潮的终结。在经历了“新可乐（New Coke）”的风波与回归之后，北极熊广告成为了流行文化记忆中的又一亮点。然而，从 20 世纪 90 年代到 2000 年代，随后的企业故事逐渐转变为务实但琐碎的公司运营与扩张，失去了可口可乐头一百年发展史中那种波澜壮阔的浪漫色彩。 ### [03:06:32](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=11192s) 痛失佳得乐与后郭思达时代的管理动荡 从 90 年代起并在 2000 年代急剧加速的趋势是：全球饮料消费重心开始逐渐脱离传统可乐，转向更加多元化的饮品类别。这场品类转移的第一个核心战场就是运动饮料，尤其是佳得乐（Gatorade）的崛起。早在 80 年代，当时归属于桂格燕麦（Quaker Oats）旗下的佳得乐就已经开创并确立了运动饮料市场。为了与之抗衡，可口可乐于 1988 年自主研发推出了 Powerade，但 Powerade 的市场份额始终徘徊在 10% 到 20% 出头，从未对佳得乐构成实质威胁。 可口可乐功勋 CEO 罗伯托·郭思达（Roberto Goizueta）于 1997 年因肺癌不幸逝世后，管理层出现了一段明显的动荡期。2000 年，可口可乐当时的首席执行官在未获得董事会正式批准的情况下，贸然对外宣布了一项价值 160 亿美元收购桂格燕麦和佳得乐的交易。然而，可口可乐董事会随后直接否决了这项收购，交易随即告吹。紧接着在 2001 年，老对手百事公司果断出手拿下桂格燕麦和佳得乐，使得佳得乐成为百事旗下极具盈利能力的王牌资产。这幕惨痛教训宛如当年可口可乐错过菲多利（Frito-Lay）的重演。从 1998 年郭思达去世以后的五任 CEO 中，前三任每一任都只在位短短三到四年，与伍德拉夫时代以及郭思达长期稳健的执掌形成了极其鲜明的对比。 ### [03:08:47](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=11327s) 肥胖危机与“全品类饮料公司”的战略转型困境 促使可口可乐必须转型成为一家“全品类饮料公司（Total Beverage Company）”的根本动力，来自于社会对含糖软饮料的强烈反弹。进入 21 世纪，尤其是 2010 年代，全美肥胖问题愈演愈烈。糖分过度摄入、高度加工食品与久坐不动的生活方式被公认为肥胖症泛滥的元凶。根据美国心脏协会（AHA）的健康建议，成年男性每日添加糖摄入上限为 36 克，女性为 25 克；然而，仅仅一听 12 盎司的标准装可口可乐，就含有高达 39 克的糖。 这给可口可乐带来了一个极其棘手的两难困局： - **无可替代的摇钱树**：仅凭原味可口可乐这一条核心产品线，就是一门利润率奇高、资本支出极低且拥有全球无敌品牌认知度的绝佳生意。在这项业务依然极其赚钱时，管理层很难有魄力全力去押注其他领域。 - **不可逆转的健康危机**：含糖可乐业务在长远来看面临无法避免的下滑，50 年后几乎不可能继续保持目前的吸金地位。然而，可口可乐又很难在不承认“自家核心同名产品其实对身体有害”的前提下开展多元化布局。 这种战略转型的深度焦虑与矛盾，正是后郭思达时期 CEO 频繁更迭的重要推手之一。 ### [03:10:41](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=11441s) 错失与联手：怪兽能量饮料（Monster Energy）的逆袭 相比之下，百事在业务多元化上步伐走得更早也更稳，先后整合了菲多利零食、佳得乐运动饮料，并在瓶装水赛道上率先推出纯水乐（Aquafina），而可口可乐直到后来才匆忙推出达能尼（Dasani）跟进。在过去 25 年里，可口可乐往往处于一种“坐拥特权地位先观望、等赛道成熟再入场”的心态，寄希望于其强大的全球分销系统能弥补起步迟缓的劣势。但在能量饮料赛道上，这种迟疑让可口可乐付出了惨痛的代价。 怪兽能量饮料的前身是做天然果汁的汉森公司（Hansen's Natural）。当管理层意识到天然果汁品牌无法胜任能量饮料的定位后，大胆打造了充满暗黑、反叛与危险气质的“怪兽（Monster）”品牌，以对抗红牛（Red Bull）更为干净整洁的品牌美学。Monster 推出后大获成功。在发展初期，可口可乐曾多次有机会收购尚处于小规模的 Monster，但因质疑能量饮料品类是否只是昙花一现的时尚潮流而按兵不动。2012 年，Monster 曾主动接触可口可乐与百事寻求出售，但当时市值已达 110 亿美元，可口可乐因嫌价格太贵而放弃收购。如今，Monster 的市值已飙升至 700 亿美元以上。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 可口可乐与怪兽饮料 2015 年资产置换与合作框架 accDescr: 展示可口可乐与 Monster 之间的品牌交换、股权投资及全球分销绑定关系 subgraph CokeActions ["可口可乐 (Coca-Cola)"] C1["剥离旗下能量饮料品牌<br/>(NOS, Full Throttle, Burn, Mother, Relentless)"] C2["斥资超 20 亿美元<br/>收购 Monster 约 20% 股权"] C3["提供全球分销网络支持"] end subgraph MonsterActions ["怪兽饮料 (Monster Energy)"] M1["剥离非能量饮料业务<br/>(包括汉森天然苏打水等)"] M2["成为可口可乐体系内<br/>独家全球能量饮料平台"] end C1 -->|"移交品牌"| MonsterActions M1 -->|"移交业务"| CokeActions C2 -->|"战略入股"| MonsterActions C3 <-->|"全球首选分销合作"| M2 ``` 2015 年，意识到错失良机的可口可乐终于通过一笔复杂的战略置换与 Monster 达成深度绑定： - 可口可乐将旗下自主孵化的能量饮料品牌（NOS、Full Throttle、Burn、Mother、Relentless）全部移交给 Monster。 - Monster 则将其非能量饮料业务（包括起家的汉森天然苏打水）移交给可口可乐。 - 可口可乐出资逾 20 亿美元购入 Monster 约 20% 的股权，成为其最大股东，并作为 Monster 的全球首选分销合作伙伴；Monster 则作为可口可乐在全球唯一的能量饮料代表。 虽然当年这笔超 20 亿美元的股权投资日后增值至近 120 亿美元，堪称一次优秀的财务投资，但作为立志成为全球全品类饮料龙头的公司，可口可乐终究未能把这颗过去 15 年饮料界最闪亮的新星完全纳为己有。颇有讽刺意味的是，能量饮料的超高刺激性宛如可口可乐最初作为“专利秘方药”的某种现代回归——消费者心知肚明它并不健康，但为了追求功能与提神效果依然趋之若鹜。 ### [03:15:12](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=11712s) 兜兜转转的高价收购：酷乐仕与 BodyArmor 在瓶装水与功能水领域，可口可乐同样走过了昂贵的追赶之路。2007 年，可口可乐斥资约 40 亿美元收购了酷乐仕（Glacéau，即维他命水 Vitaminwater 和 Smartwater 的母公司）。其联合创始人后来离开并创立了基于椰子水、糖分含量偏高的运动饮料品牌 BodyArmor。几年之后，为了再次在运动饮料领域挑战佳得乐的霸权，可口可乐转头斥资约 56 亿美元收购了这家初创公司 BodyArmor。 然而，哪怕可口可乐在这一赛道连续砸下数十亿美元，佳得乐在运动饮料市场依然牢牢占据着超过 60% 的统治性份额，百事公司运动饮料王者的宝座至今未被撼动。 ### [03:16:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=11760s) 全品类饮料的转型与装瓶商重组 回顾过去二十年，可口可乐一直高喊着要押注多元化、要孵化全新品类，但真正挑起大梁、取得统治级增长的，最具讽刺意味的依然是健怡可乐（Diet Coke）以及 2005 年推出的无糖可口可乐（Coke Zero）。在推出后的数年里，Coke Zero 甚至保持着每年 10% 的复合增长率——对于一款体量已经极为庞大的核心单品而言，这堪称奇迹。主播们调侃道，这就好像是一场针对自己原创风味的“侵权案”，可口可乐兜兜转转二十年喊着转型为“全品类饮料公司”（Total Beverage Company），结果到头来最能打的依然是经典可口可乐、Diet Coke 和 Coke Zero。 进入 2010 年代后，可口可乐除了继续收购品牌扩充版图外，还投入了大量精力进行幕后“硬核整顿”：梳理改造装瓶厂生态。在这一阶段，他们将经营效率低下或质量堪忧的特许装瓶资产回收到资产负债表内进行深度重组，待效率达标后再重新剥离（refranchising）卖给新的独立投资者，同时大力推动区域装瓶商之间的兼并整合，并彻底终结了历史遗留下来的原始母装瓶商（Parent Bottlers）体系。对于长期跟踪可口可乐股票的二级市场投资者来说，过去十几年最大的看点往往就在于这场庞大的资产轻量化与装瓶网络再特许化进程，而如今可口可乐基本上已走完了这一重塑周期。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 可口可乐装瓶网络再特许化流程 accDescr: 展示可口可乐在2010年代对装瓶系统进行回收、整改、合并并重新剥离的资本运作循环。 subgraph BottlerReform["装瓶体系重构 (Refranchising)"] A["回收低效装瓶厂<br/>(纳入资产负债表)"] --> B["提升质量与运营效率<br/>推动区域兼并"] B --> C["重新特许剥离<br/>(转回表外新持有方)"] C --> D["彻底消除母装瓶商遗留<br/>回归轻资产模式"] end ``` ### [03:17:34](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=11854s) 走向全球的本土企业与“十亿美元品牌”矩阵 虽然荧幕上和文化故事里的可口可乐几乎是“美国生活方式”的代名词，但当审视如今可口可乐的真实商业版图时，会发现它早已是一家彻底的跨国巨头：其绝大多数收入与利润其实都来自美国以外的市场。然而，可口可乐在全球落地的方式十分微妙，它通过将当地装瓶厂设立为由本地资本持股、由本土企业家经营的独立实体，不仅让巨额利润留存于当地，更使品牌在任何国家都深度内嵌于当地经济，成为实质上的“本土企业”。 在品牌战略上，可口可乐曾一度盲目崇拜“品牌数量越多越好”，到 2020 年前后其旗下的品牌阵营一度膨胀到了 500 多个。随后管理层掀起了一场激进的瘦身瘦体行动，果断砍掉了包括 Tab、ZICO 椰子水、Odwalla（果汁）、Honest Tea（诚实茶）和 Vault 等知名产品，将全球品牌精简到了约 200 个左右。在这之中，有整整 30 个品牌的年销售额突破了 10 亿美元： - **自研品牌（15个）**：包括芬达（Fanta）以及雪碧（Sprite）。主播在此插播了一段冷知识：今天的雪碧并不是凭空诞生的，它其实源于德国芬达部门研发的无色柠檬汽水“Fanta Klare Zitrone”（Fanta Clear Lemon），引入美国后借用了可口可乐圣诞老人宇宙中的经典卡通形象“精灵小子”（Sprite Boy）的名字重新包装而成。 - **外部收购后孵化壮大（12个）**：收购时规模尚小，但在可口可乐强大的分销网络赋能下成长为破十亿美元的超级巨头，典型代表如美汁源（Minute Maid）、高端牛奶品牌 Fairlife 和维他命水（Vitaminwater）。 - **收购时已达十亿美元规模（3个）**：直接以巨资收购的现成百亿美元/十亿美元级成熟单品。 ### [03:20:24](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=12024s) 咖啡、酒精与全球 22 亿份饮用的惊人规模 除了动宝（Powerade）、达能合资或自营的达萨尼（Dasani）、Schweppes（怡泉）、Smartwater、拉丁美洲的 Ciel 与 Cristal 等水饮及气泡品牌外，可口可乐近年来还在积极向外跨界。例如收购墨西哥高档气泡水 Topo Chico 后，推出了含酒精的硬苏打水（Hard Seltzer）；与烈酒巨头合作推出预调的“杰克丹尼配可口可乐”（Jack & Coke）预调鸡尾酒罐装饮料以及含酒精雪碧，开始涉足酒水蓝海。 在热饮领域，可口可乐在几年前耗资数局巨资全资收购了英国咖啡连锁巨头 Costa Coffee。主播们认为直接运营线下咖啡门店对可口可乐来说是一步耐人寻味的棋，但它同时打开了即饮咖啡与连锁场景。更惊人的是可口可乐与老盟友麦当劳的无间合作：据说双方关系之深厚，以至于麦当劳餐厅所使用的咖啡豆都是由可口可乐代为采购的。这就与当年星巴克（Starbucks）联手百事（Pepsi）生产瓶装星冰乐（Frappuccino）形成了戏剧性的对称镜像。 而在物理分发维度，可口可乐展现出了真正的“日不落”规模： - **每日饮用量**：全世界每天消费 2.2 亿份（servings）可口可乐公司旗下的饮料；如果按每人每天一杯算，相当于覆盖全球人口的四分之一以上。 - **全人类的液体摄入天花板**：据可口可乐估算，全人类每天摄入的所有液体饮料（包括饮用水、茶、咖啡等）约为 650 亿份，折合人均每天约喝 8 杯水。这意味着即便只待在液体饮料赛道，可口可乐在 650 亿的大盘中依然有极其广阔的渗透空间。 - **供应链生态**：全球拥有超过 200 家装瓶合作伙伴，分布在 950 个独立的生产灌装基地，而这些重资产基地几乎完全不需要可口可乐自己持有。 ### [03:22:47](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=12167s) 可口可乐系统经济学：极致的杠杆与利润机器 如果剖析可口可乐的财务结构，就会发现它是商业史上最完美的“利润与轻资产杠杆引擎”。整个“可口可乐系统”（包含母公司与所有装瓶商及分销网络）的总流水高达 1,750 亿美元，但可口可乐母公司表内确认的营业收入为 470 亿美元。按地域划分，美国本土贡献了约 40% 的收入，国际市场占 60%（若仅统计核心可乐碳酸品类，美国本土占比甚至更低）。 真正令人震撼的对比隐藏在雇员人数与系统收入分配中： - 整个可口可乐全球系统雇佣了约 70 万名员工； - 但可口可乐母公司内部只有 7 万名员工，仅占全系统的 10%； - 依靠这 10% 的员工，母公司拿走了整个系统 1,750 亿美元总营收中的 470 亿美元（约占 27%）。 这种极致的人效与资本杠杆，造就了装瓶商与母公司之间天壤之别的盈利能力：装瓶商要承担卡车物流、工厂折旧、仓储及成千上万工人的重资产支出，而可口可乐母公司只做两件事——**卖浓缩糖浆原液，以及投入数十亿美元的全球广告预算去向全人类“兜售梦想”**。 在 470 亿美元的收入下，可口可乐能斩获 106 亿美元的净利润，净利润率维持在惊人的 23% 左右；其毛利率常年维持在 60% 上下，历史巅峰期甚至达到过 70%——这几乎是只有轻资产软件公司才能企及的暴利水平，却诞生在一门卖实体日用品的生意里。 不过从产品大盘来看，所谓的“多元化”依然掩盖不住核心印钞机的本色： - 气泡软饮料（Sparkling soft drinks）仍然占据了全公司总营收的 69%； - 仅“可口可乐商标”（Trademark Coca-Cola，即经典可乐、健怡、无糖以及无咖啡因/调味等变体）就占了全公司总销量的 40%； - 广义的可口可乐产品家族（The Coke family）合计则占据了整整 47% 的出货体量。 无论外界如何宣扬健康化与去糖化，可口可乐这家庞然大物最核心、最稳固的盈利基石，依然牢牢扎根在那个诞生了一百多年的汽水配方之上。 ### [03:25:46](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=12346s) 增长瓶颈与日趋激烈的饮料红海 可口可乐在拓展新赛道时始终带有一种矛盾心理：管理层清楚公司必须进入其他品类，但那些新品类怎么看都不如最初的可乐主业——既没有原汁原味的商业模式那么高利润，也缺乏独一无二的品牌号召力。这就导致可口可乐往往只能“一瘸一拐”地涉足运动饮料或能量饮料等新领域；他们不再像早年那样敢于做早期豪赌，而是倾向于作壁上观，等别人把赛道跑通成为爆款后再跟进进场。如今可口可乐的市值约为 3000 亿美元，尽管以现代科技巨头“Mag 7”的标准来衡量并不算顶尖，但在传统实业中仍是一座庞然大物。不过，这一体量并未达到查理·芒格当年所做的 2 万亿美元思想实验设想，而且几乎不可能在 2036 年公司成立 150 周年时达成那个目标。 自从 1998 年罗伯托·戈伊苏埃塔（Roberto Goizueta）时代落幕后，可口可乐的年均营收增速仅有 3% 到 4% 左右，可以说是相当疲软。节目将大部分重心放在 1998 年之前的可口可乐，正是因为那段时期他们打造出了席卷全球、让全世界市场趋于饱和的商业奇迹。随着时代演进，软饮料赛道的竞争愈发残酷。1948 年二战刚结束时，可口可乐在美国软饮料市场独占 60% 的市场份额；而如今在整体软饮料品类中，可口可乐仅占约 21%，百事可乐占 10%（如果单看碳酸软饮料细分品类，可口可乐仍持有 47% 的份额，百事可乐占 19%）。整体来看，饮品选择的极大丰富让可口可乐失去了大量统领地位。 - 可口可乐目前市值约为 3000 亿美元，自 1998 年以来的年均复合增速仅为 3%–4%。 - 相比查理·芒格预测 2036 年（150 周年）达到 2 万亿美元的构想，当前体量差距巨大。 - 美国软饮料市场份额变迁：1948 年可口可乐市占率为 60%；如今在广义软饮料市场降至 21%（百事 10%），在碳酸饮料细分市场占 47%（百事 19%）。 --- ### [03:27:56](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=12476s) 复盘：可口可乐为何能取得无与伦比的成功？ 在进入分析环节时，主播们打趣说可口可乐原本的商业剧本（Playbook）其实简单到只有两件事：“用独家知识产权配方生产糖浆，然后把大把大把的钱砸在营销上”。抛开这个调侃，二人对可口可乐百年长青的核心驱动力进行了全面拆解： ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 可口可乐成功要素拆解 accDescr: 展示驱动可口可乐从糖水走向全球商业帝国的核心驱动力 subgraph MKT["市场与产品基础"] A["全球海量需求<br/>每日640亿次解渴契机"] --> B["成瘾性与感官爽感<br/>气泡+糖+咖啡因+冰镇"] B --> C["双重属性优势<br/>低单价大众消费 + 极高原料利润率"] end subgraph SCALE["规模化与渠道飞轮"] D["1美元合约意外之喜<br/>特许装瓶商网络迅速铺开"] --> E["二战借势出海<br/>军供配给完成全球采样垄断"] end subgraph BRAND["心智与竞争护城河"] F["独一无二的N of 1定位<br/>世纪级生活方式营销与情感绑定"] --> G["New Coke危机洗礼<br/>反向激活全球消费者的狂热钟情"] H["百事可乐良性竞争<br/>双雄争霸相互刺激进化"] --> F end MKT --> SCALE SCALE --> BRAND ``` 1. **庞大无垠的潜在市场**：全世界每天有 640 亿次口渴解渴契机。人类不仅需要水分，更本能地渴望除了纯水之外有味道的饮品。 2. **长达一个世纪的“N of 1”独占心智**：可口可乐建立了一种“正宗正统”（The Real Thing）的原作地位，耗费上百年时间与海量品牌营销预算，将自己深深烙印在大众意识中。 3. **二战的历史性红利**：二战为可口可乐提供了一条畅通无阻的全球铺货绿色通道，迅速在海外跑马圈地，并在身后关上了全球扩张的竞争大门。 4. **特许经营装瓶体系的飞轮效应**：当年仅仅因为一份“1 美元”的失误合同，意外倒逼出由本地独立企业家持股运营的装瓶特许体系。可口可乐公司无需承担沉重的人力成本、繁复的重资产基础设施与低资本回报率业务，就能以极快的速度在美国乃至全球跑马圈地，在餐厅和消费者一旦选定供应商就很难更换的饮料争夺战中抢占了先机。 5. **极度刺激奖赏中枢的成瘾配方**：即便去除了早期的可卡因成分，碳酸气泡、高糖、咖啡因与冰镇清凉感的结合，依然精准激活了人体所有愉悦奖赏中枢。 6. **顶级的外部生活方式营销**：将一瓶糖水与圣诞节、家庭聚会、体育运动、快乐等世间一切美好事物强行绑定。 7. **New Coke 意外的“情感复活”**：这场看似灾难的公关事件反倒唤醒了世人对原版可乐的深爱。正如唐·基奥（Don Keough）的名言：“我们既没有那么蠢，也没有那么聪明。”主播们调侃道，事实恰恰相反——他们当时绝对蠢到家了，但也绝顶聪明。 8. **与百事可乐的伟大对手局**：百事挑战赛成就了百事，而百事的步步紧逼也倒逼可口可乐蜕变，两者在针锋相对中互相成就。 9. **反直觉的“低售价+高毛利”物理实体商品模型**：在传统科技和软件行业之外，可口可乐是极少数凭借极廉价原料（水与糖）达成低售价与高利润率并存的实体消费品，使其成为全世界所有人都能随手买得起的“可负担的轻奢品”（Affordable luxury）和“让人神清气爽的暂停片刻”（The pause that refreshes）。 --- ### [03:33:22](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=12802s) 商业七力模型分析：规模经济的极致碾压 主播们引入汉密尔顿·赫尔默（Hamilton Helmer）的经典商业理论《7 Powers》（商业七力模型），探讨可口可乐持久获取超额回报的核心壁垒所在。在七种力量——逆向定位（Counterpositioning）、规模经济（Scale Economies）、转换成本（Switching Costs）、网络效应（Network Economies）、过程权力（Process Power）、品牌（Branding）和独占资源（Cornered Resource）中，可口可乐首先被排除了逆向定位，因为作为正统守成巨头，可口可乐向来是被百事可乐等挑战者逆向定位的目标。 可口可乐最具统治力的护城河正是**规模经济（Scale Economies）**。它的所有业务逻辑几乎都建立在大规模摊销之上：公司能够以远低于任何竞品的单位成本进行大批量生产和全球分销，更关键的是其**营销费用的摊销规模**。可口可乐能够年复一年地向全球市场倾泻天文数字般的广告预算，并将其分摊在不可计数的庞大出货量中，这种经年累月筑起的壁垒让追赶者几乎望尘莫及。这也解释了为什么在 20 世纪 70 年代“百事挑战赛”爆发时，百事在局部广告投放额上一度反超可口可乐，会成为当时业内极为震惊并敏锐捕捉到的格局拐点信号。 ### [03:35:11](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=12911s) 品牌力与规模经济的相互成就：不提价的品牌飞轮 在商业战略框架（7 Powers）的讨论中，二人转向了 Coca-Cola 的品牌力（Brand Power）。在常规的商业认知中，衡量品牌力最标准的方法是观察“定价权溢价”（Pricing Power Delta）——如果向消费者提供两件功能完全相同的产品，消费者愿意为其中一件多付多少钱？比如将 Tiffany 的珠宝与白牌珠宝放在一起，那个差价就是量化品牌力的尺标。 然而，Coca-Cola 却打破了这一常规：它在终端市场上基本不卖得比竞争对手更贵，甚至整个软饮行业几乎都不怎么行使传统意义上的定价权。Coca-Cola 拥有无可争议的顶尖品牌力，但他们选择的策略并不是拉高单价割取利润，而是刻意压低价格，将这种“潜伏的品牌力”转化为别的东西。 ```mermaid flowchart LR accTitle: 品牌与规模的飞轮效应 accDescr: 展示可口可乐通过低价走量、产品即广告牌、规模经济与品牌心智强化构成的正向循环飞轮。 subgraph Flywheel["可口可乐飞轮机制"] A["维持极低售价"] --> B["驱动海量销售"] B --> C["每一瓶都是行走的广告牌"] B --> D["强化极限规模经济"] C --> E["品牌心智持续强化"] D --> A E --> A end ``` 这种策略背后蕴含着极其精妙的商业飞轮： - **产品即广告牌**：每一罐、每一瓶被消费者拿在手里或摆在货架上的可口可乐，本质上都是一块极具视觉冲击力的流动广告牌。 - **正向循环**：他们拼尽全力卖出尽可能多的可口可乐，不仅是为了通过规模经济降低每单位的生产和分销成本，更是因为世界上多流通一瓶可口可乐，品牌心智就多被强化一次。 - **与规模经济的终极共生**：Coca-Cola 展现了商业史上罕见的“品牌力与规模经济”之间的完美互搏与相互赋能——规模铸就了无处不在的品牌渗透，而品牌又反哺了持续扩张的庞大规模。 虽然无法用“比 Pepsi 贵多少”来衡量其品牌力，但 1985 年“新可乐”（New Coke）问世时引发的全民抗议与狂怒，则以一种极其惨烈且罕见的方式，量化出了消费者对这一品牌的狂热忠诚。 --- ### [03:37:11](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=13031s) 7 Powers 盘点：秘方是“垄断资源”还是营销幌子？ 二人继续快速梳理 7 Powers 中的其余维度：转换成本（Switching Costs）几乎不存在，虽然大家都偏爱 Coke，但在没有选择时喝一罐无糖百事（Diet Pepsi 或 Pepsi Max）也完全能接受；网络效应（Network Economies）为零；流程优势（Process Power）从外部很难清晰界定。 随后，对话进入了激烈而充满趣味的辩论环节——可口可乐是否拥有“垄断资源”（Cornered Resource）？ - **支持方观点：秘方承载了公众赋予的神圣意义** - 核心资产当然是那张神话般的秘方。即便技术上可以人工合成出口感完全一致的液体，但秘方中被注入的精神内涵已经成为了品牌不可分割的一部分。 - 做一个思想实验：如果百事宣布“我们攻破了可口可乐的地库，拿到了配方，现在推出一款与 Coke 完全一样的 Pepsi C”，哪怕公众知道味道一模一样，也会发生不可忽视的市场价值迁移，因为大众对原版配方怀有信仰。 - **反对方观点：配方毫无实际价值，瓶装商网络才是真正的垄断资源** - 配方纯粹是转移注意力的“红鲱鱼”（Red Herring）。在《上帝、国家与可口可乐》（*For God, Country, and Coca-Cola*）附录中记录过一件真实事件：历史学家 Mark Pendergrast 在研究中意外找到了 John Pemberton 于 1886 年写下的原始配方，他兴奋地跑去质问可口可乐高管。高管们平静反问：“你就算发表了它，别人拿到了又能怎样？做出一款饮料？好，你怎么分销？怎么命名？你敢叫可口可乐我们就告到你破产；你如何打造品牌、砸巨资做营销？你怎么可能拥有我们这种量级的规模经济？你根本做不到。” - 现实中曾有前可口可乐员工盗取商业机密试图卖给百事，百事的做法是直接向 FBI 报案抓人——作为跨国巨头，百事拿着这份配方毫无用武之地。 - **真正的垄断资源（Cornered Resource）其实是遍布全球的特许瓶装商网络（Bottler Network）**：这些瓶装商控制着密不透风、无可匹敌的本地分销渠道，并且由于专营条款，绝不为任何竞争对手装瓶。可口可乐实际上交给了他们一张“合法印钞许可证”，而没有任何瓶装商有动机切换阵营去给别人打工。 --- ### [03:40:13](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=13213s) 核心提炼（Quintessence）：火腿三明治理论与利益共同体系统 在总结全篇精髓（Quintessence）的环节，两位主播首先抛出了一个源自 Warren Buffett 和 Bill Gates 的经典问题：“可口可乐是否是一家随便放个‘火腿三明治’上去当 CEO 也能正常运转的公司？” 对此，两人展开了激辩： - **赞同派**：从底层逻辑看确实如此。尽管 Asa Candler、Robert Woodruff、Roberto Goizueta 等伟大的 CEO 为公司添砖加瓦，但新可乐（New Coke）的惨败反而证明了即使管理层做出了商业史上最愚蠢的决策，可口可乐依然屹立不倒。其最核心的单品“经典可口可乐”（Trademark Coca-Cola）犹如一台不可撼动的赚钱机器。 - **反对此观点的审慎派**：并不能在所有历史阶段都任由其自流。例如在 1985 年之前，可口可乐面对百事的步步紧逼连续 15 年丢掉市场份额；又如 2000 年代面临肥胖危机与人类糖分摄入的生理天花板。如果公司的标准不仅是守成，而是一家追求高增长与资本回报的优质企业，管理层的战略调整是不可或缺的。 随后，两位主播各自总结了可口可乐能够历经百年繁荣的核心本质： 1. **它是一个系统（System），而非一家单纯的公司**： Coca-Cola 本质上是一个错综复杂的生态系统。它的商业底色在于**“如何让产业链上的每一个合作伙伴在卖你的产品时都能赚到大钱”**。 - 瓶装商拥有巨大的利润空间； - 零售商、汽水机运营商、餐馆都能获得丰厚抽成； - 甚至在大萧条时期，户外广告牌空置无人问津，广告牌主因为不愿面对凄凉惨白的空白墙壁，自发免费替可口可乐刷上经典的红色广告。 - 这印证了传奇领袖 Robert Woodruff 当年立下的铁律：“所有与可口可乐沾边的人，都必须能赚到钱。” 2. **永无止境的重复（Repetition Works）**： 与奢侈品行业不断追求新颖、每年更换主题与调性不同，可口可乐过去 150 年来做的事情极其单纯——将“始终美味，始终畅爽”（Always delicious, always refreshing）这句承诺，以令人难以置信的定力不断重复、强化并烙印在全球消费者的心智中。它击中了全人类跨越时空的恒定生理与情感需求，最终将一罐成本微不足道的糖水，打造成了人类商业史上最伟大的品牌奇迹之一。 ### [03:44:59](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=13499s) 可口可乐的冷知识：反垄断豁免、亚特兰大机场、秘鲁可卡因与孟山都 在进入结尾的保留环节前，两位主持人互相打趣：可口可乐“对健康无益，对地球也没什么好处，但它确实始终美味而提神（delicious and refreshing）”。这引申出了乔布斯当年的经典名言——“你是想卖一辈子糖水，还是想跟我一起去改变世界？”随后，他们分享了几则正片中未曾提及的惊人历史冷知识： 首先是瓶装商区域垄断的合法性问题。可口可乐和百事可乐为何能合法地给瓶装商划分排他性的专属领地（例如独家特许经营整个纽约或新泽西）？事实上，在 1980 年，美国政府通过了一项针对联邦反垄断法的修正案（The Soft Drink Interbrand Competition Act），专门为软饮料行业提供了反垄断豁免，从而使其跨区域特许专营垄断完全合法化。 第二件冷知识与亚特兰大哈茨菲尔德-杰克逊国际机场（Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport）以及亚特兰大动物园有关。这座全美乃至全球最繁忙的超级枢纽机场，其所在地块当年正是由可口可乐公司捐赠或转让的土地。鉴于可口可乐庞大的跨国业务，亚特兰大确实需要一个规模巨大的国际机场。 第三件极为离奇的往事发生在 1930 年左右。当时可口可乐公司非常担心美国政府未来会禁止他们进口古柯叶在本土提炼脱毒，于是在秘鲁秘密租赁了一家古柯碱（可卡因）提炼厂。工厂投产后，当地员工不仅顺利生产出可乐所需的脱毒提取物，还提炼出了大量副产品——纯可卡因。出于“为公司创收、当一名忠诚好员工”的朴素愿望，这位员工将多达 42 磅的纯可卡因卖给了巴黎的一名麻醉品掮客，并将卖得的货款规规矩矩地存入了可口可乐公司的官方银行账户。这让亚特兰大总部吓得魂飞魄散，陷入了必须极力掩盖这一交易的巨大恐慌之中。直到胡佛（Hoover）政府随后正式给予豁免特批，允许他们在本土加工提炼古柯叶，这一隐秘的供应链危机才算彻底解除。 最后一则冷知识则涉及化工农业巨头孟山都（Monsanto）。孟山都早期是一家糖精（Saccharin）制造厂商，而可口可乐正是孟山都成立最初几年里的主要客户，甚至曾包揽其全部的糖精供应。虽然尚不确定可口可乐当时是否真将糖精投入了配方，但可口可乐确实在 20 世纪初一手扶持并开启了孟山都的商业之路。 - **反垄断豁免**：1980 年通过联邦反垄断法修正案，赋予软饮料行业特许经营排他区域的合法豁免权。 - **土地资产**：亚特兰大国际机场及亚特兰大动物园占用的土地早期均归可口可乐公司所有。 - **42 磅可卡因事件**：约 1930 年秘鲁秘密提炼厂员工为替公司赚钱，将副产品可卡因售往巴黎并将收入存入可乐公账。 - **孟山都的首个大客户**：孟山都初创时期依靠向可口可乐全量供应糖精而立足商业舞台。 --- ### [03:48:21](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=13701s) Carve-Outs 好物分享 进入每期必备的个人好物推荐（Carve-Outs）环节： 本期推荐从健身、游戏、AI 工具、跑鞋到独立音乐皆有涵盖： - **Concept2 SkiErg（滑雪划船机）**：推荐给家庭健身房空间有限、想要进行上半身低冲击耐力训练的人群。相比占地极大的传统室内划船机，这款器械挂在墙上几乎不占空间，动作模拟越野滑雪的双杖下撑动作，是跑步休息日锻炼上半身的绝佳替代品。 - **《任天堂明星大乱斗 特别版》（Super Smash Bros. Ultimate）**：在 Nintendo Switch 上与大女儿共同游戏的温馨日常，女儿最爱扮演公主角色去“暴打兔子”（她将皮卡丘称作会蹦跳的兔子）。 - **Anthropic Claude（法律合同审阅）**：推荐将 Claude 用于审阅商业租赁协议。Acquired 团队最近为播客工作室“Acquired North”在西雅图告别地下室、搬入全新独立录音室签署租约；在无需动用昂贵外部律师的情况下，Claude 极为高效地标出了合同中潜藏的问题与风险条款。 - **Nike Vomero Plus**：接替此前 Nike Invincible 系列成为当前主力跑步训练用鞋。 - **Hermanos Gutiérrez**：由厄瓜多尔与瑞士混血兄弟组成的吉他器乐乐队，曲风悠扬平静、充满拉丁与西部空灵感，极度适合日常工作与放松聆听。 --- ### [03:51:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=13860s) 致谢、往期推荐与节目收尾 节目尾声，主持人向为本期长达近四个小时的深度调研提供巨大帮助的专业人士表达了谢意： - 感谢 Worldly Partners 的 **Arvin Navaratnam**，他所撰写的关于可口可乐数十年商业史的深度研报提供了核心框架；作为已故投资大师查理·芒格（Charlie Munger）的密友，他也提醒并分享了芒格著名的两万亿美元商业思维模型。 - 感谢可口可乐收藏家俱乐部（Coca-Cola Collectors Club）前会长 **Bill Combs**，他展示并解读了背后一整面墙的珍贵古董药房招牌与可口可乐纪念品藏品。 - 感谢 Guggenheim Partners 的零售与消费品牌资深分析师 **Simeon Siegel**，帮助梳理了消费品中品牌力（Brand Power）在财务报表上的具体量化与折射机制。 - 感谢前百事高管、苹果前 CEO **John Sculley**（约翰·斯考利），他作为当年“百事挑战”（Pepsi Challenge）的关键操盘手，为节目带来了第一手不可替代的商战内幕。 节目最后提醒听众，如果喜欢本期可口可乐的故事，可以去回听伯克希尔·哈撒韦（Berkshire Hathaway）、标准石油（Standard Oil）、劳力士（Rolex）以及 Trader Joe's 的深度剧集；时值岁末假期，本期更是向亲友科普“现代红衣白髯圣诞老人形象起源”的最佳素材。听众还可关注副线节目 ACQ2、加入官方 Slack 社区，以及订阅全新改版的邮件列表（包含剧集精炼、深度研究图文与后续选题投票）。伴随着片尾标志性的节奏乐声，这期跨越百年的软饮料商业史诗正式落幕。 ## Notable quotes > [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=0s) 你是想卖一辈子糖水，还是想跟我一起改变世界？ — David Rosenthal > [05:52](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=352s) 可口可乐始终是美国最美好与最糟糕一面的象征，它是美国历史的微观缩影。可口可乐与这个国家一同成长，既被时代塑造，又深刻塑造了时代。它不仅改变了大众的消费习惯，还重塑了人们对待闲暇、工作、广告、两性、家庭生活乃至爱国主义的观念。 — Mark Pendergrast > [36:50](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=2210s) 我们发现自己过去只在向极少数人做广告，也就是那些需要‘益脑滋补剂’的病人，而我们真正应该面向的是广大人民群众。 — Frank Robinson > [57:42](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=3462s) 我们并非仅为今日建设可口可乐，我们是在为千秋万代建设可口可乐。我们的夙愿是让可口可乐成为永久的国家饮料……在推出这个瓶子时，母公司实际上是在确立属于你们自己的权利。 — Harold Hirsch > [57:42](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=3462s) 我们要设计出一款极其独特的瓶子，即使在黑暗中仅凭手感摸索，或是摔碎在地上仅看碎片，也能一眼辨认出来。 > [01:08:22](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=4102s) 父亲，你必须彻底交出权力，完全退出日常管理。这家公司将由我全权掌控。 — Robert Woodruff > [01:16:28](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=4588s) 画面中的意念必须像枪弹一样瞬间击中受众，迫使他们由衷赞叹‘这主意真绝！’不仅如此，他们脑海中必须牢牢记住，画面中那带来清凉畅快、美妙宜人的东西正是可口可乐。 — Archie Lee > [01:49:25](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=6565s) 雇佣高管的全部诀窍，就是找一个原本优秀的好人，然后把他变成一个浑球（prick）。好人扛得住沿途的磨难与折腾；但如果这家伙一开始就是个浑球，半路上准会彻底崩溃瓦解。 — 阿尔弗雷德·斯蒂尔 > [01:49:25](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=6565s) 哪怕消费者想要的是装在山羊皮袋里的碳酸汗液，我都不在乎！如果是这样，会议室这一边的人立刻出去抓山羊，另一边的人给我原地拼命疯狂跑步出汗！ — 阿尔弗雷德·斯蒂尔 > [02:00:46](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=7246s) 如果上帝希望可口可乐里有糖精，祂一开始就会把它做成那样。 — 罗伯特·伍德拉夫 > [02:55:22](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=10522s) 批评者会说可口可乐犯了一次严重的营销失误；阴谋论者会说这一切都是我们自导自演的营销骗局。而事实是：我们既没有那么蠢，也没有那么聪明。 — 唐·基奥 > [03:40:13](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw&t=13213s) 所有与可口可乐沾边的人，都必须能赚到钱。 — Robert Woodruff ## Mentioned Ben Gilbert, David Rosenthal, 查理·芒格, 史蒂夫·乔布斯, 约翰·斯考利, Mark Pendergrast, John D. Rockefeller, 约翰·彭伯顿博士, 弗兰克·罗宾逊, 阿萨·坎德勒, Howard Candler, Ernest Woodruff, 罗伯特·伍德拉夫, Archie Lee, Harold Hirsch, Benjamin Thomas, Joseph Whitehead, Norman Rockwell, N.C. Wyeth, Haddon Sundblom, Ty Cobb, 加里·格兰特, Jean Harlow, Thomas Nast, 可口可乐公司, 默克公司, 达西广告公司, 鲁特玻璃公司, Schaefer Alkaloid Works (Stepan Company), White Motor Company, Guaranty Trust Company of New York, Trust Company Bank (SunTrust), Standard Oil of New Jersey (ExxonMobil), 胡椒博士, 百事公司, 马里亚尼酒, 彭伯顿法国古柯葡萄酒, For God, Country, and Coca-Cola, Secret Formula, 星期六晚邮报, 可口可乐世界, 沃尔特·麦克, 阿尔弗雷德·斯蒂尔, 德怀特·D·艾森豪威尔, 芬达, 詹姆斯·迪恩, 麦肯广告, Tab, 健怡可乐, 麦当劳, 雷·克罗克, Waddy Pratt, 美汁源, 菲多利, 广告狂人, Bill Backer, Hilltop, The New Seekers, 杜邦, Don Kendall, 苹果公司, J. Paul Austin, 罗伯托·戈伊苏埃塔, 唐·基奥, 哥伦比亚影业, Allen & Company, Herb Allen Jr., 沃伦·巴菲特, 比尔·盖茨, 伯克希尔·哈撒韦, 比尔·考斯比, 迈克尔·杰克逊, New Coke, Coca-Cola Classic, Coke II, 迈克尔·奥维茨, CAA, 佳得乐, 桂格燕麦, Powerade, 怪兽能量饮料, 汉森公司, 红牛, BodyArmor, 酷乐仕, Coke Zero, 雪碧, Fairlife, Topo Chico, Costa Coffee, 星巴克, Hamilton Helmer, 孟山都, 哈茨菲尔德-杰克逊亚特兰大国际机场, Concept2 SkiErg, 任天堂明星大乱斗 特别版, Anthropic Claude, Nike Vomero Plus, Hermanos Gutiérrez, Arvin Navaratnam, Bill Combs, Simeon Siegel ## Video description Coca-Cola is… sugar water. And somehow it’s also America, Christmas, summertime, friendship and happiness. Today we tell the story of how The Coca-Cola Company amazingly transmogrified a beverage into emotion in all of our collective psyches, and ALSO built one of the most incredible scale economy businesses of all-time. And oh yeah, there’s also cocaine, WW2, Mad Men, Warren Buffett, James Dean, Bill Cosby, Michael Jackson, Michael Ovitz, Steve Jobs, Bill Gates, McDonald’s and Monsanto. So cozy up to the fire with your favorite images of Santa Claus and Polar Bears and enjoy an ice-cold episode of Acquired — always delicious, always refreshing. *Links:* - The Hilltop ad https://youtu.be/1VM2eLhvsSM?si=EGPTNoPaXTMePcyx - Mad Men finale https://youtu.be/GxtZpFl3pPM?si=aZ5L7CO2gUcapMrV - Pepsi Challenge commercials https://youtu.be/mEXEdibXSak?si=9YB060i9BdgHEpYx - Pepsi’s Michael Jackson commercials https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=po0jY4WvCIc - Coke’s Bill Cosby commercials https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cAhRphhQsmY&t=33s - Two liter bottles inflating https://youtu.be/kU_gH36GG58?si=Suwm9No6HM0-pLOw - Worldly Partners’ Multi-Decade Coca-Cola Study https://worldlypartners.com/businesshistory - For God, Country, and Coca-Cola https://www.amazon.com/God-Country-Coca-Cola-Mark-Pendergrast/dp/0465054684 - Secret Formula https://www.amazon.com/Secret-Formula-Inside-Coca-Cola-Best-Known/dp/1504019857/ - All episode sources https://docs.google.com/document/d/1EAJUc7HRYqOjvwivuYvk06yMXyq8aK4qv39bsPnkINs/edit?usp=sharing *Carve Outs:* - SkiErg https://www.concept2.com/ergs/skierg?srsltid=AfmBOoqW20PnzP0cgbkXHcVWk0FwWZXglXi67XXxBF3vUKxrWX3c2kBj - Super Smash Bros. Ultimate https://www.smashbros.com/en_US/ - Claude https://claude.ai/acquired - Nike Vomero Plus https://www.nike.com/t/vomero-plus-mens-road-running-shoes-5npsVBwT - Hermanos Gutiérrez https://open.spotify.com/artist/73mSg0dykFyhvU96tb5xQV *More Acquired:* - Get email updates and vote on future episodes! https://www.acquired.fm/email - Join the Slack http://acquired.fm/slack - Check out the latest swag in the ACQ Merch Store! https://www.acquired.fm/store 00:00:00 Start 00:00:41 Intro 00:05:52 Patent Medicines & the Birth of an Industry 00:12:13 Dr. John Pemberton & the "Miracle Drug" Cocaine 00:16:40 Creating the Secret Formula (1886) 00:22:14 Frank Robinson's Genius & the First Coupon 00:30:38 Asa Candler & Building a National Brand (1890s) 00:39:49 The $1 Bottling Deal: A Fortuitous Mistake 00:52:21 Protecting the "Real Thing": Lawsuits & the Contour Bottle 01:03:24 Robert Woodruff: The Boss Takes Over (1923) 01:12:06 Creating Lifestyle Advertising & Santa Claus 01:23:58 Standardization, Gas Stations & Early Global Growth 01:32:39 Pepsi: The First Real Competitor Emerges 01:41:11 World War II: The Greatest Sampling Program in History 01:49:25 The Cola Wars Begin & the McDonald's Partnership (1950s) 02:16:10 The Pepsi Challenge (1975) 02:32:03 New Coke: The Worst Marketing Blunder Ever (1985) 02:59:06 Buffett's Investment & the "Total Beverage Company" 03:27:56 Analysis: Why Did Coca-Cola Work? 03:33:22 7 Powers 03:40:13 Quintessence 03:48:21 Carve-Outs + Outro _Note: Acquired hosts and guests may hold assets discussed in this episode. This podcast is not investment advice, and is intended for informational and entertainment purposes only. You should do your own research and make your own independent decisions when considering any financial transactions._ [Source](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OdP-4tZo0jw)

[0:00] David Rosenthal: 你是想卖一辈子糖水，还是想跟我一起改变世界？ [5:52] Mark Pendergrast: 可口可乐始终是美国最美好与最糟糕一面的象征，它是美国历史的微观缩影。可口可乐与这个国家一同成长，既被时代塑造，又深刻塑造了时代。它不仅改变了大众的消费习惯，还重塑了人们对待闲暇、工作、广告、两性、家庭生活乃至爱国主义的观念。 [36:50] Frank Robinson: 我们发现自己过去只在向极少数人做广告，也就是那些需要‘益脑滋补剂’的病人，而我们真正应该面向的是广大人民群众。 [57:42] Harold Hirsch: 我们并非仅为今日建设可口可乐，我们是在为千秋万代建设可口可乐。我们的夙愿是让可口可乐成为永久的国家饮料……在推出这个瓶子时，母公司实际上是在确立属于你们自己的权利。 [57:42] 我们要设计出一款极其独特的瓶子，即使在黑暗中仅凭手感摸索，或是摔碎在地上仅看碎片，也能一眼辨认出来。 [68:22] Robert Woodruff: 父亲，你必须彻底交出权力，完全退出日常管理。这家公司将由我全权掌控。 [76:28] Archie Lee: 画面中的意念必须像枪弹一样瞬间击中受众，迫使他们由衷赞叹‘这主意真绝！’不仅如此，他们脑海中必须牢牢记住，画面中那带来清凉畅快、美妙宜人的东西正是可口可乐。 [109:25] 阿尔弗雷德·斯蒂尔: 雇佣高管的全部诀窍，就是找一个原本优秀的好人，然后把他变成一个浑球（prick）。好人扛得住沿途的磨难与折腾；但如果这家伙一开始就是个浑球，半路上准会彻底崩溃瓦解。 [109:25] 阿尔弗雷德·斯蒂尔: 哪怕消费者想要的是装在山羊皮袋里的碳酸汗液，我都不在乎！如果是这样，会议室这一边的人立刻出去抓山羊，另一边的人给我原地拼命疯狂跑步出汗！ [120:46] 罗伯特·伍德拉夫: 如果上帝希望可口可乐里有糖精，祂一开始就会把它做成那样。 [175:22] 唐·基奥: 批评者会说可口可乐犯了一次严重的营销失误；阴谋论者会说这一切都是我们自导自演的营销骗局。而事实是：我们既没有那么蠢，也没有那么聪明。 [220:13] Robert Woodruff: 所有与可口可乐沾边的人，都必须能赚到钱。

[0:00] David: Do you want to sell sugar, water for the rest of your life, or do you want to come with me and change the world? [1:51] Ben: There's never a reason for anyone to reach for anything other than your product [1:51] You are going to want to have a Pavlovian association between your drink and happiness. And you're going to want to spend huge amounts of money blanketing the entire world with this messaging. [38:17] Frank Robinson: We found that we were advertising to the few, i.e. people who needed a brain tonic when we ought to advertise to the masses. [57:42] so distinct that you would recognize it by feel in the dark or lying broken on the ground [70:05] Archie Lee: Thirst knows no season. [71:53] Archie Lee: The pause that refreshes. [96:48] the greatest sampling program in the history of the world [117:21] Robert Woodruff: Do not ever share this with anyone and do not ever run this test again. Roberto Goizueta: Some choose to call this the boldest single marketing move in the history of the packaged goods business. We simply call it the surest move ever made. Don Keough: Some critics will say that Coca-Cola made a marketing mistake. Some cynics will say that we planned the whole thing. The truth is we are not that dumb and we are not that smart. [221:44] Robert Woodruff: everyone who has anything to do with Coca-Cola should make money.

[0:00] David, I cannot believe we're about to [0:02] do a 4-hour podcast on syrup, sugar, and [0:05] water. I mean, that's the entire [0:07] business is just syrup, sugar, and water [0:10] combined. And it's a $300 billion [0:12] company. [0:13] >> Well, Ben, you know what I'm going to [0:15] say to you in response to that? Do you [0:17] want to sell sugar, water for the rest [0:18] of your life, or do you want to come [0:19] with me and [music] change the world? [0:21] >> Oo, save it, David. Save it. [0:24] >> Who got the truth? [0:27] Is it you? [music] Is it you? Is it you? [0:29] Who got the truth now? [0:32] [music] Is it you? Is it you? Is it you? [0:35] Sitt down. Say it straight. [0:41] >> Welcome [music] to the fall 2025 season [0:43] of Acquired, the podcast about great [0:45] companies and the stories and playbooks [0:47] behind them. I'm Ben Gilbert. [0:49] >> I'm David Rosenthal. [0:51] >> And we are your hosts. Charlie Mer has a [0:54] famous thought experiment. It's the [0:56] 1880s. You want to build a company from [0:58] scratch that eventually becomes worth $2 [1:01] trillion starting with just 2 million. [1:04] So you're looking for a 1 millionx [1:06] return or as Charlie puts it a La Palooa [1:09] outcome. [1:09] >> Of course he does. [1:10] >> Very Charlie. [1:11] >> Very Charlie. [1:12] >> The constraint is it must be a [1:15] non-alcoholic beverage business. [1:18] >> Okay. [1:18] >> And another constraint, it must throw [1:20] off many billions of dollars in [1:22] dividends along the way to your [1:23] shareholders. [1:25] >> Okay. This sounds almost impossible, but [1:28] what ideas could you possibly dream up [1:30] to give it your best shot? [1:32] >> Well, I think the first question I would [1:34] have is whether I could include any now [1:38] illegal drugs in my product. [laughter] [1:43] That certainly helps. So, to build this [1:46] giant valuable company, the first thing [1:48] you need to know is you're not going to [1:49] get there with something generic. So you [1:51] have to build a brand that grows into a [1:53] strong protected trademark. And to reach [1:55] that scale, it must be global. So it has [1:58] to have a taste that's universal in all [2:00] countries. Now, conveniently for you, [2:02] all humans do require large amounts of [2:04] water every day to live. So it is a [2:06] giant market. [laughter] [2:09] >> Yes, but you're not going to fully [2:10] replace water. It's just going to be [2:12] kind of a small fraction of the time. [2:14] So, onto the beverage itself, you're [2:16] going to want to optimize it to maximize [2:18] the rewards of ingesting it as [2:21] refreshing as possible in any climate. [2:25] Now, you're going to want to do a bunch [2:26] of other stuff, too. You want to fill it [2:28] with calories to give energy. You want [2:30] the flavor, texture, and aroma that [2:32] makes it pleasurable to consume. And, [2:35] uh, you should throw in some brain [2:36] stimulants like caffeine and sugar. [2:39] That's sort of the ideal product mix [2:41] >> among other things. Yeah. Now, you don't [2:43] want competitors to swoop in for a free [2:45] ride on the market you just created. So, [2:47] you should make sure your product, the [2:49] real thing, is available everywhere, [2:52] anytime someone asks for it. [2:54] >> I see what you did there. [2:55] >> At a very low price. So, there's really [2:57] not an opportunity for competitors to [2:59] ever fill the vacuum. There's never a [3:01] reason for anyone to reach for anything [3:03] other than your product. [3:04] >> Always. [3:05] >> Always, David. [laughter] And since [3:07] everyone is not thinking about beverages [3:09] all the time, like you probably are as [3:11] the proprietor of this business, you're [3:13] going to want to associate your beverage [3:15] with all the things that they are [3:16] thinking about. The good life, family, [3:20] your sports heroes, beautiful people, [3:23] Christmas, I mean, happiness generally. [3:25] You are going to want to have a [3:26] Pavlovian association between your drink [3:30] and happiness. and you're going to want [3:32] to spend huge amounts of money [3:33] blanketing the entire world with this [3:36] messaging. Now, to build something this [3:38] valuable, you also can't have a big [3:40] expensive bottling and distribution [3:42] operation. So, you're going to need to [3:43] figure out some clever way to get [3:45] someone else's capital and employees for [3:47] that while still maintaining the control [3:50] that your brand requires. I mean, [3:52] ideally, it would be great if you could [3:54] serve the entire world with just a few [3:56] of your own production facilities. [3:58] >> That would be pretty great. [4:00] >> Yes. And the last thing, you must never [4:03] under any circumstances change the [4:06] formula or flavor. [4:09] [laughter] [4:10] >> We were doing great there. [4:12] >> We were doing great. [4:13] >> But you know, this might be why [4:15] Coca-Cola is not a two trillion dollar [4:17] company today. [4:18] >> Well, we'll debate that at the end of [4:20] the episode. listeners. Of course, this [4:22] playbook is almost exactly what the [4:24] Coca-Cola Company has done, and they've [4:27] done it over the course of [4:30] 140 years. It has its roots all the way [4:32] back in the Civil War. It grew up [4:34] through the rise of the automobile, [4:35] through the Great Depression, through [4:37] two world wars. It seamlessly and [4:40] shamelessly integrated into the hippie [4:42] culture of the 70s, and then of course, [4:44] it had the epic cola wars of the 80s and [4:48] onward. And David, I would say this [4:50] episode perhaps more than any other that [4:51] we've covered is about America. [4:54] >> Well, it's about America and then [4:56] America inserting itself everywhere else [4:59] in the rest of the world. Can't wait to [5:02] dive into it. Well, listeners, this [5:04] episode was selected by you. Last month, [5:07] we asked our email subscribers to vote [5:09] on what company we should cover next, [5:10] and Coca-Cola was the overwhelming [5:12] favorite. So, thank you to all of you [5:14] who participated. You can join that [5:16] email list at acquired.fm/e fm/e to get [5:18] in on the next round of voting. And that [5:21] same email list is getting a lot better. [5:23] We just did a big overhaul. So each [5:25] monthly email will now have episode [5:27] summaries, our big takeaways from the [5:30] company after studying it, and exclusive [5:32] photos from our research process. So [5:34] never miss an episode drop by signing up [5:36] at acquired.fm/e [5:39] or clicking the link in the show notes. [5:41] So with that, this show is not [5:42] investment advice. David and I may have [5:44] investments in the companies we discuss [5:45] and this show is forformational and [5:47] entertainment purposes only. David, [5:50] where do we start our story? [laughter] [5:52] >> Well, Ben, as you so aptly set up there, [5:56] the story of the birth of Coca-Cola [5:59] starts arguably with the birth of [6:01] America as we know it today in a newly [6:04] reunified [6:06] United States of America following the [6:08] Civil War. Mark Pendergrass in his great [6:11] book for God, Country, and Coca-Cola [6:14] that was a main source for this episode [6:16] has a great quote. He says, "Coca-Cola [6:20] remains emblematic of the best and worst [6:22] of America. It is a microcosm of [6:25] American history. Coca-Cola grew up with [6:27] the country, shaping and shaped by the [6:29] times. The drink helped to alter not [6:31] only consumption patterns, but attitudes [6:33] towards leisure, work, advertising, sex, [6:36] family, life, and patriotism. you know, [6:39] just a few small things. So, if you [6:42] remember back to our standard oil series [6:44] a couple years ago, one of the biggest [6:47] industries in post civil war America was [6:51] oil of a certain kind, but it wasn't the [6:54] same kind of oil as standard oil. It was [6:57] snake oil. [laughter] [6:59] Ah, good hook. [7:00] >> Yeah. Or as it came to be known after [7:02] the war, patent medicines. Before this [7:07] industry, there were no national brands [7:10] in America or anywhere else. There were [7:13] railroads and there were like big [7:15] national industrial companies, but there [7:17] weren't any national consumer product [7:19] companies. Everything was local. There [7:22] weren't any CPG companies. There weren't [7:24] any supermarkets. There weren't any car [7:26] companies. There weren't gas stations. [7:28] >> And there weren't advertising agencies [7:30] to go along with them. Patent medicines [7:33] were sort of like this seed crystal that [7:36] created the modern American consumer [7:39] business. [7:40] >> And what were patent medicines? [7:42] >> So going back again to our Standard Oil [7:44] series, John D. Rockefeller's dad, if [7:47] you remember, was a traveling snake oil [7:51] salesman. [laughter] [7:52] >> Yeah. In his days, back before the Civil [7:55] War, these were medicines that promised [7:59] like a cure to all sorts of ailments. [8:02] Nausea, indigestion, headaches, cancer, [8:05] tuberculosis, skull fractures, [8:08] paralysis, and impetence. [8:10] >> All based on zero research, zero [8:12] studies, [8:13] >> zero science, nothing. The Civil War [8:17] changed all that. Not necessarily for [8:19] the better. [laughter] [8:21] So after the war, there were so many [8:24] wounded soldiers in America that were in [8:27] such chronic pain that the market for [8:31] medicines like this from these snake oil [8:34] salesmen just exploded. A huge [snorts] [8:37] huge percentage of veterans from the [8:41] Civil War developed what is called army [8:43] disease, quote unquote, i.e. They were [8:46] addicted to morphine for the rest of [8:48] their lives as a painkiller, [8:49] >> which actually did work. [8:51] >> Yes, that actually did work [8:52] >> very well [laughter] [8:54] >> at killing pain. And it wasn't just [8:56] physical injuries from the war and the [8:58] soldiers who fought in it. The Civil War [8:59] ripped America apart. I mean, these guys [9:02] and their families had just gone through [9:04] this devastating trauma. I mean, there [9:07] were so many deaths, so many wounded. It [9:09] was families fighting against one [9:11] another. It was truly, arguably the [9:13] worst moment in our nation's history. [9:15] Yeah. [9:15] >> So naturally, whenever there's a uh big [9:18] problem, American capitalism sees a big [9:21] opportunity. So some of these [9:23] enterprising traveling snake oil [9:26] salesmen started scaling up the [9:28] medicines that they were making to meet [9:30] all this new demand. And as they scale [9:33] up and they start to standardize the [9:35] products that they are offering, this [9:38] industry comes to be known as patent [9:40] medicines. Now most of these medicines [9:43] were not actually patented but as the [9:46] producer of them you wanted customers [9:48] and wouldbe competitors to think that [9:50] they were that there was some sort of [9:52] barrier to entry. Yes. So pretty quickly [9:55] these newly scaling patent medicine guys [9:58] discover that the best way to reinforce [10:01] that message with consumers and to [10:03] stimulate demand was advertising [10:06] especially in newspapers. And this is [10:09] the birth of the advertising industry in [10:11] America. [10:12] >> Really, [10:12] >> it's these patent medicines that start [10:14] spending the first real scale dollars in [10:17] newspapers which are also coming up and [10:20] industrializing post civil war and [10:22] building the business model of the media [10:24] industry as we know it today. Because [10:27] just like you were talking about in your [10:29] great Charlie thought experiment from [10:30] the intro, what are these patent [10:33] medicines? It's just commodities. It's [10:35] like leaves and like nuts and water and [10:38] stuff that go into these things. I mean, [10:40] it's extract extracts, right? Okay. [10:43] >> It's super cheap commodities that are [10:47] very easy to obtain in great quantities, [10:50] very easy to then produce into your [10:53] product and transform and then pretty [10:56] small relative to other products, easy [10:58] to transport around the country. You do [11:01] start to get some of these patent [11:02] medicines that scale up and build early [11:05] national brands in this day. [11:07] >> So you might think that all this is like [11:09] ancient history. [11:11] >> A whole bunch of products that we still [11:14] buy today started as patent medicines. [11:17] Luden's cough drops, [clears throat] [11:19] >> Vix Vapor Rub, Vaseline, Listerine, the [11:23] mouthwatch, all patent medicines. Those [11:25] are patent medicines that are still used [11:27] for sort of a uh you know health purpose [11:29] today. Plenty of products that we still [11:32] use and consume today started as patent [11:34] medicines but are no longer marketed as [11:37] medicines. Graham crackers started as a [11:40] patent medicine. [11:41] >> Really? [11:42] >> Grape nuts. The cereal [11:43] >> neither grape nor nuts. [11:45] >> Angustera bitters. You know the bitters [11:47] that you get like old fashions and [11:48] stuff. That was a patent medicine. [11:49] >> Okay, that makes sense. That's squarely [11:51] what I believe a patent medicine is. [11:53] >> Yep. And then a couple things you might [11:56] be familiar with. Dr. Pepper. Really? I [12:00] didn't know Dr. Pepper was that old. [12:01] >> Yeah, Dr. Pepper predates Coca-Cola. [12:05] >> Huh? [12:05] >> And of course, Coca-Cola [12:08] started just the same way as a patent [12:11] medicine. Which brings us to Dr. John [12:15] Peton, a Confederate War veteran who had [12:20] not only been stabbed, he had also been [12:22] shot during the war and got army disease [12:25] just like all these other soldiers and [12:27] was addicted to morphine for the rest of [12:29] his life. So after the war he moves to [12:32] Atlanta and as part of his sort of [12:35] entrepreneurial aspirations in this new [12:38] patent medicine consumer economy and [12:40] also to probably solve his own problem [12:43] he starts casting about for other drugs [12:46] that could cure him and others of army [12:48] disease. And that is how in the mid [12:51] 1880s he learns about a new miracle drug [12:55] sweeping America [12:57] promising to cure all ills including [12:59] army disease. Cocaine. [laughter] [13:02] Cocaine was really really in in America [13:08] in the 1880s. Perhaps foreshadowing a [13:10] little bit the 1980s in America as we [13:12] will get to later in the episode. Except [13:15] in the 1880s, it's really legal and [13:18] really broadly encouraged. Certainly, [13:20] there's no FDA or anything to make it [13:22] illegal, but society's posture toward [13:24] cocaine wasn't bad. [13:26] >> It was like caffeine today, [13:28] >> right? They did not really discover the [13:30] addictive nature of it or demonize the [13:32] addictive nature of it yet. [13:34] >> Yep. Or the side effects, etc., etc. So [13:38] pretty quickly, cocaine becomes the most [13:40] popular patent medicine ingredient out [13:44] there. [13:44] >> It's probably the only ingredient that [13:45] actually did anything. [13:47] >> Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. And there is a product [13:49] on the market, an imported product from [13:52] France. You can't make this up. That [13:54] quickly becomes the most popular [13:56] delivery vehicle for cocaine. A cocaine [13:59] fortified wine from Bordeaux in France [14:03] called Vin Marani. It's like the most [14:06] extreme forloo you could ever dream of. [14:08] >> Exactly. Exactly. [laughter] [14:09] Yes. [14:10] So this sounds utterly ridiculous today, [14:13] but let me read you the list of public [14:17] endorsers of Vin Mariani, the like [14:20] testimonies in the Rolex Parliament. [14:23] Thomas Edison, [14:25] Buffalo Bill Cody, United States [14:28] President William McKinley gets even [14:31] better. Queen Victoria of England, and [14:35] not one but three consecutive popes in [14:39] the Vatican, all swore by Vin Marani. [14:44] >> Feels like a thing I would be swearing [14:45] by and endorsing, too. I imagine once [14:47] you start, it's the best thing ever. So [14:50] entrepreneurial Peton in Atlanta sees [14:52] Vin Marani's success and is like well I [14:55] wonder if there's a way that I could [14:57] copy and improve on that. And the way he [15:00] comes up to improve upon it is to add [15:04] caffeine to the mix. [15:06] >> Why not? [15:06] >> Yeah, why not? He decides that he's [15:08] going to get the caffeine from African [15:11] cola nuts. K O L A. cola nuts, [15:14] >> which we should say is the first [15:16] introduction of the word cola period in [15:20] the American lexicon. Cola drinks were [15:23] not a thing. [15:23] >> Yep. And it's very bitter. But the [15:25] reason he chooses it is it has an even [15:29] greater caffeine concentration than [15:31] coffee beans. [laughter] He really wants [15:33] this product to work. So Peton starts [15:36] selling Peton's French wine cocoa, which [15:40] is still wine, but is now infused both [15:44] with cocoa leaves for the cocaine and [15:46] cola nuts for the caffeine. And it's a [15:50] hit. [15:50] >> This could not have tasted good. [15:52] >> No, I can't imagine what it tasted like. [15:55] President Ulissiz Srant becomes a fan [15:58] and Peton starts selling like thousands [16:01] and thousands of bottles in and around [16:03] Atlanta, [16:03] >> which makes sense. People are drinking [16:05] it for its drug-like medicinal [16:07] qualities, not that it's in any way [16:09] refreshing. [16:10] >> Yep. Now, I say bottles, keep that in [16:14] mind here. Bottling technology in the [16:17] 1880s is not what it is today. not very [16:21] good at preserving liquids or foods. [16:25] Certainly not good at preserving [16:27] carbonation. [16:28] However, because this is a wine at this [16:31] point in time, wine has natural [16:33] preservatives in it. So, it's [16:34] self-stable. So, you can sell bottles of [16:36] wine. People have been selling bottles [16:37] of wine for centuries at this point in [16:39] time. [16:40] >> So, then prohibition hits. Party's over. [16:43] >> Yep. Fall of 1885, Atlanta, I think, [16:46] might have been the first major city in [16:49] America that institutes prohibition and [16:52] becomes a dry town, no alcohol. So [16:55] Pepperton's now like, "Well, shoot. I've [16:57] got this hit product. I need to scramble [16:59] and come up with a soft version of a [17:01] soft drink." [17:03] >> And this is the origin of soft drinks. [17:05] They're not hard as in alcoholic drinks. [17:07] They're soft. There you go. So he starts [17:09] madly experimenting with all sorts of [17:10] flavors and ingredients. And after 6 [17:13] months or so in April of 1886, he nails [17:17] a formula. [17:18] >> Yes. And so the question is, how does he [17:20] arrive at this formula? The book I was [17:22] reading, which is called Secret Formula, [17:24] a great book on the history of Coca-Cola [17:26] that had access to all the corporate [17:27] archives, really describes Peton in this [17:30] phase as finding his capitalist streak, [17:34] as sort of realizing, okay, take a step [17:37] back. Patent medicines are sold for 75 [17:40] cents, a dollar. It serves a crowd of [17:44] people when they're looking to recover [17:47] from some ailment or really at this [17:49] point probably serve an addiction. [17:51] >> We're now 20 years from the Civil War, [17:53] so a new generation is coming up. [17:55] >> Yes. [17:55] >> Yeah. That doesn't have army disease. Is [17:58] there a product that I can make that [18:00] people can afford anytime they want [18:03] that's not a medicine that's just a [18:05] refreshment and has all these other [18:07] great properties using some of the [18:08] ingredients that we've been using. So he [18:10] kind of comes up with this idea of a [18:13] five cent again because the ingredients [18:16] cost so little these extracts it's a [18:17] super high margin product a five- cent [18:20] thing that anybody can have just to have [18:21] a little pickme up a little treat when [18:23] they're at the soda fountain. [18:25] >> Pick me up. [laughter] [18:27] when they're sitting down in the social [18:28] gathering space because drugstores at [18:31] that time were sort of the Starbucks of [18:32] this time. It really was this gathering [18:34] place to go and spend time. And so he [18:37] says, "I'm going to serve this other [18:39] market of anytime refreshment." And so [18:42] he's playing around with these [18:43] ingredients and he's got the cola seed [18:45] that's got this natural caffeine in it. [18:47] Fun story, in the original Coca-Cola, [18:49] for the first, I don't know, a couple [18:50] decades, it actually had four times the [18:53] amount of caffeine that Coke does today. [18:55] Okay, so it's effectively an energy [18:57] drink, even leaving the cocaine aside. [19:00] However, the cola seed, it tastes really [19:03] bitter. It's absolutely horrible, which [19:06] was not a big deal previously cuz he was [19:08] mixing it with wine. People were [19:10] drinking it for medicinal purposes, just [19:11] kind of slugging it down. But he's [19:12] trying to create a refreshing beverage [19:15] here. And so, I did not know that this [19:18] was possible way back in 1886. But what [19:21] he does is he uses synthetic caffeine. [19:23] Merc, the pharmaceutical company, had [19:26] already been extracting pure caffeine [19:29] from cola seeds. So Peton just got a [19:33] hold of Merc and bought a bunch of the [19:35] powder. And so the first version of [19:36] Coca-Cola is a little tiny bit of the [19:40] cola seed just kind of to say that it's [19:42] in there. He's going to call this thing [19:44] Coca-Cola, but the caffeine actually [19:46] comes from a synthetic extract. [19:48] >> Yeah. Interesting. It's always been [19:49] synthetic. Huh. [19:50] >> That's right. [19:51] >> I didn't know that. That's amazing. So, [19:53] it's a great excerpt from the book [19:55] Secret Formula. At last, he stood on the [19:58] verge of inventing Coca-Cola. Down in [20:00] the basement, Peton filled his 40-gallon [20:03] kettle with plain water, which he then [20:05] heated to a boil over an open fire. [20:07] Using a wooden paddle to stir the [20:09] solution, he melted in sugar and [20:11] caffeine. [20:12] >> Right. Sugar because of the extreme [20:13] bitterness of the colonut. [20:15] >> Yes. And actually, the cocoa plant was [20:18] also bitter, so sugar was to offset it. [20:20] >> Yeah. Yeah. [laughter] [20:21] Next, he added caramel for coloring, [20:23] giving the syrup its dark, distinctive [20:26] port wine color. To balance the [20:28] sweetness of the sugar and give the [20:30] syrup its tang, he added lime juice, [20:32] citric acid, and phosphoric acid. Then, [20:35] as the basic blend cooled, Peton turned [20:37] to the question of flavor. Into the mix [20:39] went vanilla extract, elixir of orange, [20:41] and several pungent oils refined from [20:44] various fruits, herbs, and trees, lemon, [20:47] nutmeg, spice brush, coriander, and [20:49] naroli. The last ingredient in perfumes [20:52] distilled from a flower of the orange [20:54] tree. The most exotic was oil of cassia, [20:57] also known as Chinese cinnamon, made [20:59] from the bark of a tree found in the [21:01] tropical regions of Asia. And of course, [21:04] Peton added this brew to the fluid [21:07] extract of cocoa leaves. Exactly how [21:09] much cocaine went into the inaugural [21:11] batch of Doc Peton's new soft drink [21:13] syrup is impossible to calculate more [21:15] than a century later. But with even a [21:17] touch of the drug in combination with [21:18] the sugar and caffeine, four times the [21:20] amount in today's Coke made Peton's [21:23] concoction quite a stimulating beverage. [21:25] [laughter] [21:26] Yes. Yes indeed. As best as I was able [21:29] to read from a few different sources, I [21:32] think roughly once Coca-Cola starts [21:35] being produced in that first decade, [21:37] call it four or five glasses of [21:39] Coca-Cola would be about the equivalent [21:41] of a line of cocaine today. [21:43] >> Okay? So, it would take a lot of [21:45] Coca-Cola. If you're drinking that much [21:47] of that formula, you're having the [21:50] equivalent of 16 Cokes worth of [21:52] caffeine. It's a absolute crap ton of [21:55] caffeine and sugar. By that description, [21:57] the cocaine probably would affect you [22:00] less than the sugar and caffeine in the [22:01] mix. [22:02] >> That's a good point. Regardless, you're [22:04] going to get hype when you drink this. [22:07] >> And this amount of cocaine really was [22:09] only a part of the formula for those [22:11] early first few years. [22:12] >> Yes. [22:13] But it lends the first half of the name, [22:17] which Peton's business partner at the [22:19] time, a guy named Frank Robinson, comes [22:22] up with the simple, descriptive, perfect [22:26] name for this new brew, Coca-Cola, which [22:29] is funny because it neither contains [22:33] much cola since the caffeine is actually [22:35] an extract and it's just a tiny little [22:37] drop from the cola seed. And very soon [22:40] they would strip out almost all the [22:41] cocaine. And so you have a product that [22:43] for the next 140 years would be called [22:45] Coca-Cola that contains really not very [22:47] much Coca and really not very much cola. [22:49] >> Yes, indeed. So they go about getting [22:53] the new product installed and [22:55] distributed in drugstore soda fountains [22:58] around Atlanta. But Ben, you were saying [23:00] a minute ago about, oh, drugstores were [23:02] this gathering place at the time. [23:04] Remember I said about bottling [23:06] technology? If you weren't selling [23:08] alcohol, which had natural [23:09] preservatives, [23:11] >> the only way that you could buy and [23:13] consume a drink that really wasn't like [23:17] water or milk or something. It was [23:18] fresh. And so that's how soda fountains [23:20] come to be installed in these [23:21] drugstores. They're selling the patent [23:23] medicines, many of which are liquids. [23:25] And that's also how carbonated water [23:28] comes to the drugstores because mineral [23:30] water, carbonated water is thought to be [23:32] a health tonic. And so it all mixes [23:34] together. And then over the years these [23:36] morph into social places thanks in large [23:39] part to Coca-Cola. [23:41] >> Makes total sense. And I'm pretty sure [23:43] what actually happens is Peton lets his [23:45] formula settle and it's kind of this [23:48] thick syrupy thing, brings it down the [23:50] street to the first drugstore and that [23:52] drugist, that proprietor is the one who [23:54] actually combines that syrup with the [23:56] carbonated water and makes the choice, [23:59] which I think could have gone either [24:00] way. Is it a still or a sparkling [24:02] beverage to give it that champagne [24:04] sparkle to create the Coca-Cola that [24:06] would endure from there? [24:08] >> Well, thank goodness they do use the [24:10] carbonated water. Could you imagine Coke [24:13] if it were still? That wouldn't be very [24:14] good. [24:15] >> No. Well, it wouldn't be as successful. [24:17] I mean, there was probably hundreds of [24:18] things like Coke that were still that [24:20] did not succeed. [24:21] >> So, pretty quickly Coca-Cola gets into [24:24] market with these drugstores and soda [24:26] fountains and people love it. This is [24:28] great. It's a dualbenefit product. It [24:31] has all the medicinal benefits of [24:33] cocaine and caffeine, the cola that [24:35] they've been marketing and it's actually [24:38] really enjoyable to drink and it tastes [24:39] great. So the next year in 1887, Frank [24:42] Robinson, the business partner who also [24:44] named the drink, he also introduces the [24:48] script logo. Like he writes out the [24:49] Coca-Cola script logo that we still use [24:51] to this day. [24:52] >> This is unbelievable. I read that this [24:54] guy was Peton's bookkeeper. And yet he's [24:56] the one who came up with the name [24:57] Coca-Cola and the Spencerian script, the [25:00] logo Coca-Cola, which has been unchanged [25:03] other than just tightening it up a [25:04] little bit since he created it in 1887. [25:08] >> Yes, it is true that he was his [25:10] bookkeeper, but he was also his business [25:12] partner. It was like [25:13] >> It's like I'm your bookkeeper type [25:14] thing. [25:14] >> Yeah, [laughter] [25:16] exactly. So the two of them come up with [25:20] a pretty ingenious advertising and [25:23] distribution method because in the early [25:25] days they don't yet have a ton of [25:26] capital to start spending on [25:28] advertisements like all the other patent [25:30] medicines out there. They decide that [25:32] they are going to offer tickets to [25:36] consumers redeemable at their local [25:40] Atlanta soda fountains for free glasses [25:44] of Coke. and they start mailing out [25:49] these free Coke tickets or coupons, you [25:52] might say, to every address in the [25:54] Atlanta city directory. [laughter] And [25:56] then they also give them to traveling [25:59] doortodoor salesmen to go hand out on [26:01] their routes. Not Coca-Cola salesmen, [26:03] but salesmen that are selling a variety [26:05] of different products. [26:06] >> And this is the very first [26:09] manufacturer's coupon redeemable at a [26:11] retailer. Yes, there's an image on [26:14] Wikipedia of one of these tickets from [26:17] 1888 that is the oldest [26:20] known coupon used in America. And it is [26:24] actually beautiful. It kind of looks [26:26] like a dollar bill. We'll put a photo of [26:28] it in the email. It's incredible. This [26:32] becomes absolutely [26:35] huge [snorts] [26:36] for Coca-Cola and integral to its [26:38] success. [26:39] >> Well, yeah. It's a high gross margin [26:41] product where you can give out giant [26:43] amounts where if you mail someone a [26:46] little ticket that says you can come and [26:48] redeem a free drink that tastes good [26:50] that's full of sugar, caffeine, and [26:52] cocaine. I'm pretty sure they're going [26:53] to buy more from you. It's a high gross [26:56] margin product. You have lots of dollars [26:57] to play with. And on top of all this, [27:00] this is kind of a new product category. [27:02] This notion of a soft drink that's not a [27:04] patent medicine that's much cheaper than [27:07] traditional patent medicines. And so you [27:09] do actually need to do some category [27:12] creation marketing where you make people [27:15] aware that this cool new thing exists. [27:18] Yep. All of that is true. And even more [27:21] so, this couponing strategy aligns [27:25] incentives for everybody in the value [27:28] chain in a way that had never been done [27:30] before. Consumers, they love it. They [27:33] get free drinks of this great tasting [27:36] beverage. [27:36] >> Yep. drugstores and soda fountains, they [27:39] super love it because now they're [27:41] getting more foot traffic. And then once [27:43] consumers come back and start buying [27:45] their second, third, fourth, you know, [27:47] 400th drinks, this is a highly [27:49] profitable drink for them to sell, they [27:52] have gross retail margins on this. And [27:55] then three, the traveling salesman who [27:59] Peton and his associates are giving [28:01] these tickets out to, well, they love [28:03] it, too. This is like, oh wow, now a [28:05] great new free benefit I can offer my [28:08] customers. Why wouldn't I want to do [28:09] this? It's this incredible [28:12] invention that completely incentivizes [28:17] rapid extreme growth in distribution of [28:20] the product. So to further illustrate [28:23] how awesome this is for the soda [28:25] fountains, Coke when they were selling [28:28] gallons of syrup to the soda fountains, [28:30] they sold them for about a dollar. 300 [28:34] per gallon. The soda fountains then sold [28:38] drinks to customers at 5 cents a drink. [28:41] They're 128 drinks per gallon. They're [28:43] making $6.40 [28:45] of revenue for a product that costs them [28:48] a buck 30 to buy. Yeah, I'm not a [28:51] retailer, but I'm pretty [laughter] sure [28:52] those are good margins. [28:55] >> Pretty sweet deal if you can get it [28:56] then. And pretty sweet deal to be [28:58] McDonald's today offering my large Coke [29:02] with a meal. [29:03] >> Yeah, man. [laughter] [29:05] Pretty sweet deal indeed. Okay, so all [29:09] of this happens within the first year, [29:12] year and a half of Coca-Cola being on [29:15] the market. Pretty quickly, Peton, who [29:20] wasn't really doing much anyway after [29:22] inventing the drink, as we said, Frank [29:24] Robinson named it, made the logo, is [29:26] doing a lot of the distribution work. [29:28] Peton becomes convinced that he's dying, [29:32] >> which he generally was slowly over all [29:35] these years. [29:36] >> Yes. And he secretly decides that he is [29:40] going to sell off the rights to the [29:43] formula [29:43] >> without telling Robinson. [29:44] >> Without telling Robinson. without really [29:46] telling anybody. This kicks off a whole [29:48] mess of very questionably legitimate [29:53] transactions [29:54] that results by mid 1888, early 1889 [30:00] in Frank Robinson discovering what's [30:02] going on and seeking out a wealthy [30:04] Atlanta businessman named Asa Candler to [30:08] come in and be his new partner to [30:11] reunite all these various claims to [30:14] ownership of the formula and a company [30:17] that they can then grow and scale and [30:20] manifest its destiny across America and [30:22] the world. And Asa Canandler is really [30:26] the person who creates the modern [30:29] Coca-Cola company with Frank Robinson's [30:31] help in 1892, which he incorporates as [30:34] the definitive Coca-Cola Company. [30:38] >> All right. So, David, this is the first [30:41] professionally [30:42] version of the Coca-Cola Company. [30:45] >> Yes. But to give you a sense of just how [30:48] much of a hit this product becomes, how [30:51] quickly, even in the couple years before [30:54] the professionalization and the founding [30:56] of the Coca-Cola Company in 1887, so the [30:59] first year that Coke, the product is on [31:00] the market, Peton and Robinson sell 600 [31:04] gallons of Coca-Cola syrup to soda [31:06] fountains, which equates to about 75,000 [31:09] glasses of Coke served. By 1889, 2 years [31:13] later, that has quadrupled to over 2,000 [31:15] gallons. And by 1890, it's almost 10,000 [31:19] gallons. So, what's that? 3 years into [31:22] the business with no professional [31:24] management, they grow the business 10x [31:27] without even really trying. [31:28] >> It's amazing. And in that next year, [31:31] 1891, when Asa Candler buys the last [31:34] piece to fully own Coca-Cola, he got an [31:36] incredible deal. Even with all that [31:39] growth having already happened, he only [31:41] paid $2,300 [31:43] to buy it all. That is the base of the [31:45] company that he builds. [31:47] >> And that's just buying all the various [31:49] rights and claims from the people that [31:51] Peton sold it off to. No capital needs [31:54] to be invested in this business ever. [31:57] >> Unbelievable. [31:58] >> It is a cash flow bonanza since like day [32:00] one. [32:01] >> It's crazy. So, in 1892, the first [32:04] official year of operation of the [32:06] Coca-Cola Company, we have the books. We [32:08] know just how profitable they were. They [32:11] spent just over $20,000 on ingredients [32:14] and production costs. And I think that [32:16] includes all like operations and stuff, [32:18] too. There's only like three people [32:19] working in the business [laughter] here. [32:20] So, they spend just over $10,000 on [32:24] advertising. Okay. And with those costs, [32:28] they sell 35,360 [32:31] gallons of syrup at an average price of [32:34] a buck 30 a gallon. So that is $46,000 [32:38] in revenue and $12,000 in profit. Now, [32:42] for reference, the average household [32:44] income in 1892 was about $500. There are [32:48] three people working in this business, [32:50] including Candler, the owner. They made [32:53] $12,000 in annual profit in the first [32:56] year of the business. So they are [32:59] crushing it. [33:01] >> So that's each person at the company, if [33:03] they were paid equally, is making 8x the [33:05] average household income. [33:06] >> They are uh in a promising business. And [33:09] that's just for the Coca-Cola company. [33:12] Remember, the soda fountains are selling [33:15] to consumers at $6.40 a gallon. So the [33:19] actual gross revenue of Coca-Cola in the [33:23] marketplace in that first year is close [33:25] to a quarter million dollar. [33:27] >> That's a4 million on would you say a [33:30] little over $20,000 [33:32] of ingredients and manufacturing? [33:34] >> Yes. And then another $10,000 in [33:37] advertising. [33:38] >> So that's crazy. Only a tenth of the uh [33:41] ultimate sale price of the beverages is [33:43] there in the costs of the ingredients, [33:45] the manufacturing and the advertising [33:47] when you fully load it. [33:49] >> Yes. So uh there's a lot of margin to go [33:52] around. So speaking of advertising [33:55] costs, in the next few years they invest [33:59] heavily into advertising and of course [34:02] the Coca-Cola company does still right [34:04] up through to this day. The advertising [34:06] they were doing on the one hand is very [34:08] different than Coca-Cola advertising [34:10] today and specifically it's different in [34:12] that it's all purely intrinsic [34:15] advertising. It's about the nature of [34:17] the product itself. Remember they're [34:20] still sort of positioning Coca-Cola as [34:22] this dualuse refreshing beverage [34:25] non-alcoholic social drink but also [34:27] patent medicine. So here's some of the [34:30] early ad copy during this period. [34:33] Coca-Cola is the ideal brain tonic and [34:35] sovereign remedy for headache and [34:37] nervousness. It makes the sad glad and [34:40] the weak strong. [laughter] [34:42] >> Yeah, it feels patent medicine-y. [34:44] >> It feels patent medicine. Not uh, you [34:46] know, a pause that is refreshing just [34:48] yet. But what Robinson and Canandler do [34:51] do that is very much still on brand for [34:53] Coke today is they are all about outdoor [34:57] and point of sale signage and presence. [35:01] So they put the script Coca-Cola logo [35:04] everywhere across Atlanta. They make oil [35:07] cloth signs. They paint murals on walls [35:09] of buildings. They do billboards. They [35:11] put it in street cars. They print [35:14] posters for all the soda fountains to [35:16] display. Then they're like, "Why stop at [35:18] posters? Let's make calendars. Let's [35:19] make cabinets. Let's make serving trays. [35:21] Let's make glasses. Let's make clocks." [35:24] All with the big Coca-Cola logo. They [35:27] would go on to paint 20,000 murals on [35:30] the signs of barns and walls across the [35:32] countryside starting in 1894. [snorts] [35:35] Unbelievable. [35:36] >> Incredible. [35:37] >> What you're talking about, David, is [35:39] this great use of all these extra margin [35:41] dollars. They would do all this for free [35:43] for drugstores and they would say, "Hey, [35:46] don't you wish you had like a big, [35:48] bright, beautiful sign to bring [35:50] customers into their store?" And [35:52] Coca-Cola would design, pay for, [35:54] fabricate, and deliver signs for [35:56] drugstores that had the store name in [35:58] big letters. And Coca-Cola's name just [36:01] as big. And they did this for thousands [36:04] of drugstores across the South. And so [36:06] you see all these great old pictures of [36:08] these stores that effectively look like [36:10] Coca-Cola stores. [36:11] >> Oh, they're beautiful. Yeah. [36:13] >> It almost looks like they're franchising [36:15] Coca-Cola rather than Coca-Cola just [36:17] being a thing that's sold at the [36:18] drugstores. It's so beautiful because [36:22] like you said, it seems like they're [36:23] franchising Coca-Cola with no capital [36:25] investment and the drugstores freaking [36:28] love it because they're making 80% [36:30] retail margins on this Coca-Cola. Of [36:32] course, they want it to be their number [36:34] one product. [36:35] >> They want a big advertisement says we [36:36] have Coke. [36:37] >> Yes. So, by 1898, Coca-Cola is [36:41] distributing over 1 million branded [36:44] promotional items per year. This is [36:47] before the year 1900. [36:49] >> Yeah. [36:50] >> Nuts. They also start expanding [36:53] geographically [36:54] because we talked about syrup earlier. [36:57] All the Coca-Cola company is doing here [37:00] is selling this concentrated syrup. It's [37:03] the drugstore soda fountains that are [37:05] then mixing it with carbonated water and [37:07] making it a drink. The syrup is small, [37:11] compact, it's shelf stable. It's easy to [37:13] transport. combined with the couponing [37:16] strategy, they've got this killer [37:19] national growth strategy. So by 1895, [37:23] Coca-Cola is being sold in at least one [37:27] soda fountain in every single state and [37:30] territory in the United States at this [37:32] time. Wild. Wow. Yeah. And if you look [37:35] at old pictures of this time, they had [37:37] landed on what you were talking about, [37:38] the intrinsic advertising, a slogan that [37:41] most people will know, delicious and [37:43] refreshing that you see on all the old [37:45] Coca-Cola memorabilia. That's coming [37:47] into view. They're not yet talking about [37:49] the lifestyle you could have if you [37:51] associate with Coke. They're talking [37:53] about quality and they're also talking [37:55] about price. They're advertising as many [37:57] places as they can. Hey, this is 5 [37:59] cents. They also start for the first [38:01] time working with celebrities and [38:02] athletes in some of these advertisements [38:05] that they're doing. And of course, as [38:07] you would expect, in 1895, they [38:09] trademark the Coca-Cola script for the [38:12] first time. They are granted that [38:14] unbelievably valuable trademark. [38:17] >> Yes. The delicious and refreshing slogan [38:20] that actually evolves during these [38:23] years. And it's Frank Robinson who [38:25] starts to lean more towards delicious [38:27] and refreshing and the social benefits [38:30] and away from the patent medicine brain [38:33] tonic slogans. There's actually a great [38:35] quote on this from him in for God [38:37] country and Coca-Cola. He said, "We [38:39] found that we were advertising to the [38:41] few, i.e. people who needed a brain [38:44] tonic when we ought to advertise to the [38:46] masses." And so he starts dropping all [38:49] this, oh, sovereign remedy for headaches [38:51] and nervousness stuff and then starts [38:53] really emphasizing the drink Coca-Cola, [38:55] delicious, refreshing. This is really [38:58] important because he's hitting on like, [39:00] hey, Coca-Cola is for everyone. It's not [39:03] only for people who have something wrong [39:05] with them that they need a medicine to [39:06] fix. It's not a niche. It's not a [39:08] demographic. It's for everybody. [39:10] >> Yeah. And two, just instinctually, he [39:12] understood, hey, we don't want to [39:15] associate our product with negative [39:17] things, with problems. Headaches, [39:20] nervousness, those are problems. We want [39:21] to associate our product only with [39:23] positive things, delicious, refreshing, [39:26] friendship, etc., etc. [39:28] >> Yep. Which is so funny. At this point, [39:30] all the cocaine is not gone yet. we [39:32] still have uh [laughter] [39:34] >> it's being marketed as this unabated [39:36] good while at the same time the [39:38] company's like we should probably do our [39:40] best to start moving away from cocaine [39:41] because it doesn't actually seem to be [39:43] the value proposition that people are [39:45] here for. [39:45] >> Yes. [39:46] >> And the anti-ocaine sentiment is coming. [39:49] >> Yep. Before they fix the cocaine issue [39:52] though, Canler in 1899 makes what is [39:55] maybe simultaneously the best and the [39:58] worst business deal in history. [40:00] [laughter] [40:02] He gives away the right to bottle and [40:06] sell CocaCola for free. [40:09] >> Yes. Definitely one of the dumbest deals [40:12] ever if you just look at it as it was in [40:15] that moment, but would be sort of [40:17] Coca-Cola's second great business model [40:19] innovation after couponing. So in 1889, [40:23] two guys from Chattanooga, Tennessee [40:26] named Benjamin Thomas and Joseph [40:28] Whitehead come to Campbler with a [40:31] proposal. They want to bottle Coca-Cola. [40:36] They're convinced that bottling [40:38] technology has matured enough at this [40:40] point that they can now bottle fully [40:43] mixed Coca-Cola beverages. And not only [40:47] will they not go bad, it'll keep the [40:50] carbonated fizz. It will still be [40:52] delicious when opened and consumed at a [40:55] later date. [40:56] >> And Canandler's like very anti-bottling, [40:58] right? [40:58] >> Yes. He is extremely skeptical. [41:01] He's like, "Yo, we've tried this before. [41:03] I really don't think the technologies [41:05] there. [41:07] I'm not sure about this." Thomas and [41:09] Whitehead, though, they're very [41:10] persistent. They say, "Well, totally get [41:12] that. Understand that. What if we do it [41:15] at no risk to you? You let us buy [41:19] Coca-Cola syrup from you, same as all [41:21] the soda fountains are doing. We will [41:24] bottle it and sell it at our own [41:26] expense, and if the product isn't up to [41:29] your standards, you can just pull our [41:32] license and we'll stop selling it." [41:34] Candler thinks it over, and he's like, [41:36] "That's a pretty good deal. I've got [41:37] nothing to lose here. Why not? I'll let [41:39] you two young bucks have a go at this." [41:41] So, in July of 1899, the three of them [41:45] sign a contract that includes the [41:47] following terms. For a token contract [41:51] price of $1, which Candler never [41:53] collects, the Coca-Cola Company will [41:56] sell syrup to Thomas and Whitehead at a [42:00] volume discount price of $1 per gallon. [42:03] So, even less than they are selling to [42:05] the individual soda fountains out there [42:07] because I think this is going to be a [42:08] higher volume business. Thomas and [42:11] Whitehead will have the exclusive [42:14] assignable right to market and sell [42:18] bottled Coca-Cola for 5 cents per [42:21] bottle. Same price as at the soda [42:23] fountains across practically the entire [42:26] United States. [42:27] >> But this 5 cents per bottle, operating a [42:29] bottler is a tougher business than [42:31] operating the soda fountain in this [42:33] respect because there is one meaningful [42:35] additional cost, the bottle itself. [42:37] >> Yeah, the bottle. [laughter] You can see [42:39] why Candler was reluctant to get into [42:40] this business. Thomas and Whitehead must [42:43] use only Coca-Cola syrup. They can never [42:47] use any substitutes or competitors as [42:49] the syrup for the products that they are [42:51] selling. They cannot sell to soda [42:54] fountains. That channel will remain [42:56] directly sold by the Coca-Cola company. [42:58] And if they fail to supply enough [43:01] product to meet the demand for bottled [43:04] coke in the territories that they have [43:06] rights over, the contract will be [43:08] forfeit. The Coca-Cola company will [43:11] provide all advertising needs for the [43:14] product and maintain all control over [43:18] advertising. And that's it. There is no [43:22] term length on the [laughter] contract. [43:25] And um gosh, there's got to be something [43:27] in there about how that $1 per gallon [43:30] could change over time, right? [43:32] >> Nope. No, there is not. [43:34] >> So, the Coca-Cola company, as long as [43:38] this bottler continues to satisfy the [43:41] demand and doesn't violate any of the [43:43] other terms, is obligated to keep [43:46] selling syrup at $1 per gallon. [43:49] >> Yes. [43:50] >> To the bottler. [43:51] >> Yes. And the bottlers are obligated to [43:53] keep selling bottles to the public at 5 [43:56] cents retail cost. [43:57] >> Fascinating. [laughter] [43:59] >> So, let it be written. [44:01] >> Obviously, there are so many things [44:02] wrong with this, [laughter] [44:04] but also so many things right with this. [44:08] [gasps] This lets [snorts] [44:10] the Coca-Cola Company enter and scale [44:14] the bottle business completely [44:17] capital and investment free. They don't [44:19] have to do anything besides advertising, [44:22] which they are already doing for their [44:24] growing national business. [44:26] >> In fact, they're not doing any different [44:27] advertising. They're just amortizing the [44:29] cost of the same advertising against one [44:32] more touch point that they could have [44:33] with the customer. They're still [44:34] painting the same barns. They're still [44:36] putting up the same signs. [44:38] >> Yep. So, Thomas and Whitehead go back up [44:40] to Chattanooga. They set up the [44:43] Coca-Cola bottling company and they [44:45] start selling bottled coke for the first [44:48] time to groceries, stands and saloons as [44:53] they put it. Obviously, all three of [44:55] those are pretty big markets for [44:57] Coca-Cola today, especially the, you [45:00] know, like groceries and stands, aka gas [45:04] stations, convenience stores, etc., etc. [45:06] >> And at this point in history, in 1900, [45:08] the Coca-Cola Company is still just 20 [45:11] employees. [45:12] So they're about to get ridiculous [45:14] leverage on just a handful of people [45:17] that work at the parent company and that [45:18] includes making the syrup. It's a small [45:21] head office. High margin product, baby. [45:24] >> Yep. [45:24] >> So pretty quickly, two things happen [45:26] with uh young Thomas and Whitehead here. [45:29] One, they didn't actually know each [45:31] other very well before going into [45:32] business together. They end up getting [45:33] into a fight and splitting into two [45:36] separate companies. Remember, the [45:38] contract is assignable. They can do [45:40] whatever they want with it. So they [45:41] split up the territory across America [45:43] and they say, "Great, we're going to [45:44] assign the rights we have in this [45:46] contract with the Coca-Cola Company to [45:47] our two separate companies." And then [45:50] they both independently decide, you [45:53] know, man, actually owning and operating [45:56] these bottling operations and dealing [45:58] with the capital investment of both [46:00] setting up the production lines and then [46:02] buying the bottles and recycling them [46:04] and returning them and cleaning them, [46:06] etc. It's a kind of low margin, very [46:08] upfront, capital intensive thing to [46:11] bottle Coca-Cola [46:12] >> and operationally very intensive too. Of [46:14] course, we've realized we can just [46:16] assign the rights that we have here. [46:18] Well, why don't we keep assigning the [46:20] rights? [laughter] They start [46:22] subcontracting out little subterritories [46:25] to other entrepreneurs and small [46:27] bottling operations across the country. [46:30] And so basically overnight, first dozens [46:34] and then hundreds of local Coca-Cola [46:38] bottling operations pop up in these [46:41] entrepreneurial endeavors in basically [46:44] every town and countryside across [46:45] America [46:46] >> that have no contractual relationship [46:49] with the Coca-Cola company. They have a [46:51] relationship with this quote unquote [46:54] parent bottler, [46:55] >> either Thomas or Whitehead. [46:56] >> Yes. So Thomas and Whiteheads companies [46:59] come to be known as the parent bottlers [47:01] and then all the guys doing the actual [47:04] work come to be known as the actual [47:07] bottlers or the first line bottlers. [47:10] This is the ultimate rent seeker. I mean [47:12] Thomas and Whitehead just have like a [47:14] little toll booth set up in between the [47:17] Coca-Cola company that owns the [47:18] intellectual property and makes the [47:20] syrup and markets it and the bottlers [47:22] who are actually doing the work. And [47:24] they're just clipping little coupons as [47:26] the money flies by on the way over to [47:28] the bottlers and the Coca-Cola company. [47:30] >> But hey, Campler and Robinson weren't [47:32] going to do this. So like more power to [47:34] him, [47:34] >> right? That is the argument here is that [47:36] there is economic value from Thomas and [47:38] Whitehead and actually spurring bottling [47:40] to happen at all. [47:42] >> Yes. And they need to go find the local [47:44] bottlers and set up these entrepreneurs [47:46] and teach them how to do it. Eventually [47:48] they're doing nothing. But in the early [47:50] days, they're not doing nothing. [47:51] >> That's true. Within 10 years, they [47:53] managed to find 400 [47:56] proprietors of bottling operations, get [47:59] them to stand it up, and by 1925, there [48:01] was 1,200. So, it is a busy busy 25 [48:05] years finding all these child bottlers. [48:08] So basically this creates a second wave [48:12] of blitc scaling if you will for the [48:15] Coca-Cola company across America because [48:17] they'd already nationally expanded to [48:19] soda fountains but soda fountains are [48:21] only in towns large enough to have a [48:25] soda fountain. What about all the rural [48:27] areas of the countryside? Not to mention [48:29] just the simple market expansion of [48:31] letting people drink at home or wherever [48:33] at restaurants anywhere else. It's a [48:34] huge deal. The net of this is that [48:36] within a few years basically every [48:40] single man, woman, and child in the [48:42] United States becomes intimately aware [48:45] of and familiar with Coca-Cola and the [48:49] company doesn't have to lift a single [48:51] finger to do it. [48:52] >> Yep. This reminds me a lot of our Visa [48:54] episode where we were talking about the [48:56] difference between if you're Visa and [48:59] you're scaling as a network of networks [49:01] versus if you're MX as a closed loop [49:04] system. And we were talking about how [49:05] Visa achieved tremendous scale relative [49:08] to their head office size, their [49:10] employee headcount, and they did it in a [49:13] very short period of time. Coca-Cola is [49:15] sort of in the same thing here where [49:17] they can scale so fast because of the [49:19] bottlers where they're not actually [49:21] having to do all this work themselves. I [49:23] don't think Coca-Cola is the ubiquitous [49:26] international product that it is today [49:28] where they just created and then won the [49:30] market without this bottler scale thing. [49:35] >> No, absolutely not. If they had taken [49:38] the AMX approach and Candler had [49:41] decided, ah, you know, we're gonna enter [49:43] the bottling business ourselves and [49:45] we're gonna go market by market and [49:47] invest the capital in the production [49:49] lines and the bottles. Absolutely no way [49:53] would they have reached the critical [49:55] scale that they did in the country and [49:57] then internationally too. They use the [49:59] same model to go around the world. [50:01] >> Yep. And Coca-Cola would start referring [50:03] to this as the Coca-Cola system. I don't [50:05] think we've ever studied a business [50:07] before that has a system like this where [50:09] you can look at the Coca-Cola company, [50:11] which is ostensibly what we're doing on [50:13] this episode, but actually to understand [50:15] the scale and impact and reach of the [50:18] product, you sort of have to look at the [50:19] system holistically. the sum of the [50:22] Coca-Cola company and all the bottlers. [50:24] The crazy thing is this is still the [50:26] system today. Coca-Cola still doesn't [50:29] bottle. I mean, we can talk about the [50:31] exceptions to that, but in large part, [50:33] and their desired end state is there's [50:36] all these bottlers around the world that [50:38] they just sell syrup to. [50:40] >> Yeah. It's kind of like Microsoft and [50:42] Intel in the PC era, except even more [50:45] closely tied. It'd be like if Microsoft [50:48] had contracts with Intel where they got [50:50] to stipulate what the processes were [50:52] going to look like and what the machines [50:54] were going to look like. [50:54] >> It's funny. The thing that it made me [50:56] think of was uh it's kind of like our [50:57] Rolex episode where Rolex, you don't [51:00] want to be in the authorized dealer [51:01] business. It's operationally expensive. [51:03] The training is hard, but you do want [51:05] the control over the retail experience. [51:07] And Rolex managed to have their cake and [51:09] eat it too. Like we talked about that on [51:10] that episode where they can kind of say, [51:13] "Hey, it's a privilege to be able to [51:16] sell our watches and so you're going to [51:17] make your store conform to our exact [51:19] standard." Coca-Cola does the exact same [51:21] thing with the bottlers and they say, [51:22] "Hey, you have a license to print money. [51:24] It's not as much money as we're going to [51:25] print, but you can print some money and [51:28] you know it's going to be a good [51:28] business." [51:29] >> More than some money, the local [51:31] Coca-Cola bottlers usually become the [51:33] wealthiest family in any given town [51:36] across America. [51:37] >> Very true. But just to make sure we're [51:39] super clear, Coca-Cola versus their [51:42] bottlers, the Coca-Cola company has [51:44] higher gross margins, much better [51:46] returns on invested capital, requires [51:47] less invested capital. They get to focus [51:50] on just making syrup and marketing. They [51:52] don't have to do any of the [51:52] undifferiated stuff. You'd much rather [51:55] be Coca-Cola than the bottlers, but it's [51:56] a good business to be the bottler, too. [51:58] >> Especially if you're a small town [51:59] entrepreneur in, you know, turn of the [52:01] century America. Like, hell yeah. And if [52:04] the Coca-Cola company is going to [52:05] dictate terms to me and tell me exactly [52:07] how red my truck needs to be and that it [52:09] must say Coca-Cola in this particular [52:11] way and the bottles must come off [52:13] exactly like this, that is fine. I will [52:15] agree to all of this because I know I'm [52:18] going to make money. Yes. [52:22] So once things turbocharge with the [52:25] bottlers and scaling across America, a [52:28] lot of imitators and copycats start [52:31] popping up trying to make another cola [52:34] drink, use the same model, go to other [52:37] bottlers or maybe other aspiring [52:38] entrepreneurs who didn't get the [52:40] Coca-Cola franchise, might want to open [52:42] a competitive franchise in their local [52:43] town, etc., etc. By the mid1 1900s, [52:47] there are hundreds of Coca-Cola [52:50] competitors out there. There's Afracola, [52:53] Charcoa, Caroca, [52:55] Coca-Cola, Fig Cola, Coca-Cola, King [52:58] Cola, Standard Cola, on and on and on [53:00] and on and on. And by the way, a Cola [53:03] like what I'm holding up right now, [53:04] David, this brown flavored fizzy drink [53:06] wasn't a thing before Coca-Cola. [53:09] Coca-Cola was insistent that we aren't [53:12] the Coca variant of cola. Coca-Cola is [53:15] one thing that means our formula, our [53:17] secret formula with this mystery [53:19] merchandise 7X, which is the real crux [53:22] of the formula. And there's no other [53:24] things that can be colas because we [53:27] created the concept of Coca-Cola and we [53:29] are N of one. So in 1905, Congress [53:34] passes the Federal Trademark Act in the [53:38] United States and they federalize [53:40] trademark protection in the country. [53:42] Previously, it was just done state by [53:43] state, which I think is probably how [53:46] Coca-Cola trademarked the script logo [53:48] earlier than that. Might have just been [53:49] in Georgia. [53:50] >> Yep. [53:51] >> Of course, the Coca-Cola company is one [53:53] of the first registrants for their [53:56] trademark and they start using this new [53:58] law to sue the crap out of all the [54:01] competitors out there [54:02] >> and really winning on these grounds that [54:04] like cola isn't a category. You can't be [54:06] a something cola. It's not a general [54:08] term. We own Coca-Cola as a lockup. [54:11] >> Yes. and they succeed. So over the next [54:14] like 15 20 years, by the mid20s, it's [54:16] estimated that Coca-Cola sues and shuts [54:20] down over 7,000 [54:23] copycat cola brands [laughter] in a very [54:26] very busy legal department. And this [54:28] becomes the next critically important [54:30] pillar of building Coke. Only Coke is [54:34] the real thing. Coke is real. Everything [54:38] else is an imitator. It is a copycat. It [54:42] should not exist. [54:43] >> Yep. And there is a famous 1920 case [54:46] that went all the way to the Supreme [54:48] Court. There was a company called the [54:50] Coke Company, Ko K, that was insisting, [54:54] actually, it's worth an aside here to [54:56] say at this point in time, Coca-Cola did [54:59] not embrace the nickname Coke. One, [55:01] because of the affiliation with the [55:03] drug. And we should say by 1905, cocaine [55:06] is pretty much entirely gone. There's no [55:08] more coke in Coca-Cola. [55:10] >> Yeah, it's actually an amazing story. In [55:12] 1903, they contract with a company [55:16] called the Schaefer Alkaloid Works of [55:18] Maywood, New Jersey, [55:20] >> that has developed a process to [55:22] deccoanize cocoa leaves. And this [55:25] company, which still exists to today and [55:26] is still the sole supplier of decanized [55:29] cocoa leaves, Coca-Cola today, [55:32] >> is granted a federal exemption by the US [55:36] government from the DEA. They're the [55:38] only commercial entity in the United [55:40] States that is allowed to import coca [55:43] leaves [55:43] >> cuz they import it with cocaine in it [55:45] still, right? [55:46] >> Yes. And then they have a process to [55:48] take the cocaine out of the cocoa [55:49] leaves. They sell the decanized cocoa [55:51] leaves to Coca-Cola. And I'm pretty sure [55:53] the way that this ended up happening was [55:56] the Hoover administration said, "If [55:57] federal agents are present on site and [56:00] can supervise the destruction of the [56:02] cocaine byproduct, then you can do this [56:04] on American soil. You can import the [56:06] cocoa leaves, do this, create a giant [56:08] pile of cocaine, and then we will watch [56:10] you destroy it." And that's still how [56:12] they produce Coca-Cola. [56:13] >> Yeah. Which is also another piece of [56:16] protecting Coca-Cola. Nobody else has [56:19] access to cocoa leaves. you want that [56:20] taste, you ain't going to get it. [56:22] >> Cuz the cocoa leaves, as much as the [56:24] cocaine is gone, the cocoa leaf is still [56:25] an important part of the formula. So [56:27] anyway, there's this 1920 case where [56:30] Coke Ko ke is sort of tongue-in-cheek [56:33] saying, "What do you mean? You guys [56:34] aren't saying you're Coke, so certainly [56:36] we can be Coke." And the other point [56:38] they were making is CocaCola, you guys [56:41] can't actually even use your trademark. [56:44] It's unprotectable since there's not [56:46] really much cocoa in it and all the [56:48] cocaine's been removed. So, it's [56:49] actually misleading, [56:50] >> false advertising. [56:51] >> You're misleading the public by saying [56:54] that you are Coca or Cola. You're not. [56:57] And the Supreme Court says, "Uh-uh. We [56:59] are ruling in favor of Coca-Cola. It is [57:01] a phrase that has transcended being a [57:04] descriptive name, and it is now just a [57:07] brand." And the official ruling, which [57:09] is the stuff of legend, contains this [57:11] phrase. Coca-Cola means a single thing [57:14] coming from a single source and well [57:17] known to the community. [57:19] And that is the new description of what [57:21] the Coca-Cola brand is and why it is a [57:24] trademarkable thing that has nothing to [57:26] do with Coca or Cola. So this is the [57:30] first biggest front of the war that [57:34] Coca-Cola wages on the imitators through [57:37] the courts. [57:38] >> It goes to the Supreme Court. [57:39] >> To the Supreme Court. Amazing. The [57:42] second most important front of the [57:46] battle against the imitators is the [57:48] bottle. So Coca-Cola realizes, hey, [57:52] we're not actually in the bottling [57:53] business ourselves, [57:55] but we have full control over it. If we [58:00] really want to drive home to consumers [58:04] that CocaCola is the real thing and have [58:08] it be immediately identifiable what the [58:11] real thing is, we actually can force our [58:16] bottlers to develop and invest in a [58:19] proprietary bottle that'll become [58:22] instantly visually known to all [58:24] consumers in America and then around the [58:26] world. And this results in 1916 in the [58:30] famous proprietary bottle that you all [58:33] know today, the Ben you are drinking out [58:35] of right now, the Contour bottle, as it [58:38] is officially called or as it is then [58:40] known in the vernacular, the May West [58:43] bottle. [58:44] >> Yes. [58:44] >> Because its proportions look uh like the [58:47] famous actress May West. [58:49] >> Okay, David. So the bottle, [58:52] >> the May West bottle. [58:54] So, in 1912, the Coca-Cola Bottling [58:58] Company sent a note to all of its [59:00] members that Coca-Cola Company has this [59:02] great distinctive logo. It's highly [59:04] protected in the courts. We've got the [59:07] trademark on it, but we don't have a way [59:09] to protect our business as the bottlers. [59:13] So, the proposal is that the members all [59:15] join together to create a distinctive [59:18] package for the products. And so in [59:20] April of 1915, trustees of Coca-Cola [59:23] Bottling Association vote to develop [59:26] such a distinctive bottle. [59:27] >> Yes. And this is great. At the [59:30] convention of the bottlers, where I [59:32] think they approved this, the Coca-Cola [59:34] company's head of legal, a guy named [59:36] Howard Hirs, who was doing all these [59:38] lawsuits of the imitators across the [59:40] country. He comes with the mission of [59:43] trying to convince these bottlers that [59:46] spending this great capital expenditure [59:48] is going to be in their interest. And [59:49] this is what he says to them. We are not [59:52] building Coca-Cola alone for today. We [59:55] are building Coca-Cola forever. And it [59:57] is our hope that Coca-Cola will remain [60:00] the national drink to the end of time. [60:03] The heads of your companies are doing [60:05] everything in their power at [60:06] considerable expense to bring about a [60:09] bottle that we can adopt and call our [60:11] own child. And when that bottle is [60:14] adopted, I ask each and every member of [60:16] this convention to not consider the [60:18] immediate expense that would be involved [60:20] with changing your bottle, but to [60:22] remember this that in bringing about [60:25] that bottle, the parent companies are [60:28] bringing about an establishment of your [60:30] own rights. It's exactly what you're [60:32] saying, Ben. [60:33] >> Wow. [60:34] >> Isn't that amazing? What an oridor. [60:36] >> Help us help you. Wow. [60:40] So they create this design brief and [60:42] they send it around to 10 different [60:44] glass companies around the country that [60:46] says, "We want to develop a bottle so [60:49] distinct that you would recognize it by [60:51] feel in the dark or lying broken on the [60:55] ground." So simple. It's like, what do [60:58] you really want the product to be? And [61:01] so the root glass company of Terry Hoot, [61:04] Indiana designs the bottle that goes on [61:06] to win the contest. You all know what it [61:09] looks like. the contour bottle. [61:10] Interestingly, so it's got this sort of [61:13] wide top and then sort of a, as one of [61:15] the books put it, a snatched waist, [61:17] which is why they call it the May West [61:20] bottle. It's this Georgia green color. [61:23] >> That's right. [61:24] >> But hilariously, the first version of it [61:27] was actually much more round. [61:29] >> Yeah. It was almost like a cartoon [61:30] version of the bottle you know today. [61:32] And you might wonder why this sort of [61:34] like striated, striped, super round pod, [61:39] something got lost in translation and [61:42] the bottle was designed to look like the [61:45] cocoa plant. [laughter] [61:48] The cocoa pod that you smash open to get [61:50] out cocoa beans. This is a whole [61:52] different thing called the cocoa plant, [61:55] not the cocoa plant. Coa versus CO A. [61:59] >> Yeah, I read about this, too. But [62:02] ultimately, it satisfied the design [62:04] brief. You definitely recognize it. It's [62:06] super distinct. It's kind of beautiful [62:08] with the sort of rounded, we'll put it [62:10] in the email. All based on a [62:12] misinterpretation of what the plant [62:14] actually is, but very distinctive. [62:16] Ultimately, in 1915, the patent for the [62:19] contour bottle gets granted, actually [62:22] not referencing Coca-Cola at all because [62:24] they wanted the whole thing to be a [62:26] surprise when it hits the market. They [62:28] would then, this is some classic [62:30] Coca-Cola lawyering, get additional [62:32] patents for iterations on the design [62:34] that effectively renewed the patent all [62:36] the way from 1915 until the final one [62:39] expired in 1951. [62:42] The company then went to the patent [62:44] office and made the case that the bottle [62:46] shape was so distinctive and so [62:48] wellknown in 1951 that it should be [62:50] granted trademark status, which they [62:53] got. It is highly unusual for packaging [62:57] to be granted a trademark. And their [62:58] rationale was, look, in 1949, we [63:01] conducted a study that showed that less [63:03] than 1% of Americans could not identify [63:07] the bottle of Coke by shape alone. [63:10] >> It's an integral part of the product, [63:12] the brand. There you go. [63:13] >> Talk about a successful accomplishment [63:15] of that creative brief that all those [63:17] years later, 99% of America could look [63:20] at it and say, "That's a Coke bottle." [63:23] Amazing. So by the next year, one year [63:26] after, everybody in the extended [63:30] Coca-Cola family system is prospering [63:34] and nobody more so than the Coca-Cola [63:37] company at the top. Yes. And they had [63:40] gotten a variety of monkeys off their [63:42] back at this point. The cocaine is gone. [63:44] They've really started defending the [63:46] trademark. They've got this bottle [63:47] thing. They had another issue where [63:49] there was a federal regulator who [63:51] thought caffeine was evil. So they [63:53] appeased him by cutting the caffeine [63:55] content down by 2/3. [63:57] >> Yep. And by this point in time, the [64:00] Coca-Cola brand and what it stands for [64:03] and the beverage delicious, refreshing, [64:05] it's such a integral part of America [64:08] that taking out the cocaine, cutting the [64:11] caffeine by twothirds or by three/4ers [64:14] doesn't really impact things. The [64:16] country is still hooked on Coca-Cola. [64:17] >> In fact, it probably helps. [64:19] >> It probably helps. Yes. Makes it more of [64:20] a wholesome beverage. [64:22] >> It makes it so you can consume a lot [64:23] more Coca-Cola. [64:25] >> Okay. So, 1916, everybody's doing great. [64:28] Nobody's doing better than the Coca-Cola [64:30] Company. Asa Handler is a big man about [64:34] town in Atlanta. Probably the most [64:36] important person in town. So much so [64:39] that a group of other Atlanta citizens [64:42] convince him to run for mayor, [64:44] [laughter] [64:45] which he does, and he wins and becomes [64:48] the mayor of Atlanta in 1916. And so he [64:51] retires from Coca-Cola and gives his [64:54] Coke shares to all of his children. And [64:57] then a couple years later in 1919, [65:01] a local banker named Ernest Woodruff [65:04] puts together an investor syndicate and [65:07] basically stages a takeover of the [65:10] company and buys out the family members [65:13] for $25 million. This also effectively [65:17] serves as the IPO of the company because [65:20] it's a syndicate of investors and shares [65:22] start trading hands and the company [65:24] becomes publicly traded and uh certainly [65:27] they didn't need to raise capital [65:29] [laughter] [65:30] by going public, [65:31] >> right? And it was a complicated little [65:33] period because some of the kids did want [65:35] to have this happen, other ones didn't [65:36] want to have it happen. and there's sort [65:37] of family infighting. But ultimately [65:40] after a few years, Ernest Woodruff and [65:43] his syndicate of investors do own and [65:45] control the company. In fact, there was [65:48] some clever financial engineering that [65:50] had to happen to buy this company. Like [65:53] $25 million in 1919 is a huge amount of [65:57] money. And so, as a result, this is [65:59] actually the first time the secret [66:02] formula for Coca-Cola gets written down. [66:05] It had been sort of this cool secret [66:07] before, but as collateral for the loan [66:11] that Woodruff took out to complete this [66:13] transaction, [66:14] >> they wrote down the formula and placed [66:17] it in a vault at the Guarantee Bank of [66:20] New York [66:22] >> cuz that's where they got the capital [66:23] from. And so they get to hold the [66:25] formula as collateral. Prior to this, it [66:28] had always been verbal. The system Asa [66:30] Kandler set up was insane. So, this is [66:33] from the book Secret Formula about Asa [66:36] and his son Howard Candler. Asa made his [66:39] son memorize the contents of the various [66:42] containers that were stored carefully in [66:44] a locked room with their labels peeled [66:46] or scratched off for days with his [66:49] father standing watch over his shoulder. [66:51] Howard practiced making the ultra secret [66:53] flavoring compound merchandise number [66:56] 7X, learning to recognize the pungent [66:58] fruit and vegetable oils by sight, [67:01] smell, and remembering each was put on [67:03] the shelf when it came in from the [67:05] supplier until he knew by heart the [67:07] proper amounts and the exact order in [67:10] which to mix them. This is crazy. The [67:14] way in which this giant mass-roduced [67:16] thing is created. It's like only stored, [67:21] I believe, in two people's head at any [67:23] given time. And they deliberately kept [67:26] this a trade secret and didn't patent it [67:28] because if you patent something, [67:30] eventually it does become the property [67:32] of the public and anyone can use it to [67:34] further innovate. But Coca-Cola has kept [67:37] this secret all these years. [67:38] >> Yeah. And it's still part of the lore at [67:40] the company to this day that, oh, [67:41] there's two people that know the formula [67:43] and they can't travel together. Well, [67:46] the formula is out there. Like you can [67:48] find it on the internet. [67:50] >> Really? The Coca-Cola company would [67:51] maintain that is absolutely not true. [67:53] >> Well, the original formula is I it's in [67:55] the appendix of For God Country and [67:57] Coca-Cola, [67:58] >> which I think they also maintain is not [67:59] the right formula. I mean, I would swear [68:01] up and down, too. But yes, this is like [68:04] the best example ever though of someone [68:06] electing to use a trade secret instead [68:08] of a patent and then creating all this [68:11] lore and secrecy and myth around it. But [68:14] for six years as collateral, the first [68:17] written version of the formula was in [68:19] the Guarantee Bank of New York vault. [68:22] >> So Ernest, when he takes over, he's a [68:25] banker. He's an investor. This is like a [68:28] crown jewel investment that he could get [68:30] his hands on in Atlanta. He doesn't [68:33] really have any interest in running it. [68:35] So the company plots along for a couple [68:38] years with the existing management team. [68:41] Ernest really doesn't like this [68:42] perpetual contract thing with the parent [68:44] bottlers. [laughter] He's like, "What [68:46] are you two guys doing? I, as far as I [68:48] can tell, you're not doing anything." [68:50] He tries to get rid of that. This leads [68:52] to all sorts of lawsuits. The parent [68:54] bottlers win. Ernest is frustrated. [68:57] Finally, in 1923, he's had enough. He [69:00] decides that he's going to recruit a new [69:03] company president to come in. [69:05] >> This is just four years after he buys [69:07] it. And almost against his will, he has [69:11] to consider his son, Robert, as a [69:15] candidate. And Ernest barely approves of [69:18] this wayward son, Robert. Who is this [69:21] Robert Woodri character? He's the [69:23] protagonist of this story. I mean, for [69:25] all the John Peton lore and all the Asa [69:28] Kandler lore, Coca-Cola, as we know it [69:31] today, is Robert Woodruff's Coca-Cola. [69:34] >> The boss, as he would come to be known. [69:36] Yes. [69:37] >> So, Robert is 33 at this point in time. [69:41] He has left Atlanta to seek his fortune [69:44] away from his father's influence and he [69:46] has become the vice president of the [69:49] White Motor Company in Ohio in [69:52] Cleveland, Ohio. [69:53] >> Yep. [69:54] >> Which I think was one of, if not the [69:56] largest truck manufacturer in the US at [69:59] the time. [69:59] >> Yep. [70:00] >> And Robert is a star there. He's widely [70:04] regarded as one of the most talented [70:06] young executives in new burgeoning [70:09] corporate America here in the 20s. He's [70:11] best friends with the Major League [70:13] Baseball star Tai Cobb. They go hunting [70:16] together. He's like a man about town. [70:18] And Standard Oil of New Jersey is trying [70:22] to hire him as an air parent to come in [70:25] and potentially be the next CEO of [70:27] Standard Oil of New Jersey. And David, [70:30] do you know what Standard Oil of New [70:32] Jersey is today? [70:33] >> Uh, so right. [70:35] >> Exxon. It's Exxon Mobile. [70:36] >> Oh, Exxon. That's right. That's right. [70:38] >> I can never keep track of which breakup [70:40] company became which. So, yeah, there's [70:42] an alternative future where instead of [70:44] CEO of Koke, Robert Woodf became CEO of [70:47] Exxon. [70:48] >> Exxon. Yeah. And Robert through his own [70:52] devices, again almost against his [70:54] father's will, had been an original [70:57] investor in the syndicate that bought [70:59] out Coke from the Candlers. So the board [71:02] of Ko makes Ernest consider his son. [71:06] [laughter] Ernest finally says, "All [71:08] right, fine." His first offer to Robert [71:12] to come be the new president of [71:13] Coca-Cola is a salary less than half of [71:16] what he's making at White Motor Company. [71:19] [laughter] [71:20] Robert rejects that. They negotiate back [71:21] and forth and finally they reach a deal [71:24] with Robert saying one condition that I [71:27] absolutely must have is you dad you are [71:30] out. You are going to fully [laughter] [71:31] exit the business. Everything gets [71:34] handed over to me and I am going to have [71:36] full control and run this company. [71:39] Ernest is frustrated enough. He says, [71:40] "Okay." So, in 1923, Robert takes over [71:43] as president of the Coca-Cola Company, [71:46] becoming the youngest president of any [71:48] major corporation in America. At that [71:51] time, he would run the company for the [71:54] next 32 years as president and then [71:58] control the company as chairman of the [71:59] board for another 30 years after that [72:02] until his death in 1985. [72:05] Wild. So, one of the first moves that [72:08] Robert makes when he comes in is to [72:10] become close with the head adman at KO's [72:15] ad agency at the time, a firm in St. [72:17] Louis called the Darcy Ad Agency. And [72:20] Coca-Cola's main creative account man, a [72:24] guy named Archie Lee. Lee had already [72:28] created a hit slogan for Coca-Cola in [72:30] Christmas of 1922 with his thirst knows [72:32] no season campaign, which is, you know, [72:34] a great phrase with a great ring to it, [72:36] but was particularly good because Coke [72:40] had a legacy of primarily being enjoyed [72:42] in the summer. [72:43] >> Yeah. You drink it in the hot southern [72:46] summers of Georgia. [72:47] >> Yeah. So, they're like, wintertime is a [72:49] big opportunity for us. And this was [72:51] part of moving in on Christmas. More to [72:53] come on Christmas in a sec. And [72:55] together, Archie Lee and Robert Woodruff [72:59] make a pretty massive leap forward for [73:03] Coca-Cola advertising. And it's really [73:06] the last critical piece of the brand. [73:09] They [73:11] embrace, maybe I might even say create [73:15] lifestyle advertising. This is [73:17] everything that we talked about in the [73:18] Rolex episode, but that was much later [73:21] when Rolex did that in the 50s and 60s. [73:23] This is in the 1920s. Coca-Cola is [73:26] inventing this idea that through [73:29] advertising we can associate our [73:32] products with feelings. Oh yes. This is [73:36] the sort of opposite of the intrinsic [73:38] advertising that we were talking about [73:40] earlier. This is exttrinsic advertising. [73:42] Advertising that really has nothing to [73:44] do with the features of the product. [73:46] It's about the life you will live if you [73:49] associate with our brand. [73:51] >> Yes. Coca-Cola isn't a carbonated [73:54] sweetened soft drink with unique flavor [73:56] manufactured by the Coca-Cola Company. [73:58] Coca-Cola is happiness. Coca-Cola is [74:01] friendship. It's romance. It brings you [74:03] closer with the people you love. [74:06] [laughter] [74:08] Coca-Cola is summertime. Coca-Cola is [74:11] holidays. Coca-Cola is Christmas. [74:14] >> And whether you are in America or not in [74:16] America, Coca-Cola is America. [74:19] >> Yes. And boy, do the two of them just [74:21] turn out some bangers. So Archie [74:25] eliminates basically all verbiage from [74:30] Coca-Cola advertising except for one [74:33] simple slogan. So this is radical. Think [74:36] back to those original ad copies that we [74:38] were reading a minute ago. [74:39] >> So many words. [74:40] >> In this day and age in the 20s, there's [74:42] so many words. Everything is so [74:44] descriptive. In 1923, when Robert takes [74:47] the helm of the company, they come out [74:49] with Coca-Cola, always delightful. [74:54] Period. Four words. That's the campaign. [74:57] The next year in 1924, they do better. [74:59] Refresh yourself. [75:01] >> That's it. You don't need to say [75:03] anything more. And that was simplified [75:06] from Archie Lee's original idea for the [75:09] theme that year. Pause and refresh [75:11] yourself. He would uh [75:13] >> come back to that a couple years later [75:15] in 1929 [75:17] with the grand slam, mother of them all, [75:21] the pause that refreshes, Coca-Cola, [75:25] which is so funny cuz I know this is the [75:27] winner. The pause that refreshes is the [75:29] most successful campaign of this era. I [75:32] actually didn't hear about that at all [75:33] until doing this research. I associate [75:36] all these other campaigns delicious, [75:39] refreshing or always delightful, but god [75:43] did that take off. I mean this idea that [75:45] in your life you just need a pause and [75:48] everybody experiences that problem of [75:50] needing a pause and we are the thing [75:53] that you do during that pause. [75:54] >> Yeah, genius. [75:55] >> But by today's standards of language, [75:57] it's a little bit clooji. I think [75:59] >> I think there was a element of the [76:02] context of the time that came out in [76:04] 1929, same year as the stock market [76:06] crash. And so all through the 30s of the [76:08] depression, this idea that coke [76:11] >> is a pause away from the harsh realities [76:14] of your day-to-day existence in the [76:16] depression, a simple luxury that you can [76:19] take a pause and refresh with for only [76:22] five cents when everything around you [76:24] is, you know, going to I think it [76:26] really resonated. Yeah. [76:28] >> So, the slogans are revolutionary, [76:32] cutting out all the verbiage, all the [76:34] descriptive language. The other half of [76:37] what Archie Lee and Bob Woodruff do with [76:40] the brand is the imagery. So, Lee goes [76:44] out and he contracts with all these [76:46] famous American artists and illustrators [76:48] of the day to create these like American [76:52] lifestyle tableau for the visual aspects [76:55] of the Coke ads. Yeah, it should be like [76:58] a Coca-Cola advertisement that's as [77:01] >> idyllic as a Norman Rockwell painting, [77:03] you might say. Yes, [77:04] >> because they actually go get Norman [77:06] Rockwell [laughter] [77:09] >> along with NC Wyatt and Haden Sunloom [77:12] and like some of the greatest American [77:14] artists of the day to create what you [77:17] think of as the idyllic Americana family [77:20] life. It's all coming out of the [77:22] Coca-Cola ad department [77:24] >> and they're partnering with the most [77:27] looked up to athletes and celebrities. [77:29] You know, these athletes promoting [77:31] health. That must be part of why they're [77:34] so great at athletics. They have Carrie [77:37] Grant, Gene Harlo, just associating with [77:39] wholesomeness in Americana. [77:41] >> Archie Lee would describe the function [77:43] of the imagery aspect of the campaigns. [77:46] says, "The idea in an illustration must [77:49] hit the viewer like a shot. It ought to [77:51] force the exclamation from them, what a [77:54] peach of an idea. Not only that, but [77:56] they must remember that it was CocaCola [77:59] that was refreshing and good to drink in [78:02] the image." And so he and the Darcy [78:04] agency come up with a list of [78:06] commandments for the Coca-Cola account. [78:09] Some of them are never split the [78:11] trademark Coca-Cola on two lines. [78:14] Coca-Cola must always be together on one [78:16] line. [78:17] >> The circular sign should always carry [78:20] the phrase delicious and refreshing. You [78:23] should never refer to Coca-Cola as it is [78:26] not an impersonal pronoun. It is [78:28] Coca-Cola. And you should never use [78:30] Coca-Cola in the personal sense such as [78:33] Coca-Cola invites you to lunch or [78:35] Coca-Cola invites you to enjoy. [78:38] Coca-Cola is above that. [78:39] >> The other thing that happens in this era [78:41] is billboards. By 1930, there are now 29 [78:45] million cars on the road. So, billboards [78:48] sort of became this really valuable way [78:50] to promote the brand and lifestyle of [78:52] Coca-Cola. And Woodri, his lieutenants, [78:55] would often go around saying that what [78:57] Woodruff wants to do is make Coca-Cola [78:59] the most American thing in America. [79:02] >> [laughter] [79:03] >> Well, speaking of the most American of [79:05] things, how about the uh [79:07] commercialization of Christmas and uh [79:10] [laughter] Santa Claus? [79:14] Because in 1931, Lee and Woodruff and [79:17] the Coca-Cola crew create what I think [79:21] is unquestionably the greatest lifestyle [79:25] advertising success in human history [79:28] where they manage to associate Santa [79:31] Claus with Coca-Cola. [79:33] >> It's amazing. And really bring the [79:35] modern Santa Claus into existence [79:37] period. They sort of standardized the [79:40] concept of Santa. The one that we see [79:42] today is pretty much Coca-Cola's Santa. [79:46] >> Yes. Okay. So, what happens? KO does not [79:48] invent Santa as a, you know, common [79:51] urban legend. [79:51] >> Right. First, let's bust that myth. [79:53] >> The concept of Santa Claus existed long [79:56] before 1931 in Ko. The uh famous Night [79:59] Before Christmas poem was written in [80:01] 1823. So, it's been around for a long [80:03] time. And of course, there was St. [80:04] Nicholas. It goes back many, many [80:06] hundreds of years. And there was a very [80:08] popular Santa which was Thomas Nast's [80:11] Santa who was this sort of shorter [80:14] elflike Santa. We'll link to it in the [80:16] email that is on its way to becoming [80:19] Santa but is not the big smiley [80:22] approachable sort of redfaced cheery [80:25] jolly Santa. [80:26] >> Big fat dude. Yeah. [80:27] >> Yeah. [laughter] [80:28] >> Yeah. I mean that's the thing. You know, [80:30] you read the Night Before Christmas [80:31] poem. Santa's an elf. He's little. [80:33] >> Yes. [laughter] [80:34] >> Or he was before Coca-Cola. So in 1931, [80:38] Ko commissions the artist Haden Sunloom [80:41] to create Christmas ad imagery for [80:43] Coca-Cola featuring Santa Claus. And so [80:47] this being a Coke ad, Sunlum is like, [80:50] well, I'm going to make Santa as red as [80:52] possible and Coca-Cola Red. And then I'm [80:54] going to make him as big as possible to [80:56] get as much Coca-Cola red in the [80:59] picture. [laughter] [81:00] So he creates the first of his Coca-Cola [81:05] Santa campaigns that he would make for [81:08] the next 33 years until 1964. [81:13] And it debuts at Christmas time in a [81:16] full color advertisement in the Saturday [81:20] Evening Post and people absolutely [81:25] love it. You got to remember this is [81:27] 1931. So this is before television and [81:30] magazines had only just started to be [81:33] commonly printed in color. So before [81:36] this point in time, you couldn't really [81:39] get mass- prodduced color images out to [81:43] the public. So Santa didn't have a [81:45] color. Like nobody really thought about [81:47] what color Santa was. [81:48] >> That's right. Cuz sometimes Santa was [81:50] red, sometimes Santa was green. [81:52] >> Yep. Blue, yellow. The point is there [81:54] was no standardization. All of a sudden, [81:57] now KO's got this huge industrial [82:00] imagery machine of not only [82:02] advertisements in the Saturday Evening [82:04] Post, but all the billboards and the [82:06] signs and the point of sale merchandise, [82:08] etc., etc., etc., and they're just [82:10] plastering America with this big, [82:14] beautiful color version of Santa. [82:17] >> Which is funny cuz Pepsi also did do [82:20] some Santa illustrations, but Coke kind [82:23] of ran away with it. And it became clear [82:25] pretty early Ko is just going to own [82:26] Santa. [82:27] >> Yep. [82:28] >> David, do you know who Haden Sunlum also [82:30] created or uh created the most famous [82:33] illustration of? [82:35] >> I don't. I should know. [82:36] >> There's two. One is Quaker Oats. The [82:39] Quaker Oats man. [82:40] >> Oh yes, I did read that. [82:43] >> Which interestingly is owned by Pepsi [82:44] today. [82:45] >> Oh, we will get into Quaker Oats. [82:47] >> And the other is Aunt Jamaima. [82:50] >> Aha, I did not know that. as discussed [82:52] on our Mars episode. And this was really [82:54] the nail in the coffin for Coke being a [82:57] summer drink. I've heard that the most [82:59] Coke is now sold during the holidays, [83:01] which is amazing since it was a [83:03] refreshing thing served [83:05] >> for the hot Atlanta summers. Yeah. [83:07] >> Unbelievable. They also during this time [83:09] period get into partnerships, big giant [83:13] landmark brand partnerships. The first [83:16] of which is the Olympics. Coca-Cola was [83:20] a sponsor of the 1928 Olympics in [83:23] Amsterdam, which makes them the longest [83:26] running Olympic sponsor and at the LA28 [83:30] games that will make 100 years of [83:33] Coca-Cola partnering with the Olympics. [83:35] >> Yeah, I was going to say the 1928 games [83:37] in Amsterdam, were there any other [83:40] sponsors? Like the Olympics probably [83:41] weren't a commercial thing yet. [83:43] >> I think that's right. I think it was [83:44] really innovative. [83:45] >> Yeah, man. No Coca-Cola, no Visa. [83:48] [laughter] Right. And this predates all [83:50] the stuff that Coca-Cola did with the [83:51] World's Fair and with World Cup and with [83:54] all these other big sort of global brand [83:56] stage events. [83:57] >> Interesting. [83:58] >> The other big pillar in the ground that [84:00] Woodruff puts in in these first 10 years [84:02] is around standardization. This is when [84:04] he really throws his arms up and says, [84:05] "We're going to stop changing the [84:06] formula." And my understanding is from [84:09] that point on in 1920ish all the way [84:13] until 1985 [84:15] there was no changes to the Coca-Cola [84:18] formula. Woodruff's Coca-Cola was that [84:21] 65year [laughter] [84:23] unchanged formula. [84:25] >> Oh geez. What happened in 1985 besides [84:28] Robert Woodruff dying which is directly [84:30] related to what else happened in 1985. [84:32] >> We will get there. But it's this notion [84:34] of everything should be standardized. It [84:36] should be the formula. It should be the [84:37] marketing. It should be the packaging. [84:39] They were already in this ballpark. But [84:42] it was his idea that wherever you are [84:44] when you reach for a Coke, it should [84:46] feel the same. It should taste the same. [84:47] It should have the same temperature. And [84:49] so the spiritual thing that he does to [84:51] sort of illustrate this is he goes to [84:55] the bank in New York and says, "We are [84:57] repaying the loan. We are taking our [85:00] formula, the canonical oneofone formula, [85:03] and we are moving it to our bank, the [85:05] trust company bank in Atlanta, which [85:06] would become Sunrust, and it would sit [85:09] there for the next 86 years. [85:11] >> And is now in uh World of Coca-Cola, [85:14] right? [85:14] >> Yes. And the reason it is there, they [85:17] made this whole big parade of we're [85:19] taking it out of the bank and we're [85:20] putting it in World of Coca-Cola theme [85:23] park for lack of a better phrase. [85:24] >> The Coca-Cola version of Hershey Park. [85:26] >> Yes. That is a vault that is very meant [85:28] to be gazed upon because when they did [85:31] move it there about a decade and a half [85:32] ago, they kind of realized for a long [85:35] time to many generations, we made a big [85:37] deal of we have this secret formula and [85:40] you need to know about it. We're going [85:41] to be really loud about it, but it's [85:42] super secret so you can't see it. And [85:45] that worked and it really lived in the [85:47] public's consciousness and it had sort [85:49] of fallen out. It was an effort in 2011 [85:51] to kind of shake the public and [85:53] especially the younger generations and [85:55] say we are Coca-Cola and we have the one [85:57] secret formula and we want to bring it [85:59] back to your attention that we have [86:01] something that is super secret and worth [86:03] protecting. [86:03] >> The other thing Woodruff does in these [86:05] early years is he creates the company's [86:07] first statistical department to do [86:09] market research and to study the [86:11] business and customers sort of [86:12] quantitatively. They realized that by [86:15] this point they've basically saturated [86:17] the market of every man, woman, child in [86:20] America. Population growth is only going [86:22] to get them so far in terms of growth of [86:24] the business. So what they need to do is [86:27] they need to find ways for existing [86:29] Coca-Cola drinkers to access and drink [86:31] Coca-Cola more often. Now remember what [86:36] was Woodruff doing before he negotiated [86:38] with his dad to come to Coca-Cola? [86:41] He was at the White Motor Company and he [86:44] was being recruited by Standard Oil of [86:47] New Jersey. He's like, "Guys, we need to [86:49] get Coca-Cola into gas stations." [86:52] [laughter] [86:53] [gasps] [86:53] >> So, he decrees that gas stations is the [86:56] next major growth opportunity for the [86:58] company. We need to take that [87:00] opportunity to put a Coke in their [87:01] hands. So, they contract out a design [87:06] for a cooler because if you're going to [87:08] keep Cokes ice cold at 34 degrees in gas [87:11] stations, they need to be in a cooler. [87:13] They get a company to manufacture it and [87:15] they go around the country and install [87:18] 32,000 [87:20] Coca-Cola coolers in gas stations around [87:23] the country just in the first year. and [87:25] giant signs, right, that say Coca-Cola [87:27] sold here or drink Coca-Cola or [87:29] Coca-Cola always refreshing. [87:31] >> Yep. In the gas stations. This is the [87:34] precursor to coin operated vending [87:36] machines which they introduced in 1937. [87:40] And Coke is the first company to do [87:42] that. And someone told me in the [87:44] research that the gas station owners [87:48] absolutely loved this because a the [87:50] signs told people you can come get a [87:53] Coke here, which was a value proposition [87:54] for people, but B, just like we're [87:56] talking about, there's so much margin to [87:58] go around being the retailer of soft [88:02] drinks, especially at this time, that [88:05] they were making more money on Coke than [88:06] gas. [88:07] >> Yep. [88:08] >> So, of course, you want this. The gas is [88:10] a pure commodity. You're selling against [88:12] other gas stations in the area. This is [88:14] where you can actually make some real [88:15] margin dollars. [88:16] >> Totally. You don't make money on the [88:17] gas. You make money on the convenience [88:19] store, [laughter] [88:20] >> starting with Coke. So, [88:23] >> the other big change in operations that [88:26] Robert brings to the company is the [88:29] relationship with the bottlers. This is [88:31] part of his standardization push. A [88:34] whole bunch of bottlers are great and a [88:37] whole bunch are not. you know, there's [88:38] 1,200 independent businesses out there. [88:41] And so he goes around and at first he [88:42] starts trying to like bully and [88:44] intimidate the, shall we say, less [88:46] standardized bottlers into, you know, [88:49] meeting his maniacal quality standards. [88:52] After a while, he realizes, wait a [88:54] minute, why am I wasting my time trying [88:56] to convince these small town [88:57] entrepreneurs to do what I want? I'll [88:59] just buy them out. And so he changes [89:02] course for the Coca-Cola company and [89:03] says I'm now willing to buy and own and [89:06] operate bottlers. [89:08] >> Oh. [89:08] >> Not because I want to, but as a way to [89:11] like force standardization and clean up [89:13] underperforming bottlers. I'll buy them [89:16] out, fix them up, and then I'll resell [89:18] them to local entrepreneurs. [89:19] >> I didn't realize that started that [89:21] early. [89:22] >> Yeah, he started that in the 20s. [89:23] >> Wow. He also realizes, wait a minute, [89:26] this bottling franchising operation [89:29] works pretty well here in America. [89:31] Pretty sure we can do it overseas, too. [89:34] So during the 20s and 30s, he goes to [89:36] Europe, he goes to South America, starts [89:39] setting up international bottlers there. [89:42] Same model, local entrepreneurs, locally [89:44] owned businesses with every incentive in [89:46] the world to push Coca-Cola. [89:49] >> Yep. Now, there is still that one term [89:53] of the deal that was we will always sell [89:57] a gallon for a dollar. That starts to [90:00] become problematic with inflation. You [90:04] want the ability to change the price at [90:06] some point over several decades. And so, [90:09] it's pretty interesting to think about [90:11] the two sides of the coin of having to [90:14] sell it at $1 in perpetuity. The con is [90:19] obviously well inflation's going to [90:21] happen and so our margins are going to [90:23] get squeezed where it's just going to [90:25] cost more and more and more to make [90:27] Coca-Cola. The bet that they basically [90:30] were making is well since we can't raise [90:33] prices at all we need to scale to [90:37] amortatize all of our fixed costs and [90:39] get greater and greater economies of [90:41] scale on manufacturing. And so it sort [90:43] of forced them into this massive scale [90:46] mentality that they were already sort of [90:47] in. They wanted to be the one Coca-Cola [90:50] for the world. But this really backed [90:53] them into that strategy as you don't [90:55] have another strategy. Your economies of [90:58] scale in manufacturing need to outpace [91:01] inflation. So get going. [91:03] >> Yep. And the flip side of it is it was [91:06] also in the contract that the bottlers [91:09] had to sell to retailers at the enforced [91:12] retail price of 5 cents a Coke. [91:14] >> Right? [91:14] >> And as we get into the depression, that [91:16] becomes a huge lever against potential [91:21] competitors. [91:22] >> How's that? Because all the other [91:24] competitors who are at much smaller [91:27] scale than Coke, as the depression hits [91:30] and inflation starts running rampant, [91:32] they need to raise their prices. But [91:34] here's Coke, which is arguably a [91:36] superior product. It's certainly [91:38] superior in that its brand recognition [91:40] is much wider than any competing cola, [91:44] and Coke is cheaper. [laughter] [91:47] So, it's this amazing leverage that they [91:50] have over the market. So between the [91:54] trademark litigation, the proprietary [91:56] bottle, and now the pricing power across [92:00] the market, Coke is just steamrolling [92:04] all existing and potential competition [92:06] out there. [92:07] >> Which is so funny you say pricing power [92:09] because it's not more expensive. In [92:10] fact, it's most often far less expensive [92:12] than the competition. [92:14] >> Yes. But I think the competition was [92:16] having to hit the nickel price. Yes. to [92:18] try and compete with Coke and their [92:20] margins because they were subscale would [92:21] be much much much worse. [92:23] >> Yep. Coke can be profitable at way lower [92:26] end consumer prices than the other [92:29] subscale companies. [92:30] >> Yes. [92:31] >> It's like they actually have pricing [92:32] power that they're not using. [92:34] >> Yes. They have latent pricing power. [92:36] >> It's like more strategic to them to not [92:38] raise prices. [92:39] >> Yes. So, not good news for any [92:44] competitors out there. And they [92:46] basically all except for a small handful [92:48] get steamrolled [92:50] except for one. Pepsi, [laughter] [92:53] >> which amazingly started way back when [92:57] Coca-Cola started. [92:58] >> Yep. 1894. [93:00] And for many years, it was just one of [93:03] the other colas out there, you know, [93:05] would be competitors. Actually, I had no [93:07] idea about this till doing the research. [93:10] Pepsi tried to sell itself to Coca-Cola, [93:13] like sell its operations to Coca-Cola [93:15] three separate times over the years. [93:18] >> Three? I didn't know that. [93:20] >> Three times. [93:21] >> Wow. And Coca-Cola, you know, the [93:24] various owners over the years turned it [93:26] down three times. [93:29] >> Amazing. [93:30] >> Until the depression. And that is what [93:33] changes Pepsi's fortunes. So Coke, like [93:37] we've just been saying, is selling for a [93:39] nickel, and it's super hard for anybody [93:42] else to match it. But they had one weak [93:46] spot that they didn't quite think [93:49] through, and it was actually the [93:51] proprietary [93:53] May West Contour bottle. It was 6 and a [93:56] half ounces. That's not a lot of drink [93:59] in that bottle, especially by today's [94:01] standards. That's smaller than a mini [94:03] can. I think the mini cans are 7 and 12 [94:05] ounces today. [94:06] >> Let's see. I got one right here. The [94:07] mini cans very popular today. That's [94:09] been a shift. 7 and a half. Yeah, it's [94:12] crazy. The original bottles were smaller [94:14] than this. [94:15] >> 6 and a half ounces. Very small. So even [94:18] though they were a nickel, you weren't [94:19] getting a lot of refreshment [laughter] [94:22] in that bottle. In 1934, Pepsi, in [94:28] almost a lastditch effort to try and [94:30] just do something to stay alive and save [94:33] the company, tests [94:36] using recycled beer bottles, which are [94:39] 12 oz bottles, [94:41] >> to sell Pepsi, also for a nickel. [94:45] >> And when you say save the company, just [94:47] before you go on, this is not new to [94:49] Pepsi. The Pepsi that exists today is [94:53] like four Pepsis later from the Pepsi [94:56] that was started around the same time [94:57] Coca-Cola was. Coca-Cola's been [94:59] approximately one company all the way [95:01] through. Pepsi's been bankrupt two, [95:03] three times and sold to new owners and [95:05] completely new company started with the [95:08] word Pepsi in it. This has been a rocky [95:10] road for them. [95:11] >> Yes. But this is when it's fortune's [95:14] turn. So 1934 they start selling Pepsi [95:18] in 12 ounce recycled beer bottles. Now [95:21] they still have the same pricing [95:24] pressure, you know, and margin pressure [95:26] from Coke selling in a nickel. But it [95:28] turns out if you look at the unit [95:30] drivers of margins on beverages, [95:33] >> oh there's two expenses. There's sugar [95:34] and there's the bottle. And then [95:36] everything else is approximately free. [95:38] So, the amount of liquid in the bottle, [95:41] like you said, Ben, is approximately [95:42] free. Whether you're serving 6 ounces of [95:45] liquid per bottle or 12 ounces of liquid [95:47] per bottle or later 64 ounces of liquid [95:50] per bottle. Yeah. [95:51] >> Not going to impact your margins that [95:53] much. And hey, oh, by the way, there's a [95:55] lot of existing 12 beer bottles out [95:58] there that we can buy up super cheap and [96:01] put our Pepsi in. Pepsi starts selling [96:04] 12 ounce bottles also for a nickel. [96:08] Their cost structure just declined [96:10] because they can get the recycled beer [96:12] bottles. Didn't impact their margins by [96:14] putting more liquid in there. And now [96:16] they've got a really compelling consumer [96:19] value proposition during the depression. [96:22] Twice as much cola for the same price. [96:25] >> Yep. And that is the first real punch [96:29] that anyone's been able to land on [96:31] Coca-Cola. Yep. This is textbook [96:34] counterpositioning. Coca-Cola cannot [96:37] respond because they and their bottlers [96:41] have just invested all of this capital [96:43] and all of this IP into the 6 and 12 [96:47] ounce Contour bottle. They can't react. [96:50] >> Yeah, it's genius. [96:52] >> Truly genius. I mean, it was like back [96:54] against the wall genius, but genius. [96:56] >> Now, it doesn't do much for Pepsi's [96:58] brand. They're very obviously saying [96:59] like pick us because of quantity, not [97:01] because we are the more delicious or [97:03] better or more prestigious beverage. And [97:05] I think this decision, while it kept [97:07] them alive, was sort of a hangover that [97:11] they would have for the next 80 years of [97:13] this like, yeah, we're not as good. [97:16] We're not [97:17] >> the best flavor, but like [97:19] >> we're also here and you can get a lot of [97:21] us for cheap. [97:22] >> Well, are they the best flavor? Are they [97:23] not? We'll come back to that. [97:24] >> Well, that's all subjective. There's a [97:26] discount promise to the brand. [97:28] >> Yes. [97:29] >> Which in 1934 [97:30] is kind of all that matters with [97:33] consumers. [97:33] >> Went over real well. Yeah. [97:35] >> So Coke can't fight them on the amount [97:37] of liquid in the bottle cuz they're [97:39] locked into the 6 1/2 ounce [97:41] >> and they don't want to cheapen their [97:42] brand. [97:43] >> So instead they pull out another uh you [97:46] know arrow in their quiver to fire [97:48] against competitors. They sue Pepsi for [97:52] trademark infringement. Pepsi Cola. You [97:54] can't use the word cola. We have [97:55] trademarked the word cola. So in this [97:58] court process, the president of Pepsi at [98:01] the time, a guy named Walter Mack, ends [98:04] up discovering that Coca-Cola had [98:08] illegally bribed and intimidated another [98:13] cola competitor out there into shutting [98:15] down. They paid a bribe to the company [98:18] owner to just shut down rather than [98:21] going through a litigation. Mack brings [98:25] this evidence to the court where [98:27] Coca-Cola is suing Pepsi for trademark [98:29] infringement. Bob Woodruff immediately [98:32] calls him up and requests a meeting. Bob [98:35] comes up to New York, sits down with [98:37] Mac, and he's like, "Hey, this is all a [98:41] big misunderstanding. [laughter] You [98:43] know, I'm a good southern gentleman. Uh, [98:46] I don't know anything about this, but [98:47] you know what? Why don't we just settle [98:52] all of this trademark stuff? [98:54] >> You can still use the word cola. Is that [98:57] what he's offering him? [98:58] >> Yeah. The outcome of this is that Pepsi [99:00] Cola becomes the only Coke competitor [99:04] that is allowed to use the word cola [99:06] legally at this point in time, [99:07] >> which destroys any precedent of [99:10] Coca-Cola protecting cola. It means they [99:12] are forever giving up their argument in [99:14] the courts that we own cola as a part of [99:17] our trademark. Woodruff apparently uh [99:20] despite this consiliation hadn't learned [99:23] his lesson and was still not above [99:24] trying to bribe his competitors. He [99:26] tries to bribe Mac by saying like, you [99:29] know, do you really want to be running [99:30] this Pepsi thing? I'm still great [99:33] buddies with the White Motor folks. I [99:35] think you would make a great president [99:37] of White Motors. I would really love to [99:39] recommend you for that job. And Walter [99:42] Max's like, absolutely not. I'm keeping [99:44] Pepsi. Thank you for settling the [99:45] trademark litigation. [laughter] [99:47] And doesn't Coca-Cola's general counsel [99:49] quit over this, too? [99:51] >> Yes. Yes, that's right. [99:52] >> I think the idea is like, come on, we [99:53] got to fight this. We can't just like be [99:55] giving up our trademarks. [99:56] >> Yes. [99:57] >> But Woodri, this is one of the few times [99:59] where I feel like he put an idealistic [100:02] approach aside and said, "We got to be [100:04] pragmatic here. We got to settle with [100:05] these guys." [100:06] >> So, the result of this is that Pepsi [100:08] becomes Coke's first real legitimate [100:12] competitor. And by August 1941, so it's [100:15] at six, seven years later, colas that [100:18] are not Coca-Cola, have 14% [100:22] of the US soft drink market share. The [100:25] majority of which is Pepsi. [100:29] It's a major chicken in the arm. It's [100:30] basically 100% Coke before this [100:33] happened. And Pepsi establishes a pretty [100:37] meaningful foothold. [100:38] >> Yep. So, you know, on the one hand, this [100:42] is a real uh bad thing for the Coca-Cola [100:44] company. They went from having [100:46] essentially a monopoly on the market to [100:49] letting a real legitimate competitor get [100:52] established in the US. But [100:56] [laughter] [100:57] a really, really good thing is also [101:00] about to happen to the Coca-Cola Company [101:03] that makes the US market itself one of [101:07] many, shall we say, and that is World [101:10] War II. [101:11] >> Okay, David. World War II. [101:13] >> All right. [101:14] >> Gee, how did Coke end up all over the [101:17] world? Hm. So, remember we said a minute [101:21] ago that Woodruff had set up [101:23] international bottlers in the 20s and [101:25] 30s before World War II, but none of it [101:28] was very big yet. By the time America [101:30] enters World War II in 1941, Coke at [101:33] this point has already been around for [101:35] 55 years and has already established [101:38] itself as like a quintessential part of [101:40] America. So the military and the US [101:43] government realize, [101:45] hey, coke may actually be one of [101:48] America's best weapons in this war. I [101:51] mean, one, it's a symbol of home and [101:55] something for the troops morale they can [101:57] keep fighting for abroad all across the [101:59] world. And two, what greater symbol of [102:03] American prosperity to bring and plant [102:06] seeds of all around the world than [102:08] Coca-Cola? It's our perfect, you know, [102:10] cultural ambassador product here. [102:12] >> Yeah. Whether the rest of the world [102:13] looked at it that way, TBD, but I'm sure [102:16] the US government looked at it as like a [102:17] great ambassador of our values. [102:19] >> And however people around the world saw [102:21] it at the time, one way or another, they [102:23] ended up drinking Coca-Cola. [102:25] >> Yep. [102:25] >> So, first at the outset of the war, the [102:29] US introduces sugar rationing. Coca-Cola [102:33] immediately lobbies the government for [102:34] an exemption. and they produce [102:37] supporting evidence like this letter [102:38] from a military supply officer. Very few [102:41] people have ever stopped to consider the [102:43] great part that Coca-Cola plays in the [102:45] building and maintaining of morale among [102:47] military personnel. Frankly speaking, we [102:50] would be at a loss to find anything as [102:53] satisfying and refreshing a beverage to [102:55] replace Coca-Cola. In our opinion, [102:58] Coca-Cola could be classified as one of [103:00] the essential moraleb building products [103:02] for the boys in the service. [103:04] >> Which is interesting because what Coke [103:06] doesn't win is an exemption on the sugar [103:08] rationing. What they do win is they get [103:11] to supply Coca-Cola free of rations to [103:14] the military and they just get to take a [103:17] really broad lens on what to the [103:19] military means. I believe the way it [103:23] ends up coming down is technically yes [103:26] what you said Ben but it applies to any [103:30] bottler that serves retailers that are [103:35] located near a military base regardless [103:37] of whether that bottler also serves [103:39] civilian customers. [laughter] So for [103:42] large portions of the US, yeah, they can [103:44] still get full sugar Coca-Cola during [103:46] the war. [103:47] >> Wow. None of Coca-Cola's competitors, [103:50] including Pepsi, get anything like this. [103:52] >> This was a big legal battle. Pepsi was [103:54] basically saying, "Hey, you can't just [103:56] say this supplier gets an exemption by [103:58] name. You have to say like colas do." [104:00] And the response back from the [104:02] government was basically like, "Sorry, [104:03] Coca-Cola is about as American as it [104:05] gets. And that's what we need right now. [104:07] And that's what our our boys are [104:09] requesting, including General, soon to [104:12] be President Eisenhower." [104:14] >> Oh, yeah. He's a Cokeman. So, the [104:16] military under Eisenhower grants [104:20] Coca-Cola employees quote unquote [104:23] technical observer status, meaning that [104:26] they can participate in the supply and [104:29] infrastructure buildout of the military [104:31] around the world just the same as [104:33] military infrastructure people. This is [104:36] unbelievable. So, as the American [104:38] military is like advancing in the global [104:41] theater all around the world, Coca-Cola [104:43] is right there with them setting up [104:45] bottling plants and production lines to [104:49] supply the troops [104:50] >> and documenting the absolute crap out of [104:52] it to use in their advertising. [104:54] >> Yes. So, Robert Woodriuff, 1941, comes [104:58] right out and pledges that anywhere [105:01] where an American soldier is fighting [105:03] the war, they will be able to get a [105:05] Coca-Cola and they'll be able to get [105:07] that for 5 cents. Yep. There are these [105:09] just unbelievable quotes from American [105:14] GIS during the war that are in forgot [105:16] country and Coca-Cola. There's two of [105:18] them I picked out here. One, I always [105:20] thought Coca-Cola was a wonderful drink. [105:22] But on an island where few Americans [105:24] have ever set foot, it is a godsend. I [105:27] can truthfully say that I haven't seen [105:29] smiles spread over a bunch of boys faces [105:32] as they did when they saw Coca-Cola in [105:34] this god-forsaken place. [105:36] >> Wow. [105:36] >> And then, if anyone were to ask us what [105:39] we are fighting for, we think half of us [105:42] would answer the right to buy Coca-Cola. [105:44] Again, these are actual quotes from [105:46] letters from American GIS during the [105:49] war. [105:49] >> It's unbelievable. And supply them. They [105:52] did. 1941 to 1945, 64 portable bottling [105:56] plants were sent to Asia, Europe, and [105:58] North Africa. And the best estimates are [106:01] that more than 5 billion bottles were [106:03] distributed to troops during the war. [106:05] >> Wow. I saw an estimate that it was 10 [106:07] billion. [106:08] >> Wow. which of course the US government [106:11] loves just as much as it loved it during [106:14] the war because what better symbol of [106:17] America to have left behind in all these [106:20] countries around the world than [106:21] Coca-Cola. [106:22] >> Yep. [106:22] >> So Coca-Cola internally ends up calling [106:26] the war effort quote the greatest [106:29] sampling program in the history of the [106:31] world. And they estimate that the war [106:34] effort opened up markets abroad for [106:37] Coca-Cola that otherwise would have [106:39] taken 25 years and untold millions of [106:42] dollars of investment to open. Wow. To [106:46] say it accelerated CO's international [106:47] roll out is like understatement of the [106:49] century. That's international. But then [106:51] back home it really cemented Coke as [106:54] this is apple pie in a bottle. All the [106:56] servicemen coming home, Coke was the [106:58] treat that you could get when you were [107:00] at war. You better believe they're Coke [107:02] drinkers for life now. They're not [107:03] switching brands. [107:04] >> So after the war in 1950, a third of [107:07] CO's profits are already coming from [107:10] abroad from all these that they got set [107:13] up. [107:14] >> And Time magazine features Coca-Cola on [107:18] the cover of Time magazine. Have you [107:19] seen this? [107:20] >> Oh, wasn't it the first product ever on [107:22] the cover of the magazine? [107:24] >> It might have been. I'm not sure about [107:25] that, but have you seen what the image [107:26] is? [107:26] >> No. It's a painting, like an oil [107:29] painting, of an anthropomorphized [107:32] red Coca-Cola disc with arms and a face, [107:34] and it is larger than the Earth. And it [107:38] is sitting behind the Earth, reaching [107:40] around and feeding the smiling Earth a [107:44] bottle of Coca-Cola. [laughter] [107:46] And the caption on the cover of Time [107:48] magazine says, "World and friend." [107:52] [laughter] The implication being that [107:53] Coca-Cola is a friend to the world. [107:55] >> Wow. Crazy, right? [107:57] >> So, it's funny. Before World War II, [108:00] there was a presence for Coca-Cola in [108:03] pre-Nazi Germany. [108:05] >> Oh, yes. I know what story you're about [108:06] to tell. [108:07] >> As you can imagine, it became difficult [108:09] to supply Nazi Germany with American [108:11] Coca-Cola during the war. Since those [108:14] factories, German Coca-Cola factories, [108:18] lost touch with the mother ship and all [108:20] the ingredients that they would need to [108:21] source, they found [snorts] alternate [108:24] ingredients and made kind of like a [108:26] crappier knockoff drink that they could [108:29] make with the supplies they had. [108:31] >> Yep. [108:32] >> That drink is Fanta. [108:35] >> Yep. [laughter] [108:37] Yeah. Fanta, owned by Coca-Cola, was the [108:40] uh brainchild of Nazi Germany Coca-Cola [108:45] bottling entrepreneurs, [108:47] >> who lost access temporarily to the real [108:50] thing and did that instead. They would [108:52] change the formula and they would launch [108:53] it in the US later in 1960. But Fanta [108:55] has its origins as we can't get real [108:58] Coca-Cola in Germany during World War [109:00] II, so this is what we're making. Name [109:02] and all, Fanta is the name they came up [109:04] with. [109:04] >> Yeah. Parts of history that most people [109:06] don't know. Don't you want a Fanta [109:08] Fanta? [109:09] >> Yeah. [laughter] [109:10] [gasps] The thing that happens post war, [109:12] just because we've planted this seed [109:14] elsewhere to follow it through, 1945 is [109:16] the year that Coca-Cola officially [109:18] embraces Coke and trademarks it. And [109:21] from here on out, they actually do start [109:23] referring to it as Coke in the [109:24] advertising. [109:25] >> Yep. So, coming out of the war, [109:29] Coca-Cola's business, at least had never [109:32] been better. The brand domestically has [109:35] regained any of the ground that it lost [109:37] to Pepsi during the depression. [109:39] Internationally, they've just [109:41] accelerated 25 years worth of market [109:44] development into four and are basically [109:48] like part of US government policy during [109:51] the Cold War to keep Coca-Cola flowing [109:54] into countries around the world. For [109:57] Pepsi, things are not as bright after [110:00] the war. They didn't have any of the [110:02] benefits that Coke had. And so once [110:05] again, they find themselves in a [110:06] position of backs against the wall. Need [110:09] to do something different here. So, [110:12] right at the end of the 1940s, [110:14] they poach a Coca-Cola executive named [110:19] Alfred Steel. He does the unthinkable [110:22] for a Cokeman. He defects to Pepsi, the [110:27] inferior imitator. [110:29] >> That's how they refer to it. In internal [110:31] communications, they don't write Pepsi. [110:32] They say the imitator. [110:33] >> The imitator. So, Steel had been an [110:37] adman at the Darcy agency and then he [110:40] moved to Coke and joined Coke in-house. [110:43] Basically, as soon as he gets to Pepsi, [110:46] Steel stages a coup and kicks out Walter [110:48] Mack, who had been running Pepsi for [110:50] like the last 20 years. He shoves him [110:52] out and Steel becomes the new president [110:54] of Pepsi. He's uh quite the maverick, [110:58] shall we say. There are just some [111:00] hilarious quotes from him about his uh [111:02] management philosophy. One example, [111:05] quote, "The whole trick in hiring [111:07] executives is to find a good man and [111:10] turn him into a prick. [laughter] A good [111:12] man will be able to stand the course, [111:14] but if the guy was a prick to begin [111:16] with, he'll crumble along the way." [111:18] [laughter] [111:19] And then I don't care if the consumer [111:21] wants carbonated sweat in a goat skin [111:23] pouch. If so, this side of the room go [111:26] looking for goats and that side start [111:28] running fiercely in place. [laughter] [111:34] This is Alfred Steel. [laughter] [111:37] [gasps] [111:38] And not only does he turn around Pepsi's [111:41] fortunes, [111:43] I think Pepsi really becomes the more [111:46] interesting company than Coke for at [111:49] least the next, call it 30, 40 years [111:51] here after World War II. Coke has had [111:55] this incredible success on the back of [111:58] the war, but they're also pretty fat and [112:01] happy. They're not interested in rocking [112:03] the boat, shall we say. Steel clearly [112:06] doesn't give a crap [laughter] about [112:07] tradition or history or anything. [112:10] >> Nothing to lose. [112:11] >> So Steel when he gets to Pepsi says, [112:14] "All right, we're going to do three [112:17] radical things." So, one, this was [112:21] started by Walter Mack before steel got [112:23] there, but he continues it. We are going [112:26] to market our product to black [112:28] Americans. [112:30] >> This was radical probably for any major [112:35] consumer industry at the time. We are [112:37] going to hire an all black sales team [112:39] that is going to target black retail [112:41] outlets for Pepsi. We are going to run [112:44] marketing campaigns specifically [112:45] targeted at the black community with [112:47] black celebrities. [112:49] Not only was this radical for any brand [112:51] at the time, it was especially radical [112:54] for the soft drink industry because Coke [112:56] was not doing anything close to this. In [112:58] fact, Robert Woodruff was openly [113:01] supporting segregationist politicians [113:03] during this time. So, this is a huge [113:06] opportunity for Pepsi. [113:07] >> And Woodri would later radically flip on [113:10] that, right? [113:10] >> Yes. [113:11] >> Wasn't he a big part of with Mayor [113:13] Hart's field of desegregating a lot of [113:16] stuff in Atlanta? I mean, he he [113:18] eventually really came around, but [113:20] >> during the 40s, definitely not. [113:23] >> This was a big area for Pepsi to make [113:25] inroads. [113:27] >> There's also an element of geography [113:28] here, too. I mean, Coca-Cola is [113:31] Atlanta's biggest company, is [113:33] traditional southern company, whereas [113:36] Pepsi's based in New York. Okay, so [113:38] that's one. two steel decides. We're [113:41] gonna start appealing to this early [113:45] trend that I see happening in post-war [113:49] 1950s America of diet fads. We're going [113:54] to position Pepsi as the lighter drink [113:56] versus Coca-Cola. It will refresh [114:00] without filling. [laughter] [114:02] Now, how much of this is actually true [114:03] in terms of calories? [114:04] >> Which is funny because I think it's [114:05] actually even sweeter. It may have even [114:07] more sugar than Coke does. [114:09] >> Well, this is back in the days before [114:11] sugar is vilified. You know, sugar is [114:14] okay. Fat is bad. Calories are bad. [114:16] >> But I mean, the only calories in soda [114:20] come from the carbohydrate macronutrient [114:24] and specifically from sugar. And so [114:26] there's a direct relationship between [114:28] sugar and calories. [114:29] >> [laughter] [114:30] >> you're assuming that uh consumers back [114:32] in the 40s and 50s were thoughtful about [114:35] such things. [114:36] >> That's true. It's a great point. [114:37] >> Yeah. Regardless of any veracity to it, [114:41] they start directly trying to appeal to [114:43] the light market. And then third, and [114:47] maybe most importantly, we are going to [114:50] wholeheartedly embrace a revolutionary [114:54] new advertising medium and technology, [114:58] television, and we're going to use it to [115:01] target the youth of America. So, this is [115:04] crazy. Pepsi [115:07] discovers James Dean. You like the actor [115:10] James Dean? Really? Yep. His very first [115:14] acting job is in a 19 either 49 or 50 [115:19] Pepsi commercial. [115:20] >> Wow. I had no idea. [115:21] >> This ultimately would morph into like [115:23] the Pepsi Generation ads later and then [115:25] the choice of a new generation, [115:26] generation next. All the Pepsi marketing [115:28] for the next 30, 40, 50 years of like we [115:32] are for the young people, we're for the [115:33] next generation. It all starts with TV [115:36] and Alfred Steel in the 1950s. [115:39] So all three of these things work pretty [115:43] fantastically well. [laughter] [115:46] In addition to Steel also bringing over [115:48] just generally better operational [115:50] practices to Pepsi from Coke. He knows [115:52] what a real professional operation is [115:54] like. He brings standardization and [115:56] tighter controls over the bottlers [115:58] >> because Pepsi had a similar or today [116:00] even still has a similar bottling [116:02] system, right? Where they have bottlers [116:04] outside the company. [116:05] >> Yes. But Pepsi, at least until this [116:07] point in time, never had anywhere near [116:10] the same kind of uh operational [116:12] excellence you would call it today as [116:13] Coca-Cola. I mean, remember back to the [116:15] 12 oouncez bottles, they were using [116:17] recycled beer bottles. [laughter] [116:19] They're putting Pepsi in beer bottles. [116:21] >> Fair. [116:22] >> That's what Steel's working with here [116:23] when he [laughter] gets to Pepsi. [116:26] >> So, on the back of this, Pepsi's US [116:29] market share jumps pretty [116:32] astronomically. It's in the low 20s in [116:35] the early 1950s. By 1955, it's 35% of [116:40] domestic market share in America. [116:42] >> And basically all of that is coming at [116:45] the expense of Coke. I mean, Coke is [116:47] still this beloved American brand. But [116:50] with these three things that Steel is [116:53] doing, like he starts getting a [116:55] significant amount of the market. I [116:56] mean, KO's not targeting black people. [116:58] KO hasn't embraced television yet. And [117:01] Coke hasn't even thought hasn't even [117:03] crossed their minds about anything diet [117:06] yet. [117:07] >> It's true. And they're starting to be [117:08] thought of a little bit. I mean, this [117:09] would happen much more in the 70s and [117:11] 80s, but they're starting to be thought [117:12] of a little bit as the soda for your [117:14] parents, not our soda. The cool new [117:16] soda, [117:17] >> not the choice of a new generation. [117:19] >> That's right. [laughter] [117:21] >> So, by the mid-50s, Woodruff back at [117:23] Coke is finally like, "All right, got to [117:26] respond. We need to make a radical move [117:28] of our own." He switches KO's ad agency [117:32] from Darcy, you know, RT Lee, the whole [117:35] legacy of everything that they built [117:37] from the 20s, 30s through the war to [117:41] Macan Ericson, [117:42] >> the most premium ad agency in America. [117:45] >> Yep. And one of the first things, [117:48] [laughter] this is incredible, I found [117:49] in the research that Macan does when it [117:52] comes on board with the KO account is it [117:55] starts conducting scientific market [117:57] research. And one of the first things [117:59] they do is they run a blind taste test [118:05] between Coke and Pepsi. [118:07] >> No way. Coke runs this first internally. [118:10] >> Coke runs this first in the late 1950s [118:13] or Macan does for Coke. And guess what [118:15] they find? [118:16] >> That people prefer Pepsi. [laughter] [118:18] Consumers, when presented with the two [118:22] drinks, Coke and Pepsi, in a blind taste [118:24] test, a statistically significant number [118:27] of people prefer the taste of Pepsi. [118:31] >> Wow. [118:31] >> I'm pretty sure Pepsi doesn't even know [118:33] this yet. [laughter] [118:34] >> So, Macan comes in, they've just won the [118:36] account. They think this is, oh, we [118:38] found this like really, really important [118:40] thing. They come, they present it to [118:42] Woodruff. They present the findings and [118:43] his response is, "Do not ever share this [118:48] with anyone and do not ever run this [118:51] test again." [laughter] [118:56] Ah, for Ko and Bob Woodruff, would that [119:01] that would have stayed the case. [119:03] [laughter] [119:04] >> It's crazy that it really doesn't bite [119:06] him for 30 years. [119:08] >> Yeah. another well 20 years after this. [119:10] For the moment, Macan does a bunch of [119:12] things. One, right away they respond to [119:16] Pepsi in television. They say, "Hey, we [119:18] got to take TV way more seriously. This [119:21] is not just the future. This is the [119:23] present." [119:23] >> Is this uh things go better with Coke? [119:26] >> Yep. They start doing TV campaigns, [119:29] jingles. Coke starts sponsoring the [119:31] Mickey Mouse Club show starting in 1955. [119:34] Ultimately, [119:36] what McCann decides, they say, "We need [119:39] to unify our marketing collateral AND [119:43] MESSAGING ACROSS ALL OF Coca-Cola's [119:46] channels. We can't be having different [119:49] messaging and different imagery for TV [119:52] and for point of sale and for newspapers [119:54] and magazines or for our radio ads. The [119:57] idea is we need to have one Coca-Cola [120:00] site, sound, and sell. It's all the same [120:03] integrated campaigns. The first of which [120:05] is the things go better with coke [120:06] campaign in the early 60s. [120:08] >> I see. [120:09] >> And then two, as we get into the back [120:11] half of the 50s and the early 60s, we're [120:13] now in the civil rights movement. They [120:15] convince Woodruff and the company like, [120:17] "Hey, you can't ignore the black America [120:20] market. You need to market to black [120:22] Americans, too." So, they start running [120:24] ads with prominent black athletes like [120:26] Jesse Owens and Satchel Page. And this [120:29] is fun. Remember, we learned from Jesse [120:30] Cole in our Savannah Bananas [120:32] conversation that the Harlem Globe [120:34] Troters should have become the NBA. At [120:36] this point in time, they were like the [120:38] big basketball product in America. So, [120:40] yeah, co-sponsors, the Globe Troters, [120:42] >> and they had started a little bit before [120:43] that with Willie Mays in 1952, too. [120:46] >> And then the last thing McCann convinces [120:48] Woodruff of is, hey, we need to take [120:51] this diet thing seriously. [laughter] [120:53] So in 1962, they finally appealed to the [120:57] diet market by launching Tab, [laughter] [121:03] which is their new diet drink product [121:04] that they had considered naming Diet [121:08] Coke, but Bob Woodruff rejected it. Now, [121:12] the given reason is supposedly he says [121:14] if God had wanted Coca-Cola to have [121:16] saccharine in it, he would have made it [121:17] that way in the first place. [121:19] >> There is one Coke. You don't want to [121:22] mess with the one and only Coca-Cola. [121:25] >> That is the stated reason. I heard [121:27] rumors in the research. I couldn't [121:28] confirm this, but I heard rumors that [121:31] apparently the Thomas company, which is [121:34] one of the two parent bottler [121:36] organizations, remember back to the [121:38] perpetual contract and the parent [121:39] bottlers and all that. Supposedly, [121:43] they ended up with the rights to have a [121:46] 10 cent royalty [121:49] per beverage on any other products that [121:54] the Coca-Cola company launched that [121:56] carried the Coca-Cola name. [121:58] >> And supposedly that is actually the real [122:01] reason why they didn't call Tab Diet [122:03] Coke. Whatever the reason, they launched [122:05] Tab in 1962. [122:07] >> They want to dip their toe in the water. [122:08] They're not willing to go all in yet. [122:10] They're not willing to lend the brand [122:11] that's been built over the last 80 years [122:14] to [122:15] >> a fad diet product. [122:16] >> Yes, exactly. [122:18] >> Meanwhile, by that point in time, Pepsi [122:20] had launched Diet Pepsi [laughter] and [122:23] uh was doing quite well with that. [122:24] >> Also, I got to listeners, we'll put a [122:27] link in the show notes to this. There is [122:29] an astonishing ad for Tab. [122:32] >> Oh man, you sent this to me this morning [122:34] and I was like, I cannot believe this is [122:37] for real. The entire ad is a man sort of [122:40] like learing down kind of creepily at [122:44] this woman practicing tennis in a tennis [122:46] skirt and it's this jolly sort of almost [122:51] haunting jingle and the words are have a [122:54] shape he can't forget. Tab is a taste to [122:57] remember for a shape he can't forget. [123:00] When you can't be with him be in his [123:02] mind be a mind sticker. Don't you want [123:05] to have a good shape? He wants you to [123:07] have a good shape. Why don't you keep [123:09] your shape in shape? It's great to have [123:11] a good shape. Enjoy tab and keep your [123:14] shape in shape. [123:16] >> The 1960s. [123:17] >> Yeah. But dude, they knew in the 1960s, [123:22] 40 years before obesity sort of started [123:25] becoming a conversation, that full sugar [123:28] sodas were not good for your shape. [123:32] [laughter and gasps] [123:33] >> We'll leave it at that. [123:34] >> Yes. [123:36] Yeah. So, you know, they do enter the [123:38] diet market, [123:39] >> but the diet market becomes real and [123:42] enduring from this point forward. Tab [123:44] quickly becomes the bestselling diet [123:46] soda in America, I think in the world, [123:48] and stays that way all the way up until [123:51] they release Diet Coke, which we'll talk [123:52] about in a little bit. [123:53] >> Yep. [123:54] >> Tab. [123:56] Uh, recently killed actually. [123:58] >> Yeah. [123:59] >> It was one of the brands that they [124:00] sunset a couple years ago. [124:01] >> Oh, did they only kill it in 2020? I [124:03] thought it was before then. [124:04] >> Yeah. when they winnowed from like 600 [124:07] brands to 200 in 2020, that was one of [124:09] the ones that caught the axe. [124:11] >> Interesting. There's one more thing [124:13] though that Coca-Cola does in response [124:15] to this insurgent Pepsi challenge, shall [124:18] we say, in the uh 50s and 60s. [124:21] McDonald's. [124:22] >> Yes, [124:23] >> I know you have the story on this one. [124:25] >> Yeah. So, this is actually something [124:27] more that McDonald's does and less [124:29] something that Coca-Cola does. But boy, [124:31] does it become important to Coca-Cola [124:32] fast. To illustrate it, if we flash all [124:34] the way forward to today, there's a [124:36] Coca-Cola executive on the website whose [124:40] entire job is the McDonald's division of [124:44] the Coca-Cola Company. There is no other [124:46] division dedicated to a company like [124:49] this. So what happens is Ray Croc in [124:53] 1955, one of the first things he does [124:55] when he gets the expansion rights to [124:58] expand McDonald's is to look for a [125:00] beverage supplier for this new Illinois [125:03] location that he is opening. And he [125:06] calls up Coca-Cola and does a handshake [125:10] deal, meets in person, and does a [125:12] handshake deal with Wadi Pratt, who ran [125:14] KO's fountain division. And from that [125:17] point forward, for like 40 years, they [125:20] built this deeply entrenched [125:22] relationship purely on a handshake deal. [125:26] >> Wow. There's no contract, no term. [125:29] >> No. And I'm sure there is today, but for [125:31] a long time, it was McDonald's isn't [125:33] going to bid it out like everyone else [125:35] always does, and they're going to get [125:37] like amazing preferential treatment. And [125:39] here's some of the preferential [125:40] treatment that they get. Have you ever [125:42] heard, David, that Coke tastes better [125:46] when you get it from McDonald's? [125:48] >> No, but I would believe it. [125:51] >> This is like a big thing. People like [125:52] insist that I prefer to swing by [125:55] McDonald's to get a Coke versus getting [125:56] it somewhere else. And if you press, [125:58] it's just that it's a fountain and you [126:00] like fountain versus bottle or and [126:02] they're like, "No, it's actually better [126:03] at McDonald's." It is better at [126:05] McDonald's. [126:06] >> No way. Here are a variety of things [126:08] that I've heard from somewhat credible [126:10] sources and that show up in articles [126:13] that may contribute to the taste [126:16] actually being better. The thing that is [126:18] definitely true is Coca-Cola ships the [126:21] formula to McDonald's in stainless steel [126:23] tanks instead of being delivered in [126:27] bags. Normally it's bags wrapped in [126:30] cardboard and it's actually delivered [126:32] through the bottlers even though the [126:34] bottlers have nothing to do with it. [126:35] They are the delivery arm. [126:38] >> Oh, yeah. Cuz this is the fountain [126:40] business. [126:40] >> Yeah. Coke doesn't actually deliver the [126:44] syrups to all these restaurants. The [126:46] bottlers do it on behalf of them, even [126:47] there, though. There's no bottles [126:48] involved. So, Coke is quote unquote [126:50] selling directly when they sell syrup to [126:53] fountain owners. [126:54] >> But the bottlers are doing the delivery. [126:56] >> Yes. With McDonald's, it's different. It [126:57] comes in these stainless steel tanks. [126:59] McDonald's does some stuff. They [127:01] pre-chill the water and they make sure [127:03] that the hoses are chilled all the way [127:05] up into the dispenser. McDonald's [127:07] apparently actually has a different [127:10] syrup to water ratio that accounts for [127:13] ice melt. They add a little bit more [127:15] syrup than the standard recipe, which [127:18] sounds like it would be heresy. [127:20] >> Wow. And Coca-Cola lets them do it [127:22] because Coca-Cola wouldn't let anybody [127:24] else change the mixture. [127:26] >> Yes. They developed custom straws that [127:30] are a little bit wider to let a little [127:32] bit more Coca-Cola hit the taste buds on [127:34] your mouth. And this is sort of just [127:36] incidental, but because of the volume [127:39] that's done at McDonald's of selling [127:41] Coke products, the syrup's a little bit [127:43] fresher because the syrup actually does [127:44] kind of get worse over time if you leave [127:47] it in the back room. [127:48] >> Wow. Well, uh, it is a beautiful [127:51] partnership for both sides, shall we [127:53] say. [127:54] >> Here's something crazy. I think a lot of [127:55] people associate McDonald's and [127:57] Coca-Cola, both big American companies, [128:00] both historically American, a lot of [128:01] Americana in each. Until listening to [128:04] this episode, I didn't really think [128:06] about the fact that Coke has a 60-year [128:09] head start on McDonald's in going [128:11] global. And so I read in a couple places [128:15] that when McDonald's was opening in new [128:19] countries, the employees would camp in [128:22] Coca-Cola offices and use Coca-Cola's [128:25] relationships to get a foothold in the [128:28] country when they were opening. It's [128:30] like this unofficial partnership that [128:32] they have. [128:33] >> Well, it's good for both sides. [128:35] >> Yeah. And lastly, Coke sales teams are [128:38] prohibited from selling syrup to [128:39] restaurants for less than McDonald's [128:41] pays, even if it means they're going to [128:43] lose the business to Pepsi. It is sort [128:45] of this rule at Coca-Cola that no one [128:47] gets a lower price per unit volume than [128:50] McDonald's. [128:51] >> Wow. Big customer. [128:53] >> So, back to the 60s. In 1960, a few [128:55] other things happen. The first 12 ounce [128:57] aluminum cans are introduced of [128:59] Coca-Cola in the United States. [129:02] >> They also buy Minuteade, right? [129:03] Coca-Cola buys Minuteade. Yes, a little [129:06] uh precursor to what was to come four [129:08] decades later with non-soda drinks, but [129:10] this is sort of weirdly the only thing [129:11] that they have other than soda for a [129:14] long time. [129:15] >> Yep. Speaking of acquisitions, in 1965, [129:21] Pepsi buys the Fredo Le Company [129:25] >> famously where they're still one company [129:27] today at PepsiCo. [129:28] >> Yep. Ben, you found out Coke had the [129:31] chance to buy it, right? [129:32] >> Yes, they did. made a giant mistake not [129:35] buying it. The company's headquarters, I [129:38] think the original Lei company is an [129:40] Atlanta company. So, in many ways, [129:42] Coca-Cola is sort of the preferred [129:44] buyer. And Coke turns it down. Wow. The [129:48] wild thing is today, if you look at the [129:50] health of Pepsi's beverages business and [129:53] their food business with Fredo Lelay [129:55] products, Fredo is a much much better [129:58] business. While the revenues are a [130:00] little bit smaller than the Pepsi [130:01] business by revenue, Fredo Lelay [130:03] generates twice as much profit inside [130:06] the parent company PepsiCo. That's a [130:09] good one to own. [130:10] >> Yeah. Big miss from Coke. [130:12] >> Yeah. [130:13] >> On the opposite end of the spectrum, [130:15] toward the end of the 60s, Macan and Ko [130:19] really start hitting their stride. Ben, [130:22] you mentioned in the intro about uh [130:25] co-opting the hippie and counterculture [130:27] movement. Oh yeah. [130:29] >> In 1968, [130:31] Macccan and Ko launch their latest [130:35] unified marketing campaign, [130:38] The Real Thing, which is an enormous [130:42] success. And at first subtly tries to [130:46] co-op the uh, you know, counterculture [130:48] moment. It's real. The hippies love [130:50] things. [130:50] >> I mean, it doesn't have high fructose [130:51] corn syrup yet, so ostensibly, it is the [130:53] real thing. [130:54] >> If Coke is a real American thing, then [130:56] it's the real thing. [130:58] This is capped off in 1971 [131:01] by the series finale of Mad Men. [131:04] >> Yes. [laughter] [131:06] >> And Don Draper of it, too. [131:08] >> Greatest work. I It's so funny. Like, I [131:10] know this ad from Madmen. [131:12] >> Yes. [laughter] [131:12] >> Even though it's considered one of, if [131:14] not the greatest television commercial [131:15] of all time. [131:16] >> Yes. [131:17] >> I didn't know anything about it until [131:18] the Madmen series finale. [131:20] >> So, listeners, if you don't know, [131:21] >> the Hilltop ad. [131:22] >> Yes. The hilltop ad to the song I'd Like [131:25] to buy the world a coke is fictionally [131:29] created or alluded to be created by Don [131:31] Draper in the finale of Madmen, but of [131:34] course is a real ad 40 years before [131:36] Madmen came out. [131:38] >> It's so cool. Doing the research for [131:39] this episode. I always thought that [131:43] Madmen was one of the greatest works of [131:45] media ever created. I have even more [131:48] appreciation. They set the whole thing [131:51] up all the way back in the first season [131:54] of really the show by introducing Macan [131:57] Ericson. Like Macan Ericson comes in as [131:59] the foil to Sterling Cooper in the [132:02] beginning and then they're running [132:03] throughout the whole series. I didn't [132:05] realize that Macan Ericson, the reason [132:07] they're so big and the reason that it's [132:09] such a big thing is the Coke account. [132:11] >> Pretty amazing. [132:12] >> And then it all pays off in the Hilltop [132:14] ad. [132:14] >> I think it's given him a little bit too [132:16] much credit. If you're going to do a a [132:17] show about advertising in this era, you [132:20] kind of have to do Macan Ericson. [132:22] >> But I didn't realize the deep connection [132:24] between Macan and Coke and how like [132:26] integral that was. And so now [132:28] understanding this makes me appreciate [132:30] the series finale just even more. Like [132:32] it's so great. [132:33] >> For sure. So the story behind this ad is [132:36] awesome. So Bill Ber at Macan Ericson [132:38] who was sort of the big partner of [132:40] Coca-Cola's there [132:41] >> the Archie Lee of his day. [132:42] >> Yes. for a long time said that he was on [132:45] a flight that was grounded at an airport [132:48] in Ireland and he noticed a diverse [132:51] crowd of passengers and everyone's upset [132:53] that this flight isn't happening and [132:55] they're chatting and they're joking with [132:57] each other and it's over bottles of [132:59] Coca-Cola and he's like, "Man, Coca-Cola [133:02] really brings people together across [133:04] borders, across languages." And he jotss [133:06] down on a napkin, "I'd like to buy the [133:09] world a Coke." and they conceptualized [133:12] this ad and there's this whole great [133:14] story of finding the songwriters and the [133:15] musicians who performed it and all this [133:17] stuff and they want to film it at the [133:19] cliffs of Dover in the UK. They got the [133:23] budget green lit from the head of [133:24] advertising at Coca-Cola to do the most [133:27] expensive ad of all time, a $100,000 [133:30] budget. [laughter] [133:32] >> How quaint. [133:33] >> And they're going to film it over the [133:35] course of three days. And they got there [133:40] with the full cast who were going to [133:42] stand on the hillside and sing. [133:44] >> They wanted to have 200 people of from [133:46] all countries around the world. And the [133:48] point is that Coca-Cola brings everybody [133:50] together. [133:51] >> It's a hard cast to assemble because you [133:53] need people representing all these [133:55] different ethnicities and nationalities. [133:57] And they have three straight days of [133:59] rain. [133:59] >> I was going to say like cliffs of do it [134:01] rains a lot there. [laughter] [134:03] They burned through the entire budget [134:05] and so they're like, "Where are we going [134:06] to go that it won't rain? Let's go to [134:08] Rome." And so they get approval to go [134:11] all the way up to $250,000. [134:14] It rains in Rome. [134:16] >> No. [134:17] >> In the hills outside of Rome. And so [134:19] they actually have no usable footage [134:21] from everything they shot because by the [134:23] time they actually caught the actors, [134:25] they were also covered in rain and [134:27] looked like crap and no one looked [134:28] happy. And so it's this hilariously [134:31] cobbled together thing where the third [134:33] time's the charm. They have to go wander [134:36] around Rome looking for new actors. They [134:38] find a new leading lady, that woman that [134:40] the commercial opens on. They actually [134:42] have to film it in two separate [134:43] locations. The hillside is different [134:46] from the close-ups, but they ultimately [134:49] release it. It becomes absolutely [134:51] beloved. It's the catchiest tune. I've [134:54] had it in my head the entire time doing [134:56] research. They start getting calls at [134:58] radio stations to play the Coca-Cola ad [135:01] song. So then the band goes and [135:04] re-records it as a real song to release [135:06] on an album that has different lyrics [135:07] than I'd like to buy the world of Coke. [135:09] And it turns out to become a bestselling [135:11] song also. [135:12] >> So great. [laughter] The lyrics are just [135:15] uh great. They're great. And it's so [135:18] 1971 and Coca-Cola. [135:19] >> It's the real thing. [135:21] >> Yep. I'd like to teach the world to sing [135:23] in perfect harmony. I'd like to buy the [135:25] world a Coke and keep it company. That's [135:28] the real thing. What the world wants [135:30] today is the real thing. [135:33] >> And you're watching it and it does [135:34] actually stir up emotions. You're like, [135:36] "This is really beautiful. Look at this. [135:37] There's all these people that are all [135:39] here together. They're all getting [135:41] along." And then you realize this is a [135:44] giant corporation selling sugar water [135:47] and they managed to borrow the hippie [135:49] movement to create one of the most [135:51] successful [laughter] commercials of all [135:53] time. [135:53] >> Oh my god. [135:55] It's Mad Men. [135:56] >> Unbelievable. [135:58] >> Don Draper, baby. [laughter] [136:00] >> Yeah. [136:01] >> So great. Well, so the end of the 60s [136:05] and the early 70s going pretty well for [136:08] Coca-Cola. [136:10] And then in 1975, [136:12] that deep, dark, [136:16] deeply embarrassing [136:18] secret that McCann had discovered 20 [136:22] years earlier in 1955. and Robert [136:24] Woodruff had tried to bury as far down [136:28] as he possibly could comes out. The [136:32] Pepsi challenge. [136:33] >> All right, David. The Pepsi challenge. [136:36] >> I've been so stoked all episode just to [136:39] get to this. And to start it off, [136:42] >> are you about to do a Pepsi challenge? [136:44] >> I am going to do a Pepsi challenge right [136:46] here [laughter] on air. Of course, it's [136:48] not really a challenge because I didn't [136:50] hide the containers and I would [136:52] administer it to myself so it wouldn't [136:53] work. [136:54] >> What temperature are they though? [136:55] Because I hear that plays a big role. [136:57] >> It does, but they are the same [136:58] temperature. I took both of them out of [137:00] the fridge right after like World War II [137:02] or so. So, however long ago that was. [137:05] >> Cuz at warmer temperatures, the Coke [137:08] people will insist that Pepsi has the [137:10] edge because sweeter tastes better at [137:12] warmer temperatures. But Coke at that [137:14] just above freezing perfect temperature [137:16] is, you know, the best. [137:18] >> Well, let's see. [137:20] >> All right, that's the real thing seeing [137:22] right now. [137:23] >> All right, the real thing. It's good. [137:27] Oh, Pepsi and Oh, it's got that lemony [137:30] little zest to it. [137:30] >> Pepsi's a little a little lemony, a [137:32] little sweeter. [snorts] [137:37] >> I think I'm with the majority on this [137:38] one. [137:39] >> That Pepsi is better. [137:40] >> I think Pepsi tastes a little better. [137:42] Wow. David Rosenthal right here on the [137:45] Coca-Cola episode declaring that Pepsi [137:48] is your pick. [137:49] >> Well, over Coca-Cola Classic, but uh I'm [137:52] mostly a Diet Coke guy these days, but [137:54] we'll get to that in a minute. [137:56] >> Which one could argue was formulated to [137:58] better compete with Pepsi. [138:00] >> Indeed. All right, the Pepsi challenge. [138:04] So back in 1967, [138:08] a young Wharton MBA graduate joins Pepsi [138:15] after a few years of working at IPG, the [138:19] big ad agency which owned and I believe [138:22] still owns Macan Ericson, parent company [138:24] of Macan. [138:25] >> Yep, they do. Interpublic group. Now, [138:28] Ben, I know you know who we're talking [138:30] about here, but uh listeners, you all [138:33] are in for a real fun surprise when we [138:36] reveal who this person is in a minute. [138:38] So, Pepsi, as we've discussed, up until [138:42] Alfred Steel came in, had always been [138:45] kind of a seat of the pants school of [138:48] hard knocks management type company. [138:51] this person who joins I think might have [138:53] been the first MBA to join the company [138:55] and he was one of the very few even like [138:57] college graduates. So he comes in as the [139:01] director of new product development and [139:04] the first new product that he develops [139:07] and hits the market isn't a new drink [139:09] but rather a new bottle a really really [139:14] big bottle 64 ounces. He realizes in [139:17] doing market research that hey [139:19] supermarkets are becoming more and more [139:20] of a thing. We're now in the late 60s [139:22] early 70s here. There's a really [139:26] underved part of the soft drink market [139:29] which is large families and parties for [139:33] at home consumption. Buying a whole [139:36] bunch of pretty heavy breakable glass [139:38] bottles and lugging them home for your [139:41] large family or a party that you're [139:43] throwing. [139:43] >> Or even cans. Who wants to open a single [139:45] can for each person around the dinner [139:47] table? [139:47] >> Totally. And again, remember we talked [139:50] about the cost scaling element of soda [139:54] is not volume of soda. [laughter] [139:58] So it doesn't actually cost that much to [140:00] uh go from 6 ounces to 12 ounces to, you [140:03] know, a whole lot of ounces. [140:05] >> This is why basically anyone is willing [140:07] to sell you free refills on your [140:08] fountain drink. [140:09] >> Yep. So he and Pepsi start working on a [140:13] big bottle. And they pretty quickly [140:15] realize like, oh, glass is not going to [140:18] work. [laughter] [140:20] It would be a really heavy bottle and [140:22] really breakable as you're porting [140:23] around this big bottle. So they go to [140:26] Dupant, [140:28] I had no idea. [140:29] >> And say, "Hey, can you guys engineer us [140:33] something that would work here?" And [140:35] Dupont says, "Oh, well actually [140:38] you have found us at the perfect point [140:39] in time. We have a new type of plastic [140:41] that we have engineered, polyethylene [140:44] terrapith [140:46] or pet that we think would be great for [140:49] this application. It's lightweight. It's [140:52] super strong. It's really cheap to [140:54] produce. And here's the kicker for [140:56] Pepsi. We can send it premolded to all [141:01] of your bottlers. And so rather than [141:03] your bottlers having to set up really [141:06] expensive new production lines for these [141:08] new bottles, all they have to do is just [141:09] inflate the molds with air and then fill [141:12] them up. [141:12] >> Have you ever seen him inflate? It's [141:14] like the coolest thing ever watching a 2 [141:15] liter bottle inflate. [141:16] >> The 64 ounce or now 2 L bottle is born. [141:21] Pepsi gets a big jump on this against [141:23] Coke. It takes Coke another three and a [141:25] half years to come out with their own [141:27] big party bottle. So on the back of this [141:31] success for this young executive [141:32] >> and you talked to him, right? This [141:34] person you're talking about. [141:35] >> Oh yes. All these stories are firsthand. [141:37] >> Okay. [141:38] >> So uh on the back of this success, Don [141:40] Kendall, the then CEO of Pepsi is like, [141:42] "All right, kid. You passed the test. [141:44] You're ready for your next big job." [141:46] >> And this is the first time that plastic [141:48] is used, right, in soft drinks? [141:50] >> Oh, yes. I missed the punch line there. [141:53] This is the first plastic bottle. [141:54] >> That's crazy. And good for Pepsi to log [141:57] this win. pretty bad for the world to [142:00] start this single-use plastics treadmill [142:02] that we're all on now. Like, just to get [142:05] that out of the way. I was looking up [142:07] studies recently, and the Coca-Cola [142:09] company is the number one poller [142:11] globally of crap in the ocean. Pepsi is [142:14] very close behind all the big drink [142:16] companies. Everyone is always saying, [142:17] "We're trying to do a better job at [142:19] this. We're trying to do a better job [142:20] creating recyclable stuff, using recy," [142:22] but like the world is full of a crap ton [142:25] of single-use plastics. 100% man. I had [142:29] not focused on this issue at all until [142:32] doing the research. I am going to only [142:35] buy can and glass bottles going forward. [142:39] Like there's no reason not to buy cans [142:42] and glass. They're actually recyclable. [142:44] >> It's funny. I've like accidentally [142:45] started doing that anyway cuz whenever I [142:47] travel now, I use those um path water [142:50] bottles that they sell in airports and [142:51] you can just refill them. I'm not like [142:54] going out of my way to be like, "Oh my [142:56] gosh, I need the metal over the [142:57] plastic." But like it now it just feels [142:59] weird to buy plastic bottles now that [143:03] I'm so much more attuned to [143:04] microplastics. I'm also never going to [143:06] drink fluid that was sitting in a [143:08] plastic bottle for a long time after I [143:10] opened it or like refill it. I used to [143:12] refill plastic water bottles and now I'm [143:14] like uh who knows what's degrading in my [143:16] beverage. So, but yeah, this is the [143:18] start of the plastification. [143:20] >> Yes. So, back to the timeline. Don [143:24] Kendall, the CEO, is like, "Okay, you [143:26] passed the test. You are now going to [143:28] take over all of marketing for Pepsi, [143:31] and I want you to figure out how we're [143:33] going to dethrone Coke." So, the [143:36] executive takes over marketing. He's [143:38] getting settled in. He's surveying the [143:40] current state of things, and he notices [143:42] that the local Pepsi bottler down in [143:45] Dallas, Texas, is doing something really [143:48] interesting. the local ad agency for the [143:51] bottler there had accidentally [143:53] discovered the secret that Coke and [143:56] Macan has known for 20 years that [144:00] consumers prefer Pepsi to Coke. And the [144:02] way they figure it out is that they're [144:05] doing research for 7-Eleven in Dallas. [144:09] >> No way. And 7-Eleven is selling a [144:12] generic cola at the time. And they run a [144:14] taste test with both Coke and Pepsi as [144:17] the controls for the 7-Eleven generic [144:20] cola. [laughter] [144:22] >> And so this local agency happens to also [144:24] be the agency of the Pepsi Bottler in [144:27] Dallas. And so they go to the Pepsi [144:29] bottle and they're like, "Hey, guess [144:31] what we discovered?" [144:32] >> Wow. [laughter] [144:34] So locally in the Dallas market, they [144:37] start running these commercials there of [144:39] people taking the quote unquote Pepsi [144:43] challenge. [laughter] [144:44] They roll up to a supermarket in Dallas. [144:47] They plunk down a card table and they [144:49] have Coke and Pepsi behind like a [144:51] cardboard screen and they give the [144:54] consumers a glass. They say, "Which do [144:56] you prefer?" And a statistically [144:58] significant number of people say Pepsi. [145:01] And they did this at malls all across [145:03] America. They then really expanded this. [145:06] >> Well, we'll get to that now. Yeah. At [145:08] first, this is just the local Dallas [145:09] bottler that's doing it. It's a huge [145:11] success. Pepsi's market share in Dallas [145:15] jumps by 14%. [145:17] Thanks to these ads. Like, it really, [145:20] really resonates with consumers. So, the [145:23] new VP of marketing sees this and he's [145:24] like, "Oh, okay. We we got to blow this [145:27] out, but we're not going to do what KO [145:31] would do. We're not going to turn this [145:33] into like a big corporate one site, one [145:36] sound, one sell national campaign. [145:39] We got to keep this grassroots. We got [145:42] to go market by market. This is working [145:43] so well in Dallas because it's [145:45] grassroots because it's real people who [145:47] are living in Dallas taking this [145:49] challenge. And the technology that can [145:53] enable this has just come out. VCRs have [145:56] come out and early home video camcorders [146:01] are just starting to hit the market. [146:03] >> So he says, "Okay, here's what we're [146:05] gonna do. We're going to go buy a ton of [146:09] home video camcorders." [146:11] >> Oh, that's awesome. [laughter] [146:13] >> And card tables. We're going to [146:15] distribute them to all of Pepsi's local [146:18] bottlers all around the country. We're [146:21] gonna inform them about this Pepsi [146:22] challenge and we're gonna say, "Go run [146:24] your own versions of the Pepsi [146:26] Challenge." [146:27] >> Oh, wow. [146:28] >> Film them with the camcorders of real [146:31] people in your markets taking the Pepsi [146:34] challenge and put them on local [146:36] television, [laughter] [146:38] like local ad spots on local TV [146:40] channels. And this is like maybe the [146:43] most successful grassroots marketing [146:45] campaign in history. [146:46] >> I didn't even realize it was grassroots. [146:48] I mean, everyone knows the Pepsi [146:50] challenge is almost like a descriptive [146:52] way to describe a form of marketing. [146:54] Like, do you remember when Microsoft did [146:55] Bing It On? It was like, "Oh, I see the [146:57] Pepsi challenge for search." [146:59] >> I had no idea until talking to him and [147:02] doing the research. This was all shot [147:04] with camcorders. We'll link to YouTube [147:06] footage of these old videos. It's all [147:08] just malls and supermarkets and beaches [147:13] and fire stations around the country and [147:16] it's then local ads run on local TVs. [147:19] Incredible. [147:20] >> Which is funny being our age, David, I [147:22] knew what the Pepsi Challenge was, but [147:24] of course I've never actually seen it. [147:26] >> Right. I hadn't seen it either. [147:27] >> And it's funny to now actually go watch [147:29] it and see how that meets my [147:30] expectations of what I thought it was [147:31] going to be. [147:32] >> Yes. Same as you. I had the same [147:33] expectations of, oh, this must have been [147:35] like a BBDO national campaign, you know, [147:39] blah blah blah. Total opposite. This is [147:42] probably the first quote unquote reality [147:46] television commercial that's ever [147:48] produced. Like, nobody was doing this [147:50] back in the day. So, it just hits all [147:52] these local markets around the country [147:54] like a bomb. And Coke is so poorly set [147:58] up to react to this. their whole [148:00] marketing and ad strategy with Macan. [148:03] They're all national, one site, one [148:05] sound, you know, one cell. They're not [148:07] set up to go buy local [148:10] TV ad slots. [148:12] >> It's good counterpositioning. But the [148:13] punchline of the whole thing is it [148:15] wouldn't have worked if it wasn't true. [148:17] But it was true that people did prefer [148:20] the taste of Pepsi. [148:21] >> And I think it also wouldn't have worked [148:23] if it had been a big national, you know, [148:26] sort of corporate roll out because [148:27] people wouldn't have believed that it's [148:29] true. I think it's really critical that [148:31] it was real people that were doing the [148:33] Pepsi challenge instead of actors. [148:36] >> Yes. Oh, absolutely agree. [148:38] >> And I think it was also important. It's [148:39] happening in my community. [148:41] >> Right. [148:42] >> So, they blow this out like all across [148:44] the country. In 1977, Pepsi outspends [148:48] Coke in advertising for the first time [148:51] in history. And Pepsi actually passes [148:55] Coke in market share in the bottled [148:58] market. So Coke still has a overall [149:01] market share lead in the country because [149:03] of the fountain business and like [149:05] McDonald's, [149:05] >> right? Pepsi basically never was able to [149:08] break into the fountain business and the [149:10] volumes that even today Coke kind of ran [149:12] away with the restaurants serving soft [149:15] drinks out of fountains business. [149:16] >> So it's interesting in the late 70s [149:18] Pepsi does try to break in. They buy [149:21] Taco Bell and Pizza Hut and KFC and then [149:24] install Pepsi. But yeah, it never [149:26] approaches Coke, [149:28] >> which actually kind of backfires because [149:29] then Coke uses it to counterell and they [149:31] start going around to everyone else that [149:32] is considering Coke or Pepsi and saying [149:34] Pepsi owns these restaurants that are [149:36] competing with you. Why do you want to [149:37] give them more profit dollars? And so [149:39] then Coke is able to win sales on that, [149:41] which is I think is part of why Pepsi [149:43] then spun that all out as Yum Brands, [149:45] but also just kind of because I think it [149:47] was a drag on their business. [149:48] >> Yep. So on the back of this huge, [149:53] nationally known, obvious success with [149:57] the Pepsi Challenge, the young marketing [150:00] executive starts to become, you know, [150:01] pretty known in the business community. [150:03] >> And David, we should say who it is now. [150:05] >> His name is John Scully. [150:09] >> Yep. And for some of you, that will mean [150:12] a lot. And for most of you, that will [150:14] mean a lot. In about 30 seconds, [150:17] >> John starts getting a bunch of CEO [150:21] offers coming in from recruiters on the [150:24] back of his success. And you know, he [150:26] loves Pepsi. [150:28] He's built his career there. But finally [150:31] in 1983, he gets an offer that he can't [150:35] refuse. Steve Jobs comes to pitch him [150:40] and says, "Do you want to sell sugar [150:43] water for the rest of your life or do [150:45] you want to come with me and change the [150:47] world?" [snorts] [150:49] And he goes with Steve and joins Apple [150:53] Computer as CEO in 1983. [150:57] Yeah. [150:58] >> And finish the story, David. What would [151:00] then happen after John became CEO of [151:02] Apple? [151:04] Well, I think the narrative that a lot [151:06] of people know, we'll have to save this [151:07] for our Apple episode someday, is things [151:09] did not go well. Steve Jobs got kicked [151:12] out of the company. Apple floundered. [151:15] Jobs had to come back. Skully actually [151:18] grew Apple's revenue from under 1 [151:20] billion when he joined to almost 8 [151:22] billion when he left. [151:24] >> Ah, well, Tim Cook before Tim Cook. [151:26] >> And then there would be two more CEOs, I [151:29] think, before Jobs came back. [151:30] >> Yeah. Gilamelio and uh [151:32] >> Michael Spindler. [151:34] >> That's right. But yeah, John is awesome, [151:37] by the way. He's 87 years old. He's a [151:40] huge Acquired fan. He's listened to [151:42] every single episode that we've done. [151:44] >> Also, thank you to Arvin Navaratnam, [151:46] front of the show, for introducing us. [151:48] It was a fun email to get of like, wait, [151:50] John Skully listens to Acquired? [151:52] >> Yeah. So cool. He's currently on the [151:54] board of three different companies that [151:55] he's helped start over the last couple [151:57] years and he's responsible for the Pepsi [152:00] Challenge. So obviously uh Coke [152:04] eventually after years and years of [152:06] bleeding thanks to the Pepsi challenge [152:09] decides that they need to respond [152:13] >> and the response ends up happening a [152:15] full decade later. The response comes in [152:18] 1985 and the Pepsi challenge was in 75 [152:22] and Pepsi had already been taking share [152:24] from Coke starting in like 1970. [152:27] Meaningful chunks. Yeah. So why is Coke [152:30] so slow to respond to the Pepsi [152:33] challenge? Well, in addition to just [152:35] plain getting their ass kicked, [152:38] they have another problem. So Woodruff [152:41] is still the ultimate decision maker and [152:44] chairman of the board, but he's getting [152:47] pretty old at this point in time. He's [152:50] already in his 80s, approaching his 90s. [152:52] >> He has strong opinions about what [152:53] Coca-Cola is and isn't. But there's also [152:57] another [152:58] management problem at Coca-Cola, which [153:01] is that the CEO, Paul Austin, [153:05] has gotten Alzheimer's [153:07] and stays in the CEO position. And so Ko [153:12] for the back half of the 70s is just [153:15] paralyzed. like basically no decisions [153:19] can get through between Woodruff being [153:21] set in his ways [153:23] >> and it's hard for him to see, read, [153:27] hear. I mean, he's hard to communicate [153:29] with in addition with having strong [153:31] opinions and control of the company. [153:33] >> Yep. And then you have a CEO suffering [153:36] from Alzheimer's and Woodruff probably [153:38] doesn't recognize what's happening. It's [153:40] a real mess. [153:41] >> Yep. [153:42] All of this finally resolves in May of [153:45] 1980 when the board appoints a young [153:49] chemical engineer named Roberto Goseta [153:54] as CEO. [153:56] So Getta was a Cuban immigrant who had [153:59] worked his way up to become head of [154:01] technical research at age 35. And he was [154:04] one of the mythical two people who knew [154:07] the secret formula. [154:10] >> That's right. cuz he was a chemical [154:11] engineer. I mean, he was on the product [154:14] formulation side of things. [154:16] >> Yep. And he had just had a huge win [154:20] within the company when he replaced [154:23] sugar in the US with high fructose corn [154:25] syrup. He's the one who brought corn [154:27] syrup in. [154:28] >> So, starting in 1980, he got 50% and [154:31] then by 1984, they were replaced at [154:34] 100%. But basically because sugar kept [154:36] getting more expensive and farm [154:37] subsidies for corn kept making high [154:39] fructose corn syrup less expensive it [154:41] became like well as long as customers [154:43] are willing to do it and it doesn't seem [154:46] to be worse for people's health [154:48] economically it became a no-brainer to [154:49] do it. [154:50] >> Yep. So he's a real darkhorse candidate [154:54] to be CEO. The person who everybody [154:57] thinks is going to get the job is Don [154:59] Kio, the famous longtime president and [155:02] COO of Coca-Cola. And so what Roberto [155:05] does when he becomes CEO is he says, [155:07] "Don, you are my partner in crime. We [155:09] are going to run this company as a team. [155:11] You'll be my president and COO. You are [155:14] great externally. I'm great with the [155:17] product and in the strategy internally. [155:20] We're going to be a dynamic duo here." [155:22] And ultimately, Gowetta got it because [155:25] he was Woodruff's protege. I would say [155:27] Gowetta, at least as it comes across in [155:30] the book Secret Formula, did a very good [155:32] job of sort of managing up and making [155:34] sure that Woodruff felt taken care of [155:36] and informed. [155:37] >> I could see that. [155:38] >> Yeah. [155:39] >> So, they go on to have a great run. One [155:41] of the early things they do is they buy [155:45] Colombia Pictures, the [laughter] movie [155:47] studio, [155:48] >> which I always thought this was stupid. [155:51] Like whenever you hear stories of, oh, [155:54] and at one point in the cod out 1980s [155:57] where everyone was doing crazy stuff, KO [156:00] even went and bought Colombia Pictures, [156:03] >> a movie studio. [156:04] >> But financially, it actually was great [156:06] for them. Even though no business is as [156:09] good as Coca-Cola's core business, [156:11] everything pales in comparison, unless [156:13] it's Visa or a software company or [156:15] something like that. Well, not only was [156:18] it financially pretty good for them when [156:20] they ultimately sold the business to [156:22] Sony a few years later, [156:25] it leads to a lot of really good stuff [156:27] for Coca-Cola because this is how they [156:31] get to know Herb Allen Jr. and Allen and [156:34] company who was one of the principal [156:37] shareholders of Colia Pictures before Ko [156:40] bought it. And so he ends up joining the [156:42] board of Coca-Cola after the [156:44] transaction. And actually this [156:46] relationship continues right through to [156:48] this day. Herb Allen III who in the [156:51] early 2000s took over for Herb Jr. [156:54] running Allen and Company is still on [156:56] the board of Coca-Cola. [156:57] >> Amazing. So, this is how Coca-Cola [157:00] executives start going to Sun Valley [157:04] >> where Don Kio reconnects from his old [157:09] neighbor from his early young [157:12] professional days when he was working in [157:15] his first job in Omaha, Nebraska. [157:19] >> This is insane. [157:20] >> Living on Farnum Street in Omaha where [157:24] he was neighbors with Warren Buffett. [157:26] Warren Buffett is like this reall life [157:31] Forest Gump. I mean, the number of [157:33] things that he invested in that would [157:35] become these unbelievable bonanza [157:38] investments, like greatest of all time [157:39] investments. Oh, was a guy who lived on [157:41] my street. Oh, was the woman that ran [157:44] the furniture store in my town growing [157:45] up. Like, it happens over and over and [157:48] over again. Are you kidding me? Don Kio [157:51] was Warren Buffett's old neighbor. Don's [157:55] first job out of college, he worked for, [157:57] I believe, a coffee company that ended [158:00] up getting acquired by Coca-Cola and [158:02] that's how he came into Wow. Coca-Cola. [158:04] But yeah, he was just living in Omaha on [158:07] Farnum Street. [158:08] >> Crazy. And so this is how the Bergkshire [158:11] Coca-Cola relationship starts. [158:13] >> Well, so Warren at this point in time, [158:18] as we covered on our Bergkshire series, [158:20] is a Pepsi guy. [158:22] He's part of the new generation. He took [158:24] the Pepsi challenge. Kio converts him to [158:29] Coke by telling him about this new [158:32] product that they're going to launch, [158:33] cherry Coke, because Buffett loved [158:35] cherry syrup in his Pepsi. And so he [158:37] converts Warren to a Coke guy before [158:40] Warren ever invests a dollar in the [158:42] Coca-Cola company. [158:43] >> And Warren reportedly drinks five cherry [158:45] Cokes a day. [158:46] >> Yeah, he is perhaps single-handedly uh [158:49] supporting his investment these days. [158:51] [laughter] [158:52] Later on at Sun Valley, Bill Gates lets [158:56] it slip on a panel with Warren and [159:00] Roberto and Don Kio that Warren has [159:04] always told Bill that Coca-Cola could be [159:06] run by a ham sandwich [laughter] [159:09] while Roberto is sitting right there. [159:11] >> Yeah, Roberto gets very offended and [159:13] apparently never talks to Bill Gates [159:15] again. Now, given what's about to happen [159:18] here, it's actually highly debatable [159:20] whether Roberto was a ham sandwich or [159:22] not. [laughter] [159:23] >> My opinion has always been that [159:25] Coca-Cola is the type of business that [159:27] could be run. But maybe let's save this [159:30] for the quintessence. Like, we should [159:31] finish the episode deciding if if that [159:33] is true about the Coca-Cola company or [159:35] not. [159:36] >> Yes. [159:37] Well, Roberto is about to become [159:40] responsible for both the company's [159:43] greatest success since Coca-Cola and its [159:47] worst disaster of all time. [159:48] >> Yes. [159:49] >> Okay. So, first the success, of course, [159:54] we're talking about the most successful [159:56] diet drink in the history of humankind. [159:59] Basically, the only soda that I drink [160:01] today, Diet Coke. [160:03] >> You're a Diet Coke man, not a Coke Zero [160:05] man. [160:05] >> I'm a Diet Coke guy. Yeah, I know. Coke [160:07] Zero was sort of marketed as the Diet [160:09] Coke for men, but uh [160:12] like Diet Coke [160:13] >> and not just for men, but also the one [160:15] that's closer to the original Coca-Cola [160:17] formula. Diet Coke is sort of meant to [160:19] be its own thing. [160:21] >> Yeah. They did those great ads of the [160:22] taste infringement ads. Do you remember [160:24] those? [160:25] >> Oh, I don't remember them. [160:26] >> Oh, yeah. Yeah. When Coke Zero launched, [160:28] they did all this series of ads of [160:29] Coca-Cola lawyers going around suing [160:32] Coke Zero for taste infringement. [160:33] [laughter] [160:34] It's a great premise, [160:36] >> great sort of uh self-reflective uh [160:39] [laughter] advertising from Coca-Cola [160:40] there. [160:41] >> So, Diet Coke is fascinating because [160:45] they did start work on it earlier in the [160:48] '7s. It didn't come out till 1982, but [160:51] they're kind of in the lab tinkering [160:52] with the flavor because the Pepsi [160:54] challenge has basically thrown down the [160:56] gauntlet that Americans prefer the taste [160:58] of Pepsi. And they're starting to play [161:00] with this idea of like, okay, obviously [161:03] we're not going to replace Coke, but [161:05] like, is there a way that we can make [161:07] something that does compete with Pepsi, [161:09] that tastes a little bit more like [161:10] Pepsi, that tastes [161:12] lighter or sweeter or they're in the [161:15] lab, they're working on it, and [161:17] eventually they do land on this formula [161:20] that they think is great, and it's [161:22] artificially sweetened as you're talking [161:23] about. It is a huge risk in two ways to [161:27] release Diet Coke. One is because [161:31] of everything we talked about earlier, [161:33] you gotta be really careful with the [161:35] Coca-Cola brand. It's the Sacred Cow. [161:39] But two, Tab is currently in 1982 the [161:43] bestselling diet drink in the world. So [161:45] why would you release another diet drink [161:48] that risks dethroning the one that you [161:50] have that is the clear winner? And the [161:52] answer is [161:53] >> you need a win. [161:55] >> A, you need a win. B, it is so clear [161:58] that diet is going to be a gigantic [162:00] market and that's the way the world is [162:01] going and we're just holding ourselves [162:03] back from competing with our best foot [162:05] forward by not using our big brand. [162:08] >> Yep. There uh was one other reason why [162:13] they finally decided in the late 70s to [162:15] start work on Diet Coke. [162:17] >> In 1975, [162:20] the Coca-Cola Company acquired the [162:23] Thomas Company. Oh, so to the extent [162:26] that the Thomas company and the parent [162:28] bottlers, if it is true that they had a [162:31] right [laughter] to a 10-centent royalty [162:32] on other Coca-Cola drinks, that is no [162:35] longer a problem. [162:36] >> Fascinating. So, David, do you know [162:39] about how they announced Diet Coke? [162:41] >> Ah, I was going to ask you the same [162:42] thing. [laughter] [162:44] I thought I was going to get you. Of [162:46] course I do. [162:47] >> I'd be surprised if any listeners know, [162:49] but listeners, you are going to delight [162:51] in learning this with us. They announced [162:54] Diet Coke in the summer of 1982. [162:57] >> In July of 1982, [162:59] >> the same month. [163:00] >> That's right. 43 years before. [163:04] >> 43 years before us. A very special [163:08] location in the acquired cinematic [163:10] universe. Radio City Music Hall. [163:13] >> That's right. Diet Coke was announced on [163:16] stage with the Rockheads performing to [163:20] celebrate the new beverage. [163:21] >> That's right. To say it works is quite [163:24] the understatement. By the end of 1983, [163:27] the first full year on the market, Diet [163:30] Coke is the number one diet drink in [163:33] America. And unlike Tab, which clearly [163:37] from that commercial that you talked [163:39] about earlier was exclusively marketed [163:41] to women, 30% of Diet Coke drinkers, [163:45] even in the early days, are men. And by [163:50] 1984, [163:51] Diet Coke becomes the third best selling [163:55] soft drink in America, period, behind [163:57] Coke and Pepsi. And Diet Coke costs [164:01] significantly less for Coke to produce [164:04] because it doesn't have sugar. [164:05] >> Yeah. You know what's not as expensive? [164:08] Artificial sweeteners. [164:09] >> Yes. So, Diet Coke is Go Sweet's like [164:13] huge huge grand slam win. And the way [164:17] they market it is not apologetic. The [164:19] campaign is just for the taste of it. [164:22] They are full-on marketing that this [164:24] tastes great and it also happens to have [164:27] no calories. [164:28] >> This is Coca-Cola playing offense. [164:31] >> Win-win. [164:32] >> It works incredibly well. [164:34] >> You can have your Coke and drink it, [164:36] too. [164:37] >> That's right. [164:39] >> And then Goa decides to play defense. [164:44] [laughter] [164:45] Yeah, [164:46] >> with New Coke. So despite all the [164:49] success of Diet Coke, and it was a huge [164:53] success, even in 1982, [164:58] 83, 84, 10ish years into the Pepsi [165:02] Challenge, it's still kicking [165:05] Coca-Cola's ass. [165:07] >> [laughter and gasps] [165:08] >> KO in 1982 brought in Bill Cosby as [165:12] their main celebrity endorser. [165:14] >> That's right. [165:15] >> And um we'll also link to these in the [165:17] show notes. The spots that they have him [165:19] do in 82, 83, 84 are directly addressing [165:24] the Pepsi challenge. It's unbelievable. [165:27] Coca-Cola is a singular N of one [165:29] product. Coca-Cola does not exist in a [165:31] universe with other competitors. And [165:32] here's Bill Cosby directly talking about [165:36] Pepsi and the challenge. It's the worst [165:39] thing that Coca-Cola could possibly do. [165:41] >> They were in bad shape. [165:42] >> They are bleeding. And Pepsi, of course, [165:45] in typical Pepsi fashion says, "Oh, you [165:48] just signed Bill Cosby and you're [165:50] talking about the Pepsi challenge in [165:52] your spots. We're going to sign Michael [165:54] Jackson." [laughter] [165:56] >> Just brutal. Obviously both of those men [165:59] the world would later find out were uh [166:02] deeply problematic but um at the time I [166:05] think they had among if not the highest [166:09] Q ratings of any celebrity in the world. [166:12] Uh Q rating being percentage of people [166:15] surveyed who are familiar with the [166:16] person and think highly of them. [166:19] >> Yeah. But from the time that Pepsi [166:22] launched the Pepsi Challenge in 1975 [166:24] until the New Coke disaster in 1985, [166:28] the share of Pepsi grew every single [166:30] year in America while the share of [166:31] Coca-Cola declined every single year. [166:34] And so the question is, if you're [166:35] Coca-Cola, what do you do here? [166:36] >> Yep. What they decided to do was after [166:40] 99 years with the same formula, [166:44] carefully building a brand around that [166:46] logo, the taste, the secret formula, and [166:49] defining this cultural object to the [166:53] world. Stupidity struck. [laughter] [166:58] [gasps] And yes, we can't downplay how [167:00] stupid this really was. But somewhat in [167:04] their defense, if you're going to [167:08] introduce a new taste to try and counter [167:11] the Pepsi taste, which you believe is [167:13] the reason why you're losing market [167:15] share. It has to be a full replacement. [167:19] There actually is no logical path to [167:21] adding a new flavor. So, a bunch of [167:23] people are like, "Well, why didn't they [167:24] just release Coke 2 or something like [167:26] that?" Remember, Coke is a singular [167:29] product. There cannot be two Cokes. [167:32] [laughter] It would destroy the brand. I [167:34] mean, this destroys the brand, too. But [167:35] >> I don't know, David. There's Coke Zero, [167:37] there's Diet Coke, there's [167:38] >> Well, now there is, but you got to put [167:40] yourself in the mindset back then. The [167:43] other more practical problem was if they [167:47] introduced a secondary flavor and kept [167:51] original Coke on the market, they would [167:53] bifrocate the base and Pepsi would [167:56] become number one. So they were paranoid [167:59] about that that oh we're pretty sure if [168:02] we have multiple Cokes on the market, [168:04] >> who cares what the base like it's just [168:07] pure bragging rights. [168:08] >> Coca-Cola cared a lot. [laughter] [168:11] CocaCola, it's number one. Pepsi's the [168:13] imitator. How could they ever stand to [168:15] let Pepsi become number one? [168:16] >> So, what did they actually do? There's a [168:19] lot of people that probably aren't [168:19] terribly familiar with New Coke and what [168:21] actually happened. [168:22] >> So, Christmas of 1984, [168:25] the executive team makes the decision. [168:28] They're going to do it. They're going to [168:30] replace the original Coca-Cola formula [168:34] with new Coke. [168:36] >> And they've all tasted it, as has [168:38] 200,000 [168:40] people. Yep. They've done tons of taste [168:42] tests. Not only does it beat Pepsi in [168:46] taste tests, it beats original Coke, [168:49] people prefer the taste of New Coke. [168:51] Robert Woodruff is still alive at this [168:54] point. He's 95 years old. So, they're [168:57] like, "All right, before we do this, [169:01] somebody's got to go have a conversation [169:02] with Robert and tell him what we're [169:04] doing." And, uh, Roberto, this one is on [169:08] you. [laughter] [169:10] So, New Year's Day 1985, [169:13] Roberto goes to see Robert Woodruff at [169:17] his home. Robert can barely hear, barely [169:20] speak. And according to Roberto, who is [169:23] the only other person present in the [169:24] room with him. It's just the two of them [169:26] in the room. Woodruff gives his blessing [169:30] to change the formula. However, [169:35] the very next morning, Woodruff stops [169:37] eating. He's hospitalized a few days [169:40] later and he ends up passing away on [169:44] March 7th, 1985, [169:47] one month before the New Coke [169:50] announcement. [169:51] >> So poetic. The formula was never changed [169:53] while Robert was alive. [169:55] >> Nope. No, it was not. [169:58] So 6 weeks later, Friday, April 19th, [170:03] Coca-Cola sends out a press invitation [170:06] for the quote most significant [170:08] development in the company's nearly [170:10] 100year history that they are going to [170:14] hold the following Tuesday. [170:17] Well, news of what is about to happen [170:20] leaks over the weekend [laughter] [170:24] and Pepsi takes out a full page ad in [170:28] newspapers across the country on Monday [170:30] morning with the announcement reading, [170:33] "The other guy just blinked." After 87 [170:37] years of going at it eyeball to eyeball, [170:39] "The other guy just blinked." And they [170:43] gave all their employees the day off to [170:45] celebrate. [170:46] >> Y [laughter] [170:49] Which, by the way, this couldn't have [170:51] been sequenced any worse because Pepsi [170:53] does that. Pepsi starts giving [170:55] interviews to everyone they can in the [170:56] press before the announcement actually [170:58] happens. And so the press all comes in, [171:01] no one's tried it yet. So the executives [171:04] can't even get their message out about [171:06] it because everyone's just preloaded [171:08] with like, how bad are you losing that [171:10] this is the case? Does it taste like [171:13] Pepsi? Cuz Pepsi sort of seated. Hey, [171:15] you should ask them like, is it meant to [171:17] copy Pepsi? And the message that the [171:20] Coke executives have is that they're [171:22] trying not to say too much. They're [171:23] trying not to describe the flavor. [171:25] They're trying not to compare it to [171:26] Pepsi. So, they're up there just looking [171:29] like complete idiots with no answers [171:32] that are substantive while everyone is [171:34] just attacking them. [171:35] >> It is a unmitigated disaster. So, at one [171:39] point the questioning gets so tough that [171:42] Don Kio says, quote, "There's a lot of [171:44] things I'd rather be doing than being [171:46] here right now. This is at a press [171:49] conference at a new product launch, [171:52] >> launching the biggest product in the [171:54] company's history." And then the final [171:56] question of the day, a reporter asks [171:59] whether, assuming this new Coke thing is [172:02] a success, if Diet Coke will also be [172:06] reformulated. [172:07] And Roberto responds, "No, and I don't [172:10] assume that this is a success. It is a [172:13] success." [172:14] >> The two crazy quotes to double down on [172:16] that. Goa says, "Some choose to call [172:20] this the boldest single marketing move [172:21] in the history of the packaged goods [172:23] business. We simply call it the shest [172:25] move ever made." [172:27] >> Oh. [172:28] >> Then, [172:28] >> oh my goodness. [172:29] >> Don Kio follows up, "I've never been as [172:32] confident about a decision as I am about [172:34] the one we're announcing today." [172:36] >> Wow. [172:38] This is so bad. [172:40] >> Which I don't think either of those [172:41] things are true. That can't be true. [172:44] >> No, [172:45] >> just based on how timid they were in the [172:47] messaging. So, it turns out that in all [172:50] the research that they conducted for New [172:52] Coke, all 200,000 people that they did [172:56] the taste test with, they never asked [173:00] them how they would feel if this new [173:03] beverage replaced [173:05] the old Coca-Cola. And Getta's response [173:09] to this in later years is you can't ask [173:11] a question like that because people [173:12] don't know. Like, you can't get real [173:14] data on emotional questions like that. [173:17] You can only actually test do you like [173:19] this taste better or not? And so like [173:22] sure you can run that experiment but [173:23] ultimately how much faith are you going [173:24] to put in the data? [173:26] >> They would have learned something if [173:27] they'd asked that question. [173:29] >> Yeah. [173:30] >> So the company immediately starts [173:32] getting thousands of letters and phone [173:35] calls every single day. One of my [173:38] favorites is a letter that reads, "My [173:41] dearest Coke, you have betrayed me. We [173:44] went out just last week as we had so [173:47] often. And when we kissed, I knew our [173:49] love affair was over. I remember walks [173:52] across campus with you, discussing life [173:54] and love and all that matters. I [173:56] remember the southern summer nights we [173:58] shared with breezes leaving beads of [174:00] water hanging delicately from your body. [174:03] But last week, I tasted betrayal on your [174:05] lips. You had the smooth, seductive, [174:09] sweet taste of a lie. You have become [174:12] corrupted by money. denying your ideals. [174:15] [laughter] [174:17] Oh man. Or this story. In Marietta, [174:20] Georgia, a woman assaulted a Coke [174:23] delivery man with her umbrella as he [174:25] tried to stock a supermarket shelf with [174:28] new Coke. You bastard. She screamed. You [174:31] ruined it. It tastes like [174:34] [laughter] [174:38] >> And I think they just didn't realize [174:40] that what they were taking away was [174:41] people's childhood. Yes, they're taking [174:44] away America. [174:44] >> It's not about what tastes better. It's [174:46] what they were used to and it's what [174:48] they had built an entire lifestyle brand [174:51] around believing that America meant to [174:53] people. [174:54] >> Yes. So, for a couple months from April [174:57] to July, they stick with it. [175:00] >> Well, cuz here's the craziest thing is [175:01] they were prepared for a vocal minority [175:03] to be very mad. So, you're sort of in [175:06] denial about all the feedback at first. [175:08] You're like, "Yep, this is just what we [175:09] thought." And then like you get a couple [175:11] months in and you're like, "Wait, [175:13] >> this isn't ending." Yeah. [175:14] >> Does everyone hate this? [laughter] [175:18] >> Yes. The answer is yes. [175:20] >> So, I thought this lasted a year or two. [175:22] And I asked family members. I asked [175:24] people who were like, "Yeah, I think [175:25] that was like a two or three year [175:26] period." There was 79 days between when [175:30] they released New Coke and when [175:32] Coca-Cola Classic made its return. [175:35] >> Yep. So when they finally decide they [175:38] got to bring it back, there's a question [175:39] of what do they call it and what do they [175:42] do with New Coke and Coke and their [175:47] lawyers ultimately decide that if they [175:50] keep New Coke on the market as the [175:52] official Coke and they call the old Coke [175:56] Coca-Cola classic, they can make an [175:59] argument to all the bottlers the [176:02] Coca-Cola Classic is a new drink. [176:04] [laughter] [176:04] >> Really? [176:05] >> Yeah. This is part of why they bring it [176:08] back in this way [176:09] >> because there was an opportunity to like [176:11] renegotiate. Hey, actually the rights [176:14] that you own are to new Coke and then [176:16] more advantageous deal that we're going [176:18] to cut [176:18] >> is Coca-Cola Classic. Yeah. [176:20] >> Interesting, huh? [176:21] >> So on July 10th, 1985, they announced [176:24] that Old Coke is coming back as [176:25] Coca-Cola Classic and New Coke will [176:28] remain on the market. And in the press [176:30] conference, Don Kio says, "Some critics [176:33] will say that Coca-Cola made a marketing [176:35] mistake. Some cynic will say that we [176:38] planned the whole thing. The truth is we [176:41] are not that dumb and we are not that [176:44] smart." [laughter] [176:45] I don't know. It all seems pretty dumb [176:47] to me. [176:47] >> The crazy thing is they thought when [176:49] they introduced Coca-Cola Classic that [176:51] that would be the product for the [176:53] dieards, for this vocal minority that [176:56] was really upset about it. And in [176:58] practice, what happened is everyone went [177:01] back to Coca-Cola Classic and nobody [177:03] stayed on New Coke. I mean, its market [177:05] share was 3%. [177:08] >> Yeah. It plummeted. [177:09] >> And I think this completely surprised [177:11] the executives of Coca-Cola who were [177:12] like, "It's better. We were going to [177:14] make small quantities of this Coca-Cola [177:16] classic just to appease the people who [177:18] need it. But it's crazy. People just [177:21] went back to the worst tasting one." So, [177:23] there's a delicious, one might say, Koda [177:26] to this whole thing. [177:27] >> Well, wait, we didn't say the best part [177:29] of how this ends. Within a year, [177:32] Coca-Cola Classic surged past the [177:35] heights of where Coca-Cola was before [177:37] the whole debacle started. So, the whole [177:40] thing worked as an accidental publicity [177:42] stunt. No advertising campaign could [177:44] have ever gotten people to pay this much [177:47] attention to Coke. In many ways, this [177:50] actually did save Coca-Cola. After this, [177:53] they started building back share. What's [177:55] the song? Um, you don't know what you [177:57] got till it's gone. [laughter] This made [178:00] people realize, "Oh my god, I do love [178:02] Coca-Cola." [178:03] >> Yes, you're right. That is the most [178:04] important takeaway from this. This is [178:06] what finally stopped the Pepsi challenge [178:09] [laughter] [178:10] is Pepsi won and then after Pepsi [178:14] winning and Coke losing, Coke was able [178:17] to come back. But yes, they had to [178:19] literally kill Coca-Cola in order to [178:22] resurrect from the ashes and survive the [178:25] Pepsi challenge. The little fun trivia [178:27] is David, do you know what New Coke [178:30] became after [178:32] they removed the name New Coke, but left [178:35] the product on the market? [178:36] >> Oh, no, I don't. [178:39] >> They renamed it Coke 2. [178:43] >> And it was not fully abandoned until [178:46] 2002. [178:48] >> Wow. That's how long they stuck with it. [178:51] >> Yep. So, I don't know who the KO 2 fans [178:53] were, but it was available for you at [178:54] some point. [178:55] >> [laughter] [178:55] >> for a while. [178:57] >> Somebody has hoarded a whole stash of [179:00] Coke 2 somewhere. It's in some bunker [179:02] somewhere. [179:03] >> Yes. [laughter] [179:05] >> All right. So, the delicious kota to [179:07] this whole thing. [179:08] >> Please [179:08] >> remember how I set up the Warren Buffett [179:11] ham sandwich thing. And I think this [179:13] whole episode is probably where he [179:15] decides Jesus Coca-Cola could be run by [179:18] a ham sandwich. Would have been better [179:19] off. [179:20] >> But actually not, right? This whole [179:22] thing was so stupid that it was actually [179:24] amazing. [179:25] >> What's the Bernard Arno quote? Even when [179:27] he loses, he wins. [179:28] >> Yes. [laughter] [179:30] [gasps] [179:31] >> So, after this whole New Coke disaster, [179:35] Coca-Cola company's stock is in the [179:37] dumps. And who comes in but Warren [179:41] Buffett perfect [179:44] and buys a roughly 1.3 billion dollar [179:49] equity stake in the company over the [179:52] next few years and joins the Coca-Cola [179:55] board. Turns out to be a [179:59] well a debatable investment. [180:01] >> He owns about 9.5% of Coca-Cola today. [180:04] >> Yep. Bergkshire owns about 9.5% of [180:05] Coca-Cola today. That stake is worth [180:08] about 28 billion, which is a 22 23x [180:14] gross return on the $1.3 billion [180:16] investment over the course of 40 years, [180:21] which equates to only just over about a [180:23] 8% irr, but Coca-Cola stock kicks off [180:29] these days about a billion dollars a [180:30] year in dividends to Berkshire. So in [180:34] total, Bergkshire has received about $12 [180:36] billion in Coca-Cola dividends. So a $40 [180:41] billion total return on 1.3 billion [180:45] invested. Good. But again, this is over [180:47] 40 years. So that only bumps it up to [180:50] about a 10% IRRa on the investment, [180:55] >> which I imagine he would have been [180:56] better buying Berkshire Hathaway stock. [180:57] he would have been better off buying the [181:00] S&P 500 over that same time period. [181:03] That's brutal. Including dividends over [181:06] that same time period, the S&P 500 is up [181:09] about 11% annually. [181:13] So, the famous Berkshire Hathaway [181:15] Coca-Cola investment today is actually [181:19] underperforming the market. Crazy, [181:21] right? When I did some math on this, my [181:23] first glance at it was this has been an [181:25] unbelievable investment because even [181:26] though the equity value is, you know, [181:28] it's gone up, would you say 20 something [181:30] X, but over a long period of time, it's [181:32] been fine. [181:33] >> 22 23. Yep. [181:34] >> The dividend yield is insane. They get [181:37] 800 million to a billion out every year. [181:39] And their principal was 1.3 billion. [181:41] That's like 60 to 80% dividend yield on [181:45] their original investment. I'd love to [181:47] park a dollar somewhere so that I could [181:49] pull out 60, 70, 80 cents every single [181:52] year on that dollar. That's amazing. But [181:54] when you frame it the way you did, [181:56] >> but 40 years is a long time, [181:58] >> right? Over a long period of time, you [182:00] better have insane multiples to justify [182:03] locking capital up for 40 years. [182:05] >> Yep. And you know, the thing about the [182:07] S&P 500, right, is it's a rotating set, [182:10] >> right? That's not really fair. And over [182:11] the last few years, of course, the tech [182:13] companies have rotated in and yeah, the [182:15] returns from, you know, the Magnificent [182:18] 7 over the last 10 years dwarf anything [182:20] else. [182:21] >> But I'm sure buying Berkshire in 1988 to [182:24] 1994, which was the stretch that he [182:26] bought Coca-Cola, and holding it to [182:28] today, it would have been a far better [182:29] investment than buying Coca-Cola stock. [182:31] And that is a fair comparison, unlike an [182:33] index, which has companies that rotate [182:35] in and out. [182:36] >> Yep. By the way, this is the fault of [182:39] Coca-Cola over the last 20 years. It had [182:42] a ridiculous run right after Warren [182:44] invested. We'll cover it at the very end [182:46] of the episode, but revenue and earnings [182:48] growth over the last 20 years on a [182:51] annualized basis has not been great. [182:54] >> Yeah. Well, speaking of the good initial [182:57] few years of the run there, there's one [183:00] more fruit, shall we say, to be [183:03] harvested of the Colombia Pictures [183:06] acquisition that Goetta and Kio did in [183:10] the early 80s. [183:11] >> The relationship with CIA. [183:13] >> Yes. And super agent Michael Oitz, [183:17] >> past acquired guest. [183:18] >> Indeed, part of the acquired cinematic [183:20] universe. So when Coca-Cola [183:23] sells Colombia to Sony, [183:27] Oitz and CIA are official advisers on [183:30] the deal. [183:31] >> That's right. When OIT's tried to take [183:32] it from a talent agency and movie [183:34] packaging into also doing investment [183:36] banking. [183:37] >> Yes. And on the back of that success [183:41] expanding CIA into investment banking, [183:44] Oitz is like why stop there? Why don't [183:47] we expand [183:48] >> become an ad agency [183:50] >> into ad agency land too? So he comes [183:53] back to Cozetta and Kio and says, "Hey, [183:57] I want to pitch you guys on taking over [184:01] as your ad agency from Macan Ericson," [184:03] >> which is crazy. This is CocaCola, [184:06] >> but Oitz's pitch is pretty good. He's [184:08] like, "Hey, man Ericson has been great [184:12] for you guys." And of course, you know, [184:13] there was the Hilltop ad and the real [184:15] thing and everything over the past set [184:17] of years, but hey, this one site, one [184:20] sound, one cell thing is not going to [184:23] work in the new media landscape. I mean, [184:26] look at how badly you got your butt [184:28] kicked by the Pepsi challenge in [184:29] grassroots marketing. What you need are [184:33] different messages that are going to [184:35] resonate on different mediums. You know, [184:37] we've got the cable network landscape [184:39] these days. We've got ESPN. We've got [184:40] sitcoms. We've got kids shows. We've got [184:42] all this different media. It's not just [184:44] the whole family watching I Love Lucy [184:46] anymore. You need a whole new approach [184:49] for the new media landscape. And so you [184:51] shouldn't have just one television ad. [184:53] You should have a whole suite of [184:55] different television ads for different [184:57] audiences in different times of the [184:59] year. And there should be a democratic [185:00] approach to this where it's not just one [185:03] creative director at one agency. You [185:05] want the best ideas that can come from [185:06] anywhere. and we have all the talent [185:09] relationships with all these different [185:11] writers, directors, actors. You just [185:14] give us a creative brief, we'll come [185:16] back with 30 great ideas for you from 30 [185:18] different sources. So, he pitches KO [185:20] that CIA can make 40 ads a year for them [185:26] for the same cost that McCann Ericson is [185:28] making seven and they can all stay [185:30] unified under the new CO slogan of [185:33] always Coca-Cola. So in 1992, CIA wins [185:39] the business, dethrones Macan Ericson, [185:42] and among the many ads that they create [185:46] for Coke, is a new Christmas Coca-Cola [185:51] motif, not featuring Santa Claus, [185:55] but instead the polar bears. [185:58] >> Yep. [snorts] [185:58] >> Oitz makes the polar bears. Amazing. [186:01] >> Wow. [186:02] >> Yeah. I mean, he didn't make the polar [186:03] bears, but [186:04] >> oitz found the talent through the CIA [186:06] network to make the polar bears. So, I [186:10] think this is basically the climax of [186:12] our story. New Coke, what happens [186:14] afterwards, the polar bears, these [186:16] beloved ads, the rest of the '9s and [186:19] 2000s, [186:21] there's a lot of company building that [186:23] happens, but it's just not that romantic [186:27] of a story as much as Coca-Cola's first [186:30] century was. [186:32] Well, the thing that really started to [186:35] happen in the 90s and then accelerated [186:38] in the 2000s [186:40] is the beverage market just moved away [186:43] from colas and towards a whole variety [186:47] of other drinks. The first battleground [186:50] for this is sports drinks and Gatorade. [186:54] Yep. So, in the 80s, Gatorade [186:58] really came on the scene and established [187:00] the market for sports drinks. And [187:02] Gatorade was part of Quaker Oats. That's [187:05] right. I forgot Quicker Oats ended up [187:06] owning it. [187:07] >> Yeah. Way back in the day. So, [187:10] Coca-Cola, in response to Gatorade's [187:12] success, launches Power Aid in 1988. [187:16] Power Aid is a homegrown product at [187:18] Coca-Cola. [187:20] It never achieves anywhere near the same [187:23] success as Gatorade. I think it maxes [187:25] out market share in like the teens or [187:27] low 20s. Finally, in the year 2000, this [187:32] is crazy, the then CEO of Coca-Cola, [187:35] Goetta, had tragically died of lung [187:36] cancer in 1997. [187:38] In 2000, the CEO of Coke announces [187:43] publicly a $16 billion deal to acquire [187:48] Quaker Oats and Gatorade. This would [187:50] have been a great deal for the company. [187:52] >> Whoa. Yeah, that didn't happen. [187:55] >> So, he announced it without board [187:57] approval. The board rejected it after [188:01] the public announcement. The deal falls [188:04] through and the next year Pepsi ends up [188:07] swooping in, [188:08] >> buying Quaker Oats and Gatorade, and [188:10] Gatorade is like a home run for Pepsi [188:13] ever since. [188:14] >> I had no idea. Wow. [188:16] >> Wild, right? It's total echoes of the [188:18] Fredo disaster. co could have owned [188:22] Freda Lays and Gatorade. [188:25] >> Wow. [188:27] Yeah. And that is a little illustration [188:30] of the CEO at the time. There have been [188:34] five CEOs since Gowetta 1998 onward and [188:38] the first three only lasted three to [188:41] four years each. Very different than the [188:43] Woodruff dynasty and the long run that [188:45] Getta had also. [188:47] >> Yeah. The thing that is extremely clear [188:50] that David you touched on is they had to [188:53] diversify into what they call a total [188:55] beverage company really prompted by this [188:59] backlash against soft drinks. The world [189:01] sort of lost interest in first full [189:04] sugar colas and then colas and the thing [189:08] that was kind of driving it not really [189:10] in the '9s but in the 2000s and [189:12] certainly the 2010s obesity. It was [189:15] clear that America was only going in one [189:17] direction and sugar and processed foods [189:19] coupled with the sedentary lifestyle [189:21] that a lot of Americans live is a giant [189:23] culprit of obesity. And so Coke's sort [189:26] of trapped figuring out what to do about [189:29] this. The American Heart Association [189:31] comes out and says the recommended daily [189:33] limit of sugar for men is 36 grams and [189:37] women is 25 grams per day. That's the [189:40] recommended limit per day. A 12 ounce [189:43] can of Coca-Cola contains 39 grams of [189:46] sugar. [189:47] >> Yep. 39 grams. [189:48] >> So you've got this sort of hard problem [189:50] where Coca-Cola itself, just that one [189:53] product, that one product line, is this [189:56] unbelievable business, super high [189:59] margin, low capital investment, brand is [190:02] built and established all over the [190:04] world. Like it's hard to want to invest [190:07] in anything else when that's your [190:09] current business. And at the same time, [190:12] they need to. It's existential. This [190:14] product is probably going to only go [190:16] downhill from here. Maybe it's got a few [190:18] more years, maybe another decade of [190:19] success. But 50 years from now, will [190:21] this be your cash cow? No. And so, how [190:23] do you start diversifying without [190:26] admitting that your current main product [190:28] that is the company's namesake is bad [190:31] for you? It's just bad for you. [190:33] >> Yep. Tough spot to be in. [190:35] >> Not an enviable position to be in. And [190:37] you can sort of see how that churns CEOs [190:40] pretty quickly. [190:41] >> Now, the interesting thing though, back [190:43] to Pepsi, they've managed this at least [190:46] from a business standpoint pretty well [190:49] [laughter] over the past set of decades. [190:51] You know, first with Fredo, then with [190:53] Quaker Oats and Gatorade, then in the [190:55] bottled water market. So, Pepsi launches [190:58] Aquafina, Coke launches Dani. [191:01] >> Yeah, they were pretty late to the game [191:03] in waters. I mean, I think the story of [191:04] the last 25 years is they sit there in a [191:09] privileged position and look around and [191:11] wait and see and then when something [191:13] really starts happening, then they go [191:15] become active in it and they just have [191:17] to sort of hope that all the assets they [191:19] have, including the Coke distribution [191:20] system, makes it okay that they're not [191:23] first to market on some of these things. [191:25] But I don't know, sometimes it's really [191:26] cost them. And the biggest, most [191:28] interesting one is Monster Energy. Do [191:30] you know the story behind Monster [191:32] Energy? Well, I know what happened, but [191:34] I don't know the story. I mean, they [191:36] started acquiring and investing in a lot [191:39] of other beverage companies through the [191:42] 2000s. There was Oddwala, there was [191:44] Vitamin Water, there was Fuse, and then [191:47] I know Monster comes along. [191:49] >> Yep. So, Monster started, Do you [191:52] remember Hansen's Juice? [191:55] >> Yes, [191:56] >> that is Monster. [191:58] >> H I think I vaguely did know this. This [192:00] is a wild story. I don't have the entire [192:02] story because this is the Coke episode, [192:04] not the Monster episode, but at some [192:06] point the Hansen leadership realized [192:07] that they did want to get into energy [192:09] drinks, but their current brand was not [192:10] going to be effective in doing so. And [192:12] so they came up with this really crazy [192:14] brand that felt dark and dangerous to [192:16] counterposition the cleaner aesthetic of [192:18] Red Bull and ends up going great, better [192:21] than they ever could have imagined. So [192:24] there were various times early in the [192:26] transition from Hansen's Natural to [192:29] Monster where Coke could have bought it, [192:31] but it was subscale and then there were [192:34] sort of lulls and growth and it was sort [192:36] of false starts in it becoming the big [192:38] giant thing that it became. And also [192:40] energy drinks as a category, people [192:42] weren't sure how durable it was. You [192:45] know, is this really going to be the [192:46] thing that it became or is it a fad? So [192:49] in 2012, Monster reached out to [192:51] potential buyers, including Coca-Cola [192:54] and Pepsi, Buck Coke, decided against [192:56] pursuing it because the price was high. [192:59] Monster's market cap was 11 billion at [193:03] the time. [laughter] [193:04] >> Goodness. Wow. And what is Monsters [193:07] Market Cap today? [193:08] >> $70 billion. [193:10] >> Yeah. [sighs] [193:11] I'd say these energy drinks are uh not a [193:14] fad. [193:15] >> Yeah. So what ended up actually [193:16] happening much later on Coca-Cola was [193:19] like, "Ah, crap. We should have done [193:20] that." They do sign a deal with them. So [193:22] it's a pretty interesting deal. Coke [193:24] decided, "We're going to walk away from [193:26] being in the energy drink business. So [193:28] as a part of this deal, we're going to [193:29] do a business swap where Coke gives its [193:34] energy drink brands, Nas, Full Throttle, [193:36] Burn, Mother, and Relentless to Monster. [193:39] Monster transfers its non-energy [193:41] business, including the original [193:43] Hansen's Natural Sodas, [laughter] [193:46] >> amazing, [193:47] >> over to Coca-Cola. Coca-Cola becomes [193:49] Monster's preferred global distribution [193:52] partner, and Monster becomes Coca-Cola's [193:55] exclusive energy drink play, [193:58] >> and Coca-Cola gets a 20% stake in the [194:00] company, right? [194:01] >> Well, yeah, but KO had to buy it. So, KO [194:04] had the privilege of investing in [194:06] Monster in 2015. KO puts in over$ two [194:10] billion dollars. At least they're [194:12] getting on the train. So KO is the [194:14] largest shareholder now in Monster [194:16] Energy. And you know that deal looks [194:19] pretty good. That 2-ish billion that [194:21] they put in is worth almost $12 billion [194:24] today. So nice investment, but gosh, if [194:27] you're the global total beverage [194:30] company, what has the trend been of the [194:32] last 15 years in beverages? [194:34] >> I bet they sure wish they owned [194:36] >> owned Monster. Yeah. [194:39] It is funny though, like I'm talking out [194:40] of both sides of my mouth here. [194:42] >> If you think that Coca-Cola is bad for [194:45] you, wait till you see the Monster [194:47] Energy. [194:48] >> So, it's not just the obesity thing. [194:51] There's a trend into energy drinks that [194:53] has nothing to do with health. [194:54] >> Yeah. It's interesting. You know, the [194:56] energy drinks are almost a call back to [194:58] the original uh like patent medicine of [195:01] Coca-Cola. It's like, yeah, this is [195:03] really bad for you, but you're going in [195:05] eyes wide open to that. Yes, that's [195:08] exactly right. [195:09] >> It is serving a function for you. [195:12] >> Yep. The other funny thing that happens [195:14] is Coca-Cola buys Glasso, which makes [195:17] Vitamin Water and Smart Water in sort of [195:20] yet another Oh, we should also be in [195:22] water play. They pay about $4 billion [195:25] for that. The founder then goes on to [195:28] leave Coca-Cola and starts Body Armor, a [195:32] sports drink that I think is coconut [195:34] water-based, a little bit more sugary. [195:37] Turns around, sells that back to [195:39] Coca-Cola for $5 billion for a startup. [195:42] Body Armor did great. Gatorade still has [195:45] 60% plus of the market share of sports [195:48] drinks. Doesn't make a dent in PepsiCo's [195:52] number one position in sports drinks. [195:55] >> Yeah. [195:56] If you're going to look at Coca-Cola as [195:58] a total beverage company and say, "What [196:00] beverages have really been killing it [196:02] the last 20 years that you've managed to [196:05] bet correctly on or incubate in house?" [196:07] And the answer is Diet Coke and Coke [196:10] Zero. [196:11] >> Yep. Coke Zero 2005. [laughter] [196:14] Taste infringement. [196:16] >> For a few years, it was growing at 10% a [196:18] year, which is really fast considering [196:20] it launched like 20 years ago and it was [196:22] already very large. Yeah, it is sort of [196:24] ironic that the last 20 years have been [196:28] about a metamorphosis into a total [196:30] beverage company and it's Coca-Cola, [196:34] Diet Coke, and Coke Zero that are [196:36] leading the way. Yes. So, that was a lot [196:40] of stuff that happened in the 2000s. The [196:42] 2010s, they did acquire more brands. [196:45] They continue to grow the total beverage [196:47] company's portfolio. They did a whole [196:49] bunch of stuff that we're not going to [196:51] spend too much time on in this episode, [196:53] rehabbing their bottler operations, [196:56] bringing a lot of it back in house, [196:58] making sure the quality and the [197:00] efficiency was up to where they wanted [197:01] to have it, and then spinning it back [197:03] out. And so, a lot of these bottlers [197:05] came on balance sheet, then went back [197:07] off balance sheet to new owners. They [197:08] encouraged consolidation among their [197:10] bottlers. They finally got rid of the [197:13] last little element of the parent [197:15] bottlers. And so the story for people [197:19] who follow Coke as a company or a stock [197:22] is a lot around how good of a job are [197:24] they doing restructuring all the [197:26] bottlers and it seems like they're [197:27] they're mostly through this whole [197:29] refranchising thing that they're doing. [197:31] So that brings us to the business today. [197:34] >> Yeah. And the business today, the [197:38] biggest piece is a part of the story [197:41] that we basically haven't talked about [197:42] since World War II is international. [197:45] Coke is a global company. [197:46] >> Yeah. [197:47] >> Most of the revenue and profits do not [197:49] come from the United States. Even though [197:52] all the storylines that we've been [197:54] talking about are the United States. [197:56] >> But I think when people look at the [197:58] Coca-Cola that they're holding, they [197:59] think about the United States. [198:01] >> Right. [198:02] >> Maybe that's not true. Maybe I'm I live [198:04] here and so I'm ethnosentric about that. [198:06] But I'd be curious if Coke feels like [198:08] America to you if you're a listener and [198:10] you don't live here. [198:11] >> Yeah. You know, the other part of it is [198:14] Coca-Cola did set up the bottlers as [198:17] independent, locallyowned, [198:19] entrepreneurial businesses in all the [198:21] countries that they went into. Produces [198:23] a lot of profits locally. [198:24] >> Yep. So, yeah, it is a local business [198:28] wherever it is. [198:29] >> All right, so let's walk through that. [198:30] Here's Coca-Cola by the numbers today. [198:33] So, first of all, brands. For a long [198:36] time, the thought was just build the [198:38] total beverage company and more brands [198:40] is better. So, let's just keep going. [198:42] They got over 500 [198:44] around 2020. They did a big slimming and [198:47] went down to about 200. And ones that [198:49] they got rid of were Tab, Ziko, Adala, [198:54] Honesty, Vault. Those are probably some [198:56] of the ones you know that they got rid [198:58] of. They do have 30 brands that do over [199:01] a billion dollars in revenue. It's kind [199:04] of crazy that it's a house of brands [199:06] that has that many billion dollar [199:08] brands. 15 of them were created [199:09] organically like Fanta and Sprite that [199:12] we didn't talk about in this episode. [199:13] >> That's right. Ah, we didn't talk about [199:15] Sprite. Do you know the history behind [199:18] Sprite? Do you know what Sprite really [199:20] is? [199:21] >> No, not really. [199:22] >> So, Sprite as we all know it today is [199:27] not Sprite. [199:29] Sprite is Fanta Clear Lemon from [199:32] Germany. [199:33] >> Really? [laughter] [199:34] >> Yep. That they brought over to America [199:35] and rebranded it as Sprite. No way. And [199:38] they stole the name from um they had a [199:41] character named Sprite Boy who was a [199:43] part of the Coca-Cola Santa Claus [199:45] universe. [199:46] >> Yep, that's right. [199:47] >> All right. Those are two of the 15 that [199:49] were created organically in-house. Three [199:51] of them they bought that were already [199:53] doing over a billion at acquisition. And [199:55] then the remaining 12 of the $30 billion [199:57] brands that they have were small and [199:59] Coke grew them to over a billion in [200:01] revenue underneath their umbrella. So [200:03] think Minuteade, Fair Life, and Vitamin [200:05] Water. And just to share some of the [200:07] other brands they do own. Power aid, [200:08] Minuteade, Dani, Vitamin Water, Kozero, [200:14] Schweps, ah, [200:16] >> Smart Water, CL, which is another water [200:19] brand, and Crystal, which is yet a third [200:22] water brand. They recently bought Topo [200:24] Chico. They're actually playing around [200:26] in alcoholic beverages a little bit with [200:28] Topo Chico with a hard seltzer. And I [200:30] think they're also doing a Jack and Coke [200:32] and a Sprite that is uh alcoholic. So [200:36] they're starting to dip their toe into [200:38] that a little bit. [200:39] >> Fanta clear lemon alcoholic. All right. [200:41] Has a real ring to it. [laughter] [200:43] >> Fresca, Body Armor, Fairlife, and Core [200:48] Power, the dairy products. And uh Fuse [200:52] Tea. And here's one that is a little bit [200:55] of a head scratcher. Costa Coffee. [200:58] >> Yes. that they bought for quite a few [201:00] billion dollars a couple years ago, [201:02] right? [201:02] >> And it's a physical retail. It's a [201:05] coffee house in the UK. [201:06] >> Yeah. It's like a Starbucks competitor. [201:08] >> Yeah. So, that's interesting that they [201:09] operate a coffee house. By the way, [201:11] speaking of coffee, someone told me that [201:12] the relationship with McDonald's runs so [201:14] deep that CocaCola sources the coffee [201:18] beans for McDonald's. [201:21] >> Wow. [201:22] >> And if it's actually the sole source of [201:24] McDonald's, that is a giant number of [201:26] coffee beans. Well, it's interesting [201:28] with both the Costa Coffee and the [201:30] McDonald's coffee. I'm pretty sure we [201:32] talked about with Howard on our [201:34] Starbucks episode, the Starbucks Pepsi [201:36] partnership with Frappuccino, right? [201:38] >> That's right. The Pepsi was the bottler [201:39] that made the CPG version of the [201:41] Frappuccino. [201:42] >> Yep. Huge success for both companies. [201:44] >> Yep. So, those are the $30 billion [201:47] brands that they have. Coca-Cola [201:50] serves 2.2 billion servings of their [201:53] beverages to the world every day. Wild. [201:57] [laughter] [201:58] That is uh what, like a quarter of the [202:00] world's population if everybody were [202:03] having just one. [202:04] >> Isn't that crazy? [202:05] >> Definitely not evenly spread. Yes, [202:07] >> there are a lot of power users of Coke [202:09] products out there. [202:10] >> Yes, but Coca-Cola's estimate is that [202:13] there are 65 billion servings of [202:16] beverages consumed every day. [202:18] >> Does that include water or No. [202:19] >> Yeah, the human race takes 65 billion [202:23] drinks a day of something. [202:25] >> So, what's that? I guess that's eight [202:26] drinks per person per day. [202:30] >> Yes. So, you know, by that calculation, [202:32] they got a lot long way to go. Huge [202:33] market ahead of them, even if they [202:34] stayed just in beverages. [202:36] >> There you go. [202:36] >> They have 200 bottling partners around [202:39] the world with 950 unique facilities. [202:43] Pretty awesome that they don't have to [202:44] own the vast majority of that. From a [202:47] revenue perspective, this is what you [202:48] were starting to get into. And how is [202:50] the revenue breakdown? The Coca-Cola [202:52] company itself does 47 billion dollar in [202:56] revenue. [202:56] >> And how much is North America versus [202:59] rest of the world? [203:00] >> 40% of revenue is in the US and 60% is [203:03] international. [203:05] >> That's actually bigger than I would have [203:06] thought in the US. [203:08] >> Yeah. Still very meaningful. [203:10] >> I bet for the core cola products it's [203:12] less than 40% in the US. [203:14] >> Yep. I bet that's totally right. Okay. [203:17] So the interesting thing is if you start [203:19] to look at employees. So revenue $47 [203:22] billion at Coca-Cola company out of $175 [203:25] billion in total revenue by the system. [203:28] And this is as reported by Coca-Cola in [203:30] their proxy statement. There are 70,000 [203:33] employees of Coca-Cola. [203:35] But again, if you look at the system, [203:37] there are 700,000 employees. So let's [203:41] look at those last two numbers together [203:43] because that's a 10x difference in [203:45] employee count. A full 47 of the $175 [203:49] billion in revenue goes to the Coca-Cola [203:51] company, 27% of the revenue with just [203:54] 10% of the total employees. I mean, the [203:57] Coca-Cola company gets a tremendous [204:00] amount of leverage out of the bottling [204:02] system. This is just employees. This [204:04] doesn't even think about the margin [204:06] profile. This doesn't think about return [204:08] on invested capital, which again is all [204:11] much better if you're the Coca-Cola [204:13] company versus if you're the bottlers. [204:14] >> Yeah. And then there's the fountain [204:18] customers, the retail partners, the [204:19] McDonald's of the world. Definitely [204:22] Coca-Cola is at a better return on [204:24] invested capital standpoint than running [204:27] restaurants. [204:28] >> The Coca-Cola company just needs to sell [204:30] syrup and spend marketing dollars to [204:33] sell the dream. It's a beautiful [204:36] position to be in. [204:38] >> Yes, it is. [204:39] >> Earnings on that $47 billion. They [204:41] generate $10.6 6 billion of net income. [204:45] The net income margins tend to average [204:48] around 23%. Gross margins average about [204:51] 60%. Historically, it was as high as [204:53] 70%. So almost as good as a software [204:56] business, but not quite. But for a [204:59] physical goods business, it's kind of [205:00] unbelievable that they have 60% gross [205:03] margins. Then when you look at the [205:05] revenue mix on products, this kind of [205:07] gets to like what is the company today? [205:10] 69% of revenue comes from sparkling soft [205:14] drinks. So as much as they are in water [205:17] and milk and tea and juice and sports [205:19] drinks, the bulk of this business is [205:22] selling soda. 40% of all volume is [205:26] trademark Coca-Cola, which is just Coke, [205:29] Diet Coke, Coke Zero, and the like [205:31] caffeine-free and flavored variants. 47% [205:35] of the volume is the Coke family. [205:39] >> Wow. So, I I kind of continue to [205:41] maintain this mentality of they keep [205:44] trying to get into other stuff, but then [205:46] they're always a little bit like, geez, [205:48] I know we should be getting into this [205:49] other stuff, but it's not as good as our [205:51] original thing. It's not as good of a [205:54] business. It's not as unique of a brand. [205:56] And I also think they're kind of like [205:59] limping in to a lot of these other [206:01] categories. They're not making a giant [206:03] early bet on things that become the next [206:06] big beverage fad. They're trying to [206:08] watch and see how it plays out and then [206:10] jump in. [206:11] >> Yeah. Whether it's sports drinks or [206:13] energy drinks. [206:14] >> Exactly. Market cap is $300 billion. So [206:18] huge company. Not by mag 7 tech [206:21] standards, but massive, very valuable [206:23] company. You'll note, David, they did [206:25] not achieve Charlie Munger's thought [206:27] experiment of $2 trillion. And they are [206:30] very unlikely to get there by the 150th [206:32] birthday in 2036, which is the time [206:34] frame that Charlie used. [206:36] >> Indeed. growth is only 3 or 4% a year. [206:40] If you look since 1998 in the post Goa [206:43] years, it averages out to about 3 to 4% [206:46] growth. So I think fair to say anemic [206:49] when you're describing their growth in [206:51] recent years. Yeah, I think that's why [206:53] we focus the bulk of the episode on the [206:55] pre998 [206:56] Coca-Cola. That's really where they [206:59] built this unbelievable thing that [207:00] frankly saturated the world. [207:03] >> Yeah. this incredible business with all [207:05] these innovations and sort of pillars of [207:07] what became one of, if not the greatest [207:10] brand in American history. But yeah, as [207:13] we said, back starting at the Pepsi [207:15] Challenge days, I think there's a strong [207:18] argument that Pepsi was the more [207:20] interesting company. And over the last [207:22] 50 years, soft drinks as a category have [207:24] just gotten a lot more competitive. The [207:26] stat that I saw was back in 1948, [207:29] Coca-Cola said that they had 60% market [207:31] share of US soft drinks. 60% in postw [207:35] World War II America. In soft drinks [207:38] today, they have 21%. Pepsi has 10%. And [207:42] I think there's a lot of things in soft [207:43] drinks. So, if you just look at [207:44] carbonated, Coca-Cola does have 47% [207:47] market share and Pepsi has 19%. But in [207:50] soft drinks, I mean, the category has [207:52] just gotten a lot more competitive and [207:54] Coke has lost share. Yep. [207:56] >> All right. Should we move into analysis? [207:58] >> Yes, let's do it. [207:59] >> All right. So, instead of playbook this [208:01] time, because I had just something kind [208:04] of funny written down for Playbook, [208:06] which is this company really only does [208:07] two things. Manufacture syrup out of [208:09] some unique intellectual property that [208:11] they own and spend money on marketing. [208:13] [laughter] [208:14] [gasps] [208:15] Correct. I think the more interesting [208:17] playbook this time is a brief review of [208:20] why Coca-Cola worked. [208:22] >> Yes. Love it. Let's do it. Well, first [208:26] you were talking about it a minute ago [208:27] with the uh 64 billion daily thirst [208:32] quenching occasions around the globe. [208:34] >> Nice market to get to play in. [208:36] >> Yeah, they're just in a giant market. [208:39] Everybody in the world gets thirsty and [208:42] everybody in the world likes to have [208:44] some variety in what they drink besides [208:46] just water. [208:47] >> Yep. [208:48] >> Full stop. [208:48] >> Full stop. And in that category, they [208:51] built something that for many years, the [208:53] better part of a century, people felt [208:55] was N of one. [208:56] >> Yes, [208:57] >> they were the original. They were the [208:59] real thing. And it took a long time for [209:02] that to get eroded. And honestly, if I'm [209:04] looking at sodas, it's still the real [209:06] thing. It's just that there's a lot of [209:08] other things, too. And that's due to [209:10] both a multi-deade, hundredyear plus [209:14] investment in building the brand and [209:18] some of the greatest brand marketing of [209:20] all time. [209:21] >> Yep. Three, World War II and having a [209:25] unbelievably pathed path for them to [209:28] expand globally and then also kind of [209:30] shut the door behind them on global [209:32] expansion. [209:32] >> Yep. And I really do think continuing [209:35] the second party locally [209:38] entrepreneurallyowned [209:40] franchise bottling system [209:42] internationally was a huge contributor [209:44] to that. [209:45] >> Yeah. So much of CO's success. I mean I [209:47] keep going back to that moment earlier [209:49] where bottlers enabled them to scale so [209:52] much faster than not having bottlers. [209:55] And even if you look at all the [209:56] beautiful business dynamics of you don't [209:58] have to deal with that lower margin [209:59] stuff, you don't have to deal with the [210:01] high headcount stuff, the high [210:02] complexity stuff, the high overhead, the [210:04] lower returns on invested capital, even [210:06] if it's just about speed to market. [210:09] >> Yes. [210:10] >> They got to blanket America and then [210:12] blanket the world very quickly [210:14] >> before anyone else [210:15] >> with a thing that people pick a supplier [210:18] once. Whether the restaurant's picking [210:19] the supplier or people are picking their [210:21] favorite beverage, they pick it and then [210:23] it's over. And they sort of had this [210:25] unbelievably fast way to saturate in [210:28] something that was a race. It turned out [210:31] soft drinks were a category that was a [210:33] race. And who's going to get to global [210:35] scale first? [210:36] >> Yes. And it was all figured out by [210:39] accident [laughter] because of the worst [210:41] business deal in history. [210:42] >> As Steve Jobs always says, you can only [210:43] connect the dots looking backwards. [210:45] >> That's right. the $1 contract. [210:48] >> Of course, it is a highly addictive [210:50] substance that is also super enjoyable [210:52] to drink and triggers every reward [210:54] center you have. Not nearly as much as [210:56] when it had cocaine in it, but plenty of [210:58] reward centers from the uh bubbles, the [211:01] sugar, the caffeine, the cold [211:03] refreshment, everything about it. [211:05] >> I've been fired up doing this episode. [211:07] the exttrinsic marketing capability of [211:10] associating it with everything good in [211:12] your life, with happiness, with [211:14] Christmas, with your family, with your [211:15] favorite athletes. It's just amazing [211:18] lifestyle marketing. Yep. And then [211:21] lastly, I will say New Coke. It taught [211:25] us to love again. I mean, it made us [211:28] fall back in love with Coca-Cola. I [211:30] think Coca-Cola would be worse off today [211:32] if they didn't go through the new Coke [211:33] moment, which is crazy to say, but I [211:35] guess we don't have the counterfactual, [211:37] but if you just look at the data on the [211:39] resurgence in Coke afterwards, you [211:41] couldn't have come up with a better [211:42] marketing stunt. [211:43] >> Totally agree. I disagree with both [211:46] sides of the Don Kio statement that we [211:48] weren't that dumb and we weren't that [211:50] smart. They absolutely were that dumb [211:52] and they absolutely were that smart. [211:54] >> Yep. [laughter] [211:56] >> Yep. [211:56] >> I've got two more that I would add. [211:58] >> Great. One, I think Pepsi was great for [212:02] Coke. I think neither Pepsi nor Coke [212:04] would be what they are today or be as [212:07] great a product and company as they are [212:10] today if it weren't for the other one. [212:11] >> Definitely. [212:11] >> I mean, the Pepsi challenge is what made [212:14] Pepsi because there was a challenge to [212:16] Coke and then all of Coke's response, [212:19] they made each other better. [212:20] >> Yeah. And then the last one I would add [212:23] is that other than [212:27] software [212:29] and technology products, [212:32] this is the first real physical product [212:34] I think we've ever studied on acquired [212:36] where you can have both a low selling [212:40] price and high margins. [212:43] >> Oh, that's interesting. And that's super [212:46] important when it's also a game of scale [212:49] and global scale because it lets you [212:53] sell this affordable luxury or pause [212:56] that refreshes to everybody in the [212:58] world. More or less everybody in the [213:00] world can afford a Coca-Cola. [213:04] And also the Coca-Cola company makes [213:07] great margins on those selling prices. [213:10] It's a lot of volume. And that's [213:12] incredibly cheap ingredients. That's the [213:14] other. [213:15] >> Yes. [laughter] [213:17] >> That's our why Coke worked. [213:19] >> That's our tableau of why Coke worked so [213:21] well. [213:21] >> Yes. [213:22] >> All right. Powers [213:23] >> for new listeners to the show. And there [213:25] are many of you. Thank you so much to [213:27] all of you who shared the Trader Joe's [213:28] episode with friends and family. We saw [213:31] tens of thousands of new listeners come [213:34] and join us. So, welcome to the party. [213:36] This section power is gleefully ripped [213:39] from a book called seven powers by our [213:41] friend Hamilton Helmer. And in it he [213:44] examines what of these seven possible [213:47] powers is it that enables a business to [213:50] achieve persistent differential returns [213:52] or put another way to become more [213:54] profitable than their nearest competitor [213:57] and do so on a durable sustainable [213:59] basis. And the seven are [214:00] counterpositioning, scale economies, [214:03] switching costs, network economies, [214:05] process power, branding, and cornered [214:08] resource. [214:09] >> Well, it definitely wasn't [214:10] counterpositioning because Coke is the [214:12] real thing. [214:13] >> Was the first [214:14] >> Pepsi, master of counterpositioning. [214:16] Coke is the incumbent. [214:18] >> Yeah, Coke is mostly getting [214:20] counterpositioned. [214:21] >> Yes. [214:22] >> So, this is a business of scale [214:24] economies. Everything about this [214:26] business is scale economies. the amount [214:27] that they can amortize their advertising [214:29] over. It's just an amortization scale [214:32] economies business period. They can [214:34] manufacture and distribute things [214:37] cheaper than you can to way more people [214:38] than you can and good luck catching up. [214:41] And like they're going to have another [214:42] hundred years in them because of that [214:44] advantage that they've built up. [214:46] >> Yep. All of the things. [214:48] >> Yep. [214:48] >> And perhaps the most important might be [214:50] the first thing you said of advertising [214:52] their advertising spend over the life of [214:55] the company. they can afford to just [214:56] pour massive, massive, massive sums into [215:00] marketing. This is why it was such a big [215:01] deal when in the 70s with the Pepsi [215:04] challenge, Pepsi started outspending [215:06] Coke in marketing. If you were really [215:08] astutely paying attention to the [215:10] dynamic, that should have tipped you off [215:11] of like, oh, Coke is in big trouble [215:14] relative to Pepsi. Like, if Pepsi can [215:16] afford now to make the investment to [215:19] spend the same or more in marketing [215:21] dollars, they're going to catch up. All [215:23] right. So, while we're there, let's do [215:25] branding because I think this is so [215:27] interesting. Normally, brand power is [215:29] measured by the amount. If you provide [215:33] someone with two identical things, how [215:35] much more are they willing to pay you? [215:36] And that delta, you know, the Tiffany [215:39] over the generic piece of jewelry is how [215:41] you quantify their brand power. Coke [215:44] doesn't sell things in general that are [215:47] more expensive. Pricing power isn't [215:49] really a thing that's exercised in this [215:51] industry, if it exists at all. Coke [215:53] clearly has branding power, but rather [215:57] than taking price, they keep price low [216:01] and use their latent brand power in [216:04] other ways. [216:06] >> Yeah. [216:07] >> I mean, the funny thing is when they [216:08] sell a Coke, they're selling a [216:09] billboard. And so there's this flywheel [216:12] element too where they want to sell as [216:14] much Coke as possible not just to keep [216:16] their manufacturing costs low because [216:18] it's a economies of scale thing but also [216:21] because one more Coca-Cola floating [216:22] around in the world just reinforces the [216:25] brand. [216:26] >> Yeah, I would say not that I disagree [216:30] with anything you're saying. This just [216:31] reinforces for me this business is all [216:34] about scale economies. It's all the [216:36] pursuit of scale. I think this is the [216:38] best interplay we've ever seen between [216:41] branding power and scale economies where [216:44] the way that they've built a lot of the [216:46] brand that they have is through their [216:48] scale economies and they sort of go back [216:50] and forth. [216:50] >> Yep. [216:51] >> I'll tell you, you can't measure their [216:54] brand power through how much more [216:56] expensive it is than Pepsi because that [216:58] doesn't exist. You can sure measure it [217:00] though with the outcry against New Coke. [217:03] Yes, that was a uh [laughter] [217:07] one-time experiment that most brands [217:08] never run with good reason. [217:11] >> Switching costs. I don't think I have [217:13] any real switching costs. Sometimes I do [217:15] have to drink a Diet Pepsi or a Pepsi [217:17] Max and like it's fine. It's not my [217:20] preferred drink, but it's fine. [217:21] >> Yep. [217:22] >> Network economies, none. [217:24] >> No. [217:26] >> Process power maybe, but it's hard to [217:28] discern from the outside. And then the [217:31] last one, cornered resource. Okay. [217:34] What's your opinion? [217:35] >> Of course, it's the formula. [laughter] [217:39] >> You really think? Yes. [217:40] >> But I'll tell you, it's not the formula [217:42] itself. It is all of the meaning imbued [217:48] into the formula that is actually a part [217:50] of their branding power. [217:51] >> Yeah. [217:52] >> But if Pepsi said, "We broke into the [217:54] vault and we got the Coca-Cola formula [217:55] and we're releasing something called [217:57] PepsiC." And that is identical to Coke, [218:01] something would go with it. There would [218:03] be some amount of value transferred from [218:05] Coke to Pepsi. [218:06] >> Okay. Yeah. Some [218:07] >> the public gives meaning to the formula [218:10] even if you can synthetically create [218:13] something that tastes exactly the same [218:14] as Coca-Cola. [218:15] >> Yep. Okay. So, I'm going to take the [218:18] exact opposite position on this [218:20] argument. [laughter] [218:21] >> I know you've been texting me all week [218:22] that you think that the whole secret [218:23] formula thing is a red herring. [218:25] >> Yeah. I think there is today absolutely [218:28] no value to the formula. There's a not [218:30] just a thought exercise. There's an [218:32] actual conversation in the appendix of [218:35] for God country and Coca-Cola. Mark [218:37] Pendergrass in his research found John [218:41] Peton's original formula from 1886 for [218:45] Coca-Cola. He found it and he took it to [218:47] his contacts at the Coca-Cola Company [218:48] and said, "I've got it. What do you guys [218:51] think?" And they said, "Well, okay. You [218:55] publish it. Let's say somebody gets a [218:57] hold of this formula. What are they [218:59] going to do with it? [laughter] [219:01] Make a drink. Okay, great. How are you [219:03] going to distribute it? [laughter] Okay. [219:06] Well, let's say you can figure out [219:07] distribution. Well, what are you going [219:08] to call it? Are you going to call it [219:09] Coca-Cola? Well, well, of course, we'll [219:11] sue you for that. How are you going to [219:13] brand it? How are you going to invest in [219:14] marketing? Basically, how are you going [219:16] to get the scale economies to do what we [219:18] do? And the answer is you're not going [219:22] to. And to your point about Pepsi, [219:25] >> Pepsi's got a better formula. [laughter] [219:27] >> Well, Pepsi has a better Formula One, [219:28] but there actually was a case somebody, [219:31] a former Coca-Cola employee, stole the [219:34] formula and tried to sell it to Pepsi. [219:37] This actually happened and Pepsi turned [219:39] them into the FBI. What is Pepsi going [219:41] to do with the formula? Pepsi's not [219:43] going to market the Coca-Cola formula. [219:46] These are big multinational [219:47] corporations. [219:48] >> Yep. You know, if anything, what you've [219:50] convinced me of is that the bottlers are [219:52] actually a cornered resource. [219:54] >> Those bottlers have great distribution [219:56] and they're not bottling for anyone [219:57] else. [219:58] >> Yep. Great point. [219:59] >> Coke handed them a license to print [220:01] money and they're doing it. [220:03] >> Yep. [220:03] >> I actually I'm very curious. Can you [220:05] switch teams as a bottler? Probably not. [220:07] >> And I guess it's probably legal, but I [220:10] bet nobody does. [220:11] >> Yeah. Fascinating. [220:13] >> All right. Quintessence. So listeners, [220:16] this is something we added earlier this [220:17] year where we really try to come up with [220:20] something to land the plane. What is our [220:22] takeaway from the episode? And you know, [220:24] we already laid out why did Coca-Cola [220:26] work. So this is just David and my [220:28] opportunity to kind of come up with a [220:30] quippy sentence or or three. That is the [220:32] thing that's on our mind as we're [220:34] leaving the episode. But first, David, [220:37] we have to come back to the question. [220:39] Could Coca-Cola be run by a ham [220:41] sandwich? [laughter] [220:44] >> [gasps and sighs] [220:45] >> I think after studying all this history, [220:49] I have to agree with Warren. [220:51] >> Whoa. Really? [laughter] [220:53] >> And Bill, I think it could be. Now, [220:57] there have been great, incredible CEOs [221:00] in Coca-Cola's history. Candler, [221:03] Woodruff, Gosa, [221:06] all of them have added on to what the [221:09] Coca-Cola company is, I think. But if [221:11] you took just Coca-Cola, [221:14] yeah, a ham sandwich could run it. And [221:16] in fact, it's proven by the new Coke [221:19] devacle. All right. So, I disagree. I [221:22] think there were definitely periods in [221:24] history, yes. But in 1985, no. I mean, [221:28] Coke had been losing share to Pepsi for [221:30] 15 straight years. They did actually [221:32] need active management to do something. [221:34] And sort of the same thing with the [221:35] obesity crisis in the 2000s. I mean, KO [221:38] effectively bumped up against the edge [221:41] of the market of humans that it could [221:44] possibly expand to and they did actually [221:47] need a different company strategy. Now, [221:49] whether that has been executed well is a [221:51] different thing. I mean, it's only grown [221:53] 3 4% over whatever the last 27 years. [221:56] So, if the criteria is run a high [221:59] growth, [snorts] successful, great place [222:01] to put money versus all the other places [222:03] you could put money company, no, they [222:05] haven't succeeded in doing that. But I [222:07] mean, you do have to do something rather [222:10] than just be flat to anemic growth or [222:12] decline. [222:13] >> Those are very fair points. Points [222:14] taken. I would still pose the question [222:17] to you. What is the single biggest [222:20] revenue driver within the Coca-Cola [222:23] company today? [laughter] [222:25] >> Trademark Coca-Cola, [222:26] >> the real thing, baby. [222:28] >> Yep. Okay. But on to quintessence. I [222:31] have two. [222:32] >> Great. [222:32] >> One is it's a system, not a company. [222:36] >> Yep. That's new for us. I know [222:38] franchises exist, but this is sort of a [222:41] different thing and I'm interested in [222:43] studying more sort of systems where it's [222:46] multiple companies interrelated. And two [222:48] is if you really boil it down, the [222:50] Coca-Cola company in a nutshell, it is [222:53] figuring out how to incentivize partners [222:56] to sell your product. And everyone is [222:59] incentivized. The bottlers are massively [223:02] incentivized. the retailers. There's [223:04] great margin there for you. The soda [223:07] fountain operators, the restaurant, the [223:10] billboard owners. We didn't talk about [223:12] this, but in the Great Depression, when [223:14] no one was buying billboard space, the [223:17] billboard owners didn't want empty, [223:19] blank, sad billboards. So, for free, [223:21] they put Coca-Cola ads up on it. [223:24] >> They were the preferred thing to a white [223:26] wall to have there. I mean just everyone [223:30] in the entire ecosystem is incentivized [223:33] to sell Coca-Cola on behalf of the [223:35] Coca-Cola company and that is durable. [223:39] Yes, Robert Woodruff had a mantra, an [223:42] official motto within the company during [223:45] his reign as company boss that everyone [223:48] who has anything to do with Coca-Cola [223:51] should make money. [laughter] [223:53] And there you go. That is a great [223:55] quintessence. [223:56] >> Yep. mind that I would add repetition [224:00] works. [224:01] >> We've studied a lot of brands on [224:04] acquired. It's become a core part of [224:06] what we do, especially with the luxury [224:08] industry. But in the luxury industry, [224:13] they're always looking for the new spin [224:15] and [224:17] changing and there are elements of [224:19] repetition. Hermes is always Hermes, but [224:22] it's always whimsical. It's always [224:23] something new. Pierre Alexi always has a [224:25] new theme every year. With Coke, it's a [224:29] story of 150 years of always delicious, [224:33] always refreshing. And yes, they change [224:36] it up, but it's the same core thing. [224:37] >> It's a core human need. You want [224:40] something delicious and refreshing no [224:41] matter who you are or when you are. [224:43] >> Yep. That's my quintessence. [224:46] >> Great. [224:47] >> All right. Well, [laughter] cheers. [224:49] >> It's a sugar water company, David. They [224:52] make a drink of sugar water that's not [224:55] good for you. And they built one of the [224:56] most incredible brands of all time, [224:59] >> but it's always delicious and always [225:01] refreshing. [225:01] >> It's not good for us. It's not good for [225:03] the planet. And it's delicious and [225:05] refreshing. [laughter] [225:08] >> Are you trying to tell me that I could [225:10] sell sugar water for the rest of my life [225:12] or I could come with you and change the [225:14] world? [225:14] >> I promise no world changing. But I do [225:17] have some trivia. [225:18] >> Great. A thing we didn't cover on the [225:20] episode. In addition to rising to the [225:22] Supreme Court and generals, soon to be [225:25] presidents, you know, helping the [225:26] success of the company, in 1980, [225:29] the government passed an amendment to [225:32] federal antitrust law that exempted the [225:35] soft drink industry. So, Coke and Pepsi [225:37] could actually grant exclusive [225:39] territories to their bottlers, which you [225:41] might have been wondering, how do you [225:42] get this local monopoly? [225:44] >> Oh, yeah. How is this legal? It's like I [225:46] get to serve all of New York and all of [225:47] New Jersey or whatever. Yeah, they [225:49] actually have a federal exemption from [225:51] antitrust law to be able to grant [225:53] monopolies. [225:54] >> Wow. [225:56] >> Trivia number two, the Hartzfield [225:58] Jackson airport in Atlanta. [226:01] >> Yep. [226:02] >> Huge airport for anyone who's ever been [226:03] there. That land was once owned by the [226:06] Coca-Cola Company. Same actually with [226:08] the Atlanta Zoo. I mean, the Coca-Cola [226:10] Company does a lot of international [226:12] business, so uh they need a big airport [226:15] there. [226:15] >> Yes, very true. And here's my last fun [226:18] piece of trivia. Around 1930, when they [226:20] were really freaked out about whether or [226:22] not they'd have the ability to import [226:24] the cocoa leaves to the United States to [226:25] do the refining here, they actually [226:27] leased a secret cocaine refining [226:30] facility in Peru. [226:32] >> Yes, in Peru. [226:33] >> They spun the factory up. It was [226:34] working. the employee manufactured [226:36] Coca-Cola there and the extracted [226:38] cocaine that came off as a byproduct. [226:41] They had a big amount of it and they [226:42] were trying to be a good employee to the [226:44] company and earn some money with it. So, [226:46] they sold 42 pounds of cocaine to a [226:50] narcotics broker in Paris and the sale [226:52] proceeds went in the Coca-Cola bank [226:55] account. And so, [laughter] there's this [226:56] crazy period where Coca-Cola's freaking [226:58] out like, "We got to hide this. This is [227:01] not good." So, this employee wasn't [227:03] trying to like steal cocaine and sell it [227:06] on the black market and make money. He [227:08] was trying to be a good employee and [227:10] increase profits for the company. [227:12] [laughter] [227:12] >> That's right. And the Hoover [227:14] administration would eventually grant [227:16] that exception so they could refine the [227:18] cocoa leaves here in the US. But, uh, [227:20] that was just before. [227:21] >> Wow. I have one piece of trivia. Do you [227:24] know what other very large American [227:27] company Coca-Cola [227:30] helped put into business and was their [227:34] >> primary and I think sole customer for [227:36] the first few years of their life? [227:38] >> No. [227:39] >> Monsanto [227:41] >> really. So Monsanto started as a [227:44] saccharine manufacturer [227:47] >> and CocaCola was their first major [227:51] customer and bought their entire [227:53] saccharine supply. [227:54] >> Was Tab saccharine sweetened? [227:57] >> No, this is way before. I think it was [227:59] just that Coca-Cola was probably [228:00] experimenting with saccharine. I don't [228:02] know that they actually used it, which [228:05] is odd. But yeah, this is right around [228:07] the turn of the century, early 1900s. [228:09] Yeah, [228:09] >> Coca-Cola [228:11] was Monsanto's very first customer. [228:13] >> We're trying to create some mind [228:15] stickers out there. [laughter] [228:18] >> Oh god. [228:19] >> All right, carveouts. [228:21] >> All right, carveouts. [228:23] >> Great. [228:24] >> Oh boy. Well, on that um [laughter] [228:28] theme, I guess of diets, I recently [228:32] redid my home gym and I got a new piece [228:36] of workout gear that I'm really [228:39] enjoying. Have you ever heard of a ski [228:42] urg? [228:43] >> Oh, yeah. This thing is great. I am [228:45] neither a skier nor a rower, but it is a [228:48] vertical rowing machine made by Concept [228:51] 2, which is the main like rowing URGK [228:54] machine manufacturer, but it's vertical. [228:56] It's attached to your wall. Uh, it takes [228:58] up no space. And the movement that you [229:00] do is like crosscountry skiing. You [229:02] reach above you, you grab the handles, [229:03] and then you pull down like you're [229:04] cross-country skiing. It's great because [229:06] my primary form of exercise these days [229:08] is running. And on my off days, I've [229:11] been looking for like, okay, I want [229:12] another thing I can do that's not my [229:14] lower body. So, I was looking at a [229:16] rowing machine, but like it takes up a [229:18] lot of space. I don't have a lot of [229:19] space down in my gym. I went with the [229:21] ski. I'm very happy with it. [229:23] >> I'm with you for multiple days uh ahead [229:25] of the Super Bowl, so I'll have to give [229:27] it a shot when I'm staying at your [229:28] house. [229:28] >> And then one more bonus carve out in my [229:31] ongoing video gaming saga with my older [229:33] daughter. I downloaded Smash Brothers [229:35] Ultimate to her Switch and so we've been [229:38] playing that. She really likes to be a [229:42] princess, of course, and to quote [229:44] unquote fight the bunny. She calls [229:46] Pikachu the bunny. [229:48] >> So, she's always like, I want to fight [229:49] the bunny. [laughter] [229:51] >> Pikachu is bouncy. [229:52] >> He kind of looks like a bunny, you know. [229:54] I get it. [229:56] >> Awesome. I've got three. Friend of the [229:59] show, Claude, for reading leases. [230:03] >> Oh, nice. I just signed a lease on [230:06] acquired north moving out of the the [230:09] basement and uh getting a studio next [230:11] year and [230:12] >> big news. [230:13] >> It didn't warrant real lawyers looking [230:16] at it. And so I gave it a pass and I I [230:18] asked Claude, "Is there anything that's [230:20] wrong in here?" And it flagged a few [230:21] things for me that I found quite [230:22] helpful. So I don't know if anyone's [230:24] told you this yet, but I think AI is the [230:26] future and it was quite helpful for me. [230:28] [laughter] [230:29] >> Do you want to sell sugar water for the [230:30] rest of your life or do you wanna [230:32] >> That's right. Two is my current favorite [230:35] running shoes are the Nike Vomero Plus, [230:38] which seems to be the replacement for my [230:40] previous favorite, the Invincible line. [230:42] So, big fan of the uh Vomero Plus. And [230:45] then the music I'm digging right now is [230:48] an artist called Armanos Gutierrez. My [230:52] good friend Andy Sparks recently stayed [230:54] at my house and put this on while we [230:55] were hanging out one morning, and it is [230:57] uh fantastic, chill music. So, I highly [230:59] recommend it. [231:00] >> Excellent. Well, with that, we've got [231:02] some thank yous for folks who helped us [231:04] with this episode. First, as always, to [231:06] Arvin Navaratnam at Worldly Partners for [231:08] his great write up on Coca-Cola, which [231:11] is linked in the show notes. And [231:12] actually, Arind was very close with [231:14] Charlie Munger when he was alive. And [231:16] so, uh, he is the one who brought up [231:18] that thought experiment that I did not [231:20] know about or I guess remember from the [231:22] first time I read Poor Charlie's [231:23] Almanac. [231:24] >> Yeah, when you brought it up, I [231:26] remembered it, but I had completely [231:27] forgotten. [231:28] >> Same. to Bill Combmes who is the past [231:31] president of the Coca-Cola Collector's [231:33] Club, the largest collector's club in [231:35] the world, but it's great. I talked to [231:36] Bill and he had all this amazing old [231:38] Coca-Cola memorabilia on the wall behind [231:41] him, drugstore signs and stuff. To [231:43] Simeon Seagull from Guggenheim Partners, [231:46] a retail and consumer brands analyst, [231:48] who helped me think through the nuances [231:50] of how brand power shows up in [231:52] financials. And of course to all the [231:54] other past Coca-Cola folks who spent [231:56] time with us helping to make sure that [231:57] we got the story right. [231:59] >> Yes. And one more big thank you from my [232:02] end to John Skully, steward of the Pepsi [232:06] Challenge. [232:07] >> That's right. [232:07] >> Thank you so much, John, for uh giving [232:10] us those wonderful stories. [232:12] >> If you like this episode, go check out [232:14] our episodes on Berkshire Hathaway, [232:16] Standard Oil, Rolex, or Trader Joe's. [232:19] And as we head into the holiday season, [232:21] feel free to share this with anyone who [232:23] wants to understand the origin behind [232:25] the modern Santa Claus. [laughter] [232:28] >> Of course, [232:29] >> after this episode, go check out ACQ2, [232:31] our other podcast feed, available in any [232:33] podcast player if you're Jones and for [232:35] more acquired. And if you're not already [232:38] on it, seriously, join our email list. [232:41] This episode was selected by folks who [232:43] are on our email list, and we can't wait [232:46] to uh ask you to vote again for episodes [232:49] in our spring season. You can join at [232:51] acquired.fm/e [232:54] and see the new overhaul that we just [232:56] did. So, each monthly email will now [232:58] have episode summaries, our big [232:59] takeaways, and exclusive photos from the [233:01] research process. Come join the Slack [233:04] acquired.fm/slack [233:06] hangout and discuss it with all the [233:07] other smart people who listen to [233:08] Acquired. And with that, listeners, [233:10] [music] [233:10] we'll see you next time. [233:12] >> We'll see you next time. [233:16] [music] [233:17] >> Is it you? Is it you? Who got the truth [233:19] now? Huh? [233:22] [music]